[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
THAILAND: A DEMOCRACY IN PERIL
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JUNE 24, 2014
__________
Serial No. 113-191
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
DANA ROHRABACHER, California Samoa
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio BRAD SHERMAN, California
JOE WILSON, South Carolina GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
TED POE, Texas GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
MATT SALMON, Arizona THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina KAREN BASS, California
ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
MO BROOKS, Alabama DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
TOM COTTON, Arkansas ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
PAUL COOK, California JUAN VARGAS, California
GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois
RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III,
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania Massachusetts
STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas AMI BERA, California
RON DeSANTIS, Florida ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California
DOUG COLLINS, Georgia GRACE MENG, New York
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
TED S. YOHO, Florida TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
SEAN DUFFY, Wisconsin JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
Amy Porter, Chief of Staff Thomas Sheehy, Staff Director
Jason Steinbaum, Democratic Staff Director
------
Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio, Chairman
DANA ROHRABACHER, California ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
MATT SALMON, Arizona Samoa
MO BROOKS, Alabama AMI BERA, California
GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania BRAD SHERMAN, California
DOUG COLLINS, Georgia GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
C O N T E N T S
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Page
WITNESS
The Honorable Scot Marciel, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary,
Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, U.S. Department of
State.......................................................... 5
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
The Honorable Scot Marciel: Prepared statement................... 8
APPENDIX
Hearing notice................................................... 24
Hearing minutes.................................................. 25
The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress
from the Commonwealth of Virginia: Prepared statement.......... 26
Written responses from the Honorable Scot Marciel to questions
submitted for the record by the Honorable Steve Chabot, a
Representative in Congress from the State of Ohio, and
chairman, Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific................. 28
THAILAND: A DEMOCRACY IN PERIL
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TUESDAY, JUNE 24, 2014
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2 o'clock
p.m., in room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Steve
Chabot (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Chabot. The subcommittee will come to order.
Good afternoon and welcome to this afternoon's subcommittee
hearing. I want to thank the gentleman from California, Mr.
Bera, for serving as today's ranking member and also thank our
distinguished witness, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary
Scot Marciel, for being here. For reasons beyond our control we
had to reschedule today's hearing from last week, so I
appreciate your flexibility. While the Department of Defense
was previously scheduled to also testify, they rescinded their
participation and were no longer able to join the panel, which
is unfortunate. Mr. Marciel, I hope you will be able to address
some of their perspectives on the situation in Thailand and the
responses to the coup in their absence to the best of your
ability. I note the nodding of your head that indicates you
will be able to do that and we thank you for that.
Today's hearing was called to examine the implications of
the Royal Thai Army's coup d'etat on Thailand's alliance with
the United States and to assess the administration's responses
to the junta's seizure of power.
Over the past year or so, we have witnessed Thailand
descend into a state of complete political impasse. Since late
last year, protests of up to 200,000 people immobilized
Bangkok, challenging the government's right to rule; the
February 2014 elections were boycotted by the opposition
Democratic Party and Thailand's Constitutional Court declared
them null and void; Prime Minister Yingluck was forced out of
office on corruption charges and faces impeachment by the
Senate; and finally on May 20th the Royal Thai Army declared
martial law and formally took control of the country on May
22nd.
Almost immediately, the junta suspended Thailand's
Constitution, imposed a nationwide curfew, blocked
international media, banned public gatherings of more than five
people, detained journalists and academics, arrested political
leaders, shut down nearly 3,000 local radio stations, and
censored over 300 Web pages. While the curfew has since been
lifted, restrictions on media remain in place, some activists
still remain in detention, and civil society is living under a
dark shadow fearing reprisal by the junta, which has issued
harsh warnings against all political activities or public
comments seen threatening to the monarchy or the junta's
control.
The latest coup is Thailand's second since 2006 and twelfth
since 1932. But even amid a series of coups, Thailand has long
been considered an outpost of democracy and liberal ideas in
Southeast Asia. Surely, against the likes of Hun Sen's
dictatorial hand in Cambodia, the long-time junta-controlled
government in Burma, and the authoritarian communist regimes in
Vietnam and Laos, this was not so difficult of a status to
maintain.
Today, however, former political leaders, activists, and
workers are fleeing Thailand for Cambodia to escape the
increasing intolerance of dissent imposed by the junta. Only 1
year ago, this direction of migration would have been unheard
of. While this flight of people continues, Thailand faces a
serious reputational reckoning as the international community
questions Thailand's status as a beacon of democracy in Asia.
Its political crisis has already created a sense of unease
among foreign investors, and because of the instability and
uncertainty, those investors are running cold.
The junta claims that seizing power was necessary to save
Thai democracy's long-term prospects--also what they said
during the 2006 coup--yet, military junta chief Prayuth Chano-
cha has said there will be no win-win situation following the
coup and that citizens must temper their expectations. The
military has one goal, though, which is to decrease the power
of the Thai Rak Thai Party, whose followers are called the
``Red Shirts.'' Promulgating a new constitution to reduce the
power of the political parties in the Parliament, just as it
did in 2007, and further strengthening the role of military and
monarchy is likely how the junta will accomplish this.
