[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 113-120]
RUSSIAN VIOLATIONS OF THE INF
TREATY: AFTER DETECTION--WHAT?
__________
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
JULY 17, 2014
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES
MIKE ROGERS, Alabama, Chairman
TRENT FRANKS, Arizona JIM COOPER, Tennessee
DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado LORETTA SANCHEZ, California
MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
MO BROOKS, Alabama RICK LARSEN, Washington
JOE WILSON, South Carolina JOHN GARAMENDI, California
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio HENRY C. ``HANK'' JOHNSON, Jr.,
JOHN FLEMING, Louisiana Georgia
RICHARD B. NUGENT, Florida ANDRE CARSON, Indiana
JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma MARC A. VEASEY, Texas
Tim Morrison, Counsel
Leonor Tomero, Counsel
Eric Smith, Clerk
C O N T E N T S
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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2014
Page
Hearing:
Thursday, July 17, 2014, Russian Violations of the INF Treaty:
After Detection--What?......................................... 1
Appendix:
Thursday, July 17, 2014.......................................... 25
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THURSDAY, JULY 17, 2014
RUSSIAN VIOLATIONS OF THE INF TREATY: AFTER DETECTION--WHAT?
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Rogers, Hon. Mike, a Representative from Alabama, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces............................... 1
WITNESSES
Pifer, Ambassador Steven, Director, Arms Control and Non-
Proliferation Initiative, The Brookings Institution............ 5
Rademaker, Stephen G., Bipartisan Policy Center, National
Security Project Advisor....................................... 1
Thomas, Jim, Vice President and Director of Studies, Center for
Strategic and Budgetary Assessments............................ 4
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Pifer, Ambassador Steven..................................... 53
Rademaker, Stephen G......................................... 31
Rogers, Hon. Mike............................................ 29
Thomas, Jim.................................................. 41
Documents Submitted for the Record:
Brookings article by Ambassador Pifer........................ 71
Documents for the record submitted by Mr. Rogers............. 74
Letter with attachments submitted by Mr. Rogers.............. 124
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Cooper................................................... 151
Mr. Garamendi................................................ 156
Mr. Rogers................................................... 145
Ms. Sanchez.................................................. 154
RUSSIAN VIOLATIONS OF THE INF TREATY: AFTER DETECTION--WHAT?
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
Washington, DC, Thursday, July 17, 2014.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 9:33 a.m., in
room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Mike Rogers
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE ROGERS, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
ALABAMA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES
Mr. Rogers. I call this hearing of the Strategic Forces
Subcommittee to order. Thank you for being here today.
We have a distinguished panel here today to talk about
Russian violations of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
[INF] Treaty and its consequences. I know you have all spent a
good deal of time preparing your remarks. So it is my practice
to try to get right to those and our questions for you. So I am
just going to introduce my prepared statement for the record.
Our witnesses today are Mr. Stephen Rademaker, national
security project advisor, Bipartisan Policy Center; Mr. Jim
Thomas, vice president and director of studies for Center of
Strategic and Budgetary Assessments; and Ambassador Steven
Pifer, director of Arms Control and Non-Proliferation
Initiative at The Brookings Institute.
With that, I offer the floor to my colleague, the gentleman
from Tennessee, who is a truly wonderful guy, but a supporter
of a bad football team. Mr. Jim Cooper, Tennessee.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Rogers can be found in the
Appendix on page 29.]
Mr. Cooper. I thank the gentleman, my friend from Alabama.
I welcome witnesses. I have no opening statement. I look
forward to the testimony.
Mr. Rogers. Well now we will turn to our panel. I would
like to ask you to summarize your prepared statements in 5
minutes. The full statement can be offered for the record. So
without objection we will make that happen.
Mr. Rademaker, please proceed with your remarks.
STATEMENT OF STEPHEN G. RADEMAKER, BIPARTISAN POLICY CENTER,
NATIONAL SECURITY PROJECT ADVISOR
Mr. Rademaker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member
Cooper. It is a pleasure to be here before you today. I do have
a prepared statement which I do not propose to read to you. I
will just summarize it. And I have about 5 minutes, is that
correct?
I make a number of key points in my testimony. The first is
that I do think the INF Treaty historically is a very important
treaty. It is one that President Reagan achieved over an
enormous amount of opposition.
He had to withstand lots of criticism from peace activists
who basically thought the United States should look the other
way in the face of intermediate Russian--intermediate-range
Russian missiles aimed at our forces and our allies in Europe.
He didn't look the other way.
He met that threat with U.S. deployments to match the
Russian deployments. And in the end his vision was vindicated
because the Russians agreed to mutually eliminate that range of
missiles on their side and on our side.
And that was an important accomplishment. And that was very
reassuring to our allies at the time who had in many cases
serious domestic political opposition to the U.S. deployment in
their countries of those missiles.
One of the points I make is that this treaty today is
frankly much more important to our allies than to us simply
because the missiles of this range, the 500 to 5,500 kilometer
range, deployed on Russian territory as--there are a few
exceptions, but territorial exceptions or geographic
exceptions, but as a general matter they can't reach the United
States. They can only reach the territory of our allies. So
this is really more important to their security than ours. But
they are our treaty allies, so their security matters to us.
I think in the eyes of our allies it remains an important
treaty. But the next point I make in my testimony is whether
this treaty regime is likely to survive over the long term is
open to serious question.
We have to understand what this treaty does. It imposes an
obligation on the United States and then four of the successor
countries to the Soviet Union not to possess this class of
missile.
For the United States that is not an enormous problem. But
for Russia, which is surrounded by other countries that are
deploying missiles of that range, it is a big problem. And the
Russians have made that clear consistently for a period of
about 10 years. They made it clear to me personally when I was
serving in the U.S. Government as the Assistant Secretary of
State for Arms Control.
They feel this is an unfair treaty. Why should China be
able to have these missiles and not them? Why should North
Korea and Iran be able to have these kinds of missiles?
One of the points I would make to them of course was that
part of the reason that North Korea and Iran have these kinds
of missiles is because Russia transferred to them the
technology to produce them. But you know that is a historical
irony at this point. And maybe the Russians in retrospect wish
they hadn't done that. But today they are worried about the
threat of these missiles.
And looking forward I guess I think over the long term
there is little likelihood that Russia is going to remain
inside this treaty regime. And I think the issue that we are
here today to discuss is symptomatic of that.
Russia is not committed fundamentally to this treaty.
Evidently they are testing missiles that would violate the
treaty. And that testing is itself a violation of the treaty.
And I would assume that is in preparation for eventual
deployment and, if they intend to act consistent with the
treaty, termination by them of the treaty.
What do we do about this? Well, one of the points I make in
the treaty is we shouldn't do them any favors. We shouldn't
reward them for misbehavior.
And I think for the United States to declare that we are
pulling out of the treaty in response to what Russia has done
would actually be welcomed in Moscow because I think they are
wrestling with the question of how they terminate, how they get
out from under this treaty.
We shouldn't make it any easier for them. We should force
them to take the onus of that, take the international political
and diplomatic hit for pulling out of the treaty.
I do go on in some length in my testimony about how I think
Russia's attitude toward this treaty is symptomatic of their
larger approach to arms control. I think the Obama
administration would like the Russians to have a very different
approach to arms control.
The administration has a very ambitious arms control
agenda. Unfortunately they don't have a partner who shares that
agenda. And I make that point at some length in my testimony.
But we continue to face the question of what the United
States should do in response to what Russia is doing if we are
not going to terminate the treaty. And I lay--at the end of my
testimony I lay out some suggestions. A couple of them are sort
of conceptual in nature.
You know the first one I would say is the Obama
administration needs to stop worrying about its own arms
control agenda. It needs to accept the reality of Russia.
I mean Russia is not committed--Russia does not share
President Obama's vision of eliminating nuclear weapons from
the face of the earth. They don't--they are not particularly
fond of arms control agreements.
My sense, and it is only a sense, is that the Obama
administration has not wanted to confront the violations that
we are here to discuss because they are inconvenient from the
perspective of trying to advance a broader arms control agenda.
They might quarrel with that characterization, but I think
actually that is a fair characterization.
And one of my first suggestions is that they stop worrying
about that, stop worrying about their arms control agenda and
start worrying about protecting this treaty regime and holding
Russia to its legal obligations. Because if we don't do that,
you know they will be tempted to violate other legal
obligations.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Rademaker can be found in
the Appendix on page 31.]
Mr. Rogers. Thank you.
Mr. Thomas, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF JIM THOMAS, VICE PRESIDENT AND DIRECTOR OF
STUDIES, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND BUDGETARY ASSESSMENTS
Mr. Thomas. Good morning, Chairman Rogers and Ranking
Member Cooper and distinguished members of the committee. Thank
you for inviting me to testify today.
After more than 25 years in force, it is an appropriate
time to take stock of the INF Treaty and assess its continuing
relevance in a world where Russian compliance is in question,
China is actively exploiting an intermediate-range missile gap,
and Iran and North Korea continue to pursue nuclear weapons as
well as long-range delivery means.
Reports that Russia is circumventing and/or violating the
INF Treaty suggest that it may be engaged in arms control
``salami slicing'' that is slowly undermining the INF Treaty
through ambiguous infractions rather than exiting the treaty
through outright abrogation.
The United States cannot permit Moscow to make a soft exit
from the INF Treaty while itself remaining a party to the
treaty in good standing. It must ensure robust monitoring,
verification, and compliance with the treaty as long as it
remains in force.
But the United States must also look beyond an era of
Eurocentric bilateral U.S.-Russian arms control. It must adopt
a more multilateral framework consistent with the strategic
game of rebalancing to the Asia-Pacific region.
China should figure prominently in discussions about the
future of the treaty. INF-class ballistic and cruise missiles
have become a major pillar of China's counter-intervention
strategy to limit U.S. military freedom of action in the
western Pacific.
Beyond China a number of countries like Iran and North
Korea have amassed small but growing inventories of ballistic
and cruise missiles that would be proscribed if these nations
were signatories themselves to the INF Treaty.
To address these wider global concerns, the United States
should consider undertaking a latter-day, dual-track approach,
one that would attempt to update the treaty framework while
simultaneously creating post INF military options to backstop
diplomacy and hedge against the possibility that negotiations
fail.
First the United States should seek to multilateralize the
restrictions of the treaty to eliminate or replace substantial
limits on other countries' intermediate-range missiles. Toward
this end the United States should consult with allies most at
risk from the missile forces of China, North Korea, and Iran,
and enlist them to apply greater pressure on those states to
join.
If multilateralization proves unachievable, the United
States might negotiate with Russia a treaty amendment to allow
ground-launched conventionally armed missiles with ranges up to
2,000 kilometers outside Europe to balance the missile arsenals
of potential adversaries in the Middle East and Asia.
But ultimately, if the United States is neither able to
ensure Russia's compliance nor subsequently to multilateralize
or amend the treaty, it may conclude that INF no longer serves
its interests. Paradoxically, an American willingness to
contemplate the possibility of withdraw may increase U.S.
bargaining leverage in negotiating multilateralization or
amendment.
The United States should begin creating military options
now to backstop diplomacy and ensure the United States can
negotiate from a position of strength on Russian compliance,
multilateralization and/or amendment of the treaty, while
hedging against the failure of these efforts.
Such options should make credible the prospect of swift
U.S. deployments of intermediate-range missile forces to reduce
the decision to deployment cycle. Toward that end, the United
States should undertake consultations with allies and partners
to explore contingency forward-basing options for
conventionally armed intermediate-range missile forces.
The Department of Defense should undertake studies to begin
developing options for future INF-class missiles so that it
could move quickly if a political decision were taken in the
future to amend or withdraw from the treaty.
In this context, the U.S. Army might consider developing
and fielding a small sea-based, that is on barges or ships,
intermediate-range missile force for experimentation and
concept development that could later be adapted and brought to
shore if the United States amended or left the treaty.
In conclusion, suspected Russian violations of the INF
Treaty come at a time of great strategic uncertainty for the
United States on a global basis. While compliance issues must
be swiftly addressed, the United States should also widen its
aperture for evaluating the INF Treaty to ensure that it serves
its broader global interests and security commitments.
A treaty that bars two nations from pursuing certain
militarily desirable classes of missiles, while not stopping
other states, some of whom pose threats towards the United
States and its allies overseas, from possessing them must be
constantly reevaluated to determine the tipping point when the
costs of arms control overtake its benefits. That day may be
quickly approaching.
Now is the time to begin contemplating a world beyond the
INF Treaty, and taking appropriate precautionary steps.
Paradoxically, doing so may offer the best course to preserving
the viability of the treaty farther into the future. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Thomas can be found in the
Appendix on page 41.]
Mr. Rogers. Thank you.
