    [House Hearing, 113 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                          HONG KONG: A BROKEN PROMISE?

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   BEFORE THE

                      SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

                                     OF THE

                          COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                        ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 SECOND SESSION

                                   __________

                                DECEMBER 2, 2014

                                   __________

                               Serial No. 113-226

                                   __________

            Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

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                          COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

                     EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman
    CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey     ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
    ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida         ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
    DANA ROHRABACHER, California             Samoa
    STEVE CHABOT, Ohio                   BRAD SHERMAN, California
    JOE WILSON, South Carolina           GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
    MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas             ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
    TED POE, Texas                       GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
    MATT SALMON, Arizona                 THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
    TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania             BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
    JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina          KAREN BASS, California
    ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois             WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
    MO BROOKS, Alabama                   DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
    TOM COTTON, Arkansas                 ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
    PAUL COOK, California                JUAN VARGAS, California
    GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina       BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois
    RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas            JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III, Massachusetts
    SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania            AMI BERA, California
    STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas                ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California
    RON DeSANTIS, Florida                GRACE MENG, New York
    DOUG COLLINS, Georgia                LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
    MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina         TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
    TED S. YOHO, Florida                 JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
    SEAN DUFFY, Wisconsin
    CURT CLAWSON, Florida
         Amy Porter, Chief of Staff      Thomas Sheehy, Staff Director
                   Jason Steinbaum, Democratic Staff Director
                                     ------

                      Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific

                          STEVE CHABOT, Ohio, Chairman
    DANA ROHRABACHER, California         ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
    MATT SALMON, Arizona                     Samoa
    MO BROOKS, Alabama                   AMI BERA, California
    GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina       TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
    SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania            BRAD SHERMAN, California
    DOUG COLLINS, Georgia                GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
    CURT CLAWSON, Florida                WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page

                                   WITNESSES

    Mr. Dean Cheng, senior research fellow, Asian Studies Center, The
      Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy, The
      Heritage Foundation............................................     9
    Sophie Richardson, Ph.D., China director, Human Rights Watch.....    24
    Ms. Kelley Currie, senior fellow, Project 2049 Institute.........    34

              LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING

    Mr. Dean Cheng: Prepared statement...............................    12
    Sophie Richardson, Ph.D.: Prepared statement.....................    26
    Ms. Kelley Currie: Prepared statement............................    37

                                    APPENDIX

    Hearing notice...................................................    60
    Hearing minutes..................................................    61
    The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress
      from the Commonwealth of Virginia: Prepared statement..........    62

                          HONG KONG: A BROKEN PROMISE?

                                  ----------

                           TUESDAY, DECEMBER 2, 2014

                           House of Representatives,

                     Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific,

                         Committee on Foreign Affairs,

                                Washington, DC.

