[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
HONG KONG: A BROKEN PROMISE?
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
DECEMBER 2, 2014
__________
Serial No. 113-226
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
DANA ROHRABACHER, California Samoa
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio BRAD SHERMAN, California
JOE WILSON, South Carolina GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
TED POE, Texas GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
MATT SALMON, Arizona THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina KAREN BASS, California
ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
MO BROOKS, Alabama DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
TOM COTTON, Arkansas ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
PAUL COOK, California JUAN VARGAS, California
GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois
RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III, Massachusetts
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania AMI BERA, California
STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California
RON DeSANTIS, Florida GRACE MENG, New York
DOUG COLLINS, Georgia LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
TED S. YOHO, Florida JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
SEAN DUFFY, Wisconsin
CURT CLAWSON, Florida
Amy Porter, Chief of Staff Thomas Sheehy, Staff Director
Jason Steinbaum, Democratic Staff Director
------
Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio, Chairman
DANA ROHRABACHER, California ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
MATT SALMON, Arizona Samoa
MO BROOKS, Alabama AMI BERA, California
GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania BRAD SHERMAN, California
DOUG COLLINS, Georgia GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
CURT CLAWSON, Florida WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
C O N T E N T S
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Page
WITNESSES
Mr. Dean Cheng, senior research fellow, Asian Studies Center, The
Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy, The
Heritage Foundation............................................ 9
Sophie Richardson, Ph.D., China director, Human Rights Watch..... 24
Ms. Kelley Currie, senior fellow, Project 2049 Institute......... 34
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
Mr. Dean Cheng: Prepared statement............................... 12
Sophie Richardson, Ph.D.: Prepared statement..................... 26
Ms. Kelley Currie: Prepared statement............................ 37
APPENDIX
Hearing notice................................................... 60
Hearing minutes.................................................. 61
The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress
from the Commonwealth of Virginia: Prepared statement.......... 62
HONG KONG: A BROKEN PROMISE?
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TUESDAY, DECEMBER 2, 2014
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:02 p.m., in
room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Steve Chabot
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Chabot. Good afternoon. The committee will come to
order. And before we begin this afternoon, I would like to take
a moment just to say a few words about my good friend, the
ranking member, Eni Faleomavaega. As this is likely to be the
last hearing, we think, of the Asia-Pacific Subcommittee in
this Congress, this will be the last time that I will have the
honor to sit on this dais next to my good friend Eni, from
American Samoa. And I can tell you I am going to miss that
experience, opportunity, and real honor it has been. He is
truly one of the class acts of the United States Congress.
I have served on this committee for 18 years now. And that
pales in comparison, I think, to how long Eni has been on the
committee. But I have gotten to know him quite well over the
years and have gotten to know him even better after 2001.
During that year, Eni and I both served as the representatives
from the Congress to the U.N. We went to the U.N. headquarters
a number of times and worked on various issues right after that
year. It was right after September 11, so it was a very active
time when it comes to international affairs.
And our friendship has grown over the years as we have
traveled on a number of occasions to different parts of the
world, mainly in Asia. This last year, we were in South Korea,
Japan, and Taiwan, where we met with heads of state, including
in a prison with former President Chen Shui-bian of Taiwan. I
think we both agree he has been in prison long enough, and for
whatever he did he certainly served a penalty for that. We
certainly think that justice has been served, and he should get
humanitarian parole. I didn't want to get sidetracked too much
on that, but I feel very strongly about that particular issue,
and I know Eni does as well.
Because world leaders have dealt with him before, they have
seen him in action, and they know the humanness of this person,
you find out during these trips the high regard that Eni is
held in the eyes of world leaders all over this globe. He
really does care and he cares about the people of American
Samoa. But he cares about American Samoa just as much as he
cares about the whole world because he is truly a man of the
world and has made this world a better place.
As I think most people know, he served our country
honorably, wearing the uniform of our country in Vietnam. A lot
of us talk about these things, but Eni has experienced them
firsthand. We don't always agree on everything. I am a little
bit on the right, and he is a little bit on the left. Probably
people would say I am way out on the right and he is maybe a
little further to the left than a little out on the left. But
that being the fact, this is a time when bipartisanship really
has worked in many ways.
And so I want to thank him for his friendship, his
leadership on this committee, and his leadership in Congress.
He will truly be missed and truly not forgotten. He is one of
the few Members that has a photo of himself on the wall with
Elvis Presley, and as I think somebody mentioned, was in a
movie with Elvis Presley. I mean, that is pretty impressive
stuff.
But, again, in all seriousness, we appreciate your service
to our country and to this committee, Eni. And I also want to
say that in his absence when he had health issues, Ami Bera
stepped up and really did a very commendable job coheading the
committee with me. That is really what happens around here, is
we work together on these things in the Foreign Affairs
Committee.
Before I get into my opening statement, I would welcome any
other members that might, should the spirit move them, like to
say something.
Mr. Bera.
Mr. Bera. I would just echo the statements. As a freshman
Member of Congress, Eni has been a great role model, and helped
me navigate the Foreign Affairs Committee.
And you are not disappearing. You will still be around as a
resource, certainly, to this freshman Member of Congress, and
soon to be sophomore Member. So thank you for everything you
have done, and I do look forward to continuing to work with
you.
Mr. Chabot. Would the gentleman from Pennsylvania like to
say something.
Mr. Perry. Sure. Also appreciate and want to echo the
chairman's remarks. We have not served together long and only
on few occasions in this subcommittee, mostly in the course of
the full committee. But I have appreciated your perspective.
And whether we agree or disagree, there is no doubt that you
are a strong advocate for your constituency at home, and that
is what they expect. And so I applaud you for standing firm for
what you believe and for your constituents. We hope that we can
all serve with the same measure. So I wish you God's speed.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you.
The gentleman from California, who has served for quite
some time not only with myself, but with the gentleman from
American Samoa.
Mr. Sherman. Echo your comments, Mr. Chairman. I have been
on the full committee with Eni for 18 years. I have learned
more about American Samoa than I ever thought possible and more
about the issues of the Pacific and of Asia. And I would say he
is going to be missed, but hopefully he will still be here.
That will be the one thing that prevents him from being missed.
So, we look forward to gaining Mr. Faleomavaega's counsel and
input on foreign policy as the years go forward.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you very much.
And if the gentleman would like to say anything, he is
welcome to now or he can wait till the opening statement.
Okay. Thank you very much. I will now proceed with my
statement.
For 2 months, the people of Hong Kong have come together to
protest Beijing's decision to deny the city's 7.2 million
people the right to directly elect their Chief Executive,
putting the future of democracy in Hong Kong at great risk. The
demise of the ``One Country, Two System'' framework of
governance is a stark reminder that Beijing's promises can be
revoked at the drop of a hat.
What we see in Hong Kong today, however, is not an isolated
event. It is the latest chapter in the story of an increasingly
aggressive China that began 2 years ago when President Xi
Jinping assumed power. Under Xi's leadership, a new brand of
Chinese nationalism has emerged, and it is one where China
takes the center stage in international affairs by asserting
its hegemony in the region and directly challenging the United
States.
Domestically, the stifling of dissent has risen to new
levels extending even to the economic front where the
government's antimonopoly laws are targeting American
companies. Beijing is also working diligently to silence
political opposition by suppressing social media, imposing
strict Internet and instant messaging regulations, and banning
academic research and teaching on topics such as civil society,
universal values, citizens' rights, freedom of the press,
independence of the judiciary, and capitalism.
In 2013, China unilaterally imposed an air defense
identification zone over the East China Sea, imposing
unnecessary risk to international civilian air traffic. Less
than 1 year later, China turned a tin ear to its neighbors
concerns by placing a drilling platform in disputed waters off
Vietnam. Around the same time, Chinese naval vessels and its
air force began to behave aggressively attempting to intimidate
U.S. naval vessels and aircraft operating in international
waters and airspace.
Many consider current U.S.-China relations to have reached
the lowest point in a decade. And, amazingly, there is no
senior administration official that leads the China portfolio.
So it comes as no surprise that the Obama administration's
response to Hong Kong's cry for help did so little to instill
confidence with the people of Hong Kong.
The U.S. must never stand idle when democracy is being
challenged. When the glow of press conferences has faded, we
must remember that what is happening in Hong Kong is not an
isolated event. President Xi is dismantling the ``One Country,
Two System'' governance arrangement--a strategy orchestrated by
Beijing that certainly has put our friend and ally Taiwan on
notice that any accommodation or agreement may be revoked at
moment's notice and is not worth the paper it is written on.
If the Obama administration is so serious about its pivot
to Asia, how can it go so long without offering credible
support to the people of Hong Kong and their democratic
aspirations, which are in fact written and promised in law?
Saying that the U.S. does not take sides in the political
development of Hong Kong and doesn't support any particular
individuals or groups involved, as the U.S. Consulate in Hong
Kong stated, is not acceptable or correct for that matter. This
response is a capitulation to China and abandonment of our
promises to Hong Kong that U.S. support of democratization in
Hong Kong is a fundamental principle of U.S. foreign policy, as
are the human rights of the people of Hong Kong.
While hundreds and thousands of protesters have stood their
ground against attacks by thuggish China Communist Party
supporters and waves of tear gas and pepper spray from police,
the Obama administration has stood on the sidelines. Are the
wishes of the Hong Kong people not clear enough? And after a
period of calm, protests are once again escalating, and nearly
200 people have been arrested, including many of the Umbrella
Movement's leaders. Now is not the time to remain silent and
reticent in support for Hong Kong's democratic future. The
U.S.-Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992 states that the U.S. should
play an active role in maintaining Hong Kong's confidence and
prosperity. These aspirations are progressively diminishing as
a result of China's growing control over Hong Kong's Government
and the civil rights of its people.
