[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 113-131]
THE ROLE OF MARITIME AND AIR POWER IN DOD'S THIRD OFFSET STRATEGY
__________
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
DECEMBER 2, 2014
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]
________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia, Chairman
K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina
DUNCAN HUNTER, California JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut
E. SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi RICK LARSEN, Washington
ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia HENRY C. ``HANK'' JOHNSON, Jr.,
MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado Georgia
JON RUNYAN, New Jersey COLLEEN W. HANABUSA, Hawaii
KRISTI L. NOEM, South Dakota DEREK KILMER, Washington
PAUL COOK, California SCOTT H. PETERS, California
BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama
David Sienicki, Professional Staff Member
Phil MacNaughton, Professional Staff Member
Katherine Rember, Clerk
(II)
C O N T E N T S
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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2014
Page
Hearing:
Tuesday, December 2, 2014, The Role of Maritime and Air Power in
DOD's Third Offset Strategy.................................... 1
Appendix:
Tuesday, December 2, 2014........................................ 25
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TUESDAY, DECEMBER 2, 2014
THE ROLE OF MARITIME AND AIR POWER IN DOD'S THIRD OFFSET STRATEGY
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Forbes, Hon. J. Randy, a Representative from Virginia, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces................. 1
WITNESSES
Brimley, Shawn, Executive Vice President and Director of Studies,
Center for a New American Security............................. 5
Hunter, Andrew, Director, Defense-Industrial Initiatives Group,
and Senior Fellow, International Security Program, Center for
Strategic and International Studies............................ 7
Martinage, Robert, Senior Fellow, Center for Strategic and
Budgetary Assessments.......................................... 3
Ochmanek, David, RAND Corporation................................ 10
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Brimley, Shawn............................................... 44
Forbes, Hon. J. Randy........................................ 29
Hunter, Andrew............................................... 54
Martinage, Robert............................................ 32
Ochmanek, David.............................................. 68
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted post hearing.]
THE ROLE OF MARITIME AND AIR POWER IN DOD'S THIRD OFFSET STRATEGY
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House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces,
Washington, DC, Tuesday, December 2, 2014.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 4:24 p.m., in
room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. J. Randy Forbes
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. J. RANDY FORBES, A REPRESENTATIVE
FROM VIRGINIA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND
PROJECTION FORCES
Mr. Forbes. Gentlemen, thank you so much for your patience
and putting up with us as we had these votes, and we are sorry
to kind of flip you around.
We are kind of waiting for Mr. Langevin to get here. He is
on his way. Mr. Courtney is ill and is not going to be with us.
So if it is okay with you, I am going to go ahead and do the
opening statement that we had planned to do. We weren't going
to do that in the interest of time, but since we are waiting
for Mr. Langevin, we will do that.
Today, the subcommittee convenes to receive testimony on
the role of seapower and airpower in DOD's [Department of
Defense] Defense Innovation Initiative offset strategy.
Our panel of distinguished guests testifying before us are
Mr. Robert Martinage, Senior Fellow, Center for Strategic and
Budgetary Assessments; Mr. Shawn Brimley, Executive Vice
President and Director of Studies for the Center for a New
American Security; Mr. Andrew Hunter, Director, Defense-
Industrial Initiatives Group, and Senior Fellow, International
Security Program, Center for Strategic and International
Studies; Mr. David Ochmanek, from the RAND Corporation.
And, gentlemen, we thank you for being with us today.
This past summer, Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel concluded
in a speech at the Naval War College that we are entering an
era where American dominance can no longer be taken for
granted. This is a stunning admission that deserves the full
and undivided attention of the Congress.
Today, states like China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea are
investing in precision-guided munitions, advanced sensors,
undersea warfare, unmanned systems, and offensive cyber and
space capabilities to alter the military balance with the
United States.
Nowhere are these risks more evident than in the Indo-
Pacific region and specifically Northeast Asia, where the
People's Republic of China is using its growing economic and
military power to coerce its neighbors and challenge the
current American-led order.
China's investments in what it calls a
``counterintervention strategy'' are calling into question our
ability to project power, degrading escalation dominance,
forcing allies to doubt the credibility of our deterrent, and
imposing costs on current joint force capabilities that will
make it increasingly difficult to sustain the military edge.
In recent years, we witnessed various responses to these
emerging challenges, including the establishment of the Air-Sea
Battle Office, new weapons programs like the Long Range Anti-
Ship Missile, and operational initiatives like the Air Force is
pursuing in the Pacific. These efforts are all very much
necessary, but they illustrate a larger concern: Alone and
unguided by a true long-range strategic planning process, they
are insufficient to prepare the Department of Defense for the
future.
When Deputy Secretary of Defense Bob Work began discussing
a new offset strategy this past summer, this subcommittee took
notice. I read the available literature on the offset strategy
of the late 1970s and the ``New Look'' of Eisenhower initiated
in the 1950s and found in this history a useful analogy for
today. Just like during these periods, we face new military
operational dilemmas that cannot be resolved in our favor by
doing more of the same.
I believe that the concept of peace through strength
continues to be a sound maxim for guiding our defense policy,
but, given the capabilities and new warfighting concepts our
competitors are adopting, the answer cannot be just to build
more military strength but to develop and invest in the right
type of military strength.
We need to ask tough questions about the military
competitions we find ourselves in, work to match our inherent
military advantages and disadvantages against those of our
competitors, and invest our time, energy, and resources in new
ways to exploit our advantages and shift the military balance
back in our favor.
I understand the Department of Defense has initiated the
Defense Innovation Initiative to develop a new offset strategy
to prepare the United States for emerging warfighting regimes.
While I look forward to future testimony from the Pentagon
about this effort, today's hearing provides an opportunity to
enhance this subcommittee's understanding about the concept of
an offset strategy and potential options the Pentagon can
consider in pursuing this new initiative.
Finally, there is one important distinction that I believe
needs to be made concerning the offset strategy from the 1970s.
While there was a tremendous amount of intellectual capital and
research and development dollars invested during this period to
develop an offset for Soviet advantages, the resources to fund
this effort never materialized. It was not until the Reagan
military buildup in the early 1980s that the benefits of
capabilities like stealth, precision-guided munitions, and
sensors could be fielded in a way that actually exploited these
new technologies and shifted the military balance in our favor.
Today, we face a similar dilemma. Absent a reversal of
sequestration, we can develop brilliant ideas for a new offset
strategy and still fall far short of our objective.
I again thank our panel for being here to testify and look
forward to your testimony.
And, with that, we are still waiting for Mr. Langevin, but
Ms. Hanabusa has joined us, and we are glad always to have her.
And it looks like Mr. Kilmer is making his way down, and we
certainly have Mr. Byrne with us. So we are going to go ahead
and proceed with our testimony if that is okay.
With that, Mr. Martinage, I think you are first up. Is that
my understanding?
[The prepared statement of Mr. Forbes can be found in the
Appendix on page 29.]
STATEMENT OF ROBERT MARTINAGE, SENIOR FELLOW, CENTER FOR
STRATEGIC AND BUDGETARY ASSESSMENTS
Mr. Martinage. Chairman Forbes, members and staff of this
distinguished subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to
share my views on the implications of a third offset strategy
on air and maritime forces.
