    [House Hearing, 113 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                            IRANIAN NUCLEAR TALKS:
                            NEGOTIATING A BAD DEAL?

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   BEFORE THE

             SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE

                                     OF THE

                          COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                        ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 SECOND SESSION

                                   __________

                               NOVEMBER 18, 2014

                                   __________

                               Serial No. 113-227

                                   __________

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                          COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

                     EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman
    CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey     ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
    ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida         ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
    DANA ROHRABACHER, California             Samoa
    STEVE CHABOT, Ohio                   BRAD SHERMAN, California
    JOE WILSON, South Carolina           GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
    MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas             ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
    TED POE, Texas                       GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
    MATT SALMON, Arizona                 THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
    TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania             BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
    JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina          KAREN BASS, California
    ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois             WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
    MO BROOKS, Alabama                   DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
    TOM COTTON, Arkansas                 ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
    PAUL COOK, California                JUAN VARGAS, California
    GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina       BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois
    RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas            JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III,
    SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania                Massachusetts
    STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas                AMI BERA, California
    RON DeSANTIS, Florida                ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California
    DOUG COLLINS, Georgia                GRACE MENG, New York
    MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina         LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
    TED S. YOHO, Florida                 TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
    SEAN DUFFY, Wisconsin                JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
    CURT CLAWSON, Florida

         Amy Porter, Chief of Staff      Thomas Sheehy, Staff Director

                   Jason Steinbaum, Democratic Staff Director
                                     ------

             Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade

                            TED POE, Texas, Chairman
    JOE WILSON, South Carolina           BRAD SHERMAN, California
    ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois             ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California
    MO BROOKS, Alabama                   JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
    TOM COTTON, Arkansas                 JUAN VARGAS, California
    PAUL COOK, California                BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois
    SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania            JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III, Massachusetts
    TED S. YOHO, Florida

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page

                                   WITNESSES

    Ray Takeyh, Ph.D., senior fellow for Middle Eastern studies,
      Council on Foreign Relations...................................     6
    Mr. J. Matthew McInnis, resident fellow, American Enterprise
      Institute......................................................    14
    Mr. David Albright, president, Institute for Science and
      International Security.........................................    21

              LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING

    Ray Takeyh, Ph.D.: Prepared statement............................     9
    Mr. J. Matthew McInnis: Prepared statement.......................    16
    Mr. David Albright: Prepared statement...........................    23

                                    APPENDIX

    Hearing notice...................................................    62
    Hearing minutes..................................................    63

                 IRANIAN NUCLEAR TALKS: NEGOTIATING A BAD DEAL?

                                  ----------

                           TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 18, 2014

                         House of Representatives,

            Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade,

                         Committee on Foreign Affairs,

                                Washington, DC.

        The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2 o'clock p.m.,
    in room 2200 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ted Poe
    (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
        Mr. Poe. Subcommittee will come to order. Without
    objection, all members may have 5 days to submit statements,
    questions and extraneous materials for the record subject to
    the length limitation in the rules.
        If someone could get the back door, it would be
    appreciated. It is not to keep you in or keep anyone out. We
    just want the door shut.
        Iran has defied and lied to the international community for
    over a decade when it comes to its nuclear weapons program.
    Finally, the West got serious and took a stand and imposed real
    sanctions in 2012.
        The sanctions actually worked and Iran came to the
    negotiating table, but then the West retreated. Loosening up on
    sanctions just when Iran was beginning to feel the consequences
    of its actions was a monumental mistake.
        Netanyahu was correct. When this deal was made by the
    Secretary of State he said that this was a bad deal, a very bad
    deal for Israel and for the United States and for world safety.
    Since then, Iranian leaders have been emboldened by the
    economic relief they have experienced and they have reverted to
    their defiant ways.
        Recently, a top advisor to Iranian President Hassan Rouhani
    said, ``Obama is the weakest of all U.S. Presidents.'' Now is
    the time for the leader of the free world to prove Iran wrong.
        The world, including our enemies and allies, are watching.
    We have already passed the deadline for negotiations to end in
    July and now we await a second deadline, which is next week.
    There is reason to believe that the Iranians----[Loses sound.]
        After all, we will continue to pay them millions whether
    the deadline is met or not, just for the promise of
    cooperation--a promise from, really, an enemy of the world.
    Each attempt at compromise has turned out to be a stall tactic
    by the Iranians.
        While the Iranians have their first string varsity team, we
    are playing our JV team, to quote a phrase. As it is, we don't
    know how many centrifuges the Iranians currently have. The old
    principle of trust but verify does not work in this case
    because Iran has shown that it cannot be trusted.
        They will lie when the truth is not in their political
    interest. The IAEA hasn't been able to verify Iran's
    capabilities. The Iranians could have a bomb in as little as 3
    months.
        The problem is we don't know and neither does the IAEA.
    Making matters worse, we can't take the Iranians at their word
    on their nuclear aspirations. They still haven't come clean
    about their previous suspected nuclear weapons activities
    alleged by the IAEA back in November 2011.
        Iran's real aspirations are simple. They want to annihilate
    Israel, and then they want to annihilate the United States.
    That is what the real leader of Iran, Khamenei, called for just
    last week.
        We are dealing with the devil and the clock is running out.
    The deal cannot be handled solely behind doors away from the
    public and away from scrutiny. There are dire consequences in
    these negotiations and the American people expect their
    representatives--the U.S. Congress--to play a role.
        The U.S. Congress must approve or disapprove any potential
    final nuclear agreement with Iran. Here is what an acceptable
    agreement might look like.
        One, Iran would verifiably take apart its illicit nuclear
    infrastructure; two, Iran would resolve all past issues of
    concern including possible military aspects of its nuclear
    program development; three, the inspections regime must go
    beyond the authorities that the IAEA currently has; four, a
    permanent inspections team in Iran is needed and they must be
    allowed to go anywhere, see anything at any time; five, Iran
    must come into compliance with all six standing U.N. Security
    Council resolutions related to its nuclear program; and six,
    Iran's ballistic missiles program must be addressed.
        Missiles, after all, can be used to deliver nuclear
    weapons. Any deal that does not address this is not only a bad
    deal but a dangerous one. We have to address the issue of
    deliveries.
        And seven, finally, no sanctions relief should be provided
    unless a final agreement can verify and permanently prevent
    Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons.
        Even if an acceptable agreement is reached, the sanctions
    relief must be limited and phased so that we can keep our
    economic leverage. In general, any good agreement is not about
    freezing Iran's nuclear program but dismantling it. Anything
    less simply postpones the inevitable danger that a nuclear-
    armed Iran presents to the world.
        I look forward to hearing what our witnesses think about
    where we are and what we should be doing in Congress. The U.S.
    must be clear and unequivocal. There will be no reductions in
    sanctions without verified steps to show that Tehran is
    abandoning, not just freezing, its nuclear weapons program.
        I will now yield to the ranking member, Mr. Sherman from
    California, for his opening statement.
        Mr. Sherman. Thank you, Chairman Poe, for holding these
    important hearings.
        I agree with you that any sanctions relief should come only
    through an act of Congress and I hope that the Iranians
    understand that any waivers granted by this President are
    waivers that do not necessarily apply to any future
    administration.
        Furthermore, looking at the statute, waivers are supposed
    to be case by case based upon the entity applying for the
    waiver, not blanket waivers in effect suspending our sanctions
    statutes.
        The one possible disagreement I have with you is I don't
    think that even at their high water mark our sanctions were
    enough to really bring Iran to the table if that is the table
    where they are supposed to give up their nuclear program.
        We had sanctions significant enough to get them to come to
    the table where they do a kabuki dance and get some relief from
    the sanctions because it is always better to help your economy
    at least even from modest sanctions.
        So to say that we ever had sanctions significant enough to
    threaten regime survival and to cause this regime to be willing
    to give up its nuclear weapons program is questionable.
        The Joint Plan of Action gave Iran some very significant
    relief. First, it caused a pause in the reductions of oil
    purchases that were called for by the Menendez-Kirk provisions
    of the 2012 law.
        Second, it stopped Congress cold from adopting new
    sanctions statutes. And finally, and perhaps most importantly,
    it changed the whole psychology, and much of economics is
    psychology. It caused people interested in the Iranian economy
    to think that things would be on the upswing. Under this Joint
    Plan of Action, we are giving Iran $700 million, albeit of its
    own money, every month.
        I think we have got to be loud and clear to the
    administration that further releases of Iran's frozen funds
    should not occur just because we are going into a new month. If
    these talks are extended they shouldn't be extended with us
    paying a price for that extension.
        Now, we are in a much weaker bargaining position than we
    were at the beginning of this century. During the first decade
    of this century, we didn't enforce our sanctions laws.
        The administration worked very effectively and successfully
    to prevent us from passing any new sanctions laws and the
    Shiites were put in control of Iraq. So today, we have to deal
    with a much weaker hand than if we had started to take this
    program seriously at the beginning of the century.
        We are told that this JPOA has frozen Iran's program. That
    is not true and, to some extent, is true. Some of the program
    has been frozen. Some of it has been rolled back, particularly
    the 20 percent enriched uranium.
        Half has been diluted. Another half has been oxidized. But
    keep in mind even that oxidized portion is far more than Iran
    needs for any peaceful purpose. It is oxidized but it hasn't
    been converted into fuel, pellets or rods so it is pretty
    available for use in creating a bomb and it is more than a
    bomb's worth.
        So, even under this JPOA, they are close to their first
    nuclear weapon. But what concerns me just as much is their
    centrifuges are still turning, creating more and more low-
    enriched uranium that is oxidized, but reversing that
    oxidization process is rather easy, low technology and quick.
        This committee has been assured by the administration that,
    as part of this deal, we would learn of the possible military
    dimensions, or PMDs, of the Iranian program.
        Iran has stonewalled the IAEA on that and it should be part
    of any reduction of sanctions or any continuation of the
    suspension of Kirk-Menendez that we find out and that the IAEA
    is given answers to its questions.
        On the other hand, the JPOA has pretty much frozen the Arak
    plutonium reactor and that is one of its positive elements. In
    looking at a final agreement, a lot of focus is on how long the
    agreement will last, what enrichment will be allowed and how
    that enrichment will be monitored.
        We need to look just as much at how much uranium and in
    what enrichment levels Iran is able to stockpile and what
    tracing of ore and monitoring of ore and yellow cake is there
    so that we can make sure that the total grams of enriched
    uranium both in terms of quantity and enrichment level is
    consistent with the allegedly peaceful nature of Iran's
    program.
        Finally, I am going to be asking our witnesses to help us
    identify how we can draft strong sanctions legislation that
    will go into effect in a few months unless Congress receives
    and approves a good deal negotiated with Iran.
        As I said, these sanctions would have to be regime
    threatening. They would have to go beyond where we were before
    these negotiations began, and I look forward to working with
    all of the members of this subcommittee and our witnesses to
    make sure that we are ready with sanctions that will go into
    effect early next year unless Iran enters into a good deal with
    the United States.
        I say that not to make our negotiators' position more
    difficult but because only with such strong sanctions
    legislation is there any hope that they will be successful. I
    yield back.
        Mr. Poe. The Chair will recognize other members for their
    1-minute opening statements. The Chair recognizes the gentleman
    from South Carolina, Mr. Wilson, for a minute.
        Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I thank
    you for your leadership, and Ranking Member Sherman. It is
    really reassuring to see Members of Congress working together
    facing a common threat. This is so unusual.
        I am just so pleased to see you working together and all of
    us working together, hopefully, on this subcommittee. I agree
    very much with the senior senator of South Carolina, Lindsey
    Graham, who, this weekend, pointed out that the administration
    needs to understand that this Iranian regime cares more about
    trying to weaken America and push us out of the Middle East
    than cooperating with us.
        Until we recognize that reality and formulate a regional
    strategy to counter the Iranian regime's malign influence, we
    will continue to harm U.S. national security interest.
    Additionally, I support holding the President accountable by
    requiring congressional approval of any deal that is reached
    with Iran, and I want to conclude by agreeing with Prime
    Minister Benjamin Netanyahu who indicated, ``Iran is not your
    ally.''
        As the Prime Minister said on Face the Nation, ``Iran is
    not your friend. Iran is your enemy. It is not your partner.
    Iran is committed to the destruction of Israel.''
        Facing this, again, I want to thank the leadership who are
    here today and in a bipartisan manner to protect the people of
    the Middle East and the United States. Thank you.
        Mr. Poe. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Illinois,
    Mr. Kinzinger, for 1 minute.
        Mr. Kinzinger. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think it is
    important to remind everybody here that during the time of the
    Iraq war it is estimated that upwards of half of the Americans
    that were killed were killed either directly or indirectly by
    Iranian EFPs--explosive foreign penetrators--Iranian direct
    military action and things along that line.
        So yeah, you are right, Mr. Wilson. They are not our
    friend. I think the message to Iran is simple--just stop or pay
    a price, and I think we had them at that position a year ago,
    and for some reason we saw an administration collapse in a
    desperate desire to enter a deal.
        We knew that, of course, the first 6 months wouldn't happen
    so we extended another 6 months and I believe that in a week
    they are going to come in front of Congress and say, we need an
    additional 6 months, which I think would be the wrong message.
        So the question here is, with the collapse of U.S. foreign
    policy in the last couple years, what leverage do we have and I
    think it is important for us, and I appreciate the chairman
    calling this hearing, to stand together and say that we will
    not allow a bad deal with Iran.
        Mr. Poe. I thank the gentleman. The Chair will yield 1
    minute to Mr. Perry from Pennsylvania.
        Mr. Perry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have, like many of
    us, numerous concerns regarding the Joint Plan of Action and
    the continued negotiations as being a viable avenue for
    preventing--I just stress preventing--Iran from obtaining a
    nuclear weapon, which is and should be the primary objective of
    our policy and our actions.
        However, a great concern that seems to be sometimes getting
    lost in the more technical debate is the potential for a
    nuclear agreement to recognize Iran's right to enrich, and I
    take great exception with this.
        It sets a unacceptable precedent, in my mind. Other
    signatory states to the Non-proliferation Treaty--the NPT--may
    then choose to enrich themselves after they observe Iran being
    allowed to continue to enrich despite breaking its NPT
    commitments.
        A nuclear arms race is absolutely the last thing we need in
    this region of the world, and I yield back.
        Mr. Poe. The gentleman yields back his time.
        The Chair will recognize the other gentleman from Illinois,
    Mr. Schneider, for his opening statement.
        Mr. Schneider. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to thank
    the witnesses for joining us today on a most crucial issue as
    we sit less than 1 week from the deadline for negotiations
    under the Joint Plan of Action.
        The prospect of a nuclear Iran--I believe is the single
    greatest threat to the region, to the world, and it is
    imperative that we find a way to prevent that.
        If there is to be a deal it must absolutely ensure that any
    and all paths for Iran to get a nuclear weapon are blocked and,
    ultimately, permanently closed.
        What I am looking forward to hearing from you all in the
    time we have together today is your sense of the potential for
    a deal, whether it is in the next week or shortly thereafter,
    what are the consequences and concerns if there is to be a
    delay further than on November 24th, as the current deadline
    is, and, on the assumption that there is not a deal to be had,
    what would be the next steps you would want to see from this
    Congress.
        And with that, I yield back. Thank you.
        Mr. Poe. Do any other members wish to make an opening
    statement? Seeing no show of hands, the witnesses will be
    introduced and then they will have their time for opening
    statements and then proceed to questions.
        Dr. Ray Takeyh is a senior fellow for Middle East studies
    at the Council of Foreign Relations and an adjunct professor at
    Georgetown University. Dr. Takeyh was previously a senior
    advisor on Iran at the Department of State and is widely
    published.
        Our next witness, Mr. Matthew McInnis, is a resident fellow
    at the American Enterprise Institute, focusing on Iran.
    Previously, Mr. McInnis worked on Middle East and
    counterproliferation issues during his long tenure at the
    Defense Intelligence Agency.
        And Mr. David Albright is the founder and president of the
    Institute for Science and International Security. Mr. Albright
    holds Masters degrees in both physics and mathematics.
        Our first witness, Dr. Takeyh, we will start with you. You
    have 5 minutes. Thank you.

