[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 113-116]
CRUISER AND DESTROYER MODERNIZA-
TION AND LARGE SURFACE COMBATANT FORCE STRUCTURE ASSESSMENT
__________
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
JULY 10, 2014
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
___________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
89-509 WASHINGTON : 2015
________________________________________________________________________________________
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Publishing Office,
http://bookstore.gpo.gov. For more information, contact the GPO Customer Contact Center,
U.S. Government Publishing Office. Phone 202-512-1800, or 866-512-1800 (toll-free).
E-mail, [email protected].
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia, Chairman
K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina
DUNCAN HUNTER, California JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut
E. SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi RICK LARSEN, Washington
ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia HENRY C. ``HANK'' JOHNSON, Jr.,
MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado Georgia
JON RUNYAN, New Jersey COLLEEN W. HANABUSA, Hawaii
KRISTI L. NOEM, South Dakota DEREK KILMER, Washington
PAUL COOK, California SCOTT H. PETERS, California
BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama
David Sienicki, Professional Staff Member
Phil MacNaughton, Professional Staff Member
Katie Rember, Clerk
C O N T E N T S
----------
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2014
Page
Hearing:
Thursday, July 10, 2014, Cruiser and Destroyer Modernization and
Large Surface Combatant Force Structure Assessment............. 1
Appendix:
Thursday, July 10, 2014.......................................... 31
----------
THURSDAY, JULY 10, 2014
CRUISER AND DESTROYER MODERNIZATION AND LARGE SURFACE COMBATANT FORCE
STRUCTURE ASSESSMENT
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Forbes, Hon. J. Randy, a Representative from Virginia, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces................. 1
McIntyre, Hon. Mike, a Representative from North Carolina,
Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces. 3
WITNESSES
Stackley, Hon. Sean J., Assistant Secretary of the Navy
(Research, Development and Acquisition), RADM Thomas S. Rowden,
USN, Director, Surface Warfare (N96), Office of Chief of Naval
Operations, and RDML Lawrence E. Creevy, USN, Deputy Commander
for Surface Warfare, Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA 21)..... 4
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Forbes, Hon. J. Randy........................................ 35
Stackley, Hon. Sean J., joint with RADM Thomas S. Rowden and
RDML Lawrence E. Creevy.................................... 38
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Langevin................................................. 51
CRUISER AND DESTROYER MODERNIZATION AND LARGE SURFACE COMBATANT FORCE
STRUCTURE ASSESSMENT
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces,
Washington, DC, Thursday, July 10, 2014.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 4:00 p.m., in
room 2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. J. Randy Forbes
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. J. RANDY FORBES, A REPRESENTATIVE
FROM VIRGINIA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND
PROJECTION FORCES
Mr. Forbes. I want to welcome our members and our
distinguished panel of experts for today's hearing focused on
our large surface combatants, and particularly our cruisers and
destroyers. We have testifying before us the Honorable Sean J.
Stackley, the Assistant Secretary of the Navy; Rear Admiral
Thomas Rowden, Director of Surface Warfare Division, Office of
the Chief of Naval Operations; and Rear Admiral Lawrence
Creevy, Deputy Commander for Surface Warfare, Naval Sea Systems
Command.
I want to thank each of the three of you for being here,
for your service to our country, and also for your patience
with us on these votes, and we are sorry for the delay in
getting started with the hearing.
Before we begin, I wanted to congratulate Rear Admiral
Rowden on his selection as the next Commander, Navy Surface
Forces, and his assumption of command later this month.
Admiral, we thank you for that service and for what you
have done for our country. We have appreciated your advice and
counsel, and I am confident the Navy will be in good hands when
you assume command.
As to this hearing, I appreciate having received a copy of
the 30-year shipbuilding plan. We continue to have reservations
about the optimism that is built into the shipbuilding plan and
believe that the administration is disingenuous in their
sincerity to apply resources toward our Nation's shipbuilding
efforts.
This year I believe that our committee was able to provide
additional resources to the shipbuilding account and start to
change the negative shipbuilding trend lines. But revitalizing
American seapower cannot be done in just 1 or 2 fiscal years.
It will take a generational commitment from those sitting in
this room today and others to follow.
As to the administration's proposal to place 11 cruisers
and 3 amphibious ships into layup status, I continue to
question how putting these ships into long-term layup status
improves our national defense. Let me be clear, the term
``phased modernization'' that has been used by the Navy to
describe its 10-year plan is a misleading one that asks
Congress to agree to take half of our cruiser fleet out of
service with the hope that one day, in the 2020s, these ships
will all be returned to our fleet.
The Navy has indicated that the 306-ship Navy is required
to meet combatant commander requirements. The last independent
QDR [Quadrennial Defense Review] indicated a force structure of
346 ships was required. Despite what number you choose, we are
still significantly less than the force structure, both in
terms of capacity and lethality, that we need to meet even the
minimum requirements. That is why it is perplexing to me that
this administration, one that has now produced a Defense
Strategic Guidance and QDR in the last 2 years that prioritizes
seapower as a central enabler of our defense strategy, has
proposed to lay up some of our most valuable and lethal surface
combatants.
With the decrease in available assets, we will undoubtedly
increase our deployment times of our ships, burning out the
sailors and ships that support our national security. I reject
any notion that we should lock into place the negative
consequences of sequestration and vigorously oppose any
reduction of some of our most capable surface combatants to the
altar of fiscal frugality. If the U.S. Navy needs more
resources to meet its baseline requirements, then this Congress
and the Department of Defense should begin a serious discussion
about how to rebalance the budget resources available to fully
fund our national seapower priorities.
I am also concerned that the administration may already be
placing some of these cruisers and amphibious ships into a
layup status in contravention to congressional direction. I
would note that the National Defense Authorization Act for
fiscal year 2014 prohibited the retirement or layup of certain
cruisers and amphibious ships. I would encourage our witnesses
to carefully review the readiness ratings and deployment
schedules of these ships to ensure that they continue to serve
our Nation. Taking action that impacts the fleet prior to final
congressional direction should be rigorously avoided.
With regards to the overall force structure of the Navy, I
understand that the Navy has decided to continue and count
ships that the Navy has proposed to lay up for some cruisers
that would not be readily available to deploy. I also
understand that the Navy counts hospital ships and patrol ships
as ships to meet our force structure. I consider these
approaches as a mask to the true plight of our Navy and believe
these efforts only serve to cover the true extent of the
reductions in our Navy.
Let's be honest today, according to the historical
accounting rules, in fiscal year 2015 the Navy will have just
274 ships in its fleet. This is an unacceptable figure that is
the result of two decades of neglect. I am fully committed and
I think most of the people in this subcommittee are fully
committed to reversing this trend.
As to our destroyer fleet, I believe the Navy is on the
right track with introducing an advanced radar on the next
series of destroyers, also known as DDG Flight III. I still
have concerns with regards to the multiplicity of combat system
suites on our destroyers. These varying capabilities have
significant problems on the fleet's ability to properly train
and support our sailors, and I hope that we will be able to
receive additional information on this important issue.
And with that, I turn to my good friend and colleague, the
ranking member of the subcommittee, Mike McIntyre, for any
remarks he would like to make.
Mike.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Forbes can be found in the
Appendix on page 35.]
STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE MCINTYRE, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM NORTH
CAROLINA, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND
PROJECTION FORCES
Mr. McIntyre. Thank you. Thank you, Chairman. And thanks
for holding this important hearing and for the continued
excellent leadership you give us and the very valid and
concerning points that you have raised.
This is an important time for our cruiser and destroyer
fleets, and critical that during these challenging budget times
we find creative ways to ensure the Navy's entire fleet of
large surface combatants remain relevant and reach their
expected service lives.
With regard to the remaining 22 guided missile cruisers in
the fleet today, we continue the examination of what the most
cost-effective plan is for modernizing these ships and ensuring
that they will reach all of their expected service lives.
The Navy has presented Congress with a Phased Modernization
Plan that would upgrade these ships with the latest
technological advances in combat systems and maintenance
improvements, while also reducing personnel on the ships and
moving them to critically gapped billets. The Navy has
estimated this plan would save $3.5 billion in the next 5 years
and a total of $4.7 billion overall.
We know the destroyer fleet continues its modernization,
and upgrades are planned to reduce the workload and total ship
class ownership costs and to provide enhanced warfighting
capabilities. The Navy has continued its attempt to modify the
modernization schedule in an effort to provide the greatest
capabilities to the fleet. We know that we must ensure that we
have the most capable and combat-relevant ships as possible and
that they all reach their expected service lives.
These are challenging times, given the fiscal environment
that we are in. We know it is absolutely critical we find
creative ways to ensure that we have a modernized and relevant
fleet of large surface combatants and also provide flexibility
when possible. And I do share the chairman's concern that we
have as many ships as necessary as well. I know that is an
ongoing concern of our subcommittee, as well as our full
committee.
Thank you to the witnesses for your service. Thank you for
your commitment to our Navy, to our country's armed services
and our national security, and thank you for your time today
and for your patience with our delayed voting.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Congressman McIntyre.
And now we would love to hear your opening remarks. And as
we have mentioned to you, we are going to give you all the last
word at the end of all of this so that each of you will have an
opportunity, if you have misstated anything or we haven't asked
you a question you think is important, we will make sure you
get time to put that on the record.
So, Mr. Secretary, it is my understanding you are going to
start off, and so we look forward to your comments.
STATEMENT OF HON. SEAN J. STACKLEY, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE
NAVY (RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND ACQUISITION), RADM THOMAS S.
ROWDEN, USN, DIRECTOR, SURFACE WARFARE (N96), OFFICE OF CHIEF
OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, AND RDML LAWRENCE E. CREEVY, USN, DEPUTY
COMMANDER FOR SURFACE WARFARE, NAVAL SEA SYSTEMS COMMAND
(NAVSEA 21)
STATEMENT OF HON. SEAN J. STACKLEY
Secretary Stackley. Yes, sir. Chairman Forbes, Ranking
Member McIntyre, distinguished members of the subcommittee,
thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to
address cruiser and destroyer modernization. With the
permission of the subcommittee, I propose to provide brief
opening remarks and submit a separate joint statement for the
record.