Whichever way you cut it, Thailand's democracy is in peril.
The United States and Thailand have been allies since 1954
and friends for 180 years, but this latest coup raises a myriad
of challenges for the alliance. Thailand serves as a regional
operational platform for over 50 U.S. Government agencies, and
acts as an anchor for a multitude of U.S. regional security
initiatives. According to U.S. law, though, any country whose
duly elected government is deposed by military coup is
prohibited from receiving any direct foreign assistance until a
new democratically elected government has taken office.
The actions taken by the State Department immediately
following the coup, which included suspending an estimated
$10.5 million in foreign assistance to Thailand for Fiscal Year
2014, and the Defense Department's suspension of two bilateral
military exercises and high-level official visits scheduled
this month, were appropriate. However, there are estimations
that this coup could last for up to 2 years. The
administration's actions thus far only impose penalties through
September--the end of the 2014 Fiscal Year.
Thailand's military is a regular recipient of FMF and IMET
assistance, totaling about $8 million for the past 3 years. But
over the course of the last few decades, the U.S. has spent
millions promoting good governance through democracy and rule
of law activities in Thailand. With so much invested in
training and empowering the Thai military, I have to question
the effectiveness of this assistance and whether it has had any
real impact on encouraging democratic values within the Thai
military itself.
I hope, Mr. Marciel, you can discuss the administration's
long-term plans regarding additional restrictions that may be
put in place while the junta remains in power, and how the
administration will reformat its aid programs in Thailand to
support true democratic forces within the country.
Finally, while I understand that imposing restrictions or
suspending certain activities raises fears of damaging
multilateral relations beyond Thailand, the U.S. must stand by
its commitment to support the democratic values that millions
of Thais support, versus the junta's notion of a guided
democracy that will weed out political party influence. The
U.S. needs to act with prudence and measure, with
acknowledgment that bilateral relations cannot proceed as they
did only a couple months ago until free and fair elections
allow the people of Thailand to duly elect their leaders.
I think we all look forward to hearing from our witness
this afternoon. I would now like to yield to Mr. Bera for his
opening remarks for 5 minutes.
Mr. Bera. Thank you, Chairman Chabot, for calling this
important hearing and, obviously, a very timely hearing and
thank you to Mr. Marciel for being here.
For the past 6 years, Thailand has been a crucial ally and
a longstanding friend. The Thais have been critical partners in
carrying out many U.S. Government programs in a variety of
areas such as health care, refugee assistance and defense
cooperation.
Nevertheless, I am concerned along with the chairman with
Thailand's political deadlock, the restriction of freedom of
the press and assembly and the detention of political leaders
and journalists.
As the world's greatest democracy, we must call on the Thai
military to respect human rights and free speech and to refrain
from the crackdown of press, protests and arrested people for
free speech and political beliefs.
Furthermore, the last decade has proven to be a
particularly challenging one for Thailand as it has been
embroiled in a great power struggle between the Red Shirts and
the Yellow Shirts--two movements with clear fundamental
socioeconomic differences.
In 2006, the Prime Minister was accused of corruption and
was deposed by a military coup. Since then, there have been
sporadic outbreaks of violence from both sides of the political
divide.
In 2011, Thaksin's sister, Yingluck, became Prime Minister
of Thailand. Last November, thousands of anti-government
protestors assembled in Bangkok to object to an amnesty bill
that many believed would allow Thaksin to return from exile
without facing corruption charges.
Due to the mounting pressure from the opposition, Prime
Minister Yingluck announced that elections were going to take
place in February of this year but she stated that she would
not step down from her position until the newly elected
government could take office.
Unfortunately, the February election results were found to
be invalid due to the opposition's boycotting of the polls.
Prime Minister Yingluck remained in power until May 7th when
the Thailand constitutional court ousted her and several
officials from office for abuse of power.
On May 20th, martial law was implemented throughout
Thailand and on May 22nd the military established Thailand's
interim government. As a result of Thailand's military
takeover, the U.S. suspended military training exercises and
froze $10.5 million in foreign assistance.
In late May, Army Commander Prayuth, the head of the
National Council for Peace and Order, stated that he expected
the interim government to be in charge for at least the next 14
months or until peace, order and reform is achieved.
As one of our oldest geopolitical allies, I do hope that
the Thai military moves quickly to hold free and fair elections
so they can transition to a peaceful, democratic civilian-led
government.
I am also encouraged that Thailand revealed a three-phase
roadmap last month which is a positive step toward bettering
the lives of the Thai people and restoring democracy.
