[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
HEARING 2
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE EVENTS SURROUNDING THE 2012
TERRORIST ATTACKS IN BENGHAZI, LIBYA
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
HELD IN WASHINGTON, DC, DECEMBER 10, 2014
__________
Printed for the use of the Select Committee on the Events Surrounding
the 2012 Terrorist Attacks in Benghazi, Libya
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HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE EVENTS SURROUNDING THE 2012 TERRORIST
ATTACKS IN BENGHAZI, LIBYA
TREY GOWDY, South Carolina, Chairman
LYNN WESTMORELAND, Georgia ELIJAH CUMMINGS, Maryland
JIM JORDAN, Ohio Ranking Minority Member
PETER ROSKAM, Illinois ADAM SMITH, Washington
MIKE POMPEO, Kansas ADAM SCHIFF, California
MARTHA A. ROBY, Alabama LINDA SAANCHEZ, California
SUSAN BROOKS, Indiana TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
Professional Staff
Phil Kiko, Staff Director
Susanne Sachsman Grooms, Minority Staff Director
HEARING 2
WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 10, 2014
House of Representatives,
Select Committee on Benghazi,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:23 a.m., in Room
HVC-210, Capitol Visitor Center, Hon. Trey Gowdy [chairman of
the committee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Gowdy, Brooks, Jordan, Roby,
Roskam, Westmoreland, Cummings, Saanchez, Schiff, and Smith
[via speaker phone].
Staff Present: Phil Kiko, Staff Director and General
Counsel; Chris Donesa, Deputy Staff Director; Dana Chipman,
Chief Counsel; Luke Burke, Investigator; Carlton Davis,
Counsel; Sharon Jackson, Deputy Chief Counsel; Sara Barrineau,
Investigator; Craig Missakian, Deputy Chief Counsel; Yael
Barash, Legislative Clerk; Paul Bell, Minority Press Secretary;
Linda Cohen, Minority Senior Professional Staff; Ronak Desai,
Minority Counsel; Shannon Green, Minority Counsel; Susanne
Grooms, Minority Staff Director; Jennifer Hoffman, Minority
Communications Director; Peter Kenny, Minority Counsel; Laura
Rauch, Minority Senior Professional Staff; Dave Rapallo,
Minority Staff Director; Dan Rebnord, Minority Professional
Staff; Kendal Robinson, Minority Professional Staff; Monee
Ross, Minority Staff Assistant; Heather Sawyer, Minority Chief
Counsel; and Brent Woolfork, Minority Senior Professional
Staff.
Chairman Gowdy. I want to welcome everyone. I want to
apologize to our two witnesses and to everyone else who has
been waiting. Just blame me for the delay. That would be the
quickest and easiest thing to do. But we apologize for it. And
I will do my best to start on time henceforth.
This is ``Hearing Number Two: Reviewing Efforts to Secure
U.S. Diplomatic Facilities and Personnel.'' The committee will
come to order. Chairman notes a quorum for taking testimony
pursuant to the appropriate House Resolution number and House
Rule number.
I will now recognize myself for an opening statement and
then the gentleman from Maryland.
In September of 2012, four of our fellow Americans were
killed and others were injured in an attack on our facility in
Benghazi, Libya. Sean Smith, Tyrone Woods, Glen Doherty, and
Ambassador Chris Stevens died under circumstances most of us
cannot fathom. Fire, violence, terror, the weaponry of war.
I want to read something and I want to ask my colleagues to
listen to what I read, not just to the words, but I want you to
imagine having to live through or die through the experience:
On September the 11th, 2012, at 9:45 p.m., 20 or more armed men
assembled outside the U.S. mission in Benghazi and breached the
mission gate. Several Ansar al-Sharia members have been
identified among this group. The initial attackers were armed
with AK-47-type rifles, handguns, rocket-propelled grenade
launchers. During this initial attack, buildings within the
mission were set on fire. The fire set during the attack led to
the deaths of Ambassador Christopher Stevens and Sean Smith.
The remaining State Department personnel escaped to a nearby
U.S. facility, known as the Annex, and also came under attack
which continued throughout the early morning hours of September
12th, culminating in a mortar attack that killed Tyrone Woods
and Glen Doherty.
What I just read is the now official position of the U.S.
Government filed in U.S. District Court by the Department of
Justice in a motion to detain the one defendant who has been
captured and will stand trial.
Twenty or more men, the weapons of war, arson, sustained
attacks, precision mortars, terrorist groups.
It is interesting to note the use of the word
``terrorist,'' so rarely used in the days and weeks after
Benghazi by people in positions of power is now the very word
used in the very statute charging the very defendant accused of
killing our four fellow Americans.
``Conspiracy to provide material support and resources to
terrorists resulting in death.'' That's the charge. That is the
official charge, the official position of the United States
Government.
But in the days after the attack in Benghazi, the word
``terrorist'' was edited out and changed. Now the
administration uses the word ``attack.'' In the days after the
attack in Benghazi, the administration edited out and changed
the word ``attack.''
It is one thing to have it wrong initially and eventually
get it right. It is another thing to have it right initially
and then edit it and change it so that it is wrong.
I remain keenly aware there are those on both sides of the
aisle who have concluded that all questions have been answered,
there is nothing left to do, no more witnesses to talk to, no
more documents to review. It is worth noting that some of those
very same folks did not think that Benghazi should have been
looked at in the first place.
But I disagree. I do not think we should move on until
there is a complete understanding of how the security
environment described by our own Government in court documents
was allowed to exist.
I don't think we should move on until we understand why we
were told special precautions have been taken prior to the
anniversary of 9/11. What precautions were taken? Where? By
whom? Why were we told the Benghazi facility was secure? Why
were we told it was a strong security presence in Benghazi when
we now know that was false?
And it wasn't true at the time it was said.
We should not move on until there is a complete
understanding of why requests for additional security were
denied, by whom they were denied, and why an ambassador,
trusted to represent us in a dangerous land, wasn't trusted to
know what security he needed to do his job.
It has been 2 years. And we know the requests for
additional equipment and personnel were denied, but we don't
have a full understanding of why those requests were denied,
and we should not move on until there is a complete
understanding of that and why the official position of our
Government is so different today than it was in the days and
the weeks after Benghazi.
The facts haven't changed. The evidence hasn't changed. But
the way our Government characterizes Benghazi has changed a
lot.
This hearing will continue our committee's efforts to
ensure the recommendations made after the attacks on Benghazi
are actually implemented. And I will pledge again a process
worthy of the memory of the four who were killed and worthy of
the respect of our fellow citizens.
But I also pledge that we are going to keep asking
questions until we have a complete understanding of what
happened. And, to that end, we will have hearings in January
and February and March and until. And that means access to all
the documents and that means access to all the witnesses with
knowledge. This committee will be the last best hope for
answering the questions surrounding the attacks in Benghazi.
And we may actually wind up answering some of the questions
more than once. We may risk answering a question twice. That
seems like a really small investment compared with what others
have given and are currently giving to our country.
With that, I would recognize the gentleman from Maryland.
[Prepared statement of Chairman Gowdy follows:]
Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for
holding today's hearing and as well as our previous hearing
three months ago on this topic, which was proposed by
Congressman Schiff.
These two hearings demonstrate the continued commitment of
both Democrats and Republicans to making our embassies safe.
As I have often said, this is our watch. This is not about
today or tomorrow. This is about generations yet unborn. And so
we all take this assignment very seriously.
Over the course of 18 months of exhaustive investigations--
first by the independent Accountability Review Board and then
by seven congressional committees--we have learned many answers
to questions about what happened in Benghazi and what changes
are needed to improve security at our diplomatic facilities
overseas.
But as we have also seen, when it comes to Benghazi, too
many people are unaware that questions have been answered or
are unwilling to accept the answers they hear.
Our ``Benghazi on the Record: Asked and Answered'' Web site
centralizes, in one place, these answers.
Since we met last, the House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence publicly released its bipartisan, unanimously-
adopted report. As our Intelligence Committee colleagues
explained ``This report and the nearly two years of intensive
investigation it reflects is meant to serve as the definitive
House statement on the Intelligence Community's activities
before, during, and after tragic events that caused the death
of four brave Americans.''
These bipartisan findings join the previous conclusions of
the Republican-led House Armed Services Committee about the
military's readiness and response on the night of the attacks.
Our committee's Democratic members have urged the chairman
to review and accept these findings as we do not think that
there is any reason for this Committee to reinvestigate these
facts, repeat the work already completed by our Republican and
Democratic colleagues, and squander millions of hardworking
dollars that come from hardworking taxpayers.
We appreciate that the Chairman has decided to use this
hearing to focus on constructive reform instead of retreading
the same ground that other committees have already
investigated. Investigated in a way that perhaps one would
investigate something if they were looking at it under a high-
power microscope.
We urge him to keep his focus on these constructive efforts
and not be lured off this path by partisan politics. We are
bigger than that, and we are better than that.
And I appreciate you, Mr. Chairman, for our discussions
where you have agreed by the end of the year to give us a scope
as to exactly what we will be looking at. And hopefully we will
be able to come to conclusions about what we do agree on so
that we can focus on those things that we still need to
investigate.
I also appreciate the fact that you have agreed to meet
with me and the Speaker tomorrow with regard to rules of the
committee. I think you and I agree that it is nice to have
structure because it helps us to deal with issues that may come
up. And I do really appreciate that.
Immediately after the Benghazi attacks, the independent
Accountability Review Board conducted a blistering examination
of what went wrong at the State Department and identified 29
recommendations for reform.
Secretary Clinton accepted every single one of them. And
the inspector general reported, ``the Department wasted no time
addressing the recommendations.''
During our first hearing three months ago, Assistant
Secretary Starr testified that the Department had closed 22 of
the ARB's 29 recommendations.
Since then, the Department has continued making steady
progress. I am pleased to hear that. It has closed three more
recommendations and continues to make progress on the remaining
four.
The Department has now delivered fire safety equipment to
all but one high-threat post, and it has affirmed compliance
with fire safety and equipment requirements in safe havens and
in safe areas in overseas facilities.
The ARB found that the lack of adequate fire safety
equipment may have contributed to the tragic consequences that
night, so I am heartened to hear that the Department has
completed this recommendation since our last hearing.
The Department has also closed a recommendation for
increasing diplomatic security staffing to address the staffing
shortcomings identified by the ARB. Mr. Starr's testimony
indicates that the new positions are fully funded and that the
Department intends to complete all of the remaining new hires
by early 2015.
The Department has also instituted mandatory threat
training for high-risk posts and created a working group to
develop joint risk management courses, further addressing
shortcomings that the ARB identified with regard to the
training and expertise of Department personnel.
I look forward to hearing more from Mr. Starr on the work
that remains to be done.
We also are joined today by Inspector General Linick. In a
September 2013 report, his office made seven security-related
recommendations that overlapped to a large degree with the
ARB's recommendations. I was heartened to hear that six of
these recommendations are now closed.
Concerns remain, however, including lingering questions
about whether the Department has made sufficient changes to
ensure that Department bureaus are communicating effectively
and decisionmaking authority is centralized and clear.
Regarding the ARB process, the Inspector General's Office
examined the 12 ARBs convened following the 1998 East Africa
Embassy bombings through the 2012 Benghazi attacks. They
concluded that the ARB process ``operated as intended--
independently and without bias--to identify vulnerabilities in
the Department of State's security programs.''
The Inspector General nonetheless recommended adjustments
to the process, and it is my understanding that the discussions
on those recommendations are ongoing.
As I close, one of these recommendations was for the
Department to amend its Foreign Affairs Manual to
institutionalize responsibility for ARB implementation. As the
Inspector General's report noted, ``handling of the Benghazi
ARB recommendations represented a significant departure from
the previous norm in that Secretary Clinton took charge
directly of oversight for the implementation process.'' The
Inspector General found that the high-level attention devoted
to this task, ``establishes a model for how the department
should handle future ARB recommendations.''
I am interested in hearing from Mr. Starr as to whether the
Department has made the recommended change.
And to that end, I yield back.
Chairman Gowdy. Thank the gentleman from Maryland.
[Prepared statement of Mr. Cummings follows:]
Chairman Gowdy. The committee will now receive testimony
from today's witness panel. First witness will be the Honorable
Gregory B. Starr, the Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic
Security at the Department of State. The second witness will be
Honorable Steve Linick, the inspector general for the
Department of State.
Welcome to both of you. Again, my apologies for you having
to wait on me.
You will each be recognized for your 5-minute opening.
There are a series of lights that mean what they traditionally
mean in life.
With that, Secretary Starr.
STATEMENTS OF THE HONORABLE GREGORY B. STARR, ASSISTANT
SECRETARY FOR DIPLOMATIC SECURITY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE;
AND THE HONORABLE STEVE LINICK, INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE GREGORY B. STARR
Mr. Starr. Thank you, Chairman Gowdy, Ranking Member
Cummings, and distinguished committee Members. Thank you for
inviting me again to update you on the State Department's
progress in implementing the recommendations made by the
independent Benghazi Accountability Review Board, and I will
refer to that in the future as the ARB.
I would like to acknowledge my copanelist, inspector Steve
Linick. Inspector Linick works closely with the Bureau of
Diplomatic Security on many issues, some of which the committee
has highlighted for discussion today. And although I am focused
primarily on the Benghazi ARB implementation today, I hope to
be able to provide some insights into how the Department works
with the Inspector General's Office to ultimately improve
security around the world.
The task of keeping U.S. personnel overseas safe is dynamic
and an ever evolving process. We work constantly to improve our
practices and protect our people.
The ARB process is an important tool towards that goal, and
today we are safer and more secure because of the
recommendations of the Benghazi panel and other ARBs.
Our progress on the Benghazi ARB is measurable and
sustained. And, importantly, many of the lessons learned are
further incorporated into policy. Of the 29 recommendations, we
have now closed 25 of them. That includes three that we have
closed since September, my last testimony, based on further
work and analysis.
We are committed to finishing the work yet to do on the
final four recommendations and will not lose sight of
continuing and building on the security and procedural
improvements that have already been instituted.
I would like to highlight just a few examples of what we
have done to improve our security posture since the attacks in
Benghazi. These are specific, tangible changes.
We have more Diplomatic Security and Department of Defense
personnel on the ground at our facilities today.
We have increased the skills and competencies for
Diplomatic Security agents by increasing the training time in
the high-threat course.
We have expanded the Foreign Affairs Counter Threat course
for our colleagues beyond high-threat posts because we
recognize that the value of these skills extends to all foreign
service personnel and other employees at our posts overseas.
These are skills that people can take with them to make us
safer and make them safer in every post that they are at.
There are broader, more programatic changes. One which I
discussed in September is the launch of the Vital Presence
Validation Process, or our shorthand for that is VP2. Through
VP2, the State Department asks itself hard questions to balance
the risks and the benefits at our highest threat posts. The end
result is a clear-eyed risk assessment of whether the U.S.
should operate in those dangerous locations and, if so, how do
we operate.