Ambassador, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR STEVEN PIFER, DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL
AND NON-PROLIFERATION INITIATIVE, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION
Ambassador Pifer. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Cooper,
distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the
opportunity to appear today to discuss Russian compliance with
the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces treaty, and how the
United States should respond if it is determined that Russia
has violated that agreement. With your permission I have
submitted a statement for the record and will briefly summarize
it now.
I should note at the outset that I do not have access to
classified information regarding this question, nor do I have
access to the U.S. Government's deliberations. Absent concrete
information, any discussion of U.S. policy response to a
possible Russian treaty violation would invariably be somewhat
hypothetical.
The 1987 INF Treaty is a landmark arms control agreement.
It banned an entire class of U.S. and Soviet land-based
ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500
kilometers. It resulted in the elimination of 2,692 U.S. and
Soviet missiles as well as their associated launchers and other
equipment.
Russia is a successor state to the Soviet Union. Recently
questions have arisen about its compliance with the treaty.
There appear to be two charges regarding Russian
violations. Assertions that the Russian RS-26 ballistic missile
violates the treaty appear to have no basis.
Under the definitions of the START [Strategic Arms
Reduction] Treaty, the New START Treaty, and the INF Treaty,
the RS-26 is a permitted, but limited, ICBM [intercontinental
ballistic missile]. The reported R-500 cruise missile appears
to be a more serious concern. But there is little hard
information and open sources about it.
A Russian violation of the INF Treaty would be a serious
matter, as would any treaty violation. If Russia is producing,
testing and/or deploying new intermediate-range missiles, such
weapons would, depending on their range and deployment
location, pose a threat to U.S. allies in Europe and Asia, as
well as to other countries such as China. They would threaten
U.S. forward-based forces. Such missiles, however, likely would
not have the range to reach the United States.
Maintaining the INF Treaty remains in the U.S. interest.
America's allies greatly value the agreement. If the U.S.
Government were to conclude that Russia has violated the
treaty, it should press Russia to end the violation and come
back into full compliance using both senior diplomatic channels
and the special verification commission established by the
treaty.
Moreover, Washington should brief Russia's neighbors, both
in Europe and Asia, on the violation. The goal should be to
multilateralize the issue. That is to have other countries, the
ones that would be most directly threatened by a Russian
intermediate-range missile, press Moscow on the question.
Washington should strive to make this not just a U.S.-
Russia issue, but a German-Russian, a Chinese-Russian, an
Italian-Russian issue as well, and so on.
If Russia has violated the INF Treaty, the United States
should nevertheless continue to observe the treaty's
provisions, at least for the near term. U.S. withdrawal from
the treaty would free Russia from any legal obligation to
observe the treaty's limits, and would bring no apparent
advantage to the United States.
At present the Pentagon has no plans for land-based
intermediate-range missiles, so a U.S. withdrawal from the
treaty would leave Russia free to deploy missiles for which the
United States has no counterpart. Deploying new intermediate-
range missiles would take time and impose a new burden on the
stretched Defense Department budget.
Funding a new missile would require drawing funds from
other accounts such as modernization of strategic nuclear
forces, missile defense, or conventional weapons systems.
Absent a specific priority military requirement for U.S.
intermediate-range missiles, this would not appear to be a wise
use of scarce resources.
Moreover, even if the United States were to build
intermediate-range missiles, they would pose a serious response
to a Russian treaty violation only if deployed on the territory
of U.S. allies in Europe or Asia close to Russia. But the
prospects of NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization], Japan,
or South Korea accepting and welcoming deployment of new U.S.
intermediate-range missiles on their territory appears to be
very low.
Deploying such missiles in the continental United States,
on the other hand, would make little sense as they could only
hold targets at risk in the Western Hemisphere.
While continuing to observe a treaty that another party is
violating may seem counterintuitive, this is what the Reagan
administration did during the 1980s following the discovery in
1983 of the Krasnoyarsk large-phased array radar. That radar
was a clear violation of the ABM [Anti-Ballistic Missile]
Treaty.
The Reagan administration nevertheless pressed the Soviets
on the violation, but continued to observe the treaty.
Moreover, the Reagan administration simultaneously continued to
negotiate new arms control agreements with the Soviets,
including the INF and START I Treaties. In 1990 the Soviets
agreed to tear down the radar.
Mr. Chairman, Representative Cooper, distinguished members
of the committee, continuing to observe the INF Treaty while
pressing the compliance issue with Russia and having others do
so makes sense, at least for the foreseeable future.
This does not mean that if Russia has wantonly violated the
treaty the United States should continue to observe it
indefinitely. But for now there is no compelling interest on
the American part in withdrawal.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Pifer can be found in
the Appendix on page 53.]
Mr. Rogers. Thank each and every one of you. We will now
turn to questions, and I will start.
If the New York Times report this past January is correct
and the Russian INF violations began in 2008, what does this
tell us about the very foundation of the reset with Russia, Mr.
Thomas?
Mr. Thomas. Well, I think everyone here is troubled by the
potential allegations of violations of the INF Treaty, which as
all the panelists I think have made clear has even greater
implications for America's allies overseas than it does for
ourselves directly.
And I think that it also has to be connected with the--
across the entire arms control agenda. So in terms of looking
for new cuts in strategic arms, this is a factor that would
also have to be taken into account.
Mr. Rogers. Mr. Rademaker.
Mr. Rademaker. I think that report, if true, tells us two
things about Russia. First, as I stated in my testimony, Russia
has virtually no commitment to the INF Treaty. And in fact they
appear to be positioning themselves to get out from under it as
they have--officials from President Putin on down have made
clear that they are interested in doing.
Second, and I elaborate on this in my testimony, I think it
tells us about the fundamental Russian attitude towards arms
control. They, in their security doctrine these days nuclear
weapons are more important to them than ever because they see
themselves surrounded by hostile countries. And they feel that
on a conventional level they are not able to defend themselves.
Mr. Rogers. So your impression is there is no reset?
Mr. Rademaker. In the arms control area I think that is
right. The New START Treaty is sometimes held out as evidence
that there is Russian interest in nuclear arms control. But you
know my assessment of the New START Treaty was basically we
agreed to legally obligate ourselves to reduce our strategic
nuclear weapons deployments to the Russian level.
Which you know we didn't require Russia to make any
reductions, we just reduced--required ourselves to reduce to
their level. And you know they resisted taking that.
They tried to precondition that on additional concessions
from us in the area of missile defense and conventional global
strike. So you know they will use arms control to advance their
interests. But they don't consider one of their interests
nuclear weapons reductions.
Mr. Rogers. Okay.
Should the U.S. be concerned about the new Russian missiles
like the RS-26 Rubezh, which Russia had tested at intermediate
range, but Russia is calling an ICBM? Or should we be content
that Russia promises us that it will agree to count the
missiles under the New START Treaty. Mr. Thomas.
Mr. Thomas. Well, I think as Ambassador Pifer acknowledged,
the RS-26 may not in fact be a violation of the treaty. But it
certainly should be of concern to the United States and its
allies given the fact that it could be used at intermediate
range and therefore would have greater responsiveness and
shorter time of flight, and the threat that that could pose.
Mr. Rogers. Okay.
Russia is said to be preparing to deploy this system in
2015 in Irkutsk, suggesting that for an intermediate-range
missile the target is China. Now what does this do to claims
that Russia is breaking out of the INF due to U.S. missile
defense. Ambassador.
Ambassador Pifer. Well, if the Russians were to deploy the
RS-26 in Irkutsk, first of all it would be an ICBM because it
was tested in excess of 5,500 kilometers. That could not reach
the United States. But certainly I think a deployment in
Irkutsk would suggest very clearly that it is aimed at China,
and ought to be a concern first and foremost to the Chinese.
I would make one other point about the RS-26 from just a
U.S. point of view is of course the RS-26, every one that is
deployed takes a space under the New START limit and takes a
space that could be deployed by say an SS-27 or Bulava missile,
which actually could reach all of the United States.
Mr. Rogers. Mr. Rademaker.
Mr. Rademaker. Well, I know my two co-panelists have
conceded that the RS-26 is not an INF-range missile, but rather
an ICBM. I guess I would hesitate actually to reach that
conclusion based on what we know.
Apparently what we know is that they did fire that missile
to a range of 5,800 kilometers, which is in excess of the 5,500
kilometer INF range. But I don't feel that I know enough about
the nature of that test to be able to say whether that turns it
into an ICBM.
You know the basic physics of missiles is that their range
depends on a combination of the amount of thrust they can
generate and the weight of the missile. And by adjusting the
weight, if you reduce the weight you can make it go further.
Mr. Rogers. So you are saying that there is a loophole in
the INF Treaty----
Mr. Rademaker. I mean I think there may well be in this
case because you know the definition of a ground launch
ballistic missile under the treaty is that it is capable of--
that it is a weapons delivery vehicle. Now, if--you know if you
take the warhead off of a missile, it will fly further than if
it has a warhead on it.
So it could be that this is a 5,500 kilometer range missile
with a warhead. Remove the warhead, it will fly further. But an
ICBM without a warhead, in my opinion, is not an ICBM. It is a
projectile flying through the air, but it is not an ICBM.
So I think my co-panelists may have rushed to a conclusion
here that would require some further study before I would be
willing to accept that----
Mr. Rogers. Ambassador.
Ambassador Pifer. Mr. Chairman, if I could say I think Mr.
Rademaker is right on the physics.
Although this is an issue that actually was assessed in the
U.S. Government back in 1986 and 1987 when one of the questions
we asked ourselves is if the Soviets sign the INF Treaty and
get rid of all their SS-20 intermediate-range missiles, how
would they cover time-urgent targets in Europe, for example air
bases hosting American nuclear weapons. And the conclusion
within the U.S. Government was they would take intercontinental
ballistic missiles and fly those missiles to intermediate
range.
So this was sort of a scenario that was envisaged and was
seen as something that they could do, and was not seen as a
problem with the INF Treaty.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you very much. My time is expired.
Chair recognizes the ranking member.
Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Is there an equivalent forum to this panel in Russia or
China or another country that would allow the world to see the
thinking of the foreign policy elites regarding intermediate
nuclear forces? My guess is there is not, right?
So the United States unilaterally by having hearings like
this, although it is probably good for democracy, it might not
be good for our foreign policy strength because, to the extent
that you gentlemen would serve in future administrations, they
would know how you feel about these issues. So right here is
one hand tied behind our back to some extent.
Now, we celebrate our open process and we are not ready to
give that up. But it is an interesting distinction because we
oppose state capitalist regimes and authoritarian regimes who
don't have to go through these processes.
Second, I think Ambassador Pifer made the point most
clearly. This is essentially a European issue, and to some
extent a Japanese issue because INF missiles can really only
threaten those capitals. But that threat is truly startling.
To have in Russia a weapon that is possibly designed to hit
London or Paris or Rome or Berlin or Prague or Warsaw, that is
truly a devastating thing to contemplate. And the fact that
Europeans are not more engaged in this debate, because this is
essentially a Reagan-era treaty for their benefit, is an
amazing thing.
And you would think that the peoples of Europe would rise
up and say oh my God, not only is Putin a bad guy in other
respects, but in regard to destroying our own nations. Why are
Russian scientists working on things like this?
Another issue that seems to be important is regardless of
the physics of missiles, so many of these countries, especially
like a North Korea or Iran, they are only in the INF space
because they haven't yet developed the science to do ICBMs. So
this is kind of a poor man's ICBM.
And also there is this factor once you have an ICBM you can
weight it appropriately so that it becomes an INF missile. So
it is a little bit of a flexible category we are talking about
here.
But isn't the fundamental issue that we are dealing with
here is our precision-guided weapons are so advanced that a lot
of these nuke issues are kind of poor man's precision-guided
weapons? Because they can't lob a missile down a smokestack the
way we can, or at least they haven't been able to do that yet.
They rely on these more old-fashioned, general purpose, more
destructive--more broadly destructive weapons.
So those are some of the issues that I am interested in.
And the testimony, as excellent as it is, seems to skirt on
many of these issues. So how do we deal with them more
directly?
Mr. Thomas. Sir, if I might just respond on the case of the
poor man's ICBM. I think that is an accurate assessment as far
as countries like Iran and North Korea go. But it may not be as
true when thinking about China.
China in fact does have increasingly accurate ICBMs. And it
has developed a highly accurate, very sophisticated IRBM force.
And so I think that really falls into a different category.
Mr. Rademaker. And Mr. Cooper, commenting on the same
point, you know I think I would prefer to look at our precision
weapons from the opposite perspective, which is to the degree
we develop them they enable us to rely less on nuclear weapons
in our military planning. And I think most people consider that
a positive development for us to rely less on nuclear weapons.
And I guess I would suggest that most countries that are
developing nuclear weapons are not doing it because of
America's precision weapons. It is for other reasons. And even
if we were not developing precision conventional weapons I
think their interest in nuclear weapons would remain
undiminished.