I would like to request that my full written statement be
submitted for the record.
Mr. Forbes. Without objection, all of the written
statements will be submitted for the record.
Mr. Martinage. While several important lessons with
contemporary relevance can be drawn from the New Look in the
1950s and the offset strategy adopted in the 1970s, I would
like to focus my remarks this afternoon on the development of
what Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Work has dubbed a third
offset strategy.
I would like to share my thoughts on four issues. First,
why is an offset strategy needed? Or, put another way, what is
the operational problem that we need to solve? Second, what
enduring capability advantages might we leverage to enable a
new operational approach to power projection? Third, what kind
of shifts in the current DOD investment portfolio would be
needed to enable this new concept of operations? And, finally,
what isn't a third offset strategy?
So, to begin, we need a new offset strategy simply because
traditional sources of U.S. military advantage are being eroded
by the maturation and proliferation of disruptive technologies,
most notably anti-access and area denial [A2/AD] capabilities,
to state and nonstate actors alike.
While China's ongoing military modernization represents the
pacing threat in the Asia-Pacific, prospective adversaries in
other key regions around the globe are also acquiring and
fielding a wide range of A2/AD capabilities to exploit U.S.
vulnerabilities.
This trend is clear and disconcerting. Absent a major
change in how the U.S. military projects power, its ability to
deter aggression, reassure allies, and defend U.S. security
interests will be increasingly challenged in the years ahead.
More specifically, the U.S. military faces four core
operational problems that will become more severe over time.
First, close-in regional bases--ports, airfields, ground
installations--are increasingly vulnerable to attack in a
growing number of countries around the world. Second, large
surface combatants and aircraft carriers at sea are becoming
easier to detect, track, and engage extended-range from an
adversary's coast. Third, nonstealthy aircraft are becoming
more vulnerable to being shot down by modern integrated air
defense networks. And, space is no longer a sanctuary from
attack.
Given the increasing scale and diversity of these threats,
trying to counter them symmetrically with tailored forces or
competing missile for missile is likely to be both futile and
unaffordable over the long run. The United States cannot afford
to simply scale up the current mix of joint power projection
capabilities. Similarly, while active defenses and
countermeasures may be tactically effective and operationally
useful in some situations, they must not be allowed to crowd
out offensive capability and capacity, which is the foundation
upon which deterrence is built.
Turning now to my second point, to solve this growing
problem, I believe we should take advantage of U.S. core
competencies in unmanned systems and automation, extended-range
and low-observable air operations, undersea warfare, and
complex systems engineering and integration.
Importantly, when I say ``core competency,'' I don't mean
just technology. It is not just about gadgets but, rather, the
combination of technology, our industrial base, skilled
manpower, training, doctrine, and hard-to-learn practical
experience that confers the capability advantage that is
difficult for rivals to duplicate or counter.
As part of a new offset strategy, these enduring U.S.
capability advantages could enable U.S. power projection across
the threat spectrum to deter aggression, reassure our friends
and allies, and defend our national security interests.
More specifically, they could provide the basis for a
global surveillance and strike network that would be balanced,
in that it would comprise a mix of low-end and high-end
platforms aligned to a widely varying threat environment;
resilient, in that it would be geographically distributed with
less dependence upon close-in bases, have greatly reduced
sensitivity to enemy air defense capabilities, and be
significantly more tolerant of disruptions to space-based
systems.
It would be responsive, in that a credible surveillance
strike presence could be generated quickly by taking advantage
of rapid global reach and survivable forward presence. And,
lastly, it would be scalable, in that the network could be
expanded to influence events in multiple locations around the
world concurrently.
While many elements of the U.S. military would have
important roles to play in a future global surveillance and
strike network, it would emphasize air and maritime forces. In
particular, it would leverage increasingly autonomous unmanned
systems, given their advantages in terms of ultra-long mission
endurance and low lifecycle costs relative to manned platforms.
So now to my third topic: What shifts in the defense
investment portfolio would we need to realize this type of new
operational concept?
I address this question in considerably more detail in my
written statement, but, in short, I think the portfolio needs
to be rebalanced in three ways: increase space resiliency and
fielding hedges against degradation of space-based
capabilities; expanding undersea payload capacity and
flexibility; and, third, increasing the combat radius and
survivability of land- and sea-based airpower.
Simply put, it is imperative to rectify the growing
imbalance between forces that are able to operate only in
permissive environments versus those that can operate in non-
permissive environments as well.
So now to my fourth and final topic, which is: What isn't
the third offset strategy, in my view? Three quick points.
First, it is not a comprehensive national defense strategy,
let alone a national security strategy. It does not address
every threat facing the Nation, but, rather, should focus more
narrowly on restoring and sustaining our conventional power
projection capability and capacity, which is a sine qua non of
a superpower and the bedrock of deterrence.
Second, it is not about offsetting sequestration or the
Budget Control Act. Don't get me wrong; I strongly support
rescinding the Budget Control Act, eliminating sequestration,
and funding defense at a higher level. That said, the changes
in the defense investment portfolio that I outlined earlier are
needed irrespective of the budget level.
Third, it is not just about technology. It is about
identifying the operational problems that we face, leveraging
our enduring capability advantages to address them, and
technology is just but one component of that.
Lastly, I would just like to conclude by saying that we
just cannot afford to continue the current business-as-usual
approach to power projection nor plan on having the resources
and time to rectify the many problems with the current path
once they become fully manifest. So it is really essential for
Congress, and this committee in particular, to take an active
role in driving the formulation and implementation of a third
offset strategy.
I look forward to your questions and discussion. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Martinage can be found in
the Appendix on page 32.]
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Mr. Martinage.
Mr. Brimley.
STATEMENT OF SHAWN BRIMLEY, EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT AND
DIRECTOR OF STUDIES, CENTER FOR A NEW AMERICAN SECURITY
Mr. Brimley. Thank you, Chairman Forbes, members and staff,
for the opportunity to testify. I want to acknowledge my co-
panelists, whose work I very much admire.
I want to thank this committee for delving into the issue
of how the Pentagon's new Defense Innovation Initiative can be
fully harnessed for the long-term military technical
competition unfolding today.
It is a contest over military technical superiority and
whether the U.S. can sustain its advantage deep into the 21st
century or be overtaken by its competitors. This strategic
competition will be played out over decades, and it is one the
U.S. could very well lose.
America's Armed Forces must project and sustain power
across oceans and be able to perform complex offensive and
defensive operations in all types of geographic terrain and in
all operating domains. No other nation-state requires this kind
of global power projection capability to adequately protect its
national interests. The U.S. is unique in this regard.
But after over 25 years of U.S. power projection being the
source of our unique advantage, today it forms the basis for a
long-term military competition.
To properly frame the so-called third offset strategy, it
is necessary to place it in context. In my written statement, I
describe how military history can be divided into two basic
eras or regimes: the unguided-weapons regime and the guided-
weapons regime.
The key characteristic of the unguided-weapons regime was
that most munitions that were thrown, shot, fired, launched, or
dropped ultimately missed their targets. Therefore, in order to
maximize success at the point of attack, commanders would need
to aggregate their forces to achieve a--often achieve numerical
superiority.
