UNACCOMPANIED ALIEN CHILDREN: PRESSING THE ADMINISTRATION FOR A STRATEGY

HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
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UNACCOMPANIED ALIEN CHILDREN:
PRESSING THE ADMINISTRATION FOR
A STRATEGY

TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 18, 2014

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:04 p.m., in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Matt Salmon (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. SALMON. A quorum being present, the subcommittee will come to order.

I will start by recognizing myself and the ranking member to present our opening statements.

Without objection, the members of the subcommittee can submit their opening remarks for the record. And now I yield myself as much time as I may consume to present my opening statement.

Good afternoon and welcome to this, the second hearing that I have convened on the humanitarian crisis that resulted from thousands of unaccompanied minors showing up at our southern border. I have been engaged on this issue from the beginning, not only as the chairman of this subcommittee, but also as a member of the Speaker’s working group on the unaccompanied alien child crisis. I traveled with several of my colleagues to the region and saw first-hand the insecurity and the poverty that plagues the region.

While the administration cited drops in the total number of children travelling north since our first hearing on the topic back in June, the fact is that the conditions in El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala continue to be very grave. I convened this second hearing because my colleagues and I are mindful that the high levels of gang violence and the lack of opportunity right here in our hemisphere not only affects the lives of millions in Central America, but affects the United States, too, as we have seen. Indeed, the pursuit of peace and prosperity through the Western Hemisphere should be a key national security objective of the United States.

As Ronald Reagan said back in 1984, “Central America is a region of great importance to the United States, and it is so close. San Salvador is closer to Houston, Texas, than Houston is to Washington, DC.”

I have consistently been supportive of U.S. efforts through CARSI to assist the region to build capacity to strengthen their re-
perspective police forces so they can better confront the high levels of criminality brought on by gangs and drug-trafficking organizations. Between 2005 and 2012, there was a 340 percent increase in murders of women and children in Honduras. While El Salvador maintains the world’s highest rate of homicides against women and girls, Guatemala ranks third. There is widespread mistrust of law enforcement and impunity rates as high as 95 percent.

In addition to the need for stepping up capacity building for law enforcement, all three of these northern triangle countries lack stable institutions and are plagued by corruption, so U.S. efforts to improve governance and democratic values are imperative. The question remains, however—and this is why I have convened this second hearing—in this time of tight budgets, are we evaluating each and every individual program that we fund, applying metrics and determining what works and what doesn’t work?

I had asked during the last hearing for USAID to provide me with specific program-by-program metrics and, to this date, have yet to receive that information in its entirety. I am aware of the Vanderbilt study, a $3.5 million study to evaluate some of USAID’s programs in the region. Unfortunately, the study does not provide us with project-by-project evaluations and cost-benefit analysis, and that may not be available right now.

I have said this before: The U.S. taxpayer is very generous and wants to help the people of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras find a path to peace and prosperity in their respective countries. However, they also demand that we spend their hard-earned taxpayer money and achieve measurable results. As a result, we must acknowledge that previous programs in Central America have failed. Despite U.S. investments through CARSI, these countries continue to fail, and these failures ultimately contributed to the UAC crisis along our border.

It is our responsibility and yours to ensure that going forward, that we have very serious buy-in and political will from each of these three countries. And every agency involved in administering programs needs to be accountable for the effectiveness of each specific program. The goal is to help empower these countries to improve governance and build prosperity so that their citizens can prosper there.

Unfortunately, the Obama administration continues to incentivize the mass exodus of citizens from those countries by changing immigration policy by decree. On Friday, Vice President Biden announced an in-country refugee processing program as part of a strategy to deal with the unaccompanied minor crisis. Now, at first glance, the idea is a very good one. We have all talked about the treacherous journey these children must make to get to our border, so offering those people who might qualify for refugee status the opportunity to apply in their countries would be a good way to dissuade them from otherwise travelling up our southern border.

Upon closer inspection, however, it appears that this program is yet another example of President Obama’s flouting of immigration law. This newly announced program allows family members present in the United States under varying statuses, including deferred action, to petition for children and spouses in Central America to be interviewed for refugee status. If they are ineligible, the
newly announced program allows for humanitarian paroles on a case-by-case basis.

It is very important that the State Department’s Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration provided a witness to answer to the many questions my colleagues and I have about this newly announced in-country processing, particularly to understand the criteria being applied to both refugee and parole eligibility. The answer to problems plaguing the region is not to further incentivize citizens of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras to leave. Rather, we should double down on serious efforts to empower people of the region to achieve lasting peace and prosperity in their country.

Using this crisis to attempt to create favor for sheer political gain is wrong. Sadly, I believe that that might be what the President is doing.

I am looking forward to hearing from each of our witnesses about what their specific agency or bureau is doing to address the crisis with the seriousness it deserves.

Assistant Secretary Jacobson, thank you for being with us today. Ms. Hogan, Mr. Kaplan and Ms. Wiesner, I am pleased you are here as well. I look forward to hearing how assistance programs can be refocused on income generation and economic development to help provide empowerment and opportunity to the citizens of Central America. And anyway, I would like to offer an opportunity for opening comments by my colleagues as well.

Representative Duncan.

Mr. DUNCAN. I want to thank you, Chairman Salmon.

Very timely hearing.

And I want to note at the outset that I am encouraged by El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras’ willingness to work together to address the factors contributing to the child migration crisis. We saw, on our southern border earlier this year, we saw more than 68,500 unaccompanied minors apprehended between October 1 of last year and September 30 this year. It is a 77 percent increase compared to Fiscal Year 2013. And while there is a lot of good in their plan, I am concerned that the plan does not address corruption, security, rule of law, enough. It appears to be a centralized top-down approach that does not empower municipalities or individual citizens as uniform approach for the three very different countries with varying political wills.

Additionally, in June, Vice President Biden announced that the U.S. would provide $9.6 million to Central America. In July, the administration requested an additional $300 million for programs in Central America. I am interested to know what the administration’s strategy for Central America, Latin America, and Caribbean region in general is before we start increasing the flow of money. I am deeply concerned and alarmed by this administration’s attempt at backdoor amnesty through the new in-country refugee and parole program announced Friday, which allows children and their parents who have a parent or spouse in the U.S. that is a deferred action for childhood arrivals or DACA recipient, deferred action recipient granted for at least 1 year, or deferred enforced departure recipient to initiate a refugee application. I look forward to digging deeper into that during the question-and-answer period today.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

Mr. SALMON. Thank you.

And I yield to the gentleman from Florida.

Mr. DeSANTIS. Well, thanks, Mr. Chairman.

And thanks to the witnesses for coming. Before we get into this hearing, this is the first time this subcommittee has met, I believe since we were here at the very end of September for a very important issue that you really led on trying to get our Marine back from Mexico. And I just wanted to, one, just publicly say how thankful we are that he is back, but, two, to thank you for your leadership on this. I bugged you on the House floor numerous times. And I know you were frustrated about how long it was taking, but you never let that deter you. You stayed with it. You were travelling down there to meet with him, and I can tell you my constituents in Florida were really pumped when he came back, and a lot of that has to do with your hard work.

Mr. SALMON. Would the gentleman yield?

Mr. DeSANTIS. I will.

Mr. SALMON. I do want to say that after having met Sergeant Tahmooressi when he came home and followed up on numerous occasions with friends and family, I am very, very worried about him. And I have mentioned this, and I would just like to ask anybody out there in the sound of our voice to pray for him and to offer your support because he is going to need all the help he can get. He was already diagnosed with PTSD, and the 7 months plus in prison only made it worse. And I am very concerned about his well-being. He is a very troubled young man, and he needs our thoughts and our prayers.

I yield back.

Mr. DeSANTIS. And I agree wholeheartedly with that, and our veterans when they come back with the post-traumatic stress obviously very difficult then to be put in that situation where that condition is being exacerbated. We all need to keep him in our thoughts and prayers because it is not going to be easy for him.

But I just wanted to publicly thank you for your determination, and I think that this subcommittee had a lot to do with it under your leadership.

And I yield back.

Mr. SALMON. Thank you very much.

Pursuant to Committee Rule VII, the members of the subcommittee will be permitted to submit written statements to be included in the official hearing record. And, without objection, the hearing record will remain open for 7 days to allow statements, questions, and extraneous materials for the record, subject to the length limitation in the rules.

I am going to go ahead and introduce the panel now. First of all, we have the Honorable Roberta Jacobson. She is the Assistant Secretary for Western Hemisphere Affairs at the Department of State. She has also served as the Senior Coordinator for Citizen Security Initiatives in the Western Hemisphere, and as Deputy Chief of Mission at the U.S. Embassy in Lima, Peru.

And on a personal note, I have not found in my political and professional experience anybody that I enjoyed working with more
than her. She is a professional in every way and has a big heart and a big mind.

And I am so appreciative of all the great work that you have done. And I just want you to know there is a lot of good will emanating from committee members. We might differ on policy and have questions, but we never, ever have a trust gap with you, and I want you to know that from the bottom of the heart.

Ms. Hogan, another stellar individual that we have just been thrilled to be working with, is the Acting Assistant Administrator for U.S. Agency for International Development’s Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean. Previously, she served as the director of the agency’s Haiti Task Team, overseeing reconstruction efforts after the 2010 earthquake, and we thank you for being here.

Mr. Robert Kaplan is the President and CEO of the Inter-American Foundation. Previously, he worked at the Inter-American Development Bank in the Division for Mexico, Central America, Dominican Republican, and Haiti.

We also have Ms. Wiesner. She is the Deputy Assistant Secretary, and she is here in an advisory capacity, and we appreciate that. She is Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration at the State Department. Previously, she worked at the Pentagon in the African Affairs Division and as a consultant in the fields of humanitarian assistance, peace process, and post-conflict programming.

You all understand and know the lighting system. It will be green until the last minute. And then it will go amber. And it will let you know that you have got 1 minute left. And then when it goes red, you are out of time, and we would appreciate if you conclude there. And then we will have questions from members.

So, Ms. Jacobson, I will recognize you first.

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ROBERTA S. JACOBSON, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF WESTERN HEMISPHERE AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Ms. JACOBSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And let me start by associating myself with Congressman DeSantis’ comments. I think that for all of us who worked to get Sergeant Tahmooressi home, we greatly appreciate your leadership on this matter.

I would like to thank you and the members of the committee for being here today to talk about the U.S. strategy for engagement in Central America. I know that many of you and you, personally, Mr. Chairman, have been so involved in our efforts to develop a humane and effective response to the unaccompanied children and families arriving at our Southwest border. Although we are encouraged that the numbers have decreased recently, we know we cannot let up in our efforts to protect vulnerable migrants and address the underlying factors that push them north.

This year, as noted, more than 50,000 unaccompanied children left their homes in Central America to make that journey. And the spike in migration is a warning sign that longstanding challenges in Central America remain very problematic. We must address the underlying factors compelling migration, or we are doomed to repeat that migration.
We believe that the essential condition for finding a solution is present, and that is political will in the region. Last week, the Inter-American Development Bank hosted a conference on Central America, where Vice President Biden and the Presidents from the three northern triangle countries spoke about opportunities and challenges for growth. The Presidents publicly presented a plan called the Alliance for Prosperity, and it includes a clear-eyed assessment of the region’s challenges and specific steps that they themselves will take to resolve them.

But their message at the conference was simple. They will take those tough choices to address the challenges, but they need our help. So, over the past 18 months, the U.S. Government has taken a hard look at both our approach and our investments. While security is paramount, we have broadened our vision for how to achieve it and developed an interagency strategy that both aligns and supports the objectives of the Alliance for Prosperity.

To achieve that vision in which all the citizens in Central America choose to remain and thrive in those countries, we need to focus on prosperity, governance, and security. Prosperity agenda fosters integration of a regional market of 43 million people so that local businesses can become more competitive and the region attractive to international investors. Economic growth and economic opportunity has to give young people options beyond criminality or immigration.

Our governance agenda recognizes that economic growth and security are only sustainable when the rule of law and democratic institutions flourish and civil society and media can play their rightful roles and corruption is reduced.

And the prosperity and governance agendas are essential for the security agenda which we must act on effectively now. Otherwise, the payoff from those other two will not bear fruit in the longer term.