Where the process determines that U.S. national interests
require us to operate at dangerous posts, the Department
undertakes measures to mitigate identified risks and
prioritizes resources to do so.
The steps we have taken to implement the Benghazi ARB
recommendations underscore an important point. We live in a
world with more unstable and dangerous locations. Our foreign
policy often demands that we send our people to work in those
very places that are increasingly perilous.
We cannot eliminate risk. The threats evolve. As a result,
the work of securing our facilities and safeguarding our people
is never complete. We are committed to implementing the ARB's
recommendations, but we are also committed to looking forward
to meeting the new challenges and threats as they develop.
Our best assets in this effort are our people. Our highly
trained foreign service officers and security personnel are out
in the field every day executing U.S. foreign policy. They
deserve the credit and thanks for the work that they do on our
behalf.
It is our job to do everything we can to reduce the risks
they face. As the Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic Security,
I am committed to keeping our people as safe as possible.
I know that the committee as well as the Inspector
General's Office shares our commitment in making that true,
keeping our people as safe as possible.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I would be happy to answer
questions from the committee about the implementation of the
ARB.
Chairman Gowdy. Thank you, Mr. Starr.
[Prepared statement of Mr. Starr follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Gowdy. Mr. Linick.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE STEVE LINICK
Mr. Linick. Chairman Gowdy, Ranking Member Cummings, and
Members of the Committee. Thank you for the opportunity to
testify regarding our review of the ARB process and associated
work we have conducted in recent years on security-related
matters.
Since the September 2012 attacks on U.S. diplomatic
facilities and personnel in Benghazi, the OIG has redoubled its
oversight related to security, issuing inspection and audit
reports specifically targeting security matters. In addition to
that work, we inspect posts across the globe, and we review
security-related matters at each one.
In my comments today, I will address the ARB process and
discuss findings based on our other security-related work.
In September 2013, OIG published its report on the special
review of the Accountability Review Board process, the process
by which the Department's ARBs are established, supported,
staffed to conduct it.
The special review also examined the manner in which the
Department tracks the implementation of ARB recommendations.
We found that follow through on long-term security program
improvements involving physical security, training, and
intelligence sharing lacked sustained oversight by the
Department's principals. The lack of follow through explains in
part why a number of Benghazi ARB recommendations mirror
previous ARB recommendations. We concluded that the
implementation of ARB recommendations works best when the
Secretary of State and other Department principals take full
ownership of the implementation process.
OIG's special review made 20 formal recommendations. In May
of 2014, I notified the Deputy Secretary of State for
Management and Resources of the status of those
recommendations, and I provided additional suggestions and
intended to enhance the effectiveness of the ARB process.
Although some of our recommendations related to the special
review and my later suggestions remain unresolved at this time,
OIG has found evidence that the Department has made progress in
addressing some of the security concerns.
During fiscal year 2015, we will be conducting a formal
follow-up review on compliance with our own recommendations and
with the Benghazi ARB recommendations.
In addition to the ARB review process, OIG has issued a
variety of reports covering significant security matters. I
take this opportunity to highlight four areas of concern.
The first relates to physical security deficiencies. OIG
reports demonstrate that the Department is at increased risk
because it lacks sufficient processes and planning to ensure
that the Department fully understands the security needs and
priorities at posts around the world. If the Department cannot
identify security vulnerabilities, it cannot adequately plan,
budget for, or implement solutions.
In 2012, OIG conducted a series of audits of posts located
in Europe, Latin America, and Africa, which identified physical
security deficiencies at nine embassies and one consulate that
required immediate attention. A number of these posts were
designated high-threat. OIG auditors found that the posts were
generally not in compliance with the Department's physical and
procedural security standards.
Security deficiencies common among the posts included,
among others, the failure to meet minimum compound perimeter
requirements and to properly conduct inspections of vehicles
before entering posts.
The most egregious problem that we found in these audits
and have identified in recent inspections is the use of
warehouse space or other remote facilities for offices which do
not comply with standards and places personnel at great risk.
The second area of concern involves exceptions and waivers
granted from compliance and security standards. OIG has found
that a number of overseas posts had not maintained accurate
exception and waiver records. In addition, OIG found that the
Bureau of Diplomatic Security was not monitoring posts to
determine whether they were obtaining waivers and exceptions
for deviations from standards.
The Department has reported that it has remediated that
condition at this time.
The third area of concern involves stovepiping of security
issues. Although the Bureaus of Diplomatic Security and the
Overseas Building Operations share responsibility for ensuring
posts' physical security needs, they don't adequately
coordinate.
The fourth issue of concern relates to vetting of local
guards. DS oversees local guard forces that are a critical part
of security at Department missions overseas. They typically are
posted outside or just inside the perimeter of the embassy
compound and are often responsible for searching vehicles, et
cetera.
We conducted an audit of the DS local guard and noted in
June 20 of 2014 that none of the six security contractors
reviewed by OIG fully performed the vetting procedures
specified. One bad actor with the right position and access can
seriously endanger the safety and security of personnel
overseas.
In conclusion, security issues have been and continue to be
a top priority for my office. I want to thank my staff for
their professionalism and commitment to this effort. I look
forward to continuing to engage with the Department and
Congress over these matters in the coming months in an effort
to mitigate risks and avoid future incidents like the attacks
that occurred in Benghazi.
Chairman Gowdy, Ranking Member Cummings, and Members of the
Committee, thank you again for the opportunity to testify
today. I look forward to your questions.
Chairman Gowdy. Thank you, Mr. Linick.
[Prepared statement of Mr. Linick follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Gowdy. The chair will now recognize the gentlelady
from Indiana, Mrs. Brooks.
Mrs. Brooks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you both for appearing here today and for your
service to our country.
As the inspector general, Mr. Linick, and all inspector
generals for all agencies, would it be correct to say that
generally you are charged with ensuring that in this case that
the State Department is effectively managed and accountable for
its decisions? Is that what inspector generals do?
Mr. Linick. Yes.
Mrs. Brooks. And you conduct audits. We have heard you talk
about audits, evaluations. The way inspector generals do that
is they conduct audits, evaluations, inspections. And you have
just mentioned some of those. Is that correct?
Mr. Linick. Yes. And we look at programs and operations as
well.
Mrs. Brooks. And so you are like the internal watchdog or
internal police department for an agency and for the State
Department specifically.
Mr. Linick. Yes.
Mrs. Brooks. But you are not appointed by the Secretary of
State. Is that correct?
Mr. Linick. No. I was appointed by the President and
confirmed by the Senate.
Mrs. Brooks. And when were you appointed?
Mr. Linick. I was appointed in September of 2013.
Mrs. Brooks. So that means that actually you have complete
independence, don't you, from the State Department and the
decisions that they make?
Mr. Linick. Yes, we are independent.
Mrs. Brooks. And before that, you actually, as I
understand, like myself, were Federal prosecutor, focused on
fraud types of matters.
Mr. Linick. I was for 16 years.
Mrs. Brooks. And, in your finding that you undertook of the
ARB, it is my understanding that you felt--and this is
quoting--your most important finding was that the oversight of
the ARB recommendations must be at the highest levels within
the Department. Is that correct?
Mr. Linick. That's correct.
Mrs. Brooks. And what highest level were you referring to?
Mr. Linick. At least at the Deputy Secretary level.
Mrs. Brooks. And, in your opinion, is that where the
implementation of the ARB recommendation stands at this point?
Mr. Linick. That remains an unresolved recommendation. We
did receive revisions to the Foreign Affairs Manual yesterday,
and we are looking at them now.
Mrs. Brooks. And so the recommendation--and that
recommendation was made by the IG that, in fact, the Foreign
Affairs Manual should specifically state to other employees of
the Department that these recommendations would be undertaken
by the, at a minimum, Secretary of State or the highest levels,
the principals like the Deputy Secretary. Is that correct?
Mr. Linick. That is correct.
Mrs. Brooks. And so you have stated that, in fact, they
have provided that to you yesterday.
Mr. Linick. Yes. We did receive a revision to the Foreign
Affairs Manual, but we have not analyzed it yet. So the
recommendation remains unresolved.
Mrs. Brooks. And so let's talk about unresolved or closed
and findings. When the inspector general makes recommendations
and brings forth their findings, they are in several different
categories. Is that correct?
Mr. Linick. That is correct.
Mrs. Brooks. Unresolved, closed, resolved.
Mr. Linick. Exactly, yes.
Mrs. Brooks. Can you share with us what ``unresolved''
means?
Mr. Linick. So there are really two buckets. There are open
recommendations and closed recommendations. Open
recommendations can either come in two forms: They can be
resolved or unresolved. So if the Department agrees in
principle with a recommendation, that will be open and
resolved. It will not be closed until the Department proves to
us--because we are in the trust but verify business--you know,
that it, in fact, has been implemented.
An open recommendation which is unresolved means generally
the Department disagrees with the OIG. And we don't have
resolution on that. So it remains open as well.
Mrs. Brooks. Can I just ask--and sorry to interrupt--
approximately how many open and unresolved recommendations are
there?
Mr. Linick. In the ARB report?
Mrs. Brooks. Yes.
Mr. Linick. At this time, there are seven unresolved
recommendations. Like I said, a couple of them that--that might
change. We are also doing a compliance follow-up review, which
means we are actually going and doing another inspection to see
whether or not our recommendations actually have been complied
with.
Mrs. Brooks. Is that common practice, that you always do
that--compliance reviews of your recommendations?
Mr. Linick. We don't always do that. It is very resource-
intensive. Typically what would happen is the Department would
come back and say, here is documentation showing that we have
implemented your recommendation and we would close it.
The compliance follow-up review is really a different
animal because we actually do a completely separate inspection
or audit to--and actually do interviews and test whether or not
implementation has occurred. It is not something we do
frequently. We do it in cases where we believe the
recommendations are significant or where we felt that
compliance was lacking.
Mrs. Brooks. And do you also, when you go back and do the
compliance review, do you also look into recommendations that
have been closed?
Mr. Linick. Yes. We look at all of the recommendations from
soup to nuts to see where they stand. So just because we have
closed them because we have documentation we are going to go
behind that documentation and verify whether, in fact, it has
been implemented.
Mrs. Brooks. Are you aware as to whether or not prior
inspector generals actually ever did what you are doing with
respect to compliance reviews when it comes to physical
security of our Embassies?
Mr. Linick. I believe our office has done some compliance
follow-up reviews.
Mrs. Brooks. But is it fair to say that a number of the
recommendations that were in the Benghazi ARB were also in the
Nairobi ARB?
Mr. Linick. Oh, absolutely. We did see a number of repeat
recommendations, from enhancing training to enhancing the
Marine Security Guard program, to enhancing interagency sharing
and so forth.
Mrs. Brooks. So there have, obviously, been previous ARBs
where recommendations were made where the State Department
closed or agreed with the recommendations but yet we still had
the same problem.
Mr. Linick. That is correct.
Mrs. Brooks. In 2012.
Mr. Linick. That is correct.
Mrs. Brooks. So, with respect to the closed--and there are
a number of closed recommendations--what do you expect to
happen--what does ``closed'' mean? You have talked about open
and unresolved. What do closed recommendations mean?
Mr. Linick. Closed recommendations mean they provided
documentation to us to prove that they've complied with the
recommendation. In the compliance follow-up review, we will
interview and look more closely and drill down to see whether
or not it is, in fact, closed.
So closed is a preliminary conclusion, if you will, about
the status of the recommendation.
Mrs. Brooks. And, in fact, when would you have received
the--when you have made the decision that something was closed
or not closed?
Mr. Linick. We would make that decision after our
compliance follow-up team, we have a special team that does
this, reviews the documentation and then determines whether
that documentation, in fact, meets the intent of our
recommendation.
Mrs. Brooks. But, in fact, as late as June of 2014, in
fact, you just mentioned physical security deficiencies,
exceptions in waivers, stovepiping, and vetting of local guards
are still unresolved and so are not closed.
Mr. Linick. Those--those were recommendations from other
reports. In other words--so we have done--we have done the ARB
review, and we have focused on process and we have focused on
how they implemented the ARB recommendations. We have issued a
number of other reports which identify, among other things,
lack of compliance with standards, and inadequate vetting of
local guards. And we made a whole bunch more recommendations in
connection with those reports, and they are at various stages
of closure, et cetera.
Mrs. Brooks. The Best Practices Panel's most important
recommendation--you are familiar with the Best Practices Panel,
which happened after the ARB, are you not?
Mr. Linick. I am indeed.
Mrs. Brooks. In fact, it, too, indicated that elevating the
importance of security and making diplomatic security an equal
partner was its most important recommendation. Is that correct?
Mr. Linick. I believe that was recommendation number one.
Mrs. Brooks. And yet we learned at that time at our last
hearing that the State Department rejected that recommendation.
Has there been a change from our last hearing to today?
Mr. Linick. Well, we are not monitoring compliance with
that recommendation, so I don't know the answer to that
question.
Mrs. Brooks. Do you know with respect to this exact
recommendation, and that is the fact that we believe--and that
panels have made the recommendation that, in fact, all of the
implementation of the various recommendations of the ARB should
be made at one of the highest levels. These are the principals.
Is that correct? The principals under the Secretary of State?
Mr. Linick. Yes, that is correct.
Mrs. Brooks. And, in fact, the oversight right now in the
implementation is being made in the Office of Management Policy
and Rightsizing. Is that correct?
Mr. Linick. I believe they are tracking the implementation
of it, yes.
Mrs. Brooks. And that is actually what Mr. Starr said. And
``tracking'' just means, is it being done? Is that correct?
Mr. Linick. We think that the Deputy Secretary ought to
take responsibility for oversight of the implementation, that
she take responsibility for making sure that those
recommendations are followed through, that there is sufficient
funding to ensure that they are completed and that they are
adequately shared among the State Department community so
everybody knows what they are, why they are important. That is
what we are seeking with our particular recommendation.
Mrs. Brooks. Do you know who at the State Department, at
the time that they rejected that recommendation, and that
recommendation was rejected, do you know who at the State
Department made that decision to reject that recommendation?
Mr. Linick. The Sullivan recommendation or our
recommendation?
Mrs. Brooks. Both. The recommendation to reject that the
Deputy Secretary should be the level responsible for
implementing all of these recommendations.
Mr. Linick. As to the Sullivan recommendation, I don't know
who--who, if anyone, rejected that. I know the Deputy Secretary
is considering our recommendation. And, in fact, I believe,
like I said, there is a revision to the Foreign Affairs Manual
which apparently does embody that. But we haven't closed that
yet because we haven't had the opportunity to analyze it and
assess it.
Mrs. Brooks. And, Mr. Starr, do you know who made that
decision at that time?
Mr. Starr. I don't believe that there was a decision not to
comply with that recommendation.
Two things, Congresswoman. One, it was the Secretary
himself who ultimately decided that we did not need an Under
Secretary after consideration through various levels of the
Department.