The crucible of World War II and the early Cold War period
drove the development of two alternative ways for the U.S. to
compensate or offset the numerical advantages our adversaries
often enjoyed.
The first offset strategy centered on atomic weapons. The
massive destructive--the destructive power inherent in a
nuclear blast obviated the need for much accuracy. This was
initially attractive to the United States as a means to
compensate for insufficient land forces in Europe, but as the
Soviet Union approached basic parity in the nuclear balance,
the advantage that the U.S. enjoyed faded quickly. This
perceived erosion in U.S. deterrence drove the search for a new
way to offset Soviet conventional military power.
The second offset strategy that reduced the need for mass
on the battlefield came in the form of guided conventional
weapons that actively corrected their trajectories after being
fired, released, or launched. Transformative technologies like
stealth, the Global Positioning System, and the broader
revolution in computer networking acted as a critical means to
employ guided munitions against an adversary. Put simply,
guided weapons ushered in an entirely new warfighting regime,
one in which accuracy became independent of range.
Because the U.S. moved first and moved decisively into the
guided-munitions era, our Armed Forces gained a competitive
advantage that helped to reinforce our conventional deterrent
and was an influential variable, I think, in how the Cold War
ended.
For a quarter-century, the United States has continued to
benefit from its initial first-mover advantages in guided
munitions. But as both Secretary Hagel and Deputy Secretary
Work, among others, have recently described, we are fast
approaching a world in which the guided-munitions regime is
fully mature, with a much broader range of players now fully
invested. U.S. defense planners must now assume that future
adversaries will employ sophisticated battle networks and
advanced guided munitions to oppose U.S. military forces.
We see this dynamic being played out most clearly in Asia,
where China is moving quickly into the guided-weapons era with
a goal to establishing a degree of guided-weapons parity in an
extensive maritime contested zone.
So I believe the essential strategic challenge the Pentagon
faces is how to ensure that our Armed Forces can deter and
defeat an adversary that has established a degree of guided-
weapons parity. We have never encountered this kind of
strategic environment before, and I believe this has to be the
primary focus of the Pentagon's strategic planning and force
development efforts.
So the third offset strategy will need to explore many
issues. For instance, in my mind, the Pentagon needs to
determine how best to, one, defend against long-range guided
munitions at more favorable cost exchange ratios; two, ensure
U.S. aircraft carriers can project and sustain striking power
beyond adversary missile ranges, and I think this committee has
done great work in this regard; three, establish greater
magazine capacity to ensure our forces can engage in multiple
rounds of a salvable competition with an adversary employing
guided munitions; and, four, maintain resilience in our own
guided-munitions battle networks as plausible adversaries
develop ways to contest and degrade our command and control
links.
I would encourage Members to review my colleague Bob
Martinage's recent report on this topic, where he lays out a
series of strategy and spending priorities that I believe
constitute an excellent guide for the budget cycles ahead.
But as you adjudicate, scrutinize, and shape DOD's strategy
and spending priorities in the years ahead, I would encourage
you to hold the Pentagon accountable for the priorities
articulated by its leadership and also hope that you assist
them in providing the top cover necessary for implementing the
choices in the years ahead.
DOD, as you know, is a massive bureaucracy that tends to
resist even needed course corrections. But I think a window of
opportunity now exists where the strategic environment and the
fiscal pressure require real choices, and the leadership here
on Capitol Hill and at the Pentagon can firmly move the
Department such that America's military technical advantage can
be sustained in the decades ahead.
Thank you again for having me.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Brimley can be found in the
Appendix on page 44.]
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Mr. Brimley.
Mr. Hunter.
STATEMENT OF ANDREW HUNTER, DIRECTOR, DEFENSE-INDUSTRIAL
INITIATIVES GROUP, AND SENIOR FELLOW, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
PROGRAM, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
Mr. Hunter. Chairman Forbes, Mr. Langevin, thank you very
much for the opportunity to testify today on the Department of
Defense offset strategy and its implication for the role of
maritime and air power.
It is an honor to appear as a witness before this
committee, my former professional home, and a place where the
critical national security questions of our time have been and
I believe always will be thoroughly reviewed.
And I can't help but take notice of Chairman Skelton's
portrait. It was an honor to serve him on the staff, and a
pleasure to see so many of his colleagues with whom he served
and for whom he cared so deeply.
The topic of today's hearing is an important one. The
Department of Defense's recently announced Defense Innovation
Initiative, which is tasked to develop and support a new offset
strategy, is a serious effort to achieve an important strategic
objective. And that objective is to leverage innovation, both
operational and technological, to extend the Department's
advantage over potential adversaries even if those adversaries
engage in carefully planned aggressive and increasingly
successful efforts to erode that advantage.
The Defense Innovation Initiative must establish a concrete
plan to achieve this objective, and Congress must ensure that
the Department is resourced and organized to pursue that plan.
Now let me propose a few ways for the committee to assess
the offset strategy as it is being developed.
It is critical that the use of innovation as an offset
strategy is integrated within a broader national strategy. Only
in a broad strategic context can it be determined which
capabilities, and therefore which innovative concepts and
technologies, merit enhanced investment. The 2012 Defense
Strategic Guidance, the QDR [Quadrennial Defense Review],
ultimately the National Security Strategy must provide this
strategic context.
If you read these strategic documents today, they specify a
remarkably wide range of missions U.S. forces will need to be
able to perform in the future, and they cite the need for new
capabilities in the critical domains of cyber and space. Now,
to address a mission set this diverse, the next offset strategy
will have to focus on capabilities with a broad array of
applications, from the high end to the low end of conflict.
I believe there is a real danger of over-specifying the
problem, particularly if you are specifying it at one end of
the spectrum solely. As such, it is my view that the next
offset strategy should consist of a set of targeted
capabilities that enable new operational concepts and be paired
with a technology investment roadmap.
I don't believe the next investment strategy--offset
strategy should be a list of platform-specific investments.
Now, that necessary step comes later and, I think, should come
through a separate process, through the budget process.
To be effective, the next offset strategy needs to guide
action by industry as well as by the Department of Defense so
that the Department's investments are fully leveraged.
Communication with industry, therefore, including to the
maximum extent possible with nontraditional suppliers, is a key
enabler that will--as will the ability to harvest commercial
technologies. And the strategy must be flexible enough to
adjust for unforeseen adversary capabilities.
And, lastly, I want to point out that there are inevitably
tradeoffs between developing new capabilities and operational
concepts and then maintaining existing ones. We must, however,
be careful not to throw out the baby with the bathwater as we
shift our investment strategy.
Now, I believe future adversaries are likely to pursue
cost-imposing strategies that seek to raise the economic and
military stakes for U.S. military actions to levels that they
believe will be unacceptable to the American public. The U.S.
must pursue capabilities that enable effective responses at
acceptable costs.
I do not claim to be able to lay out a fully developed
offset strategy for you today that meets all of the
requirements I have described so far. Developing such an
approach will take time and much discussion with relevant
stakeholders, and I think war-gaming and experimentations to
test out these ideas will be critical.
However, it is my expectation that the next offset strategy
will extend many of the capabilities developed as part of the
last offset strategy, as they are likely to be highly relevant
when addressing future challenges.