We are a long way from achieving those goals in Central America, and that was obvious last summer in the risk that thousands of children took, the risk of ever-present rape, abuse and death, to flee the dire conditions in their home countries.

But, Mr. Chairman, over the past few months we have seen important successes. Our public messaging campaigns about the dangers of those journeys has effectively countered false messages. Increased focus on smuggling networks in Honduras and Guatemala has led to the arrest and rescue of over 235 children, and the Government of Mexico has been a vital and capable partner. Apprehensions are down to levels not seen since January 2013.

But we know that this must be sustained by increased commitments by both the administration and Congress. And so, yes, we have as one alternative offered, at the direction of the White House, a new program that will allow parents lawfully present in the United States from those three countries to petition for their children in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras to come to the United States as refugees. Those children not eligible for refugee status may be considered on a case-by-case basis for humanitarian parole. And it is equally important that we fund the implementation of this strategy, which could take as much as $5 billion over 5 years to fully implement.
We believe, again, that there is reason for optimism about Central America. The three leaders of the northern triangle have already begun to take tough decisions and are investing their own national budgets. We have a vision and a plan, and we want to work with you to help Central America and protect U.S. national security. Thank you very much.

Mr. SALMON. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Jacobson follows:]
“UNACCOMPANIED ALIEN CHILDREN: PRESSING THE ADMINISTRATION FOR A STRATEGY”

TESTIMONY OF
ROBERTA S. JACOBSON
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
BUREAU OF WESTERN HEMISPHERE AFFAIRS
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BEFORE
THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON WESTERN HEMISPHERE AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
NOVEMBER 18, 2014

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Sires, and Members of the Committee:

Thank you for the opportunity to testify on the United States strategy for engagement with Central America. I know many of you have been personally involved on this issue. The Administration welcomes the support and interest of this committee in our efforts to develop a humane and effective response to these migrants – unaccompanied children and families – arriving at our southwest border. Although we are encouraged that the numbers have decreased since July, we remain vigilant in our efforts to protect these children and address the underlying factors of violence and poverty in their countries of origin that are pushing them north.

More than sixty-five thousand unaccompanied children have left their homes to make the dangerous journey to the United States this year. From a foreign policy perspective, this migration is a warning sign that the serious and longstanding challenges in Central America are worsening. The course of action is clear. We must adequately address the underlying factors compelling so many to undertake this dangerous journey or be prepared for what is likely to be an ongoing cyclical phenomenon - with significant cost to the United States.

A stable, prosperous, and well-governed Central America is an important national security interest of the United States. Just last week, the Inter-American Development Bank hosted a conference on “Investing in Central America” where Vice President Biden and the Presidents from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras spoke about opportunities and challenges for growth and better
governance in Central America. We appreciate the IDB’s role in bringing stakeholders together and offering to provide follow-up technical meetings.

Fortunately, we believe the essential condition for finding solutions is present: political will in the region. Central American leaders recognize the scope of the challenges they face at home and have begun to act. At the IDB conference, the presidents of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras publicly presented an unprecedented, coordinated plan – the Alliance for Prosperity in the Northern Triangle. Their plan includes a clear-eyed assessment of the region’s challenges, well-considered lines of action to resolve them, and specific priorities that they themselves will pursue. The plan addresses the underlying factors of migration and promotes a region of opportunity for all of its citizens, especially young people. The presidents’ message at the conference was simple: the region’s leaders know they have serious challenges and are prepared to make the tough choices to address them, but they need our assistance.

Their agreement to a joint plan is, in and of itself, an important demonstration of this political will, which we must now harness to cultivate, and where appropriate, expand the effective developmental and security partnerships that are in the U.S. national interest.

Without significant progress in Central America, the region will continue to face extreme violence, severe economic inequality and social exclusion, and widespread corruption and poverty, compelling many Central Americans to flee their homes each year. Others will embark on this journey to reunify with relatives and family members who are already residing in the United States or to enjoy higher quality of life in the United States. A secure, democratic, and prosperous Central American region will be a stronger partner for the United States and will provide an environment in which all of its citizens, including youth, find opportunities to build their lives at home.

Over the course of the past 18 months, the U.S. government has taken a hard look at both our approach and our investments. We determined that while security is still paramount, in order to succeed, we needed to broaden our vision. Consequently, we developed an interagency strategy that can support much of what the leaders of Central America put forward in their own coordinated plan. The U.S. Strategy for Engagement with Central America both aligns with and supports the objectives of the Alliance for Prosperity plan.
To achieve this vision, U.S. engagement with Central America must balance three objectives – prosperity, governance, and security. These goals are interrelated and interdependent.

Our 
**prosperity** agenda fosters integration of a regional market of 43 million people so that local businesses can become more competitive and the region can be more attractive to international investors. **Economic growth should reach everyone, not just the well-connected few.** Our efforts will promote better education and vocational training for all citizens including women and vulnerable ethnic groups, and create business environments that are friendly to entrepreneurs, and provide alternatives to the illicit activities that contribute to insecurity and undermine effective governance.

Our 
**governance** agenda recognizes that economic growth is only sustainable when the rule of law and democratic institutions flourish, corruption and impunity is reduced, fundamental freedoms are respected, and civil society and the media can play their rightful roles. In many Central American countries, citizens, businesses and governments face corruption, transnational crime, and political cronyism. In such an environment, governments often fail to provide the most basic services and protections. We know that the sustainability of U.S. efforts will be magnified if we focus on government effectiveness and accountability, and leverage our investments to demand honest leadership and a verifiable commitment to the rule of law from our partners in the region.

Without a doubt, the 
**security agenda will remain a core priority.** If we do not collectively and effectively address insecurity now – from neighborhood streets to transnational criminal networks in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, the payoff from our other important investments will not bear fruit in the longer term.

Let me be clear. We are still a long way from achieving our core goals of sustained prosperity, good governance, and security in Central America. There is no greater indication of this fact than what we all witnessed this past summer: the willingness of tens of thousands of children to abandon their homes and travel up the isthmus and through Mexico to the United States – at substantial cost and amid the ever-present risk of rape, abuse, and death – to flee the dire conditions many face in their home communities.
Mr. Chairman, I can report that over the past few months, in partnership with Central American governments, we have achieved several important successes. Our coordinated public messaging campaigns informed families about the dangers of a migrant’s journey effectively and countered false messages peddled by migrant smugglers. Increased focus on smuggling networks in Honduras and Guatemala by host country law enforcement, including U.S. trained and vetted teams, has led to arrests of smugglers and the rescue of over 235 children. El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras are all regularly receiving repatriation flights. The Government of Mexico has also been a vital partner.

While historical migration trends typically show a decrease in the number of migrants crossing the U.S. southern border during the hot summer months and in the fall, we believe that unprecedented efforts on the part of the Administration and our partners in Central America and Mexico bore meaningful results. The number of unaccompanied children apprehended at the U.S.-Mexico border decreased from 10,628 in June to 2,514 in October – levels last seen in January 2013.

As interdiction and enforcement efforts ramp up, we remain conscious of the need to provide protection for children and other vulnerable migrants who need it—and this too is a central component of our efforts.

Our colleagues in the State Department’s Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration – or PRM – are working with international organizations, like the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), to strengthen asylum systems in the region and find ways to protect children who are threatened or displaced in their own countries so they are not forced to flee. They support the International Organization for Migration (IOM) to help the region’s governments manage migration and enforce border security in a humane way. At the direction of the White House, PRM has also worked with the Department of Homeland Security, US Citizenship and Immigration Service (USCIS) to develop a new program that was announced by Vice President Biden in his remarks last week at the Inter-American Development Bank. This new program will allow parents lawfully present in the United States to petition for their children in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras to come to the United States as refugees. These children not eligible for refugee status will be considered on a case-by-case basis for humanitarian parole. Our aim is to offer a safe, legal, and orderly alternative to a child making the dangerous journey alone to the US border.
However, any progress cannot be sustained without an increased and re-engaged U.S. commitment to our long-term strategy in Central America. We assess that it could take $5 billion over 5 years to fully implement this strategy. It is our intent to work with our regional partners who are going to put their own money and expertise into the effort, coordinate more effectively with international financial institutions, and promote private sector leadership in their efforts on this issue. Our own contributions will leverage these efforts and demonstrate American leadership and commitment to the region.

Despite serious and complex challenges, there is reason to be optimistic about Central America’s future. As I mentioned, I believe the three leaders of the Northern Triangle countries of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras are prepared to make hard decisions and to invest their own national budgets. Leaders in Panama and Costa Rica are demonstrating how the region can modernize and integrate to achieve better economic outcomes. Now is the time for a new U.S. approach to Central America that harnesses the region’s political will for change and advances a strategy that balances and prioritizes prosperity, good governance, and security in equal measure. We have a vision, we have a plan, and we want to work with Congress to help Central America and protect U.S. national security.

Thank you and I welcome your questions.
Mr. SALMON. We will move to Ms. Hogan.

STATEMENT OF MS. ELIZABETH HOGAN, ACTING ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR, BUREAU FOR LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Ms. HOGAN. Thank you.
Chairman Salmon, Ranking Member Sires, members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to share how USAID is responding to the challenge of unaccompanied minors migrating from Central America to the U.S. border. Our response to this challenge is consistent with USAID's mission, which is to partner to end extreme poverty and promote resilient democratic societies while advancing our security and prosperity.

In recognition of the gravity of the development challenges in Central America and the impact those challenges could have on the United States, USAID has maintained funding levels in Central America, even in a constrained budget environment. In fact, we have shifted approximately $100 million over the last 5 years from USAID programs in South America to Central America.

However, as the recent spike of unaccompanied minors over the summer clearly demonstrates, more needs to be done. This is why the administration requested additional resources in the Fiscal Year 2014 supplemental budget. We believe these additional resources will result in security and development gains that far exceed their costs, even in the short run. Through the Central America Regional Security Initiative, or CARSI, we are supporting crime and violence prevention programs that expand opportunities for youths living in high-crime neighborhoods and strengthening the institutions charged with administering justice and keeping people safe.

USAID's prevention strategy revolves around smart targeting, both geographic and demographic, concentrating prevention efforts on high-risk youth and high-risk communities. I am pleased to report that we have independent evidence that our programs are working. The final results from a rigorous 4-year impact evaluation carried out by Vanderbilt University in El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Panama, show that as a direct result of USAID programs, reported crime is lower, and citizens feel safer in the neighborhoods where we are working.

When compared to a 2010 baseline in these same target communities, the Vanderbilt evaluation found that, in Guatemala, 60 percent fewer residents reported being aware of homicides; in Honduras, 57 percent fewer reported being aware of extortion; and in El Salvador, 36 percent fewer reported being aware of illegal drug sales in their neighborhoods. In short, where USAID works, people see their communities getting better.

The adoption, ownership, and expansion of proven approaches by Central American governments are more important than ever. President Hernandez of Honduras has publicly committed to allocating 30 percent of the funds collected through the country's security tax to support prevention programs like ours.

In Guatemala, the government has expanded USAID's successful 24-hour court model to additional communities.
And the Government of El Salvador launched its ambitious new National Strategy for Violence Prevention in February to empower municipalities to lead prevention efforts.

While insecurity is cited as a primary driver for the migration of minors from the region, the lack of jobs and economic opportunity at home is also a critical factor. USAID’s development programs also seek to improve educational opportunities and livelihoods for the poor in rural areas. These programs remain imminently relevant because they complement and amplify our youth and urban-oriented crime prevention programming. For example, in El Salvador, a USAID partnership unlocked $25 million for small businesses to help spur job creation. As part of our Feed the Future investments in Honduras, USAID is promoting sustainable agricultural practices in the country’s drought-plagued region to improve the livelihoods and food security of 50,000 families. These kind of economic development programs align with our crime prevention programs to build a foundation for prosperity and, in so doing, relieve the pressure on youths and their families to migrate north.

USAID continues to successfully utilize partnerships with the private sector to supplement and sustain our investments in Central America. We have leveraged approximately $40 million in private sector resources to support at-risk youth. In Honduras, we have developed 41 partnerships with companies to strengthen key agricultural value chains. We are also partnering with coffee industry leaders, like Starbucks, to help coffee farmers recover from the devastating impact of the coffee rust outbreak.

