[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 113-121]
ADAPTING U.S. MISSILE DEFENSE FOR
FUTURE THREATS: RUSSIA, CHINA
AND MODERNIZING THE NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE ACT
__________
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
JULY 23, 2014
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
89-514 PDF WASHINGTON : 2015
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Publishing
Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800;
DC area (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2104 Mail: Stop IDCC,
Washington, DC 20402-0001
SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES
MIKE ROGERS, Alabama, Chairman
TRENT FRANKS, Arizona JIM COOPER, Tennessee
DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado LORETTA SANCHEZ, California
MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
MO BROOKS, Alabama RICK LARSEN, Washington
JOE WILSON, South Carolina JOHN GARAMENDI, California
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio HENRY C. ``HANK'' JOHNSON, Jr.,
JOHN FLEMING, Louisiana Georgia
RICHARD B. NUGENT, Florida ANDRE CARSON, Indiana
JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma MARC A. VEASEY, Texas
Tim Morrison, Counsel
Leonor Tomero, Counsel
Eric Smith, Clerk
C O N T E N T S
----------
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2014
Page
Hearing:
Wednesday, July 23, 2014, Adapting U.S. Missile Defense for
Future Threats: Russia, China and Modernizing the National
Missile Defense Act............................................ 1
Appendix:
Wednesday, July 23, 2014......................................... 27
----------
WEDNESDAY, JULY 23, 2014
ADAPTING U.S. MISSILE DEFENSE FOR FUTURE THREATS: RUSSIA, CHINA AND
MODERNIZING THE NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE ACT
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Cooper, Hon. Jim, a Representative from Tennessee, Ranking
Member, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces....................... 2
Rogers, Hon. Mike, a Representative from Alabama, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces............................... 1
WITNESSES
Coyle, Philip E., Senior Science Fellow, Center for Arms Control
and Non-Proliferation.......................................... 5
Joseph, Ambassador Robert G., Former Under Secretary of State for
Arms Control and International Security........................ 3
Woolsey, Ambassador R. James, Jr., Chairman, Foundation for
Defense of Democracies......................................... 2
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Cooper, Hon. Jim............................................. 33
Coyle, Philip E.............................................. 55
Joseph, Ambassador Robert G.................................. 44
Rogers, Hon. Mike............................................ 31
Woolsey, Ambassador R. James, Jr............................. 35
Documents Submitted for the Record:
CBO letter of July 21, 2014, on Ground-Based Midcourse
Defense program budgets.................................... 71
Chinese ministry of defense news release announcing land-
based anti-missile test.................................... 74
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Cooper................................................... 82
Mr. Garamendi................................................ 83
Mr. Rogers................................................... 77
ADAPTING U.S. MISSILE DEFENSE FOR FUTURE
THREATS: RUSSIA, CHINA AND MODERNIZING THE NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE ACT
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, July 23, 2014.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:49 p.m., in
room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Mike Rogers
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE ROGERS, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
ALABAMA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES
Mr. Rogers. Good afternoon. I call this hearing of the
Strategic Forces Subcommittee to order. We are here today to
discuss an issue of rising importance to the United States.
According to the Missile Defense Agency, quote, ``there has
been an increase of over 1,200 additional ballistic missiles
over the last 5 years. The total of ballistic missiles outside
the United States, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization,
Russia and China has risen over 5,900. Hundreds of launchers
and missiles are currently within the range of our deployed
forces today,'' close quote. And as we know, Russia and China
are both engaged in aggressive modernization programs pointing
hundreds of missiles of all sizes and ranges at the U.S., its
allies, and our deployed forces. That is why we are here today
for this hearing titled, ``Adapting U.S. Missile Defense for
Future Threats: Russia, China and Modernizing the NMD Act.''
We have another of our panel of distinguished witnesses
joining us today. First, we have Ambassador James Woolsey, Jr.,
Chairman, Foundation for Defense of Democracies; Ambassador
Robert Joseph, former Under Secretary of State for Arms Control
and International Security; and Mr. Philip Coyle, Senior
Science Fellow, Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation.
As usual, I will introduce my own statement for the record,
and without objection, that is so ordered, and I will recognize
the distinguished gentleman from Tennessee, who is going to
take us all out for Memphis barbecue after Alabama wins the SEC
[Southeastern Conference] this year. I yield to the ranking
member.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Rogers can be found in the
Appendix on page 31.]
STATEMENT OF HON. JIM COOPER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM TENNESSEE,
RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES
Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Nearly everything you
say is accurate except for that last part. Nashville barbecue
is way better than Memphis anyway.
I am honored that the witnesses are here. I apologize for
the delay. I look forward to the testimony.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Cooper can be found in the
Appendix on page 33.]
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Cooper.
I now recognize our distinguished panel of witnesses. If
you would please summarize your prepared statements for not
more than 5 minutes, and your full statement will be made a
part of the record.
First, we will start with you, Ambassador Woolsey. Thank
you for being here with us.
STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR R. JAMES WOOLSEY, JR., CHAIRMAN,
FOUNDATION FOR DEFENSE OF DEMOCRACIES
Ambassador Woolsey. Thank you. It is an honor to be with
you.
Mr. Chairman, I wanted to say just a few words about
electromagnetic pulse because it is a threat that is not really
debated in the public much. It is known to specialists, but it
has been highly classified until relatively recently. It is
essentially the vulnerability of our infrastructure, and
particularly our electric grid, to pulses that either could
come from the sun, for example, Quebec's electric grid was
nearly completely wiped out back in 1989 by a solar generation.
But it can also occur as a result of a detonation of a
relatively simple nuclear weapon up at low Earth orbit level a
few tens of miles, and that detonation, by utilizing the
fireball and gamma rays from a nuclear detonation, can be
extremely destructive to our electric grid.
We have a lot of remarks by Chinese and Russian specialists
talking about the utilization of electromagnetic pulse. The
Russians have bragged to us in private that they have been
helping the North Koreans figure out how to use a simple
nuclear weapon and a simple ballistic missile to attack the
grid of the United States, and this possibility is not just
theoretical. It is something that is well understood by
physicists because the earth has been receiving shocks of this
kind from the sun for hundreds of millions of years.
So one of the things that we really need to do is move
quickly to build resilience into our electric grid, and here we
are talking really about a few dollars per person in cost. And
at the same time, we need to figure out how to deal with the
threat of utilization of nuclear weapons in very limited
numbers by not only Russia or China, but a rogue state, such as
North Korea or, after, I am afraid, probably just a few more
months, Iran. This deserves the kind of attention that only
this committee and its Senate counterpart, I think, could bring
to this type of debate because there is a strong desire to
avoid trouble and avoid needing to deal with something that
might cost some money on the part of much of industry.
My friend, who was the chairman of the ARPA-E, Eric Toone,
the Advanced Research Project Agency for the Energy Department,
2 years ago moved the numbers himself and reviewed them, and he
said there is more R&D [research and development] annually by
the American dog food industry than there is by those who are
seeking to build resilience into our electric grid. Now I guess
it is a good thing for us to have healthy dogs, but in any kind
of balance of proportion of where R&D money ought to go, I
would urge strongly the review of the threat to our electric
grid from electromagnetic pulse, how easily that can be put
together and what types of work on material and devices at
modest cost could build the sort of things we need in order to
avoid this, I think, extremely serious threat. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Woolsey can be found
in the Appendix on page 35.]
Mr. Rogers. Thank you.
Ambassador Joseph.
STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR ROBERT G. JOSEPH, FORMER UNDER
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR ARMS CONTROL AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
Ambassador Joseph. Mr. Chairman, thank you for the
invitation to testify today. I have submitted a prepared
statement for the record, and in that statement, I address the
questions that are before the committee. I contrast the
fundamentally different approaches of the Bush and Obama
administrations to the development and deployment of a limited
missile defense system.
At the program level, the Obama administration from the
outset substantially reduced the funding for missile defense
and particularly for those capabilities that were to provide
for the protection of the American territory and population
centers. Programs intended to keep pace with the threat were
cancelled, such as work on fast interceptors, including boost
phase capabilities, as well as the airborne laser that had
destroyed both solid and liquid missiles in flight. The
multiple kill vehicle designed to provide a counter to the
anticipated deployment of countermeasures was ended without
replacement, and even critical sensors were mothballed,
including initially the Sea-Based X-Band Radar that provided
the most effective precision tracking.
At the policy level and again in very stark contrast to his
predecessor, President Obama has repeatedly demonstrated a
willingness to cut back on missile defenses in seeking other
objectives, such as enticing Russia to negotiate offensive arms
reductions. This was reflected in the 2009 decision to cancel a
third site in Europe and again last year with the termination
of the SM3-IIB [Standard Missile 3]. While U.S. strategic
defenses have been reduced in numbers and capabilities for the
future have been abandoned, the threat to the U.S. homeland has
grown, not just from North Korea and Iran, but from Putin's
Russia, which has embarked on a strategic build-up of offensive
and missile defense capabilities reminiscent of the Soviet
days.
The consequences of downgrading U.S. defenses, the increase
in the threats that we face, and the policy failures to deal
with these threats have major implications for U.S. missile
defenses. I will summarize very briefly six conclusions.
One, we must restore the priority of homeland missile
defense to keep pace with the qualitative and quantitative
nature of the rogue state missile threat. Major budget cuts and
multiple program cancellations have left us with an inadequate
and obsolescing defense against missile attacks from states
like North Korea.
Two, current problems with the GMD [Ground-Based Midcourse
Defense] system and, in particular, the kill vehicle, must be
fixed. Last month's successful test marked progress in this
area, but improved reliability of the system must be
demonstrated through active testing and spiral improvements.
The number of interceptors must be increased beyond the 14
announced last March. These are interceptors that would already
have been deployed under the Bush plan. Cancellation of the
SM3-IIB program intended to field in Europe a counter to
Iranian long-range missiles in the future makes additional GBI
[Ground Based Interceptor] deployments at a third site in the
United States essential.
Three, the GMD system must also evolve with improved
sensors, as well as with capabilities that can defeat
countermeasures and provide greater cost efficiency for
intercepting larger numbers of missiles. At-sea capabilities
that can contribute to the defense of the U.S. homeland should
be supported, recognizing the mobility and the cost advantages
offered by Aegis-class ships.
Four, the United States must reassess the role of missile
defenses with Russia and China. Past calls for fielding a
capability against accidental or unauthorized launches such as
that proposed earlier by Senator Nunn are even more relevant
today given the state of U.S. relations with Russia and China.
We also should examine how defenses might contribute to
deterrence of Russia and China. This is not a new concept but
one that has been incorporated in past Presidential guidance of
both Democrat and Republican administrations. While today's
security setting is much different from that of the Cold War,
Russia's increased reliance on its nuclear forces, and the
greater prospect for a miscalculation with both Moscow and
Beijing argue for a review of past strategic thinking.
Five, we cannot defend against larger-scale missile attacks
from Russia, or potentially China, in the same manner that we
are defending against rogue states. What we can do is explore
how non-kinetic approaches, such as directed energy, can be
integrated into our BMD architecture. We should also explore
the full potential of space for the deployment of sensors and
as well as interceptors to meet future defense requirements by
taking full advantage of advances in critically important
areas, such as computing and lightweight materials.
And, six, the way forward I have described will require
additional funding in a time of budget austerity. The amount
likely will be far less than the cuts imposed over the past 6
years. Funding could also come from shifting resources back
from theater programs to strategic defenses. The current
imbalance with about $4 out of every $5 going to theater
programs is simply out of sync with our defense requirements.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Joseph can be found
in the Appendix on page 44.]
Mr. Rogers. Thank you.
And, Mr. Coyle, you are recognized.