Most notably, I believe battlespace awareness capabilities
will be critical, if not the critical element of future
conflicts, both high-end and low-end. Given the rapid pace of
development in areas such as data mining, sensor fusion, image
and video processing, significant advances in battlespace
awareness are likely to become available in coming years. And
such advances can significantly enhance the ability of U.S.
forces to plan and execute successful missions at acceptable
cost.
Denying battlespace awareness to adversaries may present
even greater opportunities. The ability of U.S. forces to act
cooperatively with partner forces can provide access to
additional sensors and information that enhance our awareness
while significantly complicating potential adversaries' ability
to impose costs on the United States.
These capabilities readily lend themselves to the air and
maritime realm. AWACS [Airborne Warning and Control System],
Combined Engagement Capability, are networked approaches that
were pioneered by the Air Force and Navy and provide exactly
the kind of the battlespace awareness that is likely to be key
in future conflicts. The Marine Corps Distributed Operations
concept applied a similar conceptual approach to control of
terrain in Iraq and Afghanistan. And the Army and JIEDDO [Joint
Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization] developed
integrated sensor networks for the protection of U.S. forward
operating bases that achieved significant enhancements in
capability. These approaches can be extended and applied to
other mission areas.
The support for the funding and flexibility needed for the
Department to adopt innovative approaches is far and away the
most important role Congress can play in the development of the
next offset strategy. In an era of declining budgets, it is all
too easy to decrement investments in innovation in order to pay
readiness bills or to pay bills resulting from the failure to
make needed changes in force structure or compensation.
The risk to innovation is by no means theoretical. CSIS
[Center for Strategic and International Studies] research shows
that contract spending for research and development dropped by
21 percent in fiscal year 2013, the first year of
sequestration, significantly more than the overall 10 percent
drop in the defense budget under sequestration and more than
the 16 percent drop in all contract spending. It will require
the active support of Congress to ensure that innovation is
enabled and not stifled by these dynamics.
A significant opportunity for Congress to facilitate the
next offset strategy comes from reducing barriers to the
adoption of innovation approaches. Such approaches require
relatively open communication with industry and careful
tailoring of the acquisition process. For systems under design,
modular open systems approaches can be utilized to enable the
rapid incorporation of innovative capabilities throughout
system lifecycles.
Most critically, Congress can support easier access to
commercial technologies. Existing statutory requirements, such
as the Truth in Negotiations Act [TINA] and the Cost Accounting
Standards [CAS], were designed to protect the government's
interest in acquiring technology from firms that engage in both
government and nongovernment work. While these statutes address
real issues in the government-industry relationship, the
implementation mechanisms for these systems are not well
aligned with modern commercial practices. A careful review of
TINA and CAS could substantially enhance the Department of
Defense's ability to access cutting-edge technology.
In closing, I commend the committee's decision to focus on
DOD's next offset strategy at this hearing and recommend the
committee continue to follow this effort closely. Congressional
support for change is likely to prove decisive to success.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Hunter can be found in the
Appendix on page 54.]
Mr. Forbes. Mr. Hunter, we are glad to have you back before
the committee, and I know Chairman Skelton would be very proud
of where you have gone in your career.
Mr. Ochmanek.
STATEMENT OF DAVID OCHMANEK, RAND CORPORATION
Mr. Ochmanek. Thank you, Chairman Forbes, Mr. Langevin,
other members and staff of the committee. And thank you for the
opportunity to testify before you today.
You have posed a difficult and important question here. We
know that maritime and air forces will play crucial roles in
any future conflict against the most capable adversaries we
face, but we don't know precisely what roles those forces will
play. And that is because the nature of the challenge posed by
the most capable adversaries we face, particularly those
wielding sophisticated A2/AD [anti-access/area denial]
capabilities, is so extensive that the United States, at this
point, has to rethink its entire approach to power projection.
And, therefore, it will be premature to make conclusions about
what roles particular force elements will play.
Members of this committee are all familiar with the types
of threats that cause us the most concern. I won't rehash them
here. And, as Congressman Forbes and my colleagues have
observed, China is the leading exponent of these types of
threats but not the only one.
Since the end of the Cold War, we have come, rightly, to
expect that when U.S. forces are committed to combat against
the conventional forces of a state adversary they will win
quick and lopsided victories. Looking to the future, when we
think about combat against the most capable plausible
adversaries, we will have to revise these expectations.
In such conflicts, should they occur, U.S. forces will have
to fight, and fight hard, for the sorts of advantages that we
have come to take nearly for granted in conflicts over the past
few years--air superiority, maritime superiority, space
superiority, and the ability to operate forces forward largely
from sanctuary. We can't take those for granted anymore.
Put most starkly, the legacy concepts of operation that our
forces have used so successfully in recent years will not work
against the forces of the most capable adversaries in the
future or, at a minimum, won't produce satisfactory results.
The third offset strategy, which seeks to focus and
energize technology, development, and systems engineering, is
intended to rectify this problem, and, in response, one can
only say, ``Bravo.'' But this effort, while necessary, will not
in and of itself be sufficient. It will need to be supported
and complemented by several related activities, and I will
mention five here.
One, DOD needs to revive and reconstitute its capacity for
joint operational analysis and gaming. The joint community's
ability to conduct quantitative assessments of the capabilities
of future forces has atrophied in recent years, and this
capability is essential for all force planning. We especially
need more iterative, rigorously adjudicated, tabletop war games
to allow operators to test their nascent ideas about potential
new operational concepts against an intelligent reactive red
team.
Two, new approaches are required for basing and operating
our forces in contested theaters. Too often in the war-gaming
we have done, when the blue team tries to strengthen deterrence
during a simulated crisis by reinforcing the theater, it ends
up actually projecting vulnerability rather than projecting
power, creating lucrative targets for the enemy's long-range
precision strike assets. We need more survivable ways to base
and operate our forces in these theaters.
Three, we should do more to help our partners and allies
field more capable self-defense forces. We should not try to
solve this challenge on our own. Allies and partners can impose
smaller-scale A2/AD challenges of their own to states that
threaten them. And enhancements like this can't take the place
of U.S. forces and commitment, but analysis suggests there is a
lot of unexploited potential there.
Four, not to be crass, DOD will need more money. It is very
difficult to see how even a flawlessly executed third offset
approach could be sufficient to meet growing challenges if the
limits imposed by the Budget Control Act are not lifted in
fiscal year 2016 and beyond.
And, finally, number five, as Secretary Hagel has observed,
Congress has to be a full partner in this. If DOD is going to
spend more money on new and urgently needed capabilities, it
will have to spend less on lower-priority programs. This will
call for things like continued adjustments to force structure
and end strength, garnering savings in pay and benefits,
eliminating unneeded base infrastructure--all hard to do, easy
to say, I know, but very important if we are going to actually
get the level of effort against this new effort that is called
for.
In conclusion, I would say that the most credible deterrent
to aggression is one that confronts the adversary with the
prospect of failure at the operational level. Without question,
mounting a robust defense of this nature is becoming more
challenging for the United States, and, indeed, some people in
this country are already saying it is too hard, it is too
costly, we can't do it.
But future U.S. forces, I believe, properly modernized,
properly postured, and employed with the forces of regional
allies and partners, should be capable of posing very serious
obstacles to aggression by even our most sophisticated
adversaries. This, as I understand it, is the central goal of
the new offset strategy. I believe it is a worthy and
achievable objective.
Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Ochmanek can be found in the
Appendix on page 68.]
Mr. Forbes. Gentlemen, thank you all for your statements,
and thanks for your written statements.
I am going to defer my questions until the end. And since
Mr. Byrne was the first one at the hearing today, we are going
to recognize him first for 5 minutes for any questions he may
have.
Mr. Byrne. Gentlemen, we appreciate you being here today.
One of the things, as a new member of the committee, that
strikes me about the position we find ourselves in is that
decisions that were made before I got here--and I am not trying
to second-guess them--have put us in a posture where we don't
necessarily have the capacity to catch up as quickly as we
would like.
Is there one thing that you would focus on, one precise
thing that you could tell this committee that we should focus
on that could get us back into the game at a level that we need
to be in?
Those are easy questions, I know.
Mr. Brimley. Maybe I will take the first stab at that, sir.
I mean, I would look to the recent hearings that this
committee has held. A good example, in my mind, is making sure
that the carrier air wing can fully project and sustain strike
power in these kinds of contested environments. And so making
sure that, however the Navy or however the DOD finalizes the
requirements on the UCLASS, the Unmanned Carrier-Launched
Airborne Surveillance and Strike vehicle, whether it is for a
lightly contested environment or for a more high-end
environment, to me, that is one of the canary--a canary in the
coal mine.
You know, if DOD is really serious about fully exploiting
the advantages inherent in a long-range, unmanned strike
platform, that requirements debate is something I am paying a
lot of attention to because that, I think--how that goes in the
next 3 or 4 months I think will indicate how serious the
Department is in fully moving into this more unmanned
autonomous warfighting regime.
We have got to find a way for the aircraft carrier to
remain very relevant at range when faced with one of these
high-end, anti-access/area denial challenges. If we fail to do
that, it is hard for me to understand how we can project and
sustain power with our allies and partners and maintain the
conventional deterrence that we need to provide security in the
Asia-Pacific as one example.
Mr. Hunter. From my perspective--I recently departed the
Department of Defense--the capability that I perceive to be the
single most limited--the highest-demand, most limited capacity
that the Department has is intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance. When a new mission comes on board, that is the
thing that the COCOM [combatant commander] is most interested
and gets the least of that they are looking for at the start of
a conflict.
So I would say that is a good place to look. And, frankly,
that really informed my thinking about the criticality of
battlespace awareness in future conflicts.
Mr. Ochmanek. I would broaden it a little bit, Congressman.
If we think about recent applications of U.S. military power,
when the President presses the ``go'' button, we expect that
with hours, if not days, U.S. forces will dominate all five
domains of warfare--air, land, sea, space, and cyberspace. We
have to disabuse ourselves of that notion in the future.
So we have to find ways to reach in to the contested
airspace, maritime space, and not only detect but also strike
the enemy's operational centers of gravity, whether it is naval
ships, amphibious ships making an invasion, aircraft, combat
aircraft. And I think standoff weapons are a way to do that.
ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] systems
that can survive in highly contested air defense environments
are ways to do that.
But that is sort of the single operational problem I would
focus on as a priority.
Mr. Martinage. To build on that, I would take it up maybe
even one step higher and just say, when you look at the air and
maritime investment portfolio, it is heavily weighted towards
capabilities that operate in low- to medium-threat environments
or permissive environments. We need to shift the balance and
have relatively more capabilities that can project power in
non-permissive environments, the higher-end threat
environments.
I know you asked for one, but I am going to have to throw
one more in. And that is we need to do something to streamline
the acquisition process. It takes too long to field new
capabilities, and, you know, in many cases, they are almost
obsolete by the time they field. And we just need to get faster
and more agile in terms of our exploitation of R&D [research
and development].
Mr. Byrne. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Forbes. The chair recognizes Ms. Hanabusa, who we are
going to miss very much from this committee, and we have
enjoyed having her and her service to our country.
Ms. Hanabusa. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
As many of you may be aware, the chairman and I had this
wonderful series of hearings basically on what does it mean to
pivot to Asia-Pacific. And, as you can imagine, as someone who
represents Hawaii, when we talk about the pivot to Asia-
Pacific, I have gone on and say, well, it is an air and sea
issue. If you know anything about how large the Pacific Ocean
is, it is air and sea. Of course, it doesn't play well with, in
particular, Army, because they don't like the fact that we are
saying it is an air and sea situation.
So isn't one of the most critical aspects that we have to
deal with is really, I guess, the territoriality or the
protection of the various branches and the fact that we have
funded in the past with everyone sort of sharing equally and if
we are pivoting to Asia-Pacific, for example, it cannot really
continue with a, quote, ``equal share''?
So, as we look at what is this offset strategy, don't we
have to first begin by looking at the structure of the DOD, how
the DOD apportions its resources? And if it continues with a
basic assumption that everyone will share, then how do we then
shift to the point where we are looking at, for example,
carrier strength, submarine strength?
You know, a very good friend of mine and mentor, Senator
Inouye, always said to me, ``You know, we used to rule the
seven seas after World War II. We don't do that anymore, but we
will always rule, or we should always rule, the deep blue
sea.''
So, in that scenario, if you would all look at it in terms
of the offset strategy, I can't get past the major assumptions
that I think DOD makes. Even with the QDR that we just went
over, DOD makes certain kinds of assumptions that I don't think
necessarily fits in your strategy.
Is there any one of you who wants to tackle that? And if
you want to tell me I am wrong, that is fine too. But, you
know, I think when we talk about the pivot, we've got issues,
and it is in line with what you are looking at for the offset
strategy.
Mr. Ochmanek. Congresswoman, if I might make a suggestion
or throw out an idea, I agree with you that when we come
through the process of designing a concept of operations and a
force that will be appropriate for this new demanding
environment, things will look different. We will have different
apportionment of roles and missions across the services,
different budget shares, and so forth.
But I think form follows function. And my lead-off remarks
suggested that we don't know today exactly how we would fight
this fight in 2020 and 2025. I think that as we figure that
out, through analysis, experimentation, field exercises and
tests, we will get insights about the capabilities that we
need. And the forces, if we are successful in planning and
fielding the appropriate force, will come along to fulfill that
concept.
Ms. Hanabusa. I agree with you. But let me add this,
though. You know, if we can't know what we are going to do in
2020 or 2025, we in Congress are making those policy calls, and
I--after one of the CSIS hearings, as a matter of fact, I said,
I know how we do things now. We set policy by acquisition. As
we acquire, we are setting policy.
And that is--2020 is right around the corner. And as we go
through the NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act] and as we
go through the appropriation measures, we are setting the
policies that are going to affect 2020. So one of the most
frustrating parts about sitting on this side has been you want
us to wait and see what it is going to do, but we have to
appropriate and set the authorization early on.
So how do we come and do that and then incorporate this
offset strategy, which I agree with? I just don't know how it
all melds together.
Mr. Martinage. I think you raise an excellent point. I
mean, really, right now, we are building the Air Force and the
Navy of 2030 and 2040 and beyond. So I think that it is an
excellent point.
I mean, in terms of the offset strategy in dealing with the
challenges in the Pacific, I think, generally, basing
resiliency and dispersion is a big issue, as well as longer-
range, more survivable aircraft--both manned and unmanned--and
undersea, exploiting the undersea, as you said, both submarines
and UUVs [unmanned underwater vehicles] and other payloads.