In closing, Mr. Chairman, despite the continued commitment of the region’s governments and private entities, we recognize that our current levels of resources are insufficient to spur the kind of large-scale, transformative change needed in the region. Additional funding would enable us to significantly scale successful programs in the communities in greatest need and fully implement the U.S. Government strategy for engagement with Central America, balancing the three interrelated objectives of prosperity, governance, and security.

Thank you very much, and I look forward to your questions.

Mr. SALMON. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Hogan follows:]
Testimony of Elizabeth Hogan
Senior Deputy Assistant Administrator for Latin America and the Caribbean
U.S. Agency for International Development
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
November 18, 2014, 2PM “How USAID is Responding to the Challenge of Unaccompanied Minor Migration from Central America”

Chairman Salmon, Ranking Member Sires, Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to share how the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) is responding to the challenge of unaccompanied minors migrating from El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras to the U.S. border. Our response to this challenge is consistent with the U.S. policy to address underlying causes of this problem and our mission to partner to end extreme poverty and promote resilient, democratic societies while advancing our security and prosperity.

Through family connections, remittance flows, economic ties and gang activity, the countries of Central America are increasingly linked to communities in the United States, some of which are located just a few miles from this hearing room. For the past five years, USAID has worked alongside the State Department and other U.S. agencies to prioritize assistance in the areas of security, governance and economic development in Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador. In recognition of the gravity of the development challenges in Central America and the impact those challenges could have on the United States, USAID has maintained funding levels to Central America even in a constrained budget environment. In fact, we have shifted approximately $100 million over the last five years from USAID programs in South America to Central America.

Although we have shifted resources and maintained the budget, clearly more needs to be done. This is why the Administration requested additional resources in the FY 2014
supplemental budget request and why we look forward to working with Congress to ramp up our programming as additional resources become available. We believe these additional resources will result in security and development gains that exceed their costs – even in the short run, and most certainly in the medium to longer term. Our confidence in the effectiveness of our approach at the scale we have been able to enact is based on a recent independent impact evaluation in high crime communities in El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Panama that provide statistically significant evidence that crime rates are lower and public perception of security higher in the areas in which we work as a direct result of our crime prevention efforts. Getting wider results on the ground that will impact the lives of millions of citizens, however, needs resources to scale up and nationalize these very positive efforts.

Mr. Chairman, we have learned that the reasons for migrations are varied and complex. For example, the child migrants from Guatemala are predominantly from indigenous communities and rural areas while those from Honduras are largely from urban areas. We know that the underlying factors of lack of economic opportunity, threats to personal security, and the wish to reunite with families coupled with misperceptions about U.S. immigration laws are driving migration, yet some of these factors weigh more heavily for some communities than others. Most of the young people arriving at the U.S.-Mexico border are between the ages of 14 and 17. Many of them are aware that the journey is dangerous. Nevertheless, they and their parents choose to take this risk, and many of them do so more than once.

The surge in unaccompanied minors migrating out of Central America makes the adoption, ownership and expansion of proven crime and violence prevention approaches by Central American governments more important than ever. Our greatest impact, over time, will be that programs which have demonstrated success become the policy of the host nation-
supported by their taxpayers. We are heartened that these governments are increasingly
dedicating additional financial and intellectual resources to address the root causes of violence
and criminality in their countries. However, even greater investment by Central American
governments is needed to deepen the impact of our joint efforts. Host nations are working hard to
help their most vulnerable populations who live on the margins of the formal economy, but we
can and should urge them to do more to enact needed reforms. As the Vice President told
Central American leaders on November 14 at the Inter-American Development Bank conference
on addressing the constraints to growth in El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala, “Urgent
challenges demand urgent action—backed by courage and political will. It’s hard, but it can be
done.”

In terms of a direct response to this year’s migration flow, USAID has moved quickly to
strengthen the reception capacity of the three main countries of origin. Through a $7.6M grant to
the International Organization for Migration (IOM), we are working to ensure that countries can
receive and process increased numbers of returnees of all ages. In addition, we are working to
make sure that the governments in the region can provide any immediate care and onward
assistance for returning families and children so that they are received home in a safe, dignified,
and orderly manner.

Pending final Congressional approval, USAID expects to implement up to $160 million
in FY 2014 funds to tackle the root causes of the crime, violence and economic insecurity
driving the child migration phenomenon. Through the Central America Regional Security
Initiative (CARSII), we are supporting crime and violence prevention programs that expand
opportunities for youth living in insecure neighborhoods and strengthen the institutions charged
with administering justice and keeping people safe.
USAID’s prevention strategy revolves around smart targeting – geographic, demographic, and according to a specific set of risk factors for violence. In simple terms, our work seeks to concentrate prevention efforts on high-risk youth in high-risk communities. For example, by partnering with the Los Angeles Mayor’s Office and the University of Southern California, we are using tried and tested methodology to identify a set of specific risk factors most associated with youths joining gangs.

We have evidence that these kinds of programs are working, and evidence is crucial so we can build on what really works. The final results from a four-year, third-party impact evaluation carried out by Vanderbilt University in high crime communities in El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Panama show that – as a direct result of USAID’s programs – reported crime is lower and public perception of security higher. Our community-based crime prevention approach is a package of activities that include programs for at-risk youth, such as outreach centers that provide safe spaces and workforce preparedness training; security-related planning by municipal crime prevention committees; activities that address environmental issues like street lighting and graffiti; and community policing.

The Vanderbilt evaluation found that, compared to what would have occurred without USAID intervention, 57% fewer residents in targeted communities in Honduras reported being aware of extortion in their neighborhoods, in Guatemala, 60% fewer residents reported being aware of homicides in their neighborhoods, and in El Salvador, 36% fewer residents reported being aware of illegal drug sales in their neighborhoods. People believe and see their communities are getting better.

Agustin, a former gang member from Guatemala, participated in a USAID funded prevention program several years ago. He turned his life around, became a family man,
and now gives "prevention talks" to schools in his community. As an activist with the Youth Movement Against Violence, Agustin has started his own Tedx Talk series offering solutions for at-risk youth.

USAID is already starting to expand the most successful prevention approaches beyond the initial test communities, working with municipal and national Central American leaders. For instance, over the past six years, we have increased our network of youth outreach centers — which offer youth services and refuge from gang violence — from 25 in Guatemala to 139 across Central America, and worked with mayors to root these programs in the community. And we are preparing to open an additional 77 centers in high-crime neighborhoods in El Salvador. In Honduras alone, tens of thousands of youth have received assistance through more than 40 such centers based in that country’s most violent cities. President Hernandez of Honduras has seen this in action and has publicly committed to allocating 30 percent of the funds collected through the country’s Security Tax to support prevention programs.

In Guatemala, the government has expanded USAID’s successful 24-hour court model to additional communities, demonstrating its commitment to an independent and accessible judicial system, and the Government of El Salvador launched its ambitious new National Strategy for Violence Prevention in February to empower municipalities to lead on prevention efforts.

Going forward, USAID will continue to better target our assistance to those communities where crime, violence and child migration rates remain high, working alongside the State Department, Departments of Justice and Homeland Security, and other international donors. Through the Safer City model, which we are currently developing, we will align our resources and efforts with those of host governments, donors, private sector, and multilateral partners to ensure economies of scale. The most effective way to reduce homicide and violence is through such an
integrated approach, which must ultimately be scaled up by the governments in the region.

While insecurity related to crime and violence is cited as a primary driver for the migration of minors from the region, the lack of jobs and economic opportunities at home for youth and their families is also a crucial factor. USAID’s development programs -- to create jobs, spur agricultural development, strengthen food security and improve literacy and youth workforce development -- seek to improve the educational opportunities and livelihoods for the poor in more rural areas. These programs remain particularly relevant because they complement and amplify our youth and urban-oriented CARSI programming and will be coordinated with our outreach efforts with the private sector. As Secretary of Commerce Pritzker told the presidents of El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala on November 14, “to further advance your countries’ success, we want to see your best and brightest young people stay home, start businesses, and help grow your economies.”

In Guatemala, for instance, USAID is investing nearly $25 million over five years in a new program to improve educational access and quality for under-served populations, including rural indigenous girls and boys in 900 rural schools, and educational and vocational training opportunities for 2,000 out-of-school youth in the country’s Western Highland region.

In El Salvador, where small and medium-enterprises (SMEs) account for half of all economic activity in a nation of 6 million people, a USAID partnership with Banco Davivienda unlocked $25 million for SMEs to help spur job creation.

As part of our Feed the Future investments in Honduras, USAID contributed $24.5 million to the new Dry Corridor Initiative to promote sustainable agricultural development in the country’s drought-plagued southwest border region and improve the livelihoods of some 50,000 families.
And we are supporting a robust program across the region to limit the devastation of the Coffee Rust epidemic on Central America’s lucrative coffee sector. Our investments are helping small-scale coffee growers and workers all along the coffee value chain replant, refinance and improve management of coffee farms.

These kinds of economic development programs align with our crime prevention programs to build a foundation for prosperous economies that offer economic and other opportunities for youth and their families, and in so doing relieve the pressure to migrate north. The integrated nature of our assistance in Central America is precisely why we are not looking to cut programs in rural agriculture or climate change or health and redirect those resources exclusively to crime prevention programs. We caution against narrowing our portfolio in those countries any further.

The U.S. government continues to successfully utilize partnerships with the private sector to supplement and sustain our investments in Central America and encourage corporate social responsibility. Over the past few years, USAID has leveraged approximately $40 million in private sector resources to support at-risk youth. For example, through a USAID and Microsoft collaboration in El Salvador, approximately 25,000 youth in 13 high-crime municipalities will have access to competitive computer and technology training and a path to certification. These partnerships are part of an effort to help build a Central American economy that provides viable opportunities for current and future generations to thrive.

Such partnerships are also integral to the effectiveness of our economic development programs. In Honduras alone, USAID has developed 41 partnerships with companies, including Syngenta and Walmart, to strengthen key agricultural value chains and increase incomes of farmers and agricultural workers (more than 24,000 to date). We’re also partnering with coffee
industry leaders, Keurig Green Mountain, Starbucks and Smuckers, to help coffee farming areas recover from the coffee rust outbreak.

The U.S. strategy in Central America recognizes the inextricable requirements of progress in areas of prosperity, security and governance. We remain convinced that only by working to keep children safe and in school, train out-of-school youth for higher education or work and help business create jobs, while encouraging more government transparency, effectiveness and a stronger rule of law, will Central America become the peaceful and prosperous region we all desire.

Thank you and I look forward to answering any questions you may have.

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Mr. SALMON. Mr. Kaplan.

STATEMENT OF MR. ROBERT N. KAPLAN, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, INTER-AMERICAN FOUNDATION

Mr. KAPLAN. Chairman Salmon, Ranking Member Sires, and members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear today to testify on behalf of the Inter-American Foundation, an independent U.S. foreign assistance agency that works directly with the organized poor in Latin America and the Caribbean.

We appreciate the subcommittee’s longstanding support of our mission to help people in the region help themselves. You well know the long list of push factors in Central America that contribute to the individuals’ decisions to leave their community. In the poor communities where the IAF works, we see the human costs of too few jobs, barriers to starting and sustaining small enterprises, and a lack of educational opportunities.

In the northern triangle of Central America, one quarter of the population subsists on less than $2 a day. Violence is chronic. Government institutions are too often absent, and community safety nets have broken down. Facing these threats, families do not know where to turn. In this context, the IAF invests carefully to help local citizens gain some control over their lives by carrying out initiatives that they themselves conceive.

Our grantees demonstrate their commitment by contributing their own funds to the effort. On average, they provide about $1.30 for every dollar invested by the IAF, making the U.S. a minority partner in the development projects we support. Today our active portfolio in Central America includes 81 projects, representing $37 million of combined investment by the IAF and our grantee partners.

In the three northern triangle countries, we are supporting local initiatives in over 880 communities. Our work is not limited to youth, but 45 percent of our investment in these three countries benefits young people directly.