STATEMENT OF PHILIP E. COYLE, SENIOR SCIENCE FELLOW, CENTER FOR
ARMS CONTROL AND NON-PROLIFERATION
Mr. Coyle. Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Cooper, and
distinguished members of the Strategic Forces Subcommittee, I
very much appreciate your invitation to appear before you today
to support your study of adapting U.S. missile defense for
future threats. In my opening remarks, I want to describe why
it would be unwise for the United States to pursue a missile
defense against the intercontinental ballistic missile forces
of Russia and China. There are basically three important
reasons.
First, U.S. missile defenses, especially U.S. defenses
against ICBMs [intercontinental ballistic missiles], can at
best deal only with limited attacks, and even that goal remains
a major technological challenge. All missile defense systems
can be overwhelmed. All missile defense systems have
limitations, and those limitations can be exploited by the
offense. By definition, it is only if the attack is limited
that the defense can have a hope of not being overwhelmed. If
the enemy also employs countermeasures, such as stealth, radar
jamming, decoys, and chaff, as Russia and China do, U.S.
defenses are even more vulnerable. The technology is simply not
in hand to deal with an all-out Russian or Chinese ICBM attack.
The U.S. has experimented with many different ideas for decades
hoping to find a way. A few examples are the nuclear-bomb
pumped x-ray laser; Brilliant Pebbles, a constellation of
perhaps as many as 1,000 orbiting interceptors; and the
Safeguard ABM [anti-ballistic missile] system deployed in North
Dakota that the U.S. Congress cancelled because Russian ICBMs
could overwhelm it. These and other systems were cancelled as
unworkable, ineffective, or too costly, as when Secretary of
Defense Robert Gates ended the Airborne Laser program.
The second reason is cost. In 2002, the Congressional
Budget Office [CBO] estimated the cost of several different DOD
[Department of Defense] missile defense programs, assuming they
all would continue through 2025, as part of a layered missile
defense system. The CBO estimated that a system of Ground-Based
Interceptors, analogous to the current Ground-Based Midcourse
system, would cost between $26 billion and $74 billion. A
system of interceptors launched from ships, similar to the Navy
Aegis system would cost $50 billion to $64 billion, and a
space-based laser system would cost $80 billion to $100
billion. In today's dollars, the 2002 CBO estimate for the
space-based laser could be as high as $132 billion. CBO
cautioned against adding all these numbers together because the
systems might share some common elements such as early-warning
satellite systems, and CBO did not estimate the cost of a full,
layered system. Of course, the GMD system and the Navy Aegis
system are ongoing today. The space-based laser program office
was shut down in 2002 and its research transferred to the MDA
[Missile Defense Agency] Laser Technologies Directorate. All of
these systems were for a limited defense. CBO didn't estimate
the cost of a massive system designed to stop all of Russia and
China's ICBMs, as there was no such program in 2002.
The third reason is strategic stability. If the U.S. had
missile defenses that could handle ICBMs, the ICBM arsenals of
Russia and China, a kind of Maginot Line against ICBMs, and if,
unlike the Maginot Line, those defenses could not be defeated,
it would be strategically destabilizing. Russia and China would
need to respond with all manner of new forces, perhaps even
more attacking missiles, perhaps extensive deployment of cruise
missiles against which our ballistic missile defense systems
are useless, or perhaps the deployment of large numbers of
troops in regions that are currently stable and peaceful. Then
our missile defenses would have upset the strategic balance and
provoked new military responses from Russia and China.
Of course, under such conditions, Russia would certainly
not agree to further reductions in their strategic nuclear
arsenals, as the U.S. and Russia have been doing under START
[Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty], the Strategic Offensive
Reductions Treaty, and New START. Russia might consider
aggressive new U.S. missile defense programs as justification
to withdraw from the agreements that have significantly reduced
the threat from nuclear weapons.
In a May 28 talk at the Atlantic Council, Vice Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral James Winnefeld, summarized
why limited defenses are in the best U.S. interests. As you
know, he said, ``we have told Russia and the world that we will
not rely on missile defense for strategic deterrence of Russia
because it would simply be too hard and too expensive and too
strategically destabilizing to even try.'' Later, the Admiral
reiterated this point saying, ``And let me be clear once again:
It is not the policy of the United States to build a ballistic
missile defense system to counter Russian ballistic missiles.''
Mr. Chairman, that completes my opening remarks. I am happy
to take your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Coyle can be found in the
Appendix on page 55.]
Mr. Rogers. Great. I thank all of you for those statements.
I thank you for your preparation to be here. I know it takes a
lot of effort to prepare for these hearings, and I do
appreciate it.
I will start with my questions. First, I would say, Mr.
Joseph, you just heard Mr. Coyle's comments. I would love to
hear your thoughts about those observations.
Ambassador Joseph. Mr Chairman, I have heard the same
talking points from missile defense critics for really the past
30 years. Missile defense won't work. Missile defense is too
expensive. Missile defense will start an arms race. Missile
defense is destabilizing. These are the same arguments that
were used to support adherence to the ABM Treaty for three
decades, and this left us, they left the United States
defenseless against not just missile threats from the Soviet
Union, but also from emerging threats like North Korea. When
the U.S. withdrew from the ABM Treaty, the sky didn't fall.
There was no arms race. But what happened was missile defense
critics refocused the same talking points on the Bush
administration's missile defense plans. And, in fact, those
talking points have been used against every missile defense
undertaking that I am aware of.
Last night, in preparation for this hearing, I Googled
``Iron Dome'' and Mr. Coyle's name, and up pops an article from
the New York Times from last March, entitled ``Weapons Experts
Raise Doubts about Israel's Antimissile System.'' You guessed
it. It is too expensive. It won't work, and it is a rush to
failure. The talking points of the critics are not only sort of
repetitive. They are also wrong. And in particular, the talking
points that are often used that the Bush administration rushed
to failure, that there wasn't adequate testing, in fact, and I
have the statistics here, when President Bush made the decision
to deploy in late 2002, seven intercept tests had been
conducted, five of which were successful. Three additional
successful flight tests had taken place of the booster to be
deployed. During the Bush years, 7 of 10 intercept tests were
successful, and the reasons for the failures of the other 3
were identified and corrected.
It is true that the initial approach to GMD did not follow
the standard acquisition practices. This was a deliberate
policy choice. It was deliberate because we had no defenses
against the North Korean threat, and we needed to move forward,
but we did so in a very deliberate and measured way, including
with testing of the program.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you. We deploy missile defense systems
for anti-ship ballistic missiles from China. How do we explain
or do you think it is reasonable for us to expect the American
people to find that acceptable that we go to that extent for
5,500 sailors, but yet we aren't willing to spend money to
protect 5 million Americans in either Seattle or Los Angeles
with missile defense capability? Do any of you understand why
we are unwilling as a nation from a policy standpoint to deal
with that risk? I open that to any one of you. Mr. Joseph.
Ambassador Joseph. I have always found it difficult to
explain things that don't make sense, and I don't think it
makes sense to the American people.
Mr. Rogers. And I would argue I don't think the American
people even realize that we have the ICBM and SLBM [submarine-
launched ballistic missile] threats that are there and without
adequate resources to protect us. This is another question for
all the witnesses. We are deploying a cruise missile defense
capability to protect the National Capital Region from cruise
missiles, including, according to the commander of NORTHCOM
[U.S. Northern Command], Russian cruise missiles. Does it make
sense that we deploy cruise missile defenses to protect the
Capital from Russian cruise missiles, but we do not deploy
missile defenses to protect the American people against a
Russian ballistic missile? Ambassador Woolsey.
Ambassador Woolsey. Mr. Chairman, I don't think it makes
any sense, and I think it makes even less sense given the
devastating nature of what could be an electromagnetic pulse
attack. A launch from a freighter off the coast of a simple
Scud missile with a very primitive nuclear weapon on it to up
30, 40, 50 miles above the East Coast would detonate, make
possible a single detonation that could effectively destroy the
East Coast grid. And if the electric grid is destroyed, the EMP
Commission says that within 12 months of an EMP event,
approximately two-thirds of the American population would
likely perish from starvation, disease, and societal breakdown.
Other experts estimate the likely loss to be closer to 90
percent. We would be back, not in the 1980s pre-Web, but back
in the 1880s, pre-electric grid, and very few of us have enough
plow horses and water pump handles to live in the 19th century.
It seems stunning that something like this can happen, but
the electronics we have today are approximately a million times
more sensitive to electromagnetic pulse than the electronics
that were taken out in 1962 by the very last atmospheric tests
before the Atmospheric Test Ban Treaty cut in, in 1962. Both
the Soviets and we were stunned by the degree of destruction
many hundreds of miles away of even the primitive electronics
of the time. But now at a million times more sensitive and a
million times more vulnerable, the control systems of our
electric grid are vulnerable to destruction by a single nuclear
detonation up 40, 50, 60 miles into the atmosphere. It can
occur by a, as I said, a Scud missile being launched from a
freighter off the coast. It could take place by what the
Soviets call a fractional orbital bombardment system, a FOBS,
which essentially means a satellite, in this case containing a
nuclear weapon, that is launched to the south, instead of to
the north. To the south, we have virtually no observation,
virtually no radars, virtually no sensors, essentially nothing.
If they launch to the south and the satellite comes around the
earth over the south pole and then up into the Northern
Hemisphere and detonates, it could have the effect of exactly
what was described by the EMP Commission report that I just
read.
Mr. Rogers. And does that commission report indicate that
our public utilities have not taken appropriate steps to harden
their grid?
Ambassador Woolsey. They are--Mr. Chairman, I've got to be
careful how I phrase this. They are as ineffective and as
uncommitted to making those improvements as any action by any
American industrial or business group that I have ever been
acquainted with or seen. They will not admit that this is a
problem. They invent numbers. It is a trade association. NERC
[North American Electric Reliability Corporation], the National
Electrical Resources Corporation, North American Electric
Resilience--not Resilience. I will get the acronym right in a
second, but it is essentially the trade association for
industry. And they have had people in NERC, including one who
was head of NERC at one point, who has taken these issues
responsibly and tried to work on them. But generally speaking,
they do not do anything that would help the country deal with
this problem. And if you look at how much it would cost, you
are talking from the commission report, about $7 per American
to build resilience into the grid. That is one really, really
nice cup of coffee in the morning.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you very much.
My time is expired.
I now recognize the ranking member for any questions he may
have.
Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I was just wondering sitting here listening to the
testimony if we need to have another hearing to allow some of
these folks to give the counterarguments because some pretty
serious charges have been made here, including inventing
numbers and things like that. So, I think that might be a fair
hearing to consider. I was also wondering if Mr. Coyle would
like a chance to respond to Ambassador Joseph, because he made
some pretty serious charges against you. If you would like to
respond, I want to give you that opportunity at least.
Mr. Coyle. Well, I don't know what Ambassador Joseph found
when he was Googling me, so I am not sure what he was referring
to. We also talked for a minute there about cruise missiles as
a threat, and I could just add to that, that the effort we are
putting into cruise missile defenses is currently way, way less
and more primitive than what we are doing for ballistic
missiles. And some analysts regard a cruise missile threat as
more likely because, as was referred earlier, a nation with not
a lot of sophistication could put a cruise missile on some kind
of a vessel and get close to our shores and launch that way. So
the balance between the effort we put into cruise missile
defenses and ballistic missile defenses, I think is a
legitimate thing to be looked at.
Mr. Cooper. Ambassador Woolsey made some very interesting
points about electromagnetic pulse. We used to have a colleague
here, Roscoe Bartlett, who rode this hobby-horse for some time,
and I do not want to in any way underestimate the threat, but I
do suggest that it is probably better to build coalitions than
to champion causes individually. I know Ambassador Woolsey has
been on the Board of Trustees of Stanford University, of many
other distinguished places, think tank for Booz Hamilton. Have
you had any success persuading your colleagues on those boards
about the EMP threat?
