[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
RUSSIAN ARMS CONTROL CHEATING AND THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
(Serial No. 113-238)
SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
(Serial No. 113-132)
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
DECEMBER 10, 2014
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
DANA ROHRABACHER, California Samoa
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio BRAD SHERMAN, California
JOE WILSON, South Carolina GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
TED POE, Texas GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
MATT SALMON, Arizona THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina KAREN BASS, California
ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
MO BROOKS, Alabama DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
TOM COTTON, Arkansas ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
PAUL COOK, California JUAN VARGAS, California
GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois
RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III,
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania Massachusetts
STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas AMI BERA, California
RON DeSANTIS, Florida ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California
TREY RADEL, Florida--resigned 1/27/ GRACE MENG, New York
14 deg. LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
DOUG COLLINS, Georgia TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
TED S. YOHO, Florida
LUKE MESSER, Indiana--resigned 5/
20/14 noon deg.
SEAN DUFFY, Wisconsin--
added 5/29/14 noon deg.
CURT CLAWSON, Florida--
added 7/9/14 noon deg.
Amy Porter, Chief of Staff Thomas Sheehy, Staff Director
Jason Steinbaum, Democratic Staff Director
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade
TED POE, Texas, Chairman
JOE WILSON, South Carolina BRAD SHERMAN, California
ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California
MO BROOKS, Alabama JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
TOM COTTON, Arkansas JUAN VARGAS, California
PAUL COOK, California BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III,
TED S. YOHO, Florida Massachusetts
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces
MIKE ROGERS, Alabama, Chairman
TRENT FRANKS, Arizona JIM COOPER, Tennessee
DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado LORETTA SANCHEZ, California
MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
MO BROOKS, Alabama RICK LARSEN, Washington
JOE WILSON, South Carolina JOHN GARAMENDI, California
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio HENRY C. ``HANK'' JOHNSON, Jr.,
JOHN FLEMING, Louisiana Georgia
RICHARD B. NUGENT, Florida ANDREE CARSON, Indiana
JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma MARC A. VEASEY, Texas
Tim Morrison, Counsel
Leonor Tomero, Counsel
Colin Bosse and Eric Smith, Clerks
C O N T E N T S
The Honorable Rose Gottemoeller, Under Secretary for Arms Control
and International Security, U.S. Department of State........... 2
The Honorable Brian McKeon, Principal Deputy Under Secretary for
Policy, U.S. Department of Defense............................. 10
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
The Honorable Rose Gottemoeller: Prepared statement.............. 4
The Honorable Brian McKeon: Prepared statement................... 12
Hearing notice................................................... 48
Hearing minutes.................................................. 49
Written responses to questions submitted for the record by
members of the subcommittees................................... 50
RUSSIAN ARMS CONTROL CHEATING AND THE ADMINISTRATION'S RESPONSES
WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 10, 2014
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade,
Committee on Foreign Affairs and
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
Committee on Armed Services,
The subcommittees met, pursuant to notice, at 2:01 p.m., in
room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ted Poe
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Poe. The Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation,
and Trade and the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces is convened.
This hearing is a continuation of the Russians' arms
control to bring us up to date. I would recall and remind all
committee members that there was a classified briefing
yesterday on this issue. We have this public briefing today,
and there will be another classified briefing after this public
hearing this afternoon. The classified briefing I found
alarming, and that is why we have the witnesses here this
morning, or this afternoon.
The Chair, with the agreement of Mr. Rogers, will dispense
with all opening statements of members. Without objection, all
of the members may have 5 days to submit statements, questions,
and extraneous materials for the record subject to the length
of limitation in the rules.
I will introduce our two witnesses, allow them to give
their statements. Then we will recess for votes and come back
for questions. That will be the format of this joint committee
Ms. Rose Gottemoeller is the Under Secretary for Arms
Control and International Security at the U.S. Department of
State. Mrs. Gottemoeller also served as the Assistant Secretary
of State for the Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and
Compliance, and was the chief U.S. negotiator in the New START
treaty with Russia.
Mr. Brian McKeon is the Principal Deputy Under Secretary
for Policy at the U.S. Department of Defense. Mr. McKeon also
served on the National Security Council staff and as Deputy
National Security Advisor to the Vice President.
Ms. Gottemoeller, we will start with you.
I would request that the witnesses try to keep their
statements to 5 minutes.
You are recognized.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ROSE GOTTEMOELLER, UNDER SECRETARY
FOR ARMS CONTROL AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
Ms. Gottemoeller. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairmen Poe and Rogers, Ranking Members Sherman and
Cooper, distinguished members of the House Foreign Affairs and
Armed Services Committees, thank you for hosting this hearing
today, for having me here today.
Today I want to seek about three things: Why arms control
agreements with Russia continue to be an important tool to
enhance the security of the United States, our allies, and
partners; the seriousness with which the administration takes
compliance with arms control agreements; and U.S. efforts to
ensure Russian compliance with its arms control obligations.
As has been recognized for 4 decades, verifiable arms
control agreements can enhance the security of the United
States, our allies, and our partners. The Obama administration
has continued the longstanding bipartisan approach to arms
control with Russia that had its origins in the days of the
cold war. The administrations of President Ronald Reagan and
George H.W. Bush were the architects of many of our most
successful and enduring arms control efforts.
That said, Russia's actions in Ukraine, increasingly
confrontational posture, and violations of the INF and CFE
treaties have undermined trust and must be addressed. While
diplomacy between the United States and Russia continues, no
one can ignore that Russia's actions have undermined the very
principles upon which cooperation is built.
Further, as we consider arms control priorities this year
or in any year, we will continue to consult closely with our
allies and partners at every step of the way. Our security and
defense, as well as that of our allies and partners, is
nonnegotiable. We will only support arms control agreements
that advance our national security interests.
I will cite the New START example as one such. Since New
START entered into force in 2011, the United States has
inspected, with boots on the ground, Russian nuclear weapons
facilities 70 times. Moreover, the United States and Russian
Federation have exchanged more than 7,500 notifications on one
another's nuclear forces in the past 4 years. These
notifications provide predictability by enabling the tracking
of strategic offensive arms from location to location, giving
advance notice of upcoming of ballistic missile test launches,
and providing updates of changes in the status of systems
covered by the treaty.
In the realm of conventional arms control, the United
States and our allies have been using arms control and
confidence-building mechanisms in an effort to promote
stability in Europe, provide transparency on Russia's
provocative actions in and around Ukraine, and assure our
allies and partners in the face of Russian aggression.
We believe that arms control mechanisms have great
importance not only in providing insight and transparency into
Russian actions on the ground in and around Ukraine but in
demonstrating support for our allies and partners. More
broadly, such mechanisms contribute to greater transparency and
stability in the Euro-Atlantic region.
I want to underscore, Mr. Chairman and colleagues, that our
NATO allies and other partners in Europe are strong supporters
of arms control and confidence-building mechanisms. And they
count on our active participation and leadership of these
Now let me turn very quickly to INF.
In July of this year, as you know, the United States
announced its determination that Russia was in violation of its
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty obligations not to
posses, produce, or flight-test a ground-launched cruise
missile with a range capability of 500 to 5,500 kilometers. We
take this violation extremely seriously.
The INF Treaty, negotiated and ratified during the Reagan
administration, eliminated an entire class of ballistic and
cruise missiles capable of delivering nuclear and nonnuclear
weapons. The INF Treaty benefits the security of the United
States, our allies, and the Russian Federation, and the United
States is committed to the continued viability of the INF
We have been steadily raising our concerns with Russia
regarding violation of the INF Treaty and have, since July,
held senior-level bilateral discussions, with the aim of
returning Russia to verifiable compliance with its treaty
In addition to these diplomatic efforts, we are actively
reviewing potential economic measures in response to Russia's
violation, and the United States is assessing options in the
military sphere to ensure that Russia will not gain a
significant military advantage from its violation of the INF
My colleague, Brian McKeon, will speak further about that.
In sum, for more than 40 years, arms control has been a
tool that has contributed substantially to the national
security interests of the United States, providing
predictability and stability to us and to the global community.
As owners of more than 90 percent of the nuclear global
stockpile, the United States and Russia continue to have a
special responsibility in this regard.
We will continue to pursue arms control and
nonproliferation tools along with effective verification,
because they are the best path that we can take to effectively
limit and reduce nuclear threats and prevent such weapons from
proliferating to other nation-states or falling into the hands
of extremists bent on causing colossal destruction.
