[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
HUMAN RIGHTS VETTING: NIGERIA AND BEYOND
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH,
GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS, AND
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JULY 10, 2014
__________
Serial No. 113-196
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Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
DANA ROHRABACHER, California Samoa
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio BRAD SHERMAN, California
JOE WILSON, South Carolina GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
TED POE, Texas GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
MATT SALMON, Arizona THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina KAREN BASS, California
ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
MO BROOKS, Alabama DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
TOM COTTON, Arkansas ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
PAUL COOK, California JUAN VARGAS, California
GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois
RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III,
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania Massachusetts
STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas AMI BERA, California
RON DeSANTIS, Florida ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California
DOUG COLLINS, Georgia GRACE MENG, New York
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
TED S. YOHO, Florida TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
SEAN DUFFY, Wisconsin JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
CURT CLAWSON, Florida
Amy Porter, Chief of Staff Thomas Sheehy, Staff Director
Jason Steinbaum, Democratic Staff Director
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Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights, and
International Organizations
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey, Chairman
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania KAREN BASS, California
RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas AMI BERA, California
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina
C O N T E N T S
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Page
WITNESSES
Ms. Lauren Ploch Blanchard, specialist in African affairs,
Congressional Research Service................................. 7
Colonel Peter Aubrey, USA, Retired, president, Strategic
Opportunities International.................................... 19
Mr. Stephen Rickard, director, Washington Office, Open Society
Foundations.................................................... 25
Ms. Elisa Massimino, president and chief executive officer, Human
Rights First................................................... 37
Ms. Sarah Margon, Washington director, Human Rights Watch........ 48
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
Ms. Lauren Ploch Blanchard: Prepared statement................... 10
Colonel Peter Aubrey, USA, Retired: Prepared statement........... 21
Mr. Stephen Rickard: Prepared statement.......................... 28
Ms. Elisa Massimino: Prepared statement.......................... 40
Ms. Sarah Margon: Prepared statement............................. 51
APPENDIX
Hearing notice................................................... 72
Hearing minutes.................................................. 73
HUMAN RIGHTS VETTING:
NIGERIA AND BEYOND
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THURSDAY, JULY 10, 2014
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health,
Global Human Rights, and International Organizations,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2 o'clock
p.m., in room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon.
Christopher Smith (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Smith. The subcommittee will come to order, and good
afternoon to everyone.
As we all know, Boko Haram has significantly accelerated
its acts of mass murder and abduction in Nigeria, requiring a
more robust and effective response from the Government of
Nigeria and friends like the United States.
According to the most recent report by the Internal
Displacement Monitoring Centre and the Norwegian Refugee
Council, there are now some 3.1 million Nigerian internally
displaced persons, or IDPs, more than every other country in
the world except for Syria and Colombia.
The U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees estimates that
there are now more than 10,000 Nigerian refugees in Niger and
Cameroon. According to the International Rescue Committee, due
to credible fears of abduction, as many as 1,000 refugees a
week, 80 percent women and girls, are fleeing to the nearby
country of Niger from Nigeria's Borno State alone.
Former U.S. Ambassador to Nigeria Robin Renee Sanders
testified before this subcommittee on June 11 that the fight
against Boko Haram will be a ``long war,'' as she put it, but
that the Nigerian military and security forces are
insufficiently trained and ill-equipped to meet the challenge
of a savage, relentless violence unleashed by Boko Haram.
Just this morning she told a Capitol Hill forum on Boko
Haram that in the vacuum created by delays in training Nigerian
forces vigilante groups have now been formed. They have been
there, but now they are growing in number, and are themselves
committing human rights abuses.
According to the current State Department human rights
report, Boko Haram is responsible for the most heinous human
rights violations in Nigeria, but that same report tells us
that elements of the Nigerian Armed Forces and security
apparatus have committed serious human rights abuses as well
with little or no accountability.
Even in the face of serious threats to Nigerian and
regional security, the U.S. Government, which has a
longstanding alliance with the Federal Republic of Nigeria, has
experienced some obstacles in providing the security assistance
necessary to help our ally address this dire emergency.
Laws our Congress created to prevent our alliance with
rogue military and security forces are being blamed, by some,
for making our assistance more difficult to provide. But is the
law the problem, or, rather, is it how the law is being
applied? Or is it that the U.S. has not attempted to train
sufficient numbers of human rights vetted Nigerian forces? Or
is it the Nigerians themselves not wanting that kind of
training?
What is the targeted number for trained Nigerians? For this
year and the future, how many trainers have been committed to
this task? I believe the Leahy laws are a necessary component
of a prudent human rights policy, and today's hearing is in
large part intended to find out whether there are legitimate
obstacles to their implementation.
At the outset, I would like to make clear that I have long
supported human rights vetting to allow for training of those
who pass muster. One example of many, as chair of the then-
Subcommittee on International Operations and Human Rights, I
chaired a hearing on Indonesia on May 7, 1998, featuring a man
by the name of Pius Lustrilanang, who was tortured by members
of the Indonesian military amid deep concerns that those
involved may have been trained under our Military Education and
Training Program, or IMET.
In like manner, I and others were concerned that U.S.-
trained Indonesian troops may have been complicit in
slaughtering people in East Timor. On a fact-finding trip to
Jakarta, I sought but never received the names of specific
individuals trained by the U.S., including members of the elite
Kopassus unit, who slaughtered dissidents as the Suharto
government fell.
Similar training concerns were expressed by me and others
concerning the Joint Combined Exchange Training, or JCET, and
the Rwandan Patriotic Army during the period when the RPA was
engaged in the killing of refugees in Zaire, now the Democratic
Republic of the Congo.
Moreover, in 1999, Congress passed my legislation--and Ms.
Massimino will remember this well, because she testified at
several of those hearings that we had--that suspended all U.S.
Federal law enforcement support and exchanges with the British
police force in Northern Island, known as the Royal Ulster
Constabulary, until the new human rights training programs were
implemented there, and until programs were established to vet
out any RUC officers who engaged in human rights abuses from
benefiting from American training and preparation.
The vetting legislation worked. Exchanges and training at
FBI facilities for RUC officers were suspended for more than 2
years, until President Bush certified that the British had
established a system to vet and block anyone who committed or
condoned human rights violations from the program.
As my colleagues know, according to the current Quadrennial
Defense Review, we are in a time of increased danger from
terrorist forces in foreign nations, while shrinking budgets
force our military and security forces to become smaller and
leaner.
The QDR states, and I quote in pertinent part, ``The
Department of Defense will rebalance our counterterrorism
efforts toward greater emphasis on building partnership
capacity, especially in fragile states.'' One manifestation of
that developing policy is the President's proposal to allocate
$5 billion to a new counterterrorism partnership fund.
I have visited Nigeria twice in the past 9 months alone and
have chaired several hearings on security in Nigeria in the
past two Congresses alone. Just last month I met with U.S. and
Nigerian officials to find out why our security assistance has
been so difficult to provide when the need is so increasingly
great. Is it the process, or has the administration not sought
to seriously expand training? I don't know.
You will notice that the Department of State is not
testifying today. That is partly because Assistant Secretary of
State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, Tom Malinowski,
was unavailable when we invited him to testify. And I know he
will come at a future date and hopefully very soon. But it may
also be partly due to an abundance of caution surrounding even
a discussion of difficulties experienced in implementing the
Leahy laws.
For example, when I was in Abuja last month, I asked our
Embassy to provide me with their best recommendations, and I
would share it with everyone here, for making the Leahy vetting
more effective, so that we can provide the much needed aid to
the Nigerian Government and end the increasing slaughter and
kidnapping of innocents, such as the Chibok schoolgirls.
Despite initial assurances of cooperation, I have yet to
receive the information, but I will keep asking.
I understand that not everything can be said publicly or
should be said publicly, but, again, this law was created with
full transparency, passed the Senate at the behest of Senator
Leahy, and has been renewed year in and year out, often with
tweaks and changes to it.
As my colleagues know, we refer to the Leahy laws because
there are actually two of them, one for the Department of State
and one for the Department of Defense. Together they cover
material assistance, including equipment and training. These
laws require investigation of alleged human rights violations
by military and security forces, including police.
These investigations performed mostly by the Department of
State require details on not only individuals but also military
units. Failure to obtain such information as name and date and
place of birth can sometimes prevent an investigation and put
it into limbo.
National government officials may consider such information
an invasion of their sovereignty, although we ought to do more
to convince them why that is not so, but to avoid aiding and
abetting rogue elements, we must know if a perpetrator of abuse
is a man from Jos or a man with the same name from Kano State,
as one example.
If individuals or elements of a larger force are guilty of
human rights violations, entire battalions or regimens can be
tainted unless the guilty are identified and separated out from
those forces that are innocent of such crimes. The Leahy laws
allow for the recreation of clean units. On the surface, it
would seem that such a policy is clear and possible to
implement. Unfortunately, it has not been so simple in
practice.
Despite the fact that Sarah Sewall, Under Secretary of
State for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human Rights told
the full Foreign Affairs Committee on May 21 in this room that
at least half of the Nigerian military and security forces are
clear of allegations of human rights violations, we continue to
be told that Leahy vetting is at least slowing the provision of
security assistance.
According to Congressional testimony by Principal Deputy
Assistant Secretary of State Robert Jackson, there are an
estimated 187 Nigerian military units and 173 police units that
have been cleared, but very few Nigerian units have been
trained or are in training today. Again, the big question: Why?
Our Government provides approximately $15 billion in
security assistance worldwide each year, involving 158
countries, yet there are only 13 headquarters staff handling
Leahy vetting, in addition to Embassy personnel. Is this a sign
that these laws are not being taken seriously enough by our own
Government and is there a requirement for additional spending?
In the current fiscal year, the Department of State is
receiving $2.75 million to conduct Leahy vetting. In the newest
bill, the Senate has $5 million. Perhaps that will be enough; I
don't know. I would hope our distinguished witnesses will shed
some light on that.
Of the 158 countries we provided assistance to, 46 had some
aid withheld in 2011. The typical percentage of global Leahy
vettings that don't meet requirements is about 1 to 2 percent,
with just under 10 percent ``suspended.'' In Fiscal Year 2012,
according to testimony from the Congressional Research Service
expert, Lauren Ploch, the State Department vetted 1,377 members
of the Nigerian security forces. And of that figure, 85 percent
were cleared to receive assistance, with 15 percent rejected or
suspended.
In Colombia, the government rejected the requirements of
the Leahy laws before changing their minds and accepting the
process. Now there reportedly are more high-ranking Colombian
and military officials and officers behind bars than in any
other country other than Argentina, and Colombia is cited as a
Leahy law success.
