[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 113-107]
HEARING
ON
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT
FOR FISCAL YEAR 2015
AND
OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES HEARING
ON
FISCAL YEAR 2015 BUDGET REQUEST FOR ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE ACTIVITIES
AND NUCLEAR FORCES PROGRAMS
__________
HEARING HELD
APRIL 8, 2014
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES
MIKE ROGERS, Alabama, Chairman
TRENT FRANKS, Arizona JIM COOPER, Tennessee
DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado LORETTA SANCHEZ, California
MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
MO BROOKS, Alabama RICK LARSEN, Washington
JOE WILSON, South Carolina JOHN GARAMENDI, California
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio HENRY C. ``HANK'' JOHNSON, Jr.,
JOHN FLEMING, Louisiana Georgia
RICHARD B. NUGENT, Florida ANDREE CARSON, Indiana
JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma MARC A. VEASEY, Texas
Drew Walter, Professional Staff Member
Leonor Tomero, Counsel
Eric Smith, Clerk
C O N T E N T S
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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2014
Page
Hearing:
Tuesday, April 8, 2014, Fiscal Year 2015 Budget Request for
Atomic Energy Defense Activities and Nuclear Forces Programs... 1
Appendix:
Tuesday, April 8, 2014........................................... 35
----------
TUESDAY, APRIL 8, 2014
FISCAL YEAR 2015 BUDGET REQUEST FOR ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE ACTIVITIES
AND NUCLEAR FORCES PROGRAMS
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Rogers, Hon. Mike, a Representative from Alabama, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces............................... 1
WITNESSES
Benedict, VADM Terry J., USN, Director, Strategic Systems
Programs, U.S. Navy............................................ 5
Bunn, M. Elaine, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Nuclear and Missile Defense Policy, U.S. Department of Defense. 3
Harencak, Maj Gen Garrett, USAF, Assistant Chief of Staff for
Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration, U.S. Air Force... 5
Held, Edward Bruce, Acting Administrator and Acting Under
Secretary for Nuclear Security, National Nuclear Security
Administration................................................. 9
Huizenga, David G., Acting Assistant Secretary, Office of
Environmental Management, U.S. Department of Energy............ 7
Richardson, ADM John M., USN, Director, Naval Nuclear Propulsion
Program, U.S. Navy............................................. 6
Weber, Hon. Andrew C., Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs, U.S.
Department of Defense.......................................... 2
Winokur, Dr. Peter S., Chairman, Defense Nuclear Facilities
Safety Board................................................... 8
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Benedict, VADM Terry J....................................... 65
Bunn, M. Elaine.............................................. 51
Harencak, Maj Gen Garrett.................................... 76
Held, Edward Bruce........................................... 133
Huizenga, David G............................................ 95
Richardson, ADM John M....................................... 90
Rogers, Hon. Mike............................................ 39
Weber, Hon. Andrew C......................................... 41
Winokur, Dr. Peter S......................................... 106
Documents Submitted for the Record:
Section 1042 Report.......................................... 147
Letter to Senators Reid and McConnell from Representatives
Rogers and Cooper.......................................... 153
Letter to Secretary Moniz from Representatives McKeon and
Rogers..................................................... 154
Chart submitted by Mr. Held.................................. 156
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
Mr. Cooper................................................... 159
Mr. Garamendi................................................ 159
Mr. Rogers................................................... 159
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Cooper................................................... 172
Mr. Garamendi................................................ 177
Mr. Rogers................................................... 163
Ms. Sanchez.................................................. 174
FISCAL YEAR 2015 BUDGET REQUEST FOR ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE ACTIVITIES
AND NUCLEAR FORCES PROGRAMS
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
Washington, DC, Tuesday, April 8, 2014.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:30 p.m., in
room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Mike Rogers
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE ROGERS, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
ALABAMA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES
Mr. Rogers. Good afternoon. This subcommittee hearing will
come to order. I want to welcome our hearing participants on
the President's fiscal year 2015 budget request for atomic
energy defense activities and nuclear forces programs.
I want to thank our witnesses for being here today. We are
very proud to have these witnesses here with us today, and we
have a lot of ground to cover in this hearing.
And our distinguished witnesses are the Honorable Andrew
Weber, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical and
Biological Defense Programs at the U.S. Department of Defense;
Ms. Elaine Bunn, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Nuclear and Missile Defense Policy at the U.S. Department of
Defense; Vice Admiral Terry Benedict, Director of Strategic
Systems Programs of the U.S. Navy; Major General Garrett
Harencak, Assistant Chief of Staff for Strategic Deterrence and
Nuclear Integration; Bruce Held, Acting Administrator and
Acting Under Secretary for Nuclear Security, at the National
Nuclear Security Administration [NNSA]; Admiral John
Richardson--happy birthday to you--Director of Naval Nuclear
Propulsion Program, U.S. Navy and National Nuclear Security
Administration; Mr. David Huizenga, Senior Advisor for
Environmental Management, U.S. Department of Energy [DOE]; and
Mr. Peter Winokur, Chairman, Defense Nuclear Facility Safety
Board. That is a mouthful.
I appreciate all of you taking time to be here at this
hearing. As always, we appreciate your contributions that each
and every one of you make.
Before I hand the floor over to the ranking member, let me
highlight just a few issues to which we are paying close
attention. First, today, 2 years late, we have finally received
the administration's proposed nuclear force structure under the
New START [Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty]. I am glad to see
that the President made the right decision, the decision that
was obvious to us 2 years ago. We will take a hard look at this
in the coming weeks, and we will discuss it today, I am sure.
Second, the governance and management of the DOE and NNSA.
We had a hearing 2 weeks ago to receive the interim report of
the congressional advisory panel on this topic. It was
sobering, and it confirmed what this subcommittee has been
saying for many years. We had 13 members show up at that
hearing. I hope that shows just how serious we are taking this.
We are as serious as a heart attack, and we want to make sure
that we see some bold actions at the NNSA.
Third, promised capabilities and programs keep slipping
despite significant budget increases. Fulfillment of the
requirement for this responsive nuclear infrastructure keeps
being pushed into the distant future, and we have wasted
billions of dollars with false starts. The follow-on to the
air-launched cruise missile is pushed and may put both the
nuclear security enterprise and the Strategic Command in a real
bind. The interoperable warhead, a key pillar of the
administration's future stockpile strategy, has been pushed out
of sight on the calendar.
Fourth, integrity and leadership problems in our nuclear
forces.
General Harencak and Admiral Richardson, we appreciate the
updates you and your services have been providing us.
The services need to get on top of this. It is particular--
in particular, the Air Force needs to take a long, hard look at
itself and how it is leading and managing its nuclear forces.
Recent actions give us hope, but they must only be a start.
Let me end on a bright note. The B61 life extension
program, which many on this subcommittee and many at the
witness table have fought to get back on track, is succeeding.
NNSA and the Air Force are on schedule, on budget, and
delivering for the Nation.
Good work. This is an important first step for rebuilding
the trust and confidence of the Congress, the American people,
and our allies.
Thanks again to our witnesses. I look forward to our
discussion. And with that, let me recognize the ranking member,
my friend and colleague from Tennessee, Mr. Cooper.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Rogers can be found in the
Appendix on page 39.]
Mr. Cooper. I thank the chairman, my friend. I have no
opening statement. I look forward to the testimony of the
witnesses.
Mr. Rogers. Great. I appreciate that.
And we will now--I think that the witnesses, as you can
see, we have got a large group of witnesses. Ask you to
synopsize your opening statement to 3 minutes so we can try to
get through the panel and get to some healthy questions.
Mr. Weber, you are recognized first.
STATEMENT OF HON. ANDREW C. WEBER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR NUCLEAR, CHEMICAL, AND BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE PROGRAMS,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Secretary Weber. Thank you. Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member
Cooper, and distinguished members of this subcommittee, thank
you for giving us the opportunity to discuss the 2015 budget
request for Department of Defense nuclear forces programs. It
is an honor to come before you with my Department of Defense
and Department of Energy colleagues to testify on our efforts
to modernize and sustain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear
weapons stockpile.
Guided by the Nuclear Weapons Council, our Departments have
made substantial progress over the last year. However, stark
budget realities continue to stress our efforts to update an
aging stockpile and infrastructure.
In January, I accompanied Secretary Hagel on his visits to
Kirtland and F.E. Warren Air Force Bases and Sandia National
Laboratories. We had the opportunity to speak with and learn
from our extraordinary airmen and laboratory personnel, whose
dedication and professionalism are an inspiration. While there,
Secretary Hagel emphasized to them that we are going to invest
in the modernization required to maintain an effective
deterrent.
Our most vital modernization efforts include the life
extension programs for the W76-1 submarine-launched ballistic
missile [SLBM] warhead and the B61-12 gravity bomb. The B61
life extension program [LEP], which the chairman referred to as
a bright note, is currently undergoing development engineering
and prototypes are being assembled for early testing. Due to
sequestration impacts, the schedule for first production has
been revised to the second quarter of 2020. This will just meet
U.S. Strategic Command and NATO [North Atlantic Treaty
Organization] operational requirements.
The B61-12 program will replace four current models with
one and enable the retirement of the B83, the last megaton bomb
in the stockpile.
Stable funding for the B61 life extension program is
critical to the viability of the B-2 strategic bomber and
commitments to our NATO allies. We thank you for your continued
strong support of this program.
The world is safer today from the threat of full-scale
nuclear war than it was during the Cold War. While the role and
numbers of weapons are being reduced, maintaining a safe,
secure, and effective nuclear stockpile is critical to
deterring potential adversaries and assuring U.S. allies and
partners. We ask for your support of the President's fiscal
year 2015 budget request.
Thank you for the opportunity you have given us to testify
today, and we look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Weber can be found in
the Appendix on page 41.]
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman.
Ms. Bunn, you are recognized for 3 minutes.
STATEMENT OF M. ELAINE BUNN, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR NUCLEAR AND MISSILE DEFENSE POLICY, U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF DEFENSE
Ms. Bunn. Thank you, Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member
Cooper, distinguished members of the subcommittee.
Thanks for the opportunity to testify on our nuclear
forces. I would like to address several issues that go beyond
my advance written statement.
Russia's unexpected and dangerous aggression in Ukraine, in
violation of international law, compels us to revisit our
expectations about future Russian behavior and to reassess a
number of U.S. and NATO policies with regard to Russia. But two
of our national interests are clear: First, strengthening
NATO's collective defense. As General Breedlove said, ``We are
going through a paradigm shift.'' NATO Secretary General
Rasmussen said at a recent ministerial, ``We are now
considering all options to enhance our collective defense,
including an update and further development of our defense
plans, enhanced exercises and also appropriate deployments,''
unquote.
Second, this administration, like its predecessors, has
sought a stable strategic nuclear relationship with Russia,
especially during times of turbulence elsewhere in the
relationship, so we will continue to implement the New START
Treaty ratified by the Senate in December 2010. We want to
continue to implement New START with Russia, because it is in
our national interest. The inspections and notifications under
the treaty give us a window into Russian strategic forces and
limits them for the duration of the treaty. And we will
continue to pursue our concerns about Russian compliance with
the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty.
As Chairman Rogers mentioned, today we announced the
strategic force structure that will bring us to the New START
limits by February 2018 and provided the congressional report
required under Section 1042. That report has details on this
decision, so I won't go into all the details now, but let me
just summarize that our 700 deployed strategic forces will look
like this: 400 deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles
[ICBMs], 240 deployed SLBMs, and 60 deployed nuclear-capable
heavy bombers. The 100 nondeployed strategic missile launchers
and bombers will consist of 54 ICBM launchers, including 50
warm ICBM silos--that is, empty but still functional--spread
across three bases; 40 SLBM launch tubes; and 6 bombers. We
will also convert 56 SLBM tubes to remove them from treaty
accountability and convert 30 B-52 bombers to conventional-only
role.
This force structure achieves right balance of flexibility,
survivability, responsiveness of our nuclear forces and
supports our national security objectives by providing a mix of
force capabilities and attributes to ensure the President has
an array of options available under a broad range of scenarios
and preserves a just-in-case upload capability for each leg of
the triad.
At present, Russia as well as the U.S. seems determined to
preserve the strategic nuclear stability embodied in the New
START Treaty.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for having me here today and,
again, thank you for the work you do to provide for the common
defense. Look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Bunn can be found in the
Appendix on page 51.]
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Ms. Bunn.
And without objection, the Section 1042 report that Ms.
Bunn referenced will be entered into the record. So ordered.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 147.]
Mr. Rogers. Admiral Benedict.
STATEMENT OF VADM TERRY J. BENEDICT, USN, DIRECTOR, STRATEGIC
SYSTEMS PROGRAMS, U.S. NAVY
Admiral Benedict. Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Cooper,
distinguished members, thank you for the opportunity to testify
today. I represent the men and women of the Navy's Strategic
Systems Programs.
My mission as the Director of Strategic Systems Programs
[SSP] is to design, develop, produce, support, and ensure the
safety and the security of our Navy's sea-based strategic
deterrent capability, the Trident II (D5) Strategic Weapons
System. My written statement, which I respectfully request to
be submitted for the record, addresses my top priorities. I
would like to talk to three this afternoon.
First, my top priority is the safety and the security of
the Navy's nuclear weapons. Custody and accountability of the
nuclear assets entrusted to the Navy are the cornerstone of
this program. Our approach to the nuclear weapons mission is to
maintain a culture of excellence and self-assessment that
produces the highest standards of performance and integrity.
Second, the Navy is proactively taking steps to address
aging and technology obsolescence. SSP is extending the life of
the Trident II (D5) Strategic Weapons System to match the Ohio-
class submarine service life and to serve as the initial
baseline mission payload for the Ohio replacement submarine
platform. This is being accomplished through a life extension
program to all the Trident II (D5) sub systems to include
launcher, navigation, fire control, guidance, missile, and
reentry.
Finally, I remain concerned with the decline in demand for
solid rocket motors. While the Navy is maintaining a continuous
production of solid rocket motors, the demand from both NASA
[National Aeronautics and Space Administration] and the Air
Force has declined. This has put an entire specialized industry
at risk. While the efforts of our industrial partners and
others have created short-term relief, the long-term support of
the solid rocket motor industry remains a national issue.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify today, and I will
be pleased to take your questions at the appropriate time, sir.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Benedict can be found in
the Appendix on page 65.]
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Admiral.
General Harencak, you are recognized for 3 minutes.
STATEMENT OF MAJ GEN GARRETT HARENCAK, USAF, ASSISTANT CHIEF OF
STAFF FOR STRATEGIC DETERRENCE AND NUCLEAR INTEGRATION, U.S.
AIR FORCE
General Harencak. Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Cooper,
distinguished committee members, thank you for your continued
support of our triad and of our Air Force. I appreciate the
opportunity to update the subcommittee today on Air Force
nuclear programs and policies. I respectfully request that my
written statement be entered into the record, and I look
forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Harencak can be found in
the Appendix on page 76.]
Mr. Rogers. Well done.
All right, birthday boy, Admiral Richardson.
Congratulations on another birthday. We won't make you tell us
how old you are, but--
Admiral Richardson. All right. Thank you, Chairman.
Mr. Rogers [continuing]. You are recognized for 3 minutes.
STATEMENT OF ADM JOHN M. RICHARDSON, USN, DIRECTOR, NAVAL
NUCLEAR PROPULSION PROGRAM, U.S. NAVY
Admiral Richardson. Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Cooper,
distinguished members of the committee, it is a privilege to
testify before you. I am grateful for the consistent and strong
support this subcommittee has given to Naval Reactors, and I
look forward to the discussion of our fiscal year 2015 budget.
My budget request this year enables me to meet my primary
responsibility to ensure safe and reliable operation of the
Nation's nuclear-powered fleet. My fiscal year 2015 request is
26 percent higher than my fiscal year 2014 appropriation. This
increase directly supports our increased workload, including
three discrete national priority projects and sustaining the
program's technical support base. The three projects include
designing a new reactor plant for the Ohio-class SSBN
replacement, refueling a research and training reactor in New
York, and replacing the spent fuel handling facility in Idaho.
The funding for my technical support base, about $950
million, is absolutely essential, providing for resolution of
emergent fleet issues, spent nuclear fuel management,
technology development, and operation of prototype research and
training reactors. It also provides my foundational
capabilities, such as security, environmental stewardship, and
laboratory facilities. In short, my technical base and my
laboratories is the intellectual engine that drives safe,
reliable, and responsible operation of the nuclear-powered
fleet, past, present, and future.