Thank you for your partnership in this effort, and I look
forward to answering your questions.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Gottemoeller follows:]
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Mr. Poe. The Chair recognizes Mr. McKeon for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE BRIAN MCKEON, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY UNDER
SECRETARY FOR POLICY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Mr. McKeon. Thank you very much, sir.
Chairman Rogers, Chairman Poe, Ranking Member Cooper,
Ranking Member Sherman, distinguished members of the two
subcommittees, thank you for this opportunity today.
I will try not to repeat what Under Secretary Gottemoeller
has told you. In addressing the issues outlined in your letter
of invitation, I would point you to my full statement for the
record. Let me highlight a few key points.
When implemented fully by all parties, arms control
agreements advance U.S. national security interests. The United
States is made safer and more secure by such agreements. The
administration closely monitors compliance of other states-
parties to arms control treaties and agreements, including that
of the Russian Federation. And, as required by law, we report
this assessment to the Congress.
Through this effort, the Obama administration has
determined that the Russian Federation is in violation of its
obligations under the INF Treaty. We reported this violation in
the arms control compliance report issued in 2014, and we have
briefed you regularly on our concerns about Russia's actions
and discussed it with our allies and partners.
We believe the INF Treaty contributes not only to U.S. and
Russian security but also to that of our allies and partners.
For that reason, Russian possession, development, or deployment
of a weapons system in violation of the treaty will not be
Our objective from the very beginning has been to preserve
the viability of the INF Treaty and convince Russia to come
back into compliance with its obligations under it. Our
approach to this issue has been multipronged, beginning with
engaging Russia diplomatically while discussing other potential
measures in coordination with allies.
We have engaged the Russian Federation in diplomatic
channels since 2013, including senior-level discussions in
Moscow in September of this year. Unfortunately, Russia has not
been forthcoming with any information, nor has it acknowledged
the existence of a noncompliant cruise missile. Instead, the
Russian side has chosen to accuse the United States of
violating its obligations under the INF Treaty.
In our view, all of Russia's claims are categorically
unfounded. The United States has been and remains in compliance
with all of its obligations under the INF Treaty. In our
September meeting in Moscow, we fully addressed each of
Russia's concerns, providing Russian officials with detailed
explanations and treaty-based reasons as to how U.S. actions
comply with our obligations. These Russian claims, we believe,
are meant to divert attention from its own violation.
As a result of Russia's actions, the Joint Staff has
conducted a military assessment of the threat were Russia to
deploy an INF Treaty-range ground-launched cruise missile in
Europe or the Asia-Pacific region. This assessment has led us
to review a broad range of military response options and
consider the effect each option could have on convincing
Russian leadership to return to compliance with the INF Treaty
as well as countering the capability of a Russian INF Treaty-
We do not want to find ourselves engaged in an escalatory
cycle of action and reaction. However, Russia's lack of
meaningful engagement on this issue, if it persists, will
ultimately require the United States to take actions to protect
its interests and security, along with those of its allies and
partners. Those actions will make Russia less secure.
We now have a significant challenge ahead of us. We hope
the Russia Federation will remember why the Soviet Union signed
the INF Treaty in the first place. By agreeing to that treaty,
the United States and the Soviet Union ensured that both
parties benefited from the removal of weapons systems that
posed a real and credible threat to European security.
As I noted at the outset, the United States takes treaty
compliance very seriously. The ramifications of Russia's
actions and our response affect more than just one arms control
agreement; they affect our ability to pursue future arms
control and nonproliferation regimes. Such a violation
threatens our security and the collective security of many
allies and partners. This violation will not go unanswered,
because there is too much at stake.
We look forward to keeping you informed on this matter as
the situation develops.
Thank you for the opportunity to be here today, and we look
forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. McKeon follows:]
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Mr. Poe. I thank the statements of the witnesses.
As previously stated, the subcommittees will be in recess
until 15 minutes after the last vote in a series of three
votes. The first series--or the first vote in the series is
taking place now.
So the subcommittees are adjourned.
Mr. Poe. The subcommittees will come to order.
The Chair will recognize himself for 5 minutes.
If I understand your testimony correctly, the Russians are
in violation of this treaty. My question is, are the Russians
in violation of any other arms control treaties besides the
Ms. Gottemoeller. Yes, Mr. Chairman. We do consider the
Russians to be in violation of the Conventional Forces in
Mr. Poe. Is it correct to say that the Russians are in
violation, are not complying with the eight other arms control
treaties besides this one?
Ms. Gottemoeller. Sir, in some cases, we are working on
compliance issues with them. In the case of the Open Skies
Treaty, for example, we have had some concerns about their
compliance with the Open Skies Treaty, but we are working, and
in some cases successfully working, to resolve some of our
In other cases, such as the Biological Weapons Convention,
we have been unable to determine whether current activities
that they have going on would not be in compliance with the
treaty. And in some cases----
Mr. Poe. Excuse me. Let me ask you this question.
Ms. Gottemoeller. Yes.
Mr. Poe. Are they in violation or not in compliance with
eight other arms control treaties?
Ms. Gottemoeller. Sir, I believe that is not quite correct,
because some we have determined that they are in violation,
actually in violation of the treaty, and in some cases there
are some issues that we are working with them on to determine
Mr. Poe. Does not being in compliance mean the same as
Ms. Gottemoeller. Well, I will just give you an example,
sir. We have for each of the treaties and agreements an
implementation body for that treaty or agreement. In the case
of the New START treaty, it is called the Bilateral
Consultative Commission. And when issues come up in an
inspection, we may have a difference with the Russians, but we
try to sit down and work out that difference. In the latest
session of the BCC, we were able to work out some differences
with the Russians about their inspection approaches.
So it takes some time and it takes some work to figure out
whether they are actually in violation of a treaty.
Mr. Poe. So does ``violation'' and ``noncompliance'' mean
different things? That is really my question.
Ms. Gottemoeller. ``Violation'' and ``noncompliance'' mean
the same thing. I was just making the point that, in each of
the treaties and agreements, if we went through them one by
one, I could tell you, you know, in some cases----
Mr. Poe. So----
Ms. Gottemoeller [continuing]. We are working----
Mr. Poe [continuing]. Let's go back to my question.
Ms. Gottemoeller [continuing]. On issues.
Mr. Poe. I am sorry. I want to get this straight.
``Noncompliance'' and ``violation'' do mean the same thing.
Ms. Gottemoeller. Correct, sir.
Mr. Poe. So are the Russians in violation and are not in
compliance with eight other treaties?
Ms. Gottemoeller. Sir, they are not in compliance or in
violation with the INF Treaty and the CFE Treaty. In certain
other cases, we have concerns that we are working with them on.
Mr. Poe. So is it ``yes'' or ``no,'' as far as eight
Ms. Gottemoeller. I do not believe the number is eight,
sir. It is ``no'' for eight treaties.
Mr. Poe. If the Russians are in violation of the INF
Treaty--and you have testified that they are in violation--the
United States has options. One of those options is to withdraw
from the INF Treaty; is that correct?
Ms. Gottemoeller. That is correct. And, in fact, the United
States has a right to withdraw in any event. It is one of the
articles of the treaty. We always put that in for national
security purposes, a country may choose to withdraw from a
Mr. Poe. And what is the United States position on--what is
our position today on withdrawing from the INF Treaty? We know
they are in violation. Are we going to withdraw from the
Ms. Gottemoeller. Our view is that it is in the national
security interests of the United States and of our allies and
partners to remain in the INF Treaty and to work to bring
Russia back into full compliance with the treaty.
Mr. Poe. How long are we going to give the Russians to come
back to the fold, so to speak? A month? A year? Ten years? When
are we going to make the decision, you have had enough time to
come into compliance after you are in clear violation, this is
the day of reckoning? How long are we going to give them to
come into compliance?
Ms. Gottemoeller. Sir, I can't tell you exactly. We have a
diplomatic effort going on.
I can give you two historical examples. In the case of the
ABM Treaty, the Reagan administration and the Bush
administration worked with the Soviets diplomatically for 5
years before they were able to bring the Russians back into
compliance with that treaty.
In the case of the CFE Treaty, the Bush administration,
George W. Bush administration, and the Obama administration
also worked for 5 years. And, in that case, we did not bring
the Russians back into compliance with the treaty. We declared
countermeasures, and, basically, we have now put in place
countermeasures against the Russians with regard to the--with
regard to the CFE Treaty.