We are at a pivotal moment for democracy in Hong Kong. No
matter how long China tries to suppress basic human rights, ban
the pursuit of democratic ideals, and quash civil society, we
must not let Beijing succeed in destroying the values the
people in Hong Kong are fighting so hard to keep. The Obama
administration needs to more vocally support the pro-democratic
aspirations of the Hong Kong people. We must not let Beijing's
accusations of foreign influence bully us into silence over
upholding human rights and supporting the right of the Hong
Kong people to choose their own political future.
The U.S.-Hong Kong Policy Act stipulates differential
treatment of Hong Kong only as long as it is considered
sufficiently autonomous from China. Considering Beijing's
orchestration of the Hong Kong Government's responses to the
crises, and dictation over who can and cannot enter or leave
Hong Kong, it may be time to reassess Hong Kong's autonomous
status, and those benefits that come with that status.
I thank our witnesses for being here this afternoon. We
look forward to hearing your thoughts on how the situation in
Hong Kong may evolve in the coming weeks and months. I now
recognize our ranking member, Mr. Faleomavaega, for his opening
remarks.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank you for
holding this timely hearing in light of the serious protests in
response to conditions set by China for the 2017 elections for
Hong Kong's Chief Executive.
For years, Mr. Chairman, I have been critical of our U.S.
foreign policy toward the Asia-Pacific region. While not taking
anything less of importance as far as Europe and the Middle
East is concerned, I have always said that we are not paying
enough attention to the Asia-Pacific region, especially when
two-thirds of the world's population is in the Asia-Pacific
region. You can talk about the armies, you can talk about the
economics, and I think it is well said.
As President Ma states, Hong Kong is an extremely important
global financial center, and any political turmoil that occurs
there will impact not only Asia but the entire world. President
Ma points out that Taiwan has had universal suffrage for some
time, and believes that if a system of universal suffrage can
be realized in Hong Kong, both Hong Kong as well as Mainland
China would benefit.
I would add, Mr. Chairman, that the Asia-Pacific region and
the United States would also benefit, as would the entire
world. I ask to include President Ma's statement in the record
for the historical purposes.
Mr. Chabot. Without objection, so ordered.
Mr. Faleomavaega. As this will be my last subcommittee
hearing, I want the publicly express my appreciation for you,
Mr. Chairman. I have served as both chairman and ranking member
of this subcommittee, and I have served with many others over
the years. One of my most cherished honors has been serving
with you. You, as a member of the committee, Chairman Chabot,
are a loyal and principled man who serves your constituents in
the Asia-Pacific region with distinction and honor. No matter
where I go from here, I will always take your friendship with
me. I am going to miss you.
I am also going to miss each and every member of this
subcommittee who served with us, including my dear friend Dana
Rohrabacher, who is my buddy, truly my buddy. I especially
thank Mr. Bera for the gracious support he and his staff
provided by filling in for me during my time of recovery.
I also want to pay special tribute to Kevin and Priscilla.
You chose well when you chose those as staff director and
professional staffs, respectively. I am deeply appreciative of
the support they have given to you and me and to my staff as
well. Their knowledge and expertise in the Asia-Pacific region
has influenced many, and I will remember them both for their
extraordinary goodness, and I know that my staff feels the same
way toward them.
So, Mr. Chairman, to you, to our subcommittee members and
staff, I extend my highest and kindest regards. May God be with
each of you till we meet again. Soifua.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you very much. Thank you very much.
If the gentleman from Pennsylvania wouldn't mind if we go
out of order and have Mr. Rohrabacher speak now. Gentleman from
California is recognized.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much. And this is, of
course, a very symbolic hearing today in that we are discussing
how important the Pacific and the Asia and Pacific Rim is to
the United States of America, and how the people there on that
part of the world need to know that we are paying attention
that we are on the side of those people who are struggling to
make the word a better place. And here it is, the last day,
Eni's last day, a man who has been working all these years.
And how many years altogether, Eni?
Mr. Faleomavaega. Too many.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Too many. Well, I think I was 24 when we
were running overseas in all kind of wild places in the world.
But Eni has dedicated his life, from the time he was a
young soldier in Vietnam till this very moment, toward making
this a better world. And while we have had a few disagreements,
we have also shared the great common value of a commitment to
making it a better and freer world, and toward bringing the
people of the Pacific and of Asia into that type of
relationship with the people of the United States.
So, Eni, God bless you and Godspeed.
Just a few thoughts about this hearing.
I think one of the greatest mistakes that was ever made by
any President of the United States in my lifetime was made by a
Republican President, Herbert Walker Bush. After Ronald Reagan
cleared the path toward a great expansion of democracy, and
China at that time seemed to be heading toward democracy,
Herbert Walker Bush betrayed the people in Tiananmen Square,
betrayed the democratic movement, and let them be slaughtered.
We never did we have the retaliation against this evil regime
in Beijing that we should have had after Tiananmen Square. We
would have had a far better world today had the democracy
movement won at that time. Herbert Walker Bush was to blame for
that loss. Instead, we have a government that is the world's
worst human rights abuser.
But today, we send a message to the young pro-democracy
activists now in the streets of Hong Kong: You are not alone.
We think of you. We are with you. All people have the right to
be free. But it has to be earned. And today we recognize the
brave young men and women in the streets of Hong Kong who are
earning their freedom, earning their right to democracy, and to
control their own destiny through the ballot box.
So today we say to the young people in Hong Kong, we are
with you, don't fear, and we will try our best not to make the
mistake that we made at Tiananmen Square. This time we stand
strong for our values. And even though Eni won't be with us to
make sure that we are keeping that promise, I can assure you
that he will be behind us, giving us telephone calls, and thus
we meet our responsibility.
So thank you very much, Eni.
And thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this hearing.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you very much. Gentleman's time has
expired.
Gentleman from California, Mr. Bera, is recognized.
Mr. Bera. I will just maybe some brief comments.
When we look at Hong Kong, when we look at the protests
that are taking place, when we look at the promise of the 1997
treaty, I am interested in hearing the witnesses' testimony and
getting to the bottom of how this transition is taking place
and getting to a point where we can get to one person, one vote
and you have a true democracy. Because ultimately at the
foundation of freedom and democracy is the ability to express
your voice through your votes and pick your own leadership.
So I am curious to see how that transition is going, where
we are today, and how we get to where we want to be in 2017. So
I am looking forward to that testimony. Thank you.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you very much.
The gentleman from Arizona is recognized.
Mr. Salmon. Thank you.
First and foremost, I want to echo the sentiments that have
been expressed toward Mr. Faleomavaega. This is my second
opportunity serving with him, once was in the 1990s and now
again. There has never been a more tireless supporter of the
indigent peoples of various nations than Mr. Faleomavaega.
And we are going to really miss you. You are a wonderful
man and your heart is a good one and you have always strived to
do the right thing, not the partisan thing, and I appreciate
that.
As far as Hong Kong is concerned, I was there for the
handover ceremony of Hong Kong from Great Britain to China and
met with Martin Lee and other folks that were very, very
dubious about what would happen with this ``One Country, Two
Systems'' that China was proposing. And I am sad to say that
some of those fears that Mr. Lee expressed at that time have
been realized. That Beijing, who has said that they were going
to let Hong Kong be autonomous, then puts down all their rules
and regulations about how the vetting process is going to be
done by Beijing to decide who gets to run and who doesn't.
I congratulate these young people for standing up for
freedom and standing up for their beliefs. It is not always
easy. And I want to echo the sentiments of Mr. Rohrabacher. We
need to be strong in our response in defending freedom anywhere
across the globe. And if these young people run into harm's
way, let our voice and our actions be very, very clear that we
are on the side of freedom and democracy.
And I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you very much. Gentlemen's time has
expired.
The gentleman from California is recognized.
Mr. Sherman. Mr. Chairman, it was good to be with you, Dana
Rohrabacher, and of course the chairman of the committee back
in February in Hong Kong where we had a chance to meet those
who have really devoted their lives to trying to give democracy
to the Hong Kong people.
We had a chance to meet with Martin Lee, just as the
gentleman from Arizona met with him at the time that this all
began, when we were promised ``One Country, Two Systems.'' But
when it came to political rights and freedoms, it looks like it
is one country, one system. One person, one vote, and one
committee that decides who you are allowed to vote for.
I think that we should speak out in favor of the Hong Kong
people. But let us be frank. We can't take military action. We
are unlikely to take trade action. And oratorical support is
the most we can provide or are likely to provide. But as we
negotiate so many transactions with China, we should remember
that the promise to millions of its own citizens has been
broken and we should be very careful in transacting business
with a country that has behaved like this.
Finally, if China thinks that Taiwan would voluntarily
reunite with the mainland, I don't think the slogan they are
going to use is ``One Country, Two Systems.'' I think that
slogan has been tarnished.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you very much. Gentleman's time has
expired.
The gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Perry, is recognized.
Mr. Perry. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. I just want to say I
appreciate this hearing on this very timely and important
subject. I look forward to the testimony of the presenters here
today. I think today is a good time to think about our pivot or
our alleged pivot as a Nation to Asia and what that means.