In terms of the implementation of the ARB, the paperwork
that we have put forward to modify the FAM does show that it is
the Deputy Secretary for Management and Resources who will be
the oversight officer for ARBs.
And if you would permit me, just for a second. While this
is a change to the FAMs, I have been in multiple meetings since
the arrival of Deputy Secretary Higginbottom, and I was in
multiple meetings beforehand while Tom Nides was still the
Deputy Secretary, where the Deputy was taking direct charge of
the oversight of the implementation of the ARB recommendations.
The MPRI group is the staff that is tracking them and then
bringing these up and presenting them to the Deputy Secretary.
And then we have had multiple meetings where myself, major
officers from all the regional bureaus, the Deputy Secretary
heading the meeting, plus MPRI, plus CT, plus the other bureaus
have been in these.
So I think it is very clear that the Deputy Secretary and
our highest levels have been involved in the implementation of
the ARB. What we are doing now is making sure that it is
codified in the FAMs.
Mrs. Brooks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I yield back, but I would like to add, it is about time.
Thank you.
Chairman Gowdy. Thank the gentlelady from Indiana.
The chair will now recognize the gentlelady from
California, Ms. Saanchez.
Ms. Saanchez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to welcome and thank both witnesses for being here
today.
And I want to follow up on this line of questioning with
respect to the physical security of Embassies and mission
facilities.
Two of the past ARB recommendations that remain open, if I
am not mistaken, are from the 1999 Nairobi and Dar es Salaam
ARBs. And in those ARBs, they recommended that physical
security upgrades be made immediately and that State work to
obtain sufficient funding for building programs because that
was a need that was identified.
And as a result of those recommendations, the Capital
Security Cost Sharing Program was initiated to pay for the
costs of building new Embassies and consulates. Is that
correct?
Mr. Starr. That is correct.
Ms. Saanchez. With funding constraints and other challenges
delaying efforts to better secure its facilities, how is the
State Department addressing the need to provide necessary
security at this point?
Mr. Starr. Congresswoman, thank you for the question.
Congress has been extraordinarily generous with the
Department. Since the Nairobi bombings in 1998, we have
constructed nearly 100 new facilities around the world.
We have done major security upgrades to our facilities
around the world that we could not replace right at that
moment.
There is not a post out there that doesn't have anti-ram
walls and vehicle bars and gates, does not have guard programs,
police protecting it, forced entry doors and windows, shatter-
resistant window film. Now, after Benghazi, additional Marines,
additional RSOs.
We have been committed since, quite frankly, since 1985 in
increasing the programs.
I think the funding that we originally got under the
Capital Cost Sharing Program was about $1.3 billion a year. And
by 2012, 2013, instead of the original six or eight facilities
that we were able to build a year, we were building perhaps one
or two, perhaps three because of inflation costs.
After Benghazi, Congress was again very generous with the
Department and has authorized almost another billion dollars.
And we are now, again, on an enhanced building program,
building about six or seven new facilities a year.
So I would say that while that recommendation remained
open, technically, the Department, with the help of Congress,
has done an amazing job enhancing the safety and security of
our people through the years.
I will not say that it is perfect. Clearly, I am here, and
my job is to implement reforms after Benghazi and lessons that
we have learned. We made mistakes there. But for the vast
majority of places, I would tell you that the recommendations
that came out of the Dar es Salaam and Nairobi bombings and
those ARBs, we have assiduously been trying to implement those,
and Congress has been very helpful.
Ms. Saanchez. Could you give me an idea, Mr. Starr, because
it is a big job to try to go back and renovate facilities and
bring them up to modern security standards.
Could you estimate how many facilities you are talking
about that you have to deal with in terms of assessing the
physical security of those buildings? Ballpark figure.
Mr. Starr. There are 275 U.S. Embassies, consulates, and
consulate generals. There are approximately 10 other special
missions. The facilities that make up those missions number
over 1,000 different buildings.
Ms. Saanchez. It is quite an undertaking, then, to
consistently be upgrading their security. Would that be a fair
statement?
Mr. Starr. I think that is a fair statement.
Ms. Saanchez. Now, the Benghazi ARB found that the State
Department must work with Congress to restore the Capital
Security Cost Sharing Program at its full capacity.
Can you talk a little bit about the history of the funding
and why Congress needed to restore to the full level the
Capital Security Cost Sharing Program?
Mr. Starr. Thank you, Congresswoman.
As I alluded to just a moment ago, the original costs
coming out of the Nairobi and Dar es Salaam ARBs were
approximately $1.3 billion a year.
In 1999 and 2000 and 2001, as we geared up the program,
that gave us the ability to replace six, seven, eight,
sometimes nine facilities a year--or individual buildings at
least--and do some major security upgrades.
But that funding level was constant from about 2000 until
about 2012.
Increased building costs, inflation and other things had
reduced what we could do with that $1.3 billion. So we were
hopeful, and, as I say, Congress was very generous in
recognizing that that number had been eroded by inflation, and
after Benghazi and I think in line with the ARB recommendation,
worked with the Department and added nearly another billion
dollars to that.
So we are currently at approximately $2.3 billion under the
Capital Cost Sharing Program per year, which has allowed us to
do more security enhancements and build and replace more
unsecure facilities.
Ms. Saanchez. Thank you. It is important to note that
Congress does play a role in making sure that these facilities
are physically secure.
Mr. Starr, I would also like to ask you about temporary
facilities.
During our previous hearing, a number of members had
questions about the diplomatic facility in Benghazi--whether it
was a special mission compound or a temporary mission facility
and whether the term used meant less stringent physical
security standards applied to that facility.
That issue was investigated by the ARB and numerous
congressional committees over the past two years. At our last
hearing, you addressed this concern, explaining, and I am going
to quote from your testimony, ``whether it is temporary or
interim or permanent, that we should be applying the same
security standards that the OSPB has put in place.''
Is that still your understanding of how the Department is
applying these standards today?
Mr. Starr. Yes. That is a very hard lesson that we learned
after Benghazi. I can tell you that in one particular location
in the world--I won't say it--where we have had to have
operations where we were under great pressure to put people in
and establish a temporary facility, I turned that down and said
that we will continue to operate solely on a TDY basis until
such time as we can identify a facility and bring it up to the
necessary level of security in order to declare it a facility,
i.e., meeting the OSPB standards for that type of facility.
I got no pushback from the Department and, in fact, got a
tremendous amount of support for this.
I think you have correctly identified that the Benghazi--
whatever you call it, the temporary facility or the special
mission facility--despite efforts to do security upgrades to
it, we know that it did not meet all of the standards. And we
want to avoid a situation like that going forward.
Ms. Saanchez. I just want to point out that Mr. Linick, in
his written testimony, noted in a March 2014 audit on physical
security funding that diplomatic security and the Overseas
Building Operations Bureau have differing interpretations of
what the required physical security standards are for those
overseas facilities. And the same IG report notes that in
January 2013, the Department clarified that a single standard
applies to all facilities.
In June 2013, the Department further clarified that the
OSPB standard set forth the minimum requirements.
Has there been better communication now between the
Department and the Diplomatic Security and Overseas Building
Operations and an agreed-upon standard for what those physical
standards should be?
Mr. Starr. There is no disagreement on what the physical
security standards should be. Those standards are in our
foreign affairs manuals and foreign affairs handbooks. They are
approved by the Overseas Security Policy Board. And there is no
disagreement on the standards.
We do have different standards for a, let's say a
standalone building or an office that is in tenent commercial
office space.
But OBO, Overseas Buildings Operations, is very clear and
understands what those standards are. There is no
misunderstanding what the standards are and that they are
there.
I do think that the Inspector General's inspections have
been very helpful to us in many ways. Although sometimes I will
disagree with some of the recommendations, and as Steve alluded
to, we have some open recommendations where we may disagree.
Ultimately, we come to resolution on the vast majority of them.
In terms of what the inspectors found in some of their
reports, it is my job as the head of security when we find
security deficiencies that the IG may find to make sure that we
are addressing them as fast as possible.
And Steve's inspectors in one instance did find that we had
some significant differences between OBO and DS at a post
overseas. I met 2 days after the inspectors came back with the
head of OBO, we resolved those differences, and we have moved
on and settled the differences and made the decisions on where
we have to go.
I meet virtually every week with the head of OBO. My staff
meets at lower levels with OBO, and we have taken that
recommendation very seriously.
Ms. Saanchez. Appreciate your testimony.
And I yield back.
Chairman Gowdy. Thank the gentlelady from California.
The chair would now recognize the gentleman from Georgia,
Mr. Westmoreland.
Mr. Westmoreland. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you for being here.
Mr. Starr, just a point of clarification.kv When they use
the term ``closed'' on the recommendations, that does not mean
they are completed. Correct?
I didn't know it was that hard a question.
Mr. Starr. As Steve alluded to, there is resolved; there is
closed. We do our best when we get a recommendation to look at
it and determine----
Mr. Westmoreland. But ``closed'' does not mean the
recommendation has fully been implemented. Right?
Mr. Starr. Closed--in most cases, it does. It means that we
have, in fact, effected the change that was necessary to meet
that recommendation.
There are some recommendations that I would say, sir, are
evergreen recommendations. If we put the policies and
procedures in place and have to go through it, they may go on
for a longer period of time.
Mr. Westmoreland. Thank you.
You were in diplomatic security at the State Department
from 1980 through your retirement in 2009. Is that correct?
Mr. Starr. Yes, sir. I was an agent.
Mr. Westmoreland. And from then, you went to head of the
security for the United Nations?
Mr. Starr. Correct, sir.
Mr. Westmoreland. And, at the U.N., you were the Under
Secretary to Safety and Security. Correct?
Mr. Starr. Yes, sir.
Mr. Westmoreland. Is it true your Office of Diplomatic
Security, or the DS, and the Bureau of Overseas Buildings
Operations, or the OBO, are the two offices within the State
Department that have the primary duty to ensure the safety and
security of these overseas facilities?
Mr. Starr. That is an accurate statement, sir.
Mr. Westmoreland. According for the Foreign Affairs Manual,
your office is expressly charged with the responsibility for
ensuring that all new construction and major renovations comply
with physical security standards even though the OBO does the
actual construction. Is that true?
Mr. Starr. Correct.
Mr. Westmoreland. And under--which Under Secretary is the
DS?
Mr. Starr. I serve--I am under Under Secretary Kennedy, the
Under Secretary for Management----
Mr. Westmoreland. And who is the Under Secretary? OBO?
Mr. Starr. Yes.
Mr. Westmoreland. Also.
And the Under Secretary for Management, Mr. Kennedy, has
been in a position since November of 2007, I believe? Is that
correct? You don't know.
Mr. Starr. I believe so, sir, but I am not certain of the
date.
Mr. Westmoreland. Okay. Has Mr. Kennedy been with the State
Department, as far as you know, from the early 1970s?
Mr. Starr. I think Pat came in in about 1975.
Mr. Westmoreland. Okay. In fact, when the East African
Embassies were bombed in 1998, Mr. Kennedy was in your
position. Is that correct?
Mr. Starr. At the time of the bombing, sir, my recollection
is that we had a vacancy in the position and Under Secretary.
Mr. Westmoreland. He was the acting.
Mr. Starr. He was the acting.
Mr. Westmoreland. Okay. And although you returned to the
State Department after the Benghazi attacks, you are aware that
virtually each and every finding and resulting recommendation
in the Benghazi ARB centered on the special mission compound or
facility being a high-threat post sorely lacking in personnel
and physical security. Is that correct?
Mr. Starr. I am aware of those recommendations in the ARB,
sir, yes.
Mr. Westmoreland. Are you aware that your own inspector
general, Mr. Linick, since Benghazi, has conducted three
reviews or audits in physical security issues at overseas posts
particularly in these high-threat posts?
Mr. Starr. Yes, I am, sir.
Mr. Westmoreland. Are you also aware that the IG issued two
other reports, one that looked at how you manage your local
guard program and another that looks at how you manage your
Marine security?
Mr. Starr. Yes, sir, I am.
Mr. Westmoreland. Let's take a look at the IG report issued
in June of 2013 that looked at how you comply with the physical
security standards at five specific overseas posts that are
considered high threat. Do you recall that report?
Mr. Starr. Yes, sir.
Mr. Westmoreland. As I understand it, that report only
looked at Embassies or consulates that were constructed after
the year 2000. Is that correct?
Mr. Starr. I believe so, sir.
Mr. Westmoreland. So all built after the East African
Embassy bombings in 1998, where an ARB was sharply critical of
the then-existing physical security standards. Is that correct?
Mr. Starr. I would say the Inspector General pointed out
that there were some deficiencies in not meeting some of the
standards.
Mr. Westmoreland. That means that they were all built after
Congress passed the Secure Embassy Construction and
Counterterrorism Act, as it is known, and gave the State
Department a whole lot of money to improve those physical
security overseas. Is that correct?
Mr. Starr. Correct.
Mr. Westmoreland. So, in this report, the IG team looked at
physical security at the five posts that had a high-threat
level and the audit team looked at such things as the height of
the perimeter walls, the outside boundary, how far the
buildings were from those outside walls, looked at the anti-ram
barriers, the procedural--other barriers or resistant doors.
Whether the local guards, which we have talked about prior,
were properly inspecting, whether there were safe havens inside
the building, and the like. Is that correct?
Mr. Starr. Yes, sir.
Mr. Westmoreland. So let me ask you how the five Embassies
or consulates did. Did any of them comply with all of the
security standards that were reviewed?
Mr. Starr. No, sir. None of them are perfect.
Mr. Westmoreland. Okay----
Mr. Starr. If I may, sir. Every one of those facilities has
police and guards on the outside. Every one of those
facilities----
Mr. Westmoreland. I understand. I know. But my question
was, had all of them been met? And your answer was no.
Mr. Starr. No, sir. I want to make it clear, though, that
most of the things that the Inspector General found were minor,
do not present major vulnerabilities to us. Our philosophy of
concentric rings of security----
Mr. Westmoreland. Okay. I have got some more questions.
Mr. Starr [continuing]. I don't expect that any Inspector
General going out, any teams, is not going to find some things
that can be improved.
Mr. Westmoreland. I understand. But your answer was no.
Correct?
Mr. Starr. Correct, sir.
Mr. Westmoreland. Now, the overseas post in question, once
the problems were identified, took some sort of action to
correct all the deficiencies. But you said they were very small
deficiencies. Is that correct?
Mr. Starr. In relation to what vulnerabilities they posed,
yes, sir.
Mr. Westmoreland. So at least at some of these posts, those
problems have been fixed. Is that correct?
Mr. Starr. It is my job to make sure that any time we see
one of these vulnerabilities----
Mr. Westmoreland. Are they fixed?
Mr. Starr. Yes, they are. They are resolved.
Mr. Westmoreland. Did the inspector general ask that you
issue a directive to all your posts worldwide to see whether
other posts have the same problems?
Mr. Starr. For some things, yes.