Ambassador Woolsey. I was on the Stanford board back some
years ago, Congressman. I have been interested in this issue
really for the last couple of years and have been doing a good
deal of reading and work on it in that amount of time, but if
we go back to either the time I was at Booz Allen, which began
shortly after 9/11 for a few years, or way back when I was a
Stanford trustee, I was not involved in this particular set of
issues, EMP, at those times, but I would be delighted to work
with anybody who wants to work with me on this. I think it is
an extremely important issue.
Mr. Cooper. I was just thinking in terms of persuading
people that it is a genuine threat, you are a relative newcomer
to the issue. You served in and out of government for many,
many years. Did you just suddenly become aware of this?
Ambassador Woolsey. Not suddenly. I suppose 2 to 3 years
ago, I began to develop a serious interest in it, having done
some reading that piqued my interest.
Mr. Cooper. And the chief barrier to persuasion with other
people is?
Ambassador Woolsey. I think a lot of it is that people have
a very hard time admitting to themselves that it could be as
awful as what I have described. We all like to have manageable
problems. There is a sense of success in being able to see
something that is difficult to do and then succeeding against
it. Electromagnetic pulse is very, very challenging. It makes
most of our other dilemmas in the world I think look
comparatively straightforward by comparison. And I think that
we need to step up to the fact that although defending against
the ballistic missiles that would set off EMP is extremely
difficult, we might well be able to build resilience into our
electric grid relatively quickly and relatively affordably if
we could get our country organized to deal with it.
Part of the problem is that the electric grid has FERC
[Federal Energy Regulatory Commission]. It has NERC. It has
Department of Energy. It has electricity commissions in the
individual States. It is a situation where there are lots and
lots of people dashing off in all different directions in terms
of managing the grid. And to pull together and have a coherent
approach is technically possible, I think, but
organizationally, it is a really stunning challenge.
Mr. Cooper. It is my understanding that our former
colleague, Roscoe Bartlett, is living largely off the grid and
has hardened his network so that he is prepared. Are you
prepared for this threat?
Ambassador Woolsey. Not completely, but I do have solar
panels on my house, and I have various improvements like that,
geothermal heat pump and so forth, that would make me partially
grid-resilient I guess.
Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I see a number of our colleagues are here.
I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman.
The chair now recognizes my friend and colleague from
Alabama, Mr. Brooks, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Brooks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
This question is for all the witnesses. In 2009, the
administration sent Poland a Patriot battery with no missile
interceptors. The Poles called this deployment a potted plant.
Presumably this was done to attempt to mitigate Russian
concerns. What is the damage done to our alliances when we make
such nondeployment deployments?
Mr. Coyle. I don't know why that decision was made the way
it was made. I just can't comment.
Ambassador Joseph. Sir, I think there is a pattern of these
types of decisions, at least that I have discerned in our
foreign policy over the last few years. We don't back up what
we say. We don't impose consequences for red lines that are
established and then crossed, and I think the consequence is an
erosion of the confidence of our allies in the United States
and a view on the part of our adversaries that they have little
to fear from the United States.
Mr. Brooks. Ambassador Woolsey, do you have anything to
add? You don't have to.
Ambassador Woolsey. I think Bob summed it up very well.
Mr. Brooks. This one is also to all witnesses. Last week
this subcommittee held a hearing on Russia's violation of the
INF [Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces] Treaty. What are the
implications of the administration's refusal to provide the
annually required report and to finally, years overdue, confirm
that Russia is in violation of that treaty? What do our allies
take away from this meekness, and how about Russia and Putin?
Ambassador Woolsey. Congressman, I have not spent much time
on the INF Treaty, but I was the head of delegation and chief
negotiator for the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, which
Mr. Putin has also walked away from. It is a treaty that, among
other things, not only locked in the deployments country by
country that ended the Cold War, but when it was negotiated in
1989, 1990, 1991, it had a provision that prohibited any
country from placing troops on the land of another without
formal written permission, so what Mr. Putin has done in
Georgia and what he has done in Ukraine and what he may well be
doing in other parts of Central and Eastern Europe are clearly
in violation of that treaty, and that is why he walked away
from it, just as he walked away from the INF Treaty. He will
basically walk away from whatever treaty limits Russia in any
way that he doesn't want.
Ambassador Joseph. I think President Obama said it best:
``All arms control commitments must be scrupulously observed,
and if they are not, there must be consequences.'' The fact
that it appears that Russia is in clear material breach, I
would argue, of this INF Treaty and that there are no
consequences, I think undermines not just the confidence in the
United States, but the whole arms control process. Because if
you can't depend on other countries observing and if they don't
observe that there are consequences, what good is the process?
What good are arms control agreements? They are certainly not
going to be something that you want to pin your security on.
Mr. Coyle. Mr. Brooks, I am aware that there is a debate
about whether or not this is a violation. I have looked at it
enough myself to know that it certainly is getting close, if it
is not. But I think part of the issue here has been whether or
not the administration wants to treat it as a violation, and
that involves statecraft and other things that I am not an
expert about.
Mr. Brooks. Well, just quickly, one last question. In view
of the issues associated with Russia and the United States and
the treaties that we have with Russia and particularly the INF
and apparent violation of that treaty by Russia, what weight do
you give to any treaties between the United States and Russia?
Ambassador Woolsey. I think only treaties that the Russian
leader, particularly this Russian leader, thinks are in
Russia's interests at any one point of time are going to be
binding on Russia. He does not have a sense at all of the rule
of law, of the standards to which he is sometimes held by
statements at the United Nations and the rest. He is a KGB
officer, and not to put too fine a point on it, as far as I am
concerned, he is a thug. He has no interest in, no sense of
obligation to treaties and the rule of law. He will observe one
or more for some time if he thinks that it is in his interest
and he is not ready to violate them in order to move Russia's
interest as he perceives it forward by some other means. But he
simply lacks, as far as I am concerned, the sense of obligation
that most Western leaders and certainly American leaders have
toward a treaty that one has signed and has been approved by
our Senate, and therefore, is something we should observe. He
doesn't think that way as far as I am concerned.
Mr. Rogers. Gentleman's time is expired.
The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Georgia, Mr.
Johnson, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Johnson. Thank you. Ambassador Joseph, you just
mentioned about consequences for Russia's violation of which
treaty?
Ambassador Joseph. The INF Treaty from 1987.
Mr. Johnson. And what consequences would you recommend and
for what violations of that treaty?
Ambassador Joseph. Well, the violation that has been I know
the subject of consideration by this subcommittee has been the
development of a ground-launched cruise missile that has a
range that is banned by this treaty, a range between 500 and
5,500 kilometers. This is the one treaty that outlawed an
entire class of missiles, of ballistic missiles and cruise
missiles within that range. It applies only to the United
States and to Russia, which is what the Russians are arguing:
Why should we live with this restriction when other countries,
such as China, don't have this same restriction? But it, I
think, shows the cynicism of Russia's attitude toward arms
control in the sense that, instead of legally withdrawing from
this treaty, as we did under the ABM Treaty, we did it
according to the provisions of the treaty, they simply violate
it because they don't want to pay the political price or what
they see may be a political price. It shows the contempt that
they have for the rule of law, as Jim just mentioned in this
context.
What should we do about it? Well, if you go back to the
history of INF, the reason we were deploying INF missiles was
that the Soviet Union had been deploying SS-20 missiles by the
hundreds. We deployed 464, were on course of deploying 464. The
agreement was made that we would eliminate all of these
weapons. The question was, how do we ensure a credible
deterrent with our European partners in the context of the
Soviet Union and the Red Army and the Cold War? That is not the
security environment today. I don't believe we are living in
the Cold War today, even though some of the actions that Russia
have taken and particularly their buildup of nuclear forces is
reminiscent of those days. So what do we do? Well, I think we
have to think about sanctions, sanctions with Europeans. I
think we have to think about----
Mr. Johnson. Do you think Europeans are going to respond to
sanctions like they have with respect to the Ukraine?
Ambassador Joseph. I hope not, but I think it is going to
depend on American leadership.
Mr. Johnson. Well, I tell you. What--if America--assuming
that what you say is correct and the Russians are developing
this class of banned cruise missiles, is there a way that those
missiles gain an advantage over our defenses right now?
Ambassador Joseph. Absolutely. Absolutely.
Mr. Johnson. So then what you would recommend then would be
that we go into another arms race and try to counter what they
have done?
Ambassador Joseph. Of course not. I am not recommending an
arms race. But again, if you go back to the context in which
this treaty was negotiated, the Soviet Union had deployed SS-
20s in order to cut the link between the United States and our
European allies, to de-link the Europeans from the United
States. This was about deterrence. This was about deterrence in
the context of the Cold War.
Things have changed, but the Europeans still, I would
argue, feel a need for a strong nuclear deterrent. At the last
NATO summit, they talked about that need. So this may require,
this may require more capabilities. It certainly requires us, I
believe, not to withdraw the remaining dual-capable aircraft
and B61 bombs that are our only remaining theater nuclear
deterrent in Europe. I think we need to look at what those
options are, but we need to have consequences, as President
Obama said.
Mr. Johnson. All right. Thank you. With my last question, I
would like to ask Ambassador Woolsey, an EMP assault, who would
be the likely perpetrator? Is it a state or non-state actor,
and what do you see their end game being, having been
successful at creating a successful attack? What would happen?
What do they expect to gain out of it?
Ambassador Woolsey. Well, this would be undertaken only by
someone or a country or group that wanted to absolutely destroy
the United States because the consequences, as the commission
mentioned, the range of debate is between those who think two-
thirds of the American population would die and those who think
90 percent of the American population would die.
Mr. Johnson. The cause of death being?
Ambassador Woolsey. The cause of death being starvation,
disease, societal breakdown. We have 18 critical
infrastructures, and 17 of them depend upon electricity. So
without electricity, you have no food, you have no water, you
have no finances, you have no communications. You are back in
the 19th century without the ability to support the U.S.
population. I think that that is something that even at its
worst, China and Russia are unlikely to want to bring about,
but we had several incidents, including one very dramatic one
during the Cuban Missile Crisis during the Cold War in which we
came very, very close to nuclear war. In one case, the Cuban
portion of the confrontation in the Cuban missile crisis, in
one case, one Soviet navy admiral--or, rather, navy captain
turning a key as his two colleagues had turned it----
Mr. Rogers. Excuse me, Ambassador. We are way over time. I
am going to have to go to the next Member.
Gentleman from Oklahoma, Mr. Bridenstine, is recognized for
5 minutes.
Mr. Bridenstine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ambassador Woolsey, question for you regarding EMP. If we
did have an event, such as an EMP, the electric grid, of
course, would be at stake. Would all of our electronic gadgets
as well be at stake?
Ambassador Woolsey. As I understand it, and you realize you
are getting this from a lawyer/history major, Congressman, not
from a double E. As I understand it, there are three types of
pulses that would come from an electromagnetic pulse detonation
of, say, a nuclear weapon. One is rather similar to lightning,
and we can discount it because we have dealt with seeing to it
that our buildings and electronics can operate even when there
is lightning. One has very short wavelengths and operates
generally at line of sight, so if it were detonated up at a
particular altitude, it would more or less travel to the
horizon in all directions and would knock out everybody's
computers, whether it is in your car or in your refrigerator at
home or in this voice-magnifying box.
