[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
AFTER THE WITHDRAWAL: THE WAY FORWARD IN AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN (PART
III)
=======================================================================
JOINT HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA
AND THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
DECEMBER 10, 2014
__________
Serial No. 113-233
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
DANA ROHRABACHER, California Samoa
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio BRAD SHERMAN, California
JOE WILSON, South Carolina GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
TED POE, Texas GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
MATT SALMON, Arizona THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina KAREN BASS, California
ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
MO BROOKS, Alabama DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
TOM COTTON, Arkansas ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
PAUL COOK, California JUAN VARGAS, California
GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois
RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III,
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania Massachusetts
STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas AMI BERA, California
RON DeSANTIS, Florida ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California
DOUG COLLINS, Georgia GRACE MENG, New York
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
TED S. YOHO, Florida TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
SEAN DUFFY, Wisconsin JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
CURT CLAWSON, Florida
Amy Porter, Chief of Staff Thomas Sheehy, Staff Director
Jason Steinbaum, Democratic Staff Director
Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
JOE WILSON, South Carolina GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
TOM COTTON, Arkansas DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
RON DeSANTIS, Florida JUAN VARGAS, California
DOUG COLLINS, Georgia BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III,
TED S. YOHO, Florida Massachusetts
SEAN DUFFY, Wisconsin GRACE MENG, New York
CURT CLAWSON, Florida LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
------
Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio, Chairman
DANA ROHRABACHER, California ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
MATT SALMON, Arizona Samoa
MO BROOKS, Alabama AMI BERA, California
GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania BRAD SHERMAN, California
DOUG COLLINS, Georgia GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
CURT CLAWSON, Florida WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
C O N T E N T S
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Page
WITNESSES
The Honorable Jarret Blanc, Deputy Special Representative for
Afghanistan and Pakistan, U.S. Department of State............. 8
The Honorable Donald L. Sampler, Assistant to the Administrator,
Office of Afghanistan and Pakistan Affairs, U.S. Agency for
International Development...................................... 19
Mr. James Soiles, Deputy Chief of Operations, Office of Global
Enforcement, Drug Enforcement Administration, U.S. Department
of Justice..................................................... 33
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
The Honorable Jarret Blanc: Prepared statement................... 11
The Honorable Donald L. Sampler: Prepared statement.............. 21
Mr. James Soiles: Prepared statement............................. 35
APPENDIX
Hearing notice................................................... 66
Hearing minutes.................................................. 67
The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress
from the Commonwealth of Virginia: Prepared statement.......... 68
AFTER THE WITHDRAWAL: THE WAY
FORWARD IN AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN
(PART III)
----------
WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 10, 2014
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa and
Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittees met, pursuant to notice, at 2 o'clock
p.m., in room 2167, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ileana
Ros-Lehtinen (chairman of the Subcommittee on the Middle East
and North Africa) presiding.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. This joint subcommittee hearing will come
to order.
After recognizing myself, Chairman Chabot, Ranking Member
Deutch for 5 minutes each for our opening statements, I will
then recognize any other member seeking recognition for 1
minute. I know that we will have votes, but we hope to get
through some of this.
We will then hear from our witnesses. Thank you, gentleman,
and without objection the witnesses' prepared statements will
be made a part of the record and members may have 5 days to
insert statements and questions for the record subject to the
length limitation in the rules.
I see Mr. Delaney has joined us, and I ask unanimous
consent to allow Congressman Delaney to question the witnesses
and participate in the hearing after all the members of the
committee have had the chance to ask their questions. Welcome.
The chair now recognizes herself for 5 minutes.
This is the third and final hearing this session in a
series of hearings these two subcommittees have had aimed at
examining the way forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan after the
U.S. withdrawal.
In addition, the Middle East and North Africa subcommittee
has held hearings on how our counternarcotics efforts will be
impacted by the withdrawal and our relief and reconstruction
efforts in Afghanistan and what needs to be done to address the
waste, the fraud, the abuse that the Special Investigator
General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, SIGAR, and the U.S.
Government Accountability Office, GAO, have found over the
years.
As of Monday, the U.S. and NATO coalition have officially
closed their Afghanistan combat command, and we now have
transition from military to a civilian-led presence. A maximum
10,800 U.S. troops will remain in Afghanistan for the first 3
months of 2015, and with that number dropping to 5,500 by the
end of next year, and down to just a few hundred by the end of
2016.
But we must ask, has the administration made the decision
to withdraw from Afghanistan by the end of 2016 based on a
political decision or a strategic decision, and are we leaving
the security of Afghanistan and our own national interests in
the hands of a capable, trustworthy government and security
forces? As we take a back seat to the Afghan National Security
Forces and leave in its hands the fate of Afghanistan's
security, we have many reasons for concerns.
This past year the security forces taking the lead and
conducting many of its own operations, we witnessed the
bloodiest year in Afghanistan since 2011 as the security forces
suffered over 5,000 casualties. U.S. military leaders in
Afghanistan, including the outgoing top international
commander, Lieutenant General Joseph Anderson, have called this
casualty rate and the rate of desertion in the security forces
unsustainable. And as the U.S. began its transition out of the
lead last year, the Taliban and an abundance of other terrorist
groups and factions across the country have stepped up their
attacks, and the rate of attacks are only likely to increase
now that they know that the U.S. and our allies have ended our
combat operations.
But terrorists inside Afghanistan's borders are not its
only challenge. Pakistan continues to harbor and host
insurgents and other extremists in the Afghan border regions.
Making matters worse, Pakistan's intelligence service is known
to cooperate with the Taliban as it works to undermine
Afghanistan's stability.
Even more concerning, Pakistan's nuclear weapons stockpile
is reportedly growing faster than any other in the world and is
notoriously insecure.
Security concerns with Pakistan are not only helped--are
also not helped when the Afghan Government cannot form a
cabinet, including key positions like Defense Minister.
A weak and corrupt government combined with incapable
security forces does not indicate a positive path forward.
Another threat that gets constantly ignored is
counternarcotics. Opium cultivation and production again
increased sharply this year. Afghanistan is responsible for
over 90 percent of the world's opium supply. This is an
estimated $3 billion industry that generates immense profits,
finances terrorism in and outside of Afghanistan, and feeds the
rampant corruption that continues to plague its government.
As we approach this new phase in Afghanistan, we must be
honest with ourselves and the American people. Even though the
U.S. has closed its combat command, President Obama has
reportedly changed the rules of engagement so that all
remaining U.S. troops will be allowed to carry out combat
missions instead of just training and advising.
Combat aircraft drones will now be allowed to provide air
support. President Ghani is pleading with the administration
for additional support, for additional troops, for additional
funds, desperate to ensure that his country does not become
another Iraq.
The administration likes to pretend that Iraq and
Afghanistan are different, or at least as Secretary Hagel
claimed yesterday, that the differences outweigh the
similarities. But Secretary Hagel and the administration cannot
hide from the facts. Since the withdrawal of U.S. Troops from
Iraq in 2011, we have seen the brutal terrorist group ISIL take
over large portions of both Iraq and Syria, displace millions
of people, leave thousands dead, and threaten the interests of
both the U.S. and every ally in the region.
The fact is that U.S. troops have returned to Iraq, and
although we continue to lack a comprehensive or coherent
strategy there, the stakes are even higher in Afghanistan. If
we do not leave behind a stable strong Afghan Government with
capable security forces, the Taliban will not hesitate to
reclaim its lost territory and quickly establish another safe
haven for terrorists to thrive.
The United States has paid too much in blood and treasure
to allow this to happen. We owe it to our brave men and women
who have sacrificed everything to protect our values and way of
life, and to whom we are forever indebted, we owe it to heroes
like Christian Guzman Torres, a Marine Corporal from my
Congressional district who gave his life in the name of freedom
and democracy and whose memory and legacy will live on forever
at a post office that the Congressional delegation named in his
honor in South Dade in Princeton, Florida.
We owe it to all of those who made the ultimate sacrifice
to ensure that we do not let the gains we have made slip away,
and that we do not allow the Taliban to re-establish itself and
further destabilize the region.
I now turn to my ranking member, my good friend, Mr.
Deutch.
Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Chair Ros-Lehtinen and Chairman
Chabot for calling today's hearing.
I would like to take a moment to recognize the outstanding
work of one of our colleagues, a ranking member and former
chairman of the Asia and Pacific subcommittee, Eni
Faleomavaega. We are thankful for his years of service to this
country and his leadership in this critical area of foreign
policy.
This is our third hearing examining the future of U.S.
policy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan. The hearing comes on
the heels of the administration's announcement that it will
leave an additional--it will leave 1,000 troops in Afghanistan
to conduct operations against the Taliban and al-Qaeda linked
targets.
As we look forward to the beginning of Operation Resolute
Support, focused on training and advising and assisting, we are
reminded that for a decade we have been focused on destroying
al-Qaeda, building a secured and civil society capacity of the
Afghan Government with the goal of turning over responsibility
for their Nation to the Afghans.
The questions is have we achieved these goals? We have
effectively dismantled al-Qaeda's stronghold in Afghanistan,
but will the surge in extremism in the neighboring Middle East
impact Afghanistan.
We have turned security control of the country over to the
Afghan security forces, yet there continue to be high rates of
desertion. Can the Afghan national security force pick up where
international coalition forces have left off and ensure that
al-Qaeda cannot regroup and again use Afghanistan as a safe
haven?
At our hearings in March and October of last year, we
focused on Presidential elections as an indicator of progress.
Would we see free and fair elections lead to a peaceful
transition of power? I am pleased that President Ghani and
Chief Executive Officer Abdullah were able to come to a power-
sharing arrangement, but I would also hope that the State
Department will comment on the recount results so that we might
be able to look toward assisting Afghanistan in making sure the
process for future elections is both credible and transparent.
Electoral reform should be a high priority for Afghanistan
going forward.
This past year has been one of transition, and we now look
to President Ghani's government to articulate its agenda,
including much needed reforms for both the security and
civilian sectors in a timeline in which he would like these
reforms to move. Such a timeline would send a strong signal to
Afghanistan's international partners that the President means
business and is willing to hold himself accountable.
New leadership brings renewed hope of addressing
longstanding issues of corruption and patronage. I am
encouraged by some of the positive steps President Ghani has
taken in the 10 weeks he has been in office, including the
signing of the bilateral security agreement, but at the same
time, we have challenges remain. One looming is how this new
government can engage with the Taliban.
U.S. support and assistance will continue to be a key
component of our engagement with Afghanistan, but as our
presence decreases, we have got to focus greater attention on
how we will continue to monitor this assistance. How can we
ensure that years of training Afghan security forces and civil
society will result in stability and productive governing?
As Secretary Kerry noted last week, the U.S. will have
provided $8 billion of economic assistance to Afghanistan
between 2012 and 2015, but what happens when the assistance
from the outside slows? How will the new government create an
economy that can sustain itself without such levels of
international assistance? What will be the drivers of Afghan
economic growth going forward?
And I would like to take a moment to commend the State
Department, including the Special Representatives Office and
the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs for its work on
that CASA-1000 project, a joint energy initiative that connects
energy resources from the Kyrgyz Republic in Tajikistan with
Afghanistan and Pakistan.