Mr. Westmoreland. Okay. Did you agree to do this?
Mr. Starr. No, I did not.
Mr. Westmoreland. Oh, okay.
Mr. Linick, I want to follow up on another review of the
physical security related posts overseas. I understand that
your office hired an outside company to review how the State
Department processes these requests and prioritizes requests
for these physical security upgrades.
Mr. Linick. Yes, sir.
Mr. Westmoreland. When the auditors looked at this, did
they find a comprehensive list of all these reports or the
deficiencies?
Mr. Linick. They didn't find a comprehensive list of
security needs and requests for security needs at posts around
the world.
Mr. Westmoreland. So they didn't find a list of what may
have been called in or asked for?
Mr. Linick. They did not--they did not find a list.
Mr. Westmoreland. Okay. Were the auditors able to review a
list of these funding requests or a list of which requests were
denied or granted?
Mr. Linick. There wasn't a list.
Mr. Westmoreland. So there wasn't a list.
Mr. Linick. No.
Mr. Westmoreland. From DS, no list?
Mr. Linick. We did not find a comprehensive list of----
Mr. Westmoreland. OBO, no list?
Mr. Linick. No. But I understand they are working on that
right now.
Mr. Westmoreland. Okay. Is it true that the auditors found
that the DS and OBO do not coordinate with each other to
determine which requests should be given a priority?
Mr. Linick. They did find that in two respects. One, there
were disagreements about the standards, which have since been
remediated, which Mr. Starr had mentioned.
Mr. Westmoreland. So the fact that Mr. Starr and the OBO
get together once a week or once a month or whatever it is,
they still not come up with any of these lists that could be
combined to be looked at?
Mr. Linick. I don't believe we have seen a comprehensive
list. But I am not entirely sure of that so I would have to get
back to you.
Mr. Westmoreland. Do you know of any comprehensive lists
that may have been put into long-term planning for the future
security of the request that has been made from these posts?
Mr. Linick. I know the Department has agreed to do it and
so that recommendation has been resolved. But it still is open.
Mr. Westmoreland. Thank you.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Gowdy. I thank the gentleman from Georgia. We are
now going to try to go to the gentleman from Washington, Mr.
Smith.
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Can everybody hear me?
Chairman Gowdy. Yes, sir.
Mr. Smith. Thank you. And I really appreciate your
flexibility for this [Sound difficulties.]
Chairman Gowdy. Adam, I may get you to act like you are mad
and yell a little bit. I think the witnesses--we can hear you
pretty good but not great. So if you could act like we are
talking and you are yelling at me.
Mr. Smith. Trey, do you need me to repeat that? Do you need
me to repeat what I just asked?
Chairman Gowdy. Yes, sir. The witnesses are kind of leaning
forward. If you could yell it as loud as you are willing to do
it, Adam.
Mr. Smith. I will do that. I will repeat the question. My
question was, there have been attacks before, and one of the
allegations of the Benghazi ARB is that after those attacks,
like the Embassy bombing in Africa, we issued a report, and we
just sort of Groundhog's Day. We don't make improvements. We
don't respond. In my reading of what has happened since some of
those previous attacks, I don't believe that that is accurate.
I was just wondering if you gentlemen could outline--as one
example, the 1998 Embassy bombings in Africa--what improvements
were made as a result of the study of that problem? How much
more money was spent? How were facilities upgraded? What has
been done prior to Benghazi, to actually improve security at
our overseas facilities?
Mr. Starr. Congressman, thank you for the question. This is
Greg Starr. I recognize that there are some similarities in the
types of recommendations that were made going back through the
years on ARBs, but I, like you, find it difficult to accept the
premise that it is Groundhog Day, that we are just revisiting
the same things.
As I said before, a tremendous amount of progress was made
through the years in building new facilities, in training
different personnel, in adding local guard programs. Much of
this work was done in concert with Congress. Congress has been
very helpful in many ways in terms of funding and oversight.
From 1988 to 1992, after the original Inman Commission, we
built 22 new facilities. But then, after the end of the Cold
War, the money sort of dried up and ran out, even though we
wanted to build nearly 100. After the bombings in 1998, the
money flow for building new Embassies was given to us by
Congress very generously, and we have replaced a tremendous
amount of facilities. We have never had to give up one of those
new facilities that we have built yet.
I think the increases that we have done in training for our
personnel, additional Marine detachments, things like more
armored cars, and the things that we have done after Benghazi,
the better, much closer relationships with the intelligence
community and DOD, I think some of those things you can say,
Well, weren't you doing those things, you know, after Nairobi?
Weren't some of those things said in the ARBs? And there are
some similarities, but I think the types of things we are
facing are similar as well. I think we are going to see similar
types of attacks. You may get, even in the future, the need for
more training than we are even doing now. So I appreciate the
comments because I believe, like you do, that while there may
be some similarities, this is not Groundhog Day. We have made
significant progress since Nairobi and Dar es Salaam. There are
very few ARB recommendations through all of the ARBs that have
been left open, and those few that are open we are still
working to close. So thank you for the question, sir.
Mr. Smith. One of the big issues about Benghazi, not all
State Department facilities are the same. I mean, when we think
of our State Department presence overseas, I think most people
typically imagine our embassy, the main facility. But as
everybody knows, we have a number of different facilities where
people are located throughout the world. One of the most
dangerous places that I went to was Peshawar, where we have a
consulate in Pakistan, a few years back--very dangerous place,
very high security.
Now, when you are determining what security to provide when
you go to these temporary mission facilities or to the annexes
or consulates and--specific to Libya, specific to the two
facilities that were attacked--how would they have fallen under
the new rules implemented after some of these other attacks, in
understanding how to properly provide security for two
facilities like the ones that were in Benghazi, which were not
traditional Embassies or even consulates for that matter? Is
this something that had been contemplated previously, and if
so, what was the discussion about how to properly provide
security for these different types of facilities?
Mr. Starr. Unfortunately, sir, I am at a little bit of a
loss. As one of the Congressmen has pointed out that while
those discussions were taking place on what was going to happen
for Benghazi, I was at the United Nations. I do know that we
have all accepted the recommendations from the ARB, that
perhaps there was a little too much confidence in the chief of
mission and what he was saying, that we know that we did not
meet all of the OSPB standards for either of those two
locations, either the special annex or the special mission. I
know that we are concentrating on learning the lessons from
that. We have no temporary facilities today, no temporary
facilities at all. And should we have to have those types of
facilities, we will have a very long, hard discussion about
what needs to go into them and make sure that they are as safe
and secure as possible before we would let them be occupied. I
am just at a little bit of a loss. I can't comment on things
that happened when I wasn't here, sir.
Mr. Smith. We talked about two other, I think, huge issues
when it comes to providing security at our overseas facilities.
Number one is money, particularly at this point, and I might
also add particularly at the moment that Benghazi was attacked.
I don't imagine that there have been too many times in the
history of our country when we had as many facilities
throughout the globe that could not have been perceived to be
at a high-threat level. First of all, it was the anniversary of
9/11. Second of all, we had already in the days prior, had
riots and attacks on Embassies in I forget how many different
countries. I certainly know in Cairo why the Embassy was
attacked, and I think in somewhere close to a dozen others, we
had that. The number one issue, and I will let you--well, I
will mention them both.
The number one issue is simple resources. In a world full
of incredibly dangerous places, how do you decide how to
properly allocate resources between a Benghazi and a Cairo and
a Peshawar and Sana'a, and Yemen, and all those different
places? What role--Congress, as you said, has been generous
after some of these previous attacks, but there is still finite
resources, number one. How do you make those decisions when
there are so many places to protect?
And then the second issue that I have encountered is, quite
frequently, the chief of mission will disagree. The chief of
mission will go to places where maybe the folks back in
Washington, D.C., have said that he or she should not. There
are many, many members of the State Department out in other
countries who feel that their hands are being tied. In fact, I
have heard this complaint now from a large number of State
Department people referring to it as the ``Benghazi effect'',
that they can no longer do their job because we have gone back
the other way and tried to be too cautious. Those are two very
difficult issues, resources and then the conflict between a
member of the State Department out in a foreign country in a
dangerous place trying to do his or her job versus meeting the
security. How do those two things get balanced throughout the
State Department and throughout all of your security team?
Chairman Gowdy. Adam, before they answer, this is Trey.
There is less than a minute on the clock, but given the
technical difficulties, I am going to let them answer this
question in full and give you another question, given the
difficulties we had on the front end, but I wanted to let you
know where we were in terms of time.
Mr. Smith. Right. That is my last question.
Chairman Gowdy. Okay. Answer as long as you need to, Mr.
Starr and Mr. Linick.
Mr. Starr. Thank you, Congressman. On the question of
resources, you are correct, while Congress has been very
generous with us, I am not going to sit here and say that it is
solely a question of resources. Every year we look at every
post in the world in concert with the Emergency Action
Committee, in concert with the intelligence community, in
concert with my threat analysis, and in concert with the
regional bureaus; and we rate those threats for civil disorder,
for terrorism, for crime, and for a couple of other things, and
we rate them critical, high, medium, or low threats. Those
ratings help us determine how to best allocate resources. We
start with a base position that every one of our facilities
should meet the minimum OSPB standards, and as Steve has
pointed out, there are some times where we have problems even
doing that. When we find it, we upgrade them as fast as we can
and make sure that they are there. There are many posts that we
have to go very far above the minimum standards because of the
specific nature of the threats, and the threats can differ.
At a place where it is a threat of a car bomb, we are
looking for additional setback. We are looking for additional
barriers. When it is mob attacks, we may be looking at
additional reinforcements in terms of the military on the
ground. But we look at those threats at least for every single
post in a formalized manner every single year, and I start my
day every single morning with a threat roundup and looking at
what is out there and make determinations whether or not we
need to reinforce or do something at our Embassies. As you
correctly pointed out, that does translate into problems
sometimes where we have officers that feel that they can't get
out. We often have places where we have to balance getting the
job done with an officer's individual security and what the
threats are. I think that is a healthy tension. I want Foreign
Service officers that want to get out and want to get the job
done. And I want posts that are looking closely at what the
threats are and whether they should get out. Now, at our
highest threat level posts, I think you will that find some of
our officers may be frustrated sometimes because the security
has to be overwhelming in many ways, has to be very strong. And
the rest of our posts around the world, our people are getting
out. Our people are engaging. Foreign Service officers are
building democracy. There are rule-of-law programs, justice
programs, USAID programs, humanitarian programs, and they are
fulfilling those requirements. It is a balance, and it is a
dance, I agree, but it is an important one, and the tension is
good.
Mr. Linick. Congressman, this is Steve Linick.
Just a couple of comments to add on to that. We haven't
looked at the sufficiency of resources, but our work in the
resource area concerns how resources are prioritized. In other
words, does the Department know what its resources are? Does
the Department know what requests are made? Do they know how to
prioritize across the board? That is really the point of the
report that we issued on the topic of resources, which has been
referenced already. And if the Department cannot make a
determination as to which projects are high priority, then it
is going to be difficult to solve problems and develop budgets.
As to the second question on the Benghazi effect, I think
ultimately this comes down to good risk management, and the
ARB's first recommendation discussed the need for the
Department to make sure there is a mechanism in place to weigh
policy concerns against risks. One of our recommendations was
that this is so important that this should be elevated to the
highest levels of the Department so that someone who is in a
position of weighing policy considerations, namely whether we
maintain presence in certain very dangerous areas, can make
that determination and also be responsible when they have to
sign on the dotted line and put people at temporary facilities
or wherever in high-threat posts.
Mr. Smith. Can I just quickly follow up on that last point,
and then I will be done. I think the problem and the issue when
you say take it up to that higher level, but once you have
taken it up to that higher level, isn't that person further
away from the specific understanding of a given country or a
given area? In some ways if you are going up to someone who's
at that deputy level, they are more distant from the problem
and in some ways probably less qualified to make the call on
whether or not a given action is proper for the security
environment. Isn't that one of the reasons why the State
Department has been reluctant to implement that specific
recommendation?
Mr. Linick. I am not sure whether or not they have been
reluctant to adopt that recommendation. I know they have their
VP2 risk management system, and I don't know to what extent
that answers the question of raising risk management at a
higher level. I guess I would say that we know that some of
these decisions involve competing interests. At the lower
levels, you have got your policy folks and then your security
folks. Somebody has to be in charge of reconciling some of
these competing interests because we know our policy folks want
us to be in places. They want us to be out doing diplomacy. And
our security folks want to minimize risk. So what we are saying
is there needs to be somebody who is managing those competing
interests and then taking responsibility for those decisions.
Mr. Smith. All right. Thank you very much, Trey. And thanks
to the committee for the flexibility for allowing me to
participate by phone.
Chairman Gowdy. Adam, thanks for participating. Take care
of yourself, and we will see you in January.
Mr. Smith. Thank you.
Chairman Gowdy. With that, the chair would now recognize
the gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Jordan.
Mr. Jordan. I thank the chairman.
Mr. Starr, safety is critically important, and I appreciate
what you said in your written testimony. You said we want to
keep our people safe. We will continue doing everything we can
to support and protect them. It shouldn't be a partisan issue,
should it? Republican, Democrat, shouldn't matter?
Mr. Starr. I don't think that is a partisan issue, sir. I
have never had a problem up on the Hill where that is an issue.
Mr. Jordan. No. I wasn't insinuating that. I am just saying
that these people put their lives on the line. It doesn't
matter whether you are Republican, Democrat, who you are, what
side you come from, the simple test should be, are the policies
and actions we are putting in place making people safe. You
would agree?
Mr. Starr. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jordan. From Secretary of State Madeleine Albright this
after--it was a cyber security breach, but my guess is she
would refer to any security breach. She said this, and I quote,
``Even a score of 99 out of 100 is a failing grade.'' That is a
pretty strong statement, and I understand we don't live in a
perfect world. You have talked about that. We live in a
dangerous world, and you have got to balance diplomacy with
security and safety concerns, but I think the tenor of her
statement was what we just talked about. Safety is critical,
and we should do everything we can. It is of paramount
importance. We should do all we can to make sure our people are
safe. You would agree with that, wouldn't you, Mr. Starr?
Mr. Starr. I need to try to do that, sir, but I will just
add one inflection on this and that our primary and most
important goal is to carry out the foreign policy of the United
States Government.
Mr. Jordan. I understand. I understand the balance.
Mr. Starr. And then while doing that, we have to do
everything we can to safeguard our people.
Mr. Jordan. I get it. I get it. Mr. Starr, the number one
question I get back home about Benghazi, the number one
question I get, why were we there? Why were we there? It seems
to me it is a fundamental question, especially in light of the
very dangerous security situation that existed in Benghazi and,
frankly, some other key facts. We have talked about this
before, but Mr. Starr, the State Department has its own
standards for physical security, the Overseas Security Policy
Board standards. Were those followed with the Benghazi
facility?
Mr. Starr. No, sir, they were not met.
