[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 113-119]
UNMANNED CARRIER-LAUNCHED
AIRBORNE SURVEILLANCE AND STRIKE (UCLASS) REQUIREMENTS ASSESSMENT
__________
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
JULY 16, 2014
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia, Chairman
K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina
DUNCAN HUNTER, California JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut
E. SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi RICK LARSEN, Washington
ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia HENRY C. ``HANK'' JOHNSON, Jr.,
MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado Georgia
JON RUNYAN, New Jersey COLLEEN W. HANABUSA, Hawaii
KRISTI L. NOEM, South Dakota DEREK KILMER, Washington
PAUL COOK, California SCOTT H. PETERS, California
BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama
David Sienicki, Professional Staff Member
Phil MacNaughton, Professional Staff Member
Katherine Rember, Clerk
C O N T E N T S
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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2014
Page
Hearing:
Wednesday, July 16, 2014, Unmanned Carrier-Launched Airborne
Surveillance and Strike (UCLASS) Requirements Assessment....... 1
Appendix:
Wednesday, July 16, 2014......................................... 41
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WEDNESDAY, JULY 16, 2014
UNMANNED CARRIER-LAUNCHED AIRBORNE SURVEILLANCE AND STRIKE (UCLASS)
REQUIREMENTS ASSESSMENT
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Forbes, Hon. J. Randy, a Representative from Virginia, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces................. 1
Courtney, Hon. Joe, a Representative from Connecticut,
Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces................. 3
WITNESSES
Andress, Mark D., Assistant Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for
Information Dominance.......................................... 26
Brimley, Shawn, Executive Vice President and Director of Studies,
Center for a New American Security............................. 9
Grosklags, VADM Paul A., USN, Principal Military Deputy,
Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and
Acquisitions, Department of Defense............................ 24
Guastella, Brig Gen Joseph T., USAF, Deputy Director for
Requirements (J-8), Joint Staff................................ 25
Martinage, Robert, Senior Fellow, Center for Strategic and
Budgetary Assessments.......................................... 5
McGrath, Bryan, Managing Director, FerryBridge Group, LLC........ 10
O'Rourke, Ronald, Specialist in Naval Affairs, Congressional
Research Service............................................... 3
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Brimley, Shawn............................................... 73
Forbes, Hon. J. Randy........................................ 45
Grosklags, VADM Paul A., joint with Mark D. Andress and Brig
Gen Joseph T. Guastella.................................... 101
Martinage, Robert............................................ 61
McGrath, Bryan............................................... 86
McIntyre, Hon. Mike, a Representative from North Carolina,
Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection
Forces..................................................... 50
O'Rourke, Ronald............................................. 51
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Hunter................................................... 111
Mr. Langevin................................................. 112
Mr. Larsen................................................... 115
UNMANNED CARRIER-LAUNCHED AIRBORNE SURVEILLANCE AND STRIKE (UCLASS)
REQUIREMENTS ASSESSMENT
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House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, July 16, 2014.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:00 p.m., in
room 2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. J. Randy Forbes
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. J. RANDY FORBES, A REPRESENTATIVE
FROM VIRGINIA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND
PROJECTION FORCES
Mr. Forbes. We want to welcome you to this hearing this
afternoon. I apologize at the beginning; we are going to have a
vote series that takes place, but we will be back. It is an
important hearing and we want to go as long as it takes to get
this done.
Today the subcommittee convenes to receive testimony on the
Unmanned Carrier-Launched Airborne Surveillance and Strike
(UCLASS) program.
Our first panel of distinguished guests testifying before
us are Mr. Ronald O'Rourke. He is a specialist in naval
affairs, Defense Policy and Arms Control Section for the
Congressional Research Service; Mr. Robert Martinage, former
Deputy Under Secretary of the Navy; Mr. Shawn Brimley,
Executive Vice President and Director of Studies for the Center
for a New American Security; and Mr. Bryan McGrath, Managing
Director of FerryBridge Group, LLC.
Gentlemen, thank you so much for being here.
Collectively, this bipartisan group has advised the United
States Congress and Presidential campaigns, commanded a Navy
large-surface combatant, drafted the 2007 maritime strategy,
served as Under Secretary of the Navy, served on the National
Security Council staff, and worked at various distinguished
think tanks.
Given their diverse background, I am confident that this
bipartisan group of witnesses will be able to provide a
detailed perspective of this committee's continued work on the
UCLASS program.
Our second distinguished panel, which will immediately
follow this one, includes Navy and Joint Staff leaders,
including Vice Admiral Paul A. Grosklags, Principal Military
Deputy, Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research,
Development and Acquisitions; Mr. Mark Andress, Assistant
Deputy Chief of Operations for Information Dominance; Brigadier
General Joseph Guastella, Director of Joint Requirements
Oversight Council, Department of Defense.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. Forbes corrected his remarks for the record and
recognizes General Guastella's correct title, ``Deputy Director for
Requirements (J-8), Joint Staff.''
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Gentlemen, once again, we thank you for being here.
We have called this hearing to discuss the Navy's UCLASS
program. But before we proceed, I want to be clear from the
onset that I am a strong supporter of a future carrier air wing
that is comprised of both manned and unmanned aviation assets.
The F/A-18 Super Hornet, the F-35C, the EA-18G Growler, the E-2
Hawkeye, and the UCLASS program will all be integral to
ensuring our carrier fleet can continue to project power
throughout the globe.
I believe the fundamental question we face is not about the
utility of unmanned aviation to the future air wing, but the
type of unmanned platform that the UCLASS program will deliver
and specific capabilities this vital asset will provide the
combatant commander.
Given the likely operational environment of the 2020s and
beyond, including in both the Western Pacific Ocean and Persian
Gulf, I believe strongly that the Nation needs to procure a
UCAV [unmanned combat air vehicle] platform that can operate as
a long-range surveillance and strike asset in the contested and
denied A2/AD [anti-access/area-denial] environments of the
future.
Unfortunately, in its current form, this committee has
concluded the UCLASS air systems segments requirements will not
address the emerging anti-access/area-denial challenges to U.S.
power projection that originally motivated creation of the Navy
Unmanned Combatant Air System program during the 2006
Quadrennial Defense Review [QDR] and which were reaffirmed in
both the 2010 QDR and 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance.
It is my determination that the disproportionate emphasis
in the requirements on unfueled endurance to enable continuous
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance [ISR] support to
the carrier strike group would result in an aircraft design
that would have serious deficiencies in both survivability and
internal weapons payload capacity and flexibility.
Furthermore, the cost limits for the aircraft are more
consistent with a much less capable aircraft and will not
enable the Navy to build a relevant vehicle that leverages
readily available and mature technology.
In short, developing a new carrier-based manned aircraft
that is primarily another unmanned ISR sensor that can operate
in a medium- to high-level threat environment would be a missed
opportunity and inconsistent with the 2012 Defense Strategic
Guidance, which called for the United States to maintain its
ability to project power in areas in which our access and
freedom to operate are challenged.
But the question of UCLASS is not just one of design and
capability. It is also about the roll and responsibility that
Congress has in cultivating, supporting, and protecting
military innovation.
Like with the shift from cavalry to mechanized forces,
sailing ships to steam-powered vessels, the battleship to naval
aviation, or adopting unmanned aerial vehicles in the late
1990s, ideas that initiate difficult changes and disrupt
current practices are often first opposed by organizations and
bureaucracies that are inclined to preserve the status quo.
I believe the Congress has a unique role to help push the
Department and the services in directions that, while
challenging, will ultimately benefit our national security and
defense policy.
I therefore intend to use this hearing today to explore not
just the UCLASS program, but the broader utility a UCAV can
have on the Navy's ability to continue to project power from
the aircraft carrier and the implications for the power-
projection mission in the future if we proceed down the current
course.
Again, I thank our two panels for being here to testify and
look forward to your testimony.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Forbes can be found in the
Appendix on page 45.]
Mr. Forbes. And with that, I turn to my good friend, Mr.
Courtney, for any comments he might have.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOE COURTNEY, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
CONNECTICUT, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Mr. Courtney. Great. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank the panel for being here. Given the time
squeeze, I am going to be very brief.
Reading the testimony of both panels, I actually think
that--you know, really, I think everyone is trying to get to
the same end result here, which is a carrier-based unmanned air
wing. I think there is important discussion that needs to take
place about sort of the path in terms of moving forward.
And, again, I think, even though we are sort of walking a
tightrope here a little bit because we are talking about a
classified process, so we really can't fully flesh out, I
think, all aspects of that path at this hearing because it is a
public hearing, not a classified hearing. Again, I look forward
to the testimony.
Again, Mr. McIntyre had some brief remarks which, again,
for the record, I would ask that they be entered.
Mr. Forbes. Without objection, we will put any comments
that Mr. McIntyre has in the record.
[The prepared statement of Mr. McIntyre can be found in the
Appendix on page 50.]
Mr. Courtney. With that, I will yield back.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Joe.
And, with that, Mr. O'Rourke, we would love to hear any
comments that you might have.
STATEMENT OF RONALD O'ROURKE, SPECIALIST IN NAVAL AFFAIRS,
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE
Mr. O'Rourke. Chairman Forbes, Ranking Member Courtney, and
distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for the
opportunity to appear before you today to testify on the UCLASS
program.
Mr. Chairman, with your permission, I would like to submit
my written statement for the record and summarize it here
briefly.
Mr. Forbes. And, without objection, all the statements of
our witnesses will be submitted for the record.
Mr. O'Rourke. As requested, my testimony identifies some
issues the subcommittee might consider in assessing operational
requirements for the UCLASS program.
My statement presents six such issues. The first is whether
we are currently undergoing a shift in strategic eras.
World events since late last year have led to a discussion
among observers about whether we are currently shifting from
the familiar post-Cold War era of the last 20 to 25 years to a
new and different strategic area characterized by, among other
things, renewed great power competition.
The shift from the Cold War to the post-Cold War era led to
a reassessment of assumptions and frameworks of analysis
regarding defense funding levels, strategy and missions that
resulted in numerous changes in U.S. defense plans and programs
while leaving other programs unchanged. A shift from the post-
Cold War era to a new strategic era could lead to another such
reassessment.
Current requirements for the UCLASS program reflect
analyses that were done between 2009 and 2011 and then updated
and revalidated from 2012 through April 2013. This activity
predates the events starting in late 2013 that have led to the
discussion over the possible shift in strategic eras.
Potential questions include the following:
First, are we undergoing a shift from the post-Cold War era
to a new strategic era?
Second, if we are undergoing such a shift, should that lead
to a reassessment of assumptions and frameworks of analyses
relating to defense funding levels, strategy, and missions?
And, third, if there is such a reassessment, what effect,
if any, might it have on UCLASS requirements?
A second issue the subcommittee might consider is how
requirements for the UCLASS program might affect cost,
schedule, and technical risk.
On the issue of cost, the Navy explained to me that the
program's affordability KPP [key performance parameters] is
based on the UCLASS AOA [analysis of alternatives] update and
Navy discussions with industry about potential costs for the
UCLASS program as currently defined, plus lessons from the
UCAS-D [Unmanned Combat Air System Demonstrator program]
effort.
Defining the affordability KPP in this manner can help
ensure that the affordability KPP is realistic for the program
as currently defined.
At the same time, in the context of a debate over
requirements, this approach can produce a definition of
affordability that can be viewed as circular, to some degree,
because it can be understood as saying, in essence, what is
affordable is the program with the current requirements.
A definition of affordability that is, to some degree,
circular in nature in relation to requirements has the
potential for being invoked as a rhetorical device for
discouraging or closing down debate on requirements.
A third issue the subcommittee may wish to consider is how
requirements for the UCLASS program might affect estimated
outcomes in future operational scenarios.
The specific tactical situations that were examined in the
UCLASS AOA are related to the program's current requirements.
Assessing alternative requirements could involve examining
potential outcomes in other tactical situations, and a broader
analysis might examine how changes in requirements might affect
estimated outcomes in campaign-level force-on-force situations
rather than in specific tactical situations.
A fourth issue the subcommittee might consider is how
UCLASS requirements relate to assessments of potential future
adversary capabilities, for example, how sensitive are
requirements for the UCLASS program to changes and assessments
of potential future adversary capabilities and how much
uncertainty or potential for changes is there in these threat
assessments.
A fifth issue the subcommittee might consider is how
requirements for the UCLASS program might affect potential
technology paths for future systems and capabilities, for
example, what effect might UCLASS requirements have on opening
up, preserving, or encumbering potential pathways for achieving
the Navy's current long-term vision for naval aviation or
potential alternatives to that vision.
A sixth issue the subcommittee might consider is how
requirements for the UCLASS program might affect the behavior
of other countries. For example, what impact might UCLASS
requirements have in terms of imposing costs on potential
adversaries or persuading potential adversaries--dissuading
potential adversaries from taking certain courses of action or
reassuring U.S. allies and partners regarding U.S. intentions
and resolve.
These six issues are by no means the only ones that might
be raised, but considering them might help in forming a
framework of analysis for assessing UCLASS requirements.
Mr. Chairman, that concludes my remarks, and I look forward
to the subcommittee's questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. O'Rourke can be found in the
Appendix on page 51.]
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Mr. O'Rourke.
Mr. Martinage, we look forward to your comments. Thank you
for being here.
STATEMENT OF ROBERT MARTINAGE, SENIOR FELLOW, CENTER FOR
STRATEGIC AND BUDGETARY ASSESSMENTS
Mr. Martinage. Chairman Forbes, Ranking Member McIntyre,
and members of this distinguished committee, first off, thank
you for the opportunity to share my views on system performance
requirements for UCLASS.
I would also like to express my appreciation to the
committee for taking an active interest in what is one of the
most important force development issues facing the Department
of Defense and the Navy in particular.
I really don't think it is much of an exaggeration to say
that what is at stake here is not just the operational
relevance of the carrier air wing in the future, but, really,
the strategic relevance of the aircraft carrier for decades to
come.
I would like to highlight four themes from my written
statement: first, how to think about UCLASS requirements
broadly; second, the opportunity cost of unnecessarily high
unrefueled endurance; third, some thoughts about payload
requirements; and, fourth, what a more balanced UCLASS design
might look like.
So, first and foremost, an assessment of UCLASS
requirements should begin with a very simple question: What is
the core operational challenge that UCLASS should be designed
to solve?
The dominant answer within the Navy currently and
reportedly reflected in the UCLASS draft request for proposal,
or RFP, is that UCLASS is needed to maintain continuous
maritime domain awareness around the carrier strike group as
well as to identify targets for attack by relatively short-
range manned fighters.
An alternative view, and one that reaches back to the
initiation of the program by OSD [Office of the Secretary of
Defense] and then the CNO [Chief of Naval Operations] Roughhead
in 2009, is that the more pressing problem is maintaining our
ability to project power from the sea when, one, carriers are
compelled to stand off a considerable distance, perhaps 1,000
miles or more, from an adversary's territory due to emerging
anti-access and area-denial challenges, like anti-ship
ballistic missiles, anti-ship cruise missiles, wake-homing
torpedos--and the list goes on and on--and then, second, when
it is necessary to find and attack fixed and relocatable
targets that are defended by modern innovative air defense
systems.
If you believe we need more capacity to generate maritime
domain awareness around the carrier strike group than what will
be available when more than 60 MQ-4C Tritons, formerly BAMS
[Broad Area Maritime Surveillance], enter into service, along
with MQ-8B/C Fire Scouts that can operate off any air-capable
ship in the fleet, then the current draft RFP, at least as
reported in the press, is probably about right.
If you believe we need even more capacity for persistent
ISR and light strike in low-to-medium threat environments,
beyond the several hundred aircraft and the Predator, Gray
Eagle, and Reaper fleets, then the draft RFP for UCLASS is
probably on track.
If you believe instead that UCLASS should be the next step
in the evolution of the carrier air wing and must be able to
provide sea-based surveillance and strike capacity in
anticipated anti-access and area-denial environments, then the
Navy is aiming well off the mark, which brings us to theme two:
The opportunity cost of the current threshold requirement for
unrefueled endurance.
Driven by the perceived need to maintain continuous
maritime domain awareness around the carrier strike group,
including overnight while the deck is closed, the draft RFP
reportedly contains a derived threshold requirement for an
unrefueled endurance of about 14 hours.
The opportunity cost of that 14 hours of unrefueled
endurance, however, are permanent aircraft design trades that
reduce survivability and payload carriage and flexibility, the
exact same attributes that are needed to perform ISR and
precision strike in an anti-access/area-denial environment.