        The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:02 p.m., in
    room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Steve Chabot
    (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
        Mr. Chabot. Good afternoon. The committee will come to
    order. And before we begin this afternoon, I would like to take
    a moment just to say a few words about my good friend, the
    ranking member, Eni Faleomavaega. As this is likely to be the
    last hearing, we think, of the Asia-Pacific Subcommittee in
    this Congress, this will be the last time that I will have the
    honor to sit on this dais next to my good friend Eni, from
    American Samoa. And I can tell you I am going to miss that
    experience, opportunity, and real honor it has been. He is
    truly one of the class acts of the United States Congress.
        I have served on this committee for 18 years now. And that
    pales in comparison, I think, to how long Eni has been on the
    committee. But I have gotten to know him quite well over the
    years and have gotten to know him even better after 2001.
    During that year, Eni and I both served as the representatives
    from the Congress to the U.N. We went to the U.N. headquarters
    a number of times and worked on various issues right after that
    year. It was right after September 11, so it was a very active
    time when it comes to international affairs.
        And our friendship has grown over the years as we have
    traveled on a number of occasions to different parts of the
    world, mainly in Asia. This last year, we were in South Korea,
    Japan, and Taiwan, where we met with heads of state, including
    in a prison with former President Chen Shui-bian of Taiwan. I
    think we both agree he has been in prison long enough, and for
    whatever he did he certainly served a penalty for that. We
    certainly think that justice has been served, and he should get
    humanitarian parole. I didn't want to get sidetracked too much
    on that, but I feel very strongly about that particular issue,
    and I know Eni does as well.
        Because world leaders have dealt with him before, they have
    seen him in action, and they know the humanness of this person,
    you find out during these trips the high regard that Eni is
    held in the eyes of world leaders all over this globe. He
    really does care and he cares about the people of American
    Samoa. But he cares about American Samoa just as much as he
    cares about the whole world because he is truly a man of the
    world and has made this world a better place.
        As I think most people know, he served our country
    honorably, wearing the uniform of our country in Vietnam. A lot
    of us talk about these things, but Eni has experienced them
    firsthand. We don't always agree on everything. I am a little
    bit on the right, and he is a little bit on the left. Probably
    people would say I am way out on the right and he is maybe a
    little further to the left than a little out on the left. But
    that being the fact, this is a time when bipartisanship really
    has worked in many ways.
        And so I want to thank him for his friendship, his
    leadership on this committee, and his leadership in Congress.
    He will truly be missed and truly not forgotten. He is one of
    the few Members that has a photo of himself on the wall with
    Elvis Presley, and as I think somebody mentioned, was in a
    movie with Elvis Presley. I mean, that is pretty impressive
    stuff.
        But, again, in all seriousness, we appreciate your service
    to our country and to this committee, Eni. And I also want to
    say that in his absence when he had health issues, Ami Bera
    stepped up and really did a very commendable job coheading the
    committee with me. That is really what happens around here, is
    we work together on these things in the Foreign Affairs
    Committee.
        Before I get into my opening statement, I would welcome any
    other members that might, should the spirit move them, like to
    say something.
        Mr. Bera.
        Mr. Bera. I would just echo the statements. As a freshman
    Member of Congress, Eni has been a great role model, and helped
    me navigate the Foreign Affairs Committee.
        And you are not disappearing. You will still be around as a
    resource, certainly, to this freshman Member of Congress, and
    soon to be sophomore Member. So thank you for everything you
    have done, and I do look forward to continuing to work with
    you.
        Mr. Chabot. Would the gentleman from Pennsylvania like to
    say something.
        Mr. Perry. Sure. Also appreciate and want to echo the
    chairman's remarks. We have not served together long and only
    on few occasions in this subcommittee, mostly in the course of
    the full committee. But I have appreciated your perspective.
    And whether we agree or disagree, there is no doubt that you
    are a strong advocate for your constituency at home, and that
    is what they expect. And so I applaud you for standing firm for
    what you believe and for your constituents. We hope that we can
    all serve with the same measure. So I wish you God's speed.
        Mr. Chabot. Thank you.
        The gentleman from California, who has served for quite
    some time not only with myself, but with the gentleman from
    American Samoa.
        Mr. Sherman. Echo your comments, Mr. Chairman. I have been
    on the full committee with Eni for 18 years. I have learned
    more about American Samoa than I ever thought possible and more
    about the issues of the Pacific and of Asia. And I would say he
    is going to be missed, but hopefully he will still be here.
    That will be the one thing that prevents him from being missed.
    So, we look forward to gaining Mr. Faleomavaega's counsel and
    input on foreign policy as the years go forward.
        Mr. Chabot. Thank you very much.
        And if the gentleman would like to say anything, he is
    welcome to now or he can wait till the opening statement.
        Okay. Thank you very much. I will now proceed with my
    statement.
        For 2 months, the people of Hong Kong have come together to
    protest Beijing's decision to deny the city's 7.2 million
    people the right to directly elect their Chief Executive,
    putting the future of democracy in Hong Kong at great risk. The
    demise of the ``One Country, Two System'' framework of
    governance is a stark reminder that Beijing's promises can be
    revoked at the drop of a hat.
        What we see in Hong Kong today, however, is not an isolated
    event. It is the latest chapter in the story of an increasingly
    aggressive China that began 2 years ago when President Xi
    Jinping assumed power. Under Xi's leadership, a new brand of
    Chinese nationalism has emerged, and it is one where China
    takes the center stage in international affairs by asserting
    its hegemony in the region and directly challenging the United
    States.
        Domestically, the stifling of dissent has risen to new
    levels extending even to the economic front where the
    government's antimonopoly laws are targeting American
    companies. Beijing is also working diligently to silence
    political opposition by suppressing social media, imposing
    strict Internet and instant messaging regulations, and banning
    academic research and teaching on topics such as civil society,
    universal values, citizens' rights, freedom of the press,
    independence of the judiciary, and capitalism.
        In 2013, China unilaterally imposed an air defense
    identification zone over the East China Sea, imposing
    unnecessary risk to international civilian air traffic. Less
    than 1 year later, China turned a tin ear to its neighbors
    concerns by placing a drilling platform in disputed waters off
    Vietnam. Around the same time, Chinese naval vessels and its
    air force began to behave aggressively attempting to intimidate
    U.S. naval vessels and aircraft operating in international
    waters and airspace.
        Many consider current U.S.-China relations to have reached
    the lowest point in a decade. And, amazingly, there is no
    senior administration official that leads the China portfolio.
    So it comes as no surprise that the Obama administration's
    response to Hong Kong's cry for help did so little to instill
    confidence with the people of Hong Kong.
        The U.S. must never stand idle when democracy is being
    challenged. When the glow of press conferences has faded, we
    must remember that what is happening in Hong Kong is not an
    isolated event. President Xi is dismantling the ``One Country,
    Two System'' governance arrangement--a strategy orchestrated by
    Beijing that certainly has put our friend and ally Taiwan on
    notice that any accommodation or agreement may be revoked at
    moment's notice and is not worth the paper it is written on.
        If the Obama administration is so serious about its pivot
    to Asia, how can it go so long without offering credible
    support to the people of Hong Kong and their democratic
    aspirations, which are in fact written and promised in law?
    Saying that the U.S. does not take sides in the political
    development of Hong Kong and doesn't support any particular
    individuals or groups involved, as the U.S. Consulate in Hong
    Kong stated, is not acceptable or correct for that matter. This
    response is a capitulation to China and abandonment of our
    promises to Hong Kong that U.S. support of democratization in
    Hong Kong is a fundamental principle of U.S. foreign policy, as
    are the human rights of the people of Hong Kong.
        While hundreds and thousands of protesters have stood their
    ground against attacks by thuggish China Communist Party
    supporters and waves of tear gas and pepper spray from police,
    the Obama administration has stood on the sidelines. Are the
    wishes of the Hong Kong people not clear enough? And after a
    period of calm, protests are once again escalating, and nearly
    200 people have been arrested, including many of the Umbrella
    Movement's leaders. Now is not the time to remain silent and
    reticent in support for Hong Kong's democratic future. The
    U.S.-Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992 states that the U.S. should
    play an active role in maintaining Hong Kong's confidence and
    prosperity. These aspirations are progressively diminishing as
    a result of China's growing control over Hong Kong's Government
    and the civil rights of its people.
        We are at a pivotal moment for democracy in Hong Kong. No
    matter how long China tries to suppress basic human rights, ban
    the pursuit of democratic ideals, and quash civil society, we
    must not let Beijing succeed in destroying the values the
    people in Hong Kong are fighting so hard to keep. The Obama
    administration needs to more vocally support the pro-democratic
    aspirations of the Hong Kong people. We must not let Beijing's
    accusations of foreign influence bully us into silence over
    upholding human rights and supporting the right of the Hong
    Kong people to choose their own political future.
        The U.S.-Hong Kong Policy Act stipulates differential
    treatment of Hong Kong only as long as it is considered
    sufficiently autonomous from China. Considering Beijing's
    orchestration of the Hong Kong Government's responses to the
    crises, and dictation over who can and cannot enter or leave
    Hong Kong, it may be time to reassess Hong Kong's autonomous
    status, and those benefits that come with that status.
        I thank our witnesses for being here this afternoon. We
    look forward to hearing your thoughts on how the situation in
    Hong Kong may evolve in the coming weeks and months. I now
    recognize our ranking member, Mr. Faleomavaega, for his opening
    remarks.
        Mr. Faleomavaega. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank you for
    holding this timely hearing in light of the serious protests in
    response to conditions set by China for the 2017 elections for
    Hong Kong's Chief Executive.
        For years, Mr. Chairman, I have been critical of our U.S.
    foreign policy toward the Asia-Pacific region. While not taking
    anything less of importance as far as Europe and the Middle
    East is concerned, I have always said that we are not paying
    enough attention to the Asia-Pacific region, especially when
    two-thirds of the world's population is in the Asia-Pacific
    region. You can talk about the armies, you can talk about the
    economics, and I think it is well said.
        As President Ma states, Hong Kong is an extremely important
    global financial center, and any political turmoil that occurs
    there will impact not only Asia but the entire world. President
    Ma points out that Taiwan has had universal suffrage for some
    time, and believes that if a system of universal suffrage can
    be realized in Hong Kong, both Hong Kong as well as Mainland
    China would benefit.
        I would add, Mr. Chairman, that the Asia-Pacific region and
    the United States would also benefit, as would the entire
    world. I ask to include President Ma's statement in the record
    for the historical purposes.
        Mr. Chabot. Without objection, so ordered.
        Mr. Faleomavaega. As this will be my last subcommittee
    hearing, I want the publicly express my appreciation for you,
    Mr. Chairman. I have served as both chairman and ranking member
    of this subcommittee, and I have served with many others over
    the years. One of my most cherished honors has been serving