Mr. Forbes. Without objection, all of your full statements
will be made a part of the record.
Secretary Stackley. Thank you, sir.
Earlier this year in testimony before this subcommittee,
the Navy described how we had reshaped our shipbuilding,
aviation, and tactical vehicle plans to reflect the priorities
of the defense strategy as impacted by sequestration in fiscal
year 2013 and constrained by the Bipartisan Budget Act in
fiscal years 2014 and 2015.
In total, the Navy-Marine Corps budget request in the
Future Years Defense Plan falls $38 billion below the level
planned just 1 year ago and is further threatened by
sequestration in 2016 and beyond. To minimize the impact of
this reduced top line we have leveraged every tool available to
drive down cost. We have tightened requirements, maximized
competition, and capitalized on multiyear procurements for
major weapon systems. We have attacked our cost of doing
business from headquarters billets to service contracts so that
more of our resources can be dedicated to making warfighting
capability.
In this context, in balancing resources and requirements we
have placed a priority on forward presence, near-term
readiness, stability in our shipbuilding program, and
investment in modernization and those future capabilities
critical to our long-term technical superiority. In the end,
however, the impact of a $38 billion reduction across the
Future Years Defense Plan [FYDP] has a real impact on our
programs. These impacts are exacerbated when, as made clear in
our shipbuilding report recently delivered to Congress, you
overlay the budget required to recapitalize the Ohio sea-based
strategic deterrent in the out-years and when you consider the
effects of sequestration in 2016 and out.
This subcommittee is keenly aware of these extraordinary
challenges posed to Navy shipbuilding and modernization, and
made most clear by this year's budget submission, which
unfunded the 2016 refueling complex overhaul of the USS George
Washington. We are today making every effort to replan near $7
billion required across the FYDP to refuel the carrier, plus
maintain its air wing, manpower, and support. We have released
the balance of advance procurement funding for 2014 to continue
planning efforts in order to best maintain our options and
retain skilled labor at the shipyard, while we await
determination by Congress regarding sequestration in 2016. Yet,
this also increases the pressure on other programs.
With particular regard to Navy shipbuilding and fleet
maintenance and modernization, we remain on track towards our
objective for a 300-ship Navy by the end of this decade. In
total, 43 ships are under construction across 8 ship classes in
shipyards and weapons factories stretching across the country.
Of equal importance to our plan is our ability to maintain
and modernize the in-service fleet to ensure each ship in the
plan possesses those capabilities required by the combatant
commanders and to ensure each ship in the plan meets its
expected service life. In fact, for many of our major
combatants, more than merely meet the expected service life,
which by itself is a reversal of past history, we need to
extend their service life. And this is only made possible by
rigorous planning and execution of both maintenance and
modernization of these workhorse ships.
With specific regard to the surface combatant force, the
limitations of our budget have driven us to a dual-pronged
approach to modernize both the Arleigh Burke destroyer and
Ticonderoga cruiser classes. Across the 2015 to 2019 period, in
total the Navy has programmed $5.6 billion towards Aegis ship
maintenance and modernization, which in this budget environment
is a strong statement regarding our commitment to these ships.
Eighteen DDG-51 destroyers are programmed for midlife
modernization, including Flight I, Flight II, and Flight II
Alpha ships. Eight of these ships will receive upgrades to
combat capabilities, including ballistic missile defense, with
the balance completing necessary hull, mechanical, and
electrical [HM&E] system upgrades and repair to enable full or,
in the case of the two Alpha ships, extended service life.
Regarding the Ticonderoga class, the Navy has 22 Aegis
cruisers, which are principally responsible for performance of
air defense commander duties in support of our carrier battle
groups. Today, the oldest 11 cruisers, CG-52 through 62, have
been modernized and will deploy with carrier battle groups
until their end of service, which commences in 2019.
The Navy plans to modernize and extend the service life for
the remaining 11 cruisers, CG-63 through 73, through an
extended phased modernization program. And the elements of the
program are that we will commence in 2015 with inspection,
planning, material procurement for repair and modernization of
hull, mechanical, and electrical systems for all 11 cruisers.
The work will be scheduled to ensure efficient execution, and
to the extent practical, to provide critical stability to the
industrial base.
Once complete the HM&E phase, these cruisers will be
maintained in the modernization program until completion of
their subsequent combat systems modernization, which will be
aligned with the retirement of the first 11 cruisers.
This Navy plan is made affordable by drawing down manpower
and operating costs during the extended modernization period, a
cost avoidance of $4.7 billion. Further, the Navy plan sustains
the critical air defense commander capabilities of the cruiser
force beyond its current retirement in 2029, well into the
2040s.
The reality is that the Navy will be unable to recapitalize
this critical capability throughout the period of construction
of the Ohio replacement submarine, and without this Phased
Modernization Plan we will be unable to ensure our fleet
possesses an air defense commander capability throughout the
decade of the 2030s.
This plan also retains flexibility, if needed, to
accelerate completion of the modernization, should the security
demands dictate it, subject to funding and training of
additional crews. Alternatively, if, as directed by the House-
passed version of the 2015 National Defense Authorization Act,
we are precluded from executing this Phased Modernization Plan,
then the $4.7 billion costs otherwise avoided by the plan will
be paid in the near term, depleting the ship's maintenance,
operation, sustainment, and support fund and reducing resources
for our fleet readiness, then reducing our force structure and
its capabilities in the long term.
In summary, in response to the cumulative impact of
sequestration in 2013, the BBA [Bipartisan Budget Act] level
funding in 2014 and 2015, and the reductions across 2015
through 2019, the Department has been judicious in controlling
cost, reducing procurements, stretching developments, and
planning modernization. Many of these actions add cost to our
programs and risk to our industrial base, and add risk to our
ability to meet the requirements of the Defense Strategic
Guidance. However, they represent the best balance of
readiness, capability, and affordability for the budget in
hand.
The course set by our Phased Modernization Plan is an
example of the balancing act required by the fiscal
environment. Absent an increase to our budget, changing this
course will increase our costs and therefore our risk to the
Navy and to the Nation.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to appear
before you today, and we look forward to answering your
questions.
[The joint prepared statement of Secretary Stackley,
Admiral Rowden, and Admiral Creevy can be found in the Appendix
on page 38.]
Mr. Forbes. Mr. Secretary, thank you so much for your
remarks.
And, Admiral, we look to you now for any comments that you
would like to offer.
Admiral Rowden. Mr. Chairman, I have no additional
remarks, sir, and I am standing by for your questions, sir.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you.
Admiral.
Admiral Creevy. Mr. Chairman, I have no additional remarks
either, and I am standing by for your questions.
Mr. Forbes. Good. Well, gentlemen, thank you so much for
coming and being with us today.
I am going to start. I normally defer my comments until the
end, but since basically we are here today challenging a
provision of the defense authorization bill that was passed by
the House, I am going to start with a few questions and then
hopefully come back with some at the end.
Mr. Secretary, you can respond to this or either admiral
can do it, so it is not trying to put anybody on the spot. So
whoever wants to respond is okay. But we hear from time to time
a concern we have with the Navy and our combatant commanders
that in 2007 we were able to meet 90 percent of their
requirements. And this year, it is my understanding, we are
going to meet somewhere less than 50 percent or somewhere in
that area. And the pushback we always get is that our combatant
commanders always ask for much more than they really need.
But when I come today, I want to ask you guys how many
ships does the United States Navy believe, not that we want,
not that our combatant commanders just think we need to have,
but how many ships do we actually need in the United States
Navy?
Secretary Stackley. Yes, sir. Let me go ahead and start,
and I will turn to Admiral Rowden to add on to that.
Not a simple question. There is not a number on a wall that
you go towards. You referred to the 306-ship number that is
associated with our force structure assessment that was
completed at the end of 2012. That number has not changed.
That force structure assessment is targeting a 2024 period
of time. It is not saying that today we need 306; it is looking
out ahead out at 2024 and saying we need to build a force
structure of about 306 ships, a balanced force structure that
has 11 aircraft carriers, 88 submarines, 88 surface combatants,
33 amphibs [amphibious assault ships], 29 auxiliary ships, and
33 support ships, right on down the line. And I don't want to
leave out my Ohio-class and Ohio-class replacement, a dozen
Ohio-class replacement submarines, as well the four SSGNs
[cruise missile submarines].
So the force structure assessment lays that out. Today in
terms of how many ships that we require, we respond to the
combatant commanders' demand as you highlighted. Today's force
structure, by ship count 289, by the current number counting
283, by the previous ship counting rules that we had in place,
today's force structure produces about 100 ships on deployment
consistently around the world. That is true today, that is true
this year. And if you go back to 2007 and you look at the
number of ships that the Navy had deployed, it was true in
2007. It has been very consistent, about 100 ships deployed,
responding to----
Mr. Forbes. Secretary, when your admirals come to meet
with us, they tell us that when they look at this overall mix,
it is not just the number of ships we have deployed, it is the
number of ships we have ready in case we have a surge or we
need those ships there. Is that an accurate statement or are
the admirals misleading us when they tell us that?
Secretary Stackley. No. A hundred ships meet our presence
requirements, the surge addresses major combat operations
demands or events of the day where there is demand to increase
the number on deployment.
Mr. Forbes. So when I look at you telling me that you need
306 ships in the Navy, is that a figure that you have
established from an analysis somewhere that has been done to
say that is what needed, or is that just something that we are
basically pulling out of the air and saying, we think that
would be a good goal to push towards?
Secretary Stackley. No, sir, that is a thorough analysis
that went behind the force structure assessment that was
conducted by the CNO [Chief of Naval Operations], completed in
December 2012, and delivered to the Hill.