I would like to stress that these reductions in
survivability and payload cannot be bought back later or added
to future UCLASS variants.
Similarly, claims that threshold growth or objective
requirements will place competitive pressure on industry to
enhance survivability and payload attributes are mostly smoke
and mirrors. They may appear compelling, but they are
misleading.
As a matter of physics, absence breakthrough in engine
technology, it is impossible to achieve 14 hours of unrefueled
endurance with an air vehicle sized to operate from the
aircraft carrier without making changes to its shape and
propulsion path that negatively impact radar cross-section
reduction, a.k.a [also known as] stealth, and reduce internal
weapons carriage capacity, meaning both numbers and types of
weapons that the air vehicle can carry.
Simply put, meeting the threshold requirement of 14 hours
of unrefueled endurance necessarily results in sacrificing
survivability, weapons carriage/flexibility and the number of
weapons you can carry, and growth margins for future mission
payloads. And, again, there are no technologically viable
growth paths for restoring these attributes later.
Perhaps this opportunity cost would be acceptable if there
was a compelling operational justification for 14 hours of
unrefueled endurance, but there is not.
And the aircraft with 8 to 10 hours of unrefueled endurance
flying at high subsonic speeds would have roughly three times
the combat radius of F-18E/F or the F-35C.
So to put that into operational perspective, that same 8-
to 10-hour endurance aircraft could launch from a carrier
positioned 1,000 miles away from an area of interest, which
happens to be the range of the Chinese DF-21D anti-ship
ballistic missile, loiter on station for 3 to 4 hours, then
recover onboard the carrier still with gas in the tank.
When factoring in aerial refueling, which is typically
available in wartime, the 14-hour unrefueled endurance
requirement is even more nonsensical. With refueling, that same
8- to 10-hour endurance aircraft could remain aloft for 24 to
48 hours or longer.
I would like to shift now to the third theme, payload
requirements. I am not aware of any mission or campaign-level
analysis that supports a payload requirement of 1,000 pounds
for a carrier-based strike aircraft. Certainly that is not the
case with either the F-18 or the F-35.
Put more plainly, 1,000 pounds of payload, which equates to
four small-diameter bombs, is clearly inadequate for saturating
an adversary's short-range air defenses and neutralizing a wide
range of very relevant target sites, such as coastal defense
cruise missile sites, air defense radars, missile launchers,
even enemy service combatants. One thousand pounds of strike
payload per aircraft just isn't enough.
In addition, scant consideration appears to have been given
to the types of weapons that UCLASS should be able to
accommodate.
Even a stealthy UCLASS in the future will need to stand off
from some classes of defended targets. So it should be able to
carry weapons such as the Joint Standoff Weapon, the Long Range
Anti-Ship Missile, or LRASM, and/or a Joint Strike Missile. All
of these things need more consideration.
So now, for my fourth and final theme: What would a more
balanced UCLASS design look like? A more balanced carrier-based
unmanned air vehicle would, first, achieve the minimum level of
signature reduction required to locate priority targets and
engage them with available weapons without being destroyed by
modern air defenses or, put another way, needs to be able to
find and hit targets without being shot down. That is a minimum
precondition.
Second, it needs sufficient unrefueled endurance to reach
target areas when carriers are forced to stand off 1,000 miles
or more.
And then, third, once those two conditions are met--it can
find and hit targets without being shot down, it has a
meaningful operational combat radius--the next thing is
maximizing the amount of payload it can carry and as many types
of weapons that it can carry while still fitting on the carrier
deck.
So using that approach, a carrier-based UAS [unmanned
aircraft system] in the future could have, for example, an
unrefueled endurance of 8 to 10 hours, which translates to a
combat radius of 1,700 to 2,000 nautical miles, either from a
carrier or from a tanker; 24 to 48 hours of mission endurance
with air-to-air refueling; broadband/all-aspect, radar cross-
section reduction matched to the anticipated threat environment
of 2025 and beyond; and the ability to carry 3- to 4,000 pounds
of strike payload internally, roughly what an F-35C can carry,
including their variety of direct and standoff weapons.
With those attributes, a balanced UCLASS could serve as an
independent, long-range surveillance and striking arm of the
aircraft carrier in anti-access and area-denial environments.
With aerial tanking support, it could respond globally to
short-notice aggression, regardless of the carrier's initial
location, and contribute to a sustained extended-range
precision strike campaign against an adversary's fixed and
mobile target as part of a joint force.
So to conclude and to just foot-stomp a few points, first,
the opportunity cost of 4 to 6 hours of additional unrefueled
endurance, so 14 hours vice 8 to 10, is a dramatic reduction in
strike capacity and flexibility, a significant increase in air
vehicle vulnerability and reduced growth potential, meaning
lower margins for space, weight, power, and cooling.
Second, be very skeptical of growth paths that promise to
increase survivability and payload later. Yes. There are band-
aid solutions and some workarounds, but the core design trades
made to achieve 14 hours of unrefueled endurance involve the
air vehicle's shape and propulsion path, and they cannot be
reversed, period.
There is no question that the Nation needs a carrier-based
unmanned aircraft. The relevant question is what kind of
aircraft. The air vehicle called for in the UCLASS RFP appears
to be optimized for sustaining persistent maritime domain
awareness----
Mr. Forbes. I am going to have to interrupt you there
because we have got votes that are called. We will let you wrap
up very briefly when we get back and then go right to Mr.
Brimley and Mr. McGrath.
We apologize for these votes. Unfortunately, we are looking
at probably about 3:45 before we will be back. So we are going
to stand in recess until that time.
[Recess.]
Mr. Forbes. Thank you once again for your patience. And we
apologize for these votes.
Mr. Martinage, I think you were finishing up. If you could
take about 60 seconds and wrap up, and then we will move on to
Mr. Brimley.
Mr. Martinage. As I was saying, there is no question that
the Nation needs a carrier-based unmanned aircraft. The
relevant question is what kind of aircraft.
And, in my view, the air vehicle called for in the UCLASS
RFP appears to be optimized for sustaining persistent maritime
domain awareness and ISR coverage in relatively benign threat
environments.
And, in my view, that is redundant with aircraft in service
or soon to be in service in the Navy, the Army, and the Air
Force.
And, most critically, it does not address the core
operational problem facing aviation: The intensifying anti-Navy
threats that will push the carrier farther away from target
areas and network air defenses that will make non-stealthy
aircraft increasingly vulnerable to detection and attack. And
that is the problem we need to look at.
And I look forward to your questions and discussions later
on.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Martinage can be found in
the Appendix on page 61.]
Mr. Forbes. Well, thank you for your comments.
Mr. Brimley, look forward to your comments.
STATEMENT OF SHAWN BRIMLEY, EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT AND
DIRECTOR OF STUDIES, CENTER FOR A NEW AMERICAN SECURITY
Mr. Brimley. Thank you, Chairman Forbes, Ranking Member
Courtney, for the opportunity to testify.
I want to acknowledge my co-panelists, whose work I very
much admire.
I see the issue of how the Navy approaches the Unmanned
Carrier-Launched Airborne Surveillance and Strike program, or
UCLASS, as an important indicator of how serious the Department
of Defense is in ensuring America's long-term military
technical advantage.
I am concerned that the current program does not fully
exploit the opportunity the Navy has, in my mind, to lock in
what could be a decisive advantage in future warfare, the
ability to employ long-range, stealthy, unmanned strike
platforms from the aircraft carrier.
As a former civilian who worked national security policy at
both OSD, the Office of Secretary of Defense, at the White
House, I typically approach design procurement--defense
procurement and design issues through the lens of a policymaker
and I ask the following types of questions:
Number one, will the platform provide a future Commander in
Chief better military options during a crisis?
Two, will it help address pressing gaps in U.S. defense
strategy and planning?
Three, does it enable forward U.S. forces to present a
stronger conventional deterrent and, if necessary, help ensure
U.S. forces can defeat a plausible adversary?
Number four, will the program help underwrite the
confidence of our allies and partners?
Five, does it reflect measured judgments regarding mid- to
long-term requirements for U.S. defense?
And, six, does the program help ensure America's military
technical dominance in an increasingly competitive environment?
Having followed as best I can the debate surrounding UCLASS
program, I am concerned that the answers to most of the
questions I just outlined are ``no.''
The specific requirements in the current draft request for
proposals, in my mind, having read as much of the open-source
material as I can, will result in a platform that, one, fails
to add any real striking power to the carrier air wing; two,
duplicates many of the ISR systems already available to the
Navy; three, does nothing to address the major threat facing
the aircraft carrier, the need to operate from longer ranges
due to improvements in anti-ship, ballistic and cruise missile
design; four, and most problematically, vectors the Navy down
an investment path that will waste precious time and money, in
my view, risking our ability to integrate long-endurance,
strike-capable unmanned systems into this country's most
important power-projection asset, the aircraft carrier.
I think the strategic implications of a failure to push
hard now to develop carrier-launched unmanned combat aerial
vehicles could be significant. Budgets are tight and hard
choices must be made, but this is an area where I don't think
we can afford to get it wrong.
To do so will end up costing more money over the long term
and increase the risk that the U.S. Navy and the broader joint
force will be ill-prepared for important plausible future
contingencies.
In this respect, I fully endorse, Mr. Chairman, what this
committee did in requiring the Secretary of Defense--and I
think it is important it be the civilian leadership of the
Department--certify the requirements for this program before
further substantial funding is committed.
This committee adjudicates issues involving programs much
larger and far more costly than the UCLASS program, but I think
this is one of those rare decisions regarding setting
requirements for future capabilities that could have a major
impact on how tomorrow's joint force might fight a future war.
It is critical, in my view, to take the time to ensure that
we get this right. I appreciate being invited to speak today
and look forward to the discussion.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Brimley can be found in the
Appendix on page 73.]
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Mr. Brimley, for your comments.
Mr. McGrath.
STATEMENT OF BRYAN MCGRATH, MANAGING DIRECTOR, FERRYBRIDGE
GROUP, LLC
Mr. McGrath. Thank you, Chairman Forbes, Ranking Member
Courtney. Thank you for the opportunity to be with you today.
Thank you for your leadership in sustaining the competitive
advantages of American seapower and for the leadership that you
have exerted thus far in exerting pressure on the Department of
Defense to ensure a truly capable Unmanned Carrier-Launched
Surveillance and Strike system.
It is an honor to be on the panel with the three gentlemen
here, who are also good friends. Bob Martinage, Shawn Brimley,
and Ronald O'Rourke are among the smartest thinkers on the
scene today and to be counted among them is humbling.
And while Mr. O'Rourke's background and employment preclude
political or ideological identification, I think it is
noteworthy to note the presence of two Obama administration
political appointees, Mr. Martinage and Mr. Brimley, alongside
me, and myself, the Navy policy team co-lead for the 2012
Romney for President Committee.
The fact that the three of us are in solid agreement on the
need for continued congressional oversight of the Navy's UCLASS
acquisition is notable.
Specifically, there appears to be consensus on the need to
ensure the Navy does not pursue a largely duplicative system
that does little to advance the striking power of our Nation's
primary forward-deployed power-projection system, the aircraft
carrier strike group.
I believe we have reached a ``for want of a nail, a kingdom
is lost'' moment. The aircraft carrier has been--its demise has
been predicted for 60 years. And that demise hasn't happened
because its air wing has evolved to pace the threat throughout
its history. It is agnostic to the weapons it projects.
If the air wing of the future does not evolve in a way that
enables the kind of unmanned strike that a truly capable UCLASS
would bring, the aircraft carrier might indeed become
obsolescent.
If it becomes obsolete, the preponderant Navy that we field
today that is the primary--in my view, the primary sustainer of
the global system that is in place today will become far less
powerful. Far less powerful and influential Navy means a far
less powerful and influential United States.
This is not a small question. It is a large one. And I
appreciate your leadership on the subject. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. McGrath can be found in the
Appendix on page 86.]
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Mr. McGrath.
And now we would like to--I am going to defer my questions
until after Mr. Courtney.
So, Mr. Courtney, I will let you go first if you have any
questions.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And, again, I think this is an important hearing.
Obviously, it was something that was part of the House Defense
Authorization bill.
I feel a little bit like we are shadowboxing here, though,
because we are talking about a classified RFP process.
And, again, I think the latter two witnesses--your remarks
were, I think, at a level that I think comport with that
because you are talking about, you know, the long-range
mission--or goal of this program, which is--again, I think it
is great to have that discussion.
You know, Mr. Martinage, I mean, some of your comments were
really focused on very specific, you know, components. I mean,
the 1,000-gallon fuel item that you mentioned a couple of times
in your remarks.
And, I mean, again, just for the record, I mean, from a
process standpoint, we are in a place right now where there is,
again, a classified RFP that is going to be going out in the
next few months or so.
Have you seen any of those documents that, you know,
provide the basis for your testimony today?
Mr. Martinage. I have not seen the final draft RFP or the
most recent RFP. I have been paying very close attention to the
materials that are out about the draft RFP in the public domain
as well as the KPPs and KSAs [key system attributes]
discussion, which has been pretty extensive in the public
domain.
And I think the issue--I don't know--which is the central
one, I think, in my testimony, about the 14 hours of unrefueled
endurance is clearly a parameter that is out there in the
public domain.
And the opportunity cost of that 14 hours of unrefueled
endurance clearly has an opportunity cost in both survivability
and payload, and that is just a matter of physics.
It is not a classification issue. It is not a sensitivity
issue. It is an aircraft design issue. And given where we are
with engine propulsion technology, you just can't get to 14
hours unless you do things to the shape of the aircraft and the
propulsion path that compromise stealth and payload.
And that is why I think the current path we are on is not a
balanced design. And if you relaxed that threshold requirement
for unrefueled endurance, you could dramatically improve
payload and survivability, and that is my point.
Mr. Courtney. So, Mr. O'Rourke, I mean, in the past, I
mean, we have had weapons platforms--excuse me--and systems
that have started out looking one way and then, over time, have
evolved or adapted to different capabilities and different--
maybe you could just give some historic perspective in terms of
other programs that adaptation and evolution has occurred.
Mr. O'Rourke. Yeah. To just pick a few examples that come
to mind in the area of carrier-based aviation, the F-18 is
probably the largest single example.
It went through multiple versions, from the AB to the CD
and then to the larger version, the EF, the Super Hornet, and
off of that they also then developed the EA-18G.
Another example would be the E-2 Hawkeye and how it has
evolved from the E-2C to the Hawkeye 2000 to the E-2D Advanced
Hawkeye with its new radar.
A third example would be the P-3 that has evolved a number
of times since the 1960s through a series of updates. And the
Navy's plan right now is to procure the P-8 Poseidon multi-
mission maritime aircraft with an incremental or step upgrade
in mind.
So right now that plane exists at something called
Increment 1, but there are plans to build it in a new version
called Increment 2 that will implement three different
engineering change proposals over the next few years and then
move on beyond that to something called Increment 3. And all
these things are supposed to [achieve] IOC [initial operating
capability] between fiscal year 2014 and fiscal year 2020.
In general, it is worth noting that spiral development,
which I think is the idea that you are getting at here, is
established as an acquisition pathway for DOD programs. And, in
fact, there was a push several years ago to make it the default
approach to acquisition for DOD programs.
Mr. Courtney. Right.
And, I mean, even other sort of non-aviation--I mean, DDGs
[guided missile destroyers] have also kind of changed their
look over the years.
Mr. O'Rourke. That is right.
In the area of shipbuilding, there are additional examples.
You mentioned one, the DDG, which has moved from the Flight I
to the Flight II, from there to the Flight IIA, and now we are
planning on shifting to the Flight III.
The 688-class submarine went through a number of changes,
and the 688s we built at the end of that program are quite
different from the early ones. And the Virginia class is going
through a block upgrade.
So, yes, this same idea is well established in shipbuilding
as well.
Mr. Courtney. So, I mean--so I guess--and I don't have much
more to ask right now.
Is that--I mean, that is sort of the question of the
hearing, you know, really, whether or not, you know, this is a
fork in the road that is irrevocable and, you know, permanent,
forever, or whether or not, you know, that we can follow other
precedents in the past.
And certainly, when the next panel comes up, that certainly
would be my question that I would certainly want to pose to
them. And, you know, I may have some other written questions
afterwards.
But, you know, with that, Mr. Chairman, I would just yield
back to you.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Mr. Courtney.
Also, we have a number of our Members who would like to
submit written questions who couldn't be here because of the
votes.