Again, thank you, Chairman Chabot, for holding this
important discussion where we have an opportunity to review our
positions and policies on Thailand. I would like to again thank
Ambassador Marciel for being here and I look forward to his
testimony. I yield back.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you very much. The gentleman from
California, who is also the ranking member of the Terrorism,
Nonproliferation, and Trade Subcommittee, is recognized for 1
minute.
Mr. Sherman. Thank you. Thailand has been our friend for a
long time. I associate myself with the chair and the ranking
member. It is a shame to see this division. The Shinawatra
group might not be the one that I would support if I was a
citizen of Thailand.
I am not. We need to support democracy even if a majority
of the people that we would interact with--the business class,
the most educated, those in the capital--are wearing yellow
shirts.
It is not which group can put the most people on the
streets in central Bangkok. It is which side can win elections.
One hopes that some middle ground is found.
I would like to go to Thailand and see orange shirts on
everyone. But--and I think we should try to do what we can that
is appropriate to facilitate that. But ultimately this is a
case where we need to respect democracy, and I yield back.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you very much. The gentleman yields back
and I would now like to turn to the gentleman from California,
Mr. Rohrabacher, who is the chairman of the Europe, Eurasia,
and Emerging Threats Subcommittee.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much. It seems like a
lifetime ago I had spent some time in Vietnam in 1967. I wasn't
with the military but I was up with the Montagnards in the
central highlands and I--when I left Vietnam I was very
disillusioned by the hatred and the murder and the killing and
the mayhem that I saw going on.
And I went to Thailand on the way home and there were
people who were smiling and they were happy people and they
were an island of tranquility and goodness in the middle of
bloodletting and despotism that was happening all around them.
This was true. The stability and happiness and prosperity
that Thailand has had over the years has always been such a
blessing that we have all thought we have all rooted for that.
And it is heartbreaking now for those of us who have always
considered the Thai people to be brothers and sisters to see
that island of happiness and stability and good will now
turning into chaos and negative sentiments and vitriol.
We would hope that the military does not make the wrong
decision and stay too long. Perhaps they needed to--we'll find
out from our witness--whether or not they needed to go in in
the first place.
But the worst thing that can happen to Thailand now is if
the military who came to stop all of this decides that they are
going to stay and then systematizes and cements this negativity
into their society.
So we wish the Thai people success in recapturing the
positive spirit they once had. Thank you very much.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you very much. And I would now like to
introduce our witness panel this afternoon. It is a witness
panel of one and that is Mr. Scot Marciel, who has served as
the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of East
Asia and Pacific Affairs since August 2013. Previously, he was
U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Indonesia. Prior to that,
Mr. Marciel served as Deputy Assistant Secretary, East Asia and
Pacific Bureau, where he was responsible for relations with
Southeast Asia and was Ambassador for ASEAN Affairs. He has
been a career member of the Senior Foreign Service since 1985
during which time he has served in Vietnam, the Philippines,
Hong Kong, Brazil and Turkey, as well as in the Economic
Bureau's Office of Monetary Affairs. Mr. Marciel grew up in
Fremont, California. He is a graduate of the University of
California at Davis and the Fletcher School of Law and
Diplomacy. We welcome you here this afternoon.
I am sure you are familiar with our 5-minute rule and we
would suggest that since you are one you can expand a little
bit but if you could keep it close to 5 minutes we would
appreciate it. Thank you very much. You are recognized for 5
minutes.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE SCOT MARCIEL, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY
ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Mr. Marciel. Chairman Chabot, members of the subcommittee,
thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to
discuss the recent coup in Thailand.
Mr. Chairman, last year we celebrated 180 years of friendly
relations with Thailand, one of our five treaty allies in Asia.
We have enjoyed very close relations and U.S.-Thai cooperation
on a wide range of issues has been a extremely good for a long
time.
Our militaries engage in bilateral and multilateral
exercises that provide invaluable opportunities to develop
relationships and increase coordination and cooperation. For
many years, Thailand has also been an important partner on
important humanitarian goals and priorities.
We enjoy excellent cooperation on health, health research
and many other issues. In addition, diplomatically Thailand has
played a constructive role in the Asia Pacific region including
as a member of ASEAN and APEC.
The United States is both Thailand's third largest trading
partner, with more than $37 billion in two-way trade, and its
third largest investor with more than $13 billion in cumulative
foreign direct investment.
Our Embassy in Bangkok is a regional hub for the U.S.
Government and remains one of our largest missions in Asia.
Very importantly, we also enjoy extremely close people-to-
people ties with Thailand. So for all these reasons, we care
deeply about our relationship and about the people of Thailand.
For many years, we were pleased to see Thailand build
prosperity and democracy, becoming in many ways a regional
success story as well as a close partner. Over the past decade,
however, Thailand has grappled with an internal political
debate that has divided not only the political class but
society as a whole.
Describing this complex debate would take more time than we
have today, but in the simplest terms it is between the
supporters and opponents of former Prime Minister Thaksin
Shinawatra, whose approach to politics and governance made
him--gave him significant influence but also made him a
polarizing figure.
