[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
WHITE HOUSE PERIMETER BREACH: NEW CONCERNS ABOUT THE SECRET SERVICE
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT
AND GOVERNMENT REFORM
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 30, 2014
__________
Serial No. 113-154
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform
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COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM
DARRELL E. ISSA, California, Chairman
JOHN L. MICA, Florida ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland,
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio Ranking Minority Member
JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
PATRICK T. McHENRY, North Carolina ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of
JIM JORDAN, Ohio Columbia
JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts
TIM WALBERG, Michigan WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri
JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
JUSTIN AMASH, Michigan JIM COOPER, Tennessee
PAUL A. GOSAR, Arizona GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
PATRICK MEEHAN, Pennsylvania JACKIE SPEIER, California
SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee MATTHEW A. CARTWRIGHT,
TREY GOWDY, South Carolina Pennsylvania
BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
DOC HASTINGS, Washington ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois
CYNTHIA M. LUMMIS, Wyoming DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois
ROB WOODALL, Georgia PETER WELCH, Vermont
THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky TONY CARDENAS, California
DOUG COLLINS, Georgia STEVEN A. HORSFORD, Nevada
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina MICHELLE LUJAN GRISHAM, New Mexico
KERRY L. BENTIVOLIO, Michigan Vacancy
RON DeSANTIS, Florida
Lawrence J. Brady, Staff Director
John D. Cuaderes, Deputy Staff Director
Stephen Castor, General Counsel
Linda A. Good, Chief Clerk
David Rapallo, Minority Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Hearing held on September 30, 2014............................... 1
WITNESSES
The Hon. Julia Pierson, Director, U.S. Secret Service
Oral Statement............................................... 9
Written Statement............................................ 12
The Hon. W. Ralph Basham, Partner, Command Consulting Group, LLC
(Former Director of the U.S. Secret Service)
Oral Statement............................................... 15
Written Statement............................................ 19
Mr. Todd M. Keil, Senior Advisor, Torchstone Page, Inc. (Former
Assistant Secretary for Infrastructure Protection, U.S.
Department of Homeland Security)
Oral Statement............................................... 24
Written Statement............................................ 27
APPENDIX
Inventory sheet provided by the Virginia State Police, submitted
for the record by Mr. Cummings................................. 80
Opening statement of Rep. Elijah E. Cummings..................... 82
Opening statement of Congresswoman Eleanor Holmes Norton......... 84
Map of White House, submitted by Chairman Issa................... 86
August 20, 2014, letter to Julia Pierson from Rep. Jason
Chaffetz, submitted by Rep. Chaffetz........................... 87
Letter from U.S. Dept of Homeland Security U.S. Secret Service... 89
Remarks by the President at Signing of America's Promise Summit
Declaration, submitted by Rep. Jackson-Lee..................... 91
Dept. of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General report,
submitted by Rep. Chaffetz..................................... 92
WHITE HOUSE PERIMETER BREACH: NEW CONCERNS ABOUT THE SECRET SERVICE
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Tuesday, September 30, 2014
House of Representatives,
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform,
Washington, D.C.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:03 a.m. in Room
2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Darrell E. Issa
[chairman of the committee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Issa, Mica, Chaffetz, Gowdy,
Collins, Meadows, Bentivolio, DeSantis, Cummings, Norton,
Tierney, Lynch, Connolly, Cartwright, Duckworth, Kelly,
Horsford, and Lujan Grisham.
Also Present: Representatives Long and Jackson Lee.
Staff Present: Alexa Armstrong, Legislative Assistant;
Brien A. Beattie, Professional Staff Member; Melissa Beaumont,
Assistant Clerk; Will L. Boyington, Deputy Press Secretary;
Molly Boyl, Deputy General Counsel and Parliamentarian;
Lawrence J. Brady, Staff Director; David Brewer, Senior
Counsel; Sharon Casey, Senior Assistant Clerk; Steve Castor,
General Counsel; John Cuaderes, Deputy Staff Director; Brian
Daner, Counsel; Adam P. Fromm, Director of Member Services and
Committee Operations; Linda Good, Chief Clerk; Tyler Grimm,
Senior Professional Staff Member; Frederick Hill, Deputy Staff
Director for Communications and Strategy; Christopher Hixon,
Chief Counsel for Oversight; Michael R. Kilo, Legislative
Assistant; Jim Lewis, Senior Policy Advisor; Mark D. Marin,
Deputy Staff Director for Oversight; Ashok M. Pinto, Chief
Counsel, Investigations; Andrew Rezendes, Counsel; Laura L.
Rush, Deputy Chief Clerk; Jessica Seale, Digital Director;
Andrew Shult, Deputy Digital Director; Jonathan J. Skladany,
Deputy General Counsel; Katy Summerlin, Press Assistant; Peter
Warren, Legislative Policy Director; Rebecca Watkins,
Communications Director; Sang H. Yi, Professional Staff Member;
Aryele Bradford, Minority Press Secretary; Jennifer Hoffman,
Minority Communications Director; Chris Knauer, Minority Senior
Investigator; Juan McCullum, Minority Clerk; Dave Rapallo,
Minority Staff Director; Brandon Reavis, Minority Counsel/
Policy Advisor; Valerie Shen, Minority Counsel.
Chairman Issa. The committee will come to order.
The Oversight Committee exists to secure two fundamental
principles. First, Americans have a right to know that the
money Washington takes from them is well spent; and, second,
Americans deserve an efficient, effective government that works
for them.
Our duty on the Oversight and Government Reform Committee
is to protect these rights. Our solemn responsibility is to
hold government accountable to taxpayers. It is our job to work
tirelessly in partnership with Citizen Watchdogs to bring
genuine reform to the Federal bureaucracy. This is our mission,
and today's hearing follows one of the most important parts of
that mission.
With $1.5 billion spent by the Secret Service, nearly a
billion of that spent on protection of the First Family, the
Second Family, former Presidents and presidential candidates,
the United States Secret Service was always considered to be
the elite law enforcement Agency, made up of men and women who
were highly regarded, highly respected and highly trusted. The
country has placed great faith and trust in the Secret Service.
The agents of the Uniformed Division, their officers and
the Secret Service agents have a monumental task, that of
protecting the Nation's Presidents, past, present and future.
They do so honorably and not without considerable personal
sacrifice. They ensure the safety of the First and Second
Family, yes, and the safety of foreign dignitaries throughout
Washington and, at times, around the world. They ensure the
safety of every man and woman who enters the White House and
accompanying buildings. But a history of misbehavior, security
failures has clearly blemished that record.
On September 19, Omar Gonzalez jumped the North Fence, ran
across the White House lawn, up the steps of the North Portico
and into the front door of the White House. He was armed with a
3-inch serrated knife. He entered through an unlocked door,
passed the staircase to the presidential residence and into the
East Room of the White House.
Ladies and gentlemen, that was the part of my opening
statement that was changed last night when the early false
report that, in fact, he had been apprehended just inside the
front door was turned upside down by a revelation that, in
fact, he penetrated much further into the White House. Secret
Service officers only subdued him after he was clearly well
inside the White House.
An intruder walked in the front door of the White House,
and that is unacceptable. Common sense tells us that there were
a series of security failures, not an instance of praiseworthy
restraint. Inexplicably, Omar Gonzalez breached at least five
rings of security on September 19.
The White House is supposed to be one of America's most
secure facilities and, in fact, one of the world's most secure
facilities. So how on Earth did it happen? This failure has
once again has tested the trust of the American people in the
Secret Service, a trust we clearly depend on to protect the
President.
After allowing a paparazzi-crazed reality TV star to crash
a State Dinner, after engaging prostitutes in Cartagena, after
excessive drinking and an agent falling asleep outside his room
in the Netherlands and, yes, after the mishandling of the 11/
11/11 event, a gunman who sprayed bullets across the White
House and, it is reported, caused over $100,000 in damage that
was not properly reported in real time or understood in real
time, it is understandable that morale at the Agency appears to
be in decline, according to news reports.
In light of the recent break-in, we have to ask whether the
culture at the Secret Service and possible declining morale
have an impact in operation, and those are some of our
questions today. The appointment of Director Pierson brought
new hope that the Agency would reclaim its noble image, but
recent events have so troubled us that, in fact, we have called
the Director here to face some tough questions.
How could Mr. Gonzalez scale the fence? We understand that.
That happens often. People try to scale that fence. But how is
it that, as would ordinarily happen, agents didn't immediately
apprehend him? How was he able to sprint 70 yards, almost the
entire length of a football field, without being intercepted by
guards inside the fence? Why didn't security dogs stop him in
his tracks?
What about the SWAT team and assault rifles--or sniper
rifles? Why was there no guard stationed at the front door of
the White House? And, yes, how much would it cost to lock the
front door of the White House?
The Secret Service must show us how there is a clear path
back to public trust. The purpose of today's hearing is to gain
answers to these many questions plaguing the Secret Service.
Today we will hear from experts on both the Agency's protocol,
foreign and domestic. But, most importantly, we will hear from
the Secret Service Director herself on her plans to improve the
Agency's performance.
Americans face real danger as we serve interests abroad,
especially those stationed at our embassies. It is a time of
great peril. We are engaged in a battle against ISIL as we
speak, but that is not limited to foreign soil. Americans know
that the next attempt to take the White House may not be by a
crazed solo knife-wielding veteran with PTSD. It could well be
a planned attack from a terrorist organization.
The fact is the system broke down on September 19, as it
did when the Salahis crashed the State Dinner in 2009, as it
did when Ortega-Hernandez successfully shot the White House on
November 11, 2011, as it did in Cartagena when agents paid for
prostitutes and compromised security, as it did in the
Netherlands in 2014. We cannot further allow this.
But, more importantly, as I said to the Director before
today's hearing, the Secret Service relies on two important
skills--or facts. Their skill, their capability to protect the
President, must be at the highest level because they cannot
succeed 99 percent because 1 percent failure is not an option.
But they also rely on a good-faith belief by most people
that they shouldn't even try, that this is the hardest target
on Earth. We need to make sure that that second hardest target
on Earth is true again both in reality and in the minds of
anyone who might take on the Secret Service to get to the
President or the First Family.
And, with that, I recognize the ranking member for his
opening statement.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
We began today's hearing with an obvious premise: No
individual should be allowed to scale the fence of the White
House, sprint across the North Lawn and burst into the
residence of the First Family with a weapon. No one.
Our goal today is also clear: To determine how this
happened and make sure it never happens again. This is our
watch. This recent incident, unfortunately, causes many people
to ask whether there is a much broader problem with the Secret
Service.
Last night the Washington Post reported that Omar Gonzalez
made his way into the East Room much further than the Secret
Service previously disclosed. Another report in this weekend's
Post about a shooting incident in 2011 raises even more
questions about the competency and culture of this elite
Agency. What concerns me most about this report is that agents
said they were hesitant. Agents in this Agency said they were
hesitant to raise security concerns with their supervisors.
Ladies and gentlemen, something is awfully wrong with that
picture. The Secret Service is supposed to be the most elite
protective force in the world; yet, 4 days went by before they
discovered that the White House had been shot seven times.
Then, in 2012, there was the prostitution scandal in Colombia.
Although it had little to do with tactical protection issues,
it seriously damaged the Agency's credibility.
The Secret Service must not only carry out its duties with
the highest degree of excellence and effectiveness, but it also
must maintain a reputation which matches that performance. As
the chairman has said, much of what deters people from trying
to pierce the protective veil of the Secret Service is the
reputation, and that reputation must be one of excellence and
effectiveness.
Today's witness, Ms. Julia Pierson, was appointed as the
Director of the Secret Service last year to help restore the
Agency's standing. She has had a distinguished 30-year career
with the Agency. And to her credit, she immediately ordered an
internal review and agreed to testify.
With respect to this most recent incident, I have key
questions for the Director that I know are shared by many
people across the country: Did the Secret Service have specific
protocols for handling this type of perimeter breach? If so,
were those protocols followed in this case? And if they were
followed, do they need to be changed in light of what happened?
If the protocols were not followed, why were they not followed?
And how can we have confidence that they will be followed in
the future?
I also want to understand what happened prior to the
incident. Gonzalez was arrested in Virginia 2 months earlier,
on July 19.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to enter into the record an
inventory sheet that was provided to us by the Virginia State
Police. It lists the contents of his car, which included an
arsenal of 11 firearms, including sniper rifles and a sawed-off
shotgun. It also----
Chairman Issa. Without objection, the entire report will be
placed into the record.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much.
It also included the contents of his car, which included a
small arsenal of 11 firearms, including sniper rifles and a
sawed-off shotgun. It also included a map of Washington, D.C.,
with ``a line drawn to the White House.''
According to the Virginia State Police, the Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms and Explosives concluded that
there was no information in Gonzalez's history that prohibited
him from owning these firearms; yet, he was severely mentally
ill and a military psychiatrist reportedly treated him for
post-traumatic stress disorder and paranoid schizophrenia.
Mr. Chairman, I hate to even imagine what could have
happened if Gonzalez had been carrying a gun instead of a knife
when he burst inside the White House. That possibility is
extremely unsettling.
Today our work faces two challenges. First, the Secret
Service has not yet completed its internal review. I understand
that the Director will provide us with a status update, but the
final results are not yet in.
Second, some of the information is classified; so, we
cannot discuss it in public. The very last thing we want to do
is give people like Gonzalez a road map for how to attack the
President or other officials protected by the Secret Service.
This does not mean the committee cannot obtain the information.
The Director sent a letter on Friday offering not only to
testify here today in the public setting, but also to provide
all of us with a classified briefing. The chairman has now
agreed to hold this classified session in a separate room
directly after this hearing concludes.
Let me close by making this very final point. This, ladies
and gentlemen, is not a Democratic issue. This is not a
Republican issue. This is an American issue. This is also an
issue of national security.
The vast majority of men who serve and women who serve in
the Secret Service are dedicated, experienced public servants
who are willing to lay down their lives for their country. And
on behalf of a grateful Congress and a grateful Nation, I thank
every one of them. They have an extremely difficult job and,
like others in similar positions, they are required to make
instant life or death decisions in extremely stressful
situations.
Last year, for example, the Capitol Police shot and killed
an unarmed woman with a 1-year-old girl in the backseat of her
car. Some praised their quick responses. Others criticized
their actions. But they acted based upon their first-hand
experience right here in the Capitol when another deranged
individual burst through the doors and killed two Capitol
Police officers.
The Secret Service has a high-profile job, but it is
critically important and it requires accountability so that the
spotlight is rightly on their actions today.
Mr. Chairman, I look forward to the testimony. I thank you
for bringing us back for this hearing. And I look forward to
the questions that I have already raised and others being
answered.
With that, I yield back.
Chairman Issa. Thank you, Mr. Cummings.
Chairman Issa. I now recognize the gentleman from Utah, Mr.
Chaffetz, the Subcommittee Chairman on National Security, for
his opening statement.
Mr. Chaffetz. I thank the chairman, and I also thank the
ranking member, Mr. Cummings, and his statement. He is
absolutely right: This is not a Republican issue, a Democratic
issue. This is an American issue.
I don't want it to be the political football. But we in the
United States of America are self-critical. One of the beauties
of our Nation is we do hold ourselves accountable. And so I
appreciate, Chairman, you holding this hearing.
We have wonderful men and women who serve this Nation. They
do it patriotically. They do it--they put their lives on the
line. They walk away from their families and their spouses.
They don't know what today is going to bring them. And they do
so in a very, very honorable way, and we thank them for their
service and their dedication.
But I have serious concerns about the current leadership, I
have concerns about training, and I have concerns about
protocol. And that is what I want to get at today.
Since the current Director has taken on this role, it is
also important to note that she was the Chief of Staff since
2008. And so over the last several years, it is not good enough
to just simply excuse this as something we were trying to clean
up before because she was the Chief of Staff starting in 2008.
I am concerned about her leadership and the mixed messages that
are sent to those who serve in the Secret Service.
For instance, after the fence-jumping incident, the Secret
Service was very quickly--very quick to put out a statement
that honored the officers and agents for their ``tremendous
restraint.'' Tremendous restraint is not what we're looking
for. Tremendous restraint is not the goal and the objective. It
sends a very mixed message.
The message should be overwhelming force. If one person can
hop that wall--hop that fence and run unimpeded all the way
into an open door at the White House, don't praise them for
tremendous restraint. That is not the goal. That is not what we
are looking for.
If there were alarms that were inside the door that were
muted or silenced, I want to know why that is. Who makes that
call and decision? That, to me, is a leadership decision.
I think at some point we need to go back and review the
2013 Inspector General's report, which actually said there is
not a problem here, but has over 1,000 indications of security
concerns.
And the opening statements say we have to be 100 percent
right all the time. Everybody agrees with that. And, yet, the
Inspector General's report is pretty damning when it comes and
looks at what the agents are feeling like happens within the
Agency itself.
Very concerned about the 2011 incident. I am thankful for
the Washington Post and Carol Leonnig and what she did in the
reporting there.
As best I can tell from the spot report, as well as the
article in the Washington Post, the event in 2011 where eight
shots were fired at the White House, you had no less than five
Secret Service agents report that they thought they heard shots
fired. You had somebody on Twitter report that they saw
somebody shoot at the White House. There were two people in two
different shuttle vans who reported that they saw somebody
firing a weapon at the White House. Blocks away, moments later,
somebody crashes a vehicle. An assault rifle is in there. And,
yet, the--and the Secret Service is on the scene and nobody
ties those two together. I don't understand that.
Later the Arlington County Police actually detained this
person. He had been positively identified based on what was--
that vehicle that was there, but nobody put it into the system
to put him on the watch list. Consequently, when the Arlington
County Police pull him over, they take his picture and they let
him go. And it was only the Pennsylvania police 5 days later
that actually find this person. Now he's serving some 25 years
in jail, but he could have done a lot more damage.
If the Director is truly going to take full responsibility,
I think your opening statement and the goals you have should
also talk about leadership. Because, as I talk to the
whistleblowers at the Secret Service and others, they are
concerned about leadership.
I am also concerned about training. As I look at the 2015
budget request from the White House, on page 39, there is a
basic class totals. And I want to run through these numbers
because it is important on the training aspect.
Under Special Agent Basic Classes, in 2009, there were
eight classes; in 2010, there were eight classes; in 2011,
there were five classes; 2012, there were no classes; in 2013,
there was one class.
In the Uniformed Division Basic Class, 2009, 11; 2010,
there were 11 classes; in 2011, there were six classes; then in
2012, there was one class; 2013, one class.
And you look at the budget line appropriation for this, it
didn't go down. It is maintained basically the same. Why did
that training diminish?
And then, finally, Mr. Chairman, I worry about protocol.
Again, I mention tremendous restraint is what the Secret
Service touted. That is not the objective. If you project
weakness, it invites attacks. We want to see overwhelming
force. If a would-be intruder cannot be stopped by a dog or
intercepted by a person, perhaps more lethal force is
necessary.
And I want those Secret Service agents and officers to know
at least this Member of Congress has their back. Don't let
somebody get close to the President. Don't let somebody get
close to his family. Don't let them get in the White House
ever. And if they have to take action that is lethal, I will
have their back.
In this day and age of ISIL and terrorists and IEDs and
dirty bombs, we don't know what's going on underneath that
person's clothing. If they want to penetrate that, they need to
know that they are going to perhaps be killed. That is the
message we should be sending every single time. And that is the
kind of Secret Service that I expect.
