[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
UNDERCOVER STOREFRONT OPERATIONS: CONTINUED OVERSIGHT OF ATF'S RECKLESS
INVESTIGATIVE TECHNIQUES
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT
AND GOVERNMENT REFORM
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
APRIL 2, 2014
__________
Serial No. 113-151
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform
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COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM
DARRELL E. ISSA, California, Chairman
JOHN L. MICA, Florida ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland,
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio Ranking Minority Member
JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
PATRICK T. McHENRY, North Carolina ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of
JIM JORDAN, Ohio Columbia
JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts
TIM WALBERG, Michigan WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri
JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
JUSTIN AMASH, Michigan JIM COOPER, Tennessee
PAUL A. GOSAR, Arizona GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
PATRICK MEEHAN, Pennsylvania JACKIE SPEIER, California
SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee MATTHEW A. CARTWRIGHT,
TREY GOWDY, South Carolina Pennsylvania
BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
DOC HASTINGS, Washington ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois
CYNTHIA M. LUMMIS, Wyoming DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois
ROB WOODALL, Georgia PETER WELCH, Vermont
THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky TONY CARDENAS, California
DOUG COLLINS, Georgia STEVEN A. HORSFORD, Nevada
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina MICHELLE LUJAN GRISHAM, New Mexico
KERRY L. BENTIVOLIO, Michigan Vacancy
RON DeSANTIS, Florida
Lawrence J. Brady, Staff Director
John D. Cuaderes, Deputy Staff Director
Stephen Castor, General Counsel
Linda A. Good, Chief Clerk
David Rapallo, Minority Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Hearing held on April 2, 2014.................................... 1
WITNESSES
B. Todd Jones, Director, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and
Explosives
Oral Statement............................................... 5
Written Statement............................................ 8
APPENDIX
Opening Statement of Chairman Issa............................... 58
Opening Statement of Rep. Cummings............................... 62
April 1, 2014, letter to the committee by the Federal Law
Enforcement Officers Association, submitted by Rep. Cummings... 64
April 1, 2014 letter to ATF from Josephine Terry, submitted by
Chairman Issa.................................................. 66
December 12, 2013, letter to Attorney General Holder from The
Arc, submitted by Chairman Issa................................ 69
U.S. DOJ ``Report on Operation Fearless and Related Matters,''
submitted by Rep. Chaffetz..................................... 73
April 1, 2014, letter to Chairman Issa from U.S. DOJ, submitted
by Rep. Gosar.................................................. 78
Follow up questions and answers from U.S. DOJ.................... 83
UNDERCOVER STOREFRONT OPERATIONS: CONTINUED OVERSIGHT OF ATF'S RECKLESS
INVESTIGATIVE TECHNIQUES
----------
Wednesday, April 2, 2014,
House of Representatives,
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform,
Washington, D.C.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m. in room
2154, Rayburn House Office Building, the Honorable Darrell Issa
[chairman of the committee], presiding.
Present: Representatives Issa, Mica, Turner, Jordan,
Chaffetz, Amash, Gosar, Meehan, DesJarlais, Farenthold, Massie,
Collins, Meadows, Bentivolio, DeSantis, Cummings, Maloney,
Norton, Tierney, Clay, Connolly, Speier, Duckworth, Kelly, and
Grisham.
Staff Present: Jen Barblan, Majority Senior Counsel; Molly
Boyl, Majority Deputy General Counsel and Parliamentarian;
Lawrence J. Brady, Majority Staff Director; Lawrence J. Brady,
Majority Staff Director; Ashley H. Callen, Majority Deputy
Chief Counsel for Investigations; Sharon Casey, Majority Senior
Assistant Clerk; Steve Castor, Majority General Counsel; John
Cuaderes, Majority Deputy Staff Director; Carlton Davis,
Majority Senior Counsel; Adam P. Fromm, Majority Director of
Member Services and Committee Operations; Linda Good, Majority
Chief Clerk; Tyler Grimm, Majority Senior Professional Staff
Member; Christopher Hixon, Majority Chief Counsel for
Oversight; Mark D. Marin, Majority Deputy Staff Director for
Oversight; Ashok M. Pinto; Majority Chief Counsel,
Investigations; Andrew Rezendes, Majority Counsel; Laura Rush,
Majority Deputy Chief Clerk; Jessica Seale, Majority Digital
Director; Jonathan J. Skladany, Majority Deputy General
Counsel; Peter Warren, Majority Legislative Policy Director;
Rebecca Watkins, Majority Communications Director; Aryele
Bradford, Minority Press Secretary; Jennifer Hoffman, Minority
Communications Director; Peter Kenny, Minority Counsel; Elisa
LaNier, Minority Director of Operations; Juan McCullum,
Minority Clerk; Dave Rapallo, Minority Staff Director; and
Valerie Shen, Minority Counsel.
Chairman Issa. The committee will come to order.
The Oversight Committee exists to secure two fundamental
principles. First, Americans have the right to know that the
money Washington takes from them is well spent. Second,
Americans deserve an efficient and effective government that
works for them.
Our duty on the Oversight and Government Reform Committee
is to protect these rights. Our solemn responsibility is to
hold government accountable to taxpayers because taxpayers have
a right to know what they are getting from the government.
Our job is to work tirelessly in partnership with citizen
watchdogs to deliver the facts to the American people and bring
genuine reform to the Federal bureaucracy.
Without objection, the Chair is authorized to declare
recesses of the committee at any time.
Today's witness, Mr. B. Todd Jones, took over as the head
of the ATFE as Acting Director and later as the first Director
in the wake of Operation Fast and Furious and the scandal that
surrounded it.
His mission was to change the culture at ATF and move the
agency in the right direction. This was no small task. Two and
a half years into his tenure, it is safe to say the ATF still
has a long way to go.
Just over a year ago in Milwaukee, the Milwaukee Journal
Sentinel reported on Operation Fearless, an undercover,
storefront operation conducted by the Alcohol, Tobacco and
Firearms in Milwaukee, Wisconsin during the Director's tenure.
Everything about Operation Fearless was wrong. ATF agents
allowed convicted felons to leave the store armed and
dangerous. Three weapons, including a machine gun, I repeat,
not a semiautomatic weapon often called a machine gun, a
machine gun was stolen from an ATF vehicle.
The storefront was burglarized and $39,000 worth of
merchandise was stolen all because the ATF neglected to install
an alarm system. ATF exploited a mentally handicapped person
with an IQ in the mid 50s to assist in the storefront operation
and then arrested this poor limited capacity individual for his
involvement.
When we learned about this, Chairman Goodlatte, Chairman
Sensenbrenner, Senate Ranking Member Grassley and I immediately
wrote the ATF requesting more information. Only after receiving
our letter did the Director that day order an internal review,
even though ATF management was aware of all the operation
problems.
In April 2013, ATF briefed committee staff on this
operation. ATF assured us that the botched operation was ``an
isolated incident.'' In December 2013, however, we learned that
ATF mismanaged similar undercover operations across the country
stretching from Portland, Oregon to Albuquerque to Wichita to
Atlanta to Pensacola, Florida.
These other storefront operations followed an incredibly
reckless pattern. Agents allowed felons to leave the store with
weapons, agents exploited mentally handicapped people and
agents failed to take precautions to protect the stores from
theft.
ATF's dangerous tactics may actually be increasing crime in
your neighborhood. When ATF undertook these operations they do
not inspire public confidence. Rather, they make America wonder
if ATF is a reliable partner to keep the streets safe.
The Milwaukee operation, Fearless, was part of the ATF's
Monitored Case Program. The Monitored Case Program was created
after Operation Fast and Furious to ensure careful oversight of
field operations from ATF headquarters. Unfortunately, it is
clear that in the case of Operation Fearless, the Monitored
Case Program failed and failed miserably.
Today's hearing will explore whether other cases are
slipping through the cracks at ATF even though Monitored Case
programs exist to prevent just that. Effective leadership
requires accountability. Accountability ensures that mistakes
are not repeated.
Three years after the death of Border Patrol Agent Brian
Terry, ATF has yet to fire anybody for their roles in Operation
Fast and Furious. I personally find that inexcusable. Today, we
will learn whether ATF has held any employees accountable for
dangerous, mismanaged Operation Fearless.
We have been down this path before. ATF has promised to
change its culture, implement new policies and procedures and
hold agents accountable for their actions. What good are these
new policies and procedures if they too fail? What good are
promises of accountability if the accountability never occurs?
What message does it send to the hard working ATF agents who
get it right? You can be reckless and jeopardize public safety
in furtherance of your investigation but you will not be
disciplined or certainly not fired.
The Director now faces the difficult task of moving the
agency forward from its most recent scandal and hopefully,
finally, restoring integrity to the ATF.
I now recognize the Ranking Member for his opening
statement.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to welcome today's witness, the Honorable B.
Todd Jones, who was confirmed and sworn in last summer as the
Director of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and
Explosives.
For seven years, since 2006, the ATF did not have a Senate-
confirmed Director. I welcomed Director Jones' confirmation and
I know he has been extremely busy addressing many of the
Bureau's problems and challenges that he inherited.
ATF plays a critical role in enforcing our Nations firearms
laws and combating illegal firearms trafficking and other
crimes. Its agents, investigators and support staff work to
protect the American people from gun violence that has ravaged
communities across the country and, as a matter of fact, has
ravaged the very community that I have lived in for the last 32
years.
ATF personnel played a key role in responding to the Navy
Yard shooting, the Boston Marathon bombing, the Sandy Hook
tragedy and the Aurora movie theater attacks. In the words of
Chairman Issa, I want to thank all of those ATF agents publicly
right now who get it right.
Given the inherent dangers associated with conducting
operations that target violent criminal organizations, the ATF
must take on a certain degree of risk. Our hearing today is
focused on ensuring that the Bureau properly manages this risk
while protecting the safety of its personnel and especially the
surrounding communities.
Today, we will hear about one type of operation, the
undercover storefront. The ATF officials explained that the
Bureau has used this investigative technique successfully over
many years. By working deep inside communities that are being
terrorized by violent gangs and drug cartels, ATF agents
contend that they have been able to make a significant
difference for the residents of these various neighborhoods.
I am hoping that during his testimony this morning the
Director will explain to us exactly what is so special about
these types of programs and why are they required to get to
certain types of problems.
Over the last year, however, there have been numerous
allegations involving storefront operations in several cities.
In January 2013, the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel reported that
an undercover storefront operation in Milwaukee purchased
weapons at above market prices, including weapons that were
recently purchased at retail outlets.
It also reported that three ATF-issued firearms were stolen
from the trunk of an agent's vehicle, including an automatic
weapon that was never recovered. It was also reported that some
defendants were incorrectly identified and charged and that the
operation netted primarily low level individuals on firearms
and drug charges.
Last December, the Journal Sentinel highlighted additional
allegations in five cities: Albuquerque, Atlanta, Pensacola,
Portland and Wichita. According to these reports, some of these
operations allegedly targeted individuals with mental
disabilities. One operation was located near a school and some
others allowed felons to leave the premises with firearms they
brought into the store.
I understand that as soon as these press reports came out,
then Acting Director Jones order the Bureau's Office of
Professional Responsibility and Security Operations to fully
investigate these allegations. Last March, this office issued a
detailed report that found many deficiencies with these
operations.
According to the report, ``These deficiencies caused a loss
of property, created risk to the public and officer safety and
led to the improper arrest of four individuals.'' The report
found that ``The absence of comprehensive written guidelines
and best practices for the operation of an under cover
storefront was a contributing factor in many of the
deficiencies in Operation Fearless.''
It also found that the primary cause of deficiencies not
being identified and corrected was the failure of the case
agent and the first-line supervisors to report those problems.
I am hopeful that Director Jones will address the issue of
accountability and the issue of people reporting up. We found
in Fast and Furious there were some issues with that. The
question becomes has that been corrected.
In response to these findings, Director Jones and ATF
prepared a comprehensive manual incorporating lessons learned
from the Milwaukee operation and best practices from many other
successful storefront operations. The Bureau will also require
a personal briefing between agents and ATF headquarters, as
well as on-site inspections of the storefronts.
As I close, I hope that the committee will hear more today
about ATF's responses to the serious allegations, the reforms
that ATF has implemented and additional measures ATF can take
to have safety in high risk operations.
ATF certainly has had its share of problems over the years.
Our focus today should be one ensuring that the agency
continues its path towards reform. I understand the Department
of Justice Inspector General is also investigating the
Milwaukee operation and I hope we can obtain the results of
that review soon as well.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to place in
the record a letter sent to the committee yesterday from the
Federal Law Enforcement Officers Association.
Chairman Issa. Without objection, so ordered.
Mr. Cummings. I yield, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Issa. The gentleman yields back.
Members may have seven days in which to submit opening
statements for the record.
I now ask unanimous consent that the letter sent yesterday
to ATF by Brian Terry's family be placed in the record. Without
objection, so ordered.
Chairman Issa. I would ask that Mr. Jones also be provided
a copy if he doesn't already have it.
Mr. Mica. Personal privilege.
Chairman Issa. The gentleman is recognized.
Mr. Mica. I want to introduce a very, very special guest,
somebody who is read about in the history books, who is my
guest today. The gentleman sitting back here is Joe Kittinger,
who held the record of a man jumping from space. He has had
almost every honor you can imagine nationally and
internationally, a part of the National Aviation Hall of Fame.
Joe is here with his wife, Sherri. Joe, raise your hand so
everyone can see you. Thank you for being with us today.
Chairman Issa. I thank the gentleman.
We now welcome our witness, the Honorable B. Todd Jones,
the first full Director of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
Firearms and Explosives.
Pursuant to committee rules, I ask the witness to please
rise and take the oath.
Do you solemnly swear or affirm that the testimony you are
about to give will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing
but the truth?
[Witness responds in the affirmative.]
Chairman Issa. Mr. Jones, you are a returning witness, so
you know the routine. We won't shut off the clock but hopefully
you will use close to the five minutes.
The gentleman is recognized.
STATEMENT OF B. TODD JONES, DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF ALCOHOL,
TOBACCO, FIREARMS AND EXPLOSIVES
Mr. Jones. Chairman Issa, Ranking Member Cummings and
members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to
appear today.
I am pleased to be here to discuss the progress ATF has
made in implementing reform and to discuss our undercover
storefront operations.
As you all know, ATF's principal mission is to protect our
communities from violent criminals who engage in acts of arson,
criminally misused explosives and illegally possessed and used
firearms. We accomplish this mission through both the
enforcement of the criminal law and regulation of the firearms
and explosives industries.
When violent crime shakes our Nation, ATF is there to work
side by side with our law enforcement partners providing our
specialized skills, tools and experience. As was mentioned, in
the past two years alone, ATF has provided crucial support to
our federal and local partners in the investigation of the
Boston Marathon bombing and the horrific mass shootings in
Aurora, Colorado, Newtown, Connecticut and the Washington Navy
Yard.
Equally important though, we work with these partners to
address the less visible, but no less devastating daily
violence that plagues our cities and towns, large and small.
Across the country, ATF pursues the most violent criminals,
particularly those who engage in organized gang violence or
illegally supply those gangs with firearms.
A few of these successes are highlighted in the full
written statement we have submitted.