Mr. Forbes. So then, if we said that we needed 306 ships
and that is the plan that you have at least submitted over to
us--is that a fair statement in the 30-year shipbuilding plan--
--
Secretary Stackley. Yes, sir.
Mr. Forbes [continuing]. How many cruisers do we need?
Secretary Stackley. Okay. So in that plan we don't break
out cruisers separate from large surface combatants.
Mr. Forbes. But there is a comment in here based on the
2012 assessment of the number of cruisers we need. Is that a
fair statement?
Secretary Stackley. Let me, yes, sir.
Mr. Forbes. Please.
Secretary Stackley. We break out 88 large surface
combatants. Today we have 22 cruisers. So in terms of how many
we need, air defense commander, that role, we need an air
defense commander with deploying battle groups. So if you
assume 11 carriers, 11 carrier battle groups, 11 air defense
commanders. Today we have two cruisers per carrier battle
group, which gives us flexibility, gives us redundancy, it
gives us the ability to adjust based on ship operating
schedules, so we are not pegged to a one-for-one ratio.
Mr. Forbes. When I look at your 30-year shipbuilding plan,
and help me if I am misreading it, there is an assessment that
says that the 2012 assessment said we needed 22 cruisers. Is
that incorrect?
Secretary Stackley. In the 30-year shipbuilding plan?
Mr. Forbes. Yes, sir.
Secretary Stackley. Eighty-eight large surface combatants,
22 cruisers, 66----
Mr. Forbes. But it did say 22 cruisers?
Secretary Stackley. Yes, sir, but they go away.
Mr. Forbes. What do you mean they go away?
Secretary Stackley. They retire over time.
Mr. Forbes. So when it says that we needed 22 cruisers,
what time period did we need the 22 cruisers for?
Secretary Stackley. Twenty-two cruisers is what we have
today. The force structure assessment was targeting a 2024
timeframe. Our CG-47 class starts to retire in 2019, and it is
on a steady retirement path to the end of the 2020s decade.
What we need to do is we need to recapitalize those ships with
a future ship class, either an upgrade to a DDG-51 [USS Arleigh
Burke], a Flight IV type of ship, or a cruiser. We do not have
the ability to do that during the period of construction of the
Ohio replacement.
Mr. Forbes. You are talking about if you don't, if you
have the dollars that you currently have. But when we look at
the 22 cruisers that this assessment says that we have, why
don't we just get rid of the 11 cruisers?
Secretary Stackley. We need that air defense commander
capability, which goes beyond----
Mr. Forbes. Do we need all those 11 cruisers?
Secretary Stackley. We need 11 cruisers pegged to our 11
carrier battle groups.
Mr. Forbes. I understand, but we have 22 now and you say
we need 11. Why don't we just get rid of those 11 cruisers?
Secretary Stackley. 2019 we will be down to 10, 2020 we
will be down to 9, 2021, and by 2026 we will be done. We need
to sustain that cruiser capability, that air defense
capability.
Mr. Forbes. But why put them in the layup and hope that
you are going to modernize them? Why not just get rid of these
11 cruisers?
Secretary Stackley. Sir, we can't afford to get rid of the
cruisers.
Mr. Forbes. Well, last year you came in with a proposal to
get rid of seven cruisers.
Secretary Stackley. Yes, sir.
Mr. Forbes. Why were you going to say that we could get
rid of seven cruisers, but this year you say we couldn't get
rid of those cruisers?
Secretary Stackley. Two things. At no point in time has
the Navy wanted to get rid of our cruisers. Last year when we
had proposed to decommission early 7 of the 22 cruisers in our
plan, there was a future flight destroyer that we had
anticipated we would be able to recapitalize that capability.
You don't see that in this year's 30-year plan, because we know
we cannot afford to recapitalize those cruisers during the
period of the Ohio replacement.
Mr. Forbes. When you look at this thing you called a
phased modernization--and by the way, Congress has not
prohibited you from doing modernization, what we are doing is
prohibiting you from doing the layup. Because there are no
funds in this 30-year plan and you don't have any projected
funds to do the build-out that you need in this 30-year plan,
do you?
Secretary Stackley. The budget requirements that go with
that 30-year plan, when you look at, again, the period of the
2020s through about 2034, that exceeds any shipbuilding budget
that we have seen since.
Mr. Forbes. And that would be true even if you didn't have
the Ohio-class replacement. Isn't that correct?
Secretary Stackley. It exceeds what we have budgeted over
the last 10 years during that period, but it does not reach the
level that we reached back in the buildup of the 1980s.
Mr. Forbes. I understand that. I wish we were back in the
1980s. But I am talking about over the last 20 years when we
have cut down our ships, so far in the 1980s we built them up
to 600-and-some ships, we have been taking them down. And what
I just want to ask you is, I am looking at a 30-year
shipbuilding plan, and I am asking you that, based on the
dollars you have had over the last 20 years, can you build this
30-year shipbuilding plan?
Secretary Stackley. No, sir.
Mr. Forbes. Can you do the modernization of these cruisers
with the dollars that you have and still meet this shipbuilding
plan that you have submitted to Congress based on the dollars
that you have been allocated over the last 20 years?
Secretary Stackley. The key to us being able to modernize
those 11 cruisers, as we have laid out in our plan, which
allows us to reduce the manpower, pull them out of operation
and sustainment during an extended modernization period so that
we can replace 1 for 1 the first 11 cruisers.
Mr. Forbes. Well, Mr. Secretary, my question is the
dollars. Do you have the dollars to do that? And can you
certify to this committee that you have the dollars, if you get
the same dollars you have had over the last 20 years per year,
can you do that modernization and do the shipbuilding plan that
you have submitted to Congress?
Secretary Stackley. That plan, with the letter that
accompanies it, certifies through the FYDP. It does not portend
to certify budget levels outside of the FYDP.
Mr. Forbes. I understand, and your modernization goes
outside the FYDP.
Secretary Stackley. Yes, sir.
Mr. Forbes. So what my question to you is, can you tell us
that based on the dollars you have had over the last 20 years,
if the Navy got the same dollars, and you are suggesting they
may get less, but if they got the same dollars they had, can it
do that modernization and also do this 30-year shipbuilding
plan?
Secretary Stackley. The only way we could execute that
shipbuilding plan and the modernization that is in that plan
that modernizes those cruisers, the only way we can do that,
assuming that we have the same budget that we had in the last
20 years, is prioritizing that modernization of those ships and
that construction over--over--the rest of our budget.
Mr. Forbes. So, Mr. Secretary, I don't want to argue with
you, I just want to find out.
Secretary Stackley. Yes, sir. We are actually in very--we
are in strong agreement here, sir.
Mr. Forbes. Yeah. But I just want to make sure we are
clear. If you have the dollars you had over the last 20 years--
and I have asked you, I have asked the Secretary, do you have
any scintilla of hope of where you are going to get additional
dollars--so if we assume you are going to get the same amount
of dollars you have had over the last 20 years and let's say we
can hold that and you don't decrease, my question is, would you
have enough dollars to do the modernization that you are
talking about and do this shipbuilding plan that you have
submitted to this Congress?
Secretary Stackley. As stated right in that report, sir,
as laid out clearly in that report, the funding requirements
over the period of 2020 through 2034 exceed the budget that we
have had for the last 30 years.
Mr. Forbes. Then why would you suggest to us that we
should have a confidence level? When the Navy came in and told
us last year it wanted to get rid of seven cruisers, this year
it now says it wants to have this phased modernization, which
means laying them up until you can get more dollars to come
back and do the modernization. If you don't have the dollars
necessary to do that modernization and to do this shipbuilding
plan, give me the comfort level of how you are going to build
these ships and do that modernization and take those ships out
of layup.
Secretary Stackley. Yes, sir. So it starts with the
funding that we have in hand. We have approximately $2.2
billion that has been set aside and we brought more money
inside the FYDP to go towards the modernization plan, and
rather than sit on the ships, our proposal is that we commence
in 2015 with the execution of that modernization program and we
get through the HM&E upgrades that are required to extend the
service life----
Mr. Forbes. Mr. Secretary, you don't have the money to do
that. You wouldn't have the money to do this plan you have
submitted to us and do that modernization. Isn't that a fair
statement?
Secretary Stackley. We have the funding in the FYDP to
execute----
Mr. Forbes. I am talking about the 10-year period of time
that you have talked about this phased modernization, this
phraseology that you all brought in here. Really what you're
talking about that you can guarantee us is you can lay them up,
but you can't guarantee me today that you can do the
modernization and put them back out again, can you?
Secretary Stackley. I can tell you what the requirement
is----
Mr. Forbes. I know what the requirement is.
Secretary Stackley [continuing]. For the balance of the
work in the next FYDP, the 2020 through 2024 FYDP. I can't
certify what a future Congress or Department of Defense is
going to do----
Mr. Forbes. But what you can tell me is, based on the last
20 years, if you get those same dollars you can't meet this
plan, can you?
Secretary Stackley. There are two parts, sir.
Mr. Forbes. Okay.
Secretary Stackley. The shipbuilding program--that report
talks to the budget requirements for the shipbuilding program
as opposed to the modernization program. We don't try to look
back over the past and project in the future specifically the
modernization program.
As it relates to the cruisers, the funding requirement
inside the FYDP for the cruiser modernization program is about
$3.5 billion and most of that funding is in hand and the
balance is in our program plan.
The remainder outside of the FYDP is about $5.5 billion,
$5.3 billion. We know that is the requirement. I cannot certify
to you today that a future Department, a future Congress is
going to lay that money in, but our program plan for executing
it as it is laid out is only made affordable if during this
period we are able to reduce the costs associated with manpower
and operating the cruisers during the phased modernization
period so that we can pay the balance. Otherwise, we have just
doubled the reach.