Mr. Jordan. And when you deviate from the standards, there
is a waiver process that you are supposed to adhere to. Was the
waiver process followed?
Mr. Starr. I do not believe so, sir, no.
Mr. Jordan. No. Mr. Keil was here just a few months ago,
and he said neither the standards or the waiver process was
followed. And the State Department had a special designation
for the Benghazi facility. Isn't that correct, Mr. Starr.
Didn't you guys call it the temporary mission facility or the
special mission----
Mr. Starr. I think it was the temporary mission facility or
special mission facility.
Mr. Jordan. And was this a term created solely to do an end
run around the standards and the waiver process?
Mr. Starr. Sir, I don't believe anybody intentionally tried
to run around the waiver or the standards process. I think it
was a question that it was neither an Embassy or a consulate. I
think they were trying to find----
Mr. Jordan. If I could Mr. Starr, when Mr. Kyle testified
here just 3 months, sat right there beside you, a gentleman
that served 23 years at the State Department, he said, in
talking with people and based on my experience, it was a
purposeful effort to skirt the standards. Let me ask it this
way.
Mr. Starr. Well, I would disagree with Mr. Kyle.
Mr. Jordan. Okay. He has got a pretty good record, like you
do as well, Mr. Starr. How many facilities does the State
Department--diplomatic facilities--does the State Department
currently have around the world?
Mr. Starr. 275 Embassies, consulates and consulate
generals, composing approximately 1,000 buildings.
Mr. Jordan. Your Web site says you have 285 U.S. diplomatic
facilities worldwide. Is that accurate?
Mr. Starr. 275 consulates, Embassies, consulate generals,
and there are approximately 10 special missions, such as----
Mr. Jordan. Okay. Of the 275 or the 285, whatever number
you want to use, are any of those today designated temporary
mission facility or special mission compound?
Mr. Starr. No.
Mr. Jordan. None of them?
Mr. Starr. None.
Mr. Jordan. Which sort of brings me back to my question,
Mr. Starr. What was so important about Benghazi that we didn't
follow our own standards; we didn't follow the waiver process;
we created a term that is not used at any of our facilities,
any of the 285 today, special mission compound or temporary
mission facility, a designation not used anywhere else today?
What was so important that we do all that to be in Benghazi; we
do all that to be in a place where four Americans were killed?
Mr. Starr. Sir, I would have to refer you to the results of
the ARB, which I think address that.
Mr. Jordan. No, no. You are the witness from the State
Department. I am asking you.
Mr. Starr. I was not there when those determinations were
made, and today we do not have facilities like that.
Mr. Jordan. No, no, no. I am asking you as the
representative from the State Department to tell me what was so
important that we don't follow the standards; we don't follow
the waiver process; we create a new term out of thin air, and
none of the facilities today--we are the United States of
America. We have got more facilities probably than any other
country in the world, 285, and none of them use that
designation today.
Mr. Starr. Correct.
Mr. Jordan. Tell me what was--why--we were in Tripoli. Why
did we have to be in Benghazi?
Mr. Starr. I would have to refer you to the ARB, sir.
Mr. Jordan. Well, let me add to it. Maybe this will help
you think about giving us an answer. In the 13 months prior to
the attack on 9/11/2012, there were 200 security incidents in
Libya, IED, RPG, assassination attempt on the British
Ambassador. I mean, this was the Wild West. Repeated requests--
here is the thing--repeated requests from our security
personnel at the facility, repeated requests for additional
security. They said we need more help. We need more good guys
here. You guys said, Nope, we are not sending. In fact, what,
they had you reduced. So again I ask, that situation, probably
the most chaotic situation that we have around any of our
facilities, a whole new term, don't follow the standards, don't
adhere to the waiver process, why were we there?
Mr. Starr. Sir, I think the ARB points out that there were
mistakes made. I think it is very obvious that we had a tragedy
that occurred, and I am not denying that a tragedy occurred.
Mr. Jordan. None of us are saying that. I am trying to get
answers from you.
Mr. Starr. What I am saying is that I think we have to
learn from that lesson. I am not the witness to tell you what
happened----
Mr. Jordan. You are the State Department representative
here at the hearing on the select committee to find out what
happened. The most fundamental question is, why were we there
in the first place?
Mr. Starr. I am here to discuss the things that we have put
in place since the ARB and what we are doing to protect our
people now.
Mr. Jordan. Let me ask you one other thing. Let me ask you
another thing here. Do you happen to know the name of the
government that was in place when we had those 200 security
incidents in the 13 months leading up to this tragedy? Do you
happen to know the name of the government that was in place
when we had the IED attacks, the RPG attacks, the assassination
attempt on the British Ambassador, what was the name of the
Libyan Government at the time, Mr. Starr. Do you know?
Mr. Starr. No, I don't offhand.
Mr. Jordan. I will tell you. The Transitional National
Council, Transitional National Council. Not exactly a title
that inspires confidence, screams stability, does it, Mr.
Starr? And yet we had to be there. We just had to be there. Now
this committee, this committee is going to try to find out the
answer. Since won't give it to us, since you won't hazard a
guess, this committee is going to try to find out the answer.
But, in the meantime, we are going to make sure we keep focused
on what we started our conversation here about, Mr. Starr, and
that is the safety of our people who serve abroad.
Now, there was one good thing that came out of the ARB, one
good thing. They said we are going to have a best practices
panel, and that best practices panel made 40 recommendations,
and the most important one is the one that Mr. Linick talked
about earlier. The number one recommendation--frankly, the one
that many of the other 39 hinge upon--says we need to create at
the Under Secretary level, an Under Secretary for Diplomatic
Security. Is the State Department going to do that, Mr. Starr,
at the Under Secretary level?
Mr. Starr. A decision has been made not to implement that
recommendation.
Mr. Jordan. You are not going to do it. How many Under
Secretaries are there at the State Department, Mr. Starr?
Mr. Starr. I believe there is seven.
Mr. Jordan. I think there is six, based on the chart you
just gave us: Under Secretary for Political Affairs; Under
Secretary for Economic Growth and Energy and Environment; Under
Secretary for Arms Control and International Security Affairs;
Under Secretary for Management; Under Secretary for Civilian
Security, Democracy, and Human Rights; and the Under Secretary
For Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs.
And yet we can't have an Under Secretary for the security
of our people who risk their lives every day around this
planet. You know the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and
Public Affairs, do you know what part of the job description of
that Under Secretary? To foster cultural exchange in
international broadcasting. Now I am not saying cultural
exchange in international broadcasting isn't important. All I
am saying is the safety of the people who serve at these 285
facilities should be just as important. And you guys say, Nope,
we are going to keep you way down here, Mr. Starr. In fact, you
are the one--diplomatic security, Assistant Secretary, as Ms.
Brooks pointed out, you are way down the chart. Why don't you
want to move from the kids table to the adult table, Mr. Starr?
Why don't you want to move on up to the Under Secretary level?
Did you make that case to Secretary Kerry and say, I think
security is important enough I should be at the Under Secretary
level? Did you make that case?
Mr. Starr. The case that I made to the Secretary was that
in any instance that I needed to get to the Secretary and the
access that I needed with him, the Deputy Secretaries or the
Assistant Secretaries, I had to have the access necessary to do
my job.
Today I have that access. Whether I am an Under Secretary
or an Assistant Secretary--and I have been the Under Secretary
General For Safety and Security at the United Nations, and that
is a different organization--I can tell you that, regardless of
whether I am the Under Secretary Or the Assistant Secretary, I
have the control and the access that I need to fulfill my
responsibilities.
Mr. Jordan. I will tell you this, Mr. Chairman, if I could.
I will tell you this. I remember at Thanksgiving, it was a lot
easier to make the argument at the adult table than it was to
try to do it from the kids table. I would rather be there. In
fact, I am not the one who thinks it is the greatest idea in
the world. I think it is a great idea, but I am not alone.
Clear back in 1999, Secretary Albright said the same thing. She
thought we should have this at the Under Secretary level. Todd
Kyle and the Best Practices Panel thought we should have it at
the Under Secretary level, and the guy sitting beside you
thinks we need to elevate this to the highest level.
So I guess we got two big questions that this committee
needs to answer. Why in the world won't the State Department do
what everyone knows needs to be done, elevate this position to
the highest level that we can, make it equal with cultural
exchange in international broadcasting? And then the big
question, again, that I hope we get an answer to in this
committee, why were we there? Why were we there with these
facts and these circumstances? That is a fundamental question
that the American people want to know and the families of these
four individuals who gave their lives would like to know as
well.
With that, I yield back.
Chairman Gowdy. I thank the gentleman from Ohio.
The chair recognize the gentleman from Maryland, the
Ranking Member, Mr. Cummings.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
First of all, I would like to thank our witnesses for being
here today.
In particular, I want to thank you, Secretary Starr.
I listened to what was just stated and asked, but my
concern--and I am sure it is the concern of this entire
committee--is that when all the dust settles, that the request
of every single family member that we met--when the dust
settles, I hope it is carried out, and that is--that our
facilities are safer so that things like this unfortunate
incident does not happen again.
The Department's update shows continued strong progress
towards full implementation of the ARB's recommendations. As
the Benghazi ARB reminded all of us, ``The total elimination of
risks is a nonstarter for U.S. diplomacy, given the need for
the United States Government to be present in places where
stability and security are often most profoundly lacking and
host government support is sometimes minimal to nonexistent.''
Nonetheless, we owe Americans serving overseas our best
efforts to keep them as safe as possible. Mr. Starr, I want to
commend you for dedicating your career to achieving that goal.
I have no doubt that you are committed and determined to see
the implementation of these recommendations through. According
to your testimony, since September 17, that hearing we held
that day, the Department has closed three more Benghazi ARB
recommendations. One of the three that you closed involves the
hiring of additional diplomatic security personnel. Is that
right? I think that was recommendation No. 12.
Mr. Starr. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cummings. And your October letter said that you had
filled 120 of those 151 newly created slots. Do you still
expect to complete your hiring by early 2015?
Mr. Starr. We are on track to do that, sir.
Mr. Cummings. And what is entailed in that? Is it hard to
find people?
Mr. Starr. In some cases, actually, because we have very
high standards and some of these positions are very technical,
we have had some difficulties.
But, sir, I would like to point something out. The
recommendation was to get increased diplomatic security
personnel for high and critical threat posts and for additional
mobile security deployment teams. The 151 positions asked for
additional people for positions beyond those two things. We
have already created every one of the positions in MSD for the
mobile security teams and at our posts overseas, taken agents
that were already on board, filled those positions in those
locations. And what we do is back hire now to fill the
positions that we took those more experienced agents out of and
put the new ones there. So we have fulfilled the recommendation
of what it is, even though we continue to hire some additional
personnel. I think we have more than fulfilled that
recommendation.
Mr. Cummings. So you are still missing some people, though,
because you are moving people?
Mr. Starr. Right. We are still hiring to fill the people
that we put in behind there. Although the agents have all been
hired, it is a couple technical specialities that we are
filling in behind.
Mr. Cummings. Okay. You also closed the recommendation
related to risk management courses and enhanced threat training
for personnel at these high-risk posts. How will this training
better prepare our diplomats in high-threat regions?
Mr. Starr. We have increased the Foreign Affairs
Counterthreat Training that we offer to our Foreign Service
personnel now, not just people going to our high-threat, high-
risk posts. Every one of them has to go through that training,
and prior to this, we did not quite have the capacity to do
that. We are now increasing that training to everyone in the
entire Foreign Service over the next 4 years. Additionally, the
Foreign Service Institute has put courses in that are
complementing our skills-based training, courses like ``How to
Conduct Diplomacy in a High-Threat Environment,'' which brings
back officers from some of these tough places and shows best
practices on how you accomplish your job when you are faced
with things like sometimes you can't travel to the ministry;
sometimes there is different types of security requirements. So
I think we are addressing it both through skills-based training
on security and in the Foreign Service Institute on training
our people before they go into these high-threat environments,
how do we best do our jobs.
Mr. Cummings. So the third closed recommendation was to
procure fire safety equipment at high-threat posts. Mr. Starr,
is that complete?
Mr. Starr. It is complete with one exception, sir. I have
one post where the equipment is sitting, a specific type of
respirator mask is sitting one country away, and I am trying to
get it in today and tomorrow to that post, and we have had some
customs issues, but we have delivered the types of equipment
and the training in conjunction after talking with the New York
City Fire Department and others to all of our high-threat posts
around the world.
Mr. Cummings. Would you get us a notification when you have
completed that one thing you just said?
Mr. Starr. I will, sir.
Mr. Cummings. So they are receiving the training? Everybody
has received the training on this equipment?
Mr. Starr. We have worked closely with the fire department
to identify the equipment, and then when we ship the equipment
out, there are training programs on the equipment. And then
there are other things that OBO has done in terms of fire
safety as well.
Mr. Cummings. With the closure of those three
recommendations, that leaves four recommendations still open.
Is that right?
Mr. Starr. Yes.
Mr. Cummings. Your October letter shared with us target
dates to complete implementation of those final four
recommendations. Are you on track to complete those
recommendations?
Mr. Starr. We are on track, sir. The one that will stretch
the longest is the implementation of a new type of CCTV camera
at our posts overseas. The technical requirements associated
with that have been more difficult than we first envisioned. We
have a schedule to do it. I hope to have it done by fall of
2015. I am leery that it might go longer than that, so one of
the things we are saying is that it will absolutely be done by
the summer of 2016, but we are pushing to get it done earlier
than that.
Mr. Cummings. And the other three, when will they be
complete?
Mr. Starr. I believe that the recommendation concerning co-
location waivers will be done within probably 2 months. The
recommendation concerning assignment durations for high-threat
posts, we have essentially fulfilled that recommendation. We
are working with Congress to look at something called a dual-
compensation issue so that, if necessary, we can bring back
highly talented officers. I believe that we can close that
recommendation regardless of whether or not we get approval for
the dual-compensation waiver, so I think we will have an answer
in terms of closing that recommendation within 2 months as
well. And there is one further classified recommendation that
we are on track to close, but I would prefer not to discuss it
in this hearing.
Mr. Cummings. As I said in our previous hearing, I want to
make sure again things get done, and so I want you to get back
to us exactly when you expect--I would like to have that in
writing--when you expect these things to be done, and provide
the committee with that information because we want to hold you
to that. All right?
Mr. Starr. As the inspector general has said, there is also
going to be a review of our compliance as well, so it is not
only you, sir, the Inspector General----
Mr. Cummings. We will call it double coverage.
Mr. Starr. Exactly, and I will get back to you on that.
Mr. Cummings. All right. Now, Mr. Starr, Representative
Westmoreland discussed with you and the Inspector General the
June 2013 audit that took place before creation of the High
Threat Programs Directorate. The audit found some security
deficiencies at posts it examined. Is that correct?