Our agents put their lives on the line on a daily basis. As
they investigate our Nation's most violent criminals, they must
make difficult and often instantaneous decisions every day,
constantly balancing public safety, their own safety and the
integrity of the operation.
Of all the activities undertaken by ATF agents in the
field, none is more risk laden or potentially more valuable
than under cover work. ATF agents working under cover have
infiltrated and brought down notorious motorcycle and street
gangs, thwarted murder for hire plots and removed thousands of
guns from the hands of criminals.
The committee has asked that I address one under-cover
tactic in particular, the use of storefront operations. A
storefront operation is a valuable investigative technique in
which the under cover law enforcement officers or agents
operate a business that is calculated to identify and
proactively intervene with criminals and criminal activity in
high crime areas and hot spots. They are also conducted as
joint operations with other federal, State and local law
enforcement agencies and prosecutors.
ATF conducted 37 storefronts between 2009 and 2013. ATF had
one storefront active in 2013 and currently we have no active
storefront operations.
Storefronts are staff, equipment and resource intensive and
require significant planning and coordination. The success of
the storefront is also dependent upon a strong partnership and
ongoing collaboration with our local law enforcement partners.
The storefronts to be discussed here today identified and
built cases against criminals and would be criminals in each
and every location. As a result of our storefront operations in
Albuquerque, Atlanta, Milwaukee, Pensacola, Portland and
Wichita, over 250 defendants have been convicted and over 1,300
firearms recovered.
These defendants have over 350 previous felony convictions.
These convictions and the firearms recoveries undoubtedly made
the communities and the people who live there safer.
I acknowledge, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee,
that there were deficiencies in our execution and management of
some past activities in certain storefronts, but I want to
assure you that public safety is the utmost importance to me
and our current team at ATF.
We recognize that storefronts and other under cover
operations require stringent oversight in all facets of
planning and execution. We have put in place several policy and
operational changes, created a tighter process for the
authorization, management, oversight and review of under cover
operations, including storefronts.
As an organization, we are committed to learning from the
past and using some of those hard learned lessons to improve,
adapt and ensure we do not repeat the mistakes of our
predecessors.
In addition to our own efforts, ATF has and will continue
to cooperate with all inspector general reviews and
investigations. Some of the specific reforms we have instituted
pursuant to our own initiatives are outlined in our written
submission, but the important point is putting policy into
practice. That is what we have been working on very hard for
the last several years.
It is one thing to put policies on paper but another thing
to make them real and put them into practice. All ATF
employees, including me, are accountable for their actions and
must act at all times with professionalism, integrity and
commitment to the agency's vital public safety mission.
While I firmly believe we are on the right path, I am also
realistic, Mr. Chairman, and recognize that meaningful change
takes time.
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I want to
conclude by saying that ATF is proud to be at the front line
against violent crime that we are recognized across the country
for our expertise and take great pride in our successes that
reduce gun violence and remove violent offenders from the
streets.
I am humbled by the exceptional work done every day by ATF
special agents, industry investigators and the support staff in
combating violent crime. In the face of sustained criticism
over the last several years, the dedicated men and women of ATF
have continued day in and day out to work tirelessly to enhance
the safety for all Americans. They and their families have my
deepest gratitude for their sacrifices that this often
thankless work requires. I am honored to be here today to
represent ATF.
Thank you for your interest. I am sure you have questions
which I will do my best to address.
[Prepared statement of Mr. Jones follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Issa. Thank you, Director Jones.
I too want to reiterate the importance of the work that the
men and women of the ATF do and how much we appreciate the many
who take the risk to do the right thing in the right way.
Let me go through a couple of questions. No surprise, the
first one is a little related to Fast and Furious. Everybody at
the Department of Justice, from yourself to the Attorney
General, is living under the specter of Fast and Furious and
how it discredited the men and women who do these jobs
otherwise right.
To make the record clear, was anyone fired as a result of
Fast and Furious?
Mr. Jones. Mr. Chairman, I can say publicly in this forum
that everyone involved with ATF and the chain of command has
either been disciplined or is no longer with the agency.
Chairman Issa. Okay, but the answer of fired is no, is that
correct? Say yes or no.
Mr. Jones. As a result of the Inspector General's report,
the answer is no.
Chairman Issa. No one was fired, some chose to retire, so
let us go to a particular individual of interest, William
Newell. The IG recommended he be removed but in a settlement,
we have learned he was demoted from SES to GS-13. Did you
approve that settlement?
Mr. Jones. Mr. Chairman, we provided to the committee in
great detail a confidential document of the processes we
followed internally following the release of the IG's report.
It outlines with some particularity all of the individuals that
were identified in that report and the actions taken.
I am not at liberty in this public forum to get into
details.
Chairman Issa. Director, you are here pursuant to a
subpoena specifically because Congress does not afford you that
choice on the Privacy Act by the statute itself. More
importantly, we know what occurred. My question simply was one
that you can answer and has nothing to do with privacy. Did you
make that decision?
Mr. Jones. The process at ATF involves a professional
responsibility board.
Chairman Issa. Director, I understand. I am only asking did
you influence or have an input into that call of his not being
fired, his continuing to draw a paycheck and eventually retire
at his high pay as an SES?
Mr. Jones. I did not.
Chairman Issa. You did not. Did your number two have that
influence?
Mr. Jones. The process involves the Bureau deciding
official and the ultimate decision-maker is the Deputy Director
with appeal to me should the employee not be satisfied.
Chairman Issa. But the employee was satisfied and number
two made the call, is that fair to say for the public record?
Mr. Jones. That is fair to say.
Chairman Issa. Similarly, the Professional Review Board
proposed that Hope McAllister receive a 14-day suspension,
which I consider pretty minor. This was reduced to a letter of
reprimand. Would that also have gone through your deputy?
Mr. Jones. Again, Mr. Chairman, the process is pretty well
delineated in terms of the rights of the employees to grieve
and the ultimate decision being made with my involvement with
the Senior Executive Service being a little different than
anyone who is not a member of the SES ranks.
Chairman Issa. The Professional Review Board proposed that
David Voth be demoted to a non-supervisorial special agent
position. In settlement, he was demoted. Again, that would have
been the same process you are alluding to?
Mr. Jones. It was the process and it was followed.
Chairman Issa. So McAllister, Voth and Newell, none were
fired, all received certainly less than what the American
people would expect.
Let me move on to the five separate undercover storefront
operations with the Milwaukee one being the best known.
At this point, I am going to ask unanimous consent that the
letter dated December 12, 2013 from the organization and
nonprofit called ARC for people with intellectual and
developmental disabilities addressed to the Attorney General be
placed in the record along with excerpts from their website.
Without objection, so ordered.
Chairman Issa. I am going to read to you Director Jones,
something from that letter in which Attorney General Holder
they say decides that it is appalling and unfortunate. They
say, speaking of the intellectually disabled, people with low
IQs, ``They typically have limited if any understanding about
their involvement in crime or the consequences of being
involved in a crime. With few options for or opportunities to
build safe relationships, their strong need to be accepted by
peers in their own communities can create a unique
vulnerability that people without IDD do not experience.''
Have you become familiar with the effects that agents can
have by buddying up to people with IQs in the 50s as a result
of these operations?
Mr. Jones. I think it is important to point out that we not
target the developmentally disabled. When we run an undercover
operation, we have very limited control over who comes in the
door. I can tell you that my review of the circumstances, I
have met with ARC and talked with them about the concerns with
enhanced training, but all of these issues that have been
identified in the media with respect to developmentally
disabled individuals being targeted are the result of defense
pleadings during the process.
I am a former prosecutor. Oftentimes in investigations, the
criminal investigators have no idea what the individual's
intellectual capacity is.
Chairman Issa. But your agents worked with these people
including, at least one individual who had to be tutored, I
understand, through what a machine gun was so they could send
him out to buy one so they could then arrest him.
Director, we have had a good relationship, you have a big
job but I am going to ask you one closing question. Are you
actually telling us that it is just an accident that your
people managed to find people with extremely low IQs? These are
people who are barely functional, who clearly demonstrate their
special needs and limitations, very, very limited people.
In the 70s and 80s, you might say he is just not the
brightest ball; in the 50s and 60s, these are people severely
handicapped who just want to buddy up, who really exhibit a
type of behavior that most people in America are somewhat
familiar with, even if it doesn't enter their lives.
You are saying that your agents don't look for these people
who are so vulnerable they can just buddy up and get them to do
these things? Are you saying that under oath here today?
Mr. Jones. No, I am not saying that.
Chairman Issa. So your agents do target people with low IQs
because they are susceptible, exactly as this letter say, to
the kind of influence and what is most appalling to us is after
they use these people often in dangerous positions, they then
in many cases arrested the same people they had put in and
talked into doing these crimes, is that correct?
Mr. Jones. No, that's not correct.
Chairman Issa. That is what the Milwaukee Sentinel says and
it is what the evidence seems to show.
I am going to let all of us continue on and hopefully I
will come back to you.
Mr. Cummings?
Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Picking up where the Chairman left off, we had admitted
evidence into the record earlier, this letter from the Federal
Law Enforcement Officers Association, Jon Adler is the national
president.
This morning when I was reading this, there was a paragraph
which kind of struck me because I too am very sensitive to what
the Chairman just asked about, people with low IQs, having my
own experience in my own family.
This is what Mr. Adler said, and I wonder if you agree with
this. In this letter, he says, ``It has been alleged that ATF
targeted and exploited the mentally and incapacitated to
facilitate storefront connections to perspective criminals.
That is beyond absurd and no one in the field administers
impromptu, Jeopardy-style quizzes to assess the IQ of
perspective criminal elements. Prisons are occupied by
criminals with IQs ranging from moron to genius.
``Anyone experienced in law enforcement will tell you that
the former is the most difficult to use as a cooperator.
Furthermore, criminal elements don't provide their Myers Briggs
assessments to law enforcement and agents are left with making
a variety of critical assessments of those they are dealing
with in real time, including threat levels and safety issues.''
``Nonetheless, neither the ATF nor any federal law
enforcement component is in the practice of exploiting mentally
incapacitated individuals.''
I didn't say that. Mr. Adler, the National President, said
that. Do you agree with that? Do you have any issue with what
he said there?
Mr. Jones. Thank you for the opportunity to further explain
some of the things the Chair was talking about.
We do not target developmentally disabled or mentally
challenged individuals. We target criminal behavior. When you
are running an uncover storefront operation with all of the
bells and whistles to make sure you can maintain the integrity
of the operation, you have all kinds of individuals walking in
the door. You have no idea.
I think it is interesting to note that the media reports
about this targeting of individuals really is based primarily
on defense motions that were filed and the culling of the
public record and there is no awareness by the special agent at
that time. All of these individuals were brought to trial and
all of them raised claims in the context of sentencing advocacy
about their intellectual capacity. That is not unusual.
I have been a defense lawyer too but that is after the
fact, after someone has pled guilty. None of them claimed they
were incompetent to stand trial.
That is not to excuse the sensitivity involved and the
enhanced training that may be involved not only with the
developmentally disabled but people with mental illness. There
was an article today in the New York Times that talked about
the challenges to law enforcement, State, federal and local,
and particularly with ATF doing violent crimes type of
operations where we are having interactions with people on the
street much like State and local law enforcement officials.
It is a huge challenge for individuals who are in a law
enforcement capacity to make determinations about someone's
mental illness or their mental capacity.
Mr. Cummings. Director, I would like to ask you about the
specific action you took when you became of these allegations.
When the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel published its first story
in January 2013, you directed ATF's Office of Professional
Responsibility and Security Operations to conduct an
investigation, is that right?
Mr. Jones. That is correct. I gave them 30 days.
Mr. Cummings. Had you known about it before then?
Mr. Jones. I had two indicators before that. One was some
indication that a storefront in the St. Paul Field Division had
been burglarized. That storefront closed down in September and
it had been burglarized. I do have recollection about seeing
the storefront being burglarized.
I also had an indicator in the report about the stolen
weapons but that was the extent of the red flags that were
going off. I think the third thing was when we did see that
there were landlord tenant issues in part flagged in the
Milwaukee Journal Sentinel about how we left the storefront,
that is when we dispatched internal affairs to go out and do a
deep dive and look at what was going on in Milwaukee.
Mr. Cummings. I think the Chairman would be interested in
hearing this also. I said it in my opening statement. Can you
explain what is so unique about the storefronts and what
problems does it get to that you have to bring that kind of
operation into play?
Mr. Jones. It is an undercover technique that really is
designed to do several things. One is to gather intelligence in
the area that you locate the store, gather intelligence about
crime gun trafficking, about criminal activity, it is also an
opportunity to remove crime guns from the streets. That is in
an ideal world but it is primarily an information, intelligence
gathering technique and it is an opportunity to remove crime
guns from the street.
Mr. Cummings. In Baltimore where we have had a pretty high
crime rate and had cooperation from ATF and many other
agencies, one of the things I have always thought about and am
concerned about, I live where The Wire was filmed, you talked
about intelligence. If there is a drug operation going on and--
using this hypothetically--fighting each other for territory,
how do you get information to prevent a murder?
Would this kind of operation be helpful then? People look
at murder rates in cities, but the question is how would police
even know? Would this kind of operation go to that, too?
Mr. Jones. This is just a tool in the toolbox. There are
other things that we do, other undercover types of operations.
There is Title III telephone intercepts and then there is the
good old fashioned investigation where people take information,
they pull the threads, they use confidential informants and
build a case brick by brick. That takes information.
Mr. Cummings. The Chairman talked about this. We have an
agency that has been under the microscope, that has been highly
criticized and it is also an agency that didn't have a
permanent director for years. This was an agency that some
would like to see disappear.
It seems to me that one of the problems that I saw in Fast
and Furious was that information did not filter up to the top.
What is new now? What have you done to address that so that
when you come before us, you can be held accountable?
We were in situations before where the top people knew
nothing about what was going on down below. I was curious to
where we are now with that and did we learn anything from that,
did we learn anything from these storefront situations. When
you pulled together your recommendations for how you do
business now, how is that different, if at all?
Mr. Jones. A lot has changed. As I mentioned in my opening
remarks, change takes time. One of the things I believe is
really important to understand is the list that is required to
turn policy and procedure into practice.
When I came on as Acting Director in September 2011, the
Monitor Case Program had been on paper in July 2011. It was a
paper program, those were the fundamentals. We took a lot of
action with the pen right out of the blocks.
In addition to the pen, you need the people. You need to
get the right people in the right spots, you need to construct
a team and you need to emphasize the focus over and over again,
that this has to be real. This has all taken place in an
environment over the last several years and we have had
tremendous turnover in the organization and a very challenging
budget environment. We are grateful that we do have a fiscal
year 2014 budget so that we can plan.
This is an organization, as you pointed out, that had not
had continuous leadership. Now, between acting and being
confirmed, I have 30 months on the job. I very much have the
blocks beat. I own it for good or bad. When something is wrong,
I am going to take action to fix it.
Those remedial steps don't always happen overnight. We have
been working very hard with our team to make sure we are
learning from mistakes, that some of the systemic challenges
that were pointed out in the OIG Fast and Furious Report are
fixed and they stick.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Issa. Thank you.
I now recognize the gentleman from Ohio.
Mr. Jordan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Jones, are you familiar with the name Catherine
Engelbrecht?
Mr. Jones. I think that is an individual--yes.