Mr. Poe. Two more questions.
It is my understanding that we first detected Russian
violations of the INF Treaty in 2008. If I do my math
correctly, that is 6 years.
I am no expert in arms, but I would think the Russians
would lather up with the idea that they are in violation,
continue to be in violation, and we are just going to keep
postponing a decision to withdraw from the treaty.
What other options do we have besides withdrawing from the
Ms. Gottemoeller. Sir, if I may, I just wanted to say that
in 2008 we did not actually know that the Russians were in
violation of the INF Treaty. It took some time to determine
that fact. This is an issue that----
Mr. Poe. But others of us believed it to be in 2008.
Without arguing over the timeframe, what other options do
we have besides withdrawing from the treaty?
Ms. Gottemoeller. I will just say that we will be happy to
talk about that matter in closed session, so--but we have a
number of options. I have pointed to them already. One has been
to, you know, declare countermeasures. That is something we did
in the case of the CFE Treaty.
We also, I will say, right at the moment, have a kind of
three-pronged approach in place for dealing with this matter.
We are continuing to pursue it diplomatically. We have economic
countermeasures that we are looking at. And we are also--and my
colleague Brian McKeon can talk in more detail about this--we
are looking at military measures that we may wish to take.
So we are, in fact, pursuing our own national policy in
this regard. And if you are talking about in the realm of legal
and treaty work, then we have other options such as
countermeasures that can be pursued.
Mr. Poe. Is Russia deploying or preparing to deploy
tactical nuclear weapons in Crimea?
Ms. Gottemoeller. Sir, I don't know. But we are very, very
alert to statements that have been made by certain experts on
the Russian side about deploying capable aircraft, dual-capable
aircraft, such as backfire and missile systems that would also
be dual-capable. And we have spoken to the Russians about this
and expressed our concern about any option of reintroducing
nuclear weapons into Crimea.
Mr. Poe. The Chair will recognize the gentleman from
Tennessee, the ranking member, Mr. Cooper.
Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to first thank the witnesses, Ms. Gottemoeller and
Mr. McKeon, for their service to the country.
I worry that Congress doesn't make your job any easier. In
fact, sometimes it is a nuisance to deal with the legislative
branch, but nonetheless we are here.
I think we all agree that the Russians have cheated on this
treaty. The question is, what do we do about it?
I am worried, Mr. Chairman, that at least the public
portion of this hearing is doing more of a service to the
Russians than it is to our own people. It is easy for us to
saber-rattle up here and look tough and look strong, but I
worry that, you know, authoritarian countries like Russia do
not have hearings like this; they do not show their hand. And
we should be doing what we can to fight back intelligently, not
for domestic political consumption.
Oil, perhaps, might be our most powerful weapon. You know,
the ruble has tumbled in recent weeks due to the low oil
prices. Most Americans are rejoicing that oil is, what, about
$66 a barrel now. You know, we have some folks in our own
country who like high-priced oil. And I am not against our
energy-producing regions, but oil as a weapon is a pretty
powerful thing. Cheap oil also helps to stabilize Iran,
countries like that.
So, somehow or another, we need to figure out what would be
the most effective thing. This isn't easy, as I have just
pointed out with some geographical disparities within our own
country. I am hoping that we as Americans don't get readdicted
to foreign oil. We are truly blessed right now to have found so
much oil in our own country and to be able to drive oil prices
down. I love seeing OPEC in disarray. But we have some folks in
our country who love high-priced oil.
So, now, oil is just one of the weapons. There are many
others. I actually think the thing that would scare Vladimir
Putin the most would be if we lifted defense sequestration. And
I look forward to the new Republican majority helping us do
In order to do that, we probably are going to have to find
either spending cuts, which would be my first choice, or
revenue somewhere. And that would be an opportunity to show,
for example, that--perhaps the chairman might not be aware,
being from the Foreign Affairs Committee, not Defense--that
just to maintain our current nuclear stockpile, just
maintenance, not improvement, takes $350 billion over the next
10 years. That is a lot of money.
And right now we have difficulty forecasting where that
money is going to come from. And for a Nation that didn't even
pay for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan but borrowed much of
it from China, that doesn't make us look strong.
So there are opportunities here for America to really be
strong and to have an intelligent response to Mr. Putin and
others who are warmongering with their violations of the INF
Treaty. But let's not beat up on our own diplomats. Let's not
beat up on our own Defense Department officials.
You know, sometimes--and I venture to say that each one of
us, when you know that your opponent has grievous flaws, as
some of us have discovered in our own elections, those aren't
necessarily disclosed immediately; sometimes you wait until the
final debate--perhaps to give the administration the benefit of
the doubt. They thought it was a more strategic opportunity to
reveal this and the time was more appropriate.
But we, as Americans, should all be on the same team. We
should be unified in our response, an intelligent response, to
these treaty violations by Russia. So I would hope, Mr.
Chairman, in both the public portion of the hearing and the
private portion of the hearing that we can have a first-rate
strategic response to these treaty violations.
So thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your indulgence.
Mr. Poe. The Chair recognizes the chairman of the
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, Mr. Rogers.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. McKeon, what is our strategy for responding to Russia's
violation of the INF Treaty? And by that I want to know, what
are the ends we are seeking to achieve? And how do we expect to
see that happen?
Mr. McKeon. Mr. Chairman, our strategy has two potential
First, we seek to convince Russia to return to compliance,
as Under Secretary Gottemoeller has said, because we believe
that preserving the treaty is in our mutual security interests.
If Russia does not return to compliance, our end will be to
ensure that Russia gains no significant military advantage from
Mr. Rogers. What timeline do you have in mind?
Mr. McKeon. I can't give you a timeline, sir, as the Under
Secretary said. We are taking a hard look at it.
I can say more about this in response to your question, if
you will permit me.
Mr. Rogers. Certainly. I want you to be brief, please. I
have some questions for Ms. Gottemoeller.
Mr. McKeon. Understood.
The ways and means of our strategy address both of these
ends. As I said in my statement, we continue to remind Russia
why we signed this treaty in the first place. As Rose has said,
we have got a range of options--diplomatic, economic,
political--that we could impose on Russia that would impose
significant costs on them for its violations.
The military responses would aim to negate any advantage
Russia might gain from deploying an INF-prohibited system. And
all of these would be designed to make us more secure.
The range of options we are looking at in the military
sphere fall into three broad categories: Active defenses to
counter intermediate-range ground-launched cruise missiles;
counterforce capabilities to prevent intermediate-range ground-
launched cruise missile attacks; and countervailing strike
capabilities to enhance U.S. or allied forces.
Mr. Rogers. Okay.
Ms. Gottemoeller, has Russia deployed a ground-launched
cruise missile violating the INF? Or do they have the
capability to do that?
Ms. Gottemoeller. Sir, we have seen them developing a
ground-launched cruise missile that is in violation of the INF
Treaty. They certainly have the capability to deploy it, we
Mr. Rogers. And is there a difference between deployment
and this limited operational capability? And describe it for
Ms. Gottemoeller. Sir, I believe this is something that we
might want to take up in more detail in our closed session. We
will have some additional assistance from our technical staff
at that time.
Mr. Rogers. Okay.
How many times have you discussed Russia's INF violations
with your counterparts since the compliance report came out?
Ms. Gottemoeller. Since the compliance report came out, I
would have to count up exactly, but it is in the range of a
Mr. Rogers. To what end?
Ms. Gottemoeller. Well, I will say that the Russians have
said quite clearly to us that they believe that the INF Treaty
is in their national security interests and that they do not
intend to withdraw from the treaty now.
Mr. Rogers. Do they say why they are not in compliance,
Ms. Gottemoeller. They don't acknowledge, sir, that they
are not in compliance with the treaty. And that has been one of
the core issues that we have had to wrestle with them about at
the present time. They say that they are in complete compliance
with the INF Treaty.
Mr. Rogers. And your response?
Ms. Gottemoeller. My response is to repeat to them that we
have grave concerns about a ground-launched cruise missile that
they have tested to intermediate range. And we have given them
some certain key pieces of information to convey to them our
understanding of the program. But up to this point, as I said,
they have not acknowledged the missile.
Mr. Rogers. Now, you and Mr. McKeon have stated that you
can't state that there is a timeline or you can't tell us what
your timeline is. This has got to come to a close soon.