    with you. You, as a member of the committee, Chairman Chabot,
    are a loyal and principled man who serves your constituents in
    the Asia-Pacific region with distinction and honor. No matter
    where I go from here, I will always take your friendship with
    me. I am going to miss you.
        I am also going to miss each and every member of this
    subcommittee who served with us, including my dear friend Dana
    Rohrabacher, who is my buddy, truly my buddy. I especially
    thank Mr. Bera for the gracious support he and his staff
    provided by filling in for me during my time of recovery.
        I also want to pay special tribute to Kevin and Priscilla.
    You chose well when you chose those as staff director and
    professional staffs, respectively. I am deeply appreciative of
    the support they have given to you and me and to my staff as
    well. Their knowledge and expertise in the Asia-Pacific region
    has influenced many, and I will remember them both for their
    extraordinary goodness, and I know that my staff feels the same
    way toward them.
        So, Mr. Chairman, to you, to our subcommittee members and
    staff, I extend my highest and kindest regards. May God be with
    each of you till we meet again. Soifua.
        Mr. Chabot. Thank you very much. Thank you very much.
        If the gentleman from Pennsylvania wouldn't mind if we go
    out of order and have Mr. Rohrabacher speak now. Gentleman from
    California is recognized.
        Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much. And this is, of
    course, a very symbolic hearing today in that we are discussing
    how important the Pacific and the Asia and Pacific Rim is to
    the United States of America, and how the people there on that
    part of the world need to know that we are paying attention
    that we are on the side of those people who are struggling to
    make the word a better place. And here it is, the last day,
    Eni's last day, a man who has been working all these years.
        And how many years altogether, Eni?
        Mr. Faleomavaega. Too many.
        Mr. Rohrabacher. Too many. Well, I think I was 24 when we
    were running overseas in all kind of wild places in the world.
        But Eni has dedicated his life, from the time he was a
    young soldier in Vietnam till this very moment, toward making
    this a better world. And while we have had a few disagreements,
    we have also shared the great common value of a commitment to
    making it a better and freer world, and toward bringing the
    people of the Pacific and of Asia into that type of
    relationship with the people of the United States.
        So, Eni, God bless you and Godspeed.
        Just a few thoughts about this hearing.
        I think one of the greatest mistakes that was ever made by
    any President of the United States in my lifetime was made by a
    Republican President, Herbert Walker Bush. After Ronald Reagan
    cleared the path toward a great expansion of democracy, and
    China at that time seemed to be heading toward democracy,
    Herbert Walker Bush betrayed the people in Tiananmen Square,
    betrayed the democratic movement, and let them be slaughtered.
    We never did we have the retaliation against this evil regime
    in Beijing that we should have had after Tiananmen Square. We
    would have had a far better world today had the democracy
    movement won at that time. Herbert Walker Bush was to blame for
    that loss. Instead, we have a government that is the world's
    worst human rights abuser.
        But today, we send a message to the young pro-democracy
    activists now in the streets of Hong Kong: You are not alone.
    We think of you. We are with you. All people have the right to
    be free. But it has to be earned. And today we recognize the
    brave young men and women in the streets of Hong Kong who are
    earning their freedom, earning their right to democracy, and to
    control their own destiny through the ballot box.
        So today we say to the young people in Hong Kong, we are
    with you, don't fear, and we will try our best not to make the
    mistake that we made at Tiananmen Square. This time we stand
    strong for our values. And even though Eni won't be with us to
    make sure that we are keeping that promise, I can assure you
    that he will be behind us, giving us telephone calls, and thus
    we meet our responsibility.
        So thank you very much, Eni.
        And thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this hearing.
        Mr. Chabot. Thank you very much. Gentleman's time has
    expired.
        Gentleman from California, Mr. Bera, is recognized.
        Mr. Bera. I will just maybe some brief comments.
        When we look at Hong Kong, when we look at the protests
    that are taking place, when we look at the promise of the 1997
    treaty, I am interested in hearing the witnesses' testimony and
    getting to the bottom of how this transition is taking place
    and getting to a point where we can get to one person, one vote
    and you have a true democracy. Because ultimately at the
    foundation of freedom and democracy is the ability to express
    your voice through your votes and pick your own leadership.
        So I am curious to see how that transition is going, where
    we are today, and how we get to where we want to be in 2017. So
    I am looking forward to that testimony. Thank you.
        Mr. Chabot. Thank you very much.
        The gentleman from Arizona is recognized.
        Mr. Salmon. Thank you.
        First and foremost, I want to echo the sentiments that have
    been expressed toward Mr. Faleomavaega. This is my second
    opportunity serving with him, once was in the 1990s and now
    again. There has never been a more tireless supporter of the
    indigent peoples of various nations than Mr. Faleomavaega.
        And we are going to really miss you. You are a wonderful
    man and your heart is a good one and you have always strived to
    do the right thing, not the partisan thing, and I appreciate
    that.
        As far as Hong Kong is concerned, I was there for the
    handover ceremony of Hong Kong from Great Britain to China and
    met with Martin Lee and other folks that were very, very
    dubious about what would happen with this ``One Country, Two
    Systems'' that China was proposing. And I am sad to say that
    some of those fears that Mr. Lee expressed at that time have
    been realized. That Beijing, who has said that they were going
    to let Hong Kong be autonomous, then puts down all their rules
    and regulations about how the vetting process is going to be
    done by Beijing to decide who gets to run and who doesn't.
        I congratulate these young people for standing up for
    freedom and standing up for their beliefs. It is not always
    easy. And I want to echo the sentiments of Mr. Rohrabacher. We
    need to be strong in our response in defending freedom anywhere
    across the globe. And if these young people run into harm's
    way, let our voice and our actions be very, very clear that we
    are on the side of freedom and democracy.
        And I yield back the balance of my time.
        Mr. Chabot. Thank you very much. Gentlemen's time has
    expired.
        The gentleman from California is recognized.
        Mr. Sherman. Mr. Chairman, it was good to be with you, Dana
    Rohrabacher, and of course the chairman of the committee back
    in February in Hong Kong where we had a chance to meet those
    who have really devoted their lives to trying to give democracy
    to the Hong Kong people.
        We had a chance to meet with Martin Lee, just as the
    gentleman from Arizona met with him at the time that this all
    began, when we were promised ``One Country, Two Systems.'' But
    when it came to political rights and freedoms, it looks like it
    is one country, one system. One person, one vote, and one
    committee that decides who you are allowed to vote for.
        I think that we should speak out in favor of the Hong Kong
    people. But let us be frank. We can't take military action. We
    are unlikely to take trade action. And oratorical support is
    the most we can provide or are likely to provide. But as we
    negotiate so many transactions with China, we should remember
    that the promise to millions of its own citizens has been
    broken and we should be very careful in transacting business
    with a country that has behaved like this.
        Finally, if China thinks that Taiwan would voluntarily
    reunite with the mainland, I don't think the slogan they are
    going to use is ``One Country, Two Systems.'' I think that
    slogan has been tarnished.
        Mr. Chabot. Thank you very much. Gentleman's time has
    expired.
        The gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Perry, is recognized.
        Mr. Perry. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. I just want to say I
    appreciate this hearing on this very timely and important
    subject. I look forward to the testimony of the presenters here
    today. I think today is a good time to think about our pivot or
    our alleged pivot as a Nation to Asia and what that means.
    Today I also think about the cost of freedom, how it must be
    earned and won and how it must be renewed. Today I also want to
    reiterate how fragile democracy is, and the freedom that we
    experience, that we love and cherish today. By watching the
    events in Hong Kong, especially, you can tell that it won't be
    taken away in one fell swoop, but by increments. We can learn a
    lot from that in our own society today.
        So I am very much looking forward to the answers and the
    questions regarding this.
        And with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
        Mr. Chabot. Thank you. The gentleman yields back.
        Are there any other members that seek to make an opening
    statement? If not, we will go ahead and introduce our panel
    here this afternoon.
        We will begin with Dean Cheng, who serves as a senior
    research fellow in the Asian Studies Center at the Davis
    Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy at the
    Heritage Foundation. His portfolio includes Chinese political
    and security affairs with an emphasis on China's military
    policy and U.S.-China policy. He previously worked as a senior
    analyst for Science Applications International Corps, where he
    handled defense and homeland security issues. He also worked
    with the China Studies Division of the Center for Naval
    Analysis. Before that, Mr. Cheng served as a China defense
    analyst for the Office of Technology Assessment's International
    Security and Space Program, where he studied China's defense-
    industrial complex. Mr. Cheng has provided analysis for a
    number of news media sources and is a contributor to the BBC
    World Service, National Public Radio, Washington Post, and Time
    magazine, amongst others. Mr. Cheng is a regular speaker on
    China defense issues and U.S.-China policy. Mr. Cheng holds a
    bachelor's degree in political science from Princeton
    University and studied for a doctorate at the Massachusetts
    Institute of Technology.
        We welcome you here this afternoon.
        Our next witness will be Sophie Richardson, who serves as
    the China director at Human Rights Watch. Dr. Richardson is the
    author of numerous articles on domestic Chinese political
    reform, democratization, and human rights in Asia. She has
    previously testified before the European Parliament and both
    the U.S. House of Representatives and the U.S. Senate. She
    provides regular commentary to news media outlets. In 2009, Dr.
    Richardson, published the book ``China, Cambodia, and the Five
    Principles of Peaceful Coexistence.'' Dr. Richardson has
    received degrees from the University of Virginia, Johns Hopkins
    School of Advanced International Studies, Hopkins-Nanjing
    Program, and Oberlin College. And we welcome you this
    afternoon, Doctor.
        Lastly, our final witness is Kelley Currie, who is a senior
    fellow with the Project 2049 Institute. Her portfolio includes
    democracy, human rights, and the rule of law in the Asia-
    Pacific region. Prior to joining Project 2049, Ms. Currie
    served as an Asia policy advisor to the Under Secretary of
    State for Democracy and Global Affairs and Special Coordinator
    for Tibetan Issues, Paula Dobriansky. She has also served as
    senior advisor to the International Committee of the Red Cross,
    director of Government Relations for the International Campaign
    for Tibet, and deputy director for Asia at International
    Republican Institute. Ms. Currie was the foreign policy advisor
    to Congressman John Porter and concurrently served as the
    majority staff director of the Congressional Human Rights
    Caucus. Ms. Currie received a JD from Georgetown University Law
    Center and an undergraduate degree in political science from
    the University of Georgia School of Public and International
    Affairs. She has appeared as an expert commentator on CNN and
    the BBC and has written on Asia policy issues for national and
    international publications.
        We welcome all three of you here this afternoon. We look
    forward to your testimony. I am sure you are all familiar with
    the 5-minute rule. You will each have 5 minutes to testify. A
    yellow light will come on letting you know you have 1 minute,
    and the red light tells you to wrap up, if at all possible. We
    give you a little leeway but not a whole lot.
        Dr. Cheng, you are recognized for 5 minutes.

