[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
LESSONS FROM THE LAX SHOOTING
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
TRANSPORTATION SECURITY
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MARCH 28 and MAY 29, 2014
__________
Serial No. 113-59
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
__________
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Michael T. McCaul, Texas, Chairman
Lamar Smith, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Peter T. King, New York Loretta Sanchez, California
Mike Rogers, Alabama Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Paul C. Broun, Georgia Yvette D. Clarke, New York
Candice S. Miller, Michigan, Vice Brian Higgins, New York
Chair Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Patrick Meehan, Pennsylvania William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina Ron Barber, Arizona
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania Dondald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey
Jason Chaffetz, Utah Beto O'Rourke, Texas
Steven M. Palazzo, Mississippi Tulsi Gabbard, Hawaii *
Lou Barletta, Pennsylvania Filemon Vela, Texas
Richard Hudson, North Carolina Steven A. Horsford, Nevada*
Steve Daines, Montana Eric Swalwell, California
Susan W. Brooks, Indiana
Scott Perry, Pennsylvania
Mark Sanford, South Carolina
Vacancy
Brendan P. Shields, Staff Director
Michael Geffroy, Deputy Staff Director/Chief Counsel
Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
I. Lanier Avant, Minority Staff Director
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION SECURITY
Richard Hudson, North Carolina, Chairman
Mike Rogers, Alabama, Vice Chair Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Candice S. Miller, Michigan Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Susan W. Brooks, Indiana Eric Swalwell, California
Mark Sanford, South Carolina Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Michael T. McCaul, Texas (ex (ex officio)
officio)
Amanda Parikh, Subcommittee Staff Director
Dennis Terry, Subcommittee Clerk
Brian Turbyfill, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director
* Resignation of Ms. Tulsi Gabbard of Hawaii and Mr. Steven A.
Horsford of Nevada as Members of the Committee on Homeland
Security as of April 3, 2014.
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Statements
MARCH 28, 2014
The Honorable Richard Hudson, a Representative in Congress From
the State of North Carolina, and Chairman, Subcommittee on
Transportation Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 3
The Honorable Cedric L. Richmond, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Louisiana, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee
on Transportation Security:
Prepared Statement............................................. 8
The Honorable Michael T. McCaul, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Texas, and Chairman, Committee on Homeland
Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 5
Prepared Statement............................................. 7
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 3
Prepared Statement............................................. 5
The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Texas:
Oral Statement................................................. 8
Prepared Statement............................................. 10
Witnesses
Mr. John S. Pistole, Administrator, Transportation Security
Administration, Arlington, Virginia:
Oral Statement................................................. 12
Prepared Statement............................................. 13
Mr. Patrick M. Gannon, Chief of Airport Police, Los Angeles World
Airports, Los Angeles, California:
Oral Statement................................................. 17
Joint Prepared Statement....................................... 19
Ms. Gina Marie Lindsey, Executive Director, Los Angeles World
Airports, Los Angeles, California:
Oral Statement................................................. 22
Joint Prepared Statement....................................... 19
Mr. J. David Cox, Sr., National President, American Federation of
Government Employees, Washington, DC:
Oral Statement................................................. 24
Prepared Statement............................................. 25
For The Record
The Honorable Maxine Waters, a Representative in Congress From
the State of California:
Letter From Hon. Maxine Waters................................. 38
Appendix
Questions From Chairman Michael T. McCaul for John S. Pistole.... 45
Questions From Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson for John S.
Pistole........................................................ 46
MAY 29, 2014
The Honorable Richard Hudson, a Representative in Congress From
the State of North Carolina, and Chairman, Subcommittee on
Transportation Security........................................ 49
The Honorable Cedric L. Richmond, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Louisiana, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee
on Transportation Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 50
Prepared Statement............................................. 56
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland Security:
Prepared Statement............................................. 57
Witnesses
Mr. Frank Capello, Director of Security, Fort Lauderdale-
Hollywood International Airport:
Oral Statement................................................. 58
Prepared Statement............................................. 60
Mr. Michael J. Landguth, President and Chief Executive Officer,
Raleigh-Durham Airport Authority, Raleigh-Durham International
Airport:
Oral Statement................................................. 62
Prepared Statement............................................. 64
Mr. Kevin Murphy, President, Airport Law Enforcement Agencies
Network:
Oral Statement................................................. 66
Prepared Statement............................................. 68
Mr. Marshall McClain, President, Los Angeles Airport Peace
Officers Association:
Oral Statement................................................. 69
Prepared Statement............................................. 71
For The Record
The Honorable Cedric L. Richmond, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Louisiana, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee
on Transportation Security:
Articles....................................................... 52
LESSONS FROM THE LAX SHOOTING: PREPARING FOR AND RESPONDING TO
EMERGENCIES AT AIRPORTS
----------
Friday, March 28, 2014
U.S. House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Transportation Security,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Los Angeles, CA.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 1:04 p.m., at
the Los Angeles Airport, Clifton A. Moore Administration
Building, Samuel Greenberg Board Room, 1 World Way, Los
Angeles, California, Hon. Richard Hudson [Chairman of the
subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Hudson, McCaul, Jackson Lee, and
Thompson.
Also Present: Representatives Waters and Brownley.
Mr. Hudson. The subcommittee is meeting today to examine
the Transportation Security Administration's preparation for
and response to emergencies at airports. Before we begin, I
want to welcome all the witnesses and extend my thanks for
participating in today's hearing. I appreciate the effort taken
on behalf of those involved to have this important field
hearing.
This is an official Congressional hearing as opposed to a
town hall meeting, and as such we must abide by certain rules
of the Committee on Homeland Security and of the House of
Representatives. I kindly wish to remind our guests today that
demonstrations from the audience, including applause and verbal
outbursts, as well as the use of signs or placards are a
violation of the rules of the House of Representatives. Also,
photography and cameras are limited to accredited press only.
It is important that we respect the decorum and rules of the
committee.
I now recognize myself for an opening statement.
I would like to thank our witnesses for their participation
in this hearing and their commitment to aviation security. I
also want to acknowledge the sacrifice of TSA Officer
Hernandez, who lost his life here on November 1, 2013. It is my
sincere hope that this hearing not only reminds us of the
horrible events of that day, but also motivates us to make
changes that will improve our ability to detect and deter
potential threats and respond to future emergencies. I believe
we owe it to Mr. Hernandez and all those impacted by the
shooting to examine the facts and shed light on the details and
the time line of this incident in an open setting. That alone
is the purpose of today's hearing.
The shooting that occurred here at LAX exposed significant
weaknesses in the ability of Federal and local personnel to
communicate and coordinate during an emergency, weaknesses that
I expect that exist in other airports across the country.
Perhaps these weaknesses stem from resource constraints, or
clashes between agencies, or a belief that an incident like
this is unlikely. It is certainly easier to push emergency
planning and exercises off to sometime in the distant future
rather than making them a top priority for today when you have
so many other competing demands for time and resources. Having
said that, I think most of my colleagues will agree that 13
years after 9/11, these types of flaws cannot be tolerated
regardless of the reasons. Based on the reports completed by
the Los Angeles World Airports and TSA, it appears there is
widespread agreement on this.
According to Los Angeles World Airports, the response and
recovery efforts that followed the November 1 shooting lasted
roughly 30 hours. The shooting affected over 1,500 flights and
171,000 passengers. Among the findings in its report, LAWA
highlighted significant coordination and communication
challenges among local first responders. I agree with LAWA's
assertion that airport security needs to become more risk-
based, emergency communications need to be more streamlined,
and there must be a unified incident command set up immediately
after an event like this.
While the report provided details on certain aspects of the
response, LAWA's report conspicuously excludes any mention of
where the two officers assigned to Terminal 3 were at the time
the first shots rang out and what impact, if any, this may or
may not have had. I believe the location of these officers is
crucial to understanding the viability of a flexible response
to screen checkpoints, especially when you combine it with the
lack of interoperable radio communications that we know exists.
If we do not have law enforcement officers stationed at
heavily-trafficked screening checkpoints or ticket counters, we
should at least have confidence that we know exactly when the
first officers will be there to respond to an active shooter or
to an emergency. I look forward to discussing this issue in
greater detail today.
In addition to LAWA's report, we have had the benefit of
reviewing TSA's recent report, which highlights several
recommended actions, including mandatory active-shooter
training for screeners, improved communication systems, and
enhanced law enforcement presence at checkpoints and ticket
counters during peak travel times. The bottom line is TSA
cannot do it alone. It must rely on its local law enforcement
partners in an event like this.
Before I conclude my remarks, I would like to remind
Members that we are on a very tight schedule here today with
folks flying out at various times this afternoon. So I will be
enforcing the 5-minute rule for all Members so that we are
hopefully able to get through two full rounds of questions. My
intention is to hold a second hearing in Washington to follow
up on this hearing to look more broadly at what lessons we can
learn once we put the facts on the record here today and how
they can be applied to airports Nation-wide. I welcome all
Members to attend that hearing as well.
[The statement of Chairman Hudson follows:]
Statement of Chairman Richard Hudson
March 28, 2014
I would like to thank our witnesses for their participation in this
hearing, and their commitment to aviation security.
I also want to acknowledge the sacrifice of TSA Officer Hernandez
who lost his life here on November 1, 2013. It is my sincere hope that
this hearing not only reminds us of the horrible events of that day but
also motivates us to make changes that will improve our ability to
detect and deter potential threats, and respond to future emergencies.
I believe we owe it to Mr. Hernandez and all of those impacted by the
shooting to examine the facts and shed light on the details and time
line of this incident in an open setting. That alone is the purpose of
today's hearing.
The shooting that occurred here at LAX exposed significant
weaknesses in the ability of Federal and local personnel to communicate
and coordinate during an emergency--weaknesses that I suspect exist in
many other airports across the country. Perhaps these weaknesses stem
from resources constraints, or clashes between agencies, or a belief
that an incident like this is unlikely. It is certainly easier to push
emergency planning and exercises off to some time in the distant future
rather than making them a top priority for today.
Having said that, I think most of my colleagues will agree that 13
years after
9/11, these types of flaws cannot be tolerated, regardless of the
reasons. Based on the reports completed by Los Angeles World Airports
and TSA, it appears there is widespread agreement on this.
According to Los Angeles World Airports, the response and recovery
efforts that followed the November 1 shooting lasted roughly 30 hours.
The shooting affected over 1,500 flights and 171,000 passengers. Among
the findings in its report, LAWA highlights significant coordination
and communication challenges among local first responders. I agree with
LAWA's assertions that airport security needs to become more risk-
based, emergency communications need to be more streamlined, and there
must be a unified incident command set-up immediately after an event
like this.
While the report provided details on certain aspects of the
response, LAWA's report conspicuously excludes any mention whatsoever
of where the two officers assigned to Terminal 3 were at the time the
first shots rang out, and what impact, if any, this may or may not have
had. I believe the location of these officers is crucial to
understanding the viability of a flexible response to screening
checkpoints, especially when you combine it with the lack of
interoperable radio communications that we know exists.
If we do not have law enforcement officers stationed at heavily-
trafficked screening checkpoints or ticket counters, we should at least
have confidence that we know exactly when the first officers will be
there to respond to an active shooter or other emergency. I look
forward to discussing this issue in greater detail today.
In addition to LAWA's report, we have had the benefit of reviewing
TSA's recent report, which highlights several recommended actions,
including mandatory active-shooter training for screeners, improved
communications systems, and enhanced law enforcement officer presence
at checkpoints and ticket counters during peak travel times. The bottom
line is TSA cannot do it alone, and must rely on its local law
enforcement partners in an event like this.
Before I conclude my remarks, I would like to remind Members that
we are on a tight schedule, with folks flying out at varying times this
afternoon. I will be enforcing the 5-minute rule for all Members so
that hopefully we are able to get through two full rounds of
questioning.
My intention is to hold a second hearing in Washington to look more
broadly at how the lessons we discuss here today can or cannot be
applied to airports Nation-wide, and I welcome all Members to attend
that hearing as well.
Mr. Hudson. I now recognize the Ranking Member of the full
committee, Mr. Thompson, for any statement he may have.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for
holding this important field hearing today. At the outset, I
would like to acknowledge executive director Lindsey and Chief
Gannon of the Los Angeles World Airports for their hospitality.
Your willingness to aid the committee in its oversight by
hosting the hearing and accommodating our Members' request to
tour the site of this tragic shooting of November 1, 2013 is
appreciated.
To Administrator Pistole, thank you for appearing before
the subcommittee to discuss TSA's findings in the wake of the
shooting and planned reforms to mitigate any similar incident
in the future. We place the security of our aviation sector in
the hands of the men and women of the Transportation Security
Administration every day. Those on the front lines, the
transportation security officers, deserve to know that we are
doing everything within our power to see that they themselves
are secure when performing the critical job of screening
passengers. I am pleased that the national president of the
American Federation of Government Employees, J. David Cox, is
appearing before the subcommittee today to give voice to the
transportation security officer workforce.
As has been well documented, on November 1, 2013, an armed
gunman entered Terminal 3 of Los Angeles International Airport
and opened first on Transportation Security Officer Hernandez.
The gunman then proceeded through the terminal targeting other
TSA employees, shooting and injuring Transportation Security
Officers Grigsby and Speer. Thanks to the bravery of the police
officers on duty, the gunman was ultimately taken down and
prevented from causing further harm.
While some may wish to point fingers and assign blame for
this horrific incident, I believe doing so would be
counterproductive. All of our energies should be directed
toward not only learning from the incident, but also
implementing needed reforms. Frequently we speak of lessons
learned from a tragedy, but fail to implement the reforms
necessary to prevent those lessons from having to be learned
again.
For instance, after 9/11 we identified that communication
between and amongst first responders was an area that needed
major reforms. Despite knowing this and having spent $13
billion to correct the problem, a review of the report the
airport released last week reveals that more than a decade
after 9/11, the police and fire department at this critical
airport could not communicate effectively during an emergency.
The tools Transportation Security Officers have been trained on
in the event of an emergency did not work.
The state of affairs is unacceptable. Our police,
firefighters, Transportation Security Officers, and emergency
medical personnel, along with the American public, deserve
better. Had the shooter at LAX on November 1 been intent on
firing upon passengers rather than targeting TSA personnel,
untold lives could have been lost. In addition to the
communication issue, I have concerns regarding the training
Transportation Security Officers receive for active-shooter
scenarios. I look forward to hearing from Administrator Pistole
on how he intends to ensure all TSOs are trained to respond to
an active-shooter scenario in a manner relevant to their work
environment.
Before yielding back, Mr. Chairman, I would like to
acknowledge Representative Waters, who represents the district
the airport is in, and Representative Brownley, for their
participation in the hearing today. I also, Mr. Chairman, ask
unanimous consent that Representative Waters and Brownley be
allowed to sit and question the witnesses at the hearing today.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
[The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson
March 28, 2014
At the outset, I would like acknowledge executive director Lindsey
and Chief Gannon of Los Angeles World Airports for their hospitality.
Your willingness to aid the committee in its oversight by hosting
the hearing and accommodating our Members' request to tour the site of
the tragic shooting of November 1, 2013, is appreciated.
To Administrator Pistole, thank you for appearing before the
subcommittee to discuss TSA's findings in the wake of the shooting and
planned reforms to mitigate any similar incident in the future.
We place the security of our aviation sector in the hands of the
men and women of the Transportation Security Administration every day.
Those on the front lines, the Transportation Security Officers,
deserve to know that we are doing everything within our power to see
that they themselves are secure when performing the critical job of
screening passengers.
I am pleased that the national president of the American Federation
of Government Employees, J. David Cox, is appearing before the
subcommittee today to give voice to the Transportation Security Officer
workforce.
As has been well documented, on November 1, 2013, an armed gunman
entered Terminal 3 of Los Angeles International Airport and opened fire
on Transportation Security Officer Hernandez.
The gunman then proceeded through the Terminal, targeting other TSA
employees, shooting and injuring Transportation Security Officers
Grigsby and Speer.
Thanks to the bravery of the police officers on duty, the gunman
was ultimately taken down and prevented from causing further harm.
While some may wish to point fingers and assign blame for this
horrific incident, I believe doing so would prove counterproductive.
All of our energy should be directed toward not only learning from
the incident, but also implementing needed reforms.
Frequently, we speak of the lessons learned from a tragedy, but
fail to implement the reforms necessary to prevent those lessons from
having to be learned again.
For instance, after 9/11 we identified that communications between
and amongst first responders was an area in need of major reforms.
Despite knowing this, and having spent $13 billion to correct the
problem, a review of the report the airport released last week reveals
that, more than a decade after 9/11, the police and fire departments at
this critical airport could not communicate effectively during an
emergency.
The tools Transportation Security Officers have been trained to use
in the event of an emergency did not work.
This state of affairs is unacceptable.
Our police, fire fighters, Transportation Security Officers, and
emergency medical personnel, along with the American public, deserve
better.
Had the shooter at LAX on November 1 been intent on firing upon
passengers rather than targeting TSA personnel, untold lives could have
been lost.
In addition to the communications issues, I have concerns regarding
the training Transportation Security Officers receive for active-
shooter scenarios.
I look forward to hearing from Administrator Pistole on how he
intends to ensure all TSOs are trained to respond to an active-shooter
scenario in a manner relevant to their work environment.
Mr. Hudson. I thank the gentleman, and without objection,
we welcome Ms. Waters and Ms. Brownley.
At this time, the Chairman now recognizes the Chairman of
the full committee, the gentleman from Texas, Mr. McCaul, for
any statement he may have.
Chairman McCaul. Thank you, Chairman Hudson. I would like
to first offer my sincere condolences to Officer Hernandez's
wife, Ana, who we met with briefly before this hearing. I also
want to recognize the TSA Officers Grigsby and Speer. From what
I have seen, you are true heroes what you did that day, and we
appreciate your service.
I want to thank the Chairman for his leadership on this
issue. I also want to thank the Los Angeles World Airport for
hosting us and Chief Gannon who gave us a tour of the terminal
this morning. John Pistole, TSA, and Ms. Lindsey, thank you for
hosting us and giving us the briefings this morning. They were
very informative and very insightful.
It is critical that agencies responsible for protecting our
airports are doing all that they can to keep passengers and
employees safe. I believe this hearing is an important
opportunity to examine lessons learned from the shooting, what
went well and what did not, and how we should apply those
lessons learned to other airports as we move forward.
Unfortunately, we live in a very dangerous world. Events
like the one that happened here are difficult, if not
impossible, to prevent. But what we can do is improve our
ability to detect the threats before someone starts shooting,
or detonates a bomb, or hops a fence, or takes advantage of any
security loophole or vulnerability that we have failed to close
for one reason or another. As Chairman of the Committee on
Homeland Security, I know how committed our law enforcement
officers are and our Transportation Security Officers are day
in and day out to stay ahead of any potential threat.
Yet the tragedy that the world watched unfold at this
airport could very likely happen again at another airport in
the future, so we need to be prepared for that wherever and
whenever it may happen. There are valuable lessons to be
learned here today by this incident, but first we need to
dissect exactly what happened.
Among the shortcomings in the response to the shooting, we
know that all relevant agencies did not join together in the
unified command structure until 45 minutes after the shooting
occurred. Even then the Los Angeles Fire Department did not
join the unified command. This, along with a lack of, in some
cases, interoperable communications, made the job of executing
an effective response more difficult.
What is perhaps most concerning about the problems
identified after the incident is that if the gunman had been
shooting randomly rather than targeting TSA, we would have seen
much greater loss of life. Dozens if not hundreds of people
could have been killed within the 4\1/2\ minutes it took
officers to detain the gunman.
Also on the day of the shooting, airport police were
operating vehicle checkpoints and stopping certain vehicles to
check for anything suspicious. Yet as the airport's report
points out, it is possible the shooter actually went through
one of these checkpoints and the officers were not able to
detect or deter him.
There is no such thing as 100 percent security, but this
situation reminds us that we cannot become complacent. We need
to constantly stay ahead of potential threats with proven
tactics and techniques. There are some parallels to what
happened at the Washington Navy Yard just a month before this
incident occurred.
But I do want to close on a very positive note. I think
what we saw today with Ms. Lindsey, and Chief Gannon, and John
Pistole, not only prior to the shooting, but what was done at
the time of the shooting to stop the shooter, to stop more
bloodshed. The heroes that day, as I pointed out, are TSO
Officers, and, Chief, the great work that you did. I must say I
walked away very impressed with how this incident was handled
by all the relevant agencies, but also the way they have looked
in a self-critical way to examine what can be done better. I
think that is what it is all about, how can we do a better job
so we can prevent this from happening again.
I must say I am very, very proud of the Los Angeles airport
police, Ms. Lindsey, your efforts with the airport, and, Mr.
Pistole, what you've done with TSA to make this place a safer
airport. With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
[The statement of Chairman McCaul follows:]
Statement of Chairman Michael T. McCaul
March 28, 2014
Thank you, Chairman Hudson. I would like to offer my sincere
condolences to Mr. Hernandez's wife, Ana, as well as TSA Officers
Grigsby and Speer, who are all here with us today, and all the victims
of the shooting.
I want to commend you, Mr. Chairman, for your leadership of this
subcommittee and for ensuring that we never forget what happened at
this extremely busy airport on November 1, 2013. I would also like to
thank Los Angeles World Airports for hosting us, and welcome all of our
witnesses.
It is critical that the agencies responsible for protecting our
airports are doing all that they can to keep passengers and employees
safe. I believe this hearing is an important opportunity to examine
lessons learned from the shooting, what went well and what didn't, and
how we should apply those lessons to other airports as we move forward.
We live in a very dangerous world. Unfortunately, events like the
one that happened here are difficult, if not impossible, to prevent.
But what we can do is improve our ability to detect the threats before
someone starts shooting, or detonates a bomb, or hops a fence, or takes
advantage of any security loophole or vulnerability that we have failed
to close for one reason or another.
As Chairman of the Committee on Homeland Security, I know how
committed our law enforcement officers are, day in and day out, to
staying ahead of any potential threat. And yet, the tragedy that the
world watched unfold at this airport could very likely happen again at
another airport in the future. So we need to be prepared for that,
wherever and whenever it may happen. There are valuable lessons to be
learned by the incident that occurred here, but first we need to
dissect exactly what happened.
Among the shortcomings in the response to the shooting, we know
that all relevant agencies did not join together in a Unified Command
structure until 45 minutes after the shooting occurred. Even then, the
Los Angeles Fire Department did not join the Unified Command. This
mistake, along with a lack of interoperable communications, made the
job of executing an effective response much more difficult.
What is perhaps most concerning about the problems identified after
the incident is that if the gunman had been shooting randomly, rather
than targeting TSA, we would have seen a much greater loss of life;
dozens if not hundreds of people could have been killed within the 4\1/
2\ minutes it took officers to detain the gunman.
Also, on the day of the shooting, airport police were operating
vehicle checkpoints and stopping certain vehicles to check for anything
suspicious. Yet, as the airport's report points out, it is possible the
shooter actually went through one of the vehicle checkpoints and
officers did not deter or detect him before he entered Terminal 3 with
an assault rifle and began firing.
There is no such thing as 100% security, but this situation reminds
us that we cannot become complacent, and we need to constantly stay
ahead of potential threats with proven tactics and techniques. There
are some parallels to what happened at the Washington Navy Yard just a
month-and-a-half before this incident occurred, including that the Navy
Yard shooter was able to get through a vehicle checkpoint undeterred
and undetected.
I look forward to examining the results of the reviews conducted by
the airport operator and TSA Administrator Pistole. I believe we can
draw lessons from this tragedy that can help strengthen our emergency
response capabilities at airports Nation-wide.
Mr. Hudson. I thank the gentleman. The Chairman now
recognizes the gentlewoman from Texas, Ms. Jackson Lee, for any
statement she may have.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Might I
add my appreciation to you, Mr. Richmond, and also to the
Chairman and Ranking Member of the full Committee on Homeland
Security. I also want to acknowledge my colleagues,
Congresswoman Waters, who has with great honor served this
community and shown great compassion for these issues, and to
congratulate Congresswoman Brownley for her leadership on very
important legislation that I hope will be passed and that the
President will sign.
I thank all of you for coming to this hearing, and
particularly the witnesses: Mr. Pistole for his service to this
Nation, Ms. Lindsey for your guidance of this great airport,
and along with your colleague, Chief Gannon, who eloquently
presented the case today of November 2013. Mr. Cox, thank you
so very much for standing very strong and tall for first
responders in the name of TSO Officers.
Today we will learn what we can to prevent or to mitigate a
similar incident in the future. At the onset, I would like to
acknowledge that the Ranking Member of the subcommittee, our
friend and colleague, Mr. Richmond of Louisiana, could not
attend the hearing today, although he wanted to very much. He
has requested that I express his regret, which I will do, and
asked that I sit in his place during the hearing today. At this
time, I ask unanimous consent that Ranking Member Richmond's
prepared statement be inserted in the record.
Mr. Hudson. Without objection, so ordered.
[The statement of Ranking Member Richmond follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Cedric L. Richmond
March 28, 2014
I would like to acknowledge Administrator Pistole for his service
and leadership in the wake of the tragic shooting at Los Angeles
International Airport on November 1, 2013. I would also like to thank
Los Angeles World Airports for hosting the subcommittee, so that we may
gain a greater insight into precisely what happened on that tragic day.
Los Angeles World Airports should be commended for conducting a
thorough and thoughtful review of the shooting.
The report released last week uncovered several flaws as well as
viable solutions that can be implemented to ensure that similar future
events are mitigated or deterred altogether. It is my hope and
expectation that other airports around the Nation will review the
report and learn from it.
Having said that, Los Angeles World Airports cannot implement all
of the reforms necessary without assistance from local and Federal
partners such as the Los Angeles Police Department, Los Angeles Fire
Department, and the Transportation Security Administration.
Undoubtedly, Federal funds and resources will be required to ensure
all of the needed reforms are implemented. That places the onus on
Congress to provide the funding needed to make planned reforms a
reality.
I would like to thank national president Cox for testifying before
the subcommittee today. He brings the vital element of the perspective
of Transportation Security Officers, the front-line workforce in the
fight to protect our aviation system and those targeted by the shooter
last November.
To Gerardo Hernandez's wife and family, please accept our sincerest
condolences on your loss. Officer Hernandez was the first TSA employee
to be killed in the line of duty. His service and sacrifice will not be
forgotten. To the other Transportation Security Officers injured during
the shooting, Mr. Grigsby and Mr. Speer, we thank you for your bravery
and continued service to our Nation.
Transportation Security Officers across the country perform the
often thankless task of screening 1.8 million passengers every day. All
too often, they are the target of unwarranted criticism by both Members
of Congress and the media. Much of the criticism arises from these
dedicated public servants simply following the mandated standard
operating procedures handed down from headquarters. I would encourage
all of us to keep that in mind the next time we travel through an
airport.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Again, I thank all of the witnesses for
appearing before the subcommittee today. A special thanks, as I
already said, to Executive Director Lindsey and Chief Gannon
for hosting us, and again to Administrator Pistole and national
president Cox, our friend and a friend to working men and
women, for traveling to appear before this subcommittee.
Today we have the honor and privilege of having Officer
Hernandez's wife present with us today. As we chatted about her
wonderful children, I thought it was important to acknowledge
all of the TSO Officers, including Mr. Grigsby and Mr. Speer.
Let it be very clear that you serve in this Nation's defense,
and that TSO Officers across America are first responders, and
they are serving to protect our National security. Mrs.
Hernandez, as I said, your husband fell in the line of duty
serving his Nation, and we are grateful to all of you for your
sacrifice and your willingness to sacrifice, saddened that it
has occurred, but we thank you for your presence here today.
Today's hearing focuses on an issue that I have closely
observed during my time in Congress and as a Member of the
Homeland Security Committee; that is, the safety and security
of our aviation system and airports. For years I served as
either the Chair or Ranking Member of this subcommittee and
worked to enhance aviation security and the security of our
critical infrastructure. Indeed, I was the principal author of
the last Transportation Security Administration Authorization
Act to pass the House of Representatives, and I would hope that
we would soon have an opportunity to look at that again for the
many changes that we may need to include.
Understanding the importance of training for Transportation
Security Officers, that legislation contained a section focused
on the establishment of a centralized training facility for the
workforce. I look forward to hearing from Administrator Pistole
today on how he intends to train the entire Transportation
Security Officer workforce on active-shooter scenarios in a
setting resembling their workplace environment, a crucial
element to the many TSO Officers across America.
Today's hearing also focuses on a topic of great interest
to me in light of a similar incident having occurred, as I
mentioned earlier today, in Houston, Texas. Last May, a man
entered Houston-Bush Intercontinental Airport, sat in the
departure area for over an hour without being confronted, and
subsequently fired shots into the ceiling near a ticketing
area. Thankfully no passengers or airport personnel were
injured in that incident. The shooter ultimately took his own
life. As an additional point, it was a TSO Officer that first
acknowledged or thought that there was something suspicious
about this individual. Ultimately, this TSO Officer confronted
the individual, and the Department of Homeland Security law
enforcement agent came out from another direction and was part
of the overcoming of the individual, even though he had begun
to look as if he was going to take his own life.
Taken together, the shootings at LAX and Houston-Bush
Intercontinental Airport show that airports are target-rich
environments as unfortunate as that may seem, whether it is the
airplane, whether it is the area where passengers are, or
whether or not it is in the open space and secure areas that
TSO Officers are manning. Knowing that, it is incumbent upon us
to implement recommendations and modify policies where
appropriate that will make the airport environment more secure
for passengers, airport personnel, and Transportation Security
Officers. Undoubtedly, doing so will require resources and
support from State, local, and Federal authorities.
When an incident occurs that prompts a response from
multiple law enforcement agencies, our communications systems
are only as good as their weakest link. Our challenge today is
to make the weakest link as strong as possible. It does no good
for Los Angeles World Airports to invest in new radios and
communications systems if the surrounding jurisdictions fail to
do so.
Mr. Chairman, I look forward to listening to the testimony,
and I will submit the rest of my statement into the record.
[The statement of Hon. Jackson Lee follows:]
Statement of Hon. Sheila Jackson Lee
March 28, 2014
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for convening this important
hearing to discuss the tragic shooting at Los Angeles International
Airport that occurred on November 1, 2013.
Today, we will learn what can be done to prevent or mitigate a
similar incident in the future. At the outset, I would like to
acknowledge that the Ranking Member of the subcommittee, Mr. Richmond
of Louisiana, could not attend the hearing today. He has requested that
I express his regret for his absence and asked that I sit in his place
during the hearing today.