The really terrible one is the third kind, which has very
long wavelengths, and the waves ride along transmission lines
and destroy transformers as they go. The transformers are the
heart of our electrical grid. They are what step up the voltage
so it can be moved, step it down again so we can use it in our
homes and businesses and industry. That situation is one in
which the transmission lines run so far and the electromagnetic
pulse with the long wavelength carries so far, that the effect
could be devastating over very large areas. It could be
possible, although everything would have to work just right for
it, for the entire continental grid of the United States to be
taken out by one detonation.
Mr. Bridenstine. So if we were to harden the grid, is that
sufficient, or would the calamity that you speak of happen as
computers and systems are fried across the country? Like is the
grid enough?
Ambassador Woolsey. The grid is not enough, but it helps a
lot. If one could harden the grid against the long wavelength
and the destruction of the transformers via the transmission
lines carrying the long pulse, it would make it possible for us
to come back, and it would not destroy the whole
infrastructure. We would still have a lot of losses of local
computers and automobiles and so forth, but those, once we
started manufacturing again, could be redesigned in such a way
that the computer in your car would not be knocked out any more
than it is by lightning. So the thing that is a huge problem is
this knocking out of the transmission lines and the
transformers because the transformers are the heart of our
electrical system. If they go down, everything goes down.
Mr. Bridenstine. Got it. Ambassador Joseph, question for
you regarding Ground-Based, Midcourse Defense. We have had
tests in the past that have been very successful. We have had
tests in the past that have not been successful. It seems like
every time there is an unsuccessful test, some people use that
as evidence that, look, it can't be done. We need to stop. When
we have successful tests, the same people aren't saying, hey,
look, we just accomplished something mighty. Let's continue to
advance this capability.
In your opinion, Ambassador Joseph, how important is it for
the United States of America to have a very robust R&D
capability for missile defense and on top of that, the
infrastructure to do not just testing but validation and
operational, how is it going to be used operationally? Can you
talk about that for a second and also just for us as
legislators, we have got to make sure that we are funding these
kind of capabilities, but we don't want to be funding them if
they are going to be used to say, oh, look this one test
failed. Therefore, we need to scrap the whole system.
Ambassador Joseph. Thank you. Yes, I think it is essential
that we have a robust research and development program. We do
need, as I said in my prepared statement, to fix the problems
with GMD, and I think we are on course to do that. I think that
we need to increase the number of interceptors. We need to do
research and development, and I would argue, deploy
capabilities like fast interceptors and multiple kill vehicles
that will keep pace with the threat, because the threat is
dynamic. The North Koreans are improving their capabilities.
The Iranians will be doing the same thing. There is just no
question about that. So this is dynamic. You can't just stop
with GMD in place. You have to develop for the future.
Also I think we need a robust R&D to take us beyond a
limited missile defense. We need to explore those capabilities
that will allow us to use missile defense as part of our
deterrent with regard to Russia and I think probably China in
the future, which means that we are going to have to have
capabilities beyond the terrestrial-based type interceptors. We
are going to have to have strong directed research in the field
of directed energy for example.
And I think space is very important. We need to explore the
full potential of space because I think if we are going to have
an option for dealing with larger-scale Russian-type threats,
it will only come if we are able to deploy effectively in
space. We need to find out what our options are, and to do
that, we need to have a very robust R&D capability, and we have
to maintain an infrastructure that can provide us with the
capabilities that we need in the future to keep up with the
multiple nature of the threats that we face.
Mr. Rogers. Thank the gentleman.
Gentleman's time is expired.
The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Arizona, Mr.
Franks, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Franks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank all of you
for being here.
Director Woolsey, I can call you, Ambassador, Director.
There is a lot of things I can call you. You have got a pretty
amazing curriculum vitae. And I won't try to pretend my
attitude toward you is somehow neutral. I consider you a
friend, and I am a fan and especially was grateful for your
testimony here today. You know the privilege I have of chairing
the EMP caucus gives me a special interest in some of the
comments that you made. And I guess it is important, I would
like to point out that, you know, we talked a lot about the EMP
Commission which is the gold standard study, but there are 11
studies, 11 major studies all the way from NASA [National
Aeronautics and Space Administration] to the Academy of
Sciences to the Department of Defense to FERC, to all of these,
and they all come to very similar conclusions. It is not as if
this somehow, that this was some anomaly. And, again, I just
appreciate your courage to be able to articulate this.
Over time, sometimes it seems like things happen. I would
like to say one thing before I ask you a question that I hope
would be some encouragement to you. I have the privilege of
chairing the World Summit on Electric Infrastructure Security,
and we did our fifth year in London, and for the first time, I
saw the industry, the major leaders, not NERC--NERC is still
that trade association that you mentioned--but some of the
major players now have come 180 degrees and are on board, and
it is really very, very encouraging, so I look forward to some
significant advances here.
But you raise a few interesting points in your testimony
about the potential Scud in the tub scenario, and you
essentially answered my question and you kind of got ahead of
me. But let me ask you, do you think and to what extent is not
having a protected grid an invitation to certain opponents of
America to exploit that vulnerability?
Ambassador Woolsey. Congressman, I think it is a really
open invitation if we don't have a resilient grid. The two
countries I am the most worried about would be North Korea and
Iran. North Korea already has nuclear weapons. It already has
ballistic missiles, and it has launched toward the south in the
sort of FOBS configuration, fractional orbit bombardment
system, so that something that was launched on that trajectory
into orbit would come around at us from the south where we have
no radars, or effectively none, and no ability to perceive what
is coming. So I think they have demonstrated something that
they have, and we know from the Russians that the Russians have
helped them. The Russians have told us this. And North Korea is
ruled by a madman as far as we can tell. This is not someone
who is just as stolid and someone who has great challenges for
us in figuring out how to negotiate with him and deal with Kim
Jong Un. Iran presents a different kind of problem because
although they have not tested a nuclear weapon yet, they have
tested ballistic missiles of course. They have tested ballistic
missiles launched from platforms in the water. They have tested
ballistic missiles firing toward the south. And moreover, the
leaders, Khamenei and the others are, at least if you listen to
what they say and take them seriously, they have very strong
religious views that it is their mission in eternity to destroy
us. It is not just hostility. It is a religious commitment that
we should be gotten rid of.
Mr. Franks. I think, for me, that is one of my greatest
concerns. When someone feels transcendentally justified, it
becomes a different equation and some of the traditional
deterrents is of little impact. Let me ask you one more quick
question. As you know, the Defense Department over the years
has spent literally billions now over the last four or five
decades hardening many of our defense critical assets against
EMP. We are very aware of it on the military side of it, and we
don't have difficulty convincing generals, but the civilian
grid issue, we remain completely vulnerable. If Iran were to,
say, gain a nuclear weapons capability today that they might
delegate to some nonstate actor, what do you think would be our
reaction toward hardening our grid at that point?
Ambassador Woolsey. I would hope our interests would pick
up quickly because it takes very little sophistication to
launch something like this. The books by Peter Pry talk for
example, about the possibility of launching a nuclear weapon up
to low Earth orbit altitude with a weather balloon. One is not
necessarily talking even about a ballistic missile. So anything
that can get a simple nuclear weapon weighing a few tens of
pounds up to 30 miles could create this EMP effect. And for the
Iranians to make it possible for Hezbollah to have a nuclear
weapon in a weather balloon is not beyond the reach of
imagination.
Mr. Franks. Well, let me just suggest to you, I am very
grateful to you for your courage, and I have said once here
just a few days ago that perhaps former Vice President Dick
Cheney was one of the most articulate spokesmen on this issue,
but I may have to change my mind here.
Ambassador Joseph, there is a great deal of respect on my
part for you, too, sir. They say that one of the most
encouraging things in the world is to hear your own convictions
fall from another's lips, and that is certainly what has
happened here today, and I appreciate you.
President Obama said, in 2001, that I, ``don't agree with
missile defense systems.'' In 2008, as a candidate, he stated,
``I will cut tens of billions of dollars in wasteful spending.
I will cut investments in unproven missile defense systems.''
Now he has implemented these what I think are radical political
ideologies rather than defense principles, and how would you
describe the impacts of these campaign speeches on our national
defense?
And Mr. Chairman, before I ask you to make that question,
could I ask that the Congressional Budget Office letter of July
21 be placed in the record that would show how this
administration has affected missile defense?
Mr. Rogers. Without objection, so ordered.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 71.]
Mr. Franks. And if you still remember the question here.
Ambassador Joseph. First of all, I think you characterized
the position of Senator Obama correctly. I mean, he was a
missile defense critic. He used the same talking points: It
won't work, it is too expensive, it will be destabilizing. He
in 2008 ran against basically missile defense, pledging that he
would cut tens of billions of dollars. He certainly has cut
billions of dollars from the budget, but it is interesting to
point out that in 2010, the DOD Ballistic Missile Defense
Review, President Obama's administration made the statement
that we are now, we, the United States, are now protected
against--against threats from North Korea and other rogue
states because we have a limited missile defense, and that
capability is due to the investments that had been made in
prior years in GMD. So apparently the policy has--has evolved
since--since 2001, and certainly since 2008.
Mr. Franks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will stop there, but
I would----
Mr. Rogers. We will do another round.
Mr. Franks. Okay.
Mr. Rogers. I appreciate it. Our clocks are screwed up, so
I am trying to make sure to give everybody plenty of time going
over, but let's go to our friend and colleague from California,
Mr. Garamendi, for 5 minutes or thereabouts.
Mr. Garamendi. I am sure you will let me know when
thereabout arrives.
Ambassador Joseph, you were discussing the success of the
limited missile defense system. Do you still hold the view that
it should be a limited missile defense system against North
Korea, Iran, and an unintended missile from Russia or China, or
should we go to a full-out missile defense system against the
Chinese and Russian numerous missiles that they have?
Ambassador Joseph. So that is a--a very important question.
Clearly I think, and I believe that there is a consensus, or a
general consensus, that we need to have a defense against rogue
state threats that would provide a limited capability against a
limited threat. On that, there is consensus.
I believe that there is greater cogency to the argument
that we need a capability for accidental and unauthorized
launch, which may not be the limited defense that you need for
a North Korea-type threat.
Mr. Garamendi. Describe. What did you just say and why did
you just say that?
Ambassador Joseph. Well, if you look at the missile defense
plan for the Bush 41 administration, it was a global protection
against accidental launches--or limited strikes, GPALS, Global
Protection Against Limited Strikes, and the defining
requirement was to protect the United States against, if I
remember correctly, about 200 warheads, which would be one
Soviet, one Russian boat that had been taken by, you know, by a
rogue commander. So you had, you know, an accidental and
limited capability, but it was much more than the limited
capability that you can get through terrestrial-based GMD-type
interceptors, which, you know, are----
Mr. Garamendi. I got the difference. Do you--should we then
go to the 1990--excuse me, 1991 policy or stay with the 1999
policy?
Ambassador Joseph. Well, I think given the change in our
relationship with Russia, which has certainly not been a change
for the positive, given that there is a huge--I would argue, a
huge prospect for miscalculation--I don't think this is first
strike, second strike, this is not cold war, but I think we are
in a situation where miscalculation can take place very easily.
It could have taken place in Georgia. I have been told by
Russian sources that in the context of Georgia, the Russians
were preparing, not--not--they didn't have their finger on the
trigger; they were preparing and they had plans for a nuclear
exchange with the United States, because they didn't know how
this would escalate.
And they think about nuclear weapons a lot differently than
we think about nuclear weapons. My sense is that of the
hundreds if not thousands of analysts on our side who were
following Georgia, not one was thinking about a nuclear
exchange. That is a very dangerous situation. That is a
situation in which miscalculation can occur, and I think we
need to protect against that. What are our options? I think we
need to explore what those options are. That is why we need to
invest in research and development----
Mr. Garamendi. If we need to explore, why don't you help us
explore.