       STATEMENT OF RAY TAKEYH, PH.D., SENIOR FELLOW FOR MIDDLE
             EASTERN STUDIES, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

        Mr. Takeyh. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for inviting me here.
    I will be brief and it is always good to be with
        Mr. Poe. If your mike is working.
        Mr. Takeyh. Oh, sorry. Better?
        Mr. Poe. A little better.
        Mr. Takeyh. I think it is fair to say--I am sure there will
    be agreement on this issue, perhaps even a unanimous one--that
    the Islamic Republic has not been responsible stakeholders in
    international affairs.
        I don't think I am being too provocative with that. Yet, I
    think Iran over the years has had some success in conditioning
    the narrative of the nuclear negotiations.
        The Iranian regime has obtained an acknowledgment of its
    right to enrich. That is not necessarily a right in principle
    but acknowledgment in practice, which is a distinction of a
    rather limited nature.
        It has also persistently suggested that all U.N. Security
    Council resolutions are politically contrived and have neither
    authority nor legitimacy, and there may be indication that the
    P5+1 countries--the five members of the Security Council and
    Germany--that are negotiating on this issue may actually not
    adhere to certain aspects of the U.N. Security Council
    resolution themselves, particularly the provision demanding
    suspension, and it is probably unlikely that a final agreement
    will have a suspension component and that brings into question,
    of course, the legitimacy of international law in this
    particular respect.
        Iran has continued to insist that its existing enrichment
    capacity has to be respected and it has also maintained that
    any inspection modality has to be limited to the existing NPT
    measures which, perhaps, fall short of some of the expectations
    that we have.
        Another aspect of the Iranian diplomacy over the past year
    that has been successful has been President Rouhani's notion
    that he has inculcated rather effectively that he is under hard
    pressure from hardliners at home and the implication of that
    being that if the Western powers want a deal they should
    essentially deal with him and make the necessary concessions to
    obtain that deal.
        I don't think that is true. I think a more careful
    examination reveals that the Islamic Republic has actually
    reached an internal consensus. Today, I think the Islamic
    Republic is ruled by a unity government and some of the
    factionals in that has historically bedeviled the theocracy has
    at least for now been set aside.
        For the first time in the three decades of the existence of
    the Islamic Republic it is not troubled by divisions and
    dissension that have plagued previous governments. So I am not
    quite sure if President Rouhani is under the type of pressure
    that he speaks about.
        However, I think going into these negotiations there are
    many advantages that the Western powers have, particularly the
    United States, and one of those advantages are raised
    expectations. There has been a lot of raised expectations.
        Both parties--United States and Iran--have unwisely at
    times raised expectations about a possible deal and fed a media
    narrative of a potential historical breakthrough between the
    two old nemesis.
        Suddenly, the hard-pressed Iranian public has come to
    expect imminent financial relief should the negotiations not
    yield an agreement. Then Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, not
    President Obama, would have a popular backlash at his hand. A
    disenfranchised dispossessed population is an explosive
    political problem for the Iranian leadership.
        Therefore, I think the Western powers should not be afraid
    to suspend negotiations or walk away from the table should Iran
    prove intransigence. Ironically, a stalemate in negotiations
    are likely to pressure Iran into offering more concessions
    rather than the United States.
        I want to highlight briefly that what we are dealing with
    here is not necessarily just nuclear infractions but also the
    Islamic Republic's regional policies. The Islamic Republic
    remains a revisionist state that has done much to imperil
    American interests in the Middle East, as was just mentioned.
        It has been recently fashionable to suggest that the two
    parties have an interest in the rise of ISIL and that could
    essentially offer a pathway for cooperation. On the surface,
    this may seem sensible. Both parties do have an interest in
    defanging the militant Sunni group.
        However, the essential axiom of Middle East politics has
    always been that the enemy of my enemy is still my enemy. The
    ebbs and flows of war on terrorism should not be allowed to
    conceal the fact that the Iranian regime and its attempt to
    upend the regional order remains the United States' most
    consequential long-term challenge.
        The Islamic Republic is not a normal nation state seeking
    to realize its legitimate aspirations within the existing
    international system. It is a country whose leadership tends to
    put premium on conspiracies to explain its predicament, and as
    was mentioned it has been a staple of Ali Khamenei's speeches
    that United States is a declining power whose domestic sources
    of strength are fast eroding.
        Finally, the United States and Iran tend to see the region
    from opposite ends. The Islamic Republic's ideological
    compulsions and sheer opportunism makes it an unlikely ally for
    the West.
        The coincidence of mutual interest in opposition to a
    radical Sunni group should not blind us to the enduring threat
    that the Iranian regime represents to its population and to the
    region at large.
        Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Takeyh follows:]

