[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
EXAMINING WHAT A NUCLEAR IRAN DEAL MEANS FOR GLOBAL SECURITY
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
NOVEMBER 20, 2014
__________
Serial No. 113-224
__________
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
DANA ROHRABACHER, California Samoa
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio BRAD SHERMAN, California
JOE WILSON, South Carolina GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
TED POE, Texas GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
MATT SALMON, Arizona THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina KAREN BASS, California
ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
MO BROOKS, Alabama DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
TOM COTTON, Arkansas ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
PAUL COOK, California JUAN VARGAS, California
GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois
RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III,
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania Massachusetts
STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas AMI BERA, California
RON DeSANTIS, Florida ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California
DOUG COLLINS, Georgia GRACE MENG, New York
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
TED S. YOHO, Florida TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
SEAN DUFFY, Wisconsin JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
CURT CLAWSON, Florida
Amy Porter, Chief of Staff Thomas Sheehy, Staff Director
Jason Steinbaum, Democratic Staff Director
------
Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
JOE WILSON, South Carolina GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
TOM COTTON, Arkansas DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
RON DeSANTIS, Florida JUAN VARGAS, California
DOUG COLLINS, Georgia BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III,
TED S. YOHO, Florida Massachusetts
SEAN DUFFY, Wisconsin GRACE MENG, New York
CURT CLAWSON, Florida LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
C O N T E N T S
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Page
WITNESSES
General Michael Hayden, USAF, Retired, Principal, The Chertoff
Group (former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency)..... 9
Mr. Mark Dubowitz, executive director, Foundation for Defense of
Democracies.................................................... 16
Mr. Karim Sadjadpour, senior associate, Middle East Program,
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace..................... 41
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
General Michael Hayden, USAF, Retired: Prepared statement........ 12
Mr. Mark Dubowitz: Prepared statement............................ 18
Mr. Karim Sadjadpour: Prepared statement......................... 43
APPENDIX
Hearing notice................................................... 68
Hearing minutes.................................................. 69
The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress
from the Commonwealth of Virginia: Prepared statement.......... 70
EXAMINING WHAT A NUCLEAR IRAN DEAL MEANS FOR GLOBAL SECURITY
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THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 20, 2014
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2 o'clock
p.m., in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ileana
Ros-Lehtinen (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. This subcommittee will come to order.
After recognizing myself and Ranking Member Deutch for 5
minutes each for our opening statements, I will recognize other
members seeking recognition.
We will then hear from our witnesses, and, without
objection, the witnesses prepared statements will be made a
part of the record. Members may have 5 days in which to insert
statements and questions for the record, subject to the length
limitation in the rules.
The Chair now recognizes herself for 5 minutes.
We are now just a few days away from the Iran nuclear
deadline, and the P5+1 appear poised to accept a weak deal with
a regime that cannot be trusted.
Despite approximately $14 billion in direct sanctions
relief, as well as incalculable indirect benefits to the
Iranian economy and the nuclear program, Iran has repeatedly
stated that it will never stop enriching uranium or take one
step back in its research and development.
Despite a 4-month extension of talks and allowing Iran
access to an additional $700 million of its blocked currency
each month, Iran's Supreme Leader 2 weeks ago called for the
destruction of our greatest ally in the Middle East, the
Democratic Jewish State of Israel.
Iran recently claimed its ballistic missiles are capable of
razing Israeli cities and American military bases in the region
to the ground. Iran has called for a Palestinian incitement
against Israel, the result of which can be seen in the tragic
murders 2 days ago of five Israelis, three of whom were U.S.
Citizens in Jerusalem synagogue as they were praying.
From the onset, Iran has not complied with the terms
outlined by the P5+1, exporting more oil than allowed,
continuing production at the Arak heavy water reactor, denying
access to key facilities, and dragging its feet every step of
the way. The International Atomic Energy Agency has confirmed
that Iran isn't even cooperating with its past commitments,
such as completely disclosing its past work on nuclear
weaponization.
Rouhani, who bragged in the past about deceiving the
administration, as its chief negotiator, is known for using
stall tactics while continuing to advance Iran's nuclear
weapons program behind the scenes. And our leadership in the
White House falls for it.
The administration turns a blind eye to Iran's support of
terrorism, its constant threats against the United States and
our allies, and its failure to cooperate even during this
negotiation period. It ignores every lesson we thought we
learned when North Korea delayed its way into a nuclear weapon.
President Obama even sends secret letters to the Supreme
Leader, naively hoping to appeal to the rational side of a man
who has proven himself to be anything but.
The Iranians have made clear that no matter what a final
deal contains, they will not stop enrichment and will not allow
access to sites like Parchin and who knows how many other
covert sites.
As General Hayden has stated, because of the covert nature
of Iran's activities, American intelligence alone will not be
able to verify the agreement. And, if he would still be
advising the President, he would tell him that this deal could
not be adequately verified.
Iran must be completely transparent about its current and
past programs, including its weaponization programs and accept
snap inspections anywhere, any time. But experience and a track
record tells us that Iran will not do so. It is impossible to
verify Iran's nuclear program because, as a Defense Science
Board report has said, ``The capability to detect Iran's
undeclared or covert nuclear sites is either inadequate or does
not exist.''
Finally, the administration has misunderstood the point of
sanctions, sanctions that Congress worked hard to build from
the very beginning. The sanctions regime that Congress put into
place was designed to work together. The sanctions are
interconnected to target, not just the nuclear program, but
Iran's ballistic weapons program and human rights abuses as
well.
The P5+1 has allowed Iran's economy to grow, its currency
to strengthen, and has provided a dangerous amount of
concessions and sanctions relief to the regime based only on
its nuclear program. And they have given Iran the time and
money it needs to be more resilient and even better able to
weather sanctions in the future. The effect of sanctions takes
time and it cannot be easily re-implemented or once lifted or
once suspended.
Yet all indications are that President Obama, if a final
deal is reached, would seek to lift sanctions or use waiver
authority provided within the sanctions law. These waivers,
however, are national security waivers. It is not in the
national security interest of the United States to provide Iran
additional access to cash with which it can proliferate and
expand other ilicit activities, specifically, its support for
global terror.
Just last week, the President reissued a continuation of
the national emergency with respect to Iran, a status which has
been in place since the Iran hostage crisis in 1979. It strains
the imagination to see how the President can, on one hand,
declare Iran as a national emergency, yet on the other waive
sanctions and say, Iran is not a national security threat.
Congress needs to reclaim its sanction authority from this
administration, do everything it can to prevent this weak deal
from happening.
So let me be clear, no matter what the P5+1 does, Congress
should not allow a deal that threatens our national security
interest to stand, and we intend on repairing the damage that
has been done as soon as possible. We must reinstate and expand
sanctions, and we must not allow Iran to get a nuclear bomb.
Either the P5+1 secures the deal that includes the complete
cessation of Iran's enrichment and the full dismantling of its
nuclear infrastructure or it must walk away from these doomed
talks altogether.
And with that, I am pleased to yield to my good friend from
Florida, the ranking member, Congressman Ted Deutch.
Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Thanks for holding this extremely timely hearing as we are
just 4 days away from the November 24th deadline to reach a
deal to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon.
Madam Chairman, often we are told these hearings that--
often when we are told that, in these hearings, we have
important points to make, 5 minutes is not enough to lay out
the complex issues that we are tackling in the Middle East. But
today it really comes down to one simple question. Will we
prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons capabilities?
I don't think any of us are under the illusion that a
satisfactory and comprehensive deal will be reached on Monday.
But let me be clear, any deal must cut off all of Iran's
pathways to a nuclear weapon; and this specifically includes
the Arak reactor. A deal must dismantle Iran's centrifuge
program to prevent Iran from becoming a threshold nuclear
state, create robust verification and monitoring mechanisms to
prevent undetectable breakout, force Iran to come clean on its
past nuclear activities, including impossible military
dimensions and cover a long enough duration that the regime
won't simply wait it out.
In the absence of a deal on Monday, we could be left with
alternative outcomes. Either an extension of talks under the
current terms or framework agreement with details to be
addressed in the future negotiations or final recognition that
the clerics running around never intended to make a deal at
all. Any suggestion that talks should be extended must include
verifiable mechanisms to prevent Iran from covertly advancing
its nuclear program.
Madam Chairman, I can't stress enough to our negotiators in
Vienna and our P5+1 partners how seriously we take the
implementation of a strict verification and monitoring process.
This regime has unfortunately proven itself untrustworthy time
and time again. We have uncovered covert nuclear facilities. We
have discovered military dimensions to its nuclear program, the
development and testing of ballistic missiles, the arms shipped
to terrorist groups, all in direct violation of United Nations
Security Council resolutions.
If an extension is suggested, it must be for a clearly
defined and limited time. Iran cannot be allowed to negotiate
in perpetuity, dragging things out while continuing to receive
sanctions relief in exchange for incremental baby steps. The
current status quo will not be the accepted new normal. Now is
the time for Iran to take significant steps to show the world,
once and for all, whether or not it is serious.
And if an extension is proposed, Congress should make clear
to Iran that sanctions will be ratcheted up dramatically at the
expiration of an extension period. This will finally make Iran
understand the ramifications of failing to yield on its pursuit
of a nuclear weapon.
And while the world has been focused for the past year on
nuclear negotiations, this regime has continued to engage in
the most egregious human rights abuses against its own people,
something that we hear too little about. Make no mistake, deal
or no deal, we will not continue--we will not overlook Iran's
abysmal human rights record.
Yesterday, United Nations issued a strong rebuke to the
regime on human rights, adopting a resolution criticizing
Iran--and I quote--``alarming high frequency and increase in
the death penalty, widespread restrictions on basic freedoms
and worsening discrimination and persecution of women and
minorities.''
This regime, during the Rouhani presidency, has executed
over 850 people in the past 15 months. This includes 12
executions in one prison over 11 days in October. Religious
minorities, women, and the LGBT community continue to be
persecuted. Access to free press and the internet is blocked.
Communications are monitored and people are detained for
expressing dissent toward regime policies.
Iran has not fulfilled its promises of assistance in our
efforts as well to find my constituent, Robert Levinson, who
has now been missing and separated from his wife, children, and
grandchildren for 2,813 days. It has not released the other
Americans imprisoned or Washington Post journalist, Jason
Rezaian, who has been held without charges for over 120 days.