And the reason that we do these hearings jointly is because
it is near impossible to address the challenges in Afghanistan
and Pakistan, in many instances, in isolation from the rest of
South Asia. It might be time for the State Department to follow
this cue and realign its Bureau of South and Central Asian
affairs to better reflect this reality.
Many of us continue to have longstanding concerns over the
ability of insurgents to operate in Pakistan and cross the
border into Afghanistan. I have been encouraged by Pakistan's
military operations in North Waziristan. Even the most
skeptical among us have to acknowledge that it has disrupted
operations emanating from the North Waziristan agency,
especially for the Pakistani Taliban.
At the same time, while progress has been made in
disrupting the Haqqani networks's operations in the tribal
areas. Both of these designated--both the Haqqani network and
Lashkar-e-Taiba are responsible for the deaths of Americans.
The question is can Pakistan rid its country of terrorism
without going after terrorists wholesale? And despite the
mistrust and tensions, we need cooperation from Pakistani
security services as well as strong communication with
Pakistan's civilian leadership.
The Congress authorized $7.5 billion via the Kerry-Lugar-
Berman bill to assist in strengthening Pakistan's civilian
institutions, so I am concerned about the message sent to the
people of Pakistan and Pakistan's civilian leadership when
Secretary Kerry meets with Pakistan's chief of staff, Mr.
Blanc, and I hope that you today will be able to shed some
light as to who really is in charge of Pakistan's foreign
policy, and particularly its policy toward Afghanistan.
Finally, I would just say that, as I said previously, there
is too much at stake for us to just simply turn our backs on
these critical relationships. Continuing engagement in a
supporting role in Afghanistan is critical to ensuring terror
networks can't re-establish roots, and I look forward to
hearing from the witnesses today as to how our policy in both
places will address the challenges of these relationships.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much, Mr. Deutch.
And if you will excuse us, our subcommittees will suspend
while we vote, and then when we come back, we will have Mr.
Chabot chair, and he will give his opening statements.
We will recognize our members for their opening statements
and then introduce our witnesses, and with that, subcommittee--
--
[Recess.]
Mr. Chabot [presiding]. The subcommittees will come back to
order.
I want to again thank our witnesses for being here, and who
that are in attendance this afternoon. I want to thank the
chair for calling this important joint hearing between the
subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa and the
subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific.
I am please to join her efforts to discuss the current
situation in the Afghanistan/Pakistan region and the United
States' critically important role in securing Afghanistan's
future stability during the next few months.
Afghanistan has seen many changes this year both promising
and, unfortunately, worrying in many instances as well.
On the positive end of things, the bilateral security
agreement was finally signed in September, which I am hopeful
will both lay out and secure the U.S. role in the post-2014
Afghanistan.
Also somewhat encouraging is the relative clarity we have
of the U.S. presence in Afghanistan, as least for the next
couple of years. The last time we examined the situation in
Afghanistan back in October of last year, that picture was not
so clear.
Today, we know that Afghan security forces hold primary
security responsibility in the country, while the U.S.
maintains a force of 20,000 for the time being. That number
will decrease to 9,800 next year, then further decrease to
4,900 in 2016. At least that is what we think.
But even with clarity on the numbers, I am concerned about
future stability there because Afghan forces will undoubtedly
need continued support. The plan for an eventual U.S. Military
exit from Afghanistan after 2016 is troubling because I don't
believe that Afghan security forces will be able to secure
Afghanistan if left on their own, at least not in that time
frame.
Events in Iraq this year depicted one such scenario. ISIL
captured Mosul and Iraqi security forces collapsed. We can't
afford to let this happen in Afghanistan after so many years of
investment and sacrifice. In fact, I believe General Campbell's
statement where he expressed his confidence that ``Afghan
forces have the capability to withstand the fight internally''
is premature.
With the ISIL threat in the region spreading its talons
east, we have no way of knowing what the Taliban insurgency in
Afghanistan will look like in 2 years time. With this in mind,
it is prudent for us to keep the option of a bigger post-2016
U.S. And NATO force presence on the table.
It is widely acknowledged that stability in Afghanistan
necessitates close engagement and cooperation with Pakistan.
However, Pakistan's sustained tolerance and support of Afghan
Taliban forces in Qatar and the federally-administered tribal
areas means a peaceful, stable, independent, and united
Afghanistan is in the distant future.
Despite some advances in the U.S./Pakistan relationship and
the Pakistani military's launch of a major offensive against
Islamist terrorist groups in the federally-administered tribal
areas, the end results of these efforts are not certain.
Limited capacity, rampant corruption, distrust,
disorganization, and divergent security interests between
various sectors, both civilian and military, make promises from
Islamabad unreliable, if history tells us anything. In fact,
the political protests in August aptly illustrate the case in
point. Prime Minister Sharif's control over the military is not
strong. But the military's influence over Pakistan's foreign
and national security policies is rather solid. I urge the
administration to exhibit caution.
Pakistan's ongoing support for sectarian extremist groups
to expurgate Indian influence in Afghanistan will not end well
if the current trend continues. This path will only be to the
detriment of the region and U.S. security and foreign policy
interests.
I also continue to be concerned about Pakistan's ongoing
persecution of religious minorities. Pakistan is ranked among
the most religiously intolerant countries in the world, and
Prime Minister's Sharif's Government continues to tolerate the
oppression of Christians, Hindus, Shiites and Hamotzis, among
many others. However, the State Department has yet to designate
Pakistan a country of particular concern for its violations of
religious freedom.
Between 2012 and 2013 there were over 200 attacks among
religious groups, and 1,800 casualties resulting from religion-
related violence. The highest rates in the world. And just over
a month ago on November 4th, two young Christians were
murdered--burned alive--accused of blasphemy by a Muslim mob of
4,000 people. One of them was a pregnant mother of four. We
cannot continue to ignore this horrific behavior and the plight
of these groups due to discriminatory laws, forced conversions,
terror attacks and blasphemy arrests. Ongoing religious
persecution in Pakistan and its government's paltry efforts to
recant its support of Islamist extremist groups makes it
increasingly difficult, I believe, to justify the
administration's billions of dollars worth of aid to Pakistan.
I hope our witnesses will discuss what the administration
is doing to support religious minorities in Pakistan and demand
that the Sharif Government ensure the human rights of
minorities in that country.
I want to again thank Chairman Ros-Lehtinen for calling
this hearing. I look forward to hearing testimony from our
distinguished witnesses today.
And I would also like to associate myself with the remarks
made by the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Deutch, relative to Eni
Faleomavaega who I have had the honor to lead the subcommittee
with for the past 2 years. Eni is just a tremendous individual.
He served our country in Vietnam, and we are really going to
miss seeing him. So we wish him only the best in the future.
And if there are any other members whowould like to make
open statements, I believe Mr. Bera would like to make an
opening statement. So the gentleman is recognized for 1 minute.
Mr. Bera. Thank you, Chairman Chabot.
About 1\1/2\ years ago I had a chance to visit Afghanistan
with Chairman Ros-Lehtinen, and at that juncture there was
uncertainty. You know, we were in the midst of negotiating a
bilateral security agreement. Afghanistan was going to undergo
their elections and so forth, and while everything wasn't
smooth from that point to where we are today, at least there is
a little bit more certainty at this juncture.
And at that time too, real questions came up and concerns
from my perspective as we start to draw down the economic
impact on Afghanistan. There is no way to replace the presence
of our troops there in terms of what it means to the Afghan
economy, and in conversations with the--and in government, they
have obviously made some significant investments there.
You know, when I think about Afghanistan and South Asia in
general, it is this intricate web between Afghanistan, Pakistan
and India, and I do look forward to hearing the comments of the
witnesses on how we continue some of that economic investment
that Afghanistan will need and how we move forward from here.
Thank you, Chairman.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you very much.
And believing that no other members would like to make an
opening statement, I would like to at this point introduce our
panel for this afternoon.
First, I am very pleased to welcome the honorable Jarrett
Blanc who serves as Deputy Special Representative for
Afghanistan and Pakistan at the Department of State. Prior to
joining the State Department, he was the senior policy analyst
for multi-lateral affairs at the Open Society Institute. He has
worked for the United Nations and has managed governance
operations in conflict and post-conflict areas such as
Afghanistan, Kosovo, Lebanon and Nepal.
We welcome you here this afternoon.
Our next witness, we would like to welcome back the
honorable Donald L. Sampler who is Assistant to the
Administrator in the Office of Afghanistan and Pakistan Affairs
at USAID. Mr. Sampler previously served as senior deputy
assistant to the administrator in the OAPA. He has lived in
Kabul for several years and has traveled to Afghanistan,
Pakistan over 60 times since 2001.
And we welcome you here this afternoon, Mr. Sampler.
And our last but certainly not least witness this
afternoon, we are pleased to welcome Mr. James Soiles. Mr.
Soiles has served with the DEA since 1983, rising through the
ranks until reaching the current duties as Deputy Chief of
Operations in the Office of Global Enforcement for the Drug
Enforcement Administration. In the past, he has served as the
DEA section chief of Europe, Asia, Africa, Middle East, and
Canada section overseeing operations in 125 countries.
And we, again, want to welcome all three of you here this
afternoon. You are probably familiar with the committee rules.
You will each have 5 minutes to give your testimony. We have a
lighting system. The yellow light will let you know that you
have 1 minute to wrap up, the red light will come on, and we
would ask that you cease your testimony as close to that point
as possible. Give you a little bit of leeway, but not a whole
lot, so we would ask you to try to stay within that if at all
possible, and then we will follow up with questions.
So we will begin with you, Mr. Blanc. You are recognized
for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JARRET BLANC, DEPUTY SPECIAL
REPRESENTATIVE FOR AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
STATE
Mr. Blanc. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for the
opportunity to appear before you today to discuss Afghanistan
and Pakistan. With your permission, I will briefly summarize my
remarks for the record.
Mr. Chabot. Without objection, the full report will be
included in the record.
You might want to pull the mike, if you can, a little
closer there, just so everybody in the room can hear you.
Mr. Blanc. I will pull myself closer.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you.
Mr. Blanc. Please allow me to begin by thanking the members
of the subcommittee for your continued support for our mission
in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and also to thank the thousands of
Americans, military personnel, diplomats and assistants,
professionals who have and continue to serve in Afghanistan and
Pakistan.
The American people have been generous, steadfast and brave
in their support for this region. I would like to particularly
note the service of Ambassador Jim Cunningham who has finished
his term as Ambassador of the United States to Afghanistan and
to welcome the confirmation by the Senate last night of
Ambassador Michael McKinley.
Starting with Afghanistan, it is important to remember why
we are so deeply involved in that country today. It was in
Afghanistan that the attacks of September 11, 2001 were
planned, and we remain there because we understand the
importance of ensuring that Afghan soil not again be used to
launch attacks against us.
As part of a military coalition of more than 50 Nations, we
have helped make the world, Afghanistan, and the region more
secure. We should also be proud that we have helped the
Government of Afghanistan build the capacity and start to build
the capacity to provide security, education, and jobs for its
own people moving forward.