Our work is having a real effect: 14,300 new jobs for low-income people have been created. In the northern triangle alone, 80 percent of our grantee partners who track household income reported an increase, on average more than doubling household income in a year. And it has reduced the appeal of migration.

At the beginning of an IAF-funded project in El Salvador, 83 percent of participants under 26 said they would consider migrating. By mid-project, the number was down to 22 percent. A grantee partner in Guatemala combined education about the risks of migration with a credit program in training for small farming businesses. By the end of the grant, 79 percent of the 730 young participants said they had decided not to migrate.

Equally important is building citizens’ ability to engage their government, a challenging goal in poor communities where many citizens are not equipped to voice concerns or engage with local officials.

We have seen that when disadvantaged youths come together on their own initiative to build skills and safe spaces, start their own small businesses, and exercise leadership and teamwork for the benefit of their community, they are less likely to leave. Why? Be-
cause they become invested in the present and future of their home communities.

One Honduran teenager in Tegucigalpa recently told us: “Before participating in the program, I wanted only to follow the American dream. Now I believe that I can create my American dream here.”

The IAF does much more than send dollars to the region, and the direct results of the projects we fund tell only part of the story. Our whole approach is designed to strengthen the capabilities of our grantee partners so they can take on even bigger challenges. Fundamentally, we want them to learn from each other and be leaders in their own communities. In the process, they create social and economic anchors at home and demonstrate their preference to stay.

In fact, I am encouraged because we see many opportunities at the grassroots level to address the causes of youth migration. The impact of a single thriving community, an organized group of rural poor, or an inspired young person in an urban slum may seem small, but they become the safe havens and incubators of change that inspire others. If reached, if empowered, and if connected to each other, they are capable of generating the sea change so desperately needed in the region. They need a chance to become citizens because fundamentally, they are the ones who will change their communities and their countries.

Forty-five years ago, a small congressional delegation of members of this committee paid a visit to Central America. What they learned was not surprising, that true long-lasting change depends in large part on thriving communities, communities that provide not only social and economic opportunities for the most marginalized but are themselves foundations upon which democracies are built. One result from that trip was the creation of the Inter-American Foundation, which helps support the protagonists, not participants, in their own development.

Our work naturally complements other U.S. efforts for improving prosperity, governance, and security in Central American countries. Again, I thank the subcommittee for the opportunity to testify before you today on behalf of the IAF and our thousands of grassroots partners in the region.

Mr. SALMON. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Kaplan follows:]
Testimony of Robert N. Kaplan  
President and CEO, Inter-American Foundation  
Before the Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere,  
House Committee on Foreign Affairs  
For the hearing,  
“Unaccompanied Alien Children: Pressing the Administration for a Strategy”  
November 18, 2014

Chairman Salmon, Ranking Member Sires and members of the Subcommittee:

Thank you for the opportunity to appear today to testify on behalf of the Inter-American Foundation (IAF), a small independent foreign assistance agency of the U.S. government that works directly with the organized poor in Latin America and the Caribbean. The board and staff of the IAF appreciate this Subcommittee’s long-standing support for our mission of promoting and investing in citizen-led grassroots development to help communities thrive.

As the members of this Subcommittee deliberate on weighty matters of national and regional scope in our hemisphere, we appreciate your interest in a community-level perspective. We all know from our own country’s experience that thriving communities strengthen democracy, expand economic opportunities and enhance social resilience. Our strongest communities are those where ordinary citizens work together as neighbors to achieve common objectives. That is the essence of the IAF’s work in Latin America and the Caribbean. I am pleased to discuss with you today our activities in Central America, and how we can complement the efforts of other government agencies, as well as private organizations and firms, to help our Central American neighbors provide better opportunities for their citizens to lead healthy, safe and productive lives.

You well know the long list of “push” factors in Central America that contribute to individuals’ decisions to leave their community. Regardless of whether they move to another part of their country, to somewhere else in Central America or Mexico, or attempt to cross into the United States, the exodus is a symptom that something is wrong back home.

In poor communities where the IAF works, we see the human costs of too few good jobs, barriers to starting and sustaining small enterprises, and a lack of viable options for young people to continue their education locally. Access to clean water, basic utilities, good roads and affordable sources of energy are often scarce. In the “northern triangle” of El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras, one-quarter of the population subsists on less than $2.00 per day. How can parents send their children to high school in a neighboring town when gangs routinely board buses to shake down students, or worse? The cost of extortion keeps entrepreneurs from opening shops. Neighborhoods divided by gangs or at-risk from organized crime shutter at 7:00 p.m. When natural disasters strike, the poor are particularly vulnerable. This year’s severe drought in Central America added to the misery in rural communities already suffering from the devastating
effects of a widespread outbreak of coffee rust. Small farmers have reported losing half their crop.

Facing these threats, families do not know where to turn. Government institutions are too often absent, unable to respond adequately or simply not trusted. When citizens feel unprotected by the state, it is little wonder that they lose faith that democracy can work for them. Community “safety nets” have broken down as well; local civil society organizations are under-resourced and themselves subject to many of the same pressures, vulnerabilities and fears. The private sector can do more to provide a spark for economic development that is inclusive and benefits local people most likely to migrate. But too often, reports of corruption and firms’ indifference to the local population fuel cynicism and contribute to a climate of despair.

It is in this context that the IAF has invested carefully over many years to help local Central American citizens’ organizations gain some control over their lives by carrying out initiatives that they themselves conceive. Our partners set priorities and demonstrate their commitment by contributing their own funds to the effort; on average, they provide about $1.30 for every $1.00 invested by the IAF, making the U.S. a minority partner in the development projects we support. Our portfolio is diverse because it reflects local priorities, ranging from microbusiness development to agricultural diversification to domestic violence prevention to watershed management. At the same time, our selection process ensures that we apply our resources prudently to achieve U.S. interests as well. As others invest in improving state institutions, the IAF invests directly at the grassroots to strengthen the capacity of citizens to be protagonists in their communities’ development and to engage their governments effectively.

Today, our active portfolio in Central America includes 81 projects, representing $37 million of combined investment by the IAF and our grantee partners. Looking only at the three northern triangle countries, we are supporting local initiatives in over 880 communities. Similarly, in Mexico, we are supporting work in over 400 communities, mostly in the southern states. These urban and rural communities are the homes of families struggling to sustain and protect themselves.

What are some of the results of the IAF’s investments? Our grantee partners report their results every six months, and we independently verify the information. In the last few years, they created over 14,300 new jobs for low-income people in Central America. In the northern triangle, 80 percent of our grantee partners who tracked income generation reported an increase, on average more than doubling household income in a year.

Participation has changed the appeal of migration. In a survey of participants in one project that helped create 15 community-based businesses in El Salvador, less than 22 percent of those aged 25 years or younger said they would consider migrating, compared to 83 percent when the project started. Most insist they want to contribute to the economic stability of their communities
and create employment opportunities for their neighbors. Similarly, a recent IAF grantee partner in rural Guatemala used a combination of education programs on the risks of migration, credit and training for small farming businesses to reduce emigration among youth. Nearly 60 percent of families in this municipality had at least one member living in the United States, yet 79 percent of the 730 young participants had decided not to migrate by the end of the grant period.

Importantly, with half of Central America’s population under 25 years old and a disproportionate number of them poor, many of the initiatives we support engage young people, and these are the focus of my remarks today. About 45 percent of the IAF’s investment in El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras benefit young people directly, even more benefit indirectly as the children of mothers and fathers involved in IAF-funded programs.

What do we see that works to keep Central American youths in their home communities? Let me share a few insights from our experience.

Creating jobs by itself may not necessarily be enough to stem emigration. Similarly, providing activities to “occupy the time” of so-called “ni-ni’s” — a term referring to the one-quarter of youths aged 15-24 in Central America who neither study nor work — is not sufficient if youths remain passive recipients of programs designed or carried out by others. A first lesson from our experience is that when disadvantaged youths come together on their own initiative to build skills and safe spaces, start their own small businesses, and exercise leadership and teamwork for the benefit of their community, they are less likely to leave. Why? Because they become invested in the present and future of their home communities. Through their own effort, young people with financial hardship acquire the tools, knowledge, confidence and social support networks that make it possible — and preferable — to sustain themselves in their home communities and respond constructively to crises. Ideally, their enthusiasm becomes contagious among their peers as well. As one Honduran teenager participating in an IAF-funded project in Tegucigalpa recently told us, “Before participating in the program, I wanted only to follow the American Dream; now I believe that I can create my American Dream here.” And as a Salvadoran youth participant explained, “Before, I thought of moving to a different country, but now I think about making changes in my country.”

Second, community-based initiatives should target those at greatest risk of migrating. This is a dynamic group of young people, who, though poor or disadvantaged, have impressive drive and ambition for their future and feel locked out of opportunities at home. Our grantee partners seek to unlock access to economic, educational and other social advancement in hundreds of communities where these young people live.

Third, it is important to let youths lead. Listen and respond to the ideas marginalized young people themselves present. Rather than treating them as passive participants or trainees, we need
to give young people opportunities to take on leadership roles in the design, implementation and long-term sustainability of community-based initiatives.

Fourth, invest in both urban and rural youth, and meet them where they are -- in their home communities -- because it can be too dangerous for young people to travel outside of their neighborhoods. Central American youth migrants come from both urban and rural settings. In many cases, those from the countryside first migrate to city slums before eventually leaving the country. We have aligned our investments in the region to address this important dynamic.

Fifth, markets matter, and investing in the creation and improvement of local economic opportunities is fundamental. Young people need the skills to increase their competitiveness in the job market or to open and sustain small businesses. If they decide to go into business, they need access to affordable financing. With a poorly functioning economy that is unable to generate dignified work in so many communities, it is no surprise that the IAF receives so many requests to support microenterprise development, microcredit or community savings and loan associations.

Let me give you an example to illustrate this point. In the slums of Tegucigalpa and surrounding rural areas, IAF grantee partner Centro de Educación Vocacional Grupo Juvenil Dion (GJD) is working to improve the employment prospects of high-risk youths through vocational training, internships with local businesses and access to microcredit. A majority of the youth and their families live in areas of the city saturated with gang activity, poverty, and crime. The center combines training in hard skills with programs that develop communication and soft skills. So far, 800 young Hondurans have graduated with certification in technical trades and 105 have gotten access to microcredit to launch enterprises, including beauty salons, bakeries and carpentry businesses. At this point, 91 percent of borrowers are current with their loan payments. Importantly, “mobile workshops” take the training program to youths in communities outside metropolitan Tegucigalpa. Its marketing center provides a venue and support for six brands for the entrepreneurs’ products and services.

Sixth, building the ability of citizens to engage their government regarding urgent local needs is a critical step to increase their commitment to their home communities. Civic engagement is a challenge for marginalized communities with large out-migration. Many do not know how to raise concerns with their government and hold local officials to account for responding to citizens’ needs. Feeling hopeless about the ability to change their circumstances at home, they vote with their feet. Let me give you another example. An IAF grantee partner, Asociación Para el Desarrollo Sostenible de la Juventud (ADESJU), is changing this attitude among the 750 participants in its network of 25 youth groups. ADESJU is based in Chiantla, a municipality in Guatemala’s Western Highlands, where 78 percent of the population lives in poverty or extreme poverty and three-quarters of the population is under age 30. Participants in the association’s leadership and teamwork development programs took it upon themselves to develop a detailed
proposal to the municipal government with recommendations for programs or services that would address the urgent needs of local youth.

What is the IAF’s role in these efforts? Our work involves much more than sending dollars to the region, and the direct results of the projects we fund tell only part of the story. Our whole approach to selecting, accompanying and evaluating our grassroots partners is designed to strengthen their capabilities so that they can take on even bigger challenges. As we invest directly with incipient grassroots organizations, we help strengthen local talent and capacity to participate effectively in civic life. We also help them tap into existing civil society networks, including the family of IAF grassroots groups across the region, and connect organizations with common or complementary interests so that they can form new partnerships of their own. We want them to learn from each other and become leaders in their own communities. In the process, they create social and economic anchors at home and demonstrate their preference to stay. I am convinced that this is indeed what people want because I have heard it repeatedly in hundreds of conversations with parents and grandparents who look on with dismay as their children leave.