        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                  ----------

        Mr. Poe. Perfect timing. The Chair recognizes Mr. McInnis
    for 5 minutes.

    STATEMENT OF MR. J. MATTHEW MCINNIS, RESIDENT FELLOW, AMERICAN
                          ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE

        Mr. McInnis. Thank you, Chairman Poe, Ranking Member
    Sherman and distinguished members of the House Committee on
    Foreign Affairs.
        Thank you for inviting me here to testify on the current
    ongoing Iran nuclear negotiations. As has already been noted,
    prospects for an actual agreement on the 24th of November are
    dim but I do not underestimate the desire on both sides to get
    a deal.
        We may yet see a breakthrough but I think it is doubtful.
    While I strongly support finding a diplomatic solution to the
    impasse with Iran, I also share your concern that this
    eagerness on our part may cause us to settle for a deal that
    has not sufficiently addressed the challenge of their program.
        I fear since the beginning we have not fully understood
    what was driving Iran to the table and underestimated our
    leverage once they got there. It is a recipe for a very
    frustrating diplomacy.
        So what is Iran's calculus here? Most importantly, we
    should remember there has been no sign--and I think this has
    been noted here before--no sign of real change in their nuclear
    policy.
        They still want to man a robust Iranian enrichment program
    that is far beyond what is needed for civilian purposes. They
    have shown no willingness to come clean on the possible
    military dimensions of their nuclear research.
        If Iran had had a true change of heart we could have
    resolved all the outstanding concerns a long time ago. Iran
    would have flung open the doors of Parchin military complex to
    IAEA inspectors.
        That is not the case here. This is not South Africa. This
    is not Libya. The new diplomatic approach adopted by the
    supreme leader and President Rouhani is notable but at its
    heart it is a tactical move.
        They may accept some limits on the output of the program
    but no actual reversal of technological achievements and
    capabilities will be allowed. This is why we keep stumbling
    over their red lines, refusing to dismantle any part of their
    nuclear infrastructure.
        However, the supreme leader and President Rouhani and the
    rest of the Iranian leadership have decided they need to get
    out from underneath the sanctions and I agree with my
    colleague, Dr. Takeyh here, on his assessment of the internal
    dynamics inside the regime right now.
        The short and long term economic challenges are just too
    great for them. They need this deal now and, frankly, they need
    it more than we do and we don't take advantage of that.
        So what are the basics of an acceptable deal? They are
    quite simple and I think we have discussed them already in the
    opening statements--a reasonably verifiable regime administered
    by the IAEA that ensures Iran cannot pursue a nuclear weapon
    with a clear mechanism to reimpose sanctions for noncompliance.
        My colleague, David Albright, will certainly go into much
    more of the technical discussions about things that we need to
    address. But first I want to highlight a couple of things I am
    concerned about.
        First, we need to be aware of the trap of centrifuge
    numbers. As the efficiency of Iran's centrifuges improve,
    actual quantities of the machines will matter less. We need to
    have the right metrics for any type of deal on that topic.
        Second, for me, the heart of the matter, really, is
    bringing Iran into compliance with the IAEA on the possible
    military dimensions. There should be no relief in the most
    critical sanctions without resolving this issue satisfactorily.
        Third, given the long history of Iran's nuclear activity
    being exposed rather than willingly acknowledged, the need for
    a rigorous verification regime goes without saying. There is
    not trust here, just verify.
        Since there was a real risk of additional covert enrichment
    or weapons development activity, the ban of critical
    technologies, especially for missiles, needs to be maintained
    to the greatest degree possible.
        Fourth, we need to be very careful about how sanctions are
    unravelled. Many sanctions are related to Iran's nuclear
    program even if they are also tied to the regime's support for
    terrorism and human rights violations.
        The reverse is also true. Unthoughtful relaxation of
    financial sanctions, for example, could prove a great boon to
    the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corp's activities across the
    region.
        And that brings me to my final point and, again, agreeing
    with my colleague, Dr. Takeyh, we should not be looking to use
    the nuke negotiations as a stepping stone, as a confidence-
    building measure toward greater cooperation with Iran, unless
    we see real changes in their behaviors, which I do not expect
    under this supreme leader.
        Tehran is still trying to overhaul the political system in
    the region through subversive and violent means. It is still
    supporting and building proxy forces beholden to Iran, designed
    to threaten the U.S. and our allies and ensure the capacity to
    execute terrorism missions worldwide.
        This includes groups like Lebanese Hezbollah, Palestinian
    Islamic jihad, Hamas and, most recently, the Houthis on the
    march in Yemen. Our end states for Syria and Iraq are
    different. We may have some form of deconfliction with Quds
    Force Commander Qasem Soleimani against ISIS on the ground in
    Iraq. We may even have some form of detente. But this is not
    rapprochement. Until we see actual shifts in the policy from
    the supreme leader, our negotiations, our sanctions strategies
    and our regional policies need to be very sober.
        We should recognize at best we are checking the regime's
    worst behavior while we wait for real change in Tehran.
        Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. McInnis follows:]

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                                  ----------

        Mr. Poe. The Chair recognizes Mr. Albright for 5 minutes
    his opening statement.

       STATEMENT OF MR. DAVID ALBRIGHT, PRESIDENT, INSTITUTE FOR
                   SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

        Mr. Albright. Thank you, Chairman Poe and Ranking Member
    Sherman, for the opportunity to testify today.
        I would like to just go through several points, really,
    headlines of what I see is important to consider today in this
    deal.
        First, I think a long-term deal, if carefully crafted, can
    keep Iran from building nuclear weapons. But getting that deal
    is a major challenge, particularly by November 24th. If not
    achieved, the interim deal will need to be extended, and that
    brings me to my second point.
        The interim deal has accomplished many worthwhile goals, as
    Mr. Sherman has pointed out, but it appears to be fraying at
    the edges and needs to be strengthened if it is to continue
    being effective. We work on the technical side of this and we
    noticed in the last International Atomic Energy Agency report
    that some of the expectations of the interim deal have not been
    met. One is that Iran started to enrich for the first time in
    an advanced centrifuge called the IR-5.
        I know we relayed those concerns to the administration
    pretty early on Friday and the administration got a commitment
    by Iran that weekend that it would stop. Whether it will
    continue to stop, we don't know. Iran continues to or still
    needs to oxidize at least 500 kilograms of newly produced 3.5
    percent LEU that they produced, and this was produced since the
    July extension.
        Also, Iran had said it would convert 25 kilograms of the
    near 20 percent LU oxide into fuel assemblies. From the IAEA
    data, only 5 kilograms have actually been turned into fuel
    assemblies and I think we don't view these as violations of the
    deal since they still have until November 24th. But to us and
    ISIS it represents a fraying of the deal and so--even if it is
    extended--these things need to be addressed.
        The third issue I want to discuss, and I won't spend much
    time on it because I think we are all in agreement, is that,
    there has been little progress on getting Iran to address the
    IAEA conditions and I will just say that there needs to be at
    least concrete progress on that issue before a deal is signed.
        Obviously, Iran can't address all the IAEA's issues prior
    to November 24th and, in fact, the IAEA director general has
    said Iran isn't even trying.
        But the negotiators should only sign a deal if Iran has
    made some concrete progress and that can be anything from
    allowing visits to the military sites such as Parchin to some
    kind of international recognition that Iran had a nuclear
    weapons program and then others can think of other things.
        Later on, Iran is going to have to address the IAEA issues
    and some sanctions are going to have to be tied to that. I
    don't know what the U.S. is thinking on that but I would hope
    that there are very significant sanctions tied to actually
    addressing those issues.
        Another issue that we have worked on extensively in the
    last several months has been the sanctions on what we call
    proliferation sensitive goods. They have got to stay in place
    during the length of the agreement or through at least most of
    it until Iran has demonstrated that it is in full compliance
    and things are going well. And in particular, U.N. Security
    Council sanctions on such goods need to remain in place.
        Iran is not expected to stop seeking proliferation-
    sensitive goods abroad for its missile and other military
    programs. It may seek goods abroad for its clandestine nuclear
    activities and facilities.
        It is certainly doing so today. Iran's regime is well known
    to European authorities, including the Germans, for constantly
    trying to break their laws. In 2012 and 2013, more than two-
    thirds of their 264 investigations in Germany were involving
    the Islamic Republic. And Germany expects the proportion to
    remain the same this year. So Iran is a habitual sanctions
    violator and that is not expected to change.
        Now, if the sanctions legislation or sanctions continue
    through the U.N. Security Council resolutions there will be a
    need to provide goods to authorized nuclear programs, whatever
    level of those programs that remain, and the precedent for that
    is the exemption created for the Bushehr reactor and that
    exemption can be applied to an authorized nuclear programs.
        The difference between the Bushehr exception and any newly
    authorized exports would be that that channel or procurement
    channel is going to have to be monitored extremely carefully
    and involve the U.N. panel of experts, the International Atomic
    Energy Agency and supplier states.
        The fifth point I want to address is that I think we have
    all agreed that Iran should have a limited number of
    centrifuges. My group probably has one of the high numbers. We
    would accept up to 4,000 IR-1s and view that level can be
    verified.
        Now, the important way to strengthen that goal is also to
    reduce the stocks of low-enriched uranium and there has been
    discussion in the media about how the administration plans to
    remove large amounts of the stocks from Iran. I think that is a
    workable proposition but it should not substitute for the
    reduction in numbers of centrifuges--it should strengthen that
    goal but it should not substitute for the goal of achieving low
    numbers of centrifuges.
        And I just want to close by mentioning that Congressman
    Sherman mentioned uranium ore. That often does not receive the
    attention it needs.
        The administration has told me in the past that they are
    seeking limitations on uranium ore but we will see if that
    happens. But it requires not only knowing how much they made it
    total, but also knowing how much they are making every year,
    how much they have stockpiled, their past illicit efforts to
    acquire uranium internationally and then to cap that uranium in
    a way that Iran would not have more uranium on hand inside the
    country than it needs----
        Mr. Poe. Conclude your remarks, please.
        Mr. Albright [continuing]. It needs to meet its actual
    needs.
        Thank you. Sorry.
        Mr. Poe. Thank you.
        Mr. Albright. Sorry for going over.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Albright follows:]