Mr. Jordan. Are you familiar with the fact that she
testified in front of this committee eight weeks ago and her
testimony under oath was that in 16 years of operating her
business, the only interaction she had with the Federal
Government was filing her annual tax returns. She filed for tax
exempt status for two organizations she was involved in
creating, True the Vote and Kingstreet Patriots and then just
all kinds of interaction with the Federal Government.
OSHA visits her place of business. That never happened in
the first 16 years but then OSHA visits her place of business
twice. The IRS audits both her personal and business records
for two years. The FBI pays her six visits, two in person and
four on the phone. Another organization, your organization,
pays her two visits as well.
I sent you a letter six weeks ago asking for documents
relating to the visit ATF made to Ms. Englebrecht's place of
business and you have yet to respond to us. Is there a reason
why you cannot get us those documents?
Mr. Jones. I can check into what the delay is in the
response.
Mr. Jordan. It has been six weeks, Mr. Jones. It would seem
to me to be a pretty simple search. You put the name
Englebrecht in your computers, come up with the documents and
get them to Chairman Issa and myself.
Mr. Jones. I understand that Ms. Englebrecht's interaction
with us--I cannot speak for any of the other federal agencies--
involved a license request, a qualification inspection and then
a follow up.
Mr. Jordan. She had that license for 12 years. Why did you
suddenly decide to go visit her. The previous 12 years you
never had any interaction with her, then you visit her in
February 2012 and April 2013. Why did you visit her on those
dates? Why did you visit her twice in 13 months when for the
first 12 years, you never paid her any visits?
Mr. Jones. Congressman, I will get back to you on the
letter.
Mr. Jordan. Let me read what the Inspector General's report
said about how ATF goes out and looks at federal firearms
licensees compliance inspections. It says you look for a high
risk indicator. Is that true?
Mr. Jones. That is one of the factors.
Mr. Jordan. High risk indicators says this: such as a high
number of guns used in crime scenes traced back to the
licensee, numerous multiple sales by a federal firearms
licensee to a single individual, thefts or losses of firearms,
location in a high crime area, tips from State or local law
enforcement agencies, do you know if you had any of those
circumstances or any of those indicators or any of those
present before you went to visit Ms. Englebrecht?
Mr. Jones. I don't have information sufficient in front of
me to answer that.
Mr. Jordan. I can tell you, none of them were and yet you
show up. In 12 years, no one ever heard from ATF in 12 years
and then suddenly, she applies for tax exempt status and you
knock on her door twice in 13 months.
Mr. Jones. Congressman, I wish I had better answers.
Mr. Jordan. This is a pretty important issue. It has been
front and center in the news for over a year now. I do too.
Imagine what this lady felt like. She gets the full weight
of the Federal Government coming down on her, her family and
her business and all she is trying to do is get a tax exempt
status that had been routine for 15 years. Suddenly, the
Federal Government is saying no, no, no, you are not going to
get that tax exempt status and we are going to send four
federal agencies out to harass you, including yours.
Mr. Jones. Congressman, it is unfortunate that you and Ms.
Englebrecht think it is harassment. From our perspective, it is
part of our regulatory function.
Mr. Jordan. Don't you think it is unusual that four federal
agencies visited her in that short time frame?
Mr. Jones. I cannot speak for other agencies other than
ATF.
Mr. Jordan. Let me ask you this. Did anyone at the White
House encourage ATF to pay Ms. Englebrecht a visit in Dallas,
Texas?
Mr. Jones. No.
Mr. Jordan. Did any other federal agency talk to you or
anyone at ATF and encourage you to inspect and visit Ms.
Englebrecht?
Mr. Jones. No.
Mr. Jordan. Did any member of Congress contact you or
anyone at ATF and encourage you to go out and visit and inspect
Ms. Englebrecht's federal firearms license?
Mr. Jones. Not to my knowledge.
Mr. Jordan. No knowledge of anyone contacting you at all?
Mr. Jones. No.
Mr. Jordan. Have you talked to any other federal agency
about what you learned or discovered when you visited Ms.
Englebrecht's place of business?
Mr. Jones. Not to my knowledge.
Mr. Jordan. What did you discover when you visited there in
February 2012 and April 2013?
Mr. Jones. It was a qualification inspection. I have no
idea based on what I have.
Mr. Jordan. Were there any citations, any problems, any
fines, anything that you discovered?
Mr. Jones. I don't know.
Mr. Jordan. Our standing is there is not. We talked with
Ms. Englebrecht. In fact, we had her sit in that same chair and
answer questions from this committee.
Let me ask one other question. Did Tom Perez have any input
into your agency's determination to go inspect and investigate
Ms. Englebrecht's place of business?
Mr. Jones. No.
Mr. Jordan. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Chairman Issa. Would the gentleman yield?
Mr. Jordan. I would be happy to yield.
Chairman Issa. I also signed onto that letter and was
disappointed we did not receive further answers before this
hearing.
I will say that in light of the deliberate and verified
targeting of conservative groups by Lois Lerner and the IRS, we
cannot take coincidence, things which occur which appear to be
linked to somebody's application as a conservative for an IRS
application. There were leaks from the IRS of names of
contributors, including a constituent of the Ranking Member,
that were damaging and appear to be deliberate.
I hope you understand that when we see a pattern by an
agency and then we see coincidences, it is our committee's
requirement to fully explore what appear to be unusual
anomalies. We are not accusing you of anything but we do need
the specifics of both classified and unclassified, if
necessary, so that we can understand how such an anomaly
occurred.
Mr. Jordan. Mr. Jones, can you give us a date when you can
get those documents to the Chairman and myself and the entire
committee?
Mr. Jones. We will work with staff and your staff to figure
out the specifics.
Mr. Jordan. Sooner or later? Is it going to be as soon as
next week?
Mr. Jones. As soon as we can.
Mr. Jordan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Issa. I only want your commitment that you will
provide them.
Mr. Jones. I have been cooperative with both your staffs
and committee members in providing information as quickly as we
can. I hope you understand there is a process. I do know that
we have to get better answering the mail.
We have worked very hard and have changed some of our
processes to get better in answering the mail because we know
you need information and we have it but we also have a certain
process and level of sensitivity.
Mr. Jordan. Mr. Chairman, again, this is simple. This is
one individual, Catherine Englebrecht and the documents
relating to why after 12 years of never showing up at her
place, why you decided to go twice in 13 months. Any document
that has Englebrecht mentioned in it, we want that information.
That is a pretty simple search.
I think you can have it to us in a week, a day maybe, but
here we are six weeks later and you are telling us we will try
to do it as soon we possibly can. We heard that last week from
John Thomson at the IRS. He told us two years.
Chairman Issa. I thank the gentleman.
We now go to the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Connolly.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Welcome, Director Jones. We are so glad you are in place
and confirmed after seven years of Acting Director at the ATF
and we finally have a confirmed Director. Thank you.
I think it is quite notable that in your brief tenure, you
have already made a huge change. As I understand it, 23 field
special agents in charge, out of 25, are new under your
leadership; 38 new headquarters senior executives are new under
your leadership; to say nothing of looking at the storefront
operations and making reforms there.
You can look up Ms. Englebrecht. I remember that hearing
too. She seemed to think that it was outrageous that the
government was out to get her because she wasn't notified of an
OSHA inspection at her manufacturing plant. Of course the
statute is clear, that would actually be a violation of law if
OSHA had given advance notice of when they were coming.
She was found to have nine serious violations. She was not
inspected for a period of time. We only have 2,200 OSHA
inspectors for 8 million workplaces. It is not unusual that
there can be a gap of as much as 20 years before a firm might
actually be inspected.
She settled, by the way. The original fine was $24,850 and
she settled for $14,910, so other than that, the government is
out to get her.
Director Jones, did you volunteer to come and testify
before this committee?
Mr. Jones. I appear with an invite from the Chair.
Mr. Connolly. Were you subpoenaed to come here?
Mr. Jones. I believe there was a subpoena issued but I was
coming before the subpoena was issued.
Mr. Connolly. So you are not here as an unwilling witness?
Mr. Jones. No. I look forward to answer your questions.
Mr. Connolly. The Chairman has alleged ATF has not been
cooperative in this investigation, so let me go through that.
On April 15, ATF provided committee staff with a briefing
by an Assistant Director with operational knowledge of the
Milwaukee operation. Is that correct?
Mr. Jones. After Internal Affairs did their report with a
30 day turnaround, I believe they finished in March and we had
a briefing because of some of the confidentiality issues.
Mr. Connolly. On April 15?
Mr. Jones. On April 15.
Mr. Connolly. You were certainly cooperative with that?
Mr. Jones. Yes, sir.
Mr. Connolly. At the briefing, your staff provided an
overview of the detailed report that you ordered from the
Office of Professional Responsibility and Security Operations.
Is that right?
Mr. Jones. Yes, sir.
Mr. Connolly. On April 30th, the Department of Justice
provided additional information in response to the committee's
request answering questions about the operation and your
knowledge of it. Is that right?
Mr. Jones. That is my understanding.
Mr. Connolly. The Department provided documents in response
to the committee's request including ATF's policies for the
storage of firearms and vehicles and for conducting a
storefront operation. Is that correct?
Mr. Jones. Yes.
Mr. Connolly. On May 31, the Department provided additional
information, including steps ATF had taken for improvements to
planning and oversight over undercover storefront operations.
Is that correct?
Mr. Jones. Yes, sir.
Mr. Connolly. You did not provide the report from the
Office of Professional Responsibility at that time. Is that
correct?
Mr. Jones. I believe that is correct, although it has
been----
Mr. Connolly. Don't jump ahead of me. At that time, you did
not provide it?
Mr. Jones. That is correct.
Mr. Connolly. The reason you didn't provide it was
Mr. Jones. We were fixing things.
Mr. Connolly. And you were in the middle of a criminal
investigation?
Mr. Jones. Yes, we were.
Mr. Connolly. You didn't want to compromise that criminal
investigation, that would be a bad thing and the outlandish
risk that somebody in this committee might leak it or use it?
Mr. Jones. Once we produce information that could
compromise a criminal investigation, there is always
sensitivity when we have parallel investigations and requests
outstanding from Congress, from the Inspector General and their
active criminal investigations.
Mr. Connolly. That report has now been provided to the
committee, is that correct?
Mr. Jones. With some redactions, yes.
Mr. Connolly. On March 19, the Chairman issued the
subpoena. In his letter to you, he accused you of ``a complete
lack of cooperation with the committee's investigation.'' He
stated, ``not once have you or your staff responded to any of
these letters and produced even a single document.'' Is that an
accurate statement of your relationship with this committee?
Mr. Jones. I would hope that our relationship is
appropriate and professional and that the information that we
provide is done in a timely manner.
Mr. Connolly. But the fact is, Director Jones, you and your
staff have made yourselves available to this committee and you
have produced documents, including the one we just talked
about, is that correct?
Mr. Jones. Yes, sir.
Mr. Connolly. So it is not accurate to say you have not
produced a single document or that you have been completely
uncooperative with this investigation or is it?
Mr. Jones. That is not accurate, sir.
Mr. Connolly. I thank you and I thank you for your service,
Director Jones. We wish you all the success.
Thank you. I yield back.
Chairman Issa. Mr. Connolly, would you like to take the
witness stand? You seem to be not only good at giving
testimony, but you are very good at getting Mr. Jones to give
known answers.
Mr. Connolly. Mr. Chairman, I have learned from the best.
Chairman Issa. I have never been able to get Mr. Jones to
answer something yes or no but you are a master and I
congratulate you.
Mr. Connolly. I thank the Chair.
Chairman Issa. Thank you.
We now go to the gentleman from Utah, Mr. Chaffetz.
Mr. Chaffetz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Director, thank you for being here. Congratulations on
being appointed and confirmed. We need you in this position and
wish you nothing but the best.
Mr. Jones. Thank you.
Mr. Chaffetz. We want to thank the men and women who serve
on the front lines in very difficult situations dealing with
nefarious characters and God bless them for the work they do.
I would ask unanimous consent to enter into the record an
Office of Professional Responsibility and Security Operations
Report on Operation Fearless dated March 21, 2013, simply the
executive summary on pages 14 and 15.
Chairman Issa. Without objection, so ordered.
Mr. Chaffetz. Thank you.
Director, is it safe to say that the analysis to take away
from Fast and Furious was that it was fatally flawed and
disastrous, how would you characterize what happened with Fast
and Furious, in just a word or two?
Mr. Jones. Fast and Furious?
Mr. Chaffetz. Yes.
Mr. Jones. That is why I am here. It was a lack of
oversight and a leadership failure.
Mr. Chaffetz. If you look at what happened on Operation
Fearless, how would you characterize it?
Mr. Jones. It was on a smaller scale because there is no
comparison between Fast and Furious and what happened in
Fearless. I am not excusing the things in our internal affairs
report and we have taken remedial action to fix those things
like we have every time we have identified them.
Mr. Chaffetz. It was flawed as well, too, correct?
Mr. Jones. It was flawed, there were mistakes that were
made. It did result in prosecutions, it did result in guns
coming off the street.
Mr. Chaffetz. But it is certainly not the poster child of
what it should be doing and certainly not the fix we hoped it
would be.
Mr. Jones. No. That operation had its flaws.
Chairman Issa. Would the gentleman yield?
Didn't it also result in a machine gun going on the street
that has never been found, a yes or no would be good, like Mr.
Connolly?
Mr. Jones. Context is important too, Mr. Chair. I think it
is important to note that the agent's vehicle was broken into
between noon and three o'clock and the safe was broken into. It
was unfortunate and weapons were lost, there were some
recovered and there are some weapons that are still out there.
Chairman Issa. Thank you.
Mr. Chaffetz. Do you recall when Bernard, otherwise known
as B.J. Zapor, was appointed as the special agent in charge of
the Phoenix office?
Mr. Jones. I believe last year Mr. Zapor moved to the
Phoenix office. He was the Deputy Assistant Director of the
Central but he moved to be Special Agent in Charge of the
Phoenix Field Division.
Mr. Chaffetz. What I find curious, Director, that here we
have the Phoenix office probably the highest profile on the
heels of Fast and Furious and yet this same person was in
charge of an office that was executing on Operation Fearless.
Here you have an interim report dated March 21, 16
fundamental deficiencies, and you take the person who is in
charge of one of those offices and put him in charge of
Phoenix.
Mr. Jones. Congressman, unlike Fast and Furious, there were
very poor communications going on between the SAC in St. Paul
and what was happening in Milwaukee.
Mr. Chaffetz. But you took Mr. Milanowski who supervised
the Milwaukee office and you put him in Phoenix as well.
Mr. Jones. I sure did.
Mr. Chaffetz. Why do you do that? If this thing is so
flawed, you agree that it was flawed. With Operation Fearless,
you took the people who were overseeing the Milwaukee
operation, the SAC and then the person in charge of the
Milwaukee office and they get to go to Phoenix. You have to
clean that place up.
I don't understand how we take two people responsible for
that and put them in charge of Phoenix. I don't see the
accountability, I don't see anybody getting fired. We are
taking mentally handicapped people and putting tattoos on their
necks. We have missing weapons. We have locations opening in
proximity to schools in violation of the law. We have stolen
agent weapons. We have an agent whose personal contact
information was left in one of these offices.
We are enticing people across State lines to engage in
prostitution type things. I could go on for ten minutes listing
the allegations. Where is the accountability?