I thank them again for their service, their dedication. We
love them. We care for them. But we need better leadership. It
is not happening.
I yield back.
Chairman Issa. Thank the gentleman.
Chairman Issa. We now recognize the gentlelady from the
District of Columbia, Ms. Norton, for her opening statement.
Ms. Norton. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you
for this hearing.
My respect for the Secret Service goes back to when I was
growing up as a child in the District of Columbia and continues
profoundly to this very day.
But today we must ask--recent events call for an--recent
unprecedented events call for an unprecedented response, first,
an increasing number of White House jumpers, including the most
recent this month who was able to get deep into the interior of
the White House; before that, in 2011, multiple shots into the
living quarters of the First Family discovered only 4 days
later not by Secret Service investigation, but by White House
staff.
Beyond these failures, in the core mission of the Secret
Service to protect the White House and the First Family is an
unsettling failure to disclose, perhaps even understand, what
has occurred or to promptly investigate.
Together, this combination of failures suggests strongly
that the time is ripe for a 21st century makeover of the Secret
Service. I do not regard this matter as a mere question of
personnel. I believe it goes far deeper than that. Moreover,
the stunning events have occurred during a period when the
United States and, by definition, the White House and even the
President are being targeted by domestic and international
terrorists.
According to threat assessments, this President has had
three times as many threats as his predecessors. Just as
troubling have been indications of unwarranted secrecy in the
Secret Service. The Secret Service is not a secret society. If
there is a willing avoidance of needed transparency, that in
itself poses a danger to the White House.
For example, when noise is heard that some believe could be
gunfire at the White House, others believe is automobile
backfire, and still others believe is gun--gun--gang gunfire,
isn't it the job of the Secret Service to presume, presume,
such a sound is gunfire until an immediate investigation shows
it was not?
When line officers close to the sound have to become
whistleblowers, has active suppression of information become
yet another threat to the White House? Worse, do such failures
show that some in the Secret Service are in denial of danger,
perhaps posing the greatest risk to the White House?
Particularly troubling, in light of such unanswered
questions would be the rush to quick fixes, such as suppression
of public access to the area around the White House without a
thorough investigation. The White House and Lafayette Park,
just like the Congress, are First Amendment areas, and the
public must be allowed to express their grievances as they
always have been.
In light of the seriousness of recent breaches, the
investigation at the first instance by the Department of
Homeland Security should go well beyond the details of these
events. They are merely the most recent raw data for a top-to-
bottom investigation of Secret Service operations at the White
House. This is not a mere question of personnel. Changing
people at the top or in between will not solve the issue I
think we are presented.
We must learn whether today's Secret Service, as
structured, for example, could stop five or six fence-jumpers
jumping at the same time, intent on harm to the White House and
the President, not just a demented war vet, who even alone
might have succeeded. No scenario should be off the table for
the needed 21st century study of Secret Service operations in
the age of terrorism.
Director Pierson has shown accomplishments in her 18 months
as director. The heroism of the Secret Service is beyond
debate. The White House intruder was brought down, after all,
by an agent, but the White House and the President have been
thrust into a new era of danger.
The Secret Service should welcome an outside investigation
to assure that the necessary resources and the expert backup
and the structure for the 21st century is necessary for it to
do its job.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Issa. I thank the gentlelady.
Chairman Issa. Members may have 7 days to submit opening
statements for the record.
Chairman Issa. I now ask unanimous consent that our
colleague, the gentlelady from Texas, Ms. Jackson Lee, be
allowed to participate in today's hearing. Without objection,
so ordered.
Additionally, I ask unanimous consent that our colleague,
the gentleman from Missouri, Mr. Long, be allowed to
participate in today's hearing. Without objection, so ordered.
We now welcome our panel of witnesses. The Honorable Julia
Pierson is the Director of the United States Secret Service.
The Honorable Ralph Basham is the former Director of the United
States Secret Service and currently a partner at Command
Consulting Group. The Honorable Todd Keil is the former
Assistant Secretary for Infrastructure Protection at United
States Department of Homeland Security and is currently a
senior advisor to TorchStone Page.
Pursuant to the committee's rules, I would ask that you,
please all rise and raise your right hand to take the oath.
Do you solemnly swear or affirm that the testimony you're
about to give will be the truth, the whole truth and nothing
but the truth?
Please be seated.
Let the record reflect that all witnesses answered in the
affirmative.
In order to allow sufficient time for discussion and
questions, please limit your testimony to 5 minutes. Your
entire opening statement will be made a permanent part of the
record.
And, with that, Director Pierson is recognized.
WITNESS STATEMENTS
STATEMENT OF HON. JULIA PIERSON
Ms. Pierson. Good morning, Chairman Issa, Ranking Member
Cummings, distinguished Members of the committee.
I am here today to address the concern that we all share
following the incident of September 19 at the White House. It
is clear that our security plan was not properly executed. This
is unacceptable. I take full responsibility, and I will make
sure that it does not happen again.
As director, my primary concern is ensuring the operational
readiness of my workforce. I have been aggressive in addressing
our human capital challenges, ensuring professionalism, and
developing leaders. Through active engagement with the Agency's
supervisors and employees, I have made it clear my expectations
for professionalism and personal accountability.
Much of what we do to protect the President and the White
House involves information that is highly sensitive or
classified; so, I'll be limited in what I can say in a public
hearing.
On September 19, a man scaled the North Fence of the White
House, crossed the lawn while ignoring verbal commands from
Uniformed Division officers, entered through the front door and
was subsequently arrested on the State Floor.
Immediately that night I ordered enhancements around the
complex and, in consultation with the Secretary, initiated a
comprehensive review of the incident and protective measures to
ensure this will not happen again.
The review began with a physical assessment of the site and
personnel interviews. All decisions made that evening are being
evaluated, including those on tactics and use of force, in
light of the totality of the circumstances confronting those
officers.
I am committed to the following: A complete and thorough
investigation of the facts of this incident; a complete and
thorough review of all policies, procedures, protocols in place
that govern the security of the White House complex and a
response to this incident; and, based on the results of that
review, a coordinated, informed effort to make any and all
adjustments, to include training and personnel actions that are
necessary to properly ensure the safety and security of the
President and the First Family and the White House.
The White House emergency action plans are multifaceted and
tailored to each threat. The Secret Service has apprehended 16
individuals who have jumped the fence over the last 5 years,
including six this year alone. In fact, on September 11, 2014,
a week prior to the events that are the subject of today's
hearing, officers apprehended an individual seconds after he
scaled the fence and ran onto the grounds.
In addition to fence-jumpers, over the last 5 years,
hundreds of individuals have approached the White House
perimeter, verbalizing threats to our protectees or acting in a
suspicious manner. Officers and agents routinely leverage their
experience and training to make decisions to either arrest or
transfer these individuals to appropriate facilities for mental
health evaluations.
Protecting the White House complex is a challenge in any
threat environment. In addition to being a national icon, the
complex consists of public spaces, executive offices where our
Nation's highest leaders congregate, and the private residence
of the President and First Family. Ensuring the safety of all
who live and work in the White House while preserving access to
the millions of visitors each year requires a unique balance.
In this environment, we are never satisfied by the status
quo and we are constantly reviewing our security protocols.
With the help of Congress, we have enhanced our protective
countermeasures and security features at the White House.
In the past 5 years, the Secret Service has upgraded
perimeter cameras, officer booths, vehicle gates and command
and control systems, along with enhancements to highly
classified programs that have made the President and the
complex more secure.
We have generated many of these new security enhancements
in direct response to intelligence information on known and
emerging terrorist tactics. I thank the Congress for their
support in this time of constrained resources.
Beyond technology, approximately 75 percent of our annual
budget is dedicated to payroll costs, which support our most
valuable asset, our people. The Agency relies heavily on
experience, training and judgment of our men and women to make
critical split-second decisions.
With respect to the many questions that have been raised
and the opinions proffered in the wake of the September 19
incident, I do not want to get ahead of the investigation that
is underway.
The Secret Service has had its share of challenges in
recent years and some during my tenure. I intend to lead the
Secret Service through these challenges and restore our
Agency's reputation to the level of excellence that the
American public expects. As Director, I am proud of the Secret
Service's workforce who serve each day with honor and
distinction.
Last week our employees successfully implemented security
operations in conjunction with the 69th United Nations General
Assembly in New York City, where they protected the President
and more than 140 world leaders.
Over the last 12 months, they have completed over 5,600
successful protective missions. It is my responsibility to
ensure that these men and women have the resources and training
that they need to succeed.
As Director, I have worked with the Department of Homeland
Security, with Secretary Johnson, the administration and
Congress, to include Members of this committee, to develop a
comprehensive, forward-leaning strategy to further enhance the
Secret Service's workforce and operational capabilities. We
remain dedicated and committed to protecting the President, the
First Family and the sanctity of the White House.
I thank the committee today for the opportunity to appear,
and I look forward to your questions.
Chairman Issa. Thank you.
[Prepared statement of Ms. Pierson follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Issa. Mr. Basham.
STATEMENT OF HON. W. RALPH BASHAM
Mr. Basham. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Cummings----
Chairman Issa. Could you turn the mic on and pull it a
little closer, please.
Mr. Basham. Mr. Chairman----
Chairman Issa. Thank you.
Mr. Basham. --Ranking Member Cummings, distinguished
Members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to
share my perspective today on the recent events of the White
House and, more broadly, on the state of an Agency I care a
great deal about, the United States Secret Service.
Let me say at the outset that I look forward to discussing
how the recent incident highlights some of the challenges the
Secret Service has long faced at the White House complex in
balancing desired levels of security along with the functional
needs of those who work and live in that complex, the practical
realities of the thriving city it resides within, and the
historic symbolism and imagery of the people's house.
The incident exposes certain steps Secret Service got right
and those they got wrong and will identify corrective measures
and additional resources that can be considered. However, it
also poses some difficult questions for all of us on issues,
like the use of lethal force and our tolerance for additional
fortifications around the White House complex. Those questions
do not have easy answers, and the long-term potential
consequences must be thought through.
Let us also be mindful that, while our analysis of actions
and the shortcomings has the benefit of days of hindsight and
consideration, anyone who has served on a protective detail
knows the decision-making in an actual event with life and
death consequences is measured in milliseconds. Those who were
on duty during this incident had a much harder job in trying to
get it right than we do here today.
My perspective is one that is shaped by a career of over 30
years in the Secret Service, but also from my experiences at
the head of three other operational components within the
Department of Homeland Security and now from 5 years in the
private sector, where I remain deeply involved in the Homeland
Security issues and the implementation of international best
practices as it relates to the protection of individuals and
high-value assets.
I had the honor of joining the Secret Service in 1971, and
I enjoyed a challenging and very interesting career, including
being on protective details of Henry Kissinger, Vice President
Bush, Quayle, Gore, and countless foreign Heads of State and
foreign dignitaries. Later, President Clinton appointed me as
the Director of the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center.
And, eventually, I returned to Washington after the September
11 attacks to help start up the Transportation Security
Administration.
I rejoined the Secret Service in 2003, when I was appointed
Director, where I was honored to serve for over 3 years. I
subsequently was appointed by President Bush to serve as the
Commissioner of the United States Customs and Border
Protection, the largest law enforcement agency in the United
States. I remained in that position into the Obama
Administration at the request of Secretary Napolitano.
Upon retiring from the government in 2009, I helped found
the security company that works for private-sector and
government clients. Therefore, the viewpoint that I will share
on the subject before the committee today is informed largely
by my experience with the Secret Service, but with the benefit
of having worked for and with many other elite security
organizations around the world for almost 40 years.
Let me commend the Members of this committee for the time
and interest you are showing on this subject, especially at
this juncture when there are so many pressing security concerns
to which our government must pay attention.
It goes without saying that the recent incident with the
individual jumping the White House fence, running across the
North Lawn and making it inside the White House is
unprecedented and unacceptable. This is not just my view, but,
as the Director has stated, it is her view and other senior
management of that Agency as well as the rank and file.
Again, perspective is critically important in this
incident. We could easily be sitting here today discussing why
an Iraq veteran possibly suffering through post-traumatic
stress disorder, armed with only a pocketknife, was shot dead
on the North Lawn when the President and First Family were not
on the property.
At the Secret Service, some of the split-second decisions
made during this latest incident will thoroughly be examined,
procedures will be debated, training will be altered, and, in
the end, the Secret Service will learn valuable lessons, as
they have been doing throughout their history, of protecting
the President and his family.
This is an Agency which has never been reluctant to ``red
team'' incidents, those of high consequences and those of less
importance, to find opportunities for improvement in the way it
conducts its business, the way it trains its people and the
tools it uses to accomplish its incredibly important mission.
I can tell you that my confidence remains extremely high
that this aspect of the Service's culture remains as strong
today as it has ever been. And I know that the Agency will
learn valuable lessons that it can apply immediately to improve
security at the White House and in other settings.
I would urge the committee to keep in mind that--when
examining any incidents, that the broader context in which the
Secret Service operates is not one which is valued on security
alone.
The Service has to ensure that the President, other
protectees, and facilities in which they work and live are safe
and secure, but they do so in the context of important American
values, like freedom and openness, and in close coordination,
cooperation and almost always after negotiation with a myriad
of other stakeholders and decision-makers who have diverse
priorities, responsibilities and viewpoints.
And this dynamic is, in fact, more true when it comes to
the area surrounding the White House complex than in any other.
As much as I may have wished it when I was the Director, the
Secret Service absolutely cannot act unilaterally when it comes
to almost any security feature in and around the White House.
Stakeholders with a voice include the government of the
District of Columbia, as Ms. Norton would recognize, the
National Park Service, White House Historical Society, GSA and
others, who all provide input into any architectural changes
and improvements, new infrastructure or changes in appearance.
A prime example of this is the closure of Pennsylvania
Avenue in front of the White House to vehicular traffic, a
security imperative, for the Service--from the Service's
perspective, for many years that was politically impossible
until the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995 made the impact to
have--a vehicle-borne explosive could have on a government
building, no less a 200-year-old sandstone mansion made it very
vivid and undeniable. Even then, it was not until 2004, when I
was director, that we were able to complete the project to
permanently converting this portion of the road into a
pedestrian mall.
I might add, to this day, there are those who believe the
avenue should be reopened in spite of the overwhelming and
irrefutable evidence of the extreme risk such a move would put
the First Family and hundreds of employees who work there.
I can also tell you that there have been numerous studies
conducted over the years by the Secret Service and at the
Secret Service's request to test and explore options to address
vulnerabilities of concern at the White House complex,
motivated, in part, by concerns about the inadequacy of the
current White House fence as an outer perimeter for a complex
giving the ability of an individual or group of individuals to
quickly scale it and be on the White House grounds.
While notable improvements have been made, especially over
the last decade, to the security of the White House complex,
many unnoticeable to the public, there have been several
priority improvements desired by the Service that have not been
possible in light of other considerations or given the level of
funding provided to the Agency for such capital improvements.
Let me be clear. I am not in any way trivializing the
importance of these other considerations. As a security
professional, there have almost always--there almost always
being things that I would like to do for security purposes, but
could not, given the factors or--and limited funding. And that
is always going to be the case.
We must always keep in mind that the White House, like the
United States Capitol, is an important symbol for the American
people. It is obviously critically important that it be kept
safe, but that security must be accomplished in a way that does
not jeopardize the very values that we seek to protect and that
these buildings themselves indeed symbolize. I ask that you
keep this in context when looking at this particular incident
and examining how something could have happened or how it could
be and should be prevented in the future.
Finally, I want to make sure the committee is aware of
another fundamental principle on which the Secret Service, in
fact, any good security organization's protective methodology
is based. In the military, it is called defense in depth. In
law enforcement, it is usually referred to as multilayered
security.
When it comes to protecting the President or the White
House complex, there are many layers of protection through
which an attacker must travel in order to achieve their desired
objectives and to pose an ultimate threat to the person or
thing that is the target.
A breach of the fence and the entry of an individual into
the White House is undeniably----
Chairman Issa. Mr. Basham, could you summarize. You're at
twice 5 minutes.
Mr. Basham. Oh. I apologize.
Then, having said that, Mr. Chairman, I am ready to take
questions.
Chairman Issa. Thank you.
[Prepared statement of Mr. Basham follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Issa. Mr. Keil.
STATEMENT OF TODD M. KEIL
Mr. Keil. Thank you, Chairman Issa, Ranking Member Cummings
and distinguished Members of the committee for inviting me to
testify today regarding the U.S. Secret Service's security
protocols.
I believe I can offer a unique perspective on protecting
high-visibility, targeted facilities after spending nearly 23
years as a special agent with the U.S. Department of State's
Diplomatic Security Service, with responsibility for developing
and implementing security programs for U.S. personnel,
embassies, consulates and other official facilities around the
world. I have also spent numerous years in the private sector,
working in and advising corporate security operations and
management.
Additionally, from late 2009 until early 2012, I was the
Assistant Secretary for Infrastructure Protection at the
Department of Homeland Security. As the Assistant Secretary, I
was responsible for public-private partnerships and a
regulatory program to protect the critical assets of the United
States.
Last year I was also selected and served on the Benghazi
Accountability Review Board recommended Independent Panel on
Best Practices, which was established to identify best
practices from across U.S. government agencies, the private
sector, nongovernmental organizations and allied countries on
management and operations in high-threat, high-risk locations
globally.
Mr. Chairman, the United States Secret Service has a proud
history of almost 150 years protecting the most important
government leaders of our country, the White House and other
official facilities, and conducting criminal investigations to
ensure the integrity of our currency, banking systems and
financial communications and cybersecurity.
The men and women of the Secret Service are on the
frontline every day, keeping our Nation safe, and they do a
tremendous job. The agents and officers of the Secret Service
are constantly in the spotlight, especially serving at the
White House, one of the most prominent symbols of our Nation's
strength and democracy, and we owe them a debt of gratitude for
their service to our country.
However, every organization, even those with a century and
a half of history, must be willing to learn. Those who wish to
do us harm, from an unpredictable, lone, possibly mentally
unstable person, to an organized terror group intent on
unleashing a calculated attack, typically have the element of
surprise.
Our country today faces a very dynamic, fluid and evolving
threat environment in which the aggressors have become very
patient, resilient and determined. We have to be better than
they are.
To counter this threat, security, intelligence and law
enforcement agencies like the Secret Service must have solid
strategic and tactical management and leadership, focus on
their primary mission, and provide their people with the best
training and resources and, possibly most important, be ready
to act aggressively and appropriately when faced with a threat.
The Secret Service, like any successful organization, must be
willing to continuously evolve and improve to adapt the Agency
ahead of the threat curve.
Throughout my career, I have found that government agencies
and private-sector organizations who are at the top of their
game become complacent. Time tends to annoyingly erode and
blunt the pointy end of the spear, and organizations and their
management teams rely on, ``This is the way we've always done
it'' or, ``We know how to do it best.'' So they are unwilling
or unable to change.
The Secret Service, I believe, would benefit from expanded
use of new and emerging technologies to assist with its
protective security responsibilities. In fact, when I was at
the Department of Homeland Security, the Secret Service
partnered with my office and the DHS Office of Science and
Technology to research and develop cutting-edge technology for
use at major events in the United States. Now is the time for
the Department of Homeland Security to bring some of those
technological enhancements out of the lab and expand their use
in the Secret Service tool kit.
In addition to emerging technology, management and
leadership of an organization must adapt, change and improve.