$156 million of my request funds a new reactor plant for
the Ohio-class replacement submarine. The new propulsion plant
includes a reactor core designed to last the entire lifetime of
that submarine, 42 years, without needing to be refueled, and
will save the Navy over $40 billion in life-cycle costs.
The request for refueling and overhaul of our land-based
prototype reactor, $126 million, is necessary to improving the
technologies for that life of the ship core as well as training
about 1,000 nuclear operators for the next 20 years.
The fiscal year 2015 request for the spent fuel handling
recapitalization project, $145 million, is required to refuel
aircraft carriers and submarines, providing a safe and
effective means of processing and putting their spent fuel into
dry storage. The existing expended core facility is close to 60
years old, is the oldest spent fuel pool of its type in the
country. This facility is showing its age, including leaking
water pool walls and cracked floors. And while operated safely
and responsibly, it is getting harder every year.
My fiscal year 2015 request is especially critical in light
of my fiscal year 2014 funding levels. As just one example, a
23 percent shortfall to my operations and infrastructure
requirements resulted in insufficient funds to do required
maintenance on one of my land-based prototypes, and without
relief, I will have no choice but to shut down that reactor,
resulting in 450 nuclear-trained operators not reporting to the
fleet, putting a greater burden on sailers and families that
are already sustaining 9- to 10-month deployments.
Mr. Chairman, with the sustained support of this
subcommittee to do our work, I will continue to lead my team to
execute our work on time and on budget, and will search
tirelessly for the safest and most cost-effective way to
support the Nation's nuclear-powered fleet. Thank you again. I
am ready to answer your questions.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Richardson can be found
in the Appendix on page 90.]
Mr. Rogers. I thank you.
Mr. Huizenga, you are recognized for 3 minutes.
STATEMENT OF DAVID G. HUIZENGA, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY,
OFFICE OF ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Mr. Huizenga. I am pushing that button. Is it on?
Mr. Rogers. There you go.
Mr. Huizenga. Oh, there we are. Good.
Good afternoon, Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Cooper, and
distinguished members of the subcommittee. I am pleased to be
here today to represent the Department of Energy's Office of
Environmental Management [EM] and to discuss the many positive
things the program has achieved and what we plan to accomplish
under the President's 2015 budget request.
Our request of $5.3 billion for defense-related activities
will allow the Environmental Management program to continue the
safe cleanup of the environmental legacy brought about from
five decades of nuclear weapons development and government-
sponsored nuclear energy research. The request includes $4.865
billion for defense cleanup activities and $463 million for the
defense contribution to the uranium enrichment decontamination
and decommissioning fund should Congress choose to reauthorize
the fund.
EM continues to pursue its cleanup objectives, guided by
three overarching principles. Most importantly, we will
continue to discharge our responsibilities by conducting
cleanup within a safety-first culture that integrates
environmental, safety, and health requirements and controls
into all of our work activities.
After safety, we are guided by a commitment to comply with
our regulatory and legal obligations and, finally, to be good
stewards of the financial and natural resources entrusted to
us.
This marks the 25th anniversary of the Environmental
Management program, and we have achieved a great deal in that
time. When we were created in 1989, we were charged with
cleaning up 107 sites across the country with a total area
equal to Rhode Island and Delaware combined. In the 25 years
since EM has been working on these projects, we have completed
91 of the 107 sites and have made significant progress on the
remaining 16.
The President's fiscal year 2015 budget request will allow
us to continue to make significant progress on our ongoing
cleanup mission. To provide just a few specific highlights,
with the requested funds, we will complete the treatment of
900,000 gallons of liquid radioactive waste at Idaho, emptying
the last four of the site's aging waste storage tanks. We will
continue construction of the waste treatment and mobilization
plant at Hanford to process and immobilize liquid waste into
solid-glass logs for permanent disposal. We will also continue
to clean up the bulk of the more than 500 facilities along the
Columbia River at Hanford.
And at Tennessee, we will complete the preliminary design
for an outfall for our mercury treatment facility, while
continuing to develop the technologies needed to characterize
and remediate mercury in the environment. And finally, at
Savannah River Site in South Carolina, we will immobilize and
dispose of a million gallons of high-level waste, bringing the
site's high-level waste mission to approximately 50 percent
completion.
In closing, I am honored to be here today representing the
Office of Environmental Management. EM is committed to
achieving our mission and will continue to apply innovative
cleanup strategies to complete the work safely, on schedule,
and within cost, thereby demonstrating a value to the American
taxpayers. We made significant progress in the last quarter
century, and our 2015 request will allow us to capitalize on
past investments and successes.
Thank you, and I will be happy to take questions in turn.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Huizenga can be found in the
Appendix on page 95.]
Mr. Rogers. And I thank the gentleman.
The chair now recognizes Dr. Winokur for 3 minutes.
STATEMENT OF DR. PETER S. WINOKUR, CHAIRMAN, DEFENSE NUCLEAR
FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD
Dr. Winokur. Thank you, Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member
Cooper, and members of the subcommittee. I am the chairman of
the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, known as the
DNFSB, or Board. We are the only agency that provides
independent safety oversight of DOE's defense nuclear
facilities. I have submitted a written statement for the record
that describes the Board's mission and highlights a number of
safety issues that are particularly important to ensuring that
the DOE defense nuclear complex can safely accomplish its
missions.
The Board's budget is essentially devoted to maintaining
and supporting an expert staff of engineers and scientists,
nearly all of whom have technical master's degrees or
doctorates, to accomplish our highly specialized work.
The President's budget request for fiscal year 2015
includes $30.15 million in new budget authority for the Board.
It will support 125 personnel. This level of staffing is needed
to provide sufficient independent safety oversight of DOE's
defense nuclear complex, given the pace and the scope of DOE's
activities.
The Board provides safety oversight of the multitude of
operations critical to national defense. These operations
include assembly and disassembly of nuclear weapons,
fabrication of plutonium pits and weapon components, production
and recycling of tritium, criticality experiments, subcritical
experiments, and a host of activities to address the
radioactive legacy resulting from 70 years of nuclear weapons
operations.
While the Board supports DOE and NNSA efforts to integrate
safety into the design of new defense nuclear facilities,
continued delays regarding the path forward for modernizing
uranium and plutonium capabilities in a weapons complex
requires the Board to provide safety oversight of ongoing work
in existing aging facilities that do not meet modern safety
standards.
In February, the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant experienced an
underground fire and release of radioactive material. The board
is reviewing available information to assess the causal
factors, emergency response, recovery activities, and
corrective actions for both of these events. Fortunately, no
one was seriously hurt in either event. These were near misses.
The fire and radioactive material release events will serve
as vivid reminders that accidents do happen and that they can
have major safety consequences and mission impacts.
The Board continues to stress the importance of emergency
preparedness, response, and recovery, and addresses this topic
at each of its public hearings.
Let me add in closing that the Board and DOE together have
built a constructive working relationship. Many of the safety
concerns raised by the Board or our staff are addressed without
the need for formal communications to DOE. I am confident that
all Board members understand that an efficient, effective, and
safe nuclear security enterprise is the highest priority and
the needs of the Nation must come first.
This concludes my statement. I will be happy to answer any
questions you may have.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Winokur can be found in the
Appendix on page 106.]
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, sir.
The chair now recognizes Mr. Held for 3 minutes.
STATEMENT OF EDWARD BRUCE HELD, ACTING ADMINISTRATOR AND ACTING
UNDER SECRETARY FOR NUCLEAR SECURITY, NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION
Mr. Held. Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Cooper, members
of the committee, I am honored to be with you today.
The fiscal year 2015 budget request for the National
Nuclear Security Administration is a clear expression of
President Obama's commitment to America's nuclear security.
Within the fiscal constraints of the Bipartisan Budget Act, the
President requests a 4 percent increase for NNSA to $11.7
billion. This includes a 26 percent increase for naval nuclear
reactors and a 7 percent increase for nuclear weapons
activities.
NNSA has performance challenges ahead of us, and Secretary
Moniz will always be straightforward with you about those
challenges. At the same time, NNSA has significant successes to
build on, and the Secretary insists that we get out of our
defensive crouch and honestly tell our success stories in a way
that is meaningful to the American people.
Regarding nuclear security, for example, our
counterintelligence program was dysfunctional less than 10
years ago. Today, DOE counterintelligence is highly effective,
respected, and trusted. Less than 10 months ago, NNSA
communications with our colleagues on the Nuclear Weapons
Council [NWC] were strained. Today those communications are
healthy, more transparent, and this improved atmosphere is
helping us focus on the big strategic issues for which the NWC
exists.
On nonproliferation, in just the last 4 years, 11 countries
plus Taiwan have eliminated their caches of sensitive nuclear
materials and security has been hardened at scores of nuclear
storage facilities worldwide to prevent theft by potential
terrorists. The world is a safer place as a result.
On project management, NNSA has been on the GAO [Government
Accountability Office] High Risk List literally since the day
it was born in March 2000. Since February 2011, however, we
have consistently been on schedule and on budget for large
projects up to $750 million. As a result, GAO has taken NNSA
off its High Risk List for projects of this size for the first
time in the organization's history.
As you know very well, we still have issues with the
multibillion dollar mega projects, but thanks to the greater
discipline and more agile strategy that Secretary Moniz has
brought with him, we are making progress on those projects as
well.
That leads me to our first and foremost responsibility:
nuclear safety. For nuclear safety reasons, we simply must
modernize the aging infrastructure for enriched uranium
processing in Oak Ridge; we must modernize the aging
infrastructure for plutonium processing in Los Alamos; and
wherever we can reliably do so, we should replace conventional
high explosives in our nuclear stockpile with safer,
insensitive high explosives.
And if we take a commonsense approach that emphasizes
better sooner rather than perfect later, all of these are
doable within reasonable cost. But if, heaven forbid, we have a
nuclear safety accident because we have not done so, then, Mr.
Chairman, NNSA will truly have failed and we will forever
forfeit the trust and confidence of the American people for all
things nuclear.
Thank you, sir.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Held can be found in the
Appendix on page 133.]
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman.
I thank the panel. Well done on the time.
I am pretty impressed that you all were able to stay within
that 3 minutes.
Mr. Held, I know that you have done a great service for
this country by coming in on an interim basis at the NNSA.
Mr. Held. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Rogers. It looks like, hopefully, we are going to get
you relief pretty soon. The ranking member and I sent a letter
over to the Senate asking them to please take up the
confirmation of our nominee.
Mr. Held. Thanks. That letter, I think, hits this
afternoon.
Mr. Rogers. That is right. So it looks like the cavalry is
on the way to help you out, but I wanted it entered into the
record.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 153.]
Mr. Rogers. But with that, I do want to make reference to
another letter. Mr. Held, Chairman McKeon and I sent a letter
to Secretary Moniz, which I will introduce in a minute, but to
Secretary Moniz in March expressing our deep concern that DOE
and NNSA had let another multimillion dollar facility
construction project spin out of control, which you made
reference in your opening statement.
We strongly support the need to replace the decrepit
uranium facilities at Y-12, but it seems like NNSA and DOE has
once again failed the Nation on this large contract. We have
already spent over $1.2 billion on the design for this big-box
uranium processing facility, and the NNSA is studying
alternatives for that design. It seems like the big-box will
never be built. So quite a bit of this $1.2 billion is gone
with nothing to show for it.
I understand that your red team will propose an alternative
approach a week from today. And I will introduce the letter
that we sent to Secretary Moniz for the record.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 154.]
Mr. Rogers. My question is, who within the DOE, NNSA, and
its contractors is being held accountable for this massive
failure?
Mr. Held. Sir, as you know, that has been a major problem.
The big-box strategy has not worked for us. We are finding that
the better sooner rather than perfect later is the way to go.
That seems to be working effectively, shows great promise in
the plutonium reprocessing facilities up at Los Alamos, and
that is the reason why we are doing this, taking the same
approach down at Oak Ridge with uranium.
The big-box approach that we were on, thanks to the CAPE
[Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation] study, was really
looking, it was going to--it would not be--we would not get
into a new facility until the year 2038, which is close to 100
years after the original building at 9212 was constructed and
well after most people who are today working at Oak Ridge would
be long retired. So we have got to do better than that, and
that is the reason that I have asked Thom Mason, the director
of Oak Ridge National Laboratory, to lead the red team from
across the complex to take a look at this issue and to get us a
better solution by the year 2025 within the budget constraints.
In terms of accountability, I think you have seen that we
have changed the--we have selected a new management and
operating [M&O] contractor down at Oak Ridge. We will be
driving that contract to performance excellence. Bob Raines, at
our Acquisition and Project Management, will be doing that. And
you have also seen, I believe, that the Federal site office
manager has been replaced over the past year.
Mr. Rogers. You are talking about the program manager?
Mr. Held. On that, on the Federal site office manager, we
brought in a new Federal project manager, John Eschenberg.
Mr. Rogers. What happened to the project manager who was
overseeing this when it went off the track?
Mr. Held. They are gone now at this point.
Mr. Rogers. Are they still employed with the government, or
are they fired?
Mr. Held. I believe they retired. I can take that and check
that out for you, the factual. We brought in John Eschenberg
specifically to take a look at that project.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 159.]
Mr. Rogers. Did he have sole responsibility for this
project when it went off the rail?
Mr. Held. John? No. John has been brought in since that
time. And John does--he is the Federal project manager----
Mr. Rogers. But $1.2 billion. Anybody else lose their job
over this?
Mr. Held. The previous project manager and the previous
site office manager are no longer with us, yes, sir.
Mr. Rogers. Does that mean they are retired or terminated
or just relocated?
Mr. Held. I believe they both retired, sir.
Mr. Rogers. Okay. Let me ask this: Do you have any idea as
yet how much we are going to be able to use of the engineering
that came from that $1.2 billion in whatever we do and how much
is just gone?
Mr. Held. Some of it is just gone. We need to be frank and
honest about that, some. The M&O contractor who was designing
it made some mistakes. Some of that is gone.
The effort underway by Dr. Mason is one of the elements of
the charter letter, the charge letter that I sent to him is to
use as much of the existing design and to profit from as much
of the U.S. taxpayer investment as possible as we look for a
smarter and faster way to proceed.
Mr. Rogers. Yeah. What percentage would you estimate that
we have just lost, 25 percent, 50 percent of the engineering
that we paid for?
Mr. Held. I would have to get a specific--I will take the
question and get a specific number for you, but I would guess
it is probably close to half of it.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 159.]
Mr. Rogers. That is awful. Will you also provide to the
Congress an updated detailed project description and project
data sheet for the uranium facility within 2 weeks, because the
fiscal year 2015 budget request materials are asking us to
authorize and appropriate $335 million to continue design
activities for a big-box facility that is almost certainly
never going to get built?
Mr. Held. The--it is--we will get Dr. Mason's report a week
from today. I think it unlikely that we will have a big-box
strategy. I think it unlikely that he will recommend a big-box
strategy. And we would be using that money to effectively
implement a more cost-effective and more quicker approach. We
really need to get out of Building 9212 by the year 2025 at the
very latest.
Mr. Rogers. When he gets that to you, will you get us to
us, please?
Mr. Held. We will get it very promptly to you, sir.
Mr. Rogers. Great. Thanks.
[The information referred to is For Official Use Only and
retained in the committee files.]
Mr. Rogers. Mr. Weber, in the fiscal year 2014 budget
cycle, the DOD's CAPE office proposed a large set of
efficiencies at NNSA that would help NNSA put more money
directly toward military priorities, particularly the warhead
life extension program. The Nuclear Weapons Council, including
acting NNSA Administrator Miller agreed to this multiyear,
multibillion dollar set of efficiencies. As executive director
of this council, did you review those proposed efficiencies,
and did you support them in the fiscal year 2014 budget and
out-years?
Secretary Weber. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
The Nuclear Weapons Council in its certification of the
fiscal year 2014 budget submission had reviewed those
efficiencies, which were baked into the--to the budget request
in fiscal year 2014. I believe it was about $340 million.
It is not a one-time act. This is a continuous process
improvement, and our CAPE office is available on a continuing
basis to support NNSA in its efforts to drive even more
efficiencies.
Mr. Rogers. Okay. Last week in my office, you told me that
the DOD report that has details on these proposed efficiencies,
that you have it with you today. Do you have that?
Secretary Weber. No, Mr. Chairman. We will have that for
you. And I have spoken to Acting Administrator Bruce Held about
this. We will have that for you, the full report that is due to
you, and I apologize that it is tardy, by the end of this
month.
Mr. Rogers. Okay. And do you know offhand how much--where
those efficiencies were for fiscal year 2014?
Secretary Weber. I believe the number was $340 million, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. Rogers. And how about 2015?