Mr. Forbes. Mr. Secretary, the last thing I will just ask
you before I turn it over to Mr. McIntyre is this. When you are
looking at the number of ships that the Navy requires, their
requirements, we are talking about the number of ships that are
capable of being deployed, isn't that correct, not the number
of ships that are laid up?
Secretary Stackley. We are talking about the number of
ships that the Navy needs in order to produce what we have
historically deployed with, which is about 100 ships on
deployment.
Mr. Forbes. And when we took our missile defense systems
out of Europe and put them on the back of the Navy, can you
tell me if the Navy even knows what the requirements are today
that we need to do the missile defense capabilities that the
country needs?
Secretary Stackley. We get our requirements from the
combatant commanders.
Mr. Forbes. All I am asking is, do you know those
requirements today of what we need for that BMD [ballistic
missile defense] capability? Does the Navy know that?
Secretary Stackley. We know what the demand is today and
we are meeting today's demand. But, sir, we don't look at just
today's requirements, today's demand. We have got to meet an
increasing demand over the next 5 to 10, 15----
Mr. Forbes. Mr. Secretary, I just don't want to take up
any more time. But my point is I understand that. But you come
in here when you talk about combatant commanders' requirements
and on the one hand you say, we don't listen to them because
they are too big. Yet, you were meeting 90 percent of them in
2007, we are meeting less than 50 percent this year, you know,
and you say, well, that is because they ask for everything.
Then on BMD my question is this: Does the Navy know what
our BMD requirements are today? I understand we need to look at
them tomorrow, 5 years from now. Do you know what they are
today?
Secretary Stackley. We know how many ships we need on
station in the Sea of Japan, we know how many ships we need on
station in the Mediterranean, and we know what we need to
accompany our carrier battle group.
Mr. Forbes. Do we have a gap in our BMD requirements
today?
Secretary Stackley. I wouldn't say we have a gap today.
What I would say we have a very stressed force trying to meet
the----
Mr. Forbes. Let me ask you this, and I want you to be very
clear about how you answer this. Can we meet the BMD
requirements we have today?
Secretary Stackley. Sir. We can put the ships on station
where they are required with BMD capability, but you know as
well as I do that the--I don't want to go classified here----
Mr. Forbes. I don't want you to.
Secretary Stackley [continuing]. You know as well as I do
what the threat is and where we need to be heading. So it is
not a simple matter of the number of ships.
Mr. Forbes. But when we pull these cruisers out, some have
BMD capabilities on them.
Secretary Stackley. Yes, sir. Yes, sir.
Mr. Forbes. When they are laid up we will have less of
those requirements met, not more. Isn't that correct?
Secretary Stackley. Four of the cruisers have the earliest
baseline of BMD capability, that is correct, sir.
Mr. Forbes. Okay. Well, thank you, Mr. Secretary.
And Mr. McIntyre.
Mr. McIntyre. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Just a couple of brief questions. What is the--if you can,
just so that we are all on the same page here--the difference
between a cruiser and destroyer in the important roles they
play within the carrier strike group? And after you delineate
those differences and their role, what would be the impact to
that carrier strike group if there were no cruisers available
to fill the air defense or air warfare commander role?
Admiral Rowden. Yes, sir. Thank you for the question. I
would be happy to address this.
Today our cruisers are commanded by a captain, with a more
senior staff on the ship, and more individuals dedicated to the
planning and execution of the air defense mission for the
carrier strike group. In addition, the physical plant on our
cruisers allows for dual transmitters, one forward and one aft,
adding redundancy to those ships, and a greater number of cells
available for surface-to-air missiles for the execution of the
air defense mission.
In addition, they have increased command-and-control
capability over the guided missile destroyers. The guided
missile destroyers are commanded by a commander with a less
experienced, though perfectly capable staff underneath that
commanding officer to ensure that they can execute the missions
that have been assigned to that ship. And, typically for
carrier strike groups that we are deploying, the air defense
commander role will be assigned to the cruiser commanding
officer associated with the cruiser that is going to be
deploying for that ship. And so that is really how we drive the
requirement for the cruisers and the air defense commander on
the ship.
The guided missile destroyers will typically operate in
support. All of these ships are multi-mission ships--capable of
executing air defense, capable of executing anti-submarine
warfare, and anti-surface warfare as well. And, typically, we
will deploy more destroyers, anywhere from three to five,
typically, with a carrier strike at this time.
Given the threat that we have currently experiencing today
and the way we are deploying our ships, typically we will keep
the cruiser with the aircraft carrier, and we have the luxury
of being able to send those destroyers off on other missions.
But we always keep the air defense commander's ship with the
aircraft carrier operating in that air defense commander role.
Mr. McIntyre. All right. The second part of the question
was, what is the impact to the carrier strike group if there
were no cruisers available to fill the air defender commander
role?
Admiral Rowden. Yes, sir. The air defense commander, Alpha
Whiskey, assigned to air defense commander, the secondary role
or the secondary commander, the redundancy within the strike
group, is assigned to typically the most senior commander on a
guided missile destroyer.
Mr. McIntyre. So that is where it would go if you didn't
have a cruiser? You would go to that most senior commander on a
destroyer?
Admiral Rowden. Yes, sir.
Mr. McIntyre. And what is your comfort level with that?
Because you mentioned a minute ago you had less experienced
staff on those destroyers.
Admiral Rowden. Yes, sir, typically the department heads,
the supporting staff on a cruiser will be second to department
heads, whereas they will be first to department heads on a
guided missile destroyer. And as a consequence we leverage the
experience that those department heads have learned, typically
in their DDG [guided missile destroyer] command, as they
execute their responsibilities in the air defense commander.
Obviously, if the role falls of the air defense commander
to a guided missile destroyer, we would have to increase the
amount of training that we have and perhaps start to increase
the level of expertise on those guided missile destroyers in
order to be able to get the capability into those ships in
order to be able to ensure that we are executing the air
defense commander job properly.
Mr. McIntyre. All right. Thank you. I think that is an
important distinction to keep in mind, and I am glad that you
have stated that. I want to make sure we have that on the
record in terms of what would need to be done.
Could the reduced modernization of the Flight I and II
destroyers be a precursor to early decommissioning of some of
these vessels?
Admiral Rowden. No, sir. I don't believe that is the case.
The Flight I and II guided missile destroyers are, given the
fact that they are ballistic missile defense capable ships at
this time, are some of the most stressed ships that we have in
the inventory. They are playing a vital role across the force
in the execution of the ballistic missile defense capability.
And I believe you are referring to our phased modernization--
or, I am sorry, the accelerated modernization of our Flight IIA
DDGs.
Mr. McIntyre. Yes, sir.
Admiral Rowden. And understanding that the plan that we
are executing is designed to increase our ballistic missile
defense capacity and increase our ballistic missile defense
capability as we proceed through the remainder of the decade by
ensuring that we maintain the relevance of the guided missile
destroyers, by increasing, by upgrading their ballistic missile
defense capability, commensurate with the capability that we
will be installing in the Flight IIA DDGs. So I think that
those ships will remain as vital as they are now, given the
modified destroyer modernization plan that we have.
Mr. McIntyre. Would you agree with that assessment, Mr.
Stackley?
Secretary Stackley. Absolutely, sir. We are investing on
average over $100 million per ship in the Flight I's and II's
to modernize them. That is not a precursor to decommissioning
them.
Chairman Forbes made reference to the number of baselines
that we are managing, too many. And this reflects a 30-year
build program across Aegis that that is just the evolution of
the technology. But to the extent practical we need to raise
the earlier baselines for both the cruisers and destroyers to
get them to a position where they are not just more capable,
but we can continue to upgrade them through the balance of
their service life. And that is what we were able to do with
the Flight I's and Flight II's. But it comes at a price, and
that price is not a precursor to decommissioning them.
Mr. McIntyre. Okay. Thank you. Thank you, gentlemen.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Forbes. Mr. Conaway is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Conaway. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Stackley, in the written document, your testimony, you
talk about the Phased Modernization Plan for the CGs [guided
missile cruisers] precludes the Navy from having to increase
overall end strength by about 3,400 people, which would
otherwise be required to fill the critical shortfalls in our
training pipelines and fleet manning of the cruisers.
Can you walk us through what that actually means in the
real world? And what are the risks? And how long is it, if you
had to actually have those 3,400 people, how long could it take
you to get them into place?
Secretary Stackley. Yes, sir. So today a cruiser has about
330 to 340 officers and enlisted as part of the ship's
complement. In this Phased Modernization Plan, recognizing that
the first 11 are going to start decommissioning about 2019, the
intent is that we sustain a steady state, steady flow of 11
ships worth of manpower dedicated to cruisers out to the
retirement of the last cruiser.
What that means is, for the second 11 that go into phased
modernization, you pull the 330, 340 per ship off and you are
reducing the manpower requirement by about 3,400. Then, when
CG-52 (USS Bunker Hill) retires and CG-63 (USS Cowpens)
replaces it, you actually keep a steady cruiser manpower in
there.
The savings per year associated with those manpower
reductions, or it is a cost avoidance, is what helps to fund or
fuel the cruiser modernization. I don't know, does that
address----
Mr. Conaway. It does. But the risks associated with that
though----
Secretary Stackley. Okay. Yes, sir.
Mr. Conaway [continuing]. Are assuming that if for some
reason you decided you can't----
Secretary Stackley. Yes, sir.
Mr. Conaway [continuing]. You can't decommission one of
those cruisers, then you actually have spare 340-man crews just
handy to come into the ether and just put them in place? How
much risks are we taking by reduction in manpower.
Secretary Stackley. Yes, sir. So if we are on the
execution of the modernization program and we have reduced the
manning on those ships and we determine at some point in time
that we need to accelerate those ships out of modernization and
get them back to the force, well, then if you are, say, halfway
through and maybe we have 5 cruisers that we are going to
attempt to accelerate out, then we have to produce 1,500 to
1,700 trained sailors to man those ships. Some of those will
come out of shore billets from other portions of the Navy and
some are going to have to be trained to take over their
respective responsibilities.