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                                  ----------

        Mr. Poe. Thank you, gentlemen. The Chair will begin with
    its questions--5 minutes of questions.
        Are the Iranians working on a delivery system for nuclear
    weapons--intercontinental ballistic missiles?
        Mr. McInnis. I would say that the pursuit of an ICBM has
    been something that the Iranian regime has been going after for
    some time. I think the U.S. intelligence community has been
    watching that fairly closely.
        So, obviously, they portray it as usually tied to their
    space program or other types of activities but
        Mr. Poe. The Iranians have a space program?
        Mr. McInnis. They have been able to put some stuff up
    there.
        Mr. Poe. I understand. But the intercontinental ballistic
    missile pursuit that is not a part of the negotiations and this
    discussion, as far as I know. Is that correct?
        Mr. Albright. Yes. No, the missiles are not. That is one of
    the reasons why you want to keep the U.N. Security Council
    sanctions in place because one would expect them to go out and
    acquire or seek goods illicitly.
        Now, the reentry vehicle that would hold a nuclear weapon
    and the warhead itself are certainly part of this and a lot of
    the IAEA's concerns are exactly on those two issues. In 2003,
    their information is that they were developing a reentry
    vehicle and developing a warhead that was about .55 meters
    across that could fit inside that reentry vehicle. So that part
    of it is very much part of this issue.
        Mr. Poe. Are the Iranians delaying and cheating at the same
    time, in your opinion? Delaying implementation of another deal
    but also pursuing violations of previous agreements. What is
    your opinion on that?
        Mr. McInnis. I mean, would you characterize the IR-5 issue
    that has come up as a----
        Mr. Albright. Yes, we asked the question if the IR-5 or
    feeding the IR-5 was a violation. I mean, we think it shouldn't
    have happened. I mean, we are not lawyers so I would go as far
    as saying we think it shouldn't have happened.
        Now, the issue of violation. Right now the IAEA says that
    Iran's declared program is in compliance with its obligations
    under the nonproliferation treaty.
        They cannot say if there are undeclared nuclear activities
    or facilities that Iran may be pursuing. They don't have the
    mechanisms and the tools to do that. So we just don't know.
        On the PMD, the IAEA continues to say that some of the
    activities, and they would talk about nuclear weapons-related
    activities, may have continued and I don't know if that would
    be a violation but it would certainly be troubling if that was
    the case.
        Mr. Takeyh. I just----
        Mr. Poe. Sure.
        Mr. Takeyh. I think there are six U.N. resolutions--
    Security Council resolutions--including 1929 that was
    negotiated in May 2010 that have enjoined Iran to suspend all
    its enrichment and reprocessing activities.
        And so the continuation of those activities stand in
    violation of that. So in a sense, the entirety of the Iranian
    program that continues to operate is an illicit one.
        Mr. Poe. Mr. McInnis, do you want to weigh in that?
        Mr. McInnis. No. I certainly don't disagree with Dr.
    Takeyh's assessment on that.
        Mr. Poe. You do disagree or do not?
        Mr. McInnis. No, I definitely do not disagree with it. What
    I would add is, certainly, given the history of Iran's nuclear
    program, in my own personal opinion, I would be very, very
    surprised if there is not some type of clandestine and other
    types of activities ongoing that we, obviously, don't know
    about or it is going to be a while before we find out.
        So that is, again, there is nothing in their history to
    change that assessment.
        Mr. Poe. Has the supreme leader's statements, philosophy
    about demanding the destruction of Israel and then the
    destruction of the United States, has that changed his
    political statements?
        Mr. Takeyh. No. Actually, he has remained rather persistent
    in his notion and kind of fantastic claims that he attributes
    to the United States such as, for instance, that the United
    States deployed atomic weapons in Japan to test them out
    against--to see how it would work on human beings. I mean, he
    makes--those statements continue unabated. So he is not
    providing his nuclear negotiators with sufficient public
    relations concessions.
        Mr. Poe. And I agree with you. He has not changed their
    philosophy about destruction of Israel and the United States
    and we ought to deal with them with that understanding.
        The Chair will yield 5 minutes to the ranking member, Mr.
    Sherman from California, for his opening or his questions.
        Mr. Sherman. Thank you. We ought to be trying to prevent
    them from developing missiles but let us remember you can
    smuggle a nuclear weapon. It is about the size of a person.
        If Iran were to smuggle one into an American city and then
    let us know they had it somewhere there, that would put them in
    a position to blackmail us. Or if they decided to use a nuclear
    weapon against the United States they could do so with
    plausible deniability and I don't know how you would have
    retaliation in the absence of being sure that you knew where
    the weapon came from.
        Among all the things we are doing for Iran or at least in
    ways that benefit them our Sunni allies and human rights groups
    have asked us for a no-fly zone. That might very well lead to
    the departure of Assad, but we have not done so, just one of
    the many forbearances that Iran benefits from. I don't want to
    get partisan here but I noticed one of my colleagues talking
    about the collapse of our foreign policy under this
    administration. That implies that there was a foreign policy
    against Iran with the prior administration. I will simply say
    that most of you think this is genuine male pattern baldness.
        It is actually what happens to a Member of Congress who
    spends 8 years pounding my head into a very effective and
    successful Bush administration that was successful in not
    enforcing a single one of our sanctions and not allowing
    Congress to pass a single significant statutory sanction in 8
    years.
        The question is what is to be done. We are going to need
    additional sanctions on Iran unless we get a good agreement and
    we are not going to get a good agreement if we don't have the
    prospect of much tougher sanctions, regime-threatening
    sanctions.
        I have got two ideas I want to preview with our panel but,
    more importantly, I want to get your ideas because our
    negotiators will not be successful unless Iran is convinced
    that their economy will be crippled in 2015 by actions taken in
    the United States Congress should they fail to reach a deal
    with the United States.
        One of those ideas is to take all the way down to zero in a
    3-month period the amount of oil that we allow countries to buy
    and still be able to transact business with the New York Fed
    and dollar U-turn transactions.
        We listened to our allies who said, don't eliminate all of
    our access to Iranian oil--there might be an oil shortage and
    what will that do to our economy.
        The world is currently swimming in oil. Some of my
    colleagues are concerned that oil is selling too low and that
    that is having an averse effect. I don't join them in that
    pain.
        But, certainly, our allies can deal with $75 a barrel oil.
    Second, we could provide that--so as to cut Iran off from all
    the major Western and Japanese multinational corporations that
    if any corporation--has any contract with the United States
    Government that it must certify that all of its parent and
    subsidiary and brother-sister corporations are adhering to U.S.
    sanctions against Iran, which I describe as the not one paper
    clip rule, so that we would put Iran in a position where it
    could not do business with any of the world's major
    multinational groups or corporations.
        I would like our--I will start with you, Doctor, both to
    comment on those but to give me some other ideas. What would
    cause at least a little bit of fear in Qom right now?
        Mr. Takeyh. The Iranian Central Bank has suggested, for
    what it is worth and it is usually not worth very much, that
    what they need for their budgetary allocations about oil to be
    about $70.
        So any kind of reduction----
        Mr. Sherman. Oh, clearly, the best sanctions didn't come
    from our committee. The best sanctions came from lowering the
    price of oil from $140 down to below $75.
        Mr. Takeyh. So anything below that, if that figure is taken
    into consideration, will likely to affect it. To have the kind
    of sanctions regarding cutting off Iran along the pace that you
    are suggesting, I think that has to be accompanied by very
    significant diplomacy with our allies and China and other
    countries.
        In and of itself, I think it is going to create some
    disquiet in those particular capitals and it is going to lead
    to a lot of complaints. I think with suitable diplomacy and a
    lot of work it might come about.
        My suggestion has always been in terms of congressional
    action. A lot of people are involved in dealing with the
    Iranian nuclear negotiations--5+1, U.S. and so on.
        Mr. Sherman. I have got to go. I have got to go on to your
    co-panelists here.
        Mr. Takeyh. I think you should have the parameters of what
    is an acceptable deal legislated.
        Mr. Sherman. Yes?
        Mr. McInnis. I would just add to Dr. Takeyh Rouhani's
    economic reforms, which are actually part of what has been
    going on behind the scenes here, I mean, Ray is right in that
    they need about, you know, $70, $75 to be able to maintain
    their current budget.
        But for the kinds of structural reforms that Rouhani needs
    to get the economy moving past the really horrible management
    of Ahmadinejad for the previous 8 years, he needs more money
    than $70, $75.
        So that is one of the reasons why I think the oil is having
    a major impact on their calculus right now. Certainly, on being
    able to cut them off from finances and money to the greatest
    degree that you can do toward that is always going to be the,
    you know, that plus oil prices is the--is the right
    combination, from my perspective.
        Mr. Albright. Yes. We don't work on sanctions but I think
    what we see in my group is there is a need for a Plan B, as we
    have called it. Ideally, that Plan B would be run by the
    administration, if things are not going to work out. I don't
    think we have reached that point. I don't think we will reach
    it in November if there is an extension, that there is a need
    to be able to impose sanctions and to be able to modulate those
    sanctions.
        And so I think, from my own point of view, the best
    situation would be if the administration and Congress are
    working together to create a Plan B.
        Now, I understand your frustration. There isn't exactly
    that kind of cooperation going on and so----
        Mr. Sherman. We will get to the administration panel next