The debate also reflects deeper conflicts between segments
of society based both on socioeconomic status and on geography
and these divisions contributed to a coup in 2006 and again,
unfortunately, last month.
This latest coup came at the end of 6 months of intense
political struggle between rival groups that included months-
long demonstrations in the streets of Bangkok. Military leaders
argued that the coup was necessary to prevent violence, end
political paralysis and create the conditions for stronger
democracy.
Our position during the entire past decade of turbulence
and specifically during the last 6 months of turmoil has been
to avoid taking sides in Thailand's internal political
competition while stressing our support for democratic
principles and for the bilateral relationship.
Prior to the coup, we publicly and privately stated our
opposition to a coup or other extra constitutional actions,
stressing that the solution in a democracy is to let the people
select their leaders through elections.
We consistently communicated that message to Thai officials
through our Ambassador, visits by senior officials and through
military channels. When the coup nonetheless took place, we
immediately criticized it.
Beginning with Secretary Kerry's statement on May 22, we
have consistently called for the restoration of civilian rule,
a return to democracy and full respect for human rights.
We have told Thai officials that we understood their
frustration with their longstanding political problems but also
stressed that coups do not solve these problems but are
themselves a step backwards.
Recent events have shown that the current coup is both more
repressive and likely to last longer than the previous one. The
ruling military council has summoned, detained and intimidated
hundreds of political figures, academics, journalists, online
commentators and peaceful protestors.
It continues to censor the media and the Internet. The
military government has said they will appoint an interim
government by September and has laid out a vague time line for
elections within approximately 15 months.
Its stated intention is to reduce conflict and partisanship
within society, thereby paving the way for a more harmonious
political environment when civilians return to control.
Frankly, we do not see how the coup and subsequent repressive
actions will produce the political compromise and
reconciliation that Thailand needs.
Like most Thai, we want Thailand to live up to its
democratic ideals, strengthen its democratic institutions and
return to democratic governance. The coup and post-coup
repression have made it impossible for us to proceed with a
business as usual approach to Thailand. As required by law, we
have suspended more than $4.7 million of security-related
assistance.
In addition, we have cancelled high-level engagements,
exercises and a number of training programs with the military
and police. For example, we have halted a bilateral naval
exercise that was under way when the coup occurred and
cancelled an Army exercise scheduled for this month.
We continue to review other programs and engagements and
will consider further measures as circumstances warrant. At the
same time, mindful of our long-term strategic interests, we
remain committed to maintaining our enduring friendship with
the Thai people and nation, including the military.
The challenge we face is to make clear our support for a
rapid return to democracy and human rights while also working
to ensure we are able to maintain and strengthen this
friendship and alliance over the long term.
After democracy is restored, we fully hope and intend that
Thailand will continue to be a crucial partner in Asia for many
decades to come.
Thank you for inviting me to testify. I look forward to
trying to answer your questions. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Marciel follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
----------
Mr. Chabot. Thank you very much. We appreciate your
testimony here this afternoon and we will now have members ask
questions and I will recognize myself for 5 minutes to ask the
first question.
Thailand's second coup in a decade has demonstrated what
seems to be a greater trend emerging in Southeast Asia.
Democracy is hanging by a thread in Cambodia, Burma, and has
regressed in Malaysia. It never really existed in Vietnam or
Laos and it is in peril now in Thailand. In addition, efforts
to establish a more effective democracy--as the Royal Thai Army
is attempting under its latest coup--is setting a bad precedent
and really sending the wrong message. My question is this: Is
the administration concerned that the deterioration of the
democratic process in Thailand is doing just that, sending a
bad precedent for the region, particularly in Burma where the
military has been reluctant to live up to its reform
commitments?
Mr. Marciel. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Certainly, promoting
democracy and human rights is a key part of our foreign policy,
of course, everywhere, and certainly in Southeast Asia.
So we look at the coup in Thailand primarily bilaterally in
the impact on Thailand itself. But you are right, also the
negative example it sends--it sets for the region.
I guess maybe I am slightly on the more optimistic side but
I would note that in Southeast Asia over the last 10 to 20
years I think we have actually seen some significant progress,
most notably, of course, in Indonesia, which is a free
democracy and will have its elections very soon. The
Philippines, in Burma, as you mentioned, there is a lot more--a
lot of room to go.
I think there has been some significant progress in recent
years but, as I said, a huge amount of work still to be done
and we would rather have positive examples. One other point I
might highlight, Mr. Chairman, is that it was interesting to me
to see the regional response to the coup in Thailand.
I would argue that 10 years ago none of the neighbors in
ASEAN would have said anything. But in this case, certainly
Indonesia spoke out and others did as well, expressing concern
and a hope for a return to normalcy and to stability and I
think that is a positive sign in the region.