I would like to walk through a series of questions, if I
could.
And, Mr. O'Rourke, I would like to start with you because
you are kind of the closest we have to a historian in looking
at this from the Congressional Research Service.
Do you see any shift in the international security
environment that might warrant the Navy pursuing a different
path on the UCLASS program than what it is currently pursuing?
Mr. O'Rourke. That is the first of the six issues I raise,
whether we are undergoing right now a shift in strategic eras.
There are a number of people who feel that we are undergoing
such a shift.
My own personal view, as an analyst, is that, yes, I think
we are experiencing a shift in strategic eras. Right now I am
watching that situation and have been for a number of months.
Mr. Forbes. Could you give me a couple of examples of the
world situation that would justify you making that comment?
Mr. O'Rourke. Well, I think what caught the attention of
the people who have written about this potential shift in
strategic eras are two sets of developments.
One are those in the Western Pacific, and that has to do
with a series of actions by China starting late last year that
appear intended or aimed at gaining a greater degree of Chinese
control over its near-seas region.
That included the announcement of the air defense
identification zone toward the end of November, the incident
with the Cowpens in December, the imposition of the fishing
regulations in January, and then most recently the movement of
the oil rig to the Paracel Islands starting in May.
So that is one-half of the situation that I think a number
of these observers were noticing.
And the other was Russia's seizure and annexation of
Crimea, which was a landmark event regarding the division of
territories within Europe since the end of World War II.
And the observers who have looked at that have said, in
essence, that we may be shifting to a new strategic era, that
the unipolar moment, as it were, is over and that we are
entering a new age that is perhaps characterized by, among
other things, a greater degree of great power competition and
challenges to fundamental aspects of the U.S.-led international
order that has operated since World War II.
Mr. Forbes. So I wouldn't be changing your words if I were
to say that, based on the world situation, developments that
have taken place within the last 12 to 18 months, that, in your
view, that could suggest that the Navy should at least relook
the direction that they are heading with this UCLASS program?
Mr. O'Rourke. I can't make a recommendation, as you know.
But what I can say is that, with other people out there--and I
am not asking anybody to accept----
Mr. Forbes. I understand.
Mr. O'Rourke [continuing]. My own judgment about whether we
are entering into a new strategic era, but a number of other
observers are saying that.
And it is enough to tee the issue up for the committee and
the Congress as a whole to make its own decision as to whether
we are entering that era and, if so, whether we should then
have a reassessment of defense plans and programs.
Mr. Forbes. Okay.
Mr. Martinage, I would like to clarify something Mr.
Courtney asked and--just to make sure that we heard you
correctly.
When you talked about the 1,000-pound element, you were not
talking about 1,000 gallons of fuel, I don't think. You were
talking about a 1,000-pound payload.
But correct me if I'm wrong, I mean, because I could have
heard it wrong. I just want to make sure that question----
Mr. Martinage. That is correct.
Mr. Forbes. And, based on that, Mr. Courtney is exactly
right. We have a lot of classified information on here. He is
perfectly correct on that.
But it is your understanding, as I take it from your
testimony, that you believe the requirements out here would
relate to a 14-hour endurance requirement in the air?
Mr. Martinage. That is correct. Yep.
Mr. Forbes. And a 1,000-pound payload max. Is that correct?
Mr. Martinage. That is my understanding from what is in the
public domain.
Mr. Forbes. Now, if that is accurate and if we have
flexibility to add additional--would we have flexibility, in
your opinion--if you have those two requirements or one of
those two requirements, can we add additional payload
capability to this platform?
Mr. Martinage. Meeting the 14-hour unrefueled endurance
requirement I think would likely preclude a significant
increase in payload.
You could probably increase it some and trade off some
endurance, for example, by putting fuel in the bomb bay or
something like that or putting external weapons carriage and
reducing survivability and reducing some endurance.
If I could, I would like to build on a comment that was
asked about the evolving and adapting over time, if----
Mr. Forbes. Please.
Mr. Martinage. I think that is important for this aircraft
design to be able to evolve and adapt over time, but you need
to get the shape and the propulsion path right or you are stuck
forever in terms of the payload and the survivability. You
can't undo those things.
You can. You can build a new jet. But if you get the shape
wrong at the start and you get the propulsion path wrong at the
start, you really can't go revisit those things and add payload
and survivability later.
So driven by that 14-hour unrefueled endurance choice,
choices are being made on the shape and the propulsion path
that really can't be undone, and they will lead to an
evolutionary dead end for the aircraft.
And that is why I am concerned. I think having a spiral
development approach is a good one and you could do that with a
balanced design.
So you could take that aircraft that ultimately has 8 to 10
hours of endurance, 3- to 4,000 pounds of payload, a very low
signature, and 24 to 48 hours of refueled endurance, and you
don't have to get there all at once.
You could field the basic shape and propulsion path. Over
time you could add more advanced edges and coatings to get the
survivability. Over time you could add additional weapons that
it can carry. Over time you could add sensors to it.
But, again, it is fundamental to get the shape and the
propulsion path right at the start. And right now that is being
driven by the 14-hour requirement, and you have to ask yourself
why 14 hours.
Mr. Forbes. Now, let me ask you about that.
Assuming your testimony to be correct and we have a 14-hour
endurance figure and we have the 1,000 payload max, what does
that limit me from using in terms of payload?
Mr. Martinage. Well, the devil is in the detail, sir, and I
don't know yet because we haven't seen the designs.
But one is you won't be able to carry enough weapons to
saturate--say you were going after a surface combatant with
short-range air defenses like a Luyang II or Luyang III in the
case of the PLA [People's Liberation Army] Navy.
You would want a lot of individual weapons to saturate
their point-defense and then to take out, to neutralize the
ship. Four SDBs [small diameter bombs] is never ever going to
do it for you.
I think it is instructive that we don't think about 1,000
pounds of payload under the F-35 or the F-18. Why would you
think about it on UCLASS?
The other thing is what types of weapons. And that gets to
not the weapons carriage, you know, how much it can carry, but,
rather, the volume of the bomb bay. And that is just unclear.
That is something that needs to be looked at.
But in order to go after some of these types of targets
that are defended targets, you would want some standoff
capability. And it is unclear, as I read what is available,
whether or not those types of weapons will fit in the bomb bay
of this current design.
Mr. Forbes. Now, if I can take the advocate's role for a
moment and if we are already planning to procure 80 to 100
long-range bombers, is there a need for a UCLASS program
focused on the strike mission?
Mr. Martinage. I would say, (a), we are a joint force and
it is good to have multiple options for the Commander in Chief
to pursue.
Aircraft carriers don't need basing, and they can respond
quickly to crises wherever they are without having to ask for
permission for basing and access. They complicate an
adversary's defensive challenges because you can come from
multiple directions that they might not anticipate.
And then I would ask back: If the carrier doesn't have a
long-range strike capability, what is the point? It is supposed
to be the major power protection arm of the U.S. Navy. If we
can't project power where and when necessary, why do we
continue to invest in it?
Mr. Forbes. Mr. Brimley, if I could ask you to, one,
describe for the committee, if you would, cost imposition
strategies.
And if you could give us your thought as to whether or not
pursuing the current course, as you understand it to be for the
Navy for UCLASS, would impose any cost imposition on any of our
competitors.
And if we pursued another course, would that have any cost
imposition aspects to it?
Mr. Brimley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I think, for me, the most instructive case is just to look
at what is going on in the Western Pacific. I mean, since the
late 1990s, I think China and the PLA have gone down a path of
imposing costs on us.
Well, what does that mean? I think they have spent the
preponderance of their defense budget over more than a decade
or more--you know, close to two decades now, trying to
literally push us farther away. You just have to look at their
development of increasingly long-range and precise anti-ship
ballistic missile technology and, also, anti-ship cruise
missile technology.
This is the fundamental problem, as my colleague Mr.
Martinage talked about. If we can't project--we don't have a
capability from the aircraft carrier to project much farther
than 1,000 nautical miles, then it is very hard for us to be
able to deter behavior.
And I think that, were we to invest in a platform that
could actually project power over that distance or longer, you
could significantly complicate our adversaries' calculus and
impose costs on them, as well.
The other way I tend to think about this, too, is, you
know, our allies and partners in the region are looking to us
to be able to be with them in moments of crisis and moments of
tension, and if we have a threat that forces the power-
projection hub, the central power-projection platform of the
U.S. military, to stay well, well outside the first island
chain, for instance, it could really undermine U.S. foreign
policy and national security strategy with our allies and
partners.
Mr. Forbes. A more ambitious UCAV program would likely cost
more.
Can you tell me a little bit about your opinion of what the
value proposition would be for this?
Mr. Brimley. Mr. Chairman, yes. You know, I can't give you
specific cost estimates. I am sure the Navy and elements of the
Pentagon could give you that.
But I would just suggest that going down what I called in
my testimony a strategic UCLASS cul-de-sac--I mean, if we
invest all this money and all this time to get a system that
provides perhaps some better maritime demand awareness around
the carrier strike group, but doesn't buy down any sort of risk
regarding our ability to project power, then, in my mind, it is
a waste of money and it is a waste of time.
So even if--I mean, let's just assume for a moment that a
more ambitious UCAV could cost, say, 20, 25, 35 percent more
than the equivalent number of systems of a less capable, less
mission-centric capability that can't project power. To me, as
a civilian, as a policymaker, that is a trade worth making.
That is an investment worth making, in my view.
Mr. Forbes. Mr. McGrath, can you put the UCLASS program in
an historic context, as you look at it, and maybe tell us how
you see it fitting into a broader U.S. defense strategy both in
Asia and more broadly.
Mr. McGrath. I will take the second part of the question
first and maybe an answer to the first part will reveal itself.
Our geography is not going to change appreciably in the
near future. This Nation depends on its Navy and its Marine
Corps to a large degree for much of peacetime-shaping and
presence missions and transition-to-war duties around the world
where our far-flung interests are.
That capability is something no other nation on Earth has,
and it is a capability that a nation with our geographic
constraints has to have if we wish to be influential, thousands
of miles from our shore.
Because of the nature of the threat and the obvious desire
of strategists around the world to try and keep naval forces
from being able to generate significant power near their
shores, because they are trying to keep the carrier away--
further away, as Mr. Brimley was talking about, we have to
counter that.
If we do not counter that in a way that continues the
relevance of the aircraft carrier as our Nation's primary
power-projection platform, we either have to acknowledge the
end of American naval dominance or we have to figure out some
way to replace that power projection.
I don't know what that is. I don't know--I don't know
another platform or series of platforms or ensemble of
platforms in the Navy that could--for the amount of time that
an aircraft carrier can generate power that could match it. It
is one of the reasons we build them and operate them, is
because they are very efficient producers of combat power.
I don't have a good answer for you on the first part of
your question.
Mr. Forbes. Mr. Langevin, like Mr. Courtney, has spent a
lot of time looking at this issue and other naval issues, and
we would like to recognize him now for 5 minutes
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank our
witnesses for being here today, and I apologize with the votes
and all that. I may have, some of my questions, I hope they are
not redundant, but I need to have these answers, and I would
appreciate any insight you could give us. Again, thank you for
your testimony.
Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the committee's attention to
this very important program, and I thank you for the attention
that you have given to this, and I, again, thank our witnesses
for their insights in appearing before us this afternoon. As
you highlighted in your testimony, this is a debate not about a
program really but about the future of carrier-based aviation.
The overall pattern of unmanned systems has been initially the
description, the substitution of such systems for the three
Ds--the dull, the dirty, and dangerous--if you will. And
certainly persistent ISR is dull, though vitally important,
which is why, of course, we have Global Hawks and Reapers and
Predators, Fire Scouts, and other systems focused on that ISR
mission. So my concern is that unless the Navy asks industry
for the right capabilities, we could preclude right at the
outset UCLASS's ability to stand in for manned aircraft for
future dangerous missions such as ISR, denied environments, or
initial strikes to take down integrated air defense systems and
heavily defended targets.
We are here today to make sure what could be a truly
revolutionary capability for the future air wing achieves its
full potential. So my first question is, could you talk to the
subcommittee, could you talk us through the design tradeoffs
that will be necessary should the current unrefueled
persistence requirement stay as is, and what options would be
available to air vehicle designers if it was lowered? I will
start right down the line.
Mr. O'Rourke. I will just make a general comment that any
one platform exists within an envelope of tradeoffs and that
there are certain characteristics that can be achieved only to
a certain degree in the presence of other characteristics, so
range and endurance would be one. Payload would be another.
Stealth and survivability would be a third. And cost would be
one. And that and maybe one or two other attributes would
establish a zone or an envelope within which you would make
these kinds of tradeoffs. I am going to stop right there and
let the other witnesses answer it in more detail.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you.
Mr. Martinage. I like to think about the design trade for
carrier-based UCAV to really be driven by one--in all cases, it
has to be able to operate off the carrier, which constrains its
size.
But beyond that, think of a triangle, where you have
unrefueled endurance on one corner, payload, mission payload,
including strike payload, as another corner, and then
survivability as a third corner. Anything you do to any one of
those affects the other two. So when you say 14 hours of
unrefueled endurance as one of those three parameters, you
necessarily have to reduce what you might otherwise do in terms
of survivability, and mission and strike payload. So the
implication, to directly answer your question, sir, is the 14
hours of unrefueled endurance forces reductions or increases
signature or reduces stealth and reduces payload in all its
forms, including volume.
If you relaxed that 14 hours of unrefueled endurance, you
could significantly improve stealth, which would get us into a
classified conversation which we can't go into, but there is a
lot more you can do there. And you could probably triple or
quadruple the payload. And that payload doesn't have to be all
used at once. That can also be your growth for the future in
terms of size, weight, power, and cooling for new mission
systems, new sensors, new weapons that you might want to
integrate into the airframe in the future. But if you don't
have that margin built in, in terms of mission payload
capacity, you can't grow the aircraft in the future. I hope
that answers your question.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you.
Mr. Brimley. I would just add, Congressman, I very much
agree with my colleagues' statements. I would just say the
number one operational challenge facing force planners, defense
planners, the Commander in Chief, is do I have the option to
penetrate an adversary's anti-access/area-denial network and
hold that risk, their capabilities. And so as a civilian policy
analyst, that is the number one operational challenge that I
would ask the Navy to prioritize, and I think if you do that,
you prioritize strike capacity, stealth, payload. Probably the
last priority is really unrefueled endurance because that
forces you to make all sorts of other compromises.
So I would ask, perhaps in your next panel with our Navy
colleagues, you know, what kinds of design benefits could there
be if you prioritize the strike side, the strike and stealth
aspects of this design? I think that would open up all sorts of
other possibilities that, frankly, would give better options to
civilian leaders if we were actually to engage in some sort of
conflict, or at the very least pose a more credible deterrent
capacity overseas.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you.
Mr. McGrath. Mr. Langevin, I cannot improve upon those
answers.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you. My time is expired. I do have
other questions, but I guess I should submit those for the
record, Mr. Chairman?
Mr. Forbes. If you don't mind, Jim, we are going to submit
a group of them for the record, and we would love to have your
questions in there.
Mr. Langevin. Very good, Chairman.
And I thank our witnesses for their insight and testimony.
And I yield back.
Mr. Forbes. Mr. Courtney, did you have----
Mr. Courtney. Just really quickly. One of the tradeoffs if
you give up unrefueled persistence and reduce the thousand
pounds to a lower weight, you are also creating another sort of
challenge, aren't you, in terms of needing to have a refueling
capability, which I guess the question is are we good to go as
far as having that for unmanned air systems? I mean, that
sounds like a whole new set of challenges, isn't it, in terms
of making that work?
Mr. Martinage. Well, the first thing I would say is 8 to 10
hours of endurance is still a long combat radius, so somewhere
around 1,700 to 2,000 nautical miles, which is roughly triple
every other aircraft on the carrier deck. So that is a pretty
big operational reach improvement for the carrier air wing.
In terms of unmanned air-to-air refueling, that has been
demonstrated already by surrogate aircraft as part of the UCAS-
D program. Air Vehicle II is plumbed to do air-to-air
refueling. It was originally part of the UCAS demonstration
program. I don't know if the Navy is going to go forward with
that, but I would say the technology is pretty mature and has
been demonstrated with surrogate aircraft already.