Secretary Weber. It was over the Future Years Nuclear
Security Program [FYNSP] of the 5-year plan.
Mr. Rogers. Okay. With that, I yield back, and I recognize
the ranking member for any questions he may have.
Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I thank the witnesses for being here. I can't imagine a
heavier responsibility on this Earth than being in charge of
the entire nuclear weapons enterprise for the United States, so
I trust that you gentlemen and ladies will do your jobs to keep
them safe, secure, and reliable.
Ms. Bunn, you mentioned the New START 1042 document, and it
is my understanding that that is solidly supported by the Joint
Chiefs of Staff. Is that correct?
Ms. Bunn. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cooper. I think it is important to get that on the
record so the American people know this isn't just some
Pentagon document, this is a consensus of the Joint Chiefs.
Dr. Winokur, if you could tell me what lessons, if any, we
should learn from the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant [WIPP]
disaster or near disaster that happened in February.
Dr. Winokur. Well, Mr. Cooper, I think there are several
lessons we can learn from it. If we go back to the immediate
cause of the accident, the proximate cause, there was obviously
a shortfall in preventative maintenance. What happened was a
salt truck caught on fire, so that was certainly an issue that
we have to deal with.
I think that there were issues with emergency response and
preparedness that need to be addressed. It is something that
the Board has a great deal of interest in.
And there were obviously mistakes made during the response
of the fire and during the response of the contamination
events. That is a lesson we should take away from it.
I think that what we saw, once again, were weaknesses in
the contractor assurance system and the Federal oversight, and
those are also areas that we are going to have to strengthen,
or I think the Department of Energy needs to strengthen over
time.
I think the last I think thing I take away from it, and I
said it in my spoken statement, is that accidents happen, and
we need to be prepared for them. It isn't just Fukushima; these
aren't just chance occurrences. There are a lot of low-
probability, high-consequence accidents the Department and NNSA
need to be willing and able to deal with.
Those are the things I would immediately take from it.
Mr. Cooper. Is there a timetable for that facility to
reopen?
Dr. Winokur. That would be--excuse me--a better question
for Mr. Huizenga.
Mr. Cooper. Mr. Huizenga.
Mr. Huizenga. We have sent teams down into the mine twice
now into--through the air intake shaft and the salt handling
shaft, and we have established in a sense a clean area down in
the mine from which a base of operations. Within the next week
or two, we will proceed to the waste space and try to
understand exactly what happened. And really I won't be able to
give you a clear sense of timing until we actually get to the
waste space and understand better what actually occurred.
Mr. Cooper. Are we weeks away, months away?
Mr. Huizenga. We are probably, you know, within a couple
weeks of actually getting to the waste space, that would be my
guess, and at that point, we will--we are already--in
anticipation of what we might find, we have been working with
the chairman, Winokur, and his staff to understand, you know,
how to make sure that we proceed safely as we traverse the
probably thousand feet or so from our entry point over to the
waste space and what we might indeed have to do once we get
there to ultimately clean up the contamination and get back in
business, but we are committed to do so and committed to do so
in a safe manner.
Mr. Cooper. Admiral Richardson, you mentioned the 26
percent increase for Navy nuclear. I think it is very important
that people understand that in a time of tight budgets, it is
not just automatic pilot, everybody frozen, but certain
priorities need to be funded and processed. So I hope that we
will be able to take into account needs wherever they arise,
whether it is a Navy nuclear, whatever, because we can't just
have a one-size-fits-all approach here.
Admiral Richardson. Thank you, sir. And as I said in my
opening statement, that increase does directly address those
national strategic priorities, and we are committed to doing
that in the most cost-effective but safe manner, safe and
reliable manner as we go forward.
Mr. Cooper. Mr. Held, we have a long way to go. I know it
is progress for NNSA to be off the High Risk List, but still
there are many, many other issues. I was interested in that
small bit of bright news: Eleven nations have curtailed their
nonproliferation risk of complete disposal of risky materials.
Could you elaborate on that?
Mr. Held. Eleven nations plus Taiwan have completely
eliminated their special nuclear materials. They have no more
special nuclear materials. The world is a much safer place as a
result of that.
Mr. Cooper. What percentage of the total problem is 11
nations plus Taiwan?
Mr. Held. I would need to take that for the record. Anne
Harrington is here and might be able to provide more detail. I
would not say that totally solves the whole problem, though.
There--I would say that in the last 4 years, we have done an
awful lot. There is an awful lot to do ahead of us, and our
budget request for $1.6 billion is an awful lot of taxpayer
money to do it with. We are looking for ways. As you say, you
can't have a one-size-fits-all approach. You go from the NNSA
budget, 26 percent increase for Admiral Richardson's budget to
a 20 percent decrease on the nuclear proliferation side for
Anne Harrington's budget. So that is, I think, indicative of
some deep thought in what we were doing.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 159.]
Mr. Held. We are taking a moment to step back and look at
the synergies that we can find between nonproliferation and the
weapons program, nonproliferation and civil nuclear energy
programs.
Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman.
The chair now recognizes Mr. Brooks of Alabama for 5
minutes.
Mr. Brooks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Harencak, when does our current force of Minuteman
III ICBMs start aging out?
General Harencak. Sir, we are tasked with the United States
Air Force to maintain the Minuteman IIIs to 2030. Their ability
to reach that will require certain improvements and
modernization. So the answer to that question is we will
maintain into 2030. They will be safe, secure, and effective to
then, but in order to get us there, we are going to have to
make some--going to have to make some choices as to what we
would modernize, what we would replace.
Mr. Brooks. What life extension programs are currently
underway for these ICBMs in order to maximize their life
expectancy?
General Harencak. We are looking at upgrades, sir, for the
propulsion. We are looking at upgrades in batteries, we are
also working on an improvement program for the guidance
systems. And, of course, we are about to complete the analysis
of alternatives [AOA] on a follow-on ground-based strategic
deterrent.
Mr. Brooks. And do we have any plans or programs in place
to replace the Minuteman III ICBM force as we reach their
expected lifetime?
General Harencak. Sir, right now, we are focused on
sustaining it to 2030, but as I said, we are beginning the
process to look at a potential follow-on, which is what the AOA
for the ground-based strategic deterrent will do.
Mr. Brooks. Do you have a judgment as to when the decision
should be made for a replacement program, given that there is a
lead time for the decision being made, the research and
development being done, the manufacturing being done, and us
actually having a replacement that we can put in?
General Harencak. I believe, sir, the plan would be that we
would be making those decisions in the early 2020s.
Mr. Brooks. Thank you.
And Admiral Benedict and General Harencak again, how do we
support the industrial base for ICBM and submarine-launched
ballistic missiles, particularly in solid rocket motors?
Admiral Benedict. Yes, sir. So we currently have a very
collaborative program working right now between the United
States Navy and the United States Air Force. We have identified
eight different technology areas that we are exchanging data,
solid rocket motors being one of those eight, and we are
working very closely with industry. If we can't use the exact
same propellent, then our next mode of investigation is to find
common constituents which can be mixed to a different
formulation, which would address both Navy and Air Force needs.
That is ongoing effort, sir.
Mr. Brooks. General, do you have anything to add in that
regard?
General Harencak. Yes, sir. And the United States Air Force
and United States Navy has embarked on a deep set of
cooperation initiatives where we are going to be able to
leverage both of our buys, if you will, whether they be in raw
materials or completed components that I think will certainly
provide some efficiencies but also help our industrial base.
Mr. Brooks. This subcommittee has been informed that there
is a low-rate production program in place for the D5 submarine-
launched ballistic missile program. Is a similar program in
place for a Minuteman III and do we need low-rate production
for the ICBM to sustain the industrial base or provide
capabilities to the Air Force?
General Harencak. Sir, the first--the answer is no;
however, it is--we are definitely investigating it, and we will
be able to make a more reasoned judgment on that as we get the
AOA and as we start to make decisions on global--on the ground-
based strategic deterrent.
Mr. Brooks. Why not? You said, ``No,'' but my follow-up is,
why not?
General Harencak. Again, sir, we are not--we are looking at
how we are going to sustain this. We are also looking at the
analysis of alternatives, which has not come back yet. It will
come this summer. We will certainly be investigating should we
begin a formal program for that, but we have not yet.
Mr. Brooks. Admiral Benedict, do you have anything to add?
Admiral Benedict. Sir, we are currently maintaining a low-
rate motor production program in support of the D5. Today the
United States Navy is the only program that has strategic
propulsion in production. I am maintaining a warm line at 12
rocket motors per year, which is the minimum sustaining safe
rate for solid rocket motor production of a size and type to
support the United States Navy.
Mr. Brooks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I yield back.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman.
The chair now recognizes Mr. Langevin for 5 minutes.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank our panel for your testimony here today and
the work you do on behalf of protecting the country.
My first question will go to Ms. Bunn. So did--or Secretary
Weber could also comment--but did opting not to do an
environmental assessment of ICBM silos, as DOD had initially
planned to do and as the Air Force General Counsel had
concluded could be done, still enable the Secretary of Defense
to provide all possible options to the President to make a
determination on optimal nuclear force structure?
Ms. Bunn. Congressman Langevin, there was a lot of
information gathered over 2 years time. We would have liked to
have had further information through an environmental
assessment [EA] to have even more information, but the decision
that was made was a good one that was supported by the
Department of Defense broadly.
Mr. Langevin. And to Admiral Benedict, in your military
opinion, does reducing sub tubes as opposed to reducing silos
provide the most survivable and stable deterrent?
Admiral Benedict. Yes, sir. As Secretary Bunn said, we have
participated extensively in the various analysis on force
structure. I believe, in my professional opinion, that the
decision is very much in concert with the course that has been
set as we move towards the Ohio replacement program of 12
submarines with 16 tubes. So the deactivation of four tubes on
Ohio is very consistent with the long-range decision that has
already been made by the Secretary of Defense and the
administration.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you.
To the panel, given the concerns about Russian compliance
with its arms control treaty obligations, should we stop U.S.
nuclear reductions or any potential negotiations for further
nuclear weapons reductions, and how does this impact the need
for verification?
Ms. Bunn. Congressman, we are pursuing the troublesome
concerns we have about the INF treaty, Russian compliance with
that, but that said, they are now abiding by New START
provisions, and we see it as in our national interests to have
the window on their--on what--their force structure and where
they are headed through the inspections and verification
measures. So we see it as in our interests to continue with the
New START Treaty, as I said in my opening statement. Especially
in times of turbulence elsewhere in the relationship, we want
to keep that strategic nuclear relationship as stable as you
can. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you. Well, I would tend to agree, but I
thought it was important to get the question out there, and I
appreciate your answer.
So, for Mr. Held, and I understand Ms. Harrington is
available to answer questions as well, but I have to say, I am
very concerned about the downward funding trend for key
nonproliferation programs, and this includes the Global Threat
Reduction Initiative [GTRI], which was reduced by 25 percent
since last year and nearly 30 percent since fiscal year 2013,
and defense--nuclear nonproliferation research and development
[R&D], which was reduced by 10 percent since fiscal year 2014
and 14 percent since fiscal year 2013, due to the, and I quote,
the need to fund higher NNSA priorities within the broader
security--during the broader budget austerity, according to the
budget documents. Meanwhile the projections for the--in the
fiscal year 2012 budget plan for steady increases.
Now, while President Obama identified the prevention of
nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism as the top priority
identified in the Nuclear Posture Review and the nuclear
employment guidance issue last year and was the focus of the
latest nuclear security summit. So my question is, what were
these high priorities? Why doesn't NNSA funding priorities
match up to the President's priorities? And which would you
have accomplished if R&D and GTRI had not been cut?
Mr. Held. Sir, we are concerned as well for the reductions.
The pain was--painful decisions had to be made within the caps
of the Bipartisan Budget Act, and I think the broad spread of
the increases and decreases is reflective of very serious
consideration and balances of what we were trying to achieve.
Over half of the reduction on the nonproliferation account is
in the--is related to the MOX [mixed oxide] project in South
Carolina, where cost overruns have presented us with a very
difficult good government problem on how to proceed.
In these other areas, however, some of the reductions are
as a result of programs coming to a natural end at the end of
the 4-year surge that the President announced in Prague 4 years
ago. Some of them are admittedly painful. They are very
valuable programs, and we need to protect them.
As I said previously, though, $1.6 billion remains an awful
lot of taxpayer money to spend on these issues, and we are
looking for ways of driving synergies with other areas of the
program to maximize the return to the taxpayer on these things.
Mr. Langevin. I appreciate your answer. My time has
expired. I would just say that the threats are not decreasing,
clearly. I don't believe that NNSA priorities square with what
President Obama has identified when he talks about prevention
of nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism as a top
priority. I am concerned that what I am seeing in this NNSA
budget doesn't reflect that concern.
So thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman.
The chair now recognizes the gentleman from South Carolina,
Mr. Wilson, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to thank each of you for being here today. I
appreciate your service. I have a special appreciation. I am an
alumnus of the Department of Energy myself, and so I want to
wish you well.
And I do share the concerns of Mr. Langevin, particularly
about nonproliferation. I am very concerned. And Mr. Held in
particular, the administration's decision to place the Savannah
River Site mixed oxide fuel fabrication facility, MOX, which
transforms weapons-grade plutonium into green fuel; by placing
this into cold standby, I believe it interrupts the
environmental cleanup missions and disrupts the
nonproliferation efforts.
Last week you and Representative Marcy Kaptur from Ohio
discussed the issue. Representative Kaptur cited a report from
a January 16th paper published by former Russian negotiators of
the initial U.S.-Russia plutonium disposition agreement back in
the year 2000. As Representative Kaptur pointed out, the paper
cited that if the Americans strayed from the current agreement
regarding MOX, the Russians would have the ability to consider
enrichment of their plutonium and would not place a priority on
international monitors.
As a concerned member of this committee, I believe we
should have assurance from Russia that they will not seek this
path before we even consider placing MOX into cold standby.
Going back to the hearings last week, Secretary Moniz told
Representative Mike Simpson that the Department was considering
four alternatives to MOX. However, he noted, that only two were
less expensive than MOX. It is my understanding that these
alternatives would require in addition to--in addition to
renegotiations with the Russians, a change in the Nuclear Waste
Policy Act for the State of New Mexico to receive the material.
Have you reviewed this plutonium placement in New Mexico
with the State of New Mexico and its delegation? What is the
opinion of the leadership of New Mexico?
Mr. Held. Thank you, sir. First, the world will be a much
safer place if both the United States and Russia dispose of 34
metric tons of weapons-grade uranium. Very simply, the world
will be a safer place, and the Secretary is committed to that
mission. In terms of the agreement with the Russians, the
original agreement in 2000 had us actually both committed to
pretty much the use of the MOX technology to get rid of the--to
dispose of the plutonium. At Russian request, we revised the
agreement in 2010 to allow them to use a fast reactor rather
than the MOX approach. So there is a precedent for revising the
agreement should we have a need to do so. And we have not had
formal discussions with the Russians on this matter, but we
have had informal discussions, before the Crimea incident, I
must say. And there was an indication, a businesslike
indication that they would be prepared to talk about these
things if a need arose to do so. So it really comes down onto
the question of--a good government question of how do we do
this? What is the best way?
And the GAO issued a very good report recently on MOX that
really kind of made--pointed out the serious mistake was made
in 2007, when we rushed to construction before we had a design.
That was not a smart thing to do. And we support GAO's call for
a really deep look in why we made that decision. So the
question is how do we best address this mission focus? We have
sunk $5 billion into the MOX project already. The assessment is
that we have got $25 billion more to go in full life-cycle
costs. So the good government decision, is there a way to
achieve this mission that costs less than $25 billion?
John MacWilliams, who is a former investment banker that
Secretary Moniz brought in, has done very, very thorough and
very clear-eyed look at this. And we do believe that there are
options that are significantly cheaper. I think we owe it to
the committee to get you that report as soon as we possibly can
so that we can all together make a very good government
decision. One of the options could still be the MOX project,
though, if we can work with the M&O contractor and drive down
the price of actually making. The real question is, what is the
smartest way that is cheaper than $25 billion?
Mr. Wilson. Well, I would tell you that indeed the facility
is 62 percent completed. I believe--and not to be critical,
NNSA, the contractor, you should be working together, because
this can be done. The alternative is truly putting our country
at risk, I believe, in having weapons-grade plutonium either in
South Carolina or in New Mexico. And it just doesn't need to be
done. And I truly hope you will look at the numbers. Because
additional facts have come out that, indeed, yes, life-cycle,
the whole facility, but the result of creating fuel offsets
truly so much of the cost. And again, this is not to be
adversarial. I want to work with you. Thank you very much.