Ambassador Joseph. Well, I think we need to emphasize
directed energy in our research and development and we need to
emphasize space. We need to consider a space testbed, which was
proposed earlier in the Bush administration, to find out what
our options are and whether those options are for an
unauthorized or accidental launch of the type I have described,
or whether we have options for larger-scale attacks on the part
of Russia or China. We should know what those options are,
because we do know that we are going to be surprised in the
future and that miscalculation with Beijing and with--and with
Moscow can happen.
Mr. Garamendi. I want you to put--the three of you to put
yourself in China and Russia's shoes with the same questions.
How do they perceive us? You said that we don't have one
analyst. Have we ever gone to a situation in which we are
preparing, in recent times, for a nuclear exchange?
Ambassador Woolsey. I think Russia is more of a problem
than China.
Mr. Garamendi. No. You are in their shoes.
Ambassador Woolsey. In--I think if I were----
Mr. Garamendi. How do look at the United States?
Ambassador Woolsey. In my old job, but in Russia rather
than in the United States, I could be tempted to think that I
couldn't accomplish my country's objectives of dominating
Europe and as much of Eurasia as possible without being rather
aggressive; and that Putin, as KGB officer and with his history
and the KGB's history of what they call disinformation,
dezinformatsia, essentially adopting as their own, their
propaganda.
Mr. Garamendi. So do you want to have your own missile
defense system because the United States has so many offensive
weapons?
Ambassador Woolsey. Oh, I want as much as I can get if I am
the head of the KGB. I want----
Mr. Garamendi. So are you building those? Does Russia build
missile defense systems?
Ambassador Woolsey. I am--yes, I think I am building
missile defense systems, I am building offensive systems, I am
working on electromagnetic pulse, all of the above.
Mr. Garamendi. Ambassador Joseph.
Ambassador Joseph. Well, first of all, Putin has declared
the United States----
Mr. Garamendi. No, no. You are----
Ambassador Joseph [continuing]. Is the largest adversary.
So from a Russian perspective, we are the adversary. Putin has
undertaken a large-scale modernization of their offensive
nuclear forces, all three legs of the triad. I understand from
open Russian sources, I don't have access to the intelligence,
that Russia plans by 2020 to spend more on missile defense than
the United States.
Mr. Garamendi. Sufficient to overwhelm our strategic
weapons?
Ambassador Joseph. Well, I think that as--you know, as--you
know, looking at it from Putin's perspective, that would be
exactly what he would want.
Mr. Garamendi. Do you have the money----
Ambassador Joseph. Look, this notion of destabilizing----
Mr. Garamendi. Do you have the money to do it?
Ambassador Joseph. This notion of destabilization and an
arms race, this is a western concept. It is--it was at the core
of the ABM treaty. The Russians never bought that.
Mr. Garamendi. Mr. Coyle, I don't have much time; in fact,
I am well over time, so--assuming the clock is half accurate.
Mr. Coyle. Well, Congressman Garamendi, just to quote
Admiral Winnefeld again, ``it is not the policy of the United
States to build a ballistic missile defense system to counter
Russian ballistic missiles.''
I believe he is correct when he says that. And so if I put
myself in the Russians' shoes and we suddenly declare that we
are going to do that, we are going to build a defense like
that, I think they will use it as an excuse to build more
offensive systems, perhaps more cruise missiles, perhaps all
kinds of things that they don't have an excuse for now.
Mr. Rogers. Gentleman's time has expired. I thank the
gentleman.
And we will start round two now, and I believe everybody
had had a first round, so I will start off. And before I ask my
first question, I do want to point out that, you know, you made
the comment about Admiral Winnefeld in your opening statement.
He is the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and I think he has
to espouse the position of the administration. I think that
that policy is really a policy of the Obama administration. I
am not sure that he is espousing that as his best military
judgment, but that is just an observation on my part.
Let me ask this: China and Russia seem to want to do--and
they seem to be openly doing things for their own benefit in
that they are modernizing and building up their nuclear forces,
but at the same time openly developing missile defense
capabilities to neutralize the American strategic forces. In
fact, China's ministry of defense announced this morning that
he conducted another test today.
So given that we know openly China's doing this, Russia's
doing it, why do you think that it is America's policy to go
along with this and get along and not be more aggressive in
trying to face and push back against those trends for those two
countries? Start with Mr. Coyle.
Mr. Coyle. Well, I think the main reason, just speaking
from a technological point of view, is we don't know how to do
it, we don't know how to build a missile defense system that
would stop all of Russia's or China's intercontinental
ballistic missiles. And there is the question, well, if we did
know how, what would that cost? CBO has never been able to
estimate it, because nobody's been able to describe what that
system would look like. And then there is this argument, which
you have been hearing today, about whether or not it would be
destabilizing. But I think the first thing is we just don't
know how to do it right now, and--and so that is the first step
and that is the first problem.
Mr. Rogers. Mr. Joseph.
Ambassador Joseph. Well, I think there is a strong
ideological dimension to it, and I think that is there is a
sense that there is an arm--on our part, there is an arms
control solution to every problem.
I think that there clearly isn't in this case. The Russians
have no interest, and they have said so explicitly, no interest
in arms control, whether it is for offensive, strategic forces,
or for their theater forces, in large part, because we have
already made concession after concession, we have very little
to give and they have, at least in the theater category, an 8-
to-1 or 10-to-1 advantage. Why would they?
So there is this--there is this notion that we should be
going to global zero; we should be--we should be negotiating
with the Russians; the Russians object to our missile defenses,
therefore, we make concessions on missile defenses. We have
seen this pattern of behavior over and over, and it doesn't
work.
We did get the Russians to the negotiation table--to the
negotiating table for New START, we did do that, and we did
that through a missile defense concession, and we did get an
agreement, but if you look at the agreement, we are the ones
that go down. The Russians go up.
So if you are into, my view, unilateral disarmament, you
pursue these issues like we are pursuing them.
Mr. Rogers. Ambassador Woolsey.
Ambassador Woolsey. I was an advisor, a delegate at large
and then ambassador and chief negotiator for four different
arms control negotiations from 1969 through 1991, and the one
that I negotiated as chief negotiator covered all the countries
of Europe and all of their conventional weapons in six
languages, 101 pages, we did it in about a year, and I thought
it was a real achievement. It turned out that Putin junked it
as soon as it was inconvenient for him.
And I think that the United States has been, on the whole,
really quite naive about thinking that arms control agreements
are in fact going to limit the likes of Mr. Putin. It is, I
think, just not in the cards.
Fouad Ajami, who sadly died a month or two ago, a marvelous
scholar of the Near East, American journalist and scholar, said
that President Obama is a constitutional scholar lost in a
world of thugs, and I am afraid there is some truth to that. We
are in a world of thugs, and one of them is Putin in spades.
And it is important that we realize that, and that that is what
we are dealing with, not a group of collegial, law-abiding
countries that will kind of go along with whatever we sign and
treat it with the same degree of respect that we treat things
we sign. It is just not who we are dealing with. I wish it were
otherwise.
I felt a real sense of achievement in negotiating that
treaty. It lasted only as long as Putin didn't need to get rid
of it.
Mr. Rogers. Well, let me ask this: We have heard
observations today about Russian policy, China policy, North
Korea, and our responses thereto. We haven't heard anything
about Iran. I would love to hear your thoughts about what we
should be doing with regard to the threat from Iran. And each
one of you, just whichever order you want to go in. Start with
you, Ambassador Woolsey.
Ambassador Woolsey. Bernard Lewis, a great scholar at
Princeton of the Middle East, says that during the Cold War,
mutual assured destruction was a deterrent. Unfortunately now,
with respect to the leaders of Iran, it is an inducement. And
what he means by that, I believe, is that the set of beliefs I
described earlier in which the Iranian leadership really
believes there is a theological case to be made and that should
really dominate their thinking for destroying, particularly the
United States and Israel and our civilizations, not just one
government, that is, I am afraid, something that drives a lot
of the decisionmaking at the top level of the Iranian
government.
Mr. Rogers. And what should we do about it from a policy
standpoint?
Ambassador Woolsey. First--first thing is to recognize it
and not to get bogged down in wishful thinking. The Persians
invented chess, and they are good at it. And the way I think of
it is that they have one pawn that they are moving down along
the side of the board down to the King's row to turn him into
the most lethal piece, the Queen, which for--in the real world
would be the nuclear weapon. In the meantime, they are
distracting their opponent by doing other things on other parts
of the chessboard, but the objective is to get that nuclear
weapon.
I think they will do anything they can to see to it that
they are able to turn this situation with a limited number of
devices and the rest into a relatively quick nuclear weapon as
soon as they want it and need it, and I think that is their
objective.
Mr. Rogers. Ambassador Joseph.
Ambassador Joseph. Let me focus on the negotiations. We, of
course, don't know whether there will be an agreement with Iran
reached by the time of the latest deadline. If there is an
agreement, we don't know whether there will be ex---how many
centrifuges will be allowed, what will be the restrictions on
R&D, how long the--you know, the restrictions will last, what
will be the verification procedures. There are many, many
things that we don't know, but we do know what won't be in that
agreement right now. We do know that there will be no limits on
Iran's ballistic missile program. And the supreme leader has
recently said that, we need to redouble our efforts in this
area. And we know from our own sources that, in fact, they are
doing just that. They already have the largest ballistic
missile defense force in the region, and it is improving,
including capabilities that will provide them with continental
range missiles. We also know that there will be no ban on
enrichment.
So the two things we know combined means that Iran will be
a nuclear weapons threshold state with an expanding ballistic
missile capability. We know that.
Secretary Kerry has stated that the goal of the
negotiations is no longer to deny Iran a nuclear capability,
but it is to extend the time for breakout from 2 months to 6
months or 12 months. I think this is a fundamental mistake. I
think other countries in the region will want the same
capability, and it will lead to further proliferation. I think
it will undercut decades-old U.S. policy to discourage
enrichment by other countries. And we have been discouraging
our friends for many, many years, but once we say yes to Iran,
how do we say no to the Australians? How do we say no to--you
know, to the South Koreans? How do we say no to others?
And I come at this from a non-proliferation perspective,
and I am very concerned about that. It will put--you know, this
type of agreement will put Israel behind the eight ball, make
it more difficult for them to use force, because Iran will be
allowed to continue its nuclear program, something that the
Israelis have said is unacceptable.
Mr. Rogers. Mr. Coyle, how would you suggest our policy
respond to the growing concerns with Iran's nuclear capability?
Mr. Coyle. Well, it is--Mr. Chairman, it is obvious that
the negotiations between the P5 and Germany and Iran have been
very difficult, now being extended for another 4 months, I
guess it is. And I am hopeful, of course, that those
negotiations will be successful. So far, they have halted the
growth in Iran's nuclear program for 10 months. I hope it is
much longer than that, but anything that can be done to limit
the growth and the size of Iran's nuclear program, I think is
in our national interest.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you. Thank the gentlemen.
I now recognize the gentleman from Tennessee for any
questions he may have.
Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would just like to
reiterate my call for a more balanced witness panel. I think we
have heard a number of bold, sometimes almost wild and
intemperate statements. So if we do want to pursue them, they
should be fleshed out with a more balanced approach so that
this committee and the Congress could have more sources of
information, but I have no further questions at this time.
Mr. Rogers. The chair recognizes the gentleman from
Oklahoma, Mr. Bridenstine, if he has any additional questions.
Mr. Bridenstine. Ambassador Joseph, just out of curiosity,
if the United States of America has a $17 trillion GDP and
Russia has a $2 trillion GDP, if our economy is that much
larger than theirs, is there any reason why we should seek
parity with them as it relates to our defenses?