At this time, I ask unanimous consent that Ranking Member
Richmond's prepared statement be inserted in the record.
Thank you to all of the witnesses appearing before the subcommittee
today. A special thanks to Executive Director Lindsay and Chief Gannon
for hosting us and to Administrator Pistole and national president Cox
for traveling to appear before the subcommittee.
To the victims of the shooting, including Officer Hernandez's wife
and family, I thank you for your sacrifice and service.
Today's hearing focuses on an issue I have closely observed during
my time in Congress. That is, the safety and security of our aviation
system and airports.
For years, I served as either the Chair or Ranking Member of this
subcommittee and worked to enhance aviation security and the security
of our critical infrastructure. Indeed, I was the principal author of
the last Transportation Security Administration Authorization Act to
pass the House of Representatives. Understanding the importance of
training for Transportation Security Officers, that legislation
contained a section focused on the establishment of a centralized
training facility for the workforce.
I look forward to hearing from Administrator Pistole today on how
he intends to train the entire Transportation Security Officer
workforce on active-shooter scenarios in a setting resembling their
workplace environment.
Today's hearing also focuses on a topic of great interest to me in
light of a similar incident having occurred in Houston. Last May, a man
entered Houston Bush Intercontinental Airport, sat in the departure
area for over an hour without being confronted and subsequently fired
gunshots into the ceiling near a ticketing area. Thankfully, no
passengers or airport personnel were injured in that incident. The
shooter ultimately took his own life when confronted by a Department of
Homeland Security law enforcement agent.
Taken together, the shootings at LAX and Houston Bush
Intercontinental Airport show that airports are target-rich
environments, as unfortunate as that may be.
Knowing that, it is incumbent upon us to implement recommendations
and modify policies where appropriate that will make the airport
environment more secure for passengers, airport personnel, and
Transportation Security Officers. Undoubtedly, doing so will require
resources and support from State, local, and Federal authorities. When
an incident occurs that prompts a response from multiple law
enforcement agencies, our communications systems are only as good as
their weakest link.
Our challenge is making the weakest link as strong as possible. It
does no good for Los Angeles World Airports to invest millions in new
radios and communications systems if the surrounding jurisdictions fail
to do so.
I look forward to hearing from Executive Director Lindsey and Chief
Gannon on how the airport intends to address the communications
challenges outlined in the report the airport released last week.
Transportation Security Officers work diligently, screening some
1.8 million passengers per day, in furtherance of keeping our aviation
system secure.
They deserve to know that when they pick up an emergency phone
line, it will work. They deserve to know that the panic button they
have been instructed to press when an incident occurs will work and
prompt a response from local law enforcement. And they deserve to know
that they have our strong support and will work tirelessly to ensure
they have the training and resources needed to perform their job
effectively.
I look forward to hearing from national president Cox on what we
can do for Transportation Security Officers to make them more effective
and secure.
With that Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Hudson. I thank the gentlelady. Other Members are
reminded that you may submit written statements for the record.
We are pleased now to introduce our distinguished panel of
witnesses here with us today. First, we have the Honorable John
Pistole, who has been the administrator of the Transportation
Security Administration of the Department of Homeland Security
since 2010. As TSA administrator, he oversees and manages
approximately 60,000 employees, the security operations of more
than 450 Federalized airports throughout the United States, the
Federal Air Marshal Service, and the security for highways,
railroads, mass transit systems, and pipelines.
Ms. Gina Marie Lindsey was appointed executive director of
Los Angeles World Airport in June 2007. She has over 20 years'
experience in airport management. Ms. Lindsey briefly served as
managing director for the Seattle-Tacoma International Airport
and director of aviation for Anchorage International Airport.
We thank you for hosting us here today.
Next, Mr. Patrick Gannon was appointed to the position of
chief of airport police for Los Angeles World Airport in
November 2012. As chief of airport police, Mr. Gannon leads
over 1,100 police officers, security officers, and civilian
staff protecting LAX and other nearby airports, and ensures
compliance with TSA mandates, airport rules and regulations,
and international, Federal, State, and local laws. Chief Gannon
retired from the Los Angeles Police Department in 2012 after 34
years of service.
Finally, J. David Cox is the national president of the
American Federation of Government Employees, the largest
Federal employee union representing 650,000 Federal and D.C.
Government workers Nation-wide and overseas. I would also point
out significantly that Mr. Cox is from the 8th District of
North Carolina, from Kannapolis originally, so he is my
constituent. So I always want to make note of that.
I thank all the witnesses for being here today. The
witnesses' full written statements will appear in the record.
The Chairman recognizes Administrator Pistole to testify first.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN S. PISTOLE, ADMINISTRATOR,
TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA
Mr. Pistole. Well, thank you, Chairman Hudson and Chairman
McCaul, Ranking Member Thompson, Ranking Member Jackson Lee,
Congresswomen Waters and Brownley, for holding this field
hearing today on this important topic. I appreciate the
opportunity to appear before you with these other distinguished
witnesses.
The events of November 1 demonstrated the bravery of our
front-line workforce as well as their commitment to TSA's
mission of protecting that Nation's transportation system. In
the immediate aftermath of the incident, TSA took a number of
actions which I would like to outline in my oral statement,
including assembling a crisis action team to advise me and to
ensure communication and engagement with the workforce and
stakeholders regarding the event.
I called for a comprehensive review of TSA policies,
procedures, and training to identify improvements to the safety
and security for TSA employees, and, by extension, the
traveling public after meeting with the family of Officer
Hernandez. Thank you for recognizing Ana and for recognizing
Officers Grigsby and Speer. The day after the shooting I met
with them.
I then had our senior leadership team to take the following
steps. First, we communicated with our workforce with what we
knew and then with frequent updates. Second, I convened a
meeting of external stakeholders where I requested inputs for
actions the agency could take or consider to improve officer
safety and security. Third, I directed an internal team to
assess options and to make recommendations. Fourth, I
redirected a number of our visible intermodal protection and
response, or VIPR, teams from their surface transportation
missions to LAX and other high-profile airports to serve as a
deterrent to a shooter.
From these reviews and assessments, we received hundreds of
ideas and have implemented over a dozen of them. Now, employees
from all levels of TSA contributed ideas through what we call
our Idea Factory and in over 100 town halls that I and other
senior leadership team members have convened. We continue to
welcome stakeholder and workforce feedback as we remain engaged
in advancing further recommendations.
In that regard, I want to recognize the immediate and on-
going engagement our senior leadership team here at LAX, headed
by Federal Security Director Darby LaJoye and his team, has had
with our over 2,100 employees here at LAX, obviously the
largest contingent of TSA employees of any airport in the
country. Thank every TSA employee, particularly here at LAX in
Terminal 3, for their resiliency and their dedication to the
mission. I also want to thank LAWA, particularly Executive
Director Gina Marie Lindsey, and to the LAWA police and Chief
Pat Gannon for their strong partnership prior to November 1 and
since that day.
The LAX shooting raised a number of issues about the
training we provide to our TSA employees, and while they have
received a number of types of training, active-shooter scenario
training was not a primary focus. Since November 1, I have
mandated all TSA employees receive this training. I am pleased
to report that over 98 percent of our over 60,000 employees
have completed this training.
In support of further efforts to reinforce emergency
procedures, we have incorporated a reminder in our shift briefs
regarding evacuation routes and rendezvous points identified in
the local mitigation plan. As part of our review, we studied
how officers notify law enforcement of an emergency most
effectively and determined that we need to do two things: No.
1, regularly test existing alarms, and, No. 2, acquire and
install many more alarms in airports around the country.
Interoperability of communications between TSA and, in fact,
most Federal agencies and State and local authorities continues
to be a challenge Nation-wide, but some progress is being made.
We also directed Federal security directors to ensure all
TSA-owned wireless devices are pre-programmed with their local
emergency numbers and provide employees with their numbers to
allow them to voluntarily program them into their personal
devices. In addition, as a best practice, we are recommending
airports link duress alarms and CCTV systems to ensure that
when a duress alarm is received, a pre-determined set of CCTV
views would be programmed to automatically focus on the
location of the alarm.
After carefully studying the presence of law enforcement at
checkpoints with extensive input from stakeholders, TSA is also
taking the following actions, including incorporating maximum
response times in their airport security programs and then
recommending standards for an increased law enforcement
presence at high airport locations, such as peak travel times
at checkpoints and ticket counters to provide a visible
deterrent and quicker response times.
In conclusion, the senseless shooting of Officer Hernandez
and three others once again reminds us of the dangerous world
in which we live. The shooting has served as a catalyst for TSA
to assess its existing safety and security policies,
technologies, and partnerships. We know there is no 100 percent
guarantee in preventing terrorists and others from doing bad
things, yet we believe based on the extensive input we have
received, the actions I have outlined today provide a measured
approach to mitigate risk without trying to eliminate it.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify today.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Pistole follows:]
Prepared Statement of John S. Pistole
March 28, 2014
Good afternoon Chairman Hudson, Ranking Member Richmond, and other
Members of the committee. I appreciate the opportunity to appear before
you today.
On November 1, 2013, Gerardo Hernandez, a 39-year-old
Transportation Security Officer (TSO), was shot and killed while
stationed at a Los Angeles International Airport (LAX) Transportation
Security Administration (TSA) checkpoint. Officer Hernandez had worked
for TSA since 2010 and was a well-liked and respected employee. He
leaves behind a wife and two children.
Behavior Detection Officer (BDO) Tony Grigsby, Security Training
Instructor (STI) James Speer, and a passenger were also wounded in the
shooting. Both BDO Grigsby and STI Speer stayed at the checkpoint to
assist an elderly passenger, placing themselves in harm's way.
The events of November 1 demonstrated the bravery of our front-line
workforce as well as their commitment to TSA's mission of protecting
the Nation's transportation systems in order to ensure freedom of
movement for people and commerce. The incident also highlighted the
excellence of our security partners. We are thankful for the
exceptional work of the Los Angeles World Airports Police Department,
whose officers quickly responded to the scene and apprehended the
alleged shooter. We are also thankful for our partners at the Federal
Bureau of Investigation and the U.S. Attorney's Office, who continue to
investigate and prosecute the crime, and for the continued support from
this committee and others for Officer Hernandez's loved ones, his
fellow officers at LAX, and our agency as a whole.
In the immediate aftermath of the incident, I took a number of
actions, including assembling a crisis action team to advise me and to
ensure appropriate communication with the work force regarding the
event. We sent a situational report to all employees the day of the
shooting advising them of the details known at the time. TSA increased
the visibility of uniformed officers in and around checkpoints by
deploying Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response (VIPR) teams to
the aviation sector and by ensuring that State and local airport law
enforcement agencies provided an enhanced deployment of uniformed
officers in and around checkpoints.
I also called for a comprehensive review of TSA policies,
procedures, and training to identify possible improvements to safety
and security for TSA employees serving to protect the public at our
Nation's airports. TSA convened a team of subject-matter experts from
across the agency, and we engaged stakeholders and our workforce to
elicit recommendations and feedback. I would like to summarize our
stakeholder and workforce outreach, and then outline the results of the
review in the following areas: (1) Training, communications, and
employee support; (2) emergency response equipment and technology; and
(3) law enforcement officer (LEO) presence at and response to
checkpoints.
stakeholder and workforce engagement
After meeting with the family of Officer Hernandez and our two
wounded officers the day after the shooting, one of my first actions
was to convene stakeholder meetings at TSA Headquarters on November 7,
2013 and January 8, 2014, which included representatives from law
enforcement agencies and associations, labor groups and industry
associations, and other Federal, State, and local agencies. At these
meetings, I requested recommendations for actions the agency could take
as well as initial feedback on various ideas under consideration. TSA
afforded stakeholders an additional opportunity to provide feedback
through written comments to be provided within 30 days of the second
meeting. I considered these comments in my decision-making process and
development of supplemental proposals.
I likewise sought the input of TSA employees, through both town
hall meetings and the Idea Factory.\1\ I have also communicated
regularly with the workforce on the status of the security review via
written and video messages as well as shift briefs, emphasizing that
every possible effort to ensure officer safety is being considered and
implemented, if feasible and appropriate, and encouraging workforce
input. Employees from all levels of the organization contributed ideas,
including Federal Security Directors (FSDs), TSOs, staff from Training
and Coordination Centers, security inspectors, and Headquarters
employees. The ideas generated by employees were presented to
leadership and a number of them were endorsed. TSA continues to welcome
stakeholder and workforce feedback as we remain engaged in advancing
further recommendations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The Idea Factory is a web-based tool designed to enable
innovation and collaboration within the agency by soliciting employee
feedback on TSA policies. The Idea Factory has led to the
implementation of more than 40 innovative ideas, including changes to
Standard Operating Procedures and new initiatives that have improved
job satisfaction, increased retention, and improved the quality of work
life. To date, there are almost 9,000 ideas on the site and more than
25,000 employees have visited the site.
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training, communications, and employee support
The incident at LAX has raised concerns about the adequacy of
training for TSA employees responding to an active-shooter scenario.
Employees at TSA regularly receive an array of security and educational
training activities. However, historically, active-shooting scenario
training was not a primary focus, but was available to employees
through two optional on-line courses. As recommended through the Idea
Factory, TSA mandated this training on December 19, 2013, with a
required completion date for all employees of March 31, 2014.
Industry stakeholders further emphasized the importance of active-
shooter training and exercises through feedback provided at the
stakeholder meetings. In addition to the training course, TSA has
mandated active-shooter exercises for all TSA employees on at least an
annual basis. As a further enhancement, TSA established a working group
to develop a facilitator guide that will assist field Assistant FSDs
for Law Enforcement in providing best practices and templates for local
airport active-shooter exercises.
Feedback from law enforcement and industry stakeholders also
emphasized the importance of training and preparation to minimize
casualties and help direct law enforcement to the active shooter.
TSA requires each airport to develop and implement an active-
shooter tactical response plan consistent with our National standard,
which includes the designation of possible evacuation routes and
establishment of rendezvous points. Following the shooting, we
conducted a review of Active Shooter Mitigation Plans to ensure that
all airports have active-shooter plans in place and that such plans are
in compliance with a National model. We also swiftly reviewed the LAX
plan and confirmed compliance with the National format.
Based on feedback from law enforcement and industry stakeholders,
TSA is recommending that airport operators conduct active-shooter
training and exercises on a bi-annual basis to minimize casualties and
help direct law enforcement to the active shooter.\2\ TSA also issued
an Operations Directive requiring that all FSDs conduct mandatory
evacuation drills twice a year. This Directive supplements the
information shared by shift supervisors regarding evacuation procedures
and ensures employees are trained on the active-shooter plan in place
at their local airport.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ LAX had recently conducted an active-shooter exercise under
their plan prior to the shooting.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In support of further efforts to reinforce emergency procedures, we
have incorporated a reminder in our weekly shift brief requiring
supervisors to conduct briefings for employees regarding the evacuation
routes and rendezvous points identified in the local mitigation plan.
As such, supervisors brief all personnel at the beginning of each shift
regarding the evacuation plan, emergency exits, and alarm protocol for
their particular location.
Finally, TSA is exploring options to provide the family of TSO
Hernandez with additional benefits.
emergency response equipment and technology
As part of our review, TSA studied how officers can notify law
enforcement of an emergency at a checkpoint most effectively.\3\ The
security review determined that technological improvements to alert
notification systems are needed in many airports to ensure that duress
alarms are present at all screening locations, including at terminal
lobbies. TSA conducted a survey of screening and other locations
including X-ray lanes, private screening rooms, supervisor podiums,
Known Crew Member lanes, exit lanes, and Explosive Detection System
baggage screening areas in non-sterile spaces, which showed that
several of these locations do not have alert notification capability.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ The primary means for providing notification of an emergency is
via duress alarms.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
To close the gap identified by the survey, I approved the
acquisition of additional alert notification capacity. TSA has begun
the process of acquiring duress alarms for all airports. In addition,
we will solicit and award delivery orders to a third-party systems
integrator for the installation of duress alarms at all remaining
airports, which will begin shortly after we award the contract.
Although not all airports have extensive alert notification
capabilities, for those airports that do, we conducted a survey of all
existing duress alarms to determine if they were fully functional.
Ninety-eight percent of the alarms were deemed fully functional, and we
took corrective action to fix the remaining alarms. We then issued an
Operations Directive requiring TSA employees to conduct a weekly test
in coordination with airports to verify all alert notification systems
are fully functional.
We have also adopted guidance for FSDs to ensure all TSA-owned
wireless devices are programmed with local airport emergency numbers
and to provide employees with those numbers to allow them to
voluntarily program them into personal devices. This guidance is in
direct response to learning that calls made to 9-1-1 at airports in the
event of an emergency may not be routed to the on-site police
department.
In addition, we are engaging airports to encourage linkage between
duress alarms and closed-circuit television (CCTV) systems to ensure
that when a duress alarm is received, a predetermined set of CCTV views
would be programmed to automatically focus on the location of the
alarm. Creating these linkages should greatly enhance the ability of
the airport operator to have a real-time view of the area where a
duress alarm is activated.
law enforcement officer presence at and response to checkpoints
After carefully studying the presence of law enforcement officers
at checkpoints, TSA is taking the following actions, which reflect our
intent to enhance the visibility of law enforcement while recognizing
the financial burden that additional resource requirements would place
upon our law enforcement partners, many of whom have faced budget cuts
in recent years. We have valued the input of our workforce and the
expertise of our stakeholders in determining an appropriate balance
that enhances officer safety and security without mandating
requirements that could affect our partners' ability to provide
effective law enforcement throughout each airport.
First, we are requiring all airports to incorporate maximum
response times in their Airport Security Programs (ASPs). TSA will work
with airports to determine the most appropriate maximum response time
for their ASP. TSA conducted a review of all ASPs and concluded that
while most airports were operating under ASPs which specified a maximum
response time to checkpoints, 71 airports operating under flexible
response agreements did not have any required response time stated in
their ASP. We also identified differences in maximum response times
resulting from discretionary determinations of need made at the local
level. Although we considered imposing standardized maximum response
times by category, we recognize the importance of allowing discretion
in these determinations and are therefore not currently pursuing
standardized maximum response times. Nonetheless, ensuring that all
airports adopt clearly articulated maximum response times in their ASP
is a priority, and our FSDs are working with airports to update their
ASPs where necessary. Once updates are complete, TSA will monitor and
enforce compliance with the new policy. These changes will address the
gap identified in the agency's review while allowing local airport
security directors flexibility in working with their airport operators.
Second, I have directed TSA's VIPR teams to continue the surge in
operations at passenger screening checkpoints to provide a visible
deterrent in support of our TSOs. VIPR teams are authorized under
statute to augment the security of any mode of transportation at any
location within the United States and are typically composed of
Federal, State, and local law enforcement and security assets and TSA
personnel including Federal Air Marshals, Behavior Detection Officers,
Transportation Security Officers, Transportation Security Specialists-
Explosives, Transportation Security Inspectors, and TSA-certified
explosives detection canine teams.\4\ In the immediate aftermath of the
incident, we deployed additional VIPR teams to airport checkpoints,
reflecting our flexibility to rapidly redirect and deploy VIPR
capabilities in response to changes in the threat profile. To
accomplish this surge, VIPR deployments have been evenly split between
surface and aviation transportation modes from their previous
allocation of 70 percent in surface modes and 30 percent in aviation.
This VIPR deployment strategy has garnered support among the TSA
workforce and we will continue this shift to enhance VIPR presence at
airports, subject to adjustments based on intelligence or special
requirements.
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\4\ See the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act
of 2007, Pub. L. 110-53.
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Lastly, TSA is issuing recommended standards for increased law
enforcement presence at high-traffic airport locations such as peak
travel times at checkpoints and ticket counters to provide visible
deterrence and quicker incident response times. By implementing these
standards, airports would retain some flexibility for law enforcement
response while providing enhanced law enforcement presence during peak
travel times. We are strongly encouraging airports to adopt these
measures and will work with all airports toward implementation. All
airport operators remain obligated to comply with existing ASP,
statutory, and regulatory requirements to provide a law enforcement
response adequate to ensure the safety of passengers. In situations
where there is an imminent threat, law enforcement must therefore
respond accordingly. TSA also advised airport operators that we will
ensure our employees utilize duress alarms only when they perceive
imminent danger, with the expectation that airport security personnel
will respond accordingly.
conclusion
The tragic shooting of Officer Hernandez and injuries suffered by
two other TSA employees and a passenger on November 1, 2013, were an
extraordinary shock to the TSA community and the public. It remains
difficult to comprehend the sudden loss of a dedicated public servant
who was simply doing his job in support of the agency's transportation
security mission. The actions we have undertaken thus far are aimed at
seeking to prevent, to the greatest extent possible, a recurrence of
this tragedy, while recognizing that the next attack may take a
different form. In the wake of the LAX incident, we were given an
opportunity to identify a better way forward in partnership with
industry and law enforcement stakeholders and continued engagement with
the workforce. We remain committed to delivering meaningful
improvements to officer safety and security and to working
collaboratively with our partners in this effort. Thank you for the
opportunity to testify today. I will be happy to answer your questions.
Mr. Hudson. Thank you, Administrator Pistole.
The Chairman recognizes Chief Gannon now to testify.
STATEMENT OF PATRICK M. GANNON, CHIEF OF AIRPORT POLICE, LOS
ANGELES WORLD AIRPORTS, LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA
Chief Gannon. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Thompson, and
Members of the committee, welcome to Los Angeles International
Airport. I am Patrick Gannon, deputy executive director at Los
Angeles World Airport for Law Enforcement and Homeland Security
and chief of the Los Angeles Airport Police. Airport police is
the primary law enforcement agency for Los Angeles World
Airport with a staff of 1,100, of which approximately 525 are
sworn, approximately 400 are security officers, and the rest
are professional support staff.
The Los Angeles Airport police is committed to on-going
training. In fact, an active-shooting exercise was held 3 weeks
prior to the November 1 shooting. During this 2-day training
exercise, we trained over 350 airport police officers, Los
Angeles police officers, and Los Angeles city firefighters to
respond to an active shooter in an airport environment. We
conducted this training in an old terminal at one of our
airports. This training proved to be very helpful as we faced a
gun-wielding man at Terminal 3.
As you know, on November 1, 2013, the alleged shooter, Paul
Ciancia, entered Terminal 3 on the departure level near a
ticket counter. He walked to a nearby queuing line at the foot
of an escalator leading up to the security checkpoint and gate
area. At the bottom of the escalator was a TSA podium staffed
by TSA Officer Gerardo Hernandez.
At 9:20 a.m., Ciancia removed an assault rifle from his
luggage and shot Officer Hernandez multiple times. He went up
the escalator just a few steps, but then turned and came back
down and shot Officer Hernandez once again. As the initial
shots were fired, passengers ducked for cover. Within seconds,
TSA Officers at the upper level checkpoint urged passengers to
move away from where the shots were being fired. A number of
TSA Officers acted heroically and put themselves in jeopardy to
make sure passengers got out of the line of fire. I would like
to specifically recognize TSA Officers Tony Grigsby and James
Speer for their heroic and selfless actions as they put
themselves in harm's way to protect passengers who were slow to
exit the area.
Ten seconds after the first shots were fired, a call came
into airport police dispatch. The call was made by a TSA
supervisor who was forced to run from the area and was unable
to provide information about the shooting. Shortly thereafter,
an airline contract service employee who was near Officer
Hernandez used his cellular telephone to call airport police.
Within a minute or so, airport police had a full description of
the shooter and responded as quickly as possible.
Following the initial shooting, Ciancia went up the
escalator through the evacuated TSA screening area and into the
terminal concourse apparently looking for other TSA Officers.
Once again, he fired his assault-type weapon as people scurried
for cover. This is approximately the point where he shot and
wounded TSA Officers Grigsby and Speer and one additional
passenger.
Airport police officers quickly converged on Terminal 3
from many different directions. As the officers arrived, they
were directed towards Ciancia by a number of people in the
terminal. The officers eventually confronted Ciancia in the
terminal near gate 35 where an officer-involved shooting took
place. Ciancia was stopped and taken into custody.
The shooting of Officer Hernandez took place at
approximately 9:20 a.m. One minute and 22 seconds later, our
airport police dispatch center broadcasted the ``shots fired''
call in Terminal 3. At 9:25 a.m., airport police officers
reported that the suspect was down near gate 35. Four minutes
and eight seconds elapsed from the time that the news of the
shooting was broadcast by our dispatch center until the time
our officers reported the shooter was down in the terminal and
in custody.
There has been speculation that this event may have been
prevented if an airport police officer was posted at the TSA
screening checkpoint in Terminal 3. The facts are that a
podium-based officer at the checkpoint would not have prevented
this murder. Due to the layout of the checkpoint, the officer
would not have been in a position to keep Ciancia from
attacking Officer Hernandez. In certain circumstances I believe
that a podium-based officer would be more vulnerable in a
carefully-planned attack.
Law enforcement has made considerable changes in the way it
responds to active-shooter incidents. At Columbine High School,
it was 46 minutes before law enforcement was able to make entry
into that school. To respond and neutralize Ciancia within 4
minutes and 8 seconds from the first call to when we had the
shooter in custody, in my estimation, is remarkable. Even so,
we continually look for ways to improve our response time. Even
though we work each day to prevent violent acts at LAX, we can
never guarantee that this will always happen. What we have
learned from this incident is that when a violent attack
occurs, speed and quickness, coupled with superior tactics,
will be the key to saving lives.
Thank you very much.
[The joint prepared statement of Chief Gannon and Ms.
Lindsey follows:]
Joint Prepared Statement of Patrick Gannon and Gina Marie Lindsey
March 28, 2014
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Thompson, and Members of the
committee, welcome to Los Angeles International Airport. We appreciate
your commitment and concern that we all share in ensuring that this
airport is as safe and secure as we can make it.
Los Angeles International Airport (LAX) is the largest origin and
destination airport in the United States, serving 66.7 million
passengers in its 9 passenger terminals. LAX has 95 passenger and cargo
airlines that conducted 615,000 aircraft operations in 2013. LAX
accommodated 70,000 vehicle trips per day and has 54,000 badged
employees.
November 1, 2013, was like any other busy Friday morning in
Terminal 3 at LAX, until an act of violence by a lone gunman set off a
sequence of events that would result in the murder of Transportation
Security Officer Gerardo Hernandez and the wounding of two other TSA
Officers and one passenger. Airport police quickly apprehended the
suspect, but there was a significant travel disruption for tens of
thousands of passengers. The airport returned to full normal operations
approximately 30 hours later.
In the past several months, Los Angeles World Airports (LAWA) has
reviewed in detail every aspect of this incident at great length and
presented a comprehensive after-action report to Mayor Eric Garcetti
and the Los Angeles Board of Airport Commissioners with several key
findings. This report is available for public review on the LAWA
website. Immediate tactical response by airport police was swift,
heroic, and well-executed. Collaboration with and support from response
partners was effective. While the terminal and roadway recovery may
have advanced faster, this had to be phased with the security need to
clear all parts of the LAX campus (all nine terminals and eight parking
garages) before attempting to reinstate operational recovery. Terminal
3 was rapidly repaired and returned to service after the FBI released
it Saturday morning, even while the investigation continued. Finally,
LAX emergency management programs are maturing, and a number of areas
for improvement were identified.
In particular, the most significant challenges on November 1
centered around mass notification and public communications, terminal
evacuation and interim sheltering, customer care, and ability to
mobilize the entire airport community in the response. LAX has already
implemented a number of specific recommendations in the report and will
be implementing others in the coming months.
law enforcement and homeland security at los angeles international
airport
The primary law enforcement agency at LAX is the Los Angeles
Airport Police. The antecedents of this organization go back to
security officers first hired by the airport 64 years ago and became a
full-fledged law enforcement agency in 1984. Airport police have a
staff of 1,100, of which 525 are sworn, 400 are security officers, and
the rest are professional administrative and support staff.
Airport police officers have trained at various law enforcement
academies since 1990 and have been using the Los Angeles Police Academy
exclusively since 2006. Since 2006 we have had 200 officers graduate
from the academy, many of them graduating with honors and leadership
positions in their recruit classes. Airport police train alongside
recruits for the Los Angeles Police Department and the Los Angeles Port
Police. They receive the same training and learn about the same
policies as the other two law enforcement agencies in the city. This
ensures that the city is consistent in how it trains it officers and
improves the interaction between these three law enforcement agencies.
Airport police also participates in on-going training with agencies
throughout the region. One of our largest joint training exercises was
an active-shooter exercise held on the weekend of October 5 and 6 in
2013. We worked 6 months to develop what we considered to be a
realistic training exercise that would rival a real-world situation in
an airport environment. We trained over 350 Airport Police Officers,
Los Angeles Police Officers, and Los Angeles Firefighters in an
environment which is very different from the other scenes of active-
shooter incidents such as the Aurora, Colorado movie theater shooting,
Sandy Hook Elementary School, and the Washington Naval Yard shooting.
We worked on numerous scenarios involving an active shooter in an
effort to test and improve out tactics and to decrease our response
time to such incidents.
LAX is a unique environment from any other in the city of Los
Angeles and it presents special challenges to law enforcement and
security. In addition to maintaining a highly-visible presence through
foot patrols and beats, airport police embrace a layered approach to
security with an emphasis on strong partnerships, intelligence
gathering, patrol missions/strategies, and plainclothes details. Daily
enforcement strategies are aimed at hardening LAX as a target for
terrorism as well as other crimes that occur in an urban environment.
The goal of all officers in whatever assignment they work is to deter
and stop criminal and terrorist acts. Unfortunately as airport police
and other law enforcement agencies have discovered, you cannot always
deter an attack by someone committed to an act of destruction such as
the gunman we had here on November 1, 2013.
Since 1968, there have been 817 terror incidents involving airports
and airlines, over 50 in the United States. Nine of these were specific
to United States airports of which 7 have targeted LAX. One of our
concerns when we were pulling together our October training exercise
was the shift from a Mumbai-type of incident with multiple attacks
spread out through a metropolitan area to the most prevalent type of
active-shooter incident experienced in the United States--the lone-wolf
shooting. This involves a single individual with some sort of
destructive intention who takes out their anger on a particular
setting, be it a movie theater, elementary school, or other public
place.
We had to ask ourselves how we would handle such a situation in an
airport environment. How would we respond most quickly and effectively
once the shooting has started and stop it as soon as possible? We
always have to look at a wide variety of risks at the airport, but we
decided last year this was the type of risk for which we needed to
prepare.
november 1, 2013
The terminals at LAX are arranged in a counter-clockwise loop
starting with Terminals 1, 2, and 3. At the far end of the loop is the
Tom Bradley International Terminal. The Central Terminal Area then
continues with Terminals 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8 at the bottom of the loop.