In Nigeria, there have been no disciplinary actions against
Nigerian military for scorched earth assaults on populations,
and few high-ranking Nigerian military officers have been held
accountable for human rights violations.
We are here today to examine the questions that these facts
raise, and other facts, and our witnesses have been asked to
walk us through the process, tell us what works and what
doesn't, and suggest ways to make this process more effective.
I would like to now turn to my distinguished colleague, Mr.
Cicilline, for any opening he might have.
Mr. Cicilline. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you to
you and Ranking Member Bass for calling this important and
timely hearing.
As we all know, the security situation in Nigeria has
deteriorated seriously in recent months with the expansion of
Boko Haram, which in April brazenly kidnapped hundreds of young
schoolgirls. This committee and this Congress passed a
resolution condemning these kidnappings, and I think we all
remain committed to providing as much U.S. assistance and
advice as can be effective to support the Nigerian Government's
efforts to secure the return of these schoolgirls and to stem
the violence of this brutal and violent terrorist organization.
Maintaining robust enforcement of the Leahy laws, which
serves as the primary safeguard, assuring that the United
States is not contributing to human rights violations through
its military foreign assistance is, I believe, a necessity if
we are to maintain credibility with local populations, not to
mention do the right thing by ensuring that we are not
supporting or assisting those violating basic human rights.
So I look forward to hearing the testimony today, and I am
particularly interested in hearing our witnesses address how we
can move forward in a constructive way to assist the Nigerian
Government while ensuring that the units we support honor the
most basic tenets of human rights and international law.
With that, I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and yield.
Mr. Smith. Thank you. I would like to yield to Mr.
Pittenger.
Mr. Pittenger. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for
allowing me to participate in this important hearing and for
your 30 years of dedicated commitment to the plight of human
rights and religious liberties and freedoms of conscience
throughout the world.
Thank you, witnesses, for appearing before us today.
The purpose of this hearing, clearly, is very important, as
we work to ensure that we are taking appropriate actions to
curb human rights violations around the world, while at the
same time not undermining our own national security, the
continued attacks aimed at the young girls, then kidnapping and
selling those girls into human trafficking, is the most
egregious act and cannot be tolerated.
In May, I sent a letter to the President, joined by over
170 of my colleagues, urging all possible action to find and
protect those girls. The issue we face, however, is what
actions can or should we be taking to support a foreign
military who has been continually engaged in politically
motivated killings, torture, and excessive use of force, or
that have just been negligent in securing their country from
those who engage in this egregious abuse.
I look forward to your testimony as we will be considering
the issue on the House floor in the coming weeks.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back.
Mr. Smith. Thank you. I would like to yield to our ranking
member, Karen Bass from California.
Ms. Bass. Thank you, Mr. Chair, for holding this hearing. I
look forward to the testimony of our witnesses today, and I
don't want to take a lot of time. I want to jump right into it.
But I am hoping that as part of the testimony and looking at
the subject of human rights that someone will address the issue
and legislation that is occurring in regards to LGBT
individuals and the way we have seen draconian legislation
passed in a variety of places, and hopefully you will comment
to that in your testimony.
Mr. Smith. I would like to now introduce our distinguished
witnesses, beginning with Ms. Lauren Blanchard, who is a
specialist in African affairs at the Congressional Research
Service, where she provides analysis on African political,
military, and diplomatic affairs, and on U.S. policy in the
region, to Members of Congress, committees, and staff.
She has written extensively on security issues and U.S.
military engagement on the continent, speaks regularly at
academic institutions and international policy fora in the
United States and abroad, and has conducted training in various
countries across Africa for parliamentarians and other
government officials on the policymaking role of the Congress.
Previously, she worked at USAID, as well as in the United
States Senate.
We will then hear from Colonel Peter Aubrey, who is
currently the president of Strategic Opportunities
International and has served in a variety of staff and command
assignments during both peacetime and war. He served as the
initial director of security cooperation for the U.S. Army in
Africa, previously served as an Army attache in Nigeria and
many other countries across Africa, including Burundi at the
height of its civil war.
During the Gulf War, Colonel Aubrey advised Saudi troops
and commanded special forces in combat, and he has been awarded
the Bronze Star for Valor. Thank you for your distinguished
service.
We will then hear from Mr. Stephen Rickard, who directs the
Open Society's Washington office advocates working on both U.S.
domestic and international issues. He has had a distinguished
Washington career on Capitol Hill in the State Department and
with human rights organizations.
Before joining Open Society, he created and managed the
Freedom Investment Project, working to encourage U.S. support
for international justice. Mr. Rickard served as director of
the Robert F. Kennedy Memorial Center for Human Rights and as
Washington director for Amnesty International USA. And he, too,
is no stranger to this committee, and when he was in that
position in particular often came up on the Hill and advised us
and testified. Prior to that, he worked at the U.S. Department
of State, as well as in the U.S. Senate.
We will then hear from Ms. Elisa Massimino, who has been
the president and chief executive officer of Human Rights First
since 2008, and she helped established the Washington office in
1991 and served as the organization's Washington director from
1997 through 2008. She has a distinguished record of human
rights advocacy in Washington, as a national authority in human
rights law and policy.
She has testified before Congress dozens of times, and I
think at least a dozen before my subcommittee, including this
subcommittee, and writes frequently for mainstream publications
and specialized journals. The Washington newspaper, the Hill,
has repeatedly named her as one of the most effective public
advocates in the country.
And, finally, we will hear from Sarah Margon, who is the
Washington director of Human Rights Watch. Prior to joining
Human Rights Watch, she was associate director of Sustainable
Security and Peace Building at the Center for American
Progress, where she researched and wrote on a wide range of
issues, including human rights, foreign aid, good governance,
and global conflicts and crises.
She also served in the U.S. Senate as staff director of the
Senate Subcommittee on Africa Affairs, became a senior policy
advisor for Oxfam America, and worked at the Open Society
Institute.
Ms. Blanchard, if you would begin.
STATEMENT OF MS. LAUREN PLOCH BLANCHARD, SPECIALIST IN AFRICAN
AFFAIRS, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE
Ms. Blanchard. Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Bass, and
distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for
inviting CRS to testify today. In my brief statement this
afternoon, I will focus on the laws that require human rights
vetting and their application in Nigeria. I would ask that my
written testimony be submitted for the record.
Mr. Smith. Without objection, so ordered.
Ms. Blanchard. The State Department vets foreign security
force units prior to providing U.S. assistance based on policy
concerns and to comply with two legal provisions named for
their original sponsor, Senator Patrick Leahy. They are just
two of the many laws that Congress has enacted to promote human
rights and to protect the U.S. image abroad by distancing the
United States from abusive governments and security forces.
The first provision is codified in the Foreign Assistance
Act and applies to foreign aid programs and those authorized
under the Arms Export Control Act. It prohibits assistance to
foreign security force units credibly implicated in gross human
rights abuses.
The second provision, which applies to security assistance
funded through DoD, has appeared in annual defense
appropriations acts since 1998. Both provisions have been
modified over time, as have the procedures for human rights
vetting.
The State Department and DoD Leahy provisions are similar,
but not identical, and in recent years legislation has brought
the two provisions closer together. The foreign aid provisions
apply to all forms of assistance. The DoD provision initially
applied only to training, but was expanded in the past year to
include equipment and other assistance.
Some differences remain, notably in the standards for the
remediation of units deemed ineligible for assistance, and in
the exceptions and existence of a waiver authority in the DoD
provision. The FAA provision allows no exception from the law
except through the credible remediation of the tainted unit,
although aid could be provided through measures framed in law
with notwithstanding provisions.
The DoD Leahy provision, on the other hand, includes
exceptions for equipment and other assistance ``necessary to
assist in disaster relief operations or other humanitarian
international emergencies.'' The DoD provision also allows the
Secretary of Defense to waive the provision in extraordinary
circumstances. To date, however, DoD has never issued a waiver,
suggesting a very high bar for use.
Despite the differences in the two laws, in practice DoD
and the State Department general implement the Leahy laws
similarly. Leahy vetting is a multi-stage process that begins
at U.S. Embassies abroad and concludes at State Department
headquarters. During the process, the names of potential
candidates for U.S. assistance are checked against a variety of
sources for derogatory information. In the past 2 years, the
process has resulted in an approval rate for more than 90
percent of candidates and in an outright denial for fewer than
1 percent.
Growing DoD emphasis on partnering with foreign militaries
to address threats such as terrorism has brought increased
attention to the Leahy laws. Some military commanders have
implied in some cases that the laws have complicated their
ability to build foreign counterterrorism and counternarcotics
capabilities. Others suggest that U.S. training could improve
the behavior of abuse of forces by imparting U.S. values and
respect for human rights and the rule of law.
Attention to Leahy laws may intensify as DoD and the State
Department determine what effect the new broader DoD Leahy
provision will have on security assistance overseas. The
expanded provision is repeated in the House version of the FY15
Defense Appropriations Act, and the Senate Armed Services
Committee has proposed to codify the provision this year.
As recent hearings have highlighted, the United States is
currently seeking to balance security and human rights concerns
in Nigeria. U.S. security assistance to Nigeria has been
constrained by both law and policy concerns, and the security
relationship has been hampered at times by a lack of
cooperation from Nigerian officials and by systemic problems in
the Nigerian military.
Nigerian security force abuses in the context of operations
to counter Boko Haram have complicated efforts to pursue
greater cooperation despite shared concerns about the group.
Political and human rights concerns have been a prominent
factor in shaping U.S.-Nigeria relations for decades.
State Department reports have continued to highlight
serious human rights violations by the Nigerian security forces
for every year since the transition from military rule in 1999.
According to the State Department, the information on security
force abuses currently implicates roughly half the units in the
Nigerian military, and likely would render those units
ineligible for assistance if they were submitted for vetting.
Despite restrictions on some units, U.S. security
assistance to Nigeria is sizeable by regional standards,
totaling almost $20 million in FY2012 State Department funding,
and $16 million in FY2013. DoD funding for Nigeria has been
limited, but appears set to expand under a proposed New Global
Security Contingency Fund Program.
Multiple systemic factors constrain the effectiveness of
the Nigerian security force response to Boko Haram; notably,
security sector corruption and mismanagement. Some of these
factors impede U.S. support, even for units cleared for
assistance. Many soldiers, particularly those in the northeast,
reportedly suffer from low morale, and they have struggled to
keep pace with a foe that is increasingly well armed and well
trained.