      STATEMENT OF MR. DEAN CHENG, SENIOR RESEARCH FELLOW, ASIAN
     STUDIES CENTER, THE DAVIS INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AND
                FOREIGN POLICY, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION

        Mr. Cheng. Chairman Chabot, distinguished members of the
    committee, thank you for the opportunity to be here this
    afternoon. Ranking Member Faleomavaega, thank you for the
    fortuitous opportunity to address you on your last session
    here. My comments today are my own and should not be construed
    as representing any official position of the Heritage
    Foundation.
        Since the 1980s, when the U.K. Began negotiating with the
    People's Republic of China over the return of Hong Kong, the
    territory has been something like the proverbial canary in the
    coal mine. How Beijing would handle this territory and its
    population of 7 million would reflect broader issues of
    internal Chinese governance, cross-straits relations with
    Taiwan, and prospects for the broader Asia-Pacific region.
        Key questions here were, could the PRC allow pluralism to
    exist within the context of its political system, which is
    dominated by the Chinese Communist Party? Would it allow Hong
    Kong to continue to flourish after it had been returned to
    Chinese sovereignty? And might Hong Kong serve as a bridge for
    a modernizing, increasingly wealthy PRC to liberalize itself?
        In this regard, Hong Kong was seen as the perfect
    experiment. In the first place, Hong Kong already enjoyed
    certain key institutions, including a free press, an
    independent judiciary, and the rule of law. Beijing would not
    have to create these from whole cloth. Instead, it merely
    needed to allow the system within Hong Kong to continue and not
    interfere.
        To further reinforce this point, the PRC was also obligated
    to respect Hong Kong. The Joint Declaration between London and
    Beijing, as well as the Basic Law of Hong Kong, were both
    formal obligations undertaken by the PRC that guaranteed Hong
    Kong's system for 50 years. These documents were seen as
    codifying the idea of ``One Country, Two Systems,'' the
    principle under which Hong Kong was to be returned to Chinese
    sovereignty yet retain its own characteristics.
        Finally, there was the assessment of enlightened self-
    interest. Hong Kong was already a major financial hub and a
    major economy in its own right when it reverted to Chinese
    control. Nor was there any question that after 1997 that Hong
    Kong was, in fact, under Chinese control. The PRC was,
    therefore, seen as having every reason to want it to succeed,
    and it was presumed would therefore not interfere with its
    operation.
        Fast forward 17 years and the Chinese position regarding
    universal suffrage and how the Hong Kong Special Administrative
    Region would select its Chief Executive in 2017 suggests that,
    unfortunately, these assumptions and views were far too
    optimistic. China has gone from a still-developing country in
    1997 to the world's second-largest economy, and in the process
    its attitude toward Hong Kong and indeed toward much of the
    region has hardened.
        As the June Chinese white paper on Hong Kong made clear,
    Beijing now emphasizes the ``one country'' part of ``One
    Country, Two Systems,'' and made also clear that Hong Kong will
    maintain its own system only at Beijing's sufferance.
        China's approach to Hong Kong as seen in the suffrage issue
    highlights several key areas of concern. First, there is little
    reason to expect political reform in the PRC for the
    foreseeable future. Some had hoped that Xi Jinping might be a
    closet political reformer, but his approach to Hong Kong hardly
    supports this view. Instead, his handling of the Hong Kong
    situation with little violence and certainly no repetition of
    the scenes and costs associated with Tiananmen Square, now 25
    ago, has probably strengthened his domestic credibility, helped
    in his consolidation of power, but given him little reason to
    liberalize his policies.
        Second, China is demonstrating once again its aptitude for
    political warfare. Political warfare is the hardest form have
    soft power. Much as Russia has employed hybrid or ambiguous
    warfare in its Crimea intervention, China is doing the same in
    Hong Kong and elsewhere in the region. And in particular, we
    can see the exercising of the three warfares: Legal warfare or
    lawfare, public opinion warfare, and psychological warfare.
        China's approach to the franchise and suffrage in Hong Kong
    has been consistent with its writings on legal warfare, which
    focus on the use of the law as an instrument for justifying or
    furthering national aims. This is a much more offensive
    approach, employing the law to achieve previously established
    ends rather than defensively limiting or otherwise constraining
    one's own activities.
        This lawfare approach also complements Chinese public
    opinion warfare methods. Social and news media in China are
    tightly controlled by the government, and once the protests
    began, Chinese Weibo messages, the local equivalent of Twitter,
    were immediately censored.
        Meanwhile, the harassment of Hong Kong activists is
    integral to Chinese psychological warfare methods. The fact
    that even the average protester has been detained or had their
    travels limited serves notice that anyone who protests has
    likely been recorded and will suffer consequences.
        Third, this approach to Hong Kong, and especially the ``One
    Country, Two Systems'', the way it is now defined, is likely to
    lead to greater tensions with Taiwan. The approach of ``One
    Country, Two Systems'' was always intended to appeal the people
    of Taiwan to persuade them to accept reunification, but the
    message from recent events in Hong Kong is a cautionary, not an
    encouraging tale.
        For the United States, this has three implications. China's
    assiduous practice of political warfare is a warning about
    engaging the PRC without carefully thinking through all of the
    angles. We should engage the PRC much as we approach contract
    talks, with no assumption of shared outlooks, although both
    sides are interested in reaching an agreement and avoiding a
    strike.
        In addition, the prospect of heightened tensions across the
    Taiwan Straits means that the Asia pivot needs to be made more
    meaningful. This includes the Trans-Pacific Partnership Trade
    Agreement to underscore that America offers more than military
    solutions.
        But one final element is to strengthen the American
    military presence, including a more robust training and
    exercise schedule with friends and allies, but also expanding
    the provision of more advanced equipment to those same friends
    and allies, whether it is missile defense cooperation with
    Japan and South Korea, military sales to Vietnam, or acting on
    the sale of fighter aircraft and submarines to Taiwan.
        Thank you very much.
        Mr. Chabot. Thank you very much.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Cheng follows:]

        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                  ----------

        Mr. Chabot. Dr. Richardson, you are recognized for 5
    minutes.