This regime may no longer have the bombastic spokesman,
Ahmadinejad, to incite anti-Semitism and spew vitriol. But that
hasn't stopped the Supreme Leader from issuing just recently a
nine-point plan on why and how Israel should be annihilated. It
hasn't stopped the regime's unabated support for the murderous
Assad regime, or it relentless support for Hezbollah's
terrorism around the world. It hasn't stopped its meddling in
Iraq, and Yemen, and Bahrain, and other Gulf countries.
Look, I want to see a diplomatic solution to the nuclear
crisis. The best resolution would be to reach a comprehensive
deal that addresses all of the points that I laid out earlier.
But even if a nuclear deal is reached, Iran must know that its
behavior will not be accepted by responsible Nations. We will
speak out against the regime's barbaric treatment of its own
people. We will continue to enforce sanctions on those who
perpetuate these abuses. And we will continue to go after the
regime's financial and military support of terrorist
organizations.
I know we are all anxiously awaiting Monday's deadline, and
I would just like to repeat what we have heard from the
administration since day one, ``No deal is better than a bad
deal.'' A bad deal will gravely threaten the safety and
security of the United States, of our allies in the region,
especially Israel.
And, Madam Chairman, let me be clear about one last thing,
those of us who may question the merits of an inadequate deal
are not on a march and do not advocate a march to war. We
simply do not want to see an agreement that allows Iran to
acquire a nuclear weapon right under our noses.
Again, I thank our witnesses for appearing today. You each
bring unique expertise and insight into Iran's domestic and
foreign policy, and I look forward to a productive discussion.
I yield back.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much, Mr. Deutch.
And now I will recognize other members for their opening
statements.
Mr. Wilson of South Carolina.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
And I would like to join in with Congressman Deutch to
reiterate that this is an untrustworthy regime. It is
untrustworthy to its citizens, indeed the violations of human
rights, the subjugation of the women of Iran.
We know this is the great culture of Persia. More should be
expected of such an extraordinary country, but the people are
being subjugated. And, then, at the same time, we have an
American administration that, I think, is being extraordinarily
naive.
Our country, we should remember the inhumanity of the
hostage crisis, the taking of our Embassy in 1979, violating
every norms of civilized law, international law. Additionally,
I will never forget that it was Iran that directed the bombing
of the Marine barracks at Beirut, hundreds of Americans were
killed. It was the largest explosion since Nagasaki. And then
the IEDs provided to terrorists to kill American personnel,
Iraq, Afghanistan. Having two sons serve in Iraq, another in
Afghanistan, it was quite personal to me.
We should remember that their signs carried, in English for
our benefit, ``Death to America. Death to Israel.'' And that is
the way the negotiations should be conducted as people not
trustworthy.
Thank you.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much, Mr. Wilson.
Mr. Higgins of New York.
Mr. Higgins. Thank you, Madam Chair, for holding this
important hearing.
The nuclear--a nuclear Iran would have severe repercussions
for America's security and that of our allies, further
destabilizing an already volatile region and emboldening a
already dangerous regime.
Preventing Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon is a major
strategic imperative of the United States and must be
continued. As the deadline for concluding a nuclear deal
approaches, it is useful to provide some context on the
evolution of Iran's nuclear program. In the past, Iran
cynically used the negotiations process with the EU Nations in
order to continue enrichment activities and protect itself from
United States intervention. Now, Iran has built out its
capacity to 19,000 centrifuges.
Stiff sanctions are what brought Iran to the table, and
they must continue to be our leverage point. I fear that by
continuing to provide sanctions relief in exchange for vague
commitments by the Iranians, we are helping to rehabilitate an
Iranian economy and eroding a robust and effective sanctions
policy.
I look forward to the testimony of our witnesses.
Thank you. I yield back.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, sir.
Dr. Yoho.
Dr. Yoho. I have no opening statement, Madam Chair.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Mr. DeSantis.
Mr. DeSantis. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman, for holding this
important hearing and your diligence on this subject.
You know, between the time we left before the election and
reconvene, there were two troubling reports. One was the report
of the President writing a letter to the Ayatollah about
potential common interests that we may have with Iran to fight
ISIS, and then the other report that was troubling was that the
Iran deal was most likely to be constructed in a way to avoid
scrutiny by Congress.
And so I looked at that and said, they want Iran to be a
constructive force in Iraq and what type of consideration are
they going to provide in these nuclear negotiations, because I
don't think we are likely to be successful anyways. And I
really fear that we could be running into a catastrophic policy
outcome, and I think it is very incumbent on the Congress to
insert ourselves in this.
We should not allow a bad deal to go without us having to
vote and, if it is a bad deal, then, we need to be strong and
impose sanctions. There would have been sanctions to pass the
Senate, except for one man, Harry Reid, would not let that come
for a vote. In January, there is a new sheriff in town.
And I yield back.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Mr. DeSantis.
Mr. Vargas of California.
Mr. Vargas. Thank you very much, Madam Chair.
And witnesses for being here today.
I have always believed that it has been naive to negotiate
with Iran over their nuclear program. I think the Iranians,
their negotiating policy, really is to stall and they have
stalled. And they have extended, and they have extended. I
think they are going to continue to do that.
I thought the appropriate approach was to pass more
comprehensive sanctions. I did that here, and I thought that
they had to really pick, then, between they want an economy
that functioned, a society, or did they want their nuclear
program. They couldn't have both. Unfortunately, we are down
this path, and it looks like they want to extend and stall once
again.
I hope that we will get back to the sanctions. I hope that
we pass stronger sanctions, and I think that that is the way to
go. They have to make a decision. Do you want this nuclear
program, or do you want a functioning society?
I thank you again, Madam Chair, for holding this hearing.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, sir.
Ms. Frankel of Florida.
Ms. Frankel. Thank you, Madam Chair.
I think we are all mindful that one of the ramifications of
Iran obtaining nuclear weapons is the potential of
proliferation in the region. And so, as you testify today, I
would be interested in hearing what other countries you think
might seek to obtain nuclear weapons and how would that relate
to what is going on with ISIL?
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Very good question.
Thank you.
Ms. Frankel. I yield the rest of my time.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Mr. Cicilline of Rhode Island.
Mr. Cicilline. Thank you, Madam Chairman, and Ranking
Member Deutch for holding today's hearing on this issue that is
really vital to the U.S. national security interests.
The continuing threat that Iran poses to international
stability is of paramount concern to the United States and to
our national security interest. I certainly appreciate the
efforts made by the administration and the P5+1 in negotiations
with Iran pursuant to the terms of the joint plan of action,
but serious questions remain regarding Iran's interest in
reaching a final deal and Iran's intention of arming the terms
of any agreement, even if one were reached.
While reports suggests that some small progress has been
made in the negotiations, we must remain vigilant to ensure
that any comprehensive deal truly protects the national
security interests of the United States and our allies around
the world. We will need to ensure that Iran complies with
international law and any restrictions and requirements agreed
to in a final deal are verifiable and, also, guarantee that
Iran is unable to develop a nuclear weapons capability, period.
Finally, I want to note that it is crucial that Congress
and the administration continue to work together, not
separately to best achieve the foreign policy priorities of the
United States, an agreement that once and for all prevents a
nuclear Iran.
I thank you, and I yield back.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Connolly of Virginia.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Madam Chairman, let's stipulate, we don't like Iran. Let's
also stipulate we don't want a nuclear Iran. They are two
different things to conflate the need for domestic reform in
Iran to the point where it is pluralistic, democratic,
inclusive, and respects all human rights, otherwise, we are
never going to sit down with them and negotiate a nuclear deal,
is a very perilous proposition. We don't live in an ideal
world.
The interim agreement, according to the International
Atomic Energy Agency, has produced pursuant to the agreement.
There are no new centrifuges. Construction has been halted in a
heavy water facility reactor at Arak. Five percent uranium 235
stockpiles remain at pre-JPOA levels, and 20 percent uranium
235 stockpiles have been eliminated. It ain't perfect. We would
like to finalize a final agreement. But if we make perfect be
the enemy of the good, we are condemning the world to a
confrontation over Iran. And I think most Americans want to
avoid that if that is possible.
Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Schneider of Illinois.
Mr. Schneider. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman, and thank you
for calling this hearing. Thank you for your profound remarks.
Also, the ranking member, Mr. Deutch, I want to associate
myself with those remarks as well.
There is no newspaper big enough to cover all of the issues
happening around the world today. But every day, not just
today, every day the number one story at the top of the fold
has to be preventing a nuclear Iran.
If there is going to be a deal, it must only be a good
deal. And a good deal will only be such if it blocks all of
Iran's pathways to a nuclear weapon and not temporarily, but
permanently across generations. It has to be a deal that blocks
their programs for enrichment, weaponization, and delivery
systems. But it must also deal with Iran's support of
international terrorism and Iran's threats to the region as
well as its human rights violations. We must have a deal that
blocks that and protects, not just the region, but the entire
world.
I look forward to hearing from all of our witnesses to hear
what you have to say how we might best get to the that or what
happens if we don't.
Thank you.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, sir.
And now I will turn to Mr. Cotton of Arkansas.
Mr. Cotton. Thank you.
In the interest of time, I will speak very briefly and just
say that I am doubtful that any deal could be reached with this
Iranian regime that would stop this Iranian regime from
pursuing nuclear weapons, and I hope that the President will
take the right action to keep America and our allies safe in
the region.
And I look forward to hearing what the witnesses have to
say on these matters.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Kennedy of Massachusetts.
Mr. Kennedy. Madam Chair, than you very much.
To the ranking member, thank you both for hosting an
important hearing.
To the witnesses, thank you for, once again, appearing
before this committee and thank you for your service to our
country as well.
There are a number of issues obviously before this Congress
and before the next one. Very few have the potential of a
generational impact like an Iranian nuclear weapon and the
cascading effects throughout the region. I would ask to--I
would like--I want to get to your testimony, your comments.
I would like to hear from the witnesses at some point, if
you can speculate a little bit, assuming that a deal is not
reached on the 24th, what happens then, particularly with
regards to, I would say three points in building off my
colleague, Ms. Frankel, with regards to Russia and our
relationship with Russia, with regards to Iraq, and with
regards to ISIL and Syria?
Thank you very much.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, sir.
And now I will introduce our witnesses.