Mr. Conaway. Assuming you don't come from a standing start
with 330 to 340, what would be the normal training time to get
up, from scratch kind of thing, where you start taking from
other surface ship folks and put it together, how long would it
take to put a crew together?
Secretary Stackley. We don't have an exact answer, but our
estimate is about 2 years.
And, Tom, you want to go ahead?
Admiral Rowden. Yes, sir. One of the important parts of
this plan is when we reduced the manning on the ships, we
didn't take all 340 billets and eliminate them from the force.
And so, in order to be able to execute a reconstitution should
it be required, we actually retained the 35 most senior billets
on the ship and distributed them throughout the Navy. So in the
event that we have to return the ship to operational status----
Mr. Conaway. I got that, but those folks with those skill
sets, 4 years into this deal, they are not automatically going
to step back into the role they would have had on that ship the
day they came off of it. How do you keep refreshing that second
term or second tour guy that needs to go in there when they
have moved off to other career paths?
Admiral Rowden. Yes, sir. The career paths are still
executed for the enlisted men and the officers and they
maintain their rotation from sea to shore. And so, obviously,
there would be a time that we would have to re-form the crew,
get the crew trained, and get the crew out to sea. However, the
plan, as we have laid it out, since we have retained the
billets, the men and women that man those billets are
distributed to other areas, whether it is regional maintenance
centers or within the Afloat Training Group or other areas on
the waterfront, we would then pull those people into the ship.
The remainder of the crew, we would be able to form them in a
relatively short period of time through new accessions in order
to be able to form the crew and then get that ship out.
Mr. Conaway. So if some terrible thing happened and we had
to put those boats back in the water it is a 2-year window. The
risks are--the lack of flexibility of whatever is a 2-year
window to get that team back in place? Is that what I heard you
say?
Admiral Rowden. Yes, I would agree with the Mr. Secretary,
18 months to 2 years.
Mr. Conaway. Okay. Thank you.
I yield back.
Mr. Forbes. Mr. Courtney is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
So, Mr. Stackley, we have certainly heard a lot of the
challenges that exist with implementing the plan that the
administration suggested. But let's talk about for a second if
we go with the House defense authorization bill, which again,
your testimony--I just want to make sure I got this clear--is
that the difference in terms of cost, if we don't do the phased
modernization and just sort of keep the entire 22 cruisers
operational, is about $10 billion altogether. Is that sort of
your analysis?
Secretary Stackley. No, sir. The difference in cost is
about $4.7 billion. Specifically, absent the ability to de-man
the ships for this extended period and take them out of the
operational cycle and use those savings or cost avoidance to go
towards funding the program, it's about a $13.5 billion program
to modernize the cruisers. Through this phased approach it is
about an $8.8 billion program, the delta being about 4.7.
Mr. Courtney. All right. And that $4.7 billion, if it is
an added cost that you, the Navy, has to absorb, it would seem
to me put even more pressure in terms of trying to achieve the
shipbuilding plan with historic levels of spending as we have
been sort of using as a baseline.
Secretary Stackley. Yes, sir. The CNO in his testimony was
very clear. The reason we are doing this is because of the
budget; the reason we are doing this is because of the budget.
It is a constraint. It is a constraint for us. Given that, this
approach seems to be the right balance in terms of holding onto
that force structure, getting those ships modernized, getting
additional service life on those ships, sustaining 11 air
defense commander capable ships beyond the current plan, out
into the 2035 to 2041 timeframe. So this is trying to strike
the best balance with what is a difficult budget environment.
Mr. Courtney. And when we talk about the budget, again
using, as the chairman said, sort of historic levels of
shipbuilding as the budget. Again, the Budget Control Act,
which creates a whole separate level of pressure, I mean, the
good news about that is it just expires by law in 2021. So
historic levels of spending and shipbuilding over the last 20
years or 30 years, as you alluded to, I mean, the fact is, is
that there are a whole range of programs that are going to be
challenged throughout the whole 30-year shipbuilding plan.
Isn't that correct?
Secretary Stackley. Absolutely. I will keep stating it,
the 2020 through 2030 timeframe, when the Ohio replacement
comes along and we are still building a carrier every 5 years,
we have got to recapitalize the LSD 41 class [USS Whidbey
Island], we are building big deck amphibs [amphibious assault
ships], 4-year centers, we are trying to sustain two Virginia
classes per year, the destroyers, that budget requirement
during that period of time, and that major recapitalization,
the last time we saw those types of budgets was during the
1980s. And so, to be able to say, to be able to certify that we
will are going to be able to hit those numbers, no.
What that report does, that report defines the problem,
makes it black and white for everybody to see. We today can't
make the decisions that are going to change that, but today we
have to start taking the actions, making the effort to address
it so that it is not beyond everybody's reach when we get out
there.
Mr. Courtney. Well, certainly it is an additional reason,
Mr. Chairman, why our effort to have the Deterrence Fund set up
in the defense authorization bill, I mean, is even more
underlined, and I think highlighted by the testimony that we
are hearing here today.
I guess the other question is, you talked about the fact
that if this Phased Modernization Plan was adopted that the
availability of these cruisers would actually get pushed out
into the 2030s.
Secretary Stackley. Yes, sir.
Mr. Courtney. Is that correct?
Secretary Stackley. Yes, sir.
Mr. Courtney. As opposed to if we go with the status quo
or the House bill version. Talk to me about that for a second.
Secretary Stackley. Yes, sir.
Mr. Courtney. I mean, when do we lose those cruisers if we
just continue along with the House bill and figure out a way to
come up with the $5 billion.
Secretary Stackley. Yes, sir. So today the service life,
the expected service life of the cruisers is 35 years. They
start aging out in 2019, and they will age out at the same rate
at which we built them. So by the late 2020s they are all
retired. What this plan does is, one, through the modernization
we are going do the necessary hull, mechanical, and electrical
repairs and upgrades to buy back some additional service life,
buy back an extra 5 years service, and, frankly, during that
period, this phased modernization, this extended period when
they are out of the operational cycle, we are not burning up
the service life. So what that does, that gives us the ability
to extend the cruiser class out into the late, as I was saying,
2035 through 2041 timeframe during which they would then
retire.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Stackley.
I yield back.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Mr. Courtney.
Mr. Wittman is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Stackley, Admiral Rowden, Admiral Creevy, thank you so
much for joining us today.
Secretary Stackley, I want to talk about the 11 cruisers
that would be assigned minimal caretaker crews versus full
crews during the reduced operating status. So now you have 11
of those ships. The question would be is, if you have a
contingency and they need to be brought back up to full
operational status, the question is, is how many of those 11
ships and how quickly could they be brought back up? And if the
answer is less than 11 could be immediately brought back up,
should all 11 be counted in the fiscal year 2015 30-year
shipbuilding plan as fully capable ships available for duty?
Secretary Stackley. Yes, sir. So clearly the number
depends on where you are in the modernization plan. First, the
way we have this structured is we want to go after the HM&E
package first, we want to hit it hard.
A couple of things. We have to inspect the heck out of
these ships. They have been driven, they are at a stage in
their life that we are going to uncover a lot of things when we
do open and inspect. So step one, get in, open and inspect,
assess the material condition, get material in order, get them
into the depot to do the hull, mechanical, and electrical
upgrades that give you the service life that you need to get it
out to 40 years.
At that point in time, when those ships are in a depot, it
is just like any other ship that is in a depot, it is not
available for tasking. It is going to depend on how fast can
you complete that work and get it going again.
So in the early phase, when they are going through depot
maintenance, maybe half will be materially available to get
them going again, maybe half. Now, the issue then is not their
material condition or their readiness, the issue is going to be
the crew, and it is what we just discussed. It is going to be
pulling the senior enlisted and officers from other shore
billets and then bring in the balanced crews and getting them
trained and integrated onto the ship.
So I put out a 2-year estimate there and that is based on
new construction experience. If you look at what we do today in
terms of crew phasing and training, integrating the crew with
the ship, getting them certified and ready for deployment,
about 2 years.
After the HM&E upgrades, now have you ships that are in a
very good material condition. They don't have the most current
combat system baseline, which we want to ultimately get to, but
they are in very good material condition. And then it becomes a
matter of strictly the crew. And the first one will be ready
for operations faster than the last one because we will be
surging crews to the ships. But I think the 18-months to 2-year
rule still applies, and then the next phase going into the
combat systems modernization.
Well, now you are already in the active phase of bringing
the crews to the ships. And so, again, depending on where you
are, some of the ships are already going to be out on
deployment. By 2019 the first of the cruisers are back out on
deployment and we have crews that are surging and moving to the
ships just like in new construction so they would be able to
complete their certifications and ready for tasking faster.
Mr. Wittman. Well, it still appears then through phased
modernization that there wouldn't be all 11 ships that would be
battle force ships available at that particular time. You would
be having them available in this wave status.
But let me ask you, let me go to your question concerning
crews, and that is a concern. Today we are in a very, very high
operational tempo. We are pushing things in significant areas,
and I know the combatant commander requests have been
significant. How do you expect to maintain the same forward
presence with fewer assets? And would you expect to come back
in future years and announce additional FDNF [Forward Deployed
Naval Forces] assets as a way to achieve that?
Secretary Stackley. Yes, sir. I am going start this and
ask Admiral Rowden to finish it. But first you hit on the
forward deployed ships. That is a very important key to the
Navy's ability to sustain presence without driving our ships at
the same OPTEMPO [operations tempo], because we get to cut down
on a lot of the transit time to theater.
So the FDNF ships are an important point to increase our
operational availability of ships, and that, frankly, helps us
to compensate for cruisers being pulled out. But the high
OPTEMPO issue today, I am certain and I think you are, too,
that 10 years from now it will be worse and it will be more
demanding.