Mr. Jones. You have aggregated a lot of information without
the opportunity to talk about some of those things in
specifics. I can tell you that the individuals that were in the
St. Paul division and the movements that were made were made
for very good reasons based on their records of performance.
That is not to excuse the mistakes made in Fearless.
Mr. Chaffetz. You don't have anyone more qualified than Mr.
Zapor and Mr. Milanowski to oversee probably the most critical
office on the heels of Fast and Furious after you have an
internal report dated March 21 with 16 deficiencies listed. You
don't have anyone better than that to go and run that office?
Mr. Jones. There is solid leadership in the Phoenix field
division and a lot of oversight down there.
Mr. Chaffetz. So you have total confidence in Mr. Zapor and
Mr. Milanowski?
Mr. Jones. I do.
Mr. Chaffetz. Thank you.
Chairman Issa. Director, you said context was important.
Would you let everyone understand what the gentleman inferred
about the tattoo on the severely disabled person?
Mr. Jones. If you are talking about Operation Kraken in
Portland, Oregon. I think it is important to note that the
issue with respect to competency did not arise until the case
morphed into litigation mode and defense counsel brought up the
issue of intellectual capacity.
I think with respect to the tattoo, that was a mistake.
Chairman Issa. Context is important. Just tell the story so
everyone on the dais knows because not everyone knows and
certainly the public doesn't know, what the agents did and what
the judge did.
Mr. Jones. There as an individual, as I understand it, in
Operation Kraken who on their own volition got a tattoo that
was the logo for the storefront store and subsequently was
reimbursed by the storefront in the undercover mode. That is my
understanding.
Chairman Issa. The judge's understanding was that the
individual was talked into getting a tattoo which was basically
bought by your agents. The judge ordered that you pay to have
it re moved. Isn't that correct?
Mr. Jones. That's correct.
Chairman Issa. Thank you.
We will now go to the gentlelady from Illinois, Ms.
Duckworth.
Ms. Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Director Jones, for being here.
I am going to assume that when you come across processes
and procedures within the agency that are substandard or sub
par that you would be committed to investigating them and
perhaps coming up with better procedures. Is that correct?
Mr. Jones. That is correct.
Ms. Duckworth. Let us talk about what we have been talking
this morning, the involvement of persons with developmental and
mental disabilities.
I am deeply, deeply concerned this has happened. I
understand your statement that many of these persons are not
being recruited by your agents but, in fact, are people they
come across in the course of doing their jobs.
What training do your agents have with how to deal with
persons with developmental and mental disabilities once they
encounter them?
Mr. Jones. That was the topic of discussion with ARC and
that is something we are looking at. Unfortunately, one of the
things that happened in a poor budget environment is training.
Training is not what it should be and I think not unique to
ATF.
When you talk about developmentally disabled or people with
mental illness, there is not enough training of law enforcement
officers to recognize and deal with in situations of stress or
in undercover operations about how to deal and not deal with
individuals. It is a very difficult challenge because
oftentimes you cannot tell on the surface whether or not
somebody has issues of that nature.
Ms. Duckworth. Have you conducted an internal investigation
into this issue?
Mr. Jones. The general issue, no. We have talked internally
about developing better training regimes for folks,
particularly in the undercover setting.
Ms. Duckworth. What about in the particular case of the
individuals who were enticed into participating, the case of
the individual who had the tattoo, the case of the gentleman
with the IQ in the mid-50s?
If your IQ is in the mid-50s, it is very clear that you are
developmentally disabled. Have you done a formal investigation
into those instances?
Mr. Jones. Other than the Milwaukee operation, all of these
other storefronts identified in the media that are of concern
predated my arrival, so my level of knowledge about some of
those instances is not as deep.
I do know that the Inspector General has for review some of
those storefront operations. We will work with them once they
peal back the layers of the onion about the circumstances.
Again, the media reports are not as wholesome with respect to
the whole store.
A lot of the issues that have been raised about peoples'
mental capacity only came to light during the trial process and
sometimes in the sentencing process as part of mitigation for
the sentencing.
This is not a circumstance where there are people who are
obviously challenged walking into the storefront operation.
These are after the fact knowledge that we learn of based
primarily on the assertion of defense counsel.
Ms. Duckworth. You don't think that your agents dealing
with an IQ in the 50s knew he was developmentally disabled?
Mr. Jones. To be honest with you, I don't know what they
thought. I have never met the individual. I don't know other
than the fact that they were competent to stand trial, they
pled guilty, they were sentenced for criminal conduct and
during the sentencing process, issues were raised about their
intellectual capacity.
Ms. Duckworth. People with far higher IQs than 50 can also
be intimidated in the trial process to confess just through the
stress situation.
My question to you is, is there an IG investigation that is
looking into this issue, correct?
Mr. Jones. Part of what the Inspector General at the
Department of Justice is looking into is this set of
storefronts and looking at the details as to what happened
when, and why.
Ms. Duckworth. Leadership starts from the top. What
commitment have you made personally to pursue this particular
issue whether it is to figure out what the situation was, to
figure out what kind of training can be done even on a limited
budget basis?
I am sure ARC would probably be willing to cooperate with
you to provide some of that training or at least help you
structure something. What commitment have you made to show the
entire agency that this is important to you and is something
that is not acceptable conduct among your agents?
Mr. Jones. We have met with ARC. We are in discussions with
them about developing an appropriate training package. We have
put out word through our internal processes about situational
awareness on the issue, but it really is on the go forward a
matter of enhancing the level of knowledge and understanding to
the agents who are out there as to what they need to be on the
look out for and how to deal with situations like that. It is a
training issue and we are working on that.
Ms. Duckworth. I am out of time, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Issa. The gentlelady yields back.
We will now go to the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Mica.
Mr. Mica. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Director Jones, I have a couple of questions about the
operation in general. How long did this go on?
Mr. Jones. Which operation?
Mr. Mica. The storefronts? How long were the storefront
operations going on?
Mr. Jones. It depends on the storefront.
Mr. Mica. The whole program. How many did you have, 30
some?
Mr. Jones. Thirty-seven storefronts between 2009 and 2013.
Mr. Mica. That would be about a four or five year period
that this operation went on.
We have referred to some of the worse, egregious incidents
that took place in Milwaukee. I think there were seven places
that were cited at least in the report I have, Portland,
Phoenix, Albuquerque, Wichita, Atlanta and Pensacola, all of
which had botched operations. Is that sort of a given?
Mr. Jones. I wouldn't describe them as botched. The one I
have the most knowledge of was Milwaukee.
Mr. Mica. Each of them had names. We have gone from Fast
and Furious. I guess Milwaukee was given Operation Fearless. I
think it should be renamed Operation Fearless and Brainless
from what we have heard here today. Some of the things that
went on are astounding.
How much money did they spend in this program, can you tell
me, during the four or five years, a million, half a million,
any idea? Can you provide the committee with the amount?
Mr. Jones. I believe some documents we have produced do
give some indication as to the cost.
Mr. Mica. There were 36 of these storefronts, 7 had
horrible experiences. It doesn't sound like Wichita had an
exactly glorious operation. A known criminal came in with two
AK-47s and we only bought one. He was a known felon and was let
out on the street with the one that wasn't purchased. Are you
aware of that case?
Mr. Jones. I do have some knowledge.
Mr. Mica. AK-47, we bought one. I am told we paid such a
high price. I want to find out how much we paid for these, that
actually where we had these operations, we had little crime
waves. I heard you could get these weapons purchased at a
higher than black market rate, so ATF was buying them at a high
rate and we had little crime sprees.
I have asked the staff to also look at these different
operations but there was a spike in crime in those
neighborhoods. Are you aware of that?
Mr. Jones. I know one of the indicators we have in terms of
monitoring and making sure a storefront is operating, is it
manufacturing crime.
Mr. Mica. I am interested in the results. How many weapons
were seized in the whole program, do you know, or purchased,
not seized?
Mr. Jones. I think in the six operations that are of
particular interest to the committee, including Fearless, that
were approximately 1,300 weapons taken off the street.
Mr. Mica. I would like to see for the whole period of time
what number of weapons.
You said there were some indictments, how many indictments
and arrests?
Mr. Jones. We can get that specific information back to
you.
Mr. Mica. I would think that would be the first thing you
would tell the committee, how many arrests there were, the cost
of the operation, how many indictments--do you know how many
indictments we had?
Mr. Jones. In the six storefronts under discussion, 250
defendants were convicted, over 1,300 firearms were recovered
and the defendants had over 350 prior felonies. These are
oftentimes not first time offenders.
In Milwaukee, there were 16 federal defendants and 10 State
defendants and 150 firearms. In Pensacola, which was February
to October 2011, 78 defendants convicted, 275 firearms
recovered.
Mr. Mica. I am told the operations also had such a bad
reputation that when the FBI was contacted about participating
that they shied away or denied a cooperative effort with ATF.
Are you aware of that?
Mr. Jones. I don't have sufficient knowledge to know why
that happened. I am not going to speculate as to what occurred
to have our federal law enforcement partners pull out on that.
I do know there were concerns expressed about data
deconfliction and certain investigative concerns but I am not
in a position to explain anything.
Mr. Mica. It sounds like the whole thing went haywire.
Again, I would like to see for the record how much it cost and
what the results were for the whole period of time.
I yield back.
Chairman Issa. The gentleman yields back.
We now go to the gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Tierney.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Director Jones, thank you for being here today to give us
your perspective as the Director and formerly, the Acting
Director, as a former US attorney and as a former prosecutor as
well. I think that is helpful for us.
I understand in many of these cases, it was local law
enforcement that asked the ATF agency to set up these
undercover storefront operations in their communities, is that
correct?
Mr. Jones. My understanding is that in all of those
operations, there was to varying degrees local law enforcement
involvement.
Mr. Tierney. For example, in Milwaukee both federal and
local law enforcement requested the agency's assistance. They
wanted to target violent crime and gang crime and that is what
led them to set up that particular storefront, correct?
Mr. Jones. Yes, sir.
Mr. Tierney. I think everyone knows that gun violence is a
daily challenge in many of our communities. Can you tell us why
a local law enforcement agency would make that type of request?
Mr. Jones. Oftentimes, it is a resource issue. Sometimes it
is the collaborative nature of ATF's relationship with State
and local law enforcement. We have excellent relations with
State and locals across the country and we partner with them on
much of the work we do in cities large and small. That
partnership is very important to us.
Mr. Tierney. In your experience, how severe can the gun
problem be in local communities where ATF is requested to
assist?
Mr. Jones. That varies. Over the last couple of years, we
have tried to be more focused in our resources by dedicating
resources to those places experiencing either in the short or
long term higher levels of gun violence but I think the
partnership we have with local law enforcement is critical to
our being successful.
Mr. Tierney. In the wake of all the horrific gun violence
we have experienced in this country, the President developed a
series of proposals that were aimed at reducing gun violence
without infringing on the rights of lawful gun owners. They
would provide law enforcement additional tools to prevent and
prosecute gun crimes.
Last year, a bipartisan group of the Congress, 100 Democrat
and Republican members lead by Representatives Meehan, Maloney,
Rigell and Ranking Member Cummings, introduced the Gun
Trafficking Prevention Act of 2013. That was a bill that would
have made firearms trafficking a federal crime for the first
time and impose stronger penalties for straw purchases. Can you
explain what straw purchases are?
Mr. Jones. Straw purchasing essentially is making a
misrepresentation on Form 4473 when you purchase a firearm
legally that you are purchasing it for yourself.
Mr. Tierney. When, in fact, you might be purchasing it for
a convicted felon or somebody else who is prohibited from
owning a gun?
Mr. Jones. Yes, sir.
Mr. Tierney. That bill would have made those penalties
stronger. It was supported by law enforcement around the
country, was based on previous testimony from ATF agents who
came before the Congress and told us how helpful it would be to
finally create a federal offense for firearms trafficking.
Do you believe that would have been one useful tool in
fighting gun violence?
Mr. Jones. As a former prosecutor and as now the Director
of the law enforcement agency responsible for enforcing the Gun
Control Act, having a more fulsome federal firearms trafficking
statute would be very helpful in constructing cases and doing
investigations.
Mr. Tierney. Can you talk a little bit about how ATF
mission could be better accomplished by the adoption or
strengthening of laws that would help reduce gun violence? Are
there other ways we could be of assistance?
Mr. Jones. I don't want to step out of my lane because of
course Congress makes the law, we enforce the law and there is
lots of input into it. I can give you the perspective of a
former prosecutor and someone who now works with ATF that there
are things that could be different.
At the same time, I don't want to get into advocacy mode
that is inappropriate.
Mr. Tierney. I respect that and I don't want to put you in
that position.
Let me close by saying we have that Gun Trafficking
Prevention Act of 2013 that is a bipartisan proposal. It has
been supported by law enforcement across the country. Perhaps
in one of our future hearings, rather than delving into
conspiracy theories, we could talk about why that legislation
hasn't been brought forward and passed.
With that, I yield back my time.
Chairman Issa. I thank the gentleman for yielding back.
We now go to the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Farenthold.
Mr. Farenthold. Thank you, Chairman Issa.
Director Jones, thank you for being here. I know that is an
uncomfortable seat sometimes. We may rename it the hot seat.
I want to step back and get a big picture idea. Can you
refresh my memory? What was the stated goal of your storefront
operations?
Mr. Jones. It is a business calculated to identify and
proactively intervene with criminals and criminal activity in
high crime areas.
Mr. Farenthold. You open these storefronts and attempt to
buy back guns from criminals?
Mr. Jones. That is a piece of it. Its primary value is
intelligence gathering. Oftentimes the storefronts are wired
for video and audio, people make admissions, we can identify
them, and we can run criminal histories to see if they are
prohibited on some occasions.
It is designed to attract a certain criminal element so
that we can gather intelligence as to what is happening outside
of the storefront.
Mr. Farenthold. A normal goal of law enforcement is to move
up the chain. Rather than getting the petty street criminal,
you want to move up the chain to more serious offenders. That
is normal operation for law enforcement, isn't it?
Mr. Jones. Sometimes. If you are interested in sort of an
enterprise theory of investigation to take out a whole gang,
but sometimes you are talking about a single trigger puller who
has a reputation in the community of just being a bad actor.
Mr. Farenthold. We had testimony in this committee about
Operation Fast and Furious that what they were really after was
taking down a drug lord in Mexico or abroad. What concerns me
is, are we developing a mentality where we are after the more
serious offenders, damned the consequences?
We saw in Fast and Furious we let guns walk across the
border with tragic results. In this we see ATF encouraging
people to saw off a shotgun, having to train someone in what an
automatic weapon is.
Shouldn't we be focused on getting the job done? When we
start going beyond that, it is like we get in trouble.
Mr. Jones. I think it is important that storefront
operations, the ones we are talking about and the many others
that are highly successful, are just a tool in a toolbox that
we have. They are not the end all to be all. There are other
undercover operations.
Mr. Farenthold. I remain concerned that it is the Rudy
Giuliani theory, if we fix the broken windows, the big stuff
starts to take care of itself. Are we going for big headlines
and big busts that may go forward with a political agenda or
can we get down to the nitty gritty?
In a speech, you said, ``It was time for the ATF to bring
our A game to protect the American people and public from
violent crime and on my watch, that is what we are going to
do.'' Was Operation Fearless your A game?