Ambassador Joseph. Well, I don't think our defenses should
be focused or should be sized to that of Russia, because we
have a different set of threats than Russia faces. Russia is,
of course, developing and modernizing its strategic defenses,
particularly of the Moscow region, which is a region that is
large enough to incorporate ballistic missile fields, offensive
fields, but we have--we have interests that are much different
than the Russians, we have adversaries that are different than
the Russians, and so we need to size and scale our ballistic
missile defense according to our needs, not according to some
concept of parity.
Mr. Bridenstine. And I just--I appreciate that testimony.
It seems to me that if we are economically in a stronger
position, then it would make sense that militarily we should be
in a stronger position, and to constrain ourselves because
Russia is constrained by their GDP, I think that leads us down
a path of instability. I think a strong America is a safe
world, and that when we try to constrain ourselves, we get what
is happening right now where Vladimir Putin has invaded Georgia
and he still occupies South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
He has threatened nuclear war in Poland; he has threatened
the Baltic States, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia. He has cut off
energy, and people have suffered and died. When you talk about,
you know, the aggression in Crimea and in eastern Ukraine, you
know, these things don't just happen because--because, you
know--I guess, because, the United States of America is doing
the right thing. These things happen because people perceive
right now that we are not going to do what is necessary to
protect free countries and countries that are fighting for
their independence.
When you look at Syria, I mean, the Russians are helping
the Assad regime in Syria, and the mullahs in Iran are going
around sanctions and building nuclear centrifuges, and, of
course, those are built by the Russians. It seems like wherever
you go in the world, the Russians are on the wrong side, and it
overwhelmingly appears to me that there is no balance to this,
and that if we constrain ourselves because the Russians are
constrained, and, of course, they are constrained because their
economy is weak, and their economy is weak because it is run by
organized crime and they can't attract investment.
We have a very different system here in the United States,
and it has resulted in us being economically and militarily
very powerful. And for us to turn around and use those gifts--
or to constrain ourselves when those gifts are bequeathed upon
us, it would seem that we would be turning our backs on our
obligations.
I am a strong advocate that the United States needs to
remain the superpower that it is. And to constrain ourselves
because a country run by organized crime is constrained
naturally, I think that is a bad direction for our Nation.
Thank you. Thank you all for your testimony.
Mr. Rogers. The chair recognizes the gentleman from Arizona
to bat cleanup.
Mr. Franks. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ambassador Joseph, let me begin here again with you. First
of all, again, I appreciate your testimony so much. I don't
usually ask metaphysical questions, but sometimes it is a
rather challenging thing for me to understand why our friends
on the left seem to be so antithetical toward missile defense.
You and I know that--that the limited capability that we have
at least affords us the opportunity to defend ourselves against
an early attack, whether it is an accident or whatever it might
be a limited attack, so that then we have the opportunity, not
to have to respond overwhelmingly. We know that a Russian
Federation strike would overwhelm our system immediately, we
understand that. And for those that say, you know, we can't
protect against all of them, that it doesn't--it doesn't matter
at all. We know that the situation in Israel has been borne out
where Iron Dome has afforded them the opportunity to hold off
some offensive attacks and then allows them the time to go in
and take out and dismantle those offensive capabilities. We
understand all that.
And yet, in all loving deference to my friend, Mr. Coyle,
just a few years back, you know, the argument, and I don't want
to put the words in his mouth, but as I understood them were to
suggest that, you know, the bullet hitting bullets technology
is fantasy. And at that time, of course, we were beginning to
hit a dot on the side of a bullet with a bullet consistently,
in the words of General Obering.
So what is it--there was this notion that you tried to
articulate that GMD was rushed into development without
adequate testing. You addressed that. What is it that makes our
friends on the left seem so antithetical to this capability,
when all through history, the paradigm of warfare has been a
new capability offensively is met with a defensive capability,
and we just keep going till we--and now we face the most
dangerous weapons in the world, an incoming nuclear missile
that could ruin your whole day if it lands. Why is there this
hesitation to have some sort of defensive capability?
Ambassador Joseph. Sir, I don't know the answer----
Mr. Franks. You don't answer metaphysical questions. Is
that what you are saying?
Ambassador Joseph. Well, I am--I am always willing to throw
out an answer, or a guess, in this case. And my sense is that
there is still a hangover from the ABM Treaty days. There is a
legacy of thought from the ABM Treaty days where defenses were
considered to be bad by the United States. Okay. Soviet Union
went along with the ABM Treaty, but they cheated on that
treaty, just like they cheat on INF and other agreements. But
we had sort of ingrained in our strategic thought this notion
that mutual assured destruction is the best means of protecting
the United States. These are not people who don't want to
defend the United States, but these are people who believe that
by being defenseless against large-scale attack, against the
destruction of our society by ballistic missiles with nuclear
warheads, we will actually be safer, because that will be
stabilizing, because if both sides can destroy the other, et
cetera, you know, you----
Mr. Franks. Yeah.
Ambassador Joseph. You know the logic. And I think this, to
me--and I have an academic background. This, to me, proves the
staying power of bad ideas. I think it has been a bad idea for
a long time. You can certainly differ, I am open to other
arguments, but this bad idea just doesn't go away, and it
didn't go away when the ABM treaty went away. We still have
that legacy.
And the second factor is that we very much long for the day
in which we can all just get along, and the means to get there
is another arms control agreement.
Mr. Franks. Yeah.
Ambassador Joseph. That is how we approach this stuff.
Mr. Franks. Yeah. All right.
Ambassador Joseph. And our adversaries don't. They don't.
They see the world differently. They see the world in power
terms.
Mr. Franks. Obviously I couldn't agree with you more.
Ambassador Woolsey, let me save the last question here for
you. First of all, like you, I consider the potential of an
offensive EMP attack against us to be one of the more dangerous
short-term national security threats that we have. And so my
question to you is, given the consequences of a massive EMP
attack, or GMD event, as you have laid out in your testimony,
what practical steps do you give us to address this step? Is
legislation necessary or to get industry to move? And what
practical ideas do you propose that we can move toward
protecting the electric grid and taking away the incentive of a
potential enemy to exploit this vulnerability?
Ambassador Woolsey. Congressman Franks, that is a great
question. I have thought about this. And I believe that
although they will not want it, there is only one institution
in the U.S. Government that could take charge and get something
done and do it quickly, and that is the Department of Defense.
I would charge the Secretary of Defense with whatever support
he needed from other agencies, FERC would be one that would be
very helpful to him, by the way, I think, put him in charge,
give him the job of protecting the grid now, and the resources
that he needs.
I think you also need a Presidential commitment, but
without someone in charge, including officials at the State
level, this is an emergency, I think without someone in charge,
this will fail. The electric grid is just too diverse in the
influences on it and the people who have some kind of control
over parts of it.
Mr. Franks. Well, thank you all. And thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. Rogers. Thank all of you. And that brings us to--yes,
sir, Mr. Coyle. You had something to say?
Mr. Coyle. I just wanted to make a comment, if that would
be okay.
Mr. Rogers. Certainly. Certainly.
Mr. Coyle. Just in my own defense, I have never said that
you can't hit a bullet with a bullet, and we know from the
tests that we have done it many times now.
Mr. Franks. That was a long time ago.
Mr. Coyle. I would point out that there is common ground in
my testimony and in Ambassador Joseph's testimony. We both want
the Ground-Based Midcourse system to work. And in my testimony,
I call for both sides of the aisle to work together to fix some
of the problems that have been plaguing that system. It will
involve new investment and new ideas. I think the best science
and technology should be put towards missile defense just as we
put it towards everything else that we do in life, American--
the best of American science and technology. And so I think
there is some common ground there.
Mr. Rogers. And one piece of good news on that front is
that, I think it is 168 million new dollars over and above what
had been requested has been put into GMD in this coming year.
So the folks seem to recognize just what you said, that it
needs a little more attention, love and attention.
I would like to offer for the record the release that I
mentioned earlier from the Chinese minister of defense about
their test today. Without objection, so ordered.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 74.]
Mr. Rogers. And thank you all for being here. We are
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:21 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
=======================================================================
A P P E N D I X
July 23, 2014
=======================================================================
=======================================================================
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
July 23, 2014
=======================================================================
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]
=======================================================================
DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
July 23, 2014
=======================================================================
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
July 23, 2014
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ROGERS
Mr. Rogers. Russia is developing new missile defenses (for example,
the S-500 and the nuclear tipped Gazelle system, which it tested in its
recent March 2014 nuclear force exercise) and China has also recently
tested missile defenses. In a report provided to the committee last
year by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, he stated that,
``Russia's objective with its ballistic missile defense (BMD)
capabilities is to ensure defense of critical political and military
targets in the Moscow area from a ballistic missile attack either by
the United States or any other nation with nuclear or conventional
ballistic or cruise missile capabilities.''
a. We have spent years trying to convince Russia that our missile
defenses aren't about them, yet Russia and China are openly developing
missile defenses against us. Why do we continue to take this position?
Does it continue to make sense (to the extent it ever did)?
b. We adopted the policy of ``limited national missile defenses''
in 1999. How has the world changed since then in terms of proliferation
of ballistic missile technology, proliferation and modernization of WMD
capability, and Chinese and Russia relations with the U.S. and our
allies?
c. What are your recommendations to this committee on updating the
NMD Act?
Ambassador Woolsey. a.1 There is no good reason any more.
a.2 No.
b. Ballistic missile technology is coming to be highly proliferated
and modernized as has WMD capability. Relations with Russia and China
are cool to cold.
c. The act should be thoroughly restructured to account for the
above changes.
Mr. Rogers. China and Russia seem to want to have their cake and
eat it too: they are both modernizing and growing their nuclear forces
(China and Russia are both developing and fielding a modernized TRIAD
of nuclear forces, and Russia has undertaken a material breach of the
INF treaty and is cheating on the CTBT) while developing missile
defenses to neutralize American strategic deterrent forces.
a. Why do we play along with their notion of ``strategic
stability''? Doesn't this current situation prove what former Defense
Secretary Harold Brown once summed up as ``when we build, they build;
when we cut, they build''?
b. At what point does it pose an unacceptable threat?
c. Does Putin feel assured, because of his nuclear forces, that he
has a certain freedom of action? Have we seen that play out recently?
Ambassador Woolsey. a.1 We should not.
a.2 Yes.
b. Now.
c.1 Yes.
c.2 Yes.
Mr. Rogers. We deploy missile defenses to deal with Chinese anti-
ship ballistic missile capabilities, don't we? How do we explain to the
American people that we are willing to defend the 5,500 sailors on an
aircraft carrier, but not the 5 million residents of (the greater
Seattle area or LA) who are threatened by Chinese ICBMs and SLBMs?
Ambassador Woolsey. a. Yes.
b. We cannot do so persuasively.
Mr. Rogers. We are deploying a cruise missile defense capability to
protect the National Capital Region from cruise missiles, including,
according to the CDR of NORTHCOM, Russian cruise missiles. Does it make
sense that we deploy cruise missile defenses to protect the Capital
from Russian cruise missiles, but we will not develop and deploy
missile defenses to protect the American people against Russian
ballistic missiles?
Ambassador Woolsey. No.
Mr. Rogers. Do you believe the United States needs a layered
missile defense capability? So, boost, mid course, and terminal missile
defenses?
a. What is the impact, then, of the Obama administration
terminating all of our boost phase missile defense programs in 2009?
Ambassador Woolsey. Yes, and immediate attention to the
vulnerability of our electric grid to an orbited nuclear weapon.
a. Dangerous.
Mr. Rogers. In 2009, the administration sent Poland a PATRIOT
battery, with no missile interceptors. The Poles called this deployment
a ``potted plant.'' Presumably, this was done to attempt to mitigate
Russian concerns.
a. What is the damage down to our alliances when we make such
silly-looking deployments?