Otherwise, the Russians have no reason to believe there are any
consequences for violating this treaty or the other seven
treaties that they are violating.
Ms. Gottemoeller. Sir, I think we have been really clear
with them about the implications of their violation of the
treaty. And, in fact, I have said to my counterparts that we do
not want to go down the road of putting in place the kind of
countermeasures that would, you know, raise the kinds of
threats that existed in Europe back at the time that INF was
first agreed. And, as Brian McKeon said, we hope the Russians
will remember the reasons for which they signed up to the INF
Treaty in the first place. It was----
Mr. Rogers. At any point----
Ms. Gottemoeller [continuing]. To deal with certain
Mr. Rogers [continuing]. Do you anticipate giving them a
Ms. Gottemoeller. Sir, that is something that will have to
be determined in the context of a discussion, you know, with my
bosses. And it will also have to be determined talking with our
But I want to really stress that this does not mean that we
are doing nothing. We----
Mr. Rogers. Yes, it does.
Ms. Gottemoeller [continuing]. Are preparing for----
Mr. Rogers. It really does, Ms. Gottemoeller.
Ms. Gottemoeller. We are preparing for any options here or
Mr. Rogers. At some point, you have to recognize that there
are no consequences when you do nothing. And we are doing
nothing. And it has been going on long enough.
I would be much more reassured if you or Mr. McKeon could
say, ``Yes, sir, they have by December 31, 2015, or it is
over,'' or something. But just to keep saying, we are working
on it, you know, we are trying, that could go on forever. And
that is one of the reasons they are in Crimea right now.
I am sorry. My time is up.
Mr. Poe. The Chair recognizes the gentlelady from
California, Ms. Sanchez.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, both Secretaries, for being before us.
My question is, with respect to the determination of Russia
being in noncompliance, why did it take over 2 years to figure
Ms. Gottemoeller. Part of that, ma'am, has to do with the
way the interagency process goes forward.
We have a number of inputs that go into that process, one
of which, of course, is information that comes from our
intelligence agencies and their analyses. Then, in the case of
this particular violation, we also had a diplomatic effort
going on, again, to try to clarify the matter with the Russian
Federation and work with them on it.
And after that process had been going on for some time,
then we had our compliance process, which is, again, an
interagency activity that puts together the Defense Department,
the ICE, the State Department, Energy Department, to look very
carefully at all aspects of the situation, because it is a very
serious matter to call a country in violation of a treaty.
So that is why it takes some time.
Ms. Sanchez. And did the administration, during any of this
time, withhold any information from the Congress with respect
Ms. Gottemoeller. No, ma'am. We briefed the Congress
regularly throughout this period.
Ms. Sanchez. Has Russia responded satisfactorily to the
demands that we have made, with respect to the INF compliance?
Ms. Gottemoeller. We have been very concerned, Ms. Sanchez,
that, in fact, they have not acknowledged the violation.
Ms. Sanchez. They continue to say, there is no violation,
we are in compliance. So you are sort of----
Ms. Gottemoeller. Yes.
Ms. Sanchez [continuing]. At a standstill with respect to
Ms. Gottemoeller. Well, I will put it more succinctly. They
have not acknowledged the missile. They have not acknowledged
Ms. Sanchez. Back in the 1980s, how long did it take the
USSR to come back into compliance with the ABM Treaty once the
USSR had violated that treaty?
Ms. Gottemoeller. The Reagan administration and the Bush
administration worked on this. The Soviet Union was declared in
noncompliance in 1987. After 5 years of discussion and
negotiation, the Russians acknowledged their violation in 1991.
Came back into compliance, with the elimination of that radar
over the period of time it took to dismantle it, but 1992. So
it was a 5-year process.
Ms. Sanchez. And, during that time, did the administration
continue to engage with the Russians on that issue and others?
Ms. Gottemoeller. Yes, ma'am. During that time, in fact,
the Reagan administration negotiated the INF Treaty, and we
continued in full compliance with all the treaties and
agreements that we had in place at that time, including
implementing the SALT II Treaty, which was not ratified at that
point but which we had politically agreed to implement with the
Ms. Sanchez. So, as I recall, when President Reagan
submitted the report with respect to noncompliance, he stated
that better verification and better compliance provisions would
help finding effective ways to ensure compliance is central to
Is this still an ongoing challenge? Should we be investing
more in verification? Where is it that we can do a better job
so that it is not a 2-year process before we figure out what
the heck is going on?
Ms. Gottemoeller. Ma'am, I think the most important thing
is national technical means and having very capable national
technical means. And this is----
Ms. Sanchez. And what does that mean?
Ms. Gottemoeller. That means our own capabilities like
satellites, overhead satellites, radar systems, and systems
that we have full control of. Of course, it is nice when you
have on-site inspection, as we do with New START. That is a
very good situation. But, in other treaties and agreements, we
do not have on-site inspection. And the on-site inspection
regime of the INF Treaty ended in 2001.
So I think that the most important thing is strong
investment in our national technical means and preservation of
those capabilities and, indeed, expansion of those
Ms. Sanchez. And, in the current--as you look at the
current budgets that we have, are we doing that? Or have we
sort of just stepped and expected to be doing this verification
and compliance issue with what we have?
Ms. Gottemoeller. Ma'am, again, this area is not wholly in
my, you know, budget job jar, so to say. So I think it would
make sense to take up this point in our closed session, where
we will have a broader group of experts to talk about it.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you. I appreciate your help.
And thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Poe. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Arizona,
Mr. Franks, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Franks. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you both for being here.
Ms. Gottemoeller, I guess I should ask you for some
diplomatic immunity here for the rather pointed nature of some
of my questions.
You were the key architect for the New START treaty, and,
under your negotiation and your arms control expertise, for the
first time the United States reduced our strategic nuclear
potential while Russia was gaining the opportunity to increase
And all this time, of course, Russia was cheating on the
INF Treaty. And you knew about that, and you didn't say
anything. And it really concerns me, in that any negotiations
that we have with Iran or any treaty that we have with them, I
don't see how, in light of that, that they would have any
reticence to cheat on such an agreement.
And now Russia is building a series of first-strike
weapons, including its new cruise missile, the submarine, the
Severodvinsk class, with the long-range land-attack cruise
missile, not to mention its Club-K cruise missile system, and
that is one that kind of frightens me significantly. I have a
picture of it here, and I wish everyone could take a look at
that, where it might be for sale to the right bidder from
Russia. And, of course, it is designed to be hidden aboard
container cargo ships.
So my question to you is: Why is Russia preparing this
variety of first-strike capabilities, and how do these
capabilities promote stability?
Ms. Gottemoeller. Sir, if I may right off the bat be
straight with you, as well, we did not believe that the
Russians were violating the INF Treaty during the period when
New START was being negotiated and during the period when it
was being considered for ratification, the advice and consent
of the Senate for ratification of the treaty. We only became
concerned about it later.
Again, this is a topic we can discuss in detail in closed
session, and I will be happy to do so, but I did want to be
straight with you at the outset about that.
Now, when we negotiated the New START treaty, we realized
that, in fact, the Russians were experiencing a mass
obsolescence of their Soviet-era systems and that they would be
modernizing, as we are now embarking on modernization
ourselves. There is a little bit of a phase issue here of
modernization programs taking place at different times.
I will stress that one of our concerns in negotiating and
putting into place the New START treaty was to ensure that
there were certain central limits on what the Russian
Federation could deploy.
Mr. Franks. But I guess my question to you is, why do you
think they are preparing this variety of first-strike
capabilities? And how does that contribute to any stability
between our countries?
Ms. Gottemoeller. I think partially, sir, it is tradition
for the Russian Federation to heavily rely on their ICBM
forces. They are a large ground-based power, a large land
power, and they have traditionally historically depended on
highly accurate ICBM systems. I will say----
Mr. Franks. This is more in the area of cruise missiles, I
mean, things that are outside our agreement.
Let me shift gears. They are offering this Club-K system at
arms sales around the world. I mean, you can find it on the
And what are the consequences to Russia for selling such
systems? And do we have any consequences in mind for them doing
Ms. Gottemoeller. We have always been concerned about the
sale of high-technology weapons systems freely around the
world. We have a whole range of export control regimes that
deal with that, some of them multilateral in nature. And we do
clearly express our concerns about these kinds of things.
Mr. Franks. But given their profound danger, is our
response limited to expressing our concerns?
Ms. Gottemoeller. I am not--no, I am not familiar with this
particular system and the sales record that the Russians may
have had, so we will be prepared to get you more information on
that if you are interested.