Mr. Jones. No, it wasn't the A game and we could do better.
I freely admit that. We have learned lessons from Fearless. One
of the reasons we dispatched internal affairs is to peal back
the onion and see what went wrong, validate some of the things
that worked and know what didn't work.
I think it is significant to note that we hit the pause
button on storefronts until we can get them right. Now, if we
can't do them right, we don't do them. If we can't do them
right, we don't them. If they are not sited right, if they are
not resourced right, if they are not staffed right, if there
isn't an intelligence purpose for it other than to generate
numbers, we are not doing them.
Mr. Farenthold. As we go forward, we have been having
trouble from the Attorney General in getting Fast and Furious
information. Are you willing to work hard with this committee
to make sure we get to the bottom of these things so they don't
happen again?
Mr. Jones. I have read the Fast and Furious OIG report
several times, including the last couple of weeks, and I fully
understand some of the systemic issues. That is my challenge.
There is ongoing litigation.
Mr. Farenthold. We just cannot let this happen again.
I have one other quick question that a constituent wanted
me to ask you. We are getting reports of trouble with imports
of 7N6 Russian surplus ammunition, yet we are not seeing
anything from your agency about this. Are you planning on
implementing a new policy on that? I know that is kind of out
in left field.
Mr. Jones. It is kind of out in left field. Brownsville is
wonderful, by the way, but we will look into that if you will
give us more context.
Mr. Farenthold. We will get with you.
I am out of time. I will yield back.
Chairman Issa. The gentlelady from Illinois, Ms. Kelly.
Ms. Kelly. Thank you, Director Jones.
As we assess the problems in Milwaukee, I would like to
know how this investigative technique has been used in other
cities to target violent crime. You stated in your testimony
that since 2009, ATF has conducted 37 undercover storefronts.
Did the use of undercover storefronts only begin in 2009?
Mr. Jones. No. It is an investigative technique that really
has its genesis going back as far as 20 years in south Florida
during the height of the trafficking in Florida. We have very
good people to do it. They are not always in the right place to
do it and make sure it is done right. We have had very
successful storefronts around the country.
Ms. Kelly. This technique has been used under other
administrations like the Bush Administration?
Mr. Jones. I think the administration and the politics has
less to do with it than the public safety value of using this
as an undercover technique. It has been used for a long time.
Ms. Kelly. How do you measure the success of these
operations?
Mr. Jones. I think one measurement of success is the people
who end up coming into court. There were some successful
operations in other parts of the country that did identify and
end in conviction for very long sentences of armed career
criminals, people with extensive records.
There have been instances where storefronts have brought in
people who are on the cusp of committing egregious acts of
violence. I think the intelligence value and the way that
people have been brought in, the trigger pullers and the
traffickers of crime guns get pulled into this and giving us an
opportunity to build a case around that person, eventually
indicting them and hopefully sending them to prison.
Ms. Kelly. It is my understanding that the Pensacola police
chief made a very strong statement about the outcome of an
operation you did there in 2011, ``The value of this operation
is immeasurable and we may never know how many lives this may
have saved.'' Do you agree with the police chief that the
undercover operation might have saved lives?
Mr. Jones. I do agree with the police chief. It is very
difficult to talk about the what if circumstance, but we do
know there was good work done at a very fundamental level and
trigger pullers and traffickers were pulled off the street and
into the criminal justice system.
Ms. Kelly. We already talked about some of the other places
where storefront operations occurred. Are you satisfied with
the results in Albuquerque, Atlanta and some of the places we
talked about, Portland and Wichita?
Mr. Jones. Again, I have deeper knowledge about some rather
than others, but I do know that all of these operations
resulted in criminals going to jail in the end and making the
community safer.
Ms. Kelly. Also, we talked a lot about the storefronts, but
what other tools are in the toolbox to get illegal firearms off
the street and out of the hands of violent criminals?
Mr. Jones. One of the things we are doing particularly in
Chicago is developing firearms trafficking techniques to see
the flow in the black market of firearms. The crime gun pool is
very deep and it is quite a challenge, doing things from the
trafficking, following the gun, identifying FFLs who may be
supplying crime guns, identifying individual traffickers in the
black market who may be supplying crime guns
We have worked real hard with folks in the northern
districts of Illinois and in the northern districts of Indiana
to study the firearms trafficking patterns and trying to
intervene to cut off, to the extent we can, the supply and also
make sure those engaged in unlicensed dealing, people selling
guns on the black market, get our full attention so we can at
least drain a little bit out of the crime gun pool.
Ms. Kelly. Representing that area, I am very glad to hear
that. When I was a State legislator, that was the first bill I
passed, dealing with straw purchases, so I know how very
important that is.
Thank you so much. I yield back.
Chairman Issa. The gentlelady yields back.
We now go to the gentleman from North Carolina, Mr.
Meadows.
Mr. Meadows. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Jones, in your testimony, I know we are highlighting
the six different storefront operations today but I think you
said ``other highly successful storefront operations.'' What
are the other highly successful storefront operations?
Mr. Jones. The one that immediately comes to mind--I do not
want to overstep because some of these are still in the moment.
Mr. Meadows. According to your testimony, there are no
active storefronts right now, so I don't know that we would be
putting anyone in jeopardy.
Mr. Jones. Once they close down and it goes into
prosecution mode.
Mr. Meadows. What are the other highly successful ones?
Mr. Jones. The one that immediately comes to mind, because
I just saw a recommendation for an award, is Smoking Guns II in
Miami Gardens in the southern district of Florida. That was
very successful in taking out--
Mr. Meadows. What is successful? How do you define success?
Mr. Jones. Identifying a deadly armed criminal group
engaged in both firearms trafficking and drug trafficking in
south Florida.
Mr. Meadows. Do you have storefront operations in Chicago?
Mr. Jones. We don't have any current storefront.
Mr. Meadows. Have you had them in Chicago?
Mr. Jones. As I sit here today, I cannot definitively say.
Mr. Meadows. I don't think you have. How about in Los
Angeles? Have you had in the city of Los Angeles storefront
operations?
Mr. Jones. Again, I can't off the top of my head say that
we have never had or have not had a storefront in Los Angeles.
Mr. Meadows. Did you prepare to come and provide testimony
today?
Mr. Jones. Yes, I did.
Mr. Meadows. Wouldn't you assume some of that, out of the
37 storefront operations, that you would be able to figure out
which ones you have actually had or not?
Mr. Jones. My focus was on the ones----
Mr. Meadows. I know where your focus was. In your testimony
you talked about 37. You say today you can't tell me whether
you had one in Los Angeles, Chicago or New York. Have you have
any storefront operations in any of those three cities?
Mr. Jones. Without certainty, right here now, I can't say.
Mr. Meadows. What is your best guess?
Mr. Jones. I don't like to guess when I am sitting here
under oath.
Mr. Meadows. You have staffers behind you. Do they know if
you have had any storefront operations in any of those three
cities? I don't believe you have but have you had any?
Mr. Jones. We will find out.
Mr. Meadows. Under what matrix do you decide where to put
storefront operations?
Mr. Jones. Primarily by the intelligence needs and the
commitment of locals to work with us.
Mr. Meadows. You are saying in those three cities, you
might not have had the commitment of locals to work with you?
Mr. Jones. It is a technique that we use on occasion but it
is not the only technique that we use.
Mr. Meadows. Let me tell you the reason I ask. Those three,
according to the Center for Disease Control Prevention,
according to their report, are the top three cities in terms of
gun-related violence. Yet you don't seem to have storefront
operations in the very top three in our Nation in terms of gun-
related violence.
The President even talks about Chicago. Yet you don't have
operations there. Why would that be?
Mr. Jones. Because we are using other types of
investigative techniques in those major metropolitan areas
where the dynamics on the ground and the opportunities to
identify bad guys are a lot different than in smaller venues.
Mr. Meadows. That is exactly what I thought you would say.
There is not a direct correlation between storefront operations
and gun related violence is what you are saying.
Mr. Jones. Depending on the venue you open, if you pick the
right spot, yes.
Mr. Meadows. Those are the top three, you have no
storefront operations, so there is not a direct correlation in
terms of selling out of a storefront versus the number of
deaths that happen according to gun-related violence? There is
no empirical evidence that would suggest that?
Mr. Jones. It is a technique.
Mr. Meadows. I understand technique. Is there any empirical
data or evidence to that effect because where you are placing
these would suggest there is not.
Mr. Jones. We have placed them all around the country.
Mr. Meadows. Why didn't you place them in the top three
gun-related, violent, murder capitals of our country? Why
wouldn't you place them there? If there was a direct
correlation, why wouldn't you place them there?
Mr. Jones. One thing that immediately comes to mind is in
those larger urban areas, you have very difficult deconfliction
issues going on because a lot of people are playing in the same
territory. There are safety risks involved with this type of
undercover technique, both in terms of maintaining its
integrity, sharing information.
Mr. Meadows. If the Chairman will indulge this last
question?
Chairman Issa. Briefly.
Mr. Meadows. Is it easier for an ATF agent to blend in in
Wichita, Kansas than it is in New York City?
Chairman Issa. I am not sure if he can.
Mr. Jones. I can't answer that. In some of these
storefronts, we bring in undercovers from different parts of
the country. One reason we don't often have local law
enforcement in an undercover capacity in a place like Milwaukee
where they weren't behind the counter is because they work in
Milwaukee and may run into somebody they have arrested.
Maintaining the integrity of the undercover operation does
sometimes require bringing in people from out of town because
they are not known.
Chairman Issa. Thank you.
At this time, we go the gentlelady from California, Ms.
Speier.
Ms. Speier. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Thank you, Director Jones.
I think this hearing helps me solidify is the importance of
having another hearing to talk about storefronts in general,
Mr. Chairman. I don't know about you but I want to know how
much money we are spending on this kind of activity. Mr. Jones,
maybe you can tell us. How much do you budget for storefronts a
year?
Mr. Jones. We don't budget for storefronts. We budget for
operations. In looking at some of the basic information on
this, there is the cost of the site.
Ms. Speier. We need to find out how much you spend. You
have 37 of these storefronts. I certainly would like and
probably the Chair as well documentation to tell us how much
was spent on these storefronts and what was recovered as a
result.
I was with our U.S. attorney this morning who said you
actually had a very successful one in Gilroy, California called
Operation Garlic Press. Where do you come up with these clever
names?
Chairman Issa. Gilroy and garlic, that is not all that
clever.
Ms. Speier. It is about taking advantage of the fact that
it is the garlic capital of the world.
She indicated to me that there were some 92 persons that
were charged or at least found to be gun running. I think we
need to have a better sense and a better accountability of how
much money is being spent on each of these operations and why
certain areas are picked and others are not.
Chairman Issa. Would the gentlelady suspend for a moment?
Ms. Speier. I certainly will. Just give me extra time.
Chairman Issa. Director Jones, there has been a series of
questions on a bipartisan basis. Maybe to cut short the need
for those questions, would you agree to prepare a secure
briefing for the committee that would include essentially what
Ms. Speier is talking about but expanding on cost, all of the
operations and obviously because the earlier briefing we had
alleged there was only one in Milwaukee that was flawed and now
we have similar situations in others, a more expansive ability
to answer questions on the good, the bad and the ugly, if you
will of these various operations around the country?
Is that something you could give us a timeline and commit
to that we would make the committee available?
Mr. Jones. I think it would be of value to educate because
I think these storefronts in particular are the ones that had
issues but as Congresswoman Speier says, there have been some
successful storefronts. They are a valid technique.
I think it would be of value. We can work with staff to get
that in the appropriate venue because again, we always have law
enforcement sensitive, we have techniques and don't want to
inadvertently educate bad guys.
Chairman Issa. I would appreciate it. Today's hearing, Ms.
Speier and I are both aware, is on some flaws that you are
working on but I think it would be helpful. We would probably
bring this room into a secure mode and a time to be arranged if
your folks before the end of the hearing can give us an
estimate, we will make that time available in a few weeks.
Ms. Speier, thank you. It was time to ask the question. The
gentlelady's time fully continues.
Ms. Speier. Thank you.
I also want to alert you to a program called Operation
Lipstick that started in Boston. It is a program focused on
women. Since more than 50 percent of gun trafficking cases
involve straw purchases, and guns purchased by women are two
times as likely to be used to commit a crime, they are working
in the communities to try and get the word out to women who
tend to be the girlfriends and wives to go in and buy the guns,
that they become accomplices of crime as well. I think it is
one of the kinds of activities that we should be looking at as
well.
I also want to point out that you have the ability to
recommend to the President that he no longer allow the
importation of Russian bullets or assault weapons. George H.W.
Bush did that by Executive Order. It was enhanced by President
Clinton. It expired under President George W. Bush. So the
importation of the guns and bullets continues.
We have a case in California where a State senator was
willing, for a campaign donation, to provide an SEI undercover
agent with guns and shoulder missiles from the Philippines. We
have some other areas we can look at and I hope you will take
that into account.
The Milwaukee Journal Sentinel suggested that the ATF
storefront operation was actually generating crime. I would
like for you to respond to that allegation.
Mr. Jones. That is a concern when we design a storefront
operation. We need to have indicators, for example, from the
local police department as to whether or not there has been a
spike in burglaries. For example, we know there were issues
with respect to folks who purchased weapons and then resold
them.
That is always a phenomena that you have to maintain a
certain level of risk to make sure that is not happening.
Ms. Speier. Let me ask you this. Were they actually selling
or purchasing guns for sky high prices?
Mr. Jones. From what I have seen, the prices were
comparable to the black market price. The price that we paid in
these operations for a gun really is not what is listed at
lawful FFL; it is a black market gun. These are crime guns, so
there is value on them. If it has an obliterated serial number,
for example, it has great value.
Ms. Speier. For clarification, were any of these firearms
that were purchased and sold at those storefronts?
Mr. Jones. No.
Ms. Speier. I think that is very important.
Mr. Jones. We do not sell. It is one way. We buy the
weapons. We do not sell the weapons.
Ms. Speier. Thank you.
My time has expired.
Chairman Issa. I thank the gentlelady.
We now go to the gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Bentivolio.
Mr. Bentivolio. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Ranking
Member Cummings and distinguished members of the committee.
As we all know, one ``aw, shucks'' can wipe out a thousand
``attaboys.'' In my experience working with ATF over the years,
it has always been professional, brave and valiant, but after
reading this testimony, I cannot even get my head around what
happened in this case.
When I was preparing for this hearing yesterday, I actually
thought my staff was playing an April Fool's joke on me. The
operation could not have been this botched; this investigation
could not have been this mishandled. I am not sure where to
even begin.
I do know I have a frame of mind right now after reading
and hearing this testimony. I would join any member of Congress
who sponsors a bill to keep guns out of the hands of ATF
agents. With that in mind, I have just a few questions.
ATF agents recruited mentally handicapped people or people
with an IQ in the 50s to assist with this operation. Later
these individuals were arrested for their involvement. I taught
special education when I was a teacher and was surrounded by
these kids. They are some of the best, most caring and nicest
people who try their best and want to please. I am appalled
that you would use these individuals like this and then arrest
them later.
Does ATF even regret using these individuals in this way?
Mr. Jones. Hindsight is 20/20, Congressman. There are
lessons to be learned. As I mentioned earlier, there are
opportunities for us to do better in terms of situational
awareness training and making sure we do it right.