I don't want to exaggerate it but I think what we are
seeing is that democracy is more the standard and things like
coup are less acceptable even in the region than they used to
be and I think that is a positive sign.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you. Their military has been largely
silent about the whereabouts of certain citizens that remain in
detention. The National Council for Peace and Order, NCPO,
claims it is only talking with citizens it detains to explain
to them why the military took over. It also claims most people
are detained for only a few hours while those with stronger
political views are detained not more than 7 days. However,
over the weekend the NCPO revealed that it has kept a Red Shirt
activist, Ms. Kristuda, in detention for 3 weeks to ``help her
mediate, restore consciousness and reconsider many things so
that they can adjust her understanding.''
Mr. Marciel, can you explain what this means and whether
the detention of individuals without charges are in accordance
with international human rights standards? And also even though
we have not heard of any detainees being harmed or mistreated
to date, at least that I am aware of, they were all required to
sign documents saying that they were not harmed, intimidated,
coerced, misled, tortured or forced to give or commit any
inappropriate act before they were released? However, I might
add, a number of people have said they were subject to
intimidation and an aggressive interrogation and, before
released, issued direct warnings. Don't these actions betray
the junta's claims that it is not harming or intimidating
targeted individuals and does the State Department have any
idea how many people may still be detained against their will?
Is it the administration's plan to address this clamp down
on fundamental freedoms by restricting certain engagement
activities? So that is a lot to respond to but you have 38
seconds.
Mr. Marciel. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
We are deeply troubled by the--by the military council's
actions. They are continuing to summon and detain and
intimidate political figures, academics, journalists, peaceful
protestors.
We have publicly and in our private conversations with
government authorities have emphasized that, you know, priority
number one for us is to end this practice of detaining people.
To be honest, our information is very similar to yours in
terms of what is happening that we--though we haven't seen
evidence of physical mistreatment but certainly intimidation
that is leading a lot of people to choose not to talk.
This is a problem. I don't know the particular case of Ms.
Kristuda but we will certainly look into it but----
Mr. Chabot. If you could look into that we would appreciate
it.
Mr. Marciel. Sure.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you very much. My time has expired. The
gentleman from California, Mr. Bera, is recognized for 5
minutes.
Mr. Bera. Thank you, Chairman Chabot.
A hundred and eighty years of friendship certainly makes
Thailand one of our oldest and most reliable friends and,
certainly, listening to my colleague from California, Mr.
Rohrabacher, Thailand has in its past represented a bastion of
stability and peace and certainly, Ambassador Marciel, you
talked about the people-to-people ties.
So, certainly, the strong relationship there. So it is a
very important relationship to the United States and one that
we would love to get back to as quickly as possible to the
mutual benefit of both countries.
Could you expand on why this relationship is so important
to U.S. interests and what benefits we have seen from the
relationship?
Mr. Marciel. Thank you, Congressman. It is a good questions
and I know Congressman Rohrabacher talked about being there,
you know, some years ago when it was a bastion and, of course,
the relationship goes back 180 years. The treaty relationship
goes back to 1954.
And we have, over the many years, built up extremely close
relations and cooperation on a huge range of issues. Of course,
we have the security alliance where we have worked together in
many areas including the Vietnam War back in the '60s and early
'70s.
We worked very closely with Thailand for many years after
the war and even since then, dealing with huge refugee outflows
from neighboring countries. There are still about 140,000
refugees in Thailand.
But on other areas we work--do great work doing health
research together, working on disaster relief. I remember
flying into Burma in 2008 from a Thai air force base with a
Thai general to start the process of delivering relief supplies
to the Burmese after the terrible cyclone that hit there.
We have had Peace Corps there, thousands of Peace Corps
volunteers and students. What we have had is we have built up a
huge amount of trust over the years. The main--you know, the
Thai are very proud and very nationalistic so they don't
surrender their sovereignty at all.
But they have been willing to work with us to fix common
problems without a lot of bureaucracy and so on, just a very
practical, pragmatic opportunity, and it has also been, as we
said earlier, become a huge center for our regional operations.
We do a lot of our regional assistance out of there just
because we have very good pragmatic cooperation on a wide range
of issues. So it is a hugely valuable relationship to us.
Mr. Bera. And, certainly, an important one for us to get
back to. But as we have all pointed out, this has been a
difficult decade for Thailand. You know, when we think about
how we get back to some normalcy, what are some possible
scenarios with regards to how long the military rule could last
in Thailand and, you know, what are some things that we can do
from our side in the U.S. that informs the junta's decisions to
move a little bit more swiftly toward conducting elections?
Mr. Marciel. Well, the military leaders have talked about a
rough time frame of 15 months. What we have said is that there
is a couple of steps. First and foremost, we have urged them
and continue to urge them every day to end the practice of
detaining people and the censorship.
So these sorts of things are things that could be done, we
think, quickly--lift martial law--that would not bring about a
return to democracy immediately but certainly change the
environment significantly, and then we think they can move more
rapidly to elections.