And an important part of this is, where is the risk? Is the
risk higher in the 2020s or today? And when we look at not just
the budgets associated with recapitalizing and modernization,
but when we look at the risk associated with the threat, part
of this, what this plan does is, it accepts more risk today in
terms of cruisers that are operationally available today, but
then it buys down the risk in the out-years when, frankly, the
threat is increasing both in terms of the fiscal threat and in
terms of the adversary.
Admiral Rowden. Yes, sir. And to piggyback on Secretary
Stackley's comments, clearly to get increased forward presence
with X number of ships you either forward deploy those ships or
you increase the length of deployments. And certainly the
funding available to execute those would be required in order
to ensure that we maintain the readiness levels on those ships.
And certainly ships are built to put X amount of water
underneath the keel, and the more you are operating those
ships, the more you have to fund those appropriately in order
to ensure that you can maintain the material condition as you
bring those ships back to depot.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Forbes. Than you, Mr. Wittman.
Mr. Langevin is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank our witnesses for your testimony today.
Secretary Stackley, if I could just start with you, going
back to the shipbuilding program and our ability to meet our
shipbuilding needs. With the actions that the HASC [House Armed
Services Committee] has taken with respect to Ohio replacement
and the subsequent action that the SASC [Senate Armed Services
Committee] has taken, in terms of moving to take the Ohio
replacement program out of the shipbuilding budget and treat it
as more of a national platform with a separate funding
mechanism, what will that do to the 30-year shipbuilding plan?
And will it still leave a gap? Or to what degree does it
significantly close that gap to help us meet our shipbuilding
needs?
Secretary Stackley. Yes, sir. Let me first say that the
actions taken by both the HASC and the SASC in that regard, I
am calling it a great first step. By establishing the Strategic
Sea-Based Deterrent Fund we are creating a vehicle to help us
finance our shipbuilding program during that extremely
stressing period. It does not change the picture in terms of
dollars required for constructing new ships during that period.
So the fund is a great first step, one that identifies we
have got a problem here. It starts to set up a framework. The
dollar demand is unchanged. And that is where I think we need
to work together to identify how can we in fact not just
identify the fund, but fill the fund without it coming out of
shipbuilding.
Mr. Langevin. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Admiral Rowden, if I could turn to you. As you may know, I
have been a very vocal proponent of ONR's [Office of Naval
Research] Solid-State Laser Technical Maturity Program that
plans to test a high-powered, mature integrated weapon system
at sea in late 2016.
My question is, what impact will the testing of this laser
weapon system on the USS Ponce this year and this subsequent
solid-state laser test in 2016 have on surface combatant
modernization? And is the integration of high-energy weapon
capabilities planned already with Ponce and SSL-TM [Solid-State
Laser Technology Maturation Program] in forming final decisions
or are the Ponce and the SSL-TM being used as development
gates?
Admiral Rowden. Sir, thanks for the question. I think, to
answer your second question first, I think we really have to
wait to see what the results of the testing that we have, that
we are going to execute on Ponce is, in order to understand how
to further integrate that into future weapon systems. But I do
think--and I am not an expert by any means on this particular
weapon system, but I can say in general in the development of
weapon systems certainly the at-sea testing that we execute for
any weapon system that we are going to field is going to be
absolutely essential to understand exactly what it is we have
to do.
And so I think that certainly it is a good first step to
get the weapon systems out on ships like Ponce in order to be
able to understand not only what needs to be done to marinise
the equipment and to properly support it in execution of
operations at sea, but then also to understand how to start to
develop the tactics, techniques, and procedures, and the
concept of operations in order to go employ those weapons
effectively.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Admiral, for that answer.
And I again want to applaud the Navy for the aggressive
work that they are doing to try to get this directed energy
weapon systems out of the lab and actually into the field.
So with that, let me just turn to Admiral Creevy. With the
Destroyer Modernization Plan combining two modernization
periods into one, what is the opportunity cost in terms of
hull, mechanical, and electrical or system upgrades?
And other than conducting the combat system upgrades near
the end of the availability, how will the Navy ensure that
these destroyers are ready to rapidly integrate the latest
technologies, particularly those in support of electronic
warfare and high-energy weapons?
Admiral Creevy. Thank you for the question, sir. I would
like to answer the second part of your question first.
I think Admiral Rowden has got it right. We are going to
learn a lot when we go do at-sea test. And that is the benefit
of getting it out there to test, so we can learn about the
integration challenges, the power challenges, and those kinds
of things that we need to do.
In the meantime, we have put into our modernization program
as much as possible in the way of upgrades to support future
requirements. And combining those availabilities into one saves
us a significant amount of time in modernizing those ships and
keeps them from being offline for much less time.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, gentlemen. I have some other
questions that I will submit for the record.
But thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Forbes. Mr. Langevin, thank you for your work on this
and on the funding source, too. You have done a great job on
that. Mr. Courtney has as well.
Mr. Courtney recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And again I want to thank the witnesses for your great
testimony here today.
Secretary Stackley, I think one of the reasons why I think
there was resistance to the proposal from the administration
was to some degree, given the proposal a year before, which was
to just decommission seven ships, frankly, I just think a lot
of people had some confidence issues about whether or not this
phased modernization was just a decommissioning by another
name. And, again, I think your testimony today has been very, I
think, convincing in many respects.
But I guess I thought before you leave that if you could
just kind us walk us through (a) what changed, and (b) what
reassurances can you really state for the record that the Navy
really will sort of follow through on this different type of
approach?
Secretary Stackley. Yes, sir. A couple things have changed
that are critical here.
First, the Congress established the Ships Maintenance
Overhaul and Sustainment Fund, SMOSF. You all put $2.2 billion
into a fund to let us move forward past the budget hurdles that
we had to modernize the cruisers. That was the first key.
Second is the manpower issue. The SMOSF fund will be
consumed by manpower, operation, and support faster than we can
modernize these cruisers, particularly in this budget
environment.
So we coupled the two. We looked at the funding that we
have in hand, and we want that money to go towards the
modernization to give us the capability and extend the service
life that we need on the cruiser. We didn't want to run out of
gas along the way. And so we looked at the other costs, the
manpower and the operation and sustainment costs, and we looked
at the phasing of the decommissioning of those first 11
cruisers. And we arrived at this plan. We arrived at this plan
that says we can minimize, we can almost self-finance this
plan, at least on the front end, by pulling the manpower off
and recognizing that we are going to bring our cruiser force
structure down to 11, 1 for 1 with our carriers, but then be
able to extend that longer.
So the key was getting the SMOSF funding in place and then
looking at offloading the costs associated with the manpower
and operating and support during the period of modernization,
and then coupling the decommissioning of the first 11 with the
completion of the modernization for the back 11. And it just
balanced out in terms of the budget that we've got, the force
structure that we've got, and then the requirement that we've
got to modernize the cruisers.
Mr. Forbes. Secretary, let me take you back, because you
left out one very important item when Mr. Courtney said, what
changed? What changed was Congress said you couldn't do it. In
other words, when you came over here, you fought us tooth and
nail with that. And when we tried to put the provision in
there, the Navy still came over here and fought us tooth and
nail to try to decommission those seven cruisers.
And what really changed was when Congress looked at it and
said, that's a crazy proposal to do. We have got useful life
left on these cruisers. And then Congress said, Navy, you can't
do that. And we put the fund in.
But you could have come over initially instead of saying,
we are just going to cut these cruisers out, and said, hey we
need the cruisers, and we just need the funds to do it.
And I am not faulting you. I am just saying we need to
compare apples to apples. And when you guys come over here and
you basically salute and say, this is all we need, this is
good, and then on the other hand you come back over and say,
this is because of the budget, we need to know which is which.
Are you doing this because of the budget? Or are you doing it
because of the needs? And basically the reason those cruisers
are still floating today is because the United States Congress
said, we are not going to let you do it.
Now, I come back and I want to ask you this question,
because I had a hard time getting it, I want to make sure
everybody else could get their questions in. Based on this
report and what I understand you saying--and any of you guys
can answer, so I am not putting one person on the spot--on this
shipbuilding plan, which I am holding up here, Mr. Secretary,
you tell me, this is the number of ships we need in 2024, 306
ships. Is that a fair----
Secretary Stackley. Yes, sir.
Mr. Forbes [continuing]. Fair assessment?
Secretary Stackley. Yes, sir.
Mr. Forbes. And I take it when you say we need 306 ships,
you are not talking about 50 ships that are laid up in dry dock
and we can't use, that you need 306 ships that could be
deployed. Is that a fair statement?
Secretary Stackley. Sir, we need 306 ships to produce the
number of ships that we have to deploy.
Mr. Forbes. I understand. I understand. But you are not
talking about ships that take 2 years to get out of dry dock.
Isn't that true?
Secretary Stackley. Well, there are exceptions. Because
you know that a cruiser----
Mr. Forbes. So then what you are telling me is that in
2024 you don't need 306 ships that are operable, you just need
306 ships somewhere, even if it takes you 2 years to get them
out and get them going again? Is that what the requirements
are? And I am not trying to trick you.
Secretary Stackley. Yes, sir. No.
Mr. Forbes. I am just trying to find out what the answer
is.
Secretary Stackley. Two parts.
Mr. Forbes. Okay.
Secretary Stackley. Presence and response to major combat
operations.
Mr. Forbes. I understand both of those. But at some point
in time there is a number. Let me just tell you why.
Secretary Stackley. Yes, sir.
Mr. Forbes. Admiral Locklear comes to us, and we have a
lot of respect for him, just like we do all three of you, and
he says, if we keep moving the direction we are and we get down
to 255 or 260 ships, we cease to be a superpower. We become a
regional power. Is he correct or not correct?
Secretary Stackley. I agree with him.
Mr. Forbes. If he is correct, then, he is talking about at
some point in time 260 ships. He is not talking about 100 ships
that are capable of being forwardly present, he is talking
about 260 ships in the United States Navy.