Mr. McGrath. Sir, there was an open source report earlier
this week, and I have it referenced in my written testimony--I
don't remember exactly where it was--but where the Northrop
Grumman program manager for UCAS says that they are prepared to
demonstrate it during summer testing on board USS Theodore
Roosevelt, and the UCAS Navy program manager indicated that
if--excuse me. The contract has a provision in it, a clause in
it, to do this. Northrop Grumman says they are ready to show
it. The Navy program manager indicated that they were looking
at trying to get to that, so we will have answers to these
questions probably this summer, this coming summer.
Mr. Forbes. And if I could just end with one question, kind
of a follow-up on what Mr. Courtney's is, I don't think there
is a question that we have the capability to refuel, but the
problem that I think Mr. Courtney may be getting at, too, is
you would need a tanker or something to do it, which means we
would have to have another asset there to do that, which is at
least a question for us to raise.
But if you look at this triangle that, Mr. Martinage, you
correctly raise between endurance and payload and stealth, if
we had to pick a priority between those three things, what
would the priority be, one? And, number two, if we continue in
the direction that the Navy is heading, which is primarily an
ISR asset, does that provide any additional capability than
what the Navy already can do? And I would love to hear your
responses on any of the four of you if you could address either
of those two questions.
Mr. O'Rourke is looking at you, so I think he is----
Mr. Martinage. I will start. I will start. In terms of the
triangle, sir, I would, frankly, push back and say I wouldn't
pick any one of the three. I would pick all three. And I would
pick a balance of the three that allow it to perform the
operational mission that I mentioned at the beginning, which is
projecting power from range from the carrier, ISR and strike,
in anti-access and area-denial----
Mr. Forbes. So then maybe if I could rephrase my question,
not to compound it but to get an answer, you would say that the
number one mission that you believe the UCLASS needs to be
doing is the projection of that power through A2/AD defenses.
Is that fair?
Mr. Martinage. That is fair, and I would say the way I
would prioritize it is that first thing, the aircraft needs to
be able to go find and hit a target without being shot down. So
what that means fundamentally is you need a certain level of
stealth and the right weapon to hit the target and the right
sensor to find the target. That is one.
Then, two, I want to have enough operational radius from a
tanker or a carrier that I can do that from some reasonable
range. I think 1,000 miles would be a good figure to put down.
And then, third, I would want as many weapons and as many
different kinds of weapons as I could fit into that aircraft.
So that would be my hierarchy: find and kill targets without
being shot down, do it at range, and have has many weapons in
the magazine and different kinds of weapons as possible.
To answer your second question, sir, about what additional
would this type of aircraft provide, it would provide the
carrier strike group commander a long-range, long-persistence
ISR asset for maintaining maritime domain awareness around the
carrier battle group and then potentially finding targets for
the manned air wing.
Mr. Forbes. That they could not do today?
Mr. Martinage. No. No. I think that the MQ4C Triton, which
is land-based, could do that mission, but that carrier strike
group commander would tell you that is not organic to me. I
can't control it, so I want something that I can control.
Mr. Forbes. That is a fair statement.
Mr. Martinage. And then the other option that the Navy
could pursue is things like MQ-8B/C Fire Scout off of any air-
capable ship, so including all the destroyers and so forth;
that has a potential of 8 to 12 hours endurance, and it could
do maritime domain awareness around the carrier battle group
that way. To me, that would be a much more effective and
affordable way to get that ISR, rather than dedicating what
really should be an integral part of the carrier air wing in
the future for ISR and strike.
Mr. Forbes. Good.
Mr. Brimley.
Mr. Brimley. Sir, I would just step back for a second, and
if I could just make a broader strategic comment. Of course,
the primary decision calculus here and for this committee and
for the Navy and for the Pentagon ought to be, how can we make
sure that the carrier strike group is relevant in the conflicts
of the future?
But I think the broader strategic dynamic is concerning. We
are only at the beginning stages of a revolution in unmanned,
in increasingly autonomous systems. More than 75 nations are
now investing in this kind of technology. And the proliferation
dynamic is happening, and it is happening quick. As an analyst,
what concerns me is if we spend 5, 6, 7 years walking down this
path of making marginal improvements via an unmanned system to
organic ISR for the carrier, that is time and money we are not
spending in maintaining our military technical dominance and
advantage in these early stages of what I think will be a very
disruptive shift in the global military balance of power.
So I see this as a window of opportunity, and it is a
finite window of opportunity. I am not a technical expert, but
it strikes me that we ought to make sure that we spend the time
necessary to get these requirements right before we start
walking down a path that will close doors for us potentially
and potentially undermine our military technical power.
Mr. McGrath. Chairman Forbes, any strike group commander
would love to have more ISR around his or her strike group. I
mean, it is security. It is safety. It is knowing what is
around you. The question is, do we have an adequate supply of
platforms to provide that today? Especially when you have zero
platforms today that can penetrate at the ranges we are talking
about that make them operationally relevant in a contested A2/
AD environment. This argument that the Triton and the P-8
aren't organic is interesting, but neither is most of the fuel
that strike group commander is going to use in a campaign. It
comes from the Air Force and tankers that fly and are in tanker
tracks. I mean, there is some tanking on board the carrier, but
a good bit of that campaign-level tanking will come from
somewhere else. So I am not sure why the ISR coming from
somewhere else is that big of an issue. We need the strike.
Mr. Forbes. Gentlemen, thank you so much for sharing your
thoughts with us, helping us to create the questions we need to
be asking and those answers, and we appreciate your time.
Again, as we have apologized to you for these votes that
delayed us, but we look forward to picking your brain in the
future. And as Mr. Langevin pointed out, we have a number of
Members who have some questions they will be submitting to you
if you don't mind submitting those back for the record.
And with that, this panel will be--do any of you have any
comments that you would like to briefly offer for the record?
Mr. McGrath.
Mr. McGrath. I would just like to deal with one of the
counterarguments, and I hear this from very serious people. And
that is if you want another acquisition nightmare--and they
compare it to, you know, you name it--go down the path that you
are headed in, that we want to go in. And what bothers me about
that is there is this implicit sense that we cannot do hard
things well anymore. I think that is just not true. I think
hard things are hard, and we cannot rush to a mediocre set of
requirements out of fear that we can't do better. And I think
this committee's leadership on this and continued pressure to
try to ensure that we do better is required.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you.
Mr. O'Rourke.
Mr. O'Rourke. Just two quick comments. Returning to
Representative Courtney's earlier question about refueling, the
solution that we reach, whatever it is, is something that I do
think we need to consider in relation to the current refueling
burden on the carrier. The carrier's own organic refueling
ability does influence the range at which it can operate,
especially in situations where it might be far away from land-
based refueling. And I don't know what the impact is of various
decisions on UCLASS in terms of the net burden on the carrier's
organic refueling ability, but more than one of the people that
briefed me from the Navy and industry did bring this up. So
that is, I think, a factor that needs to be considered in the
overall situation. And that's neutral as to the outcome of
UCLASS, but from a system of systems point of view, what is the
net impact on the refueling situation of the carrier, which
influences its combat radius.
And the second, Mr. Chairman, goes to your question about
the triangle and where we should be inside of it. I tend to
think of it as a square rather than a triangle, because I think
cost is the fourth factor. If you freeze the money that is
available at a certain point and take it out, then you are
possibly constraining the ability to imagine what the plane
might be or what you might be able to achieve. So I see the
trade space as having four corners, the fourth corner being a
variable relating to the funding that is available for the
program. And in terms of where you wind up inside that trade
space, it is my hope that the six questions that I outlined at
the outset will help people to think that issue through.
Mr. Forbes. Good. I am sorry.
Mr. Martinage.
Mr. Martinage. Mr. Chairman, I would just like to follow up
on a point Mr. McGrath made, and that is a point that has sort
of been implicit to a lot of this conversation, is that a more
balanced, more capable UCAV is somehow going to be more
expensive and higher risk. I would just like to push back on
that. When it comes to stealth/low-observables, it is more a
choice about shape and propulsion path than it is about cost.
Yes, there are marginal costs with the edges and coatings and
sensor integration, but they are marginal. The big choice is
where you go with the shape and the propulsion path of the
aircraft. And that affects aerodynamic performance and other
things, but it is not so much a cost driver. You tend to pay
for these aircraft by the pound, regardless.
And the second thing is the technologies to achieve a
balanced design, from low-observables and stealth to the
payload capacities we have talked about to the combat radiuses
that we have talked about, are all low risk. They have all been
demonstrated. So if others come in here and say, Well, this
type of LO [low-observables], or this type of LO across this
frequency spectrum hasn't been demonstrated, it is just not
true.
Mr. Forbes. And, Mr. Brimley, we will let you have the last
word.
Mr. Brimley. Well, sir, I guess on behalf of my colleagues,
thank you for holding this hearing. I think there are--at least
most of us I am sure agree, this is probably one of the top
three to five defense design strategy procurement issues that
are facing the Nation and the joint force writ large. Thank you
for identifying this and zooming down on it.
One final point, as I think most of us outlined in our
written testimony, the need to be able to pose operational
challenges, to be able to penetrate anti-access and area-denial
networks, is something that has been consistently enumerated
since at least the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review. So it is
not as though this requirements debate is new. It is not as
though this challenge facing the Nation and facing the joint
force is in any way new. So I think, at least from my
perspective, I find myself being able to draw on a pretty rich
history in terms of the need to be able to set design
requirements to be able to posture the joint force to be able
to succeed in the future security environment.
And finally, just to echo what my colleague just said, you
know, that plane that landed on the aircraft carrier last year
was a certain shape and a certain design specifically because
in the very beginning of this program, those kinds of design
features were prioritized. And so I think, even from a joint
force-Navy perspective, not so long ago, the three of us and
our views, that was the view of the Pentagon. That was the view
of the U.S. Navy. So I don't think that we are advocating sort
of a technological fantasy or some kind of argument that isn't
well within the mainstream of where force designers and
planners have been for a long period of time.
Mr. Forbes. Gentlemen, thank you so much again for your
time.
And with that, we will recess for the next panel.
[Recess.]
Mr. Forbes. Gentlemen, if you would have a seat.
I am sorry to detain you for these votes, but thank you for
your patience. We have already given our opening statements
earlier. We won't bore you with having to listen to those
again, so we are going to go right on to your opening comments,
any that you would like to provide, and I take it we will go in
the order that you are seated, so with that, Admiral, we will
turn it over to you.
STATEMENT OF VADM PAUL A. GROSKLAGS, USN, PRINCIPAL MILITARY
DEPUTY, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE NAVY FOR RESEARCH,
DEVELOPMENT AND ACQUISITIONS, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Admiral Grosklags. Thank you Chairman Forbes,
Representative Courtney. Thank you for the opportunity to
appear before you today to talk about the Navy's UCLASS
program.
I need to start just by saying that the Navy is fully
committed to the development and rapid fielding of an
affordable persistent intelligence, surveillance,
reconnaissance, and targeting, or IRS&T system, with a
precision strike capability. The system will be based on an air
vehicle design which ensures that we meet our threshold
capabilities while being optimized to enable future mission
capability enhancements, particularly in the areas of sensor
payload modularity, weapons payload, and mission effectiveness,
sometimes put under the moniker of survivability. The UCLASS
key performance parameters and key system attributes, as
defined and documented in the Service Approved Capabilities
Development Document, remain consistent and stable.
That document was signed over a year ago by the Chief of
Naval Operations and has not changed. The accompanying UCLASS
acquisition strategy requires offers to be compliant with all
the threshold requirements defined in a CDD [Capability
Development Document] at a not-to-exceed cost per orbit, while
incentivizing industry to propose systems and solutions that
enable those future improvements and enhancements. More
specifically, those proposed air vehicle solutions will be
required to show basic design parameters that support the
future growth, designs that can be affordably modified and
enhanced over time to meet the future multi-mission needs of
both the Navy and the joint force without major aircraft
redesign.
We are on a path to achieve this growth capability without
sacrificing the affordable near-term persistent ISR capability.
We have had 4 years of very close engagement with industry,
including technology maturation contracts which have culminated
in the recently completed preliminary design reviews for four
candidate solutions. This close engagement has provided the
Navy with significant insight into industry capabilities which
results in our confidence that affordable, technically
compliant UCLASS design solutions are achievable within the
targeted timeline and which take into account the plan form,
the air vehicle plan form shape, and propulsion path
characteristics that are needed to ensure that we can grow to
the capabilities mentioned earlier.
It is also important to note that UCLASS will be a
complementary and enhancing part of our carrier strike group.
As part of the air wing, it supports the joint force and the
Navy across our full range of military operations. UCLASS will
make our carrier strike groups more lethal, more effective, and
more survivable. I looked forward to your questions.
[The joint prepared statement of Admiral Grosklags, General
Guastella, and Mr. Andress can be found in the Appendix on page
101.]
Mr. Forbes. Admiral, thank you.
Mr. Andress.
Mr. Andress. I am going to let General Guastella go next if
that is all right, sir.
Mr. Forbes. I think that would be a wise decision. General.
STATEMENT OF BRIG GEN JOSEPH T. GUASTELLA, USAF, DEPUTY
DIRECTOR FOR REQUIREMENTS (J-8), JOINT STAFF
General Guastella. Chairman and Representative Courtney, I
appreciate the opportunity to come and testify today as well. I
work for the Vice Chairman. I facilitate the JROC [Joint
Requirements Oversight Council] process. And as many of you
know, the JROC establishes requirements for our warfighting
needs. The UCLASS requirements have been established by our
most senior warfighters. They are the individuals that are
responsible to organize, train and equip, not just their
services but the entire joint force. All the services are
represented at the JROC.
They established the UCLASS requirements not by looking
through the lens of just the UCLASS system, but they evaluated
the entire joint portfolio of ISR and strike assets to set
these requirements, and certainly the JROC highly values
carrier-based or sea-based ISR and strike platforms.
So I would like to read a sentence or two from the JROCM
[Joint Requirements Oversight Council Memorandum], written on
the 19th of December of 2012: And the requirement for UCLASS is
for an affordable, adaptable platform that supports missions
ranging from permissive counterterrorism operations to missions
in low-end contested environments to providing enabling
capabilities for high-end denied operations as well as
supporting organic naval missions. Essentially that requirement
strikes a balance between affordability and performance.
And like I mentioned earlier, you cannot look at the UCLASS
requirement through a single lens, but only as you look at it
how does it fit into a joint portfolio of assets, from
permissive air-breathing to more advanced air-breathing assets
to include space-based assets. Where is its role in there? And
that is how those requirements were derived. While this is an
open hearing, sir, if you need us to come by later and discuss
some of the other systems or performance parameters, we are
happy to do that. Sir, pending your questions.
[The joint prepared statement of General Guastella, Admiral
Grosklags, and Mr. Andress can be found in the Appendix on page
101.]
Mr. Forbes. General, thank you.
Mr. Andress.
STATEMENT OF MARK D. ANDRESS, ASSISTANT DEPUTY CHIEF OF NAVAL
OPERATIONS FOR INFORMATION DOMINANCE
Mr. Andress. Yes, sir. Thank you for the invitation to
speak. As the resource and requirements sponsor for UCLASS, it
is very satisfying to be here and see such strong advocacy for
one of our programs. I would say it is even beyond just the
advocacy for unmanned sea-based ISR and strike. It is a desire
for more. It is a desire for more weapons payload. It is a
desire for more unrefueled or lower unrefueled range. It is a
desire to add non-organic tanking to those requirements, and it
is a desire for greater stealth. All these are great
capabilities that we have captured and assessed through our
requirements review process over the last 4 years.
I am perhaps more appreciative of the subcommittee's desire
to look for answers that balance this demand for increased
growth on a program, which we can talk about tradeoffs in
performance and capabilities, but those tradeoffs in
performance and capabilities in and of themselves have to be
balanced by cost, schedule, and technical risk. I believe the
answer that we are seeking for is that the Navy, working with
the Joint Staff, have balanced not only the capabilities
tradeoff desired, but balanced these capabilities against the
cost, schedule, and technical risk we need to succeed.
As I go into the rest of my opening testimony, I want to
highlight that I am going to only be able in an open hearing to
talk to you about the process we use as we go through
requirements building, and I will be happy to come back and
talk to you more about specific threats, sensors, and others
that are rolled into the requirements capabilities.
Mr. Forbes. Mr. Andress, could I ask if you could suspend
your opening remarks for just 1 minute.
Mr. Courtney, do you have any questions that----
Mr. Courtney. I just found out my appointment just
cancelled.
Mr. Forbes. I am sorry. Mr. Courtney was going to have to
leave, and I wanted to make sure he got his questions.