Policies and procedures and deployment of personnel and
resources should be under constant scrutiny and exercised based
on real-world scenarios. The officers and agents of the Secret
Service are some of the best this country has to offer, and
they deserve this strategic and tactical leadership to match.
All too often, Mr. Chairman, after something has gone
wrong, the cry is simply for more money, more personnel, and a
larger physical setback. This is rarely the correct answer.
Absent a comprehensive understanding of the fundamental issues
that led to systemic failures, throwing more money and people
at the problem will only exacerbate existing management
weaknesses and compound and magnify, rather than correct,
management challenges.
Internal reviews post-incident are typical in the U.S.
government from agency to agency. But from my experience, these
reviews are impacted by intentional or unintentional personal
and professional bias and are often informed by the same agency
cultural and management gaps that may have been a contributing
factor in the original incident.
The Department of Homeland Security and the Secret Service
now have a unique opportunity and critical moment in time to
obtain an unbiased, independent, top-to-bottom review, focusing
on the Service's management and policies and procedures related
to the incident on September 19 and other similar incidents.
I strongly recommend that the Secretary of Homeland
Security appoint a panel of external independent experts to
conduct this review, and this group should be tasked with
providing advice, guidance and formal recommendations to the
DHS and the Secret Service. In fact, Mr. Chairman, the panel I
was on on Benghazi was chaired by former Secret Service
Director Mark Sullivan.
Mr. Chairman, throughout my career, I have always been
proud to work side by side with my Secret Service colleagues at
every level in the Agency. The United States Secret Service is
a recognized world-class organization, and I am confident they
will learn from this most recent and related incidents and
innovate, strengthen and improve as they keep our country and
leaders safe.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman and committee Members. And I am
happy to answer any questions.
Chairman Issa. Thank you, Mr. Keil.
[Prepared statement of Mr. Keil follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Issa. I'll recognize myself now.
And I think the first question--if you can put out the map
of the White House up there. The first question, Director--if
you look at the lower portion, the first question the American
people want to know was: Is there a crash button? And had it
been pushed, would it have locked the front door of what's
marked as the ``Entrance Hall''?
Ms. Pierson. The front door at the time did not have an
automatic locking mechanism. It required an individual to hand-
lock the door.
Chairman Issa. Okay. So we have an automated system that
can lock down the White House. $800 million a year. Millions of
dollars more during your tenure each year than the President's
request. And that door was unlocked with no one standing at it
when Mr. Gonzalez came through it. Is that correct?
Ms. Pierson. The door was unlocked at the time of Mr.
Gonzalez's entry. That is correct.
Chairman Issa. Okay. And earlier there was a report and in
the indictment of Mr. Gonzalez that he was apprehended at the
entrance hall.
Isn't it true today that we understand that is not true, he
was actually apprehended at the Green Room? Is that correct?
Ms. Pierson. If I may clarify my first answer, the front
door actually consists of two doors. There is an outer door,
which is a glass--almost described as a storm door, and an
inner door, which would be a wood, ornamental, historic door.
The outer door, the glass storm door, was not locked. The
internal wood door was in the process of being hand-locked.
Chairman Issa. Okay. Bottom line is automated locking is a
capability within the White House, but not at that entrance at
that time?
Ms. Pierson. Not at that time, but has since been installed
and is effective today.
Chairman Issa. We learn from our mistakes.
The second question: Your Agency previously had reported
and an indictment against Mr. Gonzalez asserted that he was
arrested in that entry area.
Isn't it true that he actually penetrated the Cross Hall,
the East Room and, in fact, was arrested in the vicinity of the
Green Room?
Ms. Pierson. Referring to your map on the wall----
Chairman Issa. Yes.
Ms. Pierson. --as I have been briefed, the--Mr. Gonzalez
entered the front double doors----
Chairman Issa. Ma'am, I want a short answer. I have very
little time.
Was he, in fact--the Federal complaint said he was, in
fact, apprehended in one place.
Isn't it true he was apprehended further into the White
House?
Ms. Pierson. As Mr. Gonzalez entered the door, he knocked
back the officer that was standing at the doorway. The officer
then engaged Mr. Gonzalez. They crossed the east Entrance Hall
together, made the left turn down the Cross Hall. They stepped
momentarily into the East Room.
Another officer rendered aid. And he was placed on the
ground on the carpet and handcuffed on the Cross Hall just
outside of the Green Room. There is no indication at this
time----
Chairman Issa. Okay. So, in fact, the Federal complaint and
the earlier reports were not accurate. Is that correct? Yes or
no, please.
Ms. Pierson. I think the original complaint is accurate
that Mr. Gonzalez scaled the fence----
Chairman Issa. Ma'am. Ma'am, hold it. Hold it. I have very
little time, and I am not--the American people want to know is
the President safe. I want to know if we can rely on reports
from your Agency.
Now, going back to Mr. Hernandez, during your watch not as
Director, but as Chief of Staff to the Director, is it true
that, in fact, as reported, agents falsely assumed that they
were not gunshots when they were gunshots, that, in fact, there
were stand-down orders to people who had already pulled
shotguns out, that, in fact, the bullets were not discovered to
have hit the White House in real time within a 24-hour-or-
greater period by the Secret Service? Yes or no, please.
Ms. Pierson. Mr. Chairman, you're referring to the Ortega
shooting that----
Chairman Issa. The--yes.
Ms. Pierson. --occurred in November----
Chairman Issa. Ortega-Hernandez, if I remember.
Ms. Pierson. --2011?
Chairman Issa. Yes.
Ms. Pierson. At that time, it is my understanding that
there was reports of shots being fired in proximity to
Constitution Avenue----
Chairman Issa. Ma'am, ma'am, I--ma'am, ma'am, this was----
Ms. Pierson. --by the United States Secret Service.
Chairman Issa. No. Stop, please.
I want to be considerate to you. You have a hard job. But
you head an agency whose morale has gone down. It is lower than
other comparable Federal agencies. It has had a series of
embarrassments. We are going to leave the embarrassments out.
We've had two cases in which the reporting is evolving.
Only last night did the public learn that, in fact, it was
far worse, or at least somewhat worse, on September 19th. Only
recently has it been revealed--and you said you wanted to
correct the record. The Washington Post makes it clear, from
what I read, that, in fact, on November 11th of 2011, shots
were fired, the assailant left, while, in fact, the Secret
Service supervisor shut down the response of people who
believed, rightfully, there had been shots fired. And, in fact,
the follow-up did not discover the damage to the White House
and the actual shots in realtime.
Additionally, Mr. Ortega--``Ortega-Hernandez'' is the way I
have it written--would not have been apprehended except that he
had a car accident. And even when he was, it was not
immediately linked to his criminal activity.
That, in fact, the system at the White House did not detect
the actual shots fired and begin the pursuit of somebody who
had provided lethal force against the facility of the White
House; is that correct? You were chief of staff at the time. Is
that roughly correct?
And if it isn't, I will allow you whatever time you need to
properly explain what really happened on November 11th, 2011,
so the American people can understand that September 19th is
not the first time there has been considerable lapse, as I see
it, and, in fact, during a long period of time, during your
chief of staff time, now during your director time, we have had
the kinds of things that we should be concerned about for
protecting the President.
So, please tell us, in whatever time you need, about
November 11th, 2011, where The Washington Post is right or
wrong. This is your chance.
Ms. Pierson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
As you're aware, my assignment as chief of staff----
Chairman Issa. Could you get the microphone a little
closer, please?
Ms. Pierson. Certainly.
Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
As you're aware, in 2008, my assignment with the United
States Secret Service was chief of staff. My primary
responsibilities at that time were business transformation and
IT transformation for the organization. My focus was on the
business operations of the organization.
To my knowledge and based on the briefings that I have
received of this 3-year-old investigation that occurred in
November of 2011 that appeared in The Washington Post on
Sunday--I had also had been aware that Representative Chaffetz
had asked for a data inquiry. And we responded back to the
committee on September 12th and provided him detailed
information of the Secret Service's activities on that weekend.
Shots were reported by the United States Secret Service
officers in area of Constitution Avenue and 15th. There were
witness accounts of a black vehicle that had fired shots. There
was confusion at the time by the part of the witnesses as to
what they had witnessed and what they had saw. Several of those
witnesses put out Twitter accounts of what they had witnessed.
They were subsequently located and interviewed and recanted
those statements.
The actual shorts that were fired in proximity to
Constitution Avenue and 15th, the vehicle sped away and went
westbound on Constitution, erratically driving, and struck a
lightpost in the area of 23rd and Constitution. Mr. Ortega then
fled the vehicle.
Park Police officers and Uniformed Division officers
ultimately responded to the scene, where the vehicle was left
with the AK-47 in the front seat. Park Police has jurisdiction
over the traffic accident and assumed responsibility for the
initial phases of the investigation.
Chairman Issa. Ma'am, I'm going to give you all the time
you need--and thank the ranking member. But the answer is:
Where are the inconsistencies with what we now know from the
Washington Post? You said that they got the story wrong, they
were misstating it, they were mischaracterizing it. I'd like to
hear the inconsistencies.
So far, you're just corroborating that, in fact, the
understanding of the series of failures in realtime to protect
the White House are, in fact, correct, according to The
Washington Post. So please tell us where they are not correct,
please.
Ms. Pierson. Throughout the course of this, there was a
command post established down at Constitution Avenue and 23rd
Street. Metropolitan Police Department, the U.S. Park Police,
the United States Secret Service were there attempting to
resolve or understand from the witness accounts what had
happened on Constitution Avenue.
Back at the White House, individuals had heard what they
believed to be shots. The Secret Service, according to the
records that I have been able to locate on this 3-year-old
investigation, did response properly. The emergency response
teams and other officers did a protective sweep of the area to
make sure that we did not have any intruders, to make sure that
there were not any injuries and obvious signs of anything that
had been damaged.
Further investigation with the Park Police, they were
unable to resolve at that time as to whether or not these were
shots being fired at other vehicles or shots being fired at the
White House. That took some time to understand.
It wasn't until the Usher's Office was preparing for the
return of the President and First Family--or the President and
the First Lady that they identified damage on the Truman
Balcony. That led to further investigation, and that led to us
contacting the Federal Bureau of Investigation to initiate
their full investigation.
Chairman Issa. Thank you.
Mr. Cummings, I want to thank you for your understanding
and just relate something that you and I discussed yesterday,
if I may.
In Washington, D.C., and around the country, there are a
number of systems that we all know--and Baltimore, I believe,
has it too--that they're basically microphones that hear
gunshots, can identify the direction, can quickly without human
intervention figure out whether or not a real shot has been
fired, confirm it, and often give a very accurate direction.
That type of technology isn't so odd that we don't see it in
our cities. And I think that's the reason I went on so long
with this question.
Ms. Norton, I know, knows this. The District does have a
sophisticated system. And I think the committee is going to
want to make sure that not only does the White House have a
higher level of awareness of this system but that the
District's system be enhanced, if necessary, to make sure that
something like this never happens again.
And I thank the gentleman for his patience.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Director Pierson, I have thought about all of this long and
hard, and I think my major concern goes to the culture. It is
very disturbing to know that Secret Service agents in the most
elite protective agency in the world feel more comfortable,
apparently, from what I'm hearing, coming to members of this
committee and telling things than coming to you and members in
the agency.
That, I'm telling you, when I boil all of this down, that,
to me, is dangerous. It has to go against morale. I don't even
see how good decisions can be made if your own people don't
feel a level of comfort that--or they feel fear that they are
going to be able to talk about the things that concern them.
And I just want to go through some questions, and I want to
give you a chance to address that. Because, to me, when all the
dust settles, that's a problem.
And so, going back to this November 11th, 2011, incident--
and I know you were not the Director. I understand that. A lot
of people talk about the culture problem with the Secret
Service, and the press reports--of all the press reports, the
one that concerned me is that, back there on the 2011--and it
said, ``Officers who were on the scene who thought gunfire had
probably hit the house that night were largely ignored, and
some were afraid to dispute their boss's conclusions.''
Did you see that report, and are you aware of this issue?
Ms. Pierson. Ranking Member Cummings, I, too, read that
newspaper article and was troubled by those accounts.
I have asked my Office of Professional Responsibility to
retrieve the file and those records of what we know and when we
knew it, if this young officer had made such a statement. I did
find a statement where that young officer alleges that they
were reluctant to report it to their supervisor to be
criticized, I believe was his statement. That troubles me, as
well.
Mr. Cummings. And that's a major problem.
Ms. Pierson. I am going to ask my Office of Professional
Responsibility to reinterview that officer--they remain on the
job today--to determine whether or not that officer would be
more competent today or what were some of the problems that
night that she felt like she could not say that. That extremely
troubles me.
Now----
Mr. Cummings. It said that she heard shots, ``she heard
shots and what she thought was debris falling overhead. She
drew her handgun and took cover, then heard a radio call
reporting possible shots fired near the south grounds.''
She then called the Secret Service Joint Operations Center
to report that she was breaking into the gun box near her post,
pulling out a shotgun. According to this article, she replaced
the buckshot inside with a more powerful slug in case she
needed to engage an attacker, but then the call came over the
radio to stand down.''
The next day, the officer, ``listened during roll call
before her shift Saturday afternoon as supervisors explained
that the gunshots were from people in two cars shooting at each
other.'' The report said that she, ``had told several senior
officers Friday night that she thought the house had been
hit,'' but on Saturday she did not challenge her supervisors
for fear of being criticized, she later told investigators.
Now, Director Pierson, as a former field agent and as the
head of the agency, that has to concern you tremendously; is
that right?
Ms. Pierson. Yes, sir, it does. It's unacceptable.
Mr. Cummings. Does it trouble you that some of your own
agents apparently do not feel comfortable raising security
concerns?
And this is just one person. And there are others who,
again, would rather be whistleblowers--and, again, I have no
problem with whistleblowers. As a matter of fact, we do
everything in our power to protect them. But this agency, if
they'd rather be a whistleblower than to bring their concerns
to you?
See, you started off by saying that you're going to make
sure this never happens again. Let me tell you what the problem
is here. If you're heading an agency where the folks are not
providing you with the information to do the right thing, to
make the changes, how do you even know what the problems are?
You follow me? Help me with this.
Ms. Pierson. Yes, sir, if I may.
Anytime, any organization, you start to make significant
changes, some people will have resistance. Some people will
push back. However, I will continue to lead and transform the
Secret Service to ensure that we're prepared for our mission
and ensure that we can restore our reputation to the American
public.
What I will tell you, over the last 18 months that I've
been serving as Director and over the last 6 months, I have met
personally with over 1,500 of our supervisors and employees.
I've had a number of engagement sessions and spent over an hour
with each of them, expecting--advising them of what my
expectations are, what their performance requirements are, what
personal accountability is, how to manage this workforce, how
to ensure that we are performing at the highest levels in
everything that we do, that we're operationally ready, that we
are training, that we're evaluating each other, and that we're
constantly looking at our mission to make sure we're being
effective in everything we do.
I can't speak for what has happened in the past, but I can
tell you, as we're moving forward into the future and while I
am Director, I will not tolerate personnel missteps where
people either fail to act or do not support the workforce or do
not work in unison. But I would say that I suspect there are
many people that are still pushing back, and I'm going to
continue to lead forward.
Mr. Cummings. You know, the problem is that that officer,
she was right. And that was the morning after the shooting. Yet
it took 4 days for the housekeepers to discover that the
bullets had struck the building; isn't that right?
In other words, the officer was right.
Ms. Pierson. Yes, ultimately, the officer was right.
Mr. Cummings. The Washington Post story says that this
agent subsequently reported her concerns to investigators. Was
there an after-accident report about the 2011 shooting? Did it
include recommendations relating to agents reporting their
concerns without fear of being criticized? Do you know?
Ms. Pierson. I don't know, but I would say that the
officer's statement to our interviews that occurred with Secret
Service employees are different than the officer's statement to
the FBI and the investigators conducting the investigation.
And that is why I've asked my Office of Professional
Responsibility to go back and have a robust conversation with
that employee to ensure that she feels supported, knows that we
want her to come forward with any information, and that we
understand what some of the impediments may be with the
management team, where we feel like we can make improvements to
ensure that that never happens again.
Mr. Cummings. Let me say this, and then I'll close. Former
Director Sullivan invited me a few years ago--you may have been
there--to speak before your top agents after the Colombia
situation with the prostitutes. And one of the things that I
said to them back then--I expressed my tremendous respect and
appreciation, but I also told them that I don't want anyone to
imagine, imagine--imagining--that they can pierce the
protective veil of the Secret Service, period. Because I firmly
believe that the reputation is so very, very, very, very
important.
And, you know, I'd just--again, that culture thing is an
issue. I'm sure others will question you about that. But I
just--thank you for your testimony.
I yield back.
Mr. Chaffetz. [Presiding.] Thank you.
I now recognize myself.
Following up on Ranking Member Cummings, I sent you a
letter, Director, specifically asking for details about this
situation in 2011.
I'd ask unanimous consent to enter it into the record so
all Members can see it, the unclassified spot report on the
incidents in November of 2011.
Hearing no objection, so ordered.
Mr. Chaffetz. Director, why is it--why is it that when I
look at this report there isn't even a mention of Officer
Carrie Johnson? And yet The Washington Post reports details
about her calling into the Secret Service headquarters. Why
isn't her name even mentioned in the spot report?
Ms. Pierson. The spot report reflects the active
investigation. I don't know what information that you have
relative to Officer Johnson's reporting.
Mr. Chaffetz. Well, you gave us this report. I asked you
for all the details and information. This is minute by minute--
2052 hours, 2053 hours. It is minute by minute what happened in
this situation.
Are you telling me that The Washington Post is wrong, that
she didn't call into the headquarters? Did she not do that?
Ms. Pierson. I'm confused by your statement about ``call
into headquarters.''
Mr. Chaffetz. Well, according to The Washington Post, she
called in and reported and said that she had heard shots fired.
She reported that she was opening a box, getting out a
shotgun--all those details.
Ms. Pierson. That's the confusion that I have with the
Washington Post article. Typically, when there is an emergency
happening around the White House or alerts are made, much like
the shots being fired on November 11th, I would expect officers
to react according to their security protocols.
Mr. Chaffetz. And she says in The Washington Post--it says
that she called into the headquarters. There is no mention of
that. Other officers are mentioned in there, but she is not. We
will follow up on that. It is unacceptable to not even mention
the actions that she took and that The Washington Post could
get that but the Congress couldn't and you couldn't provide it.
Let's go back to the fence-jumping situation. State
police--the fence-jumper. State police had detained a person.
Had a map in the car, all the weapons that Congressman Cummings
had talked about, suspicious behavior. My understanding is
that, actually, three officers had actually spotted him that
day and not reported it--not reported it. And I want to know if
that's true as we go along.
The fence failed. Officers chased him, didn't catch him.
Sniper was in position. No shots were fired. Dogs were out
there, weren't released. Countersurveillance, I'm
understanding, is understaffed. There was no--nobody shot
anything. There was nobody that was intercepted. The doors were
unlocked. An officer was overwhelmed. The crash box was
evidently silenced.
And yet the Secret Service puts out a statement that that
they offered, ``tremendous restraint and discipline.''
My question to you is, do those officers have your
authority to use lethal force to prevent somebody from entering
the White House?
Ms. Pierson. Those officers do have the authority to use
independent judgment to leverage lethal force when appropriate.
Mr. Chaffetz. Is that true when somebody is trying to get
at the President?
Ms. Pierson. That is always true. They are law enforcement
officers.