Each terminal has three levels. The lower level is the arrival level
where passengers pick up their bags and exit from the terminal upon
deplaning from their flights. The second level is the ``departure''
level where passengers are normally dropped off in front of the
terminals and then go inside for ticketing and bag check-in. The third
level is where the airline gates are located in the ``secured area''
behind TSA screening checkpoints.
On November 1, 2013, Mr. Paul Ciancia came to LAX in a vehicle
driven by a friend and was dropped off on the ``upper'' or departure
level of the airport as would a typical departing passenger. Mr.
Ciancia walked through the door near the Virgin America ticketing
counter at approximately 9:18 A.M. and proceeded to enter the queuing
line for a TSA boarding pass check point, which was on the departure
level at the foot of an escalator leading up to the security and gate
area. Mr. Ciancia was dressed as a typical traveler. He had a roller
bag with a second bag attached to the top of it, typical of the kind of
bags people bring to airports and stow on the aircraft.
At the end of the queuing line, at the bottom of the escalator, was
a TSA podium staffed by TSA Officer Gerardo Hernandez. Mr. Hernandez
was performing document checks for TSA, checking passengers for their
ID and boarding passes. Officer Hernandez by all accounts was a jovial
individual who enjoyed his experience as a TSA Officer, friendly to the
passengers he was screening. From the video of the incident, we know he
was talking to passengers he had just screened when the shooting
occurred.
At 9:20 A.M., Mr. Ciancia removed an assault rifle from his bag and
shot Officer Hernandez from the back. He went up the escalator just a
few steps but then came back down and shot Officer Hernandez multiple
times once again.
As the shots were fired, panic and chaos set in as expected, but
very quickly the TSA Officers at the upper-level checkpoint and
passengers began to evacuate people away from where the shots were
being fired. Video of the incident shows heroic acts by TSA Officers
who put themselves and their safety at jeopardy to make sure their
passengers got out of the line of fire. The initial reaction to the
shooting was people going to the floor. That was for just a moment
before you can hear TSA Officers beginning to direct people in the
correct direction, away from the shooting.
Shortly after the incident occurred, the first call came into
airport police dispatch. The first call was made from a dedicated line
at the TSA checkpoint that went straight to the airport police dispatch
center. The TSA supervisor tried to place a call but had to leave the
area without being able to provide any additional information. An
airline contract service employee near Officer Hernandez used his
cellular telephone to call airport police. Within a minute or so,
airport police had a full description of the incident so our officers
could respond to the area as quickly as possible.
Following the shooting Mr. Ciancia went up the escalator, through
the evacuated TSA passenger screening checkpoint, and into the
concourse looking for other TSA Officers. He shot and wounded two other
TSA Officers and one civilian.
In this time, airport police officers converged on Terminal 3 from
many different directions. As the officers arrived, they were directed
towards Mr. Ciancia by civilians in the terminal. The officers
confronted Mr. Ciancia toward the end of the terminal near Gate 35
where an officer-involved shooting took place. Mr. Ciancia was stopped
at that moment and he was taken into custody.
The shooting of Officer Hernandez took place at approximately 9:20
A.M. At 9:21 A.M., our airport police dispatch center broadcast a
``shots fired'' call for Terminal 3. At 9:25 A.M., Los Angeles Airport
police officers reported the suspect was ``down'' at Gate 35. 4 minutes
and 8 seconds elapsed from the time that news of the shooting was
broadcast by our dispatch center to the time that our officers reported
the shooter was ``down'' in the terminal. The actual elapsed time was
actually shorter, considering that it took some time to safely approach
the suspect, handcuff him, and for officers to render Ciancia's weapon
safe.
The impact of the law enforcement action on flight operations and
the passengers at LAX was significant. Of the 1,550 flights scheduled
for that day, airlines canceled 252 flights and diverted 86 flights to
other airports, while 74 flights were delayed. Sixteen arriving flights
were held on board for longer than 30 minutes, as gates were not
available after ramp workers evacuated. With LAX effectively shut down,
though, there were ripple effects throughout the air transportation
system, with an estimated 1,500 flights impacted. As stated above, LAX,
including Terminal 3, returned to full operations on November 2,
approximately 30 hours after the shooting.
At the time of the shooting, approximately 23,000 passengers were
at the airport. Many in Terminals 1, 2, and 3 self-evacuated, while
those in other terminals and on aircraft were sheltered in place.
Approximately 3,500 passengers in Terminals 1, 2, and 3 evacuated to
the airfield during the incident and were then bused to appropriate
facilities. While some passengers left the airport area, others who
were expecting to depart continued to arrive at the airport, adding to
the congestion and traffic gridlock.
LAX staff established 12 evacuation and shelter sites, and
distributed 16,000 bottles of water. The Los Angeles County Mental
Health Department, the Los Angeles City Department on Disabilities, and
the Red Cross assisted with passenger accommodations. LAWA also made
extensive use of the news media and social media website to communicate
information to the traveling public.
analysis
In an incident such as this, the most important factor is speed,
how quickly first responders can get to the incident. The first
responsibility for police officers is to stop the shooter. The
responsibility of the EMS/Fire Department is to rescue victims as fast
as they can. In this case, the speed with which airport police were
able to stop this suspect and keep him from finding other TSA Officers
to shoot was very, very fast. We do not, however ``rest on our
laurels.'' Our intent, and what we are always trying to do, is to find
how we could do better.
The suspect was stopped due to the bravery of the officers that
went into that terminal knowing there was an active shooter with some
sort of an assault weapon, the superior tactics they used, and the
speed with which they responded. Some have suggested that events may
have transpired differently had there been a police officer posted at
the checkpoint. When one officer is facing a suspect with an assault
rifle, there is no guarantee of success--take on someone with an
assault weapon one on one, you may lose more times than you win.
Success is much more likely when officers come together as a team in a
tactical formation to attack the problem, because the threat posed by
the suspect or suspects is met with an equal amount of threat. Even
though the officers who responded to the call did not have police
rifles or semi-automatic weapons, their tactics and their proficiency
in the way they worked together to flank the suspect and confuse him
led to taking this suspect into custody. The key is to employ
outstanding tactics and speed and coordination by several officers
working as a team.
Officer Hernandez, the first TSA Officer killed in the line of
duty, made the ultimate sacrifice while working to protect his fellow
citizens from violence aimed at the traveling public. In addition,
there are other victims to remember. Brian Ludmer was a 29-year-old
school teacher from Illinois who was shot and sustained a serious leg
injury while standing near some TSA Officers. Two other victims are TSA
Officers James Speer and Tony Grigsby, who deserve more credit than
they received at the time of the incident for their bravery. There was
an elderly citizen at the checkpoint who froze when the when the
shooting occurred. For some reason, he did not react as fast as the
others. In spite of the shooting, the two TSA Officers stayed in order
to make sure that this individual got out safely. As they lagged behind
trying to get him to safety, one was shot in the chest and the other
one in the foot. Officers Speer and Grigsby are true heroes of this
incident, having put themselves in jeopardy because it was the right
thing to do.
Even though the shooter was in custody, communications, traffic
control, and tactical operations were still complicated. We did not
know if there were other shooters. We did not know if there was a
vehicle with a bomb or a secondary device placed in the airport area.
LAX handles about 100,000 passengers leaving each day and another
100,000 passengers arriving and 70,000 cars that go through in the
central terminal area, and it is a massive undertaking to make sure
that we keep people safe. It was necessary to shut down operations and
we could only re-open when we were certain we were not putting anyone
in harm's way.
Another key success was the interagency teamwork. Multiple law
enforcement agencies responded to this incident, not only the Los
Angeles Police Department which had a number of officers located here.
The Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department, the California Highway
Patrol, and police departments of the cities of El Segundo and
Hawthorne all responded, along with the Los Angeles City Fire
Department. Teamwork and coordination worked, as did our incident
command. It was at times chaotic and challenging, but there are lessons
that will be learned from this as we look forward and see how to
improve. Everyone that was there that day was there for the same
purpose--to keep the airport safe and open it as soon as possible.
Los Angeles International Airport will work on ways to improve
communications, to ensure that employees at the airport are able to
reach airport police dispatch as easily and quickly as possible in case
of emergency. We will look to working with our regional partners for
technology that can improve radio interoperability.
Airport police will continue to train with the Los Angeles Fire
Department to deal with active-shooter and similar situations. The Los
Angeles Fire Department has trained 200 of its officers who handle
calls in the LAX area on tactical emergency medical services. They are
now trained in how to respond to a ``warm zone'' area to treat patients
effectively while at the same time being sure they do not put
themselves into danger. We want to make sure they have force protection
as they provide medical treatment and will put our officers through the
same training.
Law enforcement has made considerable changes in the way it
responds to active-shooter incidents since Columbine High School in
1999. At Columbine it was 46 minutes before law enforcement went into
that school. To get our time down to 4 minutes and 8 seconds from the
first call to when we had the shooter in custody is remarkable. Even
so, we continually look for ways to improve our response, but instead
of improving by 10-minute increments, we are now trying to save
seconds. We are fine-tuning our procedures and tactics so we can save
those seconds and lives.
As described briefly above, at the direction of the Los Angeles
Board of Airport Commissioners, LAWA conducted an exhaustive 3\1/2\-
month review of the November 1 shooting and has published a
comprehensive after-action report detailing the response and recovery
efforts. The report assesses what happened, what could have been
prevented, what response efforts worked well, and what areas of
emergency management need improvement. The report also includes an
improvement plan based on the recommendation drawn from lessons learned
during the incident. In preparing this 83-page report, LAWA took a
detailed look at every aspect of the incident and challenged ourselves
to be better prepared for any future attacks or other disasters at our
airports. The report is available on the LAWA website.
Mr. Hudson. Thank you, Chief Gannon.
The Chairman recognizes Ms. Lindsey to testify.
STATEMENT OF GINA MARIE LINDSEY, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, LOS
ANGELES WORLD AIRPORTS, LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA
Ms. Lindsey. Chairman Hudson, Chairman McCaul, Members of
the committee, thank you very much for coming to Los Angeles
International Airport and being willing to discuss the events
of November 1. LAX is the largest origin destination airport in
the United States serving 66.7 million passengers through 9
different terminals. We host 95 passenger and cargo airlines
that conducted 615,000 operations in 2013.
November 1 was like any other busy Friday morning at
Terminal 3 until an act of violence by a lone gunman set off a
sequence of events of which you have heard a great deal. The
suspect came to LAX in a vehicle driven by a friend and was
dropped off on the departure level of the airport, just like
many departing passengers.
Mr. Ciancia was dressed as a typical traveler with luggage
typically brought to the airports by passengers. Even after he
was in custody, communications, traffic control, and tactical
operations remained quite complicated. Airport police and their
partner agencies did not know if there were other shooters.
They did not know if there was a vehicle with a bomb or a
secondary device placed in the airport area.
Now, LAX handles about 200,000 passengers per day in its
central terminal area, and it is a massive undertaking to make
sure we keep everyone safe. As soon as dispatch was notified of
the shooting, all landside airport access was shut down. We
could only reopen once we were certain we were not putting
anyone in harm's way. However, simultaneously, we were still
accepting arriving flights, so the number of passengers in the
terminals and ultimately held on board on aircraft continued to
grow.
While airport police quickly apprehended the suspect,
significant travel disruption resulted for tens of thousands of
passengers. At the time of the shooting, our best estimates are
that there were 23,000 passengers in the terminals at LAX.
Approximately 3,500 people in Terminals 1, 2, and 3 escaped
onto the airfield and were then bused to appropriate holding
facilities. That is the plan we have in place, and on that day
it worked.
Other passengers and workers in Terminals 1, 2, and 3 ran
out to the central terminal roadway. Those in other terminals
and on aircraft were sheltered in place. While some passengers
left LAX, others who were still expecting to depart on flights
continued to arrive at the airport, adding to the congestion
and the traffic gridlock outside the central terminal area.
Of the 1,550 flights scheduled for LAX that day, 1,212
actually operated, although 74 of those were delayed. Airlines
cancelled 252 flights and diverted 86 flights to other
airports. Sixteen arriving flights were held on-board for
longer than 30 minutes since gates were not available once ramp
workers evacuated. With LAX effectively shut down, there were
ripple effects throughout the National air transportation
system that impacted an estimated additional 1,500 flights.
Remarkably, the airport returned to full normal operations 30
hours after the shooting on November 2.
LAX established 12 evacuation and shelter sites and
distributed 16,000 bottles of water. Several partner agencies
assisted with passenger accommodations. LAWA also made
extensive use of the news media websites and social media to
communicate what information we had to the traveling public.
In the past several months, LAWA has reviewed in detail
every aspect of this incident and presented a comprehensive
after-action report to Mayor Eric Garcetti and the Board of
Airport Commissioners with several key findings. In preparing
this 83-page report, we challenged ourselves to be better
prepared for any future attacks or other disasters at our
airports. The report assesses what happened, what could have
been prevented, what response efforts worked well, and what
areas of emergency management need to be improved. This report
is available on LAWA's website.
The most significant challenges on November 1 centered on
mass notification and public communication, interim sheltering,
customer care given the duration of the event, and the ability
to mobilize an entire airport community in the response. LAX
has already implemented a number of specific recommendations in
the report, and we will be implementing others in the coming
months.
The report also concludes that the immediate tactical
response by airport police was swift, heroic, and well-
executed. Collaboration with and support from response partners
was effective. Terminal 3 was rapidly repaired and returned to
service.
We thank you for your attention to this matter and look
forward to answering any questions.
Mr. Hudson. Thank you, Ms. Lindsey.
The Chairman now recognizes Mr. Cox to testify.
STATEMENT OF J. DAVID COX, SR., NATIONAL PRESIDENT, AMERICAN
FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Cox. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Members of the
committee. Thank you very much for the opportunity to testify,
and what an honor it is to testify before a majority of the
committee that has a southern drawl just like me. So, that is a
very large honor today.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Cox. First, I would like to extend our deepest
condolences to the family of Officer Hernandez, and our best
wishes for the full recovery of Officers Grigsby and Speer.
Since the attack here in LAX last November, AFGE has sought
to understand how this tragedy happened and how others like it
can be prevented in the future. Unarmed, unprotected, and
exposed, TSA Officers at Terminal 3 checkpoint were easy
targets for a man with an irrational hatred of TSA and our
officers. The results of our analysis are laid out fully in our
written statement. But today I will focus on our
recommendations for improved security going forward.
AFGE strongly believes TSA should create an armed
transportation security law enforcement officer, TSLEO
position, assigned to protect TSOs and passengers at airport
checkpoints and other key locations. Deployment of duly trained
and certified TSLEOs would establish a consistent standard of
protection. This is not a call for the arming of TSA Officers.
Rather, our proposal would establish a new law enforcement unit
within TSA.
As we have heard since November 1, current airport law
enforcement operations have gaps and inconsistencies that leave
TSOs and passengers vulnerable. Many airports have no armed law
enforcement officers stationed at or in the airport. Even where
they do, different decisions about tactics, staffing, and
deployment have left many checkpoints without an armed law
enforcement officer stationed there to provide security for our
unarmed TSOs and passengers.
Placing one or more armed TSLEOs at every checkpoint and at
every key airport location will provide security improvements,
including: Integration of the law enforcement function into TSA
operations, creation of a visible deterrent to those with
criminal intent as well as those who subject TSOs to verbal and
physical assault, and provisions for the quickest possible
response when an attack occurs.
In the interest of time, Mr. Chairman, I will simply list
our additional recommendations. TSA should establish raised
protected installations at each checkpoint with bullet-proof
glass to allow armed officers to better observe the area,
detect a problem before it escalates, and create a visible
deterrent for those who might be planning an attack. TSA should
continue to deploy TSOs the new armed TSLEOs to monitor exit
lanes.
TSA must ensure close coordination between airport and
local first responders. The lack of coordination across such
agencies at LAX on November 1 made a horrific situation even
worse as emergency medical attention for our wounded officers
was delayed. AFGE strongly encourages TSA to implement the
recommendations in the November 2013 GAO report on scientific
research and enhanced training to better identify threats to
aviation security. We believe that that will increase the
likelihood that a BDO will be at the right place at the right
time to detect and deter a potential attacker, like the LAX
shooter.
Finally, TSA must immediately provide active-shooter
training to TSOs relevant to each airport, which includes
interagency drills with other first responders. AFGE also
applauds Representative Julia Brownley for introducing the
Honoring Our Fallen TSA Officers Act, which would grant TSOs
public safety officer status. Honoring public servants killed
in the line of duty recognizes that a very small portion of the
population volunteers to be put in harm's way to protect their
country. H.R. 4022 should receive enthusiastic bipartisan
support.
We look forward to the same bipartisan support for the
proposals we have made today. This concludes my statement, and
I will be happy to answer any questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Cox follows:]
Prepared Statement of J. David Cox, Sr.
March 28, 2014
Chairman McCaul, Chairman Hudson, Ranking Member Thompson, and
Representatives Waters and Brownley: My name is J. David Cox, Sr., and
I am the national president of the American Federation of Government
Employees, AFL-CIO (AFGE). On behalf of the more than 670,000 Federal
employees represented by AFGE, including approximately 45,000
Transportation Security Officers (TSOs) at our Nation's airports, I
thank you for the opportunity to testify today.
summary
On behalf of AFGE, I first want to extend our deepest condolences
to the family of our late bargaining unit member, Officer Gerardo
Hernandez. His loss is felt profoundly by his union brothers and
sisters at LAX and throughout the entire TSO workforce. Indeed, the
Federal civil servants AFGE represents are fully aware that Officer
Hernandez and his family have made the greatest of all sacrifices.
Likewise, AFGE reiterates our best wishes for a full recovery to
Behavioral Detection Officer (BDO) Tony Grigsby, Officer James Speer,
and passenger Brian Ludmer.
TSOs are tasked with keeping America's airline passengers safe, but
the officers are often powerless in the face of danger. All too often,
TSOs are verbally and physically assaulted while performing their
duties, but prior to 2013 a TSA Officer had never been killed in the
line of duty. In the wake of the LAX shooting, the risk of assaults and
mass casualty attacks resulting in the death or injury of our officers
is now known all too well. The internet and traditional media sources
are replete with commentary from people who express hatred and
vilification aimed at TSA and our officers every day, sometimes in the
most horrific terms. TSA also has records of employees being physically
and verbally assaulted while on duty at checkpoints and elsewhere. The
agency must act; this known workplace hazard must be addressed.
Since the attack on the TSA checkpoint at Terminal 3 of LAX, AFGE
has sought to understand how this tragedy happened and how it can be
prevented in the future. Sadly, the circumstances on November 1 left
Officer Hernandez with little chance for his life. TSOs working at the
checkpoint had but a moment to literally run for their lives while
warning others. The TSO workforce has expressed to our union their
continued anxiety about their safety, and who could blame them?
Although these concerns heavily weigh on their minds, TSOs across the
country continue to report for work every day and carry out their
duties of protecting the flying public to the very best of their
abilities.
But unarmed, unprotected, and exposed, TSA Officers at the Terminal
3 checkpoint were easy targets for a man with an irrational hatred of
TSA and specifically TSA Officers. There was no law enforcement
presence at the checkpoint to defend our officers from the gunman, in
part because local law enforcement had recently decided to no longer
station their officers at that location, opting for them to patrol the
terminal and related facilities instead.
AFGE applauds recent statements by TSA Administrator John Pistole
that TSA seeks to ensure ``the best possible security for TSA
employees'' and others in the airport. In light of this terrible
tragedy, AFGE strongly believes the best response to enhance security
for agency employees and the traveling public is to create an armed
Transportation Security Law Enforcement Officer (TSLEO) position
assigned to protect TSOs and passengers at airport checkpoints and
other key locations. Deployment of TSLEOs would address problems made
clear by the LAX shooting and establish a consistent standard of
protection for vulnerable TSOs and passengers across the country.
Establishment of a TSLEO position is a priority recommendation for
AFGE, and we will discuss others in this testimony.
background
Paul Anthony Ciancia has been charged on 11 Federal counts stemming
from the November 1 shooting rampage at LAX including murder, attempted
murder, and charges related to committing violence and using a firearm
in an international airport. As a result of Ciancia's attack at the TSA
checkpoint, multiple LAX terminals were evacuated, and LAX was closed
for a period of time, disrupting air travel around the world.
It is deeply troubling that we later learned that Ciancia carried
with him a letter stating he had ``made the conscious decision to try
to kill'' as many TSA employees as possible because in his words, he
wanted to ``instill fear in your traitorous minds.'' Sadly, TSOs are
not unfamiliar with these misguided, unwarranted expressions of
suspicion and hatred aimed towards the workforce. The events of
November 1 have deeply saddened and affected the morale of TSOs across
the country. During our recent conference in Washington, DC, AFGE's TSO
members expressed the anxiety they experience on the job along with
frustration that some of their fellow Americans despise them solely
because they carry out their duties as trained.
the path to improved checkpoint security
AFGE applauds Administrator Pistole for TSA's quick response
following the tragic event in Los Angeles, and for opening up a process
in which all stakeholders, including AFGE, can receive information and
provide recommendations. AFGE's concerns should be understood as an
effort to address issues leading to what the administrator has
described as: ``the best possible security for TSA employees.'' AFGE
shares a strong commitment to that goal. AFGE's recommendations follow:
1. TSA Must Fulfill Its Duty to Assure Safe and Healthful Working
Conditions for the TSO Workforce as Federal Employees
In addition to its duty to protect the flying public, TSA also has
the important obligation of protecting its workforce on the job. The
Occupational Safety and Health Act contains provisions to assure safe
and healthful working conditions for Federal employees. TSA adopted
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) Standards as
minimum acceptable safety criteria for its workplaces. OSHA developed
an enforcement policy with regard to workplace violence as early as
1992 in a letter of interpretation that stated:
``In a workplace where the risk of violence and serious personal injury
are significant enough to be recognized hazards, the general duty
clause [specified by Section 5(a)(1) of the Occupational Safety and
Health Act (OSH Act)] would require the employer to take feasible steps
to minimize those risks. Failure of an employer to implement feasible
means of abatement of these hazards could result in the finding of an
OSH Act violation. (OSHA Std. Interp. 1900 (D.O.L.) 2006.)''
Further, TSA policy tasks the agency with ``providing and
maintaining safe and healthful working conditions for all TSA
employees'' (TSA Management Directive No. 2400.2(6)(A)) and requires
the agency to furnish ``a workplace that is free from recognized
hazards that cause or are likely to cause death or serious physical
harm.'' (TSA Management Directive No. 2400.1(6)(A)(2).)
It has been largely overlooked that despite the imminent threat to
their lives, many TSOs in Terminal 3 showed remarkable courage.
Although unarmed, it was reported that TSOs ran through the terminal
alerting passengers and airport staff of a live shooter and to take
cover. BDO Grigsby told the press he was shot twice during the attack
while helping an elderly passenger to safety. The actions of BDO
Grigsby and numerous other unnamed TSOs reflects the patriotism and
commitment to public service evident in the TSO workforce.
The evident danger posed to the public during the LAX shooting and
the heroic actions of TSOs clearly demonstrate that these officers meet
the definition of ``public safety officer'' in every way. AFGE applauds
Representative Julia Brownley (D-CA) for introducing H.R. 4026, the
Honoring Our Fallen TSA Officers Act that would grant TSOs public
safety officer status for duties that protect our Nation's
transportation systems. The legislation recognizes that TSOs are the
first line of defense against transportation terrorism and perform a
very important public safety role for the country. On a personal note,
when the Honoring Our Fallen TSA Officers Act becomes law, the family
of fallen TSA Officer Hernandez will be eligible for the death benefits
retroactively. Honoring those public servants who are killed in the
line of duty recognizes that a very small portion of the population
volunteers to be put in harm's way to protect their country. There is
no reason H.R. 4026 should not have enthusiastic bipartisan support.
The TSO workforce should not feel they are on their own when it
comes to protecting themselves against violence from any member of the
public. Our proposals reflect real-world solutions to address the
potential for violence faced by our TSO members on a daily basis.
2. TSA Should Establish a Transportation Security Officer Law
Enforcement Position
The TSA administrator currently has broad authority to implement
changes that will better protect the TSO workforce and passengers at
checkpoint. When the Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 2001
(ATSA) transferred the security functions at United States airports to
a Federal Government responsibility, the statute also imbued the TSA
administrator with broad authority to assess and manage threats against
air travel. For example, the administrator holds certain law
enforcement powers, including the power to designate officers to carry
firearms and make arrests, with or without warrants. The TSA
administrator must use this authority to its greatest potential to
enhance security and support its workforce.
The U.S. military employs a strategy known as ``overwatch'' that
was widely used during the recent conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan
that should be applied to TSA checkpoint security. Overwatch consists
of armed officers deployed to a position overlooking an area where a
unit of soldiers (often unarmed) are vulnerable to attack as they
perform duties such as loading and unloading vehicles. The strategy
provided great protection to the brave men and women defending our
country and it will provide the same protection to TSOs and passengers.
Erroll Southers, a former FBI agent who was chief of homeland
security and intelligence at LAX from 2007 to 2010, said that if
officers had still been stationed at the screening area on November 1,
``that arguably would have put them in a position to know about the
incident and respond to it in a much more reduced time span.'' AFGE
shares that view and proposes that the TSA administrator exercise his
statutory authority to establish a unit of Transportation Security Law
Enforcement Officers (TSLEOs) within the agency. This force would
ensure that the agency would have one or more armed, Federal law
enforcement officers--duly trained and certified--at every airport
checkpoint, and at other key locations.
I want to clarify that our proposal does not call for, and has
never called for the arming of all TSA Officers or even a portion of
that workforce. Rather, our proposal contemplates a new law enforcement
unit within TSA. Some qualified TSOs would likely bid for positions in
this new unit. This law enforcement unit would ensure a consistent and
uniform level of security across the Nation's airports. As we have
learned in the months since the attack at LAX, current law enforcement
operations leave our officers vulnerable to attack. This is not to
fault any law enforcement agency, but rather to highlight the gaps and
inconsistencies in law enforcement coverage from the point of view of
our TSA Officers who work in the airports.
Airports currently are permitted to make their own security plans
for armed officers, as long as they follow basic guidelines and get
their plans approved by the TSA. The current system leaves the security
of our TSOs, the traveling public, and the airport checkpoints to a
patchwork of hundreds of local police jurisdictions across the country.
Hundreds of airports have no armed law enforcement officers stationed
at or in the airport. Even where law enforcement is present inside the
airport, different decisions about police tactics, staffing, and
deployment have left many checkpoints, like LAX, without an armed law
enforcement officer permanently stationed there to provide security for
our unarmed TSOs.
By contrast to the lack of consistent law enforcement support
within TSA, the Social Security Administration (SSA), to take just one
example, provides its employees with law enforcement support across its
large network of offices. AFGE represents tens of thousands of
employees at SSA, where an armed officer provides security at each of
the over 1,400 Social Security Offices around the country. This law
enforcement support was put in place based on the recommendation of
labor-management partnership meetings between AFGE and the SSA
executives in the wake of the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal
Building in Oklahoma City in 1995. In that attack, 15 SSA employees
were killed. Those officers remain in place, providing security for SSA
employees and the Social Security recipients and beneficiaries who
visit those offices.
As recently as early 2013, Los Angeles Airport Police Department
(LAXPD) officers were assigned to and stationed at each checkpoint at
LAX. This changed in April 2013, however, when LAXPD made what has been
described by the LAXPD Chief as a tactical decision in which their
officers were no longer required to remain at a podium by the screening
area. In an effort to make security plans less predictable, they are
assigned to roam the terminal provided they can respond to an emergency
at the screening station within 3 minutes. Some law enforcement experts
dispute the effectiveness of that change in tactics. From AFGE's point
of view, the harsh reality of the events on November 1 make clear that
the change failed to protect TSOs and the public at LAX.
3. TSA Should Create Law Enforcement Positions to Protect TSA's Mission
AFGE respectfully submits that the presence of armed TSLEOs would
be the most effective way to deter and repel potential future attacks.
Having one or more armed Federal law enforcement officers at every
checkpoint, and at other key locations, will provide several
improvements over the current system:
Nation-wide consistency in the protection of TSA
checkpoints, TSOs, and the millions of passengers, airline and
airport personnel who pass through those areas every year.
A law enforcement force that is integrated into TSA
operations, controlled and directed by TSA officials, but which
coordinates closely with local law enforcement to provide for
seamless operations across the country.
A visible and effective deterrent to people intent on mass
casualty attacks like the one in LAX, and to those passengers
who subject TSOs to daily verbal assaults and all-too-frequent
physical assaults.
The quickest possible response when an attack, large or
small, occurs in the checkpoint or in other key TSA work
locations.
AFGE represents tens of thousands of Federal law enforcement
officers at the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of
Defense, and our union is well acquainted with the qualifications to
become a LEO and their certifications and duties. The facts of the
November 1 incident at LAX require immediate steps to establish these
positions under the TSA administrator's existing authority. The
addition of a TSA law enforcement unit will add a necessary layer of
security in the airport that is, in most locations, not present today.
4. TSA Should Establish Protective Installations at Each Checkpoint
In addition to the establishment of a new armed TSLEO position,
AFGE advocates providing raised, protective installations at the
checkpoints and other key locations. By installing raised podiums with
bulletproof glass and other protective reinforcement, TSA can improve
the law enforcement presence and response time in the event of future
attacks.
This type of installation, raised above floor level, will allow
armed officers to better observe the area, detect a problem before it
escalates into an attack and create a visible, armed deterrent for
those who might be planning an attack. The installation would also
serve as a base from which to launch an immediate law enforcement
response to an attack.
The reinforcement of the installations would provide a measure of
protection in the event of attack by serving as a barricade for the
officers and providing cover from which they can return fire or await
the arrival of additional officers. Also, the visible presence of armed
TSLEOs in the immediate area of the checkpoint will provide a deterrent
for those seeking to breach the checkpoint or assault TSA personnel or
passengers.
5. TSA Should Continue to Deploy TSOs to Monitor Exit Lanes
Published reports have indicated that after the LAX shooter
attacked Officer Hernandez, the shooter proceeded to walk through the
exit lane and enter Terminal 3 where he continued to shoot additional
victims. Even prior to the LAX attack there was considerable
documentation, and long experience, that the exit lanes are vulnerable
points of entry for potential security breaches, particularly those
that are co-located at the TSA screening checkpoint. Despite this
history, just last year TSA decided, with no Congressional review or
authorization, to transfer the responsibility for exit lane monitoring
to the airports and their various law enforcement resources. Although
Congress blocked TSA from handing off the exit lanes at any additional
airports, at some airports exit lane staffing remains the
responsibility of the local authorities, not TSA.