First, we are all very pleased to welcome General Michael
Hayden, who has had a very impressive and distinguished career.
Over his 40-year career, he rose through the ranks to become a
Four-Star General, the Director of the National Security
Agency, the first Principal Deputy Director of National
Intelligence and the Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency. General Hayden is now a principal with the Chertoff
Group, and we welcome him here today and we thank him for his
service. Thank you very much, General.
Next, we welcome back to our committee Mr. Mark Dubowitz,
executive director of the Foundation for Defense of
Democracies, where he leads projects on Iran, sanctions,
proliferation, as the head of FDD's center on sanctions and
ilicit finance. Mr. Dubowitz is the author of 15 studies on
economic sanctions against Iran, and he is also co-chair of the
project on U.S.-Middle East nonproliferation strategy. Welcome,
Mark.
And, finally, we also welcome back Mr. Karim Sadjadpour, a
senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace. Prior to this, Mr. Sadjadpour was the chief Iran analyst
at the International Crisis Group and he is a board member of
the Banu Foundation, an organization dedicated to empowering
women worldwide.
We are very pleased with the high quality of our witnesses
today; your prepared remarks will be made a part of the record.
Please feel free to synthesize them for us.
General Hayden, we will begin with you, sir.
STATEMENT OF GENERAL MICHAEL HAYDEN, USAF, RETIRED, PRINCIPAL,
THE CHERTOFF GROUP (FORMER DIRECTOR OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY)
General Hayden. Thank you, ma'am, and thanks for the
opportunity to testify today.
In the nearly 6 years since I have left government, people
have asked me, ``What keeps you awake at night?'' Iran has
always been in my list. In fact, let me add that Iran was the
problem with which I was least satisfied when I left government
in February 2009. We certainly did not hand our successors a
pretty package here.
And so I said to myself, with the questions Mr. Schneider
and Mr. Kennedy brought up, it is the problem I think that has
most consistently continued to worsen in the intervening 5\1/2\
years.
Now, we are involved in nuclear negotiations with the
Islamic republic and, no doubt, as you have pointed out, that
is the product of the tough sanctions that two administrations
have levied against Tehran. Now, the real question before us
is, can we come out of these negotiations with a nuclear
agreement that will give us confidence that we will have the
time, the certainty, and the will to prevent Iran from becoming
a nuclear weapon state at any time in the future?
Now, I come at this as a professional intelligence officer,
so I will keep my remarks pretty much in that lane.
First point I would like to make is Iran is a tough
intelligence target. During my time as Director of CIA, Iran
was the second most discussed topic in the Oval Office. The
only one more discussed was terrorism. And, frankly, there
wasn't a number three. I mean, we talked about a lot of other
things, but we didn't aggregate around it like we did terrorism
and Iran.
President Bush used to ask me two kinds of questions. One
basket was, ``What does the program look like? How much low-
enrich uranium, how many centrifuges?'' The other basket of
questions was simply, ``How do these guys make decisions? How
do I influence their processes going forward?''
I always wanted the nuclear questions because Iran is an
incredibly, incredibly opaque society. So we should be under no
illusions that we can precisely define the motivations or the
future plans of the various power centers that vie for control
in Tehran today. So that gives me little confidence about any
plan of action predicated on helping the moderates in Tehran.
Second, our knowledge of the Iranian nuclear program is
incomplete. That is why I believe an important element of any
agreement has to be far more transparent than we have today
about the past history of Iranian nuclear efforts. It is
particularly disheartening, as you said, Madam Chairman, when
the IAEA is denied access to facilities and information that
they think they need to judge Iranian compliance.
Look, the objective of these talks is to put distance
between where the Iranians are parked and where they have to be
to have a weapon. It is near impossible for us to judge whether
the distance is adequate without a full accounting of the work
they have done to date in secrecy.
Third, even with incomplete knowledge on the program, it is
my belief that, at a minimum, Iran is keeping its options open,
working very hard to keep its options open for a nuclear
weapon. There is no other logical explanation for their
investment in time, energy, commerce, and prestige that they
have been willing to make.
Now, I say that fully aware that I was in government when
we produced a national intelligence estimate in 2007 that said
that Iran had stopped a part of its nuclear weapons program.
And that judgment was not based on the absence of evidence. It
was indeed based on evidence of absence. They had stopped some
work, but that was far more tactical than strategic. Some of
that work has resumed in other important aspects, like creating
fissile material and ballistic missile technology. That
continued to pace.
A fourth point. Iran is already close to a weapon--too
close to a weapon. The point of the negotiations, from our
point of view, has to be to roll the program back, not freeze
it in place. That means that certain activities, stocks,
facilities have to be dismantled. From all accounts, the
Iranians have not been very forthcoming on that important
subject; and so I would be very cautious about creative
solutions that have been put forward in place of the actual
dismantlement of facilities and equipment and stockpiles.
Ms. Frankel, an Iran that is parked too close to a nuclear
weapon will pretty much have the same destabilizing effect on
the region as an Iran that has just tested a nuclear weapon.
The Sunni neighbors will draw their conclusions, and they will
act accordingly, and I know that this committee understands how
harmful that would be for the entire region.
A fifth and final point has to do with verification. I had
to deal with this question at the end of the Bush
administration when we were negotiating with the North Koreans.
At that time, in NSC meetings, I pressed for an invasive
verification regime as a necessity for any agreement because I
was unwilling to guarantee that American intelligence could
sufficiently verify the agreement on its own.
So let me repeat that position for the question before us
today. Absent an invasive inspection regime, with freedom to
visit even suspect sites on short notice, American intelligence
cannot provide adequate warning of Iranian nuclear
developments.
I know there are many other aspects of the issue that the
committee will want to explore, and I look forward to that
discussion, ma'am.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much. That was very clear.
[The prepared statement of General Hayden follows:]
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Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Mr. Dubowitz.
STATEMENT OF MR. MARK DUBOWITZ, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, FOUNDATION
FOR DEFENSE OF DEMOCRACIES
Mr. Dubowitz. Chairman Ros-Lehtinen, Ranking Member Deutch,
members of the subcommittee, on behalf of FDD, thank you for
inviting me again to testify.
I am honored and certainly humbled to be testifying with
General Hayden and with Karim Sadjadpour, whose work and
service to our country I greatly admire.
As many of you have said, Iran is at this negotiation table
because of you, because of the sanctions that you have passed.
Now, Congress has attempted to do other things. You have
attempted to establish clear parameters for what constitutes an
acceptable nuclear deal. You have attempted to put in place
sanctions and waiting to increase American leverage. You have
attempted to set a strict timeline for the conclusion of a
deal, and you have attempted to demand that a final deal should
be put to a vote in Congress.
The administration has blocked all of these efforts.
Congress should continue pushing on all of these fronts, but it
should also defend the very sanctions architecture that was so
instrumental in creating. This is going to be essential to
enforce any Iranian nuclear deal, to provide increased leverage
to respond to Iranian noncompliance, and to deter and punish
Iran's elicit activities. Because after detection, what? What
leverage are we going to have left to force the Iranians back
into compliance?
Now, a negotiated agreement is the preferred solution to
peacefully resolve this nuclear crisis. Iran's record of
nuclear deception, its sponsorship of terrorism, it egregious
human rights abuses, all of this does not inspire confidence in
Tehran's commitment to honor a final nuclear agreement.
Moreover, the administration may not be demanding the best
deal it can get. Administration officials are on record
actually, in the past 7, 8 months as committing to a deal that
will ``dismantle'' ``a lot'' or ``significant portions'' of
Iran's nuclear infrastructure. But the terms of a deal could
fall far short of that. The more flawed the deal, the more
important it will be for Congress to defend the sanctions
architecture to maintain economic leverage.
Now, the administration has reportedly studied how it might
suspend the ``vast majority of sanctions'' after a nuclear deal
while bypassing you. In response, Congress needs to stand
behind the July 2014 letter that was signed by 344 members of
the House of Representatives. It affirmed ``that the concept of
an exclusively defined nuclear-related sanction on Iran does
not exist in U.S. law'' and that ``almost all sanctions related
to Iran's nuclear program are also related to Tehran's
advancing ballistic missile program, intensifying support for
international terrorism and other unconventional weapons
programs.''
Based on press reports, it appears that the administration
and perhaps the EU and the U.N. Security Council are designing
a phased program of sanctions relief, using suspensions and
snapbacks where sanctions will be suspended and only reimposed
in the event of Iranian noncompliance.
Now, the legalities of snapbacks are simple, but the
politics and economics are very complicated. A premature
suspension of U.S., UNSC, and EU sanctions an overreliance on
snapbacks could seriously undermine the Iran sanctions regime
and give Iran's nuclear program political legitimacy.
At the U.S.-EU UNSC, there would have to be agreement that
there is sufficient evidence of Iranian noncompliance to
warrant a decision to reinstate these sanctions. Significant
disputes are inevitable about the seriousness of infractions,
the appropriate level of response, and possible Iranian
retaliation.
Furthermore--and this is a concern a number of members have
expressed today--the administration may not respond effectively
to evidence of Iranian noncompliance for fear that enforcement
could prompt Iranian countermeasures. Now, this is particular
disconcerting amidst reports of a growing U.S.-Iran detente and
possible coordination to weaken ISIL.
The snapback is equally challenging to implement, given
certain economic reality. Sanctions took years before
international companies terminated their business ties with
Tehran. Once loosened, it is going to very difficult to get
those companies to leave again.
Iran also enjoyed substantial psychological benefits from
inking a deal. That will translate into improved macroeconomic
conditions as it already has under the JPOA. The administration
seriously underestimated the value of sanctions relief under
the JPOA. It did not account for the psychological impact on
Iran's macroeconomic environment. As a result, Iran's economy
has shown signs of stabilization, reflected in modest GDP
growth, a stabilization of the currency, and a significant drop
in inflation.
As Iran's economic recovery becomes less susceptible to
snapback sanctions, economic pressure is going to be a less
effective tool to respond to Iranian nuclear noncompliance.
This will make it more likely that the U.S. will be forced to
cheat--or forced to choose between either tolerating Iran's
cheating or using military force to respond to violations. And
that is unrealistic, given that this regime tends to cheat
incrementally.
In my written testimony, I provide detailed recommendations
in how Congress can defend its sanctions architecture,
including how to limit ways the administration could act
unilaterally.