Mr. Chaffetz. So it's always true when there's somebody
who's trying to penetrate the White House that they can use
lethal force?
Ms. Pierson. As appropriate, within the confines of the
law.
Mr. Chaffetz. If somebody tried--explain the details of
that. If somebody is approaching the White House, has
penetrated the security and making a run for the White House,
no apparent weapon, can they take that person down?
Ms. Pierson. The law requires that law enforcement officers
ensure that they are in imminent danger or others are in
imminent danger before they can leverage lethal force.
Mr. Chaffetz. So if the person is running at the White
House, but no apparent weapon, they can or cannot use lethal
force?
Ms. Pierson. Those are going to be independent decisions
made by the officer based on the totality of the circumstances.
Mr. Chaffetz. How does an officer know if they have an
improvised explosive device or a dirty bomb or if it's a
terrorist? How do they know that? Shouldn't they assume that
this person has ill intention?
Ms. Pierson. Law enforcement officers are trained in
observation skills, and I would assess that they are constantly
looking at people for ill intentions.
Mr. Chaffetz. I think it's confusing. This is part of what
they have to deal with. They make a split-second decision.
I want it to be crystal-clear: You make a run and a dash
for the White House? We're going to take you down. I want
overwhelming force. Would you disagree with me?
Ms. Pierson. I do want our officers and agents to execute
appropriate force for anyone attempting to challenge or breach
the White House.
Mr. Chaffetz. We've got to explore this further.
The Secret Service put out a statement that, according to
the--talked to the Associated Press, I should say. They
reported that on September 20th at 1:24 a.m. Eastern time,
Donovan, the spokesperson, Ed Donovan--Donovan said the man
appeared to be unarmed to officers who spotted him climbing the
fence, and a search of the subject turned up no weapon.
Why would he say that there's no weapon?
Ms. Pierson. I will have to have a--have to ask Mr. Donovan
that question.
Mr. Chaffetz. You haven't done that since the incident
happened?
Ms. Pierson. I know when Mr. Gonzalez was placed into
custody he was found to have a folded knife in his right front
pants pocket.
Mr. Chaffetz. Do you consider that a weapon?
Ms. Pierson. That is a weapon.
Mr. Chaffetz. Would why the Secret Service put out an
official press release saying that--or put out a statement to
the Associated Press? Did you ever correct the--did you correct
the Associated Press? Did you call them back and say, you got
that wrong?
Ms. Pierson. I have no knowledge of that.
Mr. Chaffetz. So you just let it linger out there that
there was no weapon. And that was wrong. It was inaccurate.
Correct?
Ms. Pierson. I do know that there has been a lot of
information in this case, and that's why we are doing a robust
review. I can't speak for conversations that I was not a part
of or the press's interest in----
Mr. Chaffetz. Did you read the press release before it went
out?
Ms. Pierson. I have read the press release before it went
out.
Mr. Chaffetz. Do you agree that the officers showed
tremendous restraint and discipline? You agreed with that
comment?
Ms. Pierson. I do think, based on the totality of the
circumstances and from Mr. Gonzalez's arrest, that these
officers did use restraint in making a very difficult decision
as to whether to employ legal force or subdue and arrest him.
Mr. Chaffetz. Do you think they responded appropriately?
Ms. Pierson. I do not think the security plan was properly
executed, and that is why I'm conducting a robust investigation
to ensure that we have a comprehensive review of what people
were--that I have the facts, all of the facts, so I can make an
assessments of what the decisions were on that night.
Mr. Chaffetz. Thank you. I've gone well past my time.
We'll now recognize the gentlewoman from the District of
Columbia.
Pardon me. We're going to recognize Mr. Horsford.
Go ahead. We'll go to Ms. Norton.
You're recognized for 5 minutes.
Ms. Norton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I want to thank Director Pierson for her 30 years of
service in the Secret Service, for rising through the ranks to
become the first woman director. And I am aware of what she has
inherited and of her many accomplishments.
Director Pierson, I'm going to ask you about the rumors
that have been out there about what the Secret Service may do.
When Pennsylvania Avenue was closed down after Oklahoma City,
there was a kind of example of how public access can remain. I
was heartbroken. Both sides of the White House were closed
down. I worked with the Clinton administration to open E
Street, the back side of the White House, not only for its
vista but because it's a major thoroughfare and it affected the
entire region. That was narrowly closed down.
But as Mr. Basham testified, in front of the White House,
though cars can no longer go there, people can go there. And,
essentially, it was made a park, a walkway. And I--none of my
constituents, no one says it should be reopened. Because that
would mean cars, not people.
So my concern is whether or not people will continue to
have access around the White House. I walked to the White House
yesterday. I was pleased to find not only tourists but
protestors, as usual, there.
I ask you, I noticed that on--I followed your testimony,
and you've testified 16 jumpers in only 5 years. So there's
been an increase in fence-jumpers. And so I want to know
whether you have considered before today simply asking that a
higher fence be built, one that, for example, could curve, you
know, still be historic, that wrought-iron fence, but with the
curves going outward so maybe you'd damage one of your body
parts if you tried to get over it, or even--and here, these are
off the top of my head--multilayered glass behind the fence
that could resist blasts from guns or bombs.
Since there have been 16 in 5 years, at least--I think many
more over the years--have you considered such commonsense
devices as that so that the public would still have access but
the President of the United States and his family would be
protected? Have you ever recommended that?
Ms. Pierson. Representative Norton, we do want to work in
partnership to ensure that the people have access in proximity
to the White House and the historic nature and the national
significance of Lafayette Park and Pennsylvania Avenue and the
White House.
And so I do look forward to continuing to work with you and
the administration and the Department to look at what
additional security features can be put in place, not only for
White House fence-jumpers but for the other challenges that
face in us in securing public areas.
Ms. Norton. I recognize that most of these fence-jumpers
are harmless. I am worried about multiple fence-jumpers and
whether you have the resources and the staff if there were five
or six of them who came across the fence. By my calculations,
you are down almost 300, more than 250 agents in the Uniformed
Service in the last year or 2 since the sequester and the cuts.
Is that the case?
Ms. Pierson. Yes, Representative Norton, the Secret Service
has had a reduction in its staffing as a result of
sequestration and other fiscal constraints. We are close to 550
employees below our optimal level.
Ms. Norton. Do you have--do you have to--I understand that
staff has had to be brought in from other units, who may not
have been as familiar with the White House, because of the
shortage of staff. Is that the case?
Ms. Pierson. Earlier this summer and based upon the work
requirement that the Secret Service is faced with in the month
of September in order to support the United Nations General
Assembly, I made the decision to bring in special agents from
around the country to support some of the Uniformed Division
posting assignments in proximity to the White House tours.
That's provided some relief for our Uniformed Division to be
able to take some annual leave.
Ms. Norton. Yeah.
Mr. Chairman, I realize my time is gone, but I do think
that Congress has to take some responsibility when the
sequester went across the board, including police agencies like
the Secret Service.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chaffetz. I thank the gentlewoman.
We'll now recognize the gentleman from South Carolina, Mr.
Gowdy, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Gowdy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Director, I'm actually a big fan of law enforcement, and I
don't take any delight in asking you the questions I'm going to
ask you. But law enforcement are given unique powers in our
society, and with those unique powers come unique
responsibilities. And I can't think of any responsibility
greater than guarding the safety and security of our President
and his family.
So, as I understand it, several agents believe that shots
were fired, and the supervisor concluded that it was a vehicle
backfiring. Even if that were true, given the very small
investment of resources, why not investigate the shots fired?
Ms. Pierson. Representative, I think that is where some of
the confusion starts to come out, as the story that's in The
Washington Post versus----
Mr. Gowdy. I'm not asking you about a Washington Post
story. I'm asking you about why a housekeeper, who doesn't go
to Glynco, who doesn't spend 14 weeks in training, who doesn't
have 18 weeks of training thereafter, found glass and your
agents did not. That didn't come from The Washington Post.
Is that true? Did a housekeeper find evidence of the
shooting and your agents did not?
Ms. Pierson. The housekeeper was able to locate fragments
of glass on the Truman Balcony, which is not an area that is
frequented by security personnel.
Mr. Gowdy. And I didn't you about who it's frequented--I
asked you--there was a spontaneous conclusion that shots were
fired. There were officers who believed they smelled gunpowder.
Your officers drew their weapons, Director. That's how
seriously they took it.
So I'm not interested in cursory searches. When did your
agency find evidence of the shooting?
Ms. Pierson. I believe it was on the 15th or 14th of
November.
Mr. Gowdy. Which was how many days after the shooting?
Ms. Pierson. Three to 4 days later.
Mr. Gowdy. All right. So you have an officer
contemporaneous with the shooting believing that shots were
fired. You have officers taking cover because they believed
shots were fired. You have officers at the White House drawing
their weapons because they believed shots were fired. Now give
me all the evidence to support a vehicle backfiring.
Ms. Pierson. Representative, I am sure your familiarity
with law enforcement--in downtown areas, there is sound
attenuation. Oftentimes----
Mr. Gowdy. I've never heard a car backfire six to eight
times, Director, ever. Have you?
Ms. Pierson. I've heard car backfires, but I don't think--
--
Mr. Gowdy. Six to eight times?
Ms. Pierson. I think it's undisputed that there were
witnesses that observed shots being fired.
Mr. Gowdy. Right. And it is also undisputed that a
housekeeper, who doesn't train at Glynco, who doesn't have 18
weeks of intensive training, found the evidence of the shooting
and your agency did not.
And I'm going to give you credit because you didn't bring
it up; it was brought up by a colleague. But I have some
colleagues who are just obsessed with sequestration. We can't
have any hearing without it coming up. But you're not going to
sit there and tell us that sequestration is the reason your
agency did not find evidence of the shooting, are you?
Ms. Pierson. No, I am not.
Mr. Gowdy. Okay. And I give you credit for that. And I was
stunned that one of my colleagues would try to conflate, to use
the Attorney General's word, sequestration with the fact that a
law enforcement agency waited 4 or 5 days to find evidence of a
shooting that a housekeeper found.
So give me all the evidence to back the vehicle-backfiring
narrative. Because we already know all the evidence to support
the shooting. Give me all the evidence that made your
department so sure that it was a vehicle backfiring that you
didn't even search the White House.
Ms. Pierson. The Secret Service was actively engaged with
the United States Park Police in an effort to determine where
and what direction the shots were fired on Constitution Avenue.
That----
Mr. Gowdy. Madam Director? Madam Director, you reached the
conclusion that it was a vehicle backfiring as opposed to shots
fired. Now, this is the third time I've asked. Give me all the
evidence to support that supervisor's conclusion that it was
not shots fired, despite all the contemporaneous claims that it
was and despite all of the reaction of your agency that it was.
Give me all the evidence to support the theory that it was a
vehicle backfiring.
And then tell me, why not invest the very minimal resources
required to exhaustively search the White House?
Ms. Pierson. Representative, oftentimes in these cases
there are a number of different people that make different
statements. What I can tell you is that Uniformed Division
officers on Constitution Avenue heard gunfire and reported
gunfire. I can't speak to the specificity of the individual
you're talking about that reported it as----
Mr. Gowdy. Well, can you speak to why a housekeeper found
it and your department did not?
Ms. Pierson. Housekeepers routinely work in the private
residence of the President and First Family.
Mr. Gowdy. So even when there is overwhelming, let's just
say, suspicion that shots were fired--we won't say
``overwhelming evidence'' because that would've required you to
search the premises--overwhelming suspicion of shots fired, and
you don't go through every inch of that residence?
I want you to imagine a prosecutor is in front of a jury,
Madam Director, because this is where sometimes these cases
wind up, and you explain to the jury why a housekeeper found
evidence of the shooting and your agency did not.
Ms. Pierson. Representative, again, this case has been
prosecuted in Federal court, and those explanations were made
before a Federal----
Mr. Gowdy. And thank the Lord the explanations were
sufficient for a jury. Now, I want you to make them sufficient
for Congress.
Ms. Pierson. The initial shooting incident occurred at 9:30
at night. It's difficult to see at night.
Mr. Gowdy. How about hear?
Ms. Pierson. Officers----
Mr. Gowdy. Can you hear at night?
Ms. Pierson. --heard the shots fired on Constitution
Avenue. Officers reacted, picked up security positions, swept
the area looking for any type of injury, any type of intruder.
It was not known until days later that these shots had
actually struck the upper level, the third-floor level, of the
White House.
Mr. Gowdy. Okay. I'm going to end, because I'm out of time,
with the same question that I began with: Why not search every
inch of the White House, given the very small investment of
resources?
I mean, I went on your Web site, and I saw that you have
training for psychology, you have training for survival skills,
none of which I'll minimize, all of which I'm sure is very
important. This is just processing a crime scene, Director.
This is not high math. It is processing a crime scene. You
actually don't need 18 weeks of training to be able to do that;
you just need to walk around. So why wasn't it done?
Ms. Pierson. It is my understanding that a perimeter sweep
was done. Was it as thorough as it needed to be? Obviously----
Mr. Gowdy. Evidently not.
Ms. Pierson. --not.
Mr. Gowdy. Evidently not.
Mr. Chaffetz. The gentleman's time has expired.
We'll now recognize the gentleman from Massachusetts, the
ranking member of our Subcommittee on National Security, Mr.
Tierney, for 7 minutes.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you.
Well, thank all the witnesses here this morning.
Director, I want to talk a little bit about preventions. If
we look back in July, several months before the incident where
the perimeter was breached and Mr. Gonzalez went into the White
House, it's our information that he was stopped by the Virginia
State Police and in his car they found at least 11 weapons and
a map with a line drawn directly to the White House. Is that
your understanding, as well?
Ms. Pierson. It was a regional map with a line pointed to
the memorial area of the Mall, including the White House and
the other historic monuments.
Mr. Tierney. And our reports are also that these Virginia
State Police and the ATF then referred that matter to the
Secret Service, presumably because of that line. Is that
correct?
Ms. Pierson. Yes, that's correct.
Mr. Tierney. So the Secret Service, based on that, then had
an interview with Mr. Gonzalez at that time. Is that also
correct?
Ms. Pierson. Yes. The case was later referred to the Secret
Service for an interview of Mr. Gonzalez.
Mr. Tierney. How thorough would that interview have been,
according to your protocols? How deep would they have gone into
their examination of Mr. Gonzalez and his history?
Ms. Pierson. They had a very thorough initial interview
with Mr. Gonzalez and initiated contacts with his family
members, his mental health history, and the police reports.
Mr. Tierney. So they determined that he had a mental health
history?
Ms. Pierson. He acknowledged that he had a mental health
history as a veteran suffering from PTSD.
Mr. Tierney. And do your protocols allow you to then look
at his records, to obtain his records, or is that not something
you can do?
Ms. Pierson. If the individual consents to the release of
their medical records, we do pursue that. And in this case Mr.
Gonzalez consented to the release of his military medical
records.
Mr. Tierney. So you had all of his medical records to
review. I presume your agents did review them?
Ms. Pierson. They were obtained over a period of time. And
we have received them, and they have been reviewed.
Mr. Tierney. And despite all of that, what happened? You
didn't take any action, you didn't have him arrested, you
didn't have him continue to be under observation, did you?
Ms. Pierson. Representative, it is a very difficult thing
for people dealing with disabilities and people dealing with
mental illness when they don't exhibit any unusual direction of
interest in our protectees. Mr. Gonzalez at the time denied any
interest or any intent to harm anyone. He indicated that his
information relative to the map in his car was given to him by
another individual who had recommended places in Washington,
D.C., to site see, and that he intend to go on camping trips,
and wanted to go to the Valley Forge, Pennsylvania, area.
Mr. Tierney. Was the individual whom he said gave him that
map ever questioned?
Ms. Pierson. Not to my knowledge.
Mr. Tierney. How does that comport with your protocols and
your procedures?
Ms. Pierson. I know our investigators are as thorough as
they possibly can be in investigations like this to make sure
that we have a good understanding of Mr. Gonzalez----
Mr. Tierney. So is it your testimony the individual wasn't
available for some reason?
Ms. Pierson. I do not know the specifics of that, but I can
get back with you.
Mr. Tierney. I wish you would, because I think that would
be an indication of whether or not they really were as thorough
as they should have been.
Now, notwithstanding that, there was a second incident
before the perimeter was breached by Mr. Gonzalez when he went
into the White House where he was found walking in front of the
White House with a hatchet in his belt. Is that correct?
Ms. Pierson. Mr. Gonzalez was observed on August 25 on the
south fence line.
Mr. Tierney. And he was interviewed again by Secret Service
agents?
Ms. Pierson. He was interviewed by uniformed division
officers----
Mr. Tierney. Of the Secret Service?
Ms. Pierson. --of the Secret Service and special agents of
the Secret Service.
Mr. Tierney. And his name was run against a database?
Ms. Pierson. Yes, his name was run against a database.
Mr. Tierney. And the database basically indicated the
earlier incident, right?
Ms. Pierson. Yes. The database provided information, the
original contact with Mr. Gonzalez.
Mr. Tierney. So at that time they knew he had been arrested
in Virginia, had a map pointing towards the area of the White
House, had ammunition in his car, was now found outside the
White House walking with a hatchet. We knew he had mental
health problems, his records had been reviewed. What happened
then?
Ms. Pierson. Officers and agents made contact with Mr.
Gonzalez, advised--asked him about the hatchet that he was
carrying. He indicated that he had been camping in the area of,
like, Prince William County down around Quantico.
The agents and officers had asked him for a consent search
of his vehicle. He agreed and was going to return the hatchet
to the vehicle. They went back and they looked through the
vehicle. Mr. Gonzalez was extremely cooperative, dispelled any
concerns that the officers had. He had camping gear and camping
equipment in his car. He appeared to be living out of his car.
Mr. Tierney. And so they just let him go.
Ms. Pierson. Mr. Gonzalez had not violated any laws and he
had to be released.
Mr. Tierney. Did they have any follow-up? Did anybody talk
to any other agencies in the Washington area about observing
this individual or making sure that somebody knew what his
behavior was after that second incident?
Ms. Pierson. That information, the second incident was also
passed into our analysis desk so that it could be evaluated in
context to our first contact with Mr. Gonzalez in July.
Mr. Tierney. And what happened at the end of that
evaluation, what was the recommendation?
Ms. Pierson. That he had not committed any violations, that
nothing--that he was under mental health evaluations by both
the military, VA, and that no further action could be taken by
the Secret Service, other than to continue to monitor his
behavior through his family.
Mr. Tierney. Well, is that the only way they could monitor,
is through his family? There was no other indication of law
enforcement activity that could monitor his behavior?
Ms. Pierson. He was currently on bond pending the charges
from the State police and the incident that brought him to our
attention. So there was some criminal conduct on the State
level that was still being addressed and that he was returning
to that area. The case was still under evaluation as to what
Mr. Gonzalez's mental history was and whether or not he was
going to come to our attention again.
Mr. Tierney. And it was your understanding that you thought
it was particularly appropriate that the Secret Service did
nothing else in regard to making sure that this individual was
monitored in his behavior?
Ms. Pierson. No, what I am trying to reflect,
Representative, it is very difficult for the Secret Service.
When these individuals come to our attention, as many as 300 a
year--or a day--are being evaluated by our Office of Protective
Intelligence.
Mr. Tierney. Do those 300 all have a history of twice being
picked up with weapons and a situation would put in question
that they were in proximity or heading to a proximity of the
White House?