    and its presence here demonstrates how closely they are working
    with us.
        Mr. Albright. Okay. And so I think it if this isn't going
    to work, I think the planning for the additional sanctions has
    to be going on now because you also, and I would want to
    recommend the administration do this, you don't want to have it
    happen in 1 day--in 1 day.
        Mr. Poe. Excuse me, Mr. Albright. Time has expired. Time
    has expired.
        Mr. Albright. Okay.
        Mr. Poe. Excuse me. The Chair will recognize the gentleman
    from South Carolina, Mr. Wilson, for 5 minutes for his
    questions.
        Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Judge Poe, for your leadership in
    conducting this hearing. I am very grateful that in my home
    state of South Carolina we have a significant number of Iranian
    Americans who are leaders in our state in the medical community
    and business community.
        It is a very dynamic community that means a lot for our
    state, and I meet with so many of them who are in distress
    about the authoritarian regime in Tehran and how sad it is that
    the young people of Iran are held back because of the regime
    there and denied freedom and democracy, which can be so
    positive for such a great culture as that of Iran.
        Mr. McInnis, a very important question which is facing
    Congress is what should be the minimum requirements that Iran
    should meet before Congress agrees to lift the major sanctions
    that it has imposed?
        Included in the question is the future of Iranian
    enrichment the Arak heavy water reactor, answering questions
    about the possible military dimensions and past Iranian
    violations of the United Nations sanctions, the underground
    Fordow fuel enrichment plant and Iran's nuclear-capable missile
    force?
        Mr. McInnis. I mean, the short answer should be all of
    those but, certainly, if we are going to be looking at lifting
    the sanctions and, again, I want to emphasize and from my
    comments and my submitted testimony that, you know, we have to
    be careful about what is tied in with human rights violations
    and counterterrorism sanctions in with the nuclear sanctions.
        Not that they were necessarily all tied together to begin
    with, but some of these same mechanisms that we use, you know,
    so far as financial sanctions have a compounding effect on the
    situation.
        For me, I mean, it is coming clean on the PMD and being
    able to cap the ability for their enrichment to a breakout
    level. We talked about the breakout idea. Six to 12 months, for
    me, is a minimum--that we have to have that type of warning to
    be able to do something and we need to be--do whatever we can
    to prevent whatever clandestine or covert activities are
    happening right now.
        Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much, and Dr. Takeyh, how do we
    trust a regime that has doubled executions of its own people,
    called explicitly, as you have indicated, for the destruction
    of another U.N. member, being the state of Israel, labels the
    United States the Great Satan, exports terrorism as a matter of
    state policy and has trained and supplied terrorists, including
    the IEDs that we faced in Iraq which have killed U.S. soldiers?
        And how can we trust them to abide by any agreement?
        Mr. Takeyh. I think it would be very difficult and I
    suspect in any agreement as even in JPOA there will be
    occasions and indications of violations. There are two things I
    will say.
        Any agreement negotiated with Iran, as I think Dave has
    suggested, has to have clarification of previous military
    activities. I don't know if you can actually verify a current
    agreement without knowing the clandestine history of the
    program.
        Second of all, I will say U.N. Security Council resolutions
    should be suspended in the event of a deal and not discarded
    because then you have a mechanism that can come online should
    there be indication of Iranian violation.
        Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much. And, Mr. McInnis, out of
    what has been leaked and/or disclosed about a potential final
    deal, what most concerns you?
        Mr. McInnis. For me, it is that we are not going to be able
    to resolve the PMD issues and that, frankly, that we are not
    going to be able to really have an effective metric and
    mechanism to monitor the enrichment capacities.
        So those and, certainly, the other sidebar issue of whether
    this is going to lead into other efforts we may do with them
    regarding ISIS, and other things that I fear very much where
    the path that we are going down, we are being a little naive
    about that.
        Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much and I yield the balance of
    my time.
        Mr. Poe. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from
    California, Mr. Lowenthal, for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Lowenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I am just trying to
    understand kind of where we are now and where we go to follow
    up, I guess, on some of the questions raised by Congressman
    Sherman.
        As I understand, we are not going to have an agreement. We
    will probably be talking about an extension after the 24th of
    November. I am also hearing that both Iran, for different
    reasons, and the United States it would be beneficial to both
    to have some kind of agreement for different reasons and that--
    and I am wondering, and I thought I heard also that a stalemate
    in these negotiations will benefit the United States more than
    Iran.
        Is that true or not, and why is that so and how long does
    that mean, given the existing conditions that we have?
        Mr. Takeyh. In terms of extension of an agreement, November
    24th is a sort of a self-declared deadline. They actually--
    according to the terms of JPOA, they have until January so that
    date is in many ways a self-imposed deadline.
        I think the Iranian regime, given its predicament, probably
    requires an agreement more than 5+1 do simply because they
    arouse expectations of the population that they are going to
    get financial relief and somehow their economic fortunes are
    going to turn, and you really cannot have a normal economy in
    Iran in absence of a nuclear agreement because so much of its
    economic activities are retarded by international sanctions,
    banking regulations and so on.
        So we do have that leverage going forward that the Iranian
    regime is in a worse position than we are.
        Mr. Lowenthal. Do you all agree with that?
        Mr. McInnis. I, certainly, would agree with that and I
    pointed out in my initial comments that we are in a situation
    where we have underestimated, in my opinion, our leverage. And,
    as was also pointed out by the chair and the ranking member, we
    are actually in a situation of bringing them to the table but
    in many ways the effects of these sanctions were not really
    allowed to settle.
        I mean, we could have gone much further by keeping up these
    sanctions at their current pace because the impact that was
    happening on their reduction in GDP, their inflation issues,
    those are very serious and, again, as I pointed out before, it
    wasn't just their current economy.
        They have very long-term problems that in some ways have
    nothing to do with the sanctions. But they can't solve those
    problems without having major infusions of cash and better
    access to the international markets.
        Mr. Albright. Yes. I guess on a technical level and then on
    a sanctions level I am not sure I agree. I mean, I think in the
    short run I think we have a tremendous advantage.
        But they continue to operate centrifuges. They are learning
    to operate them better. They are working on more advanced
    centrifuges in places that are outside the purview of the
    International Atomic Energy Agency.
        The way they have structured their centrifuge R & D program
    the IAEA does not know how well they are working even at the
    places where they are monitoring.
        And so I think they are going to make progress and that is
    worrisome in the long run. The other is that, again, I am not a
    sanctions expert but I can look and see in the news from places
    like Germany the exports to Iran are increasing.
        You know, there are things happening. It is just, you know,
    people are getting used to it. They are being more relaxed
    about it. I mean, we continue at ISIS to see Iran actively
    going out to buy things illegally for its nuclear program.
        We see in the last couple years that they have actually
    become more sophisticated at hiding, particularly, the
    connection between the nuclear program in Iran and the trading
    companies that go out and get these things and that is
    important because you can't chase everything.
        So if you had information linking the effort to the nuclear
    program then you would apply more resources. So I think that in
    the long run I am not so sure, I think, that this plays best
    for us.
        Mr. Lowenthal. Thank you, and I yield back.
        Mr. Poe. I thank the gentleman. The Chair recognizes Mr.
    Kinzinger from Illinois for 5 minutes and his questions.
        Mr. Kinzinger. Close. Close. Thank you. Thank you, Mr.
    Chairman, and thank you all for being here. I will say to the
    ranking member and, with a bit of a smile, I get your point
    about the collapse of foreign policy.
        I wasn't speaking of just Iran. I was more thinking of the
    rest of the world and everywhere else. So but let me just say
    thank you all for being here.
        As I mentioned in my opening statement, with Iraq
    specifically, again, and I want to make this mention one more
    time, as Mr. Wilson alluded to as well, there are American
    soldiers that are not alive today because of the actions of
    Iran.
        I think that is something that is very important to keep in
    mind. Not just direct Iranian involvement, which existed--I
    know that first hand as a veteran of the area--but also with
    the supplying of materiel and knowledge meant to kill American
    soldiers, meant to take their lives away because of their
    meddling in the region, which they have been doing everywhere.
        We see Iran very vested in propping up Bashar al-Assad in
    Syria, investing financial resources in this, by the way. At a
    time when supposedly their economy is so bad even in the
    interim deal that they are, you know, going to do whatever the
    United States wants, they are investing in the existence of
    this guy who has brutally murdered 200,000 of his own people--
    Bashar al-Assad.
        Keep in mind, I know ISIS is a major concern. We are all
    united on that. But the existence of Assad is an anathema to
    humanity, in my mind, and the way he governs.
        I just want to ask the three of you a couple of questions.
    First off, what message do you think was sent to Iran in terms
    of helping them to come to an agreement that makes sense for us
    and for the peaceful world?
        What message was sent? You know, what we are seeing today
    in Russia, for instance? Iran doesn't just look at the Middle
    East. They look at the United States foreign policy all over