Today I also think about the cost of freedom, how it must be
earned and won and how it must be renewed. Today I also want to
reiterate how fragile democracy is, and the freedom that we
experience, that we love and cherish today. By watching the
events in Hong Kong, especially, you can tell that it won't be
taken away in one fell swoop, but by increments. We can learn a
lot from that in our own society today.
So I am very much looking forward to the answers and the
questions regarding this.
And with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you. The gentleman yields back.
Are there any other members that seek to make an opening
statement? If not, we will go ahead and introduce our panel
here this afternoon.
We will begin with Dean Cheng, who serves as a senior
research fellow in the Asian Studies Center at the Davis
Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy at the
Heritage Foundation. His portfolio includes Chinese political
and security affairs with an emphasis on China's military
policy and U.S.-China policy. He previously worked as a senior
analyst for Science Applications International Corps, where he
handled defense and homeland security issues. He also worked
with the China Studies Division of the Center for Naval
Analysis. Before that, Mr. Cheng served as a China defense
analyst for the Office of Technology Assessment's International
Security and Space Program, where he studied China's defense-
industrial complex. Mr. Cheng has provided analysis for a
number of news media sources and is a contributor to the BBC
World Service, National Public Radio, Washington Post, and Time
magazine, amongst others. Mr. Cheng is a regular speaker on
China defense issues and U.S.-China policy. Mr. Cheng holds a
bachelor's degree in political science from Princeton
University and studied for a doctorate at the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology.
We welcome you here this afternoon.
Our next witness will be Sophie Richardson, who serves as
the China director at Human Rights Watch. Dr. Richardson is the
author of numerous articles on domestic Chinese political
reform, democratization, and human rights in Asia. She has
previously testified before the European Parliament and both
the U.S. House of Representatives and the U.S. Senate. She
provides regular commentary to news media outlets. In 2009, Dr.
Richardson, published the book ``China, Cambodia, and the Five
Principles of Peaceful Coexistence.'' Dr. Richardson has
received degrees from the University of Virginia, Johns Hopkins
School of Advanced International Studies, Hopkins-Nanjing
Program, and Oberlin College. And we welcome you this
afternoon, Doctor.
Lastly, our final witness is Kelley Currie, who is a senior
fellow with the Project 2049 Institute. Her portfolio includes
democracy, human rights, and the rule of law in the Asia-
Pacific region. Prior to joining Project 2049, Ms. Currie
served as an Asia policy advisor to the Under Secretary of
State for Democracy and Global Affairs and Special Coordinator
for Tibetan Issues, Paula Dobriansky. She has also served as
senior advisor to the International Committee of the Red Cross,
director of Government Relations for the International Campaign
for Tibet, and deputy director for Asia at International
Republican Institute. Ms. Currie was the foreign policy advisor
to Congressman John Porter and concurrently served as the
majority staff director of the Congressional Human Rights
Caucus. Ms. Currie received a JD from Georgetown University Law
Center and an undergraduate degree in political science from
the University of Georgia School of Public and International
Affairs. She has appeared as an expert commentator on CNN and
the BBC and has written on Asia policy issues for national and
international publications.
We welcome all three of you here this afternoon. We look
forward to your testimony. I am sure you are all familiar with
the 5-minute rule. You will each have 5 minutes to testify. A
yellow light will come on letting you know you have 1 minute,
and the red light tells you to wrap up, if at all possible. We
give you a little leeway but not a whole lot.
Dr. Cheng, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF MR. DEAN CHENG, SENIOR RESEARCH FELLOW, ASIAN
STUDIES CENTER, THE DAVIS INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AND
FOREIGN POLICY, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION
Mr. Cheng. Chairman Chabot, distinguished members of the
committee, thank you for the opportunity to be here this
afternoon. Ranking Member Faleomavaega, thank you for the
fortuitous opportunity to address you on your last session
here. My comments today are my own and should not be construed
as representing any official position of the Heritage
Foundation.
Since the 1980s, when the U.K. Began negotiating with the
People's Republic of China over the return of Hong Kong, the
territory has been something like the proverbial canary in the
coal mine. How Beijing would handle this territory and its
population of 7 million would reflect broader issues of
internal Chinese governance, cross-straits relations with
Taiwan, and prospects for the broader Asia-Pacific region.
Key questions here were, could the PRC allow pluralism to
exist within the context of its political system, which is
dominated by the Chinese Communist Party? Would it allow Hong
Kong to continue to flourish after it had been returned to
Chinese sovereignty? And might Hong Kong serve as a bridge for
a modernizing, increasingly wealthy PRC to liberalize itself?
In this regard, Hong Kong was seen as the perfect
experiment. In the first place, Hong Kong already enjoyed
certain key institutions, including a free press, an
independent judiciary, and the rule of law. Beijing would not
have to create these from whole cloth. Instead, it merely
needed to allow the system within Hong Kong to continue and not
interfere.
To further reinforce this point, the PRC was also obligated
to respect Hong Kong. The Joint Declaration between London and
Beijing, as well as the Basic Law of Hong Kong, were both
formal obligations undertaken by the PRC that guaranteed Hong
Kong's system for 50 years. These documents were seen as
codifying the idea of ``One Country, Two Systems,'' the
principle under which Hong Kong was to be returned to Chinese
sovereignty yet retain its own characteristics.
Finally, there was the assessment of enlightened self-
interest. Hong Kong was already a major financial hub and a
major economy in its own right when it reverted to Chinese
control. Nor was there any question that after 1997 that Hong
Kong was, in fact, under Chinese control. The PRC was,
therefore, seen as having every reason to want it to succeed,
and it was presumed would therefore not interfere with its
operation.
Fast forward 17 years and the Chinese position regarding
universal suffrage and how the Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region would select its Chief Executive in 2017 suggests that,
unfortunately, these assumptions and views were far too
optimistic. China has gone from a still-developing country in
1997 to the world's second-largest economy, and in the process
its attitude toward Hong Kong and indeed toward much of the
region has hardened.
As the June Chinese white paper on Hong Kong made clear,
Beijing now emphasizes the ``one country'' part of ``One
Country, Two Systems,'' and made also clear that Hong Kong will
maintain its own system only at Beijing's sufferance.
China's approach to Hong Kong as seen in the suffrage issue
highlights several key areas of concern. First, there is little
reason to expect political reform in the PRC for the
foreseeable future. Some had hoped that Xi Jinping might be a
closet political reformer, but his approach to Hong Kong hardly
supports this view. Instead, his handling of the Hong Kong
situation with little violence and certainly no repetition of
the scenes and costs associated with Tiananmen Square, now 25
ago, has probably strengthened his domestic credibility, helped
in his consolidation of power, but given him little reason to
liberalize his policies.
Second, China is demonstrating once again its aptitude for
political warfare. Political warfare is the hardest form have
soft power. Much as Russia has employed hybrid or ambiguous
warfare in its Crimea intervention, China is doing the same in
Hong Kong and elsewhere in the region. And in particular, we
can see the exercising of the three warfares: Legal warfare or
lawfare, public opinion warfare, and psychological warfare.
China's approach to the franchise and suffrage in Hong Kong
has been consistent with its writings on legal warfare, which
focus on the use of the law as an instrument for justifying or
furthering national aims. This is a much more offensive
approach, employing the law to achieve previously established
ends rather than defensively limiting or otherwise constraining
one's own activities.
This lawfare approach also complements Chinese public
opinion warfare methods. Social and news media in China are
tightly controlled by the government, and once the protests
began, Chinese Weibo messages, the local equivalent of Twitter,
were immediately censored.
Meanwhile, the harassment of Hong Kong activists is
integral to Chinese psychological warfare methods. The fact
that even the average protester has been detained or had their
travels limited serves notice that anyone who protests has
likely been recorded and will suffer consequences.
Third, this approach to Hong Kong, and especially the ``One
Country, Two Systems'', the way it is now defined, is likely to
lead to greater tensions with Taiwan. The approach of ``One
Country, Two Systems'' was always intended to appeal the people
of Taiwan to persuade them to accept reunification, but the
message from recent events in Hong Kong is a cautionary, not an
encouraging tale.
For the United States, this has three implications. China's
assiduous practice of political warfare is a warning about
engaging the PRC without carefully thinking through all of the
angles. We should engage the PRC much as we approach contract
talks, with no assumption of shared outlooks, although both
sides are interested in reaching an agreement and avoiding a
strike.
In addition, the prospect of heightened tensions across the
Taiwan Straits means that the Asia pivot needs to be made more
meaningful. This includes the Trans-Pacific Partnership Trade
Agreement to underscore that America offers more than military
solutions.
But one final element is to strengthen the American
military presence, including a more robust training and
exercise schedule with friends and allies, but also expanding
the provision of more advanced equipment to those same friends
and allies, whether it is missile defense cooperation with
Japan and South Korea, military sales to Vietnam, or acting on
the sale of fighter aircraft and submarines to Taiwan.
Thank you very much.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Cheng follows:]
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Mr. Chabot. Dr. Richardson, you are recognized for 5
minutes.
STATEMENT OF SOPHIE RICHARDSON, PH.D., CHINA DIRECTOR, HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH
Ms. Richardson. Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the
subcommittee, thanks for inviting me to testify today. I would
like to take my 5 minutes not to go into details about what has
happened in the last few weeks, but rather to talk about the
kinds of recommendations that will protect human rights in and
the autonomy of Hong Kong where tensions between police and
protesters really have reached a breaking point.