Today's hearing is timely. Having long talked about 2014 as
the critical year of transition, it is appropriate now to talk
about the way ahead as the year draws to a close. Politically,
Dr. Ashraf Ghani and Dr. Abdullah Abdullah have forged a
political compromise amid an electoral process that, while
imperfect, honored the participation of millions of Afghans and
led to the first peaceful and democratic transfer of power in
Afghanistan's history.
All eyes are now on them to deliver on the promises of
security, better governance, accountability, women's rights and
realizable sustainable development goals.
The media have focused on the challenge of the government
naming its new ministers. We should not allow this important
issue to distract us from the impressive start that the
government has already made in actually governing on issues
ranging from corruption to security. And I would also note that
we hope that Dr. Ghani and Dr. Abdullah will soon have an
opportunity to speak to you directly about their priorities and
vision of the way forward.
On security, the United States combat mission with come to
a close this year, and the International Security Assistance
Force will be replaced with a more limited international
mission to train, advise, and assist the Afghan National
Security Forces.
To a large extent, though, Afghanistan's security
transition has already taken place. In June 2013, the ANSF took
responsibility for security throughout the country, and its
performance, while despite the violent attacks of the Taliban
and other insurgents, has been impressive so far.
I would also note as you did in your opening that the BSA
has been signed and ratified and just today we have been
informed that the final formality is the Afghan legal system
has been completed so that it can come into force on January
1st.
Afghanistan, of course, faces continued economic
challenges, but at the London Conference on Afghanistan last
week, the international community and the Afghan Government
renewed our set of mutual commitments to continuing support
that country as it charts its own path to greater
sustainability.
I would also note that Afghanistan's economy and security
are inexorably tied to the broader region which remains one of
the world's least integrated, and as the ranking member noted,
it is a welcome sign of progress that earlier this month the
region finalized negotiations on key agreements for the CASA-
1000 electricity transmission line project.
Perhaps most importantly in this context, there is real
potential for improving Afghan/Pakistan relations.
Turning to Pakistan, we have a bilateral relationship that
is full of both opportunity and challenge. The bottom line is
that our relationship is vital to the national security of the
United States. We have many shared long-term interests in both
economic and security cooperation, and our policy of sustained
engagement to date has yielded tangible, if incremental,
results.
Due to the importance of our relationship, we have invested
in a substantial civilian assistance program in Pakistan which
complements our robust security assistance program.
It is easy to criticize imperfect progress in Pakistan.
However, it is also easy to overlook its successes. In May of
last year, Pakistan made its first ever democratic transition
from one civilian government to another. It has made progress
in stabilizing economy and in implementing reforms, but
obviously it has further go to realize its economic potential.
Pakistan's military operations in North Waziristan have
disrupted militant activities in the tribal areas and resulted
in important seizures of weapons and IED materials. This
operation is the latest and most extensive phase of Pakistan's
effort to extend greater government control throughout its
territory.
We recognize that Pakistan has suffered greatly at the
hands of terrorists and its sacrifices are laudable.
It is also clear that their job is not done. Militant
groups such as the Pakistani and Afghan Taliban, including the
Haqqani network, continue to pose a threat to Pakistan, its
neighbors, and to the United States. It is vital that these
groups not be allowed to find their footing, and we will hold
Pakistani leaders to their commitments in this regard.
Our constructive engagement with Pakistan has garnered
results, and it will be continued to be an important component
of our national security strategy going forward.
And with that, I thank you and look forward to your
questions.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Blanc follows:]
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Mr. Chabot. Mr. Sampler, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DONALD L. SAMPLER, ASSISTANT TO THE
ADMINISTRATOR, OFFICE OF AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN AFFAIRS, U.S.
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
Mr. Sampler. Mr. Chairman, members, thank you very much for
the opportunity to testify today about USAID's civilian
assistance in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
I am proud to represent USAID at this pivotal time in the
history of our engagement with these two countries.
Today, as a matter of fact, in Oslo, Norway, Malala
Yousafzai was awarded a Nobel Prize for her remarkable courage
and advocacy on behalf of education for girls in Pakistan and
around the world. Her recognition is made even more notable
because she shares the Prize with an Indian advocate for the
rights of children, Mr. Kailash Satyarthi. As she herself said
as she accepted the award, ``I am glad that we can stand
together and show the world that an Indian and a Pakistani can
stand united in Peace and stand together to work for children's
rights.''
In Afghanistan, as the international military forces
transition away from direct combat, and as their numbers and
their political and economic impact diminishes, the roles of
civilian agencies become increasingly more important, and
rightly so.
I am clearly aware of our commitment in and to Afghanistan.
A week from today marks the 13th anniversary of the reopening
of the U.S. Embassy in Kabul. At that ceremony in 2001, Jim
Dobbins, an outstanding diplomat and a personal role model for
me, noted that with the reopening of the United States mission
in Kabul today, America has resumed its diplomatic, economic,
and political engagement with Afghanistan. He continued and
finished by saying, ``We are here and we are here to stay.''
I first worked in Afghanistan in 2002 and played a role in
the emergency and constitutional Loya Jirgas that constituted
the founding of the new Government of Afghanistan. I have been
more or less engaged in supporting U.S. efforts there ever
since. I have worked with and for USAID, the Departments of
State and Defense, the U.N. Assistance Mission in Afghanistan,
a think tank, an NGO, and for-profit, all in support of U.S.
national interests in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
But as we enter the holiday period here at home, I am
reminded that there are over 2,300 soldiers, sailors, airmen,
and Marines who were killed in Afghanistan, and whose families
will miss them this holiday season. There have also been over
400 USAID contractors killed, and over 1,000 of our colleagues
wounded during this same period of time.
I have participated in Fallen Hero ceremonies for USAID and
State Department colleagues who were killed in Afghanistan in
the line of duty, and just last week met with the family of
Mike Dempsey, one of my employees killed last year, and I last
saw his family when I visited Detroit, Michigan for his
visitation and funeral. So I have firsthand experience in
pain--I have firsthand experience with the painful consequences
and costs for the progress we have made in Afghanistan.
I am also cognizant of the fiscal costs, the treasure that
we invest in Afghanistan and Pakistan each year. I and my staff
take very seriously our stewardship of taxpayer resources, and
we work tirelessly to ensure that these dollars are spent
appropriately and effectively, and that they support the
national interest and development goals we have set for
ourselves.
In support of our national interests abroad, USAID partners
to end extreme poverty and support resilient democratic
societies while advancing U.S. security and prosperity.
Afghanistan and Pakistan represent a range of development
challenges, but in both countries, USAID works to implement
programs that are sensible, sustainable, and developmentally
sound.
In Pakistan, we work in five sectors. They are energy,
economic growth and agriculture, health, education, and
stabilization. In Afghanistan, our programs range from
humanitarian assistance to infrastructure, which includes
energy, health, education, and governance capacity building.
In both countries, assuring and advancing the gains made by
women and girls are essential cross-cutting themes of our work,
as is building the capacity of local partners to ensure
sustainability.
As USAID navigates to the 2014 transition and looks to 2015
and beyond, the agency is committed to making every effort to
safeguard taxpayer funds and ensure that the remarkable
development progress made in Afghanistan and in Pakistan is
maintained and made durable in order to secure our national
interests in that part of the world.
It is an honor to share with you today a small glimpse of
what USAID is doing in that regard, and I look forward to your
questions.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Sampler follows:]
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Mr. Chabot. And, Mr. Soiles, you are recognized for 5
minutes.
STATEMENT OF MR. JAMES SOILES, DEPUTY CHIEF OF OPERATIONS,
OFFICE OF GLOBAL ENFORCEMENT, DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Mr. Soiles. Chairman Ros-Lehtinen and Chabot, and
distinguished members of the subcommittees, on behalf of
Administrator Leonhart and the Drug Enforcement Administration,
I appreciate your invitation to testify today regarding DEA's
counternarcotic strategy and the way forward in Afghanistan and
Pakistan.
DEA's core principle is to secure our Nation and protect
our citizens by relentlessly pursuing our mission of disrupting
and dismantling major drug trafficking organizations, their
networks and financial infrastructures, preventing the
diversion of pharmaceutical controlled substances and listed
chemicals from legitimate channels, leading the collection and
dissemination of drug-related information and strengthening the
strategic partnerships with our domestic and foreign law
enforcement counterparts and extending the rule of law
globally.
A recent report by the Special Inspector General of
Afghanistan Reconstruction indicated that the United States and
our allies have all but abandoned our focus on combating
Afghanistan's drug trade. I can say unequivocally that DEA and
our partners have not and will not abandon our focus on
addressing the drugs threats in Afghanistan, Pakistan, or
anywhere else. In fact, in some ways we have sharpened our
focus on the threats.
The United Nations has estimated that the international
drug trade generates $400 billion per year in illegal revenue,
making drug trafficking the most lucrative illicit activity by
far.
Because drug trafficking is so profitable, terrorist
organizations are increasingly tapping into the revenue stream.
The DEA has conservatively linked 22 of the 59 foreign--
designated foreign terrorist organizations to drug trafficking.
Approximately one quarter of these are based or operate in
Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Many of these organizations and other insurgent groups
operate in or receive drugs or drug-related funding from drugs
that are produced in or transited through Afghanistan and
Pakistan.
Over 80 percent of the world's illicit opiates are produced
in Afghanistan, and approximately 160 tons of heroin and 80
tons of opium are smuggled across the Afghan/Pak border every
year.
Afghan-produced heroin is primarily destined for world
markets. Only a small percentage reaches the United States.
In order to address these challenges, DEA leverages
existing programs such as our specialized vetted units, our
Foreign-Deployed Advisory and Support Teams and the Special
Operations Division to support, mentor, and advise foreign
counterparts and coordinate, de-conflict, and synchronize
ongoing investigations.
Based in large part on DEA training, mentoring and
assistance, the capacities and capabilities of our counterparts
in Afghanistan have increased. They can now independently
conduct drug investigations. In Fiscal Year 2014, they
initiated and led over 2,600 operations resulting in the arrest
of over 2,700 individuals, and the seizure of over 109 metric
tons of drugs.
Since January 2014, our counterparts in Pakistan seized
over 960 kilograms of heroin, 25,000 kilograms of opium, and
52,000 kilograms of hashish.
DEA's Special Operations Division directly supports ongoing
investigations throughout the world, including Afghanistan and
Pakistan. The Bilateral Investigations Unit of the Special
Operation Division work closely with our office to leverage
U.S. Extraterritorial authority against the world's most
significant drug trafficking and narcoterrorist organizations.
We have successfully used these laws to indict and
incarcerate several Afghan-based international drug trafficers,
including Haji Juma Khan, allegedly Afghanistan's largest
heroin trafficker with ties to the Taliban; Haji Bagcho, one of
the first defendants ever extradited from Afghanistan to the
U.S.; and Khan Mohammed, who intended to ship heroin to the
United States and use his profits to assist the Taliban.
Thanks to our efforts and those of our partners at the U.S.
Attorney's Offices in New York and Virginia, all of these
significant drug traffickers, many with ties to the Taliban,
faced justice in the United States.