In conclusion, Congress has a vital role to play to protect
and enhance U.S. economic leverage, and this leverage is going
to be essential to enforce a deal and pressure Tehran to end
all of its ilicit activities. Thank you very much.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, Mr. Dubowitz.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Dubowitz follows:]
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Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Mr. Sadjadpour.
STATEMENT OF MR. KARIM SADJADPOUR, SENIOR ASSOCIATE, MIDDLE
EAST PROGRAM, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE
Mr. Sadjadpour. Thank you to the committee. It is a real
honor to be here.
I would like to preface my comments by saying that I think
everyone in this room shares the same goal. We want to avert a
nuclear armed Iran. We want to avert another military conflict
in the Middle East, and we want to see Iran's transformation
into a more democratic, tolerant government.
I would like to focus my comments in three separate parts.
First, internal implications of the nuclear talks within Iran,
second the regional implications of the nuclear discussions
and, third, the implications for U.S. policy.
Let me start with Iran internally. The paradox of Iran is
the fact that you have a society which aspires to be like South
Korea, prosperous and integrated, and you have a regime which
shows a much greater resemblance to North Korea, prioritizing
isolation, ideological purity, and militarization.
The optimists, proponents of a nuclear deal would argue
that a deal could strengthen the hand of the moderates in
Tehran and strengthen civil society. And, again, a more
integrated Iran is good for the interests of our more pragmatic
factions in Tehran.
Skeptics would argue the opposite that what we have seen in
the last few weeks, as Representative Deutch alluded to, are
increased human rights abuses. In the event of a deal, it is
possible that the repressive apparatus of the Islamic republic
will show even greater repression in order to signal to the
population that external flexibility doesn't signal internal
weakness.
My own take is that both of these outcomes are possible in
the event of a deal. And that both Iranian civil society could
be strengthened, but we will also see a backlash at the hand--
by the Iranian hardliners. But it is important to note that
Iranian--Iran civil society and human rights community has been
overwhelmingly supportive of seeing a deal, whereas the more
hardline, revolutionary elite in Tehran have expressed a real
concern that this could possibly undermine their hold on power.
Let me move next to the regional implications of these
regional talks. The optimists would argue that a nuclear deal
could strengthen greater--could foster greater U.S.-U.N.
cooperation in the Middle East on issues of mutual concern,
whether that is Syria, Iraq, or Persian Gulf security. The
skeptics would argue that a nuclear deal would actually provide
Iran a financial boost to buttress forces like the Assad regime
in Syria or to militant forces, whether in Hezbollah or Shiite
militias in Iraq.
My own sense is that, over the last 35 years, we have seen
tremendous consistency in Iran's foreign policy in the Middle
East. I would argue the twin pillars of Iran's regional policy
has been rejecting U.S. influence and rejecting Israel's
existence. And I haven't seen, either a historic precedence or
any recent evidence, to suggest that Iran is prepared to
abandon these long-held principles in the region.
In fact, one of the fault lines between the moderate forces
and Tehran and the hardliners is that moderate forces have, in
the past, shown themselves willing to work with the United
States against mutual regional adversaries, such as the
Taliban, whereas hardline forces in Tehran have shown
themselves willing to work with groups like Taliban or even al-
Qaeda against the United States.
So my sense on the regional implications of these nuclear
talks is that, as long as Iran's supreme leader, Ayatollah
Khamenei, remains in power, we won't see any major changes in
Iran's regional policies.
Let me end on talking about the implication for U.S.
policy. I think, as one of the members alluded to earlier--and
I would agree--my sense is that we will neither see a
comprehensive resolution, nor a comprehensive failure come next
Monday. We will more likely see a limited agreement used to
justify an extension of the negotiations. I understand that, in
the past, sanctions have proven to be effective at forcing Iran
to come to the negotiating table and negotiate in a serious
way.
My concern, however, is that in the event of an impasse,
premature and unilateral sanctions by the United States, which
don't enjoy the support of our allies, could actually
jeopardize P5+1 unity and trigger Iran to reconstitute their
program. I believe that Iran's abrogation of the interim deal
should trigger additional sanctions, rather than additional
sanctions triggering Iran's abrogation of the interim deal.
And lastly, I would just like to say that I believe that
U.S. policies that have proven necessary to counter Iran's
nuclear ambitions in a way are at loggerheads with U.S.
policies necessary to facilitate Iran's--the transformation of
political change within Iran. I believe that what we have seen
necessary to counter Iran's nuclear ambitions has been economic
and political isolation, whereas Iranian civil society, Iran's
human rights community overwhelmingly believes that, in order
to foster change in Iran, they need more political and economic
intervention. So I think we need to think more creatively about
how to reconcile these two policies. I will stop there.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Sadjadpour follows:]
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Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you to all of our witnesses. I will
begin the question-and-answer period.
As the author of the strongest set of sanctions currently
on the books, the Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights
Act of 2012 and the Iran Freedom Support Act of 2006, I know
how hard it was to have these sanctions with teeth and how hard
it is to get the administration to enforce them.
The P5+1 started from a position of weakness and proceeded
to give up too much too fast, and the Iranians have taken
advantage every step of the way. The Iranians cannot be
trusted. It is impossible to verify their nuclear program, and
Rouhani has been on record bragging about his ability to
deceive the administration.
General Hayden, you have said that Iran and its nuclear
program are among the things that keep you awake at night. You
are also on record as saying that Iran isn't coming clean about
its past weaponization activities or submitting to snap
inspections of suspect facilities and that if you were still
the Director of the CIA, you would ``advise the President that
the agreement could not be adequately verified.''
The IAEA has said that Iran is not in compliance and can't
verify its nuclear program, and our intel community has
assessed that we cannot independently verify Iran's nuclear
program.
Therefore, General Hayden, I will ask you this: What kind
of threat is posed to the interests of the United States, to
our allies, to global security since the administration is
constructing a deal that can't be verified or monitored? And
what could be the impact if Iran were to actually secure a
nuclear weapon?
Secondly, how will the other actors in the region respond
to a deal that can't be trusted? And, lastly, given the fact
that our intelligence has not been able to detect Iran's
nefarious activities in the past, how can we believe that we
can detect them now?
General Hayden. Thank you, ma'am.
First of all, just point of clarification: We can't verify
this agreement in a noncooperative regime. All right. That is
why we need the robust inspection regime.
So I was asked this question as I was leaving government
during the transition. So how many nuclear--well, what is
Iranian nuclear doctrine? And I answered quite honestly, ``I
have no idea.'' And, well, how many weapons do you think they
will get? Oh, three, four, I am not sure. How many do we have?
Oh, tens of thousands. So, then, why can't we deter them? And I
said, ``Ah, now we have come to--now we have come to the
matter.'' This is not about deterring them. This is about
deterring us.
Look at Iranian behavior without one of these kits in the
garage. And I use those terms carefully. Even without the test,
even without the nuclear detonation, a parking close enough to
the nuclear weapons reality that there is great ambiguity, how
much more confidence do we give the Islamic republic in
continuing the kinds of activities that we have seen them do
and you have cataloged in your commentary at the beginning of
the hour? How much more involvement in Iraq and Syria and
Afghanistan, in the Gulf do we see when they have got one of
these things, which is kind of that whole card that they can
turn face up at any time?
With regard to what the neighborhood does, the definitive
fault line now in this part of the world isn't Arab-Israeli,
isn't moderate, religious, secular--the defining fault line
here is Sunni-Shiia. And that may be good, it may be bad. But
it certainly is.
I can't conceive of the Sunni states continuing to exist
with a Shiia state, Iran, having or too close to having a
nuclear weapon without taking actions on their own. And so here
I would see nuclear development within these countries, perhaps
not going to creating fissile materials.
But let me give you a thought, a scenario that surely can't
bring you much comfort. How about a Pakistani nuclear guarantee
for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in the face of Iranian nuclear
weapons programs? Now, that can't make you sleep well at night?
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much. Thank you.
Thank you, gentlemen.
I would now turn to Mr. Deutch of Florida.
Mr. Deutch. Thank you.
Thanks, Madam Chairman.
I wanted to just ask you about what a lot of us take as a
threshold issue here, which is how can we expect to reach any
sort of comprehensive agreement that is verifiable if we
don't--if we are not able to get past the very fundamental
questions of the history of Iran's nuclear program?
In 2020--it is now more than 2 years ago that the P5+1
asked that the IAEA be able to finish its work in Parchin. And,
to date, at least as far as I know, the Iranians haven't
permitted that. If they can't come clean about the past
military dimensions of the program, how is it possible to
expect that any agreement can be valid going forward?
Mr. Dubowitz. Well, Congressman Deutch, I mean, you are
exactly right. We can't have that confidence. And, again, I
think this has been misrepresented in the public domain, that
this is about Iran's mea culpa, that Iran has to come clean and
make a confession. This is not about a confession.
This is about can you design--as you alluded to, can you
design a proper verification and inspection regime? Because if
you don't know where Iran was conducting its past weaponization
activities--and, by the way, the IAEA says that there are still
possible military dimensions of the program still ongoing.
Then, if you can't--if you don't know where they did it, if you
can't interview the people involved, if you can't see the
documentation, if you don't have eyes into those details, then,
it is very difficult to design a comprehensive verification and
inspection regime for the future.
And so, this is why PMDs are so critical. This is why the
French, for example, have made PMDs their key issue. And
without that comprehensive verification and inspection regime,
that is, as General Hayden said, go anywhere, go any time, snap
inspections, we can see IRGC bases, we can go into military
bases, any suspected establishment we have access to, then, we
have no ability to detect an Iranian breakout, sneak-out or
fake-out. And that has been the history of Iranian nuclear
mendacity for 30 years.
Mr. Deutch. General Hayden, we always--we tend to get
caught up in the discussion of the moment and now PMD is just
part of this overall discussion.
But in your experience, what is the real concern that--that
the whole discussion of the military dimension of the program,
what we know, what we don't know? What is the real concern and
how should that impact our discussions going forward?
General Hayden. Congressman, the real concern is we don't
know the point at which they are now parked, in terms. And,
here, we are really talking about the weaponization program. We
are really talking about the hardening, the miniaturization,
the science that is involved in creating the nuclear
detonation. That is not the long pole on the tent.