Mr. Held. This is really a good government decision. So we
appreciate that. It is a really hard decision, and we really
owe it to you to get you that report so we can actually have
this conversation in a clear way.
Mr. Wilson. Well, nuclear cleanup is just so important. So,
please, thank you.
Mr. Held. Yes, sir.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman. His time has expired.
The chair now recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr.
Garamendi, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I am going to continue on this discussion about the MOX
facility.
Mr. Held, you mentioned Russia wants to consider a fast
reactor. Could you talk about that more? Do you have more
information about the type of reactor they are talking of
using?
Mr. Held. That is probably, sir--I am a retired CIA
[Central Intelligence Agency] operations officer, used to being
in dark alleys more than on highly technical things. So I can
get you an answer, a very detailed technical answer.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 159.]
Mr. Garamendi. My understanding is they are interested in
the PRISM reactor, and Mr. Belikov has recently met to discuss
that issue. That is not a CIA issue, but that is an open source
issue.
Mr. Held. That is my understanding, sir, but the technical
aspects of that are probably beyond my competency.
Mr. Garamendi. This is your wheelhouse. This is your issue.
Mr. Held. Yes, sir.
Mr. Garamendi. I am not interested in hearing you say you
don't have the technical expertise to discuss this matter,
because you are one of the primary decisionmakers, are you not?
Mr. Held. Yes, sir, I am the acting administrator, and I am
proud of it, sir.
Mr. Garamendi. When will you acquire the technical
expertise on this matter?
Mr. Held. The NNSA has that technical expertise today, sir.
Mr. Garamendi. Apparently, they didn't bother to brief the
acting administrator. Enough said. Let's move on.
Mr. Held. Okay, sir.
Mr. Garamendi. Do the pits and secondaries that we hold in
reserve, are they part of the hedge for our nuclear deterrent,
Mr. Held?
Mr. Held. One of the main reasons, sir, that we are moving
to interoperable warheads is so that we can actually reduce the
size of the hedge. The 3+2 strategy allows us to maintain a
safe, secure, and reliable deterrent based on a smaller
deterrent.
Mr. Garamendi. I know all that. My question goes directly
to the pits and secondaries.
Mr. Held. And that goes to the design of the pits and
secondaries.
Mr. Garamendi. Are they part of the hedge?
Mr. Held. Yes, sir, in terms of they are part of the
interoperable warheads.
Mr. Garamendi. And I would appreciate a detailed, detailed
reply to my question concerning Russia's apparent interest in
the PRISM reactor.
Mr. Held. They are--yes, sir, we will get you that. They,
based on the 2010 agreement, they are pursuing the fast
reactor.
Mr. Garamendi. The other question has to do in your
testimony, you talked about four different proposals that are
being investigated by NNSA.
Mr. Held. Yes, sir.
Mr. Garamendi. But the disposition, the MOX, the one you
said, reactors, and a nonreactor approach. What is the
nonreactor approach that you are looking at?
Mr. Held. The nonreactor approach would be dilution and
then storage in a geographic repository.
Mr. Garamendi. Very good. I would appreciate more detail on
all four of those proposals that you are looking at.
Mr. Held. I think the--report will get you that.
Mr. Garamendi. What is the timeframe for that report?
Mr. Held. We are hoping to get it out next week, sir.
Mr. Garamendi. I am sorry, when?
Mr. Held. We are hoping to get it out next week.
Mr. Garamendi. Good. I will await that.
My next question goes to Ms. Bunn. Is the DOD planning to
reevaluate the number of B61s that would have to undergo life
extension? And was that analysis--what was the analysis that
determined the number of B61s required?
Ms. Bunn. Sir, I don't know of any reevaluation going on. I
would defer to my colleague, who is the executive director----
Mr. Garamendi. Then let's refer to Mr. Weber.
Secretary Weber. The B61 mod 12 will be used both for the
dual-capable aircraft in Europe in support of our NATO
commitments, as well as on the B-2 strategic bomber. So as we
go into production in early 2020, the total quantity of
production is something that will be determined in----
Mr. Garamendi. The current budget for the B61 life
extension----
Secretary Weber. Yes.
Mr. Garamendi [continuing]. Presumably is based upon some
number of B61 bombs that will be extended. Is that true?
Secretary Weber. Yes. It is based on the current
requirements, which are a combination of the Strategic Command
requirement and the requirement for Europe. But that doesn't
mean that it wouldn't be reviewed between now and the start of
production in 2020.
Mr. Garamendi. So sometime between now and 2020, which is
what, 6 years, 7 years from now, you will have an analysis
about how many we are actually going to rebuild?
Secretary Weber. Yes.
Mr. Garamendi. That is particularly unuseful. Excuse me.
You have a plan today to rebuild a certain number of bombs
which, as I understand, is a classified number.
Secretary Weber. The stockpile management plan, which has
those numbers, and the Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Memorandum
[NWSM], which has those numbers, have been provided to
Congress. But they are certainly subject to change as our
nuclear posture evolves.
Mr. Garamendi. So we are headed down a path of rebuilding
B61 bombs at a certain pace, certain number, based upon an
analysis that was done when?
Secretary Weber. It is a current analysis, but it is
subject to review on an annual basis.
Mr. Garamendi. So it is not 2020 that we will have the next
review. It will be annually.
Secretary Weber. Yes.
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I am out of time. I
yield back.
Mr. Rogers. The gentleman's time has expired.
The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Colorado, Mr.
Lamborn, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I also thank the gentleman from Arizona for yielding.
Ms. Bunn, last week the New York Times reported in an
interview that General Breedlove, commander of European Command
and NATO Supreme Allied Commander, described Russia's
development of a cruise missile with a range prohibited by the
Intermediate Nuclear Forces [INF] Treaty as a, quote,
``militarily significant development,'' unquote. He elaborated,
``A weapons capability that violates the INF that is introduced
into the greater European land mass is absolutely a tool that
will have to be dealt with. It can't go unanswered.'' So our
general responsible for prosecuting any potential conflict in
Europe is saying this changes the military calculus. Has your
office, OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense] Policy,
provided guidance to General Breedlove on this apparent
violation of INF on how to adjust defense postures, what to say
to NATO allies, and what the policy implications there are for
further arms control with Russia?
Ms. Bunn. Congressman Lamborn, the U.S. and NATO are
reviewing a lot of policies right now in the face of what
Russia did in Ukraine, and in the face of INF compliance
concerns. I don't want to get out ahead of our NATO allies in
an open session. Be happy to come and talk with you about that.
Mr. Lamborn. Okay. So we can talk further a classified
setting on what the guidance is that you are giving General
Breedlove, our NATO Allied Supreme Commander.
Ms. Bunn. We are assessing now. That is where we are in the
last--that is where we are on this issue.
Mr. Lamborn. Well, I understand how the Crimean
developments have given a new urgency to this, but we have
known about the INF treaties for a period of time. So I mean I
guess I would hope we would be farther along than just still
assessing. And as a follow-up, the Quadrennial Defense Review
[QDR] states, quote, ``We,'' that is the U.S., ``will pursue
further negotiated reductions with Russia,'' unquote. Given
what we just talked about with Crimea and all those
developments, does DOD still support new negotiations with
Russia to reduce U.S. nuclear forces?
Ms. Bunn. Congressman, the Russians have shown no interest
in further reductions. And I think given where we are with
Ukraine, we don't have military to military or civilian--we
don't have contacts on these kinds of issues now for further
reductions.
Mr. Lamborn. Okay. Well, I am glad to hear that that's the
status at the moment. But the QDR was drafted some, you know,
some months ago. And at that time, those who drafted it said,
yeah, let's continue further reducing nuclear forces, including
U.S. weapons, with the Russians. So--what were you going to
say?
Ms. Bunn. I was going to say that the President last June,
when he put out his nuclear weapons employment guidance, after
several years of study and assessment with all of DOD, the
combatant commanders and so forth, assessed that we could, we
could in our own national interest, we could reduce by up to a
third our deployed nuclear weapons. However, we wanted to
pursue that in negotiations with the Russians, not do it
unilaterally. As I say, I don't see negotiations on that
occurring any time soon.
Mr. Lamborn. Did the President know about the Russian
cheating at that time?
Ms. Bunn. This is, as you know from classified hearings
that have been held in this very room with this subcommittee
and others, it is very hard for me to go into much detail on
this issue. Thank you.
Mr. Lamborn. I guess I will just make a comment. I don't
see how we can be considering a third reduction, a one-third
reduction of U.S. nuclear forces with someone like Russia, even
before Crimea. I mean, Crimea is the icing on the cake. But
even before that, with the INF cheating, I would think that
that should have been a nonstarter. Is there anyone in the
administration that is contemplating unilateral U.S. nuclear
force reductions?
Ms. Bunn. Not that I have talked with, no, sir.
Mr. Lamborn. Okay. I am glad to hear that. Thank you so
much.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Rogers. The chair will recognize Mr. Nugent from
Florida.
Mr. Nugent. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I want to thank
our panel for being here today. A lot of questions, obviously.
You can see the frustration on Members up here in regards to
getting I guess some specific answers. And Mr. Garamendi is
certainly one of those that obviously has shown some
frustration.
Your response, though, to Congressman Lamborn as regards to
the guidance given to General Breedlove. I mean, it was his
comment, open-source comment, reference to the fact that there
was a game changer in regards to the INF, what he believes is
an INF violation, particularly as it relates to the weapon
that--the cruise missile that was designed by the Russians. I
mean, what direction do we give him? I mean, is it like, don't
worry about it; we are going to handle this? We are going to
staff it; we are going to do whatever? I am just a little
concerned about where he feels he is. Because right now, he is
between a rock and a hard spot with everything that is going on
in Ukraine.
Ms. Bunn. General Breedlove has a very hard job at this
moment, Congressman.
Mr. Nugent. He does.
Ms. Bunn. He really does. In fact, I was in a meeting with
him just about a week and a half ago. There are, again, when--
it is very hard to address this issue in open session. When
there are--when there are threats that are unexpected, you have
to figure out what options there are for dealing with them when
they arrive--before they arrive. There are a lot of options for
doing this.
Mr. Nugent. Let me ask you this. Have we confronted the
Russians about that possible treaty violation?
Ms. Bunn. Yes, sir. We have. Yes. A number of times. We
have raised it with them. We were not satisfied with their
answer. We said, we will keep pressing them on this. It has
been raised at a number of levels.
Mr. Nugent. I don't think Putin really cares that we care.
So, you know, I don't know where you go from there. I mean, I
am new at this myself, so I am not sure. We will get off that
subject.
But Admiral Benedict, the Ohio-class replacement,
particularly it is probably one of the strongest--nothing
against the other aspects of our nuclear deterrent, but it
certainly is one that is most survivable. And the Navy's
Strategic Command and Department of Defense have all been very
clear that they believe there is a 12-boat minimum in regards
to that. Am I clear that we are actually not going to build 12
boats? That has been discussed or is not.
Admiral Benedict. No, sir, the current program of record is
to procure 12 boats.
Mr. Nugent. Within what time period?
Admiral Benedict. First boat commences construction in
2021, delivers in order to support a 2031, and then follows out
from there. But the program of record is a 12-boat program.
Mr. Nugent. Is for 12 boats?
Admiral Benedict. Yes, sir.
Mr. Nugent. Evidently, the information we had was
incorrect. Because obviously, I believe that is a huge hedge as
we move forward in regards to our nuclear deterrence. And I
hate to go to the Air Force, having been prior Air Force, but,
you know, we certainly have had a lot in the press in regards
to the Air Force and our readiness, at least our training
aspect of our readiness. What can you do to assure me that we
are okay, that we have got--whatever the culture issue is going
on within the Air Force has been corrected. Because we don't
hear the same issues, you know, coming from the Navy. So I
would certainly like to hear your take on that.
General Harencak. Yes, sir. As this unfortunate breach of
integrity of a small number of our officers occurred at
Malmstrom, we promised in the Air Force that we were going to
aggressively investigate it. And we did that extensively. We
said we were going to hold anybody found accountable to it, and
we have certainly done that. But most importantly, what we said
is we would get to the root cause, what we believe to be the
root cause and that we would begin a force improvement plan
that would address some of the issues that we believe were
causal.
Mr. Nugent. What do you think the number one issue was?
General Harencak. Well, number one issue was, of course,
the lack of integrity and the belief that there was a--it was
necessary for these young officers to score a hundred percent
on a test that they could reliably score a passing grade on. So
we have embarked on a very aggressive campaign to assess, fix,
and make sure that we permanently address this particular
cultural issue of missileers that they had to have a complete
and absolute zero defect. We believe, and we have shown for
many, many, many decades, that our safe, secure, and effective
stockpile of the two legs of the triad that we do is
accomplished with a mission of zero defects. However, however,
somewhere in there it was translated to these young officers
they had to have zero defects, that they could not make any
mistakes. We have addressed that, and we are going to
continuously improve and work on that particular issue.
Mr. Nugent. I appreciate that.
And my time has expired. I yield back.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman.
General Harencak, haven't you all gone to a pass-fail now
instead of 100 percent?
General Harencak. That is one issue, but there is many more
that are going to address, what we believe, to do a blurring of
the lines between training and evaluation. We believe in that
particular career field it was all evaluation and very little
training.
Mr. Rogers. Okay.
The chair now recognizes Mr. Bridenstine for 5 minutes.
Mr. Bridenstine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Held, on March 24, Chairman Turner and I sent you a
letter describing concerns with NNSA providing multiple
integrated laser engagement systems, or MILES, to Russia. MILES
is a force-on-force trainer, basically a high-tech laser tag
system. And given Russia's invasion of Ukraine and occupation
of Crimea, Mr. Turner and I believe that sending laser tag
systems to Russia free of charge is wildly inappropriate. I
have your response letter here, and I appreciate your very
quick response. And I certainly appreciate your promise to
cancel the MILES request. Very positive. And thank you for
that.
However, there are some additional questions that your
letter opened up. Despite canceling MILES, your agency is
apparently still requesting $100 million for nonproliferation
programs in Russia. And from our perspective, from my
perspective, I will speak for myself, giving Moscow
nonproliferation money, by doing that, we inadvertently
subsidize Russia's nuclear force modernization. While our
nuclear arsenal is atrophying, Russia continues to develop new
ICBMs. They are constructing new ballistic missile submarines.
They are developing new strategic bombers, among other nuclear
modernization efforts. Clearly, if Moscow has money to spend on
its own nuclear forces, then it is quite capable of fulfilling
its nonproliferation obligations without relying on the U.S.
taxpayer. Russia reportedly completed a massive nuclear
exercise last week. This exercise practiced offensive
operations involving the simultaneous use of nuclear missiles
in a bid to intimidate its neighbors. These are all open-source
reports.
Mr. Held, we have a country that is modernizing its nuclear
forces and exercising offensive strikes. We have a country that
has invaded two of its neighbors, currently occupying South
Ossetia and Abkhazia, and now Crimea. And so my question is
doesn't this $100 million that you are still requesting
directly contradict and undermine the Obama administration's
stated policy of suspending military-to-military engagement
with Russia?
Mr. Held. Thank you, sir. Thank you for your letter. And we
were happy to promptly positively respond to that letter. In
this situation, it most certainly would have been
inappropriate. There is, even during the Cold War, which I
spent most of my career in, there was a long tradition of
keeping nuclear security and arms control issues, we tried as
much as possible to keep those buffered from the ups and downs
of the overall strategic relationships. That is in our national
interest as well as the Russians' national interest.
As you can imagine, in the current situation, the Secretary
has issued guidance to we need to be very careful in reviewing
all of these programs to assure that any money that we are
spending over there is driven by U.S. national security
interests, not Russian. And it is a very fluid situation.
Mr. Bridenstine. Let me interrupt. I have only got a minute
30 left. Are you aware today there are news reports indicating
that your deputy at NNSA, Anne Harrington, who is here today,
stated that the U.S. is curtailing cooperative threat reduction
with Russia?
Mr. Held. I am aware of the news reports. The news reports
were from Russia, and they were inaccurate. That is not what
she said, according to the transcript of the meeting.
Mr. Bridenstine. That is good to hear, that those are
inaccurate reports.
Mr. Held. Yes, sir.
Mr. Bridenstine. Okay.
Mr. Chairman, I appreciate that. I yield back.
Mr. Rogers. Great. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Weber, the Nuclear Weapons Council, something we talked
about in my office also, had to certify the fiscal year 2014
and 2015 budget for NNSA. Is the council satisfied with the
NNSA's work in trying to achieve those efficiencies?