Mr. Starr. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cummings. Mr. Starr, and I will ask you when the
Inspector General's Office released its 2014 report on High
Threat Programs Directorate, one of the Inspector General's key
findings in that report is that this newly created body,
``helped create a culture of shared responsibility for security
within the Department and has forged strong partnerships with
regional security officers and counterparts in regional and
functional bureaus as well as within the interagency
community.'' I think that is an extremely positive finding,
given the fact that the Accountability Review Board considered
the lack of shared responsibility around security issues to be
systemic failure just two years ago.
Mr. Starr, could you discuss how you think the creation of
the high-threat program has created a culture of shared
responsibility in the State Department? And then my final
question, to tell us how does this culture of shared
responsibility that the IG praises improve the safety and
security at our Embassies abroad?
Mr. Starr. Thanks for the question, Congressman. We have
addressed this in many different ways. The High Threat
Directorate itself, just by the fact that we concentrate on
looking every single year at our top 30 posts, the ones that we
worry about the most, the VP2 process that we are in the
process of conducting for those 30 posts, the fact that we have
written into every senior officer's job description and every
officer in the State Department their individual
responsibilities for security, the fact that I have officers
that are attending the meetings of the regional bureaus every
single week, in some cases every single day, and when we are
looking at the programs, we are also talking about the security
implications therefore, I think have highlighted the fact that
none of us can operate independently of considerations of
security at this point.
I think there has been a culture change in the Department.
I think having to weigh the importance of our programs and why
we are in very dangerous places under the VP2 process has
brought a laser-like focus on why we are there, what the real
threats are, and have a clear understanding of the threats, not
ignoring the threats, what we have done to mitigate those
threats, and then a decision at the end of that--is our
presence still adequate, and is our presence warranted despite
all these things--I think has brought a new culture to the
Department in many ways.
I think that I have never seen security taken as seriously
as it has been in the last 2 years, and I say that not lightly
because I have been here a long time, and security has been
taken seriously for many, many years in the Department. But I
think some of these processes that we have put in place at this
time are new to the Department and are doing exactly what the
ARB wanted and what you are talking about. Is it working itself
into the culture? And the answer is yes.
Mr. Cummings. Right. And the culture is very significant.
It is one thing when you have got an aberration. It is another
thing when you actually believe in something, you are doing it
every day, and it becomes a part of your DNA, that is the DNA
of the State Department.
Mr. Starr. Yes, sir. I would add one other thing, sir. The
officers that are reaching the senior ranks of the Department
today in many cases have spent significant amounts of time over
the last decade in places like Iraq, Pakistan, Afghanistan,
Sana'a, Yemen, Cairo, other places where we have true security
problems. The officers that I work with today, every single day
at my level and above, are keenly aware that security must be
balanced with our program implementation. They have lived it.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Gowdy. Thank the gentleman from Maryland.
The chair will now recognize the gentlelady from Alabama,
Ms. Roby.
Mrs. Roby. Thank you, Chairman Gowdy.
Mr. Linick, are you familiar with the 1997 OIG
recommendation regarding the need to prioritize MSG detachments
at diplomatic posts using a methodology based on the OSPB
security standards?
Mr. Linick. I am vaguely familiar. I wasn't here in 1997.
Mrs. Roby. Okay. Are you aware that it was closed in 1998?
Mr. Linick. I think that is right. I think that is right.
Mrs. Roby. And to the extent you can answer this, it was
closed because the Department amended its memorandum of
agreement with the Marine Corps to include procedures for
establishing the size of existing detachments and procedures
for activations and deactivations. Is that correct?
Mr. Linick. I don't recall why it was closed without
looking at the documents.
Mrs. Roby. Well, in 2014, your office again looked at
whether--at where and how Marine Security Guard detachments
were being utilized at the State Department posts overseas. Is
that correct?
Mr. Linick. That is correct.
Mrs. Roby. And were you able to determine whether there is
a methodology for prioritizing and assigning new MSG
attachments to overseas posts and whether that methodology was
effective?
Mr. Linick. Our auditors found in that report that there
were no formal procedures to select or identify posts. They
couldn't show how the Marine Security Guard units compared with
other posts. There was no formal plan for expansion. They
simply just didn't have the processes and procedures that one
would normally think you would have.
Mrs. Roby. So you weren't able to figure out how DS makes
the determination of where these Marines go?
Mr. Linick. We were not.
Mrs. Roby. And is it the same or similar issue to your
knowledge--I know you don't seem as familiar with the 1997--but
the Inspector General then told DS to create a process or
methodology to select posts, so this is a similar situation.
Correct?
Mr. Linick. I will accept that premise.
Mrs. Roby. Okay. So how can we on this committee have
confidence that recommendation 11 from the Benghazi ARB made
just 2 years ago, that the Department and DOD will provide more
capabilities at higher-risk posts? How can we have the
confidence that that will be fully implemented?
Mr. Linick. Well, that is the challenge of closing
recommendations. We have a compliance follow-up group that I
can tell you what they do now, and they do look very closely at
the actions that the Department takes to close recommendations.
They wouldn't close it unless they felt that there was
significant progress.
Mrs. Roby. Mr. Starr, I am going to follow up with you on
this point. According to the OIG, only 40 percent of the new
MSG detachments have been assigned to posts with high or
critical rating for political violence terrorism. In light of
your last statement in the previous questions, you said you
have never seen security taken so seriously in the past 2
years. Well, how does the fact that only 40 percent of the
high-risk, high-threat posts have these Marine security guard
detachments, how does this satisfy the ARB recommendation 11 to
expand that program to provide more capabilities and capacities
at higher risk posts?
Mr. Starr. Thank you for the question, Congresswoman. There
is actually a very clear, very simple answer for this. Most of
the posts that are high threat, high risk already had Marine
Security Guard detachments at them. That is why the 40 percent
number is there. Of the 30 posts that we ranked as our highest
threat, highest vulnerability, 19 of them already had Marine
Security Guard detachments. We have added two to those. Of the
remaining nine posts, five of those posts, there is no one
there. The post is in name only. We don't have people on the
ground, Mogadishu, Herat----
Mrs. Roby. Let me interrupt you for just a second.
Mr. Linick, do you agree with those numbers?
Mr. Linick. I haven't confirmed those numbers, so I don't
know.
Mrs. Roby. Okay.
Mr. Starr. And there are several other posts. There is
about four posts in that high-threat list where we would like
to put Marine Security Guard detachments; the host government
has not allowed us to do that. But the reason that that figure
seems very strange is that in the vast majority of cases, we
have already got Marine detachments at those places that are
high threat.
Mrs. Roby. Let's be very clear about this, Mr. Starr. How
many current high-risk threat posts do not have MSG
detachments?
Mr. Starr. Of the 30 highest-risk, highest-threat-level
posts, nine do not, but five of those nine are not functioning
posts. They are closed. So four.
Mrs. Roby. Do you agree with that, Mr. Linick, or do you
not know?
Mr. Linick. I don't know.
Mrs. Roby. Okay. Is there a timetable, Mr. Starr, in place
for assigning the MSG detachments to the, you say four posts?
Is there a timetable?
Mr. Starr. I would like to do it tomorrow, but I will tell
you I find it unlikely that I am going to be able to assign
Marine detachments to those posts.
Mrs. Roby. And you say it is because host nation problems.
Mr. Starr. Host nation problems.
Mrs. Roby. When I talked to you last time, 3 months ago, it
doesn't seem like we have made much progress, but I asked you,
you know, what is your plan with the ones that you don't? If
you have got host nation problems, are there other ways to get
security there? And you said in your testimony, if we find that
we don't have those types of protections--you listed adding DS
agents, several other mitigating things--but you said if we
don't find that we don't have those types of protections or
that we think that those risks are too high, then we won't be
there. So why have we not made progression on those four posts
that you are stating now we still do not have those protections
in place?
Mr. Starr. In some cases, we have other types of
protection. The host nation has stood up and given us high
levels of protection. In some cases, I have a tremendous amount
of other resources there, including Diplomatic Security agents
and armed contractors that meet the threat. In some cases, we
have made a determination that the host government is standing
up and fulfilling its responsibilities, and while we would
still like to have Marines there, the fact that we don't does
not mean that we cannot continue. This is some of the things
that we are looking at as we do this VP2 process, when we weigh
why we are at a post, what the threats are, what resources we
have overall, and as I say Marines are one tool in our tool
kit.
Mrs. Roby. Mr. Linick, I want to take Mr. Starr's answer
and follow up with you. Do you think that is sufficient?
Mr. Linick. My question is along the lines of the report,
what are the plans? Where are the plans? Where is the
methodology? What plans out there are there to negotiate with
host governments that are unwilling to take us, those kinds of
things?
Mrs. Roby. And you have not gotten a clear answer from DS
on exactly how this is going to be handled. Correct?
Mr. Linick. All the recommendations are open at this time.
Mrs. Roby. All the recommendations are open. And based on
the questions from Ms. Brooks earlier, ``open'' means they are
unresolved and there is no evidence there that they are doing
anything to make it better?
Mr. Linick. Well, actually, there are a number of open
resolved recommendations. In other words, the Department has
agreed in principle to comply, but there are two
recommendations which are unresolved, which means we just
disagree.
Mrs. Roby. Of the six, there are four unresolved--excuse
me, four resolved and two unresolved?
Mr. Linick. That is correct.
Mrs. Roby. But even the resolved, you have just gotten them
to say that they want to do something, but you have no actions
to back up their words?
Mr. Linick. That is correct.
Mrs. Roby. So we still have, according to Mr. Starr's
testimony, we have four places, very dangerous places of the
world where American lives are at stake because we don't have
the proper security in place?
Mr. Starr. Congresswoman----
Mrs. Roby. This is for Mr. Linick. Is that correct?
Mr. Linick. I have to accept those facts because I don't
know independently whether that is true.
Mrs. Roby. Recommendation six of your report recommends
that DS Marine security guard programs conduct a staffing and
resource assessment and judiciously allocate appropriate
resources to facilitate compliance with the Benghazi
Accountability Review Board Report to upgrade security for
personnel at high-threat posts. Has this been done?
Mr. Linick. Not according to the facts that I have heard.
Mrs. Roby. So, in fact, the Department has yet to comply
with Benghazi's ARB recommendation 11. Correct?
Mr. Linick. We believe Benghazi ARB recommendation 11
intended for there to be Marine Security Guards at all high-
threat posts.
Mrs. Roby. And so I want to hear you say that is correct.
Mr. Linick. Yes, that is correct.
Mrs. Roby. Thank you very much. I have got 22 seconds left.
I did want to touch a little bit on the local guard force, and
let's see, real quick, Mr. Linick, if I can just get to the
point with you, you had two findings in your report: A,
security contractors did not fully comply with the vetting
requirements called for in the contracts; and, B, the regional
security officers at overseas posts took it upon themselves to
vary the vetting and approval process and failed to ensure that
the security contractors provided all the required
documentation. That is correct?
Mr. Linick. That is correct.
Mrs. Roby. So did any of the security companies that had
contracts fully perform all vetting required in their
contracts?
Mr. Linick. No. We looked at 87 personnel files, and none
of them--none of the security contractors performed all of the
vetting requirements contained in the contracts.
Mrs. Roby. And of the six Embassies reviewed, did any of
them allow guards to work before being fully vetted?
Mr. Linick. Yes, a number of them allowed them to work
without vetting.
Mrs. Roby. Mr. Chairman, I just do not understand how this
can be just 2 years after four Americans were killed in
Benghazi, we have local guards that are not fully vetted that,
clearly, Mr. Chairman, show that we have a severe security
threat in very dangerous places where American lives are at
stake today. Thank you so much. Thank you for being here.
I yield back.
Chairman Gowdy. I thank the gentlelady from Alabama.
And the chair will now recognize the gentleman from
California, Mr. Schiff.
Mr. Schiff. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank the gentlemen for being here. I appreciate your
service very much. Mr. Starr, I wanted to ask you, just for
some historical perspective, because I think many Americans may
be under the impression that what took place in Benghazi was
extraordinary in the sense that we have never had attacks on
our diplomatic facilities or tragedies like this in the past.
Tragically, we have had a great many over the years, and I
wonder if you could shed a little light on maybe the last 20
years. How many times have our facilities been attacked? How
many times has that resulted in injuries or fatalities? Is the
problem getting worse because the world is now more unstable?
It seems like there are more high-threat posts now than ever.
Is that just an impression, or is that the reality? And what
does that mean in terms of the prioritization you mentioned at
the outset? And that is--the priority is for a diplomatic post
to implement the policy of the United States--that has to be
done in a way where we can protect our people, but they are
there for a reason.
And there are many posts where we are where we could ask
the same questions. Why are we in Yemen? Why are we in Iraq?
Why are we in any of these places that are inherently
dangerous? There are foreign policy objectives in each of these
places, as there was in Libya. We have increasingly difficult
calls to make about where we post our people, what risks we are
willing to undertake in furtherance of our policy, and it is
one of the reasons I have such great respect for our people
that are in the diplomatic corps, because they are at risk.
There is just no avoiding it these days. Can you set a little
of the historic trend for us? What has been our experience with
violence at our facilities? To what degree is that phenomenon
changing, and is it changing for the worst?
Mr. Starr. We have more posts today categorized at high or
critical threat for civil disorder or terrorism than at any
time in my service in the Department. I think we are seeing a
lot of different threats emerging. I don't think that is a
surprise to anyone. We are challenged in many ways, but, again,
going back to what we have been doing since Nairobi and Dar es
Salaam, which was when Al Qaeda first came in our view full
face, that we had to recognize that we had a determined
nonstate enemy against us, a lot of the programs that we put in
place and the buildings that we have built have helped make us
safer and balanced that security.
But, Congressman, as you say, over the last 10 or more
years, we have had multiple, multiple attacks on our facilities
and our people in Iraq, many, many attacks in Afghanistan. In
Herat last year, we had a horrific attack with two truck bombs,
eight suicide bombers trying to kill our people at the
consulate in Herat. Our security systems worked. We killed all
of them. We lost, tragically, some third-country national
security guards and some Afghan police officers, but no
Americans were killed in that.
As has been alluded to here, at the same time as the
Benghazi attack, we had huge crowds and mobs that were coming
over our facilities and attacking our facilities in Cairo, in
Tunisia, and in Sudan. And in the last two posts, 8 and half
hours before the host country came to our support, our
facilities held, and no Americans were injured. We have had and
lost certain Foreign Service officers and one-off attacks,
lone-wolf types of attacks, including John Granville in Sudan
not too many years ago. We have had RPG attacks, truck bomb
attacks, car bomb attacks, car bomb attacks on our motorcades.
We have had aircraft that have been shot at.
We have had almost innumerable attacks on our facilities
over the last 20 years. And you are right; they are going up.
It is a challenge. I would first say that it is a testament to
the Foreign Service that our officers still want to get out and
implement the important Foreign Service goals that we have to.
It is a testament to their willingness to take new types of
training and for the Department to take on these security
risks.