This transfer of exit lane duties has been strongly opposed by
airports and AFGE for good reason. An exit lane breach can bring
airport operations to a halt and strand tens of thousands of passengers
across the country for hours. Such a breach can allow an active shooter
or anyone seeking to create mass casualties access to what is often the
part of the airport with the largest crowds: The air side of the
terminal. Even before the attack at LAX, TSOs assigned to exit lane
monitoring duties suffered assaults at the hands of passengers and
others seeking to breach the exit lane.
Exit lane monitoring should remain primarily a TSA responsibility
in all airports, and that responsibility should be returned to TSA at
airports where it was previously delegated to local authorities. In
addition to the TSOs who have normally staffed the exit lanes in the
past, the new TSLEOs we have proposed should be assigned to the exit
lanes. This change will ensure the same consistent National security
standards as at the checkpoint.
6. TSA Should Implement Necessary Changes to Improve the BDO Program
AFGE has for years strongly supported the layered approach to
security, and the risk-based security principles implemented by TSA.
AFGE agrees with TSA and with broader law enforcement community that
behavior detection programs are an important element of the overall
security system that will keep commercial aviation safe. Although
speculative, AFGE believes that the behavior of the LAX shooter would
have been noticed by well-trained BDOs on patrol near the checkpoint
and afforded them an opportunity to help prevent the shooting.
AFGE recognizes the valid concerns stated in the November 2013
Government Accountability Office report on the Screening of Passengers
by Observation Techniques program and strongly encourages TSA to
implement the recommended scientific research and enhanced training to
better identify threats to aviation security. This will in turn
increase the likelihood that a BDO will be in the right place at the
right time to detect and deter a potential attacker like the LAX
shooter.
7. TSA Must Ensure Close Coordination Between Airport and Local First
Responders
While the Los Angeles World Airport's (LAWA) report on the November
1 active-shooter incident represents a well-intentioned effort to
identify and address security problems, AFGE found the report's
conclusions and omissions disturbing. We cannot help but express our
dismay at the lack of coordination across those agencies responsible
for security at the airport. Officer Hernandez waited 33 minutes before
he received medical attention. Over an hour passed before command posts
were merged and a unified response coordinated. Emergency equipment
such as the checkpoint ``panic button'' simply did not work. Even if
the ``panic button'' had operated properly, TSOs did not have clear
access to that device and checkpoint phones, and it is not clear those
devices would have contacted directly local or airport law enforcement.
In addition, the LAWA report does not discuss the impact of the
redeployment of and removal from TSA checkpoints of local law
enforcement, nor why two assigned officers were out of position when
the shooting began. The issues leading to the failure of security must
be openly acknowledged and addressed to ensure lessons are learned from
the November 1 tragedy and applied to airports around the United
States.
8. TSA Must Provide Immediate Active-Shooter Training for the TSO
Workforce
Our members report that prior to the attack at LAX the only active-
shooter training available to them was a video providing instruction
for an active-duty situation at an office building. Clearly an office
building situation cannot compare to an active shooter at a checkpoint
as TSOs and passengers are trapped in a small, enclosed area. AFGE
calls upon TSA to establish and implement airport active-shooter
training for all TSOs. As much as possible, TSA should coordinate with
Federal, State, and local airport organizations to establish live
shooter interagency drills. The LAX shooter had an animus against and
was targeting TSA employees in his attack. TSOs are the unique targets
and should have priority for training designed specifically for their
protection. In addition, TSA must allow all TSOs time to receive the
training. Our members complain that due to management staffing concerns
that recently-hired TSOs are more likely to receive training than
incumbent employees. This is unacceptable for certification and skills
training and unthinkable for active-shooting training. The TSOs on duty
at LAX on November 1 did the best they could to save their lives and
those of the public. No TSO should ever be placed in that situation
again in the future.
conclusion
AFGE believes that improved security for the more than 45,000
Transportation Security Officers represented by our union is essential
for improved public safety. TSOs should receive recognition and respect
for performing important job duties that are not always safe. We
strongly urge that AFGE's recommendations be implemented. We look
forward to participating in additional dialogue about implementation of
the changes that we have recommended. This concludes my statement. I
will be happy to respond to any questions.
Statutory Authorities
(p) Law enforcement powers.
(1) In general.--The Under Secretary may designate an employee of the
Transportation Security Administration or other Federal agency
to serve as a law enforcement officer.
(2) Powers.--While engaged in official duties of the Administration
as required to fulfill the responsibilities under this section,
a law enforcement officer designated under paragraph (1) may--
--
(A) carry a firearm;
(B) make an arrest without a warrant for any offense against the
United States committed in the presence of the officer, or for
any felony cognizable under the laws of the United States if
the officer has probable cause to believe that the person to be
arrested has committed or is committing the felony; and
(C) seek and execute warrants for arrest or seizure of evidence
issued under the authority of the United States upon probable
cause that a violation has been committed.
(3) Guidelines on exercise of authority.--The authority provided by
this subsection shall be exercised in accordance with
guidelines prescribed by the Under Secretary, in consultation
with the Attorney General of the United States, and shall
include adherence to the Attorney General's policy on use of
deadly force.
(4) Revocation or suspension of authority.--The powers authorized by
this subsection may be rescinded or suspended should the
Attorney General determine that the Under Secretary has not
complied with the guidelines prescribed in paragraph (3) and
conveys the determination in writing to the Secretary of
Transportation and the Under Secretary.
ATSA, 49 U.S.C.A. 44901
(h) Deployment of armed personnel.
(1) In general.--The Under Secretary shall order the deployment of
law enforcement personnel authorized to carry firearms at each
airport security screening location to ensure passenger safety
and National security.
(2) Minimum requirements.--Except at airports required to enter into
agreements under subsection (c), the Under Secretary shall
order the deployment of at least 1 law enforcement officer at
each airport security screening location. At the 100 largest
airports in the United States, in terms of annual passenger
enplanements for the most recent calendar year for which data
are available, the Under Secretary shall order the deployment
of additional law enforcement personnel at airport security
screening locations if the Under Secretary determines that the
additional deployment is necessary to ensure passenger safety
and national security.
ATSA, 49 U.S.C.A. 44901 NOTE
deadline for deployment of federal screeners
Pub. L. 107-71, Title I, 110(c), Nov. 19, 2001, 115 Stat. 616,
provided that:
``(1) In general.--Not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of
this Act [Nov. 19, 2001], the Under Secretary of Transportation for
Security shall deploy at all airports in the United States where
screening is required under section 44901 of title 49, United States
Code, a sufficient number of Federal screeners, Federal Security
Managers, Federal security personnel, and Federal law enforcement
officers to conduct the screening of all passengers and property under
section 44901 of such title at such airports.
``(2) Certification to Congress.--Not later than 1 year after the date
of enactment of this Act [Nov. 19, 2001], the Under Secretary shall
transmit to Congress a certification that the requirement of paragraph
(1) has been met.''
Mr. Hudson. Thank you, Mr. Cox. I now recognize myself for
5 minutes to ask questions.
Chief Gannon, I would like to start with you, sir. Let me
say first that I agree with you that 4 minutes and 8 seconds is
quite a remarkable amount of time that elapsed from the time
you received the call until your officers took down the
shooter. So, I just want to acknowledge the heroes, the
officers, that serve under you and the work that they did, and
the preparation that you led in this sense. I think everyone
recognizes their actions on that day were extraordinary, if not
heroic.
Chief Gannon. Thank you. We are very proud of them.
Mr. Hudson. One of the issues that we have heard different
information about was the location of the two officers in
Terminal 3 that day. I would just ask so we can get it on the
record to be clear, exactly where were the two officers that
day?
Chief Gannon. One officer was using the restroom in an
adjacent terminal, and the other officer was out on the
airfield, which is part of his responsibilities.
Mr. Hudson. You know, my interest is not to try to play
gotcha with any particular officer, but just to try to
understand the policies. The officer who was in the restroom,
was there a policy that an officer operates under when you are
taking a break that you notify someone that Jeff is going to
cover your area, or was it standard operation just to quickly
take that break and then get back on----
Chief Gannon. Well, yes, we have a policy, and, yes, that
policy is to ensure that we have coverage in that terminal. But
for a restroom break? I do not hold somebody to making that
kind of determination. I expect people to be able to use the
restroom and get quickly back to where they are, so I do not
have a particular problem with that.
I have throughout my entire airport or our entire airport
and through each of the terminals, we have a tremendous
responsibility throughout those, whether it is in the departure
level, or at the arrival level in the baggage claim areas, or
out on the airfield. There are a lot of different
responsibilities that our officers have, and there are a number
of people along the way that were there to protect. But they
are only one layer of security here at the airport, so a lot of
focus has been on those two officers. But they are not the only
officers that were working that day, nor are they the only ones
who had responsibilities to that terminal.
Mr. Hudson. Well, explain that a little bit if you could
briefly. What are some of the layers that day that would have
overlapped with Terminal 3?
Chief Gannon. Well, in addition to the officers that we
have assigned to terminals each day, we also have motor
officers. We also have bike officers that were working that
particular day. We have officers on foot beats throughout the
terminals. We have officers that respond on mopeds. I have
supervisors that are actively working and police cars, and we
have roving patrol units that were working in the central
terminal area that day. So the response to a shooter or to any
incident that occurs in an airport is the responsibility of a
number of different officers, not just the officers that work
in that terminal each day.
Mr. Hudson. Great. Thank you, Chief Gannon. Administrator
Pistole, your testimony stated that TSA is recommending airport
operators conduct active-shooter training. As I think was
pointed out, LAX had just done such an exercise 3 weeks prior,
and I think that contributed to the performance of the officers
of TSA, as well as law enforcement that day in November. But
are you working in coordination when you do these trainings
with the local law enforcement at the airports? Could you maybe
explain how that works?
Mr. Pistole. Yes, Chairman. So there are actually two
aspects to the active-shooter training. One is for all TSA
employees, not just TSOs, but all TSA employees around the
country and internationally around the world to make sure that
they know what to do in the event that an active shooting takes
place at their place of work. So that is the one aspect.
As you know, there are three different types of training.
One is basically an on-line course which 98 percent of our
employees have completed. The other is a tabletop exercise,
which is often done more in conjunction with airport operators
and police, and then the tactical training, which is done. The
training that was done 3 weeks before actually combined all
three, and so I commend LAWA and the police in terms of doing
that because it probably did save lives from the standpoint of
people knowing what to do to escape. We can call it an
``evacuation,'' but as I think as some people heard earlier, it
is as much an escape as it is evacuation to know to get out of
harm's way.
So, that training is on-going based on and in concert with
airport authorities and police. We are requiring that now to be
done at least semi-annually at all 447 airports around the
country.
Mr. Hudson. I appreciate that. Since I am going to hold
everyone else to their 5 minutes, rather than ask a question
with 13 seconds left, I am going to now yield to the Ranking
Member of the full committee for questions you may have. Mr.
Thompson.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you very much. Chief Gannon, simply
put, how would the response to an active-shooter situation
differ today at LAX compared to what happened November 1?
Chief Gannon. Well, I think that the response to the actual
incident itself and to the shooting, it is tough to be faster,
quicker than we did on that particular day. Part of the
difficulties that we had on that day was coordinating all of
the resources that responded to the airport. That was one
challenge that we had, and making sure that we understood
exactly where they were being put to work and building out an
effective incident command to be able to deal with those. The
other issue is prevention. We have spent a lot of time
wondering if we could prevent this incident. Given the case of
Paul Ciancia, he was not on anybody's radar screen. I do not
think that we could have prevented this in that regard.
But there are ways in which we can educate our employees,
educate people within the airport to be better partners with us
and to be more observant as to what is going on that maybe
behavior exhibited by Mr. Ciancia could have been identified
and then acted upon before he had an opportunity to shoot. I do
not think in this particular case it was, but we have put
together a community- and policing-based approach to assigning
officers to specific terminals to build relationships with
people so that we get better information out of our employees.
Mr. Thompson. Well, I guess my point I am trying to get at
is you have identified coordination as something that would be
different now than before. Now, based on what we have been told
during our visit here, it is still very difficult for the LAWA
police to talk to the sheriff's department, to talk to the
LAPD. What are you doing or, Ms. Lindsey, what are you doing to
affect that interoperability issue that still exists?
Chief Gannon. Well, it still exists here. It exists
throughout southern California and throughout the Los Angeles
area. The county is responsible for putting an interoperability
plan. They have a program called LA-RICS that is in
development. We have developed our communications systems to be
compatible with LA-RICS, but that is some time off.
In the mean time, what we have done on the short-term, for
example, with fire and with LAPD, the units especially that
worked the fire stations associated with this airport or LAPD
officers that are on campus or close, is that we provide them
with a radio which they can monitor for us and which we can
monitor their frequencies. We do have frequencies that we can
talk to LAPD on our frequencies, so we do have interoperability
to some degree, but not to the extent that I think we need in a
major incident.
Mr. Thompson. Ms. Lindsey.
Ms. Lindsey. I think the only thing I would add is that we
are encouraging LA-RICS to take the steps that they need to
take because we have already implemented the technology that
they are ultimately going to implement, so there really is not
a whole lot more than encouraging them to take the steps they
need to take that we can do from the airport perspective.
Mr. Thompson. Mr. Cox, an active-shooter situation is a
difficult scenario. What are you recommending for a situation
like this for the minimal kinds of training TSOs should have in
that situation?
Mr. Cox. No. 1, there has to be an opportunity for the TSOs
to take the training, and remember their jobs are very
demanding. If people are lined up to get into the airports, it
is hard for them to take time to get the training. So, No. 1,
the time to do it, the training, to understand what to do, how
to get to the alarms, that they are handy, having more radios,
that it would be permissible to use their own cell phone to
call for help, to get help immediately, how to evacuate
themselves, passengers, where to go for a safe harbor-type
things.
Each airport is a little bit different as we all
understand. They are built differently. But the training and,
again, the freeing-up of the officer to have the time to do the
training. That happens in every organization in the Government
and the private sector where we struggle to get the time to do
it.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you. Yield back.
Mr. Hudson. Thank the gentleman. The Chairman now
recognizes the Chairman of the full committee, the gentleman
from Texas, Mr. McCaul, for any questions he may have.
Chairman McCaul. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me just first
take the opportunity to say thank you to our TSA Officers out
there who I think day in and day out under very difficult
circumstances protect the traveling public from threats,
whether it be lone gunmen or terrorists. We certainly
appreciate the work you do. I know you do not always hear that,
but I wanted you to hear that from the Chairman.
Chief, I look at threats, risks, and vulnerabilities. Now,
this airport has been under threats really since 9/11. It is a
target, and it was certainly on that day. When I look at what
was the weak point as I analyze this particular fact pattern,
it seems to me that once someone goes through the proper
screening, a weapon is going to be detected and picked up. So
having the police, you know, beyond that screening, post-
screening, it is helpful, but it seems to me the real
vulnerability is before that process in the perimeter, if you
will, before they go through their screening. Also in this
case, the exit where the shooter actually went through the exit
to get into the terminal and, I believe, to push threats out.
You want to push that threat out before he gets in. So what are
your lessons learned in that regard when you look at what
happened that day?
Chief Gannon. Well, I absolutely agree with you. I think
that the threat for this airport starts on Century Boulevard at
the entrance to the airport and extends through the curb area
and the drop-off and into the terminals themselves, and up to
the screening checkpoint is where our greatest threat occurs.
So, our emphasis should be in those particular areas. That is
consistent with the strategy that we have put together. That
was consistent with the way in which last May when we moved
from that podium assignment where we had officers sitting or
standing at a podium behind the screening and to move them up
front with that in mind to reduce the threat there.
There are a number of challenges at any of our airports,
and there are a number of issues that involve crime and other
things that we have to address each and every day. But I also
feel that it is important that we protect everybody in this
airport environment to the best of our ability.
Chairman McCaul. Now, as Mr. Cox talked about, you know,
putting a police officer in front of each screening checkpoint
would probably be ideal. Obviously resources are an issue.
However, are there ways to be agile, flexible to keep the
threat guessing? I think if you had one person always in one
place, they are able to predict better in terms of, you know,
the threat at that particular juncture. So in other words, the
flexibility and agility, do you think that is important to sort
of move these assets around at the airport?
Chief Gannon. I absolutely think so. I think if you are
predictable, then you are vulnerable, and that is why I do not
think we should be as predictable. You know, to our best
knowledge, anybody who is going to cause an issue here and take
a violent act at this airport is probably going to watch and
look and pay attention to how we do our jobs each and every
day.
Chairman McCaul. Let me just, because my time is going to
run out, just say to apprehend the suspect under 5 minutes is
pretty extraordinary. I do think we can always do better. I
think had he not just been targeting TSA, we could have seen a
lot more bloodshed that day.
Administrator Pistole, when you look at resources, and we
always have to look at that, as you well know, you know, in the
Bush Intercontinental Airport, it was a CBP Officer or, I
believe, an ICE Officer that actually responded. CBP in
Terminal 3 were there. You have the VIPR teams that we saw
today. You have a lot of assets around there. You have the
police. You have got CBP Officers, ICE that can respond that
are armed and trained unlike the TSOs. Can you speak to that in
terms of bringing those resources together to prevent this kind
of threat from happening?
Mr. Pistole. Yes. Thank you, Chairman. There are a number
of challenges and opportunities, as you indicated, with the
multiple layers of security that could be brought to bear. One
of the challenges is to know how to integrate those different
resources. So, as Chief Gannon mentioned, it is one thing to
have the airport police doing random patrols and having that
unpredictable aspect of things along with coordinating with our
VIPR teams, which, of course, is another layer of security
there.
When we start introducing other components, for example,
DHS, ICE, CBP, who have primary responsibilities elsewhere,
then it becomes a question of what are we diverting them from
in terms of their responsibilities and addressing what risk and
what threat. So we do try to balance risk, threat,
vulnerability, consequence, as you mention, that formula for
assessing risk, to make informed judgments.
You mentioned about if we did have a special cadre of armed
TSOs. I have several concerns about that which I can go into
later, but introducing more guns into the checkpoint on a fixed
basis I do not think is a solution.
Chairman McCaul. I tend to agree with that. I see my time
has expired. Thank you.
Mr. Hudson. Thank the gentleman. The Chairman now
recognizes the gentlewoman from Texas, Ms. Jackson Lee, for any
questions she may have.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you very much. Let me just refresh
the witnesses' memory. I started out by indicating that TSA
Officers are in the service of their country and in the service
of protecting the National security of this Nation. I think
that as we proceed with this hearing, it is a very key element
collaborating with local law enforcement. Chief Gannon, I again
want to go on the record and say 4-and-some-seconds minutes was
a remarkable effort, and we thank you again very much.
Mr. Pistole, in that direct thought of National security,
you in 2013 did a vulnerability assessment of LAX with
Transportation Security and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation. In my opening remarks, I alluded to the fact
that TSA and TSO Officers should have the ability to pick up an
emergency phone line and it should work. They deserve to know
that a panic button, when they have been instructed to press it
when an incident occurs, will work and prompt a response from
local law enforcement. In an active-shooting situation that is
crucial.
So, my question is whether the vulnerability assessment
that was done in November 2013 took into account the
communication between first responders. I think we have raised
that question. But then on the other hand, the ability of the
Transportation Security Officers to call for assistance in the
event of an incident at a checkpoint, which I think is crucial.
Mr. Pistole. Yes. Thank you, Congresswoman. Actually the
most recent joint vulnerability assessment was just in February
2014, so just very recently following the shooting in November,
and it was part of a previously-scheduled one. So, one of the
things we look at with the FBI and the Airport Authority and
the airport police is the communication, not necessarily in
terms of interoperability of radio systems because there are a
number of challenges to that both from a budget, a number of
different aspects. Does the airport police want to have TSA
Officers on their radio channels and communications just like--
--
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Pistole, I want to ask two other
questions, so if you can summarize your response.
Mr. Pistole. So the bottom line is they looked at a number
of things, including communications. We do not look at
communications, say, between first responders, between LA fire,
LA police, LA sheriff, and LAWA. That is not part of the joint
vulnerability assessment.
Ms. Jackson Lee. So can we add to that now the ability of a
TSO Officer to have an immediate response based upon whatever
is present for them to make that call?
Mr. Pistole. Yes. The question we do look at or the issue
we do look at is, do TSA Officers have the ability to
communicate directly with airport police? And the answer to
that is yes, as the supervisory TSO did on November 1, 10
seconds after the first shot was fired.
Ms. Jackson Lee. But that was a red phone?
Mr. Pistole. That was a red phone.
Ms. Jackson Lee. So, I think my point is we want to make
sure that all that is operable from our perspective in the
Federal Government.
Mr. Pistole. Right, and LAWA found that that was not
operable, so they have taken actions to correct that.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Yes, let me quickly, is it, in your mind,
very important for there to be a Federal TSO professional
organization as opposed to privatization? Does this really
point out how important that is?
Mr. Pistole. Well, yes. I believe that TSA is a Federal
workforce----
Ms. Jackson Lee. But that it is important to be under the
Federal auspices as opposed to privatization.
Mr. Pistole. It is, but we also recognize Congress' mandate
to have privatized screening.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Some of us disagree with that. Thank you.
Let me ask Mr. Cox about the importance of a trained
professional TSO organization as opposed to privatization. Then
might you comment very briefly on what you think is important
about a separate law enforcement entity to TSO.
Mr. Cox. No. 1, I think the American people had the outcry
that they wanted the Federal Government to operate the
screening at airports after 9/11, and since that time TSA has
done a fantastic job in protecting the flying public. I clearly
believe that that needs to be a function of Government, and
they are doing an excellent job. Part of it with having a law
enforcement function in TSA, I commend the work of the police
department here at the Los Angeles Airport. They did a
fantastic job.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Yes, they did.
Mr. Cox. Very, very brave officers that ran right into the
situation. But at the same token, TSA, they need law
enforcement there. My good friend and colleague sitting beside
me would not be looking to the Phoenix police department to
provide the security for his officers. He wants to do that.
There needs to be some type of law enforcement inside of
TSA to provide security at that checkpoint. There are still
very large airport parking lots, all of those type things that
have to be managed in an airport operation, and which we need
the local law enforcement and the airport law enforcement to
handle. But those checkpoints in TSA, it was one of ours that
did not get to go home to his family.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman, I yield
back. Thank you very much.
Mr. Hudson. Thank the gentlelady. The Chairman now
recognizes----
Ms. Jackson Lee. I apologize for having to depart at this
time. Thank you.
Mr. Hudson. Well, thank you for participating in this
hearing. Thank you for your leadership.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you.
Mr. Hudson. The Chairman now recognizes the gentlewoman
from California, our host, if that is appropriate. We are in
your Congressional district, so we appreciate you joining us.
Ms. Waters, we now recognize you for any questions you may
have.
Ms. Waters. Thank you very much, and I certainly appreciate
your being here. I would like to thank Homeland Security
Committee Chairman Michael McCaul, Ranking Member Bennie
Thompson, Transportation Security Subcommittee Chairman Richard
Hudson, and Congresswoman Sheila Jackson Lee, who is sitting in
for Ranking Member Cedric Richmond, for organizing this field
hearing in my district entitled ``Lessons From the LAX
Shooting: Preparing for and Responding to Emergencies at
Airports.''
I want to begin by joining with my colleagues to honor the
life and service of Gerardo Hernandez, the Transportation
Security Officer who was killed in the line of duty during the
active-shooting incident on November 1, and I offer my deepest
condolences to his family and friends. I also honor all of the
TSOs, LAX police officers, and other first responders who
risked their lives to stabilize the situation and protect the
public on that tragic day.
This hearing follows the release of two reports on the
November 1 incident, one by the Los Angeles World Airports and
the other by the Transportation Security Administration, and I
am concerned about some of what was revealed in those reports.
But I am not worried because those things that were revealed,
whether it is the red telephone, or the panic buttons, or even
the interoperability, are things that can be fixed. I think
that Ms. Lindsey and Chief Gannon have already talked about a
quick response to those kinds of things. They have the
resources to do it, and they certainly will do it.
I would like to just spend a moment, if I may, to talk
about the need for a consistent law enforcement presence at TSA
passenger screening checkpoints, such as the one where Officer
Hernandez was killed. Now, let me just say this. I know that
there are differences of opinion about this. What I am anxious
to hear today and in the near future is that the discussion
will continue. There may be things that can be tried. There may
be alternatives. But what I do not wish to do is to simply have
the issue put to rest at this time because I am concerned that
there may be a better mousetrap. I am not sure.
Following the shooting incident, I discussed airport
security issues with leaders of the American Alliance of
Airport Police Officers. Following our discussion, I wrote a
letter to TSA Administrator John Pistole in which I recommended
that law enforcement officers be stationed within 300 feet of
TSA passenger screening checkpoints. I have a copy of that
letter with me today, and with the committee's consent, I will
include it in the hearing record.
[The information follows:]
Letter From Hon. Maxine Waters
December 19, 2013.
The Honorable John Pistole,
Administrator, Transportation Security Administration (TSA), TSA-5
Administrator, 601 South 12th Street, Arlington, VA 20598.
Dear Administrator Pistole: I write you today to express the
importance of having law enforcement officers stationed within 300 feet
of TSA passenger screening checkpoints and the need for airport police
to have access to all airport security cameras.
It is my understanding that these two security recommendations were
included in a September 2012 letter to you signed by Mr. Marshall
McClain, President of the Los Angeles Airport Peace Officers
Association (LAAPOA). In the aftermath of the tragic shooting incident
at Los Angeles International Airport (LAX), I am deeply concerned that
these issues have yet to be addressed by TSA. I expressed the
importance of implementing these security recommendations in my
statement during the House Homeland Security Committee Subcommittee on
Transportation Security hearing entitled ``TSA's SPOT Program and
Initial Lessons from the LAX Shooting,'' on November 14, 2013. I
believe that these recommendations will play a vital role in ensuring
that all travelers and airport employees are safe in our Nation's
airports.
As the Member of Congress who represents LAX, the safety and
security of all of the people who work in and pass through LAX is of
paramount importance to me. Following the tragic shooting incident at
the airport, I met with representatives from the American Alliance of
Airport Police Officers (AAAPO), including the Presidents of LAAPOA and
the police associations of the Port Authority of New York and New
Jersey (JFK, LaGuardia, and Newark airports) and Baltimore-Washington
Intemational (BWI) airport, to discuss suggestions for addressing
serious security gaps in our Nation's airport system. We all agreed
that requiring a law enforcement officer to be located within 300 feet
of a TSA passenger screening checkpoint and requiring airport police to
have access to all airport security cameras are sensible and cost-
effective steps that will significantly enhance the security of all
major airports across the Nation.
In this regard, I urge you to immediately revisit and reevaluate
the proposals put forth by the AAAPO in their letter to you dated
September 28, 2012, which I have enclosed for your reference.
Thank you for your time and attention to this matter. I look
forward to your response.
Sincerely,
Maxine Waters,
Member of Congress.
Appendix.--Letter From the American Alliance of Airport Police Officers
September 28, 2012.
The Honorable John Pistole,
Administrator, Transportation Security Administration, TSA-1
Administrator, 601 South 12th Street, Arlington, VA 20598.
Dear Administrator Pistole: Thank you again for taking time this
week to visit with our group to discuss our mutual goals of airport
safety and security.
As a follow-up to our discussion, please find below the five major
issue areas we discussed with specific examples and proposed solutions:
TSA and Airport Police Screening Point Breach/Incident Protocol--
Immediate Notification
Issue.--When security breaches and/or incidents occur in TSA
screening areas, TSA agents are attempting to investigate and/or self-
correct breaches, exposing the travelling public to risk, delaying
investigatory actions, and causing unnecessary travel disruptions.
Example.--In January 2012, two pipes which resembled pipe bombs
were removed from a traveler's bag at LaGuardia Airport and set aside
in a common area, prompting a security scare that was not reported to
airport police until 6 hours later. See http://www.nypost.com/p/news/
local/queens/bomb_botch_at_lag_cNNAisTre- 0rBixGKlehknI.
Proposed Solution.--TSA must be required to immediately notify
airport police of security breaches and/or incidents at passenger
checkpoints. Standard operating procedures must be prescribed between
TSA and airport police when dealing with security breaches and/or
incidents at passenger and baggage checkpoints.
Real-Time Airport Police Access to Closed Circuit Security Cameras
Issue.--Most airports do not have a coordinated airport-wide closed
circuit security camera system. Instead, TSA, airport management,
tenants, vendors, and others own and operate camera systems without a
common repository. Most importantly, there is no requirement that
stakeholders provide airport police with a camera feed should a crime
or incident occur. In all breaches, real-time access to video is
essential to airport police containing and assessing situations. The
absence of a standardization that requires that airport police must be
provided real-time access to any camera system on airport property has
led to unnecessary disruptions and numerous incidents when perpetrators
have eluded detainment.
Example.--At Newark Airport in August 2012, traces of explosives
were identified on the hands of a woman at the TSA screening point. TSA
did not follow protocol and detain her for secondary screening nor did
they immediately contact airport police when they realized their
serious error. A half-hour after the incident when airport police were
notified, TSA could not even identify which of the three screening
areas within the terminal was the breach area. As a result, the
terminal was shut down for approximately 3 hours, delaying travel and
inconveniencing thousands of passengers. See http://www.myfoxny.com/
story/19199785/security-breach-at-newark-airport#ixzz22mr44BK7.
Proposed Solution.--Any entity with security cameras at Category X
airports must provide a real-time feed to the airport police's primary
video surveillance system. Each entity is responsible for the cost of
providing the feed.
LEO Podium Positions/Screening Rule--300 Feet of Screening Area
Issue.--Current statute requires that a law enforcement officer
(LEO) ``be able to provide prompt responsiveness to problems occurring
at the screening points.'' The definition of ``prompt'' has been
interpreted broadly.
Example.--At large New York City area airports, an officer must
respond to ``problems'' at screening checkpoints within 5 minutes; a
feat virtually impossible if an officer is charged with patrolling the
entire terminal area and is performing other police functions. We share
the concern you expressed about officer responses to TSA. The
implementation of a 300-foot rule would address this matter and ensure
a LEO is immediately prepared to answer TSA calls.
Proposed Solution.--A uniform standard should be applied to all
Category X airports which would require a LEO within 300 feet of the
passenger screening area.