The last point I wanted to make about their ICBM forces is
the central limits of New START really are so small by
comparison with the historical numbers that the Russians really
do not have the opportunity for a strike capability that would
be, you know, a decapitating first strike or something like
that. It is just not possible with the lower numbers. And that
is why we do emphasize that these kinds of treaties are
beneficial for strategic stability.
Mr. Franks. As far as their decapitating first-strike
capability, that is something we should talk about in the
closed session, because there might be some issues to take on
Mr. McKeon, if I could, to try to squeeze it in under my
time here, how is DoD responding to the rise in Russian first-
strike capability development and planning?
Mr. McKeon. If I could, sir, briefly on the Club-K, I am no
expert on it, and we will get you more information, but I don't
believe they have sold it yet. They have been showing it off at
Mr. Franks. Just the arms shows, yeah.
Mr. McKeon. Yes.
Mr. Franks. But it doesn't encourage me that----
Mr. McKeon. No, it is not a great sign. I am not trying to
downplay the concern that you have. I just don't think it has
been sold yet to--they are marketing it at arms shows.
As I said, sir, earlier in response to Chairman Rogers, we
are looking at a number of possible countermeasures in the
military sphere, ranging from reactive defense to counterforce
to countervailing defense measures. I don't want to get into
the specifics because we are still working through various
options, but we have a broad range of options, some of which
would be compliant with the INF Treaty, some of which would not
be, that we would be able to recommend to our leadership if a
decision were taken to go down that path.
Mr. Franks. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Poe. The Chair recognizes the ranking member of the TNT
committee, Mr. Sherman from California.
Mr. Sherman. Thank you.
What are the military benefits to the Russians of the
violations we are accusing them of? If they developed and
deployed these intermediate-range missiles, would that enhance
their ability to threaten our European allies? Or do they
already have enough ICBMs to deal with both whatever they would
want to do off the European continent but also on the European
continent, as well?
Ms. Gottemoeller. Sir, it has been a fact from the outset
that an ICBM, an intermediate-range target could be handled by
an intercontinental-range system. That is just a fact----
Mr. Sherman. Right.
Ms. Gottemoeller [continuing]. That has been well
understood, in fact, since the INF Treaty and before. So our
view is that the Russians have adequate capability to handle
issues around their periphery.
They actually argue, again, among their expert community
that the targets in Eurasia are the ones that concern them
most, not necessarily emphasis on NATO and the European allies
but targets across Asia, as well.
But this is a good question for the Russians, because it is
not--you know, we don't see a need for the system, quite
Mr. Sherman. So they are spending a lot of money at what
now is tough economic times for them to develop, in violation
of their treaty obligations, a basically duplicative system
that will allow them to do that which their ICBMs could already
do in both Europe and Asia.
Ms. Gottemoeller. Yes, sir. That is our point of view.
Mr. Sherman. Now, the treaty provides for a special
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty Special Verification
Commission. Have we invoked that formal provision, and do we
Ms. Gottemoeller. Sir, we wanted to drive this issue to a
higher level, and, in fact, I believe since I briefed this
group the last time, we have had President Obama writing to
President Putin. We have also had my boss, Secretary Kerry, but
also Secretary Hagel and Chairman Dempsey all speaking to their
counterparts at a high level about our grave concern in this
matter, as well as I continue my diplomacy in this arena.
So we really wanted to drive it to a high level and not
have it being handled in the more or less routine channels of
Mr. Sherman. So we haven't convened this special commission
because we wanted to do something even more formal and more
Ms. Gottemoeller. Correct, sir. That is the idea, to have a
very, very strong spotlight shown on the measures, on the
Mr. Sherman. What does Russia get from this treaty? They
claim we violate it. They themselves are violating it. We
pulled out of the ABM Treaty. They could solve a lot of
diplomatic problems by just pulling out of this treaty. What
benefit do they get from our compliance with the treaty?
Ms. Gottemoeller. I think it is the same benefit, sir, that
they got when they signed up to the treaty back in the late
1980s--that is, this treaty, by banning the deployment of
intermediate-range nuclear systems, addresses the treat of a
short-warning, very short-warning attack on critical strategic
targets such as strategic command and control. So the benefits
to the Russians are the same as they always were in terms of
the military benefits.
Mr. Sherman. And from that standpoint, they benefit more
than we do. Since the days of missiles in Cuba, the Russians
have never been able to use that short-range, short-warning
against us. And yet, if this treaty were to fall apart, NATO
would have that capacity against their most sensitive assets,
Ms. Gottemoeller. Well, sir, I don't want to jump out ahead
of my DoD colleagues in terms of what precisely would be the
countermeasures. Mr. McKeon might want to talk to that. But----
Mr. Sherman. Why don't we ask him to----
Ms. Gottemoeller [continuing]. If I may, I just want to
stress that we are talking about here ground-launched cruise
missiles in this case, and I think that is the important thing.
The Russians have sea-based capabilities and air-based
capabilities that can also threaten CONUS, of course.
Mr. Sherman. Mr. McKeon?
Mr. McKeon. Sir, we don't have ground-launched cruise
missiles in Europe now, obviously, because they are prohibited
by the treaty, but that would obviously be one option to
explore, some kind of----
Mr. Sherman. Yeah. The point I was making is I think Russia
has more to lose if this treaty falls apart than we do because
we have land-based facilities within between 500 kilometers and
5,500 kilometers of their most sensitive sites; they do not
have land bases within that range of our sites.
And, with that, I will yield back.
Mr. Poe. The gentleman yields back his time.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Turner,
for 5 minutes.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you both for being here.
I want to disagree first, Mr. McKeon, with a comment you
made. You said that arms control is the most important tool we
have for national security. I just want to put a footnote to
that: Of course, China, North Korea, Iran, Pakistan have not
been part of the reduction of the nuclear threat to the United
Ms. Gottemoeller, you very frequently in your testimony
here said, ``That would be best answered in closed session.''
Well, let me just tell you, as I begin to ask you these
questions, that will not be an acceptable answer to my
questions. I have sat here, and there is not one person that
has asked you anything that is classified that you can't
answer. And although you may choose it would be best to answer
it in closed session, this is an open session, the questions we
ask are open, and they are questions that you have
responsibility to answer for both the American public and to
Congress. So I will not be accepting that the best answer would
be in closed session. I accept your best answer here.
We are going to return back to the issue of Russia
violating or not being clearly in compliance with its treaties.
Chairman Poe had asked if it was not in compliance with as many
as eight. You identified that they were not in compliance with
the Treaty on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces, the INF, and
that they were not in compliance with the Treaty on
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, CFE. That is two.
You then said to him that there were others, but you didn't
specify what those others--and it doesn't require closed
session for you to specify those because it is not classified.
So I would like to ask you, in what others is Russia violating
or not clearly in compliance besides those two?
Ms. Gottemoeller. We have long been concerned about their
Soviet-era programs of chemical weapons and biological weapons.
And so we have continued to express great concern about those--
Mr. Turner. So is Russia violating or not clearly in
compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention, BWC, or the
Chemical Weapons Convention, CWC? Your answer is?
Ms. Gottemoeller. We are continuing to press them on
providing us information about those two----
Mr. Turner. Are they----
Ms. Gottemoeller [continuing]. Programs.
Mr. Turner [continuing]. In compliance with those two
You know the answer. Provide the answer. It is not
classified. If you have concerns--you either can or cannot
testify before us that they are in compliance.
Are they in compliance with the Biological Weapons
Convention, BWC? Yes or no? Yes or no? Not classified. Clearly
within your realm. Clearly within something that is public
consumption and certainly is something for oversight for
Congress. Are they in compliance with the Biological Weapons
Convention, your scope of your employment, BWC? Are they?
Ms. Gottemoeller. With regard to the Soviet-era programs,
Mr. Turner. Great. Okay.
Ms. Gottemoeller [continuing]. We have problems.
Mr. Turner. So we have three from you now.
The next one that you mentioned was the Chemical Weapons
Convention, CWC. Are they in compliance with the Chemical
Weapons Convention, CWC? Yes or no?
Ms. Gottemoeller. With regard to the Soviet-era programs,
Mr. Turner. Okay. So that is four.
Ms. Gottemoeller [continuing]. Sir, if I may----
Mr. Turner. We are clicking along here. New START Treaty,
are they in compliance or not in compliance?