The reality of being held to account for crimes in the U.S.
courtroom is a powerful and complimentary tool that must be
used to the fullest extent possible.
Due to the immediate and dire consequences of international
narcoterrorism crimes, DEA does not have the luxury of adopting
a reactive response to this existing criminal threat. Only a
proactive investigative response with the prospect of
incarceration in the U.S. can address the threat posed to U.S.
national security. Unfortunately, prior to leaving office,
President Karzai suspended extraditions of indicted individuals
from Afghanistan to the U.S., therefore foreclosing U.S.
prosecution.
President Ghani could send a clear message to the
international drug traffickers and narcoterrorists that operate
in Afghanistan by appropriately allowing them to face justice
in the United States and thereby complying with international
agreements, enhancing Afghanistan's security and strengthening
the U.S. national security. Quite simply, a safe Afghanistan
means a safer U.S.
Administrator Leonhart and the men and women of the DEA are
committed to standing with our interagency colleagues and
domestic and foreign counterparts to build and sustain
effective counternarcotics programs to protect U.S. national
security interests around the world.
Thank you.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Soiles follows:]
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Mr. Chabot. And members will now have 5 minutes to ask
questions, and I will begin with myself.
Mr. Blanc, I will begin with you. The Inter-Services
Intelligence Directory, ISI, has come under intense scrutiny
for its alleged ongoing links with and even material support
for Islamic militant/terrorist groups operating in Pakistan,
perhaps including the Haqqani network of Afghan insurgents.
What is your assessment of the security, intelligence and
political roles played by the ISI? Does that organization play
a double game with the United States as many assume is the
case?
Mr. Blanc. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I think that what we have seen most recently in Pakistan
with the North Waziristan operation is a real disruption of all
insurgent and militant activity in Pakistan, including the
Haqqani network.
Now, that is not to say and it remains the case that
Afghan-focused militants continue to operate from Pakistani
territory, and that is to the detriment of Afghan security. It
is to the detriment of our security. It is to the detriment of
Pakistan's security.
The Pakistani authorities, all Pakistani authorities,
including intelligence authorities, military authorities,
civilian authorities, have repeatedly said to us that they will
prevent the reconstitution of these disrupted groups as their
operations continue and conclude, and it is part of our
continuing dialogue with Pakistan to make sure that that is the
case.
So we are very focused on making sure that the disruption
that we have seen over the last few months becomes a more
permanent fact.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you. That is a nice answer, but I am not
sure if you answered my question, but I won't press you on
that.
Let me turn to you on this, Mr. Soiles. I really believe
that if the international community does not continue to
disrupt and dismantle drug trafficking in Afghanistan and
Pakistan, the economic development, stability, and rule of law
assistance we have provided there all these years will become
null and void.
You mentioned in your testimony that you will continue to
pursue a collaborative and productive relationship with the
Pakistani Government to support DEA efforts.
Can you discuss the state of your agency's relationship
with the Pakistani Government and the extent of cooperation you
receive from local law enforcement? Rampant corruption is known
to be a huge problem in virtually every sector in Pakistan. So
how does that affect your ability to interdict and shut down
drug trafficking networks?
Mr. Soiles. Well, our relationship with Pakistan, as you
all know, has been prickly, but----
Mr. Chabot. Has been what?
Mr. Soiles. Prickly. Difficult.
Mr. Chabot. Tricky. Okay.
Mr. Soiles. Yeah. But the DEA has always had a relationship
with the anti-narcotics force of Pakistan. We have a vetted
team that we use that we work with.
Recently we got authorization to open our office in
Karachi. Of course, as you probably know 45 or 50 percent of
the heroin produced in Afghanistan comes through Pakistan down
to Karachi and then out the Makran Coast.
We are--that is part of our containment program. We have--
we have worked really hard, not only with the Pakistanis, but
with all Afghanistan's partners to build the capabilities to
contain the flows going across the Afghan borders.
The Pakistanis are working hard with us to look at those
organizations. We are working not only in Afghanistan and
Pakistan, but in Central Asia, and also in East Africa where a
lot of this stuff ends up on--on the Makran Coast and go down
to East Africa and get off, flow into Tanzania and Kenya.
So we have a presence in these areas. We have vetted teams.
We have established vetted teams, and we will continue to do
that. The vetted teams give us an immediate capability to deal
with the investigations that we need and deal with the problem,
but it also has a long-term institution-building, capacity-
building capability.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you.
I have only got about a minute to ask my question and get a
response. Let me come back to you, if I can, Mr. Blanc, on a
different question.
GAO recommended in 2012 that the State Department direct
the U.S. mission in Pakistan to enhance its counter-IED
performance measures to cover the full range of U.S.-assisted
efforts. I understand that this recommendation remains open.
Can you explain why there has been so little action on this
and share with us what steps, if any, the State Department
plans to take to address these recommendations that would serve
to benefit U.S. soldiers and our allies in Afghanistan and
development efforts in Pakistan as well?
I think we all know that that is one of the most dangerous
things that we face in both Iraq and Afghanistan, and that is
IEDs.
Mr. Blanc. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
And, actually, there is a report out today from JIEDDO
because this is the--the counter-IED effort goes across both of
our missions and a number of military organizations.
And, if I may, I am just going to refer to some of the
specifics in the report----
Mr. Chabot. Okay.
Mr. Blanc [continuing]. Because, actually, there is some
good news here.
So it is assessed that the actions of the Government of
Pakistan and the Pakistan industry are steadily decreasing the
amount of HME material necessary for IEDs available to the
insurgency, increasing the cost of IED components, and forcing
the insurgency to extend its supply line deeper in Pakistan,
making it more vulnerable to, essentially, Pakistani efforts.
Information has become available that insurgent forces are
having difficulty obtaining the IED precursors that used to be
more easily available on the market, and the lack of
availability is a likely link to the voluntary ban on the sales
of some these materials in Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
by Pakistan's sole producer of one of the key precursors,
Pakarab.
We will--we can submit the rest of this report to you for
the record. Your staff probably already have it. But where this
broadly points is that the whole-of-government effort that we
have undertaken with both Embassies with the Department of
Defense I think is actually showing results on thecounter-IED
effort.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you.
My time is expired. But if you could make the report
available to the committee, we would appreciate that, and then
all members would have access to it. And, as I say, my time is
expired.
The gentleman from Rhode Island, Mr. Cicilline, is
recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Cicilline. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for
holding this important hearing.
And thank you to the witnesses for being here.
I would like to begin, Mr. Blanc or Mr. Sampler, when you
consider the level of funding in foreign assistance that has
been provided to Afghanistan and the expectation that they will
continue to rely on foreign assistance for at least the next
decade, what are the plans that the new Government--this new
coalition Government has developed, if any, to really begin to
build an economy in Afghanistan that might ultimately be able
to actually provide goods and services that the Afghan people
require? And what is the likely timeline for this--the country
to wean itself from almost total subsistence from foreign aid?
Mr. Sampler. I will begin, Congressman. Thank you for the
question.
The new Government is still establishing itself. I came
just this past week from London, where President Ghani and CEO
Abdullah presented their aspirations. We have the benefit in
Afghanistan now of having a President who is himself a well-
known international economist of developmental countries.
Dr. Ghani wrote the book, ``Fixing Failed States,'' which
literally addresses how to do these things in a very measured
and predictable and deliberate way. Now, taking his academic
aspirations and translating them into operational reality is
the challenge that he faces.
I will give you a very small example, though, that gives me
reason for optimism. In Afghanistan, they realized back in 2006
that they needed to have an electric power utility, not unlike
Duke Power or Georgia Power, and they created DABS, which is
the Afghan power utility. At the time, it received subsidies
from the government of around $50 million a year to become
functional.
I am pleased to say that, with USAID support and other
donor support, DABS is now actually turning a profit. It is
actually regarded in the region as one of the more well-managed
power utilities.
So if Dr. Ghani can identify the kind of talent that he has
found in DABS and if he can replicate that kind of competence
in the ministries of Afghanistan, I think there is reason for
optimism.
Mr. Cicilline. But do we have--have we developed specific
measurements and timelines so that we can be certain that these
kinds of improvements in governance and anti-corruption efforts
actually happen?
I mean, is that a condition of our assistance or at least
an implicit expectation that we are measuring that we have some
delineated outcomes that we expect over a certain period of
time?
Mr. Sampler. At the tactical level, it is. And what I mean
by that is, in each of the ministries in which we work, we have
very specific metrics for what we expect that ministry to
develop.
You have to remember that 10 years ago they were not a
literate society; so, it literally began with teaching some of
these staff to read and to operate computers.
But in each of the ministries, we make sure that they have
the prerequisite requirements to manage funds before they do,
and that is, in effect, building this government and building
the institutions from the ground up.
In terms of timelines, that would be irresponsible of me to
suggest. I think you are right to say it will be measured in 5-
year increments or decades. It will not be quick.
But President Ghani has said publicly one of his primary
goals is to build an economy that will allow government
revenues to grow and allow him to wean his government off of
international subsidies as quick as----
Mr. Cicilline. I think what would facilitate that progress
is for us to be setting those expectations as a condition of
our support and assistance.
I think what is irresponsible is for us to continue to
spend unlimited amounts of money on an effort without some
clear expectation of what we expect the Afghan people to do.
And I have been very critical of our failure to really
demand that the Afghan people take responsibility for their
governance and their security and really begin to take on those
responsibilities.
But I just have a minute left. So I want to turn to you,
Mr. Soiles, for a moment on the question of the illicit drug
trade.
As you said in your testimony, Afghanistan is responsible
for 90 percent of the world's opium, and despite the fact that
we have spent $7.8 billion in counternarcotics efforts in
Afghanistan since 2002, Afghanistan has, in fact, produced an
all-time high--record-high amount of opium.
And it really calls into question--if they are going to
build an economy, it is going to require that there be--it be
replacing this opium economy, and it doesn't seem like we are
having great success with record-high production and a huge
expenditure of American taxpayer dollars.
What can you recommend that we do differently or better to
produce better results?
Mr. Soiles. We are--the Drug Enforcement Administration is
an investigative agency. We are not eradicators, but
eradication would be an important issue. But that causes other
issues that our USAID and our State Department people could--
are more adept at explaining.
The reality is you got to have--we have to have a
counternarcotics capability in that country. The reality is,
when we first went in in 2002--and DEA did go in there in
2002--there was no one. There was no institution at all.
And, as a result, we have had to build the institutions
from ground up, everything, the buildings and--along with our
interagency partners, because it was--it was State and DOD and
USAID. It was a real U.S. interagency effort to try to build
those institutions so they can actually perform the duties that
they were given.
We had to establish their legal systems. We had to
establish the judicial process in Afghanistan. We have done
that. And it is working. It is working.
Mr. Cicilline. Except it is not working. I mean, this is
one of the challenges I think we face when we try to build
countries and those kinds of institutions. They are producing
opium at the highest rate that they have ever, and we have
expended, you know, billions--$7.8 billion since 2002.
And it just strikes me that it is--I am not assigning blame
to this, but it strikes me that it demonstrates the futility or
the almost near impossibility of taking on the responsibility
of building another country from the ground up, that that
responsibility ultimately has to rest with the Afghan people.