This may sound like painstaking and meticulous work. It is. But that does not mean that it cannot be undertaken on a larger scale. The IAF has many years of experience nurturing local capabilities, and we can tap into extensive networks of grassroots organizations throughout the region to draw new resources and energy into the effort from a variety of sources.

So where do we go from here?

There are many opportunities to do so much at the grassroots to address the causes of youth migration before they leave or once they are returned. The IAF sees considerable talent and capacity in Central American civil society to manage more resources to help youth and their communities open economic opportunities and work with their governments and business sector to respond to challenges of crime and violence. The impact of a single thriving community, an organized group of rural poor or an inspired young person in an urban slum may appear small, but they become the safe havens and incubators of change that inspire others. There remain untapped thousands of communities, tens of thousands of organized groups and hundreds of thousands of young people ready to step forward with solutions and what little resources they have. If reached, if empowered and if connected to each other, they are capable of generating the sea change so desperately needed in the region.

We believe it is important to put community members -- including young leaders -- in the driver’s seat to best address local problems. Youth need to be engaged in more than job-training or extra-curricular activities. They need a chance to become citizens. Fundamentally, they are the ones who will need to change their communities and countries.
Forty-five years ago a small congressional delegation of members of this committee paid a visit to Central America, in part to examine the effectiveness of U.S. development efforts in the region. What they learned was not surprising: that true, long-lasting, meaningful change depends in large part on thriving communities — communities that provide not only social and economic opportunities for the most marginalized but that are themselves foundations upon which future democracies can be built. One result from that trip was the creation of the Inter-American Foundation. We are driven by the vision of thriving communities where people direct their own lives as individuals and citizens. Over our history we have supported more than 5,000 organizations in communities across the hemisphere in pursuit of this goal. While our grantee partners may be poor, they are not passive. When we are successful, they are protagonists — not participants — with aspirations and the ability to think beyond a project and shape their own future.

Working at the community level as we do complements U.S. diplomatic efforts and other bilateral foreign assistance for improved prosperity, governance and security in Central American countries. Importantly, it serves Congress’s intent in the creation of the Inter-American Foundation spelled out in our enabling legislation: to “strengthen the bonds of friendship and understanding among the peoples of this hemisphere.”

Again, I thank the Subcommittee for the opportunity to testify before you today on behalf of the IAF and our thousands of grassroots partners in the region.
Mr. SALMON. I am going to go ahead and ask questions, and then I will yield to the ranking member. My first question, maybe it would be most appropriate for you, Assistant Secretary, or Ms. Wiesner, but according to the information the administration released last Friday, individuals residing in the U.S. will be able to petition for refugee status for their children and their spouses living in Central America. This is, therefore, a family reunification program, presumably the priority 3, P–3 category. Under 8–CFR Section 207, a principal refugee admitted to the United States may request follow to join benefits for his or her spouse and/or unmarried children under the age of 21 if the family has become separated.

My question is this: Are the family members living in the U.S. who will petition for these children refugees? Are they refugees, and if they are, have they been deemed as such, have they been deemed refugees? If not, under what authority are the nonrefugees living in the United States under a whole host of statuses allowed to petition refugee status for their family member?

Ms. JACOBSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And I am going to turn to DAS Wiesner, who is much more expert in this, because I do think that this is not, in fact, the standard program that you are describing. It is something quite different, it is designed to focus on the children in-country who are obviously the ones that we are trying to get out of such a difficult circumstance in the three northern triangle countries without having them attempt this very dangerous journey and try and enter the country in the undocumented status as they did last year.

Catherine.

Ms. WIESNER. Sure. So to try to answer your question, and please follow up if I missed part of it. You asked if this is part of the P–3 program. It is not exactly the P–3 program; that is based on people who are out of their country of origin already as refugees.

You asked if the parents themselves in the United States would be considered refugees under this program. They are not. They are considered under the statuses under which they are here. So they are either here as Lawful Permanent Residents or the additional six statuses that are eligible to apply. So the refugee claim is a claim of the child themselves, the child facing a risk of persecution, either they have experienced persecution or they have a well-founded fear of persecution in their home country on one of the five protected grounds. The five protected grounds are their race, their religion, their nationality, their political opinion, or their membership in a particular social group.

So maybe another way to put it is the eligibility to petition in this program is one category. And those are the parents and their statuses here in the United States. But in order to be granted refugee status, the child themselves have to show that they are eligible for that status.

Mr. SALMON. So it is not the P–3 program?

Ms. WIESNER. It is not the P–3 program.

Mr. SALMON. If a minor or spouse is not granted refugee status, they will be considered for parole. What kind of visa will they then be entering the United States with? And how will we be able to ensure that they don’t overstay if their 2-year renewal is not ap-
proved? And then, finally, the administration noticed the parolees would be able to attend school? Will a minor be allowed to attend a public university once he or she becomes of age? Will they qualify for Federal grants and State aid? And what is the real difference between a refugee and a parolee who can potentially apply for DACA if his parole status is not renewed?

Ms. WIESNER. So I can definitely talk about some of the differences between the assistance offered to refugees who are resettled and what is available to parolees, but for details on the parole program, I will have to refer you to the Department of Homeland Security, who administers the parole program.

So when a refugee comes to the United States under our resettlement program, they are eligible for a range of benefits, which include a resettlement and placement grant that is administered from the State Department through our resettlement agencies. And then they are also eligible for follow-on refugee benefits from Health and Human Services. And it includes things like assistance in enrolling in school when they become of age. If they are of age, then assistance getting jobs and housing. These will be children joining parents, so we assume that their parents already have housing and jobs, so it is really more about getting them into school as refugees.

As well, there is no cost to apply to the program in either case, but if you come as a refugee, your medical check is free. And you will get a loan to take the flight to the United States, which you then have to repay back later.

Parolee is a temporary—sorry, one of the more important aspects of refugee settlement is that it is a path to legal permanent status and to citizenship, and that is one of the main differences with parolees. That is a temporary status. As you noted, it often usually lasts for 2 years, and you have to apply for renewal.

None of the benefits that I just mentioned for resettlement are available to parolees either. In fact, if you are not eligible for refugee status and are considered for parole, then your family has to submit an affidavit of support which shows that they are able to support you here in the United States.

Mr. SALMON. And if it is not the P–3 program, what is it? What program is it?

Ms. WIESNER. It is called in-country refugee processing, which is allowed—I mean, it is accounted for in the law. Both refugee status and parole discretion are in the Immigration and Nationality Act.

Mr. SALMON. Do you know what law it is under just so we can reference it?

Ms. WIESNER. We can get the specific citations.

Mr. SALMON. That is fine.

I recognize the ranking member.

Mr. SIRES. First of all, Chairman, let me apologize for being late. These days we have a lot of things going on. You know, I am upset about something that happened to us as this exodus happened. And I am very concerned about the origin of how this happened. I will go back and forth. Just try to follow me.

When this whole thing started—and everybody is shocked about the kids and the conditions and everything else. The Hispanic Caucus called a meeting, and we asked the Ambassadors from these
countries to come to the meeting so we can discuss how this whole thing started. Do you believe we got one Ambassador from these countries, and they sent staffers. Meanwhile, we have like 13, 14, 15 Congress Members at this meeting, and we have to now try to deal with staffers.

To me, that shows me that maybe they were not as serious at trying to stop this. To me, that just, I just don't know if this whole stampede started as a rumor. And all these kids all of a sudden came across the border because of the rumors that started.

But if 14 or 15 Members of Congress call for a meeting to try to help—this is the Hispanic Caucus trying to help—you don't send a staffer to the meeting. You try to deal with the situation and see how it can best be alleviated. So I am more concerned about the roots of why this happened. And then, obviously, we have to deal after they get here.

Right now there is a lull. Obviously, there is not as many kids coming over, but I don't want to see this being used as a release on a pressure cooker on somebody saying we start this rumors and we get the coyotes to get these rumors, and you are going to have a rush of kids coming over. I just don't know how you deal with that.

Ms. Jacobson. If I could, Mr. Sires, the only thing I would say is that I think one of the things that last summer taught all of us, both here in the United States but especially in these countries, was it was a wake-up call for some of the countries in terms of what they needed to do at home. And what we have seen over the last 5 months is a real shift in the attention to some of the underlying issues and in the will to address those issues back home to ensure that some of the areas that were not getting the attention they deserved geographically, because we know where most of the kids are coming from and their families, and economically and in terms of level of violence, which were not being attended to by either national governments or local governments. So I do think you see a difference, as you saw reflected in the three Presidents here last week, in the attention to those causes.

Mr. Sires. Does anybody have any other observation?

Mr. Kaplan. Yes. I can't speak to what the Ambassadors did here, but I have to say that on the ground, in the communities where we are working, hundreds of communities throughout the region, the objective conditions on the ground are really as horrendous as everybody has been describing them with levels of violence and poverty.

Mr. Sires. I don't doubt that at all. I am a Hispanic. I think I know a little bit about the Western Hemisphere. But my concern is this business of using a rumor or starting a stampede to release the pressure of what is happening in these countries.

So we have to really try to address—and I know you are doing your best and some of the USAID is doing their best, but I don't know if it is enough because I don't think this is going to be over. I think this is going to continue, and then, obviously, we are going to have to deal with the immigration issue here in America and how to deal with our own issues here.

Ms. Jacobson. But you have also had governments that have stepped up their antismuggling legislation and the units that they
are using to go after those traffickers and to put out the message that this won't be tolerated as well, so I think that is very important.

Mr. SIRES. I think what happened was those governments realized how upset this country was, and they were concerned that maybe some of the aid would be cut if they don't step up to the plate and start doing some things about what is going on in their own country with their own children.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SALMON. Thank you.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from South Carolina, Mr. Duncan.

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks for your work on this this summer. It was a real problem and you went to try to get your hands around and head around what was going on.

The President is supposed to consult with Congress to establish the number and groups of refugees eligible for admission each fiscal year.

Ms. Jacobson, under what authority are you establishing the in-country refugee and parole program?

Ms. JACOBSON. Well, I will be happy to ask Catherine to say anything further that she needs to, but my understanding is that when the numbers for the fiscal year are sent to Congress, as they were this September——

Mr. DUNCAN. Four thousand——

Ms. JACOBSON. Those numbers obviously are the numbers that we are working with. Those are the numbers that will include any increases in Central America. Obviously, a program like this would take time to set up. We would not expect numbers of any magnitude to really be seen until, frankly, quite a ways down the road, frankly probably late into 2015. Were we to need any additional numbers beyond that 4,000, there is some flexibility within the overall numbers, but we anticipate those numbers being adequate for the coming year.

Mr. DUNCAN. So you are telling me nobody has been processed through this program to date?

Ms. JACOBSON. No. That is correct. In fact, the program itself will not even begin to take applications into it any earlier than at least the beginning of December. It has not begun. And, obviously, as a new program, this will begin, and we will see in terms of the kinds of response that we get.

Mr. DUNCAN. Who sets the cap?

Ms. JACOBSON. Well, in a program like this, there is no cap at the outset. We have to see who qualifies for the——

Mr. DUNCAN. It is just an open number of refugees that are able to come into this country? There is no cap?

Ms. JACOBSON. Obviously, what we sent to Congress is the overall cap in refugees. That stands.

Mr. DUNCAN. What is the cap for 2015.

Ms. JACOBSON. Four thousand for this region. I don't know what the global number is.

Ms. WIESNER. Sir, the global number is 70,000, and that is established by Presidential authority and Presidential determination.

Mr. DUNCAN. That is from all countries?
Ms. WIESNER. That is globally, exactly, and so 70,000 is a cap. It is what we budget against.

Mr. DUNCAN. What is the cap for Central America?

Ms. WIESNER. And then, within that, we make allocations. For Latin America and the Caribbean, the allocation right now is 4,000.

Mr. DUNCAN. Do you anticipate any change and increase in those number for Central America out of that global number?

Ms. WIESNER. We left at 4,000 because we thought that was probably appropriate, but there is some flexibility to change it if need be over the course of the——

Mr. DUNCAN. We are seeing Syrian refugees. We are seeing Afghans, Iraqis. There is a global need of people seeking to come to this country. So I guess what I am asking, are you planning on expanding the number from Central America, or are you going to leave it sort of like it is, status quo?