And my question to you is, when we look at this and I fast
forward out to 2024, and you guys are meeting over at the
Pentagon somewhere, and then you are coming over here and
telling Mr. Courtney, Mr. Langevin, me, the Speaker of the
House, and the other members here, we need 324 ships, are you
talking about just 324 hulls somewhere or are you talking about
324 ships that are capable of being used in the United States
Navy?
Secretary Stackley. It is 324 ships. Well, that report
refers to 306 ships.
Mr. Forbes. I am sorry, 306 ships, I apologize, 306 ships.
Secretary Stackley. Yes, sir, 306 ships that are capable
for being used in the United States Navy, some number of which
are in depots, some number of which just got back from
deployment and are in a surge status, some number of which are
training up, getting ready to go on the next deployment. So it
is an entire cycle. That is the force structure that we need to
produce today about a hundred ships on deployment or a
different mix in response to a major combat operation.
Mr. Forbes. If that is true and we can look at 2024 and
say we need 306 ships, how many do we need today?
Secretary Stackley. Okay. I will reflect back on the CNO's
and the Commandant's testimony at their posture hearing. We
need more ships. We need more ships. It is that
straightforward.
Mr. Forbes. But I can't do that, Mr. Secretary. I mean, I
am fighting for you. And you come over here and you tell me,
no, we can get by with this. I need to walk into the other
Members of Congress and tell them. If you are telling me, we
are good to go, we only need 250 ships, or we need 260 ships,
they are going to go with that.
I need you to tell me, does the United States Navy know
today how many ships they need today? You know what you need
when you look out in the distance at 2024. Can you tell me how
many you need today? This is 2014, this is 10 years earlier,
where you don't have to have a crystal ball. You know. How many
ships do you need today?
Secretary Stackley. Sir, we need to produce about a
hundred ships deployed today. And what is happening today at
today's current number of 289 ships is that the operational
tempo of those ships is higher than where it needs to be. So,
in fact, we do have ships that are on 8-month deployments. That
is starting to stress the ships materially and stressing the
crew.
Mr. Forbes. I understand. And, Mr. Secretary, I have
enormous respect for you.
Admirals, can you all give me a number? I mean, does the
United States Navy, if it walks over here and I have a
checkbook that I can open up, can you guys tell me? You tell me
you can predict out a decade from now how many ships we need.
Can we predict out 12 hours from now and say this is how many
ships I need tomorrow morning?
Admiral Rowden. Mr. Chairman, I think there are a
significant number of variables in that equation.
Mr. Forbes. But there can be variables in 2024. At some
point in time I have got to be able to get my hands around some
number somewhere. I can't just be saying, oh, it depends. I
mean, how do you come up with a definite number a decade from
now and you can't tell me a number today? That is what I am
just scratching my head and trying to figure out.
Admiral Rowden. Sir, I think what it comes down to is it
comes down to understanding in determining what the number of
ships that we have to have is, the ability to assume away or
assume specific variables on this particular date is a very
difficult thing to do. I think Mr. Secretary is exactly right
in saying it is about a hundred ships deployed.
Mr. Forbes. But, Admiral, do you understand my
frustration? When you guys can come over here and give me a
shipbuilding plan that the Secretary of Defense is certifying,
saying this is how many ships I need a decade from now. And I
am just asking you a simple question. I am not asking you to
predict where China is going to be or Russia is going to be or
any of those things a decade from now. I am just saying, today,
when I walk over to the appropriators or anybody else and I
say, this is how many ships we need, how many ships do we need?
And I am really frightened if the United States Navy can't
tell me a number. I mean, be one or two off, but just give me a
number somewhere.
Secretary Stackley. Sir, we don't have the luxury of
telling you how many we need absent of the budget that we are
dealing with and absent of the number that we have got today.
So what we can describe is what the OPTEMPO is of the force
that we have got today, we can talk about the combatant
commanders' demands and what it has taken to meet those when
there are shortfalls.
Mr. Forbes. Mr. Stackley, when the testimony we have from
admirals that we respect enormously says, if we meet the
combatant commanders' requirements we would need 400 to 500
ships in our Navy. So we take that off the table. And what we
are getting at, we are not appropriators, we are authorizers. I
need you to tell me how many we need so I can go fight and say
this is how many ships we need.
If the United States Navy doesn't even know how many ships
you need today, how in the world can we fight for you to get
those numbers? And how can I with a straight face go to the
American people and say, wait a minute, we know a decade from
now how many we are going to need, we just don't know how many
we need today? I mean, I just don't understand that. You all
have got to help me with that.
Secretary Stackley. I will give you an example.
Mr. Forbes. Okay.
Secretary Stackley. I am going to go back to the posture
hearing because I think both the CNO and the Commandant were
very clear. We would like to have 50 amphibious ships today to
answer all the demands. Those are workhorse ships. We don't
have 50, we have 29. And our plan is to build up to 33 because
that is what we can afford.
I don't know if that is a requirement, what we need today.
But when we look at all the tasking that we would choose to
fill if we did not have a constraint in terms of what the force
structure is today, what our budgets are today, we would be a
much larger Navy.
Mr. Forbes. I understand that, Mr. Secretary. But can you
just appreciate a little bit of my frustration when I am just
looking at you guys, who I trust, who I respect, I am saying
you guys think, you plan, you do strategies over there. At some
point in time do you not ever say, this is how many ships we
need in the United States Navy, and we are short? Or we have
more than we need?
Secretary Stackley. I would tell you that we need about
300 ships.
Mr. Forbes. Okay. Now, if we need 300 ships, what I want
to--and I will take that. Okay.
Secretary Stackley. That is the best number that we have
got.
Mr. Forbes. That is okay. Be off some.
But then when I look at this shipbuilding plan, this
shipbuilding plan says today's battle force count is 289. Fair?
Secretary Stackley. Yes, sir.
Mr. Forbes. And it says that. But then on the back it has
that based on the accounting rules we have used for a decade or
more----
Secretary Stackley. 283.
Mr. Forbes. All right. What is this 274 figure in here?
Look at the back. I don't know if you have the 30-year
shipbuilding plan. If not, I will have it brought to you.
Secretary Stackley. Today we have six ships in the ship
count that a year ago were not in the ship count.
Mr. Forbes. Okay. Six ships more.
Secretary Stackley. Yes, sir.
Mr. Forbes. And if you take the cruisers out--I am
looking, it says fiscal year 2015, it says total naval force
inventory, and there is a figure of 274. Where does that come
from? I am just trying to understand.
Secretary Stackley. Yes, sir.
Mr. Forbes. You see where I am at least referencing?
Secretary Stackley. Yes, sir.
Mr. Forbes. And explain that. This is your plan. I am just
reading it.
Secretary Stackley. Okay. The numbers I am quoting you are
2014, today's numbers.
Mr. Forbes. Okay.
Secretary Stackley. What happens over the next year is we
decommission a large number of frigates, which is identified
earlier on in the report.
Mr. Forbes. Okay. So it gets worse then. So next year,
instead of 289 or something, based on the previous count, I
would be at 274 ships. Fair?
Secretary Stackley. Yes, sir. Yes, sir.
Mr. Forbes. Okay. So I am going down. And you say, I need
300 ships. Admiral Locklear is warning us that if we get to 260
we become a regional power, and you agreed with that. And you
say, next year we will be down to 274.
I am getting scared that I am heading in the wrong
direction. I am heading closer to 260 than I am to 300.
And then here is my question. Our plan for modernization of
these cruisers would require that two of them actually be fully
modernized next year, in fiscal year 2015. That is our plan.
That is the House plan.
Secretary Stackley. Yes, sir.
Mr. Forbes. So we know we would have two more cruisers at
the end of next year. Your plan would not require any be
modernized, fully modernized next year.
So my question to you is, do we have any contingency plan--
Admirals, maybe you can address this--anywhere on the globe
where we say that when we count the number of ships we need
that we have 2 years to get those ships out and get them over
for that operational plan that we would have?
Secretary Stackley. The answer is no for major combat
operations. But when you look at the requirement for our force,
the numbers driver is presence.
Mr. Forbes. Got you. But here is my worry, and I am just
going to end it on this.
Secretary Stackley. Yes, sir.
Mr. Forbes. I worry because of today--first of all, let me
compliment you on at least heeding what Congress has said about
our aircraft carrier and putting the money to do that. And
thank you guys for doing that. I think that is important for us
to do.
Secondly, though, what I walk away with today, enormous
respect for you guys, you know that, I am not arguing with you,
I am just trying to get my hands around the fight. Because I
believe that over the next decade or two, so goes the United
States Navy, so goes the national defense of this country.
And when I am looking at you, who I respect enormously, all
three of you, and you say we need 300 ships, and then I wave
this plan around that says, look, this is what we are going to
have, we are going to have 306 ships in 2024, but all of us,
everyone in this room knows there is no money to build all
these ships over that time period, that we will have about a $4
billion shortfall each year, then I put that aside. And then I
ask you this. I said, we need 300 ships, based on what you
said, and I do not doubt your word, but I am heading next year
down to 274, based on the way we have always counted them. And
Admiral Locklear is warning me, if I get to 260, I become a
regional power.
Do you see why that makes me nervous? And I am not
interested in coming out and settling and telling the American
people what our budget says we have to get to. I am more
interested in knowing what we have to have so I can go fight
for that on the House floor.
And then the last thing I will just tell you is, every one
of these operational plans we have, when we look at the ships
we need and what we have, none of them give us 2 years to go
pull these ships out of dry dock and get them manned up to do
it. And so that is the frustration we have.
And I come back to what Mr. Courtney said. When you all
came in here last year and said you just wanted to dismantle
these seven ships, if we had not stepped up and done what we
did, those ships would be gone.
And I fear the same thing is going to happen with these
cruisers. If we don't step up to the plate, at least I know
with our plan we will have two of them next year that will be
modernized. And then I hope Congress will step up to the plate
and get the money to do them because we need those ships in the
United States Navy.