How all that sorts out in terms of budget share, I guess we
will need to see. But the point I would stress, though, is
that, whether it is the offset strategy or the pivot to the
Pacific, those aren't comprehensive national defense
strategies. We still have other challenges around the world--
you know, subconventional aggression in Europe, you know, in
the Ukraine, counterinsurgencies in various places in the
world, counterterrorism. Those are all places where, you know,
ground forces, the Army and the Marine Corps, have important
roles to play.
So we have to just figure out what the right capability and
capacity balance is across these various types of
contingencies.
I am not sure if that exactly answered it.
Ms. Hanabusa. Thank you.
And I yield back.
Mr. Forbes. Mr. Coffman is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Coffman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
A couple questions. The first one is, in terms of the
projection of seapower, the carrier has been central to that.
And if you look at the Chinese, they realize they are never
going to match us carrier for carrier, so they are focused on
some, I guess you might call it an asymmetric measure or the
anti-ship ballistic missile.
How--I mean, is it still important for us to put so many of
our eggs in that one basket as a platform for the projection of
seapower?
Anybody who wants----
Mr. Brimley. Maybe I will just quickly.
To build on what Mr. Martinage was talking about, you know,
the aircraft--and knows better than I do, certainly--the
carriers we are fielding today are going to be with us for 40-
plus years. And so, for me, as sort of a policy analyst, you
know, and to put a pun on it, you know, that ship has sailed.
So the question for me is, how do we make sure that that
investment, that sunk cost----
Mr. Coffman. Well, I mean, 11--do we maintain in the
future----
Mr. Brimley. That is right.
Mr. Coffman [continuing]. 11 carriers?
Mr. Brimley. That is right.
So the question for me is, how do we make sure that what
flies off of that carrier can make that investment sound when
we look at the operational challenges we will face 5, 10, 15
years from now?
That is why, for me, in terms of this question, it is the
carrier air wing that is the key. And if you can fully push the
Navy--in my mind, if you can fully push the Navy to embrace
what I see as the inherent benefits of moving decisively into
the unmanned, more autonomous regime where you can really get
some cost-benefit analysis and get an unmanned system to be
able to penetrate and strike at distance and at range, that
makes the aircraft carrier highly relevant even 20, 25, 30
years out.
A separate question is, you know, what is the long-term
future of the capital ship? Some analysts have suggested that
over time the A2/AD environment may get so bad that the
competition tends to go under the surface. And you see
indications of that now. You see senior leaders spending a lot
of rhetorical time and effort talking about making sure we
maintain our submarine advantages. I think that is the
critical, sort of, corollary to your question, sir.
Mr. Hunter. I would just say on that, I agree with the
point about the sunk costs. We have these carriers. They
provide incredible capability. We don't want to lose that. They
are being threatened. And there are things that we should do in
terms of having capabilities with increased range and with low
observability. But that does take you down the path where the
cost-imposing strategy is working. In other words, you are
playing into the cost-imposing strategy, because long-range and
very low-observable platforms tend to be fairly expensive.
What we relied on in the past to protect the carrier was
the fact that it was hard to find. And it is becoming
increasingly easier to find because adversaries are using more
networked approaches, as we did long ago.
We simply didn't focus, I believe, on how to defeat those
capabilities, their battlespace awareness, their ability to
find us, because it is so new that these capabilities belong to
anyone except us. And I think the most cost-effective way I can
think of to go after that is to go directly after their ability
to find and detect our assets.
Mr. Coffman. The last question is: Speaking to airpower and
the future of the manned bomber that the Air Force wants versus
unmanned or existing platforms--and I think that the argument
for the next generation of manned bomber is, well, what if,
i.e., communications were cut off, you would still be able to
execute a mission, versus an unmanned platform.
I mean, in terms of the investment and the alternative uses
of those dollars, is that a viable argument?
Mr. Ochmanek. We did some work on that some years ago,
Congressman. The marginal cost of actually putting human beings
inside that platform is fairly low.
Mr. Coffman. Okay.
Mr. Ochmanek. And when Secretary Gates approved the
program, he specified that it should be optionally manned so
that we have the choice, as we field these things, to send them
out with crews or without crews.
Mr. Coffman. Okay.
Mr. Ochmanek. So we will have flexibility as we build the
overall platform to employ it in different ways.
And you are right; how confident we are about the
resiliency of that communication link will be a key factor in
whether or not it will be viable as an unmanned platform.
Mr. Coffman. Okay.
Mr. Ochmanek. So I think we have covered--covered down on
that.
Mr. Coffman. Okay. Great.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Forbes. Mr. Langevin is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to welcome our panel here today. Thank you for your
testimony.
And, Mr. Hunter, in particular, welcome back before the
committee. It is great to see you again.
So I appreciate the discussion that we are having and the
comments you have made.
And, Mr. Brimley, in particular, I appreciate the comments
you made on UCLASS. We talk about developing the standoff
technologies. I think these types of things are going to be
essential.
And in terms of what we should be doing, actually, one only
has to look at what our adversaries are doing and what would
hold our assets and our capabilities at risk. And, certainly,
developing platforms that are most robust, that are standoff,
that allow for deep penetration are the things that we need to
focus on more heavily.
So I am watching very closely the Pentagon's decision as
they design the requirements on UCLASS to see where that is
going to come down. I think that will be very telling about how
they are thinking and if they are getting this right.
But, obviously, innovation is going to be key to all of
this and developing these new capabilities. And no matter which
way the innovation tree branches, there are a few constraints
that will be limiting factors.
But if I could, just for a minute, to focus particularly on
the undersea, the Virginia-class program of record is well
known, and the trend, of course, for the number of platforms
and the payload space that they will have, particularly as the
SSGNs [cruise missile submarines] age out and VPM [Virginia
Payload Module] slowly builds into the fleet. The picture in
terms of the numbers that we need isn't necessarily a pretty
one, particularly when we look at programs like the LDUUV
[Large Displacement Unmanned Undersea Vehicle], whose threshold
requirements for the integration with VPM and Virginia-class
boats with dry-dock shelters.
So are we investing in enough payload capacity to enable
these future mission and technology constructs?
And, Mr. Martinage, maybe we would start with you and go
down the line.
Mr. Martinage. In my view, increasing undersea payload
capacity and flexibility is a critical thing that we need to
look at as part of the offset strategy. I think we gain a lot
of advantage from our undersea warfare capabilities. And, as
you alluded to, on the current trajectory, our undersea payload
capacity is going to shrink by over 60 percent when the SSGNs
retire in 2028 and the declining LA [Los Angeles] class are
retired more quickly than they are being replaced by Virginia.
So, at the time we want to be increasing undersea capacity,
it is actually going down rather dramatically. So the question
is, how do we deal with that?
One is I think, absolutely, we have to get on board with
Virginia Payload Module. It looks like we are heading in the
right direction, but, again, that needs to be fully funded.
Then, looking at other options, undersea payload modules is
a program that DARPA [Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency] is looking at, which would be payloads that are
external to the submarine that could be deployed in peacetime
or in period of crisis, but it would be a means to increase
payload capacity but outside the submarine.