The extraordinary demonstrations by a cross-section of
people in Hong Kong are in our view not simply about the
composition of Hong Kong's nomination committee. After waiting
patiently for years for China to fulfill its promise of
democracy, many are angry at Beijing's political overreach and
at the Hong Kong Government's growing tendency to marginalize
the interests of the majority on issues ranging from education
policy to urban planning.
In the broadest sense, the current tensions are local and
logical reactions of people who have enjoyed civil liberties
and a reasonably responsive government but who now see these
freedoms increasingly threatened and who have a very clear
sense of how those rights are denied just across the border. In
our view, physically removing demonstrators from the streets of
Hong Kong will do little to answer their underlying grievances
and will arguably serve to exacerbate them.
The most critical and urgent step the central and Hong Kong
Governments can take is to revisit the territory's undemocratic
electoral arrangements and ensure that the appropriate ones are
fashioned, as required by Article 45 of the Basic Law, ``in
light of the actual situation,'' where the majority has
repeatedly made clear that it favors genuine democracy.
We urge that both take immediate action, including by
developing a time-bound and detailed plan to put into practice
universal and equal suffrage. Any proposals for methods of
nominations should conform to international human rights
standards, including those in the ICCPR, which pertains in Hong
Kong.
Hong Kong authorities also can and should immediately meet
with protest leaders and submit a new report to the central
government acknowledging broad support for genuine democracy
and asking the National People's Standing Committee to clarify
or retract its August 31 decision.
While it is reassuring to see Hong Kong authorities
investigate several police officers who were caught on camera
viciously beating a protester, that confidence is undermined by
repeated incidents of excessive use of force, including in
recent days where police have used pepper spray at close range,
hit with batons people who were clearly trying to leave protest
areas, or tackle and arrest without warning student protest
leaders. We urge the establishment of an independent
investigative body to look into the now 1,000-plus complaints
regarding police conduct.
At a political level, it would be encouraging if the senior
leadership in Beijing could accept the idea that people in the
mainland and in Hong Kong want democracy and not construe
people's demands for that as a threat to national security. At
an absolute minimum, Beijing should stop arresting people in
the mainland for their peaceful expressions of support to the
demonstrators and lift whatever restrictions have been put in
place for demonstrators to enter the mainland.
The United States has expressed concern about violence, the
right to peaceful assembly, and the rights to vote and to run.
American officials have said that they have expressed these
concerns directly to the highest levels of the Chinese
Government. But much of the commentary, including President
Obama's remarks while in Beijing, has been so calibrated as to
be convoluted. Other remarks are superficially sensible,
calling, for example, that difference between protesters and
authorities be resolved through peaceful dialogue, but seem to
deny the reality that Hong Kong people's efforts to do just
that have been ignored.
The U.S.'s repeated denials that it had had any role in
fomenting or sustaining the demonstrations suggests to us that
it is more concerned in assuaging Beijing's irrational fears
than standing up robustly for democratic rights. It is
appropriate to ask why President Obama could be so publicly
restrained on the topic of elections and democracy in Hong Kong
while he was in Beijing, yet just few days later offer up
extensive commentary and support on the same subject in Burma
and later from Australia.
One recalls Assistant Secretary of State Victoria Nuland
handing out bread to demonstrators in Maidan Square, American
Ambassadors observing elections in other parts of Asia, or the
U.S. vociferously decrying rollbacks of democratic rights in
other parts of the world. Why not in Hong Kong? Such an
approach undermines in our view the U.S.-Hong Kong Policy Act,
and it enables other governments, which, for better or for
worse, take their cues on these issues from the U.S., to remain
virtually silent.
Arguably most problematic in our view, it telegraphs to
pro-democracy activists in Hong Kong and the mainland that they
can likely only count on perfunctory support or recognition
from the United States.
So it is encouraging to us to see the reestablishment of a
Hong Kong Caucus here in the Congress and the introduction of
an updated Hong Kong Policy Act. We believe this to be a very
important tool. We believe that increased U.S. Government
scrutiny and regular reporting are and should be seen as a
positive obligation, an opportunity to identify critical
developments and points of leverage in a territory of
extraordinary diplomatic, economic, and strategic interest to
the United States.
Thank you.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Richardson follows:]
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Mr. Chabot. Ms. Currie, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF MS. KELLEY CURRIE, SENIOR FELLOW, PROJECT 2049
INSTITUTE
Ms. Currie. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you to the
members of the committee, in particular Mr. Faleomavaega.
It is an honor to be here on your last hearing and have the
opportunity to speak on this subject. It is a real challenge,
however, to follow my two colleagues who have so ably covered
so many of the issues here. I will try to add something with my
remarks.
I have got a written testimony that I would like to submit
for the record.
Mr. Chabot. Without objection, so ordered.
Ms. Currie. When Mr. Salmon talked about traveling to Hong
Kong in 1997, he traveled with my former boss, John Porter, on
that trip. My involvement in Hong Kong began with working for
Mr. Porter for 5 years in the early and mid-1990s--and late
1990s too, I guess--and his leadership on that issue inspired
me to continue to follow the events in Hong Kong and inspired
my respect for the people of Hong Kong and the efforts that
they have made over the past 30 years since the signing of the
Joint Declaration to preserve their democratic rights and
freedoms.
And watching what has happened over the past 2 months and
indeed in recent years, as Beijing has carefully tried to
rachet back the democratic prerogatives and freedoms of the
Hong Kong people, has been a very frustrating act. When I
worked in the Congress--and Mr. Rohrabacher, Mr. Salmon, and
others will remember these days--the Congress was quite active
on Hong Kong issues and took a leading role in pushing the
administration forward in defending the rights and prerogatives
of Hong Kong people.
Unfortunately, in recent years both the Congress and the
administration have gone relatively silent on Hong Kong. In
particular, as the situation has evolved, we have not seen the
kind of activism that marked those years around the handover.
That is natural because that was a particularly important time.
But the times now have shown that we need to maintain a focus
on what is going on in Hong Kong and continue to follow up on
the promises that the United States made when it took up the
mantle as Hong Kong's guarantor in 1997 as the British
retreated.
I believe that this is a role that the United States took
up willingly and because it has interests in Hong Kong, as Mr.
Cheng as so ably outlined. But it also is aligned with our
values. And that is why it is so disappointing to see how the
U.S. has not stood up for the values of the Hong Kong people as
well.
I would like to just go to follow up on some of the
recommendations that Sophie has mentioned about how the
Congress can be more active.
The U.S. handling of Hong Kong has hardly been the only
example where our reticence has encouraged the worst impulses
of the Chinese regime. Our Hong Kong policy approach takes
place against a broader backdrop of reluctance to publicly call
Beijing out over abuses that are rooted in the structural
authoritarian nature of the regime.
Beginning with the period leading up to the 2008 Olympics,
there has been a perceptible change in U.S. willingness to
publicly, consistently, and vigorously stand up for the rights
of Chinese dissidents, Tibetans, Uighurs, and other persecuted
groups. All democratic governments have become more reluctant
to speak out over this period, but the absence of a strong U.S.
voice has exacerbated this long-term trend.
Given the strong message that the people of Hong Kong have
sent the world through the Umbrella Movement, however, it is
clear that the U.S. needs to start acting both on its values
and its interests in Hong Kong in a more forceful way. The
recent efforts to again require annual reports on Hong Kong are
a good start. But Congress needs to hold the administration
accountable for making these reports a serious policy effort,
not just a useless box-checking exercise, which they had become
toward the end when they ended after 2007. I don't know if you
have read the old reports recently, but they are almost
content-free, and they virtually ignore what was happening on
the ground in Hong Kong, both in terms of the democracy
movement that was emerging there and the growth of civil
society and the role that Beijing was playing.
I believe that in order to achieve a more meaningful
report, the Hong Kong Policy Act should be amended so that the
next review or the next report the executive branch is required
to conduct a full interagency review pursuant to the
presidential determination authority in Section 202 that
relates to Hong Kong's autonomous status and whether it
continues to be preserved and include detailed findings
regarding whether Hong Kong is sufficiently autonomous to
continue receiving the beneficial treatments that it currently
receives.
In addition to findings on detailed issues in cooperation
with counterparts in Hong Kong, the report should also focus on
the overall political context and progress for its genuine
democratic reforms. The House Foreign Affairs and Senate
Foreign Relations Committees should consider holding annual
joint hearings on the reports as well. And Congress should also
speak out more directly on its concerns through passing of
resolutions and legislative action as needed.
The administration also needs to speak up in defense the
Hong Kong more publicly, more often, and more clearly. It
should stop issuing the kind of confused statements that Dr.
Richardson mentioned and that ignore China's failure to live up
to the promise of ``One Country, Two Systems''. We should also
not forget those on the mainland who were detained solely for
expressing support for the Umbrella Movement.
The U.S. should work with his partners in the U.K. To
address China's implementation of the Joint Declaration through
efforts such as joint commissions of inquiry and joint
demarches. The U.K. Is our closest ally and international
partner, and their credibility is on the line here as well, due
to their failure to stand up for liberal values in Hong Kong.
Likewise, we should look for opportunities where they may
exist at the U.N., bearing in mind the low likelihood of any
effective action. However, Beijing deeply dislikes being
confronted at the U.N., so those opportunities at least do put
the issues in a forum where they have to respond to them.