Ms. Pierson. No, but many of them are brought to our
attention for either having an unusual direction of interest or
making a direct threat against our protectees. They are
mentally ill, many of them have a long mental health past. Some
of them are more cooperative than others. But in the specific
case of Mr. Gonzalez, he was being very cooperative. His family
had been contacted by investigators. The family members
indicated that he was cooperative, that he did not have a
violent past. His mental health records, to my understanding,
as I've been briefed, did not reflect any of his mental health
contacts referred him as being a danger to himself or others.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your time.
Mr. Chaffetz. I thank the gentleman.
One follow-up to that. It is my understanding people have
told us that there were three different officers that had seen
him, recognized him the day that the incident happened, but did
not report it. Is that true or not true?
Ms. Pierson. It is my understanding, based on how I've been
briefed, that two of the officers recognized Mr. Gonzalez in
the area of the White House on September 19 and observed him
for some time. They had remembered him from the contact they
had had with him on August 25 when he was on the south fence
line. They observed him for some time, he wasn't acting
inappropriately, he didn't violate any laws.
Mr. Chaffetz. They did not report that and they did not
approach him, correct?
Ms. Pierson. I think they noted that, but they did not
approach him.
Mr. Chaffetz. And they didn't report it.
Ms. Pierson. Not to my knowledge.
Mr. Chaffetz. I now recognize the gentleman from Georgia,
Mr. Collins, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate that.
I think there are several concerns. And I think one of the
things that I agree just wholeheartedly with, with the ranking
member is this is something that both Republicans and
Democrats, this is--we're talking about the White House. It is
not a national icon, as you said, it is a world icon. Everyone,
you think of America you think of the White House.
And one of the concerns that I have and we've been
mentioning many of the issues here recently on just different
events going on is the issue is not the protocols that have
been put in place now and how it wasn't done. It's the issue of
why are there seemingly so many incidents on a foundational
level. Because if we don't start at the foundational, why there
doesn't seem to be a willingness to report, why there doesn't
seem to be a willingness to exercise, you know, a willingness
to say this is something that I've noticed. As the officer
said, she didn't feel that she could report up line.
If there's other issues where you're having the instances
described overseas, in other places, there seems to be a
foundational issue that we have got to address in these--not
only from your perspective, but from hearings.
And there are several things that I want to address. You
made a statement just a moment ago, it was curious, because you
said in the matter of one sentence you said we get 300
suspicious people a year and 300 a day in the same sentence.
Which is it?
Ms. Pierson. Let me correct myself. In talking to our
Protective Intelligence Division, as of yesterday they were
directly overseeing 327 investigations.
Mr. Collins. Okay. So in totality we are looking at 327 at
this point.
The question I have is, you said that you're still making a
review, but it is our understanding, it has been reported, and
it is also very visual, as my colleague from the District of
Columbia has pointed out, there has already been a new fence or
perimeter, a police line perimeter put in front of the White
House. Is that correct?
Ms. Pierson. We have put up a temporary bicycle rack----
Mr. Collins. Yes or no?
Ms. Pierson. --to provide us with some standoff areas to
the fence while this investigation is underway.
Mr. Collins. Ms. Pierson, I thank you for the long answer
to yes, but I have several things that I want to have, because
I think they are important here, because you've made several
comments that we're doing an investigation, we're saying why
these protocols were breached, how they got there further. But
yet you also said, we don't want to rush to change--or we don't
want to change things, but yet we have already started with
putting up a perimeter fence or at least a barrier now back
from the fence currently.
I'm wondering here is the problem doesn't seem to be the
fence. The problem seems to be the fact that someone jumped the
fence, run 70 yards, went into the White House with nobody
stopping them.
You made a comment--I also have from my background my
father was in law enforcement, so this is hard for me in
looking to it--but you made an analogy just a few moments ago
that I'm not sure should be accurate here. You talk about
discretion and restraint. Discretion and restraint in the way
you--police officers do this all the time, they do so on the
side of the road when they have made a stop. You are talking
about officers who are protecting a national icon.
When they jump the fence, there should be an immediate
understanding this person should not be here and there should
be an immediate understanding that there is not a restraint
factor here, this is not the nice, cuddly Secret Service, that
you've got on our property, let's move you back off.
Someone running, I'm having trouble how you correlate
restraint and discretion in a traffic situation, which is the
way it came across, to someone actually going after the
President's home.
Ms. Pierson. Representative, I have stated that they did
not properly execute the security protocols that are
appropriate to respond to----
Mr. Collins. You believe because that is because of the
information or guidance that they have gotten from the top that
they were not sure what to do? Have they been told to exercise
restraint in these measures or they have been told to exercise
protection?
Ms. Pierson. Those officers have the authority to take
legal law enforcement action as individuals. I am conducting an
investigation to find out what were the decisions that were
made, what are the facts in the totality of the circumstances
that those officers saw.
Mr. Collins. Mr. Keil, I want to give Ms. Pierson a break
here, because this issue of putting the fence line in front or
at least a police barrier in looking at this area, I think we
have--again, we're trying to make ourselves appear better as
we're working on it, as hard as that is to say. This President
and his family deserve to be protected. It is very concerning
to me that they were not told even about the shooting until
many days later. That's just mind boggling to me for this
President and his wife to have to deal with that, especially
when their daughter was actually in the residence that night.
I do have a question, Mr. Keil. Explain to me, is putting
the fence, is this the only fix here? I mean, we have not heard
from anybody else. Help me out here. Is there a better way to
go about this?
Mr. Keil. Sir, from my perspective protecting U.S.
Embassies around the world, as Mr. Basham even pointed out, it
is a concentric ring of security, layered security. The fence
typically is one of the last things. And typically fences are
meant to keep good people out. Bad people find ways over
fences. So you can't simply rely on a fence to be your last
resort.
Mr. Collins. Okay. Mr. Chairman, I think the issue that has
come as we go forward here is the protection of this not just a
national icon, but a world icon. In the threat environment in
which we're in it's very concerning that we get half-truths to
start with, more truth. It's just a leaking out, when this is a
group here that truly wants to say what is the issue here and
why are we not doing it in the proper way. And simply putting
up a visual we're doing something is not right. The foundation
has go to be laid, and over the past few years the Secret
Service has a foundational problem, and I think that's your
bigger issue here, along with protocols not being followed.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Chairman Issa. [Presiding] I thank the gentleman.
As we go to Mr. Lynch, I just want to make sure one thing
was clear. Director, the failure to apprehend Mr. Gonzalez
before he got well into the White House, the change of a
further setback or fence, since you successfully stopped 16
jumpers in the last 5 years, you said that in your opening
testimony, was there any reason that you couldn't have stopped
17?
In other words, you're taking the American people's space
with this additional fence and the proposal for a setback that
would include Pennsylvania and Lafayette being restricted. And
yet you've made no case here today that you couldn't have had
17 out of 17 apprehensions if not for outright human error and
procedural failures. Isn't that true?
Ms. Pierson. The placing of the bike rack to provide a
buffer zone for the fence is to allow us time to do this
analysis to make sure that our personnel and our procedures are
going to be effective with the time constraints that the
individuals have to be able to effect an effective tactical
response to runners or fence jumpers.
Chairman Issa. Okay, I guess I get it that you're not up to
snuff to the level you'd like to be and until you're sure you
are you want to have that extra time. I sort of get that, but I
have to be honest, that's a little concerning.
Mr. Lynch.
Mr. Lynch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I thank the witnesses.
Madam Director, I want to go over again the prior contacts
between Mr. Gonzalez and the Secret Service.
As my colleague Mr. Tierney noted, there was a prior
contact with Mr. Gonzalez back in July 2014. He had been pulled
over and he had a small arsenal of weapons in the car.
I just want to try to explore, when does the red flag come
up for the Secret Service? So the Secret Service was informed
that he had 11 weapons in the car. And I just want to go over,
I had the evidence list from the State police that was provided
to the Secret Service.
Mr. Gonzalez had a Mossberg Maverick model 88 .12 gauge
pump service shotgun in the car. He had a Springfield Armory
.308 Winchester with a scope and a bipod. He had an Adler Italy
Jager AP-85 with a red dot scope in the car. He had a Tristar
12 gauge shotgun in the car. He had an AR-15, which is a pretty
sophisticated weapon, with a flashlight and scope. He had a
Weatherby Vanguard 270 caliber bolt action rifle with a scope
and a bipod. He had a Smith and Wesson 380 caliber automatic
black handgun. He had a Glock 45 in the car with an empty
magazine, although later we found he had 800 rounds of
ammunition. He had a .357 Magnum revolver. As well, he had
another .45 caliber. And he also had a map--and this is the
evidence list and you seem to be minimizing all this stuff--but
it says, one map of Washington, D.C., with writing and a line
drawn to the White House.
Okay. So that's what we have with our introduction to Mr.
Gonzalez. And also subsequent to that we know he has a history
of mental illness. Then he shows up at the White House in
August of 2014, he's got a hatchet in his belt. No red flags,
we let him go.
Then, of course, there's the day that he jumps the fence
and runs into the White House. And I want to talk about that
for a minute. You say that he came in through the front gate,
went through the front door at the portico, and was wrestled to
the ground--or to the carpet actually you said--wrestled down
to the rug near the Green Room. I just want to remind you that
the distance from the front of the White House where he came in
to the Green Room is about 80 feet. This is only 60 feet, the
width of this room right here, this 60 feet. So----
Chairman Issa. Seventy yards.
Mr. Lynch. No, no, it wouldn't be 80 yards. No, it's 70
yards the lawn, it's 30 yards inside the house, inside the
house. I've been there many, many times. To talk about somebody
transversing the White House foyer, the full length of the East
Room, down to the Green Room, to the American public that would
be half of a White House tour. That's what that would be. That
isn't just getting inside the portico, that's half of a White
House tour to the American public.
And you keep minimizing this stuff. I'm just wondering,
when do the red flags go up for the Secret Service? I know you
have a lot of wonderful people over there, but this is not
their best work. And we have a serious, serious issue here
about protecting the President and his family. This is
disgraceful, this is absolutely disgraceful that this has
happened. And I'm not even going to mention the fact that it
took us 4 days to figure out that somebody had shot seven
rounds into the White House.
This is beyond the pale. And I have listened to your
testimony very deliberately here this morning. And I wish to
God you protected the White House like you're protecting your
reputation here today. I wish you spent that time and that
effort to protect the American President and his family like
I'm hearing people covering for the lapses of the Secret
Service on these several occasions. I really do.
Mr. Lynch. So what are we going to do--and, look, this
whole thing is the United States Secret Service versus one
mentally challenged man, one man with mental illness, who you
knew had mental illness.
This is the Secret Service against one individual with
mental illness, and you lost. You lost. And you had three shots
at this guy, three chances, and he got to the Green Room in the
White House.
What happens when you have a sophisticated organization
with nefarious intent and resources going up against the Secret
Service? What happens then?
Chairman Issa. The time of the gentleman has expired. I
thank the gentleman.
But if the gentlelady has any answers to any of his
questions, I would appreciate hearing them.
Ms. Pierson. Let me be clear. The United States Secret
Service does not take any of these incidents lightly. They are
all an extremely----
Mr. Lynch. With all due respect, that is my point.
As a casual observer to what has happened here, I don't
think the Secret Service is taking as their duty to protect the
American President and his family at the White House--I don't
think you are taking it seriously. That is exactly my point.
Based on the evidence--based on the evidence and the series
of lapses, unfortunately, that is the conclusion that I arrive
at, that you are not taking your job seriously.
I'm sorry. I hate to be critical. But we've got a lot at
stake here. We have a lot at stake. And I know people are
dancing around this issue, but I've got to call it like it is.
I have very low confidence in the Secret Service under your
leadership. I have to say that. And that is not--that's not an
easy thing for me to say. But based on the evidence, that's how
we have to call it here.
Based on the evidence, my confidence in you protecting the
American President right now at the White House, which is
supposed to be one of the most secure buildings in the country,
if not the world--my confidence in you doing that is very, very
low right now.
Chairman Issa. I thank the gentleman.
The gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Meadows, is
recognized.
Mr. Meadows. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Director Pierson, I want to come back. You were appointed
in March of 2013. Is that correct?
Ms. Pierson. Yes. That's correct.
Mr. Meadows. So what three things have you done to improve
the culture since you have gotten there? Very briefly. I have
limited time. What three things have you done to improve the
culture? Because that has been brought up, that there is a
culture problem.
Ms. Pierson. We have instituted an Office of Professional
Integrity. We have established a new discipline process so that
discipline is done in a more transparent and consistent way. We
have initiated development training for our supervisors, for
our SES, and for our work and file workforce.
Mr. Meadows. All right. So you've done some training and
some new positions. Because I'm a little concerned. When that
question came up--I watch people all the time--and no less than
four people that are here with you today agree that you have a
cultural problem. And, you know, you can tell from their
responses that there is an issue within the Agency. But I also
want to go back and give you a chance to correct your
testimony.
I thought I heard earlier that you said that you were short
500 Uniformed Secret Service people due to sequestration. I
can't believe that would be accurate. So I'll give you a chance
to correct that.
Ms. Pierson. Across the organization, the Secret Service is
down 550 personnel.
Mr. Meadows. Okay.
Chairman Issa. Will the gentleman yield for just a second?
Mr. Meadows. Yes.
Chairman Issa. He wanted--would you stop the clock for just
a second--the amount of people who are in the U.S. Secret
Service the day you were sworn in and the amount of people that
are there today, if you would, please, because these numbers of
full-time equivalents and so on--I think all of us on the dais
have a right to understand what the impact is from the day you
were sworn in.
Ms. Pierson. Well, I don't have those specific numbers for
you today. Representative Chaffetz did bring up the fact that
there had not been any basic training classes in fiscal year
2012 and 2013.
Mr. Meadows. But we're talking about the number of people.
And you're saying 500 fewer people? That cannot be right,
Director.
Ms. Pierson. That is correct, sir, over the last 2 years.
Mr. Meadows. Well, let me tell you why it is confusing.
Because I am looking at your budget request for last year, and
it says in here, in your request, that you plan to reduce the
staffing by 376 full-time equivalents.
Why would you do that? If you're already short 500, why
would you, in your budget request, request a 376 full-time
equivalent reduction? I am confused. Wouldn't you be confused?
In your budget request, you also said that we need to be
reducing the number of years of experience by 5 years over the
next 4 years. I am confused.
Why would we want less-experienced Secret Service agents,
Director? These are your numbers. Do you have an answer?
Ms. Pierson. I do know that we have provided a human
capital strategy to the Congress, at their request, that
outlines the Secret Service's requirements----
Mr. Meadows. But these are your requests.
And let me tell you what is even more confusing then. I
will go ahead a little bit further.
It says the committee--the congressional committee is
concerned that the President's budget request creates a pay
shortfall that will result in the reduction of at least 376
full-time equivalents and that this will fundamentally affect
the dual mission within the Secret Service. The committee was
recognizing this, not you.
Do you not think that that creates a cultural problem when
you're seeking reductions and you're here testifying today that
you have too few people? Do you see the hypocrisy in that?
Ms. Pierson. I do see the difficulty in trying to operate a
critical Federal Agency in times of fiscal constraint.
Mr. Meadows. Okay. Well, let's go, since you're talking
about fiscal constraints--because I started looking real
quickly--because I agree with Mr. Lynch. We need to do all we
can to give you the tools to make sure that you can change the
culture and protect our President.
So I started looking at it, but I was concerned to find a
whistleblower came to us and said that you spent over $1
million on an executive luxury suite--is that correct?--on the
eighth floor. On your eighth floor, over $1 million spent on a
luxury suite since you've come to power.
Ms. Pierson. I don't know what that is in reference to
unless----
Mr. Meadows. Did you spend $1 million or more on a
conference room, outfitting it--a luxury suite--on the eighth
floor? Yes or no?
Ms. Pierson. No. What we have done is spent money to
transform our Director's Crisis Center.
Mr. Meadows. Okay. The Director's Crisis Center, which is
on the ninth floor. Now we've done it again on the eighth
floor.
We've got locators on each one of those floors. Is that
correct? That's what the whistleblower is telling me.
Ms. Pierson. That information he has talks about the
integration of both the Director's Crisis Center----
Mr. Meadows. How do you know? Because the whistleblower
talked to us.
Ms. Pierson. I know from what we have done in the way of
installations within our office. I can't speak to what your
individual is reporting----
Mr. Meadows. Okay. Do you have a locator on the eighth
floor now?
Ms. Pierson. We have multiple locators in the building.
Mr. Meadows. Do you have one on the eighth floor?
Ms. Pierson. Yes.
Mr. Meadows. Okay. Is that a secure area?
Ms. Pierson. Yes.
Mr. Meadows. Is the eighth floor a secure area where
vendors that don't have classified--can they go in and out, if
they don't have a clearance, on the eighth floor?
Ms. Pierson. All of our vendors are either escorted or have
clearance, and the locator itself is not a classified document.
Mr. Meadows. So--but it does tell you where the President
and the Vice President and all relative people are. It is a
locator. Right?
Ms. Pierson. It is a reference point for our management
team.
Mr. Meadows. Why would you need another one of these? When
you already have two, why would you need another one one floor
down in your luxury suite?
Chairman Issa. The gentleman's time has expired.
The gentlelady may answer.
Go ahead and answer.
Ms. Pierson. I am--we need to have instant information for
us to be able to make informed decisions as a management team,
and having quick access and enough people to leverage
technology and look at camera views and look at information
being provided to us realtime from our protective missions is
critically important to me and critically important to my
staff. This is one of the areas where some of those key
decisions are made, and it is integrated in with other systems
throughout the building.
Mr. Meadows. Mr. Chairman, I yield back. I think we need to
explore this further, though.
Chairman Issa. I thank the gentleman.
And for the Director, during the hearing, we are going to
try and get more accurately the correct number because I have
got to tell you, from the dais, I think all of us want to
understand this 500.
We show 1,420 authorized uniformed officers, 1,300 on hand.
And we don't show that is an appreciable drop during your
tenure, as your budget has gone up, with 2,200 agents.
So we are trying to find where the 500 represents a
shortfall in full-time equivalent other than a legacy of,
perhaps, never filling the authorized slots.
I am going to give the additional time to the gentleman
from Virginia.
But if you will answer just one question:
Isn't it typical that, although your budgets are
increasing, that you plus-up going into the 2016 or a
Presidential cycle and that's when you want to peak and that
you do have lesser requirements when you don't have
Presidential candidates and so on?
Because I am very concerned about the--coming before
Congress at a time when we are giving you more money than
you're asking for and complaining about sequestration and
limited resources.
So be prepared to answer that. I am not going to take the
time right now. It is the gentleman from Virginia's time. But
those questions are going to continue throughout this hearing,
and we are going to follow up in writing afterwards.
The gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Connolly, is recognized.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Director Pierson, in light of the facts that have come out
and in light of your own review thus far, had the First Family
been in the family quarters or anywhere in the White House,
would you conclude professionally that there was a threat to
the First Family?
Ms. Pierson. Yes. I think Mr. Gonzalez coming into the main
floor mansion is a threat.
Mr. Connolly. I think it is really important to remember--
you know, I was a freshman in high school on November 22, 1963,
and all of us who lived at that time remember where and when we
were when we heard the terrible news from Dallas.
But, you know, in my mind is that Secret Service agent, Mr.
Hill, who threw himself on the speeding car that contained the
President and the First Lady and used his body to shield her.