Mr. Andress, I am sorry to interrupt you. Please go ahead.
Mr. Andress. No problem. So, as General Guastella has
pointed out, I am going to go into the requirements and how we
float the requirements from start to finish. I am going to talk
to you about the missions that those are trying to achieve, and
I am happy to follow up with more specifics on the threats and
the parameters that we are trying to target with UCLASS.
So UCLASS will be permissive ISR and strike in the near
term as we have prioritized getting this initial capability to
the fleet and operating off a carrier in a technically viable,
timely, and affordable manner. But the overall system must be
able to operate in a contested environment and support high-end
operations in the 2020s and beyond to pace the threats we
believe will be present as part of the larger carrier air wing.
I want to make sure that you understand the depth of
requirements analysis that has gone into this very high-level
requirements statement. The fundamental gap that the program is
bringing came from a capabilities-based assessment looking
across not only the future carrier air wing of 2025 and beyond,
but we also looked at the carrier air wing operating in a joint
environment. The gap that was most prevalent from running
multiple scenarios is persistent ISR and strike from the sea
base. That capabilities-based assessment led to what we call an
initial capabilities document. This document is endorsed by the
Joint Staff, and it specified a range of tactical scenarios in
which we will need this program to operate. These scenarios
have been reviewed and endorsed repeatedly over the last 3
years. They have not been static. They have been revisited not
only from the standpoint of the threat scenario. They have been
revisited with the Intelligence Community to look at what is
the evolving threats that it must face? What are the ranges?
What are the frequency bans? What are the distance we must be
at? So that has not been a static process. It has been a
recurring process leading up to this RFP.
The scenarios, and we call them design reference missions,
begin with permissive ISR and strike and then move into
contested ISR and strike against littoral threats. Think of
this as small boat threats to naval forces. Next is contested
ISR and strike against coastal land-based threats. Think of
this as coastal defense cruise missiles, other emerging
threats. And finally, anti-surface warfare scenarios. Think war
at sea against near-peer adversaries. These design reference
missions also include the need to both give and receive aerial
refueling.
These scenarios which are based on how the COCOMs
[combatant commands] intend to fight and win in the next
decade, drove the right balance of endurance, sensors, weapons,
and self-protection for UCLASS as a member of a carrier strike
group that in this timeframe will include Joint Strike Fighter,
E2D, and Growlers equipped with next-gen [generation] jammer
capabilities. The Navy made the decision to field these
capabilities in increments primarily based on cost, schedule,
and technical risk. Through extensive engagement with industry,
we believe the incremental approach can be achieved while
maintaining relevance against the threats to carrier air wing
in 2025 and beyond. Thank you.
[The joint prepared statement of Mr. Andress, Admiral
Grosklags, and General Guastella can be found in the Appendix
on page 101.]
Mr. Forbes. Mr. Courtney, I am going to yield to you in
case you have to leave. I appreciate you staying to ask your
questions.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your
courtesy again. That conflict evaporated. So I want to thank
the witnesses for your testimony.
Admiral, I think I counted the words ``modification,''
``enhancement'' and ``growth'' probably about four or five
times during your remarks and echoed in the other witnesses,
and that, as you may have heard from the prior panel, I mean,
was sort of a big focus of the discussion, which is just, you
know, some of the witnesses were sort of posing the next step
as almost this irrevocable decision. And, you know, I just
wonder if you could just sort of maybe talk about that a little
bit more about whether or not you think that the persistent
non-refueling priority is something that is going to lock us
into, you know, a system that can't sort of achieve sort of the
goals of strike capacity that I think everybody agrees would be
good for the country. So, again, I was wondering if you could
comment on that?
Admiral Grosklags. Yes, sir, and I will probably ask the
requirements officer, Mr. Andress, to tag in as well.
And we have been very, very careful as we have built the
request for proposals and flowed the requirements from the
capabilities description document or development document down
into a detailed specification to try and ensure that industry
understands that we need a solution that can grow to future
mission roles over time, should the Navy and the joint force
decide to implement those. It is technically achievable. We
have seen the designs that industry is likely to offer us
through the preliminary design review [PDR] process. That
report out of the PDR process that is required by NDAA
[National Defense Authorization Act] language from a couple of
years ago I believe you will see if not late this month, early
in August. It does certify that those PDRs were complete. They
were in accordance with the process. But the net result of
that, from our perspective, was along with 3 years of very
close observation of what industry can offer, we know that
there are technical solutions out there that provide us the
capability to grow to a more survivable--read low-observable--
platform if we decide to go down that path.
There are things that we need industry to bring on day one
in order to ensure that that is possible. We have seen that in
their designs already, so we are comfortable that we can get
there. We have also asked them to look at additional payload in
terms of weapons, and we have asked them or required them to
bring to us on day one additional capacity opportunity beyond,
and I don't want to go into too much detail of source selection
criteria, but additional capacity beyond the 1,000 pounds that
was talked about earlier. The threshold requirement remains
that 1,000 pounds on day one. That is our early operational
capability. It is also important to point out that the aircraft
is required to have two external 3,000-pound hard points which
can carry fuel for refueling other aircraft. They can carry
other weapons. They can carry other sensor pods for a variety
of missions. We are ensuring that all of these capabilities or
enhancements for growth capability are built in on day one. We
don't intend today to implement all of those because we don't
know where the requirements of the future will necessarily take
this platform, but we want to ensure that it is not a dead-end
solution for the carrier or for the joint force, that it is a
very adaptable solution that can be incrementally grown in
capability into the future, and we believe the requirements
support that and our acquisition strategy that industry will
see through the request for proposals reflects that as well.
Mr. Andress. I could add to that from the requirements. We
spent a lot of time in the analysis of alternatives looking
through unrefueled persistence. We analyzed 8-hour. We analyzed
10-,
12-, 14-hour, and 24-hour endurance models. We viewed these,
all the time we view these through those design reference
missions. It is against the targets they have to kill, where
the aircraft needs to be, how far it needs to be from the
carrier, et cetera. And we assessed that against mission
effectiveness, but we also looked at technical risk and cost.
And so while I will need to be able to come talk to you about 8
and 14 hours from the mission effectiveness in a more
classified setting, I can certainly talk to you in this setting
about cost, which was a huge driver in the AOA, and some of the
technical risks.
Twenty-four hours of endurance is, while the most cost-
efficient, introduced unacceptable technical risk to one of our
top performance criteria, which is carrier suitability. This is
mostly driven I think by wingspan, payloads, and things like
that. Eight hours endurance introduced by far the highest
lifecycle cost of all the alternatives by a margin of over four
to one. Fourteen hours, when you looked at the difference
between 8 and 14 hours from a development standpoint and
introduced negligible technical or cost risks, so the 14-hour
requirement facilitated the optimal balance to achieve two 24
by 7 orbits at 600 nautical miles from the carrier or one orbit
at 1,200 nautical miles from the carrier or a single strike
mission--that is an orbit, persistent, 1,200 miles--or a
single-strike mission at over 2,000 miles from the carrier. So
we are very comfortable with the unrefueled requirement as it
sits and that it doesn't limit our ability to grow to objective
requirements across the other balances of weapons,
survivability, et cetera.
Mr. Courtney. One other question. Again, obviously the
House has acted with the Defense Authorization Bill for 2015
and, again, had the additional review that was included in the
language. I mean, at this point the classified RFP is, I mean,
that is imminent. Right? Is the game plan pretty soon in terms
of when that is going out?
Admiral Grosklags. Yes, sir. In fact, the Defense
Acquisition Review Board that was planned to make the decision
for the release of that document was scheduled for next Monday.
The Deputy Secretary of Defense asked for a precursor meeting,
and because several of the principals were out of the country
this week, that meeting and the subsequent DAB were postponed
until next week. It is our expectation they will both happen
next week, and the RFP release would follow that second
meeting.
Mr. Courtney. I mean, at this point, if the law or the bill
passes as written by the House--I mean, there is assessment
requirement. I mean, is that something that you will just have
to--I mean, obviously, it is the law. But I mean, it doesn't
conflict necessarily with that RFP already having been
released. Right? You are just going to have to comply with it
as written.
Admiral Grosklags. No, sir, it does not conflict with
releasing the RFP.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you.
I yield back.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Mr. Courtney.
Admiral, I want to come back. Mr. Courtney was exactly
right. We heard three words, ``modification,'' ``enhancement,''
and ``growth,'' by everybody, but there was another word we
heard from everybody, too, which is ``affordability.'' Could
you help me with the definition of affordability, because that
seems like something you guys really want to get across,
affordability? Between an aircraft carrier and an LCS [Littoral
Combat Ship], which one is most affordable?
Admiral Grosklags. I am not sure I can crisply answer that
question.
Mr. Forbes. And the reason you can't answer it is because
it depends on the mission that you want to accomplish. Isn't
that true?
Admiral Grosklags. Absolutely, sir.
Mr. Forbes. So if you are looking at a UCLASS, we can get a
very cheap UCLASS platform if we just reduce down the
requirements. The key for us is making sure we get the right
mission that we want the UCLASS to accomplish. Is that a fair
statement?
Admiral Grosklags. Yes, sir, I think it is important that
we get the correct requirements upfront, and that is where this
program started, with the correct requirements.
Mr. Forbes. Can you help me with this part, too? You
indicated to us that this document was signed a year ago or
longer. Is that fair?
Admiral Grosklags. The capability development document, or
CDD, was signed in April of 2013 by the CNO. It is a Navy
document at this point.
Mr. Forbes. The reason I ask that is because we had
testimony by several individuals in our previous panel,
including Mr. O'Rourke, who we put a lot of credibility in as
kind of the historian that we look to for the CRS
[Congressional Research Service], who says that there have been
world events that have developed in the last year, including
China's actions, the Russians and Ukraine, that perhaps would
give a pause to look and see if the strategic look that we had
at this program a year ago might not have changed in the event
of world events. Do you think Mr. O'Rourke was wrong in his
analysis?
Admiral Grosklags. Not having seen his entire analysis, I
don't think he is incorrect in that we have an obligation,
frankly, to continue to look at our requirements over time to
see if they are, in fact, evolving or need to evolve to meet
any new threats.
Mr. Forbes. Would it be fair of this committee or
subcommittee if we were to simply say that we have had certain
events that have taken place in the last 12 months that have
dramatically changed some of the ways that we look at our
strategic goals around the world?
Admiral Grosklags. I would say that is correct. I would
also comment that we have continued to look at the--while they
have not changed--we continue to look at the requirements for
the UCLASS program. And, again, one of the key aspects is that
we are building in that ability to adapt this platform to
missions of the future, regardless of what they may be as long
as they fit in the earlier discussion that we had.
Mr. Forbes. And I want to address those. I want to also
then come back to what you just said. You don't fault this
subcommittee for saying that, based on those changes, since you
have just said that you need to continually be looking at those
requirements, you don't fault this subcommittee saying before
we pour the concrete and start heading down this very expensive
program, that we should perhaps measure twice and cut once to
make sure we get it wrong--right, and to make sure that the
Secretary of Defense has a second look at it?
Admiral Grosklags. Sir, I will let the requirements folks
talk to that specifically, but I believe we have measured at
least twice. We continue to measure, and in fact, over the last
weeks, the Joint Staff and the Navy have continued to look at
these requirements and, frankly, from my perspective, continue
to validate what we have.
Mr. Forbes. I am going to give you plenty of opportunity to
respond to that. First of all, I want you to know, I don't want
you to talk about anything that is classified, and we know we
have got all of that in our logistics. But we have heard the
previous panel talk about this 14-hour time period.
Mr. Andress, I think you just mentioned that, and you said
there was no technical risk or cost difference if we went from
8 hours to 14 hours. Did I understand that? Or marginal, maybe
your word was ``marginal.''
Mr. Andress. No. You misunderstood. The cost risk of going
from 14 to 8 is dramatic. It includes both cost from fuel, cost
from fuel burdens for tankers. It includes costs for additional
integration. Now, remember, you are an unmanned system, so now
you have to integrate the system that you will refuel with in
the unburdened tankers. All those now have to map to those
tankers.
Mr. Forbes. So the cost of having 8 hours versus 14 hours.
Mr. Andress. Is enormous.
Mr. Forbes. Much more expensive.
Mr. Andress. Dramatically. Like I said, it is more than
four times.
Mr. Forbes. So that is why you would like to lock into the
14 hour----
Mr. Andress. That is not the only reason, sir. Cost was one
factor, and we locked in the 14 hours at both threshold and
objective. It doesn't need to change to achieve our contested
high-end operations that we get at the objective requirement.
It does not need to be 8 hours refueled when combined with
those other capabilities, which are weapons, sensor, sensor
range detection, survivability, et cetera. So I highlighted
lifecycle cost because it drove a lot of the analysis of
alternatives as we look to where and when this thing needs to
operate in the dependencies.
Mr. Forbes. I think that is fair. Just like our LCS and
carrier example, it is much more expensive to operate a
carrier. Since we now have 14 hours that we are talking about,
and we can at least talk about that figure, would you also
agree that if you do lock into that 14 hours, that you have
significantly limited the amount of payload that you could
expand to at a foreseeable time given the platform that you
would have?
Mr. Andress. No, sir. We are not limited by the payload,
the growth in the platform as we go from threshold
requirements, permissive to the contested and high end.
Mr. Forbes. So then you would say that when we talked about
that 1,000-pound payload factor, you would say that is
inaccurate, that you could go much higher than that 1,000
pounds and still have that 14-hour endurance requirement?
Mr. Andress. Absolutely, sir, and that is specified in the
threshold to objective requirements that Admiral Grosklags has
testified we would be able to achieve.
Mr. Forbes. Ok, now let me ask you this. If you look at in
light of what I at least understand to have senior level
guidance about the growing need to project power despite A2/AD
challenges in the past four QDRs and in the Presidentially
approved Defense Strategic Guidance, why did the JROC change
UCLASS requirements away from the A2/AD last fall?
Mr. Andress. I am not aware that the JROC changed the
requirements away from it.
Mr. Forbes. Were the requirements changed? I am sorry. I
didn't mean to interrupt you.
General Guastella. Sir, the requirements have grown over
the 3 years. They have been looked at. Actually, the JROC, in
terms of your question before about measuring how many times,
the JROC has looked at the UCLASS requirements six times over
the last 3 years. Sir, most recently, the 4th of February it
was looked at again, so very recently, especially in light of
current events.
And like I mentioned before, sir, and as you have said, the
world is more dynamic now possibly than even when the platform
was first envisioned. The budget pressure, however, is more
acute than ever, and a trillion dollars over 10 years is what
we face. And so I think that the JROC is aware of that fiscal
reality and ensured that it has been able to make--been forced
to make performance and tradeoffs----
Mr. Forbes. And, General, that is my point. You need to
help us with what we need as what the mission should be because
we have also had the Navy come over here and say they want to
park 11 cruisers. And we said, We disagree with you. We have
had the Navy come over here and say, We don't want to do
another carrier. And we felt that was wrong. So when you tell
me that we looked at different requirements and we looked at
budget requirements, I am asking you the strategic requirements
because, as I understand it, one of--the previous panel would
just disagree with what you think the ultimate mission might be
for the UCLASS. They think that one of the most compelling
needs that we are going to have with this platform is to be an
integrated part of our carrier wing that can penetrate A2/AD
defenses. What I hear you saying is that it needs to be the
sophisticated ISR capability.
And so as I looked at the senior level guidance, we have
heard over and over again their need to project these same
kinds of A2/AD defenses. And so I guess my question is, not
just based on budget or fiscal restraints, but what is it that
caused you to change the ultimate mission goal that you had, or
did that change?
General Guastella. Sir, I think it is best to say that no
asset serves a single purpose. And almost every asset in DOD
serves the joint fight.
Mr. Forbes. Fair. What is the primary purpose? Would you
agree with me that I am making choices between a primary
purpose of an ISR capability or of a platform that is capable
of penetrating A2/AD defenses?
Mr. Andress. I will take it. I want to go back to the
questions about the strategic. And it is very important to note
that UCLASS, the CDD was signed last year by the CNO, and we
have looked at it again through the JROC just a few months ago.
The implications are that we have a shift from this post-Cold
War permissive only mentality and that UCLASS has missed that
in its requirements. And what I want to assure the committee is
that the design reference missions that I spoke of--spoke of,
follow, first--follow the Defense Strategic Guidance, speak to
both the permissive environment as a threshold capability but
have the requirements and objective capability which they will
grow to to get at the contested and supporting the high-end A2/
AD environment. Those were thought through, and the specific
locations where the threats, the surface-to-air missiles we
must face, the enabling factors to A2/AD were factored into the
mission performance that UCLASS needs to meet.