The U.S., the U.K., and Commonwealth countries such as
Canada and Australia, should also develop a joint protocol and
treatment of student visa applicants who have been arrested for
peaceful political activity. This is a very important issue
because of the importance of education and study abroad for
Hong Kong students and our requirement that if you have been
arrested you have to list this on your visa application. We
shouldn't penalize people for engaging in civic activity in
Hong Kong.
Mr. Chabot. Is your testimony about done?
Ms. Currie. Yes. I am done.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you.
Ms. Currie. Finally, any cuts in Cantonese broadcasting on
RFA and VOA should be restored so that we can continue to get a
positive message out as media censorship rachets up in Hong
Kong and outlets for genuine expression continue to be closed
down there. Thank you.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Currie follows:]
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----------
Mr. Chabot. And we thank all the witnesses for the
testimony. I will now recognize myself for 5 minutes.
It is disconcerting to know that while protests in Hong
Kong continued, the administration was working behind the
scenes to finalize deals and new initiatives with China which
were announced following the APEC Summit last month, deals that
raise a lot of questions themselves. I think it is logical to
conclude that one of the reasons for the administration's weak
responses and tepid support for pro-democracy forces in Hong
Kong was to ensure that these deals didn't fall through.
Looking ahead, what are the potential tradeoffs for U.S.
policymakers between more forcefully pursuing democratic reform
in Hong Kong on one hand versus pursuing other goals with
Beijing? Do you think the administration's tip-toeing on
providing support for the people of Hong Kong is ultimately
more harmful for our role in Asia than helpful?
And I would welcome any of the panel members. Dr. Cheng,
would you like to take that?
Mr. Cheng. Well, sir, to begin with, I think that one of
the great flaws of the approach that you have outlined that the
administration is pursuing is the fact that many of these
agreements, at least at this point, have few published details.
And the devil, as they say, is in the details, especially
because the Chinese have demonstrated with the issue of
suffrage their adeptness at legal warfare.
So with the example of the climate change regulations, who
will measure China's emissions? Whose statistics will they use?
We know that Chinese statistics are often only perhaps
glancingly associated with reality. As a result, we seem to be
placing ourselves at the, essentially, mercy of Chinese
statistics. To trade off our longstanding commitment on the
issue of values, as my fellow witnesses have highlighted, in
exchange for a promise of Chinese compliance based on their
statistics makes buying a pig in a poke a sure guaranteed
bargain by comparison.
At the same time, it raises questions among many of our
allies about the kind of allied and commitment we have to them.
If we are not going to stand up for our principles, things of
longstanding interest, in exchange for airy promises, what
happens when it is the potential commitment of U.S. force,
whether it is to places like the Senkakus or to ensuring
freedom of the seas in the South China Sea?
Mr. Chabot. Let me ask a different question to the other
two witnesses if I can here, because my time, I am through it
already.
This past weekend, the most well-known student leaders were
arrested, including Joshua Wong and Lester Shum, in a manner
that demonstrated an alarming level of force from the Hong Kong
police. Ms. Richardson or Ms. Currie, do either of you have an
update on the status of these individuals or do you have a
sense of whether they will be charged, and if so what they
might be charged with?
Ms. Richardson. Thanks for the question. The footage of
their detention was indeed alarming. There appears to have been
no provocation. They did not seem to be presenting any sort of
imminent threat to the police. They are also hardly, if they
were standing right here, I think we could say that they are
not especially physically threatening people. And so the way in
which they were arrested that day is particularly alarming.
They were tackled to the ground, they were cuffed, no warning
was given, and no request seems to have been issued that they
effectively surrender themselves.
They have both been released. It is not clear whether
charges are going to be pursued. It is worth nothing that Mr.
Wong was actually previously detained for about 48 hours until
a judge, in really the finest we expect of Hong Kong's judges,
essentially said the police have absolutely no basis to have
detained him and let him go. But that was not until he had been
detained and his computer had been seized and searched.
It is hard not to see tactics like this as both evidence of
lack of discipline in some circumstances on the part of the
police, but also a way of telegraphing to other student leaders
that this is what might be in store for them as well.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you.
Let me squeeze one last question here and a quick response,
if I can. Today the founders of the pro-democracy campaign
asked student protesters to retreat over concerns of growing
violence at the hands of the police, who have used batons and
pepper spray and teargas to drive back crowds.
If they do indeed back down and return home, where do we go
from here? Will that essentially indicate that they are
capitulating to China or, as the founders stated, is it rather
a silent denunciation of a heartless government?
Ms. Currie. I am going to go with the latter. I think that
what has been amazing, not just the past 2 months but
Scholarism and the Occupy Hong Kong With Love and Peace
movements that predate the past 2 months. And the activities
that they have undertaken have shown a level of civic
commitment, discipline, and just plain politeness and
competence in engaging the authorities, I think that many
people have been surprised by the youth of Hong Kong and
heartened by how they have stepped forward and filled in this
space.
I think that Beijing fell back on its usual Marxist-
Leninist tactics of ignoring the moderate opposition of Martin
Lee, Emily Lau, Anson Chans of Hong Kong who wanted to engage
them through official channels and do things moderately. And
that didn't create enough of a crisis in order to justify
heavyhanded rule, so they had to force a confrontation. But,
unfortunately for Beijing, the demonstrators and the people
involved in the Umbrella Movement have shown themselves to be
of the highest caliber of character for the most part, with a
few exceptions, obviously, but when you have that many people
involved there will be.
But I don't think they are going anywhere. The ideals they
represent and the voices they represent and the issues that
they represent aren't going anywhere, so they aren't either.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you. My time has expired. Let me just
conclude by saying very briefly that I am very heartened by the
people of Hong Kong and the bravery and the standing up for
their rights that we have seen. I have to say I am disheartened
by the administration's lack of support there, just as I was in
the Green Revolution in Iran a few years back.
And my time has expired. I will now yield to the ranking
member for his questions.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I certainly want to thank all our three witnesses this
afternoon for their statements and the positions they have
taken concerning this important issue.
Just wanted to ask all the three members of panel, the
administration supposedly says that they do not take a position
at this time toward the situation now in Hong Kong. Do you
support universal suffrage or do the protesters there in Hong
Kong, what is your perception? If I were Chinese, I would say
this is a local matter, what is it there for Americans to tell
me what to do and how to do it? And I would like to ask the
three panelists for your response to that.
Ms. Currie. There are internationally recognized standards
for what universal suffrage is. And it includes, as one of the
members earlier referred to, one person, one vote. And it also
includes the right of people to choose their own leaders.
This is very important. In Burma, President Obama talked
about this in the context of the Burmese elections, about the
need for the Burmese people to be able to choose their own
leaders. But yet in the Hong Kong context the administration
says we don't take sides. This is deeply problematic.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Dr. Richardson.
Ms. Richardson. Just another point about international law,
which is equally unbelievably clear that people have the right
to run. There cannot be restrictions, undue restrictions on who
is able to run, which is really the crux of the August 31
decision.
I think people in Hong Kong have made it painfully clear
that they want to be able to vote, they want to be able to
choose who they are voting for and how these people represent
them. I think this is really not just about the finer points of
electoral arrangements. I think people feel that the Hong Kong
Government progressively less responsive to them and that this
is another way in which their ability to control or have input
into public policy is eroding.
But I think the important point is that they have made it
clear what they want. Also, look, let's just be very clear, the
administration is perfectly capable of taking sides either in
choosing party A or party B when it suits it. It is also
perfectly capable of answering this question with respect to
principle, and it has been awfully squeamish in both regards.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Mr. Cheng.
Mr. Cheng. I would also just note here that the National
People's Congress's white paper in June and its statement on
August 31 would seem to constitute at best an infringement, if
not a violation in many ways of both the Joint Declaration and
the Basic Law. Now, it is up to the National People's Congress
to interpret these aspects, but to come up with an
interpretation that is almost directly 180 degrees from what is
stated really calls into question China's commitment to
upholding international agreements.
So the issue here is as much one of do you live up to your
international commitments, and, if you don't, then it is for
the United States, a key trade partner, a key presumably
negotiating partner, to call you on this as part of enforcing
international order.
Mr. Faleomavaega. So will there be an agreement among the
three members of the panel that there should be universal
freedom to that extent, allowing the people of Hong Kong to
decide for themselves their future politically and
economically? Does that seem to be your position on this?
Mr. Chabot. I think all three witnesses have nodded in the
affirmative.
Mr. Faleomavaega. I have said in my statement that I have
always been very critical of our U.S. foreign policy toward the
Asia-Pacific region, which has been no policy, in my opinion. I
take this position because I feel that the mentality and the
focus of our entire foreign policy is toward the Middle East
and Europe, but when it comes to Asia-Pacific we get mixed
signals. Every administration, every Congress, if you will, and
even the people and the leaders in the Asia-Pacific region that
I have met, they say, hey, what is going on? What is your
position? Give me these basic principles that we are
discussing.
So that is my concern, Mr. Chairman.
And would you like to comment on that?
Ms. Richardson. I would love to comment on that and bring
it back to a point that Mr. Rohrabacher raised in his opening
remarks about, you were, I think, referencing a piece that was
in Foreign Policy about whether the Obama administration has
any senior people on China. I mean, look, the administration is
filled with lots of people who have lots of China experience.
Some of them are ferocious defenders of human rights, and we
appreciate them.
I think the problem is that there is no policy, and there
hasn't been for quite some time. And arguably one of our real
points of frustration has been to be presented with significant
numbers of people with fairly deep China experience who have
yet to craft a policy that is coordinated and executed from
senior levels on down.