Secretary Weber. Mr. Chairman, we were able--all of the
members of the Nuclear Weapons Council were able to certify the
budget. But in doing so, we recognize that there is risk. We
were able to preserve the highest priorities, but we had to
slip some programs, including the interoperable warhead one,
the Long-range Stand-off Missile [LRSO]. And what is most
important is that we go back to a situation where we can have
long-term certainty and stable funding. And with sequestration
hanging over our heads in 2016, that puts a lot of stress on
the priorities of the Nuclear Weapons Council.
Mr. Rogers. So is DOD satisfied with NNSA and their effort
on these efficiencies?
Secretary Weber. We continue to work with our partners in
NNSA to identify additional efficiencies and to keep that focus
on delivering the life extension programs for our nuclear
weapons. And I agree strongly with Acting Administrator Bruce
Held that the tone of our partnership is very good at the
leadership level. We talk frequently and in a very civilized
manner. These are common problems that we have to work on
together.
Mr. Rogers. So is DOD satisfied with their progress on
these efficiencies? I know you want to keep a positive tone,
but it is either yes or no.
Secretary Weber. We have made progress.
Mr. Rogers. Make it a positive yes or no.
Secretary Weber. We are not fully satisfied, and believe
there are more opportunities for increased efficiencies.
Mr. Rogers. That is a very positive no.
Mr. Held, are you satisfied--never mind. What efficiencies
specifically are you going after in fiscal year 2015, and how
much do you think you will be able to save?
Mr. Held. Yes, sir. They are, on pure management
efficiencies--there are two streams, management efficiencies
and workforce prioritization. That is part of the CAPE study.
On the management efficiencies, our target for fiscal year 2014
was $80 million. Our target for fiscal year 2015 is $163
million. And the target across the FYNSP [Future Years Nuclear
Security Plan] is $1.3 billion. For fiscal year 2014, we will
not only meet, we will beat the $80 million target. For fiscal
year 2015, we look like we are not only going to meet, but we
look like we will beat it. And so now we are actually
projecting out to the fiscal year 2016 efficiencies. So those
are real efficiencies, where we are getting mission
effectiveness at greater cost-effectiveness--cost-efficiency.
On the workforce prioritization, however, this is where we
have a little bit of a difference, is essentially the argument
of the workforce prioritization is--and that is $1.5 billion
over the 5-year FYNSP. What that calls for is a 25 percent
shift of the workforce from what would be--what was classed as
lower priority work to higher priority work. And so what we
did, NNSA did two studies, one internal, one external. And
really what that involves is shifting workforce from
certification of the stockpile and dismantlement to life
extension programs. Sir, we don't believe that is a simple
budgetary exercise. We think that is a major policy decision.
And so to the extent that there is a collegial debate, it goes
to that question. But let me assure you, back to the original
thing, in terms of continuous improvement, we are committed to
that.
Mr. Rogers. Will you get those specifics reduced to writing
and submit them?
Mr. Held. You bet. You bet.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 159.]
Mr. Rogers. Great.
And finally, Dr. Winokur, Congress has been trying to get
your organization an inspector general for over 2 years now. I
understand that you met with leaders of the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission's Inspector General [IG] yesterday. And I also heard
that the IG and you disagree on how it should carry out its
work. My question is will you assure this subcommittee that you
and your organization will fully cooperate with the IG and
provide the information, access, and resources the IG needs to
carry out its job?
Dr. Winokur. Mr. Chairman, the Board did meet with the
inspector general yesterday. I think it was a very productive
meeting. The inspector general will brief at an all-hands
meeting all the Board staff on Friday. And I can assure you
that the Board and the inspector general will work together
effectively and efficiently. I don't see any disagreements at
this time between the Board and the inspector general. I have
heard that there was some of these discussions on the Hill.
Quite frankly, sir, I don't believe there is any validity to
any of those comments. The Board and the inspector general will
work together effectively. We understand their role very well.
And we are very confident we will be able to work with them.
Mr. Rogers. That is the correct answer.
Dr. Winokur. And you have my assurance.
Mr. Rogers. All right. Thank you, sir.
The chair now recognizes the ranking member for any further
questions he may have.
Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
A question on nonproliferation. The Defense Science Board
in January issued a report that had a number of very disturbing
sentences in it. Let me read two. ``In short, for the first
time since the early decades of the nuclear era, the Nation
needs to be equally concerned about both vertical proliferation
and horizontal proliferation. These factors and others more
fully discussed in the report led the task force to observe
that monitoring for proliferation should be a top national
security objective, but one for which the Nation is not yet
organized or fully equipped to address.'' To any of the
panelists, what should we be doing about this to meet the
warning of the Defense Science Board?
Mr. Held. Sir, I think, if I may initially, I think we
would agree with the Defense Science Board. I think we need
to--and it is part of our budgetary process--we need to step
back and see what is the strategic path ahead of us on these
issues. We have asked--or one of the committees has asked GAO
to look into this as well, which we are really looking forward
to helping that. And the Secretary has asked the Secretary of
Energy Advisory Board to look into these things as well.
What is the right strategic path? We have had success over
the past 4 years. We are in a different budgetary environment.
We are in a different strategic environment. What is the good
strategy, the right strategy? Do we need to tweak it? And how
do we need to proceed? We do not know the answers to that right
at the moment, but we do agree with the need to ask the
questions, though.
Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Rogers. Thank the gentleman.
The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Arizona, Mr.
Franks, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Franks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank all of you for being here. Always grateful to the
people that are out trying to look out for the best interests
of freedom, and especially the United States.
Ms. Bunn, last week, the New York Times reported that
General Breedlove, our Supreme Allied Commander, a great man,
in my estimation, described Russia's violation of the INF
treaty as a, quote, ``military significant development.'' He
elaborated, he said, ``A weapons capability that violates the
INF that is introduced into the greater European land mass is
absolutely a tool that will have to be dealt with. It cannot go
unanswered,'' close quote.
So this, again, the Supreme Allied Commander responsible
for prosecuting any conflict or potential conflict in Europe is
saying that this changes his military calculus. So my question
is, has your office or OSD Policy provided guidance to General
Breedlove on this potential violation of the INF and on how to
adjust defense postures, what to say to NATO allies, and what
the policy implications are for further arms control with
Russia?
Ms. Bunn. Congressman Franks, General Breedlove is a very
good general. I would agree with you there. A lot of respect
for him. Our careers have passed many times. He is dealing with
a lot of tough problems right now. As we discussed a few
minutes ago, we are looking at a lot of options with regard to
Russia. If there were, if they deployed something like you
described, we would have to--there are some things we would
need to do. There is assessment going on right now in the U.S.
Government. And that is, as I said before, that is about as far
as I would feel comfortable going in open session.
Mr. Franks. I understand. General Breedlove is someone I
have a lot of personal gratitude and affection for. He actually
took me up in an F-16 and did a 360 over the Goldwater Range.
And you got to really trust a guy to do that.
Admiral Richardson, it was certainly great meeting you last
year and hearing about the significance of your mission. Could
you describe to us the impacts to the Naval Reactors program
after the cuts that you took in fiscal year 2014 from the
levels that you requested? How have you tried to mitigate those
effects--the effects of those cuts I should say? And what are
the costs and schedule impacts to the Navy if the spent fuel
handling facility project is not funded appropriately in fiscal
year 2015?
Admiral Richardson. Sir, thank you for that question. I
will start with the spent fuel handling facility, if I could.
That was one of the areas where our appropriation was below our
request by about $50 million. And additionally, we did not get
the new start authority. So that project was put on hold,
delaying another year of funding and 2 years in execution. And
to put simply, it is costing the country more to delay this
facility than it is to just get on with building it. So, for
instance, last year, it was a $50 million decrease between our
request and our appropriation. That is going to cost about $300
million to $350 million to recover. Each year that we delay
this is another $100 million to $150 million to the Nation.
That cost is spent on constructing temporary storage containers
for the spent nuclear fuel that comes off of aircraft carriers.
That fuel is--those aircraft carriers are being refueled on a
heel-to-toe basis down in Virginia. We feel it is a national
strategic priority to get those carriers turned around and back
to sea as quickly as possible. And so to accommodate that fuel,
we are building temporary storage containers until we can get
that facility online. And so appreciate very much this
subcommittee's support for our work there to build that new
facility.
With respect to the other cuts from the 2014 request, about
$100 million was applied to my operating and infrastructure
budget. It is a 23 percent funding cut. That is the budget I
use to basically maintain and operate my labs, my technical
support base. By virtue of the cuts of that year, two major
concerns that I have right now. One is that by virtue of that
funding cut, we were unable to purchase a high performance
computer. That computer was going to be applied to progress the
design for the Ohio replacement class submarine reactor plant.
As I stand right now, I am 6 months behind in that by virtue of
being unable to purchase that computer. I can most likely
recover that if I am funded in 2015. And so that is my
mitigation. I will reprioritize work. That is a national
strategic priority, our number one priority as well. And I can
do that. But it comes at a cost to that other work.
Additionally, there was only sufficient funding to perform
required maintenance to one of my two training and research
reactors in New York. And so we had to commit to one or the
other. Pending any relief, I am going to have to shut down one
of the training reactors as fiscal year 2015 starts. That will
result in, at minimum, 450 operators that will not be trained
and sent to the fleet, incurring additional stress on the
operating force out there. And then that number only goes up
until I can secure that funding and get back on track, sir.
Mr. Franks. Thank you.
And thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much.
Mr. Rogers. Thank the gentleman.
The chair now recognizes Mr. Garamendi for 5 minutes.
Mr. Garamendi. Mr. Chairman, thank you for this hearing.
This is really important. And I really appreciate it. There is
about 20 hours of questions that I have, but I will take my
remaining 3 minutes--4 minutes and 15 seconds.
Admiral, you were just talking about the spent fuel at your
facility and about some method of disposing of it. Could you
just expand on that quickly and tell us how you propose to
permanently dispose of the spent nuclear fuel from the Naval
Reactors?
Admiral Richardson. Sir, I will just describe our process
up there. So we take our spent fuel from both our submarines
and our aircraft carriers. We process it off the ships at the
shipyards where they come in. All of that spent fuel gets sent
to my Naval Reactors facility in eastern Idaho, on the Idaho
National Lab. That fuel is processed through a pool where we
store the fuel until it can then be safely taken out of that
pool and placed into dry storage. And that is currently how we
process it right now, sir.
Mr. Garamendi. You said the dry storage remains the
permanent disposal?
Admiral Richardson. Well, right now, pending a national
repository, we maintain that fuel in dry storage at our site in
Idaho.
Mr. Garamendi. Have you ever heard of the IFR program?
Admiral Richardson. No, sir.
Mr. Garamendi. Integral Fast Reactor.
Admiral Richardson. I have heard of it, but I am not
conversant on it.
Mr. Garamendi. You realize we spent $10 billion figuring
out how to dispose of this stuff, and figured it out, and then
mothballed it? Are you aware of that?
Admiral Richardson. I am not.
Mr. Garamendi. Are you any of you aware of this? Question.
All of you. Integral Fast Reactor. Oh, my God. Okay. We got a
problem, gentlemen and lady.
Next time you are here I am going to ask you the same
question, have you ever heard of the IFR, the Integral Fast
Reactor? And I hope to have an answer that ``I have heard of
it, and I know exactly what it is.'' It is a fast reactor that
was specifically designed by the United States Government to
dispose of the highly enriched--excuse me--of the spent nuclear
fuels from all of your programs. And it worked. It operated for
some 10 years--actually, longer than that. But I am not going
to go into a lesson here, but I expect you to know about it the
next time you come before this committee.
It also happens to be the PRISM reactor that is being
discussed in Moscow and in the United Kingdom to dispose of
their plutonium.
A couple of other questions.
Excuse me, that was shocking.
Dr. Winokur, what are the top concerns that you have not
yet expressed to this committee about the safety of the nuclear
enterprise?
Dr. Winokur. Well, I think the top concerns from my
perspective right now is this gap between this aging
infrastructure, which is 50, 60, 70 years old, that requires a
lot of oversight and care, and we have to monitor and finally
determine when it can continue to operate in a safe and
reliable fashion and when new replacement facilities or
alternative strategies for plutonium and uranium are going to
come online. That gap is becoming increasingly a concern.
Another area where I have concerns, as I said before,
formality of operations. The Board wrote a recommendation on
safety culture. I think formality of operations is one of the
better measures of safety culture. And we don't right now see--
we see some improvements by the Department, but a lot more has
to happen in the operational space to have confidence. One area
to me, Congressman, that is incredibly important is contractor
assurance systems. In the final analysis, the contractors have
to be able to get the job done. There are a lot more of them. I
mean, there is always going to be a need for Federal oversight
and the Board's independent oversight. But the contractors have
to get the job done. These contractor assurance systems, in my
opinion, are not improving, not maturing the way they need to.
And they have to in the long run. The government has to depend
upon those contractors. There will be oversight, but that has
to happen.
And then, finally, the thing I am concerned about is the
fact that accidents do happen. And we really do need to learn
better lessons from Fukushima. I still think there is a sense
in the complex that these accidents won't happen. But I think
the job of the Board and the job of the Department is to make
sure they are prepared for what I always refer to as the low-
probability, high-consequence accident. How to be ready for
that. It can happen. It will happen. And these sites are very,
very complicated. And there are many different facilities and
many different operations, and a lot of things can go wrong. So
it is going to require a lot of drilling, a lot of planning,
and a lot of coordination.
Mr. Garamendi. You are talking here specifically about the
military reactors, military programs, not the commercial. Or
are you talking about both?
Dr. Winokur. No, I am talking about the defense nuclear
facilities under the jurisdiction of the Board, not commercial.
Mr. Garamendi. Yield back.
Mr. Rogers. Thank the gentleman.
The chair now recognizes Mr. Bridenstine for any more
questions he might have.
Mr. Bridenstine. Yes. Mr. Held, I just wanted to follow up
with the question I asked earlier about the $100 million for
nonproliferation programs. All of us believe in
nonproliferation. I wanted to get insight. When we talk about,
you know, basically subsidizing, if you will, Russian military
modernization, especially nuclear modernization, ICBMs,
strategic bombers, ballistic missile submarines, when we talk
about what they are doing within their nuclear modernization
programs, including violating the INF, and while they are doing
this, we are in essence subsidizing the security of their
current nuclear capabilities, at some point, we as Americans
have to make a decision that we are subsidizing their nuclear
modernization program, and we got to stop spending it.
I am going to ask Chairman Rogers that when we do the mark
that we really look hard at this $100 million that it seems
your agency is requesting. I was wondering if you could give us
your insight as to at what point do we make a decision that we
are inappropriately subsidizing Russian nuclear modernization?
Mr. Held. So thank you for the question. Very important
question. Things have changed pretty considerably since we
built this budget request. And so I think we need to look at
this in a very clear-eyed fashion. We welcome the committee's
interest in this, and welcome dialogue on this. I would suggest
that we are in the business of U.S. national security, not in
subsidizing the Russians one way or the other. Our
responsibility, the responsibility of everybody at this table,
and yours as well, is U.S. national security. And so if that
money is judged not to be serving those interests, then we
shouldn't pursue it. And I look forward to talking to you about
this issue over the time. It is a very fluid situation.
Mr. Bridenstine. Thank you, Mr. Held.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Rogers. Thank the gentleman.
I thank the witnesses. A very productive hearing. And I do
thank all of you for your service to our country. And I
appreciate your preparing for this hearing and making yourself
available. I would remind you that the record will be left open
for 10 days.
If any Members who could not make it to the hearing have
questions, or those who are here just couldn't get their
questions in and they submit them to you, I would ask you to
provide a response in a timely manner.
And with that, this hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 5:15 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
April 8, 2014
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
April 8, 2014
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DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
April 8, 2014
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[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING
April 8, 2014
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RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ROGERS
Mr. Held. NNSA assigned a new Federal Project Director to the
project in May 2012. Shortly after he came on board, he identified the
space-fit issue to the Departmental leadership and the Department
immediately began recovery efforts. NNSA's commitment to not start
construction until design is 90% complete allows the Department to
reevaluate its options. NNSA engaged with B&W Y-12's corporate
leadership and performed a root cause analysis for accountability
purposes as well as to improve performance going forward. Several new
personnel were brought in to improve the caliber of the project team,
significant fee reductions were made, and an allowability review for
direct costs has been initiated. Specifically, in FY 2012, NNSA reduced
the fee associated with the design work by 90% ($5.1M), and in FY 2013,
fees were reduced 60%. ($29M) in the areas of Project Management and
Leadership primarily due to poor performance on UPF design, thereby
sending a strong performance signal within the parameters of the
contract fee structure. [See page 12.]