Ms. WIESNER. At this point we left it at 4,000. I would just add that in addition to including this in-country program specifically in the report that went to Congress in September, we did the required consultations with the Judiciary Committee, where this program was raised, and also did staff briefings back in September, so there has been some consultation in advance of the Vice President’s remarks on Friday.

Mr. DUNCAN. And I am not saying which number is right or wrong. I am just trying to get my head around what you are going to do with that allocation.

I have a question just reading this. You know, in this country, you can vote when you are 18. You can sign a contract and be tied to that when you are 18. You can get married. You can be tried as an adult at 18. But in everything I am reading here, you are identifying children as 21 and younger. Why?

Ms. WIESNER. That is the definition of minor children that DHS uses according to the law.

Mr. DUNCAN. By the way, we asked DHS to come to this hearing, and they refused. That was my request.

It is interesting because a parent is eligible to request program access for his child who is a resident in one of the three countries if the parent is at least 18 years old, but the child—you are going to identify a child as 21 or younger, but you are saying a parent has to be at least 18. There seems to be some hypocrisy there.

If we need to change that in the law, we will change it. But there is hypocrisy of the two ages. In the United States, you are a child until you are 18 years old. Do you agree with that?

Ms. WIESNER. The definition of a minor youth is in the law, but, obviously, if the petitioning parent is 18, the child is going to be significantly younger than that.

Mr. SALMON. My wife says I am still a child.

Mr. DUNCAN. This is true.

So you are allowing the children. And, from what I am hearing, you all have found a way to get these children into this country without them having to take that arduous journey across Mexico and on the trains and everything that we have seen.

What specific circumstances would you allow a second parent residing in the home country, say El Salvador, Guatemala, or Honduras, to be added to the child’s petition and be considered a ref-
ugee? Not just talking about the children. Mom if she is in El Salvador, or dad, can come with them.

Ms. WIESNER. Right. So they have to be the parent of the child, or they have to have been married to the petitioning parent in the United States at the time that that parent received their legal status in the United States.

Mr. DUNCAN. Is that common practice for other countries as well for refugee status? Do we allow mom and dad to come with the child?

Ms. WIESNER. That is actually the P–3 program that the chairman spoke about previously.

Mr. DUNCAN. Historically, in the P–3 program, do we allow mom and dad to accompany the child?

Ms. WIESNER. It is usually the child accompanying the mom and dad in that case.

Mr. DUNCAN. What circumstances would prevent a parent from being considered for refugee status?

Ms. WIESNER. The same definition for refugee status applies for the child as for the parent. If the parent is not eligible for refugee status, then they could be considered for parole.

Mr. DUNCAN. Okay. My time is up.

Are we going to have another round of questions? I just yield back right now.

Mr. SALMON. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Florida, Mr. DeSantis.

Mr. DeSANTIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I guess the issue with me is our policies that are adopted particularly unilaterally now by the administration more and more, that effects the behavior that we see. When the President did the administrative amnesty for minors in 2012, that was a signal that was sent. You had Biden going down this summer saying, no, no, no, it doesn't apply to you, only if you were here a certain time. The Honduran President said there was a lack of clarity in U.S. laws that were contributing to this surge.

I wanted to ask—and my colleague from South Carolina mentioned DHS. I wish they would have been here. An issue that I think does send a signal for people to come illegally that involves both DHS and Department of State. I was shocked when we received this report on the Judiciary Committee: Fiscal Year 2013, ICE released 36,700 convicted criminals who were in the country illegally rather than have them detained, pending outcome of deportation proceedings. We always hear, we got to focus the resources on the criminals, the people who really mean us harm. Some of the convictions that these people were convicted: 193 homicide convictions, 426 sexual assault convictions, kidnapping, aggravated assault, vehicle theft, drug trafficking, very, very serious offenses. And yet DHS is releasing these individuals into American society rather than repatriate them back to their nation of origin.

Now, what does that have to do with the State Department? Here is why. Now, not all of them. We asked DHS to provide us the list of offenses and identify reasons to the best they could why they were released. Some of the people they claimed that they want to return them to their home country, but their home country just won't accept them. They are only allowed to hold people for so long
under binding court decisions, and so they have no choice but to release them.

The way I understand the system is supposed to work is that you have somebody, let’s say that has been convicted of rape. They are here illegally. No right to be here. Our Government is supposed to go to that country. Let’s say it is China. You go to China, and you say, hey, here, take your national. And if China doesn’t take them back, then we are under 8 U.S.C. Section 1253, subsection delta, the Secretary of Department of State shall order the consular offices in that foreign country to discontinue granting visas to nationals and citizens of that country until DHS has certified that they are accepting their convicted foreign nationals.

So, Secretary Jacobson, we know that some of these people who had been are convicted are from countries in the Western Hemisphere. Has the State Department ordered any consular offices in any of those countries to stop granting visas because those countries have not accepted some of these convicted criminal illegal immigrants?

Ms. JACOBSON. We have not, Congressman, and the main reason we have not is, as you, I think, realize, the cutting off of visa services to a country is an extreme step that really leaves us sort of——

Mr. DESANTIS. Well, actually, it may be that, but as I read it, I think the statute says that the Secretary of State shall order.

Ms. JACOBSON. Sir, the only thing that I would like to add is all three of these countries are taking back criminal deportees. They may not be taking back all of them, and they certainly are not taking back as quickly as we would like in terms of the court’s ability to hold them or authority to hold them.

Mr. DESANTIS. And I understand that. What the countries are doing is one thing. I want to try to hone in on how the State Department——

Mr. JACOBSON. You have to have documentation to go back, and that is what we have to work out with the Country. Right?

Mr. DESANTIS. No, no. I understand that, but my point is these people are being released, so clearly there was a breakdown somewhere along the line. Now, as I read the statute, I think a lot of my colleagues on Judiciary, we believe that that is the way the system works. You don’t take them back, the State then takes the step that it is an obligatory duty. The statute uses the word “shall.” Now, in your initial response, you suggested that that may be an extreme measure, and that it is a discretionary—it is up to the Secretary to determine whether that step needs to be taken, and as I read it, Congress has expressed the will that the Secretary of State needs to do this. So is it an obligatory duty?

Ms. JACOBSON. I am sitting here before you. I want to be honest. I am not a lawyer, and my lawyers at the Department would get nervous if I tried to interpret law here. But those countries are taking back criminal deportees. They have not refused as a matter of policy or their own law.

Mr. DESANTIS. You are talking about just the three countries at issue here?

Ms. JACOBSON. In particular, yes.
Mr. DeSantis. But there are other countries in the Western Hemisphere who have not taken some of the deportees because if there is not, then we are getting two different stories between State and DHS. That is why I think it would have been good to have DHS here.

Ms. Jacobson. I would have liked to have my colleagues here, but I think what we are talking about is the question of whether it is a country’s policy not to take back any criminal deportees or whether they are simply not taking back as many or as quickly as we would like them to take it back.

Mr. DeSantis. I don’t even think it needs to be a policy. I think as soon as DHS notifies the State Department that the government of a foreign country denies or unreasonably delays accepting an alien who is a citizen—maybe it has to be in all cases, I don’t know. But it seems clear to me that if we are in a situation where we are releasing, DHS is releasing a lot of these people, maybe they are just not notifying the State Department about everyone that they are releasing. I would want to know that information, too. Maybe it is that they are notifying the State Department, and the State Department is not taking the step that the statute requires. Maybe the State Department is actually returning a portion of them, but I think, you look at someone, the President or people on the very far left who want essentially an open border; people on the far right don’t want—they want to stop even some legal immigration—everyone in that whole gambit believes that when people are here and committing serious criminal offenses, that we need to protect the American people and send them back.

Ms. Jacobson. We are absolutely in the same place on that, and let me assure you that DHS and the State Department work really closely on the issue of criminal deportees. And when we are notified by DHS, we work really closely with them to push very hard to get countries to take back those criminal deportees.

Mr. DeSantis. But not hard enough to where you would actually stop the issuing of visas?

Mr. Jacobson. We succeed very often in getting criminal deportees returned.

Mr. DeSantis. I appreciate that, but very often, so we had 193 homicide convictions. Let’s just say 20 of those from the Western Hemisphere, very often maybe we return 15 of them. That means you have five people that are going to be released by ICE, which I don’t think is an acceptable number. I want to get to the bottom, and maybe this is something we can do jointly between this subcommittee and Judiciary.

Mr. Salmon. Actually, if the gentleman would yield.

Mr. DeSantis. Yep.

Mr. Salmon. It is something I am pursuing. Our sheriff of Maricopa County approached me—I don’t know how many of you remember a few weeks ago the two sheriff deputies in California that were murdered by an illegal—

Mr. DeSantis. Right.

Mr. Salmon [continuing]. Somebody that was here illegally. Well, he had been in our Arpaio’s jail four different times and released by INS—or, excuse me, by DHS four different times, and then he told me there are thousands that come through his jail
alone that are flagged by DHS, whether it is a rape or a murder or drug charges, they are flagged, and then they are taken and they don’t know where they go.

The sheriff has no idea whether they are released into the States, here in the States, or if they are deported and sent back, but he does know that they are coming back to his prison again because they are being re-arrested for different crimes that they have committed since the original crime that they were arrested for.

Mr. DeSantis. Well, look, Mr. Chairman, you know, we can get DHS here, we can get some people from Judiciary, Homeland Security, because at the end of the day, 36,000 convicts and the total number of convictions in Fiscal Year 2013, 88,000 convictions among that class, that clearly is not doing what is necessary to keep the American people safe, and so there is a breakdown somewhere, and I don’t——

It was tough getting the information from DHS to begin with, but I want to see, because I think the system is supposed to work to where if they are not accepting them, then there are consequences, and most countries will probably rather accept them than accept the consequences, and so we need to make sure that that is——

Mr. Salmon. It needs to be a joint hearing, as you said, and we are pursing it. In fact, you and I talked——

Mr. Duncan. Will the gentleman yield?

Mr. Salmon. Yes, I would.

Mr. Duncan. I am chairman of the Oversight Subcommittee on the Homeland Security Committee, and we are looking into the issue of the released prisoners and the subject you talked about in Maricopa County.

So I don’t think you limit it to this subcommittee and Judiciary. I think you involve the Homeland Security Committee, and Secretary Jacobson was talking about, DHS and State working well together, well if they work so well together, why is DHS not sitting at the table today?

Mr. Salmon. All right. I am going to go ahead, and if it is all right, go through one more round of questions.

And my first question is regarding a report that was released today by the Seattle International Foundation. It shows that from 2010 to 2012—this is for you, Ms. Hogan, U.S. foundations invested $488 million in Central America.

So moving forward, how will the Obama administration work with private donors to leverage these resources to ensure that the Federal Government’s dollars are maximized? Also, are you currently coordinating any public/private partnership in El Salvador, Guatemala or Honduras focused on vocational programs and workforce competitiveness, and if so, can you tell us how they work and how they contribute to economic prosperity in the communities where they are administered?

Ms. Hogan. Thank you very much for that question. I will start with the work that we are doing with the private sector on workforce development that we do in Central America as well as Mexico and the Caribbean, and we have seen some really great successes as a result of that combination of resources that the private sector brings to bear along with the training that we can provide.
And what the private sector is looking for are people that have the kind of skills that can go into the jobs that they have openings for. And so with work/life skills, with computer skills, with market-oriented training, what we have been able to see is these companies picking up these youths to go and work for them.

In fact, in one of our programs, we have seen 77 percent of the youth that come out of our workforce training programs either go to work or go back to school for increased education.

The other thing that we are seeing is that youth that come out of these training programs, these workforce development programs, are also sometimes opening up their own businesses based on the skills that they develop as a result of this training. So we are very excited about it. It keeps kids in the communities, the companies get the kind of skill mix that they need, and it has really been a very successful flourishing partnership with some of the key companies of the region.

As far as how we work with private foundations, one of the things that we are doing in Central America is designing what we call a safe cities approach to be sure that we can bring all the resources to bear in a particular place-based strategy so that we draw upon the resources, not just of the U.S. Government, but as we already are doing with the private sector, but also with international—other donors, for example, with the international development banks that might be investing in this, as well as private foundations, and so what we are doing is scoping out who has interest in this community, who has something to bring to the table for support, and how can we maximize our impact by bringing all of that together under one strategy, one set of metrics, for one set of results.