    the place. The Iraq pullout in 2011 as well as the comments by
    the administration about this idea of a pivot away from the
    Middle East, which I know and I have heard from the
    administration they regret using those words and I understand
    that and I appreciate it.
        But they were used and that is the perception. So I ask the
    three of you if you could talk about kind of those foreign
    policy areas where, I think, there has been some difficulty and
    talk about what message that has sent to Iran in terms of
    motivating them to come to the table with a good deal for us.
        Mr. Takeyh. On the issue of the tensions between United
    States and the Russian Federation, I think they have become
    more obvious and a more tangible impact on the negotiations if
    there is a breakdown of some sort of a diplomacy on the P5+1.
        I think then you can see the Russians pulling away from the
    5+1 consensus as may the Chinese as well in terms of
    repatriating Iranian money and so on. So the Russian angle is
    not obvious at this point but it can be.
        The region itself today is, as you mentioned, Congressman,
    is rather disorderly, to say the least, and Iran is an
    opportunistic country that is trying to take advantage in
    Syria, in Iraq, in Lebanon, in Yemen, and so they do seem to be
    engaged in a sort of a cold war with the Saudis that is playing
    us off throughout the region.
        And as I have mentioned, there is a persistent narrative on
    the Iranian leadership that, you know, they do have
    opportunities at this point that they have to exploit because
    they were not that obvious before.
        Mr. Kinzinger. But wouldn't it--it also seems that if we
    had Iran, and I think we did a year ago, to the point where
    they were in pretty--I mean, we had our boots on their neck,
    basically, on these--or before the negotiations started.
        But if even in this interim agreement is such that, you
    know, their economy is still taking it on the chin, they have
    been able to invest a stunning amount of resources in expanding
    their influence around the Middle East. It has been amazing.
        Mr. Takeyh. There is no question that they are apportioning
    whatever money they have in an injudicious way and the welfare
    of their population doesn't seem to be their priority on that.
    That is true about most revolutionary states and this is one of
    them.
        Mr. McInnis. I would just add to that point that one of our
    major foreign policy failures several years ago was the
    underestimation of how far Iran would go to prop up Assad.
        I think there was a general consensus here in Washington
    and other capitals that Assad's days were numbered, as the
    President said. That really underestimated the fact that Syria
    is absolutely essential for Iran's foreign policy, for its
    ideological objectives, for its religious objectives, that they
    cannot--even if they have lots of problems with Assad himself,
    they can't lose Syria and I think we have kind of lost the fact
    that Iran is not going to be pulling back from its foreign
    policies that it has been pursuing since the end of their
    revolution.
        And, frankly, on the money issue, yeah, the money keeps
    flowing but at the same time the amount of money it needs--that
    Iran needs to be able to kind of keep up its efforts there in
    the region is still--I mean, Iran--as much as Iran's economy is
    strained, it still doesn't spend tons of money on military
    issues. Its percentage of GDP on defense is, like, under 4
    percent.
        Mr. Kinzinger. And because my time is up, I just want to
    wrap up with saying this. I think if there is an attempt by the
    administration to come to this body and even--or not come to
    the body but say, we need additional time, I mean, I hope and I
    think there would be bipartisan support to not give that
    because I can't see what would happen in another 6 months that
    we didn't have an opportunity to do in the first year and I,
    frankly, think reinstating the sanctions and walking away from
    the table and saying fine, you chose your own destiny, is much
    more powerful than saying yeah, I know, we didn't have enough
    conversations so you need another 6 months. I yield back.
        Mr. Poe. The gentleman yields back his time. The Chair
    recognizes Mr. Schneider, the gentleman from Illinois.
        Mr. Schneider. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Dr. Takeyh, you mentioned that there are multiple--you
    referenced the fact that there are multiple U.N. Security
    Council resolutions saying that Iran has effectively zero right
    to enrichment.
        Yet, Mr. Albright, you talked about, potentially, 4,000
    centrifuges. Could all of you touch on, I'm trying to think of
    the best way to phrase the question is why, if any, number of
    centrifuges are acceptable for a final agreement with Iran?
        Mr. Takeyh. I think the U.N. Security Council resolutions
    have suggested that Iran has to suspend its activities and come
    into compliance and then a deal can be negotiated that may
    actually involve some residual enrichment.
        One of the assumptions that has guided the United States
    across two administrations has been that, if you settle for
    limited number of centrifuges and limited enrichment, then
    Iranian pride would be satisfied and therefore they would
    settle for that permanent symbolic program.
        What the Iranians have said persistently, publicly and
    privately, is that they are seeking an industrial-size program.
    So whatever enrichment capacity they have, they do envision
    that capacity to be industrialized, and I would just say that
    the comprehensive deal that is being negotiated today in of
    itself is also an interim deal of duration.
        It will have a sunset clause at some point. Maybe that
    sunset clause is 15 years, maybe it is 10 years, and there is
    some discrepancy about that. But subsequent to that, Iran is
    under no legal stricture to expand its program.
        It can, therefore, have an industrial enrichment capability
    that is legal, sanctioned and without any hazards of economic
    penalties.
        Mr. Schneider. Mr. McInnis?
        Mr. McInnis. Actually, I yield to Mr. Albright.
        Mr. Albright. Yes. If you think of it in terms of breakout
    time, which is what drove us to this number and it is a
    combination of centrifuges and stocks----
        Mr. Schneider. Yes, I have turned in your submitted
    testimony to the charts.
        Mr. Albright. Okay. Oh, okay. But if they had no
    centrifuges at all we would estimate their breakout time is 2
    years. So, they know how to do it. They can make them and so
    you can't eliminate that and so then the question is how many
    can you accept under some kind of criteria like breakout and
    verifiability and we ended up that we could live with 4,000.
        Now, in terms of their right, I think we're paying a very
    heavy price. I mean, I am not a lawyer. I understand--I have
    seen Senator Kerry say they have no right to enrich--it is not
    in the treaty.
        But for us, it is a tough compromise to accept because we
    work just as much on North Korea, in theory at least, as Iran.
    This is a special time, and that pivot to Asia, while it may be
    opposed by those working on the Middle East, those working on
    North Korea see a desperate need for more U.S. attention to
    stop North Korea's nuclear weapons advancements.
        And so, now I know it probably will be impossible to argue
    that North Korea give up its centrifuge program because of what
    is happening in Iran.
        So I think that it is where compromises are being made. We
    are accepting them at my organization but they are very
    problematic and they are going to cause problems and that means
    that, in any deal that is gained, Iran has to be made to pay a
    very heavy price for it and there does need to be some kind of
    condition at the end so that the program is under special
    arrangements that keep it and other countries from being able
    to claim that they can just go ahead and build as many
    centrifuges as they want.
        Mr. Schneider. And--I am sorry. Go ahead, Mr. McInnis.
        Mr. McInnis. I would just add one quick comment on that.
    One of the things I think we underestimated in why Iran came to
    the table last year is because, as Mr. Albright was saying,
    they have actually achieved a certain technological capability
    that is almost impossible to walk backwards from and so that is
    something that, you know, once they had--which they were not
    at, say, 6, 7 years ago when there was much more at risk for
    them.
        So I think they are at a confidence level that allows them
    to come to the table because there is only so much we can do to
    them.
        Mr. Schneider. Thank you. Mr. Albright, to build on your
    comment, at zero centrifuges because of their know-how they are
    2 years away from a breakout.
        At the current 19,000, approximately, IR-1 centrifuges if
    they were to operate all of those you estimated a year ago that
    the JPOA moved it back from, if I remember correctly, 1.3 to
    1.6 months?
        Mr. Albright. Yes, there is a difference now for us. It was
    from 2 months to 3 months, that was the walk back, still well
    within 20 percent.
        Mr. Schneider. But still well within a year. My question is
    what is an acceptable time frame moving them back from that 3
    months to somewhere between 3 months and 2 years that the
    international community should be expected to live with if
    there is a number?
        Mr. Albright. The U.S. position is 1 year. That translates
    into, at least in our calculations, about 2,000 IR-1s staying
    in place with certain amounts of low-enriched uranium.
        So we think 6 months and, again, it is 6 months to the
    point where they have enough weapon-grade uranium for a bomb
    and we think that is--that is acceptable.
        The administration told us many times that they want a
    year. They see ours as too short and, you know, if they can get
    a year I am all for it.
        Mr. Schneider. Just because of limited time I am going to
    take back and turn now to the Iraq heavy water reactor. Is
    there----
        Mr. Poe. The gentleman's time has expired.
        Mr. Schneider. I am out of time.
        Mr. Poe. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from
    Pennsylvania, Mr. Perry, for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Perry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, gentlemen.
    It seems to me that any negotiation deal is predicated on trust
    and whether it is regarding Iran's nuclear program or buying a
    car that is the minimum requirement.
        So with that in mind, as far as I am aware, last month the
    IAEA reported that Iran did not provide information about work
    it had completed on high explosives for a nuclear bomb and
    other possible military dimensions of its nuclear program, even
    though it promised to do so back in November 2011.
        So we're 3 years in. Can anybody explain what this means? I
    mean, to me it is somewhat obvious but maybe I am missing
    something.
        Sometimes things are counterintuitive. So is there
    something I am--you know, if I am trying to build a nuclear