Ms. Gottemoeller. Yes.
Mr. Turner. Yes what?
Ms. Gottemoeller. Yes, they are in compliance.
Mr. Turner. Okay. Great. Thanks.
Okay. Let's see--nope, that is an acronym. The Treaty on
Open Skies, compliance or not in compliance?
Ms. Gottemoeller. They are in compliance with the Open
Skies Treaty, sir.
Mr. Turner. The moratorium on nuclear testing, are they in
compliance or not in compliance, Ms. Gottemoeller?
Ms. Gottemoeller. The moratorium on nuclear testing, yes,
we believe they are in compliance with their moratorium. But
you do realize, sir, that this is not a legally binding treaty.
It is, you know--essentially, it is a political----
Mr. Turner. It is one within the realm of responsibility of
your employment, is it not?
Ms. Gottemoeller. Correct.
Mr. Turner. Great. That is why I wanted an answer from you.
The Vienna Convention?
Ms. Gottemoeller. The Vienna Document, sir?
Mr. Turner. Compliance or not compliance?
Ms. Gottemoeller. They are in compliance with the Vienna
Again, these are politically binding commitments. They are
confidence-building measures. And, again, we have some concerns
with how they have implemented certain aspects of the Vienna
Mr. Turner. But your concerns are not that they are
Ms. Gottemoeller. Our concern is that they are not----
Mr. Turner. It would have to be they are violating it,
right? I mean, you don't have concerns that maybe they are
just, you know, not fully committed to it. It is either they
are complying or not complying. You have concerns as to whether
or not they are not complying, right?
Ms. Gottemoeller. Correct. We----
Mr. Turner. Great.
Ms. Gottemoeller. Okay.
Mr. Turner. So we will count that in the category of
The Missile Technology Control Regime, MTCR, compliance or
Ms. Gottemoeller. The Missile Technology Control Regime we
believe that they are essentially in compliance with, but I
will say that, again----
Mr. Turner. The Budapest Memorandum? I think we can both
kind of guess what your answer should be on that one.
Ms. Gottemoeller. I definitely agree with you on that one,
Mr. Turner. And that would be?
Ms. Gottemoeller. They are not in compliance with----
Mr. Turner. Great.
Ms. Gottemoeller [continuing]. The Budapest Memorandum.
Mr. Turner. All right.
Ms. Gottemoeller. But, again, let me stress that this is a
Mr. Turner. All right. One, two, three, four, five. Okay,
so there are five, at least, you would tell us openly that they
When you said to Chairman Poe that there were others, are
there others besides the Treaty on Intermediate-Range Nuclear
Forces, INF; the Biological Weapons Convention, BWC; the
Chemical Weapons Convention, CWC; the Treaty on Conventional
Armed Forces in Europe, CFE; the Budapest Memorandum that you
believe they are violating?
Ms. Gottemoeller. No.
Mr. Turner. Are there others?
Ms. Gottemoeller. I do not, sir.
Mr. Turner. So you say there are no others?
Ms. Gottemoeller. I do not at the moment recall any others.
Mr. Turner. ``Do not recall.'' I mean, this is your
professional responsibility to recall. This is not like, you
know, Mr. Gruber coming here and saying, ``I just suddenly
don't remember what I was talking about.'' I mean, this is your
Are there others, or are there not?
Ms. Gottemoeller. No, sir, there are none others that I
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Poe. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Rhode
Island, Mr. Langevin, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
To our witnesses, in particular Deputy Under Secretary
McKeon, what are the risks for national security if the U.S.
withdraws from the INF or from New START as a response to
Russian INF violations?
Mr. McKeon. Well, in terms of the INF Treaty, sir, the
primary risk is greater instability in Europe if the Russians
were to deploy this noncompliance system in significant
In terms of withdrawal from New START, right now there are
central limits under the treaty on strategic systems. They come
into effect in early 2018 and then last for 3 years after that.
So if we were to withdraw from the treaty, there would be no
limitations on Russian strategic systems and we would lose the
verification regime of that treaty, including the on-site
So, over time, we would continue to have less and less
knowledge of Russian strategic systems, which would make the
Joint Chiefs nervous, and there would be no limitations on
their strategic systems, which we don't think would be to our
Mr. Langevin. So, in your assessment, does arms control
support national security? And if so, how?
Mr. McKeon. Yes, sir, it does. And I believe in my
statement I said it is an important element, not the most
important element, of national security.
Mr. Langevin. Under Secretary Gottemoeller, why did the
U.S. not simply withdraw from the ABM Treaty in the 1980s?
Ms. Gottemoeller. As I understood, sir, there was a view at
the time, again, that it contributed to strategic stability,
and there was, I think, a good record of discussions on what
was going on with the Krasnoyarsk radar at that time. But the
treaty was seen as being important to the balance between
strategic offensive and defensive forces at that time.
Mr. Langevin. Was diplomacy successful in that instance?
Ms. Gottemoeller. In the end, yes, diplomacy was
successful. It was a long and difficult discussion with the
Soviet Union to begin with and then the Russian Federation, but
the Russian Federation did end up dismantling the Krasnoyarsk
radar and returning to full compliance with the ABM Treaty.
Mr. Langevin. Given the what appear to be significant
violations of the INF Treaty, should the U.S. withdraw from
Ms. Gottemoeller. My view, sir, is that we should not in
any way take steps that would essentially give the Russians a
bye in this matter. If we withdrew from the INF Treaty, it
would legalize the illegal actions they are taking now, and I
don't think that is in our interest to do so.
Mr. Langevin. All right.
Under Secretary Gottemoeller, Secretary McKeon, the Defense
Science Board concluded in a January 2014 report that, I quote,
``monitoring for proliferation should be a top national
security objective but one for which the Nation is not yet
organized or fully equipped.''
Do you agree? And what are State and DoD doing to address
Ms. Gottemoeller. Sir, perhaps I will allow Mr. McKeon to
answer that. I gave my version of views on that to Mrs.
So, Brian, would you like to add anything?
Mr. McKeon. Sir, I am not familiar with that particular
report. I think, as a general matter, we would agree that we
can make more investments in verification technologies. And you
will have some folks from the IC in the closed session, and
they could probably speak with a little more detail about some
of their deficiencies and investments we ought to be making.
Mr. Langevin. Okay.
Since I still have some time, Secretary Gottemoeller, in
answering some of the previous questions of my colleague on
Russia's compliance or noncompliance on several treaties, you
weren't fully able to finish your answers. Do you want to add
to that and complete your answers where you weren't fully able
to do so?
Ms. Gottemoeller. Thank you, sir.
I think the important point is that there are two treaties,
the INF Treaty and the CFE Treaty, where we are fully concerned
about violation of the treaty by the Russian Federation.
In some of the areas we were discussing, like the Chemical
Weapons Convention, I always like to stress that we don't want
to throw out the baby with the bathwater. The Russians continue
to eliminate their Soviet-era holdings, and I just gave a
speech in The Hague last week noting the intensified efforts by
the Russians to get rid of their chemical weapons from the
So, although we have concerns about the Soviet-era programs
and that they haven't given us all the data that they may have
with regard to those programs, we are satisfied that they are
intensively working to eliminate the huge stock of chemical
weapons that they have from that era.
Mr. Langevin. Very good. My time has expired, but thank
And I yield back.
Mr. Poe. The gentleman yields back his time.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Lamborn.
Mr. Lamborn. Colorado.
Mr. Poe. Colorado. I am sorry. Did I insult Colorado or
Mr. Lamborn. No, they are both great States.
Mr. McKeon, is Russia deploying or preparing to deploy
tactical nuclear weapons in Crimea?
Mr. McKeon. Sir, I don't know the answer to that. We have
not seen that, but we are watching it closely.
Mr. Lamborn. Are there not open-source reports that such is
Mr. McKeon. We have seen some of those open-source reports,
but I don't think we have seen--and we could get into it in the
closed session--I don't think we have seen that actually
Mr. Lamborn. Okay. Well, maybe we can talk more about that
Ms. Gottemoeller, what is the position of the Department of
State concerning a moratorium on testing of kinetic energy
Ms. Gottemoeller. Sir, we have looked at that option as a
perhaps diplomatic option that we would like to pursue, but we
are not placing any emphasis on it at this time.
Mr. Lamborn. Okay. I might come back to you in a second on
this. I want to see what DoD thinks about that.
Mr. McKeon, does DoD have a position on such an action that
we just discussed?