Ms. JACOBSON. Mr. Chairman——

Mr. SALMON. Yes. Thank you.

Ms. JACOBSON [continuing]. Just real quickly, I am going to go from this hearing to speak at NASA, which is a student exchange convention that is here in town, and as part of the President's 100,000 Strong in the Americas, which is, as you know, not a government program, we have raised over $3 million of private funds to try and do these university-to-university partnerships.

But the part I am proudest of are not the traditional partnerships. They are, frankly, the partnerships of either what we call vocational training schools or community colleges, which don't necessarily exist in some of the Central American countries to provide that gap between high school and a 4-year college which most of these kids will not have access to.

And at that conference today, there will be Chilean students who were at Montclair State. We are doing a lot of work, in fact, with Arizona, both with ASU and in some of the community college systems. This is where I think some of our best private/public work can be done in the education sphere in places like Central America.

Mr. SALMON. Assistant Secretary Jacobson, I not only serve on this committee, but I am on the Education and Workforce Committee also, and I have worked with Arizona State and Maricopa Community College system for years and years and years. In fact, I used to represent them as well in my private life.
So I really would love to figure out a way—at least maybe we could do some pilot stuff in Arizona, and I would love to work with you and the Secretary of Education to try to come up with some innovative ways, because that really is—the way to empower people, that is the way to get them out of poverty. That is the way to get freedom. So I would really love to work with you on that.

The Chair recognizes the ranking member, Mr. Sires.

Mr. SIRES. Yes. Years ago when we used to deport criminals, I think we would just send them back. Do we have a situation now where we send them back with a rap sheet knowing what they did, and is there any follow-up to see if some of these people reappear again here in the States?

Ms. JACOBSON. Mr. Sires, what I am going to give you is sort of a partial answer, because some of the rest of it I am going to get back to you on as well as checking with my DHS and Justice Department brethren.

We have worked over the last number of years to do better with the countries in the region at giving them information on the criminal history of the people that they are going to be accepting with criminal deportees. They ask, I think legitimately, to know what kinds of crimes they have committed so that they can be prepared as a receiving country to know what kinds of—you know, if they go back into the communities, how did they have to prepare themselves.

Some of that information is now much better able to be transferred to other governments. We have pilot programs. I know that both DHS and Justice have worked with countries in Central America and in the Caribbean to try and convey as much information as possible within our own laws so that they can give countries an idea of the history of criminal deportees.

Beyond that, obviously those folks are put into a system so that in the future when they might attempt to come back into the country through legal means they are registered in the system as having criminal records in the United States, and that should not be possible. If they come in via undocumented or illegal means, obviously, that is a different story, but obviously that information is put into both State Department and DHS databases.

Mr. SALMON. If the gentleman would yield——

Mr. SIRES. Thank you.

Mr. SALMON. I have actually done quite a bit of research on this, and the ones that we are talking about were never adjudicated. They are arrested and arraigned for an accused crime, but they never get to adjudication because they are flagged and INS comes and gets them and either deports them or lets them go before they are ever even adjudicated.

So that is one of the big missing problems. They certainly—if they are deported, they don’t go serve in the prisons in those countries. They are out scot-free, and of course they don’t come back the legal way.

The other interesting thing is during the situation with the unaccompanied minors. Remember how we were told that they came—they didn’t come to the entry points. They came to the middle ground. Why did they do that? Because then it took all kinds of
agents off of the checkpoints, and meanwhile the bad guys would sneak through other places. They were used as decoys.

So it is not about being able to get a good handle on them because, as I was told by Sheriff Arpaio, he has had some that have been in his prison ten times or more for different crimes, ten different crimes. So they have been arrested, flagged by INS, released, back in jail, arrested on another crime a few months later or 1 year later. It is a serious problem.

The Chair recognizes Mr. Duncan.

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you. I just have a few follow-up questions or final questions, rather.

The U.S. is contracting out refugee processing to the International Organization for Migration. So why aren't you working with the U.N. Refugee agency, UNHCR, to establish IDP camps if the situation is so dire in Central America that these children are having to escape the situations there?

Ms. WIESNER. Sure. In fact, we are doing both. We work with the International Organization of Migration around the world on the processing of resettled refugees, and as you know, we have a very strong relationship with UNHCR as well.

We recently gave UNHCR a grant of 700—around $770,000 as an initial contribution toward their work in Central America with the express purpose of building up their presence there, understanding the dynamics of internal displacement within these countries and working with the governments to increase protections for children at risk of harm in their own country so that they won't have to flee.

Mr. DUNCAN. Is the U.N. setting up IDP camps in Central America?

Ms. WIESNER. They are not setting up IDP camps, but they are working with the governments to understand right now the dynamics of internal displacement.

Mr. DUNCAN. Right. What is the cost for the U.S. to contract with IOM?

Ms. WIESNER. I don't have those figures for you right now.

Mr. DUNCAN. Was it a competitive bidding process? Why was it awarded to them? Why was an MOU given to them?

Ms. JACOBSON. I think you may be talking because I don't think we have offered any kind of contracting yet for the in-country processing. I am not——

Mr. DUNCAN. My understanding is an MOU was filled.

Ms. JACOBSON. But I am talking—the MOU that we have with the IOM is on the repatriated folks who go back from the United States, the families and the adults, and we have contracted with IOM to do the repatriation of those folks who came during the summer surge——

Mr. DUNCAN. In their home country?

Ms. JACOBSON [continuing]. So there are two different—there are two different contracts.

Ms. HOGAN. Let me just add to what Roberta just said.

USAID has a $7.6 million grant to the IOM, International Organization for Migration, to help governments prepare to upgrade the reception services that they provide to repatriated migrants, and we have seen that the governments in turn have really stepped up to the plate in terms of making more space available, getting vol-
unteers to help in processing people, making sure they get food when they get off the plane, giving them medical referrals, job referrals, et cetera.

So they have been doing quite a bit and we have seen—I actually got to see a plane of migrants repatriated in Honduras, and it went very, very smoothly, and I think that IOM has really done a very good job and is standing by to see if additional services may be required.

Ms. WIESNER. Congressman, just to clarify, so IOM does do a lot. They implement this program for USAID. They are the existing contractor for us for the existing resettlement support center in Quito, Ecuador, and it is that center that we are going to be expanding to accommodate this new program in Central America, and when that contract contribution was awarded to IOM several years ago, it was a competitive process posted online for the existing resettlement support center in Quito.

Mr. DUNCAN. Right. Okay.

Vice President Biden talked about providing $9.6 million to Central America, and in July the administration requested an additional $300 million. A lot of money promised. The President promised some money this week over in China. Where is this money coming from? Does it come out of your budget at the State Department?

Ms. JACOBSON. Well, as you know, the $300 million that the President was talking about was in the supplemental that was sent to Congress this summer, and the 9.6 that the Vice President talked about when he was—I think it was probably when he was in Guatemala earlier in June, was funds that we reallocated from within the State Department’s budget that we thought was much more urgently needed, quite honestly, in Central America for things like repatriation and resettlement of migrants——

Mr. DUNCAN. I mean, the reason I ask that question, I get this question at home a lot, because every time we turn around, the Vice President or someone in the administration is promising $100 million here, $1 billion here, and your budget’s finite. You know, it is set by Congress. So are you all shrinking your budget? Are you reallocating resources? What programs are being changed here?

Ms. JACOBSON. Certainly some of the funds are coming from reallocation. There was a Congressional notification that went forward just a few days ago for about $76 million in funds for INL, the International Narcotics and Law Enforcement, funds to be reallocated toward Central America. Those, I believe, were originally funds from a number of years ago destined for Iraq that could no longer be used. Those are being reallocated for Central America.

Some funds have been from elsewhere. The $300 million, as you know, was the supplemental request. That was not taken from elsewhere, but even so, as you know, the $300 million in the supplemental request was out of a $3.7 billion overall request. So the foreign assistance portion of it was really quite small.

We continue to believe that although foreign assistance budgets are extremely constrained, we are well aware it is, in fact, more efficient if we use those funds in the countries to try and address those root causes than if we try and deal with the effects of it right here on our territory and our——
Mr. DUNCAN. And I am not arguing today about the appropriate use or inappropriate use of the money, but I guess I am concerned as a Member of Congress and accountable to the taxpayers that I would love to see a breakdown of the State Department’s budget and all the promises made and where that money is coming from. How you are reallocating that money.

Mr. Chairman, that might be a request that the Foreign Affairs Committee as a whole makes to the State Department because there are a lot of promises made by the administration that we have got to find enough money through a CR or an appropriations bill to fund or they have got to reallocate. I would love to see that.

The last thing that I wanted to ask, Mr. Chairman, really probably is for DHS, and they are not here, but I just wonder, how many new DHS personnel will be required at U.S. Embassies in the Northern Triangle countries to implement this program? Do you all know?

Ms. JACOBSON. Do you mean the in-country refugee processing program?

Mr. DUNCAN. Right.

Ms. JACOBSON. I don’t know that we have a specific number yet of individuals, although I think in general this will be carried out by others in terms of the—in the countries, the three countries, but frankly, as we implement all of these efforts to reduce migration, I don’t think there is any doubt that we may need some additional people in our Embassies in all three countries. Let me ask——

Mr. DUNCAN. I mean, my understanding, Madam Assistant Secretary, is that DHS has refugee interview locations in six Latin American countries but not in the Northern Triangle countries.

Ms. JACOBSON. I think that is correct.

Mr. DUNCAN. Are they planning to shift personnel or add? And I guess that is my—the gist of it.

Ms. WIESNER. They do circuit rides in many parts of the world. There are some refugee adjudicators based at Embassies, but most of the refugee interviews that are done around the world are people who come in for a circuit ride of 6 weeks and conduct a number of interviews. So that is the model that we will be using to start in Central America. So there will be no additional burden on the Embassies.

Mr. DUNCAN. Okay. That is a good thing.

Mr. Chairman, I had an experience with an Afghan interpreter, translator, served with 3rd Infantry, and it took 2 years to get someone that the Army vouched for, several generals, I don’t know if Petraeus did, but Allen did, a number of others to get this gentleman into this country. Vouched for by the military, fought alongside our military in Afghanistan, threatened by the Taliban, lost his uncle during the process.

Took 2 years. Had his visa issued to come to this country and then State pulled it away from him. He was chased from the Embassy home and evaded Taliban numerous times. I throw that out there in that I would hope the process is at least as taxing for refugee children coming from Central America as it was from somebody coming from Afghanistan, and I say that in that it shouldn’t be taxing. It shouldn’t be as taxing for people in Afghanistan that serve our Nation.
Mr. SALMON. Well, and it begs a bigger question. I understand that the numbers, even though there is a 4,000 number, that can be exceeded if they come from another area. Right? Is that correct? What I mean is, the total number for the world is, what, 70,000?

Ms. WIESNER. 70,000.

Mr. SALMON. Yeah. And so if you decide to reallocate that or have 10,000 come from Central America, you just have to shrink it somewhere else so it stays under the total global amount. Right?

Ms. WIESNER. There would have to be a reallocation if the number went above 4,000. There is some flexibility built into the system. We also, as Assistant Secretary Jacobson noted, won't be accepting applications before December. So, you know, the Fiscal Year 2015 comes to end pretty soon thereafter.

Mr. SALMON. Because a concern would be that there are very calamitous situations in other parts of the world, Sudan, as you mentioned, Afghanistan, and it would be tragic—I mean, I hope it is at least based on the most serious people globally and it is an equal standard.

I would hope that if somebody gets over here because they are uncomfortable where they are living and somebody else has the threat of death for their religious belief in another part of the world, I would hope the greater consideration would be given to the latter.

Ms. WIESNER. And there is prioritization given to cases that are at the greatest risk of harm. So there are expedited processes for those cases.

Mr. DUFFY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And I appreciate you holding this hearing to shed light on what is going on.

Ms. Wiesner, do you have this document in front of you with a list of categories?

Yes?