It is a sacred mission the Secret Service has. It is not an
easy mission.
But it is very troubling to all Americans that our duly
elected President and his family were actually potentially in
real jeopardy on the White House grounds itself.
I wonder whether you would agree that, when you look at
every aspect of this, sadly, it represents a comprehensive
failure. They add up one by one. I think there was a failure,
frankly, to take the Gonzalez threat seriously after the
information provided by the Virginia State Police.
We knew he had a history of mental illness. We knew that he
was loaded up with guns. We knew that he had a map of
Washington. You indicate that that map was described as just a
tourist map, looking at places he might go. That might make
sense except for the fact that he was loaded up with ammunition
and weapons in his car at the time.
Now, my friend from Utah has made headlines and made a
statement here today that he believes your reaction should be
one of maximum force. I guess we should read that to mean that
he should be shot on sight when he crosses the fence, when he
goes over the fence.
I am very reluctant to join him in that kind of advice to
the Secret Service because there is a First Family in the White
House. There are guests in the White House. It is a busy and
bustling place. And the idea that we're going to have a shoot-
out on the White House grounds seems to me a last resort, not a
first resort. And I am not sure Members of Congress ought to be
in the business of actually spelling out Secret Service
protocols for you. I am not sure that's our competence.
But having said that, one can still conclude that the
reaction of the Secret Service on sight was profoundly
inadequate and, actually, potentially put the First Family in
direct jeopardy, physical harm.
And I don't sense from you, Director Pierson, a sense of
outrage about that, a sense of mission that you want to reform
and correct this cascading set of mistakes that led to,
potentially, a catastrophe for the United States.
Could you comment.
Ms. Pierson. I am sorry you don't get that sense from me. I
have spent a career in the United States Secret Service,
protecting Presidents, their families, and the White House
complex, in addition to our other missions.
There is nothing more sacred to any Secret Service agent,
Uniformed Division officer or Administrative-Technical
Professional Employee, than our responsibilities for mission
success. We don't take it lightly.
But we do it under very difficult and challenging
conditions. There is not a lot we can do in managing
individuals with mental illness who do not commit a crime or
who do not put themselves in a position where the Secret
Service can take further actions against them. We are limited
by the system that we have to work within, the laws of our
country.
Mr. Connolly. Ms. Pierson, I don't doubt for a minute your
sincerity. What I said was I don't sense any sense of outrage
about what happened.
Ms. Pierson. We all are outraged within the Secret Service
of how this incident came to pass, and that is why I have asked
for a full review. It is obvious. It is obvious that mistakes
were made. It is self-evident that mistakes were made.
We must identify what the facts are, learn from the facts,
assess and make changes, enhance training, to ensure that this
never happens again. The Secret Service has a proud history of
making sure that we go back and look and do after-actions after
every incident so that we can apply better security measures to
ensure the protection of those we are bound to protect.
Mr. Connolly. I think that's really important, and I think
it is really important in this discussion and this hearing that
we remember there are real human beings whose safety and
security is at stake.
And it just so happens one of those human beings was
elected not once, but twice, by a majority of this country to
be its President, and that sacred responsibility has to be
uppermost in our minds, even if that means that reputations
fall, careers get interrupted, demotions occur, or people get
fired. His safety and that of his family is the paramount
concern here, and that's what we all need to be concerned
about.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My time is up.
Chairman Issa. Thank you.
We now go to a gentleman who served in what I think fairly
is called difficult conditions both in Vietnam and in Iraq. And
with all due respect, I think he will object to your calling
working at the White House a difficult environment.
The gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Bentivolio, is recognized.
Mr. Bentivolio. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Basham and Ms. Pierson, thank you very much for your
service in the Secret Service, one of the premier law
enforcement agencies, in my opinion, an aspiration many, many
years ago, from investigating counterfeiters to protecting the
President of the United States. I commend you all for your
dedicated service in the past.
Mr. Basham--did I pronounce that right?
Mr. Basham. ``Basham.''
Mr. Bentivolio. ``Basham.'' Thank you very much.
In your introduction, you said you went from--well, we have
an intruder that got into the White House and went 30 yards and
was finally apprehended and we have a hearing about that right
now. And you said we would have a hearing as well had we shot
him once he jumped the fence. And you're absolutely right.
But I was trained that you only use as much force as is
absolutely necessary to subdue or fix the problem, never any
more undue force. And that's a difficult challenge in itself;
is it not?
But we have dogs patrolling the White House, and you seem
to have forgotten about 10 other, probably, protocols you could
have used to subdue that person before they went into the White
House. Correct?
Mr. Basham. You're absolutely correct.
Mr. Bentivolio. All right. So in the after-action review,
were any of those considered? And what other actions could they
have taken to stop this intruder before he entered the White
House?
Mr. Basham. Clearly, as the Director has stated, there were
mistakes, there were failures, there were opportunities to take
this individual down based upon the reactions of the officers
that were in place at the time. And they clearly did not take
those actions.
And that is why the Director has to--and the staff has to
determine why they made those decisions or lack of making those
decisions and understand what was going through their minds,
what was going on on the White House grounds at the time, what
was the clutter situation. They need to have the time to do the
investigation to determine what the circumstances were on the
ground.
Mr. Bentivolio. But they had the opportunity to do an
investigation when they--well, they found out that there was--
Mr. Gonzalez had guns in his car, he had a map to the White
House. I would have been asking a lot more questions other than
just letting him go.
Why wasn't he brought in for further questioning by the
Secret Service especially?
I mean, just the map alone--I think lawyers call that a
preponderance of evidence, indicating that he had some intent
in doing something wrong or illegal, jeopardizing the President
of the United States and the White House.
Why wasn't he brought in for questioning then?
Mr. Basham. I believe the Director did state that the
individual was interviewed and that the agents made a
determination--which is a very difficult determination to
make--as to whether the individual truly represents a threat to
the President of the United States.
Mr. Bentivolio. Are we privy to those questions and that
report, Mr. Chairman? Do we have access to that report?
Chairman Issa. In an appropriate setting, we'll make them
available.
Mr. Bentivolio. Great.
Mr. Basham. Even subsequent to that, when they interviewed
him when he was at the White House, unless he is breaking the
law, there is no power that the Secret Service has to take this
individual into custody, and that is the difficulty that they
face.
And, you know, I totally agree with the Representative,
that I do not believe that we want the Secret Service's first
action on the White House ground when someone climbs over the
fence, what, 16 times in the last 5 years--that the Secret
Service's first reaction is to kill that person. That is, in my
mind, not acceptable to me or to the American people.
Mr. Bentivolio. Well, I agree.
But there is an element of--there is responses that are
well within the power of the Secret Service to protect the
intruder when they jump the fence and come in, use of dogs, for
instance, a mass going--a mass of Secret Service agents heading
in that direction to take down that individual. But at the same
time, they have to--it could be a diversion.
So there's a lot of things going on in the Secret Service's
head, I am sure, when we have an intruder like that. But I just
have a real--well, I think I am out of time.
Mr. Basham. But I will say, in 1976, there was an
individual who came over the fence, apparently was carrying
some type of device that was--appeared to be a weapon, but
turned out to be a pipe, and they shot him. And there was
criticism for that shooting in 1976. This is a difficult,
difficult balance to strike.
Mr. Bentivolio. I understand. And I am out of time.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Issa. I thank the gentleman.
We now go to the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr.
Cartwright.
Mr. Cartwright. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Director Pierson, you have served in the Secret Service for
30 years. You have served under both Republican and Democratic
administrations.
And so you know--and you have stated publicly that this
recent security breach was unacceptable, and we've heard other
adjectives here today from both sides of the dais: profoundly
inadequate, shocking, disgraceful, outrageous.
Is there any one of those adjectives you disagree with?
Ms. Pierson. No.
Mr. Cartwright. Thank you.
And there have been--there has been some discussion about
what we knew about the person leading up to the incident where
he jumped the fence and crashed the White House.
We actually had his medical records, did we not, before he
jumped the fence?
Ms. Pierson. I believe we had received the medical records
and they were being reviewed prior to him jumping the fence.
Mr. Cartwright. So with everything else we knew--we stopped
him, he had a carload of high offensive ammunition and guns,
and he had a map to the White House--you know, he just about
was wearing a hat saying ``I am the most dangerous person who
could come to the White House,'' and, yet, all of these things
happened. And not to put too fine a point on it, Director
Pierson, there were numerous layers of security that he was
able to flummox.
A surveillance team outside the fence reportedly did not
spot Mr. Gonzalez quickly enough to give an early warning. An
officer stationed in a guard booth as well as a SWAT team on
the North Lawn reportedly did not react in time. A dog trained
to intercept intruders reportedly was not released. No officer
reportedly was stationed outside the front entrance of the
White House, and the door was left unlocked. And then just
yesterday press accounts reported that Mr. Gonzalez made it all
the way into the East Room and that the alarms had been
silenced.
To me, all of those adjectives apply. This was a stunning,
outrageous, disgraceful breach. And I know you can't discuss
specific details and we are going to go into executive session
so that you can be more forthcoming about tactics and
procedures, but I want to start here with broader questions.
First, I assume that the Secret Service has a specific
protocol--or multiple protocols for handling these types of
breaches. Am I correct in that?
Ms. Pierson. Yes, sir. We do.
Mr. Cartwright. And without getting into those protocols
themselves and providing anybody at large a road map, can you
tell us whether they were followed in this case.
Ms. Pierson. No, they were not.
Mr. Cartwright. And why weren't they followed, Ms. Pierson?
Ms. Pierson. I do not know. And that is going to be one of
the main issues that I hope to resolve through the course of
this investigation.
Mr. Cartwright. Well, I think it is--we have said multiple
times here that you have been on the job, what, for about a
year and a half now and you're on the job to reestablish the
credibility and the reputation of the Secret Service as the
finest, most formidable protective force on the face of the
Earth. Is that a fair statement?
Ms. Pierson. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cartwright. If someone wants to do us harm, it behooves
all of us to remember that right now you are protecting the
most threatened American President in our Nation's history.
It is kind of a bad time to have something like this
happen, isn't it, Ms. Pierson?
Ms. Pierson. It is never acceptable to have an individual
breach the White House.
Mr. Cartwright. So would you please explain to me in terms
that you can reveal in public what you have done since becoming
the new Director of the Secret Service to turn this Agency
around and prevent things like this from happening.
Ms. Pierson. From the start of my appointment, I have made
it perfectly clear to the workforce of my expectations for
professionalism and accountability. How that was accomplished:
by the establishment of a new Office of Integrity, the
establishment of a new table of penalties for a discipline
process that is more transparent and consistent and well known
to the workforce as to what the expectations and the level of
tolerance will be. I personally have a zero tolerance level
when it comes to misconduct, and we are addressing it
accordingly.
In addition to that, training is critically important and
developing leaders is critically important. This year we have
established a lot of in-service training for our workforce as
well as specialized training for our leadership. I have had a
lot of personal engagement with my supervisors and the
workforce.
When I became Director, I had over 70 professional
supervisory positions that were vacant. I made those
promotions. I offered orientation to those new supervisors, and
I have continued to make sure that there is no doubt that we
are going to be held to the highest standard that the American
public expects.
I do understand, when you start to bring change into an
organization, there is pushback. We're going to continue to
improve. This incident is an operational incident. Although it
is being addressed, it is very similar--or a side effect of
some of the other cultural problems. I looked at this as a
strict tactical concern. We have a security procedure that
wasn't followed.
One week prior an individual had climbed the fence and was
arrested within seconds. Why didn't that same activity happen
on the night of the 19th? That is part of my concern, and that
is what we're investigating. I agree that mistakes were made
and the proper protocols were not followed. It is unacceptable.
Mr. Cartwright. Ms. Pierson, my time is up, and I look
forward to closer questioning in the executive session.
I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Mica. [Presiding.] I thank the witness.
And I recognize the gentleman from Florida, Mr. DeSantis.
Mr. DeSantis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Director Pierson, you had just said that this was an
operational failure. So I just want to be clear. Because there
was talk about salaries, the number of personnel, budgets.
This September 19 failure was in no way related to a lack
of funding or personnel. Is that accurate to say?
Ms. Pierson. It is accurate to say that the officers on
duty that night failed to execute the security protocols that
they should have.
Mr. DeSantis. But you're not saying it is a 100 percent
operational failure. You're saying that it may be--you're not
ruling out that this may be a resource issue. Correct?
Ms. Pierson. I do believe that we need to look at our
training protocols and our staffing protocols. And so, yes,
that would refer back to resourcing.
Mr. DeSantis. Okay. Because I think--and the budgets have
been mentioned--the budget request for fiscal year 2014 from
the Agency was $822.6 million for salaries and expenses, but,
yet, Congress appropriated $846.7 million for salaries and
expenses. So there is a disconnect here, and I think that--let
me ask you this relating to this:
You have a guy, Gonzalez. All the agents know who he is by
this time on September 19 because he had been arrested in
Virginia. He had weapons, ammunition, a map with the White
House circled. So this is clearly something that would have
been disseminated to the agents. He's able to, of course, leap
the fence and get deep inside the White House.
How many Secret Service agents stood between him
penetrating that first fence and getting in? In other words,
were there just not enough people there? How many people were
there?
Ms. Pierson. The White House complex is secured, and the
building is defended by the United States Secret Service
Uniformed Division, and I can provide you information in a
different setting as to the location and numbers of personnel.
Mr. DeSantis. Because I noticed for this hearing you--there
was a request of the Sergeant at Arms for people to accompany
you to this hearing, and I believe that they're probably
sitting behind you.
How many people have accompanied you to this hearing today?
Do you know?
Ms. Pierson. I would believe 12 of my senior managers.
Mr. DeSantis. Okay. Because we had a request for 18
personnel, but you say maybe only 12. So at least 12, maybe
more, are accompanying you here for testimony, which is
important, but it kind of cuts against this idea that we're at
a manpower shortage, especially in some of the numbers that we
have been doing.
Let me ask you this about the culture of the Agency. Now, a
number of incidents have been raised. You had the celebrity
crash the White House dinner a few years back; of course, the
2011 shooting incident, and the Agency's poor response to that
has been talked about; you did have the 2013 May incident at
the Hay-Adams Hotel involving an agent; a Miami 2014 car
accident involving agents with alcohol suspected; in the
Netherlands, 2014, excessive drinking by agents, and some had
to be sent home; and, of course, what got the most publicity,
probably, is the 2012 incident in Colombia.
So a lot of people look at this and I think they think that
there are, obviously, a lot of good people in the Secret
Service, but they think there may be a cultural problem. Now,
you say you don't think that the September 19 breach is a
result of that culture.
But let me ask you: How do you assess the health of the
culture in the Secret Service right now?
Ms. Pierson. Well, since becoming Director, we have
established an Office of Integrity. I have made my position
known on the level of professionalism that is expected,
accountability at all levels.
I have met personally with every front-line supervisor up
to my SES managers and have provided them some additional
training to ensure that they know how to lead, that they know
how to manage and they know how to work with this dedicated
workforce.
At the same time, we are providing training for the
workforce, but we are doing it at the same time that we are
meeting very difficult protective requirements and
investigative requirements around the world.
I believe that we have started to make a pretty significant
transition within the organization in recognizing that we have
made missteps and that we need to learn from these incidents
and improve.
Mr. DeSantis. And you think that the steps that you have
taken have resulted in a discernible improvement in the
culture?
Ms. Pierson. I think these steps, along with continuing to
promote and support new management, will help us in that
process.
Mr. DeSantis. Thank you.
Mr. Meadows. Will the gentleman yield for a follow-up?
Mr. DeSantis. I yield to the gentleman from North Carolina.
Mr. Meadows. Let me just ask a follow-up because it gets
back to this budget question.
So, under your direction, was there a reduction in the
counter-surveillance manpower under your directorship?
Ms. Pierson. Under my directorship?
Mr. Meadows. Yes.
Ms. Pierson. I established a new permanent division----
Mr. Meadows. Was there a reduction? Yes or no?
Ms. Pierson. I don't believe there was a reduction. No.
Mr. Meadows. Okay. Because the whistleblower seemed to
indicate that there is a study that recommended that there
should be 100 people for counter-surveillance and that you
personally made the decision to cut that by a third. Is that
not correct?
Mr. Mica. The witness can answer. And the time has expired.
Would you answer, please.
Ms. Pierson. Yes.
I would like to review that study. I know that we have
asked for a study in the past that related to counter-
surveillance and counter-surveillance methodologies to be
employed by the Secret Service in the context of the National
Capital Region, and we earlier this year established a counter-
surveillance division and staffed it with what we believe are
the appropriate resources for this time. And we'll continue to
go back and look at that process and see how we need to
continue to resource it as appropriate.
Mr. Mica. I thank the witness.
I recognize the gentlewoman from Illinois, Ms. Duckworth.
Ms. Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I have tremendous respect for the members of the Secret
Service, and I can't believe that I am about to begin this line
of questioning as a Member of Congress because it should never
have gotten to this point where I have to ask you these
questions.
Specifically, I would like to touch on your AAR process,
the after-action review process.
Do you conduct AARs? You mentioned that you did earlier.
But do you?
Ms. Pierson. Yes. We do refer to them as fact-finding.
Ms. Duckworth. Okay. Do you conduct fact-finding at all
levels? For example, following the Hernandez shooting incident,
were there fact-finding sessions conducted at every level, for
example, with the personnel that were on the White House
grounds that night, maybe during the shift change brief, maybe
the next morning at the next shift change and then all the way
up the region and then all the way up to the director level?
Would that be a normal course of action?
Ms. Pierson. Yes, it would.
Ms. Duckworth. So, at the fact-finding sessions, once you
discover something that is deficient, do you then change your
procedures based on what you learn at the fact-finding
sessions?
Ms. Pierson. Yes, we would.
Ms. Duckworth. Have you changed your procedures for when
the White House comes under a shooting incident?
For example, if the shooting happened at 9 p.m. at night
and it was too dark then, I am not sure why you don't have
access to flashlights and spotlights to check the White House
in the evening. But okay. It was too dark.
Do you now have a procedure for checking the entire
building, including the third floor, either at night or the
next day? Is that now part of the new procedures?
Ms. Pierson. Yes, it is. And, again, that night--it is a
three-story building. So oftentimes it would require lift
trucks and such. But we do have a better protocol now to ensure
that proper sweeps are done across the complex as a result of
that after-action.
Ms. Duckworth. It is the people's house and the President
of the United States. I think the American public would
begrudge a lift truck at night to go check the outside of the
building, I would imagine, but you have that procedure in
place.
So if there is a suspected shooting incident, it would be
sooner than 3 or 4 days and the housekeeper before we find the
bullets in the side of the White House because of the new
procedures. Correct?
Ms. Pierson. Yes, ma'am. Lessons learned.
Ms. Duckworth. Okay. Post-Hernandez, the first--I am sorry.
The--not Hernandez--the recent breach that just happened--after
he was initially apprehended with the ax in his waistband and
he had this story, were information of that apprehension or
that discussion that those agents had with him--was that
shared--would have been shared as part of the fact-finding the
next day at a shift?
Would pictures of him have been shown to the officers
coming on shift--on the next shift, ``Hey, we stopped this guy.
He had an ax in his waistband. He had all this ammo in his car.
Watch out for him. He may come by''? Was that ever done?