By many accounts, Nigerian troops are not adequately
resourced or equipped to counter the insurgency, despite a
security budget approaching $6 billion. In the assessment of
DoD officials, Nigerian funding for the military is skimmed off
the top.
DoD officials have assessed the Nigerian forces as ``slow
to adapt to new strategies, new doctrines, and new tactics,''
and have described Nigeria as ``an extremely challenging
partner to work with.'' U.S. officials have sought to encourage
the government to take a more comprehensive counterterrorism
approach, and one that is, in the words of one of DoD official
to Congress, less brutal. One of the primary aims of DoD
engagement is to ``convince the Nigerians to change their
tactics, techniques, and procedures in the northeast.''
The State Department suggests that the Leahy laws have
provided a strategic tool to encourage reforms in Nigeria, and
in Africa more broadly. The Nigerian military has sought to
develop its own civilian protection and human rights monitoring
and training in the past year, and the Nigerian President
recently ordered more human rights training for officers.
Nigerian officials have also made statements suggesting an
evolving counterterrorism strategy, one that seeks not only
security but also political and economic solutions. In sum,
Nigeria provides an example of the challenges U.S. policymakers
face in building foreign counterterrorism capacities.
By many accounts, developing countries like Nigeria that
are struggling with terrorist threats may desperately need the
specialized skills and support that U.S. security assistance is
designed to provide. But when security forces abuse civilians,
U.S. engagement may risk not only tainting the U.S. image, but
also may fuel popular grievances and alienate local
populations.
U.S. officials continue to explore ways to improve the
vetting process in the dialogue with partner governments to
enhance effectiveness in accountability and to mitigate the
risk that U.S. partners might not use U.S. assistance
responsibly.
Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Blanchard follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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Mr. Smith. Thank you very much for your testimony.
I would like to now ask Colonel Aubrey if he would present
his comments to the subcommittee.
STATEMENT OF COLONEL PETER AUBREY, USA, RETIRED, PRESIDENT,
STRATEGIC OPPORTUNITIES INTERNATIONAL
Colonel Aubrey. Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Bass,
distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for
inviting me here today.
As requested, I will focus my remarks today on what are
commonly called the Leahy laws, which prohibit the provision of
U.S. security assistance to foreign security force units that
have been credibly implicated in violations of human rights.
I previously submitted written comments to the subcommittee
and request that they be entered into your record.
Mr. Smith. Without objection, so ordered. And that of all
of our distinguished witnesses will be made a part of the
record, your statements and any material you would like
attached to it.
Colonel Aubrey. Thank you. Rather than reading what I had
previously submitted, I would like to give some observations on
security assistance that I have encountered in a 30-plus year
career that focused on foreign internal defense, security
assistance, and security cooperation as they affect training in
Nigeria.
Nigeria is a particularly difficult case. During my tour
there from 2006 to 2008, I served with three different Chiefs
of Army Staff. Two were American-trained, and I enjoyed good
access and a large degree of cooperation. The third was not
U.S.-trained, was uncooperative, and routinely refused to
facilitate vetting for U.S. training, claiming it was an
unreasonable infringement of Nigerian sovereignty.
My team and I got the job done. It wasn't pretty, it wasn't
prompt, and it definitely wasn't easy. Vetting can be near
impossible. The standards are not beyond reasonable doubt, but
credible. A misspelled name can result in unintentional
blacklisting, and the system does not lend itself to
correction. And, more importantly, you have to have the host
nation cooperating. If they do not cooperate, the system fails.
There is no simple answer on how to solve vetting,
training, and access in Nigeria. Corruption, poor leadership,
regional differences, tribal issues, and religious conflicts
plague Nigeria and its armed forces.
Previous sanctions have led to a generation of leadership
not enamored with the United States, having been trained,
mentored, and cultivated by some of our global competitors.
Nigeria does not have a command and control infrastructure that
will allow its commanders in the field to have direct controls
of his forces, relying on cell phones and in some cases runners
to pass messages.
Training is inadequate. Soldiers receive an inadequate
amount of ammunition to train with. Officers frequently abuse
their authorities, and there is no real professional NCO corps.
The units that we have focused our attention on, usually
those earmarked for external U.N.-sponsored peacekeeping
missions, perform at a much higher standard, but still suffer
from the problems I describe. At the same time, the Nigerians
are fiercely proud of their accomplishments. They have West
Africa's War College. They offer officer training to their
neighbors.
They have successfully deployed to neighboring countries,
and they participate in regional exercises and deployments. All
of these issues help set the stage for the dilemma that is
Nigeria and the difficulties faced in providing training to
help combat the surge of Islamic extremism in the northeast and
their inability to contain the violence.
Nigeria's problems of vetting can be found almost
everywhere. In Liberia, the Liberian Armed Forces, a force
recruited, vetted, trained, and still mentored by U.S.
personnel, still have training delayed by vetting requirements,
and we know that their force has not been accused of human
rights violations.
The rest of Africa has similar stories. In my written
testimony, I passed a story relayed to me by one of my former
subordinates that in Uganda a misfire occurred in an attempt to
rehabilitate a blacklisted unit. The end result was the
blacklisting of the officer involved in the rehabilitation
attempt, rather than the rehabilitation of the blacklisted
unit.
I offer these following recommendations to the committee
for consideration. Authorize DoD human rights training in a
broad category of subjects similar to the expanded IMET program
that we executed in the 1990s. Allow engagement that is
designed to professionalize those errant forces, teach the law
of land for human rights, the military role in civil societies,
and other such subjects. Develop an exit strategy for the bad
units and individuals that will build for the potential for
full engagement. Rehabilitate and professionalize, rather than
punish. And, finally, develop some type of vetting process for
units like the LAF.
If we don't engage, our global competitors can and usually
will.
I want to thank this committee for this opportunity, and I
stand ready to answer your questions.
[The prepared statement of Colonel Aubrey follows:]
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Mr. Smith. Colonel Aubrey, thank you very much for your
testimony. And coming from someone who actually was in the
Embassy, provided this kind of training and vetting, it is very
important that we receive your insights.
Colonel Aubrey. Thank you.
Mr. Smith. We would like to hear from Mr. Rickard, if you
could provide your testimony.
STATEMENT OF MR. STEPHEN RICKARD, DIRECTOR, WASHINGTON OFFICE,
OPEN SOCIETY FOUNDATIONS
Mr. Rickard. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank
you for holding the hearing. And thank you, Ranking Member
Bass, and the other distinguished members of the committee for
your commitment to human rights and to Africa, as demonstrated
by your service on this important subcommittee. And I would be
very happy to talk about some of the LGBT issues that the
ranking member raised, which are extremely important.
I have worked on the Leahy law, in one form or another, for
nearly 17 years. And I have discussed them with countless State
Department and Defense officials, as well as human rights
experts all over the globe. And the Leahy laws are just common
sense. They prohibit the United States Government from arming
and providing military training to security force or police
units abroad that have been credibly alleged to commit a small
list of the very worst human rights violations.
These laws do not prohibit the United States from providing
assistance, even in the most violent conflict-wracked
countries, like Nigeria and Colombia. On the contrary, because
the Leahy law involves a unit-by-unit examination of human
rights records, the Leahy laws provide a formula for the United
States to engage in countries like Nigeria. They are a formula
for success in those countries, not a prohibition on
engagement.
Indeed, Colonel Aubrey's description of the success story
in Liberia in his written testimony seems to me a perfect
example of what can be accomplished when we build human rights
vetting and training into our system from the ground up. If it
can work in Liberia, and it can work in Colombia, it can work
in Nigeria and elsewhere.
I would like the members of the committee to keep in mind
four numbers when you think about the Leahy law. The first is
530,000. That is the number of units that the United States
Government had considered training in just the last 3 years,
530,000.
The second number is 90 percent. That is the number of
those units that got a quick response, a green light to proceed
after they were vetted, generally within 10 days. There is even
a fast track procedure for countries that have generally good
human rights records.
The third number, which you referred to, Mr. Chairman, is 1
percent. Less than 1 percent of the time a unit is prohibited
from receiving assistance under the Leahy law. It is not a
burdensome requirement.
But the final number is 2,516. The Leahy law blocks aid in
a tiny percentage of cases, but that doesn't mean it is
unimportant. And 2,516 is the number of vetted units that the
U.S. Government found to be credibly involved in gross
atrocities in just the last 3 years.
In other words, without the Leahy laws, this hearing
wouldn't be about a handful of units that DoD would like to
work with but can't because of their atrocious human rights
records; this would be a hearing about the 2,516 units that we
did assist, that we gave guns to, that we gave military
assistance to, and only later discovered that members of those
units had committed murder, rape, and torture. The Leahy law
stopped that, and it stopped it 2,516 times in just the last 3
years.
Those 2,516 units weren't being asked to meet a high
standard. The Leahy law doesn't require pristine forces. The
State Department defines gross human rights violations to cover
five gross crimes: Murder, torture, rape, disappearances, and
other gross violations of life and liberty. That is it. And the
Leahy law doesn't even prohibit you from working with those
units if the government will clean them up.
So when someone tells you that we can't work with a unit, I
would encourage you to ask three questions. The first is, what
did the unit do that got it on the list? If we can't work with
them, it must mean that the United States has determined that
that unit is one of the worst of the worst. It is in the 1
percent of units that the U.S. found credible information that
they were committing murder, rape, torture, disappearances, or
other gross crimes.
Second question: Why won't the government clean them up?
The Leahy law lets you work with a unit if the government will
take effective action. Maybe the government, as Colonel Aubrey
has said, doesn't accept the U.S. commitment or it considers it
an infringement on its sovereignty. Maybe it doesn't want to
let the U.S. tell it what to do. Maybe the government has no
control over the units, and it can't clean up the units, even
if it wants to. But ask yourself: Why won't the government or
can't the government clean up these units?
And finally; ask, if we know or believe that these units
have committed the worst of the worst offenses, if the
government will not or cannot clean up the units, why should
the U.S. taxpayers pay to give those units, those specific
units rather than other units, guns and military training?
There are a number of things that could be done to improve
the Leahy law, and I think there is a lot of common ground
here. We should increase funding for vetting. And I would note
that since Colonel Aubrey's examples in Nigeria, there has
already been a revolution in Leahy law vetting. An excellent
database has been created. There are now 13 professional
vetters who do this work. There is in fact a system to correct
mistakes in the document. So there has been enormous progress
in the last few years.
Two, we should make remediation and vetting a cost of doing
business. We should set aside one penny out of every dollar to
just say, ``This goes to vetting and fixing the bad units.'' If
we want to be in Nigeria, that is just a cost of doing business
there.