Mr. Held. We have not lost $1.2B on design. To date we have
expensed approximately $880M on the UPF project. Much work has occurred
on the project beyond engineering design for the big box structure,
such as NEPA, technology development, utilities and road relocation,
and safety basis studies and analysis. The design efforts to date have
focused principally on building 9212 process capabilities, development
of process technologies, and the development of the safety analysis and
authorization basis. These efforts are readily transportable to a
smaller facility that contains the 9212 capabilities (ie: casting).
[See page 12.]
Mr. Held. The NNSA is always striving to find costs savings in
support of mission activities, and we welcome all suggestions on how to
save taxpayer funds. NNSA and its contracting partners, for example,
are looking at ways to reduce deferred maintenance, control the growth
of pension payments, and constrain medical expense growth. NNSA is also
asking its Lab and Plant leadership teams to help identify savings
initiatives. The new Pantex/Y-12 award may serve as a model to spur
additional cost savings across NNSA.
The NNSA will continue to balance mission requirements with budget
driven adjustments, and looks forward to close coordination with
Congressional committees, the Department of Defense and other
stakeholders to ensure that the budget reflects the most effective and
efficient operation possible while supporting our mission deliverables.
Going forward, any additional efficiency targets imposed in the absence
of a specific plan for their accomplishment would constitute a scope
cut and therefore adversely affect the nuclear weapons modernization
program, as well as NNSA's broader Weapons Activities mission space to
include the stockpile, science, infrastructure recapitalization, and
counterterrorism. [See page 27.]
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. COOPER
Mr. Held. The complete removal of highly enriched uranium (HEU)
from these 11 countries plus Taiwan represents 322 kilograms or .06% of
the total amount of HEU at civilian facilities. While the overall
percentage is relatively small, the number of countries that have HEU
inventories greater than one kilogram was reduced by 1/3 during the
Four Year Effort. [See page 15.]
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GARAMENDI
Mr. Held. After Russia conducted a reassessment of its plutonium
disposition program to better align it with its national nuclear energy
strategy, Russia proposed to the United States that Russia's
disposition program center on the use of fast reactors: the BN-800
under construction and a smaller BN-600 which was already part of its
disposition program. Russia also proposed a number of significant non-
proliferation controls on the use of fast reactors. As a result, the
Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement (PMDA) was amended, and
the agreement entered into force in July 2011. It allows Russia to
dispose of its weapon-grade plutonium by fabricating it into MOX fuel
and irradiating it in fast reactors under certain nonproliferation
constraints, particularly with respect to the breeding ratio and
reprocessing of breeder blankets. Russia continues to make progress on
the BN-800 fast reactor, which will be used to support Russian
plutonium disposition. [See page 20.]
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
April 8, 2014
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ROGERS
Mr. Rogers. In January, Secretary Hagel provided a report assessing
the requirements for plutonium pit manufacturing. This report
reaffirmed the requirement for a pit production capacity of 50-80 pits
per year.
a. Do you consider achieving a pit production capacity of this
level to be part of implementing President Obama's stated goal of a
``responsive nuclear infrastructure?''
b. Should pit production capacity be tied solely to the needs of
the life extension programs, or should the requirement for a responsive
infrastructure also influence when we achieve a pit production capacity
of 50-80 per year?
Mr. Weber. A. A responsive nuclear infrastructure certainly
includes a plutonium pit production capability. This year the Nuclear
Weapons Council will review the capacity requirement and the schedule
for achieving it.
B. Pit production is not tied solely to life-extension programs.
Secretary Hagel's report provides four drivers for our pit production
requirements: 1) policy objectives for the nuclear deterrent,
especially the desire to reduce the weapons in the hedge by
implementing a responsive infrastructure; 2) military requirements; 3)
stockpile aging; and 4) infrastructure cost and capacity.
Mr. Rogers. Did the Nuclear Posture Review Implementation Study
examine in detail various options for the structure of U.S. nuclear
forces, including a dyad and potential monad?
Last summer, the results of this study were released. Why did
President Obama ultimately decide to reject eliminating a leg of triad?
Mr. Weber. The Nuclear Posture Review Implementation study provided
a detailed look at U.S. deterrence requirements, including alternative
employment strategies and force structures. The Presidential guidance
stated that the United States will maintain a nuclear triad, which is
the best option to maintain strategic stability at reasonable cost,
while hedging against potential technical problems or vulnerabilities.
Mr. Rogers. Can you provide the exact amount for the record, and
your best recollection right now, of the amount of DOD budget authority
it has transferred to DOE-NNSA in FY15? How much did it provide in FY14
and in previous years?
Would you say the Department has gotten its money's worth--is DOD
happy with NNSA's execution of key programs like LEPs and major
infrastructure construction projects?
Mr. Weber. Currently, DOD has transferred $1.535 billion in Fiscal
Year (FY) 2015 budget authority to NNSA. The following table provides
the FY 2011-2015 total transfers (topline and annual) in millions:
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TY $M FY 2011 FY 2012 FY 2013 FY 2014 FY 2015
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
President's Budget Request 2011 642 887 1,082 1,428 1,644
Topline Budget Authority
Transfer
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Uplift 0 290 439 843 1,535
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total 642 1,177 1,521 2,271 3,179
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Through the Nuclear Weapons Council, DOD has worked with NNSA to
prioritize programs within the available funding. DOD continues to work
with the Department of Energy to improve the weapons procurement
process and meet our requirements for life-extension programs.
Mr. Rogers. The FY13 NDAA requires the Nuclear Weapons Council to
certify the budget request for NNSA each year. As the Executive
Director of the Council, do the Council members believe this is a
useful process and authority? How could it be strengthened?
Was the certification process helpful during budget request
formulation? Do you have greater confidence that NNSA is applying
resources to military priorities?
Mr. Weber. The certification process has helped increase
communication and transparency between DOD and the Department of Energy
during budget formulation. It has facilitated the incorporation of DOD
priorities.
Mr. Rogers. The FY13 budget request terminated the Common Vertical
Lift Support Platform (CVLSP) (i.e., helicopter). This helicopter was
to replace Air Force UH-1Ns that average more than 40 years old and
fill critical roles in security in the ICBM fields. What is the Air
Force's plan to fill the gap in capability left by cancellation of this
program?
Mr. Weber. The Air Force plans to submit a formal report as
directed by the 2014 NDAA on September 30, 2014 outlining the UH-1N
Replacement Strategy. The strategy is currently under review, and will
be determined by the AFROC this summer. The decision facing the Air
Force is whether to continue flying the UH-1N via a Service Life
Extension Program or to replace the UH-1N with another airframe.
Mr. Rogers. Does the decision to defer the first interoperable
warhead program by at least 5 years affect the number of W76-1 warheads
to be produced? Do we now need more warheads for a hedge?
Mr. Weber. DOD is not planning to increase the number of W76-1
warheads produced. The Nuclear Weapons Council will continuously
evaluate the hedge requirements and make adjustments if necessary.
Mr. Rogers. Do you think that NATO allies should be asked to share
part of the costs of the B61 Life Extension Program (LEP) costs
currently paid for by the NNSA and the Air Force?
Would having the NATO allies pay for part of the LEP be against the
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty?
Do NATO allies intend to purchase dual-capable aircraft with their
own funds?
Why are B61s necessary for extended deterrence in Europe?
Please describe why the B61 LEP is needed for our own strategic
deterrent, in addition to our extended deterrent for NATO and allies in
Asia.
Ms. Bunn. Several of our NATO Allies do make substantial monetary
contributions in several ways to offset the costs of stationing nuclear
weapons in Europe. However, there is no desire for NATO Allies to help
fund the LEP both because the United States requires the B61-12 for its
own nuclear deterrence requirements and because U.S.-only funding
ensures that the United States retains total control of design and
capability decisions for the weapon. This allows the United States to
ensure that the weapon has the desired characteristics for the
strategic bomber mission as well as the dual-capable aircraft mission.
The existing nuclear burden-sharing arrangements with NATO are
consistent with Article 1 of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT). If Allies were to fund of a portion of the B61-12 LEP, by
changing the status quo, it might create the perception that the
actions of the United States and its NATO Allies are inconsistent with
the NPT.
Several NATO Allies currently have, and operate, with their own
funds, dual-capable aircraft at various levels of readiness that are
capable of delivering nuclear weapons. These aircraft are assigned to
the NATO nuclear deterrence mission on a voluntary basis. We expect
that these contributions will continue in accordance with NATO's 2012
Deterrence and Defense Posture Review (DDPR), which concludes that the
current mix of nuclear, conventional, and missile defense capabilities
for deterrence and defense is appropriate for the Alliance. For some
NATO Allies, this will eventually require the purchase of new aircraft,
or refurbishment of existing aircraft, in order to continue to
contribute to this important Alliance mission. Some of our NATO allies
with dual-capable aircraft have already contributed to the research and
development of the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), as well expressing their
intentions to purchase the JSF.
The B61-12 LEP is necessary to maintain a credible and effective
gravity bomb capability for the bomber leg of the U.S. nuclear Triad,
our dual-capable aircraft, and those of our Allies, allowing for the
eventual retirement and ultimate dismantlement of every other gravity
bomb currently contained in the U.S. stockpile, all of which are being
maintained well beyond their intended service lives. Completing the
B61-12 LEP will demonstrate that the United States intends to maintain
the important nuclear deterrence commitments of this and previous
Administrations to Allies and partners across the globe and will
reassure those Allies and partners that they do not need to pursue
their own, independent nuclear weapons.
Mr. Rogers. In the past several years, NATO has made a series of
decisions and declarations regarding its nuclear posture. Please
describe these decisions and NATO's nuclear policy going forward. What
is NATO's policy regarding future changes to its nuclear posture?
Ms. Bunn. NATO's most recent and definitive declaration regarding
its nuclear posture is contained in the Alliance's May 2012 Deterrence
and Defence Posture Review (DDPR). The DDPR affirmed that nuclear
weapons are a core component of NATO's overall deterrence and defense
capabilities along with conventional and missile defense forces; that
NATO is committed to maintaining an appropriate mix of these
capabilities; and that, as long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will
remain a nuclear Alliance.
With respect to possible future changes to NATO's nuclear posture,
the DDPR also states that ``the existing mix of capabilities and plans
for their development are sound,'' but that ``NATO will continue to
adjust its strategy, including with respect to the capabilities and
other measures required for deterrence and defense, in line with trends
in the security environment.'' In this respect, ``NATO is prepared to
consider further reducing its requirement for non-strategic nuclear
weapons assigned to the Alliance in the context of reciprocal steps by
Russia, taking into account the greater Russian stockpiles of non-
strategic nuclear weapons stationed in the Euro-Atlantic area.''
Mr. Rogers. Please tell us the status of the interagency process
that will make a determination on whether this cruise missile is a
treaty violation? When will this determination be made?
Ms. Bunn. The Administration takes compliance with all arms control
agreements extremely seriously.
The Administration will report the most current determinations on
arms control compliance in the annual compliance report, prepared by
the State Department, after receiving inputs from the Departments of
Defense and Energy, as well as the Intelligence Community.
This year's report is in the final review phases and will be fully
coordinated and submitted soon.
Mr. Rogers. In January, Secretary Hagel provided a report assessing
the requirements for plutonium pit manufacturing. This report
reaffirmed the requirement for a pit production capacity of 50-80 pits
per year.
Do you consider achieving a pit production capacity of this level
to be part of implementing President Obama's stated goal of a
``responsive nuclear infrastructure?''
Should pit production capacity be tied solely to the needs of the
life extension programs, or should the requirement for a responsive
infrastructure also influence when we achieve a pit production capacity
of 50-80 per year?
Ms. Bunn. The capability to produce 50-80 pits per year is a
component of a responsive infrastructure that both meets the needs of
our planned and prospective life-extension programs and allows the
United States to shift away from retaining large numbers of non-
deployed warheads as a hedge against technical or geopolitical
surprise, allowing reductions in the nuclear stockpile. The pit
production capacity of our nuclear infrastructure should take both of
these factors into account.
Mr. Rogers. Did the Nuclear Posture Review Implementation Study
examine in detail various options for the structure of U.S. nuclear
forces, including a dyad and potential monad?
Last summer, the results of this study were released. Why did
President Obama ultimately decide to reject eliminating a leg of triad?
Ms. Bunn. The review was led by the DOD, and included senior-level
participation by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, U.S. Strategic Command, the Department of State, the
Department of Energy, the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence, and the National Security Council staff. The review did
examine different nuclear force postures; however, the President
determined that retaining all three Triad legs will best maintain
strategic stability at reasonable costs, while hedging against
potential technical problems or vulnerabilities and changes to the
geopolitical environment.
Mr. Rogers. President Obama's Nuclear Employment Guidance rejects
the notion of de-alerting U.S. nuclear forces while continuing to
examine options to reduce the role of ``Launch under Attack'' in U.S.
planning. Please explain why the President chose to reject de-alerting
U.S. ICBM forces?
Ms. Bunn. The President determined that U.S. nuclear forces should
be operated on a day-to-day basis in a manner that maintains strategic
stability with Russia and China, deters potential regional adversaries,
and assures U.S. allies and partners. He has also directed DOD to focus
on increasing the decision time and information that would be available
to the President in the event of a crisis where nuclear weapons use was
being considered.
Mr. Rogers. President Obama's Nuclear Employment Guidance rejects
the notion of de-alerting U.S. nuclear forces while continuing to
examine options to reduce the role of ``Launch under Attack'' in U.S.
planning. Please explain why the President chose to reject de-alerting
U.S. ICBM forces?
Do you agree with the characterization that we hear that our
nuclear forces, particularly our ICBMs, are on ``hair-trigger alert''?
Ms. Bunn. After a comprehensive review, the President concluded
that all three legs of the Triad should be operated on a day-to-day
basis in a manner that maintains strategic stability with Russia and
China, deters potential regional adversaries, and assures U.S. allies
and partners. He has also directed DOD to institute measures that would
increase the decision time and information available to the President
in the event of a crisis where nuclear weapons use is considered or had
occurred.
I do not agree with the characterization that our nuclear forces
are on ``hair trigger'' alert. U.S. nuclear forces, even those at high
states of readiness, are subject to multiple layers of control and
strict safeguards. In addition, I fully support the President's
decision to continue the practice of open-ocean targeting of our
ballistic missiles so that in the highly unlikely event of any
accidental or unauthorized launch of a U.S. ballistic missile, the
weapon would land in the open ocean.
Mr. Rogers. Do you believe our extended deterrent assurances to
allies lose credibility if we continue to slip deadlines for
modernizing our stockpile?
Ms. Bunn. I believe that the credibility of our extended deterrence
assurances to our allies and partners is based on multiple factors. One
of the most important factors is the consistent affirmation that the
United States will retain a credible capability to forward-deploy
nuclear weapons with heavy bombers and dual-capable fighter aircraft in
support of U.S. allies and partners around the world. Over time, it is
possible that the absence of the weapons modernization programs would
have an impact on both deterrence and assurance. The B-61 Life
Extension Program FPU schedule did slip as a result of sequestration
and delays in receiving funding. Such events highlight the importance
of resolving the fiscal issues that we face, and how crucial stable and
consistent funding is to the ability of these programs to meet cost and
schedule deadlines.
Mr. Rogers. What is the minimum number of Ohio-class replacement
submarines that are required to fulfill STRATCOM's requirements for
sea-based deterrence? Please explain why less than 12 does not meet
requirements?
Admiral Benedict. Navy conducted a thorough analysis and determined
that a force of 12 OHIO Replacement SSBNs with 16 missile tubes,
compared to the 14 OHIO Class, satisfies strategic deterrent
requirements at the most affordable cost and meets STRATCOM operational
requirements. The requirement to procure 12 OHIO Replacement SSBNs
allows the Navy to provide 10 operational SSBNs during class mid-life
overhaul period. During these overhauls, two SSBNs will be non-
operational while they undergo required mid-life maintenance periods.
This force will fulfill the combatant commander minimum essential
requirement of 10 operational SSBNs. Reducing the fleet of SSBNs below
10 operational, now or in the future, will reduce survivability and
will limit flexibility to respond to an uncertain strategic future
Mr. Rogers. What will happen to the Navy and Air Force's costs for
rocket motors if NASA chooses to pursue liquid-only technology for
future spaceflight rockets? Are you comfortable that there is an
interagency process between the services and NASA to understand the
interdependencies between your programs for this?