And we have now been at it for 13 years, and it calls into
question how much more lives and Treasury should invest in this
effort.
And, with that, I yield back.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen [presiding]. Thank you very much, Mr.
Cicilline.
And now Mr. DeSantis from Florida.
Mr. DeSantis. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
The President exchanged five very high-ranking Taliban
detainees, very lethal terrorists, in exchange for the Bowe
Bergdahl trade. The assurances were that they would be in Qatar
and be monitored.
So what have those detainees been doing in Qatar since they
have been transferred there?
Mr. Blanc. Congressman, thank you for the question.
There are limits, of course, to precisely what I can say in
this forum. You are exactly right to----
Mr. DeSantis. Can you say, though, that--without going into
detail, that you--we are in a situation where we can monitor
them so that they are not reengaging in terrorist activity?
Mr. Blanc. Yes, sir.
Mr. DeSantis. Okay.
Mr. Blanc. And I would actually like to further add to that
that the Qataris have been scrupulous in their adherence to the
terms and conditions of their agreement with us.
Mr. DeSantis. President Obama has reportedly changed the
rules of engagement for the remaining U.S. troops in
Afghanistan so that now troops will be allowed to carry out
combat missions instead of the initially reported train-and-
advise role.
What are the rules of engagement for U.S. Troops and
personnel in Afghanistan.
Mr. Blanc. Sir, I would defer to the Department of Defense
to describe the rules of engagement in particular.
The announcement that you are referring to regards the
missions of the troops. While it is true that we have--we have
moved from--or are moving from a combat mission to a train,
advise, and assist mission, there, of course, have always been
things the troops are going to be able to do, including
continued counterterrorism missions in conjunction with the
Government of Afghanistan, our own force protection
requirements, and a new thing that the President has announced,
which is that, in certain extreme situations, we will be able
to provide support to the Afghan National Security Forces as
they are conducting their own operations.
Mr. DeSantis. So if we want to get the actual rules of
engagement, are those--I understand the DOD is the one that
promulgates them.
Are those classified? Do you know?
Mr. Blanc. Sir, I am sorry. I actually don't know the
answer to that question.
Mr. DeSantis. Okay. What is the impact of the 24 elections
in--2014 elections--excuse me--in India have had on India and
Pakistan relations, specifically with regard to the conflict in
Kashmir? And do you think that the 2014 elections has had a
noticeable effect on India-Pakistan relations?
Mr. Blanc. Well, sir, I will be careful in what I say about
India because my colleagues from the Bureau of South and
Central Asia, which is responsible, are not here with me today.
What I will say is that the elections in both Pakistan a
year ago and then in India this year do create a window of
opportunity with new Governments, both with strong mandates.
And to some extent, we have seen some hopeful signs from
both sides, including Prime Minister Modi's invitation for
Prime Minister Sharif to attend his inauguration, an invitation
which Prime Minister Sharif took up.
We would like to see more focused improvement along the
line of control in other areas of the conflict. We would like
to see more focus on building some of the trade links which we
think are essential for both countries and essential for the
region. But there have been at least some positive indications
since those two elections.
Mr. DeSantis. My constituents will say, ``Man, India''--or
``Pakistan and Afghanistan, what is going on over there? Why do
we even need to be worried about it?''
And one thing I will always say is, ``Well, Pakistan has
nuclear weapons and, in a very dangerous part of the world,
those in the wrong hands could be catastrophic.''
So what efforts is the administration pursuing to influence
Pakistan to cooperate on nuclear nonproliferation and security
in the region?
Mr. Blanc. Sir, I think you have put your finger exactly on
it, that it is a complicated relationship with Pakistan, but
one that for a number of reasons is vital for our national
security interests.
And those interests, including nuclear weapons and assets,
including the safe haven that some militants have found, those
are the center of our dialogue with Pakistan.
And so it is what drives every conversation that we have.
It is what drives the strategic dialogue that the Secretary of
State has with his counterparts in Pakistan. And that will
continue to be structuring our engagement with Pakistan moving
forward.
Mr. DeSantis. My final question is--I think we have learned
some lessons in Iraq, well, from the beginning, but
particularly over the last several years.
Is the administration looking at Iraq and saying, ``Okay.
In Afghanistan, if we withdraw too soon, that could create a
situation in which jihadists will be able to gain more
territory''?
You know, we are having to now put more troops back into
Iraq and we are much more engaged there than we were 2 years
ago. Is there a similar danger in Afghanistan?
I know the mission end date has changed a little bit, but I
still think the President's goal is to really radically
withdraw. If that happens, are we going to just leave behind
another Jihadistan?
Mr. Blanc. Sir, you know, as far as withdrawing lessons
from different operations, I can only tell you my perspective
as part of this discussion. And I served in both Afghanistan
and Iraq for a number of years and have always believed that
the comparisons drawn between the two countries are misleading
guides to policymaking, that there are tremendous differences
between the two countries.
There differences between the way the politicians in the
two countries have come together or not come together. There
are differences in the way that the Afghan----
Mr. DeSantis. And I agree with that. My time is almost up.
So I agree with that 100 percent. But what would you say in
terms of--Is there a danger that, as the U.S. presence wanes,
that terrorism and jihadist groups are able capitalize on that?
Mr. Blanc. I think that we need to be very focused on
filling in the gaps that the Afghan National Security Forces
still has so that they are able to take responsibility--fuller
responsibility for security across their country and make sure
that Afghanistan does not again become an international threat.
And I believe that we are on track doing exactly that, that
the Afghan Security Forces, since taking lead responsibility
across the country in June 2013, have done a good job despite
very forceful efforts on the Taliban to disrupt them.
And, actually, I would just like to underline this. I think
it is often missed. The Afghan National Security Forces took
lead responsibility across the whole country in June 2013. That
was really the transition point.
And the fact that there hasn't been the sort of
catastrophic effect that some people might have feared I think
is an indication that the strategy of standing the Afghan
forces up and helping them fight their own fight is working.
Mr. DeSantis. I yield back.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much, Mr. DeSantis.
Dr. Bera is recognized, even though I have the esteemed and
much revered colleague Mr. Connolly breathing down my neck next
to me----
Mr. Connolly. Who once worked in the Senate.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen [continuing]. Who once worked in the
Senate as a staffer.
Dr. Bera, you are recognized
Mr. Bera. Well, I appreciate my esteemed colleague from
Virginia deferring to me.
The political complexity of South Asia, the political
complexity of the interrelations between Afghanistan, Pakistan,
and India, you know, are not easy. You know, when we were there
1\1/2\ years ago, you know, my impression when we met with
President Karzai was, in many ways, he did not make it any
easier, playing one country out against the other.
Perhaps, Mr. Sampler, with the new administration in
Afghanistan, have you seen a shift in how Afghanistan is
interacting both with India and Pakistan and how that
administration is engaging?
Mr. Sampler. Yes. Certainly. I will begin and then yield to
Jarrett from the State Department for the diplomatic level.
But, you know, India is the fifth largest donor in
Afghanistan. And in that regard, they have done remarkable
things for the Afghans, and particularly for Afghan women in
some cases.
Allowing Afghan women, for example, to travel out of the
country is a challenge. But if they are going to a place like
India, where many of their family and relatives have been
before, they are allowed to go.
And so India has taken it upon themselves to train Afghan
women in some basic life skills and confidence-building skills
and then in some vocational training skills that allow them to
work from their homes.
Similarly, at a more--at a higher level, they have--USAID
has worked with the Government of India to host a number of
bilateral business development conferences where Afghan
businessmen have gone to India.
Specific to your question, President Ghani has thus far--
and it is very early days--been very adept at talking about the
importance of a regional approach to solving the problems and
not two separate bilateral approaches, and I think the steps we
have seen on the development front have been very sensitive to
that.
But I will yield on the diplomatic front to Mr. Blanc.
Mr. Blanc. I think, you know, Larry has done a terrific job
of laying out the need for economic integration and the
critical role that India, in particular, can play in
Afghanistan in that respect.
Looking more to the political and the diplomatic issues, it
is clear that regional diplomacy is one of the President of
Afghanistan's most important and hardest jobs, and President
Ghani has really grabbed hold of it in his first 65 or 70 days
in office.
He has visited Saudi Arabia. He has visited China. He has
visited Pakistan. He has welcomed key Pakistani leaders to
Afghanistan. And I think he has struck a new tone in terms of
trying to find ways to cooperate bilaterally with these key
countries, but also as a regional grouping.
And it is early days yet, obviously. There is a lot of work
for him to do. There is a lot of reciprocation from these
partners to do. But I think he has approached it in a very open
and intelligent way.
Mr. Bera. I would imagine, as we go into this transition
phase in 2015, you know, in conversations with Indian multi-
national companies and others that have made significant
investments in Afghanistan, one of their major concerns
obviously is the security climate there.
And, you know, as the ANSF, you know, gains further
capabilities, I think one thing we can certainly do to continue
to encourage investment in Afghanistan infrastructure and a
favorable investment environment is to continue to offer some
of that--at least security training and security confidence.
You know, shifting gears to Mr. Soiles, it does--it appears
to me that the narcotics trade and narcotics trafficking go
hand in hand with counterterrorism. That would be an accurate
assessment and----
Mr. Soiles. Absolutely. The UNODC's recent study suggests
that 50 percent of the Taliban revenues come from the
trafficking of narcotics.
Mr. Bera. So if we are looking at other situations where we
can kind of--you know, let's take Colombia, for instance, where
I would imagine we encountered a very similar situation.
Are there lessons to be learned from how we approached
Colombia and our engagement there that we can apply to
Afghanistan?
Mr. Soiles. Absolutely. But Colombia was a lot more
progressed as a nation than Afghanistan was. They didn't have
decades of internal strife. I mean, the whole country was
devastated because of the internal stuff that was going on in
Afghanistan. But yes.
In fact, we used the model of Colombia in a lot of ways to
see what was needed in order to build the kind of narcotics
forces of Afghanistan, and we--not only Afghanistan, but in
some of the neighboring countries, for instance, some of the
central Asian countries that we are dealing with to try again
to stem the flow of the narcotics that are going out.
Mr. Bera. Right. And one last question.
One of the big successes in Afghanistan, perhaps for you,
Mr. Sampler, is that we have educated a decade of girls, and
those are real gains. Yet, one of my concerns is, as we start
to transition out, how do we hold on to those gains and, you
know, empower this generation of girls that are now becoming
women in leadership? And I would be curious about your
perspective.
Mr. Sampler. And that is one of the core interests of
USAID, is making stable and advancing the gains for women and
girls thus far.
One of the best metrics for the success we have had in
educating women and girls over the preceding 12 years is that
there are now roughly 40,000 girls who have enrolled in
universities in Afghanistan and others who have enrolled in the
regions. We have various scholarship programs and various
incentive programs to keep them engaged.
There is a tension in Afghanistan, though. Families choose
to marry their daughters and--not even prematurely, but choose
to see young women married as opposed to entering professional
circles. So we are working to create opportunities and set-
asides for women in some of these circles.