    weapon I imagine I want a triggering device and so on and so
    forth and I don't want to tell anybody if everybody is mad
    about me doing it.
        So this seems axiomatic to me. Are we foolish Americans
    missing something?
        Mr. Albright. No, I don't think so. No, I think it is one
    of the reasons why I don't think there should be a deal until
    Iran has demonstrated some concrete progress on addressing the
    inspectors' issues and that dealing with the high explosives
    was one of the test cases.
        They promised to do it I forget when. Was it back in May, I
    think? And they didn't and then they told the IAEA, in my mind
    making it even worse, that we don't even want to have another
    meeting until after November 24th.
        So I think it is a very troubling development and I think
    what Iran is trying to do is seeing if they can get away with
    it. There are also many people who are saying the past doesn't
    matter and that why do we bother with this.
        So I think it is very important that Congress have a very
    strong voice in saying that it does matter and I know all my
    experience in inspections and working on verification is the
    past does matter and the warning for that should be what
    happened in Iraq in 1991 when the IAEA and others did not worry
    about the past and only focused on the present and the future.
    It turned out they had a very large nuclear weapons program
    that had been missed by the inspectors.
        So I think the IAEA learned from that and they want to know
    the past.
        Mr. Perry. Well, why wouldn't the past matter in this
    context? I mean, what other measure of trust would you have? If
    you just met somebody--Country A met Country B for the first
    time--you establish a certain level--a base level of
    trustworthiness because you have to start somewhere.
        But in this context----
        Mr. Albright. Well, you can't build it on trust. That is
    why they have the rules we want to know the past.
        Mr. Perry. Right.
        Mr. Albright. I mean, you can't build it on trust. Maybe
    you can--later you can have trust----
        Mr. Perry. But aren't our--but aren't our actions
    currently--don't they portend that they are built on trust?
        Mr. Albright. No, I--no, I don't think so. No, I don't----
        Mr. Perry. Are our actions?
        Mr. Albright. In terms of there is--in the negotiations I
    think there has been quite a rapport built up between U.S.
    negotiators and the Iranians but I don't think the U.S. actions
    are based on trust.
        Mr. Kinzinger raised an important point. I had the
    privilege of listening to some of the investigators who tracked
    back not only the IEDs but it was the purchase of key
    electronic components for those IEDs in the United States and
    they were able to identify the Iranians, particularly one
    Iranian in Tehran, who was at the center of this network.
        So I think all of them understand that we are dealing with
    a regime we cannot trust.
        Mr. Perry. That is exactly my point, but yet we are moving
    forward as if we should trust them when they have given us
    nothing to be trustworthy about.
        Mr. Albright. Well, I think the United States has to remain
    firm. I mean, I think they have conditions, they were laid out
    and that they should remain firm in achieving those conditions
    and not very much from the--I don't want to call them red lines
    because they tend not to use those terms but they are core--
    they are core requirements for a successful deal.
        Mr. Perry. Does a nuclear explosive device that--the
    triggering that you discussed in May, is there any other
    application for said device other than----
        Mr. Albright. There are always other applications, and Iran
    is seeking those. That is how it tries to answer this; it comes
    up with some civil use.
        Mr. Perry. Give us some examples, if you have them.
        Mr. Albright. Well, with the exploding bridge wires--the
    IAEA evidence combined on those, combined with other
    information is pretty clear that it was to detonate a nuclear
    explosive.
        Iran has tried to argue no, no, it is just for other
    military purposes. They have tried to even concoct, I believe,
    some civil purposes.
        You can always do that and in fact the approach Iran has
    taken and it could be an effective one, is to give nothing
    away. They deny they ever had a nuclear weapons program.
        They deny the IAEA access to all information that could
    confirm what they are suspecting or alleging. They deny them
    access to facilities where they could get information and they
    deny them access to people.
        In a sense, what Iran learned is the best lie is the total
    lie. So if you are going to have a front have a complete front
    and don't give at all. That is what, I think, Iran cannot get
    away with if there is going to be a deal.
        Mr. Perry. Okay. So----
        Mr. Poe. The gentleman's time has expired.
        Mr. Perry. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Mr. Poe. Gentleman's time has expired. I thank the
    gentleman. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California,
    Mr. Vargas, 5 minutes.
        Mr. Vargas. And thank you, Judge Poe, and again, thank you
    for holding this hearing and the people who are here today
    testifying. I am--I think that they have denied everything and
    I actually never agreed to the interim agreement.
        I thought it was a mistake. I continue to think it is a
    mistake. I think that we were naive going into this entire
    process. I believed that the sanctions were working.
        I voted to screw down even harder sanctions and I think
    that that is the way we should have gone. We should have made
    them make that decision, do you want your nuclear program or do
    you want an economy--do you want a society.
        Unfortunately, we didn't go down that route and here we
    are, and I don't believe we are going to get an agreement. I
    remember thinking that once we got to the end of that interim
    agreement that in fact it was going to be extended.
        People said no, we will get to that agreement. Well, we are
    about to reach the extension and say well, we are going to--we
    are going to extend it again, and it is exactly, I think, what
    many of us believed.
        And during the whole time they haven't stopped. They
    haven't gotten rid of their centrifuges. In fact, I will ask
    you about that. Do they still have their centrifuges? Can they
    still enrich? They haven't gotten rid of a single one of them,
    have they?
        Mr. Takeyh. They have committed to--David can speak about
    this--essentially transform the enriched uranium into a
    chemical compound that is less accessible in terms of
    oxidization.
        Mr. Vargas. Right. But the centrifuges themselves--have
    they committed to getting rid of them? Have they gotten rid of
    any?
        Mr. Takeyh. The parameters of the Joint Plan of Action they
    were not required to so. Yes.
        Mr. Vargas. That is right, and I think it has been a
    terrible mistake. The other thing, though, I want to--because I
    don't have much time, I do want to focus on the sunset because
    I think that is even more dangerous.
        Do you remember when the revolution started there? 1979.
    How many years is that? Thirty-five years. Now, they want a 5-
    year deal. We are looking at maybe a 10- or 15- or 20-year
    deal, and after that they are treated the same as Japan or
    Germany or any of these other countries.
        They get to walk out from underneath these sanctions and
    all these other restrictions. I mean, how can that possibly be
    the case?
        Mr. Takeyh. My guess would be that if there is a
    comprehensive plan of action negotiated it will be an
    extraordinary complicated document which will have stages and
    there will not be a single sunset clause but sunset clauses.
        So some capabilities come online after 2 years, some after
    three, some after five and I think that is how they are going
    to pursue and at some end point and then the program will be
    unhinged from any kind of internationally mandated
    restrictions.
        Mr. Vargas. Would anyone else like to comment? I haven't
    heard that process until right now.
        Mr. Albright. Yes. Yes. I don't know the details. I mean,
    originally, and I heard this currently from administration
    officials, is they were really thinking on order of 30 years, a
    full generation, and that in that time they would expect Iran
    to have changed at least on the nuclear----
        Mr. Vargas. As they have in the last 35 years?
        Mr. Albright. Well, I am explaining on the nuclear issue.
    They weren't expecting them to change on the regime necessarily
    but on the nuclear program the people would have aged.
        We saw this in the Iraqi nuclear program. I mean, the
    people--the nuclear experts in 2003, when I met some of them
    after the fall of Baghdad, were not of the caliber they had
    been in 1999 and 2000 when they--when they were actively
    engaged in their centrifuge program and in 2003 there were
    fewer of them.
        So I think they are counting on a whole generation to have
    an impact. Now, the trouble is they have walked back from that
    30 years and we are now hearing of 10 years, 15 years. So there
    will have to be some criteria on the--at the end of the deal.
        It can't just be some, you know, it is tough and then
    suddenly it disappears. So there is going to have to be----
        Mr. Vargas. Doctor, did you have a comment on that? It
    seemed like you wanted to comment.
        Mr. Takeyh. Well, no. I just think that, you know, given
    the fact that this--I mean, I don't know the details of
    negotiations but given the fact that any agreement will unfold
    in stages, presumably at every stage Iranian nuclear capacity
    enlarges after the initial agreement that puts some curbs and
    perhaps some restrictions on it, and then the trajectory is
    that it will get to--it will get to a point where it is without
    restriction and then the decision to have an industrial-size
    program will be a national decision--the Iranian Government's
    decision and they take into account all the factors that go
    into that.
        Mr. Vargas. Well, I just have 20 seconds left. I guess I
    would say I think we are going down the wrong path. I have
    always believed that. I hope we get back to the sanctions and I
    think that they have stalled.
        They have stalled magnificently. We have been caught up in
    it. We have been naive and we continue to be naive. Thank you,
    Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Poe. I thank the gentleman from California. The Chair
    will recognize the gentleman from Arkansas, Mr. Cotton, for his
    5 minutes.
        Mr. Cotton. Thank you, and first, to save my time, I will
    associate myself with all the comments Mr. Vargas just made
    about the folly of pursuing this course from the outset. But
    here we are.
        I have heard it said that any attack on a nuclear weapons
    system could only set back a country by 5 years because a
    country starting from scratch could develop nuclear weapons in
    5 years with the right technical expertise.