Three, we should train people. Many of the examples that
Colonel Aubrey cites are examples of misunderstandings of the
law. And if people had simply understood the law better,
including the case that he cites in Uganda, that problem would
have never arisen. So more training would be better.
In my written testimony, I respond to many of the common
criticisms of the law, and I would be happy to do so in
response to questions. But I would like to ask people to
consider what the lower standard would be below the Leahy law.
Should we take rape off the list of gross human rights
violations? Should we take murder off the list? Should we say
that if you haven't murdered anybody in 2 years, or 4 years,
that is enough; now we will give you guns? Do we have a statute
of limitations? This is the rock bottom human rights
requirement that we should have.
Mr. Chairman, I am a preacher's kid, and the Bible tells us
that--in the Book of Acts--before his conversion on the road to
Damascus, the Apostle Paul was a persecutor of the Christian
church. In fact, according to Acts, he was present at the
killing at Saint Stephen, my namesake.
But the Bible tells us that he cast no stones himself at
the killing of Saint Stephen. What he did was he held the
cloaks of the people who did. He cast no stones, but he was
complicit. He gave support to the people who did.
And when we go to places like Nigeria, shouldn't we at
least ask ourselves, whose cloaks are we holding? Who are we
handing stones to? That is what the Leahy law asks. That is all
that it asks. Let us not be complicit in the worst human rights
abuses in places like Nigeria.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Rickard follows:]
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Mr. Smith. Mr. Rickard, thank you very much for your
testimony.
We will take a short recess. There are a number of votes
occurring on the floor. We have about a minute to get over and
vote. So we stand in recess. Thank you.
[Recess.]
Mr. Smith. The subcommittee will continue its hearing.
And Mr. Pittenger does have to go, but he would like to ask
a question of the panelists, and then we will go to Ms.
Massimino.
Mr. Pittenger. Thank you. Really appreciate the good work
that you all do, and certainly hope that our advocacy can make
a difference for the lives of these wonderful people.
A motto I have lived by is inspect what you expect. So I
would like to ask you, as we take a little bit more depth in
the effectiveness of the Embassies, the DoD, and the State
Department, and how they are doing in the vetting process. A
fundamental piece of this discussion is knowing whether we are
accurately identifying the good actors or if we are
misidentifying bad actors as good ones.
Ms. Blanchard, can we start with you?
Ms. Blanchard. That is a tough question. You know, the
Embassies in many of these countries have to rely greatly on
groups like Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International for
the reporting. I mean, these Embassies are only staffed,
particularly in Africa, by small staffs. So they are relying on
that reporting, and then they have to determine whether that
reporting is credible or not.
They also, you know, benefit from local journalists and
local NGOs, and they have the very difficult task, particularly
in countries like Nigeria that are strategically important,
that face serious threats, in determining whether that
information is valid on a security force unit or not.
So I think that, you know, there is a lot of challenge
there. And when you have got short-staffed Embassies, it is----
Mr. Pittenger. Sure. Makes a difference. Anybody else that
would like to respond to that?
Ms. Margon. I would be happy to make a quick response. I
think the short answer is it depends. It varies very much from
Embassy to Embassy. In some cases, it is particularly dependent
on the Ambassador at the Embassy. We have seen a real overhaul
in vetting in certain Embassies. I think the U.S. Embassy in
Colombia has done a very good job of putting human rights
vetting to the forefront of its relationship with the security
forces there.
Doesn't mean the relationship is perfect. It doesn't mean
the security forces themselves are perfect. In fact, they are
quite the opposite still. But it has become a central part of
the conversation, and each side knows what is expected.
The other piece that I would just add very briefly is that
this is an important question because it is essential that the
executive branch embrace the Leahy law and human rights vetting
as part of its foreign policy, and so that they do a job both
at the Foreign Service Institute in training officers but also
encourage the military to train officers to understand the law,
what it means to apply it, what the expectations are, and how
to clean, if you will, units that have been dirty.
Mr. Pittenger. Ms. Massimino?
Ms. Massimino. Yes. I am so glad you asked that question,
because there is another asset that we have or that we could
exploit more fully in the Leahy vetting process, and that is,
in addition to internationally focused NGOs, the local NGOs
often have the best, most up to date, most reliable
information, but a lot of times they don't understand how the
process works, what level of detail they need, the form that
the information needs to be in.
So it would be worth our while, I think, a good investment
in reaching out, in having the Embassies reach out to those
local human rights defenders, explain to them what the Leahy
law is, solicit their information, develop relationships with
them.
You know, the State Department has issued these human
rights defender principles, guidance on how Embassies ought to
interact with human rights activists in-country, and it really
is kind of a blueprint for how to develop good relationships
with those NGOs. And if those were fully implemented, I think
we would have an additional resource in making sure that the
vetting is well done.
Mr. Pittenger. Thank you.
Colonel?
Colonel Aubrey. The only thing I would add to the
discussion is the need to do a whole of Embassy approach on
that, make sure that the defense attache is incorporated in
there.
Part of the problem is, on the identification, is making
sure that the units are properly identified. That DAT is going
to know that the unit that came out of Sokuto that had this
type of unit patch, that had this type of equipment that
committed the violation was a particular unit.
And that way, even if the people reporting it don't
understand the military order of battle, is that with a whole
of Embassy approach--and you actually ask the accurate
questions--it can actually be pinpointed properly.
Mr. Pittenger. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, I have one more question, if that is okay.
Mr. Smith. Yes, it is.
Mr. Pittenger. Thank you. Well, I would like to hear your
thoughts on the real impact of the Leahy laws, that they have
had. Do you feel that foreign countries have been impacted by
our reluctance to aid security forces engaged in human rights
violations? And, if so, could you give possible examples of
what actions that they have taken?
Ms. Blanchard. In terms of effectiveness of the Leahy law,
I think some of it depends on how much the country wants our
assistance, and I think this may be a question in the case of
Nigeria. In cases that want U.S. assistance, and there are a
few on the continent that I think of as an example, countries
like Colombia, if they want U.S. assistance, then they will
generally comply with our rules and regulations.
And often you will see even senior military people switched
out and units go through this process of remediation. And the
clearer that the Embassy staff can be with the host country on
how that remediation process works, the more likely we are to
see accountability.
If a country doesn't want our assistance, then how
effective can the vetting be? And that is----
Mr. Pittenger. Sure. Thank you very much for your
dedication and your good work.
And, Mr. Chairman, thank you for the courtesy----
Mr. Smith. Thank you very much, Mr. Pittenger.
Mr. Pittenger [continuing]. Of asking. I appreciate it.
Mr. Smith. Ms. Massimino, if you could proceed.
STATEMENT OF MS. ELISA MASSIMINO, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE
OFFICER, HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST
Ms. Massimino. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you,
members of the subcommittee. I appreciate the opportunity to be
here today to share our views on human rights vetting and the
critical role that it plays in advancing human rights and U.S.
national security.
I want to also express my profound gratitude to you, Mr.
Chairman, for your leadership on this and so many important
human rights issues. You came to Congress about the same time
that Human Rights First was born, and I feel like we have been
working together ever since. There is really nobody in
Congress, and very few people outside of Congress, who can
match your passion and persistence. You are a constant reminder
to your colleagues and to all of us that respect for human
rights is not only the right to do; it is the smart thing to
do.
And Human Rights First is actually an organization that is
built on that idea. Our central mission is to foster American
leadership on human rights, and human rights vetting
requirements, the Leahy laws, are absolutely critical to that
leadership.
When Secretary Kerry rolled out the human rights country
reports this year, he said, ``The places where we face some of
the greatest national security challenges today are also places
where governments deny basic human rights to their nation's
peoples, and that is no coincidence.''
As the U.S. expands its partnerships with foreign military
and security forces to counter new threats, it is important to
keep that in mind. Respect for human rights is neither a trump
that beats other national interests, nor is it a soft concern
that can be traded off or deferred without undermining those
very interests.
Respect for human rights, rather, is the cornerstone. It is
a foundation on which to advance other national priorities.
While the United States serves its national interest when
it lives up to its ideals, the converse is also true. We have
learned from years of experience that it is not just our
reputation that is degraded when our partners engage in abusive
and predatory practices; it is our security as well.
Association with these abuses weakens U.S. moral authority, an
increasingly, I think, undervalued resource these days, and
alienates the civilian populations whose support is essential
in the struggle against terrorism. And it is used by terrorists
to validate grievances and to recruit others to their cause.
The Leahy laws are sometimes viewed as an insurance policy
to minimize the risk that American leaders are seen as
collaborators with criminals. And that is an important thing,
but human rights vetting is much more than human rights risk
insurance. I would like to focus on two other strategic
objectives of the Leahy laws that underscore both its
importance and its practicality.
First is the Leahy law's role in promoting accountability.
In any country, real accountability in security services
depends on the capacity and the willingness of civilian
institutions to act. The Leahy laws encourage respect for human
rights by providing an incentive for foreign governments to
bring violators in their security forces to justice.
The Leahy laws by themselves can't ensure that our security
partners will hold abusive individuals and units accountable.
For the law to be effective, the U.S. must embed it in a
broader human rights strategy. Proper training helps foster a
culture of accountability, which is one of the reasons that
professionalizing partner forces is a key component of our
national defense strategy. Properly trained security forces
understand the negative ramifications of human rights abuses,
and, thus, are less likely to commit them.
So the vetting process required by the Leahy laws not only
encourages the development of justice mechanisms, but when it
is paired with robust training and assistance programs, it
fosters professionalism with security forces that ultimately
makes resort to those mechanisms less necessary.
The other strategic value of the Leahy laws is their
contribution to the conduct of U.S. counterterrorism
operations. By encouraging foreign governments to institute
counterterrorism policies premised on the rule of law and
respect for human rights, and by demanding accountability for
human rights violations, the U.S. creates the legitimacy needed
for effective counterterrorism operations and mitigates the
conditions that help give rise to extremism.
Consider Colombia. The U.S. Embassy in Bogota has fully
embraced the Leahy laws with two full-time staff positions
dedicated to vetting 30,000 to 35,000 individuals annually.
None of that was easy. It wasn't cheap, and Leahy vetting is
not a panacea. But after a decade of effort and targeted aid
that has spurred improvements, the Colombian Government
continues to take action against many violators of human
rights.
Finally, the Leahy law is just not an obstacle to pursuing
our security goals. I know there are some, including in the
military, and some here in the Congress, who have expressed
concerns that the Leahy laws create an obstacle to our security
goals because they bar the U.S. from equipping security forces
on the front lines of conflicts, such as in Nigeria.