     STATEMENT OF SOPHIE RICHARDSON, PH.D., CHINA DIRECTOR, HUMAN
                              RIGHTS WATCH

        Ms. Richardson. Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the
    subcommittee, thanks for inviting me to testify today. I would
    like to take my 5 minutes not to go into details about what has
    happened in the last few weeks, but rather to talk about the
    kinds of recommendations that will protect human rights in and
    the autonomy of Hong Kong where tensions between police and
    protesters really have reached a breaking point.
        The extraordinary demonstrations by a cross-section of
    people in Hong Kong are in our view not simply about the
    composition of Hong Kong's nomination committee. After waiting
    patiently for years for China to fulfill its promise of
    democracy, many are angry at Beijing's political overreach and
    at the Hong Kong Government's growing tendency to marginalize
    the interests of the majority on issues ranging from education
    policy to urban planning.
        In the broadest sense, the current tensions are local and
    logical reactions of people who have enjoyed civil liberties
    and a reasonably responsive government but who now see these
    freedoms increasingly threatened and who have a very clear
    sense of how those rights are denied just across the border. In
    our view, physically removing demonstrators from the streets of
    Hong Kong will do little to answer their underlying grievances
    and will arguably serve to exacerbate them.
        The most critical and urgent step the central and Hong Kong
    Governments can take is to revisit the territory's undemocratic
    electoral arrangements and ensure that the appropriate ones are
    fashioned, as required by Article 45 of the Basic Law, ``in
    light of the actual situation,'' where the majority has
    repeatedly made clear that it favors genuine democracy.
        We urge that both take immediate action, including by
    developing a time-bound and detailed plan to put into practice
    universal and equal suffrage. Any proposals for methods of
    nominations should conform to international human rights
    standards, including those in the ICCPR, which pertains in Hong
    Kong.
        Hong Kong authorities also can and should immediately meet
    with protest leaders and submit a new report to the central
    government acknowledging broad support for genuine democracy
    and asking the National People's Standing Committee to clarify
    or retract its August 31 decision.
        While it is reassuring to see Hong Kong authorities
    investigate several police officers who were caught on camera
    viciously beating a protester, that confidence is undermined by
    repeated incidents of excessive use of force, including in
    recent days where police have used pepper spray at close range,
    hit with batons people who were clearly trying to leave protest
    areas, or tackle and arrest without warning student protest
    leaders. We urge the establishment of an independent
    investigative body to look into the now 1,000-plus complaints
    regarding police conduct.
        At a political level, it would be encouraging if the senior
    leadership in Beijing could accept the idea that people in the
    mainland and in Hong Kong want democracy and not construe
    people's demands for that as a threat to national security. At
    an absolute minimum, Beijing should stop arresting people in
    the mainland for their peaceful expressions of support to the
    demonstrators and lift whatever restrictions have been put in
    place for demonstrators to enter the mainland.
        The United States has expressed concern about violence, the
    right to peaceful assembly, and the rights to vote and to run.
    American officials have said that they have expressed these
    concerns directly to the highest levels of the Chinese
    Government. But much of the commentary, including President
    Obama's remarks while in Beijing, has been so calibrated as to
    be convoluted. Other remarks are superficially sensible,
    calling, for example, that difference between protesters and
    authorities be resolved through peaceful dialogue, but seem to
    deny the reality that Hong Kong people's efforts to do just
    that have been ignored.
        The U.S.'s repeated denials that it had had any role in
    fomenting or sustaining the demonstrations suggests to us that
    it is more concerned in assuaging Beijing's irrational fears
    than standing up robustly for democratic rights. It is
    appropriate to ask why President Obama could be so publicly
    restrained on the topic of elections and democracy in Hong Kong
    while he was in Beijing, yet just few days later offer up
    extensive commentary and support on the same subject in Burma
    and later from Australia.
        One recalls Assistant Secretary of State Victoria Nuland
    handing out bread to demonstrators in Maidan Square, American
    Ambassadors observing elections in other parts of Asia, or the
    U.S. vociferously decrying rollbacks of democratic rights in
    other parts of the world. Why not in Hong Kong? Such an
    approach undermines in our view the U.S.-Hong Kong Policy Act,
    and it enables other governments, which, for better or for
    worse, take their cues on these issues from the U.S., to remain
    virtually silent.
        Arguably most problematic in our view, it telegraphs to
    pro-democracy activists in Hong Kong and the mainland that they
    can likely only count on perfunctory support or recognition
    from the United States.
        So it is encouraging to us to see the reestablishment of a
    Hong Kong Caucus here in the Congress and the introduction of
    an updated Hong Kong Policy Act. We believe this to be a very
    important tool. We believe that increased U.S. Government
    scrutiny and regular reporting are and should be seen as a
    positive obligation, an opportunity to identify critical
    developments and points of leverage in a territory of
    extraordinary diplomatic, economic, and strategic interest to
    the United States.
        Thank you.
        Mr. Chabot. Thank you very much.
        [The prepared statement of Ms. Richardson follows:]

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                                  ----------

        Mr. Chabot. Ms. Currie, you are recognized for 5 minutes.

      STATEMENT OF MS. KELLEY CURRIE, SENIOR FELLOW, PROJECT 2049
                               INSTITUTE

        Ms. Currie. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you to the
    members of the committee, in particular Mr. Faleomavaega.
        It is an honor to be here on your last hearing and have the
    opportunity to speak on this subject. It is a real challenge,
    however, to follow my two colleagues who have so ably covered
    so many of the issues here. I will try to add something with my
    remarks.
        I have got a written testimony that I would like to submit
    for the record.
        Mr. Chabot. Without objection, so ordered.
        Ms. Currie. When Mr. Salmon talked about traveling to Hong
    Kong in 1997, he traveled with my former boss, John Porter, on
    that trip. My involvement in Hong Kong began with working for
    Mr. Porter for 5 years in the early and mid-1990s--and late
    1990s too, I guess--and his leadership on that issue inspired
    me to continue to follow the events in Hong Kong and inspired
    my respect for the people of Hong Kong and the efforts that
    they have made over the past 30 years since the signing of the
    Joint Declaration to preserve their democratic rights and
    freedoms.
        And watching what has happened over the past 2 months and
    indeed in recent years, as Beijing has carefully tried to
    rachet back the democratic prerogatives and freedoms of the
    Hong Kong people, has been a very frustrating act. When I
    worked in the Congress--and Mr. Rohrabacher, Mr. Salmon, and
    others will remember these days--the Congress was quite active
    on Hong Kong issues and took a leading role in pushing the
    administration forward in defending the rights and prerogatives
    of Hong Kong people.
        Unfortunately, in recent years both the Congress and the
    administration have gone relatively silent on Hong Kong. In
    particular, as the situation has evolved, we have not seen the
    kind of activism that marked those years around the handover.
    That is natural because that was a particularly important time.
    But the times now have shown that we need to maintain a focus
    on what is going on in Hong Kong and continue to follow up on
    the promises that the United States made when it took up the
    mantle as Hong Kong's guarantor in 1997 as the British
    retreated.
        I believe that this is a role that the United States took
    up willingly and because it has interests in Hong Kong, as Mr.
    Cheng as so ably outlined. But it also is aligned with our
    values. And that is why it is so disappointing to see how the
    U.S. has not stood up for the values of the Hong Kong people as
    well.
        I would like to just go to follow up on some of the
    recommendations that Sophie has mentioned about how the
    Congress can be more active.
        The U.S. handling of Hong Kong has hardly been the only
    example where our reticence has encouraged the worst impulses
    of the Chinese regime. Our Hong Kong policy approach takes
    place against a broader backdrop of reluctance to publicly call
    Beijing out over abuses that are rooted in the structural
    authoritarian nature of the regime.
        Beginning with the period leading up to the 2008 Olympics,
    there has been a perceptible change in U.S. willingness to
    publicly, consistently, and vigorously stand up for the rights
    of Chinese dissidents, Tibetans, Uighurs, and other persecuted
    groups. All democratic governments have become more reluctant
    to speak out over this period, but the absence of a strong U.S.
    voice has exacerbated this long-term trend.
        Given the strong message that the people of Hong Kong have
    sent the world through the Umbrella Movement, however, it is
    clear that the U.S. needs to start acting both on its values
    and its interests in Hong Kong in a more forceful way. The
    recent efforts to again require annual reports on Hong Kong are
    a good start. But Congress needs to hold the administration
    accountable for making these reports a serious policy effort,
    not just a useless box-checking exercise, which they had become
    toward the end when they ended after 2007. I don't know if you
    have read the old reports recently, but they are almost
    content-free, and they virtually ignore what was happening on
    the ground in Hong Kong, both in terms of the democracy
    movement that was emerging there and the growth of civil
    society and the role that Beijing was playing.
        I believe that in order to achieve a more meaningful
    report, the Hong Kong Policy Act should be amended so that the
    next review or the next report the executive branch is required
    to conduct a full interagency review pursuant to the
    presidential determination authority in Section 202 that
    relates to Hong Kong's autonomous status and whether it
    continues to be preserved and include detailed findings
    regarding whether Hong Kong is sufficiently autonomous to
    continue receiving the beneficial treatments that it currently
    receives.
        In addition to findings on detailed issues in cooperation
    with counterparts in Hong Kong, the report should also focus on
    the overall political context and progress for its genuine
    democratic reforms. The House Foreign Affairs and Senate
    Foreign Relations Committees should consider holding annual
    joint hearings on the reports as well. And Congress should also
    speak out more directly on its concerns through passing of
    resolutions and legislative action as needed.
        The administration also needs to speak up in defense the
    Hong Kong more publicly, more often, and more clearly. It
    should stop issuing the kind of confused statements that Dr.
    Richardson mentioned and that ignore China's failure to live up
    to the promise of ``One Country, Two Systems''. We should also
    not forget those on the mainland who were detained solely for
    expressing support for the Umbrella Movement.
        The U.S. should work with his partners in the U.K. To
    address China's implementation of the Joint Declaration through
    efforts such as joint commissions of inquiry and joint
    demarches. The U.K. Is our closest ally and international
    partner, and their credibility is on the line here as well, due
    to their failure to stand up for liberal values in Hong Kong.
        Likewise, we should look for opportunities where they may
    exist at the U.N., bearing in mind the low likelihood of any
    effective action. However, Beijing deeply dislikes being
    confronted at the U.N., so those opportunities at least do put
    the issues in a forum where they have to respond to them.
        The U.S., the U.K., and Commonwealth countries such as
    Canada and Australia, should also develop a joint protocol and
    treatment of student visa applicants who have been arrested for
    peaceful political activity. This is a very important issue
    because of the importance of education and study abroad for
    Hong Kong students and our requirement that if you have been
    arrested you have to list this on your visa application. We
    shouldn't penalize people for engaging in civic activity in
    Hong Kong.
        Mr. Chabot. Is your testimony about done?
        Ms. Currie. Yes. I am done.
        Mr. Chabot. Thank you.
        Ms. Currie. Finally, any cuts in Cantonese broadcasting on
    RFA and VOA should be restored so that we can continue to get a
    positive message out as media censorship rachets up in Hong
    Kong and outlets for genuine expression continue to be closed
    down there. Thank you.
        Mr. Chabot. Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Ms. Currie follows:]