        Is that a correct estimate, in your opinions? Let me start
    with Mr. Albright and go down the----
        Mr. Albright. I think it is hard to know. I mean, in the
    case of the Iraq bombing in 1981, I mean, it may have
    accelerated the program. I mean, it was limping along quietly,
    a small program around a safeguarded reactor and after that
    bombing it took off.
        And the issue, though, I think is--it is not--is to--if any
    military strategy is going to be proposed, I mean, I and my
    organization are opposed to those. I mean, we see it as a
    failure of policy.
        But if anything like that was proposed, you can't go in
    with just one strike. I mean, you have to be able to go back.
    You have to ensure that any military strategy is constructed so
    that Iran doesn't rebuild--that it understands that to rebuild
    is to suffer even worse consequences.
        And so that has to be more of the guiding philosophy than
    thinking that one strike could do much of anything.
        Mr. Cotton. Mr. McInnis?
        Mr. McInnis. What I would add, and certainly, this was, you
    know, something that is involved in the U.S. Central Command
    and other parts of the government. I think that there is, in
    agreement with Dr. Albright, a general understanding that you
    have to take, to use an Israeli expression here, mowing the
    lawn with this type of approach--that there is no way to really
    walk this all the way back more than a few years. I think this
    was, again, one of the reasons why, again, Iran was willing to
    come to the table at this stage because they had gotten this
    far and they don't have to go backwards or at least they could
    never be pushed back far enough that they couldn't recuperate.
    And I think that there is another, you know, issue here that,
    you know, that the Iranians are looking, you know, frankly, at.
    A potential loss of a deal, if nothing comes through in
    November or beyond, the prospects for a military option could
    be back on the table either with Israel or the U.S.
        I have been, you know, in watching the Iranians talk over
    the last few months, you know, they have been going through
    some additional interesting cycles of being spooked by the
    Israelis and beginning in August of this year and I do think
    that even though I think the drop in oil prices has been a
    particular pressure on them this fall to make them a little bit
    more eager and desperate for a deal I think behind the scenes
    the thought that the military option may be back on the table
    is affecting their calculus to some degree.
        Mr. Cotton. Dr. Takeyh?
        Mr. Takeyh. I agree with those statements.
        Mr. Cotton. Okay. And thinking about negotiations it is
    always important to think about the ultimate motives or goals
    of your negotiating partner or adversary, as the case may be.
        Thucydides said peoples go to war because of fear, interest
    and honor. Why do you think Iran has been pursuing a nuclear
    weapon for so long? Start with Dr. Takeyh and go down the other
    way.
        Mr. Takeyh. I do think they have a nuclear weapons program
    because they think that having achieved that capability, and I
    do think when they get to the point of threshold they will
    cross. I don't think they will have this sort of a murky hedge
    options.
        It, first of all, provides them a deterrent capability and
    that deterrent capability gives you an ability to project
    power. So there is a seamless connection between projection of
    power and deterrence.
        Mr. Cotton. Primarily against the United States and Israel?
        Mr. Takeyh. Primarily but not exclusively. So in that
    particular sense, also when Iran looks at the Persian Gulf the
    conventional balance of power tends to be--to its disfavor,
    given the level of Saudi armament and so on. So a combination
    of nuclear capability, unconventional capability married to a
    significant missile fleet kind of negates that.
        Mr. McInnis. Yes. I would just add that, you know,
    certainly coming out of the Iran-Iraq war we knew back in the
    1980s there was, you know, a real kind of prohibition, I think,
    in thinking about a nuclear program because the shah had
    pursued one.
        But I think that watching what happened after the Iran-Iraq
    war and seeing how existential some of their crises they are
    facing that they would need some type of capacity to basically
    make us back off or make Iraq back off or, you know, or Israel
    or anyone else.
        I mean, they look at what happened with Libya. They look at
    North Korea and those situations and I think they continue to
    take it to heart that they need something to make us never ever
    think about invading.
        Mr. Takeyh. If there is time I would like to have a slight
    disagreement with Bill but if there is not that is fine.
        Mr. Cotton. It is the hands of the judge.
        Mr. Poe. Well, the gentleman's time has expired. Mr.
    Albright, you can put your answer in writing and so can you,
    Dr. Takeyh. The Chair will recognize the gentleman from Texas,
    Mr. Castro, 5 minutes.
        Mr. Castro. Thank you, Chairman. Thank you, gentlemen, for
    your testimony this afternoon. I came in a little bit late so I
    apologize if I am retreading over ground that was covered.
        But do any of you recommend an extension for the bargaining
    period--the negotiations period?
        Mr. Takeyh. I think November, as I mentioned, the 24th
    deadline is an artificial one and the administration does
    really have until January according to the terms of the Joint
    Plan of Action. So they don't really require an extension up to
    that point.
        Mr. Castro. Okay.
        Mr. McInnis. Certainly, if it actually gets us a better
    deal and allows some of the additional pressures to take hold,
    yes, I would support an extension.
        Mr. Albright. Yes. I would accept an extension. I would
    add, though, that it needs to be negotiated carefully because I
    think the current interim deal is fraying and there are
    problems and that those have to be addressed and so that it
    can't just be some simple rubber stamp extension.
        Mr. Castro. So it sounds like the panel here is open to an
    extension. But let us imagine that everything falls apart and
    there is no agreement. What happens then?
        Mr. Albright. Well, I think--I hope and I am not
    encouraged, but I would hope the administration had worked up a
    plan of action. I mean, that is what one would expect is----
        Mr. Castro. A plan of action on sanctions, for example?
        Mr. Albright. Well, that would include sanctions. I mean,
    you have to manage the escalation. Iran, in reaction to the
    Kirk-Menendez bill, they sent out a signal that if that bill is
    passed or they called it sanctions imposed that they would then
    start making 60 percent enriched uranium which, if you do the
    calculations, is awfully close to weapon grade.
        Mr. Castro. I guess let me ask you what additional
    sanctions----
        Mr. Albright. You want to manage the escalation.
        Mr. Castro. Sure, and what additional sanctions would you
    all impose that we aren't already doing? What are the
    additional sanctions you would impose?
        Mr. Albright. Well, I think Congressman Sherman had a few
    ideas----
        Mr. Castro. Sure. Sure. Sure.
        Mr. Albright [continuing]. That I think there is lots of
    room for imposing sanctions. I think the----
        Mr. Castro. But what specifically are the additional
    sanctions you would impose?
        Mr. Albright. Well, you could impose driving down the oil
    exports of Iran further. You could take steps to discourage any
    foreign companies selling to Iran. I mean, I think there is----
        Mr. Castro. But aren't we--I mean, aren't we applying a lot
    of that pressure now? Are sanctions doing a lot of that now?
        Mr. Albright. No. No. There is a lot of pressure to do--
    there are things happening. I think another area that would be
    fruitfully explored is additional financial sanctions.
        Not all banks are sanctioned in Iran. They have some
    connections to the international financial system. So I think
    that you could--you could explore that. I think those tend to
    be the most effective.
        But, again, I think it--you don't want to have a wildly
    escalating situation.
        Mr. Castro. Sure. Well, and let me ask you----
        Mr. Albright. Iran already knows how to make nuclear
    weapons.
        Mr. Castro. Let us imagine that Iran become more isolated
    and the sanctions are not enough. Do you support military
    action against Iran?
        Mr. Albright. No, I do not.
        Mr. McInnis. Only in the most extreme circumstances where
    we have a clear indication that they are actually breaking out
    and pursuing a nuclear weapon.
        Mr. Castro. What would that extreme circumstance look like
    exactly?
        Mr. McInnis. Well, it would be us detecting they actually
    have decided to pursue this. I think this is something that I
    would be very hesitant to take, given some of the implications
    from--it is the same reason why the Israelis have held back on
    the trigger for so long.
        Mr. Takeyh. And just in terms of, briefly, on the
    sanctions, under the previous legislation Iran, which has about
    five or six purchasers of oil, had to decline their oil
    purchases by 5 percent every several months to conform with
    those sanctions and not be subject to secondary measures by the
    United States.
        Under the Joint Plan of Action, those have been suspended
    so the reenactment of those, I think, could affect markets.
    Now, whether the Chinese are going to comply to them or not I
    am--it is going to be difficult. As of when--I can't make that
    decision, Congressman, when to use military force.
        I just cannot at this point have the necessary information
    to think about that particular issue. I think it is one of the
    most serious considerations that an American President has to
    make and he has to take into consideration a great many things
    before making that decision--the scope, pace of the program,
    the ramifications of that attack.
        There is one thing and only one thing that Hitler knew and
    that was war--he used to say war is like stepping into a dark
    room--you could step on something toxic or nothing at all, but
    you never know until you walk in.
        So you are essentially suggesting when do you walk into the
    dark room.
        Mr. Castro. How much time do I have, Chair? How am I doing?
        Mr. Poe. Twenty seconds.
        Mr. Castro. All right. I yield back.
        Mr. Poe. I thank the gentleman. I will say this to the
    gentleman from Arkansas who wanted to continue to ask
    questions, congratulations on your election and you will find
    that in the Senate they have no time limits on anything.
        So you will be able to pontificate and ask questions
    indefinitely.
        Mr. Cotton. I am going to have to learn to be much more
    long winded then.
        Mr. Poe. I want to thank all the gentlemen for being here.
    The information has been excellent. And this subcommittee is
    adjourned. Thank you.
        [Whereupon, at 3:31 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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