Mandatory Screening for All Airport Employees and Armed TSA
Issue.--At various airports, prior to DHS permitting TSA to wear
metal badges, all TSA employees were screened with other airport
employees and passengers who enter the airport. TSA asserts that since
they now wear metal badges that will set off screening alarms, they
should be exempt from screening procedures. As a result, all TSA
employees at LAX and any item they carry or have on their body (i.e.
backpacks, purses, etc.) bypass the screening checkpoint.
Example.--At LAX, all airport employees must go through the TSA
screening checkpoint except TSA, armed on-duty law enforcement
officers, and Federal Flight Deck Officers (who also carry weapons).
This issue is of great concern considering TSA agents have the
potential of bringing prohibited, dangerous and/or illegal items with
them to work. Similarly, at JFK, airport employees are permitted to
enter the airport via a rudimentary metal turnstile that is located
immediately off the tarmac without passing through TSA screening.
Again, these airports are among the most vulnerable to terrorist
attacks in this country. In addition, two TSA agents are armed at LAX.
They are: Don McMullen, assistant Federal security director for TSA/Law
Enforcement Division at LAX and a task force officer on the FBI's Joint
Terrorism Task Force, and John Lingram, TSA assistant special agent in
charge at LAX and a former Federal air marshal.
Proposed Solution.--Policy should revert to pre-badge protocol
which required TSA employees go through the TSA screening checkpoint
before entering secure areas of the airport.
TSA Mission Creep/Definitive LEO and TSA Roles
Issue.--TSA agents are charged with screening every passenger and
bag boarding commercial aircrafts. TSA agents are not law enforcement
officers and are not trained nor equipped to perform police work.
Airport police officers are vetted, attend an academy, and continually
receive criminal policing, hijacking, and terrorist training. They are
not screeners and do not seek to perform TSA-specific duties. TSA has
expanded the scope of their authority beyond screening areas to more
traditional ``police'' work without clear lines of delineation with
airport police, jeopardizing public safety, contributing to a break in
chain-of-command, and delaying timely law enforcement responses. This
``mission creep'' threatens the security of the airport.
Example.--TSA's Behavior Detection Officer (BDO) program, which is
designed to detect threat behavior patterns, has received almost
universal criticism for its cost, lack of effectiveness, and racial
profiling claims. Our officers have become frustrated with the program
as BDO's have not produced a viable terrorist threat at any of our
airports, yet many police hours have been expended in dealing with BDO
claims to no avail. See http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/12/us/racial-
profiling-at-boston-airport-officials-say.html?pagewanted=all and
http://www.gao.gov/assets/310/304510.pdf.
Proposed Solution.--TSA employees who are not trained as Federal
law enforcement officers should be restricted to conducting passenger
and bag screening and agents should have no jurisdiction beyond
passenger and baggage screening checkpoints. A pilot program should be
conducted at two or three Category X airports to test the feasibility
of only airport police, who have the foundational LEO training,
knowledge of the specific airport environment, and ability to make
arrests, to perform behavior detection activities in order to determine
the efficiency, effectiveness, and cost comparisons between airport
police BDO and TSA BDO programs.
The members of the American Alliance of Airport Police Officers
have a long and productive history and respected relationships with
numerous Federal partners including the FBI, Customs, and airplane-
based Federal Air Marshals. The key to the success of our mutual
efforts is that each participant has clear definitions of
responsibilities. The only Federal entity with which our officers
experience constant tension is with TSA non-law enforcement operations.
It is important that we address the underlying issues and adjust our
interactions to serve our mutual mission of keeping airports safe.
In this vein, we hope you will thoroughly review and advance our
recommendations. As we discussed, all airports are not created equally.
Our airports are among the most-trafficked and terrorist-targeted in
the country and world. The rank-and-file officers we represent are
fully committed to our mission and we seek to have a productive and
more defined relationship with TSA to accomplish this goal. The
implementation of these five initiatives would promote these efforts.
We look forward to your responses and to working with you, House
Homeland Security Chairman Peter King, and others to address these
important concerns.
Sincerely,
Mr. Marshall McClain,
President, Los Angeles Airport Peace Officers Association.
Mr. Paul Nunziato,
President, Port Authority Police Benevolent Assoc. Inc.
Ms. Waters. I was pleased to learn that TSA was responsive
to the concerns that I raised and addressed this issue in its
report. Specifically, TSA issued recommended standards calling
for an increased presence of law enforcement officers at high-
traffic locations within the airport, such as peak travel
times, and checkpoints, and ticket counters. However, TSA still
does not require that law enforcement officers be consistently
present at these checkpoints, even during aforementioned peak
travel times.
The LAWA report, on the other hand, does not address this
issue at all. LAWA implements a flexible response approach to
security, which allows police officers to roam around the
airport, but does not specifically require them to be present
at the passenger screening checkpoints. The fixed-post approach
by contrast requires a police officer to be stationed at each
passenger screening checkpoint. Airports and local police
departments that support the flexible-response approach have
argued that this approach provides visibility of police
officers throughout the airport, and less predictability for
those who are intent on doing harm.
I realize that a consistent law enforcement presence at TSA
screening checkpoints is a controversial issue. However, I
would argue that the fixed-post and flexible-response methods
are not mutually exclusive. A major airport, like LAX, can have
police officers at every screening checkpoint and still have
additional officers patrolling the airport. If the United
States Capitol complex where we work in Washington, DC can have
police officers stationed at security checkpoints as well
additional officers patrolling the vicinity, then I think it is
possible for LAX.
Some airports and local police departments have also argued
that stationing a police officer at every screening checkpoint
is just too expensive, but I do not accept that particular
argument. I do not want to compromise airport security in order
to save money by paying for fewer police officers. Regardless
of which local, State, or Federal agency is responsible for
stationing officers at TSA screening checkpoints, a consistent
law enforcement presence at these checkpoints is critical.
I, therefore, look forward to a frank discussion regarding
TSA checkpoint security today and in the future. However, I
firmly believe that we should not adjourn without at least
continuing to address this issue, and I want to thank Chief
Gannon for his perspective on this. He gave me a new insight
about predictability and the fact that if it is known that
there is an officer at the checkpoint, they become easy
targets. I appreciate that.
I want to thank Mr. Cox because you gave us another way to
look at this. You talked about how this possibly could be done.
That is why I think it is so important to continue the
discussion because I think we can be creative, and we can try
things. I think there is no reason why we cannot take several
ideas, try them out, see what works best. But I do not want to
give up on this discussion.
I thank you for allowing me to be here today, and I thank
all of you for the wonderful tour that you gave us today. It
certainly gave us a better insight. This is an important
facility. LAX is the economic engine of this area, all of the
South Bay and my district. I appreciate you. I appreciate all
of the tremendous responsibility that you have. I want to be
part of the solution, not part of the problem. Thank you very
much.
Mr. Hudson. I thank the gentlelady. Now I recognize the
gentlelady from California, Ms. Brownley.
Ms. Brownley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to thank
you, and Chairman McCaul, and Ranking Member Thompson for
having this important hearing here today. As someone who
travels every week, as my colleague, Ms. Waters, and I both do,
to and from LAX, I have to say I feel very, very safe. But as
Chairman McCaul mentioned, we cannot be complacent, and I think
this incident informs us on changes we need to make to improve
all of our security.
I want to thank Chief Gannon and all of the men and women
who serve with you to protect us here at LAX, and to Mr.
Pistole, and all of the TSA Officers who work very, very hard
every single day, and who put their protection or put our
protection over theirs every single day to ensure our safety. I
have to state that with serving, I believe, over 200,000 people
every single day here at LAX, it is like a major public event
that takes place every single day.
So I want to thank all of the witnesses who are here today
and their willingness to answer our questions. Hopefully the
very tragic death of Transportation Security Officer Gerardo
Hernandez and the wounding of other TSA employees and a
passenger at LAX on November 1 will never, ever happen again.
But it is incumbent on all of us to work together to identify
possible improvements to safety and security for TSA employees
and our traveling public.
However, the shooting also raised another serious issue,
and one that I believe we must address. As you know, current
law does not provide TSA Officers with death benefits like
those offered to firefighters, police officers, FBI agents, or
State troopers. I am just naming a few of the law enforcement
personnel who all receive death benefits. That is why I have
introduced the Honoring Our Fallen TSA Officers Act, which
seeks to remedy this inequity.
My bill would amend Federal law to provide for the
eligibility of a TSA employee to receive public safety
officers' death benefits. As we have learned today, and the two
TSA Officers who are here with us today, Officers Grigsby and
Speer, and all the TSA employees who demonstrate courage and
bravery every single day in hopes of never having another
November 1 incident. God forbid that an incident like this ever
happens again as well as the husband of Ms. Hernandez, who is
with us today. But if another TSA Officer ever dies in the line
of duty, I believe that these benefits are critically important
to their families.
So with that, I wanted to ask Mr. Pistole, having served in
the FBI and now with TSA, what is your opinion on whether TSO
or TSA Officers should be afforded the same benefits as the
Federal partners that help to secure this country every single
day?
Mr. Pistole. Well, first, Congresswoman, let me thank you
for initiating the bill to recognize TSA employees as public
safety officers to receive that benefit. Obviously it would be
a tremendous benefit to TSA overall, particular to the
Hernandez family, in this instance. You're right, hopefully
would never be needed again, but I greatly appreciate your
initiation and support of that, and would hope that that would
come to fruition retroactively obviously, and then be proactive
in terms of any future losses. Tremendous appreciation and
support. On behalf of all the men and women of TSA, thank you.
Ms. Brownley. Well, thank you very much. You know, I
certainly would appreciate it if you and the organization
could, and I know you have taken a look at the bill. But if you
could take a deeper look at the bill and provide any feedback
as we move forward with it, I would appreciate it very, very
much.
I see that my time has almost expired, so I will yield
back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Hudson. Thank the gentlelady. I would like to recognize
the Chairman of the full committee for any closing statement
you may have, Mr. McCaul.
Chairman McCaul. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me just say
again to Ana, our thoughts and prayers are with you. I know we
can never undo what has been done, but we want to make you
whole again as much as we possibly can. We are determined to
help you.
To Administrator Pistole, thanks for the fine job that you
do and your officers do under very, as I said, difficult
circumstances, particularly in this case. Chief Gannon, the
response time of your officers responding to the threat in less
than 5 minutes is to be commended.
Finally, Ms. Lindsey, I did not get to ask you a question,
but I did want to close by commending you as well for the model
that you have created of cooperation in your command center. I
think it is important that the general public be aware of what
you have done even before this incident, but more so after,
pulling together the relevant agencies to work together to
better prevent threats like this from happening. Again, very
similar to a joint terrorism task force mode where you bring
all the relevant players into the same room with video
equipment so that God forbid something like this happens again,
we will be able to respond very quickly and protect the
traveling public.
So with that, I will just close by saying, Mr. Chairman,
thank you for your leadership in holding this hearing. To
Maxine Waters, thanks for hosting us in your fine district. You
are a very lucky woman. The weather is very nice here.
[Laughter.]
Chairman McCaul. It is a little bit better than Washington,
DC right now.
Ms. Waters. Yes.
Chairman McCaul. Again, Mr. Chairman, thanks for your
leadership.
Mr. Hudson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank our witnesses
for your testimony and the Members for your questions today. I
have committed to working together in a bipartisan way to look
at lessons learned to make sure that Officer Hernandez did not
die in vain, to do what we can as our responsibility as
representatives of the people to go forward and make this
country safer for the flying public, to assist the law
enforcement TSA airport administrators around the country and
the tough job they do every day. So I thank you for making this
possible.
I would point out that Members of the subcommittee may have
some additional questions for the witnesses, and we ask that
you respond to these in writing. But without objection, the
subcommittee stands adjourned.
Ms. Waters. Mr. Chairman, before you----
Mr. Hudson. You caught me before I hit the gavel. The
Chairman recognizes Ms. Waters.
Ms. Waters. I need unanimous consent just to take care of
something I did not care of. I just really realized that Mr.
Tony Grigsby and Mr. James Speer, the officers who were shot,
are here.
Mr. Hudson. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Waters. I just wanted to thank you so very much. I am
so pleased that you are getting well and you are back to work.
Thank you so much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Hudson. Yes, ma'am. Without objection----
[Laughter.]
Mr. Hudson [continuing]. The subcommittee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 2:21 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
----------
Questions From Chairman Michael T. McCaul for John S. Pistole
Question 1. Does TSA consider legislative report language to be
legally binding?
Answer. The Government Accountability Office (GAO), in its
Principles of Federal Appropriations Law, states that legislative
report language ``will not be used to add requirements that Congress
did not include in the statute itself.'' The GAO adds that legislative
report language ordinarily will not be used to controvert clear
statutory language. In Cherokee Nation v. Leavitt, the Supreme Court
expressly stated that legislative report language does not bind
Executive agencies. 543 U.S. 631, 646 (2005) (``(L)anguage contained in
Committee reports is not legally binding.'') In adhering to the Supreme
Court ruling and the GAO guidance, the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) makes every effort to be responsive to legislative
report language.
Question 2. TSA has stated that it is able to perform screening
operations at ``3 to 9 percent'' greater cost efficiency than Screening
Partnership Program (SPP) contractors providing the same security
service. Does the Federal Cost Estimate (FCE) TSA utilizes to set
maximum allowable price bids in SPP contract solicitations represent
TSA's costs for providing security screening services or does it
represent the total cost to the Federal Government?
Answer. The reference made to 3 percent to 9 percent is from a
Government Accountability Office (GAO) report update in 2011 (GAO-11-
375R) which included alternative approaches to formulating estimates.
As reflected in the report, this range was for a point in time and was
a composite average for all participants in the program. Estimates vary
from airport to airport and are dependent on security requirements,
which are known to change as a result of such things as changes to the
configuration of the airport, passenger throughput, and equipment
requirements. Although TSA calculates all relevant costs, only those
that impact TSA's budget are included in the Federal Cost Estimate
included in the Request For Proposal.
The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is currently
pursuing an independent study of the Screening Partnership Program as
related to cost and performance comparisons. TSA intends to include, as
part of this study, a full assessment of the existing methodology,
proposed changes and potential impacts of implementing those changes.
This independent report is expected to be provided to GAO for its
review within 1 year of enactment of the fiscal year 2014 budget.
Question 3. If a contract is awarded below the FCE then is that
contract more cost-efficient than using Federal screeners?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration awards contracts
under the Screening Partnership Program that provide the best value to
the Government and do not compromise security or detrimentally affect
the cost efficiency or effectiveness of screening passengers or
property as required by the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012
(Pub. L. 112-95). Upon conclusion of the evaluation process which
includes Federal Cost Estimate criteria, the award is made to the
responsible Offeror whose proposal, conforming to the solicitation,
will be most advantageous to the Government.
Question 4. TSA staffs exit lanes at airports that they have deemed
collocated with the passenger screening checkpoint. At present, there
is no Nation-wide standard that defines or measures how the TSA
determines which exit lanes are collocated versus non-collocated with a
passenger screening checkpoint. What specific criteria does TSA use to
determine which exit lanes are considered collocated with a passenger
screening checkpoint?
Answer. The Bipartisan Budget Act required the Transportation
Security Administration (TSA) to continue to meet access control
responsibilities for exit lanes for those lanes where TSA was meeting
those responsibilities on December 1, 2013. As required by the
Bipartisan Budget Act, TSA staffs the required exit lanes regardless of
whether or not the exit lane is collocated.
Question 5. Is it TSA policy to not staff exit lanes that are
modified or reconfigured after December 12, 2013?
Answer. In cases where airport remodeling or reconfiguration of an
exit lane is such that the location essentially remains the same, exit
lane access control responsibilities will be staffed in the same manner
it was staffed on December 1, 2013. If remodeling, reconfiguration, or
construction significantly changes the location of existing exit lanes,
requiring additional staffing and resources, TSA is not statutorily
obligated to monitor those exit lanes. TSA intends to continue to
assess options for realizing efficiencies and appropriately satisfying
access control functions.
Questions From Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson for John S. Pistole
Question 1a. The report TSA released on March 26, 2014, titled
Enhancing TSA Officer Safety and Security: Agency Actions and Path
Forward, states that the agency will issue ``recommended standards''
which call for increased law enforcement presence at passenger
checkpoints at peak travel times.
With the majority of airports now using the flexible-response model
for responding to incidents at passenger checkpoints, why is the agency
issuing recommended standards rather than mandating that police
officers be stationed at passenger checkpoints at peak travel times?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) considered
a variety of options to enhance law enforcement presence at checkpoints
during peak travel times, but decided against mandating this
requirement after receiving significant feedback from airport law
enforcement and stakeholder groups. While TSA and law enforcement
stakeholders believe placing police officers at checkpoints during peak
travel times is a desirable and prudent goal, the stakeholders also
believe strongly that airport law enforcement entities need the
flexibility to be able to respond to incidents anywhere on airport
property. As a result, TSA chose to maintain the existing law
enforcement requirements codified in the current Security Directive and
Airport Security Programs, and instead, issued a recommendation via
Information Circular IC 14-01 to increase law enforcement presence
during peak travel times at high-traffic locations to provide visible
deterrence and quicker incident response time.
Question 1b. Please explain for the subcommittee how and the extent
to which TSA trains its workforce on how to utilize communications
equipment so that the workforce can effectively communicate with State,
local, and Federal partners during an emergency.
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) employees
are trained to use multiple methods of communication. Transportation
Security Officers (TSOs) utilize Land Mobile Radios to communicate from
the checkpoint to the TSA Coordination Center. The TSOs have also been
provided with local police emergency phone numbers and are encouraged
to program these numbers into their personal cell phones. At some
airports, Duress Alarms and Red Phones are available to notify either
the local law enforcement or airport operations center of an emergency;
and TSA is working to install these devices at all airports. Training
on radio communications for the TSOs is conducted on TSA's On-Line
Learning Center, followed by localized On-the-Job training to address
nuances due to the different layouts and checkpoint configurations at
the various airports. The Coordination Centers are responsible for
communicating with State, local, and Federal partners during an
emergency utilizing the Voice Over Internet Protocol Phone or cell
phone. Other forms of communications utilized by the Coordination
Centers include the High-Frequency Radios and Satellite Phone. The
Coordination Centers also monitor the Transportation Events Network, a
24/7 National-level alert network conducted over a teleconference
bridge which enables the airports to have situational awareness of
incidents at other airports.
Question 1c. Please explain for the subcommittee the role of the
Aviation Security Advisory Committee during TSA's review of the active-
shooter incident at Los Angeles International Airport on November 1,
2013.
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration hosted three
stakeholder meetings throughout the review process (November 7, 2013,
January 8, 2014, and March 21, 2014) and invited the stakeholders to
provide input and feedback to the agency review of the Los Angeles
International Airport shooting and proposed actions. While the Aviation
Security Advisory Committee (ASAC) was not formally convened, 22 of the
31 organizations who sent representatives to one or more of these
sessions are affiliated with the ASAC.
Question 1d. What protocols are Transportation Security Officers
trained to follow when they identify a weapon either on a passenger's
person or in their carry-on bags?
Answer. If a weapon is identified on a passenger, the protocol for
the Transportation Security Officers (TSO) is to stop the screening
process and notify the supervisor. The supervisor will call for a local
law enforcement officer. If the weapon is identified in the passenger's
carry-on bag, the TSO will maintain control of the bag and notify the
supervisor. The supervisor will call for a local law enforcement
officer.
Question 2a. The President's budget for fiscal year 2015 proposes a
decrease in Visible Intermodal Preparedness and Response (VIPR) teams
from 37 total teams to 33. In the aftermath of the LAX shooting, TSA
responded by adjusting the ratio of VIPR teams from 30-70 ground-to-
aviation ratio, to 50-50.
Given the large number of airports that could benefit from the
deterrence and mitigation factor that VIPR teams are intended to
provide, how do you envision the proposed reduced number of VIPR teams
being an effective tool for securing checkpoints going forward?
Question 2b. What resources are in place to help TSOs in the
immediate aftermath of tragic events such as the shooting at LAX on
November 1, 2013, in terms of coping with the stress and other mental
issues that undoubtedly stem from such a tragedy?
Answer. To increase the security of Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) personnel and passengers at checkpoint areas, TSA
has implemented the use of Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response
(VIPR) resources at airports Nation-wide to augment current
transportation security and law enforcement resources at the airports.
The proposed decrease in VIPR teams in fiscal year 2015 should have
minimal impact on program effectiveness as TSA will maintain its VIPR
operations in those areas of highest risk, including at the checkpoint.
TSA has an Employee Assistance Program (EAP), which is contracted
through Federal Occupational Health. The EAP includes crisis
management, personal and group counseling, and referral services for
all TSA employees and their immediate families. EAP services are
available to all TSA employees 24 hours a day, 7 days per week, via a
toll-free number. EAP played an important role in assisting Los Angeles
International Airport management and staff in the aftermath of this
tragedy by providing individual and group counseling services
throughout the months of November and December 2013.
Question 3a. During an emergency, people look to uniformed
personnel for direction. In the checkpoint environment the first
uniformed personnel a passenger is likely to see will be a
Transportation Security Officer.
Are Transportation Security Officers trained in crisis management
and incident management?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration's (TSA)
Transportation Security Officers (TSOs) are trained to respond to a
variety of emergencies at the airport. The TSOs regularly exercise
emergency drills that apply to a wide variety of scenarios to include
fire, natural disaster, and active shooter. Following the LAX shooting,
TSA incorporated a reminder in shift briefs requiring that supervisors
conduct briefings for employees regarding evacuation routes and
rendezvous points identified in the local mitigation plan. As an
additional measure in the aftermath of November 1 shooting, TSA issued
an Operations Directive which requires every TSO to participate twice
per year in an evacuation drill that includes a physical orientation of
evacuation routes, rally points, and shelter-in-place locations. TSA
also regularly conducts security breach drills to practice what to do
when a violation occurs in a sterile area. TSA has also mandated the
workforce take the Federal Emergency Management Agency Active-Shooter
Training Course. Local management personnel also conduct tabletop and
live exercises, often with local stakeholders, to exercise the Tactical
Response Plans including Continuity of Operations.
Question 3b. A contract airport service worker first called in the
shooting and another service worker encountered the shooter and was
able to describe him and help identify his location in the terminal for
police personnel. There are some 8,900 service workers at LAX, spread
throughout the terminals in far greater numbers than TSA employees and
LAWAPD personnel combined. Given the role these workers played as eye-
witnesses and as the ``first-first responders,'' wouldn't it benefit
everyone for these workers to receive training aimed at honing their
observation and communication skills to be able to work effectively
with authorities and the public in emergency situations?
Answer. Yes. TSA recently released an Information Circular with
recommendations to train personnel and airport stakeholders in active-
shooter security measures and exercise active-shooter plans bi-
annually. The Federal Emergency Management Agency offers a free Active-
Shooter Training Course which is accessible to the public. In addition,
local TSA management invites stakeholders to participate in Tactical
Response Plans exercises for a multitude of scenarios.
Question 3c. TSA and FEMA administer the Transit Security Grant
Program, which funds major costs associated with preparedness training
for workers on the Nation's public transit systems. There does not
appear to be a similar program for airport workers. Would you be in
favor of creating a new program for airports similar to the existing
program for transit or adapting an existing grant program to serve this
purpose?
Answer. The Nation's airport system has sufficient programs and
structure to provide preparedness training for those who work in the
Nation's aviation system. Airport operators are required by TSA
regulations to provide security awareness training or advanced training
on specific measures that can be applied to mitigate immediate or
expected threats. Airport operators also conduct annual preparedness
and response exercises as required by their Airport Security Program.
Collectively, the aviation industry currently provides training to all
workers in the aviation environment.
Question 4a. The report TSA released on March 26, 2014, titled
Enhancing TSA Officer Safety and Security: Agency Actions and Path
Forward, states that the agency will expand duress alarm coverage at
screening locations in airports across the Nation in response to the
shooting at LAX on November 1, 2013, and subsequent review.
What procurement vehicle does TSA intend to use to acquire the
additional 4,500 duress alarms the agency has announced it will install
across the country?
Question 4b. What is the anticipated cost of the procurement and
installation of the new duress alarms?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is using
the Security Equipment Systems Integration Multiple Award Indefinite
Delivery/Indefinite Quantity contract for the procurement of the duress
alarms.
TSA is currently evaluating the proposals received for this effort.
The Government's estimate is one of many tools utilized to validate
cost and therefore procurement-sensitive.
LESSONS FROM THE LAX SHOOTING: AIRPORT AND LAW ENFORCEMENT PERSPECTIVES
----------
Thursday, May 29, 2014
U.S. House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Transportation Security,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:31 p.m., in
Room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Richard Hudson
[Chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Hudson, Rogers, Brooks, Richmond,
and Swalwell.
Mr. Hudson. The Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Transportation Security, will come to order.
The subcommittee is meeting today to hear testimony
examining lessons learned and law enforcement perspectives from
the LAX shooting.
I recognize myself for an opening statement.
I will start by saying I apologize for the late start. But
Congressman Swalwell and I have to live by the bells here and
vote when we have got to vote and so we apologize to everybody
who has been waiting, but we really appreciate you being here.
The subcommittee is meeting today to continue its review of
lessons learned from the senseless act of violence that
occurred at Los Angeles International Airport last year and we
are here to assess how we can better secure our Nation's
airports and transportation systems.
On the morning of November 1, 2013, a lone gunman entered
LAX's Terminal 3 and brutally shot and killed Transportation
Security Officer Gerardo Hernandez while also shooting and
wounding one passenger and two other TSOs, who had heroically
stayed behind to assist an elderly gentleman in evacuating the
checkpoint.
The LAX shooting resulted an inspiring display of bravery
by emergency first responders, law enforcement officers, and
TSA personnel. In March, I, along with Chairman of the full
committee Mike McCaul, full committee Ranking Member Thompson,
and several other Members traveled to LAX and conducted a site
visit and a field hearing, and we were able to meet with first
responders who were there that day and to better understand and
comprehend the complexity and the scope of the response that
day to the shooting.
While I remain impressed by the planning and execution of
the incident response at LAX, it is incumbent upon this
subcommittee and TSA to ensure that airports of all sizes are
aware of best practices and security incident response and are
prepared to work together with law enforcement to mitigate such
events in the future.
As our Nation faces an evolving threat landscape that
focuses in on soft targets, as we have seen in the tragic
bombings of the Boston Marathon, we all must recognize the
vulnerabilities airports present and need to be adequately
prepared to handle such events.
Indeed, airports around the world have experienced such
incidents in the past. The Frankfurt airport shooting, the
Moscow airport bombing in 2011, as well as the Glasgow airport
car bomb in 2007, show a history of attacks perpetrated against
the unsecured areas of airport facilities.
With approximately 450 Federalized airports in the United
States, effective coordination between law enforcement, airport
operators, first responders, and TSA is critical to protecting
the public in an emergency and in mitigating an incident as
quickly as possible.
I believe that better interoperable communications, regular
emergency response and evacuation drills, equipment testing,
and well-articulated response plans are the basis for
accomplishing this objective.
These observations reflect lessons learned from the LAX
shooting as we saw some confusion and delay in establishing an
incident command post, communicating effectively between
responding agencies and keeping the public at LAX informed as
to what was happening and where they should go for safety.
The after-action review conducted by LAX admits that normal
operations could have resumed much sooner had the response
effort been better coordinated.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses, their own
thoughts on security incident response and how their airports
are prepared to deal with such events. I also am eager to hear
your thoughts on TSA's after-action review and recommendations
for enhanced law enforcement presence at ticket counters and
security checkpoints during certain peak travel times.
While TSA is responsible for screening passengers and
helping to prevent acts of terrorism against the aviation
sector, the overall security and safety of the airport
environment primarily lies with airport, local, and State law
enforcement actions stationed in and around the airport.
Whether it be an active shooter or an individual breaching
perimeter security and stowing away in the wheel well of an
aircraft, it is important for the subcommittee to understand
the unique challenges facing the airport stakeholders and what
can be done to detect and respond to perceived and known
threats.
I thank the witnesses again for being here and look forward
to their testimony.
I now recognize the Ranking Member of the subcommittee, the
gentleman from Louisiana, Mr. Richmond, for his opening
statement.
Mr. Richmond. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for
calling the hearing today.
Your continued focus on the tragedy events that resulted in
the death of Transportation Security Officer Hernandez is
appreciated.
I would also like to thank our panel of witnesses for being
here today.
Mr. Capello and Mr. Landguth will provide the airports'
perspective on how the tragic events at Los Angeles
International Airport on November 1, 2013, prompted changes in
preparedness and response planning for similar events.
Mr. Murphy, president of the Airport Law Enforcement
Agencies Network, will share with us the collective sentiment
and strategies being implemented by airport law enforcement
agencies across the Nation.
We learned a great deal about the response on the day of
the shooting and what can be done to improve upon that response
from the respective reports released in March by the
Transportation Security Administration and Los Angeles World
Airports. Those reports expose several flaws and identified
viable solutions that can and should be implemented to ensure
that similar future incidents are mitigated or deterred
altogether.
Today, we have the opportunity to understand how the
airport law enforcement community and individual airports are
implementing these recommendations and learn about what more
can be done.
Having said that, Los Angeles World Airports as well as
other airports throughout the Nation, cannot implement all of
the reforms necessary without assistance from local and Federal
partners. A significant portion of the reports address the need
for interoperable communications and reliable emergency
infrastructure and the technology advanced society that we live
in; it is hard to accept that some panic buttons within
airports do not work and that we cannot figure out a way to
ensure first responders can communicate seamlessly during an
emergency.
Undoubtedly, Federal funds and resources will be required
to ensure all of the needed reforms are implemented. That
places the onus on Congress to provide the funding needed to
make planned reforms a reality.
Mr. McClain, thank you for being here today. Your
perspective is extremely valuable. In your position as
president of the Los Angeles Airport Peace Officers
Association, your insight comes from having first-hand
experience at LAX on that tragic day. I am interested in
hearing more about the concerns you outline in your prepared
testimony regarding airport law enforcement's interaction with
the Transportation Security Administration.
Given that law enforcement and TSA share a common goal, the
safety and security of the traveling public, it was troubling
to read in your testimony that recommendations made to TSA
prior to the shooting were not acted upon.
Before yielding back, I would like to emphasize the
important work Transportation Security Officers do to protect
our Nation against attack. As Mr. McClain points out in his
prepared testimony, airplanes and airports remain desired
targets of terrorists around the world. Unfortunately, there is
a tendency to marginalize that threat as we become consumed
with the desire to expedite screening for larger and larger
segments of the population.