Admiral Benedict. Navy's Trident II (D5) rocket motor costs are
impacted and dependent on NASA's program decisions. NASA is expected to
make a decision in the 2016 timeframe on the use of liquid or solid
propulsion systems as part of the advanced booster for the next
generation of space launch vehicles. If NASA decides to use liquid
propulsion systems for the advanced booster, this will result in
significant future unit cost increases and result in diminishing
critical skills in the solid rocket motor industry. These increased
cost and reduced critical skills in an already fragile industry will
have an impact on the Navy's Trident II (D5) program. The Navy has
worked closely with our industry partners to reduce overhead cost and
streamline the infrastructure in-line with current production needs.
The industrial base remains volatile and ongoing NASA solid rocket
motor development programs are vital for sharing significant overhead
costs for the Navy. Navy has been working closely with NASA and other
Services to share and understand interdependencies between various
programs. There is an effort to formalize this process by establishing
a multi-agency team of experts. Solid rocket motors are vital for
weapon systems and space applications and the industrial base remains
an issue that must be addressed at the national level.
Mr. Rogers. We have a classified document agreed to by the Navy and
NNSA regarding the number of W76-1 warheads that will be provided to
the Navy by certain dates. Has NNSA been meeting those milestones that
were agreed to?
Have you had to adjust fleet operations at all due to NNSA's
slowdown in delivering W76-1s? What is the likelihood you will have to
do so in the future?
Admiral Benedict. NNSA did not meet their commitments for
deliveries of W76-1s to the Navy in FY13. The NNSA proposed a revised
delivery schedule for FY14 and FY15 to recover and meet its commitment
to the Navy. Due to the deficiencies of deliveries to the Navy in FY13,
Navy worked with STRATCOM to revise the deployment plan for our warhead
modernization effort to ensure there are no operational impacts. We are
closely monitoring this issue.
Mr. Rogers. Please provide us the Navy's perspective on why we
should consider including a refresh of the conventional high explosives
as part of the W88 ALT 370 program.
Admiral Benedict. The Navy believes it is prudent to consider a
W88/Mk5 conventional high explosive (CHE) replacement as a part of the
W88/Mk5 Alteration 370 (Alt 370) Arming, Fuzing and Firing program. CHE
replacement is a practical mitigation strategy to sustain the W88/Mk5
into the late 2030s. Executing the replacement in conjunction with the
ongoing Alt 370 program is a cost effective option, which minimizes
impact on the operational Fleet and the overall nuclear weapons
complex. Many of the planned activities for the Alt 370, including
flight and ground qualification testing, could be used to test and
qualify the warhead after CHE replacement. The W88/Mk5 is a critical
component of the sea based leg of the triad. The Navy is committed to
work with the Nuclear Weapons Council to ensure it is fully informed of
the options available to maintain an effective and credible sea-based
strategic deterrent capability.
Mr. Rogers. Do you believe the Nuclear Weapons Council and its
subgroups, including the Standing Safety Committee that you both sit
on, function effectively? Would you like to see any changes?
Admiral Benedict. I believe the Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC)
continues to improve its oversight of the nuclear complex and has
increased transparency and accountability. With regard to the subgroups
such as the NWC Standing Safety Committee (NWC SSC), of which I am a
member, our responsibility is to provide the information, options, and
recommendations to the NWC in order to allow the NWC to make informed
decisions regarding the nuclear enterprise. One key element of the NWC
SSC that could be improved is the review of material to a deeper depth
of understanding; this could happen through debate at the SSC. Another
area that I would like see improve is better empowerment of the Action
Officers (AO) on the NWC SSC. The AO core is the backbone of the NWC
SSC. As members of the NWC SSC, we must better utilize the highly
capable and professional AO structure to ensure they are always
afforded the opportunity to conduct thorough and thoughtful analysis
before issues are presented to the NWC SSC or NWC for decision.
Mr. Rogers. Does the decision to defer the first interoperable
warhead program by at least 5 years affect the number of W76-1 warheads
to be produced? Do we now need more warheads for a hedge?
Admiral Benedict. The decision to defer the first interoperable
warhead program did not resulted in any changes to W76-1 quantities. I
defer to the Office of the Secretary of Defense to provide a response
to the hedge requirements. However, new hedge numbers, in light of the
delay, would make sense.
Mr. Rogers. President Obama's Nuclear Employment Guidance rejects
the notion of de-alerting U.S. nuclear forces while continuing to
examine options to reduce the role of ``Launch under Attack'' in U.S.
planning. Please explain why the President chose to reject de-alerting
U.S. ICBM forces?
Do you agree with the characterization that we hear that our
nuclear forces, particularly our ICBMs, are on ``hair-trigger alert?''
General Harencak. The assertion that U.S. Intercontinental
Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) are on ``hair-trigger alert'' is false.
The U.S. ICBM force is highly safe, secure, and effective, and is
an integral part of a command and control system that maximizes
Presidential decision time and flexibility during times of crisis. As
the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review affirmed, the current day-to-day alert
posture of ICBMs enhances strategic stability, provides significant
advantages to the U.S. nuclear force posture through extremely secure
command and control, and offers high readiness rates at relatively low
operating costs.
As with other U.S. strategic weapon systems, the use of ICBMs is
governed by strict, redundant nuclear safety and surety procedures, and
their release is possible only by direct Presidential authorization.
The Air Force believes that maximizing Presidential decision time is
imperative and can further strengthen strategic stability, especially
at lower force levels.
Mr. Rogers. Why does the FY15 budget request propose to delay the
Long Range Standoff (LRSO) weapon by 1-3 years? What is the Air Force's
preference for how long that delay actually is?
General Harencak. The Fiscal Year 2015 President's budget request
shifts funding for the LRSO program by three years due to warhead life
extension schedule delays with the National Nuclear Security
Administration (NNSA) and the continuing fiscal challenges of the
Budget Control Act.
The Air Force anticipates partnering with NNSA beginning in 4QFY14
to begin the Concept Assessment Phase (6.1) of the LRSO warhead effort.
At the same time, the Air Force continues risk reduction and early
systems engineering work as it assesses options to affordably execute
the LRSO program. The Air Force preference is to minimize the delay to
the extent necessary to align with the NNSA warhead program and meet
combatant commander initial operating capability requirements.
Mr. Rogers. When does our current force of Minuteman III ICBMs
start aging out? What life extension programs are currently underway
for the ICBMs?
What assessments or surveillance are we doing related to aging in
the ICBM force?
What are our plans or programs to extend the life of our Minuteman
III ICBMs? When must the decision be made to proceed with life
extension?
General Harencak. Several modernization efforts for the Minuteman
III (MM III) program are underway, such as ICBM Fuze Modernization,
Solid Rocket Motor (SRM) Modernization, and Guidance Modernization that
will ensure aging subsystem replacement and viability of MM III
operations through 2030, as well as supporting the transition to the MM
III follow-on. Age out of MM III subsystems is projected to occur
between 2020 and 2030.
Both acquisition and life extension efforts, to include ICBM Fuze
Modernization, SRM Modernization and Guidance Modernization programs,
will deliver replacement subsystems in FY22, FY23, and FY27
respectively. Additionally, the ongoing Ground Based Strategic
Deterrent (GBSD) Analysis of Alternatives, expected to be completed
this fall, will inform requirements, acquisition strategies and plans
for on-going efforts of SRM and guidance modernization.
The Air Force regularly conducts Force Development Evaluation
flight tests, numerous ground tests, and surveillance programs to
determine the reliability of all MM III weapon system aspects. These
efforts allow for the identification of operational deficiencies that
must be addressed to sustain current and future operations.
Mr. Rogers. What will happen to the Navy and Air Force's costs for
rocket motors if NASA chooses to pursue liquid-only technology for
future spaceflight rockets? Are you comfortable that there is an
interagency process between the services and NASA to understand the
interdependencies between your programs for this?
General Harencak. Absent significant changes to the SRM industrial
base, there is no empirical data or forecasted impact to the Air
Force's costs for rocket motors should NASA choose to pursue liquid-
only technology for future spaceflight rockets. The Air Force's Solid
Rocket Motor (SRM) Modernization program, funded in the FY15
President's Budget, is based on current industrial base capacity and is
not reliant on NASA's participation.
The Air Force understands the importance of the current industrial
base supporting SRM Modernization program efforts. We will continue to
work with other services, industry partners, and NASA to explore
commonalities, share technologies and production practices, and
eliminate redundancies throughout the SRM industry.
Mr. Rogers. Do you believe the Nuclear Weapons Council and its
subgroups, including the Standing Safety Committee that you both sit
on, function effectively? Would you like to see any changes?
General Harencak. Consistent with the Nuclear Weapons Council
Chairman's annual report to Congress, the Council and its subgroup
continue to meet its responsibility of ensuring the United States
retains a safe, secure and effective nuclear deterrent. As the
authority and responsible custodian for two legs of the Triad, the Air
Force believes it should have a larger and more direct role in shaping
the processes and decisions that affect the nuclear weapons enterprise.
Mr. Rogers. Please update us on the investigation into the fire and
radiation release at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant in New Mexico.
a. What has been found?
b. How long do you expect the shutdown to last?
c. How is the shutdown at WIPP sending ripple effects across the
DOE-EM complex?
Mr. Huizenga. a. Following the February 5th salt haul vehicle fire
and the February 14th radiological release events, DOE commissioned two
Accident Investigation Boards (AIB). The vehicle fire AIB final report
and initial radiological release AIB report have been issued and the
Department is currently developing formal Corrective Action Plans for
both. After the final radiological release AIB report is prepared and
issued, a separate Corrective Action Plan will be prepared.
DOE continues to investigate the cause of the February 14th
radiation release. In the underground, the focus has been on taking
photographs and videos of the waste stacks, taking samples and swipes,
and retrieving filter paper from the continuous air monitor. During the
month of June, underground entries have been suspended while High
Efficiency Particulate Air filters in the ventilation system are
replaced. After this filter evolution is complete, underground entries
will start again for further investigation, surveying, maintenance,
decontamination and other activities. The information obtained during
the investigation is being analyzed by some leading experts in various
fields of expertise. All of this is being studied to try to determine
the cause of the release. Based on recent entries into the WIPP
underground, the AIB is evaluating the contents of a set of waste drums
that came from Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) that are located
in Panel 7. The AIB is looking at the possibility that a chemical
reaction may have occurred within a drum, causing a potential high-heat
event and a subsequent release.
b. The length of the time required to recover from the incident
cannot be fully known until the cause of the event is understood and
recovery planning is completed.
c. We are carefully evaluating the impacts to other Department of
Energy sites including impacts on commitments with regulators. Specific
impacts being evaluated include the Department's ability to meet: the
removal of all legacy transuranic (TRU) waste from the Idaho National
Laboratory by December 31, 2018, and, certain milestones for the WIPP
certification of contact-handled and remote-handled TRU located at the
Oak Ridge Reservation beginning September 30, 2015.
Mr. Rogers. Is EM on track to meet its regulatory and compliance
agreements for FY14? What about for FY15 and beyond?
Mr. Huizenga. The Environmental Management (EM) program will make
significant cleanup progress with the President's fiscal year (FY) 2015
budget request of $5.6 billion. Assuming Congress appropriates the
President's request, key progress will include continued efforts on
radioactive tank waste stabilization, treatment, and disposal; special
nuclear material consolidation, stabilization, and disposition;
transuranic and mixed/low-level waste disposition; and excess
facilities deactivation and decommissioning.
While significant cleanup progress has been achieved and will
continue to be made in fiscal years 2014 and 2015, several challenges
have impacted our progress on certain important projects. These
challenges include the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control
Act, which enacted sequestration, reduced EM funding by $394 million in
FY 2013, and the FY 2014 lapse in appropriations and partial-year
Continuing Resolution delayed work. The culmination of these events is
anticipated to delay some FY 2015 milestones that cannot be met even
with additional funds.
To the extent milestones are anticipated to be delayed, DOE will
follow the provisions of its cleanup agreements for working with
regulators regarding milestone adjustments, as necessary.
Mr. Rogers. In January, Secretary Hagel provided a report assessing
the requirements for plutonium pit manufacturing. This report
reaffirmed the requirement for a pit production capacity of 50-80 pits
per year.
a. Do you consider achieving a pit production capacity of this
level to be part of implementing President Obama's stated goal of a
``responsive nuclear infrastructure?''
b. Should pit production capacity be tied solely to the needs of
the life extension programs, or should the requirement for a responsive
infrastructure also influence when we achieve a pit production capacity
of 50-80 per year?
Mr. Held. a. NNSA considers pit production capability and capacity,
as well as other capabilities, as components of a responsive
enterprise. Each year we assess the affordability of our program and
make adjustments to balance across our mission space.
b. NNSA is committed to maintaining key plutonium production and
associated support capabilities at the Los Alamos National Laboratory.
Moreover, NNSA is committed to meeting the requirements that underpin
implementation of a responsive infrastructure which includes plans to
construct two modular structures that will achieve full operating
capability not later than 2027.
NNSA's commitments are contingent upon the receipt of timely
congressional appropriations and authorizations, including the release
of previously requested reprogramming funds from the Chemistry and
Metallurgy Research Replacement (CMRR) project in August 2013.
Mr. Rogers. Why does the FY15 budget request propose to delay the
Long Range Standoff (LRSO) weapon by 1-3 years? Would NNSA prefer a 1,
2, or 3 year delay to LRSO?
a. How would the various delays affect the nuclear security
enterprise, particularly production workloads at the plants and design
teams at the labs?
Mr. Held. In July 2014, the NNSA and Air Force will begin an LRSO
Phase 6.1 Concept Assessment. The Phase 6.1 work includes development
of an integrated master schedule and aligning the first production unit
of the warhead with missile development. The Nuclear Weapons Council
(NWC) took a preliminary step in this program by identifying the W80
and W84 cruise missile warheads as the best candidates for a reuse-
based life extension that will be performed by Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory (LLNL) and Sandia National Laboratories (SNL). The
funding profile in the Future Years Nuclear Security Plan (FYNSP)
supports a First Production Unit (FPU) date of FY 2027, reflecting a
three-year delay, in keeping with the NWC's December 2013 meeting
decision. This delay defers FYDP (and Future Years Defense Program)
costs in order to present a fiscal profile for the Departments of
Energy and Defense that is more affordable while simultaneously
recognizing the priorities of both departments.
a. At this early stage of the project, the FPU date could be
accelerated by as much as 2 years (from the current baseline of 2027
based on funding levels), to 2025, provided there is an increased
funding profile to support the change. Production plant and design
agency impacts of the various delay options have not been fully vetted
but there appear to be benefits as well as disadvantages to the delay
options. For example, the currently slated three-year delay in LRSO
will cause a production gap when the B61-12 life extension program
(LEP) and W88 Alt 370 complete production at the end of 2024. This
production gap is projected to last until the start of LRSO production
in 2027. However, design team workloads at SNL may actually be smoothed
due to this delay as the B61-12 and W88 Alt 370 (SNL and Los Alamos
National Laboratory supported) will be entering the production stage
(Phase 6.5) at approximately the time LRSO (SNL and LLNL supported) is
entering its early design stage (Phase 6.3) when demand for design work
will begin to peak. Shifting FPU of LRSO back toward 2025 will reduce
the production gap but may increase demand on SNL as multiple life
extension programs incur overlapping design and engineering phases.
Mr. Rogers. NNSA's Weapons Activities is requesting an increase of
over half a billion dollars compared to the amount appropriated in
FY14. At the same time, we're seeing NNSA defer or delay several key
programs, including the LRSO warhead and the W78/88 LEP. Why are we
being asked to pay so much more but get so much less than the program
plan that was committed to in the FY14 budget request?
Mr. Held. Each year we reassess requirements and costs based on new
information, and re-align program and funding as necessary. The
objective is to maintain balance of activities to accomplish both near
and long term requirements. Plans for life extension programs,
modernization of key capabilities, and delivery platforms are
coordinated with DOD and decisions are made by the Nuclear Weapons
Council.
The program submitted in the FY 2015 President's Budget Request
reflects a balanced program that sustains and modernizes the current
stockpile while maintaining the facilities and workforce necessary to
conduct stewardship for the indefinite future. The program maintains
stockpile warheads through the conduct of routine maintenance such as
limited life component exchange. It surveils and assesses the state of
the stockpile so its safety, security, and effectiveness can be
assured, and undertakes work to prevent or correct any shortfalls. It
supports infrastructure and personnel across the complex to ensure
production and intellectual capabilities are available for stewardship.
Finally, it provides for the safe, secure, and environmentally
compliant operation of these capabilities in support of the stockpile.