We have, as you may be aware, a $400-million program which
we are funding to the level of $200 million over 5 years called
``Promote,'' and it is specifically focused on women from the
age of 18 to 30 who have taken advantage of at least their
primary education. We can assist them with secondary education,
vocational training, and then placement in either the private
sector, in government, or in civil society.
So we are looking to seize and make permanent those gains
to achieve sort of a tipping point that women can't be set back
from.
Mr. Bera. Right. Thank you.
And I will yield back.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Dr. Bera.
The chair recognizes herself. And I apologize to the
witnesses if the questions that I am going to be asking have
been already asked. I was in another--some other few meetings.
So I thank you. I read your testimony.
So I'll start with Mr. Blanc.
In testimony before our Middle East and North Africa
subcommittee last month, former CIA Director Michael Hayden
posed a scenario of what he said, ``A Pakistani nuclear
guarantee for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in the face of
Iranian nuclear weapons programs.''
Do you think that Pakistan would sell Saudi Arabia a
nuclear weapon? What can you tell us about their nuclear
cooperation? Where would other players in the region acquire
the technology for it? We know that--we have heard reports that
other countries in the region as well might be interested.
And, Mr. Sampler, during a previous hearing with SIGAR and
GAO, we discussed the fact that State and USAID were moving to
give Afghanistan more and more in direct assistance, and this
was despite warnings from these agencies that the Afghans were
not remotely capable of handling the massive amounts of
assistance and that the Afghan leaders lacked a system to
manage the endemic corruption.
Now, you testified that USAID has, with regard to direct
assistance, ``put in place stringent measures to safeguard
taxpayer funds.''
And so I will ask you: Are these stringent measures the
same recommendations that SIGAR recommended before USAID
started providing direct assistance? And how much money are we
providing in direct assistance in dollar amounts? And what is
that in terms of percentages of what we are providing in total?
Also, what steps have State Department and USAID taken to
mitigate the risks of providing direct assistance that GAO and
SIGAR highlighted?
And, lastly, have State and USAID addressed all of the
recommendations of these agencies? And which ones have yet to
be recommended and why? Because I know it is a long list that
they had.
And, lastly, sir, Mr. Soiles, in your testimony, you
describe the connection between drug trafficking and terrorist
financing in and outside the country.
Can you elaborate on the fact that 24 Afghan and 15
Pakistani individuals have been designated by OFAC under the
Kingpin Act. Will we see more of that? Less of that? Is that
about average?
And what does this tell us about the scope of drug
trafficking in the region and the threat posed by the nexus
between terror and drug trafficking?
So, Mr. Blanc, we will begin with you. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Blanc. Thank you, Madam Chair.
It is, of course, true that Pakistan and Saudi Arabia have
important and deep ties. I have seen no indication of the
scenario that you have described. And we would----
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. You have seen what, now?
Mr. Blanc. I have seen no indication of the----
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. No indication.
Mr. Blanc. And we would look very negatively on any
indication of proliferation of any kind, including that.
Certainly a large part of our national security dialogue with
Pakistan is focused on nonproliferation issues.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Did I select the wrong country? Would
there be such collaboration between Pakistan and some other
country or Saudi Arabia and some other country?
Mr. Blanc. Ma'am, Saudi Arabia I couldn't speak to. But,
no, we are not--we are not seeing ongoing proliferation
concerns of that nature. And within the limits of what we can
discuss here, I would just say that we are--nonproliferation is
an important part of our dialogue with Pakistan.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. So you feel fairly confident that, were
these other countries to acquire the technology, the material,
et cetera, it would not be provided by Pakistan?
Mr. Blanc. We--I haven't seen indications of that scenario.
And we are very focused in our dialogue with Pakistan on
keeping them away from any kind of proliferation of that or any
other nature.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. And would you--was our intelligence good
enough during the A.Q. Khan era that you would have also had
indications that something was happening?
Mr. Blanc. Ma'am, that was before my time in this office
and, I imagine, probably something that we couldn't discuss in
this forum in any case.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you.
Mr. Sampler.
Mr. Sampler. Yes, ma'am. I will try to address your
questions in the order I remember them and, if I miss some,
please--I will go back.
With respect to on-budget support, we have about----
Mr. Connolly. Mr. Sampler, could I just ask you to bring
this closer to you. I am sorry.
Mr. Sampler. Certainly.
Mr. Connolly. The acoustics are not good here.
Mr. Sampler. Certainly. Is this better?
With respect to on-budget support, $2.4 billion of the $21
billion that we have been appropriated has been shared with the
Afghans to what we call on-budget support.
I don't use the phrase ``direct support'' because, in
development circles, that typically means money given carte
blanche to a government, and we don't do that.
On-budget support is a very specific mechanism that we use
with a particular office or ministry, and it is very tightly
controlled.
So to answer your question, about 11 percent of the money
that we have spent in Afghanistan has been spent in this on-
budget mechanism. It is a mechanism that, from a development
perspective, we quite like because it builds government
capacity.
But it is one from a fiduciary accountability perspective
that we don't trust because it means that we are putting more
of our faith in the local government.
So to the second point, then, of SIGAR's recommendations
for how we account for and how we control this on-budget
support, they made 18 recommendations, and I am--17 of the 18
we either already were or are now implementing.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. So out of the 18, 17 have already been
put in place or will be put in place?
Mr. Sampler. Have already been put in place.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Have already been put in place.
Mr. Sampler. Yes, ma'am.
And then with respect to the discussion about the----
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. What is that last one?
Mr. Sampler. I don't know. I was afraid you would ask that,
but I am happy to find out.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. No. Don't worry about it.
Mr. Sampler. With respect to the broader question of
safeguards in these ministries, we don't give money to the
Government of Afghanistan. We give money to particular
ministries or offices. And we only do that after they meet a
very exhaustive list of preconditions.
And, in fact, we embed in that ministry what is typically
called a grants and contract management unit, and these are
people who work for us on our payroll, but are embedded in the
ministry to oversee this ministry as they build their capacity.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Are they American citizens?
Mr. Sampler. No, ma'am. Typically not.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Typically not.
But they work----
Mr. Sampler. They work for us and under our supervision.
And they are qualified to international standards. If they
are an accountant, they are an internationally certified
accountant. If they are a bookkeeper, they meet international
standards for bookkeeping. And they don't work for the
ministry, but they work in the ministry alongside the
ministerial team.
Their roles are twofold. Primarily, they are there for our
accountability. But, secondarily, they are there for mentoring
and to help this Government as they build these institutions'
capacity.
I will stop there. And if there is something I missed, I am
happy to go back.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. No. Thank you so much.
Mr. Soiles.
Mr. Soiles. The OFAC Kingpin Designation Act, which was
passed in 1999--since that time, we have had about 3,500
designations on kingpins. And it is a drug--it is a Treasury
action against drug traffickers--international drug
traffickers.
And, basically, what it does----
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. How many total did you say, sir?
Mr. Soiles. Since 1999, 3,500.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. But that is throughout the world?
Mr. Soiles. Yes. Throughout the world. Throughout the
world.
And it is an interagency process that you--you appoint
someone and it has to go through a review process in order to
become OFAC or Kingpin.
Obviously, when we first started the process in 1999, our
threat was Colombia, Mexico, Western Hemisphere, and it is
geared toward looking at--initially, it was geared at looking
at traffickers out of that region, out of this--the Western
Hemisphere. And a lot of their assets were in the United
States. So, the process actually freezes their assets.
As it went global because of the--how drugs became global,
we have used it around the world. But, more importantly, by
designating the Afghan-Pak, what we do is we use it with our
foreign counterparts, our partners, to say, ``These people are
drug traffickers. If they have assets in your country, you
should be looking at it,'' and we can provide the assistance in
order for them to freeze those assets. Okay. So that is the
first part of your question.
The second part of your question is the drug terror nexus
and how does it work. As I stated earlier, 50 percent--
according to UNODC, 50 percent of the Taliban funding comes
from drug trafficking.
We have seen not only in Afghanistan, but in other areas of
the world--the FARC down in Colombia and other places of the
world, where the terrorist organization starts off basically
taxing the farmers. That is what happened in Afghanistan. They
taxed the farmers.
But they have progressed beyond taxing the farmers. They
provide security to the labs. They do transportation. They are
involved in actual moving roles just like the FARC did, the
FARC being one of the largest drug-trafficking organizations in
the world. That is what has happened--what happened in
Afghanistan.
The real problem with all that, of course, you know, the
terrorists have funding to do their operations. But in addition
to that, a collateral bene--or problem comes where they use the
money to corrupt various governments along the routes. And that
we have seen, too. Forget the corruption in Afghanistan and
Pakistan, but even in Central Asia. We have seen it in the
Balkans. We have seen it in Africa.
And all--a lot of these countries that are--experience the
threat as the drugs move out of Afghanistan and through these
territories are developing democracies. So they don't need
another problem.
So--and, ultimately, what happens is, if they corrupt the
governments, then they have a weak--weak institutions and it
gives the terrorist organization safe havens. And that is the
real threat.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. It is a real threat.
Now, of these 24 and 15--24 Afghans, 15 Pakistani, is that
the largest number that we have ever had? When were--when were
those designated as kingpins? And how has the level of
cooperation changed with the new Government in place in
Afghanistan?
Mr. Soiles. They are designated over time. As
investigations are developed and we can identify our
organization and a network, we designate them along the way. Of
course, it is an interagency process and it takes time to do.
So those are over time.
Now, also, part of the process is, at some point, if they
are not a threat, they get removed from the list. So--but the
24 and 15 have been there for awhile. We are working with the
Afghans on the targets. The Afghans have initiated a financial
investigative team that we are mentoring, that we are working
closely with together.
The new President has--has stated openly and publicly that
counternarcotics is a priority for his administration. He has
taken steps. We have seen significant steps for him--showing
that it is a priority for him, and we will continue working
with the new--with the new administration.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Let's hope so. Thank you very much,
gentlemen.
Yes, Mr. Blanc.
Mr. Blanc. Ma'am, if I could just add one thing to that,
which is that, again, it is very early in President Ghani's
administration.
Mr. Connolly. Mr. Blanc, you have got to pull that closer
to you, too, please.
Mr. Blanc. Thank you.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you.
Mr. Blanc. It is very early in President Ghani's
administration. But one of the things that he did in literally
his first weeks of office was to remedy some failings in their
anti-money laundering law in order to address concerns raised
by the Financial Action Task Force, or FATF.
And that, of course, relates to the counternarcotics issue.
It relates to the counterterrorism issue. And I think it is--
again, it is an indication that this Government is taking very
seriously some of our shared concerns.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much.
Thank you, gentlemen.
And now my good friend, Mr. Connolly.
Mr. Connolly. Madam Chairman, if I may, I would like to
give my colleague from Maryland the opportunity to ask his
questions if he--he is on a tight schedule.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Absolutely.
Mr. Connolly. And then I would reclaim my time.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Mr. Delaney is recognized.
Mr. Delaney. I want to thank the gentleman from Virginia
for giving me the opportunity.
And I want to thank the chair and the ranking member for
allowing me to sit in and participate in this important hearing
about two countries that will obviously be very important for
our national security for a long time.
The reason I was particularly focused on sitting in on this
hearing is because one of my constituents is a gentleman named
Warren Weinstein, who was captured in Pakistan over 3\1/2\
years ago.