Congress has been a very important partner in how we have
met these risks, particularly since the 1998 bombings in Dar es
Salaam and Nairobi, and we appreciate that.
We will continue to work on these things, but I don't think
it is a surprise to anybody that we are living in a world that
has a high degree of instability in many countries. There is a
lot of open discussion about how extremism is drawing in new
youth, disaffected personnel, and has a calling that is being
heard by certain people. So we have our challenges cut out for
us, and we are going to do the best we can to meet those
challenges while still implementing the foreign policy of the
United States government.
Mr. Schiff. Thank you. Mr. Starr, let me drill down on a
couple specifics that I think have manifested themselves in
light of this increasing threat environment and increasing
number of high-risk posts, and that is more people that are on
temporary assignment and people that are of short duration in
some of these high security threats. Many of us that have
visited our diplomatic facilities overseas meet people that are
there for short tours. You talked about one way of trying to
fill the gap with retirees. It may be desirable to bring in the
retirees who have great experience, but why is that necessary?
Are we having trouble attracting enough personnel to go to
these high-threat posts? Is there a mutually reinforcing cycle
where people who go to a high-threat post therefore get
recommendations from people in those posts for future
assignments and are kind of locked into high-threat posts? What
is the impact on our personnel of the proliferation of
dangerous places where they work?
Mr. Starr. Congressman, the situation that we face is that
most of these high-threat posts are unaccompanied. We are
asking more and more of our personnel to take unaccompanied
tours away from their families for longer periods of time.
Generally, these have been 1-year tours, but we are now at a
point where we are asking more of our officers to serve 2-year
unaccompanied tours overseas without their families. We have
rotated many of our Foreign Service officers and many of my
security agents and my security personnel through multiple
hardship tours without their families at these high-threat
posts at this point.
The Foreign Service has a certain amount of personnel. We
have not had to rely particularly on very many TDY personnel.
Some of the other agencies that are present at our posts
overseas have greatly relied on temporary duty personnel, not
so much the Department. We have had officers that stood up and
continue to stand up and serve at these places. But it is not
without cost. It is not without, in some cases, fracturing
families, or are we asking them to serve tour after tour in
high-threat posts multiple times at these places? Do we have
behavorial problems and other things that are coming out of
this? And the answer in some cases is yes.
In many cases, where we have a need to put our best people
in some tough places where we are asking sometimes for
temporary personnel but sometimes for longer periods of time,
the Department is asking to bring back some of the retired
people. Somebody is going to use that vast experience that they
have got, and they are going to pay them for it. We would like
to be able to avail ourselves of that as well if possible.
Mr. Starr. But I do think that the State Department has
been at the forefront of filling our positions with mostly
full-time assigned personnel. Although we, too, rely on TDYs
occasionally.
Mr. Schiff. Just one last question, because I only have a
minute left, I wanted to follow up on. I think we all recognize
the importance of having high-level attention paid to the ARB
recommendations by the top principals in the State Department.
And I fully concur that Secretaries Clinton and Kerry have
embraced and even established this as a best practice.
You had mentioned that it was codified in the Foreign
Affairs Manual very recently. But the embrace of that by those
top principals, that was from the very beginning. In fact, that
was a standard that they set, was it not?
Mr. Starr. I think it was very evident from the statements
of Secretary Kerry and our principals that we were in this
together. And everybody had to get on board.
What we are now doing is bringing it around to the fact of
putting it in the policy. And Steve has pointed out that is
important. We need to make those changes. We need to codify
this going forward. And we are doing that. But I agree with you
that I have spent many hours and many meetings with the Deputy
Secretaries and many others. And I have had discussion with the
Secretary about what security means to us.
Mr. Schiff. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I yield back.
Chairman Gowdy. Thank the gentleman from California.
The chair would now recognize gentleman from Illinois, Mr.
Roskam.
Mr. Roskam. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Starr and Mr. Linick, thanks for your time.
Secretary, I find your argument inconsistent in this sense.
And I just want to bring to your attention a couple of
statements that you have made to my colleagues, some of the
realities that I perceive, and walk you through my thinking.
A couple of minutes ago, you told Ranking Member Cummings
that there has been a culture change in the Department. And if
there has been a culture change in the Department, that
presupposes that you basically offer everything up that is an
obstacle and to recognize and to reflect, look, this is a
problem, and we are going to rid ourselves of every single
problem that was an obstacle to a remedy.
Couple of minutes ago, you made the argument to Mr.
Schiff--not an argument, but you made the point, increasingly
dangerous world. Nobody here disagrees with that. It was
compelling you used words like ``extremism,'' ``disaffected
youth,'' and these posts that are unaccompanied because they
are miserable places to go, presumably.
And yet one of the things that is the remedy to that is the
waiver authority in recommendation No. 13 that the department
continues to cling to.
So the recommendation of the Best Practices Panel in No. 3,
it says this, it says, Waivers to establish security standards
should only be pursued subsequent to the implementation of
mitigating measures as agreed by Regional Bureau or other
program managers advised by D.S. and as informed by the
Department risk management model.
That is a great idea.
Now, here is the problem. The Department--and I don't know
where you were in the discussion. But the Department has said,
We don't think that is a great idea. In fact, we think this: In
certain cases involving national security--I am going to come
back to that because that is such an ambiguous term--an
exception can be approved based on the mitigating measures
already in place--presuming that there are mitigating measures,
I might add--even though future mitigating measures may be
planned to bring the facility even closer to or in conformance
with the OSPB physical security standards. In such cases when
time is of the essence to further U.S. national security
interests, the Department requires flexibility to grant an
exception prior to the implementation of planned mitigating
measures.
So here is my point. That is a gaping exception. That is an
exception, Mr. Secretary, that anything can get through. And I
mean anything.
So if it is simply, look, this is national security, all of
a sudden, that becomes a laminated hall pass for somebody at
the Department of State to say we are declaring this a national
security emergency. Yeah, we have gone through to the whole
process, the process that you described that is identifying the
high risk--high-threat, high-risk posts, going through VP2. So
far, there is no restraining influence.
Then there are two choices, either recharacterize something
as a special mission compound or something else or go through
another process.
And even within the other formalized process, there is
still this waiver authority. And people around you, Mr.
Secretary, are saying, Give it up.
And by your own argument, I might add, you are making the
argument that you should give it up, that there is a culture
change that is so big that you are describing it to Ranking
Member Cummings and a world that is so dangerous that you are
using all kinds of words that we all agree with. So why in the
world hang on to this thing?
Mr. Starr. For a very specific technical reason, sir. We
pick a place. Sometimes the best that we can get in a short
duration if we are going to go back in. We have to make
decisions on what needs to be done and what levels of things we
can't possibly do.
I can't create 100 feet of setback when there isn't 100
feet of setback. We may have to accept that.
And at a certain point we have to make decisions: Are we
going to accept that, do the rest of the things that we need to
do, or are we just going to say, no, we are not going to accept
that? And then continue looking until we find a place.
By the way, I have never found a place to lease in 30 years
in the Department that actually had a hundred feet of setback
that was available.
Mr. Roskam. Secretary Starr, what is different than the
reasoning that you just articulated to me just now from the
reasoning that put us in Benghazi and that allowed four people
to be killed? What is different?
Mr. Starr. There is--I will admit that there is some
measure of risk in what I am saying. But----
Mr. Roskam. Huge risk, based on what you told Mr. Schiff.
Mr. Starr. No, I don't agree that it is huge risk. I think
that we have to----
Mr. Roskam. You told him it was a dangerous world filled
with extremists and disaffected youth. That was 5 minutes ago.
Mr. Starr. True.
But I think that we have to be able to make decisions to
progress. In some cases, if we are going to lease a new
facility, we are going to have to admit that we are going to
have to give waivers to certain things in order to fulfill
that.
Mr. Roskam. So what is different about what you just
articulated.
Mr. Starr. The difference is that we have to do the
waivers, that there has to be a decision process.
Mr. Roskam. Yeah. But then why don't you agree to the
mitigation? That was the key finding of the Best Practices.
Mr. Starr. Because in some places, we can't get the
mitigation.
Mr. Roskam. If you can't get the----
Mr. Starr. I can't rare----
Mr. Roskam. Look.
Mr. Starr. I cannot get a blast-proof building unless I
build it.
Mr. Roskam. Then why do we ask people to go to these
places?
Mr. Starr. Because in some cases, the foreign policy
imperatives of why we need to be there mean that we are going
to take reasonable levels of risk.
Now, what we have to be careful is that we don't take
unreasonable levels of risk. There has to be an open and
fulsome discussion about why we need to be there. What risks
are we really running? Do you really understand the threats? If
you put people----
Mr. Roskam. Look, Best Practice Panel recommendation is
trying to codify that risk discussion.
And if you rewind the tape today and you listen to the
answers that you gave--and I was carefully listening to this.
Earlier in the last--in our last discussion time, the last
hearing, Mrs. Roby asked you a question, and you and I had an
exchange about your answer.
But just to refresh your memory, she asked, Is it possible
for the State Department to open a temporary residential
facility? And you said, We don't have any at the moment; I
can't imagine that we would or that I would approve it. You,
singularly, Mr. Starr.
Earlier today, in part of the exchange, you said, I am
committed to keeping our people as safe as possible.
Now, I get it. That is opening statement language, and
there is nothing wrong with that.
You then told Ms. Saanchez, I turned that down.
You then told Mr. Jordan, I have access.
And your bristle was up a little bit because he was pushing
you around. But you were saying, I have access to the Secretary
of State.
Now, here is the problem: When you are gone, that next
person will be confronted with the same discussion that you
admitted is basically that there is nothing really different
about the thinking that went in on Benghazi, to your knowledge,
because you told us you weren't there.
I am telling you that I think it is very similar, that line
of thinking that says, yes, it is dangerous, got to get 'em, we
gotta go, and, yeah, there is no time. We got to check these
boxes and yeah, yeah, yeah.
And you have got this national security exception that the
exception like I have described is this big. And we are right
back into this situation.
Notwithstanding the culture change that you have offered
up. Do you see where this is going? Which is why people around
you are saying Give it up. Offer it up. You don't need it.
Mr. Starr. I think that that relying on one
recommendation----
Mr. Roskam. This is not one recommendation.
Mr. Starr. No, that is one particular recommendation that
we don't agree with because of a technical reason that we have
to be able to say in advance and write the waivers and say, We
are going to accept waiving that security standard, gives us
the ability to do these things.
Mr. Roskam. Look, in your answer, though----
Mr. Starr. The larger issue, though, is things like VP2 and
having processes in place.
And I recognize that this one particular one is confusing
in terms of it seems like we don't want a process.
Mr. Roskam. Oh, it is not confusing to me.
Mr. Starr. It seems like we don't want a process there. But
the fact is there is a process there.
Mr. Roskam. I don't think there is anything confusing about
this. You are basically saying, we are not going to mitigate--
you are not basically saying. You are saying we are not going
to mitigate. And these answers that the State Department has
offered, it presupposes mitigation that is already in place.
And it is relying on a speculation of possible mitigation.
In fact, it says it may be planned. May be planned.
That is speculation beyond speculation. This is speculation
upon speculation. Do you see how it is that people are coming
to the conclusion that in a post-Starr era, that, like it or
not, is coming, in a post-Starr era, when special committees
are not around, there is going to be every bit of possibility
and pressure based on the national security exemption, which as
I have described it is this big. All of a sudden we are right
back into this situation and we are grieving the loss of life.
I ask you to revisit this. I ask you to reconsider this.
This is something that you are clinging to. And that you ought
not.
I yield back.
Chairman Gowdy. Thank the gentleman from Illinois.
Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Maryland.
Mr. Cummings. You know, Mr. Starr, Mrs. Roby asked Mr.
Linick about the vetting of local security guards. I am
really--and I thought she had an excellent line of questioning.
I want to make sure I understand what is going on here,
because when the dust settles, again, I want to make sure our
people are safe.
When we talk about the vetting, can you tell me why there
is no vetting in those--I think it was four countries, Mr.
Linick.
Mr. Linick. It was six countries.
Mr. Cummings. Six.
Mr. Linick. Six contractors.
Mr. Starr. Congressman, the answer is that it is not true
there was no vetting. What the report points out is that they
didn't fully comply with the vetting requirements.
There are places around the world where we work that our
normal vetting requirements, things like requiring a police
check, can't be accomplished. There are places where we are or
the contractor is not allowed to perform a background
investigation. This is, of all places, in one place is Italy.
We cannot vet contractors in Italy because of personal rights
and statements that they have in law. It does not mean that we
don't do our best job to vet the people that we bring on board.
Now, I want to say one thing clearly. When Steve and his
inspectors go out and they find a circumstance where they say,
Hey, we don't think the contractor is living up to the vetting
requirements, I want to know that and we take that seriously
and we go back and say, Okay, what is happening here?
And, in some cases, we may find that there is a reason that
the contractor isn't fully vetting the people. He may have to
use alternate methods. But there may be cases and Steve's
people may find out that he is trying to put some shortcuts in
place. He doesn't want to pay for the vetting. And we need to
know those things. And that is valuable guidance that Inspector
Generals' teams are bringing back to us.
So I think it is a dual answer. One, I want to know what
they are finding because these inspections are part of our
backstop, and they are important to us.
Second, there may be reasons in some cases that there may
not be a full vetting. Cases that we can't do it.
There are different types of workarounds. And certain
places because we can't do police checks or they don't make
any--you just buy a police check, essentially. We are looking
at family ties. You know, does everybody know this person? Does
this person really want to work at the Embassy? And people have
known his character for a long time. So there may be
workarounds.
And, finally, there are places where we know that we have
significant issues hiring local employees to be guards. And, in
some of those places, we made the decision that we bring in
third-country contractors at tremendous expense because there
is no other way to get the vetting done, and we don't trust the
people.
So it is a holistic answer. I don't want to say that we
don't value, and I necessarily disagree with the IG on some of
these things. They play a really important role. The inspection
process is important to us. And when Steve's people come back
and say, Hey, something is not right here, we look at it. We
try to correct it as fast as possible. Or we have an
understanding that maybe it doesn't quite meet the needs, and
then we will have an open recommendation and we will go back
and forth with the inspector on that.
I would note, sir, that our guards have stood by us through
thick and thin. Some of them have stayed years after we have
closed our facilities and protected them.
We have never had a green-on-blue incident with any of our
guards. In many cases, they have showed loyalty to us far
beyond what we could ever do.
Are our guard programs perfect? No. And we strive to keep
them up to snuff every single day, try to require the highest
possible compliance with the rules and regulations that we put
in place.
And Steve's people play an important role in keeping us
there. So it is, all told, I need those guards, and we are
going to continue doing that. And I think we are doing
overwhelmingly a good job. Are there some things we need to
work on, yes, and when we find them, we are going to work on
them.
Mr. Cummings. Are you familiar with the June 2014 Inspector
General's report with regard to an audit of the Department's
oversight of the vetting process used for local security
guards? You are familiar with that audit?