Mr. Bentivolio. In my experience, there is a difference in
individuals with low IQ. It is pretty easy to spot. You would
think anyone with any life experience could just ask the simple
question, is this the person we should be using for this
operation. You are going to discontinue using individuals in
this way that have this low IQ?
Mr. Jones. To the extent we know that up front at that
stage, in an investigation, of course.
Mr. Bentivolio. Has ATF apologized to any of these
individuals?
Mr. Jones. I know the person in particular from the
Portland operation, we have had some interaction with them but
many of the individuals are in the custody of the Bureau of
Prisons, unfortunately, so the opportunity for interaction is
limited.
Mr. Bentivolio. In the storefront location in New Mexico,
ATF agents gave lessons in how to identify a machine gun. At
the location in Kansas, ATF agents told a man how to saw off
the end of a shotgun. Is it normal for ATF agents to teach
heroin addicts and drug dealers how to tell the difference
between a machine gun and a semiautomatic weapon?
Mr. Jones. I think it is important to note that when these
ATF agents are in an undercover capacity, they have to go into
role unless you want to blow the integrity of the operation.
Again, you have to make decisions about the cost benefit
analysis.
Mr. Bentivolio. Talking about your decisions, earlier you
mentioned that before you go into any operation, you do a risk
analysis. Did I hear that correctly? You evaluate the risk?
Mr. Jones. Yes, sir.
Mr. Bentivolio. Was one of those highly successful
operations in a storefront the one located within 1,000 feet of
a middle school? If, that's the case, why wasn't a risk
analysis done for that? Why would you put one of these
storefront operations where you have criminals coming in with
these guns and rifles within 1,000 feet of a middle school?
Mr. Jones. If I am correct in my recollection, I think the
case you are discussing is the Portland operation. It was sited
poorly in terms of its proximity to a school. Current state is
making sure the location is not only secure, but you avoid
situations like that. That is after the fact.
Mr. Bentivolio. So you have an ongoing?
Mr. Jones. Three years ago.
Mr. Bentivolio. After action review, what went right, what
went wrong and how could we do better?
Mr. Jones. Yes.
Mr. Bentivolio. You have a policy in place applying those
things you have learned for future operations?
Mr. Jones. Yes, sir, already in place.
Mr. Bentivolio. Seems like once again you are learning the
lessons of how not to do an operation on a regular basis.
Thank you. I yield back.
Chairman Issa. I thank the gentleman.
We now go to the gentleman from Missouri, Mr. Clay.
Mr. Clay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me thank also for conducting this hearing to allow me
to publicly thank Director Jones and the men and women of ATF
for putting their lives on the line on a daily basis to protect
communities throughout this country.
One example I would like to share with my colleagues is the
storefront operation conducted in my hometown of St. Louis,
Missouri. The St. Louis and East St. Louis metropolitan area is
consistently ranked in the top five most dangerous cities in
overall violent crime.
Director Jones, in your testimony, you highlighted that in
April through July 2013, ATF led a 15 week surge including a
storefront operation to reduce violent crime in my district.
According to several news outlets and other accounts, this
surge was successful. Let me repeat for my colleagues, this
surge was successful.
The storefront operation was successful, resulting in 159
defendants being charged of which 78 percent were previously
convicted felons. In addition, 267 firearms and significant
quantities of illegal narcotics were taken into ATF custody.
This enforcement action had a significant impact on violent
crime as an analysis by the St. Louis City Police Department
comparing crime statistics from January through July 2012 to
statistics for the same time frame in 2013 revealed that murder
was down 15.7 percent, robbery was down 22.3 percent; and
aggravated assault was down 22.6 percent.
Director, my first question is, in enforcement actions like
this one in St. Louis, how much of a priority does ATF place on
working cooperatively with local law enforcement to address
public safety and law and how important is it to reducing
violent crime?
Mr. Jones. I think it is absolutely critical. The
opportunity we had last year to work an enhanced enforcement
operation in St. Louis was probably one of the better
operations we have done in my tenure because we brought the
full package.
We brought in experts who know how to do a storefront; we
brought in experts who did undercover. We worked very closely
not only with the St. Louis Police Department but also the East
St. Louis Police Department.
I think it is an example of the pivot that we have made on
two things: having a focus, a unified effort with our State and
locals in getting the resources we need to the spot.
Unfortunately, what we did in St. Louis cannot be replicated
all around the country and it is one of the things we have
moved to with the mobility model so we can bring access from
around the country to do it and do it right or not do it at
all. That is particularly important when we do undercover
operations.
Mr. Clay. That is why I take this opportunity to say thank
you to you and the men and women of the ATF speaking on behalf
of my constituents who want to live in a safer environment, who
want their neighborhoods cleaned up, who want those illegal
weapons taken off the streets.
What is the impact of violent crime on the youth and people
of color in a city like St. Louis and what success is ATF
having in disrupting and dismantling gang violence in areas
that you target?
Mr. Jones. Unfortunately, there are pockets of violent gun
crime that increasingly are involving younger individuals. I
call it more disorganized crime. It is blocks, turf and it is
ingrained. The challenges are in St. Louis, Memphis, Chicago.
There are areas around the country where we are working
very closely to do two things, identify traffickers so we can
disrupt the crime gun pool and identify the worse of the worse
in terms of the trigger pullers who are often not only teaching
downstream a culture of violence but also perpetrating violence
themselves. It is the armed career criminals in these
communities who are of particular interest to us.
Mr. Clay. Thank you so much.
Mr. Chairman, we should be supporting these efforts and not
trying to conduct witch hunts.
Chairman Issa. I am sure the gentleman knows we are not.
Would the gentleman yield to the Ranking Member?
Mr. Clay. Certainly.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you, Mr. Clay. I am glad you mentioned
that.
I thought I would go back to what the Chairman said earlier
with regard to the briefing you are going to give us. In light
of what Mr. Clay just said, I think it is extremely important
that we give out some of the good stuff that is happening.
I can tell you living where I live, many feel sometimes
like they are in a terror zone and it is hard. Trying to get to
the very people Mr. Clay talked about is so very, very
important. If the ATF has a way of doing it right, I am glad
you said what you said, do it right or not at all, it sounds
like the kind of tool that would be very, very helpful in
neighborhoods like the one I live in.
I am really looking forward to that and I am looking
forward to all the changes you are making to make sure you get
it right. I hope we will have that briefing very soon.
Thank you.
Chairman Issa. I thank the gentleman.
We now go to the gentleman from Florida, Mr. DeSantis.
Mr. DeSantis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Welcome, Director.
In August 2013, you were sworn in, is that correct?
Mr. Jones. Time flies. I think it was August.
Mr. DeSantis. I mention that because I am going to ask
about some of the issues my colleague from Ohio, Mr. Jordan,
asked in terms of ATF's visit to this woman in Texas.
I just want to clarify whatever happened during those
instances happened before you came onboard. At this point we
are asking you, in terms of responding to Mr. Jordan's letter,
to be transparent about what happened. If nothing sinister
happened, nothing sinister happened.
We are in a situation where this woman applied for tax
exempt status for two conservative leaning groups. After having
never had any interaction with law enforcement for 20 years,
she was visited by the IRS, OSHA, FBI, ATF and Texas' version
of the EPA.
This committee has been consumed with dealing with
targeting done by the Internal Revenue Service. We have had
high officials in the IRS who have refused to testify and we
have had trouble getting documents. I hope you will be a force
for transparency.
I understand they had a license for 12 years. Basically, it
is a precision metal cutting company. They did the firearms
license, thinking maybe we will do firearm parts at some point.
They never actually manufactured any firearms parts. Even
though they had a license for a while, ATF audited them in
February 2012. Do you know the reason why that audit took
place?
Mr. Jones. Now that I have had an opportunity to look at
the timeline, my understanding is that Ms. Englebrecht's
business was issued a Plan B firearms license by ATF in October
2009. In February 2012, they had a routine compliance
inspection. There were some minor recordkeeping errors and a
warning letter was issued. Then in April 2013, we conducted a
follow up inspection and there were no violations, over a
period between 2009 and 2013, as simple as it sounds,
coincidence and explanations, irrespective of what other
agencies were doing.
Mr. DeSantis. I understand that.
How common is it that given they were not involved in
firearms manufacturing at all, I understand they had the
license thinking they may do it, devoting the resources to
auditing them versus using resources in other areas. I would
imagine you guys have limited resources and know you cannot
possibly deal with every issue out there, what went into or do
you know what went into the decision to focus those two visits
on Englebrecht Enterprises given that they weren't even
manufacturing any firearm parts vis a vis doing that in other
areas that may have been more pressing in terms of the threat
they posed to the public?
Mr. Jones. I think there are two things to keep in mind.
The investigative function, the regulatory function, we have
approximately 700 investigators around the country and
thousands of licensees both FFLs and FELs and they do have a
punchlist.
If you read the IG report, you know sometimes we have
things fall behind simply because of the volume. We have
discretionary time when we can focus on naughty FFLs, those few
that are naughty and then there is the nondiscretionary time.
A 2009 FFL license issued after a qualification inspection
and coming down for a routine compliance inspection within 12
years, I am not sure which field position would cover that but
I know both Dallas and Houston field divisions have a pretty
vibrant inspection schedule because of the number of licensees
down there.
Mr. DeSantis. You would definitely state that it would be
inappropriate if her filing for tax exempt status for
conservative leaning organizations influenced ATF in any way,
you would admit that would be totally inappropriate if
something like that were to happen?
Mr. Jones. That is not part of our practice. We have our
hands full trying to keep up with the volume of inspections
required, qualifications, follow up compliance and people work
very hard on the inspections front. They are doing the best
they can. That is not into the mix of who ends up on the
compliance inspection.
Mr. DeSantis. I appreciate your time today. I would just
reiterate the Chairman and Mr. Jordan, if you could just get us
answers to that letter in due time, we would really appreciate
that.
I yield back. Thank you.
Chairman Issa. I thank the gentleman.
We now go to the gentlelady from New York, Mrs. Maloney.
Mrs. Maloney. I thank the Chairman and Ranking Member for
holding this hearing.
Director Jones, welcome.
I know the nature of today's hearing is about ATF's
undercover storefront operations but we have never had the
Director of the ATF before. I would like to ask you some
questions related to ATF hearings we have held before
specifically on the problem of gun trafficking.
In 2001, the House Oversight Committee had one of your
special agents, Peter Forcelli. I asked him whether criminal
penalties were so weak that federal prosecutors are discouraged
from pursuing cases involving the so-called straw purchasers,
those who buy guns and sell to known felons and others who
legally cannot have them.
He testified in his written and oral statement that the
current straw purchasing laws ``are toothless.'' That is what
he said. He further said that existing gun laws do not provide
law enforcement officials the tools they need to successfully
stop the flow of illegal guns to Mexico. He also testified that
in his view, Operation Fast and Furious was a partial
consequence of these deficiencies.
It is an issue of great concern in the country. Ms. Speier
mentioned the lipstick cases where they are trying to inform
women but shortly after Sandy Hook, in western New York in
2012, a week or two afterwards, there was a terrible case where
a prior felon was released and a straw purchaser got him a
bunch of guns.
He then put his house on fire and when the police and fire
department came to put the fire out, he mowed them down, shot
them. Certainly if this woman had known there would be real
penalties, I doubt she would have been out there buying guns
for him.
These agents testified in that hearing that don't even
bother to prosecute or refer for prosecution because the
penalties are so weak that you are not even doing anything. It
is almost not worth the time of law enforcement.
In response to that, I offered a bill that made trafficking
in guns a felony. I find it almost unbelievable that
trafficking in illegal guns is not a felony. It increases the
penalties on straw purchasing.
An incredible amount of law enforcement across the country
came out in support of this legislation. It is bipartisan. An
NRA member, Scott Rigell, is one of the prime leaders on this,
as well as Ranking Member Cummings and a former prosecutor from
Pennsylvania, Representative Meehan, has been very active on
it.
It seems to me if we don't give the tools to law
enforcement their job, the testimony from these agents was we
don't even bother to prosecute because the penalties are so
weak, it is not worth our time to pursue it.
My question is, do you think we should have stronger laws
and penalties against straw purchasers? Do you think it would
stop the practice that has been such a terrible problem in our
country? According to an ATF report in 2000, ``straw purchasing
is the most common channel of illegal gun trafficking,
accounting for almost half, 46 percent of all investigations.''
Do you think stronger penalties would help bring down that
number? If you could comment on it, I think it is a very
important issue. Keeping guns out of the hands of criminals
should be a top priority.
Law abiding people can own guns. It is not aimed at them.
It is for criminals, drug dealers, gang dealers.
Mr. Jones. Congresswoman, I think that is one of our
focuses in our overall mission. As I mentioned before, a
federal firearms trafficking statute would be helpful. I know
there are increasing efforts across the country by U.S.
attorneys, with whom we work closely, to do more straw
purchasing or providing a gun to a prohibited person. I know
that the U.S. Sentencing Commission has recently revised their
guidelines.
To get back to your point, a federal firearms trafficking
statute would be helpful. I would push back a little bit about
these cases are not being done. I think they are being done by
U.S. attorneys around the country. The challenge is more
getting the fact pattern.
The lipstick phenomenon, a criminal defendant who has no
criminal history who may be in a relationship with a bad guy
and ends up in federal court for the first time is different
from someone who has a pattern of purchasing weapons, doing the
sort of aggregation and selling them on the black market.
Mrs. Maloney. The testimony of your agents was that it was
a slap on the hand or a paper notice. Possibly we should do a
joint GAO request to find out how straw purchasers are treated
when they are convicted. That was the point they made. They
don't try to convict because the penalties are so weak.
The bill we worked on increases penalties. I believe it is
supported by your department and other law enforcement. I think
it is worth looking at. I think a GAO report of what does
happen to traffickers would help.
Chairman Issa. I thank the gentlelady.
We now go to the gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Collins.
Mr. Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
This is an issue for me. I thank you for your service and
also the military as well.
As I was growing up one of the things I always found was
when one officer did something wrong, everything else got tight
and you were basically assuming that everybody was the same.
This disturbs me in the sense that the storefront
operations were overall looked after from DC but handled in the
agency in the different areas. I am going to concentrate
specifically on Atlanta because some of your comments today are
not consistent with actions that happened in Atlanta and I want
to talk about that.
Atlanta Blaze, the storefront operation, bought stolen
goods, including guns stolen from police squad cars. How many
stolen police weapons did ATF agents in Atlanta recover?
Mr. Jones. I know a bit about Atlanta Blaze because it is
one of the historical ones. It is not something that was going
on when I came onboard.
Mr. Collins. I understand that but today's hearing title
was undercover storefront operations involving all of these. I
would have expected you to have been at least briefed on all
the ones that were going on especially given the problems that
existed in many of them.
Mr. Jones. I do understand that in Atlanta there were some
weapons that ended coming into the storefront that were the
result of thefts steps from other police officers.
Mr. Collins. What did the ATF agents do with the weapons
when they purchased them and where are those weapons now?
Mr. Jones. I believe the case is completed. I am not
certain as I sit here today where the weapons are now.
Mr. Collins. Are you aware that the Atlanta Police
Department spent considerable resources interviewing witnesses
and attempted to recover the weapons because ATF agents did not
report the guns as recovered? Why didn't the ATF properly
return the guns to the Atlanta Police Department?