The logic behind this position is that in some conflicts
there just are no good options, and that in service of a larger
objective, against a bigger threat, the U.S. may need to
tolerate units that have committed abuses.
But those concerns should be assuaged just by the facts. It
is really important not to conflate the need to work with
governments and militaries that have questionable human rights
records with what the Leahy law is intended to prevent. For our
part at Human Rights First, we believe that when the U.S.
military interacts with foreign militaries, it is generally a
net plus in terms of effectiveness, professionalism, and
governance by the rule of law.
But no matter what lens you view it through, it is never in
America's interest to arm or train or partner with individuals
or units that are credibly believed to have committed torture,
rape, or other such heinous crimes.
Now, I have heard, and I understand from the State
Department and others, that the Leahy laws have never really
prevented the U.S. from engaging in an essential operation.
There has always been a more reliable, rights-respecting
alternative.
As you heard from our colleague, Ms. Blanchard, the numbers
really speak for themselves. If there is a problem getting
training and assistance to the right people in Nigeria, I am
not sure it is because of the Leahy laws. Clearly, we don't
want the Leahy laws to end up disqualifying good people who
share our goals and seek our support from getting it.
Those individuals are not covered under Leahy, and, in
fact, it is not uncommon for a new unit to be created for the
sole purpose of excluding abusers and making sure we can help
those people who share our values and our goals. And not only
should we be cooperating with those military forces who share
our goals, we also should be working with them to help them
demand accountability for those accused of crimes.
I suspect that the belief in some quarters that human
rights vetting is a hindrance rather than a help in the
country's battle against terrorism and other security threats
might grow out of a failure to recognize its value. We all know
that in the face of danger the big picture tends to get lost,
and human rights vetting comes to seem a little bit like do-
goodism that can be disregarded in the interest of national
security.
But we should reject the temptation to cut moral and legal
corners. The Leahy laws really derive from the bipartisan
commitment to our country's ideals. And those ideals are a
national security asset. And when we ally ourselves with those
who undermine human rights, we are endangering ourselves.
Now, we have in the written statement several
recommendations for improving implementation of the human
rights vetting process, and maybe we can address those in the
questions and answers.
But I thank you for your leadership, again, in holding this
hearing, and for digging in as usual on the details of what can
make human rights real.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Massimino follows:]
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Mr. Smith. Ms. Massimino, thank you very much for your
testimony, for your leadership for decades. And we will get to
your recommendations as soon as we hear from our next witness,
Ms. Margon.
STATEMENT OF MS. SARAH MARGON, WASHINGTON DIRECTOR, HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH
Ms. Margon. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, thank you for inviting
me to testify today. I am really pleased this subcommittee is
looking at the details of human rights vetting and its
application in Nigeria and beyond.
It is a timely hearing, given the impending U.S.
redeployment from Afghanistan and the inevitable shift in
resources and priorities that will occur. In fact, this shift
has already begun with President Obama's recent creation of the
Counterterrorism Partnership Fund and other correlated efforts
to strengthen the capabilities of foreign military partners.
It is a renewed and expanded approach to security
assistance that calls for reinvigorated attention to the Leahy
law as a critical tool to finding the right balance between
incentivizing institutional reform and addressing ongoing and
systemic abuses that undermine larger U.S. security goals.
As you have noted, Mr. Chairman, the Leahy laws are an
important means to ensure that the U.S. is not complicit in
grave human rights abuses abroad, and that it upholds its
international legal obligations. But it also makes sense within
the larger foreign policy context, since militaries that commit
abuses can also exacerbate longstanding grievances, escalate
atrocities, foment political instability, and provide abusive
armed opposition groups and terrorist organizations with a very
powerful recruiting tool.
As examples, I would like to talk a little bit about our
research in Nigeria, and then move off the continent for a
second to talk about Iraq, given that it has returned to media
pretty heavily.
Since long before the Chibok abductions, and the Bring Back
Our Girls campaign captured the world's attention, Human Rights
Watch has been reporting on the crisis in northern Nigeria and
the serious abuses the security forces have perpetrated in
responding to it. In 2009, we denounced the government's
killing, while in custody, of Boko Haram leader Mohammed Yusuf
and many others, acts which are widely believed to have spurned
further violence by the group.
In October 2012, we released a report that looked not only
at Boko Haram's atrocities, but also at the impact of Nigeria's
heavy-handed security response. We found that in an attempt to
halt increasing violent attacks between 2010 and 2012,
Nigeria's security forces killed hundreds of Boko Haram
suspects, along with members of local communities who were
apparently attacked at random. Our research made clear that the
members of the security force used excessive force, were
physically abusive, detained suspects secretly, stole money,
and burned homes.
In May 2013, Human Rights Watch issued another report
examining massive destruction in the northern town of Baga. We
used satellite imagery and witness evidence to confirm that
while Boko Haram did attack a military patrol, kill a soldier,
and wound five others, the government's response was directed
at the local community, as government forces burned homes and
killed local residents.
Our satellite images actually indicated high levels of
building destruction, but because we were not able to visit the
north we weren't able to confirm death figures from witnesses
of almost 200 people.
Security force abuse in Nigeria is not limited to the Boko
Haram crisis, as I am sure you know. It is deeply systemic.
Over the years, we have documented many cases of abuse and
apparent indiscriminate or excessive use of force outside of
insurgency-related situations, from the oil-producing Niger
Delta region, to arbitrary killings in response to
intercommunal violence in Nigeria's middle belt, to political
violence that often accompanies elections at all levels of
government, to even small events such as one that occurred
about a 1\1/2\ weeks ago in the city of Lagos, where it
appeared soldiers went on a bus-burning rampage, randomly
beating and harassing city residents after a bus ran over and
killed one of their fellow fighters earlier that morning.
This abusive conduct completely undermines the security
force's effectiveness and creates strong resentment within the
communities they are ostensibly there to protect. In the case
of Boko Haram, many Nigerians have expressed reluctance to
share any information that might help stop the group, because
they are afraid it will be used against them.
Worse still, the Nigerian Government has largely failed to
undertake any kind of credible investigation in the ongoing and
pervasive security force abuses that have repeatedly been
brought to their attention. More than 10 years on, the
government has still not held any members of the security
forces accountable for a 2001 massacre of more than 200 people
in Benue State.
If we turn to Iraq very briefly, as another example, where
Prime Minister al-Maliki's heavy-handed approach to security
has exacerbated security tensions, perpetuated impunity, and
undermined the rule of law. We see that in January 2013, the
Prime Minister promised to reform the criminal justice system,
but a year later had done nothing and the brutal tactics of his
security forces remain essentially the same.
In late May, just before the initial advance of ISIS, Human
Rights Watch documented how Iraqi security forces were dropping
barrel bombs on populated areas and attacking hospitals in
Fallujah as the government intensified its campaign against a
broadly defined group of insurgents.
This is not to say that Iraq hasn't been grappling with
some very serious security threats. We know this. But the
government's excessive use of force in law enforcement
situations and violations of the laws of war has hindered
rather than helped the country's counterterrorism efforts. He
has terrified hundreds of civilians, killed thousands more, and
the government has alienated affected populations, many of
which could have been potential allies in the name of
``combatting terrorism.''
A cautious approach to security assistance, combined with
robust Leahy vetting, is essential given the body of objective
evidence in both cases implicating security forces in gross
human rights abuses. The Washington Post editorial board noted
earlier this week, if U.S.-backed forces commit human rights
abuses, the damage is twofold. The fight against insurgents is
compromised, and so is support for the alliance with the United
States.
We also have a number of recommendations, which I will
shorten, but very briefly the first is that Human Rights Watch
would recommend support for the larger $5 million in the Senate
appropriation for the Leahy vetting to ensure that Embassies
have the right staff.
The second is for the administration, and Congress to press
the administration, to move much more quickly on developing
guidance for remediation and accountability.
And, finally, just to pick up on this last point that you
mentioned earlier, the administration needs to do a much better
job of publicly embracing the principles of the Leahy law at
extremely senior levels and making clear both the implication
and the consequences for all partner nations.
Thank you. I am happy to take your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Margon follows:]
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Mr. Smith. Thank you very much for your testimony, and for
your specific recommendations, which will be very helpful to
the subcommittee.
All of your comments and testimony I think will be of
tremendous nature. We are in an inflection point. We are at a
crossroads, I think, especially with the President's proposal
and the language that you, Ms. Blanchard, pointed out in a June
26 submission to Congress with regards--that would seemingly
bypass the Leahy amendment, the ``notwithstanding'' language,
any limitation in the provision of law that would otherwise
restrict the amount or recipients of such support or
assistance, contingent on notification to Congress that it is
in the national security interest to do so, as part of the
Counterterrorism Partnership Fund. And I thank you for
amplifying that in your testimony.
So this does come I think at an important point in this
debate. I would like to ask one general question about Nigeria,
and, Colonel Aubrey, you might want to be first to answer it.
We tried as a committee for approximately 2 years to get the
administration to designate Boko Haram a foreign terrorist
organization.
Matter of fact, Greg Simpkins and I traveled to Jos and to
Abuja last September, and the primary reason for going was to
try to figure out why that FTO designation was not forthcoming,
which, again, just like Leahy is not a panacea, nor is FTO,
there is no panaceas, but there are tools in the toolbox that
could help choke and stop the flow of funds, or at least figure
out where those funds are coming from. And sooner is always
better than later, rather than waiting to a Stage 4 cancer,
which Boko Haram has become.
And so my question is, when we get to training properly
vetted, Mr. Rickard talked about 530,000 as the number, and you
have a number of different periods, Ms. Blanchard, in your
testimony--but large numbers of troops, service members, have
been trained pursuant to Leahy. Only a small percentage are
excluded. It does take some time, of course.
But the question would be about the small number, the
infinitesimal small number, of Nigerians who indeed have been
trained, especially since Mr. Jackson had testified on the
Senate side that roughly half of the Nigerian forces would be
eligible for military training. And that is especially
important in counterinsurgency training.
So your thoughts on, you know, 1,200, 1,300, I don't know
what the number is for Fiscal Year 2013. But it is not much
when one battalion is trained and, you know, the need for five
to ten with that very special skill-set, human rights-oriented.
Your thoughts on that. It seems like it is too small.
Colonel Aubrey. I am not sure that numbers itself really is
relevant on that. I have always felt that the Nigerian Army had
sufficient strength to protect its borders. What you are
talking about is national will, Chairman, is do they have the
wherewithal and do they have the trust of their military to
effectively train and arm and deploy. And I say that, you know,
very cognizant about their military history.