        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                  ----------

        Mr. Chabot. And we thank all the witnesses for the
    testimony. I will now recognize myself for 5 minutes.
        It is disconcerting to know that while protests in Hong
    Kong continued, the administration was working behind the
    scenes to finalize deals and new initiatives with China which
    were announced following the APEC Summit last month, deals that
    raise a lot of questions themselves. I think it is logical to
    conclude that one of the reasons for the administration's weak
    responses and tepid support for pro-democracy forces in Hong
    Kong was to ensure that these deals didn't fall through.
        Looking ahead, what are the potential tradeoffs for U.S.
    policymakers between more forcefully pursuing democratic reform
    in Hong Kong on one hand versus pursuing other goals with
    Beijing? Do you think the administration's tip-toeing on
    providing support for the people of Hong Kong is ultimately
    more harmful for our role in Asia than helpful?
        And I would welcome any of the panel members. Dr. Cheng,
    would you like to take that?
        Mr. Cheng. Well, sir, to begin with, I think that one of
    the great flaws of the approach that you have outlined that the
    administration is pursuing is the fact that many of these
    agreements, at least at this point, have few published details.
    And the devil, as they say, is in the details, especially
    because the Chinese have demonstrated with the issue of
    suffrage their adeptness at legal warfare.
        So with the example of the climate change regulations, who
    will measure China's emissions? Whose statistics will they use?
    We know that Chinese statistics are often only perhaps
    glancingly associated with reality. As a result, we seem to be
    placing ourselves at the, essentially, mercy of Chinese
    statistics. To trade off our longstanding commitment on the
    issue of values, as my fellow witnesses have highlighted, in
    exchange for a promise of Chinese compliance based on their
    statistics makes buying a pig in a poke a sure guaranteed
    bargain by comparison.
        At the same time, it raises questions among many of our
    allies about the kind of allied and commitment we have to them.
    If we are not going to stand up for our principles, things of
    longstanding interest, in exchange for airy promises, what
    happens when it is the potential commitment of U.S. force,
    whether it is to places like the Senkakus or to ensuring
    freedom of the seas in the South China Sea?
        Mr. Chabot. Let me ask a different question to the other
    two witnesses if I can here, because my time, I am through it
    already.
        This past weekend, the most well-known student leaders were
    arrested, including Joshua Wong and Lester Shum, in a manner
    that demonstrated an alarming level of force from the Hong Kong
    police. Ms. Richardson or Ms. Currie, do either of you have an
    update on the status of these individuals or do you have a
    sense of whether they will be charged, and if so what they
    might be charged with?
        Ms. Richardson. Thanks for the question. The footage of
    their detention was indeed alarming. There appears to have been
    no provocation. They did not seem to be presenting any sort of
    imminent threat to the police. They are also hardly, if they
    were standing right here, I think we could say that they are
    not especially physically threatening people. And so the way in
    which they were arrested that day is particularly alarming.
    They were tackled to the ground, they were cuffed, no warning
    was given, and no request seems to have been issued that they
    effectively surrender themselves.
        They have both been released. It is not clear whether
    charges are going to be pursued. It is worth nothing that Mr.
    Wong was actually previously detained for about 48 hours until
    a judge, in really the finest we expect of Hong Kong's judges,
    essentially said the police have absolutely no basis to have
    detained him and let him go. But that was not until he had been
    detained and his computer had been seized and searched.
        It is hard not to see tactics like this as both evidence of
    lack of discipline in some circumstances on the part of the
    police, but also a way of telegraphing to other student leaders
    that this is what might be in store for them as well.
        Mr. Chabot. Thank you.
        Let me squeeze one last question here and a quick response,
    if I can. Today the founders of the pro-democracy campaign
    asked student protesters to retreat over concerns of growing
    violence at the hands of the police, who have used batons and
    pepper spray and teargas to drive back crowds.
        If they do indeed back down and return home, where do we go
    from here? Will that essentially indicate that they are
    capitulating to China or, as the founders stated, is it rather
    a silent denunciation of a heartless government?
        Ms. Currie. I am going to go with the latter. I think that
    what has been amazing, not just the past 2 months but
    Scholarism and the Occupy Hong Kong With Love and Peace
    movements that predate the past 2 months. And the activities
    that they have undertaken have shown a level of civic
    commitment, discipline, and just plain politeness and
    competence in engaging the authorities, I think that many
    people have been surprised by the youth of Hong Kong and
    heartened by how they have stepped forward and filled in this
    space.
        I think that Beijing fell back on its usual Marxist-
    Leninist tactics of ignoring the moderate opposition of Martin
    Lee, Emily Lau, Anson Chans of Hong Kong who wanted to engage
    them through official channels and do things moderately. And
    that didn't create enough of a crisis in order to justify
    heavyhanded rule, so they had to force a confrontation. But,
    unfortunately for Beijing, the demonstrators and the people
    involved in the Umbrella Movement have shown themselves to be
    of the highest caliber of character for the most part, with a
    few exceptions, obviously, but when you have that many people
    involved there will be.
        But I don't think they are going anywhere. The ideals they
    represent and the voices they represent and the issues that
    they represent aren't going anywhere, so they aren't either.
        Mr. Chabot. Thank you. My time has expired. Let me just
    conclude by saying very briefly that I am very heartened by the
    people of Hong Kong and the bravery and the standing up for
    their rights that we have seen. I have to say I am disheartened
    by the administration's lack of support there, just as I was in
    the Green Revolution in Iran a few years back.
        And my time has expired. I will now yield to the ranking
    member for his questions.
        Mr. Faleomavaega. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I certainly want to thank all our three witnesses this
    afternoon for their statements and the positions they have
    taken concerning this important issue.
        Just wanted to ask all the three members of panel, the
    administration supposedly says that they do not take a position
    at this time toward the situation now in Hong Kong. Do you
    support universal suffrage or do the protesters there in Hong
    Kong, what is your perception? If I were Chinese, I would say
    this is a local matter, what is it there for Americans to tell
    me what to do and how to do it? And I would like to ask the
    three panelists for your response to that.
        Ms. Currie. There are internationally recognized standards
    for what universal suffrage is. And it includes, as one of the
    members earlier referred to, one person, one vote. And it also
    includes the right of people to choose their own leaders.
        This is very important. In Burma, President Obama talked
    about this in the context of the Burmese elections, about the
    need for the Burmese people to be able to choose their own
    leaders. But yet in the Hong Kong context the administration
    says we don't take sides. This is deeply problematic.
        Mr. Faleomavaega. Dr. Richardson.
        Ms. Richardson. Just another point about international law,
    which is equally unbelievably clear that people have the right
    to run. There cannot be restrictions, undue restrictions on who
    is able to run, which is really the crux of the August 31
    decision.
        I think people in Hong Kong have made it painfully clear
    that they want to be able to vote, they want to be able to
    choose who they are voting for and how these people represent
    them. I think this is really not just about the finer points of
    electoral arrangements. I think people feel that the Hong Kong
    Government progressively less responsive to them and that this
    is another way in which their ability to control or have input
    into public policy is eroding.
        But I think the important point is that they have made it
    clear what they want. Also, look, let's just be very clear, the
    administration is perfectly capable of taking sides either in
    choosing party A or party B when it suits it. It is also
    perfectly capable of answering this question with respect to
    principle, and it has been awfully squeamish in both regards.
        Mr. Faleomavaega. Mr. Cheng.
        Mr. Cheng. I would also just note here that the National
    People's Congress's white paper in June and its statement on
    August 31 would seem to constitute at best an infringement, if
    not a violation in many ways of both the Joint Declaration and
    the Basic Law. Now, it is up to the National People's Congress
    to interpret these aspects, but to come up with an
    interpretation that is almost directly 180 degrees from what is
    stated really calls into question China's commitment to
    upholding international agreements.
        So the issue here is as much one of do you live up to your
    international commitments, and, if you don't, then it is for
    the United States, a key trade partner, a key presumably
    negotiating partner, to call you on this as part of enforcing
    international order.
        Mr. Faleomavaega. So will there be an agreement among the
    three members of the panel that there should be universal
    freedom to that extent, allowing the people of Hong Kong to
    decide for themselves their future politically and
    economically? Does that seem to be your position on this?
        Mr. Chabot. I think all three witnesses have nodded in the
    affirmative.
        Mr. Faleomavaega. I have said in my statement that I have
    always been very critical of our U.S. foreign policy toward the
    Asia-Pacific region, which has been no policy, in my opinion. I
    take this position because I feel that the mentality and the
    focus of our entire foreign policy is toward the Middle East
    and Europe, but when it comes to Asia-Pacific we get mixed
    signals. Every administration, every Congress, if you will, and
    even the people and the leaders in the Asia-Pacific region that
    I have met, they say, hey, what is going on? What is your
    position? Give me these basic principles that we are
    discussing.
        So that is my concern, Mr. Chairman.
        And would you like to comment on that?
        Ms. Richardson. I would love to comment on that and bring
    it back to a point that Mr. Rohrabacher raised in his opening
    remarks about, you were, I think, referencing a piece that was
    in Foreign Policy about whether the Obama administration has
    any senior people on China. I mean, look, the administration is
    filled with lots of people who have lots of China experience.
    Some of them are ferocious defenders of human rights, and we
    appreciate them.
        I think the problem is that there is no policy, and there
    hasn't been for quite some time. And arguably one of our real
    points of frustration has been to be presented with significant
    numbers of people with fairly deep China experience who have
    yet to craft a policy that is coordinated and executed from
    senior levels on down.
        Mr. Faleomavaega. I am sorry. My time is up. Thank you, Mr.
    Chairman.
        Mr. Chabot. Thank you very much.
        The gentleman from Pennsylvania is recognized for 5
    minutes.
        Mr. Perry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Ladies and gentlemen, I will start with Dr. Richardson and
    Ms. Currie. Recently Secretary Earnest made the statement the
    United States supports universal suffrage in Hong Kong in
    accordance with Basic Law, and we support the aspirations of
    the Hong Kong people, while at the same time--I think you
    already alluded to this. I just feel like it is important to
    have it on the record--the U.S. Consulate in Hong Kong said, we
    do not take sides in the discussion of Hong Kong's political
    development.
        With that, is the administration sending mixed signals in
    Hong Kong or to Hong Kong to the protestors? Same thing, are
    they sending mixed signals to Beijing? And is there a clear
    policy at all from the administration in this regard?
        Ms. Currie. Yes, they are sending mixed signals, both to
    the protestors and to Beijing. And, no, there is not a clear
    policy. I think that what you saw was the consulate issue a
    terrible statement that they were called on the carpet for,
    rightly so, by various quarters, and then Josh Earnest, trying
    to walk it back into something that is a little more
    appropriate, in line with the historic posture of the United
    States on Hong Kong and the Hong Kong Policy Act.
        But, again, it fits a pattern that Sophie just described of
    incoherence, of reactiveness. You have the so-called pivot or
    the rebalance that is unbalanced and not strategic in any real
    way and not rooted in American principles in any real way, and
    it causes them to constantly be spinning around saying one
    thing one day and something else the next. It is a problem
    across the board.
        Mr. Perry. Okay. I just wanted to get your input because I
    see this as a continued failure of foreign policy of which
    there are many strikes at this point. But moving on, other than
    the rhetoric that Mr. Sherman talked about earlier that we can
    engage in, I want to see us take more concrete action, or some
    concrete action.
        And let me just ask you this. Regarding what the Congress
    should do, United States Congress should do, would passing
    legislation to make Hong Kong eligible for the U.S. visa waiver
    program be a viable alternative that might make some form of a
    difference.
        Ms. Richardson. It strikes me as a perfectly sensible
    strategy to pursue. I think one of the difficulties in
    developing legislative responses to the crisis in Hong Kong is
    ensuring that the people of Hong Kong aren't being punished for
    essentially the mistakes or the problems caused by the central
    government or the failures of the Hong Kong authorities. It is
    difficult sometimes to separate those out.
        I do want to go back very briefly to the question you asked
    a moment ago which is simply to say that I think when this
    administration has been good on China and human rights issues,
    it has been very good. I will point, for example, to its
    reactions to the life sentence given to Ilham Tohti, a very
    prominent Uighur economist. There were statements from the
    White House, from the State Department, from the Secretary. The
    President mentioned Ilham Tohti at a speech in New York. But
    the unwillingness to deal with these issues or raise them
    publicly while in Beijing or, indeed, give remarks to the
    Chinese press in an interview to Xinhua, I think really
    undermines the comments about Ilham Tohti.
        The President made reference to ETIM, the East Turkestan
    independence movement. Experts have debated for years about
    whether it even exists, without providing information to
    substantiate that claim and in effect hang a bulls eye on any
    Uighur identified by the Chinese Government as being associated
    with ETIM is hugely problematic. And so it is this very, very
    inconsistent response. And one would like to think that this
    far in you could get a more consistent reaction, but that seems
    to be extremely difficult.
        Mr. Perry. Because my time is going to expire and I want to
    spend some time with Mr. Cheng, I think I will stick around for
    round two. But just keeping with your current line of thinking
    and responding, do you think that what you just described as
    putting a bulls eye, so to speak, on those folks that would be
    interested in that movement, is that borne out of ignorance? Is
    there some method to it from this administration or are they