Mr. McKeon. I apologize, sir. I was consulting my
colleagues on another issue, and I didn't hear your question.
Mr. Lamborn. Okay. Anything concerning a moratorium, with
our country and any others, on not testing, so as not to test,
kinetic energy antisatellite weapons or methods?
Mr. McKeon. I will confess I am only in the Department 4
months. I don't believe we are pursing or considering a
moratorium of that kind.
Mr. Lamborn. Okay.
My concern is that there may have been discussion about
that by some folks in the Department of State that was done
unilaterally without talking to DoD, because DoD would be, I
think, less receptive to such a thing, knowing more about what
is really at stake.
Mr. McKeon. Sir, it is a big government, and there are lots
of people and lots of layers, and there may be people in
different departments who have talked about it, but I don't
believe that is the position of the United States Government at
Mr. Lamborn. Okay.
And back to you, that is not a U.S. Government position?
Ms. Gottemoeller. That is correct, sir.
And I did want to emphasize, I mentioned a moment ago that
there had been some discussions and consideration of it, and
these were fully interagency discussions. I do want to
underscore that there were opportunities to fully discuss and
consider pros and cons and so forth on an interagency basis.
And so there shouldn't be a sense that this was, you know,
something that was being pursued unilaterally by the U.S.
Department of State.
But, as I said, we are not placing an emphasis on pursuing
it at this time.
Mr. Lamborn. Well, good, because I would be very concerned
if Department of State was pursuing something without talking
to the folks at Department of Defense.
Ms. Gottemoeller. Sir, my experience is that simply doesn't
Mr. Lamborn. Okay. We are all in agreement on that.
Mr. McKeon. Yeah. Sir, if I might add, I will speak to my
own newness in the Department, and I have certainly not heard
any discussion of this issue. I didn't mean to say that----
Mr. Lamborn. Okay.
Mr. McKeon [continuing]. People in State were not
coordinating with DoD. I just have not----
Mr. Lamborn. Okay.
Mr. McKeon [continuing]. Seen that in my short time.
Mr. Lamborn. Okay. Thank you for that.
Now, changing subjects, if I am not mistaken, Ms.
Gottemoeller, you said earlier that INF weapons that the
Russians would be pursuing in violation of the INF, you know,
cruise missiles between 500 and 5,000 kilometers----
Ms. Gottemoeller. Uh-huh.
Mr. Lamborn [continuing]. Would be only duplicative of what
they already have a capability of doing with strategic
missiles. Is that----
Ms. Gottemoeller. That is our understanding, sir, and our
view as to why this is a redundant kind of capability.
Mr. Lamborn. Well, with that in mind, that seems to
contradict what General Breedlove has said, the commander of
our European forces. In an April news report, he said, ``A
weapons capability that violates the INF that is introduced
into the greater European landmass is absolutely a tool that
will have to be dealt with. It can't go unanswered.''
Ms. Gottemoeller. I agree with that, sir, absolutely,
particularly in the context that this is a weapon that has been
banned for, you know, decades at this point. There are many
reasons on the political and the military front that we must
respond to it.
Mr. Lamborn. So when you use the word ``duplicative,'' you
are not in any way slighting that capability, which someone
might assume. You are saying this is a very serious matter.
Ms. Gottemoeller. Absolutely.
Mr. Lamborn. Okay. Because ``duplicative'' means, oh, is it
really that big of a deal?
Ms. Gottemoeller. Well, again, my colleague from the
Defense Department may wish to speak to this, but the only
point I was saying is that we have known from the time that the
ban was put in place in the late 1980s that if a country wished
to use an ICBM, an intermediate-range system, in a depressed
trajectory or a lofted trajectory, it could do so, and it would
have the same kind of potential against intermediate-range
targets in that kind of use.
Mr. Lamborn. And, lastly, you do agree with General
Breedlove, this must be dealt with?
Ms. Gottemoeller. Absolutely, sir. Yes.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you very much.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Poe. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from
California, Mr. Garamendi, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Garamendi. I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Gottemoeller, you were asked a series of
questions about the various treaties and agreements, and you
were compelled to answer ``yes'' or ``no,'' which is usually a
way we use to try to trap people.
Would you please, for the record, provide the additional
information that this committee needs to fully understand the
answers to your question?
Ms. Gottemoeller. Yes, sir. I will be happy to do that.
Thank you for the opportunity.
Mr. Garamendi. I think he went through seven or maybe eight
different treaties and agreements. I am sure the record would
help you remember all of them.
I personally dislike that kind of activity because it does
not fully inform us about some very complex matters. I will
take that up with Mr. Turner when I have him outside this room.
And I wish he were here. It is just something we shouldn't be
doing. We should get full answers if we really want to
I do have a series of questions. I suspect most of them are
going to have to come in a closed session. But a lot of this is
more about Europe than it is about the United States. What is
the NATO position on all of these matters?
Ms. Gottemoeller. I will begin. Perhaps my colleague would
like to comment, as well.
Our NATO allies have been very, very committed to arms
control treaties and agreements as a way to enhance security
and stability not only in Europe but also beyond. And they
count on our leadership in trying to develop and continue to
strengthen these regimes.
And so we have briefed them regularly on our very grave
concern with regard to Russian noncompliance in this case. They
have been very concerned about it, but they have been very
supportive of our efforts to bring the Russians back into
compliance with the treaty.
Mr. Garamendi. Are they suggesting that we bail out of the
Ms. Gottemoeller. By no means, sir. Quite the opposite.
They are very keen to ensure that we work in every way we can
to bring Russia back into compliance with the treaty.
Mr. Garamendi. Mr. McKeon, is that the view of the
Department of Defense also?
Mr. McKeon. It is, sir.
And what I might add is that, although the NATO states are
not parties to the treaty--it was originally a treaty between
us and the USSR and now the successor states of the USSR--they
are great beneficiaries of the treaty. So they are quite
interested in it remaining in force.
And, as the Under Secretary has said, we have kept them
extensively briefed. After we went to Moscow in September, she
briefed them by videoconference, the North Atlantic Council, on
our efforts. And we have been working with them on their own
intelligence and military assessment.
Mr. Garamendi. Okay.
I think you may have answered this once before, but does
the Department of Defense hold the position that we should
remain with the INF Treaty?
Mr. McKeon. It is the position of the Department and of the
administration that we should continue to be in the treaty and
seek to bring the Russians back into compliance at this time.
But we are planning for other options to push them back into
the treaty or if the day should come that we don't want to be
in the treaty any longer.
But, yes, for the time being, it is the position of the
administration we should stay in the treaty.
Mr. Garamendi. Okay. It is my understanding that the
principal issue is the delivery system or systems. Is that
Mr. McKeon. That is correct.
Mr. Garamendi. Okay. Are they attempting to develop a new
nuclear weapon or enhance an existing nuclear weapon?
Mr. McKeon. I think we should save that for the closed
Mr. Garamendi. I had expected that answer.
I think I will yield back at this point and await a closed
Mr. Poe. I thank the gentleman from California.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr.
Perry, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Perry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ladies and gentlemen, thank you for your service to the
Ms. Gottemoeller, is there a difference in our ability to
detect an ICBM versus a GLCM?
Ms. Gottemoeller. Sir, they are different kinds of systems.
An intercontinental ballistic missile----
Mr. Perry. I know what they are. I am just asking----
Ms. Gottemoeller. Yeah.
Mr. Perry. So isn't there a strategic advantage then,
wouldn't Russia have a strategic advantage to have that
delivery system that was undetectable by us because it--you
know, it runs across the ground. I mean, by the time you see
it, it is past you. Isn't that a strategic capability?
Ms. Gottemoeller. I would say that it offers some, you
know, capability to the Russians. Clearly, they have not had
intermediate-range systems up to this point.
Mr. Perry. Some? It offers a lot. We can't do anything
about it. Once it is launched----
Ms. Gottemoeller. But they have had a number of very
capable both air-breathing systems, cruise missile systems, and
intercontinental--the ballistic system----
Mr. Perry. Right.
Ms. Gottemoeller [continuing]. For many, many years now.
And so, in terms of the increment of new capability, that is, I
think, what we have to be concerned about.
Mr. Perry. Right. This is a big step.
Ma'am, I heard you say earlier that we hoped that they
weren't going to embark on this. And with all due respect, I
see this as, you know, they hope--or we hope--we hoped they
wouldn't go into Ukraine, and we hoped they wouldn't shut off
the gas valve, and we hoped a lot of things, but they took
action, and we continue to hope.