While I was present in Nigeria, we were very confident that
the amount of ammunition that they would issue out their
soldiers was usually zero, that we had people going through
training in Jaji, the Infantry Training Center, preparing to
deploy to Darfur that had been in their unit for 5 years and
had never fired their weapon once.
It is incumbent on the National Command Authority to trust
its elements of defense and security. Unfortunately, the
history in Nigeria does not lend the civil administration great
confidence of that. And that is why my--my current military
peers that had served in the 1990s probably will curse me for
my statement about expanded IMET.
I know that when I had to implement that I was not happy
about having to do some of the Defense Sector Reform
initiatives prior to doing regular military training, because
that is what, you know, the targeted nation wanted. But there
is something to be said about teaching a military's proper role
in civil society, both on the civilian side where the civilians
understand how to properly command and control the military,
but having the military understand the divisions.
In Nigeria, the incidences that have been talked about,
that is their own people that they are going into, that it is
not enemy combatants on a foreign shore. So understanding that
civil-military relationship, taking some of the lessons-learned
that we have learned from 13 years of combat in Afghanistan and
Iraq, and how atrocities make the jobs more difficult. It makes
achievement of the mission goals much more hard.
You know, I don't have a solution. Just an observation
that, you know, the problem in Nigeria is trust.
Mr. Smith. Yes.
Ms. Blanchard. I think Colonel Aubrey has touched on a
number of the issues. I think there is certainly an issue of
political will, and also of follow-through on the part of the
Nigerians.
If you look at the two areas of security cooperation where
we have had the most success, it has been in peacekeeping
training and in maritime security and counternarcotics. The
Nigerians have recently been making the decision to scale back
their contributions to peacekeeping, and they are dropping
further down the list. And they were always one of the top five
contributors. They are no longer. So they are making some
different decisions about how they allocate their military
resources.
In terms of special forces capabilities, they haven't
prioritized that. We started, I believe, in 2010 to try to work
with a special counterterrorism unit. They didn't keep the unit
together. We are facing that challenge now where they are still
debating whether a unit that has been cleared and trained to do
counterterrorism missions will actually have that mission.
So there have been some challenges I think in follow-
through, particularly in engagement with us on things that we
have offered and things that they have taken us up on. So I
will leave that.
Mr. Smith. Yes.
Ms. Margon. Just wanted to pick up on those points. I think
you raised the right question. And in the grand scheme, the
small number of units that have been trained are not enough,
but it is important to remember a couple of things.
First is in the specific case of Boko Haram, a military
solution is not going to fix the problem. And so while it may
be that more clean units need to be engaged, it is not solely a
military problem. It needs to be engaged in a much wider and
more comprehensive approach, which requires much greater
political will from the government in Abuja. That is the first
point.
The second point----
Mr. Smith. On that point, if I could----
Ms. Margon. Sure.
Mr. Smith [continuing]. Is it possible that Boko Haram has
gotten to the point where--I mean, we are looking at ISIS every
day and seeing the gains they are making in Iraq, which seems
to have caught many people flat-footed, both in Baghdad as well
as in Washington and other capitals.
They have built up a critical mass. They weren't supposed
to be able to project power on Abuja, and a month before we got
there they blew up a bus station. It is almost as if they are
extending with impunity their ability to kill and maim, and of
course the Chibok schoolgirls' abduction, followed by other
abductions, and slaughter of young men as well, and boys, in
school. It is as if the terror reign has gone to an
unprecedented level, and they have gotten stronger, not weaker.
So just a thought, but your thoughts on that.
Ms. Margon. Yes. I wouldn't disagree. I think we have
reached a much more violent and expanded version of Boko Haram
right now. I do think in part that has to do with the heavy-
handed approach from the Nigerian security forces in their
response, not exclusively,but I do think over the short term
what the Nigerians need to be looking at is putting together
units and putting political will behind that to deal with the
immediate military and protection concerns.
But then there are also needs to be a much larger response
that looks at the historical marginalization and
disenfranchisement and poverty of the north that has enabled
Boko Haram to capitalize on and move forward with that type of
strategy.
Mr. Smith. Yes. Ms. Massimino?
Ms. Massimino. I would just reinforce what Colonel Aubrey
said, because I thought really you crystallized the problem
that is often faced with human rights vetting and with so many
other situations where we are faced with kind of a short-term/
long-term--you know, what appears to be a conflict.
And I really welcomed your comment that, you know, this is
not--doesn't feel as urgent perhaps to establish these
mechanisms for accountability, buildup, you know, foreign
military's JAG corps, educate them about the proper
relationships with their civilian masters, and all of that. But
if we don't do that, everything else is harder. And so holding
to the discipline of that is really important, and I think that
is exactly what we are facing with implementation of the Leahy
laws.
Mr. Smith. Ms. Margon, you have mentioned in your
testimony, in your recommendations section, that Congress
should press the administration to develop clear policy
guidance on how the diplomats and military officials can
support foreign governments, promote accountability.
And you also point out, ``Finally, the administration
should publicly embrace the principles of the Leahy law.''
Especially with regards to Nigeria, has that happened at the
highest levels of our Government?
Ms. Margon. I would say that in the aftermath of the Bring
Back Our Girls campaign, there has been a very clear
understanding at senior levels from this Government, from this
administration, about the need to be cautious in engaging with
the Nigerian military. The administration is well aware of the
problems.
Has it been embraced prior to that? Not in the way that it
should have been. It doesn't mean that any laws are being
violated. Of course not. But it does mean that engagement at
the Ambassador level and at the Embassy needs to be much more
robust when U.S. Government officials, particularly military
officials, are going to Nigeria, human rights vetting and
security cooperation needs to be a top talking point, which, to
the best of my knowledge, it has not been until very recently.
Mr. Smith. Has it been enough of a priority--and, Colonel,
you might want to speak to this as well--within the
administration to say Boko Haram is a lethal growing cancer on
the body politic of Nigeria? Just like al-Shabaab did such
unbelievable damage, still does, in Somalia and now is
projecting that damage to Nigeria, to Kenya, and elsewhere.
My feeling is, and you don't have to share it, is that
there has been an underappreciation of the threat, which means
we could have been accelerating the number. If half of the
Nigerian military is eligible to be trained, by implication
that half are not, pursuant to Leahy, why aren't we training
more, and why is there not a hurry-up offense to get as many
well-vetted but specially trained troops to protect the
Nigerian people, the largest country in sub-Saharan Africa?
Ms. Blanchard. If I could speak to that.
Mr. Smith. Please do.
Ms. Blanchard. The administration I think has taken very
seriously the threat posed by Boko Haram for quite a long time.
I think one of the challenges--and former Assistant Secretary
Carson made it clear that one of the reasons that the
deliberations on whether or not to designate Boko Haram a
foreign terrorist organization took a while, was that there was
concern raised by a number of NGOs and African studies
academics here in the United States and elsewhere about
actually labeling the group a foreign terrorist organization.
Now, the State Department made several statements labeling
them a terrorist organization, but on the actual FTO
designation. The concern was that that might be seen to give a
green light to the security force abuses that they were seeing
in the northeast by the Joint Task Force. Those reports went
back, obviously, to what Sarah talked about back to 2009.
But particularly as the Joint Task Force stood up, from
2011 onward, we were seeing a lot of very, very serious
reporting coming out, and there was the concern that the
Nigerian Government might perceive that designation to give a
green light to those operations.
And on the flip side, there was not clear evidence, from
what I understand from talking to administration officials,
that the implications of the FTO designation, i.e. the ability
to freeze funds in the United States and stop travel of Boko
Haram individuals in the United States, would have much of an
effect. There wasn't evidence to suggest that there was a lot
of----
Mr. Smith. Well, I get your point, but there is a larger
issue whether or not sufficient personnel are deployed at
Treasury, for example, even now, that FTO has been so
designated to really make a difference and to work this 24/7 to
try to find out where the AK-47s, the IEDs, and everything else
is coming from. And I have asked those questions, and I have
not gotten the kinds of answers that would make one sleep well
at night.
We are not working it, in my opinion, the way we could or
should. That is even FTO. So I just throw that out. Anybody
else want to comment on the issue?
Colonel Aubrey. Mr. Chairman, the only thing I would add is
that the extremist issue in the trans-Sahel area is not a new
one, and it isn't a new one to the Department of State, to
Congress, or to the Department of Defense.
I go back to where I sit on national will. Burkina Faso for
years denied that there were issues in the north, and it was
only after many years and many discussions that they actually
acknowledged. The host nation has to request the assistance,
you know. And until they do, until they recognize the problem,
it is hard to help a partner nation develop an effective
strategy.
Mr. Smith. Let me just ask the question with regards to
units versus individuals and just get each of, if you would,
your thoughts on that. You make the point, Colonel, that
sometimes the taint is forever. And I was talking to Elisa
Massimino before we reconvened, and it just struck me that
there are a number of units in the U.S. military, including the
unit that Lieutenant William Calley was a part of, the Abu
Ghraib deployment, where the bad apples were prosecuted. Not
enough, obviously, with Lieutenant Calley; he is the only one
who was convicted as a result of the My Lai massacre in
Vietnam.
And it just seems to me that maybe reconstituting or
encouraging host governments like--or friendly governments like
Nigeria to come up with a brand-new unit, as opposed to an old
unit that has a terrible reputation.
And as you point out, Ms. Blanchard, you know, there is a
tension there, and you do quote Admiral William McRaven in
Congressional testimony that while he supported the vetting
process, it has restricted us to the number of countries and
our ability to train units that we think need to be trained.
Individuals--that is an absolute, that individuals should be
vetted to the greatest extent possible.
But it does become at least problematic about the unit
side. Your thoughts on that, because it seems to me that it is
worth a discussion, and I am sure there will be a little
difference of opinion as a panel.
Colonel Aubrey. And I will bring myself back to my--what
had been my profession for most of my adult life, is we are
quite proud of those little pieces of cloth, the streamers that
hang from our regimental colors, and so forth. Asking someone
to rebadge doesn't usually sit very well with a soldier. They
are quite proud of their unit lineage.
If you look at the battle streamers on the Army colors,
they date back to Valley Forge. So approaching any other
country's units to discuss, you know, reconstitution doesn't
necessarily sit well. Whether or not we agree with their
lineage, a lot of times they are quite proud of their lineage.
That on these units they--you know, because of their colonial
past, they talk about the colonial wars they fought, or what
they did in the First World War, the Second World War, and are
quite proud, and rightfully so, of their lineage.