    just clueless about it? I mean, how does that come about? They
    have not consulted with the right people that know something
    about the situation?
        Ms. Richardson. Mr. Perry, I would be delighted to have a
    good answer to that question. I don't.
        Let me be very clear. There have been horrific attacks
    against civilians in Xinjiang. That is absolutely clear, and we
    have condemned them. But I think the administration has fallen
    peculiarly prey to a Chinese Government line. We are going to
    hear that line again and again and again from Beijing in every
    discussion about Xinjiang and terrorism for years to come. How
    that sentence wound up in that interview, I do not know. And
    believe me, it is not for want of asking.
        Mr. Perry. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
        Mr. Chabot. Thank you. The gentleman's time has expired.
        The gentleman from California, Mr. Sherman, is recognized.
        Mr. Sherman. I want to pick up where the gentleman from
    Pennsylvania left off. I can't agree with the idea of a visa
    waiver for either Hong Kong or China, simply because we can't
    create a circumstance where anybody who can get a Hong Kong
    passport gets right into the United States. Over half the
    illegal immigrants or roughly half the illegal immigrants in
    the United States today came here on an airplane and their
    entry into the United States was legal. And given the
    incredible poverty of some in China, and even some in Hong
    Kong, I don't know if we can go visa waiver. I do see the
    reciprocity approach of how long a visa, once issued, is good
    for and how many different trips you can make, but those are
    only to people that we have decided will not be economic
    immigrants to the United States.
        But I do want to pick up on the gentleman from
    Pennsylvania's question, and that is, other than rhetoric is
    there anything we can do to express our dissatisfaction with
    this violation of the commitments of Beijing to the people of
    Hong Kong?
        Mr. Cheng. Well, to begin with, sir, on the issue of visas,
    for example, one of the things that clearly is important here
    is the opportunity to bring more information from Hong Kong out
    to the broader world and more information from the outside
    world to Hong Kong. Part of the issue here is the fact that the
    Chinese refuse to issue visas to journalists, and in fact at
    the joint press conference between President Obama and
    President Xi, he in turn lectured the New York Times about how
    if you don't get visas, it is your own fault.
        Mr. Sherman. Right. And that applies even to journalists
    going to Hong Kong, let alone those going to the rest of China.
        Mr. Cheng. Certainly there are controls, observations and
    the rest.
        Mr. Sherman. I think we have gotten an awful lot of
    information from Hong Kong during the present unrest. It is not
    like there is a shortage of Americans visiting Hong Kong. I
    think we are getting a fair amount of information.
        Mr. Cheng. We are, but that information comes out. That
    information doesn't necessarily go back in, and the Chinese are
    very, very tightly controlling their media. At a minimum,
    demanding reciprocity, given the number of official Chinese
    journalists in the United States, and creating that kind of
    reciprocity on the press visa aspect, would be----
        Mr. Sherman. I certainly don't want to reduce the number of
    Chinese journalists here.
        Ms. Currie, I think you had a important point also about
    visas, which is that being arrested by the Chinese Government
    for a political crime should not count against somebody in
    getting a visa to the United States. Does the State Department
    have the procedures now to make sure that we can tell the
    difference between a pickpocket and a political activist.
        Ms. Currie. Frankly, we don't really, especially in a high-
    volume visa office like the consular office in Hong Kong.
        Mr. Sherman. Do we even have something on the form where
    you can say, I have been arrested but it was political?
        Ms. Currie. There is a place on the form where you say that
    you were arrested, and then you can explain the circumstances.
    But the average consular officer, you have to remember, is a
    brand new foreign service officer usually serving their first
    tour overseas, and their inclination is generally to say no.
        Mr. Sherman. We have got to somehow bring in the State
    Department, and I don't care how junior these people are, they
    can't be discriminating against people because they have been
    arrested for political rights and expressing themselves
    politically.
        I just want to say that this all comes from our insane
    trade policy toward China since we granted MFN. We have this
    enormous trade deficit which creates this huge debt which
    causes Americans to shrink from criticizing China, because oh,
    my God, they loan us so much money, money we wouldn't have to
    borrow if we were allowed to sell our goods to China. And it
    also creates these enormous profits that create some of the
    biggest names in our country, biggest corporations in our
    country, becoming lobbyists against doing anything to undermine
    the insane trade policy that started it all.
        I don't think we are going to have a balanced policy toward
    Hong Kong until we have balanced trade. I might also point out
    that if we had balanced trade with China we would have a labor
    shortage and significantly increased wages in this country.
    That could happen if we adopted Warren Buffett's idea of
    legally required balanced trade. I don't think that is likely
    to be adopted any time soon. I don't know whether Mr. Cheng had
    a comment on that.
        Mr. Cheng. Sir, I think that part of the fundamental
    concept of trade is, of course, competitive advantage. Whatever
    else the Chinese are guilty of, and they are guilty of quite a
    few things, the reality is that we are not going to create or
    recreate the textile industry in this country regardless of----
        Mr. Sherman. Sir, reclaiming my time. Germany exports to
    China. We don't. Those are political decisions. The American
    workers are the best in the world. The American products are
    best in the world. And the huge trade deficit is not because we
    don't provide value. It is because of the slanted trade
    policies and IP policies of China. And blaming the American
    worker, blaming the American product for the decisions made in
    Beijing is not the way I want to go.
        I yield back.
        Mr. Chabot. The gentleman's time has expired.
        The gentleman from California, Mr. Rohrabacher, is
    recognized.
        Mr. Rohrabacher. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        I would remind Mr. Sherman that I have a piece of
    legislation that suggests that we should not be permitting more
    Chinese journalists to come to the United States than they
    permit us to have our journalists come and operate in China. So
    reciprocity would be, I think, one tool, especially considering
    that the vast majority of their so-called journalists are
    actually spies and people who have come here to do us harm and
    propagandize for their dictatorship rather than trying to find
    honest information to provide for the Chinese people. So I
    would think that would be a good way to deal with that.
        We don't seem to have any reciprocity with the Chinese. I
    mean, didn't we give most favored nation status to China after
    they slaughtered the democracy movement in Tiananmen Square?
    What was our reciprocity there? In fact, it was just the
    opposite. We gave them a reward even though they had just
    committed an evil action. WTO was, of course, permanent most
    favored nation status, was granted by the Clinton
    administration. Let me just note again this is bipartisan in
    the sense that Herbert Walker Bush was the one who originally
    came out kissing the feet of these gangsters in Beijing and
    followed by Bill Clinton, all anxious to do favors for these
    omnipotent rulers of Beijing who rule with an iron fist.
        China is, because of its size and other factors, should be
    considered the world's worst human rights abuser. We were told
    there would be some impact on that if we just simply did
    business with them. And I think, Mr. Sherman, before you leave,
    I would like to make sure I back up your point--I don't think
    he hears me--back up his point. The Chinese are not, as you
    say, outdoing us economically because of the American worker.
    We have given enormous economic benefits to them in terms of an
    open market, in terms of capital investment, in terms of
    turning our face away and letting them get away with the
    massive threat of American technology which has basically
    permitted them to introduce products to the market that were
    based on our R&D. So they don't have any R&D costs. We are
    picking it all up for them. No wonder they can charge less.
        I think that the people of Hong Kong are our greatest ally
    in the fight for freedom and peace in this world because they
    are confronting the world's worst human rights abuser. Just as
    when we ignored and betrayed the people in the Tiananmen Square
    democracy movement, we now have a world that is less peaceful,
    we now have a world that is more at risk because of this
    vicious dictatorship that stays in power. The young people, the
    young activists in Hong Kong today, if they are successful,
    will create a better world, a more peaceful world, a world in
    which the Chinese and American people will deal with each other
    as equals and not having a President being afraid to bring up
    whatever issue with the leader, with his counterpart in
    Beijing.
        I think that it is quite obvious where we could actually be
    doing things that would counteract or at least put ourselves to
    be taken seriously by the Chinese. There are things we could be
    doing, and especially when it comes in the economic area.
        But also, look, when the Chinese Government decides that
    they are going to commit armed force against people who have a
    territorial dispute, whether it is against India, whether it is
    against Japan, whether it is against the Philippines, whether
    it is against Vietnam----
        Mr. Connolly. Or Crimea.
        Mr. Rohrabacher. Well, that is what I am saying. In Crimea,
    Putin sends a couple troops across the border into areas that
    want to be part of Russia and we go bananas. But China commits
    all of this force across the way in disputed territories, there
    is no price to pay. Well, we need to have a little bit more of
    a consistent pro-freedom policy, and if we do, like the people
    in Hong Kong, like the activists in Hong Kong, the people of
    this world will help build a better world, and we will be on
    their side.
        Thank you very much.
        Mr. Chabot. Thank you. The gentleman's time has expired.
        The gentleman from the Commonwealth of Virginia is
    recognized for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Connolly. I thank my friend, and I couldn't resist
    helping my friend from California because I wanted him to have
    an all-inclusive list.
        Thank you, panel, for being here. And I want to get in two
    sets of questions if I can. I pray I can get it in.
        One is, I would be very interested, and I am going to start
    with you, Dr. Richardson, because you said the problem is not
    that the Obama administration hasn't done good things in human
    rights and other areas, it has, but the problem is no policy. I
    would like to explore that. What ought to be our policy in Hong
    Kong, and what is our leverage? Let's have a realistic, not a
    quixotic policy.
        And then secondly, the second question I want to get at
    with the three of you is, what is the impact on Taiwan? Taiwan
    is watching all of this. If there was any appetite in Taiwan,
    and there was, for maybe a similar model some day in the
    future, what is the impact on Chinese behavior vis--vis Hong
    Kong, do you think, on those aspirations or those political
    dynamics in Taiwan?
        So the first question, what ought to be our policy? And
    what leverage do we have to try to fashion it?
        Ms. Richardson. Let me try to answer the first one very
    quickly about policy. I think one of the big problems is that
    15 years ago when we were having the PNTR debate, human rights
    issues occupied a much larger piece of the policy pie. And as
    the relationship has deepened and expanded and there are dozens
    and hundreds of competing interests, the amount of time and
    attention that is given to human rights issues has shrunk.
        What we have wanted to see is a much more thoughtful policy
    approach that recognizes human rights issues and human rights
    protections as fundamental to a host of different issues in the
    relationship. Quite like Mr. Rohrabacher's point about pro-
    democracy protestors in Hong Kong as allies, these are the
    people who are arguing for protections that are just as
    important for their electoral processes as they are for U.S.
    businesses to do what they do and succeed in that part of the
    world. It is about a free press and an independent judiciary
    and a free flow of information.
        I think the fact that no more thoughtful policy has been
    developed such that human rights-related requests or demands
    can be leveled by many different actors in the U.S.
    relationship, that it remains almost exclusively the purview or
    the burden of the State Department as they sometimes view it,
    has made it very easy for the Chinese Government to essentially
    minimize and not react to the kinds of demands that are made.
        There are certain practical tactics that really aren't used
    very well any more, the demands of releases. Even the
    clarification after the President's visit of the human rights-
    related requests that were made in advance of the visit that
    weren't fulfilled. Right? I mean, there are levers that aren't
    being pulled, but there is also the very obvious value of
    public rhetoric and challenging Chinese officials publicly,
    which is something they deeply dislike and usually will move to
    try to avoid. And I think making that a regular part of an
    interaction, whether it is Secretary Johnson or whoever runs
    the Pentagon or Secretary Kerry, is critical. I am going to
    leave the Taiwan question.
        Mr. Connolly. Yeah. I agree with you wholeheartedly, and I
    think human rights always must be a hallmark of U.S. diplomacy,
    and we retreat from who we are when we don't make it one.
    Having said that, it must also be done carefully and subtly,
    that question of leverage again.
        Well, if I announce that I am forming Democrats for Chabot
    for Speaker, I guarantee you that is not helpful to Steve
    Chabot and in some quarters might even make him suspect, that
    he is so friendly with people like me. So in a more serious
    vein, we need to be careful that with the best of intentions we
    don't put a target on somebody by virtue of our blessing and
    imprimatur. So it has to be done with skill, is my only point.
        Ms. Richardson. I am all for skill, and I am all for
    nuance, but I also think we are not yet at a point in time--and
    we should be--where a host of interests across the U.S.
    Government recognize the Ilham Tohtis, the Puder Changs, the
    Gao Yus, all of these people who have gone to prison in China
    as allies for their interests as well and go to bat for them.
        Mr. Connolly. That is right.
        Ms. Richardson. This is not an enormous analytical leap.
    And this problem is getting significantly worse in the
    mainland, and it requires a much more robust response.
        Mr. Connolly. Good point.
        Mr. Cheng, on Taiwan.
        Mr. Cheng. Very quickly, sir, 2016 will be a crucial year,
    and I would predict that we are going to be looking at much
    worse cross-straits relations. The recent elections in Taiwan
    have already seen a significant growth in DPP popularity and
    power. This was not necessarily key to what has been going on
    in Hong Kong specifically, but there is no question that the
    people in Taiwan who are skeptical of reunification look at
    what has happened in Hong Kong as a very important warning.
        The cross-straits relationship has been calm for the last 6
    years, in no small part because President Ma Ying-jeou chose
    not to emphasize independence. But the prospect of a pro-
    independence government arising in Taipei is especially
    difficult to calculate because Xi Jinping himself was not
    within the inner circle of power when there was a previous DPP