They have talked about the need for reform. Pretty much
every government in the world can benefit from some reforms as
long as the process is inclusive and reflects the will of the
people.
So we will continue to urge them and many other countries
are continuing to urge them to move more rapidly. It is, to be
honest, very hard to predict, though, how long they are going
to stay in power at this point.
Mr. Bera. I have got two quick questions. One, knowing that
this is tourist season and many Americans will, you know, often
will go visit Thailand, are there any threats to U.S. citizens
in this period at this juncture?
Mr. Marciel. Congressman, this is something, of course, our
Embassy and we monitor extremely closely. We haven't seen
threats. We haven't seen things that are really dangerous. We
did issue a travel notice just making people aware of the
overall situation but not of specific threats, no.
Mr. Bera. Okay. And just very briefly, the Thai junta has
talked about this three-phase roadmap. Do you think you could
describe, you know, in brief that three--those three phases for
us?
Mr. Marciel. Well, they have talked about, first, kind of
a--I don't remember the term they used but kind of a cooling
off period to try to reduce the tensions and then a period of
reform, which has been quite vague, to be very honest.
We don't know what types of reforms they are talking about,
the interim government being established this September, which
we--you know, we don't know much about what that would be.
It wouldn't be democratically elected, though. It would be
appointed and then leading to elections roughly a year after
that. But it is quite vague, to be honest.
Mr. Bera. Okay.
Mr. Chabot. Gentleman's time has expired. The gentleman
from Pennsylvania is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Perry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Scot,
for your testimony today. Just wondering how China has
responded to the events, and with the luxury of hindsight if
you can speak to how they responded or tried to influence
Bangkok after the 2006 coup. What were there successes? Are
there any parallels currently?
Mr. Marciel. It is a good question, Mr. Congressman. I
would say that I don't think there is any outside power that
has undue influence in Thailand, including us or China. I mean,
these political issues are being dealt with very much on an
internal basis with Thai decisions.
So I don't think there is an outside hand, per se. I can't
really speak for the Chinese Government. I would assume,
looking at what they are doing around the region, that they are
doing all they can to build closer relations with all the
countries and I would assume that goes for Thailand.
It is a very close trading partner already and right on
their border. I don't know of anything significant after 2006,
certainly as a result of the coup that--anything that changed.
So, again, this is pretty much a domestic driven matter. Again,
I am hesitant to speak on behalf of the Chinese Government
where they are. But we are not seeing anything dramatic.
Mr. Perry. All right then. If they don't move back to a
representative government within some reasonable time, and I
don't know what the reasonable time frame and I have never
visited but I am just trying to gauge through you the sentiment
of the people, at what point have they had enough?
Is there a concern--is there any propensity to civil war
over this or are they going to be satisfied for a fairly long
period of time? What is a reasonable period of time? Is the
14--I have read 14 months somewhere as reasonable as the
expectation people and is that acceptable?
Mr. Marciel. It is a very good and difficult question, one
that we are asking ourselves as well. My own view is that the
Thai people have embraced democracy and while there was no
doubt much frustration with the political paralysis and
corruption and all these issues that people have been talking
about for some time, my strong sense and our strong sense is
the Thai people very much value their freedoms and their
democracy.
So I wouldn't want to put a time on it but I would expect
that the Thai people over time, if there is not movement toward
a restoration of civil and political liberties and movement
toward reasonable elections, that over time there will be more
and more Thai people who will look for opportunities to express
their unhappiness.
Can't really put a time frame on it but I do think the
majority of Thai people have made clear they want democracy
and, certainly, that is our view as well.
Mr. Perry. Is there any concern regarding U.S. policy
toward other important issues such as the transition in Burma
or ASEAN's South China Sea diplomacy with China and human
trafficking in the region? Is there any concern with those
issues?
Mr. Marciel. Well, Thailand is an important player on all
of those issues. Certainly, we have had good cooperation with
Thailand authorities in terms of support for the reforms in
Burma.
They are very active as--within ASEAN they are the dialogue
partner at this time for China on South China Sea issues. So
they play an important role. Certainly, on trafficking in
persons we have a lot of work to do with the Thai in that area.
It is a little bit early to know what is going to happen
under this military council. What I can say is that political
problems over the last decade have sometimes limited Thailand's
ability to be as active as it normally would.
But the Foreign Ministry is a very professional group and
they have actually, generally speaking, continued to be very
active and constructive and we would hope that that will
continue going forward.
Mr. Perry. All right. In the limited time I have, just as a
narrative and maybe you can comment, it seems, you know, based
on what I have read and what you have testified so far today is
that this is the quintessential example of all politics is
local.
There is not much we could have done or should have done.
There is not much we can do. It is going to play itself out and
seems like at least for the United States interest at this
point life in Thailand is going to continue on and our
relationship is going to continue on and they are going to
figure out where they want to be or not, and in the next period
of time we are going to sit and observe. That is what I gather
from this.