Mr. Jones. I am not aware of that.
Mr. Collins. Did you look over these storefront operations
before coming to testify today?
Mr. Jones. I spent a lot of time with Fearless, I spent
less time with the four that occurred before I got onboard at
ATF.
Mr. Collins. Knowing that this was overall, I am concerned
in the sense that this was a storefront and there were multiple
operations to know this.
Going back to another one, there was an ATF agent who
bought one high point pistol stolen from a police car Christmas
2010. As of November 2013, the Fulton County police department
still had the firearm listed as stolen. A representative said
the department had not received any notification that the
weapon was recovered.
I will ask the question and I will assume the answer at
this point, has the agency returned it to Fulton County?
Mr. Jones. I am not sure.
Mr. Collins. Has the AFT informed Fulton County that the
ATF had recovered this weapon?
Mr. Jones. I am not certain.
Mr. Collins. This is why I said earlier the interesting
part to me was that in St. Louis, there seems to be this
wonderful cooperation between local enforcement and the ATF but
in Atlanta, there wasn't and right now we are still looking at
this.
I will ask another question. Does ATF have a policy about
notification of other law enforcement agencies when weapons or
other possessions are obtained by ATF agents either by purchase
through a storefront operation or otherwise?
Mr. Jones. I know that we do run traces at a storefront.
Mr. Collins. That is not what I asked. I asked do you have
a policy of notifying other agencies when they recover or buy
stolen police equipment?
Mr. Jones. I don't want to step out of bounds here and say
for certain that we do but I would be surprised if we did not
have a policy about recovering weapons that are traced back to
a law enforcement.
Mr. Collins. That is concerning in itself. I am going to
ask that be made available to my office and the committee as
soon as possible. That should be an easy find. I wonder if
there is someone behind you who probably already has that
information. If you don't have a policy, that needs to change.
If you do have a policy, I would ask why it is not being
followed in this situation.
Talking about the cooperation between agencies in St. Louis
that my colleague spoke of, why was this run so seemingly
different in Atlanta where you have other law enforcement
agencies spending a lot of time trying to track down their own
weapons when ATF had the weapons? Why is there such a
disconnect here?
Mr. Jones. Let me first say we have good working
relationships with Atlanta and Fulton County and all over
Georgia.
A disconnect and an individual circumstance, an isolated
circumstance about the repording mechanism, going back and
people looking for weapons and not cooperating, that is
disappointing to me to hear. I understand your concerns about
the lack of communication.
Mr. Collins. I am still concerned about where these weapons
actually are. You used an interesting word a moment ago. Based
on the questions about the woman who was investigated, you
said, you keep a list and you used the word naughty part. It is
very interesting to me because I think that wording is good
because it reminded me of the song we're making lists, we're
checking it twice to see who is naughty or nice and maybe the
naughty part here was they applied for a C4 permit. That might
be why they got more scrutiny than they should have.
This Atlanta operation bothers me. I do want to hear those
answers and please get those to my office and the committee as
soon as possible.
Thank you for your service.
Chairman Issa. I thank the gentleman.
We now go to the gentlelady from New Mexico, Ms. Grisham.
Ms. Grisham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Director Jones, I appreciate that several times during this
hearing, you have talked about the problems you are aware of,
your obligation and efforts with ATF and that these efforts be
productive and minimize risk to the public and maximize the
operation and to take responsibility for the things that don't
work.
I absolutely appreciate that. Considering as many of us
have the focus on local operations and that ATF did conduct a
storefront operation in Albuquerque in 2010, I think I share an
obligation to the same degree to assure that the problems with
the Inspector General and the ATF and the public are adequately
addressed.
Like many other members here today, I am specifically
concerned about how our agency interacts with persons with
mental illness or mentally disabled individuals. I want to get
right to policies and training.
It is my understanding that the FBI and local law
enforcement, in fact I know unequivocally that local law
enforcement in Albuquerque uses CIT, crisis intervention teams
and their effort is to calm persons who have a mental illness,
disorder or an issue in lieu of arresting them. We know that
minimizes risk frankly on both sides.
I did a quick search right here in the committee to see how
easy it is to find what kind of training and policies exist. In
fact, it is clear that there is substance abuse recognition,
cultural sensitivity, there is training on developmental
disorders, personality disorders and I could go on because the
list I found in a quick search was fairly exhaustive giving me
the impression that there is a considerable body of training to
help someone identify when they are dealing with a population
or individual in this situation.
I want to know do folks at ATF take part in this training?
Mr. Jones. As stated before Congresswoman, that is
something that is really important to us given some of the
things we have learned over the last year or so. It is not only
unique to ATF but I think the Albuquerque Police Department and
police departments around the country are in a position where
they need to have enhancement about not just people who are
developmentally disabled but people with mental illness because
those circumstances, particularly in the work ATF does, where
you have street level interaction, it is important to have.
Ms. Grisham. You repeatedly say that what you do is deal
with sort of conduct, that there is no way to identify an
individual per se. I also recognize you have to be cautious
about creating an environment where there is discriminatory in
every operation.
You have known for quite some time. These trainings have
been available and around for a long time, at least a decade.
That is my personal knowledge in my community. I guess we could
argue today in a place like Albuquerque they might need some
significant retooling but did you do that a year and a half
ago, are you doing that training right now given the
circumstances?
Mr. Jones. Absent specific public safety threat, we don't
target developmentally challenged individuals. As you
mentioned, we target convicts.
Ms. Grisham. You are clearly engaged now in a situation
where you know you have these problems and as a result, it
seems to me that training is a good thing. Are you engaging ATF
in these training protocols that clearly exist in like
operations and for like law enforcement officials in the
Department of Justice and in local police forces?
Mr. Jones. We have had discussion about how we integrate
that into our training.
Ms. Grisham. But you haven't done it, you are looking at
it?
Mr. Jones. The ones that you identified, the sort of
prepackage, whatever the Los Angeles Police Department has
done.
Ms. Grisham. I am going to guess that these are packages,
if we are going to call them that, I would hope these are
sophisticated, evidence-based training protocols that exist in
the Department of Justice that should be readily available for
a model like ATF. I am flabbergasted that they are not
available to you and that you are not utilizing them.
It seems to me you guys don't have any written policies or
procedures to deal with these issues. I would ask, because my
time is up, the following. My expectation is that you share a
role in making sure we have best practices, we mitigate risk
both to officers and absolutely to the public, that you
immediately replicate these policies and procedures, make them
relevant to the operations you are responsible for and you
bring the evidence that you have a protocol and a program in
place for training immediately back to this committee for our
review and discussion.
I don't understand why that is not the case.
Chairman Issa. I thank the gentlelady.
We now go to the gentleman from Arizona, Mr. Gosar.
Mr. Gosar. Director, thank you for being here.
What was the ATF like before you were sworn in?
Mr. Jones. Generally speaking, I had a lot of interaction
going back 20 years from an AUSA time. ATF was one of those
organizations I enjoyed working with both as a prosecutor and
as a US attorney the first and second time.
I have a lot of respect for the work they did with me
personally and Minnesota generally. The developments that
happened in certain field divisions in your part of the world
is unfortunate.
Mr. Gosar. That is where I want to go. Wouldn't you agree
we had some bad habits down in the Phoenix field office?
Mr. Jones. Sometimes bad things happened.
Mr. Gosar. You said there were not. There are those of us
on one side of the law and those on the other side of the law
have to be held accountable in the same way, wouldn't you
agree?
Mr. Jones. Yes.
Mr. Gosar. Looking at it from the outside--I am a dentist
and a politician, Mr. Jones, so I look at structure. You have
to hold people accountable for improper decisions, do you
agree?
Mr. Jones. I agree with that, sir.
Mr. Gosar. There are certain actions that require
termination?
Mr. Jones. Depending on the actions, in the government
setting, yes, there are certain things that would cross that
line. The public sector has a little bit more structure than
the private sector in terms of terminating somebody's
employment.
Mr. Gosar. The lack of faith from the private sector or our
constituents is that bureaucrats are not held to the same
accountability. Would you agree with that?
Mr. Jones. Not necessarily.
Mr. Gosar. If you get on main street America, they find
that bureaucrats have a whole different aspect of
accountability.
First, I would like to enter into the record a letter to
you from Josephine Terry, Brian Terry's mom.
Chairman Issa. Without objection, so ordered.
Mr. Gosar. I want to highlight some of the inquisitions
here.
You are familiar with Inspector General Michael Horowitz's
comprehensive report or review of ATF's Operation Fast and
Furious and related materials, are you not?
Mr. Jones. I am.
Mr. Gosar. In that case, and I want to cite for her because
she does it so eloquently, ``identified several current
Department of Justice and ATF employees who bore particular
responsibility for the many mistakes made in Operation Fast and
Furious. These employees included ATF agents Hope McAllister,
David Voth, George Gillett, William Newell, Emory Hurley, and
Michael Morrissey.
``I understand these individuals have continued their
employment with the Department of Justice despite the findings
of the Inspector General's report.''
It has come to our attention that the ATF's Professional
Review Board had previously recommended termination for some of
these individuals. Is that true?
Mr. Jones. We provided that information.
Mr. Gosar. Is that true, yes or no?
Mr. Jones. That material has been provided.
Mr. Gosar. Yes or no.
Mr. Jones. That material has been provided.
Mr. Gosar. That was a yes, right?
Mr. Jones. Yes.
Mr. Gosar. Why weren't these followed through?
Mr. Jones. I am not quite sure I understand.
Mr. Gosar. Were there any terminations? For example, let's
take one, William Newell. Were they then fired?
Mr. Jones. There are people who have retired, there are
people who have been disciplined.
Mr. Gosar. I would like to enter in the record a letter
from the U.S. Department of Justice to you, Mr. Chairman, dated
April 1, 2014 outlining summaries.
Chairman Issa. Without objection, it will be placed in the
record.
Mr. Gosar. It doesn't show that. There is no accountability
for Fast and Furious.
From the guy who ran his own dental practice on
accountability, it seems when we come into the place of
service, the head of the ATF, that it is dysfunctional at least
when you start looking at the Phoenix office, when you have
such a quandary with Fast and Furious, we would actually hold
people accountable.
This was hardly unaccountable. The Brian Terry family has
no answers whatsoever, wouldn't you agree?
Mr. Jones. It is unfortunate that communication has not
been what it should be in terms of anyone who has lost a person
in the line of duty.
Mr. Gosar. I want to highlight it even further because you
had a conversation with the gentleman from Atlanta.
The Terry family was talking to Michelle Terwilliger, a
special FBI agent, about communication and about Atlanta. It
seems you have problems all the way around in communication
with other law enforcement officers.
``Imagine to the shock, I am learning that the members of
the ATF field division and the US Attorney's Office in Arizona
had chosen to keep the important piece of information about one
of those guns found at the Brian Terry murder was not brought
forward.'' Once again, a gentleman was talking about Atlanta
not talking.
We understand there were problems in Milwaukee with the FBI
and communications. Does ATF have a problem playing with other
law enforcement offices?
Mr. Jones. No.
Mr. Gosar. My question to Mr. Meadows is why would we want
to play in Chicago with the highest rate of death with guns,
why would we want to work with those? It is just an exercise in
communication.
Chairman Issa. The gentleman's time has expired but you may
answer.
Mr. Jones. We work very closely with federal, State and
local in Chicago and every place that we are in. Our
partnerships with both our federal brothers and sisters within
the department and at the local police level are actually
critical to our performing our mission. That partnership
includes communication.
While it is not perfect across the country and while
personalities do impact sometimes that level of communication,
organizationally, that is something we highly value and
couldn't do our job without that partnership.
Chairman Issa. I thank the gentleman.
We now go to the gentlelady from the District of Columbia.
Ms. Norton. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Mr. Jones.
I was at another hearing but I did want to be here to hear
your testimony and at least ask a question.
First of all, I commend the ATF for looking to innovative
risk bearing ways to get at gun running in our society. I am
going to defer to your expertise. I know this much, thugs
consistently outsmart law enforcement. We can stay ahead of
them by tailoring to the location to what you think will work
there.
If all we do is second guess without having the available
expertise, then I am not sure we will get at this. I am not
going to tell you or wonder why you haven't done one of this
storefronts and this or that city. I would like to know off the
record whether there has been any such storefront here in the
District of Columbia. I would appreciate your writing our
office on that question.
We would be a city not unlike Milwaukee. Milwaukee, like
the District, has declining crime. They had one of these
storefronts. I don't know if we do but they had one and some
guns were stolen from an agent's vehicle. That is one of the
risks that you always have when there is a storefront or for
that matter, in any area where there are people who want to get
at guns and use them.
After the Milwaukee experience, you ordered the Office of
Professional Responsibility and Security Operations to conduct
a full investigation. I have seen that report. I am pleased to
say it pulls no punches.
I do know that the field agents, in the absence of
guidance, were trying to put together ways on their own of how
to run a storefront operation. That bothered me, that there was
no guidance on something as risky and I think, frankly, worth
the innovation as one of these operations.
After that Professional Responsibility report, did you take
any action in response, Mr. Jones?
Mr. Jones. We took actions both with respect to reviewing
how they were operated. We took action with respect to the
lessons learned both from a resource standpoint, from a
management standpoint and we took action to try to minimize the
chance that those issues identified in Milwaukee didn't happen
again.
Ms. Norton. Mr. Jones, there was no written guidance. Did
you develop a manual or other operations guidance after the
Milwaukee incident?
Mr. Jones. That is one of the things that did emerge from
that, the level of understanding, because we have a cadre of
experienced agents but sometimes that knowledge is difficult.
One of the things we have done is generate sort of a best
practices manual.
That is separate and apart from what is in our order with
respect to undercover operations and specifically storefront
operations. That is more the parameters of what the rules of
the road are. This secondary document and the follow on
training, when they are done, is sort of a go by.
It is law enforcement sensitive but it does talk about the
things that you should consider, the things that need to be
considered to successfully operate a storefront. That has been
memorialized in a storefront operations manual.
Ms. Norton. I am not sure the committee staff has had an
opportunity to review this manual. Have you submitted the
manual?
Mr. Jones. I believe because of the sensitivity with the
methodologies that it may have been reviewed. We have had staff
over to ATF headquarters to look at manuals.
Ms. Norton. I would appreciate your submitting the manual
so the committee could take a look at it. I think it would
help, with some the questions that have been raised, for people
to know there is written guidance and how that guidance
proceeds.
Chairman Issa. If the gentlelady would yield?
Ms. Norton. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Issa. I would certainly join with you. I do want
to be careful that manuals that are not available to the
public, if we take them into the committee as committee
documents, then they become broadly available normally.
Ms. Norton. I certainly didn't think they would become
broadly available because then the thugs would have them.
Chairman Issa. If the members of your staff would like an
in camera review and after an in camera review you want
specific portions to be provided to the committee, I would join
with you in it but I would prefer that we continue the process
whenever we have that kind of sensitive information of having
staff see it and only if we believe we need some portion do we
request that portion. It is also less burdensome on the agency.
Mr. Jones. I understand there was an invite to have staff
come over to our shop and look at it. As the Chair mentioned,
if anything peaks your interest, we can follow up but there is
a certain level of sensitivity about an operational manual.
Ms. Norton. I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank you, Mr.
Jones.