And, as Mr. Sampler probably knows, he was a contractor for
USAID at the time and has had a long career--he is 72 years old
at this point. He has had a long career working for the Peace
Corps and for USAID and for helping people around the world on
behalf of our Government. And he has been over there for 3\1/2\
years now, and we know he is being held by al-Qaeda.
And so my question for you, Mr. Blanc, is: In your opinion,
is the Government of Pakistan, its civilian and military
leadership, cooperating with us to the full extent possible in
our efforts to try to secure Warren Weinstein's release back to
the United States?
Mr. Blanc. Thank you very much for that question,
Congressman.
Our hearts go out to Dr. Weinstein and to his family. I
think it is a measure of the nihilism of his captors that they
would hold somebody who is so dedicated to the welfare of the
people of Pakistan.
We are cooperating with the Government of Pakistan. The
Government of Pakistan is cooperating with us in this
investigation. As you know, there is a terrible kidnapping
problem in Pakistan----
Mr. Delaney. Yes.
Mr. Blanc [continuing]. That affects Pakistanis as well.
There is always more that we can do. There is always more
that they can do. But, yes, we are cooperating.
Mr. Delaney. But, in your opinion, are they--for example,
if we want to interview individuals that they have detained as
part of their police processes that are familiar with Mr.
Weinstein's kidnapping, are we provided unfettered access, in
your opinion, to these kind of resources?
Mr. Blanc. We have been getting access in those cases. Yes,
sir.
Mr. Delaney. Are we conditioning various assistants we
provide to the Government, whether it be civilian and defense
assistants, on full and complete cooperation as it relates to
not only Mr. Weinstein's situation, but, obviously, other
hostages that may, unfortunately, be held in the region?
Mr. Blanc. I think that we look at our assistance, both
civilian and military, in Pakistan as, really, an investment
that we are making in our own national security.
So while we wouldn't--we don't and wouldn't want to
specifically condition pockets for specific actions, we want to
be able to look at that leverage and use it to best improve our
relationship with Pakistan and the assistance they provide us.
I think again, in this case, we really are getting
cooperation out of them and--within the confines of their
abilities because, again, they face a very serious problem of
their own.
Mr. Delaney. Right.
And I understand how we can condition our aid on the
release of hostages like Warren because they may--you know, at
least their representations to us is they don't know where he
is.
And, as you have said, many--there is many even high-
ranking--children of high-ranking Government officials in the
country who have been kidnapped.
But it seems to me information that is completely under
their Government's or military's or police control, there
should be no hesitancy about providing us with complete and, as
I said, unfettered access to that information.
And I guess my question is: Why is it not a condition to
the cooperation that we provide? Again, I understand why
certain things can't be a condition because it is out of their
control.
But access to information, intelligence they may have about
a specific American who is captured and left behind over there,
it would seem to me that is the low-hanging fruit of things we
can use our significant leverage to obtain.
Mr. Blanc. And, again, I guess the most important answer I
would give to this question is that we are cooperating with the
Government of Pakistan and they are cooperating with us,
including on access to detainees and other issues.
Mr. Delaney. Just a separate question: Do you believe--you
know, because we have a broader issue with respect to Americans
that have been kidnapped in the region and, quite frankly,
other parts of world.
Do you believe the coordination--because the United States
Government in a whole variety of ways provides assistance to
countries all over the world and, in my opinion, why we have--
while we obviously have a policy against negotiating with
terrorists for the release of Americans, which is a policy I
obviously support, we have many partners around the world who
can help us in finding and identifying and locating and
securing the release of Americans.
Do you think that we are coordinated enough as a Government
and have made this a big enough priority? For example, should
we have a hostage czar who is looking at every touchpoint that
the United States has with partner nations around the world who
might have information that are useful to us to get these
people home? In your experience, what is your answer to that
question?
Mr. Blanc. Sir, I would be reluctant to comment on that
particular proposal partially just because I haven't thought it
through.
I have been very involved in the hostage cases that we have
addressed in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and what I would say is
that they certainly--again, going back to the premise that we
can always do more, these cases have received a tremendous
amount of attention at the highest levels and I think have been
the focus of creative diplomacy and thoughtful efforts to find
the leverage that we can and use it to--to secure the freedom
of these individuals.
Mr. Delaney. With the chair's permission, one more
question.
Is there anything that this Congress can do to put in place
a system so that the resources and leverage the United States
Government has is used more fully to help identify--we will
stay with Warren Weinstein, for example--to help find where he
is and bring him home?
Mr. Blanc. I am grateful for that question.
I don't--it is not something I can pull off the top of my
head. But, with your permission, I would like to take that back
to our counterterrorism teams and come back to you with a
considered answer.
Mr. Delaney. Okay. Thank you.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much for making such a
valuable contribution to this debate. Thank you.
Mr. Delaney. Thank you.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. It is a terrible situation.
Mr. Perry is recognized.
Mr. Perry. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Gentlemen, thank you for your time today.
Mr. Blanc, the question will be related to you.
But, first, you know, although December 8, 2014, marked the
official end to the U.S. and NATO combat mission in
Afghanistan, the violence and threats to U.S. interests in the
region are certainly far from over.
As a matter of fact, as I understand it, 2014 is the
bloodiest year in Afghanistan since 2001 and, to date, the
administration reportedly has not altered its post-2016 troop
planning for Afghanistan, asserting that only successful Afghan
governance can keep Afghanistan stable over the long term.
Now, I am concerned that, similar to the power backing that
allowed ISIL's rise in Iraq, the Taliban is waiting to reclaim
lost territory and establish another safe haven for terrorists
to thrive in Afghanistan.
So, with that, is this administration willing to be
flexible? And can you give any assertions in that regard with
planned American troop levels in Afghanistan after 2016?
Mr. Blanc. Congressman, thank you for the question.
We are operating along the plan the President announced,
which is precisely as you have outlined it, and our view is
that that plan is working, that the Afghan National Security
Forces, which hardly existed 6 years ago, have been in lead
responsibility for the security of their country since June
2013, and despite the extremely violent efforts of the Taliban
insurgent groups against those forces, despite the need to
protect two rounds of Presidential elections, despite the need
to protect the loya jirga to confirm the BSA last year, the
Afghan National Security Forces have held.
And so what we think is necessary for our national security
is to continue to fill in some of the gaps and needs that the
Afghan National Security Forces have--that is the train,
advise, assist mission--so that they can--they can continue to
take the last bits of responsibility that we have essentially
already given them over the course----
Mr. Perry. But if there are setbacks in the successes that
you have enumerated that requires a more robust effort, a
little bit of a longer stay as opposed to a date-based
withdrawal, is this administration--are you able to say now,
without equivocation, that the administration is flexible
enough to change its policy based on troop and basing levels?
Mr. Blanc. You know, I think I can point to some
flexibility that the administration is showing, for example, in
moving from a 9,800-troop level for the end of this year to a
10,800-troop level in response to specific requirements. And I
think it is clear the President stays in very close touch with
his commanders and will continue to do so.
That said, I think everything that we see confirms our
confidence in the plan that we are on to have a more normalized
security relationship with Afghanistan with them leading the
fight in their own country in 2017.
Mr. Perry. With all due respect--and I hope you are right--
but from many Americans' views and certainly partially mine,
that--the flexibility that we have seen recently in the
administration is more borne out of events in Iraq than events
and facts on the ground in Afghanistan.
Be that as it may, the flexibility is there. But I would
like to get some kind of confidence and an answer that says
that that flexibility will remain regarding Afghanistan,
specifically notwithstanding other events in the world that
might politically make it more plausible, more agreeable, to do
what needs to be done based on the facts.
Let me ask you this: Post-2016, can you give us any
indication of what metrics will be used to determine the size
of a residual force?
Mr. Blanc. Sir, I would have to defer that to the
Department of Defense that has been working on plans for a
security assistance office in Afghanistan.
Mr. Perry. So does that mean that there will be no
political component to assessing troop strength size in
Afghanistan?
Mr. Blanc. I think that, of course, there is a political
component. The conflict is political. And so we will have a
discussion about what the requirements are, which is
essentially a political discussion.
But in terms of planning for what the numbers would be and
what that more normalized security relationship requires in
terms of people to oversee assistance and other factors, I
think there are--we have--we have planning experts, and DOD
will be much better suited to answer those questions.
Mr. Perry. I would agree with you.
And I would just urge the State Department and the
administration to take the advice of the military planners in
this regard based on the facts as opposed to the political
considerations, not the ones in Afghanistan as--or the ones in
Afghanistan more than the ones in this country that--that might
call for a hasty withdrawal based on the considerations of what
somebody's campaign speeches might have been or political
narrative might have been to secure the gains that many
American lives and Treasury have spent to retain.
Appreciate your time.
And I yield back.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Excellent point. Thank you, Mr. Perry.
Mr. Connolly.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Madam Chairman, and welcome to our
panel.
Before I begin, Mr. Soiles, what part of New England are
you from?
Mr. Soiles. From Massachusetts.
Mr. Connolly. Where?
Mr. Soiles. Lowell, Mass.
Mr. Connolly. Lowell. Oh, my God. All right. I had a
primary opponent from Lowell.
Mr. Soiles. I thought I lost the accent.
Mr. Connolly. Oh. You lost the accent. He said
``Colombier,'' he says ``oughta,'' and he thinks he lost the
accent. But thank God you probably still root for the Red Sox.
Mr. Soiles. Oh, absolutely.
Mr. Connolly. God bless you. All right.
Put my time back to 5, please.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Yes. Move it back.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
I want to ask about efficacy because I think, really, that
is what all of us ought to be concerned about in Iraq and
Afghanistan, holding in abeyance Pakistan.
Mr. Blanc, for example, we spent apparently something like
$61.5 billion in equipping, training, recruiting personnel for
the Afghan National Security Forces.
Would you say that investment has been a successful
investment?
Mr. Blanc. Sir, I think that the investment----
Mr. Connolly. You need to speak directly into the mic. The
acoustics in this room are really among the worst. I am sorry.
Mr. Blanc. I am very sorry, sir.
Mr. Connolly. That is all right. That is great.
Mr. Blanc. I would say that our investment in the Afghan
National Security Force is paying off and that, in particular,
the investment that we have made really since 2008, 2009 is
paying off, that, from a point, you know, at the beginning of
this administration, where there hardly was an Afghan National
Security Force, we are now at a point where, since June 2013,
they have been in the lead in providing security across the
country through some very difficult months and through some
very challenging periods, including two rounds of Presidential
elections.
Mr. Connolly. Would you say they are equipping themselves
well against, for example, the Taliban?
Mr. Blanc. Yes, sir.
Mr. Connolly. And maybe we could agree, maybe not, in sharp
contradistinction with the Iraqi Armed Forces that melted away
in the face of ISIS.
Mr. Blanc. Sir, I haven't been to Iraq since 2005. And so I
want to stay away from comparisons in which I am not an expert.
But I will say----
Mr. Connolly. Well, I am not an expert either, but I can
read a newspaper. I can see the television.