The long pole on the tent is the fissile material. And if
you recall, even in 2007, when we said ``good evidence they
have stopped weaponization,'' they kept working on the long
pole, which was the fissile materials. And so you have got
fissile material being developed--sorry, Congressman. Let me--
let me give a slightly longer----
Mr. Deutch. Sure.
General Hayden [continuing]. Answer because something
strikes me.
In the transition, again, to the Obama administration, we
had an NSC meeting about Iran. And the President asked me,
``How many kilos of LEU and medium-enriched uranium do they
have?'' And I said, ``Mr. President, I actually know the answer
to that and I am going to give it to you in a minute, but let
me give you another way of thinking about this.''
There isn't a neutron or an electron in Natanz that is ever
going to show up in a nuclear weapon. Okay. What they are
building out in Natanz is confidence. What they are building
out in Natanz is technology and the ability to do this. They
are going to build the fissile material for a weapon, the HEU,
at a site about which we have no knowledge. Okay.
And so this--as Mark points out, our lack of knowledge, our
lack of an ability to go to locations where they may be doing
these things gives me very little confidence that we know how--
as I said, we are not going to get an agreement that absolutely
prevents. We are going to get an agreement that creates enough
space for us to do something between the decision to go and the
decision to have.
Mr. Deutch. Thank you, General Hayden.
Mr. Sadjadpour, in my remaining few seconds: Does the
Iranian--do the Iranian people want the right to enrich as much
or more than a government that is not repressive, that doesn't
violate human rights, that respects freedom of the press and so
on?
Mr. Sadjadpour. Representative Deutch, there has never been
an open discussion in Iran about the nuclear issue.
Recently, a prominent intellectual, Sadegh Zibakalam, who
questioned the wisdom of Iran's nuclear program was sentenced
to 18 months in prison. So, despite the fact that the
government says that the population is united behind the
program, they don't allow for open debate.
Recently, a former minister in Iran said the ancillary
costs of the nuclear program have been upwards of $400 billion.
I think if you posed the referendum to the Iranian people,
``Would you like $400 billion to be spent on hospitals and
schools, or would you like $400 billion spent on an antiquate
nuclear program, which has isolated the country politically and
economically,'' I think the vast majority would prefer the
former. But this is a program, which is not driven by the
Iranian people, but by the Iranian Government.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much.
Mr. Wilson of South Carolina.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Madam Chairman. And thank you for
your leadership on this issue.
And we appreciate each one of you being here today. And,
Mr. Sadjadpour, your analogy of Korea was very thought
provoking, and I really hope the people of Iran think about it,
too, because the extraordinary success of South Korea is
something to be emulated everywhere in the world. And it was
really intriguing.
General Hayden, in your testimony, you mentioned creative
solutions and what--that we should be cautious of them. Could
you expand on what a creative solution is and why we should be
wary?
General Hayden. The one I had in mind, Congressman, was the
one that have been floated with regard to the number of
centrifuges. I know what all of us in the room would like, is
that the right number is zero. But I think the cost of
admission to the current negotiations was an agreement that
there would be some enrichment in Iran. Now, we can judge
whether that is good or bad, but I think it truly is.
So, now, the debate is how many. All right. My very
unscientific number is maybe four to 5,000. The regime has
19,000. The Supreme Leader is talking in tens and scores of
thousands.
The creative solution we have is, well, they wouldn't
dismantle the centrifuges. They disconnect the plumbing so you
couldn't use them in sequence to enrich uranium. It is those
kinds of things that make me uncomfortable. That the Iranians
are holding their ground--just in the tactics of negotiations,
they are holding their ground and we are coming up with,
``Well, how about this'' as another way to get some sort of an
agreement. I am just made very uncomfortable about that.
Mr. Wilson. And thank you for your insight because it
really is very important.
Mr. Dubowitz, in your testimony, you reference analysis of
a recent IAEA report that indicates Iran has directly violated
terms of the joint plan of action. How has the administration
responded to this evidence of Iranian cheating? I am concern
that Iran will continue in incremental cheating, and the
international community won't respond effectively.
What kind of punishments for breaches to the JPOA or
violations of a possible comprehensive agreement should be put
in place to send a message that no cheating of any sort would
be tolerated?
Mr. Dubowitz. Congressman, thank you for the question. And,
actually, it gets to Karim's comment that, you know, we should
set up it so that Iran's abrogation should trigger sanctions.
Well, in fact, if H.R. 850 and S-1881 had been in place, those
sanctions in waiting would have been triggered and rightfully
so, because the Iranians were cheating on the JPOA. And what
they were doing is they were introducing UF6 gas into an
advanced centrifuge, into the IR5. And that was a violation of
the JPOA. It was in the IA report, and it was detected and
publicized by David Albright.
And this is an example of what Iran does when I say ``they
cheat incrementally and not egregiously'' and that they are
testing the boundaries of our willingness to respond. And there
was no response. There were no sanctions. There was no economic
cost. And the message to Iran is, when there is a comprehensive
agreement, you can cheat incrementally, you can exploit
ambiguities, you can find workarounds. And the Iranians are
experts at doing this. The regime is an expert sanctions
buster. It is also an expert at busting the spirit and the
commitments that they make.
And so what can we put in place? Well, what we have to put
in place is significant economic leverage. We have to be able
to hit them hard economically when they cheat. So when they
don't let inspectors into Parchin number 1, 2, 3 and 5, when
they start moving ahead on advanced centrifuge R&D, when they
do a number of the things that they are going to do to cheat,
we have to have sufficient economic leverage.
My fear and my testimony is that we are going to surrender
that economic leverage, the President is going to suspend
sanctions and, through that sanctions relief, Iran's economy is
going to increase, it is going to harden, it is going to become
more durable, and it is going to be much more difficult to then
use economic leverage to force them back into compliance.
Mr. Wilson. And the response of the Obama administration
was no response at all?
Mr. Dubowitz. Well, public reporting confirmed that the
administration has heard what Mr. Albright had said and had
spoken to the Iranians, and the Iranians denied having done it,
and the administration assures us that the Iranians are not
doing it anymore, so----
Mr. Wilson. Well, that would be no response. And I share
your concern.
In regard to the financial based sanctions, have they been
effective?
Mr. Dubowitz. Financial sanctions have been very effective.
And I just want to point out, again, your letter of July 20th
makes this very clear, those financial sanctions are not
nuclear sanctions. Secretary Lew, Under Secretary Cohen, Under
Secretary--former Under Secretary Levy have all made clear that
the sanctions, the financial sanctions that have been put in
place are because of a range of Iran's elicit activities. It is
nuclear, it is ballistic missile, it is terrorism, it is money
laundering, it is elicit financial conduct.
In fact, administration officials have repeatedly said we
put the financial sanctions in place to protect the integrity
of the global financial system. It would be a big mistake to
unwind those financial sanctions because we have a nuclear
deal. We have seen this movie before, it was called North
Korea. And the unwinding of the sanctions against Banco Delta
Asia, and we saw two subsequent nuclear tests after that and
the unwinding of the tough financial sanctions against North
Korea.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Mr. Wilson.
Mr. Higgins of New York.
Mr. Higgins. Thank you, Madam Chair.
General Hayden, you had said that the knowledge of the
Iranian nuclear program is incomplete. And here is what we do
know. The growth of the program, obviously, in the last decade
has been explosive--163 centrifuges, which are the machines
that I understand mix at supersonic speeds to enrich uranium to
bomb-grade. There are now 19,000. There are heavy water
reactors, which are used to create plutonium, which is another
bomb fuel.
My concern is not as much even for the current capacity of
Iran to create a nuclear weapon; it is the second and third
generation. It is the things that they are doing now. It is the
knowledge in this multibillion-dollar atomic infrastructure, or
they created it, which is a huge part of the economy and
finances the Revolutionary Guard, that you can't destroy
knowledge.
So what is it additionally that we don't know? Because I
will tell you something. From what we do know, it is pretty
compelling that we shouldn't pull back on sanctions, that we
should be accelerating.
You know, the Supreme Leader, Khamenei, used to say, you
know, that the sanctions don't hurt us, you know, they make us
stronger, they make us economically independent. But his
statements in the last, you know, 12 months, he is talking
about, you know, the sanctions are brutal, both in terms of
inflation and oil output and currency valuation, even to the
extent that you can't get chickens at Ramadan because there is
no chicken feed.
So what don't we know?
General Hayden. Well, number one, Congressman, we don't
know where everything is. All right? The facilities we know we
know, and we don't know what we don't know.
Qom, for example, Fordow, all right? We discovered that
before it became operational, but it was fairly far along
before we discovered it. And it was a major facility, and we
actually had some help in order to make our initial discovery
there.
We don't know about the weaponization program, the details.
How far along are they, for example? How quickly are they
transforming from IR-1s to IR-2s, the advanced centrifuges?
So, to take your point, as they build competence, as they
build technology, the footprint that they need to do the
breakout sprint to highly enriched uranium, that footprint
becomes smaller and smaller.
And back to my point, they are not going to do this at
Natanz, because they have to kick the IAEA out, literally, to
do that. That is a trigger. They are going to do it somewhere
else, a somewhere else about which we have no knowledge at the
present time. And this gets harder to detect as their
efficiency increases and, again, the footprint that has to be
shown gets smaller and smaller.
Mr. Higgins. Mr. Dubowitz, you said that Iran is at the
table because of sanctions. And that is your area of expertise,
the sanctions history.
What is it that we are not doing that we ought to be doing
to further apply pressure on the Iranian regime?
Mr. Dubowitz. So, very specifically, Iran still exports 1.3
million barrels of oil----
Mr. Higgins. To?
Mr. Dubowitz [continuing]. And an additional couple hundred
thousand barrels of condensates.
Mr. Higgins. To? To whom?
Mr. Dubowitz. They are exporting it to China, India, Japan,
South Korea, Turkey, and Taiwan.
Mr. Higgins. Okay. Keep going.
Mr. Dubowitz. And H.R. 850, which has cleared your
committee, would have taken a significant bite out of those
exports. It would have closed the condensates loophole. It
would have denied them essential oil revenues.
They also have $120 billion of oil revenues sitting in
escrow accounts around the world. They are semi-restricted,
meaning they can only spend that money in the six countries
that I named earlier on bilateral trade. So you could----
Mr. Higgins. Where is that money being held?
Mr. Dubowitz. It is, again, held in China, India, Japan,
South Korea, Turkey, and Taiwan----
Mr. Higgins. Yep.