And I have said this before, and I will end on this. I
don't think this is a Phased Modernization Plan. I think it is
a phased euthanasia plan. Because I think when those ships go
into dry dock, we have no guarantee that they are ever going to
be coming back.
But with that, I am going to let each of the three of you
have the final word on whatever you want to say. And thank you
guys for your service to the country. And thanks for being over
here.
And, Mr. Secretary, we will start with you.
Secretary Stackley. Yes, sir. Let me start by simply
stating that neither the Phased Modernization Plan nor the
prior 2 years when the Navy walked over proposals to
decommission the cruisers are done as a preference. Those are
done facing the realities of where we are with the budget. And
it is not something that we can overlook as we put together our
program. And so we have to take the resources that we have got
and strike the right balances between our requirements, the
funding that we have, and then lay it before Congress.
Now, in every scenario we have described that we need more
ships. So there is no debate here on that. And the report that
we deliver to Congress that lays out not just the force
structure that we need and the plan to build it, but lays out
the budget requirements for that, that is sending a very clear
signal to Congress and to the public that in order to meet our
306-ship requirements the funding that is needed greatly
exceeds what we have had for the past 20 years. And we can't
march up to it slowly and wait until the FYDP arrives, when the
Ohio replacement program is ongoing at the same time the
carrier recapitalization, right on down the line, and then deal
with the problem. We are identifying this problem years in
advance so that we collectively have the opportunity to work on
it.
The 306-ship plan is under great budget stress. One of your
concerns and one of your comments, and we take it on board, is
that don't allow the budget to dictate what your requirements
are. Well, in fact, the budget that we have submitted to the
Hill, the 2015 through 2019 budget, goes right by the Budget
Control Act [BCA]. It doesn't disregard it entirely, but it
doesn't allow ourselves to be constrained.
So what we have tried to do is put Budget Control Act
aside, but then responsibly try to arrive at what is the
minimum funding requirement beyond the BCA that meets a measure
of capability that we have got to have to support the defense
strategy.
So we are trying to again strike that right balance without
being constrained just by the BCA, but then not just submitting
a budget that is beyond all reach. Maybe we don't have it
exactly right, but we are trying to hit that balance.
Our concern is not just the challenge associated in those
out-years, our concern is sequestration, because the plan that
we have just laid out that we are critiquing here and the
concerns that are being raised, those are only exacerbated if
in 2016 we show up with the same budget that we told you we
were going to come forward with this past year and it gets
sequestered. It just compounds the problem.
So we are trying to articulate what our requirements are.
It is about 306 ships. We have been consistent for the last
several years in terms of the mix of ships and what the budget
requirement is in terms of new construction and, in this case,
in terms of modernization. And we are trying do the best
government that we can in terms of responsibly managing the
resources that we have got to produce that amount of
warfighting capability.
We might not have it exactly right, but what I am confident
of and I am sure of is if in the end we do keep those cruisers,
those 11 cruisers in an operation and sustainment fashion and
continue to deploy them to meet the demands of today, and we
have to live inside of a sequestered budget or otherwise, we
are going to have less resources available to recapitalize our
fleet, because it will become a zero-sum game.
So I entirely agree with you in terms of identify the
requirement, identify the budget needed to requirement, give
Congress the ability to go in and fight for it. And we are
there with you in that fight. But we also have to be prepared
to address the impacts of living under a BCA. And we can't wait
until we are in the middle of that scenario to then start to
address it.
We have done the best we can to lay out a balance--it is
above BCA--a balance in terms of requirements and resources to
get us to that 306-ship Navy. It is not perfect; it is not
where we want to be. But we are trying to strike that right
balance, not just for the taxpayer, but for the warfighter.
Mr. Forbes. Mr. Secretary, you are a good man. You have
got a tough job, a hard job. We want to work with you, and we
want to help you on that. End of the day, we want to get you
where you need to be, even if it is not where you want to be.
So thanks for all do you.
And, Admiral.
Admiral Rowden. Yes, Mr. Chairman. Again, I appreciate the
opportunity to appear before you today.
In the execution of my responsibilities as the Director of
Surface Warfare Division, one of the things that is front and
center in my brain is that carrier strike group commander that
is going to be deploying in the late 2020s and into the 2030s
timeframe.
I had the honor and the privilege back in the 2009 to 2011
timeframe to command two carrier strike groups out of San
Diego, California. I came to rely heavily on all of my warfare
area commanders and especially on my air defense commander that
was assigned on the USS Chancellorsville and was assigned on
the USS Mobile Bay.
I think about the men and women that we are going to be
deploying at that timeframe, and I think about the capabilities
that we must deliver. As I sat down with the team in N96
[Surface Warfare] to look at what had changed, as Secretary
Stackley talked about, in generating savings and the cost to
own and utilizing the money that was put into the SMOSF fund, I
wanted to figure out how we could best get through the 2020s
and into the 2030s and take care of those strike group
commanders that are going to be deploying at that period of
time.
The purpose-built air defense commander ships that we have
today, upgraded and modernized, will deliver the capability
that those individuals need in order to be able to do the
Nation's bidding at that time.
This is not a perfect plan, as Secretary Stackley said, but
it is a plan that I think we can live with, I think we can
stick to it, and I think we can execute it. These are superb
ships today, and they will be superb ships in the future. And I
look forward to working the plan and to ensuring that we have
the funds and the fortitude in order to continue to press
forward with that.
Mr. Forbes. Admiral, thanks for being there. We appreciate
all that you do and the men and women that serve under you.
Admiral.
Admiral Creevy. Chairman Forbes, distinguished members of
the subcommittee, thank you again for allowing me to appear
today before you regarding our Navy surface ship program. SEA
21 [Naval Sea Systems Command] is committed to the efficient
planning and successful execution of our critical modernization
programs. This will help ensure, as Admiral Rowden says, that
our sailors have the required capabilities to meet the
operational commitments.
Force structure, ship count, and budget discussions aside,
what I hope in the plan that we have presented in the PB
[President's Budget] 2015 budget demonstrates our commitment to
the CG Mod [Cruiser and Destroyer Modernization] program and
communicates some level of comfort that we are committed to
executing.
I think what is important to note there is that our current
plan brings all these ships into the HM&E avail in the first 3
years of the program, demonstrating commitment, buying the
service life of those ships up front so that we know they can
go the distance and makes us able to pull them back into
service more quickly and again demonstrates our commitment.
My biggest challenge, as the guy who has to execute
whatever program is eventually approved, is the uncertainty in
the churn. And that is definitely my most difficult challenge.
If I can lock down a plan in advance, I know I have the team, I
have the processes, I have the discipline. I think the Navy has
proven through the Aegis programs, cruisers and destroyers, and
our associated modernization programs that they are very strong
programs, very successful. And I know if I can lock down a
plan, I can execute it.
That is all I have, sir. Thank you very much.
Mr. Forbes. Admiral, thank you.
And, gentlemen, thank you so much for all that you do for
our country. Thanks for your patience and being here with us.
And Joe, Jim.
With that, we are adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 5:28 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
=======================================================================
A P P E N D I X
July 10, 2014
=======================================================================
=======================================================================
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
July 10, 2014
=======================================================================
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
July 10, 2014
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN
Mr. Langevin. I appreciate your statement regarding the benefits of
the phased modernization plan. As we modernize the capacity and
capability of these cruisers, could you comment on their post-
modernization ability to field high-energy systems?
Secretary Stackley. There is currently no plan to field high-energy
systems on the CG 47 Class ships. However, as research and development
efforts continue in the field of high-energy systems the CG 47 Class
ships, post modernization, could receive consideration for the fielding
of high-energy systems.
Mr. Langevin. With the destroyer modernization plan combining two
modernization periods into one, what is the opportunity cost in terms
of HM&E (Hull, Mechanical, and Electrical) or system upgrades? Other
than conducting the combat system upgrades near the end of the
availability, how will the Navy ensure that these destroyers are ready
to rapidly integrate the latest technologies, particularly those in
support of electronic warfare and high-energy weapons?
Admiral Rowden. The combined HM&E and Combat Systems (CS)
availabilities provide a fully modernized DDG in 64 weeks vice 171
weeks with split availabilities. The ships will continue to receive the
full HM&E and CS modernization upgrades in an integrated work package
enabling fully modernized DDGs to be available to the Fleet sooner,
including the combat systems testing completing at the end of the
availability. There are multiple efforts in progress to develop more
energy efficient systems and to accommodate the integration of future
electronic warfare and high-energy weapons. The integration of these
technologies would be supported within the plan to conduct combined
destroyer modernization availabilities.
Mr. Langevin. What effect will the decision to descope the Flight
I/II Arleigh Burke destroyer upgrades have on maintenance and training,
given that there will be a permanent diversity of software and hardware
capabilities across the destroyer fleet? What sorts of additional costs
will be incurred by the decision to support these multiple lines of
software and hardware throughout the life of the ships?
Admiral Creevy. The descoping of the Flight I/II Arleigh Burke
destroyers modernization package will have a minimal impact on training
costs due to student throughput and instructor requirements remaining
virtually the same for all baselines and the costs to maintain current
Flight I/II training equipment being less than the cost to procure new
training equipment for new baselines. The one exception to this is the
Navy/Missile Defense Agency (MDA) PB15 plan to install Ballistic
Missile Defense (BMD) 4.X on additional Flight I/II DDG's which
increases annual training costs by approximately $800K per year, $4.0M
over the Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP).
Aegis Baseline 5.3.9 remains the most stable and best supported
Aegis baseline from both the standpoint of parts support and training.
The training infrastructure is in place and fully supported and funded.
While this may be viewed as a ``permanent diversity of software and
hardware capabilities across the destroyer fleet,'' the end result will
be a more rapid reduction of the several baselines found in the Flt IIA
ships, as they are replaced with Advanced Capability Build (ACB) 12/BMD
5.0 at near their midlife thus reducing overall lifecycle costs.
[all]