Mr. Marciel. Mr. Congressman, I agree with you that, you
know, most of the fixing of this problem really has to come
from the Thai people themselves, like most other countries.
We have and will continue to urge--and a lot of other
countries around the world are doing the same--trying to urge
them to move back toward democracy as quickly as possible. We
have some small assistance programs that we hope to continue
under notwithstanding provisions that would allow us to work in
those areas as well. What I would say is that we will have to
observe certain things.
The relationship we want to maintain long term but
meanwhile, until there is a return to elected government, we
won't be able to do business as usual. In other words, there
are certain limitations and restrictions on the relationship
until democracy is restored.
Mr. Perry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you. The gentleman's time has expired.
The gentleman from California, Mr. Rohrabacher, is recognized
for 5 minutes.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Again, for those of us who have--consider
ourselves friends or even part of the family of--with the Thai
people it is heartbreaking to see this slide from being a
positive society into a society where there is such negativity
and animosity that seems to be springing up among those people
who I used to think of as the people with smiles.
And according to your testimony, you are telling us that
this negative transition is not caused by necessarily ideology
and we know it is not caused by religious differences like we
see in other countries where people start killing each other
like in Northern Ireland and other places.
But instead you are suggesting it is geography and
partisanship, and that is very interesting that we have got
forces at play that are bringing people to this--
democratically-inclined people toward this negative situation.
In Europe, when you have people who seem to be at conflict
with one another that--and there doesn't seem to be a major
ideological split and that it seems more on personality and
then, as you say, partisanship and geography, there is an
organization called the OSCE that comes in, as they are now in
Ukraine to try to help the people there come to an
understanding of where they are at and how they might get the
situation reversed and going in a positive direction. Is there
no OSCE in the Asia Pacific area?
Mr. Marciel. Mr. Congressman, no, there isn't and, I mean,
there is ASEAN, which, you know, as I mentioned has raised a
few questions about this. But it is a very different
organization than OSCE and the Thai before the coup did not
seem at all receptive to the idea of outside parties.
I think there were some high-level U.N. people who looked
to see if they might be able to engage and help and there was a
lot of push back from the Thai.
Mr. Rohrabacher. I would call on the military in Thailand
now from--as advice from a friend that they call in outside
people to try to--like you would do if you were having a
dispute in your family you might want to call someone in to
help counsel both sides in a positive way because--and the
military is not capable of that type of reconciliation effort.
The military knows how to handle violence and they know how
to use force. They do not know how to make people solve
problems and be conciliatory toward each other. So I would
think that establishing some organization like that, like the
OSCE, in Asia--Asian Pacific would be positive.
Perhaps in this specific situation we should advise them.
There must be other organizations that could come in and serve
in this capacity. In the past, the king has had such a positive
impact. Has the king's influence now been diminished, that he
is unable to use this to solve some of this chaos that is going
on?
Mr. Marciel. Thank you. First, I would--I would agree with
you that, as I said in my testimony, we don't see how this
military, if you will, suppression of partisanship--while
perhaps it feels good for the moment we don't see how this
solves the underlying problem and so that is part of our
argument to the Thai military.
In terms of who could play a role, there were some outside
groups that were very quietly behind the scenes trying to
encourage a dialogue and a deal before the coup.
In terms of the king and the monarchy, he hasn't been seen
very much recently and hasn't really spoken publicly to this
issue. So it is a little bit hard for us to tell exactly, and
given the tremendous sensitivities and reverence for the king
in Thailand I wouldn't want to speculate unnecessarily.
Mr. Rohrabacher. He has helped before and he has stepped in
in the past to help bring back more stability and a better
atmosphere in his country and, again, send the military back to
their job and taking them out of government.
Let us just note the longer the military stays in the more
likely it is that corruption and, yes, repression will emerge
from that type of rule because you have--where you have control
it does not mean that people will be any more honest unless or
they would be more likely to do their job well.
So let us hope that this--the message we send and we are
sending to the military is let us move on back to democracy as
soon as we can and be very serious about finding someone to
help reconcile these personality and regional and geographic
differences.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you very much. The gentleman's time has
expired. We will go to a second round. Since we don't have too
many members it won't be a very long round but I recognize
myself for 5 minutes.
Mr. Marciel, after the 2006 coup in Thailand, the
administration then decided not to cancel the annual Cobra Gold
joint military exercise. The current coup will last at least 15
months according to the junta leaders, therefore, continuing
through the spring of 2015 and into the fall. Since the Cobra
Gold exercise takes place that spring, does the administration
intend to suspend Thailand's participation in the Cobra Gold
military exercise and couldn't its location be moved out of
Thailand, for example, to Australia where we have rotational
troops in Darwin?
Mr. Marciel. It is a very good question, Mr. Chairman. The
short answer is we haven't made a decision on that yet. We are
certainly looking at it and our ability to go forward with it
in Thailand. As you mentioned, it is a hugely important
exercise not only for Thailand and the United States but for
the region.