Mr. Dubowitz [continuing]. And only used for bilateral
trade purposes. But Iran can use the money. So you could lock
up the full $120 billion and deny them all of that revenue and
they wouldn't have money to fund their imports.
Again, those are two ideas that would take a serious bite
out of the Iranian economy.
And, more importantly, it sometimes is not the substance of
the sanctions, it is the psychology of sanctions. In an
escalating sanctions environment, like we saw between 2007 and
2013, the psychological blow of sanctions created a sense of
fear in international markets and a sense of despair in the
Iranian domestic economy. And that translated into a severe
economic recession that Iran is now emerging from.
Mr. Higgins. Okay.
My time has expired.
Mr. DeSantis [presiding]. The gentleman's time has expired.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Illinois for 5
minutes.
Mr. Kinzinger. Well, I thank the chairman.
And thank you all for being here.
And, General, it is great to see you. From one Air Force
guy to another, I thank you for your service.
It is sad because, to me, you know, we are sitting around
talking about what could happen or what will happen, and none
of this surprises me. I mean, honestly, I could have told you a
year ago that we would be extending the interim agreement for 6
months, that we wouldn't come to a conclusion, that we would be
sitting here 4 days prior to the 1-year deadline and probably
will get some kind of a request, either a terrible deal that
miraculously has a breakthrough at the end or, more than
likely, another request for an additional 6 months or however
long the administration will want, which, to me, is going to be
interesting because I don't understand what can happen in a
further 6 months or any further time period that could compel
Iran to come to the table that hasn't been able to occur in the
first year. I mean, there is not going to be any additional
step-up of pain or anything like that.
I also think it is important to remind everybody,
especially when we talk about ISIS but when we talk about this
issue too, Iran is not our friend. Probably a significant
number of American casualties that occurred in the war I was in
in Iraq occurred directly or indirectly from Iran--from Iranian
actions directly, from Iranian technology that was exported to
terrorists for one purpose, to kill American soldiers. That is
why it was sent. So this technology was compiled in Iran and
exported to Iraq for the sole purpose of killing young men and
women from the United States of America. Okay? Let's just
remember that. This is the Iran that we are talking about.
And now we find ourselves in a situation where, you know,
we are 4 days out from trying to guarantee that they won't
build a nuclear weapon. We have to send a message to South
Korea that has begged for the right to do some kind of
reprocessing and recycling that we are going to give,
potentially, the right to enrich to our worst enemy but yet our
best friend, among our best friends, will not have the equal
right. We all know that debate.
I have a question that I would like to ask first off. Let's
talk a little bit about what happened in North Korea. I was a
young guy when there was the discussion of possibly striking
locations in North Korea. I believe that President Clinton at
one point had been ready to give the go order, and then it was
backed off when a breakthrough deal was reached with North
Korea to prevent them from obtaining nuclear weapons. We all
know that basically, theoretically, a little bit later, they
had a big parade and we saw nuclear weapons and they were
nuclearized.
What lessons did we learn from that that we ought to apply
to this moment here? I know you guys addressed North Korea when
I was out of the room, so if we are reiterating, please forgive
me. So I want to talk about that.
And the other thing I want to say is this--or the other
question I want to ask is this. What kind of a message is it
going to send, not just to Iran but to Russia, to all these
hotspots we are dealing with around the world, if at the point
the deadline, the red line comes up with a deal with Iran we
simply extend it and go back to negotiations?
So, General, I will start with you, both the issue of North
Korea as well as the issue of what message are we going to send
to the world and not just in the Iran situation.
General Hayden. Thanks, Congressman. I will be very
efficient.
When we were negotiating with the North Koreans in 2008,
early 2009, I mean, our judgment was simply they are not going
to give up their weapons program. They can't. It would be
irrational on their part, given their world view. All right?
There is a bit of that inside the Iranian regime, as well. And,
you know, my job is to try to think like they think, so forgive
me while I lay out the point of view from a serious person in
Tehran.
They went to school on what happened to Muammar Qadhafi.
All right? Here was someone who gave up his WMD program in
negotiations with the United States in return for what he
perceived to be a bit more welcoming international community.
And we ended up over a 10-month period with a sustained bombing
campaign under NATO, overthrowing that government and leading
to his death.
And so even the calmer people in Tehran, you know, not the
apocalyptic ones, are saying, oh, so that is what happens to
you when you give up this kind of program. So I don't have to
demonize the Iranians to tell you I have come to the conclusion
that this is too important to them for them to give it up.
When we went out of the gate the first time--what now, 10
months ago?--I was very careful with my public commentary to be
broadly supportive of the negotiations. I wanted to exhaust all
possibilities. But I learned in my last job at CIA to think
ahead, think of what you think--think of what people are going
to want you to think in 10 months. And so I thought through the
process of, what if we don't get an agreement in 6? What is an
okay process then?
And when we began--I am talking 10 or 11 months ago--my
conclusion was, I will give it one more 6, I will give it one
more period. But what we can't stand is the diplomatic
equivalent of a continuing resolution, you know, where we have
them too close and we are not pushing them back.
Mr. Kinzinger. Thank you.
I would love to hear from you, but we are out of time, so I
will I yield back.
Thanks.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen [presiding]. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Cicilline of Rhode Island.
Mr. Cicilline. Thank you, Madam Chair.
And thank you to the witnesses.
General Hayden, I want to build on what you were just
saying. So if it is, in fact, the case that the Iranians or the
regime believe that the development of a nuclear weapons
program is necessary for their self-defense, is there any
reason to have any hope that there will ever be a resolution
which includes an agreement to dismantle the program that they
find necessary for their self-defense? Or is there some other
set of systems or defense capability that would replace,
potentially, their belief that they need it to defend
themselves? Or is that just beyond----
General Hayden. I don't think there is a military answer
from their point of view that gives them the same kind of
assurance that the ambiguity of the program, not the actual
detonation, maybe not even the possession--that is why good
people--number one, Congressman, that is why this is a problem
from hell. There are no good off ramps.
But that is also why some good people, like Amos Yadlin,
who was my counterpart in the Israeli Defense Force--General
Yadlin thinks you can't get the small deal, ``small'' as being
defined as the nuclear deal. You can only get the nuclear deal
inside of a much larger deal between Iran and the West. And we
have already talked about how difficult that would be, given
all of the other parameters.
Mr. Cicilline. So you take that assessment and you add to
it the testimony you provided with respect to the incredible
difficulty, maybe impossibility, of verifying the activities of
the regime. When you take those two facts together, does it
make it even less likely?
General Hayden. Yes, sir, it does.
Look, when I do this publicly, I do a little Venn diagram
in the ether here. Here is everything the Iranians can
legitimately give up. Here is everything we legitimately need.
Mr. Cicilline. They don't intersect.
General Hayden. They don't intersect.
Mr. Cicilline. So, then, if, in fact, the conclusion of
these negotiations is some determination that we can't reach an
agreement and the parties stop the negotiations, I would like
to know what your assessment is of what happens next.
Mr. Dubowitz, Mr. Sadjadpour might also add to it, but
starting with General Hayden.
General Hayden. That is why we left this an ugly baby for
the next administration. We didn't have any good answers.
You know, the other answer is, well, then, we have to go
physical, we have to go kinetic. And Secretary Gates used to
consistently say in our meetings, if we go kinetic, we will
guarantee that which we are trying to prevent, an Iran that
will stop at nothing, in secret, to develop a nuclear weapon.
Mr. Cicilline. And do you think that is----
General Hayden. Yeah. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cicilline. Mr. Dubowitz?
Mr. Dubowitz. So, Congressman, I think there is, first of
all, another kinetic option and there is another economic
option.
The kinetic option is not necessarily to strike Iran's
nuclear facilities today. The kinetic option is to actually
ground the Assad air force, an air force that is dropping
barrel bombs on Syrian men, women, and children. The Syrian
regime is Iran's closest ally in the Middle East. They have
gone all-in to support Assad.
And it is also going to be critically important to the
defeat of ISIL that we actually are finding a way to support
the Syrian Sunnis, who have been increasingly radicalized
because of the butchery of the Assad regime, and they have
turned, as a result, to ISIL.
So I think the kinetic option is to actually--as part of
the administration's Syria review process is to look at
grounding Assad's air force and moving militarily against
Iran's closest ally in the Middle East.
The economic option is--again, there are a tidal wave of
sanctions that are possible. There are also phased, calibrated
sanctions that will begin to tighten the squeeze on Iran and do
so in a way that is not going to necessarily lead to a
significant nuclear physics escalation from the Iranians.
Mr. Cicilline. But can I ask you, Mr. Dubowitz, on the--
with respect to additional sanctions, you know, I have read a
lot of material that talks about the ability of the leadership
of the regime to sort of protect themselves from the impact of
sanctions and, in fact, to even benefit from some of the market
conditions that result from sanctions.
And it seems to me, long-term sanctions can only work if
ultimately they create conditions which cause people in the
country to assert pressure on the government or the regime to
change. And it doesn't sound like, from any of the testimony
today or anything we have heard in this committee, that there
is any likelihood that that pressure is going to be
sufficiently strong to actually change the regime so long as
things like the gentleman who spoke out and is imprisoned for
18 months for just questioning the worthiness of the program.
So, you know, speak to that question of, how do we impact,
you know, the folks who are making the decisions in the regime,
who I think sometimes actually benefit from these sanctions?
Mr. Dubowitz. So the elites will always benefit, but the
question is, can you shake the economy--the macroeconomic
fundamentals of an economy, that the regime fears economic
collapse?
And what we saw in 2009, combined with 2012 and 2013, was
millions of people on the street in 2009, yelling, ``Death to
the dictator,'' ``President Obama, are you with us or with the
dictator?,'' and in 2011, 2012, an economy that was facing a
balance-of-payments crisis and that was in a severe recession,
which combined to create fear in the regime that this Green
Revolution would become a blue revolution, that it would lead
to millions and tens of millions of Iranians outside of the
middle-class suburbs of North Tehran but into the cities and
towns of Iran and labor strikes in the key energy sector--in
fact, conditions that we saw in 1979 that led to the Iranian
revolution in the first place.
That combination created terror, in my view, and the regime
has avoided that now. They have repressed the Green movement,
as Karim has said, and they have also dealt with this economic
stress by moving away from a severe recession into a modest
economic recovery, thanks to the sanctions relief and the de-
escalation of sanctions pressure.