Ambassador Woolsey. a. Substantial.
Mr. Rogers. What should the future of missile defense look like?
Ambassador Woolsey. Boost-phase, including space-based. EMP attacks
from orbiting nuclear weapons appear impervious to BMD unless all
launches of any kind from a particular country are destroyed on the pad
or early in boost phase (as advocated several years ago by William
Perry and Ashton Carter).
Mr. Rogers. President Obama said in 2001 that ``I don't agree with
a missile defense system.'' In 2008, as a candidate, he stated, ``I
will cut tens of billions of dollars in wasteful spending. I will cut
investments in unproven missile defense systems.'' Has he implemented
these political ideologies? How would you describe the impacts of these
campaign speeches on our national defense?
Ambassador Woolsey. a. Yes.
b. Highly damaging.
Mr. Rogers. In 2009, President Obama slashed our deployment of GBIs
from 44 to 30 and cut our GMD budget in half, and terminated kill
vehicle modernization programs like the MKV.
a. Is it any wonder our only national missile defense system has
encountered difficulty?
Ambassador Woolsey. No.
Mr. Rogers. Some on the Left say we need to make concessions on
U.S. missile defense or they fear we won't be able to obtain further
nuclear reductions. Would you care to comment on whether that is true
and if so, what recommendations would you offer the subcommittee?
Ambassador Woolsey. Since Russia cheats on its treaty obligations
most reductions disproportionately affect us and are therefore not
worth bargaining for.
Mr. Rogers. The administration is refusing to brief this committee,
including its chairman, on the facts of its proposals to Russia to make
agreements on our missile defense deployments.
a. Do you believe the administration owes it to the people's
representatives in Congress to keep it informed on these matters?
b. What should the Congress do if the administration continues to
hide these matters from it? Would you support efforts to fence or limit
funding until Congress' oversight responsibility is respected?
Ambassador Woolsey. a. Absolutely.
b. Limit funding desired by the administration, not the small
amounts going to BMD.
Mr. Rogers. It has been reported that Ukraine has asked for the
deployment of a PATRIOT battery to defend its territory. Is there any
good reason not to deploy it?
Ambassador Woolsey. No.
Mr. Rogers. A week prior to this hearing, this subcommittee held a
hearing on Russia's violation of the INF treaty.
a. What are the implications of the administration's refusal to
provide that annually required report and to finally, years overdue,
confirm that Russia is in violation of that treaty? What do our allies
take away from this meekness? How about Russia and Putin?
b. How should the U.S. and our NATO and Asian allies respond?
c. Is further arms control possible when one party to treaties
decides it does not have to comply with them?
Ambassador Woolsey. a. 1, 2 and 3. Demonstrates excessive
willingness to accommodate Russia, dangerously so.
b. Deploy BMD ourselves while chronicling Russia's violations.
Withdrawing from treaty is one strong possibility.
c. No.
Mr. Rogers. What should Congress prioritize in terms of future
investments to our missile defense system?
Ambassador Woolsey. Space-based boost phase and defenses against
EMP attacks, including making electric grid far more resilient.
Mr. Rogers. In 2010, Vice President Biden offered that one of the
reasons the Senate should ratify the New START treaty was to strengthen
the hand of then President Medvedev versus Mr. Putin? Did that theory
work out any better for us that any of the Vice President's other
foreign policy recommendations in his almost 40-year Federal Government
experience?
Ambassador Woolsey. No.
Mr. Rogers. Russian nuclear doctrine, according to Russian press
reports, envisions the use of nuclear weapons in a conventional
conflict. Can the U.S. or its allies afford not to defend itself from
such a escalatory use of nuclear weapons?
Ambassador Woolsey. No.
Mr. Rogers. Russia is developing new missile defenses (for example,
the S-500 and the nuclear tipped Gazelle system, which it tested in its
recent March 2014 nuclear force exercise) and China has also recently
tested missile defenses. In a report provided to the committee last
year by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, he stated that,
``Russia's objective with its ballistic missile defense (BMD)
capabilities is to ensure defense of critical political and military
targets in the Moscow area from a ballistic missile attack either by
the United States or any other nation with nuclear or conventional
ballistic or cruise missile capabilities.''
a. We have spent years trying to convince Russia that our missile
defenses aren't about them, yet Russia and China are openly developing
missile defenses against us. Why do we continue to take this position?
Does it continue to make sense (to the extent it ever did)?
b. We adopted the policy of ``limited national missile defenses''
in 1999. How has the world changed since then in terms of proliferation
of ballistic missile technology, proliferation and modernization of WMD
capability, and Chinese and Russia relations with the U.S. and our
allies?
c. What are your recommendations to this committee on updating the
NMD Act?
Ambassador Joseph. [The information was not available at the time
of printing.]
Mr. Rogers. China and Russia seem to want to have their cake and
eat it too: they are both modernizing and growing their nuclear forces
(China and Russia are both developing and fielding a modernized TRIAD
of nuclear forces, and Russia has undertaken a material breach of the
INF treaty and is cheating on the CTBT) while developing missile
defenses to neutralize American strategic deterrent forces.
a. Why do we play along with their notion of ``strategic
stability''? Doesn't this current situation prove what former Defense
Secretary Harold Brown once summed up as ``when we build, they build;
when we cut, they build''?
b. At what point does it pose an unacceptable threat?
c. Does Putin feel assured, because of his nuclear forces, that he
has a certain freedom of action? Have we seen that play out recently?
Ambassador Joseph. [The information was not available at the time
of printing.]
Mr. Rogers. We deploy missile defenses to deal with Chinese anti-
ship ballistic missile capabilities, don't we? How do we explain to the
American people that we are willing to defend the 5,500 sailors on an
aircraft carrier, but not the 5 million residents of (the greater
Seattle area or LA) who are threatened by Chinese ICBMs and SLBMs?
Ambassador Joseph. [The information was not available at the time
of printing.]
Mr. Rogers. We are deploying a cruise missile defense capability to
protect the National Capital Region from cruise missiles, including,
according to the CDR of NORTHCOM, Russian cruise missiles. Does it make
sense that we deploy cruise missile defenses to protect the Capital
from Russian cruise missiles, but we will not develop and deploy
missile defenses to protect the American people against Russian
ballistic missiles?
Ambassador Joseph. [The information was not available at the time
of printing.]
Mr. Rogers. Do you believe the United States needs a layered
missile defense capability? So, boost, mid course, and terminal missile
defenses?
a. What is the impact, then, of the Obama administration
terminating all of our boost phase missile defense programs in 2009?
Ambassador Joseph. [The information was not available at the time
of printing.]
Mr. Rogers. In 2009, the administration sent Poland a PATRIOT
battery, with no missile interceptors. The Poles called this deployment
a ``potted plant.'' Presumably, this was done to attempt to mitigate
Russian concerns.
a. What is the damage down to our alliances when we make such
silly-looking deployments?
Ambassador Joseph. [The information was not available at the time
of printing.]
Mr. Rogers. What should the future of missile defense look like?
Ambassador Joseph. [The information was not available at the time
of printing.]
Mr. Rogers. President Obama said in 2001 that ``I don't agree with
a missile defense system.'' In 2008, as a candidate, he stated, ``I
will cut tens of billions of dollars in wasteful spending. I will cut
investments in unproven missile defense systems.'' Has he implemented
these political ideologies? How would you describe the impacts of these
campaign speeches on our national defense?
Ambassador Joseph. [The information was not available at the time
of printing.]
Mr. Rogers. In 2009, President Obama slashed our deployment of GBIs
from 44 to 30 and cut our GMD budget in half, and terminated kill
vehicle modernization programs like the MKV.
a. Is it any wonder our only national missile defense system has
encountered difficulty?
Ambassador Joseph. [The information was not available at the time
of printing.]
Mr. Rogers. You served in the previous administration. It has been
suggested by some witnesses, including Mr Coyle, that GMD was rushed
into deployment without adequate testing, etc. Would you care to
provide the facts as you know them?
Ambassador Joseph. [The information was not available at the time
of printing.]
Mr. Rogers. Some on the Left say we need to make concessions on
U.S. missile defense or they fear we won't be able to obtain further
nuclear reductions. Would you care to comment on whether that is true
and if so, what recommendations would you offer the subcommittee?
Ambassador Joseph. [The information was not available at the time
of printing.]
Mr. Rogers. The administration is refusing to brief this committee,
including its chairman, on the facts of its proposals to Russia to make
agreements on our missile defense deployments.
a. Do you believe the administration owes it to the people's
representatives in Congress to keep it informed on these matters?
b. What should the Congress do if the administration continues to
hide these matters from it? Would you support efforts to fence or limit
funding until Congress' oversight responsibility is respected?
Ambassador Joseph. [The information was not available at the time
of printing.]
Mr. Rogers. It has been reported that Ukraine has asked for the
deployment of a PATRIOT battery to defend its territory. Is there any
good reason not to deploy it?
Ambassador Joseph. [The information was not available at the time
of printing.]
Mr. Rogers. A week prior to this hearing, this subcommittee held a
hearing on Russia's violation of the INF treaty.
a. What are the implications of the administration's refusal to
provide that annually required report and to finally, years overdue,
confirm that Russia is in violation of that treaty? What do our allies
take away from this meekness? How about Russia and Putin?
b. How should the U.S. and our NATO and Asian allies respond?
c. Is further arms control possible when one party to treaties
decides it does not have to comply with them?
Ambassador Joseph. [The information was not available at the time
of printing.]
Mr. Rogers. What should Congress prioritize in terms of future
investments to our missile defense system?
Ambassador Joseph. [The information was not available at the time
of printing.]
Mr. Rogers. In 2010, Vice President Biden offered that one of the
reasons the Senate should ratify the New START treaty was to strengthen
the hand of then President Medvedev versus Mr. Putin? Did that theory
work out any better for us that any of the Vice President's other
foreign policy recommendations in his almost 40-year Federal Government
experience?
Ambassador Joseph. [The information was not available at the time
of printing.]
Mr. Rogers. Russian nuclear doctrine, according to Russian press
reports, envisions the use of nuclear weapons in a conventional
conflict. Can the U.S. or its allies afford not to defend itself from
such a escalatory use of nuclear weapons?
Ambassador Joseph. [The information was not available at the time
of printing.]
Mr. Rogers. You have mentioned several times the report by the
National Academy of Sciences. Do you endorse its recommendation that
the U.S. develop and deploy an East Coast site?
Mr. Coyle. The National Academy committee emphasized that an East
Coast site should not be built unless and until several other actions
were completed first. These are the development of a new two-stage
booster for the GMD interceptor, and a new larger and more capable kill
vehicle. The Committee also pointed out that the Missile Defense Agency
does not have the sensors required to support an East Coast site, and
without which an East Coast site would be unable to achieve its
intended purpose. I agree with the Committee.
Mr. Rogers. What is your assessment of the success of the Iron Dome
system deployed by Israel? How has your assessment shifted, if at all,
during the recent Hamas-instigated violence in Gaza?
Mr. Coyle. The successes that Iron Dome reportedly has had in
battle are so far more evidence of the possibilities of Iron Dome than
a demonstration of an operationally effective system. As we saw with
Patriot in the first Gulf War, it is very difficult to get information
in battle with real ``ground truth''. During my time in the Pentagon I
saw this also in military exercises that were not instrumented.
However, when military exercises were instrumented a very different
picture emerged as to what actually had happened. Accordingly I am
skeptical of the claims of 90 or 95% effectiveness made for Iron Dome.
News reports show that Iron Dome often misses, and Prime Minister
Netanyahu reported this also on ``Meet the Press.'' From these reports
it appears the Israeli civil defense system deserves at least as much
credit for saving lives as Iron Dome, if not more. Reports from the
recent violence in Gaza reinforce these conclusions.