Ambassador Pifer. Mr. Cooper, I would like to make three
points. First of all, you are exactly right. I mean the reason
the United States entered into the INF Treaty was to provide
security for our allies, to protect them and remove a threat to
them in form of the SS-20 missile.
Why have they not been more public about concerns to this?
My guess is they are waiting for the United States to come to
some kind of a conclusion and at that point you know they may
then speak up.
And that is why I would recommend that if the U.S.
Government concludes that the treaty has been violated that a
major focus should be briefing allies, we want to have
Chancellor Merkel raising this with Mr. Putin. We want to have
President Xi raising this with Mr. Putin.
We want to have--you know this is an issue that concerns
the allies first and foremost. And rather than making it just a
bilateral issue we are going to make this a multilateral
question.
And then finally just a general observation. I think you
have seen over the last several years the Russian doctrine
evolve to slightly greater reliance on nuclear weapons. In part
because they see the advances of the American military has made
with precision-guided conventional weapons on missile defense.
And I think their perception is that that gap is not
growing. That gap is perhaps even increasing. So unfortunately
over the last few years they have come to place greater
reliance on nuclear weapons systems.
Mr. Cooper. Well, on the European question we are pushing
our allies to increase their defense spending to 2 percent of
their GDPs [gross domestic products]. We are not probably going
to succeed in that. So this is a very important issue to
highlight for Angela Merkel and other European leaders to get
their heads more in the game.
So I would not only encourage full NATO briefings, but also
ways to engage the general public because the world was
transfixed by sporting events like the World Cup. They are not
focusing on Mr. Putin and his scientists, you know developing
weapons that would target their cities, which is a pretty
devastating thing.
It is one thing to invade Crimea. It is another thing to
target London, Paris, Rome, Berlin, cities like that, because
that is the true implication of these weapons.
Mr. Rademaker. If I could just comment.
First, Mr. Cooper, I agree with what Ambassador Pifer said
about the importance of engaging our allies in this. And I
guess one of the things that was troubling to me when I read
the New York Times story was that according to that story the
Obama administration concluded in late 2011 that there was a
likely treaty violation and yet they didn't brief our NATO
allies on it until January of 2014.
So they let more than 2 years go by before briefing our
allies. And it is a mystery to me why they would have waited
that long given that I think we all agree that it is pretty
important to engage our allies in a campaign of diplomatic
pressure on the Russians to cease these violations.
Second, on your comments about the threat to our allies
from these missiles, I would like to inject into the discussion
the fact that we also need to be mindful of the Russian
tactical nuclear weapons that are deployed in Europe. But you
know the numbers are classified, but I think most estimates are
that Russia has about a 10-to-1 advantage over NATO in terms of
the number of tactical nuclear weapons.
And you combine that with evidently movement toward the
deployment of these types of missiles, which could deliver
those tactical nuclear weapons, and I agree with you entirely,
our allies should be much more alarmed than they are.
Mr. Cooper. I know my other colleagues have questions and
they have rung the bells for votes. So I should yield the
balance of my time.
Mr. Rogers. Thank the gentleman.
Chair now recognizes the gentleman from--not Arkansas,
Arizona, Mr. Franks.
Mr. Franks. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am not from
Arkansas, that is for sure. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, you know General Breedlove said that a
weapons capability that violates the INF and that is introduced
into the greater European landmass is absolutely a tool that
will have to be dealt with. And he said I will not judge how
the alliance will choose to act. But I will say that they will
have to consider what to do about it.
It is a question that cannot go unanswered. That is his
basic point here. And if you will grant me just a little
diplomatic immunity here, Mr. Chairman, we have witnessed this
President ignore the green movement in Iran. We have witnessed
him, it appears now, be entering into an agreement with Iran
that will have a protected protocol for them to enrich uranium.
We have witnessed him take the side of the Muslim
Brotherhood in Egypt. We have, we witnessed the President set a
faulty red line in Syria and failed to secure the embassy in
Benghazi on the 11th anniversary of 9/11.
We have witnessed him fail to secure a status of forces
agreement in Iraq, which is in the midst of falling now in the
hands of ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria], one of the
most deadly terrorist groups we have seen in years. And we are
now witnessing him, seeing our most vital and cherished ally,
Israel, feeling abandoned and alone in the world under attack.
Mr. Cooper. Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Franks. So my question is, is this administration going
to call what Russia is doing now a violation of the INF? Do you
think that they will stand up and say it is a violation?
And if they do, will they inform the Congress of that fact
and the American people and our Article 5 NATO allies before
they inform Russia? Will they stand up in this situation? Or
will they do as they have done in the litany I have just
outlined? Mr. Rademaker.
Mr. Rademaker. Congressman, I think the answer at the
moment is we don't know.
Mr. Franks. Well you see, I wouldn't be shocked.
Mr. Rademaker. I hope they will. Again, according to the
New York Times they concluded there was a likely violation in
2011. There have been two Arms Control Compliance Reports
submitted to the Congress since then, neither of which has
mentioned this issue.
Another one was due on April 15th of this year. It may be
forthcoming soon. And I think that will be an interesting test
of the question you ask, whether they are prepared to confront
this in the forthcoming Arms Control Compliance Report.
Mr. Franks. Well, let me put the question to the entire
panel here. Is there anyone on the panel that would say that
they believe that the Russians have violated the INF or have
not? Mr. Rademaker, do you believe that the Russians at this
point have in fact violated the INF?
Mr. Rademaker. Well, I think you know I am like the other
panelists here. I do not have access to classified information
so I have to rely on what has been in the news media.
Assuming what I have read in the news media is true, yes,
it sounds like a violation, frankly a material breach of the
obligations that Russia has under the INF Treaty.
Mr. Franks. Mr. Thomas, what do you think? Has Russia
violated the INF?
Mr. Thomas. Sorry. Based on what has been reported already
in Western reports already, as well as even within Russia's own
media, there are good reasons to believe that Russia may indeed
have violated the INF Treaty.
Mr. Franks. Ambassador, what is your perspective?
Ambassador Pifer. At this point, not having access to
classified information, I do not know. Based on what I have
seen in open sources I do not believe the RS-26 is a violation
of the INF Treaty. There is a much more serious concern,
apparently, about the cruise missile question.
Mr. Franks. Well, I think it is, in my judgment, obvious
that the Russians have violated the INF. And I would hope this
President, even given his newfound flexibility after the
election, would face that directly and bring this to the
American people and inform Russia and stand up.
Because these treaties, if there is to be any hope for
treaties, if we do not abide by them and we do not hold each
other accountable then the treaty is not worth the paper it is
written on. And I think it is a big issue, Mr. Chairman. And I
hope the President would consider the sentiments here.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman.
Chair now recognizes another member who is not from
Arkansas, and my colleague, Mr. Lamborn from Colorado.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I thank you all for being here. This is a very important
issue, and I appreciate the perspective each one of you brings
to this panel and this important discussion.
Mr. Rademaker, you said in your testimony as well as in
your written statement that even though we had made gestures to
the Soviet Union through New START, pretty much unilateral
because we only came down to the level they were already at for
the most part, that it hasn't been reciprocated. And they have
no interest in really going beyond that.
I am concerned that like you said here, the President has
called for a further unilateral--what appears to be a
unilateral reduction in our strategic forces. Are you concerned
about the unilateral aspect of the U.S. further reduction, or a
reduction even if it is reciprocated by the Russians given that
there are other countries not being included like China?
Mr. Rademaker. Yes, Congressman. I comment on that in my
prepared testimony.
As you know, President Obama in his Berlin speech last year
called for a further one-third reduction in deployed U.S.
strategic nuclear forces. He indicated in the speech that he
hoped to negotiate that with Russia.
And he had in fact dispatched his national security advisor
to Moscow to try and commence that kind of conversation. The
Russians, by all indications, were not interested in his
initiative.
One of the points I make in my testimony is I think there
has been some ambiguity about whether, at the end of the day,
President Obama would be prepared to try to implement that one-
third reduction unilaterally even if Russia did not undertake
to make the same reduction. And I think the current moment
would be a good one to eliminate any hope that they may have in
Moscow that President Obama would do such a thing.
The combination of what Russia has done in Crimea with the
violations of the INF Treaty that we are here discussing today,
to me that provides a useful occasion to close the door to the
hope that the Russians may have that because of his deep
commitment to eliminating nuclear weapons President Obama might
unilaterally----
Mr. Lamborn. Mr. Rademaker, if our administration had clear
vision I think that that would be the case. But you listen to
the litany that Mr. Franks recited.
And I think this administration and the President in
particular have rose-colored glasses on. They are overly
optimistic about how their--how the U.S. example is going to be
so compelling that other countries will follow it. And yet that
hasn't been the case. Would you agree with that?
Mr. Rademaker. Basically yes. I mean I think President
Obama deeply believes that nuclear weapons are a threat to
humanity and he would like it to be part of his legacy to
abolish them, or at least take dramatic action in the direction
of abolishing them. And I think it is a source of great
frustration to him that the Russians aren't interested in
joining him in that effort.
You know I feel his pain. But you know we can't wish the
Russians to be different than they are. Maybe one day they will
be different. But under the current government they have their
priorities and it is evident what they are.
So I wish he would be clearer because I think the
Russians--the Russians, I dealt with them a lot in the arms
control context. They look for weakness and seek to exploit it.
And I think they detect President Obama's personal desire to do
this. And you know why should they negotiate reductions with us
if they think America is going to give them--give unilateral
reductions in exchange for nothing?
So step back and wait for President Obama and his passion
to eliminate these weapons from the face of the earth to move
unilaterally. I mean for Russia, from a pure national interest
point of view, not sharing President Obama's enthusiasm for
eliminating these weapons, that would be a huge progress for
them.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you. And for any one of you, real
quickly here, given the fact that China is more powerful than
ever and growing more powerful, including on the strategic
level, should we continue in the former mode of just bilateral
negotiations with us and Russia where China is left out? Or
should we include them in any future arms control agreements?
Any one of you. Ambassador.
Ambassador Pifer. Yes, sir. I think at current point now if
you look at the total U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals, each
of these countries is probably about 10 times the size,
actually more than 10 times the size of the nuclear arsenals of
any third country, including China. So at some point if the
U.S. and Russia continue to come down you have got to bring in
third countries.
Mr. Lamborn. Or if they continue to come up.
Ambassador Pifer. Or if they continue to come up, correct.
But I think there is still--it would be room for at least one
more U.S.-Russia reduction before you had to get a more
complicated issue of third countries.
If I could come back briefly to the President's proposal in
Berlin, as I understood the Pentagon is that the Pentagon view
was that the United States could reduce deployed strategic
warheads by about one-third from the 1,550 limit without regard
to a Russian reduction.
However, every administration comment I have seen publicly
since last June a year ago has been that they are talking about
a reciprocal reduction. And my guess is that with the recent
turn in U.S.-Russian events, I would be astonished that there
is any expectation in Moscow of a U.S. unilateral nuclear
reduction at this point.
Mr. Lamborn. I hope you are right. Thank you.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you all. We have been called for votes.
We are only going to have two votes. So we are going to recess
briefly while we run over and hit those two votes. We should be
back in about 20 minutes, if you will hang around.
Thank you.
[Recess.]
Mr. Rogers. The hearing is now back--called back to order.
We do have another member here.
I appreciate you all waiting around. I know that is awful
aggravating when they call us for votes and--in the middle of a
hearing. But it is what it is. But this has been a very
informative process, and I really appreciate you being here.
The ranking member has brought to my attention that the
rules require that members are not allowed to refer to other
members or the President in derogatory ways during these
questions. So we would ask everybody to adhere to that and
maintain a certain decorum in here.
I would like to recognize the ranking member on that issue
for a moment.
Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I checked with the
parliamentarian during the votes and he pointed out that clause
2(k) section 4 of rule XI requires that committees be operated
according to the order and decorum of the House. And I think
when members ask the chair for immunity in anticipation of out
of bounds comments they are about to make, and I just heard
another member eagerly anticipate what he called a rant.
That doesn't sound like even the members themselves are
operating--know they are operating out of bounds of order and
decorum. So I would ask the chair to enforce the rules of the
House.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman.
Chair now recognizes the gentleman----
Mr. Turner. Just a second. Mr. Chairman, I have an inquiry.
If the ranking member is complaining about members saying
things about a member, and does so by saying something about
another member, is that a violation?
Mr. Cooper. I think the House rules talk about naming
members by name----
Mr. Turner. So if we do it----
Mr. Cooper [continuing]. The President by name.
Mr. Turner. If we do it without maybe saying their name.
Okay. Great. Well, now that we have that down we will make
certain we follow that. Thank you.
Mr. Rogers. Chair now recognizes my friend and colleague,
the gentleman from Ohio, the former chairman of this
subcommittee, Mr. Turner, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Mr. Pifer, thank you for your language that you have used
today. It is very informative, and it is very specific. And I
want to go back to your language.