Mr. Cicilline. Thank you.
I yield back.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, sir.
Dr. Yoho?
Mr. Yoho. Thank you, Madam Chair.
I appreciate you guys being here today.
And, General, if you had a hard time sleeping before, I am
sure you have a really hard time sleeping now. I never have a
hard time sleeping, but I do now since I have been on Foreign
Affairs.
I have been here for 2 years--this is my first term--and I
have had multiple hearings on this subject. All the experts
have said that Iran is, you know, 5, 6 months away from having
enough material to have a nuclear bomb. That was 1 year ago, so
I can only assume they have enough material.
And I agree with you in that their two pillars are the
rejection of U.S. influence and the rejection of Israel's
existence. I don't think they have wavered on that. And I have
watched this for over 30 years, since the oil embargoes of the
1970s.
And they are hellbent on getting a nuclear weapon. Would
you agree with that?
General Hayden. I would change that slightly. They want to
keep that door open, and visibly open, that they have the
nuclear option to exercise, to go to a weapon.
Mr. Yoho. Okay. But what I am seeing for the last 30 years
is a cat-and-mouse game where they say they are not doing it
but we find out they are, and they are doing it----
General Hayden. Oh, they are clearly--they are clearly
setting the stage for it.
Mr. Yoho. And so we know what their intent is.
And I guess a couple questions I have here: How do you get
Iran to roll back their program? What is the impetus that is
going to make them roll back?
Because with the sanctions that have been in place, they
were still continuing. They have not stopped. They have gotten
closer, and they have got the ICBM program going on. And I
agree 100 percent with you; what they are doing is refining the
technology. They don't need as many centrifuges. They are more
efficient with the smaller ones or the higher-tech ones. So
they can do a better job, and they can keep that hidden,
covert.
In order to negotiate an agreement, there has to be trust,
understanding, character, integrity, and verification. I have
seen none of that. I mean, they throw the IAEA out, the
International Atomic Energy Agency out every chance they get,
or they prevent them from going in. We know they have exploded
a nuclear trigger device, but they have covered that up. They
have covered it up with a parking lot. And there is just no
trust there.
And so, with these negotiations, do you feel the sanctions
were backed off too early?
General Hayden. That is a tough call.
Mr. Yoho. Mr. Dubowitz, how about you?
Mr. Dubowitz. I am certainly on record repeatedly saying
that. I mean, I think that we had brought them very close to
a----
Mr. Yoho. I agree.
Mr. Dubowitz [continuing]. Balance-of-payments crisis, and
4 or 5 more months of sanctions escalation would have presented
this regime--and let me just actually--it is not just me saying
this.
Mr. Yoho. No.
Mr. Dubowitz. When Rouhani came into office, he said it.
Mr. Yoho. Right.
Mr. Dubowitz. I mean, he actually came out and said, ``It
is worse than I expected.'' Now, politicians always say that.
``The other guy did a bad job'' and----
Mr. Yoho. Right.
Mr. Dubowitz [continuing]. Lowering expectations so that I
can exceed them. But you had many Iranian officials--the
President, economic officials--coming out and saying, ``This
economy is a complete mess. It is worse than we expected.''
Mr. Yoho. Right.
Mr. Dubowitz. So they were very close to an even more
severe economic crisis.
Mr. Yoho. All right.
Let me ask you, what did we get out of the negotiation? I
mean, usually, when you negotiate, there is something that you
get. I don't see anything that we got. I mean, we still have
four Americans over there that--I don't want to put Americans
as hostages and negotiate for them, but I don't see anything
that we got to even open up these negotiations. I think we
should have carried them on another 5, 6, 7 months, 1 year.
How likely is it--well, if we continue with the
negotiations and we extend it, do you see Iran backing off on
their ultimate goal of getting a weapon?
General, go ahead.
General Hayden. Again, I do not see them backing away from
keeping the option open----
Mr. Yoho. Keeping the option open.
General Hayden [continuing]. And turning to a weapon.
Mr. Yoho. Mr. Sadjadpour, how about you?
Mr. Sadjadpour. I agree with the General, in that I have
always thought Iran's ambitions are to have the capability, not
necessarily to weaponize.
Mr. Yoho. All right. So they want to have the right to do
that, is what they are working on.
And so, with the sanctions, they were doing that anyways.
All right? They were getting closer to that. Now that we are in
negotiation, they are going a little bit faster. They are
getting the technology. So what I see is they are going to do
it regardless.
What would be the effect if we just pulled out and says,
``You know what? You are not playing fair. We don't like the
way you are playing. We are just going to put the sanctions
back until you are serious about it''? I mean, is that an
option that you would recommend?
Mr. Sadjadpour. I think, Congressman, it is important to
contrast the current Iranian Government with the predecessor
government of with Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Two years ago,
Ahmadinejad united the international community against Iran.
Countries like Russia, China, Europe, which actually have
disparate interests vis-aa-vis Iran, united around the same
policy.
I think this time around it is going to be much more
difficult to maintain international unity, especially if the
United States issues what I would say are unilateral sanctions
against Iran. You may see the P5+1 split up and Iran exploit
those divisions, which would be a very negative outcome for us.
Mr. Yoho. I am out of time, and I thank you.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Dr. Yoho.
Mr. Connolly of Virginia.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you so much, Madam Chairman.
In some ways, the previous President--you were referring to
the regime blaming the other guy. It took us 4 or 5 years to
learn how to pronounce his name, ``Ahmadinejad.'' Maybe we miss
that part of him.
I guess I am not sure I am following where this testimony
is all going or where my colleagues want us to go.
So would we be better off if we had not had the interim
agreement? Should we have just walked away from it and said,
no, we don't trust you, we don't like you, we have lots of
other issues as well, we think you are headed inevitably to a
nuclear capability, and therefore we are not going to pursue
the negotiation option? Should we have done that?
General Hayden. I will jump in first, Congressman.
The other options are so bad that I, personally, 10 months
ago, 11 months ago, that is why I was willing to tolerate
negotiations with a state I believed to be a fundamentally
unreliable negotiating partner.
Mr. Connolly. Right.
General Hayden. I was willing to give this a chance.
Mr. Connolly. So you----
General Hayden. But it depends on the character of the
agreement.
Mr. Connolly. I agree. But I wanted to get that--I mean,
given all other options, we should have pursued this and tried
to make it work?
General Hayden. Again, given how bad all the other ones
were, we needed to exhaust the table before we started to turn
to the others.
Mr. Connolly. Mr. Dubowitz?
Mr. Dubowitz. Congressman, I agree. I mean, as I said in my
testimony, I think that a peaceful resolution of the Iranian
nuclear crisis was the right way to go. I think a negotiated
agreement is the right way to go.
I think the dispute that is taking place now is between
those who are skeptical of Iran and those who may be skeptical
but they fundamentally believe that there has been a sufficient
change in the domestic environment in Iran and in any
interfactional power balance that we should be supporting
Rouhani and Zarif against the hardliners and that we have a
chance to fundamentally change the Iranian regime's approach to
its nuclear weapons program.
I don't believe that there is a fundamental distinction
between the so-called moderates and the hardliners. They are
all united around a common objective.
I do think that we can do a better job of negotiating with
the Iranian regime. I think we--we didn't have to give up four
concessions right up front as part of the JPOA and diminish our
economic leverage at the same time.
Mr. Connolly. Yeah, and I want to get there, because that
is my next question.
But did you want to comment, Mr. Sadjadpour?
Mr. Sadjadpour. Yeah, Congressman. As Henry Kissinger often
says, we have to weigh these major foreign policy decisions not
against the ideal alternative but the realistic alternative.
Mr. Connolly. Right.
Mr. Sadjadpour. I think we would all agree here there
wasn't a better alternative than the interim deal.
I would also add that the interim deal has done a few
things which have been useful. We got Iran to pull its car over
to the side of the road; it is not making forward progress----
Mr. Connolly. Right. And I think that is really important,
because--all right, we have now established all three of you
agree, given the options, we had to go that route. And I think
I am hearing you admit, or say, it is not all bad. I mean, some
of my colleagues get carried away maybe a little bit, and you
would think that this interim agreement has been an abject
failure in all respects. That is not true.
But moving forward, there is the question, Mr. Dubowitz,
you were I think getting at, which is efficacy. We want a non-
nuclear Iran. If I am hearing General Hayden correctly, your
view of history and your view of intelligence is that is an
unachievable goal, given what options we have in front of us.
The what you euphemistically call the ``kinetic'' option would
actually have the opposite effect, you said, which we may want
to make sure Prime Minister Netanyahu understands. And we could
bomb or take out Assad's air force. I am not sure, in terms of
efficacy, that will deter Iran from pursuing a nuclear option.
We can double down on sanctions, which guarantees that Rouhani
cannot politically stay at the negotiating table, which
effectively will end negotiations and probably seal our fate in
terms of what happens next: We either accept the nuclear Iran
or we take it out militarily.
I don't see a lot of good options here. And I see Congress
doing what it usually does, which is cavil, but not have any
helpful solutions in terms of, well, then, what will we do.
Mr. Dubowitz. Congressman, I disagree with you, because I
don't think Rouhani is going to leave the negotiating table. I
think the Iranians are going to stay at the table. I think the
fact----
Mr. Connolly. Even if we double down----
Mr. Dubowitz. Even if we double down.
Mr. Connolly [continuing]. On sanctions?
Mr. Dubowitz. Even if we double down on sanctions.
Mr. Connolly. Huh.
Mr. Dubowitz. Because I think that they need to stay at the
table. They need to stay at the table because they need to
figure out a way to get themselves out from under this
international pressure. I agree with Karim. I think that is
part of their strategy.
They also need to stay at the table because, for them,
diplomacy has actually been very useful--with the Europeans
from 2003 to 2005, with us. Diplomacy is the way to move their
nuclear program along.
The car is not at the side of the road, by the way. On
certain elements of the nuclear program, like 20-percent
enriched uranium, we have made some progress, but the Iranians
are moving on other aspects of the program. To Congressman
Deutch's point, we don't know what they are doing on
weaponization. They could be moving their weaponization
activities down the fast lane as quickly as possible, and we
don't know. Advanced centrifuge R&D. As Olli Heinonen has said,
they could have thousands of advanced centrifuges somewhere
that we don't know about, and they could be manufacturing them
today.