    President.
        So essentially you could wind up in 2016 with three sets of
    leaders, all of whom have very different interests, a potential
    DPP President possibly, but certainly more pro-independence
    sentiment on the island; Xi Jinping, who would be confronted
    with a pro-independence attitude on the island; and of course
    we ourselves are going to be very, very focused on our own
    electoral politics, and perhaps, as the ranking member noted,
    not necessarily paying the right amount of attention to that
    region as the pot begins to boil.
        Mr. Connolly. Thank you. And Mr. Cheng is a constituent of
    mine, and his brilliance is obvious.
        Mr. Chabot. Thank you. The gentleman's time has expired.
        We will go on a second round, but we are going to have
    votes here very shortly, so if we can keep it. I will just ask
    one question. And my colleague and friend from Virginia has
    already brought it up. I was going to talk about Taiwan, so I
    will just bring it up very briefly because you already
    addressed it, Mr. Cheng, very well.
        And that is, relative to Taiwan, obviously they can't have
    helped but observe China's thuggish behavior in Hong Kong, and
    I think it probably did send a message in the recent election
    to some degree because KMT was soundly defeated in the local
    elections around the country.
        Now, President Ma, to his credit, had spoken out in favor
    of the Hong Kong protestors. And so you addressed the question
    really. I just really wanted to get back, as one of the
    cofounders of the Congressional Taiwan Caucus, what impact will
    this have, if any, on the public's attitude toward China and
    reconciliation versus independence versus maintaining the
    status quo, et cetera?
        Mr. Cheng. As we saw this summer with the Sunflower
    Movement which took over the Taiwan legislature, there is a
    growing unease, frankly unhappiness in Taiwan toward the
    current status quo. There is a perception that the island is
    falling ever more under the sway of Beijing. And if Beijing
    were living up to its commitments, was truly valuing things
    like ``One Country, Two Systems'', that might produce one
    dynamic. But as we have seen in Hong Kong, what this really is
    saying is, from the people of Taiwan it seems, we don't trust
    you as a partner.
        Now, the problem is that, and we saw some of this in Hong
    Kong, is Beijing doesn't take to that sort of skepticism very
    well. And the sad reality is that Taiwan's security is eroding.
    There have been reports from our own military about how
    Taiwan's ability to control the air space and sea space around
    the island is deteriorating. There has not been a major arms
    sale to Taiwan in years. The recent sales have mostly been
    fulfilling previous commitments dating back over a decade.
    Taiwan has been asking for the U.S. to allow teams to go and
    study the problem in Taiwan, and those requests apparently are
    sitting on some State Department desk for years.
        By the way, this is bipartisan. It is not simply this
    administration. They has been sitting on those desks dating
    back to the previous administration. This sends a signal,
    unfortunately, to Taiwan that maybe you should try and cut a
    deal, unfortunately, with an unreliable partner.
        Mr. Chabot. And if I were a resident in Taiwan, I would be
    particularly concerned when they hear stories about the
    administration's goal to reduce our military back to pre-World
    War II levels at a time when the PRC has increased their
    military expenditures by double digits every year for the last
    25 years.
        That being said, I think that the U.S. should continue to
    maintain a very strong relationship with Taiwan, and we should
    be there for them. They are a role model for other countries
    around the world, and we shouldn't let them be bullied by the
    PRC.
        That being said, I will yield back the balance of my time
    and turn to the gentleman from American Samoa.
        Mr. Faleomavaega. Mr. Chairman, I have no further questions
    other than to again thank our distinguished panelists for their
    statements and their positions. And I certainly want to thank
    you for your leadership and your service to our committee and
    to our country. Yes, this will be my last subcommittee hearing,
    and it has been my distinct honor and privilege of having
    served with you and the other members of the committee,
    hopefully being helpful in developing a better world.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Chabot. Thank you very much.
        The gentleman from Pennsylvania.
        Mr. Perry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I will turn to Mr. Cheng. We spoke briefly prior to this
    about China and the fact that they aren't a very good neighbor.
    They are happy to--well, we in this country are oftentimes
    accused from within and without of being imperialist. They on
    the other hand go ahead and take the minerals and the raw
    materials--with a deal, they make a deal with somebody, some
    nation, to take the raw materials. And as you aptly put it,
    they don't lecture. Of course, they are not in any position to
    lecture, but they don't lecture. They are happy to do that. But
    as a world actor on the world stage, they are not a very good
    neighbor in the way that we would see one.
        That having been said, why do you suppose there is this
    reluctance from this administration to take quantifiable action
    regarding Beijing's actions in Hong Kong--cyber crime, the
    physical incursions in the China Sea, et cetera. Why do you
    suppose there is this reluctance? And I said to you, and I just
    want you to recount your statement, I said to you, is it
    because we borrow so much money from them and we are concerned
    that that would jeopardize that? If you could just elaborate.
        Mr. Cheng. Sir, I do not believe that the administration is
    reticent because of the concern over issues of debt, because,
    frankly, China purchases American debt more because of the
    situation with its own currency which is under very tight
    control, which is not free floating. China is not really in a
    position to replace the U.S. as a global reserve currency. It
    is buying American debt because it is probably the best and
    safest place to put China's surpluses short of building the
    world's largest mattress and stuffing all of that money
    underneath.
        I do believe, however, that the administration has chosen
    to value other things more highly than in some cases our
    principles and in other cases our traditional strategic
    interests. The administration, for example, trumpeted the
    climate change agreement as a huge advance despite lacking in
    details. This dates back to 2009 when the administration made
    very clear that what it wanted from China more than anything
    else was an agreement at the Copenhagen climate talks.
        So I believe that the administration is pursuing what for
    it is a rational choice of saying what they value, which seems
    to be on issues of things like climate, and on more nebulous,
    less concrete things from their perspective, such as human
    rights or American security commitments to the region, it is
    willing to offer those up.
        Mr. Perry. Thank you.
        Moving on, I would just like to make one clarification
    while I have got the mike. A good friend from the other side of
    the aisle commented that my interest in potentially modifying
    the visa waiver program would be untenable because he included
    all of China in the discussion where I did not ever advocate
    for all of China, just Hong Kong specifically. I also find it
    very telling and interesting that he would continue with
    restrictions for political dissidents, meanwhile advocating for
    an open southern border, which he currently is, as far as I
    know.
        That having been said, again to you, Mr. Cheng, if you can
    just codify very simply, what are our interests in Hong Kong,
    and why should Americans care? Why should Americans care? Why
    should we invest? What are our interests? If you can codify
    that pretty simply, I know that is hard to do. I have got about
    1\1/2\ minutes left, which is yours.
        Mr. Cheng. Sir, some of the issues at stake here, at the
    most materialistic end, this is a global financial hub. You
    create massive disruption if you have instability in one of the
    world's truly global financial centers. You raise questions
    about the American commitment to its principles when we walk
    away from people who want to be free.
        My colleagues here have stated quite eloquently the issue
    of values and where they stand and how we are perceived with
    regards to those values and especially if we walk away from
    them. And, frankly, we also send the wrong message to Beijing
    about what is in its interests if we mislead them into thinking
    that they can violate agreements without consequences. At some
    point, if somebody keeps getting away with things, they are
    going to keep on doing that.
        Mr. Perry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank you, panelists.
        I yield back.
        Mr. Chabot. The gentleman's time has expired. The gentleman
    from Virginia is recognized.
        Mr. Connolly. Thank you.
        First of all, Mr. Cheng, I agree with your last statement.
    I believe Beijing in a sense respects one thing: Power. And it
    is a mistake for the United States not to sell weapons to
    Taiwan. It is a mistake for the United States not to show, in
    fact, a fortified relationship with Taiwan, especially in light
    of the developments in Hong Kong. It is a mistake for the
    United States not to make it very clear, at least in diplomatic
    sessions with the Chinese, we care a lot about that, and it
    will impinge the relationship, as Dr. Richardson, I think, was
    suggesting in a previous answer to my question.
        I do want to be fair though. I know you are from Heritage
    Foundation. But with respect to Mr. Perry, it is hardly limited
    to this administration that we pull our punches with China. I
    wish that were true. Since Richard Nixon went to Beijing and
    visited with Zhou Enlai and saw the Forbidden City and the
    Great Wall, every succeeding administration has made
    compromises that make one sad about U.S. principles and virtues
    and values because they are weighing various and sundry
    factors, and there seems to be this ethos we can't afford to
    make the Chinese angry. And it seems to me that that is the
    wrong calculus, even if it is noble in intent.
        And I wonder if you might all want to comment on that
    because I am cochair of the Taiwan Caucus, and I feel that it
    is really important we not equivocate about the Taiwan
    Relations Act commitments to Taiwan and that Beijing is always
    calculating those misses. And we have now virtually given
    Beijing veto power over weapon system sales, as Mr. Chabot
    indicated, to Taiwan, and I think that is a terrible mistake.
    But at any rate, your views. Question of what does Beijing
    respect and how does that fashion or should fashion or
    influence U.S. policy.
        Ms. Currie. I agree with you that this is a bipartisan
    problem and it largely tends to be focused in the executive
    branch, but not exclusively. When I worked at the State
    Department it was very frustrating at times to see the way in
    which the Department and the government as a whole, the
    executive branch as a whole, would curl into a self-protective
    ball when it came to dealing with China and choose the issues
    that they would raise and the way in which those issues would
    be raised based on the likelihood that they would provoke a
    negative reaction. The things that provoked the negative
    reaction go off the list, and the things that can be talked
    about safely without upsetting the Chinese stay on the list.
        And our officials become conditioned over time, because the
    Chinese react to anything in a very hyperventilated way when
    they don't like what they are hearing from our officials.
    Whereas we are conditioned to sit and take everything that they
    say, no matter how offensive it is to our values, no matter how
    offensive it is to our interests. Our diplomats sit there and
    take it from the Chinese. And then when we say anything that is
    even mildly critical, they fly off the handle. And it is a
    strategic negotiating tactic that they use in the way that they
    deal with us.
        So i think part of the problem is it goes back to the way
    our diplomatic corps is organized, how they are trained, what
    they are prepared to deal with when they go into meetings with
    the Chinese. They simply are not, even when they are China
    hands, and in some cases the China hands are the worst because
    they have invested all these years in learning Chinese and in
    making relationships with people in the Chinese Government. The
    last thing they want to do is screw up their career by
    alienating their interlocutors.
        So one of the big problems is trying to get people out of
    this mind frame that the relationship is the most important
    thing about our relationship. It is not. The relationship is a
    means to an end. And our interests and our values are the same
    thing when it comes to China. These two fundamental issues lie
    at the heart of the problem with our lack of policy and our
    lack of strategic thinking about how to deal with China.
        Mr. Connolly. Thank you so much.
        If the chairman will indulge, I would just like to give the
    other two panelists an opportunity to answer the same question.
    I thank the chair.
        Ms. Richardson. I will try to be very quick and just point
    out that in 1997 the great hope was not only that rights in
    political space in Hong Kong would be protected and possibly
    expand, but also that it might have a positive influence on the
    mainland. And we are here today because we are seeing the
    opposite. And I think if the U.S. really does believe that
    democracies and rights-respecting governments make better trade
    partners, make better strategic allies, make more reliable
    partners across a host of issues, there is a lot more work to
    be done with respect to China.
        I think it is also deeply problematic. It is not just a
    question of people I think scaling back their expectations of
    diplomatic initiatives or what the Chinese Government may or
    may do, I think there is almost a complete absence from these
    discussions about what people more broadly in China want and
    supporting that and expressing some solidarity with people who
    are trying to make precisely the kind of change that I think is
    fundamental to the U.S. achieving its long-term policy goals.
    Again, it goes back to the point about seeing various activists
    in the mainland as key allies for lots of different interests
    in the U.S., not as sort of the human rights box to be checked.
        Mr. Cheng. Sir, the key and fundamental difference here is
    that China knows what it wants. It pushes for those goals, and
    it pushes them with every lever at its disposal, which given a
    centralized authority means economic, industry, official
    spokespeople, media, et cetera.
        We need to be consistent in our policy objectives and
    persistent in enunciating them. We need to apply not only the
    State Department and the Commerce Department and the levers of
    government in the executive branch and also here in the
    legislative branch, but also to encourage business, to
    encourage NGOs, to encourage media and other places to be as
    forthright in standing up for those American principles, not
    American Government principles, but American principles, as the
    Chinese are in standing up for theirs.
        I don't fault the Chinese for standing up for what they
    believe in. That is their business. I do fault us for not
    applying all of those levers in a consistent manner
    persistently.
        Mr. Chabot. Thank you. The gentleman's time has expired.
    All time has expired. And we want to thank the panel for its
    testimony here this afternoon. We are being called to the floor
    for votes now. All members will have 5 days to supplement their
    remarks or submit questions.
        And I want to once again thank Mr. Faleomavaega for his
    service to this committee, to American Samoa, and to our
    country. We really did mean all those nice things that we said
    about him.
        And if there is no further business to come before the
    committee, we are adjourned. Thank you.
        [Whereupon, at 3:44 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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