A few members ago you were asked the question of whether or
not Russia was in violation. You first carefully said that you
do not have access to classified material. And I appreciate
that distinction.
And then secondly you said that you do have concerns. And
that I think is a very careful statement considering the lack
of access. So it is not saying that there is not a violation.
It is not saying there is. But it is saying there are concerns.
And that would be accurate. Right? Okay.
Mr. Pifer, you are considered an expert on arms control.
You are director of Arms Control and Non-Proliferation
Initiative for The Brookings Institution.
Expert, expertise is based upon knowledge. And I appreciate
that you have said that you don't have access to classified
information. And so that does, to some extent, limit your
expertise or your knowledge. And you cite that you were looking
to open sources.
So, for you to be asked a question are they or are they
not, you have carefully not concluded. Because I mean you would
agree with me, right, that if you actually concluded whether or
not Russia was or was not, it would be just frivolous
speculation. Is that correct?
Ambassador Pifer. At this point as I said I think that
there is enough information in open sources about the RS-26
ballistic missile that my own conclusion is that it is
consistent with the definition of an ICBM.
But what I have seen in open sources regarding the cruise
missile question, which I gather to be the more serious issue,
there is not yet enough detail to come to a conclusion. But
certainly if the Russians are testing, producing, or deploying
a missile within the range band of INF, that would be a
violation.
Mr. Turner. But you would agree for you to go further and
actually conclude would be a frivolous speculation. It would
not be the careful language that you have had, the frivolous
speculation. Correct?
Ambassador Pifer. I am not comfortable making that
conclusion because I don't have the access to information. That
is correct.
Mr. Turner. So if you did conclude it would just be
frivolous. We wouldn't be able to use the information. We
wouldn't be able to conclude anything from the information.
Ambassador Pifer. If I reached that conclusion now based on
what I know it would be speculative.
Mr. Turner. Right.
A year ago on July 2013 you wrote a blog criticizing our
chairman saying, ``Allegations of Russian Intermediate-Range
Nuclear Forces Treaty Violations--Where's the beef?''
Your conclusions today are different than your conclusions
in this July 2013 op-ed, are they not?
Ambassador Pifer. That article in July was focused on the
question of the RS-26 ballistic missile.
Mr. Turner. Well did your--you are raising issues, though,
about what the chairman has said. And there is no statement in
here as to a limitation of what--of which missile he is talking
of. He has raised concerns about possible Russian treaty
violations. And you say in there he doesn't specify what the
violation was. So you can't--your article is not just on that
missile. It is on the issue of Buck McKeon having concerns.
Ambassador Pifer. The concern that I raised in that article
was at the time the public speculation out there was focused on
the ballistic missile, not the cruise missile.
Mr. Turner. Well, you can't say that. It says right here
that he did not specify what the violation was. So you can't
say that is what it was. I mean in your article--let me put
this in the record. I will put this in the record.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 71.]
Mr. Turner. I have a question for you about your
conclusion. You cite NASIC [National Air and Space Intelligence
Center] in here, which thank you for citing NASIC. They are in
my district. But I will note from your statement that you don't
get classified briefings from NASIC.
You have here though that our chairman is--this is a
critical compliance assessment you say based on facts and
evidence, not on allegations that border on frivolous. You say
that our chairman is being frivolous in having concerns in July
2013 that there may be treaty violations. But yet today you say
you have concerns. Do you want to retract this statement about
our chairman?
Ambassador Pifer. The article that I wrote a year ago was
focused on reports out that were focused on the ballistic
missile, the RS-26.
Mr. Turner. That is not what this article says. And again
we will put it in the record. You are criticizing the chairman.
And you say that he does not specify what the violation was.
And then you say his concerns are frivolous. You can't be
saying what his concerns are because you cite in the article
that you don't know what they are.
But the thing that I find really interesting is that you
don't have access to any classified information and you know he
does. I mean you don't know what he knows. But yet you felt the
need to write this op-ed.
So I want to ask you. Surely, because you don't have access
to classified information, you probably picked up the phone and
called someone just to check with them before you went on this
rant in calling our chairman frivolous. I would like to know,
who did you call in the State Department to just check in on
this?
Ambassador Pifer. Congressman, I wrote that article on the
basis of stories at the time that were focused on the RS-26
ballistic missile.
Mr. Turner. Did you call anyone at the State Department and
say, hey, this letter was a concern. Is anybody working on
this? Is there anything I should know?
Ambassador Pifer. I did make one call to somebody----
Mr. Turner. Who did you call?
Ambassador Pifer. I called----
Mr. Turner. And you are in front of Congress, so this is
one of the ones where you get to be truthful. Who did you call?
Ambassador Pifer. I called the Deputy Assistant Secretary
of State, Congressman, and said here is an argument I plan to
make.
Mr. Turner. Name?
Ambassador Pifer. Is it a dumb argument?
Mr. Turner. Care to give us--you gave us the title.
Ambassador Pifer. It was Deputy Assistant Secretary Rose.
Mr. Turner. Thank you so much.
Ambassador Pifer. Frank Rose.
Mr. Turner. All right. He misled you, unfortunately.
Ambassador Pifer. No, because again the conversation I had
with him was specifically on the RS-26 issue.
Mr. Rogers. The gentleman's time is expired. We are going
to have another round in just a minute so we will get back to
that.
Chair now recognizes himself for questions.
How long should the U.S. continue to unilaterally be bound
by the INF Treaty? We are at present apparently the only party
complying with the treaty. Do we let this drag on for 6 years?
In some ways it already, reportedly, is--has drug on too long.
What do you think, Mr. Rademaker?
Mr. Rademaker. Mr. Chairman, I say in my statement that I
don't think we should respond to what we know Russia to have
done at this point by pulling out of the treaty. I think from a
Russian perspective that would be more of a reward than a
punishment.
Because from my personal dealings with them I know that
they would very much like to get out from under the treaty. And
so I think they would welcome a U.S. decision to withdraw
because that would obviate the need for them to withdraw.
That said, I suppose we do--we need to be mindful of what
they are doing. We need to pay close attention. And it could be
that at some point they step across a line that does jeopardize
our security. And at that point of course we would have to take
measures that might include withdrawing from the treaty and
deploying countermeasures either in the area of missile defense
or our own INF-range missiles.
Mr. Rogers. Well, on that point, you know you were a
lawyer, as I understand it, with the State Department. How
would you define a difference between a violation and a
material breach and the consequences of each?
Mr. Rademaker. Okay. Well, Mr. Chairman, the international
law on that question is set forth in Article 60 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties. And I can just read you what
it says. It says ``a material breach of a treaty consists in
the violation of a provision essential to the accomplishment of
the object or purpose of the treaty.''
So you know I think the difference between a material
breach and--let me put it this way. A violation--the difference
between a violation that is a material breach and a violation
that is not a material breach is that one that is a material
breach is one that violates a provision essential to the
accomplishment of the object or purpose of the treaty.
And so then you would have to look at what is the object
and purpose of the treaty to determine what a material breach
might be. I think the object and purpose of the INF Treaty is
fundamentally to forbid the parties to possess or test INF-
range missiles.
The allegation in the New York Times article was that
Russia has tested an INF-range treaty. So if that allegation
were true, I think that would rise at the level of a material
breach.
Now I guess I should distinguish between reaching an
internal legal conclusion that there has been a material breach
and a decision to declare to the world or confront the other
side with the accusation of a material breach. If the
allegations in the New York Times story are true, I think as a
legal matter there is a material breach.
What we choose to do on the basis of that information is up
to us. Again, I mean there is relevant international law on
this. Just because there has been a material breach does not
automatically terminate the treaty. It gives the victim of the
breach the right to terminate the treaty, but it doesn't
automatically terminate it.
In other words, it creates a situation where the treaty
becomes voidable, but not necessarily void.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you very much.
Chair now recognizes the ranking member for any additional
questions he may have.
Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
At some point in the questioning the issue came up about
when the current administration knew about a possible violation
of the INF Treaty and what we should have done to notify our
allies about it.
It is sometimes true, perhaps not always true that our
means of detecting a violation is secret. And by revealing the
knowledge that we have, we might compromise sources and
methods. And of course no one wants to do that, right?
So since none of the witnesses have been able to have
access to classified information we don't really know the
answer to the question of when revealing a treaty violation
might compromise our intelligence gathering. So it might be a
little bit hasty to presume that immediately on suspecting a
violation we should have immediately made it a big issue. So
sometimes the only exercise people get is jumping to
conclusions.
Now it is--I don't want to jump to conclusions either. But
it--just like I pointed out earlier that we are the only
country that really has open forums on discussions like this.
So that puts us at a disadvantage.
So let's not put ourselves at further disadvantage by
establishing a de facto requirement that as soon as you learn
something you tell everything you know. That would be silly
because hopefully the purpose of hearings like this is to
strengthen America, not to weaken America. And I sometimes
worry that by exposing internal divisions, some of which are
purely political, that we have the unintended consequence of
aiding our enemies, not strengthening our own cause.
I noted in Mr. Pifer's testimony that he pointed out that
it would be useful for the current administration to revive the
Special Verification Commission, which apparently hasn't even
met since 2007, and that might be a useful way. Can you tell me
the composition of that commission and what purpose
reinvigorating them might serve?
Ambassador Pifer. Well, I think in terms of the U.S.
engagement with the Russians on this issue there are two
levels. One is the political channels, including at the Cabinet
level, Secretary Kerry, Secretary Hagel, with their Russian
counterparts.
But the INF Treaty specifically established the Special
Verification Commission. And one of its defined purposes in the
treaty was to address issues or questions about compliance. So
that would be where you would get into the technical level
questions where you want to explore the alleged violation. Ask
the Russians what is going on and try to get their explanation
of it.
Mr. Cooper. Who are the members of the Special Verification
Commission, just Russians and Americans? It is not--does it
have European representation?
Ambassador Pifer. It is a U.S.-Russian commission, which I
think--and this I am uncertain. The Belarusians, Kazakhstanis,
and Ukrainians I think also have participation on the Russian
side. This was a fact that when the Soviet Union collapsed you
had INF systems in different countries.
I believe two countries, Turkmenistan and I think
Uzbekistan, basically said we won't play. They only had one INF
site that was eliminated on their territory. And then those
other four countries, though, assumed the Russian obligations.
So it is the U.S. on one side of the table, and then the
Russians, Kazakhs, Belarusians, and Ukrainians on the other.
Typically I think what the United States does though is
that when there is this kind of group meets, if there are
issues of importance then we typically brief the allies. There
are set up channels at NATO to do that.
But I think you are correct. I think it actually has not
met since 2003.
Mr. Cooper. Oh, really, that long a period of time?
Ambassador Pifer. Well, the treaty basically--all of the
reductions in the treaty were accomplished by 1991. All of the
treaty inspections ended in 2001. So I think the mechanism
remains there.
It is an indefinite mechanism as the treaty is indefinite.
But neither side over the last 11 years has called to use it.
And I think in this case if there are the sorts of concerns
that are suggested in the New York Times, it would be
appropriate to activate that mechanism.
Mr. Cooper. One other aspect of the INF Treaty that hasn't
been illuminated in this hearing is that it authorizes some
pretty intrusive inspection mechanisms--inspection mechanisms
that we apparently found very helpful in terms of inspecting
Russian sites and talking with scientists and things like that.
Are those still in place? You noted somewhere in your
article, I think June 9, 2014, that in one location they were
still in full force, but perhaps others had atrophied. Are we
still under the INF Treaty conducting these on-site intrusive
inspections?
Ambassador Pifer. No, sir. The INF inspections were--in the
treaty were to continue for 13 years after entry into force. So
the last INF inspections ended in 2001.
Mr. Cooper. Well, there was one site, I am sure I won't
pronounce the Russian--it seemed like out of habit we still had
a presence, Votkinsk.
Ambassador Pifer. Sir, that would be Votkinsk. What
happened is we had a presence under the INF Treaty at Votkinsk.
But we also had a presence under START I at Votkinsk.
Mr. Cooper. So it is under the START I?
Ambassador Pifer. Right. And the START I Treaty expired in
2009, yes.
Mr. Cooper. So our folks are there today, or no longer
there?
Ambassador Pifer. They left in 2009.
Mr. Cooper. Got you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman.
Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Arizona, Mr.
Franks, for 5 more minutes.
Mr. Franks. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman I
would just try to make a couple points here.
Senator Kerry recently stated if we are going to have
treaties with people we have got to adhere to them. We are not
going to pass another treaty in the U.S. Senate if our
colleagues are sitting up here knowing somebody is cheating.
I guess the first thing I would do, Mr. Rademaker, Mr.
Thomas, and Ambassador, would you--do you agree with the
Senator's perspective? Do you agree with his position?
Mr. Rademaker. You are referring to the recorded comments
of Senator Kerry when----
Mr. Franks. Yes.