Officer Hernandez reported to work at LAX on November 1,
2013, with the goal of ensuring our aviation sector remains
secure and passengers could travel freely. In a senseless act
of violence, his life was cut short while working to protect
the rest of us. Today we will strive to identify ways to better
safeguard the officers we task with keeping our aviation sector
secure.
Mr. Chairman, I am looking forward to working with you on
legislation derived from the subcommittee's oversight work that
will enhance preparedness and response capabilities at airports
when incidents occur.
Before yielding back, I would ask unanimous consent that a
collection of news articles regarding the November 1 shooting
at LAX provided to the committee by the Service Employees
International Union be inserted into the record.
Mr. Hudson. Without objection.
[The information follows:]
Articles Submitted For the Record by Hon. Cedric Richmond
May 29, 2014
reports depict utter confusion after lax shooting
CBS/Associated Press, March 18, 2014, 7:15 AM
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/reports-depict-utter-confusion-after-lax-
shooting/
A report on the emergency response to last year's shooting at Los
Angeles International Airport cites serious shortcomings in
communication between agencies that left major commanders in the dark
and a long lag in establishing a coordinated response.
An early copy of the report to be presented to airport
commissioners Tuesday was obtained by The Associated Press.
It cites the ``heroism'' of officers who shot and took suspect Paul
Ciancia into custody after he'd allegedly killed a Transportation
Security Administration officer and injured three people Nov. 1.
But it details lapses in coordination and technology between police
and fire departments, which set up separate command posts that didn't
unify for 45 minutes.
The report says police and fire commanders arrived on the scene
with no idea where to go or what the others were doing.
Suspect Paul Ciancia, 24, was shot and quickly subdued by police.
The Pennsville, N.J., native has pleaded not guilty to 11 federal
charges, including murder of a federal officer.
A separate, union report obtained by the AP last week said
thousands of LAX workers had no idea what to do when the gunman opened
fire in a terminal--because they were inadequately trained to deal with
an emergency.
Members of SEIU United Service Workers West--sky caps, baggage
handlers, wheelchair attendants and janitors--weren't prepared for an
evacuation, were hampered by poor communication, and were essentially
on their own during the chaos, as panicked, fleeing passengers ran onto
the tarmac and dove onto luggage conveyer belts. In some instances,
passengers were left alone in wheelchairs during the shooting.
Many issues outlined in the union report and by the airport itself
were identified as deficient in 2011 by a special panel of experts
convened by the former mayor to review public safety at LAX. Los
Angeles World Airports began revamping emergency plans that were to be
completed last summer. But in June, the airport commission gave the
contractor 18 more months.
LAX spokeswoman Nancy Castles said in an email that the airport's
review will discuss including the ``airport-wide community'' in
emergency response efforts.
Peter Goelz, former managing director of the National
Transportation Safety Board and an aviation safety and security
consultant, said a lack of coordinated planning during an emergency can
be a ``fatal flaw'' that endangers the public and workers.
``The airline industry and airports in particular have spent
hundreds of millions of dollars since 9/11 in emergency response
preparedness and upgrades, and the reality is that for airport service
workers, they're always the last ones considered in the planning even
though they have absolutely the most direct contact with passengers,''
said Goelz, who had no role in the report.
The union conducted the study after the airport declined to include
its members in a comprehensive review of the emergency response slated
for release Tuesday.
``Passengers are placed at greater risk as a result of a lack of
effort on the part of the airport authority to include these workers in
emergency response coordination and communications, as well as a lack
of training and investment in the contract service workers who provide
passenger services on behalf of the airlines,'' according to the report
by the union that represents about 2,500 of the 8,900 service workers
at LAX.
The union report, which will be released this week, calls for
emergency response training, participation in drills, and specialized
training for people who deal with disabled passengers or security.
The AP previously reported that the airport investigation found
several lapses that led to a delayed response. The only two armed
officers on duty in Terminal 3 were out of position when the shooting
began; medical help wasn't quickly provided to the TSA Officer who
died; and an emergency phone system and panic buttons weren't updated
or, in some cases, even working.
Airport officials said in a recent hearing that they're creating
teams to update travelers during emergencies and improve the public
announcement system, which currently can't broadcast throughout the
airport. They said the review also looks at providing more evacuation
training and instruction to employees on how to shelter large numbers
of people.
The union report detailed multiple instances where airport service
workers were critical to the emergency response. One service worker was
the first to alert airport police dispatch about the shooting. A union
security worker pointed responding officers toward the gunman. Moments
earlier, the worker had faced the gunman, who repeatedly asked him,
``Where is TSA?"
While TSA Officers followed practiced emergency procedures, union
officials said workers were given little or no direction during the
attack and the airport shutdown that lasted more than five hours. More
than 23,000 travelers were evacuated or held in areas without official
explanation or information. Much information--even for airport
workers--was obtained through news reports, social media, and messages
from family and friends.
Fanny Fuentes, who rotates between airport jobs and has worked at
LAX for 14 years, was in Terminal 1 when 15 passengers tried to enter
the terminal from the tarmac.
``They were running right by the planes on the airfield, probably
about 10 to 15 feet away from them, which is really dangerous,
especially close to the engines,'' Fuentes said.
When someone yelled that there was a shooting inside the terminal,
a crowd of about 100 travelers ran outside toward the runway. Disabled
and elderly passengers were left unattended as people fled.
``They were just sitting there shaking like, `What is going to
happen to us?' '' Fuentes said.
The union report, which didn't compare emergency readiness at other
airports, also cites multiple instances when radios issued to some
workers failed because of battery or transmission problems. Veteran
workers said the airport provided inadequate or no training on
evacuation routes and procedures.
Multiple employees said they were better prepared for emergencies
because of training at previous jobs at places such as Taco Bell,
Disneyland, or Wal-Mart.
______
lax review finds inadequacies in airport's warning systems, mass
communication
Brenda Gazzar, Los Angeles Daily news, March 18, 2014
http://www.whittierdailynews.com/general-news/20140318/lax-review-
finds-inadequacies-in-airports-warning-systems-mass-communication
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
FILE.--In this Nov. 1, 2013 file photo provided to the AP, which has
been authenticated based on its contents and other AP reporting, police
officers stand near a weapon at the Los Angeles International Airport
after a gunman opened fire in the terminal, killing one person and
wounding several others. A report on the emergency response to the
shooting cites serious shortcomings in communication between agencies
that left major commanders in the dark and a long lag in establishing a
coordinated response. (AP Photo/File)
In responding to last year's fatal Terminal 3 shooting, Los Angeles
International Airport officials had an inadequate emergency alert and
warning system, failed to focus on incident command basics and fell
short in communicating to passengers, a report released Tuesday found.
The 83-page broad internal review, conducted with an outside
consultant, called the overall response ``successful'' but shed light
on lessons learned following the Nov. 1, 2013, shooting.
Los Angeles Mayor Eric Garcetti hailed LAX officers for responding
``expertly and heroically'' in quickly stopping suspect Paul Ciancia, a
Sun Valley resident who had allegedly targeted TSA Officers and had
more than 100 unused rounds of ammunition. The shooting left
Transportation Security Administration Officer Gerardo Hernandez dead
and three others, including two TSA Officers, wounded. Ciancia has been
indicted on 11 counts in relation to the shooting, including murder of
a federal officer, and is awaiting trial.
``I want also be clear that we got lucky out there,'' Garcetti told
reporters at a news conference at LAX. ``We're lucky the shooting
didn't take more lives. We're lucky that day the casualty list was not
higher. I asked for this report to make sure we do everything we can
not to depend on luck as well as the heroic work of our first
responders.''
Among the key recommendations are that emergency alert and warning
systems, including duress phones or ``red phones,'' need to be updated
and technologies for 9-1-1 notifications to airport police must be
better integrated.
``The right systems, clear lines of responsibility and well-
documented processes for alert notification are critical to avoiding
delay in mobilizing a response during the early stages of any
emergency,'' the report stated.
The review also found that there needs to be a continuing emphasis
on incident command basics and that public mass notification at the
airport ``was lacking.''
LAX is now developing a centralized public address system to
facilitate communication around the airport, adding nearly a dozen
message signs for incoming roadways and finding a way to send emergency
messages to travelers' cellphones at the airport, Garcetti said.
``Our response has to be in this day and age both analog and
digital, face-to-face and virtual, something we see both actively and
feel passively,'' he said.
In addition, all Los Angeles Airport International telephones and
panic alarms in the terminals will transmit location information to
dispatch when an emergency call is made. On Nov. 1, a TSA supervisor
picked up an LAX telephone that rings airport police during the
incident but she dropped the phone when she had to evacuate
immediately. Because of a ``glitch'' in the system, officers couldn't
tell where the call was coming from, said Los Angeles World Airports
Police Chief Patrick Gannon.
``All our phones were designed and developed so caller
identification would pop up on the screen,'' Gannon told LAWA
commissioners. ``That had fallen off the grid and was not working
properly.''
Garcetti also called on the state officials to upgrade the 9-1-1
calling system so that calls made from cellphones at the airport aren't
automatically routed to the California Highway Patrol officials but to
airport police. In the meantime, airport employees are being urged to
program the airport police dispatch number into their cellphones, he
said. Training will also be given to airport employees so they are
better equipped to help passengers evacuate during a crisis, he said.
``While LAX is ahead of most airports nationally and
internationally, the after-action report is a template for continuing
evolution at LAX,'' LAWA Executive Director Gina Marie Lindsey said.
``Our learning will be a catalyst for change at other airports all over
the world.''
Meanwhile, members of a union that includes airport workers such as
baggage handlers, wheelchair attendants and skycaps, asked Los Angeles
World Airports commissioners to consider the report they released on
the incident.
The report by SEIU United Service Workers West found that
passengers ``were placed at greater risk as a result of a lack of
effort on the part of the airport authority to include these workers in
emergency response coordination and communications as well as a lack of
training and investment into the contract service workers who provide
passenger services on behalf of the airlines.''
LAX wheelchair attendant Fanny Fuentes, 41, was praised by Garcetti
for her efforts in helping to evacuate Terminal 3 and disabled
passengers during the Nov. 1 shooting. Fuentes, a member of SEIU United
Service Workers West, said she was encouraged that the mayor promised
emergency training to the airport's employees and other measures to
help secure the safety of passengers and others.
``I'm excited because I've been with the airport since `96, and I
haven't seen that happening,'' Fuentes said. ``For the mayor to commit
himself to do it publicly, I think there is going to be a change.''
Mr. Richmond. With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
[The statement of Mr. Richmond follows:]
Statement of Hon. Cedric L. Richmond
May 29, 2014
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for convening this hearing. Your
continued focus on the tragic events that resulted in the death of
Transportation Security Officer Hernandez is appreciated.
I would also like to thank our panel of witnesses for being here
today. Mr. Capello and Mr. Landguth will provide the airport's
perspective on how the tragic events at Los Angeles International
Airport on November 1, 2013, prompted changes in preparedness and
response planning for similar incidents. Mr. Murphy, President of the
Airport Law Enforcement Agencies Network, will share with us the
collective sentiment and strategies being implemented by airport law
enforcement agencies across the Nation.
We learned a great deal about the response on the day of the
shooting and what can be done to improve upon that response from the
respective reports released in March by the Transportation Security
Administration and Los Angeles World Airports. Those reports exposed
several flaws and identified viable solutions that can and should be
implemented to ensure that similar future incidents are mitigated or
deterred altogether.
Today, we have the opportunity to understand how the airport law
enforcement community and individual airports are implementing these
recommendations and to learn about what more can be done. Having said
that, Los Angeles World Airports, as well as other airports throughout
the Nation cannot implement all of the reforms necessary without
assistance from local and Federal partners. A significant portion of
the reports addressed the need for interoperable communications and
reliable emergency infrastructure.
In the technologically-advanced society that we live in, it is hard
to accept that some panic buttons within airports do not work, and that
we cannot figure out a way to ensure first responders can communicate
seamlessly during an emergency. Undoubtedly, Federal funds and
resources will be required to ensure all of the needed reforms are
implemented. That places the onus on Congress to provide the funding
needed to make planned reforms a reality.
Mr. McClain, thank you for being here today. Your perspective is
extremely valuable. In your position as president of the Los Angeles
Airport Peace Officers Association, your insight comes from having
first-hand experience at LAX on that tragic day. I am interested in
hearing more about the concerns you outlined in your prepared testimony
regarding airport law enforcement's interaction with the Transportation
Security Administration. Given that law enforcement and TSA share a
common goal, the safety and security of the traveling public, it was
troubling to read in your testimony that recommendations made to TSA
prior to the shooting were not acted upon.
Before yielding back, I would like to emphasize the important work
Transportation Security Officers do to protect our Nation against
attack. As Mr. McClain points out in his prepared testimony, airplanes
and airports remain desired targets of terrorists around the world.
Unfortunately, there is a tendency to marginalize that threat as we
become consumed with the desire to expedite screening for larger and
larger segments of the population.
Officer Hernandez reported to work at LAX on November 1, 2013, with
the goal of ensuring our aviation sector remained secure and passengers
could travel freely. In a senseless act of violence, his life was cut
short while working to protect the rest of us. Today, we will strive to
identify ways to better safeguard the Officers we task with keeping our
aviation sector secure. Mr. Chairman, I am looking forward to working
with you on legislation derived from this subcommittee's oversight work
that will enhance preparedness and response capabilities at airports
when incidents occur.
Mr. Hudson. Thank the gentleman.
Other Members of the committee are reminded that opening
statements may be submitted for the record.
[The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson
The shooting at LAX resulted in the loss of Officer Hernandez's
life and served as a stark reminder of the dangers the men and women on
the front lines of securing our aviation sector face. Unarmed and
exposed, Transportation Security Officers perform the often thankless
task of screening approximately 1.8 million passengers per day.
They do so with limited workplace protections and the great
responsibility of preventing another terrorist attack on the scale of
9/11. Given their vulnerability and the critical role they play in
protecting our homeland, it is essential that airports and the law
enforcement agencies that serve them have the resources, training, and
plans in place to ensure a swift and effective response when an
incident that threatens the safety of Transportation Security Officers
occurs.
In March, this subcommittee held a site visit and field hearing at
LAX to better understand the circumstances surrounding the response to
the shooting. While the response of the individual police officers who
prevented further loss of life on that tragic day is to be commended,
the overall response at LAX left much to be desired.
Panic buttons at the checkpoint were not in working order. The
emergency phone Transportation Security Officers have been trained to
use did not display the location of the incident to the command center,
and the police, firefighters, and emergency medical personnel
responding could not communicate via interoperable radios.
In the wake of the shooting, Administrator Pistole initiated a
Nation-wide review of the preparedness and response capacity of our
airports so that we can either prevent or mitigate a similar incident
in the future.
As was displayed this past weekend in Santa Barbara, California, it
may not be possible to prevent a disturbed individual from opening fire
on innocent strangers in a public setting. That reality, however,
should not stop us from instituting policies that will improve the
response to such incidents at our Nation's airports.
I look forward to hearing from Mr. Capello, the director of
security at Fort Lauderdale International Airport and Mr. Landguth, the
president and chief executive officer of Raleigh-Durham International
Airport regarding the lessons their airports learned from the response
to the shooting at LAX.
I am also eager to hear the law enforcement officer's perspective
from Mr. Murphy and Mr. McClain on how the response to an incident at
an airport can be improved. Given his position with the Los Angeles
Airport Peace Officers Association, Mr. McClain is in the unique
position of being able to help us understand how the response to a
similar incident at LAX would differ today from that on November 1,
2013.
Before yielding back Mr. Chairman, I would be remiss if I did not
point out that the House has still not acted on legislation introduced
by Representative Brownley of California that would result in Officer
Hernandez's family receiving death benefits in the amount of $300,000.
Making a family who lost their husband and father in the line of
duty whole should not be a partisan issue, yet, to date, not a single
Republican Member has co-sponsored Representative Brownley's
legislation.
I would encourage the Chairman and all of my Republican colleagues
to consider cosponsoring H.R. 4026 and to urge their leadership to
allow for consideration of the legislation on the House floor.
Mr. Hudson. We are pleased to have a distinguished panel of
witnesses before us here today.
Mr. Frank Capello is the aviation security director for the
Broward County Aviation Department, which operates the Fort
Lauderdale Hollywood International Airport and the North Perry
General Aviation Airport. Mr. Capello is responsible for
managing the aviation department security division, which
includes oversight and coordination over the law enforcement
services provided by the Broward County Sheriff's Office. Mr.
Capello is a member of the Airports Council International World
Security Standing Committee as well as chairman of the Florida
Airports Council Security Subcommittee. Prior to joining the
Broward County Aviation Department, he was an FAA special
agent, a Federal air marshal, and a TSA Federal security
director.
Mr. Michael Landguth serves as the president and CEO of
Raleigh-Durham International Airport. Airport I use rather
frequently. Mr. Landguth is responsible for RDU's overall
staffing, budgeting, strategic planning, and operations. Prior
to joining the Raleigh-Durham Airport Authority, he served as
CEO and president of the Chattanooga Metropolitan Airport
Authority. Mr. Landguth is an accredited airport executive and
a member of the board of directors of the American Association
of Airport Executives. He also serves as chairman of the
Airports Council International North America's Medium Hub
Caucus.
Does that fit on a business card? That is quite a title.
Next we have Mr. Kevin Murphy, who the president of the
Airport Law Enforcement Agencies Network, ALEAN, and chief of
police for the Cincinnati Northern Kentucky International
Police Department. ALEAN helps facilitate communication of law
enforcement intelligence, actively provides input in the
formulation of public policy concerning civil aviation
security, and promotes, sponsors, and conducts a regular
information sharing network for the benefit of airport law
enforcement officers throughout the world.
Mr. Marshall McClain is a police officer and current
president of the Los Angeles Airport Peace Officers
Association. This association represents the rank-and-file
police, firefighters protecting the city's airports, including
LAX. Officer McClain joined the Los Angeles Airport Police in
2002. He holds the rank of Police Officer 3, and is assigned as
a senior lead officer to the patrolled services section at LAX.
He is a co-founder of the American Alliance of Airport Police
Officers, and serves on the board of directors for the Peace
Officers Research Association of California.
Thank you all for being here.
The witnesses' full written statements will appear in the
record.
The Chairman recognizes Mr. Capello to testify.
Do we have the lights working here? We have got green,
yellow, red. Okay, can you see green there? I guess we will get
a signal for when we have got to start cutting you off there.
But if you will follow, you will have a yellow light is when
you have a minute left, I believe, and then the time expires at
5.
So, Mr. Capello, you are recognized for 5 minutes. Thank
you.
STATEMENT OF FRANK CAPELLO, DIRECTOR OF SECURITY, FORT
LAUDERDALE-HOLLYWOOD INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT
Mr. Capello. Thank you.
Chairman Hudson, Ranking Member Richmond, and Members of
the subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to be with you
today to discuss aviation security issues.
Although random shootings are not new at airports, they are
prevalent in other public areas. As an example, last Friday, a
crazed gunman went on a shooting rampage in a popular Santa
Barbara student enclave. Numerous active shootings have
occurred throughout the country in the past 12 months. They are
one of a multitude of aviation security challenges airports in
the United States have implemented measures to address.
My oral testimony today will contain two recommendations:
Training and funding. The current threats to airport terminals
are diffused, complicated, unpredictable, and can occur in
different areas within the airport. The FBI reports that
academic studies of active-shooter statistics reveal that 49
percent of the time the active shooting ended before police
arrive. Also of interest is that in 10 percent of the cases,
the shooter stops and walks away. In 20 percent of the cases,
the shooter goes mobile, moving to another location. The
average active-shooter incident lasts 12 minutes, while 37
percent last less than 7 minutes.
The training I am recommending would have a goal of adding
a new layer of ingenuity within the airport environment. This
training must enhance the awareness of not only first
responders but must be afforded to all those who work in the
airport environment. In developing this type of training
program, there must be varying types of knowledge imparted that
is customized for the actual responsibilities of the workforce.
Aviation security incident training offered to first responders
would be different than the aviation security training offered
to other employees that work at an airport.
Second. Federal funding for aviation security initiatives
such as the training I mentioned must be looked at. There is a
need to specifically fund aviation security initiatives and
technology, throughout airports in the United States. The
amount airports are reimbursed by TSA under the Law Enforcement
Officer Reimbursement Program has decreased significantly over
the last several years.
The continued reduction in the amount of these funds comes
at a time when funding should be increased as a result of the
strains being placed upon U.S. airports while they comply with
an increasing amount of Federal mandates and simultaneously
address an increase in the number of significant incidents
impacting aviation security.
Funding for United States airports was made available in
the 1980s after a terminated employee used his airport
identification badge to board PSA flight 1771 and crashed as a
result of a murder-suicide. All 43 people aboard the aircraft
died. This funding was used to install an automated access
controls that are installed today, used to deny restricted area
access immediately if an employee is no longer authorized for
that access.
Congress should study the provision of additional funds
that would be used by airports throughout the United States to
fund security technologies and increased reimbursement for law
enforcement officers to further enhance aviation security in
public areas of airport terminals.
I do not believe that fixed-post law enforcement officers
offer a significant countermeasure to respond to an active-
shooter situation. A flexible-post law enforcement officer
offers a level of unpredictability and an element of surprise.
Additionally, if provided airport security specific
funding, airports could increase the tempo of continually
enhancing the various layer of security technologies and
increased reimbursement for law enforcement to further support
aviation security in public areas of terminals.
Congress should also allow for the additional funding of
research of airport security technologies, such as the
evaluation and testing currently being conducted by the
National Safe Skies Alliance, which is funded by the Federal
Aviation Administration. For example, this research could
enable airports to more wisely use limited monetary resources
to implement projects to better protect airport perimeters
which help to minimize the impact of an unauthorized entry onto
an airfield.
I again thank you for this opportunity and look forward to
answer your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Capello follows:]
Prepared Statement of Frank Capello
May 29, 2014
Chairman Hudson, Ranking Member Richmond, and Members of the
subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to be with you today to
discuss aviation security issues. These issues impact our Nation in so
many ways and impacts all those who use our Nation's airports for
employment, business travel, and leisure travel.
I am the aviation security director of the Fort Lauderdale
Hollywood International Airport. My duties include the planning,
directing, and administering a comprehensive safety and security
program for the County's Aviation Department to ensure compliance with
all Federal security regulations. The central core of my duties is to
ensure the safety and security of the traveling public and employees
who work at Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood International Airport.
Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood International Airport averages over 700
scheduled passenger aircraft flight operations daily. We have more than
64,000 passengers in our terminals daily. Twenty-five scheduled
airlines operate from our 4 terminals.
Mr. Chairman, I want to assure you and the Members of this
subcommittee that airports across our Nation take recent incidents and
the potential for future incidents involving terrorism and other
criminal acts as a very serious matter. Airport executives, including
the aviation director of the Broward County Aviation Department, Mr.
Kent George, hold safety and security as our first and foremost
priority. We work very closely in collaboration with our local
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) office to reinforce the
layers of security that currently exist and to work towards continuous
enhancement of aviation security on a daily basis.
I would like to add that our department works very closely with our
local Customs and Border Protection office and also the contingent of
FBI agents assigned to our airport. In addition to the 93 sworn
officers assigned as our law enforcement provider, the Broward
Sheriff's Office, we are also very proud of the work of our Fire
Department which is a service also provided by the Broward Sheriff's
Office. Crash Fire and Rescue services are an integral part of any
response to a critical aviation security incident involving protection
of property and lives. I would like for you to know that our law
enforcement services and our Crash Fire and Rescue services are
provided by the same organization, the Broward Sheriff's Office, as I
think that the distinction avails our organization a high degree of
interoperability.
The nature of many tragic events is unpredictable and therefore
there is not one way to prevent certain behavior from occurring.
Unfortunately, many threats can only be mitigated and not eliminated.
Random shootings are not new to airports. On November 22, 1974 Samuel
Byck entered BWI Airport, shot Police Officer George Neal Ramsburg in
the back and proceeded in a hijacking attempt of a Delta DC-9 aircraft.
During this incident the co-pilot of the flight was shot dead and the
pilot was shot numerous times.
I cite this incident as I believe that it is relevant in recent
discussions regarding the use of law enforcement officers at a fixed
post near airport passenger screening checkpoints. At Fort Lauderdale
Hollywood International Airport we use a hybrid of fixed-post officers
and flexible response officers to handle responsibilities related to
the safety of those in the vicinity of TSA screening checkpoints. The
flexible response officers further enhance security as the officer has
the ability to patrol a greater area and adds a certain degree of
unpredictability towards someone planning an attack.
We also use a unique way to provide these law enforcement officers
in a more cost-effective way. Instead of using a normally scheduled
officer at a fixed post, we provide a ``detail'' officer. The
``detail'' officer is usually an officer from the airport district what
works a detail that is scheduled outside of the officer's normal duty
hours. Currently we deploy detail officers at each passenger screening
checkpoint 8 hours daily. This officer is authorized by law, to affect
an arrest or discharge their firearm for cause while on duty. The
``loaded'' cost of an officer is approximately $67.00 an hour. The
``detail'' officer costs $37.00 an hour. The manner in which officers
are provided to TSA passenger screening checkpoints allow our airport
to provide additional law enforcement officers as a result of a lower
cost per hour.
Unfortunately, random shootings are not new to airports; they are
also prevalent in other public areas. As an example, last Friday a
crazed gunman went on a shooting rampage in a popular Santa Barbara
student enclave. Numerous active shootings have occurred throughout the
country in the past 12 months. They are one of a multitude of aviation
security challenges airports in the United States have implemented
measures to address.
Since the tragic events of November 1, 2013 at LAX, the airport
community has been working with the TSA to identify and develop
security enhancements. We appreciate the TSA's collaborative approach
of their working with industry to protect all those who work in and
travel through the airport environment. We concur with recommendations
put forth by TSA in Information Circular 14-01. We find that the
recommended enhancements contained in the Information Circular are
prudent and we plan to follow the recommendations. The current threats
to airport terminals are diffuse, complicated and unpredictable. The
FBI reports that academic studies of active-shooter statistics reveal
that 49% of the time, the active shooting ended before police arrive.
Also of interest is that in 10% of the cases, the shooter stops and
walks away. In 20% of the cases the shooter goes mobile, moving to
another location. The average active-shooter incident lasts 12 minutes,
while 37% last less than 5 minutes.
My testimony today contains two recommendations. I would be glad to
work further with TSA and the subcommittee on matters that can further
improve aviation safety and security and I look forward to any
questions you may have.
First, I believe that training for the most recent threat is
relevant, but this training should not overcome the need for a training
program that ultimately makes an airport more secure. The training I am
suggesting would have a goal to ``add a new layer of ingenuity'' within
the airport environment. A majority of aviation security training must
be proactive and well-thought-out with a lesser focus on airport
security training that is rooted towards reactivity concerning recent
events. Many airports throughout the United States have already
implemented some form of this training to a degree. This training must
enhance the awareness of not only first responders, but must be
afforded to all those who work in an airport environment.
In developing this type of training program, there must be varying
types of knowledge imparted with an amount of training that is
customized for the actual responsibilities of the workforce. Much of
this training should be followed by actual on-the-job training (OJT)
that is actually conducted in the workplace setting. On-line training
is very useful, table-top exercises do allow for a further
understanding of training objectives. The use of some form of
``tactical'' training for all employees with responsibilities in
airport passenger terminals is a big step forward when considering
comprehensive training for aviation security.
In a typical airport setting there would be specific training for
law enforcement personnel, other specific training for personnel such
as TSA and airport authority employees, and then another specialized
curriculum for the other employees working in an airport setting. At
all layers the training would encompass aviation security awareness and
how to report security issues to the proper authorities responsible for
aviation security. Additionally this training would identify how to
evacuate or escape. This type of training is available today. The two
major factors that limit the use of this type of training is the
ability to accept training from an outside entity and the cost. These
hurdles are easily overcome when logic is used to analyze the cost
benefit of the training.
Second, Federal funding for aviation security initiatives, such as
the training I mentioned, must be considered. There is a need to
specifically fund aviation security initiatives and technology
throughout airports in the United States. The amount airports are
reimbursed by TSA under the Law Enforcement Officer Reimbursement
Program has decreased significantly over the last several years. The
decision to reduce the amount of these funds comes at a time when
funding should be increased as a result of the strains being placed
upon airports throughout the United States as they comply with an
increasing amount of Federal mandates and simultaneously work to
provide an optimal level of aviation safety and security. At the same
time, airports are challenged by the lack of available funding
necessary to provide for projects to update infrastructure. Restoring
sufficient funds to the Law Enforcement Officer Reimbursement Program
would be instrumental in providing more capability to deter criminal
activity and is certainly a prudent measure to mitigate an active-
shooter situation.
I do not believe TSA Transportation Security Officers should be
armed. Generally speaking, more guns at a TSA passenger screening
checkpoint are not a solution. TSA Officers have specific duties that
would be impacted if the same officers were required to be fully
trained in the laws involving the retention and handling of firearms,
and the time needed to maintain proficiency in the use of a firearm.
Additionally, as more and more entities are introduced into a response
plan, that plan becomes exponentially harder to plan, coordinate, and
implement. The use of law enforcement officers that have already been
trained and equipped to respond to active-shooter incidents is the most
prudent and effective way forward.
Funding for United States airports was made available in the 1980's
after a terminated employee used his airport identification badge to
board PSA Flight 1771 and crashed the aircraft as a result of a murder/
suicide. All 43 people aboard the aircraft died. This funding was used
to install automated access controls that are used to deny restricted
area access immediately. Since 9/11 significant Federal funding has
been provided to TSA to purchase and install hold (checked) baggage
explosive detection systems to further address the threat of a bomb
being placed in the baggage which is to be loaded aboard the aircraft
at airports in the United States.
Congress should study the provision of additional aviation
security-specific funds that would be used by airports throughout the
United States to fund security initiatives, technologies, and increased
reimbursement for law enforcement officers to further enhance aviation
security in the public areas of airport terminals. Additionally, if
provided airport-specific funding, airports could increase the tempo of
continually improving the various layers of security currently in place
at airports throughout the United States. Congress should also allow
for the additional funding of research of airport security technology,
such as the evaluation and testing currently being conducted by the
National Safe Skies Alliance which is funded by the Federal Aviation
Administration. For example, this research could enable airports to
more wisely use limited monetary resources to implement projects to
better protect airport perimeters to reduce the amount of unauthorized
entries onto airfields.