Ms. Pierson. It is my understanding that he was initially
observed by members of our counter-surveillance division. So I
am assuming--and I would have to get back to the committee--
that that would be part of the protocol of our counter-
surveillance division as well as our Uniformed Division
officers that are frequently seeing these people come along the
south fence line.
Ms. Duckworth. Okay. Would that have been shared with all
of the officers stationed along the south fence line or who
might have contact with passersby, ``This guy's been by a
couple times. He's''--you know, ``keep an eye out for him''? Is
that a standard thing that would now happen as part of your
procedures every shift?
Ms. Pierson. I would assume it is discussed, but I don't
know to what specificity it is physically reported amongst
Uniformed Division. But the information that Mr. Gonzalez had
appeared on the south fence line, was interviewed, his car
was--he consent to a search to his vehicle--all of that was in
a written report provided and supplemented a part of Mr.
Gonzalez's contact.
Ms. Duckworth. What about any results from fact-finding
that spoke to the lack of communications between the agents who
were safeguarding the First Daughters being on a different
frequency as the agents who were taught responding to the
2011--the shooting incident?
My understanding is that the agent inside did not know--
because she did not hear traffic--that the suspected shooting
had happened and did not find out about it until through a
third party, another agent.
Has that been fixed? Now are all the agents listening to
multiple frequencies?
Ms. Pierson. Our protocol would require that all agents are
notified regardless of their assignment for that type of
incident with a shooting on the complex. So, yes, I would say
that information is now passed through our joint operations
system.
Ms. Duckworth. I am running out of time.
I am just very concerned that we're not learning from
lessons learned, that these things are happening--whether or
not the fact-finding sessions are happening, this information
is not disseminated in some way.
And I would love to maybe end up in executive session or
something to touch more on how you're fixing and updating your
protocols because this seems pretty standard to me.
With that, I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Mica. Well, thank you.
And I am going to recognize myself.
Welcome, Director Pierson. There has been a lot of chest-
beating, and there has been a lot of beating up of the Director
today.
And I want to give you an opportunity to talk about not
just what took place, but also what we can do to make certain
that the White House is safe, the First Family is safe, and
these incidents don't happen again.
There are basically two things that we deal with to do
that. One would be personnel, your personnel, and the second
would be technology. I would believe those two would resolve
the problem in the future.
Since you came in sort of to clean up some of the mess--the
problems with performance, the problems with morale--I will
say, too, that you're the first Director in 22 years to ever
call me personally and ask for some assistance.
Before this incident took place, folks, she actually called
and she said, ``I want to improve the quality of our
personnel,'' and she asked for, actually, two things. And they
are still pending before this committee, interestingly enough.
I just checked.
But one was to improve the standards for the agents. I know
there had been a lack of academy training and not a lot of
folks trained.
But you were also--and you formerly headed HR, concerned
about the agents. Is that correct?
Ms. Pierson. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mica. Okay. And then, also, the ability to hire and
fire. We saw in the VA scandal the hands tied to hire and fire.
And you asked for--I guess to create--to call the service
an exempt service. Is that correct?
Ms. Pierson. Yes, sir. It is referred to as excepted
service.
Mr. Mica. Yes.
And that would be--would give you more ability to
discipline.
I asked the staff the status of those, and it is still
pending. There has been some objection from the other side of
the aisle even to take them up. So I thank you for stepping
forward and, also, for recommending that.
Little things like technology--now, you weren't the
Director in 2011 when the bullets hit the White House, were
you?
Ms. Pierson. No, sir, I was not.
Mr. Mica. Well, you got beat up pretty good on that one
today.
But it is kind of interesting that the White House--and,
really, they discovered some concrete or something that had
been chipped out of a balcony that isn't examined and was--the
surface area of the White House is quite a bit, and you would
want to examine some of it. And that wasn't done at 9:50 at
night, whatever it was.
But the fact remains that a window was broken. Now, that
concerns me because, at my house, I have a security system. If
a window is breached--actually, when I left this morning, I
didn't want to disturb my wife quite early, but the security
alarm sort of notifies you that someone's coming in or going
out. I don't have a very sophisticated system.
But a window breaking in the White House in 2011, it seems
like that should--and I know there are two barriers. One is
bulletproof, and the other is the original--or antique glass.
That should have been taken care of.
Has that been taken care of? Do you know?
Ms. Pierson. I know that the windows have been replaced.
Mr. Mica. No. I am talking about security for breaching
that.
Again, a simple thing. If someone opens a window or a
window is broken at my house, I have an alarm. Have you ever
heard of these guys? It is not very costly. You can subscribe.
But that can be installed. It is a simple technology device and
company, private system, that can do that. So I don't think we
have to spend a lot of money.
I think, one, we have got to improve the quality and
professionalism, which you're trying to do. You have got to be
able to hire and fire people. And you have to put some
technology in place. We don't have to put cement trucks and
barriers in front of the White House. It is the people's house.
Now, do you know when the current 7-foot, 6-inch fence was
installed?
Ms. Pierson. 1965.
Mr. Mica. 1965.
And I don't want to go through some outrageous things. I
know the taxpayers have to fund this. But maybe we could raise
that a little bit.
The other thing, too, is you are part of the--you have
lived in Florida. We could even put some vegetation barriers,
simple things like--how about Spanish bayonet? You jump that
fence and you get quite a greeting when you hit the ground.
Inexpensive vegetation barriers.
But there is a whole host of things that we can do cost
effectively. So I hope you will consider some of them as we
look at some solutions.
Jumping the fence at the White House is not new. Is that
right?
Ms. Pierson. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Mica. But what has happened is they went beyond the
barrier.
The other thing, too, is I understand the President and the
First Family were not at the White House when this took place
and sometimes the security personnel and Secret Service do get
refocused to address where the President is.
And he had just departed. Is that correct?
Ms. Pierson. That is correct.
Mr. Mica. Okay. Well, again, welcome to the Government
Reform and Oversight Committee. It is good to have you here
today. Thank you.
Mr. Tierney. Mr. Chairman, can I just make an inquiry?
Mr. Mica. Sure.
Mr. Tierney. You made some reference during your remarks
that the Director had made two requests and some--there was
some objection from this side.
Could you expand on that for us. Because we're not aware of
that, as far as I know.
Mr. Mica. She told you the two requests that were made.
Mr. Tierney. Right.
Mr. Mica. She actually contacted me. We contacted staff.
And we have asked staff to look at it. I asked the staff just
now.
I said, ``Well, what is the status of that?''
And they said there was--I said, ``Have we moved forward on
her request?''
They said, ``No.''
I said, ``Why?''
They said, ``Because some of the staff''--or ``some of the
Members on the other side of the aisle objected to that.''
And, I mean, you can object to it----
Mr. Tierney. Well, I don't think anybody has. That is my
point. We're not aware of that.
Mr. Mica. The Director has taken steps to improve both the
performance----
Mr. Tierney. Mr. Chairman, we understand that and we are
willing to accept that.
Mr. Mica. And the qualifications and the status of one of
the most respected law enforcement services in the world, not
just----
Mr. Tierney. We're appreciative of that. I think--and we
don't disagree that she did that.
Mr. Mica. I am just telling----
Mr. Tierney. Where we disagree is nobody on this side knows
what you are talking about.
Mr. Mica. I have got to tell it like it is, and that is how
it is.
Mr. Tierney. No. You are telling us like somebody told you
it was.
Mr. Mica. Well, that is the facts.
So, again, she testified under oath that she did contact me
in that regard. I asked staff. And that is the status of that.
Mr. Cummings. Would the chairman yield just for a moment,
please?
Mr. Mica. Yes.
Mr. Cummings. Would the chairman yield just for a moment?
Mr. Mica. Yes.
Mr. Cummings. I just want to make something very, very
clear. On this side of the aisle, we will do everything in our
power to make sure that the Secret Service has everything it
needs----
Mr. Mica. There, too, I----
Mr. Cummings. Let me--may I finish, please?
Mr. Mica. Yes. Go right ahead.
Mr. Cummings. --it needs to protect the President, his
family, the Vice President, his family, the families of--and
the President--and our former Presidents.
This is extremely important to us. And I don't want this
hearing or anybody to get the impression that we are not a
million percent supportive of making sure that the Secret
Service has what it needs legislatively or financially.
Mr. Mica. Well, I thank the gentleman. And I know he'll
work with us to try to accommodate the request of the Director.
Does the gentleman from----
Chairman Issa. [Presiding.] Would the chairman yield?
Mr. Mica. Yes.
Chairman Issa. Perhaps just to clear the record, I think
that the entire committee needs to be aware that there have
been requests to have personnel standings of exempt changed, in
some cases, to make them easier to terminate. Now, that is a
debate we can certainly have.
I do believe today that, although that is something the
committee should consider--and I am certainly supportive of at
this level people being subject to disciplinary action if
they're unable to fulfill their mission easier--I don't believe
today that is the basis under which these various failures
occurred. So--and I am happy to have a discussion later on the
details of the personnel changes, but that was the limit.
And, again, for the Director, I did receive that.
I did not--because we can't immediately act on it
unilaterally, but I don't believe it has anything to do with
today's--the number of failures. It may have something to do
with low morale. But, then again, if you make people easier to
fire, that also sometimes leads to low morale.
Mr. Mica. Well, respectfully stating my point on this, I
think the Director has taken on the responsibility of improving
the performance, and very key to that is also the educational
qualifications, which she asked, and the ability to hire and
fire people.
And I think they are relevant because, when you don't have
discipline, you don't have good performance. And when the
Director doesn't have the tools to accomplish that, then we
don't get what we should.
With that, Mr. Horsford, the gentleman from Nevada, is
recognized.
Mr. Horsford. I want to thank Chairman Issa and the ranking
member, Mr. Cummings, for holding this extremely important
hearing.
Director Pierson, let me be frank. I believe that you have
done a disservice to the President of the United States. Not
only have you compromised his safety and security, you have
compromised the safety and security of his family and the staff
of the White House. The pattern of lax security and following
basic protocols indicate a culture at the Secret Service that
needs to change.
Now, while the President may not be in a position to
publicly criticize this failure to adequately protect his
needs, I will. This President has far too much to worry about
both here and around the world. He should not have to also be
concerned with his personal safety and security and that of his
family.
So my question, Director, is: Why should we have confidence
in the Secret Service's ability to protect the President of the
United States and the First Family when there has been such a
pattern of lax security?
Ms. Pierson. I believe the incident on September 19 is not
representative of pattern. As I have stated, there have been
others that have attempted to gain access to the property that
were immediately arrested. My biggest concern is that security
plan--that effective security plan was not properly executed on
the night of the 19th.
Mr. Horsford. Beyond September 19, which is the most recent
incident, the fact that we are just now learning from the
Washington Post that ran a story about the 2011 shooting
incident where Ortega-Hernandez fired at the White House, it
took 4 days for the Secret Service to realize that bullets
actually hit the White House residence, and that only occurred
after a housekeeper and an usher identified the concern because
of a broken window.
Can a broken window be observed visibly from both the
inside of the White House as well as the outside?
Ms. Pierson. In this case, the location of the broken
window, up against the mansion facade, along the trim and
balcony, it was not visible from the exterior.
Mr. Horsford. From the exterior.
What about the interior?
Ms. Pierson. The interior, in the private residence of the
President and the First Lady, there were indications that the
ballistic glass had a dimple, or actual damage to the ballistic
glass. It was not recognized by the housekeeping staff until
the curtains had been pulled in preparation for the President
and First Lady's return.
Mr. Horsford. And so how was it that the Secret Service
personnel, prior to the housekeeper finding that--they did not
do the proper assessment, inspection of that location in order
to identify that until 4 days later?
Ms. Pierson. I will be happy to have a discussion with you
in a private session. But, typically, the private residence of
the President and First Lady is just that. It is their private
residence.
Mr. Horsford. Well, I understand that you are not able to
discuss all of the exact details of some of the security
protocols in this open hearing, and I look forward to asking
you more detailed, step-by-step questions about the exact
protocols that failed, the missteps by individual agents, and
the depth and breadth of this review that the investigation of
this incident covers.
Has there been any disciplinary action pursued against any
of the personnel who failed to follow proper protocol to date?
Ms. Pierson. That is pending, based upon the conclusion of
the investigation to determine exactly what the facts are, and,
appropriately, enhancements will be made and personnel actions
will be taken.
Mr. Horsford. And that is where I tend to differ a little
bit. Because of this pattern of lax security not just from the
most recent incident, but from prior incidences, someone should
be held accountable. The security of the President of the
United States is serious and his family is serious, and we
don't need a long, lengthy review for someone to be held
accountable.
So I look forward to getting more facts about this in our
executive briefing. But, ultimately, Director, we need to make
sure that people are held accountable. There are men and women
in the Secret Service that do a great job, and they are to be
commended for that job. But when an individual fails to do
their job properly, they need to be held accountable.
Ms. Pierson. I agree with that statement. People make
mistakes. They need to be held accountable.
Chairman Issa. Thank you.
For all members, as we near the end of this hearing, we
will be going into executive session upstairs at the
subcommittee room immediately following this.
The gentlelady from New Mexico, Ms. Grisham, is next.
Ms. Lujan Grisham. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
I want to do a couple of things. I want to go back to many
of the statements that have been made today, and I want to try
to fast-forward to the situation that we're all dealing with.
And then I have got a very specific question about a protocol
that I am hoping not in executive session you can answer.
So we're all trying to figure out what we can do in this
hearing to understand this incredible breach but, at the same
time, recognize that this is a--the people's house, a public
building, and to work on those balances.
And you have heard many Members be concerned about the
thought that we would have sort of a shoot to kill first. And,
of course, I think about earlier--I think in this year we had a
toddler breach the fence.
And so it is clear, for me, at least, that that is too far
and want to create an environment where we all feel that there
is a public safety aspect here.
But I think in your earlier testimony you said that we have
had 60 individuals try to breach the fence this year. So that
is, roughly, one a week.
Ms. Pierson. 16 over 5 years. Six individuals this year.
Ms. Lujan Grisham. This year.
In any event, so this--we know that folks, whether it is a
mental illness issue or something in addition to that--we know
that we have an issue.
And I also heard you earlier in your testimony talk about
part of your career in the Secret Service, that you were, at
one point in time, working on some of the IT issues. Is that
correct?
Ms. Pierson. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Lujan Grisham. So I am going to now go back to the 2011
incident, and I am going to read to you what the Washington
Post said about that shooting incident. And I know that we have
said this several times. It bears repeating.
``Back in the White House, key people in charge of the
safety of the President's family were not initially aware that
a shooting occurred. Because officers guarding the White House
grounds communicate on a different radio frequency from the
ones used by agents who protect the First Family, the agent
assigned to Sasha learned of the shooting a few minutes later
from an officer posted nearby.''
Now, while communications and radio dispatch in and of
themselves may not be narrowly construed as IT, I construe
communications efforts, particularly in the context of
interoperability, to be definitely inside that realm.
Since 2011, have you resolved those communication issues?
Ms. Pierson. Yes. And as a result of the incident, we have
ensured that information is passed--even if agents, officers or
others are operating on different radio frequencies, that that
same information is passed--that emergency information is
passed to all people who have a need to know.
Ms. Lujan Grisham. So all of the radio frequencies are
now--you are communicating on a single or--and that may be an
inappropriate statement about how that works--but they're all
interoperable. All those communications techniques are working
collectively and so are the alarms?
Ms. Pierson. The radio systems are operating with
commonality, and that is controlled through our joint
operations center. So agents and officers are allowed to
operate on particular frequencies based upon their work.
The alarm systems are now becoming more and more integrated
with some of our radio systems, but we are still in that
transition phase.
Ms. Lujan Grisham. Because I'm really--among all of the
other issues, I'm really struggling with the communications and
the unilateral efforts by any personnel to decide not to have
an alarm, such as the door, by the ushers or anybody else.
And I'm really trying to understand that, if you are doing
this continuous improvement, training, investments and making
sure that this elite protective force is, in fact, just that--
state of the art, effective, elite--how that miscommunication
could occur without anyone having any idea. And, for me, it is
gross neglect.
How does that occur? How does somebody at that level
interfere with the protocol established by the Secret Service?
Ms. Pierson. I think the concern was, when these alarms
were put into place, the proximity to other activities within
the White House, it could be an interference, such as the tour
lines or other public events.
Ms. Lujan Grisham. So an interference. And I said that I
think that you need to be able to address the balances of the
public visiting, utilizing, meeting at the White House.
But it is stunning to me that that would trump your own
protocols from making sure that you have alarms whose purpose
is to trigger a threat so that you can have an effective,
global within the Secret Service, both interior and exterior--a
communications plan that would allow you to effectively execute
a protocol. Otherwise, you can't.
And I know I'm out of my time. But something is wrong with
this idea----
Chairman Issa. We will be going into a classified session.
I think that is going to help. I thank the gentlelady.
The chair would announce that we now have two members who
have been waved on that will ask their questions. That will
complete the full round.
With the indulgence of the ranking member, we're going to
have an additional 5 minutes per side divided by whoever Mr.
Cummings would like to recognize, myself, and then we will go
upstairs into an executive session.
So 5 minutes a side for our two guest members, then 5
minutes a side, which will include closing. So that will give
everyone an understanding that roughly 10 minutes--or 20
minutes from now we will conclude, for anyone--any staff who
want to make sure their Members are available upstairs.
And, with that, the gentleman from Missouri, Mr. Long.
Mr. Long. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Director Pierson, are your agents that are charged with
guarding the White House and guarding the occupants of the
White House--are they allowed to use smartphones while on
duty--and I'm talking about personal smartphones--texting,
tweeting, playing games? Are they allowed to use personal
smartphones while on duty?
Ms. Pierson. No. They would not be.
Mr. Long. And that is strictly enforced? You are confident?
Ms. Pierson. I know that they have access to a Blackberry,
which is part of the tools that we give our officers and agents
to receive information and pass information.
Mr. Long. That is an official phone, to me.
Ms. Pierson. Yes.
Mr. Long. That is something that they need in their day to
day to say go this gate or that or watch for this guy. But I am
talking about personal smartphone usage.
You say they are not allowed to do that while on duty,
guarding the White House and its occupants?
Ms. Pierson. It is possible that some employees have a
personal cell phone for emergency contact by their family, but
they are discouraged from using any kind of technology----
Mr. Long. They are discouraged from using. Okay.
A week before someone was caught jumping a fence. A week
later someone was not. Correct?
Ms. Pierson. Yes, sir.
Mr. Long. Okay. Were you at the White House picnic this
year?
Ms. Pierson. No, I was not.
Mr. Long. Okay. I am sure you are familiar with it.
Do you know when it was? I'll answer that. It was 2 days
before the event.
At the White House picnic, it was Senators, Congressmen,
Republicans, Democrats. Everyone is invited. Our families were
invited. We took our families. We get stopped at the street. We
have to show an ID, Members of Congress, Senators, our
families.
They are checking the books, making sure everything is in
order to let us go another--I want to say 70 yards. I don't
know exactly, but just down the sidewalk a little tiny ways.
And then they check our ID again, ``Get your driver's
license out. We need to check your ID again before you can go
onto the premises of the White House.'' So we go into the
picnic. Several hundred people there. I don't know--200, 300,
400--what it was.
The President and the First Lady are normally there. On the
17th of September this year, the First Lady was out of State.
The President of the United States was there at that event.
We have had four assassinations in this country. We have
had about 2 dozen attempted, including the shooting of Theodore
Roosevelt and Ronald Reagan. We just heard my friend, Ms.