Mr. Rademaker [continuing]. When we found this at the
Foreign Relations Committee? He is certainly more expert on
what the Senate is prepared to do----
Mr. Franks. I am not asking for his expertise. I am asking
for yours.
Mr. Rademaker. You know I think I agree with his
observations.
Mr. Franks. Okay. Mr. Thomas.
Mr. Thomas. I think we clearly have an interest in ensuring
adherence to the treaties that we have entered, and making sure
as long as they are enforced.
Mr. Franks. I don't mean to be redundant here, but Mr.
Ambassador, do you think that it is important that we adhere to
them and----
Ambassador Pifer. No, adherence to the treaty is absolutely
important. Although I would point out in the past that although
there have at times been questions about Russian or Soviet
observance of the ABM treaty, the Reagan administration went
ahead and concluded additional treaties.
Mr. Franks. Well, in response to the Soviet Union's
violation of that AMB missile treaty, 23 members of the House
of Representatives, led by Les Aspin, Harry Reid, and Barney
Frank, that is not exactly the conservative opportunity
society, wrote that violations of the ABM treaty went to ``the
heart of arms control process. And adherence to existing
treaties is a necessity in order for future agreements to be
possible. And that if this problem is not resolved in a
satisfactory matter it will have serious consequences for the
future of arms control and the arms control process.''
You all think that the majority leader of the Senate at
that time was correct when he wrote that letter? And is that a
standard that should apply today?
I am just trying to be real basic here. I am not trying to
over--you know, but the bottom line is, it is not a small
issue. If we don't adhere to our treaties, if we don't enforce
them, you know. And I just am convinced that we are in the
process of demonstrating that we are willing to stick by a
treaty and let our potential opponents go their own way. And I
think that has profound implications.
I am afraid that this administration is doing for
vacillation and provocative weakness what Stonehenge did for
rocks. And I am concerned that this is sending a message that
the world over, and that it is at the heart of some of the
instability in the world.
If we don't have a clear, clarion message that America is a
faithful partner to a treaty and requires people to be faithful
to them, then not only is the treaty process vitiated, but
ultimately the whole attitude of the world is you can't depend
on America.
You know we had the agreement with the Ukraine that if they
would give up their nuclear weapons that America would protect
their sovereignty, their physical sovereignty. Russia said the
same thing.
Now, Russia might have sort of abrogated that, but we did
too. And this President didn't even apply some of the sanctions
that he could have, much less military response.
And the entire glue of an alliance that holds it together
is that you believe that you can count on your partners. You
can count on your allies to be there when you need them. And I
am afraid that we are just sending this message that America is
no longer really going to be a committed partner.
So I am hoping, I am hoping that the three of you in this
discussion today will elevate this issue. Because in my
judgment there is no doubt that the Russians have abrogated
this treaty. And if we have no response, it is not good news
for our children and future generations.
And I hope if nothing else comes from this committee that
we--this particular hearing, that we somehow tell the world
that there is still an America that you can count on. And right
now that is not what the world thinks.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman. I want to thank the
witnesses for being here. I do want to announce that today
Chairman Poe and I have sent a letter to Secretary Kerry to
tend to this issue and start looking at what we should do about
these violations.
Thank all of you. I know it takes a lot of time to prepare
for these things, and I appreciate your attendance here today.
It has been very helpful.
And with that, this hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:10 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
July 17, 2014
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
July 17, 2014
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DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
July 17, 2014
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
July 17, 2014
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ROGERS
Mr. Rogers. How important is it that the U.S. shows the Russian
Federation that they cannot profit from this violation?
Mr. Rademaker. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
Mr. Rogers. It's pretty clear that the Russian Federation
vehemently dislikes U.S. missile defenses and plans for more missile
defenses. Is that leverage in this case? How so?
a. If Aegis Ashore can defend against these capabilities, with
``minor'' modifications according to the Director of the Missile
Defense Agency, should we be sure that capability is deployed in
Romania and Poland?
Mr. Rademaker. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
Mr. Rogers. It's pretty clear that the Russian Federation
vehemently dislikes U.S. prompt global strike systems planning and
development. Is that leverage in this case?
a. Please describe the role of these systems in Asia.
b. Please describe why you understand DOD wants these systems and
has a military requirement for them.
Mr. Rademaker. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
Mr. Rogers. If the Administration knew about the INF violation
since 2008, was it obligated to advise Congress of it at the earliest
opportunity? Could there be a good reason to decide not to share that
information with the Senate at the time?
Mr. Rademaker. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
Mr. Rogers. If the Administration has decided to call the INF
violation a ``violation'' does the Administration owe it to the
Congress to advise the Congress before it informs Russia? Does it have
an obligation to share this determination with our Article V NATO
allies before Russia?
Mr. Rademaker. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
Mr. Rogers. In a report appearing on the Daily Beast website, it
was reported that, while serving as Chairman of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, then-Senator John Kerry held a classified hearing
of his committee on Russia's INF violations. He is reported to have
stated:
``If we're going to have treaties with people, we've got to adhere
to them . . . We're not going to pass another treaty in the U.S. Senate
if our colleagues are sitting up here knowing somebody is cheating.''
Do you agree with Senator Kerry's position?
a. In response to the Soviet Union's violation of the Anti-
Ballistic Missile Treaty, 23 members of the House of Representatives,
led by Les Aspin, Harry Reid, and Barney Frank, wrote that violations
of the ABM treaty went ``to the heart of the arms control process'' and
that ``adherence to existing treaties is a necessity in order for
future agreements to be possible'' and that ``[i]f this problem is not
resolved in a satisfactory manner, it will have serious consequences
for the future of the arms control process''.
Was the current majority leader of the Senate correct when he wrote
that letter? Is that the standard that should apply today?
Mr. Rademaker. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
Mr. Rogers. How long should the U.S. continue to unilaterally be
bound by the INF treaty? We are at present, apparently, the only party
complying with the treaty. Do we let this drag on for 6 years--in some
ways it already, reportedly, has (according to the New York Times)--
like the Russian violations of CFE did?
Mr. Rademaker. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
Mr. Rogers. What are the benefits and risks of seeking to
``multilateralize'' the INF treaty? What are the odds China is willing
to eliminate its hundreds of intermediate-range ballistic missiles and
cruise missiles?
a. Is there a risk to going down this road? Can we be
diplomatically out-maneuvered by the Russians? Does it risk making
their violation look legitimate?
Mr. Rademaker. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
Mr. Rogers. Is the INF treaty still relevant for today's security
environment?
Mr. Rademaker. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
Mr. Rogers. What about other violations? Russia is known not to be
complying with the CTBT. Do we need to resolve that too?
Mr. Rademaker. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
Mr. Rogers. Russia is seeking U.S. support for new aircraft and
sensors under the Open Skies treaty. But, Russia isn't complying with
that treaty; should we approve those new aircraft and sensors if Russia
isn't in compliance? Should we use this treaty, which Russia clearly
values, as leverage to obtain Russian compliance with INF?
Mr. Rademaker. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
Mr. Rogers. Russia got the U.S. to agree to unilateral reductions,
while Russia is actually building up its nuclear forces under New
START. Do we need to let Russia know that continued U.S. compliance
with New START cannot be assured if Russia is going to violate INF and
threaten our allies?
Mr. Rademaker. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
Mr. Rogers. Should the U.S. be concerned about new Russian
missiles, like the RS-26 Rubezh, which Russia has tested at
intermediate-range, but, Russia is calling an ICBM? Or should we be
content that Russia promises us it will agree to count that missile
under New START?
a. Russia is said to be preparing to deploy this system in 2015 in
Irkutsk, suggestion that, for an intermediate range missile, the target
is China. What does this do to claims that Russia is breaking out of
INF due to U.S. missile defense?
b. Do you believe that there is a loophole in New START and INF
allowing Russia to develop an IRBM but to call it an ICBM?
c. If this was known during New START ratification, is there any
reason to allow Russia to negotiate in this loophole?
Mr. Rademaker. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
Mr. Rogers. Should our allies feel safe and secure because they are
promising to count these intermediate range missiles as ICBMs? Why or
why not?
Mr. Rademaker. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
Mr. Rogers. Are ground-launched intermediate range ballistic
missiles and cruise missiles different than submarine-launched, or air-
launched, missiles of the same type and range? How?
Mr. Rademaker. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
Mr. Rogers. If you believe in arms control, shouldn't you be the
most committed to seeing this treaty enforced? To punishing cheating
and violations in all forms?
Mr. Rademaker. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
Mr. Rogers. What are some political and economic consequences that
the President and Congress should impose?
Mr. Rademaker. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
Mr. Rogers. Why is Russia developing and deploying a new ground-
launched cruise missile in violation of the INF Treaty? What are the
military and/or geopolitical benefits for Russia derived from this new
intermediate-range missile?
Mr. Rademaker. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
Mr. Rogers. How important is the continuation of the INF treaty to
U.S. interests? What would be the positive and/or negative impact from
its demise? Would there be a significant impact on PGS and other
planned or existing programs? On balance, should we walk away from the
treaty?
Mr. Rademaker. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
Mr. Rogers. Would any of our allies feel sufficiently threatened to
take compensatory action or would they assume that is solely the
responsibility of the U.S.?
Mr. Rademaker. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
Mr. Rogers. The INF treaty is the only treaty the U.S. has ratified
that has eliminated whole types and classes of nuclear weapons. What is
the impact to President Obama's legacy if this treaty is ``broken'' on
his watch?
Mr. Rademaker. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
Mr. Rogers. How important is it that the U.S. shows the Russian
Federation that they cannot profit from this violation?
Mr. Thomas. It is very important that Russia comply with its treaty
obligations. Failure on the part of Russia to do so in the case of the
INF Treaty calls into question the credibility of its other treaty
commitments, as well as the wisdom of entering into any future arms
control agreements with it. A muted response to a violation of the INF
Treaty on the part of the U.S. could embolden Russia to further violate
the Treaty or assume that it can similarly violate other arms control
agreements with impunity and potentially endanger the prospects for
continued strategic stability.
Mr. Rogers. It's pretty clear that the Russian Federation
vehemently dislikes U.S. missile defenses and plans for more missile
defenses. Is that leverage in this case? How so?
a. If Aegis Ashore can defend against these capabilities, with
``minor'' modifications according to the Director of the Missile
Defense Agency, should we be sure that capability is deployed in
Romania and Poland?
Mr. Thomas. U.S. plans for enhancing the defense of CONUS, its
field forces and facilities in Europe, as well as protecting NATO
allies from ballistic missile attack should move ahead irrespective of
Russian compliance or non-compliance with the INF Treaty. ``Leverage''
implies that a certain capability or action is conditional on something
else. Pursuit of enhanced missile defense capabilities should be
unconditional.
a. I believe that Aegis Ashore should be deployed in Romania and
Poland irrespective of the status of the INF Treaty or any potential
capability modifications.
Mr. Rogers. It's pretty clear that the Russian Federation
vehemently dislikes U.S. prompt global strike systems planning and
development. Is that leverage in this case?
a. Please describe the role of these systems in Asia.
b. Please describe why you understand DOD wants these systems and
has a military requirement for them.
Mr. Thomas. Again, we should make decisions about Prompt Strike on
the merits of the program, rather than viewing the capability as a
bargaining chip vis-a-vis Russia regarding the INF Treaty. At the same
time, demonstrating that the United States has credible military
options to pursue should the INF Treaty no longer be in force may
backstop diplomatic efforts to bring Russian back into compliance and/
or modify the Treaty in the future. That would require initiating
significant research and development efforts to ensure that the United
States has a capability it would be able to deploy should the treaty
end up being abrogated.
a. IRBM-class systems could play a very important role in Asia to
symmetrically counter China's extant, large arsenal of same-class
systems.
b. From the Unclassified version of the Joint Staff Report on
Conventional Prompt Global Strike, ``[Conventional Prompt Global
Strike] systems could be employed to strike globally, precisely, and
rapidly with lethal kinetic effects against high-payoff, time-sensitive
targets in denied and/or geographically isolated areas when other
forces are not available, not responsive enough, or not preferred.''
These conditions could exist when required to strike targets in one or
more theaters simultaneously, there is limited or no military presence
in a region, and/or anti-access/area-denial systems pose high risks
projecting conventional U.S. forces into those theaters. Prompt,
extended-range strike systems could mitigate these risks and complicate
potential adversaries' planning. They could play a crucial role,
moreover, in deterring multiple countries simultaneously.
Mr. Rogers. If the Administration knew about the INF violation
since 2008, was it obligated to advise Congress of it at the earliest
opportunity? Could there be a good reason to decide not to share that
information with the Senate at the time?
Mr. Thomas. I am not privy to the Administration's thinking on
compliance issues or the considerations that might have influenced the
timing of its most recent report submission and declaration of a
Russian INF Treaty violation. My understanding is that the Congress
requires the submission of a compliance report on an annual basis.