Mr. Faleomavaega. I am sorry. My time is up. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you very much.
The gentleman from Pennsylvania is recognized for 5
minutes.
Mr. Perry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ladies and gentlemen, I will start with Dr. Richardson and
Ms. Currie. Recently Secretary Earnest made the statement the
United States supports universal suffrage in Hong Kong in
accordance with Basic Law, and we support the aspirations of
the Hong Kong people, while at the same time--I think you
already alluded to this. I just feel like it is important to
have it on the record--the U.S. Consulate in Hong Kong said, we
do not take sides in the discussion of Hong Kong's political
development.
With that, is the administration sending mixed signals in
Hong Kong or to Hong Kong to the protestors? Same thing, are
they sending mixed signals to Beijing? And is there a clear
policy at all from the administration in this regard?
Ms. Currie. Yes, they are sending mixed signals, both to
the protestors and to Beijing. And, no, there is not a clear
policy. I think that what you saw was the consulate issue a
terrible statement that they were called on the carpet for,
rightly so, by various quarters, and then Josh Earnest, trying
to walk it back into something that is a little more
appropriate, in line with the historic posture of the United
States on Hong Kong and the Hong Kong Policy Act.
But, again, it fits a pattern that Sophie just described of
incoherence, of reactiveness. You have the so-called pivot or
the rebalance that is unbalanced and not strategic in any real
way and not rooted in American principles in any real way, and
it causes them to constantly be spinning around saying one
thing one day and something else the next. It is a problem
across the board.
Mr. Perry. Okay. I just wanted to get your input because I
see this as a continued failure of foreign policy of which
there are many strikes at this point. But moving on, other than
the rhetoric that Mr. Sherman talked about earlier that we can
engage in, I want to see us take more concrete action, or some
concrete action.
And let me just ask you this. Regarding what the Congress
should do, United States Congress should do, would passing
legislation to make Hong Kong eligible for the U.S. visa waiver
program be a viable alternative that might make some form of a
difference.
Ms. Richardson. It strikes me as a perfectly sensible
strategy to pursue. I think one of the difficulties in
developing legislative responses to the crisis in Hong Kong is
ensuring that the people of Hong Kong aren't being punished for
essentially the mistakes or the problems caused by the central
government or the failures of the Hong Kong authorities. It is
difficult sometimes to separate those out.
I do want to go back very briefly to the question you asked
a moment ago which is simply to say that I think when this
administration has been good on China and human rights issues,
it has been very good. I will point, for example, to its
reactions to the life sentence given to Ilham Tohti, a very
prominent Uighur economist. There were statements from the
White House, from the State Department, from the Secretary. The
President mentioned Ilham Tohti at a speech in New York. But
the unwillingness to deal with these issues or raise them
publicly while in Beijing or, indeed, give remarks to the
Chinese press in an interview to Xinhua, I think really
undermines the comments about Ilham Tohti.
The President made reference to ETIM, the East Turkestan
independence movement. Experts have debated for years about
whether it even exists, without providing information to
substantiate that claim and in effect hang a bulls eye on any
Uighur identified by the Chinese Government as being associated
with ETIM is hugely problematic. And so it is this very, very
inconsistent response. And one would like to think that this
far in you could get a more consistent reaction, but that seems
to be extremely difficult.
Mr. Perry. Because my time is going to expire and I want to
spend some time with Mr. Cheng, I think I will stick around for
round two. But just keeping with your current line of thinking
and responding, do you think that what you just described as
putting a bulls eye, so to speak, on those folks that would be
interested in that movement, is that borne out of ignorance? Is
there some method to it from this administration or are they
just clueless about it? I mean, how does that come about? They
have not consulted with the right people that know something
about the situation?
Ms. Richardson. Mr. Perry, I would be delighted to have a
good answer to that question. I don't.
Let me be very clear. There have been horrific attacks
against civilians in Xinjiang. That is absolutely clear, and we
have condemned them. But I think the administration has fallen
peculiarly prey to a Chinese Government line. We are going to
hear that line again and again and again from Beijing in every
discussion about Xinjiang and terrorism for years to come. How
that sentence wound up in that interview, I do not know. And
believe me, it is not for want of asking.
Mr. Perry. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you. The gentleman's time has expired.
The gentleman from California, Mr. Sherman, is recognized.
Mr. Sherman. I want to pick up where the gentleman from
Pennsylvania left off. I can't agree with the idea of a visa
waiver for either Hong Kong or China, simply because we can't
create a circumstance where anybody who can get a Hong Kong
passport gets right into the United States. Over half the
illegal immigrants or roughly half the illegal immigrants in
the United States today came here on an airplane and their
entry into the United States was legal. And given the
incredible poverty of some in China, and even some in Hong
Kong, I don't know if we can go visa waiver. I do see the
reciprocity approach of how long a visa, once issued, is good
for and how many different trips you can make, but those are
only to people that we have decided will not be economic
immigrants to the United States.
But I do want to pick up on the gentleman from
Pennsylvania's question, and that is, other than rhetoric is
there anything we can do to express our dissatisfaction with
this violation of the commitments of Beijing to the people of
Hong Kong?
Mr. Cheng. Well, to begin with, sir, on the issue of visas,
for example, one of the things that clearly is important here
is the opportunity to bring more information from Hong Kong out
to the broader world and more information from the outside
world to Hong Kong. Part of the issue here is the fact that the
Chinese refuse to issue visas to journalists, and in fact at
the joint press conference between President Obama and
President Xi, he in turn lectured the New York Times about how
if you don't get visas, it is your own fault.
Mr. Sherman. Right. And that applies even to journalists
going to Hong Kong, let alone those going to the rest of China.
Mr. Cheng. Certainly there are controls, observations and
the rest.
Mr. Sherman. I think we have gotten an awful lot of
information from Hong Kong during the present unrest. It is not
like there is a shortage of Americans visiting Hong Kong. I
think we are getting a fair amount of information.
Mr. Cheng. We are, but that information comes out. That
information doesn't necessarily go back in, and the Chinese are
very, very tightly controlling their media. At a minimum,
demanding reciprocity, given the number of official Chinese
journalists in the United States, and creating that kind of
reciprocity on the press visa aspect, would be----
Mr. Sherman. I certainly don't want to reduce the number of
Chinese journalists here.
Ms. Currie, I think you had a important point also about
visas, which is that being arrested by the Chinese Government
for a political crime should not count against somebody in
getting a visa to the United States. Does the State Department
have the procedures now to make sure that we can tell the
difference between a pickpocket and a political activist.
Ms. Currie. Frankly, we don't really, especially in a high-
volume visa office like the consular office in Hong Kong.
Mr. Sherman. Do we even have something on the form where
you can say, I have been arrested but it was political?
Ms. Currie. There is a place on the form where you say that
you were arrested, and then you can explain the circumstances.
But the average consular officer, you have to remember, is a
brand new foreign service officer usually serving their first
tour overseas, and their inclination is generally to say no.
Mr. Sherman. We have got to somehow bring in the State
Department, and I don't care how junior these people are, they
can't be discriminating against people because they have been
arrested for political rights and expressing themselves
politically.
I just want to say that this all comes from our insane
trade policy toward China since we granted MFN. We have this
enormous trade deficit which creates this huge debt which
causes Americans to shrink from criticizing China, because oh,
my God, they loan us so much money, money we wouldn't have to
borrow if we were allowed to sell our goods to China. And it
also creates these enormous profits that create some of the
biggest names in our country, biggest corporations in our
country, becoming lobbyists against doing anything to undermine
the insane trade policy that started it all.
I don't think we are going to have a balanced policy toward
Hong Kong until we have balanced trade. I might also point out
that if we had balanced trade with China we would have a labor
shortage and significantly increased wages in this country.
That could happen if we adopted Warren Buffett's idea of
legally required balanced trade. I don't think that is likely
to be adopted any time soon. I don't know whether Mr. Cheng had
a comment on that.
Mr. Cheng. Sir, I think that part of the fundamental
concept of trade is, of course, competitive advantage. Whatever
else the Chinese are guilty of, and they are guilty of quite a
few things, the reality is that we are not going to create or
recreate the textile industry in this country regardless of----
Mr. Sherman. Sir, reclaiming my time. Germany exports to
China. We don't. Those are political decisions. The American
workers are the best in the world. The American products are
best in the world. And the huge trade deficit is not because we
don't provide value. It is because of the slanted trade
policies and IP policies of China. And blaming the American
worker, blaming the American product for the decisions made in
Beijing is not the way I want to go.
I yield back.
Mr. Chabot. The gentleman's time has expired.
The gentleman from California, Mr. Rohrabacher, is
recognized.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I would remind Mr. Sherman that I have a piece of
legislation that suggests that we should not be permitting more
Chinese journalists to come to the United States than they
permit us to have our journalists come and operate in China. So
reciprocity would be, I think, one tool, especially considering
that the vast majority of their so-called journalists are
actually spies and people who have come here to do us harm and
propagandize for their dictatorship rather than trying to find
honest information to provide for the Chinese people. So I
would think that would be a good way to deal with that.
We don't seem to have any reciprocity with the Chinese. I
mean, didn't we give most favored nation status to China after
they slaughtered the democracy movement in Tiananmen Square?
What was our reciprocity there? In fact, it was just the
opposite. We gave them a reward even though they had just
committed an evil action. WTO was, of course, permanent most
favored nation status, was granted by the Clinton
administration. Let me just note again this is bipartisan in
the sense that Herbert Walker Bush was the one who originally
came out kissing the feet of these gangsters in Beijing and
followed by Bill Clinton, all anxious to do favors for these
omnipotent rulers of Beijing who rule with an iron fist.