I think what is even more important is that for the Leahy
vetters, whether it is in the Embassy or with INVEST, is that
they understand the order of battle, and understand what the
units really mean. What is the difference between a section or
a platoon, a division, a battalion? Who ranks what, the
sergeant or the general? And that would be effectively--to
understand what the unit rotation is, what is the turn of
enlistment to the unit?
Liberia, which had a turn of enlistment, they just--the
first batch of--they have just brought in their second batch of
recruits since the LAF was reconstituted. So if you know that
they are going to do a rotation in 6 years, that if a unit had
done something 10 years ago, the chances of anybody being in
that unit, having committed that atrocity, is gone.
That would be much more effective than saying take the 131
that committed atrocities in Maiduguri 3 years ago, and we are
going to rebatch it as the 151, because we won't know.
Mr. Smith. Thank you.
Ms. Massimino?
Ms. Massimino. Yes. So the examples that you gave of U.S.
units, where there were abuses, you know, those are examples
where there was investigation, prosecution, and I think in
order to get the full value of the Leahy laws and human rights
vetting, as I said in my testimony, you don't want that viewed
in sort of a narrow way where you just kind of rearrange the
deck chairs and see if you can assemble.
I mean, that is one way, and it is perfectly permissible
under the law to create new units and all that. But, really,
what we want, what we all want, fundamentally, the Leahy law is
to prompt better human rights performance, stronger commitment
on the part of the militaries and the governments to
accountability and the rule of law. And you don't get that if
you are, you know, just rearranging the deck chairs.
But, you know, as to these units that, you know, have this
sense of identity and cohesion and all of that, there is
nothing inherently wrong with that. But we all know that there
are units that are, you know, proud and have cohesion around
the wrong things. They are notorious for being human rights
violators.
And I think there you really have to wonder whether long
term the interests are going to be served if you are balancing
those interests with keeping that band of brothers together
when what has drawn them together and the identity of the unit
is not something you want to perpetuate.
Mr. Smith. Yes.
Ms. Margon. Just quickly, I think if you are talking about
rogue elements or abusive units within an otherwise law abiding
military in the country, then the units should be disbanded and
prosecuted, the individuals should be prosecuted. This is in
fact what we have recommended in specific cases in Bangladesh,
Indonesia, and Afghanistan. But if it goes beyond the rogue
elements or the abusive units and is a more endemic problem
within the security forces, then nothing else is going to
suffice, as Elisa said, when it--as opposed to accountability
or prosecution.
And there the U.S. can plan a really important role. The
State Department, USAID, Defense Department, and Justice all
have really deep and varied experience in helping set up
justice mechanisms, technical expertise. Prosecution is a
critical component that helps with the institutional reform, so
it really depends on what you are looking at when it comes to
the unit.
Mr. Smith. Let me ask--oh, yes. Ms. Blanchard?
Ms. Blanchard. Just a final point. Three things. I think,
one, creating new units demonstrates political will, and we
have seen a number of important security partners on the
continent that do that, because there are issues with tainted
units, and we have been able to move forward, particularly
contributors to the mission in Somalia.
A second point is that the vetting process should really
ensure that they try to identify the smallest unit possible
when they have evidence of an abuse. We have seen cases in
important security partners, again, in East Africa, where
larger units have been tainted because the NGO reporting on the
information wasn't able to get it down. And as a result, we
have had important counterterrorism training postponed with
very key battalions.
And then, the third point is the fact that there are
differences in the laws, and perhaps there are differences in
the laws for a reason. The State Department/FAA Leahy provision
requires that these individuals be taken to justice. The
language in the DoD law is slightly different, and, as a
result, you can have the individual taken out and not
necessarily go through a court of law system to get the unit
back to being eligible for training.
Mr. Smith. I have a lot of other questions. I will ask them
all and ask of you, whichever ones you would want to respond
to.
First, starting with--I went on the Web site for the
Nigerian Army last night, and one of the feature parts of that
Web site talks about how the International Committee for the
Red Cross is collaborating with the NA, the Nigerian Army, and
it talks about a training the trainers program, law of armed
conflict programs. Obviously, I think they are primarily
focused on peacekeeping, but I guess they might be talking
about other good human rights-oriented behavior.
What is your thought on that kind of collaboration? Because
obviously it is front and center, and hopefully, you know, the
ICRC is conveying some very important principles and best
practices with regards to human rights.
Secondly, some of you may know that I am the prime author
of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000. When we did
the reauthorization in 2003, we added a provision that
militaries would be part of the minimum standards, and I still
am concerned that when we look at a country's performance vis-
a-vis the minimum standards prescribed in the law, that
militaries are not sufficiently taken into consideration as to
the tier ranking, Tier 1, Tier 2, Tier 3, or Tier 2 Watch List.
And I am wondering, with regards to Leahy, how focused are
we on trafficking with regards to a military? I have tried
unsuccessfully for well over a decade to establish an Assistant
Secretary within DoD's chain of command that would be focused
at an office exclusively on trafficking, because I am great
believer because I talk to generals and armed forces leaders
throughout the world every time I travel it seems. I always
bring up trafficking, and when a politician or a lawmaker
brings it up, it certainly does not have the gravitas that it
would have if a colonel or somebody with a few stars was
talking military to military, training the trainer, so to
speak, language.
I know that DoD does a wonderful job in many cases, but I
am wondering if in the vetting process trafficking,
particularly sex trafficking, is included. And we know of the
things that Shekau said was that he was going to sell the women
from the Chibok school, and the young girls. No one knows if
that has happened, but obviously trafficking is everywhere, and
it is a horrific crime.
Thirdly would be, if somebody is unfairly excluded, say a
commander has a platoon or a squad, a number of people that,
really, are up and comers, they really are wonderful soldiers,
and somehow they get excluded in the vetting process, or not
enough information is known, what does happen with those
people? Do they get a second chance?
Is there an appeal process to--because obviously upward
mobility even, but also capability in terms of fighting a group
like Boko Haram is enhanced if your best soldiers are included,
and they are also human rights-vetted. So the appeals process
would be another question.
Also, delays. You mentioned, Colonel, that when you were a
commander, U.S. Army Security Systems Training Management
Organization (SATMO), ``I was faced with delays in deploying
trainers due to incomplete vetting.'' If you could maybe--and
others, if you would like, but if you could expand upon, what
kind of delays are we talking about? Is it a week, a month? Is
it forever for some? How does that work in terms of your
ability to match up a trainer with a group of soldiers that are
in need of that training?
And the INVEST program, Ms. Margon, your point about the $5
million being far superior than the just under $3 million for
the vetting process, and 13 people I think is the number that
are at DRL. How important is that? Is that really a make or
break issue? All of you might want to speak to that, but it
seems to me that if you don't have the personnel deployed, the
job doesn't get done.
I know in our Embassy in Nigeria we do have--and I actually
watched a vetting process happen with the Google search and
INVEST, and it was one they had already done, but it was just
to show me how, because I had never seen it actually done, at
least at that stage.
Is there room for improvement there? Is the INVEST program
database accurate? Is it something that needs improvement, or
is it just a work in progress, always going from good to
getting better?
So there are a couple of questions. And, again, you might
want to touch on those policy tensions that, Ms. Blanchard, you
have talked about, between the military and state and human
rights community, which can be benign tensions. Everyone is
looking out for--or hopefully striving for the same ultimate
goal here, but we need to learn from each other.
But if you could perhaps address some of those questions.
Ms. Blanchard. I will start with the first issue you
raised, the Nigerian Army engaging with the ICRC, and I think
that is a great development if it is happening. I think one of
the trends that we see, not just in Nigeria but in countries
like Kenya and elsewhere where you have security force abuses,
they often can be linked to breakdowns in the criminal justice
system. You see frustration from local police, from the
military, that individuals, you know, be they Boko Haram or
otherwise, are not going through the system.
And, as a result, particularly in Nigeria, we have seen
massive detentions. These are not criminal justice detentions,
but you are seeing thousands of people held in military
facilities, particularly in the northeast, in Borno, in
horrific conditions. So if ICRC can engage with the Nigerian
military on how to improve those detention facilities, that is
fantastic. A much bigger step would be to address the criminal
justice system and its ability in countries like Nigeria and in
East Africa to address processing of terrorism cases.
On the issue of political tensions, this is a very
difficult one, and there are a number of different tensions. It
is not just between the military and the State Department.
Often there are different parts of the military that see this
differently, I think. You might find that the regional commands
view things differently sometimes than special operations
commanders who are dealing with these countries on a more
episodic basis.
But there are also political tensions between posts, the
Embassy, be it both State Department and DoD officials and FBI
officials, and others who have to manage those day-to-day
operations, managing the relationship with the host country,
and people back here in Washington, DC, who have to establish
and implement the policies, including the Leahy laws. So there
are tensions in terms of what your primary day job is, I guess.
And in terms of you mentioned Admiral McRaven's testimony
last year, as I noted in my written testimony, he followed that
up and said that there had been subsequently some very
constructive engagement between DoD and the State Department.
And I think that as DoD has started to look more deeply at
partner capacity-building, they are really having I think some
constructive dialogues with the State Department on how to
improve the process, improve the vetting process, improve the
discussion with the host governments on how to hold forces
accountable, how to provide this human rights training. So I
think that that is moving in a positive direction.
Colonel Aubrey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I agree with
Lauren about the ICRC. The only thing I would say, if--having
dealt with the Nigerian Army, if they are putting it on their
Web site, I assume it has the blessings from the highest level,
and that means it is probably being checked.
As we all know, you know, soldiers do what they know that
their officers are checking on. If they are taking it
seriously, it is a positive movement forward.
Trafficking, I understand what you are saying. I know that
any military member going into the SOUTHCOM area, one of the
things that is required for entry is to complete--it is listed
under force protection, but it really is training on human
trafficking.
It is, once again, things that get checked, people do. If
they are sitting down there--if that is a standard that becomes
across the board, you will see a greater emphasis from the
military. Obviously, in the SOUTHCOM area of responsibility,
human trafficking had been a concern for the SOUTHCOM
commander, and he acted accordingly.
INVEST--I understand the State Department has 13 people
doing it. Mr. Rickard's number was 530,000 units checked. With
one boss and 12 workers, that is a horrendous workload. I defer
to Ms. Margon's bit about $5 million is much better than the $2
million. Obviously, it is a huge workload when you look at U.S.
global engagement and having to validate a significant number
of military units globally.