I would like my staff to be able to see some of this as
well because as I said, this is a city that had high gun
incidents go down and we would be very interested in looking at
what you are doing with respect to the storefronts.
As long as my staff could also see that, I would certainly
understand the admonitions of the Chairman and Mr. Jones.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Issa. We will now go to the gentleman from
Kentucky, Mr. Massie.
Mr. Massie. Mr. Jones, thank you for coming to testify
today. It is quite an honor and opportunity to be able to ask
you questions.
I am an avid gun collector. I try to convince my wife that
these are investments but she says how are they investments if
you are never going to sell them. She has a point but it causes
me to wonder and also watching some collectors who have been
prosecuted and arrested but collectors and the firearms dealers
and the ATF, itself, wouldn't be better served if we had some
very bright lines drawn between what is a straw purchaser and
who is not, and also who is and is not a dealer.
You are kind of left to interpret a very gray area. I have
always wondered wouldn't it be helpful if Congress defined that
line a little bit better for you or somebody did between dealer
and collector, for instance, the number of sales per year?
Mr. Jones. It is always helpful to have Congress define in
a statute where certain lines are drawn. It is difficult, on
occasion, for us with regulatory authority to do that with
clarity all of the time both because of the process and the
dynamics as you mentioned.
Mr. Massie. You think it could be helpful if we did. I just
think it helps people who want to obey the law to have it drawn
very brightly. That is something I would advocate for.
This next question may not seem related to this hearing but
it is because maybe we can avoid another hearing if I could get
one question answered.
Are you familiar with Ares Armor recently raided in
California? They make 80 percent polymer loaders for AR-15s?
Are you familiar with them?
Mr. Jones. I am familiar with that. That is an active
criminal investigation so I will say up front there are
limitations about that.
Mr. Massie. Understood. The search warrant is public and
that sort of thing so I think we can talk some about it.
One thing that was requested was a list of their 5,000
customers. Ares Armor maintains they are not in the business of
manufacturing firearms. If this is true, then what would
justify the ATF having a list of their 5,000 customers?
Mr. Jones. I hope you understand, Mr. Massie, that there
are certain things that are on the public record particularly
with the TRO. My understanding is the search warrant is still
sealed and it is an active criminal investigation.
Generally speaking, I think in those circumstances where we
are investigating the potential, this is specific to Ares
Armor, one of the things of interest for someone who may be
illegally manufacturing firearms is the list of who they have
sold them to, not necessarily to look at the list but to see if
there are witness leads about the circumstances.
Mr. Massie. That will be up to the court to decide whether
Ares Armor was manufacturing firearms, not Congress and not the
ATF.
Mr. Jones. I think in between there is prosecutors involved
also.
Mr. Massie. Right, but the jury gets to decide.
Mr. Jones. Yes, they do.
Mr. Massie. If the jury finds they were not manufacturing
firearms, can we have some assurance from you that list of
5,000 people they were selling material to won't be kept by the
ATF?
Mr. Jones. I think in the normal circumstance of
investigations that would be something that would migrate into
a prosecutor's office and at the conclusion of a case.
Mr. Massie. I would hope the 5,000 names required and if
Ares was found not to be manufacturing firearms, that would
destroy that list because the list was otherwise ill gotten.
A quick question on this particular case in Wichita,
Kansas. Agents let felons leave the store with guns on at least
three occasions. One man brought in two AK-47s to sell but
agents only had enough money to buy one. The man, a felon, was
allowed to leave with the other AK-47. This was at Bandit
Trading in Wichita, Kansas, one of the storefronts.
Why would ATF agents let a felon leave a storefront with an
AK-47?
Mr. Jones. I am not certain of all the circumstances but I
think in an undercover setting, first and foremost, we may not
know the individual is prohibited until after the fact. Someone
who comes into the store, even if there is a suspicion that
they are crime guns, the status of the person selling the gun
isn't always known.
Mr. Massie. Do you think the agent should have alerted
local law enforcement that there was a felon in possession of
an AK-47?
Mr. Jones. I think if they had an opportunity with cover
teams and the right staffing, that the circumstances may
warrant away from the premises some intervention.
Mr. Massie. According to my information, this weapon was
never recovered. Is that true?
Mr. Jones. I am not certain as I sit here today of all the
details of that particular circumstance other than the fact
that there may have been a lack of knowledge about someone
being prohibited when they tried to sell the weapon.
Mr. Massie. If you found out your agents knowingly let a
felon leave the store with an AK-47, would you be concerned?
Mr. Jones. Yes.
Mr. Massie. Would you follow up on that for us?
Mr. Jones. Yes.
Mr. Massie. Thank you.
I yield back my time.
Chairman Issa. I thank the gentleman.
Director, I am going to be very brief with one quick round
of questioning.
Chairman Issa. The Monitored Case Program, the subject
today, how frequently was Operation Fearless briefed to the ATF
headquarters, to your knowledge?
Mr. Jones. We spent a lot of time on the Monitored Case
Program because one of the recommendations in the IG report on
Fast and Furious was the lack of communication as to what was
going on out in the field.
The Monitored Case Program we have in place isn't the same
as it was a year ago or two years ago. It has grown and we have
learned more. I think at the core of it is the push/pull
dynamic of what comes up and how we get it, and what is pulled
up and how we get it.
The circumstance with respect to Operation Fearless was it
did not migrate up the food chain. It got briefed up and not
all the information on the ground got briefed to the SAC which
means it didn't get to the Deputy Assistant Director. That is a
phenomena we have worked hard to make sure both by looking at
our own case management system and proactively engaging with
the special agents in charge about what is coming up.
Chairman Issa. If I could interpret that accurately that
would mean that the answer to the question of how frequently
was headquarters briefed, the answer was you weren't. It didn't
get to you is what you are saying.
Mr. Jones. There are a number of cases on the Monitored
Case Program that I don't get a personal briefing on.
Chairman Issa. I actually asked about headquarters so I was
including your deputy.
Mr. Jones. The Deputy Assistant Directors do, based on
their region, have regular interaction. Fearless was up to the
Deputy Assistant Director in terms of the information flow but
I think the glitch that we learned was what the special agent
was hearing was positives and not problems.
Chairman Issa. Is it fair to say that although our
information shows that Operation Fearless was briefed to
headquarters nine times, that, in fact, those briefings were
insufficient to uncover the flaws in Operation Fearless?
Mr. Jones. Yes.
Chairman Issa. How often were you briefed on Monitored Case
programs in a setting in which you knew you were being briefed
on Monitored cases?
Mr. Jones. We have monthly meetings.
Chairman Issa. Essentially in 12 months, 12 times, roughly?
Mr. Jones. Yes.
Chairman Issa. Were you ever briefed on Operation Fearless
separate from the Monitored Case Program in some capacity? Did
the deputy come in and say I want to talk to you?
Mr. Jones. Me personally?
Chairman Issa. Yes, you personally.
Mr. Jones. No.
Chairman Issa. No. This is redundant somewhat but did you
ever meet with anybody at main Justice concerning Operation
Fearless?
Mr. Jones. No.
Chairman Issa. Did you ever meet with anybody at DOJ's
Criminal Division about Operation Fearless?
Mr. Jones. In terms of time frame?
Chairman Issa. If the answer is yes, then the follow up
would be, when was the first time and what was the subject?
Mr. Jones. There were discussions with the Justice
Department and particularly the IG when we launched internal
affairs to go out there and do the dive but until certain
issues came to light, no. This was field division, United
States Attorney's office, Milwaukee Police Department--February
to September of 2012, so it is not an extended storefront
operation. It was up and down pretty quickly. Then the concerns
were brought to light.
Chairman Issa. Would it be fair to say that your first
meeting with DOJ, the Criminal Division, would have been after
the end of Operation Fearless as an ongoing operation?
Mr. Jones. In terms of the Criminal Division, I don't
recall any interaction. I briefed up on challenges we were
having and we talked to the United States attorney about cases
generated out of that operation.
Chairman Issa. You didn't talk with anyone at the DAG's
office or anyone of that sort?
Mr. Jones. We have regular meetings, sort of here is where
we are.
Chairman Issa. Is it possible that in the last 12 or 14
months, you did have conversations about Operation Fearless
with DAG?
Mr. Jones. I think it would be fair to say we have had
conversations about storefronts generally but I don't recall
having specifics on this particular operation in Milwaukee.
Chairman Issa. Final question, I guess, following up on
that. This has been an area of interest of the Deputy Attorney
General, the storefronts and the concerns about operations?
Mr. Jones. Collectively all the DOJ enforcement community,
US attorneys and the Deputy Attorney General have had a lot of
discussions about managing risk in the last several years. New
policies across the board within the Department of Justice are
applicable to all law enforcement and US attorney offices.
There have been discussions with the DAG about managed risk
and information flow generally.
Chairman Issa. Mr. Cummings, do you have anything?
Mr. Cummings. Yes.
Chairman Issa. If you don't mind, I will let you close. We
will go to Mr. Jordan briefly.
Mr. Jordan. I thank the gentleman.
I want to be clear, you were Acting Director of ATF when
ATF visited Ms. Englebrecht's place of business. You have been
Acting Director since August of 2011, to my understanding? Have
you been Acting Director since August 2011?
Mr. Jones. My first day in that building was I think the
last day in August.
Mr. Jordan. You were Acting Director when ATF visited Ms.
Englebrecht in 2012 and 2013?
Mr. Jones. Yes.
Mr. Jordan. I mentioned briefly at the end of my first
round Mr. Tom Perez. We had a hearing in this committee
regarding what took place in St. Paul, what we have called the
quid pro quo.
I am interested because Mr. Perez was in the Civil Rights
Division and Ms. Bosserman is the person heading the
investigation in the IRS. I am curious about your interaction
with Mr. Perez in your role as US attorney but while you were
also Acting Director of ATF.
When he contacted you about the Newell case and the fact
that you had career attorneys recommending intervention, that
was subsequently changed and you did not intervene based on
conversations you had with Mr. Perez. Can you walk me through
that briefly?
Mr. Jones. It is more than briefly. I had a lot of
discussion during my confirmation process about those
interactions. It is fair to say I have never talked to Mr.
Perez about anything related to Ms. Englebrecht.
Mr. Jordan. How did it happen you had career attorneys tell
you we need to intervene, this is a good case, $62 million
potential fraud against the Federal Government and then you
decide not to do that?
During the hearing we had on this issue in this committee,
the Democratic witness told us that is highly unusual when you
have career attorneys recommending you take a certain course of
action and then it is subsequently changed. How was that
decision reached? Did you agree with Mr. Perez, did you
ultimately sign off on it, how was it decided?
Mr. Jones. That is something beyond the scope of why I am
here today and I am not really prepared to go into a deep dive
as to what went on with my experiences as United States
Attorney.
Mr. Jordan. I would argue it has a lot to do with this
committee. We have spent countless hours investigating the IRS
situation and how Mr. Perez at the Civil Rights Division, how
Barbara Bosserman gets to be the lead investigator in the
Justice Department investigation of this. We think Tom Perez is
involved. I am trying to figure out how this may relate.
We know Mr. Perez flew to St. Paul, got things changed, we
know the United States Government did not intervene even though
there were millions of dollars at stake we could have
potentially recovered. We know that didn't happen after Tom
Perez talked to you and after your career attorneys said we
should intervene. I think it is highly relevant.
Mr. Jones. I provided a substantial amount of information
to Senator Grassley's staff on the record that I am sure they
would share with you transcripts of my prior testimony.
Mr. Jordan. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Chairman Issa. I thank you.
We will now go to the Ranking Member.
Mr. Cummings. Director, first of all, I want to thank you
for your testimony. It has been very helpful. I think you shed
a bright light on the good, the bad and the ugly, and I do
emphasize good. There is a lot of good here. On the other hand,
as you said, it has to be done right.
As I was sitting here, I was thinking you can never say
thank you enough. Again, I say thank you to you and to the ATF.
Let me tell you why. On Good Friday of last year, I went to
observe an autopsy of a young African American man who had been
killed--shot to death by so-called friends. I intentionally
wanted to go and see an autopsy of a gunshot victim.
It was interesting when I watched that autopsy they
apparently shot him in the head right behind the ear and it
came out over the eye, one bullet. When I looked at the hole, I
swear it looked to be about half the size of a penny on one
side but on the other side, it looked like the size of a
quarter.
Then they showed me something like a CAT scan of what
happened when the bullet went through his head and how
everything just exploded. I followed that case because I was
curious.
Then I had the situation with my nephew at Old Dominion who
was murdered three years ago. Some people came into his room at
5:00 a.m., a third year honor student at Old Dominion, and
killed him, blasted his head. Two days later, I went to his
apartment and his brains and blood were splattered all over the
walls.
That is what your folks try to prevent. I want them to know
that it is so very, very important. They may not get all the
thanks and they have been through some hell. I know they have.
We watched the Fast and Furious situation and mistakes were
clearly made. I was glad to see you come in and that was one
reason I went to your swearing in because I had so much hope
for this organization because it is so important.
I think we need to make sure under all of these
circumstances that we get it right because I think when
anything goes wrong, it is wrong but nobody pays a lot of
attention to the right. The mission must go on.
There are kids in my neighborhood who tell me they could
get a gun if they have the money faster than they can get a
cigarette. That is real. You all have a tough situation to deal
with but I am so thankful that the ATF exists because if it
didn't, we would have to invent it.
The expertise that your people bring, the dedication, I
don't want what happened with regard to Fast and Furious to
have a chilling effect on any of them. I want them to
understand they have a mission that is bigger than they are. It
is about trying to make sure people are safe and trying to make
sure they address the issues of guns being in the hands of the
wrong people doing the wrong thing.
Again, I want to say thank you. I am looking forward to our
briefing. I am hoping that the policies that your team has
brought together now or put in place will address the kind of
issues that came up in Fast and Furious. I am hoping with
regard to the storefront situation that things are in place so
we don't have to go through this kind of situation again.
I think the best words you could have said, at least music
to my ears, are that if we cannot do it right, we are not going
to do it at all. It reminds me of my first trip to Israel many
years ago. They had a saying which rings in my head. It said,
if we are not better, we will not be. I thank you for pursuing
the best.
The Chairman and I were kind of joking about who wants this
job but we know that it is the love of country, it is the love
of trying to make a difference and have an impact in your time
on this earth. We appreciate it.
Mr. Jones. With respect to that last comment, I have a lot
of friends who ask me too but over the last two and a half to
three years, I have gotten to know this organization. I have
been to ever field division and met a lot of people outside of
headquarters, agents, investigators, and support staff. They
have a great mission and this is really a great organization.
They understand. We all understand that we have to refill
that well of credibility because of recent events and mistakes.
I share with you without any hesitation that the folks at ATF
are dedicated to a very important mission. It is probably the
most resilient law enforcement organization I have ever come
across.
In the face of a lot of adversity related to both
enforcement of the Gun Control Act to recent snafus and
mistakes made and for a lot of different reasons, they are
tough as nails and are completely dedicated to the mission of
making our communities safer from gun violence, arson and
people who would use explosives to hurt folks.
It is an honor to be at the helm of this organization.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Issa. I thank you for your testimony.
We are going to stand adjourned. If you don't mind, the
Ranking Member and I would like to see you in the back for a
couple of minutes.
Thank you.
Mr. Jones. Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 12:20 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
APPENDIX
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