So it is something we are looking at. We have a little bit
of time to work with and we will certainly be looking at it
very closely. It will depend partly on what happens on the
ground there. As to whether it would be something that could be
moved, I would--if my military or DoD colleague were here I
would defer to them. I would maybe take that question if I
could.
Mr. Chabot. Sure. Yes, that is understandable and I would
just make the point in following up you indicated you are not
sure at this point whether we will or we won't. But assuming
that perhaps they come to the decision to move ahead with it, I
would just make the point that in light of the repressive
nature of the current coup and the restrictions that are
imposed by our own law, I think an argument could be made that
the U.S. cannot justify Thailand's participation. Wouldn't it
send the message to other nations that, irrespective of whether
a military or civilian government controls that particular
country the U.S. will still engage with their military?
I think it could, clearly, send the wrong message if we
allowed them to participate in Cobra Gold and I would just pass
that thinking along to the administration for their
consideration. I assume you will make sure that happen,
correct?
Mr. Marciel. I will, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you. Thank you very much. On Friday, the
State Department released its 2014 Trafficking in Persons
report, which downgraded Thailand from Tier 2 watch list to
Tier 3 for its failure to appropriately fight human trafficking
in the sex industry, in the seafood industry, and in the
garment industry. Being designated to this black list with the
likes of North Korea and Iran and Syria and Russia comes
certain diplomatic and economic penalties in addition to the
penalties dictated under law for the coup itself. Pursuant to
the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000,
countries on Tier 3 are subject to certain restrictions on
bilateral assistance such as nonhumanitarian and nontrade-
related foreign assistance. These countries may also lose
access to IMF and World Bank assistance, for example. Would you
discuss what penalties could be imposed on Thailand for this
downgrade in addition to restrictions being made in response to
the coup itself?
Mr. Marciel. Yes, Mr. Chairman. As you mentioned, Thailand
was downgraded to Tier 3. Countries placed on Tier 3 on
trafficking in persons could be subject to certain restrictions
of nonhumanitarian, nontrade-related U.S. Government assistance
and multilateral voting.
These restrictions, if applied, would take effect at the
start of Fiscal Year '15. Humanitarian, trade-related and
certain types of development assistance are not affected by
these restrictions and the President may waive some or all of
these restrictions if he determines that the affected
assistance would ``promote the purposes of the Trafficking
Victims Protection Act of 2000 or is otherwise in the national
interest of the United States.''
There has been no--since this decision to downgrade was
just made we have not yet addressed that question of a possible
waiver.
Mr. Chabot. Before I ask my final question--because my time
is rapidly terminating here--I would just make a point that I
think it is crazy how we do that all the time. We give all
these restrictions and then we let the President waive them all
if he says that would be against the best interests of the
United States more or less. And so the restrictions are really
not restrictions at all, and that is the way Congress does
business, which I think is quite foolish. I will give myself 1
additional minute here so I can ask the final question.
More recent attention has been given to human trafficking
and especially in Thailand's seafood industry. For example,
Thai officials are said to have been complicit in selling
Rohingya Muslims, who are fleeing Burma, into servitude on
fishing boats. In fact, personnel from the Thai Navy itself
were implicated in these charges. Why is Thailand not doing
more to address trafficking of these migrant workers and what
is our administration doing to see that they do?
Mr. Marciel. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We agree that one of
the primary reasons that Thailand was downgraded was over
concerns about the lack of action by the Thai Government to
deal with the problem of trafficking in persons related to the
seafood fishing industry.
For several years now we and others in the international
community have expressed concern about forced labor of foreign
migrants in the Thai fishing and on-land seafood industries.
This is something we talk to the Thai about continually. We
did before the coup. We will continue to do after the coup.
I would say overall that the Thai Government is more aware
of the overall trafficking in persons problem than in the past
and taking some steps but we think, given the scale of the
problem, not doing enough and we are specifically asking them
to focus on the seafood industry and will continue to do so.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you very much, and I will just conclude
my question by making a point. I would like to reiterate what
Mr. Rohrabacher said, that I think the United States has always
viewed Thailand as a very strong ally, a wonderful country who
is going through some tough times right now. And the criticism
that might be heard in Thailand about their country is
criticism directed at the instability in the government and, in
some measure, the unhappiness with the junta and some of their
restrictive behavior. Although it probably pales in comparison
to some other countries who have been much harsher on their
population. Nonetheless, we expect more from Thailand because
they are such a wonderful country and we hope that they will in
the very near future be in that category again. I think that
concludes our testimony and we want to thank you very much, Mr.
Marciel, for your testimony here this afternoon. I would ask
unanimous consent that all members will have 5 legislative days
to submit any questions in writing or to supplement their
testimony.
And if there is no further business to come before the
committee, we are adjourned.
Thank you very much.
[Whereupon, at 3:38 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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