I do understand that ISIS is now one of the best-equipped,
best-financed terrorist groups on the planet because precisely
of the comprehensive collapse of the Iraqi Armed Forces in the
face of a military threat. And we paid for it.
We--remember history. We rebuilt the Iraqi military after
Paul Bremmer took it apart. God knoweth why, but he did. So we
rebuilt it to the tune of tens of billions of dollars.
Surely you could agree, based on what you know, not being
an expert, and what I know, not being an expert, that that is
hardly a success model.
Mr. Blanc. My colleagues in the Bureau of Near Eastern
Affairs would probably be unhappy with me if I wade deeply into
this.
What I will say is--as I said in response to Mr. DeSantis
earlier, is that, from my experience in both Afghanistan and
Iraq and having spent a couple of years in both, I think that
the comparisons between the two are overdrawn and--and I think
that the nature of the security forces is one place where the
comparisons are overdrawn.
I certainly believe that the Afghan National Security
Forces, having taken lead responsibility for security in their
country in June 2013, have weathered a predictable, but very
violent, storm and deserve a tremendous amount of praise and
credit for that.
There are still areas where they need our support, and that
is what the train, advise, assist mission is about. I think
that, if we can finish that mission, we will redeem the
investment that you have described and leave behind a security
force that is able to secure its country and, therefore,
provide critical security for the region in the world without
our combat mission.
Mr. Connolly. I hope you are right.
But, again, I began by saying my questions of all three of
you are going to be about efficacy. And they are not--they are
hard questions and they are not easy answers and, you know--but
I think we, as a country, have to ask ourselves this. Was the
investment--did it pay off? And when it doesn't, we have to be
honest with each other that it didn't--it didn't work.
And maybe you are right that, with the military in
Afghanistan, in contradistinction to a nearby place that you
are not an expert on and I am not either, it is working. I hope
you are right. I sure hope that $61 billion--it is working.
Mr. Blanc. And I want to let Larry make a very compelling
case he is going to make about the tremendous gains that we
have seen in Afghanistan from the civilian assistance.
Mr. Connolly. The what?
Mr. Blanc. Tremendous gains we have seen in Afghanistan as
a result of our civilian assistance.
But before--before he does, I just want to underscore that
one of the things that is unique about our engagement in
Afghanistan is that the planning for 9/11 took place in
Afghanistan. We are engaged there because there was a threat
from there, and our continued engagement there is inexorably
linked with our national security.
Mr. Connolly. I am well aware of that. But we, of course,
took our eye off the ball to invade Iraq that had nothing to do
with 9/11. I am very well--very aware of the history.
Mr. Blanc. But on Afghanistan and the focus that I believe
we have brought to Afghanistan since 2009, I think that
standing up their security forces so that they can take over
from us and be a provider rather than a consumer of
international security--I think it is--we are on the right
track and we are seeing signs of success.
Mr. Connolly. All right. Well, we will hold you to it.
Before you answer a question you haven't been asked, let me
ask you a question and then you can answer, including Mr.
Blanc's lead in.
We had a hearing in June, this subcommittee, and we heard
from Mr. Sopko, the SIGAR, and we heard from Mr. Johnson from
GAO. And they actually testified they could not provide metrics
for the percentage of funds that were well spent or wasted
because--in Afghanistan because the raw numbers did not exist.
Is it your testimony that they are wrong, that, as a matter
of fact, you have got metrics and you have got numbers that
would demonstrate the efficacy of the domestic investments we
have made in reconstruction and relief and civil engagement in
Afghanistan?
Mr. Sampler.
Mr. Sampler. Congressman, it absolutely is. As the question
is asked, it is a very simple answer.
We do have metrics for success. And I can start with a very
concrete and appreciable on the ground kind of metrics all the
way up to more strategic what we call developmental objectives
that we are pursuing.
So I will answer that question first and then, with your
permission, I will address Jarrett's question as well.
In Afghanistan, for example, with respect to health care--
--
Mr. Connolly. If I may just for a second, Mr. Sampler.
If the chair will indulge us, this is, I think, the last
hearing of the----
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Sure.
Mr. Connolly [continuing]. Of this Congress. At least I
hope it is my last hearing of this Congress. And so if she will
indulge us to allow Mr. Sampler to----
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Please go right ahead. Thank you. Thank
you, Mr. Connolly.
Mr. Connolly. I thank you, Madam Chair.
Mr. Sampler. I will be brief and I will let you ask
followups, if you wish.
But with respect to health care, for example, an area in
Afghanistan that is often raised and criticized because of the
amounts of money invested, our efforts have helped raise the
average life expectancy by 22 years in Afghanistan. So Afghans
who would have died as they had children in elementary school
can now live to see grandchildren.
Mr. Connolly. Good metric.
But, Mr. Sampler, do you directly take issue with the
testimony of the SIGAR that says, ``I can't tell you how much
money was wasted and I can't tell you how much money was well
spent because we don't have the raw numbers in Afghanistan''?
That was his testimony. And remember what his charge is. So be
careful here.
Are you taking direct issue with the SIGAR?
Mr. Sampler. I have in the past. And I will. We certainly
have the numbers, and we share all our data with SIGAR. If
there are particular issues that he would like to explore, we
are happy to share the information that we have.
There are times when the special Inspector General takes a
different view of success than we do or he takes a different
view of the risk of particular programs we are pursuing than we
do. But we don't do programs that don't have metrics.
That is not something that I would come before Congress and
defend or go before my boss, Dr. Shah, and defend. We do have
metrics on all of our programs. And if--if we have been remiss
in not sharing our numbers broadly enough, I am happy to
address that.
If you would allow me to address----
Mr. Connolly. Well, I would just say--and I know you want
to go on, and I welcome it.
I would just say to you there is a profound difference
between your testimony right here and now and what we heard in
June--profound--and one is true or the other is true. They
can't both be true.
I take your point that we have metrics, but some metrics
are meaningless and some metrics are meaningful and--but he
claims--and so did GAO, by the way; he backed it up--that,
``Sorry. We don't have those. We can't have metrics. We can't
even establish metrics. That is how bad it is. We can't account
for billions of dollars in economic assistance to
Afghanistan.''
And you are here testifying that is not true, and you are
wearing your AID hat asserting that. Is that correct?
Mr. Sampler. Congressman, I don't know the context under
which they said that, but I will stand behind my assertion that
we have metrics for the programs we perform in Afghanistan.
Mr. Connolly. All right. You wanted to----
Mr. Sampler. Very briefly.
Several of the members raised the issue that 2014 has been
the most violent year in Afghanistan of the last 5, and that is
actually certainly true. Our numbers show attacks up 83 percent
over the average of the previous 5 years. But I wanted to give
you a customer's perspective of security in Afghanistan.
In the last 15 days, there were about 10 or 12 attacks just
in the greater Kabul area alone. And I called some of my
partners working on the ground in Afghanistan to make sure that
they were--that they had what they needed to assure their own
safety, and the partners made the following observation.
They said that the Government of Afghanistan doesn't
control the number of incidents of violence that occur. The
Taliban has a vote in that regard. And so they recognize that
the number of incidents may not be immediately something the
government can manage.
But two different partners spoke very highly of the
professionalism of the police who had responded to attacks on
their compounds and who had dealt with their Afghan staff and
their international staff in what they described as a very
competent and a very professional way.
So I would just propose for your consideration that, as we
evaluate the Government of Afghanistan's ability to secure its
population, we focus on their response to violent incidents
more right now than on their ability to prevent them.
Preventing violence is maybe a graduate-level task that we
expect them to eventually achieve, but right now I am thrilled
to see, given my 12 years in Afghanistan, that the police in
Afghanistan are someone someone--that they are partners welcome
into their compounds as opposed to refuse to deal with.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Mr. Sampler. We will explore this
in more depth. Thank you.
My final question, with the indulgence of the chair, has to
do with the DEA and drugs.
Mr. Soiles, in the time we have been in Afghanistan, given
our commitment to fighting poppy production and narcotics
trafficking and cross-border transshipment of illicit drugs to
Iran, what has happened in that time period is, I believe,
Afghanistan is now the world's number 1 heroin-producing
country and Iran is now the number 1 heroin addict-consuming
country, despite us spending $7.8 billion in counternarcotics
funding.
How--again, the efficacy question. So we feel pretty good
about our investment and the payoff?
Mr. Soiles. The DEA part of that--the DEA part of that is a
very small budget. I mean, our vetted teams there that we have
that we have trained--we have 77 vetted members.
We have what we call the National Interdiction Unit, which
is our kind of SWAT team types that go out and project out with
our FAST teams into--outside of Kabul that--that is only about
530 members.
And then we have what we call the Technical Investigative
Unit, which is our intercept program that we have there in
order to go after the command-and-control structures of
organizations.
You have to be able to intercept their communications. To
intercept their communications, you need a--we have a judicial
process in Afghanistan that we helped build and, as a result,
we use that as evidence.
Those units have been very effective. We--we stood up
this--the counternarcotics police of Afghanistan from scratch
along with our partners from State and our partners from DOD.
We have trainer training programs, and now they are training--
--
Mr. Connolly. Mr. Soiles. Mr. Soiles. You are representing
the United States Government here, too. I mean, yes, you are
DEA and Mr. Blanc is State Department, where we have a
narcotics matters bureau. Presumably, you are coordinating with
all of the U.S. entities in a coordinated anti--you know,
counternarcotic strategy for Afghanistan.
When I was in Afghanistan, I remember getting briefed by
DEA and State Department and the Embassy and so forth in Kabul
about what we were planning and what we were doing and the
interdiction and all that good stuff.
But the fact of the matter is, I think, the narcotics
trade--well, poppy production has grown, not decreased, and the
narcotics trade has grown, not decreased, both in volume and in
value.
So don't we have to ask ourselves that--you know, what--do
we need to do something different. Because it doesn't seem to
have worked.
And it is hardly like the United States didn't have a
footprint in Afghanistan. I mean, the longest war in our
history was in Afghanistan.
Mr. Soiles. True. Bottom line is we do. We ask that
question every day.
Mr. Connolly. And are we satisfied with the answer?
Mr. Soiles. We don't see an alternative other than to
continue building the capabilities of the Afghans for them to
have a sustainable ability to solve their own problem, and that
is what we do.
Mr. Connolly. Do you believe the current Afghan Government
is committed to ``solving their own problem'' with respect to
narcotics?
Mr. Soiles. I think the former government had a big issue
of--not the guys--not the people that we work with, quite
honestly, the rank and file counternarcotics police officers
that we deal with, but I think there was some significant lack
of political will from the former administration. With Ashraf
Ghani in, the new President, when are hopeful.
Mr. Connolly. All right.
Thank you, Madam Chairman. I am not sure I am satisfied
with the answers about efficacy, but I am glad we had the
hearing to explore it.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. It is a good theme.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. And I am glad that we had the hearing as
well. I am glad that we had all of the hearings this session.
We thank you gentlemen for your service to our country. We
know that this is a very troubling situation, the way forward
in Afghanistan and Pakistan. We could be at this all day and
all night and not come up with the answers, but we thank you
for what you are doing for our country.
Thank you. And with that, the subcommittee is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:26 p.m., the subcommittees were
adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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