Current and previous administrations have spotty records on the timely
submission of compliance reports, but good governance would suggest
they should provide the basic facts in a timely manner that would
inform Congressional deliberations, not limited to the INF Treaty.
Mr. Rogers. If the Administration has decided to call the INF
violation a ``violation'' does the Administration owe it to the
Congress to advise the Congress before it informs Russia? Does it have
an obligation to share this determination with our Article V NATO
allies before Russia?
Mr. Thomas. Informing the Congress and U.S. Allies of any
determination of a treaty violation would be prudent as it would foster
a unified, coordinated response and increase the pressure that could be
applied to resolve the violation swiftly and bring all Parties into
compliance.
Mr. Rogers. In a report appearing on the Daily Beast website, it
was reported that, while serving as Chairman of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, then-Senator John Kerry held a classified hearing
of his committee on Russia's INF violations. He is reported to have
stated:
``If we're going to have treaties with people, we've got to adhere
to them . . . We're not going to pass another treaty in the U.S. Senate
if our colleagues are sitting up here knowing somebody is cheating.''
Do you agree with Senator Kerry's position?
a. In response to the Soviet Union's violation of the Anti-
Ballistic Missile Treaty, 23 members of the House of Representatives,
led by Les Aspin, Harry Reid, and Barney Frank, wrote that violations
of the ABM treaty went ``to the heart of the arms control process'' and
that ``adherence to existing treaties is a necessity in order for
future agreements to be possible'' and that ``[i]f this problem is not
resolved in a satisfactory manner, it will have serious consequences
for the future of the arms control process''.
Was the current majority leader of the Senate correct when he wrote
that letter? Is that the standard that should apply today?
Mr. Thomas. Yes.
a. Yes, adherence to existing arms control agreements should weigh
heavily in contemplating future arms control initiatives, since it
speaks fundamentally to the necessary political underpinnings of any
such arrangement.
Mr. Rogers. How long should the U.S. continue to unilaterally be
bound by the INF treaty? We are at present, apparently, the only party
complying with the treaty. Do we let this drag on for 6 years--in some
ways it already, reportedly, has (according to the New York Times)--
like the Russian violations of CFE did?
Mr. Thomas. Russian violation of the INF Treaty comes at a time of
great strategic uncertainty. While compliance issues must be swiftly
addressed, the United States should also evaluate the INF Treaty in
broader, global context. A treaty that bars two countries from pursuing
certain classes of missiles, while imposing no restriction on other
states--some of which pose serious threats towards the United States
and its allies--doing the same, must be constantly re-evaluated to
determine the tipping point when the costs of arms control overtake the
benefits. That day is quickly approaching. The United States must look
beyond the INF Treaty and begin taking appropriate precautionary steps.
Paradoxically, doing so may offer the best course to preserving the
viability of the treaty farther into the future.
Mr. Rogers. What are the benefits and risks of seeking to
``multilateralize'' the INF treaty? What are the odds China is willing
to eliminate its hundreds of intermediate-range ballistic missiles and
cruise missiles?
a. Is there a risk to going down this road? Can we be
diplomatically out-maneuvered by the Russians? Does it risk making
their violation look legitimate?
Mr. Thomas. Multilateralizing the treaty, assuming all signatories
would come into full compliance and eliminate their INF-class weapons,
would, in theory, be the best option to safeguard the viability of the
treaty much farther into the future. Absent efforts to multilateralize
or otherwise amend it, the treaty will increasingly be at odds with
broader U.S. and allied interests. Conventional wisdom holds that China
would never be willing to sign onto the treaty and eliminate its
inventory of intermediate-range ballistic and cruise missiles. This is
reminiscent of conventional wisdom that preceded the original INF
Treaty in the 1980s. Many felt that Russia would never eliminate its
intermediate-range ballistic and cruise missiles. However, in the face
of a determined effort by the United States to develop and field INF-
class systems and the willingness of European allies for host forward-
based systems, Russia returned to the negotiations that quickly led to
the Treaty's endgame. Similarly, if China faced a credible prospect of
neighboring countries and/or the United States developing and
eventually deploying such systems, it too might be highly incentivized
to become of signatory.
a. The issues should be addressed sequentially. Ideally, the United
States and Russia should satisfactorily resolve the issues surrounding
Russian violation of the INF Treaty before taking on the issue of
multilateralization.
Mr. Rogers. Is the INF treaty still relevant for today's security
environment?
Mr. Thomas. Suspected Russian violations of the INF Treaty come at
a time of great strategic uncertainty. While compliance issues must be
swiftly addressed, the United States should also evaluate the INF
Treaty in broader, global context. A treaty that bars two countries
from pursuing certain classes of missiles, while imposing no
restriction on other states--some of which pose serious threats towards
the United States and its allies--doing the same, must be constantly
re-evaluated to determine the tipping point when the costs of arms
control overtake the benefits. That day is quickly approaching. The
United States must look beyond the INF Treaty and begin taking
appropriate precautionary steps. Paradoxically, doing so may offer the
best course to preserving the viability of the treaty farther into the
future.
Mr. Rogers. What about other violations? Russia is known not to be
complying with the CTBT. Do we need to resolve that too?
Mr. Thomas. In general, turning a blind eye to any treaty violation
might encourage further violations. All allegations of treaty
violations should be carefully and fully investigated and resolved.
Mr. Rogers. Russia is seeking U.S. support for new aircraft and
sensors under the Open Skies treaty. But, Russia isn't complying with
that treaty; should we approve those new aircraft and sensors if Russia
isn't in compliance? Should we use this treaty, which Russia clearly
values, as leverage to obtain Russian compliance with INF?
Mr. Thomas. I am unfamiliar with these specific Open Skies issues,
but consistent with my earlier answers I believe non-compliance issues
are always serious matters that should logically be resolved prior to
undertaking new initiatives under existing agreements or contemplating
new arms control agreements.
Mr. Rogers. Russia got the U.S. to agree to unilateral reductions,
while Russia is actually building up its nuclear forces under New
START. Do we need to let Russia know that continued U.S. compliance
with New START cannot be assured if Russia is going to violate INF and
threaten our allies?
Mr. Thomas. I would expect the United States, just as I would
expect Russia or any other signatory, to honor binding treaty
commitments.
INF violations should be considered carefully and factored into
consideration of any future arms control initiatives involving Russia.
Mr. Rogers. Should the U.S. be concerned about new Russian
missiles, like the RS-26 Rubezh, which Russia has tested at
intermediate-range, but, Russia is calling an ICBM? Or should we be
content that Russia promises us it will agree to count that missile
under New START?
a. Russia is said to be preparing to deploy this system in 2015 in
Irkutsk, suggestion that, for an intermediate range missile, the target
is China. What does this do to claims that Russia is breaking out of
INF due to U.S. missile defense?
b. Do you believe that there is a loophole in New START and INF
allowing Russia to develop an IRBM but to call it an ICBM?
c. If this was known during New START ratification, is there any
reason to allow Russia to negotiate in this loophole?
Mr. Thomas. The development of systems such as the RS-26 at the
seam between the INF Treaty and New START should be of concern to the
United States and its allies. Ballistic missiles launched from Russia
would obviously have shorter time of flight to targets in Europe than
in North America thereby reducing warning time and the opportunities to
engage them, which would diminish strategic stability.
a. If Russia does indeed deploy intermediate-range missiles to
operating areas from which they could range China, it would suggest it
views the PRC as a military threat. This is likely only one of a
variety of factors that would weigh in any Russian decision to exit the
treaty, which suggests U.S. missile defense deployments are possibly a
pretext more than a reason for Russian dissatisfaction with the Treaty.
b. There is no safeguard in New START that would preclude a country
from firing an ICBM at less than continental ranges.
c. One of the pitfalls of arms control agreements is that they may
have unforeseen (or at least not widely appreciated or publicized)
consequences.
Mr. Rogers. Should our allies feel safe and secure because they are
promising to count these intermediate range missiles as ICBMs? Why or
why not?
Mr. Thomas. Our allies should be concerned about any capabilities
that could be deployed and used to target them for short-warning
nuclear attack.
Mr. Rogers. Are ground-launched intermediate range ballistic
missiles and cruise missiles different than submarine-launched, or air-
launched, missiles of the same type and range? How?
Mr. Thomas. Ground-based missile systems have several advantages
over submarine and air-launched missile platforms. First, ground-based
missile platforms do not need to be as sophisticated as their airborne
and undersea counterparts. This reduces their cost significantly,
allowing far greater numbers to be constructed at similar cost. Second,
ground-based systems have survivability advantages. Fixed-placement
systems can be hardened, while mobile systems can quickly relocate
after firing and thus present targeting challenges. Third, ground-based
systems are easier to develop with partner states, which facilitates
burden sharing. Together, these factors suggest that the proliferation
of ground-based intermediate-range missile systems are an effective way
to hold adversary targets at risk, imposing steep costs for relatively
less investment compared to airborne and undersea systems.
Mr. Rogers. If you believe in arms control, shouldn't you be the
most committed to seeing this treaty enforced? To punishing cheating
and violations in all forms?
Mr. Thomas. The failure to enforce arms control agreements erodes
confidence in arms control as a viable national security instrument. It
is difficult to see why the United States should pursue future arms
control initiatives with a party that is violating existing agreements.
Mr. Rogers. What are some political and economic consequences that
the President and Congress should impose?
Mr. Thomas. There is a range of political and economic steps that
could be taken to impose costs on Russia for non-compliance, but they
will be most effective with the support and active participation of
like-minded nations. Russian violations of the INF Treaty pose an even
greater threat to allies overseas than they do to the United States.
Ideally, U.S. allies would take a far more prominent role in
confronting Russia. The United States should therefore endeavor to
ensure that it maintains, and where necessary strengthens, its
strategic solidarity with its allies around the world.
Mr. Rogers. Why is Russia developing and deploying a new ground-
launched cruise missile in violation of the INF Treaty? What are the
military and/or geopolitical benefits for Russia derived from this new
intermediate-range missile?
Mr. Thomas. Providing means of delivery for either a conventional
or nuclear warhead, an intermediate-range GLCM would have benefits for
Russia in terms of greater accuracy, flight path/survivability, and
covert deployment.
Mr. Rogers. How important is the continuation of the INF treaty to
U.S. interests? What would be the positive and/or negative impact from
its demise? Would there be a significant impact on PGS and other
planned or existing programs? On balance, should we walk away from the
treaty?
Mr. Thomas. Continuation of the INF Treaty would be important to
safeguard U.S. interests insofar as it encompasses additional countries
possessing INF-class systems worldwide. The demise of the treaty could
have a positive outcome should it allow the United States to develop
INF-class conventional missiles, should the United States choose to
field them in significant numbers, and should allies and partners agree
to host forward-based systems.
The major downside of exiting the treaty would be the risk of
horizontal and vertical proliferation of the same systems in ways that
could threaten our allies.
Paradoxically, the best ways to bolster the U.S. negotiating
position to amend the treaty, or to hedge against the treaty's demise,
are the same: to develop credible IRBM and GLCM options. Before
abandoning the treaty, the United States would be well-served to
attempt to adapt and modify the treaty, including in ways to ensure the
adherence of all parties to the amended requirements, in ways that suit
U.S. interests. Backstopping such a negotiating effort, the Department
of Defense should pursue research and development options that would
make far more credible the threat of the United States fielding a
robust intermediate-range missile force if the treaty lapsed.
Mr. Rogers. Would any of our allies feel sufficiently threatened to
take compensatory action or would they assume that is solely the
responsibility of the U.S.?
Mr. Thomas. Our allies' interests are at risk with the Russian INF
violation. This is not just an issue for the United States. Indeed,
NATO Secretary General Fogh Rasmussen said on July 30 that ``[the INF
Treaty] remains a key element of Euro-Atlantic security--one that
benefits our mutual security and must be preserved.'' U.S. allies
beyond Europe should also give the issues surrounding intermediate-
range weapons greater attention, as it affects the security and
interests of allies in multiple theaters.
One possibility is that in the future, even if the United States
remained bound by the Treaty, its allies and partners which are not
parties to the Treaty could independently develop, test and deploy INF-
proscribed systems. One of the United States' distinct advantages over
its rivals is its portfolio of alliances. Were U.S. allies and partners
to field IRBMs and GLCMs while Russia and the United States remained
parties to the Treaty, this could disadvantage Russia and create a
favorable asymmetry for the United States.
Mr. Rogers. The INF treaty is the only treaty the U.S. has ratified
that has eliminated whole types and classes of nuclear weapons. What is
the impact to President Obama's legacy if this treaty is ``broken'' on
his watch?
Mr. Thomas. Irrespective of the historical legacy of the INF
Treaty, if it is broken due to Russian violations, Moscow should bear
the fully responsibility for the treaty's demise.
Mr. Rogers. Do you now believe you were misled by Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State Frank Rose when he counseled you to write an article
that has been proven to be at least misleading, and in reality
inaccurate; and which Mr. Rose knew (or at least should have known) at
the time to be inaccurate?