Holmes Norton, earlier in her questioning say that this
President has received approximately three times the number of
threats on his life of any other President. I was surprised to
hear that.
The President of the United States was there that night
among 300 people, let's say, 400, whatever it was. I shudder to
think--he was behind a rope. Those of you old enough to
remember clotheslines, it was about a three-quarter-inch--
looked like a clothesline rope was his protection that evening
from 300, 400 people.
I shudder to think if this gentleman would have come 48
hours earlier, jumped the fence that night, run into the crowd,
or say he had eight or ten friends with him.
The President of the United States was behind a clothesline
rope that night. I've got pictures on my cell phone of him
having--letting people take selfies with him, holding babies,
taking pictures. It is a great gesture from the President. We
want to be close to the President. We want to be able to talk
to him, reach out to him.
But if you don't take anything else away from this hearing
today, take that picture in your mind. You weren't there, but
48 hours earlier we could be having a whole different
conversation here today, and that is very, very upsetting to
me.
I love first-responders. I've got a great deal of
admiration, respect for first-responders, police, whether it is
the local police, the sheriff, the highway patrol, the Secret
Service, the FBI, the people that protect us.
Let me ask you another question: Are there people with
automatic weapons patrolling the White House grounds inside or
out, standing there with their finger on a trigger of an
automatic weapon in plain sight that might be a deterrent?
Ms. Pierson. We do have a number of tactical assets that
are deployed at the White House routinely.
Mr. Long. Are they in plain sight with an automatic weapon
with their finger on the trigger, like they are outside of this
building and next door here at the Capitol?
And I was driving down the street yesterday here. There was
a Capitol Hill policeman with an automatic weapon, finger on
the trigger, very, very observe--we were stopped at a stop
sign, and I said, ``I wonder if they have an extra threat today
or something because this guy is really on point.''
But I think that--if we had something like that and I am
thinking about jumping the fence, whether I have my full mental
faculties or not, and I see someone there with an automatic
weapon, their finger on the trigger, do you think I am not
going to think two or three times about--just like I would
about doing something at the Capitol because I see all these
people around with automatic weapons guarding us, safeguarding
our lives?
But, again, I shudder to think what could have happened 48
hours earlier, if that guy would have wanted to jump the fence
that night and run out in the middle of 300 or 400 people or
have two or three friends with him and the President is behind
a clothesline rope.
I appreciate you being here. Appreciate your testimony.
With that, I yield back.
Chairman Issa. I thank the gentleman.
I would second his point, that I've seen Senators wait 2
hours after the Salahi incident to get into the White House in
9-degree temperatures.
I certainly hope that we won't have the kind of craziness
that you can take 2 hours to get in the White House as a member
of the House or Senate, but somebody can just jump the fence
and be inside in a matter of seconds. That is, I think, what
this hearing is all about.
And I thank the gentleman.
We now go to the patient gentlelady from Texas, Ms. Sheila
Jackson Lee.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for your
courtesy.
And to the ranking member, Mr. Cummings, thank you for your
courtesy and thank you for acknowledging that Homeland Security
and this committee has worked together on a number of issues.
Before I started, I want to put into the record by reading
it the words expressed by Mr. Obama, our President, just last
week, as, Madam Director, you made it very clear that, at the
General Assembly, you protected not only the President, but 140
Heads of State.
And the President said, ``The Secret Service does a great
job. I am grateful for all the sacrifices they make on my
behalf and on my family's behalf.''
I wanted to just add that because the President has
confidence.
I also want to acknowledge that your storied history
equates to the storied history of the Secret Service starting
in 1865, and we recognize that it has continued in that
service.
And I hope this hearing, as my colleagues have said,
between Republicans and Democrats, would alter this headline
that I hold up that says ``The Secret Service opens door to
ridicule.'' I disagree with that and say it opens the door to
restructuring and revamping because I think you have been very
honest with us today.
And I also hold, since it was mentioned, documents, which I
would ask, if I am able to put into the record, unanimous
consent. I don't know if that----
Chairman Issa. Without objection, the entire document will
be put into the record.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The list of assassinated presidents, four dead--too many--
and six was attempted. That is the basis of our passion.
I also want to acknowledge the Homeland Security Inspector
General report on three headlines that I'll read--and maybe we
will get into this because I have some specific questions--in
the classified.
But it had three points: Policies and procedures for
proposing and issuing discipline are insufficient; United
States Secret Service is not always in compliance with Federal
disciplinary rules; internal controls are insufficient to
ensure discipline is aligned with agency.
Now, you would probably say that a lot of this has been
corrected, and I look forward to those questions. But let me go
specifically to my concern.
On July 19, the State Virginia Police found a man that had
any number of indictable things--and when I say that, sawed-off
shotguns, rifles, a number of items that are not the normal
course--even though he is under the Second Amendment. And then,
on August 25, our officers stopped this gentleman.
I am going to say to the American people, since this
President is documented, maybe because he is different, maybe
because of the policies, that he has had more threats than
others.
I am going to say to the American public maybe someone
should have known the gentleman who jumped the fence on the
19th. Maybe his family should have reported him.
But I do believe that it was unacceptable that he was
stopped on August 25 with the information and there could not
have been some basis upon which this gentleman could have been
referred to an institutional hold or referred to call family
members in and to address the question. Yes. Individuals have
that.
My question to you is: Why was this gentleman that jumped
on September 19, stopped on August 25 with a background of the
enormous amount of guns and other threatening items--why wasn't
he taken into custody?
Let's not say that law didn't allow us. Why wasn't there a
way that he could have been held, his family could have been
called, the military's an ex-retiree--or an ex-officer of the
military could not have been called?
And I have another question. So maybe I should ask it out
of courtesy to my colleagues.
The other egregious thing that I thought was particularly
outrageous is, in the 2011, when it was either--it either was a
car backfiring or gang fights--which I have never heard of gang
fights at the White House--I am asking you this question on the
one that happened on the 19th. The most egregious that I could
ever think is that the individuals surveying the White House on
that day failed to stop him.
And we have a picture, which you cannot see, of--one, two,
three, four, five--six uniformed officers--I wonder if there is
a fitness problem here--chasing this gentleman who could not
capture him. All six of them in this picture could not capture
him.
And so my question is: What in the open domain stopped them
from getting him before he jumped the fence? This is on
September 19. What stopped them from getting him when he jumped
over the fence with six or more officers chasing him--uniform
officers?
And why would in the September 2011 event you think that it
was a gang fight instead of a more serious investigation into
the fact that there was gunfire?
Ms. Pierson. We are looking into why Mr. Gonzalez was not
stopped when he came over the fence, I've stated publicly, and
I'll continue to work with my workforce to understand why he
was allowed to make access to the mansion and why he wasn't
detained earlier, as soon as he jumped the fence.
I need to understand why he was not recognized earlier in
the day and further surveillance put on him as to further
analysis as to why he was there and why he had returned to the
White House. I cannot explain those questions today.
In regard to the shooting back in November of--11 of 2011,
all's I can advise is that, in collaboration with the U.S. Park
Place, the Metropolitan Police Department, the Secret Service,
the conflicting witness statements, at--that night at that time
there was confusion about whether there were shots at the White
House or shots from car to car.
It appears to me that those are also documented in the
police reports. I regret the confusion. It occurred 3 years
ago. I know that we have learned from that incident and the
Secret Service would react differently today than it did 3
years ago.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Chairman, let me just conclude by
saying, in the light of ISIL and Corazon, with direct interest
and commitment to attacking the United States and maybe the
President, I think this hearing highlights the serious need for
revamping and restructuring that is so key when we all are
working together for the ultimate good of protecting the First
Family's life. I hope you agree with me.
Ms. Pierson. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I yield back.
Chairman Issa. Thank you.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I yield back.
Chairman Issa. Pursuant to the agreement, chairman and
ranking member will divide 10 minutes equally, 5 minutes per
side.
I will now yield 4 of those minutes to the gentleman from
Utah, Mr. Chaffetz.
Mr. Chaffetz. I thank the gentleman and, again, appreciate
this hearing.
Director, anytime there is a breach of protocol or the
President's personal security has been jeopardized or the White
House security perimeter has been breached, is there an
internal review?
Ms. Pierson. Yes.
Mr. Chaffetz. And are you aware--are you--can you assure
the committee that you are informed anytime those things
happen?
Ms. Pierson. I am expected to be informed. Yes.
Mr. Chaffetz. Is the President of the United States
informed?
Ms. Pierson. I would assume that the President of the
United States is informed. I don't know.
Mr. Chaffetz. You are the head of the Secret Service.
Explain to me why you wouldn't know that.
Ms. Pierson. Well, your question was subjective as to
whether or not I would know.
Mr. Chaffetz. Well, who briefs--do you brief the President
or don't?
Ms. Pierson. If your question is when are--there are
incidents that involve the President of the United States or
the First Family and security concerns, yes.
Mr. Chaffetz. Then, you do brief the President?
Ms. Pierson. Yes.
Mr. Chaffetz. Do you brief the President if there has been
a perimeter breach at the White House?
Ms. Pierson. I have confidential conversations with the
President.
Mr. Chaffetz. Do you brief the President if he has--his own
personal security has in any way been jeopardized?
Ms. Pierson. I have confidential conversations with the
President, and those would be the topics that we would cover,
in addition to other things.
Mr. Chaffetz. What percentage of the time do you inform the
President if his personal security has been breached?
Ms. Pierson. I would say in proximity to the incident.
Mr. Chaffetz. No. I asked you: What percentage of the time
do you inform the President if his personal security has in any
way, shape or form been breached?
Ms. Pierson. Percent of the time? 100 percent of the time
we would advise the President.
Mr. Chaffetz. You would advise the President?
Ms. Pierson. Yes.
Mr. Chaffetz. In calendar year 2014, how many times has
that happened?
Ms. Pierson. I have not briefed him, with the exception of
one occasion for the September 19 incident.
Mr. Chaffetz. So the only time you have briefed the
President on perimeter security, the President's personal
security, the First Family's security, has been one time in
2014?
Ms. Pierson. That is correct.
Mr. Chaffetz. Mr. Chairman, as we kind of wrap up here, I
think there is a bipartisan call for change, to change. I would
like to ask for an independent review. I think there needs to
be a top-down review of not only security but, also, the
culture. And I want to refer our colleagues to this.
And, Madam Director, I don't understand why Special Agent
Basic Classes, in 2012, there were zero and, in 2013, there was
one. In the Uniformed Division Basic Classes, in 2012, there
was one and, in 2013, there was one. I don't understand that.
I also want to again go back to this Inspector General's
report because I think there is a serious, serious problem
here.
Let me read some questions in how the Secret Service agents
themselves responded:
``If a senior manager engages in misconduct or illegal
activity, he or she is held accountable.'' Less than half of
the respondents said that that was true.
``I can report a suspected violation of any rule,
regulation or standard of conduct without fear of
retaliation.'' Only 55.8 percent of the respondents said that
that statement was true.
Again, Secret Service agents themselves in a confidential
survey, when asked, ``The Secret Service's disciplinary process
is fair,'' only 40.3 percent said ``yes.''
``Disciplinary actions within the Secret Service are
applied consistently for similar offenses.'' Only 30 percent
said ``yes.''
``Disciplinary actions within the Secret Service are at the
appropriate level of severity, given the offense.'' Only 36.6.
This demands an independent investigation and review team--
the FBI, military, whatever it takes--but they need to look at
the management, they need to look at the leadership, they need
to look at the culture and the security.
I thank the chairman.
Chairman Issa. I thank the gentleman.
The entire IG report will be included in the supplemental
of the hearing.
Chairman Issa. I am going to reserve that last minute and
yield to the ranking member.
Mr. Cummings. Ms. Pierson, I just--Director Pierson, I just
want to follow up on some of Ms. Jackson Lee's questions.
Going back to Mr. Gonzalez, you confirm that the Secret
Service did an extensive interview of him. Is that right? Is
that right?
Ms. Pierson. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cummings. And I believe you testified that you
requested his medical files, which documented his medical
illness, and he agreed that you could have them. Is that what
you told us?
Ms. Pierson. Our procedures are, in consultation with the
individual, Mr. Gonzalez, the scope of the investigation would
include a confidential release of their medical records, and he
complied. Yes.
Mr. Cummings. So you actually--Secret Service had his
medical files. Is that right?
Ms. Pierson. Yes. That is part of their investigation.
Mr. Cummings. Here is my question. Federal law prohibits
certain people with mental illnesses from possessing firearms.
That statute is 18, USC, 922(g).
Now, the statute is detailed, but the prohibition covers
people who have been ``adjudicated as a mental defective'' or
who have been committed to an institution for mental illness.
Are you aware of that statute?
Ms. Pierson. Yes, I am.
Mr. Cummings. According to press reports, Gonzalez had
severe mental illness. He was apparently seeing a military
psychiatrist, who diagnosed him with severe mental illnesses,
and his family confirmed the same thing.
What steps did the Secret Service take to prevent this
individual from possessing firearms after he was arrested in
July and after the Secret Service interviewed him?
Ms. Pierson. Ranking Member Cummings, he was interviewed by
the Virginia State Police. We notified the Alcohol, Tobacco and
Firearms, who interviewed Mr. Gonzalez, who notified the Secret
Service, based on their discussions with Mr. Gonzalez, to have
a further discussion with him. So many Federal agencies have
been in contact with Mr. Gonzalez.
Mr. Cummings. But--so you consulted with ATF?
Ms. Pierson. ATF was the initial investigators, first
responded to Virginia State Police's inquire of his weapons.
Mr. Cummings. When the Secret Service spoke to the family,
didn't they also say he had a mental illness and needed help?
Ms. Pierson. The family concurred that he exhibited signs
of PTSD.
Mr. Cummings. The statute says the prohibition applies when
any lawful authority has made a determination that the person,
as a result of mental illness, is a danger to himself or to
others.
Don't you think that applies here?
Ms. Pierson. It would be worth having further investigation
in concurrence with his interview. Yes.
Mr. Cummings. Let me just conclude.
You know, the question has come up--and every time I step
out in the hall just for a minute, I have got reporters coming
up to me, asking me, ``Do you think that Ms. Pierson--Director
Pierson can correct the situation?'' And what I have said is
that the jury is still out.
And let me tell you why I say that. You were talking about
internal review a little bit earlier. And again I go back to
that whole culture question. If your Secret Service members
don't feel comfortable sharing information, I don't know how
you get the information that you need to address the kind of
concerns that you might have because you won't even have the
information.
And then it hit me, as I was thinking about this whole
thing, if I have got Secret Service members who are more
willing to be whistleblowers and come before the Congress, what
that tells me is that they don't trust each other. There is a
problem of trust within an agency--and correct me if I am wrong
on this point--that really needs to have trust within it.
Is that right? Wouldn't you agree with that piece?
Ms. Pierson. Yes. We do need to have confidence and trust
with each other. That is correct.
Mr. Cummings. So--so----
Chairman Issa. Gentleman, I think she answered to the
negative of your question of: Isn't there a lack of trust? And
she said:Yes. There is trust. I will restore the time.
Mr. Cummings. Yeah.
Do you believe that there is a lack of trust?
Ms. Pierson. No. I do believe that employees trust each
other.
Mr. Cummings. But--so, then, help me. Please help me with
this. Help me with this.
How do you--and I--and I know--I think you have the
greatest of intent. You have given us 30 years, and I
appreciate it.
How do you get past that--it is hard for me to get past
that whole issue of folks not being willing. Members of the
Secret Service are coming to Members of this committee--not to
me, but to others--telling them things that--and they don't
even seem to discuss them with you all, their higher-ups. And
it goes back to the lady back--the agent, back to 2011, when
she was apparently afraid or thought that nobody would listen
to her.
Help me. Just tell me how you are going to deal with that.
Ms. Pierson. Ranking Member Cummings, I have made a number
of changes in our management and our leadership team. I am
going to continue to make changes in our leadership team for
promoting individuals, for spending a lot of time helping them
become leaders and supervisors or holding them accountable.
We are holding the workforce accountable. We are providing
more opportunities for training. We are spending time doing
engagement sessions with the workforce to find out what are
some of the inherent problems.
Mr. Cummings. You said a little bit earlier you are going
to support new leadership.
So you are constantly bringing in new leadership. Is that
right?
Ms. Pierson. When I took this position, we were down 70
special agent supervisory positions. Those positions have now
been filled.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much for your testimony. I
look forward to talking with you in the classified briefing.
Chairman Issa. I thank the gentleman.
I now yield 1 minute to Mr. Meadows.
Mr. Meadows. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to come back because, in testimony here, you have
been very specific. You have said 500 to 550 employees.
Chairman Issa asked you that again, and you continued to stay
with that. So I went and asked for what you were requesting
this year, and you should have a copy of that. We have given
that to your staff right there.
How is it that, if you are down 550 full-time employees,
that you are only asking for 61 more? Why would you not ask for
500?
These, again, are your numbers. And I am just trying to
find--you know, in all of this, it is all about trust and
integrity, and some of your testimony just doesn't seem to line
up with the facts.
Ms. Pierson. Well, it is challenging when you start to talk
about operational positions and----
Mr. Meadows. Well, it is challenging, from an oversight
standpoint, to get to the truth, and that is what we are trying
to do. We are giving you this opportunity.
Ms. Pierson. Thank you.
If you would, it is challenging to talk about an FTE in a
full-time position. The FTEs represent 50 percent in that first
year that they would be hired.
Part of the challenge that we have had and part of what I
have presented to the committee and asked for their support on,
both from the chair and the ranking member, is authority for
the Secret Service to pursue accepted service legislation.
Hiring is a challenge for me, and trying to hire in a process
that is cumbersome is more difficult.
The agents in the Uniformed Division, officers and
personnel that we hire within the Secret Service, require a
robust background investigation. They require a lot of security
clearance.
Mr. Meadows. But why don't you request the funds to do
that?
Ms. Pierson. I requested legislation to support me and to
be able to identify new efficiencies in the hiring process.
We put out a vacancy announcement for special agents,
received 45,000 applications, and because of the cumbersome
processes that I have to comply with, we have only been able to
onboard 72 this year.
Mr. Meadows. So how long will it be before the President is
safe, then? Under your scenario, you have got to wait for
legislation. You have got to wait for an act of Congress. That
doesn't make sense.
Ms. Pierson. Well, we are currently trying to work with the
Office of Personnel Management and identify every efficiency
that we possibly can to assist us in being able to bring on
these personnel that we critically need.
Mr. Meadows. So is the President safe today, then?
Ms. Pierson. The President is safe today. And we are going
to continue to migrate our resources to every place that we
need to ensure the President, his family, those others that we
protect, as well as the White House complex, are safe.
Mr. Meadows. I am troubled you didn't ask.
I will yield back. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Issa. I thank the gentleman.
As promised, we will now recess and go into executive
session.
Briefly, before we do, I want to make sure that the
Director in open hearing understands and our other witnesses
who we are going to dismiss at this time it is the considered
view of the chair--and, I believe, with--in concurrence with
the ranking member--that an internal investigation by the
Secret Service is not sufficient--I repeat--is not sufficient
to provide the kind of confidence back to the American people.
So I will be working with the ranking member to send a
letter to the Secretary of Homeland Security, asking for a far
greater and more independent investigation of the assets needed
and the changes needed to bring back the kind of confidence the
American people and the President deserve.
We stand in recess. And we will reconvene in a secure
location.
[Whereupon, at 1:31 p.m., the committee proceeded in closed
session.]
APPENDIX
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