From the publicly available evidence, it appears that Iron Dome is
not working nearly as well as what is being claimed. Considering the
millions of dollars that the Congress has authorized for Iron Dome, the
Congress should request data on the performance of Iron Dome from
Israel. This data could be provided to an appropriate U.S. national
laboratory that has the in-house technical expertise to analyze it.
Without such data there is no way to know if the system is working at
the high levels of performance claimed.
Mr. Rogers. You have suggested that the threat data has changed and
Iran is now not expected to be able to flight test an ICBM in 2015.
a. Are you aware of the comments of Gen Flynn, ``as stated by the
chairman in his opening statement where he talked about our assessment
being in the 2015 timeframe, you know, given--given the development
that we see that's accurate; so by about 2015.''
b. Have you read the classified appendix to the 2014 Iran Mil Power
Rept? Well, I have. You should be careful about referring to the
conclusions of a report when you have not seen them, sir. People who do
that run the risk of looking uninformed and foolish.
Mr. Coyle. a. Yes, I am familiar with the Senate Armed Services
Committee hearing held on February 11, 2014, in which General Flynn
made that comment. However, General Flynn misspoke. It was not Chairman
Levin who brought up Iranian missile capabilities in his opening
statement, it was Ranking Member Inhofe.
b. No, I have not read the classified appendix. In my testimony I
was not referring to the conclusions in that report. I was making my
own assessment.
Mr. Rogers. The administration is refusing to brief this committee,
including its chairman, on the facts of its proposals to Russia to make
agreements on our missile defense deployments.
a. Do you believe the administration owes it to the people's
representatives in Congress to keep it informed on these matters?
b. What should the Congress do if the administration continues to
hide these matters from it? Would you support efforts to fence or limit
funding until Congress' oversight responsibility is respected?
Mr. Coyle. a. Yes.
b. The Congress should be informed when in the course of
negotiations the administration believes it can reach an agreement
which both parties are likely to honor. The Congress always has the
authority to express its opinions with respect to funding for executive
branch activities but needs to be thoughtful and prudent about
establishing precedents that might impact future international
negotiations. In the instant case, no, I would not support efforts to
fence or limit funding as such efforts would be counterproductive.
Mr. Rogers. It has been reported that Ukraine has asked for the
deployment of a PATRIOT battery to defend its territory. Is there any
good reason not to deploy it?
Mr. Coyle. A single PATRIOT battery could not defend the Ukraine.
Mr. Rogers. In 2010, Vice President Biden offered that one of the
reasons the Senate should ratify the New START treaty was to strengthen
the hand of then President Medvedev versus Mr. Putin? Did that theory
work out any better for us that any of the Vice President's other
foreign policy recommendations in his almost 40-year Federal Government
experience?
Mr. Coyle. The New START Treaty was ratified in the U.S. Senate by
a vote of 71 to 26 with 13 Republican Senators voting for it. America's
NATO allies also strongly supported the treaty. In Russia President
Medvedev introduced the treaty for consideration by the Duma, and
signed the ratification resolution passed unanimously by the Russian
Federal Assembly, demonstrating a strong hand throughout.
Mr. Rogers. Russian nuclear doctrine, according to Russian press
reports, envisions the use of nuclear weapons in a conventional
conflict. Can the U.S. or its allies afford not to defend itself from
such a escalatory use of nuclear weapons?
Mr. Coyle. During the Cold War, the United States had an analogous
nuclear doctrine to counter what were seen at the time as superior
Soviet conventional forces if the Soviet Union were to attack West
Germany through the Fulda Gap. This included atomic demolition mines,
the Davy Crockett recoilless rifle for firing small nuclear
projectiles, and A-10 ground attack aircraft. Then as now missile
defenses are not capable of defending against such battlefield tactical
nuclear weapons systems.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. COOPER
Mr. Cooper. What was the cost of phase 1 and phase 2 of Strategic
Defense Initiative (SDI)?
What would the cost be of a system that could defend against
Chinese and Russian warheads today?
Ambassador Woolsey. I don't know.
a. I don't know.
Mr. Cooper. What was the cost of phase 1 and phase 2 of Strategic
Defense Initiative (SDI)?
What would the cost be of a system that could defend against
Chinese and Russian warheads today?
Ambassador Joseph. [The information was not available at the time
of printing.]
Mr. Cooper. What was the cost of phase 1 and phase 2 of Strategic
Defense Initiative (SDI)?
Mr. Coyle. According to James A. Abrahamson and Henry F. Cooper,
about $30 billion were spent on SDI between 1985 and 1993 when it was
cancelled. See ``What Did We Get for Our $30-Billion Investment in SDI/
BMD? September 1993.
Cost estimates for the Strategic Defense Initiative vary widely. In
a 1987 paper the Heritage Foundation wrote, ``While it is unlikely that
SDI will be as cheap as the 40 billion claimed by some SDI backers, the
price tag probably will be in the range of $115 billion to $120 billion
spread out over ten years.''
Other estimates are much higher, up to $1 trillion attributed to
former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown. See Heritage Backgrounder
#607, Strategic Defense: ``How Much Will It Really Cost?'' October 2,
1987
Mr. Cooper. What would the cost be of a system that could defend
against Chinese and Russian warheads today?
Mr. Coyle. A complete system has never been designed or costed. A
1982 Defense Department report said that a system of space-based
lasers, not including all the associated systems for detection,
coordination, and command and control that a complete SDI system would
need to have, might cost up to $500 billion (see ``Strategic Defense
and Anti-Satellite Weapons,'' Hearing before the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations, April 25,1984, p. 67).
Mr. Cooper. What are your views on the value and feasibility of
boost-phase missile defense?
Mr. Coyle. I agree with the conclusion of the Defense Science Board
report of September 2011 that because the timelines for boost-phase
missile defense are so short, early intercept is not itself ``a useful
objective for missile defense in general or for any particular missile
defense system.'' See Defense Science Board Task Force Report on
``Science and Technology Issues of Early Intercept Ballistic Missile
Defense Feasibility,'' September 2011.
Mr. Cooper. Do you agree with the National Academy of Sciences
conclusion that the ``DOD should not invest any more money or resources
in systems for boost-phase missile defense'' and that ``boost-phase
defense is not practical or cost effective under real world conditions
for the foreseeable future''?
Mr. Coyle. For all practical purposes, yes. The NRC committee
wrote, ``All boost-phase intercept (BPI) systems suffer from severe
reach-versus-time-available constraints.'' There are specialized
systems that might work in the boost phase against relatively small
country such as North Korea. But those systems would not be effective
against larger countries such as Iran, Russia or China.
Mr. Cooper. Why was the multiple kill vehicle program canceled?
Mr. Coyle. Defense Secretary Robert Gates made the decision to
cancel the Multiple Kill Vehicle in the spring of 2009. According to
the GAO, ``MDA terminated the Multiple Kill Vehicle element because of
feasibility issues raised about this technology, which was still in its
early stages of development, as well as a decision to refocus MDA's
resources on new technologies aimed at early intercept of ballistic
missiles.'' See GAO-10-311.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GARAMENDI
Mr. Garamendi. In 2009, just 5 years ago, the Nuclear Posture
Review Commission, supported the conclusion that ``For more than a
decade the development of U.S. ballistic missile defenses has been
guided by the principles of (1) protecting against limited strikes
while (2) taking into account the legitimate concerns of Russia and
China about strategic stability.'' Do you now disagree with this
conclusion? Did you agree at the time?
Ambassador Woolsey. I disagree with the proposition that these
should be guiding principles, but I acknowledge that five years ago and
today these principles influence many and in fact provide the
underlying assumptions of much of our government's actions with regard
to BMD programs.
Mr. Garamendi. What kind of missile defense system(s) would be
needed and would be feasible to counter Russian and Chinese nuclear
weapons?
Ambassador Woolsey. Space-based boost phase.
Mr. Garamendi. What actions might China and Russia take in response
to a U.S. missile defense against their capabilities? Would it affect
the number and type of their offensive systems? What are the cost of
offensive versus defense systems? Would Russia or China be more likely
to perceive the need to strike first?
Ambassador Woolsey. a. More emphasis on both offense and defense--
blaming U.S. for the size of their programs.
b. Probably little.
c. I don't know.
d. It would depend highly on the circumstances.
Mr. Garamendi. What kind of missile defense system(s) would be
needed and would be feasible to counter Russian and Chinese nuclear
weapons?
Ambassador Joseph. [The information was not available at the time
of printing.]
Mr. Garamendi. What might the impacts to strategic stability be of
expanding missile defense systems to counter Russian and Chinese
warheads? Why would this action not result in an arms race?
Ambassador Joseph. [The information was not available at the time
of printing.]
Mr. Garamendi. What actions might China and Russia take in response
to a U.S. missile defense against their capabilities? Would it affect
the number and type of their offensive systems? What are the cost of
offensive versus defense systems? Would Russia or China be more likely
to perceive the need to strike first?
Ambassador Joseph. [The information was not available at the time
of printing.]
Mr. Garamendi. What might the impacts to strategic stability be of
expanding missile defense systems to counter Russian and Chinese
warheads? Why would this action not result in an arms race?
Mr. Coyle. Expanded missile defense systems to counter Russian and
Chinese ICBMs would be strategically destabilizing because--if Russia
and China believed those systems were effective--those nations would
need to respond to counter what they would see as a new threat. Their
responses could include new tactical and strategic forces, perhaps even
more attacking missiles to overcome those new U.S. defenses, perhaps
extensive deployment of cruise missiles against which our ballistic
missile defense systems are useless, or perhaps deployment of large
numbers of troops in regions that are currently stable and peaceful.
Then our missile defenses would have upset the strategic balance and
provoked new military responses from Russia and China.
Of course, under such conditions, Russia would certainly not agree
to further reductions in their strategic nuclear arsenals, as the U.S.
and Russia have been doing under START, the Strategic Offensive
Reductions Treaty, and New START. Russia might consider aggressive new
U.S. missile defense programs as justification to withdraw from New
START and other agreements that have significantly reduced the threat
from nuclear weapons.
Mr. Garamendi. What actions might China and Russia take in response
to a U.S. missile defense against their capabilities? Would it affect
the number and type of their offensive systems? What are the cost of
offensive versus defense systems? Would Russia or China be more likely
to perceive the need to strike first?
Mr. Coyle. China and Russia might launch new offensive missile
programs to overwhelm new U.S. missile defenses against their
capabilities. China and Russia also might initiate new military actions
in its regions against which U.S. missile defenses would be useless.
For example, they might choose to increase their land-, sea-, or air-
based offensive systems and to deploy those systems in new regions.
With respect to the cost of offensive versus defensive systems,
during the Reagan years, Paul Nitze, the highly regarded scholar and
statesman, presented three criteria that any missile defense system
must meet before being considered for deployment. Nitze's criteria were
formally adopted as National Security Directive No. 172 on May 30,
1985.
The Nitze criteria were:
1. The system should be effective;
2. Be able to survive against direct attack; and
3. Be cost effective at the margin--that is, be less costly to
increase your defense than it is for your opponent to increase their
offense against it.
So far U.S. missile defenses do not meet the Nitze criteria.
By definition, First Strike is a preemptive surprise attack using
overwhelming force. A missile defense system capable of continental
coverage and also of defending against most or all attacking ICBMs, is
considered by nuclear strategy analysts as enabling First Strike
because it would allow for a nuclear strike to be launched with reduced
fear of retaliatory destruction. No such missile defense system exists,
but if the U.S. had such a system China and Russia would worry about
the U.S. being the one to strike first. Similarly, if Russia or China
had such a system, America would worry about Russia or China striking
first.
[all]