In closing, I wish to assure you that we are in the process of
implementing many specific post-LAX shooting enhancements to our
Airport Emergency Plan and to our Disaster Preparedness Plan. We are
currently involved in evaluating different types of active-shooter
training that will improve our ability to better train airport
employees. We know you understand the importance of the need for
airports to consider, evaluate, and implement local initiatives to
enhance our layers of security, and our opportunity to leverage
available and future technology.
Mr. Hudson. Thank you, Mr. Capello.
The Chairman recognizes Mr. Landguth for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL J. LANDGUTH, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE
OFFICER, RALEIGH-DURHAM AIRPORT AUTHORITY, RALEIGH-DURHAM
INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT
Mr. Landguth. Thank you, Chairman Hudson, Ranking Member
Richmond, and Members of the subcommittee.
I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today to
participate in this public hearing.
I would like to commend this subcommittee and the
Transportation Security Administration for the thoughtful and
collaborative approach they have taken surrounding the horrific
events that occurred on November 1, 2013 at LAX. Our thoughts
and prayers go out to the family of Mr. Hernandez.
I believe the efforts of this subcommittee and the
collaborative discussion it has created within the industry
will provide measurable security improvements for travellers
and workers at the Nation's airports.
The Raleigh-Durham International Airport is located in
North Carolina, and it is the 39th largest airport in the
United States. We handle over 9 million passengers a year. As a
commercial service airport, we have the responsibility to
detect, deter, and prevent both security threats and safety
concerns that could harm passengers and employees.
The LAX incident was significant, and airports have
responded aggressively by looking at emergency responsiveness,
evacuation strategies, local and Federal coordination, and a
host of other issues to make sure they are adequately prepared
if such an incident occurs again.
Commercial service airports across the country are required
to develop an airport emergency plan that addresses the
following: Aircraft, terrorism, hazardous material incidents,
structure fires, natural disasters, sabotage, highjacking,
water rescues, and crowd control. Airports are constantly
evaluating safety and security risks and regularly reviewing
their emergency and contingency plans to ensure they are
prepared.
At RDU, we have added to our emergency plan over time by
developing a special passenger assistance plan, crisis
communication plan, baggage handling contingency plan, and a
communicable disease plan. Also at this time my staff is
developing a severe weather plan to address the significant
weather events, such as a hurricane. We also hold annual safety
and security table-top exercises to practice and test our
emergency plan.
With regard to the incident at LAX and its impact on
airport emergency response, I offer several recommendations
below on how airports and the Federal Government can work
together to strengthen the response to these types of
incidents.
Encourage the development of active-shooter response
recovery guidelines by TSA versus a one-size-fits-all
regulations to ensure that all airports have the basic
framework to meet the requirements of their individual
airports.
The task and actions needed for recovery and return to
normal operations are best handled in the airport emergency
plan or a stand-alone plan, not in the airport security plan.
Enlist TSA to act as a clearing house for lessons learned for
active-shooter incidents. While RDU sent three of its employees
to the LAX active shooter and San Francisco aircraft accident
debriefings, not all airports across the country can afford
this type of investment. Therefore, a real-time clearing house
of information of the very best ideas on how to deal with
active-shooter scenarios would significantly increase the
overall preparedness of all airports in this country.
We encourage your recommendation to airports in
coordination with TSA conduct active-shooter awareness training
for all of their employees and tenants. In the summer of 2013,
RDU provided its employees an active-shooter awareness
training. It was so well-received that employees have requested
that we provide this training to their families.
While on the surface this may not seem like a significant
deterrent, we believe we mitigated a potential act against our
passengers and employees at our facility after the training was
conducted.
Recognizing the layered approach to terminal area security
around the checkpoint and ticket counters is the most
effective. One layer includes community policing. At RDU, we
are developing and expanding our community policing program to
include the employees of the airlines and other tenants to
reinforce the importance of immediate action drills and proper
communication procedures while infusing a mindset of constant
awareness.
Additionally, we conduct two active-shooter tactical drills
each year, have enhanced our armament and weapons training, and
added two explosive detection dogs and we are exploring ways to
utilize technology, such as CCTV and facial recognition
software to act as a force multiplier to assist with the
detection, prevention of, and recovery from criminal activity.
Our objective is to build rings and layers to security to
detect, discourage, mitigate, and react to threats. Airports
are concerned with how to respond to the ever-changing threats
while maintaining the common goal of protecting citizens in our
facilities.
Finally, I appreciate the leadership of Chairman Hudson,
Ranking Member Richmond, and Members of the subcommittee on the
exit lane staffing issue. In light of the tragedy of LAX, we
encourage the long-term technology solution be considered. The
solution, would further reduce the potential point of entry by
individuals wanting to harm our passengers and employees.
Movement to employee technology solution at the exit lanes
will require an investment to achieve the security objective. I
would encourage Members of Congress to make the necessary
investment by offering a grant to implement technology
solutions at airports across the country.
Looking forward, Mr. Chairman, I know the committee is
interested in seeking actions to ensure that all airports are
adequately prepared should future active-shooter events
materialize, which we all hope will not be the case.
Therefore, I summarize the action recommendations discussed
above as follows:
One, plans for response recovery from active-shooter
scenarios should be handled in the airport emergency plan or
other emergency planning documents developed by the airport to
ensure they are tailored to the specific airport.
Two, TSA should act as a clearing house for the best ideas
from across the country to address active-shooter scenarios and
in a timely fashion share this information with airports.
Three, require active-shooter awareness training for all
airport employees, including those of airport tenants and the
TSA.
Four, airport law enforcement should take a layered
approach to security around the checkpoint and ticketing
counter and include testing of these plans as part of the
annual AVSEC tabletop exercise.
Finally, five, work towards funding a program for
implementation of a technology solution at the Nation's airport
exit lanes.
Thank you for your leadership on this important issue
facing our country. The industry appreciates the collaborative
approach you have chosen to address your concerns.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Landguth follows:]
Prepared Statement of Michael J. Landguth
May 29, 2014
Chairman Hudson, Ranking Member Richmond, and Members of the
subcommittee, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today
to participate in this public hearing. I would like to commend this
subcommittee and the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) for
the thoughtful and collaborative approach they have taken surrounding
the horrific events that occurred on November 1, 2013 at LAX. Our
thoughts and prayers go out to the family of Mr. Hernandez. I believe
the efforts of this subcommittee and the collaborative discussion it
has created within the industry will provide measurable security
improvements for travelers and workers at the Nation's airports.
Raleigh-Durham International Airport is located in North Carolina
and is the 39th-largest airport in the United States. We handle over 9
million passengers a year. As a commercial service airport we have the
responsibility to detect, deter, and prevent both security threats and
safety concerns that could harm passengers and employees. The LAX
incident was significant, and airports have responded aggressively by
looking at emergency responsiveness, evacuation strategies, local/
Federal coordination, and a host of other issues to make sure they are
adequately prepared if such an incident occurs again.
Commercial service airports across the country are required to
develop an airport emergency plan that addresses the following:
Aircraft, terrorism and hazardous material incidents, structural fires,
natural disasters, sabotage and hijackings, water rescues, and crowd
control. Airports are constantly evaluating safety and security risks
and regularly review their emergency and contingency plans to ensure
they are prepared. At RDU we have added to our emergency plan over time
by developing a special passenger assistance plan, crisis
communications plan, baggage handling contingency plan, and a
communicable disease plan. Also, at this time, my staff is developing a
severe weather plan to address a significant weather event such as a
hurricane. We also hold annual safety and security table-top exercises
to practice and test our emergency plan.
With regard to the incident at LAX and its impact on airport
emergency response, I offer several recommendations below on how
airports and the Federal Government can work together to strengthen the
response to these types of incidents.
Encourage the development of active-shooter response and recovery
guidelines by TSA versus one-size-fits-all regulations to ensure that
all airports have the basic framework to meet the requirements of their
individual airports. The tasks and actions needed for recovery and
return to normal operations are best handled in the Airport Emergency
Plan, or a stand-alone plan, not in the Airport Security Plan.
Enlist TSA to act as a clearing house for lessons learned from
active-shooter incidents. While RDU sent three of its employees to the
LAX active shooter and the SFO aircraft accident debriefings, not all
airports across the country can afford this type of investment.
Therefore, a real-time clearing house of information of the very best
ideas on how to deal with active-shooter scenarios would significantly
increase the overall preparedness of all airports.
We encourage your recommendation that airports, in coordination
with TSA, conduct active-shooter awareness training for all of their
employees and tenants. In the summer of 2013 RDU provided its employees
with active-shooter awareness training. It was so well-received that
employees have requested that we provide this training to their
families. While on the surface that may not seem like a significant
deterrent, we believe we mitigated a potential act against our
passengers and employees at our facility after the training was
conducted.
Recognize that a layered approach to terminal area security around
the checkpoint and ticket counters is the most effective. One layer
includes community policing. At RDU we are developing and expanding our
community policing program to include the employees of the airlines and
other tenants to reinforce the importance of immediate action drills
and proper communication procedures, while infusing a mindset of
constant awareness.
Additionally, we conduct two active-shooter tactical drills each
year; have enhanced our armament and weapons training and added two
explosive detection dogs; and we are exploring ways to utilize
technology, such as CCTV and facial recognition software, to act as a
force multiplier to assist with the detection & prevention of and the
recovery from criminal activity.
Our objective is to build rings and layers of security to detect,
discourage, mitigate, and react to threats. Airports are concerned with
how to respond to ever-changing threats while maintaining the common
goal of protecting citizens in our facilities.
Finally, I appreciate the leadership of Chairman Hudson, Ranking
Member Richmond, and Members of the subcommittee on the exit lane
staffing. In light of the tragedy at LAX, we encourage that a long-term
technology solution be considered. This solution would further reduce
the potential point of entry by individuals wanting to harm our
passengers and employees. Movement to employ a technology solution at
the exit lanes will require an investment to achieve this security
objective. I would encourage Members of Congress to make the necessary
investment by offering a grant to implement technology solutions at
airports across the country.
Looking forward, Mr. Chairman, I know that the committee is
interested in seeking actions to ensure that all airports are
adequately prepared should future active-shooter events materialize,
which we all hope will not be the case. Therefore, I summarize the
action recommendations discussed above as follows:
1. Plans for response and recovery from active-shooter scenarios
should be handled in the Airport Emergency Plan or other
emergency planning documents developed by the airport to ensure
they are tailored to the specific airport.
2. TSA should act as a clearing house for the best ideas from across
the country to address active-shooter scenarios and in a timely
fashion share this information with airports.
3. Require active-shooter awareness training for all airport
employees including those of airport tenants and the TSA.
4. Airport law enforcement should take a layered approach to security
around the checkpoint and ticketing counter and include testing
of these plans as part of the annual AVSEC table-top exercise.
5. Work towards funding a program for implementation of a technology
solution at the Nation's airport exit lanes.
Thank you for your leadership on this important issue facing our
country. The industry appreciates the collaborative approach you have
chosen to address your concerns.
Mr. Hudson. Thank you, Mr. Landguth.
The Chairman recognizes Mr. Murphy to testify.
STATEMENT OF KEVIN MURPHY, PRESIDENT, AIRPORT LAW ENFORCEMENT
AGENCIES NETWORK
Mr. Murphy. Chairman Hudson, Ranking Member Richmond, and
Members of the committee. Thank you for the opportunity to give
an airport law enforcement perspective.
I truly appreciate the commitment and concern from this
committee to ensure the aviation system continues to be a safe
and secure environment for our traveling public.
After the LAX shooting, Administrator Pistole immediately
reacted by setting in motion a comprehensive review of the
incident and forming a group of aviation experts to look at all
aspects of the current security programs related to the
incident. Administrator Pistole should be commended on this
measured and thorough approach to ensure all entities with ties
to the aviation system had an opportunity to review, discuss,
and provide input to any advances or changes to the security
measures which are in place.
The Airport Law Enforcement Agencies Network, or ALEAN, was
involved early on in these discussions and meetings as one of
the prevailing issues focuses on whether a law enforcement
officer should be stationed at or near the checkpoints.
ALEAN is a nonprofit organization formed in 1989 to
represent those law enforcement agencies whose mission is to
protect and patrol the Nation's airports. ALEAN was formed to
facilitate the exchange of information concerning terrorism and
emerging criminal trends associated with airport operations.
ALEAN has over 100 U.S. airport police agencies as members,
ranging from the largest Cat X to the smaller Cat 3 airports.
Columbia Metropolitan, Huntsville, Indianapolis, Louis
Armstrong, Dallas-Fort Worth, Atlanta, Chicago, Los Angeles,
Metropolitan Washington, Cincinnati are but a few of our member
airports.
ALEAN has and continues to be opposed to the mandatory
stationing of law enforcement officers at checkpoints. It
severely limits the ability of the police chiefs and commanders
at airports to manage their officers. Law enforcement officers
are a finite and valuable resource which need to be deployed to
all areas of the airport, some with much higher risk than the
checkpoints. Given the fact that all airports are unique,
forcing a standardized approach to response times for any
incident may indeed cause law enforcement officers to be pulled
away from other areas within the airport which are equally as,
if not more critical.
Just as Administrator Pistole has used a risk-based
approach to arrange security measures, airport police chiefs
and commanders use the same approach for their individual
airports to position their officers in the best location to
handle all calls for services and provide security and safety
to all the airport travellers and staff.
Airport law enforcement officers are responsible to detect,
deter, and respond, to criminal and other public safety or
security-related incidents from the roadway to the runway of
our Nation's airports. Depending on the ebbs and flows of
individual airports, the higher risk may be with large number
of vehicles on the curb dropping off passengers to the long
lines at ticket counters or the many bags and unattended items
in the baggage pick-up areas. The airport law enforcement
officer needs to have the ability to move throughout these
areas to provide deterrence and response capabilities.
Assigning an officer to a fixed post tethers him to one
location and creates an inefficient use of much-needed
manpower.
Law enforcement officers are a key element in deterring and
detecting and responding to a critical incident, such as an
active shooter. But they are not the only aspect of creating a
safe and secure environment. There is no one tactic or strategy
that can be developed to prevent these incidents in the future
or provide a better security stance.
The best approach is a multi-layered approach.
Communication from the airport tenants to the airport emergency
communications centers, or ECCs, is a vital layer which must be
clear and direct. Again Administrator Pistole has led this
charge to ensure there are direct lines of communication to the
airport ECC from checkpoints and even further to encourage all
TSA employees to program their individual cell phones with
direct line to the ECC. This approach has been mirrored by
airport tenants and employees across the country.
Another layer is additional enhanced video data systems.
Video data systems provide immediate eyes on the situation,
especially if the systems are linked to incoming call or alarm
locations. Cameras allow the ECC to better direct the
responding officers to the exact location of the incident,
facilitating a quick resolution to the incident.
Administrator Pistole and the TSA are to be commended for
partnering with many U.S. airports on funding to expand
existing video data systems, this funding program should be a
focus for this committee.
Dynamic incidents, such as active shooters, will continue
to occur in our Nation and abroad. Only a flexible, layered
security stance which involves all entities within the airport
complex will allow for a swift resolution and recovery from
these incidents. Airport police chiefs and commanders must be
able to move their officers freely to where the risk is for
that individual airport.
Thank you for your continued focus on improving the safety
and security of our Nation's traveling public. I look forward
to answering any follow-up questions you may have.
Mr. Hudson. Thank you, Mr. Murphy.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Murphy follows:]
Prepared Statement of Kevin Murphy
May 29, 2014
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Richmond, and Members of the
committee, thank you for the opportunity to give input and perspective
on the lessons learned from the LAX shooting as it pertains to airport
law enforcement. I appreciate the commitment and concern from this
committee to ensure the aviation system continues to be a safe and
secure environment for our traveling public.
The Airport Law Enforcement Agencies Network or ALEAN is a non-
profit organization formed in 1989 to represent those law enforcement
agencies whose mission is to protect and patrol the Nation's airports.
ALEAN was formed for the purpose to facilitate the exchange of
information concerning terrorism and emerging criminal trends
associated with airport operations. The original charter participating
agencies were located in the largest Cat X airports, but ALEAN has
since expanded to over 100 U.S. airport agencies as regular members and
numerous foreign Associate Membership agencies in Canada. Many
governmental law enforcement agencies such as the FBI, FAMS, INTERPOL,
U.S. Secret Service, and federal regulatory agencies from around the
world also hold Adjunct Membership. ALEAN holds official conferences in
the Spring and Fall of each year to discuss business, provide training,
and conducts monthly membership teleconference calls.
After the LAX shooting and senseless murder of Transportation
Security Officer Gerardo Hernandez, Administrator Pistole immediately
reacted by setting in motion a comprehensive review of the incident and
forming a group of aviation experts to look at all aspects of the
current security programs as it related to the incident. Administrator
Pistole should be commended on this measured and thorough approach to
ensure all entities with ties to the aviation system had an opportunity
to review, discuss, and provide input into any advances or changes to
the security measures which are in place.
ALEAN was involved early on in these discussions and meetings, as
one of the prevailing issues focuses on whether a law enforcement
officer should be stationed at or near the checkpoints. ALEAN has and
continues to be opposed to the mandatory stationing of law enforcement
officers at checkpoints, because it severely limits the ability of the
police chiefs and commanders at airport to manage their officers. Law
enforcement officers are a finite and valuable resource which need to
be deployed to all areas of the airport, some with much higher risk
than checkpoints. Given the fact that all airports are unique, forcing
a standardized approach to response times for any incident, may indeed
cause law enforcement officers to be pulled away from other areas
within the airport which are just as critical.
Just as Administrator Pistole has used a risk-based approach to
arrange security measures, airport police chiefs and commanders use the
same approach for their individual airports to position their officers
in the best location to handle all calls for service and provide
security and safety to all of the airport travelers and staff, not
focusing on a single group. Airport law enforcement officers are
responsible to detect, deter, and respond to criminal and other public
safety or security-related incidents from the roadway to the runway of
the Nation's airports. Depending on the ebbs and flows of individual
airports, the higher risk may be with large number of vehicles on the
curb dropping off passengers, to the long lines at ticket counters or
the many bags and unattended items in the baggage pick-up areas. The
airport law enforcement officer needs to have the ability to move
throughout these areas to provide deterrence and response capabilities
to all. Assigning an officer to a fixed post tethers them to one
location and creates an inefficient use of much-needed manpower.
Law enforcement officers are a key element in deterring, detecting,
and responding to a critical incident such as an active shooter, but
they are not the only aspect of creating a safe and secure environment.
There is no one tactic or strategy that can been developed to prevent
these incidents in the future or to provide a better security stance.
The best approach is a multi-layered approach. Communication from the
airport tenants to the airport emergency communication centers (ECC) is
a vital layer which must be clear and direct. Again, Administrator
Pistole has led this charge to ensure there are direct lines of
communication to the airport ECC and even further to encourage all TSA
employees to program their individual cell phones with the direct line
to the ECC. This approach has been mirrored over to all airport tenants
and employees. Another layer for the ECC is additional or enhanced
video data systems. The video data systems provide immediate eyes on
the situation, especially if the systems are linked to incoming call or
alarm locations. Cameras allow the ECC to better direct the responding
officers to the exact location of the incident facilitating a quick
resolution to the incident. Again, Administrator Pistole and the TSA
are to be commended for partnering with many U.S. airports on funding
to expand existing video data systems.
Los Angeles World Airports conducted an all-encompassing after-
action report of the incident and shared the report with all, so others
could benefit from what they experienced. This type of coordination and
information sharing are the key elements of ALEAN. Over the years ALEAN
has played a significant role in ensuring a successful 1994 World Cup
Soccer Tournament in the United States, developed a model partnership
with the Federal Government with the National Explosives Detection
Canine Program, managed the airport community's post-9/11 law
enforcement response, initiated a National aviation law enforcement
benchmarking project, put in place a vital real-time electronic
intelligence-sharing network for airport criminal investigators and an
administrative information-sharing network, helped local agencies
develop and share model best practices programs, and assisted with the
development and integration of public policy related to aviation law
enforcement. ALEAN partners with the American Association of Airport
Executives (AAAE) and Airports Council International (ACI) to address
issues vital to our industry. ALEAN's partnerships include working with
local Joint Terrorism Task Forces, the Federal Air Marshall Program,
and the TSA Federal Intelligence Officer Program to ensure the safety
on the travelling public.
Coordination between law enforcement agencies is needed to resolve
these dynamic incidents and all must be trained to respond as one.
Active-shooter response training is yet another layer which airports
must participate in. A lone gunman who is intent on senselessly
destroying the lives of others may be nearly impossible to deter or
detect until the first shot is fired. Airport police agencies must
continue to train to quickly respond and resolve these incidents. The
training should include mutual aid agencies, Federal law enforcement
officers, and as important, the fire and EMS agencies which respond to
the airport. We have continued to improve deterrence and response to
active-shooter incidents through experience and training. Airport
police and responding EMS must train to quickly recover, remove, and
treat those injured persons quickly, even if the incident continues in
other areas of the airport complex.
Dynamic incidents, such as active shooters, will continue to occur
in our Nation and abroad. Only a flexible layered security stance which
involves all entities within the airport complex will allow for a swift
resolution and recovery from these incidents. Airport police chiefs and
managers must be able to move their officers freely to where the risk
is. ALEAN members continue to be inventive and proactive in creating
different and unique security layers to deter those who want to do harm
in our airports and to respond quickly and effectively when those
incidents do occur. ALEAN provides coordination by sharing best
practices among its members such as: Airports which have created random
dynamic force and long gun patrols; active-shooter response bags which
include first aid items and other tools to resolve an incident; random
vehicle inspection posts; enhanced security ID checks to ensure all
those in the security area are authorized to be in the security area.
These are but a few of the innovative security layers being created by
airport police across the Nation--all require the ability for airport
police chiefs and commanders to flexibly deploy their finite assets
where the risk is for that airport.
Thank you for your continued focus on improving the safety and
security for our Nation's traveling public.
Mr. Hudson. Chairman recognizes Mr. McClain to testify.
STATEMENT OF MARSHALL MC CLAIN, PRESIDENT, LOS ANGELES AIRPORT
PEACE OFFICERS ASSOCIATION
Mr. McClain. The November 1, 2013 shooting at LAX was a
tragedy----
Mr. Hudson. Is your microphone on there?
Mr. McClain. Just let me make sure.
Mr. Hudson. Okay.
Mr. McClain. November 1, 2013 shooting at LAX was a
tragedy, and I appreciate Chairman McCaul, Chairman Hudson,
Ranking Member Thompson, and Ranking Member Richmond for
inviting me to testify before your committee today.
LAX is staffed by a specialized proprietary police force
that is explicitly trained to police and secure LAX, which is
widely considered to be the highest terrorist target on the
West Coast. Specifically, LAX is the third-busiest airport in
the United States, serving 165,000 passengers daily. Passenger
traffic increased 7.3 percent in 2013, and is continuing to
rise. That same year, LAX opened its new Tom Bradley
International Terminal, which includes a total of 18 new
boarding gates, serving many airlines from countries with long-
standing histories of conflicts.
The nature of airport policing in airports like ours is
intertwined with our Federal law enforcement partners,
including the FBI, Customs and Border Protection, and airplane-
based Federal Air Marshals. All of which we have had a long,
productive history. A key factor to our ability to effectively
work together are clear delineations of responsibility and
mutual underlying respect and strong trust in the abilities of
our partners to follow protocols and do their jobs.
LAX has been the focus of some of our country's most high-
profile airport events, including an attack by an Egyptian limo
driver that killed 2 people and injured 4 at Israel's El Al
ticket counter, a terrorist plot in which a car filed with
explosives was stopped at the Canadian border with the
intentions of detonating at LAX, an airport bombing that killed
4 and wounded another 36, and the most recent shooting.
On the general policing side, crime at the airport ranges
from stolen property to arrest of fugitives. As a frame of
reference, in 2013, the number of reported crimes at LAX
increased by 10 percent to 1,569, with an average rate of
nearly 24 arrests per week. During the same time period, the
LAX permanently expanded physically and increased passenger
levels, the number of Los Angeles World Airport police sworn
officers steadily declined to its lowest level since 2008. For
context and of significant importance to this hearing today,
when November 1 shooting took place, there were only 2 officers
assigned to the entire Terminal 3 at LAX, which is typically on
any given day.
In September 2012, the American Alliance of Airport Police
Officers, which is comprised of rank-and-file law enforcement
officers representing the airports of LAX, JFK, La Guardia,
Newark, and Dallas-Fort Worth, met with Administrator Pistole
to have a frank discussion about local law enforcement
interactions with TSA, the only Federal agency with which our
officers experienced consistent and on-going lack of
coordination and communication.
We made five specific recommendations for Cat X airports to
the administrator. None of these recommendations were acted
upon. Four of these recommendations, which include, No. 1,
requiring a law enforcement officer presence within 300 feet of
a TSA screening station, police access to closed circuit TVs,
definitive standards of operating procedures between law
enforcement officers and TSA, and, No. 4, providing the tools,
equipment, and resources for both TSA and law enforcement
officers to better do their jobs.
This most likely would have had a better impact on November
1. I am concerned that TSA has not moved on basic low-tech,
low-cost, and low-effort solutions that are necessary to
mitigate and perhaps prevent future acts of violence.
Furthermore, I am concerned with our own airport management
at LAX is not balancing policing and security with their
ambitions to physically expand the airport and market it as a
destination for world travelers. In fact, the U.S. Department
of Transportation Inspector General recently released the
Federal audit reporting policing funds have been illegally
diverted at LAX in an astronomical amount of $49 million and
irregularities associated with an additional $7.9 million.
Many of our officers are fully aware of the illegal misuse
of these funds, and we are hopeful that the Federal Government
will force termination of these activities and require
renumerations to our department for the funding that has been
lost so it can be applied to the various policing deficiencies
that have come into focus this last fall.
Our officers did not fail LAX when it was our time, when it
mattered. We should expect the same in return by our management
and the Federal agencies who impact what we do. We are hopeful
that circumstances do not find us back here again or at a
hearing at another airport in our country after another
incident that could have been mitigated or prevented by common-
sense solutions with high-end returns on investment.
As law enforcement officers at LAX, we want our airports to
be the gold standard, not just for marketing and economic
standpoint, but also functionally with safety being almost the
top priority--among the top priorities.
In closing, most importantly, my fellow officers and I do
mourn the death and tragic loss of life, and our heart does go
out to the Hernandez family. We would also express our hopes
that those who were injured on that day will recover well and
with speed, and we solemnly commit to ensuring that we will
continue our best effort to protect our airports and its
occupants.
Thank you for convening this very important hearing today.
[The prepared statement of Mr. McClain follows:]
Prepared Statement of Marshall McClain
May 29, 2014
The November 1, 2013 shooting at LAX was a tragedy and I appreciate
Chairman McCaul, Chairman Hudson, Ranking Member Thompson, and Ranking
Member Richmond for inviting me to testify before your committee on
lessons learned to prepare for future incidences at our Nation's
airports.
As a precursor, I would like to lay out why airport policing is
unique and multifaceted and why it is becoming increasingly necessary
to focus attention on how the Federal Government guides local and
National security at our airports.
LAX and many large American airports are their own cities.
Specifically, LAX spans 3,425 square miles and is the 3rd-busiest
airport in the United States serving 165,000 passengers daily, meaning
that over 1 million people pass through our airport weekly, which is
roughly the entire population of the city of Dallas. In 2013, LAX
served 66.7 million passengers--a 7.3 percent increase from the
previous year. That same year, LAX opened its new Tom Bradley
International Terminal which includes a total of 18 new boarding gates
servicing many airlines from countries with long-standing histories of
conflicts in neighboring gates within a confined and highly-trafficked
area.
LAX is staffed by a specialized proprietary police force that is
explicitly trained to police and secure LAX which is widely considered
to be the highest terrorist target on the West Coast. The work and
training we do is critical to ensuring that if an incident happens,
like the shooting attack in November, we are prepared to protect our
airports and the traveling public quickly, precisely, and orderly to
curtail and minimize damage. Airplane and airports have an indisputable
association to terrorism and impactful acts of crime in our world today
and airport policing has had to adjust to address the evolution of
airlines moving from targets of hijackings to airplanes being used as
weapons of mass destruction and airports serving as symbols to those
wishing to do harm as a high-profile way to make a statement.
As such, the nature of airport policing is intertwined with our
Federal law enforcement partners including the FBI, Customs and Border
Protection, and airplane-based Federal Air Marshals, all of with which
we have a long and productive history. A key factor to our ability to
effectively work together are clear delineations of responsibilities, a
mutual underlying respect, and a strong trust in the abilities of our
partners to follow protocol and do their jobs.
LAX has been the focus of some of our country's most high-profile
airport events including: An attack by an Egyptian limo driver that
killed two people and injured four others at Israel's El Al Airlines
ticket counter; a terrorist plot in which a car filled with explosives
was stopped in Canada with the intention of detonating at LAX; an
airport bombing that killed 4 and wounded 36; and the most recent
shooting. On the general policing side, crimes at the airport range
from stolen property, arrests of fugitives, aggravated assaults, and
felonies for narcotics and weapons violations. As a frame of reference,
in 2013, the number of reported crimes at LAX increased 10% to 1,569,
with an average weekly arrest rate of nearly 24 per week.
During the same time period that LAX permanently expanded
physically and increased passenger levels, the number of LAWAPD sworn
officers has steadily declined to its lowest level since 2008 (see
attached California Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training
study). For context, and of significant importance for the purposes of
this hearing, when the November 1 shooting took place, there were only
2 officers assigned to the entire Terminal 3 at LAX, which is typical.
In September, 2012, the American Alliance of Airport Police
Officers, which is comprised of rank-and-file law enforcement officers
representing the airports of LAX, JFK, La Guardia, Newark, and Dallas-
Ft. Worth, met with Administrator Pistole to have a frank discussion on
our concerns about law enforcement interaction with TSA--the only
Federal agency with which our officers experience consistent and on-
going lack of coordination and communication. We made specific
recommendations to the administrator including: Fortifying security
screening points with visible law enforcement officer (LEO) presence;
real-time police access to airport CCTV cameras; mandatory screening of
all airport employees; definitive standard operating procedures between
LEOs and TSA; and providing the tools for TSA and LEOs to do our jobs
(see attached letter). None of these recommendations were acted upon.
Four of these recommendations--LEOs at TSA screening, CCTV access,
definitive standard operating procedures between LEOs and TSA, and
providing the tools for TSA and LEOs--most likely would have had an
impact on November 1. In its report following the shooting, the TSA has
since issued recommended standards for law enforcement presence at
checkpoints and ticket counters during peak travel times and has
encouraged the linking of notification/duress alarms to CCTV systems
but we are still awaiting implementation.