China is, because of its size and other factors, should be
considered the world's worst human rights abuser. We were told
there would be some impact on that if we just simply did
business with them. And I think, Mr. Sherman, before you leave,
I would like to make sure I back up your point--I don't think
he hears me--back up his point. The Chinese are not, as you
say, outdoing us economically because of the American worker.
We have given enormous economic benefits to them in terms of an
open market, in terms of capital investment, in terms of
turning our face away and letting them get away with the
massive threat of American technology which has basically
permitted them to introduce products to the market that were
based on our R&D. So they don't have any R&D costs. We are
picking it all up for them. No wonder they can charge less.
I think that the people of Hong Kong are our greatest ally
in the fight for freedom and peace in this world because they
are confronting the world's worst human rights abuser. Just as
when we ignored and betrayed the people in the Tiananmen Square
democracy movement, we now have a world that is less peaceful,
we now have a world that is more at risk because of this
vicious dictatorship that stays in power. The young people, the
young activists in Hong Kong today, if they are successful,
will create a better world, a more peaceful world, a world in
which the Chinese and American people will deal with each other
as equals and not having a President being afraid to bring up
whatever issue with the leader, with his counterpart in
Beijing.
I think that it is quite obvious where we could actually be
doing things that would counteract or at least put ourselves to
be taken seriously by the Chinese. There are things we could be
doing, and especially when it comes in the economic area.
But also, look, when the Chinese Government decides that
they are going to commit armed force against people who have a
territorial dispute, whether it is against India, whether it is
against Japan, whether it is against the Philippines, whether
it is against Vietnam----
Mr. Connolly. Or Crimea.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Well, that is what I am saying. In Crimea,
Putin sends a couple troops across the border into areas that
want to be part of Russia and we go bananas. But China commits
all of this force across the way in disputed territories, there
is no price to pay. Well, we need to have a little bit more of
a consistent pro-freedom policy, and if we do, like the people
in Hong Kong, like the activists in Hong Kong, the people of
this world will help build a better world, and we will be on
their side.
Thank you very much.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you. The gentleman's time has expired.
The gentleman from the Commonwealth of Virginia is
recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Connolly. I thank my friend, and I couldn't resist
helping my friend from California because I wanted him to have
an all-inclusive list.
Thank you, panel, for being here. And I want to get in two
sets of questions if I can. I pray I can get it in.
One is, I would be very interested, and I am going to start
with you, Dr. Richardson, because you said the problem is not
that the Obama administration hasn't done good things in human
rights and other areas, it has, but the problem is no policy. I
would like to explore that. What ought to be our policy in Hong
Kong, and what is our leverage? Let's have a realistic, not a
quixotic policy.
And then secondly, the second question I want to get at
with the three of you is, what is the impact on Taiwan? Taiwan
is watching all of this. If there was any appetite in Taiwan,
and there was, for maybe a similar model some day in the
future, what is the impact on Chinese behavior vis--vis Hong
Kong, do you think, on those aspirations or those political
dynamics in Taiwan?
So the first question, what ought to be our policy? And
what leverage do we have to try to fashion it?
Ms. Richardson. Let me try to answer the first one very
quickly about policy. I think one of the big problems is that
15 years ago when we were having the PNTR debate, human rights
issues occupied a much larger piece of the policy pie. And as
the relationship has deepened and expanded and there are dozens
and hundreds of competing interests, the amount of time and
attention that is given to human rights issues has shrunk.
What we have wanted to see is a much more thoughtful policy
approach that recognizes human rights issues and human rights
protections as fundamental to a host of different issues in the
relationship. Quite like Mr. Rohrabacher's point about pro-
democracy protestors in Hong Kong as allies, these are the
people who are arguing for protections that are just as
important for their electoral processes as they are for U.S.
businesses to do what they do and succeed in that part of the
world. It is about a free press and an independent judiciary
and a free flow of information.
I think the fact that no more thoughtful policy has been
developed such that human rights-related requests or demands
can be leveled by many different actors in the U.S.
relationship, that it remains almost exclusively the purview or
the burden of the State Department as they sometimes view it,
has made it very easy for the Chinese Government to essentially
minimize and not react to the kinds of demands that are made.
There are certain practical tactics that really aren't used
very well any more, the demands of releases. Even the
clarification after the President's visit of the human rights-
related requests that were made in advance of the visit that
weren't fulfilled. Right? I mean, there are levers that aren't
being pulled, but there is also the very obvious value of
public rhetoric and challenging Chinese officials publicly,
which is something they deeply dislike and usually will move to
try to avoid. And I think making that a regular part of an
interaction, whether it is Secretary Johnson or whoever runs
the Pentagon or Secretary Kerry, is critical. I am going to
leave the Taiwan question.
Mr. Connolly. Yeah. I agree with you wholeheartedly, and I
think human rights always must be a hallmark of U.S. diplomacy,
and we retreat from who we are when we don't make it one.
Having said that, it must also be done carefully and subtly,
that question of leverage again.
Well, if I announce that I am forming Democrats for Chabot
for Speaker, I guarantee you that is not helpful to Steve
Chabot and in some quarters might even make him suspect, that
he is so friendly with people like me. So in a more serious
vein, we need to be careful that with the best of intentions we
don't put a target on somebody by virtue of our blessing and
imprimatur. So it has to be done with skill, is my only point.
Ms. Richardson. I am all for skill, and I am all for
nuance, but I also think we are not yet at a point in time--and
we should be--where a host of interests across the U.S.
Government recognize the Ilham Tohtis, the Puder Changs, the
Gao Yus, all of these people who have gone to prison in China
as allies for their interests as well and go to bat for them.
Mr. Connolly. That is right.
Ms. Richardson. This is not an enormous analytical leap.
And this problem is getting significantly worse in the
mainland, and it requires a much more robust response.
Mr. Connolly. Good point.
Mr. Cheng, on Taiwan.
Mr. Cheng. Very quickly, sir, 2016 will be a crucial year,
and I would predict that we are going to be looking at much
worse cross-straits relations. The recent elections in Taiwan
have already seen a significant growth in DPP popularity and
power. This was not necessarily key to what has been going on
in Hong Kong specifically, but there is no question that the
people in Taiwan who are skeptical of reunification look at
what has happened in Hong Kong as a very important warning.
The cross-straits relationship has been calm for the last 6
years, in no small part because President Ma Ying-jeou chose
not to emphasize independence. But the prospect of a pro-
independence government arising in Taipei is especially
difficult to calculate because Xi Jinping himself was not
within the inner circle of power when there was a previous DPP
President.
So essentially you could wind up in 2016 with three sets of
leaders, all of whom have very different interests, a potential
DPP President possibly, but certainly more pro-independence
sentiment on the island; Xi Jinping, who would be confronted
with a pro-independence attitude on the island; and of course
we ourselves are going to be very, very focused on our own
electoral politics, and perhaps, as the ranking member noted,
not necessarily paying the right amount of attention to that
region as the pot begins to boil.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you. And Mr. Cheng is a constituent of
mine, and his brilliance is obvious.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you. The gentleman's time has expired.
We will go on a second round, but we are going to have
votes here very shortly, so if we can keep it. I will just ask
one question. And my colleague and friend from Virginia has
already brought it up. I was going to talk about Taiwan, so I
will just bring it up very briefly because you already
addressed it, Mr. Cheng, very well.
And that is, relative to Taiwan, obviously they can't have
helped but observe China's thuggish behavior in Hong Kong, and
I think it probably did send a message in the recent election
to some degree because KMT was soundly defeated in the local
elections around the country.
Now, President Ma, to his credit, had spoken out in favor
of the Hong Kong protestors. And so you addressed the question
really. I just really wanted to get back, as one of the
cofounders of the Congressional Taiwan Caucus, what impact will
this have, if any, on the public's attitude toward China and
reconciliation versus independence versus maintaining the
status quo, et cetera?
Mr. Cheng. As we saw this summer with the Sunflower
Movement which took over the Taiwan legislature, there is a
growing unease, frankly unhappiness in Taiwan toward the
current status quo. There is a perception that the island is
falling ever more under the sway of Beijing. And if Beijing
were living up to its commitments, was truly valuing things
like ``One Country, Two Systems'', that might produce one
dynamic. But as we have seen in Hong Kong, what this really is
saying is, from the people of Taiwan it seems, we don't trust
you as a partner.
Now, the problem is that, and we saw some of this in Hong
Kong, is Beijing doesn't take to that sort of skepticism very
well. And the sad reality is that Taiwan's security is eroding.
There have been reports from our own military about how
Taiwan's ability to control the air space and sea space around
the island is deteriorating. There has not been a major arms
sale to Taiwan in years. The recent sales have mostly been
fulfilling previous commitments dating back over a decade.
Taiwan has been asking for the U.S. to allow teams to go and
study the problem in Taiwan, and those requests apparently are
sitting on some State Department desk for years.
By the way, this is bipartisan. It is not simply this
administration. They has been sitting on those desks dating
back to the previous administration. This sends a signal,
unfortunately, to Taiwan that maybe you should try and cut a
deal, unfortunately, with an unreliable partner.
Mr. Chabot. And if I were a resident in Taiwan, I would be
particularly concerned when they hear stories about the
administration's goal to reduce our military back to pre-World
War II levels at a time when the PRC has increased their
military expenditures by double digits every year for the last
25 years.