Strategically, your question was, where does UCLASS fit in
on that? The capabilities-based assessment says that UCLASS
provides ISR and strike at longer range from the carrier,
ranges I just spoke to, two orbits at 600 nautical miles, one
orbit at 1,200 nautical miles, and single strike missions at
2,000 nautical miles. That strategic mission hasn't changed.
The requirements have not changed. Our path to get there is
consistent and is balanced. The capabilities are balanced
against cost, schedule, and technical risk.
Mr. Forbes. So, Mr. Andress, can you provide us the
assurance that this RFP will create a platform that will meet
those threshold objectives?
Mr. Andress. Absolutely, yes, sir.
Mr. Forbes. What about the objective requirements?
Mr. Andress. Yes, sir. I think your question is, will the
RFP address threshold requirements, and will it enable a path
to objective requirements. Is that your question?
Mr. Forbes. No. Will it meet the objective requirements?
Mr. Andress. This RFP is not designed to meet the objective
requirements. It is not a part of our acquisition strategy, not
when you balance it against cost, schedule, and technical risk
of carrier suitability.
Mr. Forbes. Now, let me just ask you a couple final
questions. Is the Navy abandoning the precision landing system
developed and successfully tested during the UCAS-D effort for
the UCLASS program?
Admiral Grosklags. Sir, our long-term plan is to utilize
the Joint Precision Approach and Landing System [JPALS], which
is a separate Navy-run, Navy-managed program of record. A
couple of advantages in doing that: The first is the UCAS-D
precision landing system is a very proprietary system that was
designed specifically for this demo program. It would require
significant modifications to enable it to operate long term in
the carrier environment operationally.
Alternatively, with JPALS, what we get is a solution that
we are not only going to use for UCLASS but also for the Joint
Strike Fighter. A Joint Strike Fighter also requires a
precision landing system, and JPALS fits that need for both the
F-35Cs on board the aircraft carrier and the F-35Bs for the
Marine Corps on board our large-deck amphibs [amphibious
assault ships]. So that common program serves multiple
platforms for the Navy.
Mr. Forbes. Last question I will have for you. Could the
UCLASS air vehicle described in the draft RFP operate in the
South China Sea against the Chinese SAG [Surface Action Group]?
Mr. Andress. Our most stressing design reference mission
dealt with SAG capabilities, and I am happy to come by and show
you what that exactly entails, what that threat is, where that
threat is located.
Mr. Forbes. And when you do, could you also talk about the
Taiwan Strait and the Black Sea and how that would operate
there if you don't mind?
Mr. Andress. Yes, sir. I would be happy to do that.
Mr. Forbes. Mr. Courtney, did you have any follow-up
questions?
Mr. Courtney. Just a quick follow-up.
Mr. Andress, you mentioned again sort of some of the, I
don't know what the word is, constraints or just realities that
you have to kind of deal with in this whole process, and you
talked about technical risk being one of them. Again, the prior
panel, we had a little colloquy regarding the issue of
refueling. If you were going to lower the fuel amounts on
board, that obviously that would create an immediate
requirement to have tankers be able to do this. Again, that is
one of those technical, I don't know if the word is ``risk,''
but challenges. I mean, tankers aren't really doing that right
now in terms of refueling unmanned systems. Isn't that correct?
Mr. Andress. Not to my knowledge, no, sir.
Mr. Courtney. So, again, when people sort of talk about
well, let's lower the fuel capacity and that way we can add
more strike capability, and if you are going to do deep
strikes, it almost makes refueling, you know, mandatory. I
mean, that is a whole another set of challenges that you have
to deal with. Right? If you were trying to jump to that system
right away.
Mr. Andress. Yes, sir. It would be if we were trying to
jump. We would not necessarily--remember the sea base is always
mobile, and it is able to gain accesses that land bases do not
always give us the luxury to enjoy. So when we talk about a
threshold capability of 2,000 miles for a single-strike
mission, that is a significant strike unrefueled. So no fueling
requirement, no tanking along the way. That is significant. And
in the threshold capabilities is where you get into where that
strike mission--I mean, the objective capabilities that you run
against those missions get into how much more difficult that
strike mission would be. But at threshold on objective, we will
have unrefueled tanking to support a 2,000 nautical mile
strike.
Mr. Courtney. Right, pretty good range.
Did you want to comment, General?
General Guastella. Sir, if I could, an absolutely valid
question.
The JROC's approach is--if you look at it as a strike
asset, it falls into a family of strike assets. And so, if
there is very long-range targets, maybe that would be something
more suited to different assets.
And so what we will do is tailor targets that are
associated to the UCLASS's capability range to it and then
assess other targets to different platforms.
And together, though, as a family of systems, it is how we
feel we are best presenting a joint force for our country.
Mr. Courtney. I yield back.
Mr. Forbes. Well, General, in that regard, too, we have a
family of systems for ISR as well and a lot of other
capabilities that we are using for that.
And what we are looking at here is the Navy capability from
a carrier platform because the big concern we have is the A2/AD
defense is pushing our carriers out further and further.
So if we weren't worried about the Navy doing that, we
could rely on our bombers or whatever might be involved in that
family of assets.
Mr. Andress, just one last thing I want you to clarify
again. And I think you have done this, but I want to make sure.
You said that cost was a huge driver in the analysis of
alternatives. What alternatives did we take off the table
because of cost?
Mr. Andress. Sir, I spoke to the analysis of alternatives
of different endurance ranges, from 8, 14, to 24. We took 24
off the table as we did the analysis both on mission cost and
technical risk.
We then took off--as we went from the AOA, we saw that
those two were still viable. Then you started to look at--from
cost, it became the 8-hour mission as compared to mission
effectiveness, and we went with the 13.6 hours.
Mr. Forbes. So you didn't take off additional payload or
anything like that based on your cost analysis?
Mr. Andress. Could I take that for the record to make sure?
Mr. Forbes. Sure. If you could just bring that over when
we----
Mr. Andress. It is a complicated mix of tradeoff analysis.
I want to make sure I get you the right answer.
Mr. Forbes. And we can talk about that when we get into the
classified setting.
Mr. Andress. Absolutely.
Admiral Grosklags. Sir----
Mr. Forbes. Oh, please. Please.
Admiral Grosklags [continuing]. On that question, two other
things that were taken off the table because they were looked
at as part of that analysis of alternatives--and I believe they
were mentioned earlier--was the Fire Scout--that was looked at
as a potential solution for this mission requirement of ISR&T
from the carrier--as was Triton.
And those were taken off for obviously different reasons,
but the determination was neither one of them could meet this
requirement for something that supported the carrier, wherever
it happened to be around the world, real-time.
Mr. Forbes. Good.
I had promised all three of you that I would give you any
time you needed for a wrap-up. And so I want to offer you that
now.
And maybe, Admiral, if we could start with you and----
Admiral Grosklags. All right, sir. First, I want to clarify
something that was mentioned today just so we are crystal-
clear.
You had asked a question about 14 hours and, if we add
additional ordnance or mission systems to the aircraft, was
that 14 hours still achievable.
I think the answer to that is it depends. We will find out
from our vendors once we get the actual proposals back
whether--as we add additional weight to the aircraft, typically
that will reduce their endurance capability. We will find out
whether, with additional payload, they can still meet 14 hours.
But the specific requirement for the day-one capability--
and, again, this is the near-term day-one capability--is 14
hours unrefueled with a single laser JDAM [Joint Direct Attack
Munition]. That is the basic requirement to get out there,
perform the ISR&T mission with a precision strike capability.
We acknowledge in this specification, as they bring more
weapons to the table, just like any other aircraft, be that
manned or unmanned, that the endurance, the range, the
performance of the air vehicle will decline over time.
Mr. Forbes. But, Admiral, help me with that, then, because
I--you know, I just want to make that clear. And thank you for
clarifying that.
Because I thought it was your statement--not yours, but
maybe Mr. Andress'--that you could add that additional payload
and continue to have that 14 hours.
And you are not saying you couldn't do it. What you are
saying is you will have to check to see if you could do it. Is
that a fair statement?
Admiral Grosklags. Yes, sir. I just wanted to make sure you
were clear on that.
Mr. Forbes. No, because that does help me.
Because if, in fact, the previous panel was correct in
saying that they didn't believe you could do that and if, in
fact, when you come back, your conclusion is we could not
increase that 1,000-pound payload and continue with the 14
hours, then it becomes very important for us to ask what are we
taking off the table by not being able to use more than 1,000
pounds of payload.
And if I could just ask one more thing. I am going to let
you respond all you want.
Because the previous panel would suggest that there are a
lot of those targets that Mr. Andress was talking about that
you cannot handle with 1,000 pounds of payload.
So now please clarify for me to make sure I am not missing
any of those points.
Admiral Grosklags. No, sir. You are accurate.
And as the mission roles of this aircraft develop over
time, what we are trying to ensure is the operational
commander, whether that be the carrier strike group commander
or a COCOM or a joint force commander in the area of
operations, has the flexibility to make that decision: Do I
want this 14-hour aircraft with a precision strike capability,
albeit somewhat limited, or am I willing to give up a little
bit of that endurance for a particular mission where I want to
carry more ordnance or I want to carry a different sensor
package or I might want to take additional fuel on my external
hard points?
Those decisions, long term, we want to leave to the
operational commanders. So we are trying to build an air
vehicle that is adaptable to that situation.
I mean, I heard some earlier comments about an 8- to 10-
hour aircraft that could carry 4,000 pounds and could not be
seen by anybody. And, frankly, that doesn't exist. It does not
exist, and it is not technically achievable today.
We have looked at the tradeoffs very, very carefully
between all the mission roles, all the mission capability,
weapons, low observability, endurance, cost, manpower to
sustain: How does it fit on the carrier? How does it blend in
with the rest of the carrier strike group? How does it blend in
with the joint forces, as the general mentioned? And the 14
hours for that particular mission set at EOC [early operational
capability] was really the sweet spot. We melded all those
things together.
Mr. Forbes. And, Admiral, as you come back to us--and I
don't expect you to have the answers today--it is night and day
difference between what you said and what I maybe misunderstood
from Mr. Andress, in that, if we are, in fact, saying that, if
we lock into a requirement of 14 hours, we don't know for sure
if we can increase this 1,000-pound payload--I am just--I am
sorry. Go ahead.
Admiral Grosklags. Yeah. I just want to be clear.
When we write requirements for any aircraft or, frankly,
any system, we will have a baseline requirement that we can
test them to. Okay?
So the baseline requirement for the fielding of this
aircraft is to be able to comply with that 14-hour endurance
requirement, the orbits that Mr. Andress talked about with a
defined payload.
If we or the operational commander in the future chooses to
change that mission payload, then we don't hold industry to
provide us an aircraft that continues to meet all the other
parameters that are encompassed in that baseline capability. We
have to have something to measure them against initially, and
that is what that 14 hours is.
Mr. Forbes. And I understand that, and I appreciate that.
I guess what I am trying to also say is that what the
previous panel, I thought, was indicating to us is it might be
more important for you to be able to have that increased
payload as opposed to that endurance if, in fact, your goal is
penetrating those A2/AD defenses.
And one of the things they would at least suggest is that
you can't just come back and modify this platform quite as easy
as it is being represented to be able to do.
In other words, it is not some modular thing that a
commander in the field just says, ``Okay. Today I would rather
have 8 hours.'' You see what I am saying?
Admiral Grosklags. Yes, sir. It is not that simple.
We know that when--based on the design solutions we have
seen to date, we know that industry will be able to bring us
something that has a greater weapons payload than what is in
that initial requirement.
We also know and have been clear with the industry that, if
they bring us that additional weapons payload, in that
operational context, they will not be required to meet the 14-
hour endurance requirement.
Mr. Forbes. And, if I could--again, I appreciate your
clarification--that is the essence of what we have been saying.
If we lock into a requirement on this 14-hour provision
because of affordability, because of whatever we are looking
at, we just want to make certain that we are not going down a
route that is going to take other options off the table which
could be incredibly important, if, in fact, you view this
UCLASS as important not just for ISR, but for penetrating an
A2/AD defense.
And if you also say, for it to do that successfully, it has
got to carry more than a 1,000-pound payload, then we are
starting off in the wrong place at the beginning. And that is
just what our concern is, and maybe that is a discussion we
have to have in a classified session.
Admiral Grosklags. I think part of it would be easier in a
classified setting.
However, as we discussed earlier, we have seen through the
preliminary design reviews that industry has design solutions
that cannot only enable us to grow to a more mission-effective
capability in terms of low observability without major
modifications to the airframe that we are going to see on day
one, we also have seen the capability to carry additional
weapons in those same designs.
So, again, the 14-hour requirement is for that early
operational capability single mission. That does not constrain
us specifically from adding additional weapons capability to
the aircraft. And, in fact, we have seen designs that carry
considerably more than that 1,000 pounds. But we will not hold
the providers of that to 14 hours with those additional
weapons.
So, again, it gives us the flexibility in the future to
decide, ``Yes. We want to carry more weapons on a particular
mission.'' We have to go through, you know, the process for
certification for those weapons. So it will take a little bit
of time, not day one. But it gives us that flexibility in the
future to go there.
Mr. Forbes. Okay. And thank you, Admiral.
Mr. Andress.
Mr. Andress. Yeah. I just wanted to build on that, and
maybe I can offer some clarity.
Our threshold requirements for the 1,000 pounds and 14
hours and that has to be tested against, it doesn't change as
we go from threshold to objective requirements. The
requirements remain 14 hours endurance. The requirement for
weapons grows beyond--it goes to greater than 1,000 pounds.
I think what Admiral Grosklags was pointing out that hasn't
really been highlighted is, even at threshold requirements,
this thing is going to have 1,000 pounds internal carriage and
two hard points with 3,000 pounds.
So if the commander makes the decision to strap 3,000
pounds of weapons on the outside and the 1,000 pounds of
internal carriage, you wouldn't expect it to still test to the
14-hour requirement. Does that make sense?
Mr. Forbes. Yes, sir. It does.
Mr. Andress. I just wanted to make sure that was very
clear.
Mr. Forbes. It does.
Mr. Andress. And I think it will be very helpful for you
when we show you the specific design reference missions at
threshold and at objective that we need to achieve.
Mr. Forbes. I think it would. Thank you, Mr. Andress.
General, any?
General Guastella. Sir, I appreciate the opportunity to
testify today and realize it is an unclassified forum and it is
difficult to present some of the analysis that JROC uses and
how the UCLASS fits into that joint portfolio, but happy to
come back if you have additional questions, sir.
Mr. Forbes. Good.
Well, gentlemen, thank you so much for your patience and
for being here to help us. We thank you for your service to our
country. And we look forward to getting together again in that
classified session to be able to talk further about it.
And, with that, Mr. Courtney, if you don't have anything
else, then we are adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 5:45 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
July 16, 2014
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
July 16, 2014
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[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
July 16, 2014
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. HUNTER
Mr. Hunter. How does this platform fit into current or anticipated
operational plans? Specifically, which mission is it most important
that this platform be capable of performing? Are we seeking UCLASS to
be a naval force multiplier or focused for deep strike?
Admiral Grosklags. Persistent sea-based Intelligence, Surveillance,
Reconnaissance, and Targeting (ISR&T) with precision strike is the most
critical gap that UCLASS will fill. This was reinforced in a combined
USAFRICOM, USCENTCOM and USSOCOM Joint Emergent Operational Need
(JEON), in which UCLASS was deemed a suitable solution. UCLASS will
fully integrate with the Carrier Air Wing to support a myriad of
missions from permissive counter-terrorism operations to missions in
low-end contested environments, to providing enabling capabilities for
high-end denied operations, as well as supporting organic naval
missions. The UCLASS initial Concept of Operations (CONOPS) includes
long dwell surveillance and targeting for extended range weapons, and
precision strike against time sensitive targets.
Mr. Hunter. What sort of ordnance do you see a strike oriented
solution carrying? What types of targets do you envision it striking?
Are these missions already within the F/A-18 or F-35C capability? How
would a strike oriented UCLASS compliment or overlap with capabilities
offered by those platforms?