And another thing you said, that they didn't acknowledge
the violation. Do we require them to acknowledge the violation
before we act? I mean, if you are lying about something--like,
right now they are saying, ``We are not in Ukraine.'' Do we
require them to acknowledge the violation? Is that----
Ms. Gottemoeller. Well, sir, I worked with them for over a
year in the diplomatic realm to really see what we could do in
the diplomatic realm to get them back into treaty compliance
before we declared them in noncompliance last July, before we
declared this violation.
Mr. Perry. Right.
Ms. Gottemoeller. So we do, of course, do everything that
we need to do----
Mr. Perry. I understand we do everything----
Ms. Gottemoeller. We do everything that we need to do,
including working on the diplomatic, economic, and military
front, to put in place the policies that we need to have to
counter this violation.
Mr. Perry. And I would agree with you that diplomacy is
preferable. But timing and the time that it takes also is a
factor here, because other things are occurring while we are
talking, and that is a concern.
And I am concerned that we are counting on them to be the
good actors, when they have a storied and longstanding history
of violating and lying and obfuscating. And it concerns me that
we just continue to go on.
That having been said, do you believe that further
unilateral disarmament by the United States is a correct
response at any level?
Ms. Gottemoeller. Sir, such unilateral reductions are not
on the table.
Mr. Perry. Okay. But we have heard that the President has
discussed that, is considering that, might consider that, and I
just want you on the record. You would agree that that is not
an appropriate response at this time?
Ms. Gottemoeller. As I said, sir, they are not on the
Mr. Perry. Okay. And you agree that it is not a correct
Ms. Gottemoeller. Sir, you know that I have people above my
Mr. Perry. Sure. But I am asking you. I get it. I am asking
you, as the subject-matter expert that the Nation is depending
on, you, what is your response?
Ms. Gottemoeller. Sir, I am happy to tell you that such
unilateral reductions are not on the table, and I think that is
Mr. Perry. Okay. So you are not----
Ms. Gottemoeller [continuing]. Response.
Mr. Perry. I understand. You are not going to answer.
Do you believe that the U.S. has violated our obligations
regarding any of these agreements that have so far been stated,
seven or eight of them? Have we materially violated any of
them? I know Russia accuses us. They accuse a lot of things.
But do you believe we have violated any of them?
Ms. Gottemoeller. Sir, if you take a look at our compliance
report, we determined that we are in full compliance with all
of the treaties and agreements.
Mr. Perry. Okay. So is America safer and more secure if we
abide by the treaty and Russia continues to cheat?
Ms. Gottemoeller. I think the important word here, sir, is
``vigilance,'' that we have to recognize when there are
problems in compliance, when there are actual violations, we
have to be very vigilant and we have to deal with them. We
cannot be taken by surprise. But I think, in general, yes, they
continue to provide for mutual stability, predictability, and
Mr. Perry. With all due respect--and I agree that vigilance
is important, diplomacy is important. But we are talking about
nuclear weapons being placed around places that are of vital
interest to the United States and the world, and there is no
margin for error.
With that in mind, what would you suggest is the
appropriate role for Congress in responding to this situation,
as it appears that the administration cannot or will not
Ms. Gottemoeller. Well, sir, I would say that the
importance of your oversight can never be overstated. We have
Mr. Perry. We understand the importance, but what----
Ms. Gottemoeller. We have an open hearing here today.
Mr. Perry. What would you suggest would be our correct
response to safeguard our Nation and the world in our treaty
Ms. Gottemoeller. Well, sir, I do want to emphasize that we
do take action in this matter, we have taken action in this
matter, and we will continue to take action in this matter. And
we appreciate your partnership in supporting our efforts.
Mr. Perry. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Poe. I thank the gentleman.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Oklahoma, Mr.
Bridenstine, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Bridenstine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I would like to thank the gentleman from Pennsylvania.
I think he is hitting on a critically important point about
imposing unilateral commitments on ourselves.
And it opens up, I think, an important philosophical
question for you, Mrs. Gottemoeller. If we were to comply with
the INF and they were to continue violating the INF, do we have
a treaty at all?
Ms. Gottemoeller. I think one thing that is important to
recall, sir, is that there are a number of countries who are
parties to this treaty, 11 countries in addition to the Russian
Federation and the United States. And so it is an entire treaty
system that extends across Eurasia.
So I think in our efforts--and I mentioned this earlier--it
is very important to continue to press the Russians to come
back into compliance with the treaty. If somehow we left the
treaty, then it would essentially be giving them a free ride to
do whatever they well pleased. So I think it is important to
say that they are in violation, that there is a problem, you
know, they are not abiding by their treaty commitments, and not
give them a free ride.
Mr. Bridenstine. So if we were to pull out of the INF,
earlier you mentioned that that would make legal their illegal
actions; is that correct?
Ms. Gottemoeller. Correct.
Mr. Bridenstine. So currently they are in violation of the
Ms. Gottemoeller. Correct.
Mr. Bridenstine. And that is going to supposedly encourage
them to get back in compliance with the law.
Ms. Gottemoeller. I think if international law means
anything to the Russian Federation, they should be considering
Mr. Bridenstine. What did international law have to say
about the invasion and occupation of South Ossetia, for
Ms. Gottemoeller. Well, I said in the outset of my remarks,
of my testimony----
Mr. Bridenstine. Real quick, what did----
Ms. Gottemoeller [continuing]. That we are gravely
Mr. Bridenstine. What did international law say about the
invasion and occupation of Abkhazia?
Ms. Gottemoeller. We are very concerned about----
Mr. Bridenstine. What did international law say about the
invasion and occupation of Crimea?
Ms. Gottemoeller. We are very concerned----
Mr. Bridenstine. At what point----
Ms. Gottemoeller [continuing]. About all those matters.
Mr. Bridenstine. At what point does the international law
mean anything as long as we continue to allow them to violate
Ms. Gottemoeller. I think, sir, that the important thing is
that the structure of international law provides for global
security and stability overall. And because there are
violations out there--and in the case of Crimea, you pointed to
this very strong example, you know, on the current scene, that
Russia has violated the territorial integrity and sovereignty
of Ukraine by coming into Crimea and by, you know, bringing
their troops into eastern Ukraine, as well.
But that doesn't mean, you know, that we do away with the
OSCE principles or the U.N. charter. The system of law, it is
important to maintain it in place----
Mr. Bridenstine. So do you personally believe----
Ms. Gottemoeller [continuing]. As a way to go after
countries that then violate.
Mr. Bridenstine. Let's say we have a bilateral commitment
with Russia, a bilateral commitment, and they are in violation,
the question is, do we continue to impose unilateral commitment
upon ourselves that hinder us but enable them to continue to
Ms. Gottemoeller. I think the important thing, sir----
Mr. Bridenstine. Just ``yes'' or ``no,'' do you think we
should do that? Philosophically, do you think we should impose
commitments upon ourself that hinder our ability while they are
continuing to progress?
Ms. Gottemoeller. In this case, the answer is ``yes'' to
stay within the treaty and then to look at what countermeasures
we have available--Mr. McKeon already mentioned we have a
number of military countermeasures--that stay within the realm
of the treaty.
Mr. Bridenstine. Okay.
So I have 1\1/2\ minutes left. Mr. McKeon, we are talking
about cruise missiles here. What type of ability do we have as
a Nation militarily to provide early warning to our friends and
allies in Europe that these missiles may be engaged?
Mr. McKeon. Sir, we could talk in more detail in closed
session about our military capabilities in Europe. I don't want
to advertise for the Russians what capabilities we have in
Obviously, with short- or intermediate-range missiles
closer to Europe's and NATO's borders, it leads to shorter
warning time, and you have to have adequate sensors to have
So we have some capabilities. I don't want to overstate
what those are.
Mr. Perry. And then, as far as the ability to hold at risk
targets, do we have that ability?
Mr. McKeon. Yes.
Mr. Bridenstine. Roger that.
I yield back.
Mr. Poe. I thank the gentleman.
This concludes the open session of these two subcommittees.
The subcommittees will recess to 2212 for a classified
briefing, and we will continue in 10 minutes, 4:05, as the
clock on the courtroom wall, to quote a phrase.
[Whereupon, at 3:55 p.m., the subcommittees recessed, to
reconvene in closed session at 4:05 p.m. the same day.]
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