Mr. Starr. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cummings. And he reported and explained that
contractors are challenged in vetting local security forces
because of local privacy laws, lack of credit reporting
services, and difficulty in obtaining official records in the
host country.
And how do you operate within those kind of constraints?
You go for--you do as much as you can and then you--I mean, how
do you--you want to vet. And so is there a certain point where
you say, well, there is just not enough vetting that we can do
that we can hire these folks? How does that work?
Mr. Starr. When we make a determination that we really
can't do any vetting, and we have no confidence in the guard
force, that is when we may turn to this other alternative,
third-country nationals, that we bring in from another country
that we can vet if we can get permission from the host country
to do that.
In many cases, it is more subtle than that, sir. As I say,
when the police check, it may not be worth the piece of paper
that it is printed on or where there are privacy laws that we
can't do things, in many cases we look at who knows this
person? What recommendations have they got? Are they family?
Are they tied to the Embassy in some place?
We have got to have guards. We have got to have people
manning those posts. We have got to have people that are, you
know, checking the people when they come in and checking their
packages and inspecting the cars.
And even when some of those vetting procedures may not
comport with what we do in terms of a security clearance back
here in the United States, we have a great deal of faith and
confidence in them, even though, in some cases, we may not meet
every requirement. We may not be able to cross every T and dot
every I. We have to take at a certain point some levels of
risk.
Mr. Cummings. Just one other thing, Mr. Starr. We have
spoken extensively about risk management. During our last
hearing, you spoke about how important it is to assess both the
willingness and the capability of the host country forces to
provide local security.
How does the State Department consider the potential issues
with local guards today when considering whether to operate in
a certain country? And how has that changed since Benghazi?
Mr. Starr. I don't know that that has actually changed
since Benghazi, sir. I would say that it has been an ongoing
issue for us. There are some countries that will not allow us
to have guard contractors. In some cases, we can hire them
directly. There are some countries where we have made that
determination that because of counterintelligence issues or
because we may think that the guard force could be infiltrated,
and we don't have faith and confidence that we may use third-
country contractors, this has been an ongoing issue since 2002.
We look at every country very carefully. We make a
determination how we can best fulfill the security requirements
in that country, whether it is a contract, whether it is a PSA,
direct-hire guard force, whether it is a third-country national
guard force.
We rely in great part on the experience of the RSOs in the
field and the contracting officers and the general services
officers to give us advice here in Washington and listen to
them and then make recommendations and decisions based on the
best knowledge that we have.
Mr. Cummings. Let me say this. I want to thank both of our
witnesses for being here today. We really do appreciate it.
And we appreciate your willingness to work hard every day
to make our people safer. I know, Mr. Starr, that we have--I
know we pressed you hard today. Please recognize and understand
that we do so to ensure the Department's feet are held to the
fire because it is important for all of us that we do this
right. And I remind you again it is our watch. Your testimony
in September and October update you have provided us, we
appreciate. And your testimony today shows continued progress.
And we appreciate your willingness to work with us and anyone
else who helps to make our Embassies safer. So I want to thank
you for that.
And I want to thank you, Mr. Linick, for all that you are
doing because you, too, help us keep these feet to the fire.
With regard to the ARB, I think we are making good
progress. But I want to make sure everything is done. And I
know that there are some ARB recommendations, quite a few of
them, from past ARBs. I think we need to take these
opportunities and try to address as much as we possibly can,
even back then, because those things are still ongoing. Right,
Mr. Linick There are still problems.
Mr. Linick. Yes, that is correct.
Mr. Cummings. So, again, I want to thank both of you again.
Mr. Starr, don't forget that we want to know when those
other recommendations of the ARB will be completed and to let
us know when they are, in fact, completed. All right? Okay?
Mr. Starr. Yes, sir. We will get those answers to you.
And, sir, I expect to be pressed pretty hard. This is tough
business, and it is important business. And you can press as
hard as you want. Myself and Steve, we are both pretty tough
guys. And we appreciate even the tough questioning.
The opportunity to put those things on the table with you
in an important committee like this is important to me, too.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much.
Chairman Gowdy. I thank the gentleman from Maryland.
Secretary Starr, I was going to pursue a line of
questioning. And I will get to that at some point.
But when Jimmy Jordan asked you why were we in Libya--and I
am not going to ask you the same question because you made it
clear you are not the right person for us to ask. And I am
going to respect that. But I want to make sure you understand
why Jimmy would ask you that question and why all of us are
asked that question with alarming frequency in our districts.
The last hearing we had, you did a very good job of
explaining to those of us who are not in diplomacy that you
have to weigh and balance. I think you said you have to weigh
and balance the policy with the risk to determine whether or
not you should have a presence.
And it just struck me that there is no way you could
possibly weigh and balance policy versus risk if you don't
understand what the policy is.
And then I started thinking, when Jimmy was talking, I
wonder where the question came from.
And I knew I had seen this somewhere. Do you know someone
by the name of Ben Rhodes?
Mr. Starr. I don't know Ben Rhodes personally; I know the
position that he was filling.
Chairman Gowdy. I don't know him either. But there was a
memo 3 days after four of our fellow Americans were killed in
Benghazi. And I will skip over goal number one of his
communications memo. Actually, I won't. Because it says to
convey that the U.S. is doing everything we can to protect our
people and our facilities.
And it just struck me, if you really were doing everything
you could, we would not have had 50 separate recommendations
after he wrote that memo and this now the second hearing to
make sure that those recommendations were implemented.
But I am going to skip over that goal to get to the second
goal.
The second goal, Secretary Starr, was to underscore that
these protests are rooted in an Internet video and not a
broader failure of policy.
So I am going to skip over the video part of that for now
and get to the second clause, the dependent clause in that
sentence, ``not a broader failure of policy.''
How can we judge whether or not a policy has failed or
succeeded if no one tells us what the policy objectives were?
How can we do that?
How can you weigh and balance the risk?
Jimmy's gone through the risk, members on the other side
have gone through all the escalating episodes of violence in
Benghazi. And it may well be that the reason for us to have
been there supersedes all of those episodes of violence. But
how? How can a committee of Congress know that if no one tells
us why we were there?
So you are not the right person to ask. Who would you ask
if you were us? Who should we bring to explain why were we in
Libya?
Mr. Starr. The policy questions I think should more
properly be directed to the NEA Bureau, Near Eastern Affairs
Bureau that had responsibility for that.
Chairman Gowdy. I am looking for a name, preferably. Who
would be able to tell us what policy we were pursuing in Libya
was so important to skip over all the things that Mr. Roskam
pointed out and to weigh and balance the episodes of violence
in such a way that the presence outweighed the violence.
Mr. Starr. At the risk of having her never talk to me
again, the Assistant Secretary for NEA Anne Patterson, I think,
is the highest-ranking person in the NEA Bureau, and at the
time of the attack was the U.S. Ambassador in Egypt. And I
think Anne or one of the Deputy Assistant Secretaries in the
NEA Bureau could give you the best answer on that.
Chairman Gowdy. All right. Well, I thank you for that name.
And I want to make sure you and I are on the same sheet of
music.
Do you understand why we would have that question? I mean,
do you think that that is a fair and legitimate question for us
to ask, what the policy was, so we can then weigh and balance
it, as you instructed us to do?
Mr. Starr. I think that is a reasonable question, sir.
Chairman Gowdy. Okay, well, thank you.
Now, Secretary Starr, last time you were with us we not
only discussed the most recent ARB recommendations, but we went
back and highlighted some from the past. And one in particular
from 1999 caught my attention: The Secretary of State should
take a personal and active role in carrying out the
responsibility for ensuring the security of U.S. diplomatic
personnel abroad. It is essential to convey to the entire
Department that security is one of the highest priorities.
And Secretary Starr, just in case somebody missed that part
of the 1999 ARB, the authors reiterated that point with this:
The Secretary of State should personally review the security
situation of Embassies and other official premises, closing
those which are highly vulnerable and threatened.
Two previous ARB recommendations that you could essentially
lay on top of one another. They are identical.
And I don't think they are identical because they forgot
that they put the first one. I think they are identical because
they were trying to send a message to us. This is really
important. And it is deserving of the attention at the highest
levels of the Department.
So here is what I want to do. I want to ask you, I want to
know, specifically with respect to Benghazi, in October of
2011, there was a specific request for a machine gun to defend
our facility in Benghazi. And, in August of 2012, just a month
before the attack on our facility, a document again lists a
machine gun as equipment needed and requested.
Do you know who denied the requests for those machine guns
and why?
Mr. Starr. No, sir, I do not.
Chairman Gowdy. Who should I ask and find out?
Mr. Starr. You can ask me, sir, and I will go back and
research that.
Chairman Gowdy. Would you do that for me?
Mr. Starr. Yes, I will.
Chairman Gowdy. Have you watched the video surveillance
from the night of the attack?
Mr. Starr. I have.
Chairman Gowdy. Without going into great detail, would you
agree with me, or do you at least see why somebody on the
ground might have asked for that piece of equipment, given what
you and I have seen in the surveillance video? I mean, thinking
back to the video, can you see how that might possibly have
come in handy that night?
Mr. Starr. In my review of what happened and looking at
that, I think the agents made the right decisions at that point
not to engage. I think that they were equipped with fully
automatic weapons, not quite the rate of fire power of a
machine gun. I agree that, you know, machine guns can be very
menacing and have a tremendous effect. But, in this
circumstance, I'm not sure----
Chairman Gowdy. They wanted them for the rooftop. They
wanted them for the rooftops.
I want you to go back if you would and watch the video and
see whether or not you conclude the same way that I concluded
or not. And I appreciate if you could go back and, with
specificity, I want to know who reviewed that request, who
denied that request, and is there an appeals process within the
State Department in light of these two previous ARB
recommendations that the Secretary of State should take a
personal and active review that the Secretary of State should
personally review the security situation. Is there an appeals
process where someone hypothetically could say, you know what?
You are giving me a no, but I'm going to take this up the food
chain. Does that exist?
Mr. Starr. Yes.
Chairman Gowdy. All the way up to the highest levels of the
State Department?
Mr. Starr. I will tell you that the one thing the
Department has that very few other agencies has is something
called the dissent channel. And it is a channel that we highly
prize and that if you disagree with policy or you disagree with
a decision, that officers in the Department of State at all
ranks and all locations have the ability to send something
directly in at the highest levels through a dissent channel
cable and say, I disagree with something, and it goes to the
highest level.
Chairman Gowdy. In June and July of 2012, mere months
before the attack in Benghazi, the Ambassador himself requested
a security team be extended to stay longer.
Mr. Starr. Security team in Tripoli, sir, not Benghazi.
Chairman Gowdy. In Tripoli, yes. But it doesn't take much
to imagine him traveling from Tripoli to Benghazi with an
increased security presence, does it? If there were more
security folks in Tripoli, and he is traveling to Benghazi, it
is not that much of a stretch to surmise that some of them may
have actually traveled with him.
Mr. Starr. When he traveled to Benghazi in that trip, sir,
he took additional RSOs with him. There were additional RSOs
that could have gone as well but they made the determination--
--
Chairman Gowdy. For a grand total of how many?
Mr. Starr. Five at post.
Chairman Gowdy. All right. And how many were there before
the foot print was reduced?
Mr. Starr. Three.
Chairman Gowdy. No, no, no. How many were there before
their deployment ended?
Mr. Starr. I don't think there was ever more than five at
that post, sir.
Chairman Gowdy. In Tripoli?
Mr. Starr. No, I am sorry. In Benghazi, I am sorry.
Chairman Gowdy. I am talking about--I am talking about that
the Ambassador would have had access to.
Because you and I agree the number that he had access to
was reduced, despite the fact that he asked for more.
Mr. Starr. The military team, the SST team had departed.
Additional DS agents were put into post.
Chairman Gowdy. What I want you to find out for me is this,
because this is a Presidentially-appointed Ambassador who made
a pretty plaintiff pleading. In fact, I will quote it to you:
``Our efforts to normalize security operations have been
hindered by a lack of host nation security support, an increase
in violence on foreign targets, and neither compound meets OSPB
standards.''
Do you know would said that?
Mr. Starr. From your context, I would think it would be the
Ambassador.
Chairman Gowdy. It was the Ambassador himself in a--what I
would describe as a pretty plaintiff pleading for some help.
And this is the response he got: No. I do not not want them to
ask for the team to stay.
Do you know who said that to the Ambassador, the
Presidentially-appointed, Senate-confirmed Ambassador?
Mr. Starr. It was referring to the SST and that might have
been Ambassador Kennedy.
Chairman Gowdy. It could have been. But it was actually
Charlene Lamb. And Charlene Lamb is not, has not been, and is
not likely to ever be the Secretary of State for this country.
And so when I see her responding to a Presidentially-
appointed, Senate-confirmed Ambassador who is making a pretty
plaintiff pleading for some extra help and she says, ``Do not
not make that request,'' I want to know whether the Ambassador
had the ability to go above her head and go straight to the
top. And if not, why not?
Mr. Starr. The Ambassador certainly did have the ability to
go over her head.
Sir, I do think that the one salient point that must be
discussed is that there was quite a bit of discussion about
relieving the SST, the military team that was there and only
provided static security at the compound, with additional
diplomatic security agents who could provide static security
and mobile security. I think that was why the decision was made
to release the SST. We were replacing it with personnel that
actually had more capabilities.
Chairman Gowdy. Well, Secretary Starr, my time is up. But
sometimes when everyone is to blame, no one is to blame. And
part of the frustration that Mr. Roskam I believe so eloquently
remarked on today was the designation of the facility itself.
And then you have our heretofore failure to understand what
policy would have been so important----
You testified that we have how many un-personed posts right
now? Five? Did I hear you correctly? Five? You were going
through a series of numbers. And you said, Well, five of those
you can discard because actually there is no one there.
Mr. Starr. Correct.
Chairman Gowdy. So we do close facilities.
Mr. Starr. Yes, sir.
Chairman Gowdy. And I am assuming that someone did the
weighing and balancing on those five and decided, you know
what? Through the miracles of technology, or whatever, we don't
have to have a physical presence there.
So you can understand why we would like to know what
weighing and balancing went on with respect to Libya. And I
want to know who saw these requests for extra equipment and
personnel, who denied them, and whether or not you believe--
and, inspector general, you can help here, too--whether or not
you believe that there is a culture in the State Department
where there would be any consequences for following the dissent
channel, because some companies do say, ``Sure, I have an open
door policy,'' but sometimes when you walk through that open
door, your career takes a hit.
With that, I want to thank the ranking member and all the
other members.
Thank both of you.
You and I get together privately. You discuss a reasonable
timetable for getting answers to those questions.
And, with that, the members would have five additional days
to put whatever they want, any questions, in the record.
Thank both of you for your time.
Mr. Starr, in your case, twice. And if you would convey to
the men and women who work for the State Department how
grateful all of us, irrespective of politics, are for their
service.
And, with that, we would be adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:59 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
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