Admiral Grosklags. Given the projected speed of UCLASS and most
probable target sets, the weapons most valued by fleet requirements are
the 500-pound class Laser Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM) and the
upgraded Small Diameter Bomb (SDB II). The internal weapons capacity
requirement of greater than 1000 pounds of ordnance at threshold was
determined to address specific classified scenarios and compliments the
Carrier Air Wing capability. An objective growth criteria for 2,000
pounds of LJDAMs and/or SDBIIs is also specified. Additionally, the
UCLASS Air Vehicle will have a minimum of two external hard-points each
provisioned to carry 3,000 pounds, suitable for most weapons currently
employed by the Carrier Air Wing.
Mr. Hunter. Do UCLASS budget estimates provided to Congress this
year envision a low-cost, affordable acquisition strategy or do they
envision development of a presumably more expensive, highly stealthy
platform?
Admiral Grosklags. The UCLASS budget profile, as outlined in the
President's Budget for FY 2015, provides adequate funding to achieve
the Early Operational Capability with growth capabilities outlined in
the current acquisition strategy. Affordability is a key component of
the UCLASS acquisition strategy.
Mr. Hunter. What is your specific endurance requirement for UCLASS?
Can you have it all--long endurance and high stealth--or is there a
tradeoff? What considerations need to be weighed between a 14 hour
endurance solution with little or no strike capability and a 10 hour
endurance solution with significant strike capability?
Admiral Grosklags. The endurance requirement, as part of the
Persistence Key Performance Parameter, is to provide two unrefueled
orbits (24/7 coverage) at a radius of 600 nm from the aircraft carrier,
or one unrefueled orbit at 1200 nm per UCLASS system, or for each air
vehicle to fly an unrefueled maximum range profile (out and back) to
2000 nm to perform strike missions.
The designs of aircraft which can meet the UCLASS requirements are
driven by unrefueled endurance/range; senor payload weight/volume;
weapons payload; low-observable characteristics; in-flight refueling
provisions for both fuel give and receive; and, as important as any of
the preceding, the constraints of operating from an aircraft carrier
including consideration of such things as structural loads for launch/
recovery, landing area (width), and deck spotting factor. Even with all
of the above design constraints, through two years of close engagement
with industry, the DoN is very confident that affordable UCLASS
aircraft with 14 hours of unrefueled endurance and a high degree of low
observability are possible and will be proposed by industry in response
to our forthcoming request for proposals.
A 14 hour endurance UCLASS will be able to carry 1000 to 2000
pounds of internal weapons. One thousand pounds is the minimum
requirement and the potential to attain 2000 pounds at EOC will be
determined by specific vender proposals. This payload is sufficient to
meet mission requirements as defined in the UCLASS Design Reference
Missions. In addition the UCLASS will have a minimum of two 3000 pound
external hard-points capable of handling the majority of weapons in the
current CVW inventory.
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN
Mr. Langevin. Looking at the vast array of ISR assets available to
a carrier strike group commander--space, airborne both from land and
sea, and undersea--what would be the ``secret sauce'' that an ISR-
centric, 14-hour UCLASS would bring that an 8-10 hour UCLASS could not?
Mr. O'Rourke. In preparation for the hearing, I received briefings
on the UCLASS program from the Navy and from each of the four firms
that are currently competing for the program. The Navy stated that its
analysis of alternatives (AOA) for the UCLASS program concluded that an
8-hour UCLASS would have effectiveness comparable to a 14-hour UCLASS
in three of the four tactical situations that were examined in the AOA,
and somewhat less effectiveness than a 14-hour UCLASS in one of the
four tactical situations. The Navy stated that the AOA concluded that
an 8-hour UCLASS would have a higher life-cycle cost than a 14-hour
UCLASS. Life-cycle cost, the Navy stated, included development,
production, and operation and support (O&S) costs. Based on the
briefings I received from industry, my sense is that some in industry
might agree (or at least not disagree) with these findings, while
others might disagree or argue that the AOA did not examine the right
set of tactical situations. In my prepared statement for the hearing, I
stated that:
The specific tactical situations that were examined in the UCLASS
AOA are related to the program's current operational requirements.
Assessing alternative operational requirements for the UCLASS program
could involve examining potential outcomes in other tactical situations
that may not have been considered in the AOA. A broader analysis might
examine how changes in UCLASS operational requirements might affect
estimated outcomes in campaign-level, force-on-force situations, rather
than in specific tactical situations. (Statement of Ronald O'Rourke,
Specialist in Naval Affairs, Congressional Research Service, Before the
House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection
Forces, on Unmanned Carrier-Launched Airborne Surveillance and Strike
(UCLASS) Requirements Assessment, July 16, 2014, pp. 5-6.)
Mr. Langevin. Looking at the vast array of ISR assets available to
a carrier strike group commander--space, airborne both from land and
sea, and undersea--what would be the ``secret sauce'' that an ISR-
centric, 14-hour UCLASS would bring that an 8-10 hour UCLASS could not?
Mr. Martinage. The short answer is that there is no ``secret
sauce'' that a 14-hour UCLASS would bring that an 8-10 hour UCLASS with
significantly enhanced survivability and strike capacity could not. The
Navy's rationale for 14 hours of unrefueled endurance centers on its
stated requirement for 24-hour intelligence, surveillance and
reconnaissance (ISR) support of--or ``maritime domain awareness''
around--the carrier strike group (CSG). Putting aside survivability and
strike capacity issues and looking narrowly at just the MDA mission
(which, I would argue, is the central problem with UCLASS
requirements), the only ``advantage'' conferred by 14 hours of
unrefueled endurance is the ability to bridge the closed or
``overnight'' period of the canonical 12 hour ``deck day'' without
land-based airborne tanker support.
If the deck day were extended by three to four hours, or if
aircraft were arranged on the flight deck at the close of normal air
operations to support one or two overnight recoveries, then this so-
called advantage vanishes. Of course, if land-based aerial refueling is
available, which is axiomatically true during joint combat operations,
the 8-10 hour air vehicle could be ``tanked'' during the night rather
than recover to the carrier. It is essential to note that if the
carrier is supporting power projection operations in anti-access
environments anticipated in the 2020s, which is when UCLASS would
field, it would likely be standing off some 1,000-1,500 nautical miles
(or more) from an adversary's coast. In which case, the only practical
way to sustain persistent ISR-strike operations would be to refuel
UCLASS inflight from Air Force tankers operating several hundred miles
closer to the battlespace, just outside the range of adversary air
interceptors and surface-to-air missiles. A non-refuelable UCLASS, even
one with 14 hours unrefueled endurance, would offer marginal utility in
such scenarios.
Equally important to note is that the Navy already has two other
UAS programs of record underway that will yield overlapping, multi-
tiered (strategic- and tactical-level) persistent MDA in support of CSG
operations. Indeed, the MQ-4C Triton, a marinized version of the Air
Force's RQ-4 Global Hawk strategic surveillance UAS with over 30 hours
unrefueled endurance, was designed expressly for the ``broad area
maritime surveillance'' mission (hence, its previous ``BAMS'' moniker).
And while the Navy is currently planning to acquire some 68 Tritons, it
would take just three of these aircraft (two operational, one spare) to
sustain 24-hour MDA in support of a CSG. Triton is complemented in the
MDA domain by the MQ-8C Fire Scout, an unmanned helicopter with over 12
hours unrefueled endurance capable of operating from any air-capable
surface combatant (e.g., carriers, destroyers, cruisers, littoral
combat ships). Together, Triton and Fire Scout will arguably generate a
surfeit of MDA capacity over the near-term. Thus, it makes little sense
for the MDA mission--much less the readily dispelled notion of an MDA
``capability gap''--to drive UCLASS requirements.
The more important issue this question raises is the opportunity
cost of that 14-hour endurance in terms of reduced payload capacity and
flexibility, survivability, and growth potential. The cost of 14 hours
of unrefueled endurance is most likely about 1,000-3,000 lbs of weapons
(or other mission payloads), the inability to carry stand-off weapons
both currently in the inventory and in development, and a significant
increase in presented radar cross section at relevant threat
frequencies.
Mr. Langevin. Looking at the vast array of ISR assets available to
a carrier strike group commander--space, airborne both from land and
sea, and undersea--what would be the ``secret sauce'' that an ISR-
centric, 14-hour UCLASS would bring that an 8-10 hour UCLASS could not?
Mr. Brimley. The short answer is, no secret sauce would be provided
from an ISR-centric, 14-hour UCLASS. As discussed during the hearing,
the types of permanent design decisions that would be required to field
a 14-hour UCLASS would preclude the kind of payload and limited stealth
that would be required to provide a meaningful increase to the striking
power of the carrier air wing. As I described during the hearing, I am
not a former naval officer and I am not an aircraft design expert--when
I engage in a requirements discussion my perspective is that of a
civilian defense strategist. That is to say, I concern myself with
several threshold questions, including:
1. Will the platform provide a future Commander-in-Chief better
military options during a crisis? 2. Will it help address pressing gaps
in U.S. defense strategy and planning? 3. Does it enable forward U.S.
forces to present a stronger conventional deterrent and, if necessary,
help ensure U.S. forces can defeat a plausible adversary? 4. Will the
program help underwrite the confidence of our allies and partners? 5.
Does it reflect measured judgments regarding mid- to long-term
requirements for U.S. defense? 6. And finally, does the program help
ensure America's military-technical dominance in an increasingly
competitive environment?
I don't think a very limited system designed to provide ISR to the
carrier meaningfully addresses any of the above questions. Far and away
the most pressing challenge facing the U.S. Navy is finding ways to
project and sustain combat power in the face of adversary ballistic and
cruise missile technology that could hold at risk our aircraft carriers
well beyond the unrefueled range of their strike aircraft. The original
requirements for an unmanned combat aerial vehicle (UCAV) date back to
the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review. I believe the original conception
of harnessing the unmanned revolution to provide an asymmetric and
disruptive capability that would ensure the combat relevance of the
carrier air wing to a plausible high-end challenge were correct. We
need a system that has broadband, all-aspect stealth, is capable of
automated aerial refueling, with an integrated surveillance and strike
capability. My argument is that these original requirements were
largely correct, and the recent deviations from this to a more limited
ISR role reportedly described in the draft UCLASS RFP are not wise
given the projected security environment.
Finally, as we talked about during the hearing, it is not as if
several of my colleagues and I were arguing for a capability that is
well outside the realm of the possible. We all observed the multiple
recent successful tests of the Navy's X-47B, a stealthy flying wing
design that will likely succeed in air-to-air refueling tests as well.
I am confident that we can build and field the kind of system that the
Navy will need to give a future Commander-in-Chief real deterrent and
carrier-based strike options that I believe he or she will need in the
years ahead.
Mr. Langevin. Looking at the vast array of ISR assets available to
a carrier strike group commander--space, airborne both from land and
sea, and undersea--what would be the ``secret sauce'' that an ISR-
centric, 14-hour UCLASS would bring that an 8-10 hour UCLASS could not?
Mr. McGrath. Thank you, Representative Langevin, for your
continuing interest in this matter and for this excellent question.
You correctly list a number of ISR sensors to which a Strike Group
Commander has access. The array is considerable, and in some respects,
overlapping. To the extent that there is any ``secret sauce''
available, it all revolves around the question of ``who controls the
asset?'' If the CSG Commander had a 14 hour ISR privileged UCLASS at
his disposal and UNDER HIS COMMAND, it gives him additional operational
flexibility versus assets ``owned and operated'' by some other
commander. Under current Command and Control (C2) schemes, the CSG
Commander must request assets from others to fill this mission, and
this is something no commander enjoys. Having instant and untrammeled
control of a capability is always better than ``access'' to someone
else's asset.
This said, the CSG Commander relies on others to provide him with a
lot of capabilities. He does not own the P-8's or MQ-4's that provide
him with support. He does not own satellite assets that give him
support. He often relies on inorganic tanking from USAF refueling
assets. The point is, the aircraft carrier deck is already a crowded
place, so taking up valuable real estate simply to provide the CSG
Commander with an asset solely under his control--the opportunity cost
of which is moving more slowly and ineffectively to combat capability
in a contested environment--seems imprudent when there are a plethora
of other ways to get the desired information to the Strike Group.
Mr. Langevin. Why is air-to-air refueling not a threshold
requirement? What effect would having the ability to refuel have on the
requirement--for instance, would the endurance requirement come down in
a CONOPS where a UCLASS platform was able to refuel after takeoff, like
current manned missions?
Admiral Grosklags. The UCLASS Air Vehicle will be required to be
provisioned for aerial refueling at threshold. All vendors are required
to meet the requirements set forth in the Persistence KPP which call
for two 600 nm 24/7 orbits or one 1200 nm 24/7 orbit or one 2000nm
strike; all of which must be conducted unrefueled. Due to the
compressed test and evaluation period and requirements outlined in the
affordability Key Performance Parameter, aerial refueling, which
includes both giving and receiving fuel, would not be achievable by the
2020 Early Operational Capability (EOC) deployment and will be
implemented in the future based on Fleet requirements/demand. Complete
implementation of aerial refueling at threshold would not affect
current threshold endurance requirements. Additionally, including air-
to-air refueling at threshold would add technical difficulty and cost
to the development process making the program unaffordable. The tanker
fleet would also require additional development and test, adding cost
and time to the program.
Mr. Langevin. I'm sure each of you are aware of the public reports
of several nations developing advanced radar systems and radar networks
specifically designed to defeat low-observable platforms. Given the
pace of development and the proliferation of air defense radar systems
in the past, how confident are you that the levels of low-observability
across key frequencies that the Navy is planning to require would be
sufficient for UCLASS to conduct the full range of envisioned missions
through the life of the platform?
Admiral Grosklags. When developing the Air Vehicle survivability
specifications, a broad range of current and future threat systems were
evaluated. This assessment looked at a full range of scenarios
including shore based and maritime A2AD threats. The Early Operational
Requirement threshold capabilities, future growth, requirements, and
objective criteria were based on this assessment and the Concept of
Operations which utilizes UCLASS as part of a fully integrated Carrier
Air Wing/Carrier Strike Group.
Mr. Langevin. Can you give us an example of a mission that a 14-
hour endurance UCLASS could accomplish that a 8-10 hour vehicle or
other assets, whether sea, air, or space, could not?
General Guastella. Persistence is a key attribute for the Unmanned
Carrier Launched Airborne Surveillance and Strike (UCLASS) system.
Based on extensive endurance and aerial refueling analyses, a 14-hour
vehicle is the most cost effective approach to meet operational
requirements. UCLASS must integrate into the standard carrier (CVN)
flight cycle, and while an air vehicle with 8-10 hour endurance may
have the same surveillance and strike capabilities, the shorter
endurance will require costly aerial refueling to integrate into CVN
operations. Avoiding the reliance on aerial refueling provides a cost
advantage and reduced operational risk. A 14-hour unrefueled endurance
allows 24-hour coverage within a standard fly day and the greater
persistence and range translate to greater operational flexibility for
the Carrier Strike Group and operational commanders.
Mr. Langevin. Why was 1,000 pounds chosen as a threshold strike
capability? What does that translate to as far as weapons capabilities,
including standoff weapons? How does the weight relate to volume
requirements? And what requirement is this strike capability designed
to address?
General Guastella. The Unmanned Carrier Launched Airborne
Surveillance and Strike (UCLASS) Analysis of Alternatives (AOA)
examined several performance recommendations that drove the development
of the Key Performance Parameters (KPPs) outlined in the draft
Capabilities Development Document (CDD). The internal weapons capacity
of > 1000 pounds at threshold was determined by several factors
including endurance, survivability, carrier integration and, most
importantly, targets serviced. Based on this analysis, UCLASS'
precision strike capability will be designed to address specific
classified scenarios for both today's missions and future threats. In
these scenarios, the 500-pound class Laser Joint Direct Attack
Munitions (LJDAM) and the upgraded Small Diameter Bomb (SDB II) are the
weapons of choice. Each of these weapons enhance ``maneuverability''
when employed against a moving target like a ship or vehicle, and SDBII
provides a significant standoff capability. The threshold requirement
of 1000 lbs internal, with objective growth approaching 2000 lbs allows
for 2-4 LJDAM or 4-8 SDBIIs. This number of weapons provides sufficient
precision strike capability to service the target sets outlined in the
AOA. Additionally, the UCLASS air vehicle is planned to have at least
two external hard-points, provisioned for additional 3000 lbs of
carriage each, to carry a majority of the weapons currently employed by
the Carrier Air Wing.
Mr. Langevin. I'm sure each of you are aware of the public reports
of several nations developing advanced radar systems and radar networks
specifically designed to defeat low-observable platforms. Given the
pace of development and the proliferation of air defense radar systems
in the past, how confident are you that the levels of low-observability
across key frequencies that the Navy is planning to require would be
sufficient for UCLASS to conduct the full range of envisioned missions
through the life of the platform?