That being said, I think that the U.S. should continue to
maintain a very strong relationship with Taiwan, and we should
be there for them. They are a role model for other countries
around the world, and we shouldn't let them be bullied by the
PRC.
That being said, I will yield back the balance of my time
and turn to the gentleman from American Samoa.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Mr. Chairman, I have no further questions
other than to again thank our distinguished panelists for their
statements and their positions. And I certainly want to thank
you for your leadership and your service to our committee and
to our country. Yes, this will be my last subcommittee hearing,
and it has been my distinct honor and privilege of having
served with you and the other members of the committee,
hopefully being helpful in developing a better world.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you very much.
The gentleman from Pennsylvania.
Mr. Perry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I will turn to Mr. Cheng. We spoke briefly prior to this
about China and the fact that they aren't a very good neighbor.
They are happy to--well, we in this country are oftentimes
accused from within and without of being imperialist. They on
the other hand go ahead and take the minerals and the raw
materials--with a deal, they make a deal with somebody, some
nation, to take the raw materials. And as you aptly put it,
they don't lecture. Of course, they are not in any position to
lecture, but they don't lecture. They are happy to do that. But
as a world actor on the world stage, they are not a very good
neighbor in the way that we would see one.
That having been said, why do you suppose there is this
reluctance from this administration to take quantifiable action
regarding Beijing's actions in Hong Kong--cyber crime, the
physical incursions in the China Sea, et cetera. Why do you
suppose there is this reluctance? And I said to you, and I just
want you to recount your statement, I said to you, is it
because we borrow so much money from them and we are concerned
that that would jeopardize that? If you could just elaborate.
Mr. Cheng. Sir, I do not believe that the administration is
reticent because of the concern over issues of debt, because,
frankly, China purchases American debt more because of the
situation with its own currency which is under very tight
control, which is not free floating. China is not really in a
position to replace the U.S. as a global reserve currency. It
is buying American debt because it is probably the best and
safest place to put China's surpluses short of building the
world's largest mattress and stuffing all of that money
underneath.
I do believe, however, that the administration has chosen
to value other things more highly than in some cases our
principles and in other cases our traditional strategic
interests. The administration, for example, trumpeted the
climate change agreement as a huge advance despite lacking in
details. This dates back to 2009 when the administration made
very clear that what it wanted from China more than anything
else was an agreement at the Copenhagen climate talks.
So I believe that the administration is pursuing what for
it is a rational choice of saying what they value, which seems
to be on issues of things like climate, and on more nebulous,
less concrete things from their perspective, such as human
rights or American security commitments to the region, it is
willing to offer those up.
Mr. Perry. Thank you.
Moving on, I would just like to make one clarification
while I have got the mike. A good friend from the other side of
the aisle commented that my interest in potentially modifying
the visa waiver program would be untenable because he included
all of China in the discussion where I did not ever advocate
for all of China, just Hong Kong specifically. I also find it
very telling and interesting that he would continue with
restrictions for political dissidents, meanwhile advocating for
an open southern border, which he currently is, as far as I
know.
That having been said, again to you, Mr. Cheng, if you can
just codify very simply, what are our interests in Hong Kong,
and why should Americans care? Why should Americans care? Why
should we invest? What are our interests? If you can codify
that pretty simply, I know that is hard to do. I have got about
1\1/2\ minutes left, which is yours.
Mr. Cheng. Sir, some of the issues at stake here, at the
most materialistic end, this is a global financial hub. You
create massive disruption if you have instability in one of the
world's truly global financial centers. You raise questions
about the American commitment to its principles when we walk
away from people who want to be free.
My colleagues here have stated quite eloquently the issue
of values and where they stand and how we are perceived with
regards to those values and especially if we walk away from
them. And, frankly, we also send the wrong message to Beijing
about what is in its interests if we mislead them into thinking
that they can violate agreements without consequences. At some
point, if somebody keeps getting away with things, they are
going to keep on doing that.
Mr. Perry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, panelists.
I yield back.
Mr. Chabot. The gentleman's time has expired. The gentleman
from Virginia is recognized.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you.
First of all, Mr. Cheng, I agree with your last statement.
I believe Beijing in a sense respects one thing: Power. And it
is a mistake for the United States not to sell weapons to
Taiwan. It is a mistake for the United States not to show, in
fact, a fortified relationship with Taiwan, especially in light
of the developments in Hong Kong. It is a mistake for the
United States not to make it very clear, at least in diplomatic
sessions with the Chinese, we care a lot about that, and it
will impinge the relationship, as Dr. Richardson, I think, was
suggesting in a previous answer to my question.
I do want to be fair though. I know you are from Heritage
Foundation. But with respect to Mr. Perry, it is hardly limited
to this administration that we pull our punches with China. I
wish that were true. Since Richard Nixon went to Beijing and
visited with Zhou Enlai and saw the Forbidden City and the
Great Wall, every succeeding administration has made
compromises that make one sad about U.S. principles and virtues
and values because they are weighing various and sundry
factors, and there seems to be this ethos we can't afford to
make the Chinese angry. And it seems to me that that is the
wrong calculus, even if it is noble in intent.
And I wonder if you might all want to comment on that
because I am cochair of the Taiwan Caucus, and I feel that it
is really important we not equivocate about the Taiwan
Relations Act commitments to Taiwan and that Beijing is always
calculating those misses. And we have now virtually given
Beijing veto power over weapon system sales, as Mr. Chabot
indicated, to Taiwan, and I think that is a terrible mistake.
But at any rate, your views. Question of what does Beijing
respect and how does that fashion or should fashion or
influence U.S. policy.
Ms. Currie. I agree with you that this is a bipartisan
problem and it largely tends to be focused in the executive
branch, but not exclusively. When I worked at the State
Department it was very frustrating at times to see the way in
which the Department and the government as a whole, the
executive branch as a whole, would curl into a self-protective
ball when it came to dealing with China and choose the issues
that they would raise and the way in which those issues would
be raised based on the likelihood that they would provoke a
negative reaction. The things that provoked the negative
reaction go off the list, and the things that can be talked
about safely without upsetting the Chinese stay on the list.
And our officials become conditioned over time, because the
Chinese react to anything in a very hyperventilated way when
they don't like what they are hearing from our officials.
Whereas we are conditioned to sit and take everything that they
say, no matter how offensive it is to our values, no matter how
offensive it is to our interests. Our diplomats sit there and
take it from the Chinese. And then when we say anything that is
even mildly critical, they fly off the handle. And it is a
strategic negotiating tactic that they use in the way that they
deal with us.
So i think part of the problem is it goes back to the way
our diplomatic corps is organized, how they are trained, what
they are prepared to deal with when they go into meetings with
the Chinese. They simply are not, even when they are China
hands, and in some cases the China hands are the worst because
they have invested all these years in learning Chinese and in
making relationships with people in the Chinese Government. The
last thing they want to do is screw up their career by
alienating their interlocutors.
So one of the big problems is trying to get people out of
this mind frame that the relationship is the most important
thing about our relationship. It is not. The relationship is a
means to an end. And our interests and our values are the same
thing when it comes to China. These two fundamental issues lie
at the heart of the problem with our lack of policy and our
lack of strategic thinking about how to deal with China.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you so much.
If the chairman will indulge, I would just like to give the
other two panelists an opportunity to answer the same question.
I thank the chair.
Ms. Richardson. I will try to be very quick and just point
out that in 1997 the great hope was not only that rights in
political space in Hong Kong would be protected and possibly
expand, but also that it might have a positive influence on the
mainland. And we are here today because we are seeing the
opposite. And I think if the U.S. really does believe that
democracies and rights-respecting governments make better trade
partners, make better strategic allies, make more reliable
partners across a host of issues, there is a lot more work to
be done with respect to China.
I think it is also deeply problematic. It is not just a
question of people I think scaling back their expectations of
diplomatic initiatives or what the Chinese Government may or
may do, I think there is almost a complete absence from these
discussions about what people more broadly in China want and
supporting that and expressing some solidarity with people who
are trying to make precisely the kind of change that I think is
fundamental to the U.S. achieving its long-term policy goals.
Again, it goes back to the point about seeing various activists
in the mainland as key allies for lots of different interests
in the U.S., not as sort of the human rights box to be checked.
Mr. Cheng. Sir, the key and fundamental difference here is
that China knows what it wants. It pushes for those goals, and
it pushes them with every lever at its disposal, which given a
centralized authority means economic, industry, official
spokespeople, media, et cetera.
We need to be consistent in our policy objectives and
persistent in enunciating them. We need to apply not only the
State Department and the Commerce Department and the levers of
government in the executive branch and also here in the
legislative branch, but also to encourage business, to
encourage NGOs, to encourage media and other places to be as
forthright in standing up for those American principles, not
American Government principles, but American principles, as the
Chinese are in standing up for theirs.
I don't fault the Chinese for standing up for what they
believe in. That is their business. I do fault us for not
applying all of those levers in a consistent manner
persistently.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you. The gentleman's time has expired.
All time has expired. And we want to thank the panel for its
testimony here this afternoon. We are being called to the floor
for votes now. All members will have 5 days to supplement their
remarks or submit questions.
And I want to once again thank Mr. Faleomavaega for his
service to this committee, to American Samoa, and to our
country. We really did mean all those nice things that we said
about him.
And if there is no further business to come before the
committee, we are adjourned. Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 3:44 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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