And then, lastly, taking advantage of UUVs, like the large-
diameter UUV, and a family of UUVs, I think, is really
critical. I think that is another high-payoff area with
unmanned systems and automation that could help us increase the
geographic coverage of our limited submarine fleet by having
the unmanned systems extend their reach and their flexibility.
The other thing is that I think we want to look at new
types of payloads for our submarines. Right now, it is
fundamentally torpedoes and Tomahawks. It doesn't have to be
that way. There is a variety of new weapons that they could
take on, in terms of electronic attack or decoys or going after
enemy air defenses, going after aircraft. There is a wide range
of other things submarines could do that we should actively
explore.
Mr. Langevin. But do we have a right balance in terms of
investing enough in payload capacity and enabling these future
missions? What do you think?
Mr. Martinage. My personal view is we need to shift the
overall composition of the fleet over time increasingly to
undersea and shift some of the resources that currently is
going into the surface combatant force structure and
modernization, shifting that balance--however much we need to
determine--more towards the undersea for the reasons that we
have talked about.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you.
Anyone else want to comment?
Mr. Ochmanek. I think, looking forward, undersea launch
platforms and standoff attack means are good bets for this
contested environment. And VPM is the option immediately
available to us.
Mr. Langevin. So could I ask this? Are the current
organizational structures within the services robust enough,
independent enough, and agile enough to drive innovative
tactics, procedures, and technologies and the like into the
operational forces? And how does today's status compare to the
structure that produced the innovative ideas of past offset
strategies?
Mr. Hunter. I think this builds a little bit on Ms.
Hanabusa's question, as well, because the question is, you
know, can the services accept innovation? Because it does
threaten existing capabilities, existing infrastructure for
which there are strong advocates within the Department.
And one of the reasons why I recommended that the strategy
be focused more on capabilities than on platforms is because I
think, when you get into platforms, it is inevitably, well, I
have my platform and you have your platform and now we are
going to fight each other over who wins.
I think at the level of capability, it is not necessarily--
as in some cases there are clear service, you know, areas of
excellence. But at the level of capability, all of the services
have an opportunity to at least make a case for how they can
provide that capability, what can they bring to the table. So I
think it changes the conversation a little bit less to one
about rice bowls and more about what folks can actually do and
bring to the table.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you.
Mr. Martinage. On that point, I would just reiterate a
point that Dave Ochmanek made during his presentation about the
need for joint operational analysis and war-gaming. I think
that is one of the tools that could help build confidence that
these are new operational concepts that we need to exploit and
these are the types of enabling technologies we need for those
concepts to work. And I think that is just an important tool
for building that confidence and driving that change.
Mr. Langevin. Very good. I share that. Thank you.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Forbes. As you guys know, Mr. Langevin has been a
leader in these issues on this committee and the full
committee, and we appreciate his leadership in all of that.
I want to wrap up now by telling you two things. First of
all, this has been a very important hearing for us, and it is
just the beginning. And we are probably going to follow up with
some written questions, if that is okay with you, to get on the
record.
Mr. Byrne and I were in a meeting earlier today when we
heard the majority leader give us a cute little analogy, but he
talked about four frogs sitting on a log--or maybe he said
five. I forgot what it was. But let's say it was five frogs
sitting on a log, and four of them decided to jump off. How
many was left? And the answer was five, because there is a big
difference between deciding and doing. And so we want to make
sure that we go from just talking about this to doing it.
And assuming we do that, we--Mr. Brimley, you have been
very clear that this shouldn't be a defense strategy. I think
everybody is pretty much agreeing with that, that we should
narrow the focus of this down.
So I am going ask you four questions. You can pick any one
of them you want, or all of them, and use it as, kind of, each
of your closing remarks.
But first thing, all of our strategies and our budgets are
built on assumptions. If you had to pick two of the assumptions
that we are using today that you think are wrong or either
could very probably be wrong, what would those two assumptions
be?
The second thing is: How do we do what Mr. Brimley has
suggested we do and focus our efforts? In other words, if we
weren't going to shotgun this and bring it into a focus, the
next two steps that we take from here, what would you recommend
that those two steps be?
And then the third one is: This a partnership, but more and
more this is no longer just a partnership between DOD and
Congress; it is also the private sector. And we are depending
more and more upon their creativity and what they bring to the
table. How do we get them involved in this process but yet try
to protect our intellectual property rights so that we are not
having all this stolen around the globe?
And then the fourth part of that, each of you have
mentioned the importance of our allies. How do we do more to
encourage our allies to be a part of this strength thing?
And, Mr. Ochmanek, why don't we start with you, and we will
just work backwards down the line and finish up.
Mr. Ochmanek. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will take a swing
at two of those pitches.
First, with regard to the next two steps, not to be a
broken record on this, but I think careful analysis of the
problem can help us focus from the outset on what we think the
most important operational challenges are.
As we discussed before we came in here, the people--the
giants who gave us the offset strategy from the 1970s that were
so successful didn't wake up every morning with vacuous
thoughts about how to transform the force. They woke up trying
to solve discrete operational problems of enduring importance:
How do I attrit and delay the second echelon of Soviet Army
forces in Central Europe in the face of a very robust air
defense?
And that is the kind of focused work that can help a
strategy like this really make rapid progress toward innovating
on the things that our future combatant commanders most need.
So that would be step one.
Mr. Forbes. And if I could impose on you----
Mr. Ochmanek. Yes, sir.
Mr. Forbes [continuing]. Go ahead and take that step. If
you were there and you said, ``What do we need to be focusing
that analysis on?'', give me two suggestions that you would put
forth.
Mr. Ochmanek. Two have been mentioned here. One is finding
ways that when we project power forward that the forces we
project are survivable so that we are not inviting an attack by
our adversary, we are not creating targets for him to shoot at.
We don't know how to do that yet. In the 1960s and 1970s,
we did it by pouring a lot of concrete at our bases in Germany.
It worked well because the adversary didn't have highly
accurate weapons. That is not likely to work now.
It is going to be a combination of things: dispersal,
getting used to using austere facilities, simple things like
rapid runway repair, fuel bladders, things like that. But it is
a mix of things, and we have to try it, we have to learn it, we
have to practice it. And then we have to resource this.
And, two, again, finding ways to locate, identify, track,
engage, damage, and destroy enemy forces on the move in the
opening hours of a war. Before we have been able to roll back
the air defense, before we have been able to achieve maritime
superiority, reaching into that bubble to attack.
Mr. Forbes. So you are looking at more offensive capability
than just defensive capability?
Mr. Ochmanek. I think it is offensive strike capability in
the service of a defensive strategy, yes.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you.
Mr. Hunter.
Mr. Hunter. It is a long list of questions. I think----
Mr. Forbes. Pick two you like.
Mr. Hunter [continuing]. I got them down.
I would say two assumptions that I think we may have or may
make that will be wrong, I think we are wrong if we think we
know where the fight will be. I don't think we do know where
the fight will be, and we will probably be surprised. That has
been a lesson of recent history.
Mr. Forbes. Your former chairman loved to testify that I
think he had 13 conflicts while he was here, and 12 of them we
did not predict.
Mr. Hunter. Exactly.