General Guastella. We are confident that the Joint Requirements
Oversight Council (JROC) survivability requirements for the Unmanned
Carrier Launched Airborne Surveillance and Strike (UCLASS) program are
sufficient. The Joint unmanned aerial system portfolio includes systems
with various levels of performance, survivability, basing options and
missions. The UCLASS will play a key role in providing carrier-based,
persistent intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and precision
strike capability within this portfolio.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LARSEN
Mr. Larsen. To what degree have you reviewed the Navy's UCLASS
draft RFP and classified addenda? Are there aspects of the Navy defined
survivability requirement or other requirements you find insufficient
and why?
Mr. Martinage. I reviewed earlier drafts of these materials while
serving in the Department of the Navy. Questions about survivability
cannot be adequately addressed at the unclassified level.
Mr. Larsen. Since the Navy and OSD/Joint Staff vetted the UCLASS
requirements, has additional information come to light to warrant a
change to those requirements at this stage of the acquisition process?
Mr. Martinage. Countering emerging anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD)
challenges was OSD's original motivation for both starting Navy UCAS/
UCAS-D in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), and for providing
the additional $2 billion in the FY11 Program and Budget Review. The
need for a longer range, survivable, carrier-based air vehicle for ISR
and strike in contested airspace was articulated throughout the 2010
QDR and affirmed in testimony to Congress on several occasions by
senior Navy official in 2010 and 2011.
The current key performance parameters (KPPs) emerged from a highly
contentious--and still unsettled--debate with DOD over the past two
years. Among the competing schools of thought are those who seek a
lower-end, carrier-based UAS optimized for counter-terrorism missions
as a hedge against the potential loss of land-bases for armed UAVs such
as the MQ-1 Predator and MQ-9 Reaper; those that believe a capability-
gap exists with respect to maritime domain awareness (MDA) around the
carrier strike group (CSG); those that are willing to dilute UCLASS
requirements to reduce bureaucratic and cultural resistance within the
naval aviation community to ``get something'' onto the carrier deck;
and those, like myself, that fervently believe that a stealthy, air-
refuelable ISR-strike UAS is needed to maintain the operational
relevance of the carrier air wing in the face of emerging A2/AD
threats. The latter would offer ``pan-conflict spectrum utility,''
meaning that it would be equally capable of the counter-terrorism, MDA,
and counter-A2/AD power projection missions.
What has changed since this debate was first joined is a growing
awareness within DOD and the national security community of the
probable scale, scope, and pace of the unfolding A2/AD challenge.
Meanwhile, the feared loss of land bases to support counter-terrorism
operations in the Middle East, Central Asia, and Africa has not
materialized and there are no signs that it will. While it is difficult
to say whether counter-terrorism will be as prominent in the mid-2020s
when UCLASS is scheduled to field as today, current trends suggest that
the U.S. military will retain a wide range of options for basing long-
range UAVs such as the extended-range MQ-9 Reaper and RQ-4 Global Hawk.
In contrast, threats to the aircraft carrier and its embarked aircraft
are clearly intensifying.
Although several countries around the world are fielding A2/AD
capabilities, the pacing threat is China. In its most recent Annual
Report to Congress on Military and Security Developments involving the
People's Republic of China, DOD highlights myriad threats to the
aircraft carrier including air-, sea-, and submarine-launched anti-ship
cruise missiles; wake-homing torpedoes from a growing and increasingly
capable submarine fleet; and long-range, anti-ship ballistic missiles
(ASBMs). It states:
China is fielding a limited but growing number of
conventionally armed, medium-range ballistic missiles,
including the DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM). The
DF-21D is based on a variant of the DF-21 (CSS-5) medium-range
ballistic missile (MRBM) and gives the PLA the capability to
attack large ships, including aircraft carriers, in the western
Pacific Ocean. The DF-21D has a range exceeding 1,500 km and is
armed with a maneuverable warhead. (pp. 5-6.)
In addition to the carrier being potentially pushed well outside
the unrefueled combat radius of its embarked fighters, the F-18E/F and
F-35C will also confront increasingly deadly land- and sea-based
integrated air defenses (IADS). Not only are modern IADS diffusing
widely around the globe, they are also growing more lethal owing to
several synergistic trends: more sensitive radars operating over wider
frequency bands, increased resistance to electronic attack (e.g.,
jamming and spoofing), increased interceptor range, more advanced
signal processing, and high-speed networking. Variants of the Russian-
made S-300 (SA-10/20), for example, are already in service in about a
dozen countries, including Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus,
Bulgaria, China, Slovakia, and Venezuela. Both Iran and Syria have
repeatedly attempted to procure the S-300 from Russia. China has
already fielded a dense, networked IADS. As the most recent Annual
Report to Congress on Military and Security Developments involving the
People's Republic of China states:
China's ground-based air defense A2/AD capabilities will
likely be focused on countering long-range airborne strike
platforms with increasing numbers of advanced, long-range SAMs.
China's current air and air defense A2/AD components include a
combination of advanced long-range SAMs--its indigenous HQ-9
and Russian SA-10 and SA-20 PMU1/PMU2, which have the
advertised capability to protect against both aircraft and low-
flying cruise missiles. China continues to pursue the
acquisition of the Russian extremely long-range S-400 SAM
system (400 km), and is also expected to continue research and
development to extend the range of the domestic HQ-9 SAM to
beyond 200km. (p. 35)
Prospective adversaries are also investing in more capable air
superiority fighters, outfitted with modern sensor systems and armed
with beyond-visual-range (BVR) air-to-air missiles. These aircraft can
be vectored--in some cases, in large numbers--to intercept U.S.
aircraft based on rough targeting tracks developed by ground-based
early warning radars. U.S. tanker aircraft will need to honor both the
unrefueled radius of adversary fighters, and also the range of their
BVR missiles, when establishing aerial refueling ``tracks'' (rendezvous
points) for penetrating U.S. aircraft. Against a nation such as China,
which has a growing force of air interceptors with unrefueled radii
between 600-900 nautical miles, this would require U.S. tankers to
stand off as much as 750-1,000 nautical miles. It is critical to note
that this standoff distance exceeds the unrefueled radii of the F/A-
18E/F, F-22 and F-35A/B/C; and thus, would effectively preclude a
penetrating offensive role for the entire U.S. fighter force. No fact
more vividly underscores the need to shift emphasis within the attack
capability area from short-range, manned fighter aircraft to
penetrating, long-range, manned and unmanned ISR-strike systems.
Responding to this growing appreciation of the intensifying A2/AD
threat around the world, the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) stressed
the need to improve U.S. power projection capability in contested
environments. Consider the following excerpts from the QDR:
In the coming years, countries such as China will continue
seeking to counter U.S. strengths using anti-access and area-
denial (A2/AD) approaches and by employing other new cyber and
space control technologies. Additionally, these and other
states continue to develop sophisticated integrated air
defenses that can restrict access and freedom of maneuver in
waters and airspace beyond territorial limits. Growing numbers
of accurate conventional ballistic and cruise missile threats
represent an additional, cost-imposing challenge to U.S. and
partner naval forces and land installations. (pp. 6-7)
As the Department rebalances toward greater emphasis on full-
spectrum operations, maintaining superior power projection
capabilities will continue to be central to the credibility of
our Nation's overall security strategy. (p. 19)
The Department's investments in combat aircraft, including
fighters and long-range strike, survivable persistent
surveillance, resilient architectures, and undersea warfare
will increase the Joint Force's ability to counter A2/AD
challenges. (p. 36)
This recognition of the need to adapt U.S. power projection
capabilities to address current and emerging A2/AD challenges was re-
affirmed recently in the independent review of the QDR conducted by
National Defense Panel created by Congress. That panel, chaired by
William Perry and John Abizaid, unanimously concluded that:
We believe it is also critical to ensure that U.S. maritime
power projection capabilities are buttressed by acquiring
longer-range strike capability--again, manned or unmanned (but
preferably stealthy)--that can operate from U.S. aircraft
carriers or other appropriate mobile maritime platforms to
ensure precise, controllable, and lethal strike with greater
survivability against increasingly long-range and precise anti-
ship cruise and ballistic missiles. (p. 43.)
To conclude, the current UCLASS requirements as endorsed by the
Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) appear increasingly
misaligned with DOD's own threat assessment and articulation of the
Nation's overall security strategy in the QDR (as well as in the
Defense Strategic Guidance previously approved by the President).
As I stated in my testimony, an assessment of UCLASS requirements
should begin with a very simple question: what is the core operational
challenge facing carrier-based power projection? Although the Navy and
the joint force more broadly have multiple means of providing MDA
around the carrier strike group and to identify targets for attack by
relatively short-range, manned fighters in low-to-medium threat
environments, that is the focus of the JROC-approved KPPs. In my view,
the far more pressing challenge will be projecting power effectively
when the carrier is compelled to standoff at considerable distance
(e.g., 1,000-1500 nm) from an adversary's coast, and then find and
engage targets defended by modern IADS. UCLASS requirements should be
adjusted now to address that extant and intensifying challenge.
Mr. Larsen. To what degree have you reviewed the Navy's UCLASS
draft RFP and classified addenda? Are there aspects of the Navy defined
survivability requirement or other requirements you find insufficient
and why?
Mr. Brimley. I have not reviewed the UCLASS draft RFP or addenda,
both of which are classified. I base my opinions on the open-source
reporting that I have confidence in, including official statements from
Navy officials--all of which describe requirements for an ISR-centric
platform. As we discussed during the hearing, I believe an ISR-centric
capability will do little or nothing to address the main challenge
facing the carrier air wing and the carrier strike group more broadly,
which is the need to provide persistent combat strike power over long
ranges in the face of adversary systems designed to target our aircraft
carriers well outside the unrefueled radii of the air wing. Addressing
that capability gap, rather than add a redundant ISR capability,
strikes me as a more prudent way to invest limited taxpayer resources.
Mr. Larsen. Since the Navy and OSD/Joint Staff vetted the UCLASS
requirements, has additional information come to light to warrant a
change to those requirements at this stage of the acquisition process?
Mr. Brimley. The requirement for a stealthy, refuelable unmanned
carrier-based strike aircraft was relatively constant since the 2006
Quadrennial Defense Review, which directed the Navy to ``develop an
unmanned longer-range carrier-based aircraft capable of being air-
refueled to provide greater standoff capability, to expand payload and
launch options, and to increase naval reach and persistence.'' Since
then, both the 2010 QDR, the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance, and the
2014 QDR all restated the need to develop capabilities that are
relevant to an anti-access/area-denial environment. I think it is very
prudent to ask the Navy exactly how they took this guidance and
produced a draft RFP that seems to deviate quite substantially from the
strategic guidance that has been on the books for years. From what I
can gather via open sources and official statements, there seems to be
a view that organic ISR is the capability gap that can best be
addressed by an unmanned system. I totally disagree with that argument.
Given what we know about China's modernization path, its stated
strategy to deter our forces with long-range and increasingly precise
anti-ship ballistic and cruise missiles, and given our clear lack of
long-range and persistent combat strike power from the aircraft
carrier, it seems to me the role of civilian policymakers in this
process is to ensure that taxpayer dollars are spent wisely. As several
of my colleagues and I discussed at the hearing, we believe that
applying the disruptive characteristics of unmanned aircraft to the
striking power of the carrier air wing is the kind of investment path
the Navy badly needs to walk down before it is too late.
Mr. Larsen. What is the Navy's approach to growth in the draft RFP
and what kind of roadmap do you envision going forward?
Admiral Grosklags. Growth beyond threshold capability, which
provides an affordable path to ensure system effectiveness against
future threats, is a vital part of the UCLASS acquisition strategy.
Specific areas of growth, identified and prioritized by Fleet input,
include Sensor Payload Adaptability/Modularity, Weapons Capacity, Orbit
Capacity, Mission Effectiveness (Survivability), Sustainability, and In
Flight Refueling. While some specific growth provisions are required,
the RFP also ensures the above growth priorities are adequately
prioritized and incentivized, enabling the offerors to propose their
best value solutions.
Mr. Larsen. The first panel expressed concerns with how the Joint
Staff, OSD, Navy and Operational Commanders determined the requirements
for UCLASS. Please describe the detailed process and reviews that have
led to the defined requirements in the UCLASS draft RFP including the
organizations involved and the general timeline.
General Guastella. The Joint Staff, Office of the Secretary of
Defense, the Navy and Operational Commanders have been involved in
requirements definition process for the UCLASS system since 2010.
UCLASS has adhered to the Joint Capabilities Integration and
Development System (JCIDS) process and has received JROC validation of
the UCLASS Initial Capabilities Document (ICD) in June 2011 and the
Analysis of Alternatives (AOA) in October 2012. Additionally, several
JROC memorandums (JROCM) have been issued further refining requirements
and priorities.
The JROC is legislated by Title X U.S.C sec181. Voting members
include the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Council
chairman) and one general or admiral from the Army, Navy, Air Force,
and Marine Corps. Advisory members include, but are not limited to, the
Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics,
the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), the Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy, the Director of Cost Assessment and Program
Evaluation, and the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation.
The following list captures the history of requirements oversight
that has led to the currently defined UCLASS requirements.
June 9, 2011--JROCM 087-11. Approved UCLASS ICD. Directed the AOA
address incremental capability growth options and trades to ensure
affordability & rapid delivery.
August 11, 2011--Material Development Decision Defense Acquisition
Board. Approved AOA commencement stating ``UCLASS is an essential step
in the evolutionary integration of unmanned air vehicles into the
Carrier Strike Group.''
June 8, 2012--JROCM 086-12. Revalidated UCLASS ICD, prioritizing
cost & schedule for an affordable platform in three to six years.
Proposed Joint Emerging Operational Need (JEON) for sea-based Intel
Surveillance and Reconnaissance not validated.
October 1, 2012--UCLASS AOA Assessment. Director of Cost Assessment
and Program Evaluation certified UCLASS AOA for future acquisition
decisions.
December 19, 2012--JROCM 196-12. Established refined requirement
(e.g., 2 x 24/7 unrefueled orbits at 600 NM, 1 x 24/7 unrefueled orbit
at 1200 NM, 2,000 NM unrefueled strike) for an affordable, adaptable
platform that supports missions across permissive counter-terrorism and
low-end contested environments, enables capabilities for high-end
denied operations, and Navy organic missions (Navy incorporated into
draft CDD).
April 5, 2013--Draft Capability Development Decision (CDD) reviewed
by Navy. Chief of Naval Operations approved Navy UCLASS draft CDD
(incorporated JROCM guidance).
April 19, 2013--JROCM 089-13. JROC reviewed overall Joint Unmanned
Aerial Systems (UAS) portfolio and refined UCLASS requirements.
Approved updated ICD changes since June 2011.
May 21, 2013--JROCM 105-13. Endorsed UCLASS AOA and requestd
program update to JROC by 30 Nov 13 to evaluate program against JROCM
196-12 (19 Dec 12).
June 7, 2013--Technical Development Strategy Approved. Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD
(AT&L)) approved UCLASS acquisition strategy.
June 10, 2013 Congressional Certification. Vice Chairman Joint
Chiefs of Staff (VCJCS), Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research
Development and Acquisition (ASN RDA) and USD (AT&L) certified to
Congress UCLASS need, program viability, affordability, and compliance
with statutes.
October 18, 2013--Executive Requirements and Resources Review
Board. Navy leadership reviewed baseline system thresholds, prioritize
growth capabilities (i.e., payload adaptability, survivability, weapons
capacity, air refueling, sustainability).
October 30, 2013--Force Application Functional Capabilities Board.
Navy provided Joint Staff, OSD, Combatant Command, and Service
representatives the UCLASS program overview, draft key performance
parameters/key system attributes (KPP/KSA), cost, schedule, risks.
November 14, 2013--JROC. Program review of KPP/KSAs, cost,
schedule, risks.
February 4, 2014--JROCM 009-14. Endorsed November 2013 review of
UCLASS program; established UCLASS Early Operational Capability (EOC)
4-5 years from contract award; emphasized affordability and earliest
possible delivery. Directed program update to JROC within 60 days of
contract award.
May 22, 2014--Navy update to VCJCS. Program status and draft
request for proposal (RFP). Per JCIDS requirements, the UCLASS draft
CDD will be revised following technology development and submitted to
the JROC for validation prior to Milestone B.
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