Would you do me a favor? Would you maybe walk me through one by one and just tell us what these are and what was the rationale for putting them on the list. So if you could start with the Lawful Permanent Resident. Who is a Lawful Permanent Resident and why did they make it onto the category list?

Ms. WIESNER. So I am afraid this is going to be another instance where we are going to disappointed that the Department of Homeland Security is not here because these are all——

Mr. DUFFY. I am sure you won't disappoint.

Ms. WIESNER [continuing]. Statuses. No, we are definitely. We would like to be able to present this jointly with them. It is a joint program.

So these categories were developed jointly with the Department of Homeland Security. These are all considered to be lawfully present statuses by the Department of Homeland Security, and in designing a program——

Mr. DUFFY. So it is—I don't have a whole lot of time, but if you would just walk me through each one, and if you know the rationale, who are these individuals and what was the rationale, if you know, how they got on the list.
Ms. WIESNER. I can walk you through the categories. Lawful Permanent Resident is relatively self-explanatory, I think.

Temporary Protected Status applies to nationals of El Salvador and Honduras. Those are two of many countries that benefit from Temporary Protected Status. They were awarded at different times in the past due to natural disasters and events.

Mr. DUFFY. And are the first two, both of them, those two statuses would be here legally. Correct?

Ms. WIESNER. Everybody on this list is considered to be lawfully present.

Mr. DUFFY. Okay. Parolee granted for at least 1 year, what is that?

Ms. WIESNER. So parole is a discretionary authority given to the Secretary of Homeland Security to admit people to the United States based on an urgent humanitarian need or in the public interest.

Mr. DUFFY. So someone who was brought here but it is not a status that is given someone who was already in the United States. Is that correct?

Ms. WIESNER. Correct.

Mr. DUFFY. Okay. Deferred Action for Childhood Arrival (DACA).

Ms. WIESNER. I can’t say much more about that than I think what everybody knows.

Mr. DUFFY. So a quick question on DACA. This was executive action from the President. Right? Is that correct?

Ms. WIESNER. Uh-huh.

Mr. DUFFY. And if you are a child who has taken advantage of DACA, do you really have legal status or is it just a deferred removal program? You don’t have legal status if you are a child in the DACA program; are you?

Ms. WIESNER. I believe that DHS would make a distinction between a legal status and lawfully present, and would say that under the DACA program people are lawfully present.

Mr. DUFFY. For how long?

Ms. WIESNER. For the period granted.

Mr. DUFFY. How long is the DACA program in action?

Ms. WIESNER. I can’t answer that question.

Mr. DUFFY. So this is not a long-term permanent status. It is an executive action made by the President——

Mr. SALMON. Would the gentleman yield?

It is only guaranteed through the President’s term.

Mr. DUFFY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Would you agree with that, Ms. Wiesner?

Ms. WIESNER. I mean, that is the definition of an executive action.

Mr. DUFFY. Right. So if you are someone who is here in the United States and not going to be removed because of executive action, that is good for another 2 years, and they have made this list so they can basically engage in chain migration, bringing family members up from Central America. Is that correct?

Ms. WIESNER. I think what you are getting at——

Mr. DUFFY. Is that correct?
Ms. WIESNER [continuing]. Is the status that the children will have when they get here, and it is true that if you have refugee status, you have a path to legal citizenship.

It is also true that if you arrive at our border and apply for asylum and are eligible for it, then you have a legal path to citizenship.

Mr. DUFFY. But that is different——

Ms. WIESNER. So this is offering the same opportunity to the same children but before they take the dangerous journey.

For those who would be admitted under parole, they would be admitted under a temporary status as well.

Mr. DUFFY. But being a Lawful Permanent Resident is something far different than someone who has a status for the remaining 2 years, or while the President is the President. Correct?

And they are able to take advantage of this program though their legal—the legality of their status will only remain for another 2 years. Is that fair to say?

Ms. WIESNER. I think it is fair to say that these are all different categories, and some of them are permanent, some of them are temporary, and they are all considered lawfully present.

Mr. DUFFY. Maybe you are right that I will be disappointed in this hearing. If you are telling me that they are all different categories, you have stated the obvious. That is why I am asking you about them.

Let’s go to withholding of removal guarantee. What is that? The last one.

Ms. WIESNER. I don’t have——

Mr. DUFFY. Grantee—removal of—withholding the removal grantee. You don’t know what that is?

Ms. WIESNER. It means there is a removal order there with—there is a withholding of a removal order.

Mr. DUFFY. So there is an order to remove them, but that has been stayed. Is that your understanding?

Ms. WIESNER. I am going to have to refer you to DHS for the details on the category.

Mr. DUFFY. And they can take advantage of this program. Correct?

Ms. WIESNER. Everybody on this list is eligible to apply for the programs.

Mr. DUFFY. So there was an order to remove, it has been withheld, and you can take advantage of the program.

If there are children who are found ineligible for refugee status, they could still be admitted if they are at risk of harm. What is the definition of “still at risk of harm?”

Ms. WIESNER. Well, I think as the chairman and others outlined in their openings statements, we have all seen the incredible insecurities facing the region as well as the individual—the violence faced by individual children on a daily basis. So——

Mr. DUFFY. Is there a standard for that?

Ms. WIESNER. The definition of significant harm is a discretionary authority granted to the Department of Homeland Security.

Mr. DUFFY. So it is discretionary.

Ms. WIESNER. Correct.
Mr. Duffy. Okay. And we now have the current number that we
can allow from the region is 4,000, but you have indicated that that
number could go up. Is that correct?
Ms. Wiesner. The allocation for Latin America and the Carib-
bean region right now for refugees is 4,000.
Mr. Duffy. And it can go up to how many?
Ms. Jacobson. Well, I mean, I think what Ms. Wiesner indicated
was that the global total is 70,000. When we sent the refugee num-
bers forward for this year knowing that this program was going to
start, we did not adjust that number. We did not think we would
really need more than the 4,000, but it is only elastic up to the
70,000, but no one believes that it will be expanded, obviously, to
70,000.
Mr. Duffy. Of the 70,000 number, how much of that has been
utilized?
Ms. Jacobson. Globally?
Mr. Duffy. I mean, if you have used up to 20,000 so far, you
might have—you could take that 4,000 up to——
Ms. Jacobson. Are you talking about with this program? This
program hasn’t begun yet.
Mr. Duffy. No, no. I know, but you said there is a total of 70,000
that——
Ms. Wiesner. Right. Globally——
Ms. Wiesner. In the fiscal year. So about 6,000 refugees have ar-
rived so far this fiscal year from around the world.
Mr. Duffy. Okay. So if the same was in the next fiscal year, in
theory, you could move this from 4,000 up to 64,000, in theory. Not
saying that you are, but you have a total of up to 70 that you could
use, and if you have used six this year, you can do the same next
year, the total number could be much higher than 4,000? Am I los-
ing you?
Ms. Wiesner. A little, because the 6,000 of the 70,000 have ar-
rived this year.
Mr. Duffy. Right. And does——
Ms. Wiesner. Next year the allocation will probably be informed
by the number who have arrived this year from the region, but it
was set at 4,000 with an understanding that that would cover the
expected number this fiscal year.
Mr. Duffy. Okay. Maybe we are speaking past each other.
I guess would you categorize this as a program for chain mi-
gration?
Ms. Wiesner. I am sorry. Could you repeat the question.
Mr. Duffy. Would you categorize this as a program for chain mi-
gration? No?
Ms. Wiesner. I would not. No.
Mr. Duffy. Okay. And I am going to yield back in just one mo-
moment.
I would tell you I think there is a desire within this institution
to figure out how we get immigration reform done, and I think
there is a willingness on both sides of the aisle, and I think there
is an opportunity to get it done without going through programs
like this where we have a withholding of a removal guarantee that
I don’t think this is the process in which we should use.
My hope is that the President will hold off and allow this institution with the Senate to actually work and go through proper channels to actually have an immigration system that is understandable, knowable, and going to work from one President to the next, because we will have a new system of laws in place and as opposed to Presidential executive actions which I don’t think gives certainty to those who have come here without documentation.

And I think it actually exposes them to greater risk, especially if executive amnesty, which I know we are not talking about, but is overturned by the next President or is overturned by the courts that could expose folks who are here without documentation, I think, to pretty significant harm.

With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

Mr. SALMON. We need permanent solutions that will stand the test of time, not just a solution during one administration or two administrations, and as the gentleman I think just illustrated, the laws are so very subjective and it leaves so much discretion to the person making the decision.

My fear is that even though I know it is supposed to be priority based, my fear is that, given the fact that in government so often the right hand doesn’t know what the lefthand is doing and there is not a lot of communication, is that some incredibly needy recipient would be ignored because—and somebody else who is not nearly as needy gets granted asylum status or refugee status, and that is why we held the hearing more than anything, is that we really do believe that we need to have clarity going forward, and that we want to solve the problem with Central America.

The answer is not some mass exodus out of Central America, but the answer is to solve the problems, the economic problems, the security problems, and we just—we want to take that on together, and we need your advice and we need your help to figure out what works, what doesn’t, where can we put more resources, how can we leverage existing resources better, and how can we do a better job.

I really appreciate you being here today. I know that at times it has felt frustrating, the line of questioning. It is not meant to be pejorative or as painful as it has been. It has just been that way because I think there is such a lack of clarity, and we just want to make sure that going forward that we all comply with existing law. We can’t comply with a law that doesn’t exist yet, and for that, again, I would ask Ms. Wiesner if you could give us the citation. I know you are going to go back and look at that of what specific law this new program falls under so that we can understand going forward.

And for the American people that are having an opportunity to watch this hearing, you understand now, as Mark Twain said, there is two things you don’t want to see being made, sausages and laws. It is a very messy process, and it is very frustrating, but we will get to the bottom of it. We will figure out the solutions, and I greatly appreciate your being here today.

Thank you very much and this hearing is now adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 3:33 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
APPENDIX

Material Submitted for the Record
SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING NOTICE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
WASHINGTON, DC 20515-6128

Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere
Matt Salmon (R-AZ), Chairman

November 17, 2014

TO: MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

You are respectfully requested to attend an OPEN hearing of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, to be held by the Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere in Room 2172 of the Rayburn House Office Building (and available live on the Committee website at http://www.ForeignAffairs.house.gov).

DATE: Tuesday, November 18, 2014
TIME: 2:00 p.m.
SUBJECT: Unaccompanied Alien Children: Pressing the Administration for a Strategy

WITNESSES:
The Honorable Roberta S. Jacobson
Assistant Secretary
Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs
U.S. Department of State

Ms. Elizabeth Hogan
Acting Assistant Administrator
Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean
U.S. Agency for International Development

Mr. Robert N. Kaplan
President and Chief Executive Officer
Inter-American Foundation

Ms. Catherine Wiesner
Deputy Assistant Secretary
Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration
U.S. Department of State

By Direction of the Chairman

The Committee on Foreign Affairs seeks to make its facilities accessible to persons with disabilities. If you are in need of special accommodations, please call 202-225-9901 at least four business days in advance of the event. Questions with regard to special accommodations (in general, including availability of Committee materials in alternative formats and accessible hearing devices) may be directed to the Committee.
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

MINUTES OF SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSACTIONS AND THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

HEARING

Day: Monday Date: 11/18/2014 Room: 2172 RHOB

Starting Time: 2:00 p.m. Ending Time: 3:33 p.m.

Recesses: (___ to ___) (___ to ___) (___ to ___) (___ to ___) (___ to ___) (___ to ___)

Presiding Member(s)

Chairman Matt Salmon

Check all of the following that apply:

- Open Session [ ]
- Executive (closed) Session [ ]
- Electronically Recorded (taaped) [ ]
- Stenographic Record [ ]

TITLE OF HEARING:

"Unaccompanied Alien Children: Pressing the Administration for a Strategy"

SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT:


NON-SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT: (Mark with an * if they are not members of full committee.)

N/A

HEARING WITNESSES: Same as meeting notice attached? Yes [ ] No [x]

(If "no," please list below and include title, agency, department, or organization.)

STATEMENTS FOR THE RECORD: (List any statements submitted for the record.)

TIME SCHEDULED TO RECONVENE _________

or

TIME ADJOURNED _________

Subcommittee Staff Director