Second--and maybe this is a Pentagon perspective; I am
still a recent escapee--is the assumption that regular order is
better, better than the alternatives that have been created
over the last several years, that we are more insightful when
we take a longer period of time to make a decision.
I do think that analysis is critical, and I am not in any
way meaning to downplay the importance of it. But our regular-
order processes are not holy writ. And there is still a
tendency, as we come out of the conflicts that we have been in,
as much as we can, over the last 10 years, that if we could
just get back to regular order things would work much better.
And I think that is a false assumption.
Mr. Forbes. And the two things are not mutually exclusive,
you know, to be able to----
Mr. Hunter. Exactly.
Two next steps. I am going to agree--I know it is a little
bit boring, but I am going to agree with Dave on the
criticality of experimentation, work on operational concepts,
and the net assessment that he mentioned. Those are things that
need to be substantially reinforced and upgraded. And, as you
know, we changed our structure for engaging in that work in the
last several years, and I am not sure it has yet reached a new
balance where it ought to be in those capabilities.
And the second step is we need to work with industry,
because they are the key to the problem. There is no innovation
without talking to industry. And by that, I don't necessarily
mean what we think of as the traditional defense industry, the
big six contractors of the Department of Defense. I mean
industry more broadly. Because it is a global and fully open
industry now that is creating the kinds of technologies that
are relevant to the problems we are trying to solve.
On how to protect intellectual property, I think you have
to look at what industry's incentives are. Although they
clearly have a business incentive to protect their intellectual
property, they don't necessarily have the incentive to protect
it in the way that we would like that to occur. We need to talk
to them about what are the incentives that they need to do what
we want them to do in regards to their intellectual property.
And then on allies, I think we have to change the culture
of the government. This is not just a DOD problem, but there is
still a perception that we protect technology by holding it
tight. And that is just, I think, not in accord with the
reality of a global industrial complex that is out there, that
is in the world that we are living in. We can't achieve that
goal. And it only inhibits our ability to access technology,
the best technology, when that resides in companies that are
overseas.
Mr. Forbes. Okay. Thank you.
Mr. Brimley.
Mr. Brimley. Yes, sir. Quickly, I will take on flawed
assumptions and next steps.
On flawed assumptions, you will hear echoes of the--me echo
the statements of my colleagues.
Number one, that the U.S. will maintain dominance in the
guided-weapons regime. As I said in my written statement and my
oral statement, I think that assumption is false. I think it is
false today. It is certainly going to be false 5, 10, 15 years
from now. I think there is an indication--I mean, planners in
the Department are moving in this direction, but I think, you
know, keeping up that focus in the years ahead will be
important.
And, number two, another flawed assumption is that the U.S.
will be able to compensate for a loss in the first-mover
advantages that one might accrue from being aggressively moving
in the unmanned and robotic warfighting regime. I think, given
where the intellectual ideas are emanating from, it is not like
the 1970s, where it is sort of a DOD-focused S&T [science and
technology] R&D. These ideas are emanating--you know, autonomy
is happening in Silicon Valley, it is emerging overseas. I
worry that we are not going to be able to catch up if we fail
to move and move decisively in the next, say, 5 years.
In terms of next steps, I would just encourage Members to
make sure that the next budget submission reflects these
rhetorical priorities. I think we ought to hold the Pentagon
leadership accountable for the rhetorical priorities that it
has talked about.
I think we have talked about some program-specific canaries
in the coal mine. If you are serious about the offset strategy,
here are a couple programs where we can see indications about
how the Department is moving. That is going to be very
important, I think, in the next 4 to 5 months.
And, number two, just to continue doing what you are doing.
I think, for this subcommittee and for the House committee writ
large, I would encourage you to develop a year-long series of
hearings to fully explore this issue, whether it is a hearing
on undersea dominance and payload capacity, a hearing on
maritime experimentation, a hearing on alternative air and
maritime concepts of operations, where we could start talking
about these things more fulsomely in the public domain, and
maybe a hearing on what the role of allies and partners is.
And as you pursue, perhaps the allies and partners one is
an interesting one. If you call a bunch of defense nerds like
us to the table, we will all basically agree with one another.
But I think it would be interesting if you called in some
regional--some responsible regional players from, say, the
Pentagon or the State Department for a hearing like this and
really force bridges to be built between, sort of, functional
defense expertise in the Department and the more regional
policy expertise. That could be a very valuable thing.
Mr. Forbes. Mr. Martinage, we will let you have the last
word.
Mr. Martinage. Great. Thank you very much, Congressman
Forbes.
On the two flawed assumptions, there are so many, I am not
sure where to begin. But the two that I think stick out most to
me is the assumption of close-in operational sanctuaries,
whether it is airfields, carriers forward, surface combatants
forward, airborne tanking forward. We are unlikely to be able
to operate that way in the future.
And the second is our freedom of operation, our use of
space in the electromagnetic spectrum. I think those are both
going to be increasingly contested, with a lot of cascading
ramifications for how we think about the joint force and how it
operates.
I would echo really what all my colleagues have said on
point two--the experimentation, the war-gaming, the conceptual
development, I think that is all critical.
And, as Shawn said, while we don't have a crystal ball, I
think some near-term wins of things that are put forward under
the offset-strategy umbrella, like the VPM [Virginia Payload
Module] or UCLASS or directed energy or UUVs and unmanned
systems--we are pretty sure that those things are going to
figure prominently in the future. You know, we can work out the
details later, but I think those are all--would be candidate
near-term wins.
In terms of the private sector, I agree on, you know, the
importance of bringing them in and, you know, minimizing, you
know, espionage and theft. I think the bigger fundamental
problem is private industry doesn't really want to work with
the Department of Defense, because they put their IP
[intellectual property] at risk, their profit margins are
constrained, or, you know, they have--very narrow, they have a
ton of red tape and regulations to deal with. So, generally
speaking, a lot of the cutting-edge R&D that is out there in
the private sector, they are not interested in working with the
Department of Defense. Which gets back to, you have to fix our
acquisition processes in the Department.
And then, lastly, on allies, I think if we come up with a
compelling strategy, I think our allies will kind of help us
figure out what they can do to support it. I think we need to
bring them into the tent as we get this further along. I mean,
the process is just starting in the Department. It is probably
going to take some months or a year to flesh out the strategy,
but I think once we do, I think our allies will want to try to
help.
And I think there are likely to be some key roles in
command and control, communications, logistics, basing, as well
as potentially helping to field and develop some of these new
capabilities. Working with some of our closer partners, I think
that is possible, as well, to help share some of the burden of
doing that.
But, again, I thank you for the opportunity to speak today.
Thank you for the subcommittee's interest in this, I think,
very important area. And, as Shawn said, I think a series of
hearings over the next year or two to keep people's feet to the
fire and keeping this on the rails would go a long way.
But thank you.
Mr. Forbes. We thank all of you for your help. As you know,
DOD has kind of launched their first volley at this. This is a
congressional first volley. And we are going to be doing this
for a long time, I am sure, as we try to get our hands around
what we need to do and how we need to move forward. So we
appreciate your help today, and we are going to continue to try
to pick your brains as we move forward.
So, with that--do you have anything else that you have?
With that, thank you, gentlemen, for being here.
And we are adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 5:31 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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December 2, 2014
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December 2, 2014
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