We also met with and communicated with the House Homeland Security
Committee staff and you, Mr. Chairman, post-November 2013 and discussed
issues relating to fortifying security clearance areas, CCTV, panic
buttons, 9-1-1 systems and airport phone caller identification. While
some would make the case that these are complex, highly-expensive
endeavors, they are not and they should be undertaken. I am hopeful
that this committee will strongly encourage support of our
recommendations with the airports who receive substantial Federal
funding in areas your committee authorizes.
I am concerned that airport management at LAX is not balancing
policing and security with their ambitions to physically expand the
airport and market it as a destination for world travelers. In fact,
the Department of Transportation's (DOT) Office of the Inspector
General (OIG) recently issued findings of a DOT IG Audit of LAX that
found diversion of airport policing funds and other citations for
diverting airport funds at LAX in the amount of $49 million, as well as
numerous irregularities relating to an additional $7.9 million in
undocumented policing monies. Furthermore, I am concerned that TSA has
not moved on basic, low-tech, low-cost, and low-effort solutions that
are necessary to mitigate and perhaps prevent future acts of violence
at our airports. My comments expressed in this testimony are to enhance
and promote safety at our airports. It is my singular goal.
Individually, we respect and admire all of our co-workers.
We are well aware that the November 1 shooting could have gone in a
very different direction had the shooter been on a different mission.
We are aware that had he been less methodical; had he been running
instead of walking; had he been non-discriminating in targeting the
general public and not just TSA; and had his intension been to get to a
plane, many more people could have been killed.
My officers did not fail LAX when it was our time--when it
mattered. We should expect the same in return and are hopeful that
circumstances do not find us back here again or at a hearing at another
airport in our country after another incident that could have been
mitigated or prevented by common-sense solutions with high-end returns
on investments. As law enforcement officers at LAX, we want our airport
to be the gold standard, not just from a marketing and economic
standpoint, but also functionally, with safety being among the top
priorities.
In closing, and most importantly, my fellow officers and I mourn
for the Hernandez family. We also express our hopes that those who were
injured will recover well and with speed and we solemnly commit to
ensuring that we will continue our best efforts to protect our airport
and its occupants.
Thank you for convening this very important hearing.
Mr. Hudson. Thank you, Mr. McClain.
We appreciate all of you being here and appreciate your
testimony.
Now I'm going to recognize myself for 5 minutes to ask
questions.
One of the issues that Mr. Capello and Mr. Landguth both
touched on, I guess, is the--it was brought up in TSA's own
after-action review, was that there needs to be more training,
active-shooter training. They recommended the airport operators
conduct this training on a biannual basis, and also in addition
to mandatory evacuation drills, that sort of thing.
How important do you think it is that these be jointly
conducted between TSA and airport--you both sort-of touched on
the other stakeholders who it might be necessary. But maybe you
could expand on that a little more, the need to do the joint
training. I will open up to either one of you.
Mr. Capello. I think there is a lot of issues to address in
your question, sir.
One of the biggest concerns is that if there are many
individual plans, somebody like myself, my airport, would have
to ensure that those individual plans mesh up together so that
the outcome is very positive at the end.
So I think it is important that at some point that those
plans have to be vetted against each other to make sure they
will be successful in their entirety.
On the other side of the coin is that the more entities you
introduce into some type of emergency plan, the more
complicated it becomes exponentially. So we need to be careful
of that.
I happen to think the best approach is an individual
airport approach to this type of planning, exercising, even
training and then maybe some type of approval by TSA, review by
TSA----
Mr. Hudson. Let each airport sort-of come up with its own
game plan and then TSA review it.
Mr. Capello. Exactly. I do believe that there is so much
benefit to that. It is sort of the reason why I believe I am
here today is that you are looking for some subject-matter
expertise and I believe I could provide that.
I think airports should be allowed to provide that in the
airport setting. If there is some required Federal oversight,
it would be in some type of framework or a template or some
approval of the plan that is in place.
Mr. Hudson. Sir.
Mr. Landguth. Mr. Chairman, I have to agree.
I think training everybody concessionaires, tenants, TSA,
all of our employees, everybody needs to be trained in this.
Because detection is identifying these things as quickly as you
possibly can and then knowing how to communicate that
information.
There are lots of these kinds of plans out there. TSA has
gone through and done some training with their staff. I will
tell you as they did the training for their staff I asked some
of their employees to try to describe that for me, and one
thing that I thought was quite interesting is what was silent,
and what was silent is: How are we going to take care of the
passengers?
There is a lot about how we deal with the employees, which
is important, don't lose--I am not trying to downplay that. But
we also need to take care of the passengers. We have 9 million
people that come through that facility. I am responsible for
all 9 million, plus the tenants, plus the employees.
So the airport have an overarching kind of plan to make
sure everybody is coordinated, everybody knows what is going
on, how we are going to communicate, how we are going for
evacuate, how we are going to have our tactical plans coming
forward is extremely important I think moving forward.
Mr. Hudson. I will agree and that sort of dovetails on my
next question, which is, one of the concerns we had at LAX, I
alluded to in my opening statement, is that there was no way to
communicate with the passengers in the terminal, even in other
terminals that were on lockdown.
How do you at your airports communicate, how would you
communicate in an incident like this with the general public?
Mr. Capello. So we have a couple different methods. The
first one is, we are fortunate, we made some recent upgrades to
our infrastructure at Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood International
Airport. We do have the ability to talk to every terminal,
either individually or together all at once, what we call a
group page, a group message.
So if something was to happen today, our central
communication center could start talking to the terminals right
away. We also have plenty of boots on the ground and we would
start talking either through voice or through bullhorns that we
have equipped in our vehicles and with our personnel. So we
have that also.
We have a, I think it is called social media honcho at my
airport, a public affairs guy, and he is very proficient as
starting social media very quickly and getting the word out and
we practice it often at our airport in messaging to our
travellers different bits of information.
We are going through a lot of construction, and we enjoy
messaging to all the travellers about the status of our
construction and the challenges that we are facing. So I feel
like we are prepared and we do have quite an ability to talk to
our traveling public.
Mr. Hudson. My time has expired, but I will let you, Mr.
Landguth, very quickly.
Mr. Landguth. Very quickly, we have kind-of what I call
current plan. A current plan deals with kind of an all page on
our all page system. The LEs and TSA both are listening on each
other's radios. So if something is going on, we can communicate
and they can start their terminal evacuation program. We can
get the message out through an all page to our tenants, they
can begin their program to kind of get people out at the end of
the day and we provided training to everybody regarding
terminal evacuation.
In the future, we are looking for a mass communication
system because we have what we call a common-use system. So
every single flight information display, the ticket counter, at
the check-in counter, flight information display, baggage
information display, we can broadcast that information telling
the passengers and telling the tenants exactly what needs to be
done in the future.
That is our future that will help everybody move very
rapidly if there is a dangerous situation.
Mr. Hudson. Thank you.
My time has expired.
At this point I will recognize the Ranking Member of the
committee, gentleman from Louisiana, Mr. Richmond, for any
questions you may have.
Mr. Richmond. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I will start with you, Mr. McClain. You mentioned in your
testimony that you all met with Administrator Pistole and gave
four recommendations in I believe you said September about
closed circuit TV, about law enforcement presence at that
passenger checkpoints and so forth.
How has your working relationship with TSA changed since
the shooting?
Mr. McClain. Well thank you, sir.
First off, our relationship with TSA, it is a mutual
respect. We respect what they do in terms of screening
passengers and cargo. What you have to realize is there are not
clear lines of delineation and that still hasn't changed today,
in terms of everybody has a role to do, whether it be the
baggage handlers, whether it be TSA screeners, TSOs, whether it
be the airline attendants. Everyone has their role. But it is
not very clearly laid out where TSA's job begins and where it
ends.
So when it becomes a law enforcement matter, it should be a
law enforcement matter and not be in a tug of war, and some of
that continues today.
Mr. Richmond. How do we help create those clear lines and a
better working relationship to where you all come together to
find an understanding?
Mr. McClain. Well, I agree with my fellow Members on the
committee here that each airport does have its own different
needs and different rules that go into play specifically.
But in terms of TSA, that needs to come directly from the
administrator down to his troops that when it is an airport
police matter or a law enforcement matter, the LEOs are in
charge and let them do their job.
Mr. Richmond. The next question, I will let you start off
with it, but I also wanted to get Mr. Capello's viewpoint, and
Mr. Landguth.
You also mentioned that as airports continue to try to grow
and try to expand their market share and all of those things,
which I believe you all are about 9 million passengers a year;
in New Orleans airport, we are about 9 million a year. I know I
just met with my airport director a couple months ago, but he
wants to build a new airport. But at no time did he discuss
security and I'm not saying that he left it out; maybe I didn't
ask.
But there is clearly a move to increase passenger travel
and all the things because the economic development that goes
with it.
Do you think that we are sacrificing safety in pursuit of
market share? I will start with Mr. McClain and then I will
give both of you all a chance to answer.
Mr. McClain. Yes, sir. I do agree that we are sacrificing
it. Whenever you have a plan for expansion or capital
improvement project and it does not include public safety,
there is a problem. When you have a situation like LAX where it
clearly is expanding, everyone knows that that is their goal to
expand. But over the last 4 years, our officers' numbers have
been declining. All of us will agree here it typically takes
about 2 years to get someone hired through the academy and
being a solo officer. So we--the officers that we need now we
should have had 4 years ago.
So you are going to have these general managers of airports
who are looking at bringing in the dollars for that airport and
that expansion not always looking at public safety.
So it should be part of a capital improvement project.
Whenever that comes forward to you here or when it comes to
appropriations in terms of funding for that, part of that plan
should have some inclusion of where law enforcement is in that
plan.
Mr. Richmond. Got it.
Mr. Capello.
Mr. Capello. Two things on that. First thing on police
staffing or law enforcement officer staffing. That is a
decision that is made by myself and my chief of police and up
to this point, we are both very satisfied that we are
adequately staffed for the amount of traffic that we have
today, even considering the possible myriad of contingencies
that could occur on airport property. If that was not the case,
then I certainly have an avenue to go to the airport director,
whether is at the budget cycle or in the middle of a budget
cycle, and articulate my concerns; and I am confident that
anything the chief of police or I needed in the area of law
enforcement would be satisfied through that venue.
On the second note, airport expansion, if you came to my
airport today, it just looks like a construction site and I
have been at Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood Airport, International
Airport just a little over 3 years, and from the day I walked
in the door till yesterday when I left, I am involved in the
design and planning of all projects. From the security side, I
handle the security side. It is not to say I get everything I
want all the time. But at the end of the day, I am satisfied
that I have a safe and secure facility.
Mr. Richmond. You are included. I was saying you are
included in the process.
Mr. Capello. Oh, absolutely.
Mr. Richmond. Okay.
Mr. Capello. It is a major part of my day, actually.
Mr. Richmond. Mr. Landguth, if you could answer quickly. I
see my time has expired.
Mr. Landguth. I will tell you that airport directors across
the country, safety and security is paramount and I know Mr.
Iftikhar, and I will tell you that it is his top of his radar
too from a safety and security standpoint.
We made investments in active-shooter drills. We have got
an investment for mass communication. We bought additional
weapons. We have added two explosive detection canines. We are
looking at new technology solutions from a CCTV standpoint. We
are making that investment. Safety and security is paramount.
Airport managers across the country get that. It is a
challenging revenue environment out there, but we are not going
to sacrifice safety and security. It is not going to happen.
Mr. Hudson. Thank you.
Thank the gentleman.
At this point, Chairman will recognize gentleman from
California, Mr. Swalwell, for any questions you may have.
Mr. Swalwell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Wanted to thank each and every one of our witnesses. This
of course is important.
I think in just the last year, whether it is the LAX
shooting or some of the perimeter challenges that we have seen,
or even the Oceanic crash at SFO, which is near my district, we
have certainly seen the challenges that aviation can pose for
us. For me, aviation security is so important because if we do
not have public confidence in aviation security, the economy we
know will greatly, greatly suffer.
I wanted to first ask Mr. Capello, you mentioned in your
testimony calling for pilot testing of technology and you noted
that research could enable airports to more wisely use limited
monetary resources to implement projects to better protect
airport perimeters.
In San Jose about 2 months ago, we had a teenager breach
the perimeter by going over the fence, which was not seen or
detected by human eyes or video surveillance and he boarded a
flight that took him to Hawaii as a stowaway.
What that illustrated to me was that we don't have TSA
guidelines right now that require airports to be alerted when
any person or thing crosses an airport perimeter and these
perimeters are vast. At San Jose, it is a thousand acres, which
is approximately 10 football fields that you could put within--
I'm sorry, more than--which is 100 football fields that you
could put in this airport ground, bigger than many small
cities.
So, do you think the guidelines that TSA has should require
every airline or every airport to be alerted if the perimeter
is crossed in a way that it doesn't get in the way of your goal
of allowing each airport to individually have their own
security plan?
Mr. Capello. No, I don't. I believe again that the experts
who are tasked with that on the ground, people like myself, are
more than able to handle that.
So a couple things with that. At Fort Lauderdale, we had a
fence jumper. Didn't make the National news. It was within the
last couple months. I don't have a perimeter detection,
intrusion detection. I don't have a lot of things. I do want,
do need some things. But there is a way to go about that.
The outcome of the story at Fort Lauderdale is that while
the gentleman was going up the fence, the community policing
part already had kicked in and we were receiving calls through
three different numbers. We publish a--of course, 9-1-1. We
also on the back of our badges have a number you can call to
immediately talk to our control center, and then we have a
police non-emergency number.
So as this individual is climbing the fence, we were
already receiving calls.
Mr. Swalwell. Don't you think, Mr. Capello, that for
perimeters that are so vast that it is impossible for human
eyes to detect these, especially at night?
Mr. Capello. Sure. Yeah, absolutely. I was thinking about a
simple way to present my testimony to you about this particular
issue and the only thing I can come up with, and I apologize,
but it is some time ago, I used to carry a cell phone and now I
carry a smart phone. I can still make phone calls with both of
them. But I am much more productive with the smart phone.
So if my airport director came to me and said, hey, we just
found $25 million and we are going to put in this elaborate
CCTV system, intrusion detection system, I would be the
happiest guy in the room. But the bottom line is that is not
the only area we are responsible for. You heard testimony today
that we have roadways, we have buildings, we have commercial
crimes, we have assaults, we have everything. We also have
fence jumpers, unfortunately.
I think we all need to devote attention to it. I am not an
alarmist about it just yet. Of course, I would like to have
technology that would make my workforce more productive, my
police and my security people.
Mr. Swalwell. Do you think that $5 million, which the Safe
Skies Alliance has right now, is enough to study the
technologies? Or do you think expanding that program would
benefit perimeter security?
Mr. Capello. I think it is a great question, and it is an
easy one for me. I think it needs to be expanded. Why? Why?
When I became aware of what the work that Safe Skies was doing,
the gentleman was trying to explain to me exactly what they do,
and he knew I wasn't getting it. He said, listen, just think of
Consumer Reports.
He said, we are the Consumer Reports of airport security.
After thinking about it, it is the best way to convey any
testimony to you.
I don't have the resources nor the time to evaluate if this
system will work in the rain, the snow, the heat, the fog, the
sand, animals. They have experts to do that.
They will tell you what the system can do and what the
system can't do. We at airports----
Mr. Swalwell. I'm sorry, Mr. Capello. I think my time has
expired. But it looks like we may have----
Mr. Hudson. We will do a second round.
Mr. Swalwell. A second round, yeah. If you don't mind, Mr.
Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Hudson. If all the Members agree.
Mr. Swalwell. Thank you, Mr. Capello.
Mr. Hudson. Thank you.
At this point, I will recognize myself for a second round
of questions.
So address this to Mr. McClain, Mr. Murphy, either one, if
you both want to sort-of chime in on this. One of the issues,
one of the key findings in LAWA's after-action report was the
issue of sort-of the command-and-control, having a unified
command-and-control system where, you know, all the different
agencies that were responding could coordinate in one place.
That seemed to be one of the big deficiencies.
Could you maybe expound on that and explain from your
perspective exactly why it is so important to have that one
unified command-and-control at each airport?
Mr. McClain. Well, for starters, I would like to start with
the 9-1-1 system. Because to start there----
Mr. Hudson. That is where I was going next. But if you want
to go there first.
Mr. McClain. I'm sorry. Well, I will encompass it in both.
Mr. Hudson. Sure.
Mr. McClain. In terms of unified command and lines of
communication, if you don't have that, it delays the process
and that is what we saw that day. You had four different
command posts set up, which everyone at this table say that
that is not done. That is not the way we train, that is not the
way we do it; but on that day, it happened.
But when you touch on things like the 9-1-1 system,
currently, if you dial 9-1-1 at the airport at LAX, it does not
go to airport police. So that is not even streamlined.
So, that is a situation that we brought up for the last 4
years, and it still hasn't been addressed today.
So simple low-tech things like having a caller ID system in
place. When we talk about revenue and the revenue issue has
come up, we still have to circle back to the fact that $49
million of Federal dollars was diverted instead of being used
where it was supposed to be. The other 7.9, DOT is not even
sure what that was about.
So there is revenue there. But it is not going to the right
places to make sure that it is being done properly. So if you
went to LAX, you saw LAX, there is billions of dollars being
spent on beautification. Let's call what it is. Beautification
rather than public safety.
So I still don't see public safety being paramount because
you look at what is being spent on public safety as opposed to
what is being spent on beautification, it is dramatically
different.
Thank you.
Mr. Hudson. Mr. Murphy, you want to chime in on the 9-1-1
issue or the issue of the unified control?
Mr. Murphy. Unified command is the most basic principles in
our NIM system. Our compadres on the fire department are way
more advanced than what the police departments have been doing
and they have been using unified command for years
successfully.
Many of their fires need mutual aid. So any time you are
bringing in other areas for mutual aid, especially if they are
on a different radio system, when they have different tactics,
the command has to be channeled from one location.
Before you even do that, you have to get back to the
training of it. Is that, you know, you can put unified command
in, but do you have to train on it as well as a group as mutual
aid partners come in?
As for the 9-1-1, obviously, it is a best practice--9-1-1,
it does--if you don't have the ability to receive those in your
PSAPs, in your ECCs, then it does take time to transfer that
from one place to another, 30 seconds or so to transfer those
calls. Obviously, the more efficient way is to have them all
ring in to directly who is directing those emergency services
at the time.
Mr. Hudson. Absolutely. One of the things that really
struck me on our site visit to LAX was how quickly that first
officer made it into Terminal 3 and when he hit that front
door, he was up the escalator and, I mean, there was no
hesitation. It is pretty incredible the amount of time, but, so
30 seconds here and there really matters. So it really
impressed upon me just, you know, in that quick amount of time,
how far the shooter advanced, but also how quickly they got
there.
I am running out of time, but maybe if I could throw it to
Mr. Landguth and Mr. Capello, if you could just quickly. The
issue at LAX was if you call from your cell phone 9-1-1 while
you are in the terminal, it went to, I believe, the sheriff
department, if you called from a land line in the terminal, it
went to LAPD, and so what would happen in the case of your
airport if someone called from their cell phone? Do you have
land lines or others ways to contact 9-1-1 from your airports?
Mr. Landguth. Yeah. I think that is one of the lessons
learned that we have is, of all of our telephone systems or
telephones that we have at Terminal 2, we should have an
automatic button that we can actually hit that goes directly to
the equivalent of our
9-1-1 center at the airport itself, but right now if people are
dialing 9-1-1, it is going to the emergency operations, Wade
County emergency operations 9-1-1 center, and so there is a
little bit of challenge there.
So proper training, immediate buttons that people can
actually touch. I think TSA's got a program across the country,
I think it is 8-8-8 that they will hit no matter what airport
they are at across the country, so it goes immediately to the
airport's communication center. So I think we have recognized
that that is probably an area that needs some improvement, and
we are working on it.
Mr. Hudson. I am glad they picked 8-8-8 and not 6-6-6 or
some other number.
Mr. Capello, very briefly, my time's expired and I want to
give my--if you have anything to add, just do it very quickly.
Mr. Capello. The only thing I will add is if you dial 9-1-1
in my area, you will be connected to the dispatcher that
actually does dispatch of the deputy that will show up at your
scene, so it is all integrated.
Mr. Hudson. Gotcha. Thank you.
Well, I appreciate that. At this point I recognize our
Ranking Member, Mr. Richmond, for a second round of questions.
Mr. Richmond. Thank you.
Mr. Murphy, I am sure after the LAX shooting, you received
tremendous response from various airport law enforcement
entities and representatives that you represent. From your
perspective, the law enforcement perspective, what was the
recurring take-away that you noticed from the airport law
enforcement community?
Mr. Murphy. Yes, sir. The active shooter has been on our
radar for a long time with ALEAN. We have been training on that
over the last several of our conferences, and our members, most
of our members, if not all of our members, have an active-
shooter plan or are putting an active-shooter plan in process
when the LAX shooting occurred.
We had a conference shortly after that in Los Angeles, and
we talked with our members, and there were several themes.
First and foremost, comparing the LAX shooting with other
active-shooter incidents across the Nation, they solved that
problem very fast. It was obvious that Los Angeles had a good
plan, and we were reaching out to say: Hey, what does your plan
look like?
No. 2 was the training, for our officers, as well as our
airport staff and the training needed to not only go on
resolving the incident, but recovery and recovery of victim
extraction. That came up very, very obvious that, hey, we need
to make sure that we are able to get victims out very quickly
and work with our fire departments so they are able to come
into a warm zone. It may not be totally secure, but we have got
to get those folks in so we can get victims out and save lives
much faster.
Then the last part is to handle all the mutual aid. It was
obvious that if someone puts out a call for help, you are going
to get a lot of help, but then how do you manage those folks
and how do you get them to where you need them so they can
truly help you and not bind up the system.
Mr. Richmond. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, with that, I yield back.
Mr. Hudson. Thank the gentleman.
I will recognize my colleague from California, Mr.
Swalwell, for a second round of questions.
Mr. Swalwell. Thank you.
First I would like to correct my math. That would be almost
1,000 football fields. Okay.
But, Mr. McClain, when I toured San Jose Airport, I was
stunned to hear how few sworn law enforcement officers the city
of San Jose gives to the airport in coordination and I don't
think the number needs to be divulged, but it is pretty low. Do
you have a recommended formula for number of officers per acre
or per number of travelers daily at an airport?
Mr. McClain. Well, thank you, sir. That still varies from
airport to airport and county to county. I will say that having
a proprietary law enforcement agency there as opposed to a
municipal agency or, with all due respect to my colleague here,
a county agency, sometimes that varies in terms of the
dedicated force there and typically, it is the agencies that
are not proprietary that allocate less resources. That is just
my opinion, that is what I have seen.
I believe that as airports grow, as they expand, they have
to reassess what officers they have allocated. If you are
making the responsibility larger, you can't just say, hey, we
got by with it 5 years ago when we had less area of
responsibility. I know it was talked about earlier about
whether you should have officers dedicated at a screening
station or not. You also have to look at if you have an officer
dedicated to that screening post, that is one less officer to
rotate around.
But when you look at embassies or when you look at, when we
came in here today, there were police officers dedicated there
as you came in. I don't know how you on this panel would be if
you came in one day and those guys were just roving around, or
if you went into an embassy and you didn't see a marine there,
he was just roving around. So those are real things that we
have to look at and whether that revenue is being allocated to
those public safety resources in conjunction with the expansion
of those airports.
Mr. Swalwell. There is perception, value, right, to having
someone at the checkpoint? Because I actually agree with you
about giving them more latitude to rove around, but I imagine
the other side of the argument would be the perception value of
an armed officer at a checkpoint.
Another question, and actually I would open it up to anyone
who wishes to answer, and I think our airport security
directors may have some thoughts on this. One of our local
airports, I learned and observed that at the general aviation
entrance point, folks can enter, who have their planes at the
airport can fob their way in with a badge without any security
personnel watching them come in or verifying that their fob or
badge is for that person, and leaving the risk of someone
tailgating in behind or somebody who isn't the pass holder
badging in to the area.
At this particular airport, the general aviation area will
get, can get you to the commercial part of the airport, and I
had concerns about that, about whether even on the general
aviation side if we should have human eyes, whether it is
someone on the ground looking at the pass or remotely having
someone, you know, hold up their pass to a camera and so we are
at least verifying people that are coming in and out.
Any thoughts on that? Everyone's looking at you, Mr.
Capello.
Mr. Capello. I will take it. I do have thoughts about it.
At the airport I am stationed, we don't use a fob, but we do
use an airport-issued identification badge for that type of
access and there is an awful lot of vetting and security
checks, security threat assessments, fingerprint-based criminal
history checks that go on before that credential is issued.
So, yes, at the airport I am at, you can use that
credential to access the general aviation or fixed-based
operator area of the airport, and, yes, you could eventually go
from that area to a more secure area of the airport.
At my airport, to go to that small secure area of the
airport, you have to go through another type of staffed
credential check, because the two levels of security are
different. So it acts like a lock, and you will eventually
balance it out, that if you are going from a, let's just call
it a restricted area to a more secure area, you yet have
another check.
At that gate where that credential was first used where
there was not a guard, there is generally CCTV, and if there is
any issues at that gate, we start watching that gate very
closely. There is also equipment hooked to that gate that
generates alarms if a gate is manipulated with or kept open too
long and things like that.
What I find generally is that when you evaluate the risks
and the threats and the consequences and whatnot, that to me it
is very low risk at this point because of the set-up I
currently have. I am very comfortable with the set-up I have.
There may be other airports, though, that don't have such an
elaborate set-up, but at least where I am at, I do.
So I am very--it is low on my radar right now compared to
other things that go on in an aviation security setting.
Mr. Swalwell. Great. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Hudson. Thank the gentleman.
I now recognize my colleague from Alabama, Mr. Rogers, for
any questions he may have.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Murphy, based on your knowledge, are the majority of
airports in America equipped with effective interoperable
communications equipment that will allow them to talk with
first responders in the community in the event of an active-
shooter incident?
Mr. Murphy. To be quite honest with you, I don't know that
answer. I know that where I police in Cincinnati, we have had
an 800-megahertz system for 20 years and our responding mutual
aid partners have a 400-megahertz system. So for 20 years we
have been on a different radio system, but we have put
technology patches or unified command-type procedures in place
to make sure that we are able to talk to those in case we do
ask them to come in and help, but I do not know if there are--
what percentage have interoperability or not.
Something we should consider is as we move to the digital
platform, most agencies are moving to a P25 or some kind of
digital platform, that we are going to experience more of these
instances where areas are moving up to new radio systems, and
we expect that those are going to continue to have
interoperable problems until all P25 is fully converted.
Mr. Rogers. Anybody else know the answer to that question?
Mr. Capello. I would like just a clarification. Were you
asking about gunfire detection or interoperability of radios?
Mr. Rogers. No, no, no. Just in the event there is an
active shooter in the airport, do the airport police have
interoperable communications that will allow them to talk to
fire and emergency responders in the community?
Mr. Capello. At the airport I am at, Fort Lauderdale, the
answer is yes. The police services and the fire services are
provided by the same provider, which in this case would be the
Broward County Sheriff's Office.
Mr. Rogers. But does anybody know if that is true among the
majority of airports in the country? If you don't know, you
don't know. I just----
Mr. Capello. I don't know.
Mr. Rogers. It is a big frustration to me. Several years
ago on this committee, I was in charge of the--I was chairing
the subcommittee that dealt with that, and we have spent
enormous sums of money trying to assure interoperability, and
it just doesn't seem like we are getting anywhere.
There seems to be a lot of resistance among various first
responders that they have their system of communications, and
it doesn't always talk with their counterparts in the area. I
would like to see us mandate that if we are going to spend
Federal dollars, it has to be equipment that will talk with the
areas around it.
Mr. Capello, and Mr., is it Land----
Mr. Landguth. Landguth.
Mr. Rogers. Landguth. One of TSA's after-actions in
response to the shooting at LAX was the increase in its VIPR
Team presence in the airport environment. Have you noticed an
increase in VIPR Team presence at your airports and do you feel
that the VIPR Teams are a beneficial deterrent?
I will start with you, Mr. Landguth, and then we will go to
Mr. Capello.
Mr. Landguth. I am not quite sure. I don't know what the
activity of the VIPR Team is. That is typically handled down
at, my chief of police would handle that type of activity. So I
am sorry. I don't know.
Mr. Rogers. Okay. Mr. Capello.
Mr. Capello. We have had VIPR Teams at the airport and we
welcome them. As far as any noticeable increase, I would have
to say I have not noticed that, but I must say that we do get
what I consider adequate coverage from those teams.
One of the other things that occurs at my airport, and we
just had one over the weekend, specialized enforcement where we
invite the same components of a VIPR Team to set up shop on our
roadways and in various parts of the airport itself to be that
visible deterrent and actually pull over vehicles and search
vehicles and things like that. So I say that, I confidently say
that between the actual, ``the VIPR Team'' and the special
enhancement or enforcement that we do set up on a regular basis
due to certain situations, such as holidays or whatever, the
coverage there is adequate.
Mr. Rogers. Great. Thank you.
Last question, and this is backing up to the previous
subject matter, interoperable communications. Do you know, Mr.
Murphy or Mr. Capello, if the police equipment, communication
equipment that is in your airport was purchased with Federal
money in full or in part?
Mr. Murphy. I believe ours was probably purchased with AIP
funding, but I would have to verify that.
Mr. Rogers. Okay. Mr. Capello.
Mr. Capello. I don't know the exact answer to that, but I
know since I have been there, anytime equipment is purchased, I
wind up eventually paying the bill for it, and I don't believe
that any of that incurred any Federal funding or reimbursement.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you very much.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Hudson. I thank the gentleman.
I thank the witnesses for your testimony and Members for
their questions.
You know, this LAX tragedy is one that I hope we can all
learn from. You know, I continue to insist that the indelible
image from that day in my mind will not be the horrific
shooting of Officer Hernandez, but it will be that vision of
that police officer hitting the front door and rushing up that
escalator without--looked like Batman, without any hesitation.
That to me is the image of that day.
I just thank the witnesses for their time and helping us to
look at lessons learned, to look at how we move forward to make
the flying public safer.
So with that, I will just ask the Members that--the
witnesses that Members may have additional questions. If they
submit those, we ask that you answer those in writing.
Mr. Hudson. Without objection, the subcommittee stands
adjourned. Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 3:44 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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