Mr. Connolly. Yeah.
Mr. Dubowitz. So it is incorrect, A, to say that the
Iranians have no other option but to walk away, because if they
walk away and they walk away, they will be faced with a tidal
wave of sanctions that will collapse their economy.
And, B, there are inherent flaws in the JPOA that need to
be corrected, and a comprehensive agreement needs to be a more
effective agreement. And there are very good reports out there
and analysis that shows how it can be better. We all agree
there should be a negotiated agreement. We just think it should
be a fine agreement.
Mr. Connolly. Yeah. I----
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Although your time is over, Mr. Connolly,
I know General Hayden would like to respond.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you.
General Hayden. Thank you, ma'am.
Congressman, another way of thinking about it perhaps: You
think about this as two clocks going. All right? One clock is
the clock on the Iranian nuclear program, and the other clock
is the potential for change within the Iranian political
system. I mean, we don't want to treat Iran like Japan, because
Iran is not like Japan, but Iran doesn't have to stay not like
Japan forever.
And so maybe one way of thinking about this is what we are
really trying to do here is to slow their progress, to slow
this clock down, to leave the potential for other developments
over here to take place.
And there are a variety of tools to slow that clock down.
There are sanctions, there are embargoes, there is covert
action, and there are negotiated settlements, duly, carefully
arrived at, that make it more difficult for the regime to speed
up this clock.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much, Mr. Connolly.
Mr. DeSantis?
Mr. DeSantis. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Yeah, I just want to associate with what Mr. Dubowitz just
said. I think that, you know, more pressure--you know, Iran--it
may not ever be possible, I have been skeptical, we could
actually come to a negotiated agreement, but, certainly,
relieving sanctions, I think, shows them they can get away with
more. When you are putting more pressure on them, from their
psychology, I think that you at least have a chance.
And that is why, General Hayden, I appreciated your
admonition about trying to think like they think. Because I
think sometimes some of the folks in the State Department--and
I think this is indicative, when the President is writing a
letter to the Ayatollah to try to, you know, seek common ground
in the fight against ISIS, I don't know that that appreciation
is there the way it should be.
Let me ask you this. You had mentioned how Iran looks at
something like what happened to Qadhafi and they say, well,
gee, why would we not want to have a weapon? I think that is
100 percent correct.
Is it the case--it has been reported, and, kind of, I know
we say that around here--that when the U.S. deposed Saddam
Hussein in 2003, that Iran halted its program at that time out
of fear?
General Hayden. The National Intelligence Estimate of 2007,
reflecting back on that period, the Iranians did stop one
aspect of the program, the weaponization, and not the others.
They did. It was coincident with the American move into Iraq,
the American presence in Afghanistan, but my analysts,
Congressman, were reluctant to draw it as cause and effect.
Mr. DeSantis. Well, I appreciate that.
In terms of--so we have talked about North Korea, that
example. Obviously, that is not a good path for us to follow.
It didn't work. And I know it is a tough issue. It seems to me,
if you look in the Middle East, the other examples of nascent
nuclear states, Iraq in the 1980s, that was neutralized
militarily by Israel; Syria, 2007, same thing.
But I noticed there was an article in The Atlantic in
which, or Jeffrey Goldberg, Bloomberg--he writes for one of
those--where I think he quoted an administration official
basically cowing that Netanyahu, you know, he has waited too
long, he is not going to be able to do anything. And they
thought that was kind of, like, a good thing.
And I just wonder, I mean, if Iran does not fear the
potential credible threat of military force, isn't it much less
likely that they are going to be willing to make the
concessions that we are looking for?
General Hayden. It is very important that Iran believe that
all options are on the American table. And I am making this
distinction, Congressman, because this is not about will, it is
about capacity. And the ability of the Israeli Air Force, much
smaller than ours, distant from the battlefield and so on,
their ability to inflict a punishing strike on this nuclear
program is far less than ours. So it is our will, it is our
policy that makes the difference and creates leverage in
negotiation.
Mr. DeSantis. And in terms of the kinetic targets, that
with Iran's program, we are looking at something that is much
more dispersed and difficult compared to Syria and Iraq,
correct?
General Hayden. The Osiris reactor in Baghdad, al-Kibar in
Syria in 2007, a raid. This will have to be a campaign, if it
were ever chosen.
Mr. DeSantis. So the underlying problem with the whole
thing with Iran is that, of course, it is led by an Islamic
fanatic ideology. And having a new regime there, I think you
have millions and millions of people who would rejoice at being
liberated from what is essentially a theocratic, authoritarian
country.
Now, we know and I think, Mr. Dubowitz, you mentioned 2009
and how there was turmoil. So, today, what are the prospects of
more demonstrations? What are the prospects of there being a
really credible movement to try to govern Iran in a different
way?
Mr. Sadjadpour. Congressman, the discontent which existed
in 2009 hasn't gone away, but, at the moment, I see no
prospects for any type of meaningful popular uprising. There is
no cohesion to the opposition. And I think, frankly, when
Iranians look around at what is happening elsewhere in the
region--the carnage in Syria, the carnage in Iraq--I argued
that in 1979 the Iranians had a revolution without democracy,
and today they aspire for a democracy without a revolution.
I think there is an important point here, because there is
a paradox to U.S. Policy toward Iran which I think it behooves
us to think creatively about. And that is that I think everyone
in this room would agree that the underlying problem we have
with Iran is really the nature of this Iranian regime. We are
never going to be able to trust its nuclear program is purely
peaceful. But the challenge is that the policies that we are
pursuing in order to counter Iran's nuclear program, political
and economic isolation, I would argue entrenches those very
hardline forces in Tehran that we are trying to get rid of.
And I think it is important for U.S. policy to think about
being aligned with the aspirations of the Iranian people for
greater political and economic integration rather than being
aligned against those aspirations of the Iranian people.
Mr. DeSantis. And I am out of time, but if you could for
the record maybe submit some examples of what we can do policy-
wise. Because I think that that would solve a lot of problems
in the region.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, Mr. DeSantis.
Mr. Schneider of Illinois.
Mr. Schneider. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
Again, to the witnesses, thank you for sharing your insight
here, but thank you, more importantly, for the work you have
done and continue to do. What happens in Congress can't happen
without the work that you do. But I also want to emphasize that
I don't think the United States and the international community
can effectively stop Iran without the work Congress does, so,
again, to implore the chair and the ranking member to continue
on that.
Mr. Sadjadpour, I want pick up on something you said in
your opening remarks, and that was the prospect--there is so
much we need to focus on, but I want to stay focused on Monday,
on the 24th--the prospect of a partial agreement on Monday. The
principle was and the need for a comprehensive agreement 1 year
ago was that there would be nothing agreed to until everything
was agreed to.
So I guess I will throw this to the whole panel. What
happens if there is a partial agreement? What does that do?
What is the consequence of that? And what actions must Congress
take, in that case?
Mr. Sadjadpour. Congressman, I think that when both sides
and, frankly, when all sides--China, Russia, our European
allies, United States, and Iran--when they contemplate the
alternatives to failed negotiation--potential return to status
quo ante, potential escalation, potential conflict--I think
everyone appreciates the fact that, even if it is not possible
to meet in the same place to comprehensively resolve this
issue, it behooves all sides to try to continue to work forward
and at least extend the negotiations.
What happens afterwards? It is my sense that if you can
lock in Iran's current compromises, they are not making forward
progress, and continue to deter forward progress, keep them in
place, that is not a bad option for the United States. It is
what I call ``managed irresolution.'' I think if you have a
scenario whereby they remain 1 year away from having a nuclear
weapon, we have averted a conflict in the region. That is not a
perfect outcome, but, compared to the alternative, it is not a
bad outcome.
Mr. Schneider. Okay.
Mr. Dubowitz?
Mr. Dubowitz. So, Congressman Schneider, I would say this.
First of all, Iran is about 2\1/2\ months away from breakout as
a result of the Joint Plan of Action, which means the length of
time it takes to weaponize a sufficient amount of uranium for a
nuclear weapon. We actually don't know, as General Hayden has
said and others have said, what is happening on the
weaponization side. So we actually don't know how far Iran is
from having a nuclear weapon. We know they are 2 months away
from having weaponized uranium for a bomb. So the status quo is
fragile, to say the least.
The second thing is, regardless of what happens on Monday--
I will get back to my original testimony--we have to maintain
sufficient leverage through these negotiations. And that is
economic leverage, it is political leverage, it is a credible
threat of military force. My fear has been, since signing the
JPOA, that our economic leverage is diminishing.
And now you, as Congress, are in the position where the
administration has said to you, we are going to bypass you with
respect to sanctions relief. And so, as I detail in my
testimony, there are 12 recommendations about how you can build
a sanctions relief firewall, how you can ensure that what you
are putting in place will maintain some of the toughest
sanctions. It will give a phased and smart program of phased
sanctions relief and that you can maintain that economic
leverage.
Because whether it is a comprehensive deal, a partial deal,
an extension of the JPOA, at the end of the day the Iranian
regime is salami-slicing us, and they are stretching out these
negotiations. They are diminishing our economic leverage. They
are giving up concessions on the nuclear side that are
reversible.
That is the key. Nuclear concessions they give up are
reversible. Sanctions relief that we give up is irreversible.
Mr. Schneider. I agree.
And I just want to give General Hayden the last word with
two other small questions to that. Because I do think, if there
is to be sanctions relief, Congress has to have its voice
heard.
But, to your point, you talked about clocks, and you also
talked about the term or duration of an agreement. How far back
do you think the clock has to be set, in an agreement moving
Iran from decision to breakout capability, to be effective? And
how long do you think that agreement has to stay in place to be
viable and to give us something that we can count on?
General Hayden. I would begin my discussions at at least a
year. Okay? And I would begin my discussions with indefinite.
And I don't mean----
Mr. Schneider. I agree.
General Hayden [continuing]. To be flippant. I am quite
serious.
Mr. Schneider. No. I use the term ``generations.'' But it
can't leave the people in power today in power when this
agreement ends.
All right. With that, my time has expired. Again, thank you
for what you do. And thank you to the chair and the ranking
member.
Mr. DeSantis [presiding]. The gentleman's time has expired.
The Chair thanks the witnesses for their time and their
testimony. We learned a lot, and we very much appreciate you
taking the time to come.
And, with that, this hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 2:45 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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