And the last comment on vetting, for that particular
mission, we were able to reschedule. U.S. Army Africa has no
dedicated forces to it. It is a headquarters. The Army's
solution for that is to implement through--on the global
manning process is to earmark what they call the regionally
aligned force. And every year an Army brigade or a brigade
equivalent is designated to the combatant commander to use for
engagement opportunities.
There are finite periods. You know, that brigade commander
or that unit commander has requirements that he or she has to
meet. If they cannot deploy because the unit to be trained has
not been vetted, it--you know, it will depend on what else the
United States Army has earmarked for that unit the next quarter
or the next fiscal year.
It might not ever recur. It could be an opportunity lost.
It is very much dependent on the particular training being
desired and when it is being scheduled.
Mr. Smith. Colonel, before going to Ms. Massimino, did you
find that the names that were tendered to you were more likely
to be pre-cleared and to be of soldiers who are likely to make
it, so in a way it is already having a laudatory effect on the
Nigerian Army? And does it then begin to create a culture where
human rights are the way forward for a soldier to really make
it in the military, particularly if he is career-oriented?
Colonel Aubrey. The quality of U.S. training is superb.
Most foreign nations--much broader than just Nigeria--select
their best and brightest to come to the United States to go to
our schools. So it is definitely a career enhancing move to be
selected to come to the United States under the IMET program.
For training in theater, our soldiers are good. The quality
of training that we give is good. Their soldiers benefit. So,
yes, it would be a career-enhancing move to it.
As far as pre-clear on vetting, the Nigerians, when I was
there, they understood what our requirements were. They knew
far enough in advance because we were talking battalion level
training, that we would check the names of every member of that
battalion, and they had enough time to do it. And there was the
political will at that time--and it was already addressed as--
you know, then, peace support operations was very important to
Abuja.
ASO Iraq did what was necessary and had the defense
establishment do what was necessary to meet those terms. It is
still, what is their political will to do so?
Mr. Smith. Thank you.
Ms. Massimino?
Ms. Massimino. Thank you. I don't have a lot to add to
that. I want to also say that I don't know the content of the
ICRC training for the Nigerian military, but I can't imagine
that that is not a huge net plus, to have that happening. So it
is good to hear that.
On trafficking, I am really glad you brought that up. I
know that Leahy vetting sometimes includes things beyond what
the law requires, but I would be also curious to know, and I
don't know, whether engagement in trafficking by militaries is
part of that.
I don't think I have had a chance to talk to you yet about
the fact that Human Rights First is launching a major campaign
on anti-trafficking efforts. And at a recent meeting with
General Kelly, SOUTHCOM, at the human rights roundtable, we had
a specific discussion about the concerns that criminal networks
engaging in human trafficking are diversified and also are, you
know, supporting terrorism, and it is becoming one large
weapons, people, drugs, and terrorism network, profit network.
And so you could certainly make an argument that it ought
to be, and I think we are going to be working closely with the
U.S. military and others to try to ramp up efforts to identify
those in foreign militaries that are engaging in trafficking.
And then, on the appeals process, Ms. Blanchard is far more
knowledgeable about that than I am, but I did want to flag
this, because it goes back to the importance of the duty to
inform. Leahy really, again, to get the full benefit, it is not
really going to work unless we are telling the people who are
being excluded why they are being excluded, and then start
working with them.
And I think there is sometimes a reluctance to do that, to
make the relationship awkward, or we don't want to, or the
governments aren't going to like it, and that has bled into
sometimes kind of putting people in a strategic limbo where
there is not a decision made. They don't want to make a
negative decision, so they just put them in a closet and it
never gets made. And that is not helpful either.
So those are things that it would be good to find some ways
to tackle.
Ms. Margon. Just very quickly, you know, I think on the $5
million, my response will speak both to the $5 million in the
Senate appropriations bill and the tensions. What is very
important to remember about Leahy is that there is both an
Embassy side of this, so the U.S. Embassies are taking care of
this, and there is the Washington side. That can breed
tensions, not just along civ-mil lines, but also from posts
back to Washington.
The $5 million, if you think about it, there is at least
$15 billion of security assistance globally, the centerpiece of
the President's counterterrorism plans as we redeploy from
Afghanistan, is going to be this Counterterrorism Partnership
Fund. Five million dollars to do the vetting is, assuming it is
legislated correctly with Leahy requirements, we would hope, is
that that is what needs to happen. It is a basic need to
continue to expand the vetting pool that way.
So it would go to basic things like supporting staff and
computers in Washington, but also enabling the Embassies, as I
understand, to be better trained. It is desperately needed, and
in the grand scheme it is not a lot of money to help move the
process forward and make it easier, so when defense attaches at
post have to do this vetting, it doesn't result in delays, it
doesn't result in a misunderstanding, and names dropped off of
people who should be.
The final thing that I would just mention is on the
trafficking. As far as I understand, Leahy doesn't cover
trafficking, since we are looking at just the gross human
rights violations. But what I think it is important to note is
that Leahy often works hand in glove with other conditions that
have been put on through various bills, appropriations, and
otherwise.
I think what we have seen in Indonesia and the Philippines
is that Leahy has been the minimal basis along with some other
conditions that have helped move those countries in the right
direction. And so in considering next steps on trafficking, it
may not mean Leahy has to change per se, but that there are
additional alternative expansions that can be made and other
bills that can work in a correlated way.
Mr. Smith. Thank you. And just to add for your
consideration, but I do think section 502(b) and the language
clearly would cover trafficking. Look at the disappearance of
persons, degrading treatment, cruel and inhuman, I mean, it is
ready-made for that.
We will ask the administration, if they haven't, if they
will include it, because it needs to be I think, and get the
TIP office to weigh in as well, hopefully they will agree.
I do have one final question, and maybe--Ms. Blanchard, you
answered it, but the Counterterrorism Partnership Fund, the $5
billion proposal which had legislative language--and I read the
language and it right from your testimony, which came up on
June 26, so just a few weeks ago--seems to not include the
Leahy amendment.
I mean, with notwithstanding language red flags go up as
soon as that language is anywhere, and it says notwithstanding
any limitation in the provision of law that would otherwise
restrict the amount or recipients of such support, does this
bypass Leahy? Or am I misreading the language?
Ms. Blanchard. It could potentially, if enacted in that
way. And the difficulty with these notwithstanding provisions,
we don't always know how they are implemented. So it is not
always clear when the administration makes a policy decision to
use that notwithstanding authority or not.
But, yes, potentially that could, if that makes it into
law, leave ways to--I don't want to use the term ``go around
Leahy,'' but potentially.
If I could make one comment, CRS doesn't make policy
recommendations, but on the issues of resources for vetting the
new DoD definition of ``assistance,'' again, significantly
broadens the amount of security assistance-type activities that
the State Department will now have to be vetting for. And DoD
is still, to my understanding, working on the definition of
what all that includes, but it is significantly larger than the
training that they were vetting for previously.
And if you then add on top of this the potential $5 billion
new counterterrorism capacity-building program, that is a
massive potential amount of vetting that needs to be done.
Ms. Massimino. Yes. I just wanted to underscore that that
is also in our recommendations about the $4 billion for the
Counterterrorism Partnership Fund. And it is a huge red flag,
and I think it is hard to understand that language in any other
way. But Congress has an opportunity. You should not let that
go past.
If there is, you know, any place where the Leahy vetting
requirements should really be, you know, doubled down on, it is
in this new strategy that the United States has for countering
terrorism through these partnerships. That makes Leahy even
more critical than it has ever been. And if this goes through
with that notwithstanding language in it, it risks really
gutting these important human rights laws.
Ms. Margon. I would second that. It is a huge red flag for
us, and very, very concerning. And it doesn't quite align with
what the President said in his West Point speech. And if you
look at the Syrian opposition, nobody in the administration
talks about this new fund to go to the Syrian opposition unless
they are talking about the vetted Syrian opposition.
And so the language that was sent up to Capitol Hill
doesn't meet with the rhetoric that we have been hearing out of
the administration, so it is very worrisome if it is
implemented in that way.
Mr. Smith. I do have one final question, because I did ask
about INVEST. The Google search, INVEST--and thank you for your
patience, especially with that very long voting that we had on
the House floor, but--and then the input that comes in from
NGOs and the human rights community, does the State Department,
and DRL in particular, as well as the Embassies, have a
sufficiently broad net to receive information from
whistleblowers and people who--like a mayor who may know of
something that needs to be told about what happened in his
city, or an NGO that is indigenous in Nigeria, are we getting
enough by way of a channel of information in that third part of
the information flow?
Yes?
Ms. Margon. I can talk about that a tiny bit, since we do a
lot of the work. I think, again, it depends. It is case by
case. It depends a lot on both the international and local
organizations, the contacts that the officers have with the
defense attache, and the political officers in the Embassy.
In the case of Nigeria, I think there is a lot of
information flow. For Human Rights Watch, one of the things we
have been trying to do a better job on when we do our research
and reporting is be as clear as we can about the units that we
observe and to get the information that will enhance Leahy
vetting, whether it be the name we are told repeatedly from the
State Department, date of birth, which obviously is very hard
to get, but we try to include as much specific detailed
information as we can to help that, and to pass that through
both the Embassy channels and then back it up here in
Washington.
And we work with some of the local organizations to do that
as well, and we encourage the Embassy officers to reach out and
to hold meetings in as much capacity as they can.
Mr. Smith. Yes?
Ms. Massimino. Again, I would just underscore that there
are these human rights defender principles that, if they were
fully implemented everywhere, there is nothing about them that
specifically relates to Leahy, but it would in essence make it
the practice of the U.S. Government to establish the kinds and
depths of relationships with NGOs in these countries that would
produce more detailed information that would make the Leahy
vetting process work better.
Mr. Smith. Yes. Ms. Blanchard?
Ms. Blanchard. One comment on the INVEST system. I think
this online database is an incredible tool. You mentioned the
issue of trafficking earlier. From my understanding, the State
Department is trying to input a variety of other not
necessarily gross human rights abuse related information,
including on corruption and trafficking and other serious
concerns on units when they have that information.
But then, of course, that goes back to the issue of time
and resources to actually put that information into the system.
So, again, going back to the 13 people staffing this at
headquarters.
Mr. Smith. I want to thank all of you for your
extraordinarily incisive testimony, the expertise that you have
brought to the subcommittee. This will be widely shared with my
colleagues, and so thank you so very much, because I think it
comes at a very, very important pivotal point.
And our hope is that more service members will be trained
and trained to be effective, but also adequately and robustly
vetted for human rights abuses, so that these troops are the
kind of people we can be proud of, and Nigerians and others in
other countries can be proud of.
I thank you, and the hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 5:12 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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