Ambassador Pifer. Mr. Rose did not mislead me, and I do not believe
that my July 16, 2013 article, ``Allegations of Russian Intermediate-
Range Nuclear Forces Treaty Violations--Where's the Beef?,'' was
misleading or inaccurate. I wrote ``Where's the Beef'' after reading
news articles in late June and the first half of July 2013 that
asserted that the Russian Yars-M ballistic missile (also referred to as
the RS-26) was a violation of the INF Treaty.
The articles--see, for example, Bill Gertz's ``Russian Aggression:
Putin Violating Nuclear Missile Treaty'' in the June 25, 2013
Washington Free Beacon--asserted that the Yars-M/RS-26 was a violation
of the INF Treaty because it had been tested to a range of 2000
kilometers, whereas the INF Treaty bans all ground-launched ballistic
missiles with ranges between 500 and 5500 kilometers. The Yars-M/RS-26,
however, had also been tested to a range of 5800 kilometers.
The 2010 New START Treaty, as the 1991 START I Treaty, defines an
intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) as ``a land-based missile
with a range in excess of 5500 kilometers,'' while the INF Treaty bans
ground-launched ballistic missiles with ranges ``in excess of 500
kilometers'' but ``not in excess of 5500 kilometers.'' My assessment
thus was that, because the Yars-M/RS-26 had flown in excess of 5500
kilometers, it was a permitted ICBM, not a ground-launched
intermediate-range ballistic missile.
That seemed straightforward to me. When writing ``Where's the
Beef?,'' I contacted Mr. Rose and asked whether my assessment of the
Yars-M/RS-26 was correct. He confirmed that my understanding that the
Yars-M/RS-26 was a permitted ICBM was consistent with the U.S.
government's view.
That is the assessment reflected in ``Where's the Beef?'' That
article dealt solely with the allegation regarding the Yars-M/RS-26
ballistic missile. At the time when I wrote the article, I was not
aware of U.S. government concerns about the Russian test of a ground-
launched intermediate-range cruise missile.
Mr. Rogers. If the article focused on the RS-26 as you say, do you
think it was incumbent upon DAS Frank Rose to tell you there were other
INF violations that were of concern so that you did not write such
allegations were ``frivolous,'' when it turns out they are quite
substantial, and were substantial at the time, as DAS Frank Rose knew
(or at least should have known)?
Ambassador Pifer. The ``Where's the Beef?'' article clearly
addresses only the allegation that the Yars-M/RS-26 ballistic missile
was a violation of the INF Treaty. That was the only allegation of a
Russian INF Treaty violation of which I was aware when I wrote the
article, and my question to Mr. Rose dealt solely with the Yars-M/RS-26
ballistic missile.
Had Mr. Rose volunteered information about the cruise missile
concern, I certainly would have been interested. However, given what I
understand to be the classified level at which information regarding
the cruise missile issue was held at the time, it would have been a
serious breach of security regulations for him to share it with me.
Mr. Rogers. Why is the article still up on the Brookings web page?
In the name of intellectual and academic honesty, shouldn't it be
rescinded and taken down (or at a minimum updated/corrected)?
Ambassador Pifer. The ``Where's the Beef?'' article clearly
addresses only the allegation that the Yars-M/RS-26 ballistic missile
was a violation of the INF Treaty. I believe that the article's
conclusion that the Yars-M/RS-26 is a permitted ICBM, not a ground-
launched intermediate-range ballistic missile, remains valid and that
this allegation of a violation has no basis in the treaty.
The New York Times carried a story by Michael Gordon on January 29,
2014, ``U.S. Says Russia Tested Missile, Despite Treaty,'' which
revealed the U.S. government's concern that Russia had tested a ground-
launched intermediate-range cruise missile in violation of the INF
Treaty. My articles subsequent to that (which are posted on the
Brookings web-page) draw a distinction between the allegation regarding
the Yars-M/RS-26 ballistic missile and the reported violation by the
testing of a ground-launched intermediate-range cruise missile. See,
for example, ``The Moscow Missile Mystery: Is Russia Actually Violating
the INF Treaty?'' in Foreign Policy, January 31, 2014 and ``Don't Scrap
the INF Treaty'' in The National Interest, June 9, 2014.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. COOPER
Mr. Cooper. How did the administration deal with the ABM Treaty
violations, and what was the outcome?
Mr. Rademaker. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
Mr. Cooper. How did the administration deal with the ABM Treaty
violations, and what was the outcome?
Mr. Thomas. Following the Reagan administration's discovery that
the Soviet Union's large phased-array radar at Krasnoyarsk violated the
1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the administration decided not
allow that violation to affect its broader arms control agenda, even as
U.S. and Soviet officials worked to resolve the violation. Ultimately,
under enormous pressure, the Soviet Union granted U.S. inspectors
access to Krasnoyarsk enabling them to establish beyond doubt that it
constituted an ABM Treaty violation, which the Soviets finally
acknowledged. Had the entire arms control process been halted, the
United States and Soviet Union would not have entered into the INF
Treaty a few years later. Some have said that the United States should
bear this incident in mind when considering how the INF Treaty
violation should affect the broader arms control agenda. Others might
argue that the situation is different today and requires a different
approach. Whereas broad trends in the mid-1980s suggested a thawing in
Soviet-U.S. relations, the opposite appears to be occurring at the
present time.
Mr. Cooper. Is the INF treaty of enduring significance, militarily
or otherwise, to the United States, Russia or NATO and its members?
Why?
Ambassador Pifer. The INF Treaty was a landmark arms control
agreement, resulting in the elimination of nearly 2700 U.S. and Soviet
missiles, their launchers and other associated equipment. It
dramatically reduced the nuclear threat to American allies in Europe
and Asia and was warmly welcomed by those allies, as well as by other
states.
The INF Treaty continues to be in the security interest of the
United States and its allies, as it constrains the Russian nuclear
threat. This is particularly the case as there are no plans and, as far
as I know, no serious U.S. military requirement for ground-launched
intermediate-range ballistic or cruise missiles. (U.S. strategic
nuclear forces, U.S. dual-capable aircraft and nuclear bombs deployed
in Europe, and the ability to forward deploy U.S. dual-capable aircraft
and nuclear bombs to the Western Pacific currently provide the nuclear
umbrella to U.S. allies in Europe and Asia.)
Were the INF Treaty to cease to be in force, I would expect U.S.
allies in Europe and Asia to be concerned that Russia would then be
free to build without any constraint ground-launched intermediate-range
ballistic and cruise missiles that could directly threaten their
territory. Such missiles would also pose a direct threat to U.S. forces
deployed forward in Europe and Asia.
At several points over the past decade, senior Russian officials
have publicly questioned whether continued adherence to the INF Treaty
was in Russia's interest. They have noted that the treaty's ban applies
only to Russia and the United States (actually, it also applies to
Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine). They have expressed concern that
other countries near Russia possess or are developing intermediate-
range missiles. Russia thus may hold a different view of the
significance of the INF Treaty than do the United States and U.S.
allies.
Mr. Cooper. If Russia is found to be in violation of the INF treaty
in the upcoming report, what should the U.S. do?
a. What are our options for bringing Russia back into compliance
with the treaty? [Question #51, for cross-reference.)
Ambassador Pifer. The U.S. government has concluded that Russia
violated the INF Treaty by testing a prohibited ground-launched
intermediate-range cruise missile. This is a serious matter. The U.S.
government should take several measures in response, with the objective
of having Russia return to full compliance with the treaty:
First, the administration should use opportunities in diplomatic
channels, including meetings at the cabinet/ministerial-level, to raise
the question with Russian officials and press them to resolve U.S.
concerns and come back into full compliance with the treaty.
Second, the administration should contact Russia, Belarus,
Kazakhstan and Ukraine and convene a meeting of the Special
Verification Commission, established by the INF Treaty in part as a
venue for addressing INF compliance issues.
Third, U.S. officials should brief NATO allies, Asian allies
(particularly Japan and South Korea) and other interested countries,
including China and India, about U.S. concerns. Were Russia to deploy a
new ground-launched intermediate-range cruise missile, it would pose a
direct threat to countries in Europe and Asia. This should not remain
just a bilateral U.S.-Russian issue; Washington should do what it can
to make this a question between the Russian government and its
neighbors--the states that would be directly threatened were Russia to
deploy new intermediate-range missiles.
Fourth, the Pentagon could consider a feasibility study on possible
new U.S. ground-launched intermediate-range missiles. Given budget
pressures and the current lack of a defined priority military
requirement, there would be little sense in proceeding to develop or
acquire such missiles. However, the prospect of a future Pershing III
or new ground-launched intermediate-range cruise missile might remind
Moscow of the value of the INF Treaty.
While pursuing these steps, it would be in the U.S. interest to
continue to observe the INF Treaty. Although at some later date it
might be appropriate to consider withdrawal, for example, if Russia
deployed intermediate-range missiles, at this point there are sound
reasons for continuing to adhere to the treaty:
First, if Washington withdrew from the treaty, it could be seen as
responsible for ending the agreement. Moscow would certainly prefer
that Washington initiate withdrawal and take the political heat for
ending the treaty, and it would do everything in its power to place the
blame on the United States.
Second, a U.S. withdrawal that ended the treaty would leave Russia
free to test, produce and deploy ground-launched intermediate-range
ballistic and cruise missiles without constraint. That would increase
the threat to and raise concern on the part of U.S. allies.
Third, at present, the Pentagon has no plans for ground-launched
intermediate-range ballistic or cruise missiles. A U.S. withdrawal from
the treaty would leave Russia free to deploy missiles for which the
United States has no counterpart.
Developing new U.S. intermediate-range missiles would take time and
would impose a new burden on an already stretched Pentagon budget. It
would draw funds from other defense accounts, such as the modernization
of strategic nuclear forces, missile defense or new conventional
weapons systems.
Fourth, even if the United States were to build new ground-launched
intermediate-range missiles, it is not clear where it would deploy
them. Those missiles would pose a serious response to a Russian treaty
violation only if deployed in Europe, Japan or South Korea, but it is
unlikely that any of those allies would welcome the prospect of hosting
such missiles. Deploying intermediate-range missiles in the continental
United States would make little sense, as they could only hold targets
in the Western Hemisphere at risk.
Mr. Cooper. How did the administration deal with the ABM Treaty
violations, and what was the outcome?
Ambassador Pifer. (I understand this to refer to the Reagan and
George H. W. Bush administrations.)
The Reagan administration had several concerns regarding Soviet
compliance with the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and its
1974 protocol. The primary concern dealt with Soviet construction of a
large-phased array radar near Krasnoyarsk in central Siberia.
The ABM Treaty and its protocol limited the United States and
Soviet Union each to one ABM interceptor deployment area. In order to
ensure that large phased-array radars (LPARs) located outside
deployment areas would be used for permitted early warning purposes but
not for battle management (i.e., guiding ABM interceptors to their
targets), the treaty required that LPARs outside of the deployment
areas be located on the periphery of a country's territory and oriented
outward.
In 1983, the U.S. intelligence community detected construction of
an LPAR at Krasnoyarsk. The radar was more than 800 kilometers (500
miles) from the Russian-Mongolian border and, instead of being oriented
outward--i.e., toward the south--it faced to the east, over a broad
expanse of Soviet territory.
The Reagan administration judged that the radar constituted a
violation of the ABM Treaty. U.S. officials raised the radar at the
fall 1983 session of the Standing Consultative Commission, the body
established by the ABM Treaty to address, among other issues, questions
about treaty compliance.
The Soviets asserted that the Krasnoyarsk LPAR would be used for
space-tracking purposes, an implausible claim given that few space
orbits would pass through the radar's field of view. However, the LPAR
did have an excellent view of the attack corridor for U.S. submarine-
launched ballistic missiles flying out of the northern Pacific Ocean to
targets in the central Soviet Union. The radar plugged a gap in the
Soviets' early warning radar coverage; to gain the same early warning
coverage without violating the ABM Treaty, the Soviets would have had
to build two LPARs in the Soviet Far East.
A January 1984 White House report to Congress assessed that the
Krasnoyarsk LPAR ``constitutes a violation of legal obligations under
the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972 in that in its associated
siting, orientation and capability, it is prohibited by this Treaty.''
U.S. officials continued to press the Soviets on the radar.
The Reagan administration later considered declaring the radar a
``material breach'' of the ABM Treaty, a term that would have provided
stronger grounds for withdrawal from the treaty. But Washington did not
withdraw.
In 1989, the Soviets conceded that the radar was a ``technical''
violation of the ABM Treaty in that its location was inconsistent with
the treaty's requirements. They argued that the radar was for early
warning purposes (likely true, though that did not make the radar
compliant with the letter of the treaty). In 1990, the Soviets agreed
to dismantle the radar--seven years after the U.S. intelligence
community first detected it.
Over the seven years between the discovery of the Krasnoyarsk
radar's construction and the Soviet decision to dismantle it, the
Reagan and George H. W. Bush administrations continued to observe the
ABM Treaty, even as they raised their concerns about the radar and its
compliance with the treaty. They also continued to observe other arms
control agreements. The Reagan administration, which considered the
1979 Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty II (SALT II) ``fatally flawed,''
observed a policy of not undercutting that unratified treaty until late
1986.
Moreover, the Reagan administration also continued to negotiate new
nuclear arms control agreements with the Soviets. The Reagan
administration concluded the INF Treaty in 1987. It made major progress
on the START I Treaty, reaching agreement on the levels of strategic
forces to be allowed each side. The George H. W. Bush administration
completed and signed START I in 1991.
Mr. Cooper. Why should we abide by the Treaty if Russia is
unwilling?
Ambassador Pifer. If Russia proceeds to violate the INF Treaty by
deploying ground-launched intermediate-range ballistic and/or cruise
missiles, it may make little sense for the United States to continue to
abide by its terms. The current public charge is that Russia violated
the treaty by testing a prohibited ground-launched cruise missile. The
U.S. government has not charged, at least not publically, that Russia
has deployed such missiles.
Any violation of a treaty needs to be taken seriously. Given that
continued application of the INF Treaty is in the security interest of
the United States and its allies, the U.S. government's goal now should
be to get Russia back into full compliance with the treaty. I have
outlined in my response to QFR #51 recommendations as to steps that
Washington should take to achieve this.
If the United States were now to withdraw from the INF Treaty, it
could have several effects, all negative for the United States.
Washington rather than Moscow could bear the political costs of ending
the treaty. A U.S. withdrawal that ended the treaty would leave Russia
free to test, produce and deploy intermediate-range missiles without
constraint. As the Pentagon has no plans for land-based intermediate-
range ballistic or cruise missiles, a U.S. withdrawal from the treaty
would leave Russia free to deploy missiles for which the United States
has no counterpart. Even were the United States to build a counterpart,
it is not clear it could deploy such missiles within range of Russia.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SANCHEZ
Ms. Sanchez. If there were no INF Treaty, would we deploy
intermediate-based land systems in Europe, and would the NATO allies
support such a deployment? And, if there were no INF Treaty, would we
deploy land-based systems in Asia, or are sea-based systems sufficient
to meet our growing needs there?
Mr. Rademaker. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
Ms. Sanchez. Why is it taking us so long to determine what Russia
is doing, and whether or not it is in compliance with the treaty?
Mr. Rademaker. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
Ms. Sanchez. What might Russia do if it were no longer bound by the
INF Treaty? What might they develop and deploy if they were totally
freed from the limits?
Mr. Rademaker. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
Ms. Sanchez. Are our allies paying attention to this issue, how
have NATO countries responded? How would that affect U.S. and allied
security (in both Europe and Asia)?
Mr. Rademaker. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
Ms. Sanchez. If there were no INF Treaty, would we deploy
intermediate-based land systems in Europe, and would the NATO allies
support such a deployment? And, if there were no INF Treaty, would we
deploy land-based systems in Asia, or are sea-based systems sufficient
to meet our growing needs there?
Mr. Thomas. In the 1980's, in response to Russia's build up of
IRBMs and GLCMs, NATO allies supported the development and deployment
of U.S. IRBMs and GLCMs in Europe. Paradoxically, it was their
deployment that ultimately drove the Soviet Union back to the
negotiating table, resulting in the 1987 INF Treaty that eliminate all
ground-launched missiles with ranges between 500-5,500 km. If Russia
were to again develop and deploy intermediate range missile systems
that could threaten European allies, it stands to reason that U.S.
allies might again welcome and host U.S. land-based intermediate- range
systems in response.
In Asia, the principle missile threat to our allies comes not from
Russia but from China, which has already deployed hundreds of
intermediate-range missiles that can hold allied territory at risk.
Those countries might similarly welcome conventionally armed
intermediate-range missiles that could have a stabilizing effect on the
regional military balance.
Sea-based systems, given the inherent payload limitations of
submarines and surface combatants, are unlikely to be able to fully
meet our growing needs for conventional strike capacity in the Asia-
Pacific theater. Nevertheless, sea-launched and air-launched long-range
conventional strike systems--both standoff and penetrating--remain
essential as part of an appropriate mix of capabilities for deterrence.
Ms. Sanchez. What might Russia do if it were no longer bound by the
INF Treaty? What might they develop and deploy if they were totally
freed from the limits?
Mr. Thomas. Unconstrained by the INF Treaty, Russia could build up
and deploy large numbers of intermediate-range missiles to hold at risk
targets both in Europe and in Asia. Interestingly, a sizable deployment
of Russian missiles into its Far East would likely be of greatest
concern to China. Thus, the demise of the INF Treaty could create a
``double jeopardy'' problem for China.
Ms. Sanchez. Are our allies paying attention to this issue, how
have NATO countries responded? How would that affect U.S. and allied
security (in both Europe and Asia)?
Mr. Thomas. NATO is alive to the Russian INF Treaty violation. As
NATO Secretary General Fogh Rasmussen said on July 30, ``Russia should
work constructively to resolve this critical Treaty issue and preserve
the viability of the INF Treaty by returning to full compliance in a
verifiable manner.'' In Asia, to date, I am not aware of any public
response by our allies. Given that they also have clear interests at
stake, they should also weigh in on the issue.
Ms. Sanchez. If there were no INF Treaty, would we deploy
intermediate-based land systems in Europe, and would the NATO allies
support such a deployment? And, if there were no INF Treaty, would we
deploy land-based systems in Asia, or are sea-based systems sufficient
to meet our growing needs there?
Ambassador Pifer. As far as I am aware, the Pentagon does not have
an identified military requirement for a new ground-launched
intermediate-range ballistic or cruise missile. Were there to be no INF
Treaty, it would be prudent, before building such missiles, for the
U.S. government to determine the military requirement and also to
ascertain whether allies in Europe or Asia would be prepared to host
such missiles. If based in the continental United States, intermediate-
range missiles could only hold at risk targets in the Western
Hemisphere; there does not appear to be a military requirement for
that.
My assessment is that it would not be easy to find allies willing
to host U.S. ground-launched intermediate-range missiles on their
territory.
U.S. deployment of INF missiles (Pershing IIs and ground-launched
cruise missiles) to Europe in the 1980s was a key factor in motivating
Moscow to agree to ban intermediate-range missiles. But deployment in
Europe was by no means guaranteed; in the end, it proved a close thing.
Some U.S. officials at the time feared that deployment could tear NATO
apart.
Today, it is not clear that any NATO members would be eager to host
such missiles, especially if they were nuclear-armed. Those allies most
likely to offer to accept U.S. intermediate-range missiles would be in
Central Europe. Deployment there, however, would put the missiles in
places where they would be more vulnerable to a preemptive strike. Such
deployments would also be hugely provocative to Moscow--and would
probably be opposed by some NATO members.
I do not believe the United States would find takers for ground-
launched intermediate-range missiles in Asia, either. Japan would worry
about the effect of such deployments on its relationship with Russia
and, in any case, would not accept nuclear-armed missiles. South Korea
is building its own missiles to hold targets in North Korea at risk and
would fear that deployment of U.S. missiles on its territory would
disrupt its warming relations with China.
Ms. Sanchez. Why is it taking us so long to determine what Russia
is doing, and whether or not it is in compliance with the treaty?
Ambassador Pifer. I have not been a part of the U.S. government
process regarding Russia's INF Treaty violation and do not know why it
took until July to reach a compliance judgment.
Ms. Sanchez. What might Russia do if it were no longer bound by the
INF Treaty? What might they develop and deploy if they were totally
freed from the limits?
Ambassador Pifer. I believe that, if Russia were no longer bound by
the INF Treaty, the Russians would give serious consideration to
building and deploying intermediate-range ballistic and/or cruise
missiles. Senior Russian officials over the past decade have publicly
questioned whether continued adherence to the INF Treaty was in
Russia's interest. They have noted that other countries--countries
closer (in most cases, much closer) to Russia than to the United
States--possess or are developing intermediate-range missiles, which
the INF Treaty bans Russia from having.
Were Russia to be freed from the INF Treaty's limits, some Russian
officials would almost certainly argue for developing and deploying
intermediate-range missiles to counter those deployed or being
developed by third countries. Some Russian officials might also see new
intermediate-range missiles as having utility in politically
intimidating U.S. allies in Europe or Asia, just as the Soviets used
the SS-20 in the early 1980s.
Ms. Sanchez. Are our allies paying attention to this issue, how
have NATO countries responded? How would that affect U.S. and allied
security (in both Europe and Asia)?
Ambassador Pifer. Following release of the State Department's
compliance report on July 29, the NATO Secretary General released a
statement on July 30 in which he said that the United States had
briefed NATO on its determination regarding Russia's violation of the
INF Treaty, termed the treaty a ``key element of Euro-Atlantic
security,'' and called on Russia to work constructively to resolve the
issue and return to full treaty compliance.
The Polish foreign ministry also released a statement on July 30
that noted that the INF Treaty ``is one of the foundations of the arms
control and nuclear disarmament regime,'' said that ``its undermining
would represent a serious challenge to Europe's security,'' and called
on Russia to explain the issue and return to observance of the treaty.
The statement also noted Poland's intention to consult with NATO allies
on the issue.
The September 4-5 NATO summit declaration stated that ``it is of
paramount importance that disarmament and non-proliferation commitments
under existing treaties are honored, including the Intermediate-Range
Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, which is a crucial element of Euro-
Atlantic security. In that regard, Allies call on Russia to preserve
the viability of the INF Treaty through ensuring full and verifiable
compliance.''
As noted in my response to QFR #51, I believe the United States
should engage allies in Europe and Asia (and others, such as China) on
this issue with the objective of multilateralizing the question. Rather
than leaving this as just a U.S.-Russia issue, Washington should seek
to mobilize other countries--particularly those states in Europe and
Asia that would be directly threatened were Russia to build new
intermediate-range missiles--to make their concerns known directly to
Moscow.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GARAMENDI
Mr. Garamendi. Do you believe the U.S. has adequate verification
measures in place to detect cheating of nuclear arms control
agreements? Is verification important?
Mr. Rademaker. [The information was not available at the time of
printing.]
Mr. Garamendi. Do you believe the U.S. has adequate verification
measures in place to detect cheating of nuclear arms control
agreements? Is verification important?
Mr. Thomas. Verification is absolutely crucial. When it comes to
the INF Treaty, once the weapons were verified to have been destroyed,
verification monitoring was curtailed. One lesson from the INF Treaty
experience is the need for continued inspections and monitoring to
detect testing or reconstitution of programs after systems have been
eliminated.
Mr. Garamendi. What is the significance of a violation of that
treaty? Please define, as you understand it, the difference between a
treaty ``violation'' and a ``material breach''?
Ambassador Pifer. I understand the difference between ``violation''
and ``material breach'' to be as follows:
``Violation'' refers to any activity that is inconsistent with a
treaty's requirements and obligations. A violation can be major or
minor. For example, the 1991 START I Treaty limited the United States
and Soviet Union (later Russia) each to no more than 1600 deployed
ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers after December 5, 2001. Had Russia after
that date deployed 2000 ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers, that would have
constituted a major violation of the treaty. START I's Conversion and
Elimination Protocol required that ICBM silos, if eliminated by
explosion, have the top six meters of their headworks destroyed. If a
side had destroyed only the top five meters of the headworks, that
would have constituted a violation, though it almost certainly would
have rendered the silo inoperable, thus achieving the treaty's purpose.
``Material breach'' refers to a major violation of a treaty
provision(s) that is core to the purpose of the treaty. Material breach
would normally be invoked by a party to the treaty in preparation for
withdrawing from the treaty or suspending it.
Mr. Garamendi. Do you believe the U.S. has adequate verification
measures in place to detect cheating of nuclear arms control
agreements? Is verification important?
Ambassador Pifer. Verification is critical to any arms control
agreement. It is my understanding that, before signing an arms control
treaty, the U.S. Intelligence Community conducts a review to ensure
that the verification and monitoring measures are appropriate to the
agreement.
This does not mean that the United States has--or needs to have--
the capability to detect every violation of an agreement. Doing so
would require extremely intrusive monitoring measures that likely would
not prove acceptable to the Russian or U.S. militaries.
I support the standard of ``effective verification'' articulated by
Ambassador Paul Nitze in the 1980s. Ambassador Nitze called a treaty
effectively verifiable as long as ``if the other side moves beyond the
limits of the treaty in a militarily significant way, we would be able
to detect such violation in time to respond effectively, and thereby
deny the other side the benefit of the violation.'' The focus is not on
detecting every violation but on detecting those that are militarily
significant and doing so in time to ensure an adequate response so that
U.S. security is not degraded.
[all]