Mr. Rogers. We have heard that the challenges that still need to be
overcome to achieve fusion ignition at the National Ignition Facility
(NIF) at Lawrence Livermore National Lab are considerable. What is the
path forward for NIF in FY14 and the out-years?
a. Why has NNSA rescinded its rule that all non-NNSA customers be
charged ``full freight'' for use of the facility? Why have we gone so
quickly away from the full cost recovery model before it was ever even
implemented?
Mr. Held. NNSA is continuing to follow the plan laid out in the
November 2012 Report to Congress, Path Forward to Achieving Ignition in
the Inertial Confinement Fusion Program. We are in the process of
preparing a report on more specific milestones requested in the FY 2014
Senate Report on Energy and Water Development Appropriations. We expect
to have it published by August 11, 2014.
In particular, NNSA has altered its efforts from pursuing the
``point design'' to taking a scientific approach to understanding the
barriers to ignition. While we have a long way to go, NIF has made
considerable progress in improving the thermonuclear yields. We are
within a few percentage points of achieving what is known as the
``alpha-heating'' milestone. The weapons programs at both LLNL and LANL
believe that these yield levels are already sufficient to begin
returning valuable data on thermonuclear burn to inform our weapons
physics efforts under stockpile stewardship.
a. The response to the announcement that NNSA was implementing this
policy made clear that it would result in no additional funds for NIF,
but would lead to the cessation of research programs of interest to
NNSA, DOE more broadly, and to the national security of the Nation.
We rescinded this rule when Dr. Moniz became Secretary of Energy
because it is contrary to the long-standing DOE policy--a policy with a
substantial statutory backing--not to charge user facility fees for
scientific users of DOE's user facilities unless the research is for
proprietary uses. It is DOE practice that when we fund the operations
at a facility, it funds the operations of that facility for all non-
proprietary users. A number of interagency reports document DOE and
White House Office of Science and Technology Policy agreement that DOE
would steward its high energy density facilities (NIF, Z and Omega) for
broad national use. There are two classes of users outside of NNSA for
NIF and Z; basic science users and DOD users. Basic science grants from
the Office of Science or the NNSA under the Stockpile Stewardship
Academic Alliances program are sized on the basis that principal
investigators will not pay user facility fees. Likewise DOD users such
as DTRA or MDA did not request and have not been appropriated funds to
cover the costs of their use of NIF or Z.
Mr. Rogers. Please provide us NNSA's perspective on the potential
option of including a refresh of the conventional high explosives as
part of the W88 ALT 370 program.
Mr. Held. Any decision about high-explosives refresh will be driven
and supported by a sound technical basis. Like all of our stockpile
weapons, the W88 is evaluated in an annual cycle to assess and certify
that it meets all requirements. As with all systems, there are concerns
about continued aging of the systems and their components, and aging
affects are considered as part of this annual surveillance. The high
explosives are examined and monitored as part of this process. The
Director of Los Alamos National Laboratory, the Design Agency for the
W88/Mk5, has the responsibility to perform this annual evaluation for
the CHE in the W88. He continues to assess that the W88 meets military
requirements and remains safe, secure, and reliable. A new cycle of
surveillance data will be collected this year, and will add to our
overall understanding of how the explosives in the W88 are aging.
NNSA has studied implementing a CHE refresh of the W88 in
conjunction with the ALT 370 program. The CHE refresh option could
support NNSA's development of alternatives to extend the W88 weapon
system lifetime, but refreshing the CHE does not explicitly extend the
useful lifetime of the W88. CHE refresh does reset the beginning of
life for several components in the nuclear explosive package, a
potentially helpful result if planned life-extension activities (i.e.,
Interoperable Warhead (IW)-1 or IW-2) for the W88 system are further
postponed.
NNSA completed a W88 CHE Refresh Cost and Feasibility Report,
detailing an overall cost of $576 million (including management
reserve) for implementation. Some combination of DOD and NNSA funding
would be required to complete this activity, and NNSA's FY 2015 Budget
Request does not include fiscal provisions for CHE refresh.
In the near future, the W88 ALT 370 progress will diverge from an
alignment with CHE refresh activities. Because of stakeholder interest,
NNSA has taken steps in FY 2014 to allow maximum synergy between the
ALT 370 and the CHE refresh through FY 2015. These steps preserve our
ability to maintain leveraging and trade space for future LEPs and
reduce the overall estimated cost to the government for implementation
of both programs.
Mr. Rogers. Please provide us the number of personal service
contractors employed by directly by NNSA. How has this number changed
over the past 5 years?
Mr. Held. The number of personal service contractors employed by
NNSA is zero and that number has not changed over the last 5 years. To
ensure proper use of support service contracts, NNSA reviewed existing
contracts and verified that terms and conditions do not create personal
services contracts. Additionally, to assure that administration of
support service contracts is appropriate and does not inadvertently
create a personal services situation, NNSA is training federal
employees on proper interactions with contractor employees.
Mr. Rogers. How is the shutdown at WIPP sending ripple effects
across the NNSA complex?
Mr. Held. It is difficult to determine specifics. Depending on the
length of the WIPP shutdown, there could be programmatic impacts to Pu
Sustainment but as of now, LANL is investigating backup options to
disposition waste that could mitigate some of the future impact.
The WIPP shutdown could also impact the Material Recycle and
Recovery (MRR) program at LANL. Any resumption of MRR work done
involving the Plutonium Facility 4 vault de-inventory requires
temporary drum storage at LANL until a long term storage solution is
made available.
Mr. Rogers. By law, Congress is supposed to receive the annual
Report on Stockpile Assessments, which includes the assessments of
stockpile health conducted by the laboratory directors and by the
commander of U.S. Strategic Command, by March 15. Like last year, we
still have not yet received this important report that we use to inform
our legislative and budgetary decisions each year. Why the delay? When
will we receive it?
Mr. Held. a. The coordination process took longer than expected in
order to reach consensus on a few specific items.
b. The FY 2013 Report on Stockpile Assessments was signed by the
President on May 8, 2014. It was delivered to Congress on May 9, 2014.
Mr. Rogers. From a technical standpoint, do you believe the B61 LEP
schedule can be slipped again without impacts to the safety, security,
or reliability of the weapon? What is the assessment of the NNSA lab
directors on this?
Mr. Held. NNSA is seeing aging and degradation issues even today.
The further we extend the schedule, the more risk we are forced to
accept in the safety, security and reliability of the B61. As stated by
Dr. Paul Hommert, President and Director of SNL, during his testimony
to the HASC-SF in October of 2013 ``In order to sustain high confidence
in the safety, security, and reliability of the B61 into the next
decade, it is our technical judgment that we must complete the life
extension program currently being executed.'' In recent years, his
letters have documented concerns related to technology obsolescence and
aging. While the B61 is currently safe and secure, these concerns
continue to increase. For example, in the past three years, SNL and
LANL have observed time-dependent degradation not seen before in
electronic, polymer, and high-explosive components. This observation is
not surprising given the age of the B61 weapon system, the oldest units
of which were manufactured and fielded in the late 1970s with some
components dating back to the 1960s. As planned, the B61 LEP addresses
all known aging-related issues and also addresses technology
obsolescence to ensure the bombs continue to meet DOD requirements.
Mr. Rogers. Has NNSA benefited from the greater transparency to and
involvement with the Nuclear Weapons Council?
Mr. Held. The Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC) and its subordinate
Standing and Safety Committee provide for the Services, Combatant
Commands, Department of Defense, and Department of Energy to
cooperatively determine the actions necessary to provide a safe,
secure, and effective nuclear weapon deterrent. Collectively, we are
able to review options for extending the lives of our weapons, develop
a path to a responsive infrastructure, and accomplish trade-offs
between various programs to attain the stockpile necessary to keep the
Nation safe. Involvement with the NWC ensures options and opinions are
discussed, enabling DOD and DOE/NNSA to work with Congress and the
Administration from a common understanding.
Mr. Rogers. Does NNSA's W76-1 LEP funding in FY15 and out-years
meet all Navy requirements for regarding scheduled deliveries?
a. Does the decision to defer the first interoperable warhead
program by at least 5 years affect the number of W76-1 warheads to be
produced? Do we now need more warheads for a hedge?
Mr. Held. Yes. As submitted to Congress in the most recent Selected
Acquisition Report, the W76-1 LEP funding profile for FY 2015 and
subsequent years until close out of production in FY 2020 meets all
Navy requirements for scheduled deliveries. Production numbers are
written in the Selected Acquisition Report and delivery schedules are
discussed at the Project Officers' Group. To prevent any confusion,
NNSA is drafting a letter that will specify the agreed to deliveries.
This letter should be sent out by the end of June/early July.
a. The IW-1 decision did not affect the number of W76-1 to be
produced, and NNSA has no plans to alter W76-1 production quantities.
Decisions about hedge quantities would need to be addressed by the NWC.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. COOPER
Mr. Cooper. The January 2014 Defense Science Board report
``Assessment of Nuclear Monitoring and Verification Technologies''
recommended much more focus on verification and detection to be able to
meet medium and longer-term proliferation threats such as proliferation
of nuclear weapons materials. There has also been concern about
Russia's compliance on a nuclear arms treaty. The report concluded that
``technologies and processes designed for current treaty verification
and inspections are inadequate for monitoring realities.''
What actions are NNSA and DOD taking in response to the Defense
Science Board's report? And do you believe the resources and plans are
adequate to meet this rapidly changing threat and need?
What is the constraining factor? What more could we be doing if
funds were available?
Ms. Bunn. DOD and NNSA are participating in an effort led by the
National Security Council at the Under Secretary level to address the
concerns and recommendations in the report. The interagency group will
formally analyze each DSB recommendation and identify relevant existing
and planned activities. It will then determine whether resources and
plans are adequate. The results will be used to assist in planning
future activities to close any gaps identified in the report.
Mr. Cooper. Last year, NNSA had a goal of $320 million in
efficiencies but only achieved $80 million. This year, NNSA documents
do not identify any new efficiencies. By comparison, DOD budget
documents commit DOD to an additional $95 billion in efficiencies in
the next 5 years, on top of efficiencies already being pursued such as
20% cut in civilian personnel in the Office of the Secretary of
Defense. DOD reportedly also identified nearly a billion dollars in
efficiencies for NNSA. What efficiencies will NNSA commit to, and is
there a plan to achieve the $240 million that were promised last year
and are there any new efficiencies being considered or pursued?
Ms. Bunn. As a member of the Nuclear Weapons Council Safety and
Security Committee, I consistently work with my fellow committee
members, including our NNSA/DOE colleagues who serve as co-chairs, to
pursue increased efficiency and cost savings throughout the nuclear
enterprise. DOD continues to offer the expertise of the Cost Assessment
Program Evaluation office to NNSA as it pursues greater efficiencies in
the future.
Mr. Cooper. The January 2014 Defense Science Board report
``Assessment of Nuclear Monitoring and Verification Technologies''
recommended much more focus on verification and detection to be able to
meet medium and longer-term proliferation threats such as proliferation
of nuclear weapons materials. There has also been concern about
Russia's compliance on a nuclear arms treaty. The report concluded that
``technologies and processes designed for current treaty verification
and inspections are inadequate for monitoring realities.''
What actions are NNSA and DOD taking in response to the Defense
Science Board's report? And do you believe the resources and plans are
adequate to meet this rapidly changing threat and need?
What is the constraining factor? What more could we be doing if
funds were available?
Mr. Held. NNSA agrees with the DSB Report conclusion, ``the
technologies and processes designed for current treaty verification and
inspections are inadequate to future monitoring realities,'' and would
expand this conclusion to include both cooperative and non-cooperative
regimes. NNSA has invested heavily over the last 50 years to support
current and future monitoring requirements, including using space-based
detection means to support the Limited Test Ban Treaty, developing
options for warhead verification in collaboration with Russia and
international partners, and improving confidence in discriminating low-
yield underground nuclear explosions from other seismic sources. But
work remains and the scope is expanding, as the Report describes. For
example, NNSA expects future monitoring requirements under a
cooperative regime may include accounting for deployed and non-deployed
warheads in addition to delivery platforms; and future proliferation
detection requirements under non-cooperative scenarios will likely
expand both in capabilities sought by existing nuclear states and in
the number of actors trying to access these capabilities. Solutions
will require a continuous process of tailored and persistent
surveillance for both warhead authentication and monitoring throughout
weapon lifecycles and for monitoring undesirable nuclear activity
throughout the world. In anticipation of the DSB Report findings, NNSA
has especially emphasized verification and monitoring support efforts
during the past several fiscal years. For example, NNSA has developed a
series of national test beds in nonproliferation and monitoring to be
responsive to future needs and capabilities to be adaptive to
activities of a creative adversary. These efforts have included the
participation of the Department of State's Office of Arms Control and
Verification (AVC), the Department of Defense's Defense Threat
Reduction Agency (DOD/DTRA), and representatives of nearly all of the
Intelligence Community. This approach is fully aligned with the DSB
recommendations on integrated spiral development. NNSA welcomes the
opportunity to provide more detail and offers a classified briefing
that would meet the request on both constraining factors and funding.
Mr. Cooper. Last year, NNSA had a goal of $320 million in
efficiencies but only achieved $80 million. This year, NNSA documents
do not identify any new efficiencies. By comparison, DOD budget
documents commit DOD to an additional $95 billion in efficiencies in
the next 5 years, on top of efficiencies already being pursued such as
20% cut in civilian personnel in the Office of the Secretary of
Defense. DOD reportedly also identified nearly a billion dollars in
efficiencies for NNSA. What efficiencies will NNSA commit to, and is
there a plan to achieve the $240 million that were promised last year
and are there any new efficiencies being considered or pursued?
Mr. Held. In June 2014, NNSA submitted a report to Congress
entitled Report on National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)
Efficiencies in FY 2014 which detailed how NNSA met its FY 2014 target
of $80.0 million in ``cost of doing business'' efficiencies and noted
how pursuing $240 million in ``workforce prioritization'' efficiency
targets would harm NNSA's ability to certify the safety, security, and
effectiveness of the nuclear stockpile. The Committee requested NNSA
identify an additional $59.5 million in ``cost of doing business''
efficiencies to release the remaining portion of the $139.5 million as
described in the FY 2014 NDAA. NNSA will soon submit an addendum to the
June report showing such savings.
The NNSA is always striving to find costs savings in support of
mission activities, and we welcome all suggestions on how to save
taxpayer funds. The NNSA will continue to balance mission requirements
with budget driven adjustments, and looks forward to close coordination
with Congressional committees, the Department of Defense and other
stakeholders to ensure that the budget reflects the most effective and
efficient operation possible while supporting our mission deliverables.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SANCHEZ
Ms. Sanchez. United States taxpayers are expected to cover much of
the modernization of the B61s through a life extension program which is
to cost around $2.1 billion.
Are there any plans for NATO countries to contribute to the cost of
the B61 life extension program of the B61? How much is NATO paying in
FY14 for its share in terms of contribution to NATO nuclear sharing?
Are there plans to re-evaluate the number of B6s that will undergo
the life-extension program? And is nuclear sharing with NATO consistent
with Article 1 of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty which says
``nuclear states will not assist non-nuclear weapon states in acquiring
nuclear weapons''?
Mr. Weber. There are no plans for NATO countries to contribute to
the cost of the B61-12 Life Extension Program (LEP). However, NATO
basing nations provide substantial financial support to the nuclear
mission by providing aircraft, aircrews, load crews, and security
forces, and also by providing facilities and much of the supporting
infrastructure and equipment necessary to support the U.S. munitions
support squadrons. Several NATO allies have contributed funding to F-35
development and have expressed a strong interest in acquiring the F-35
as their dual capable delivery system. Without the financial
contributions of those NATO allies, the F-35 unit cost to the U.S.
would increase. NATO common funding has paid for over $300 million,
approximately 75 percent of the B61 storage security infrastructure and
upgrades. There are no plans to re-evaluate the number of B61s at this
time.
The existing arrangements for the deployment of U.S.-owned and
controlled nuclear weapons in support of NATO are consistent with
Article 1 of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT). Allied funding
of a portion of the B61 LEP would almost certainly create perception
problems regarding U.S. and Allied compliance with the Nuclear NPT, and
any sharing of nuclear weapons design information with non-nuclear
States associated with such funding would be problematic.
Ms. Sanchez. United States taxpayers are expected to cover much of
the modernization of the B61s through a life extension program which is
to cost around $2.1 billion.
Are there any plans for NATO countries to contribute to the cost of
the B61 life extension program of the B61? How much is NATO paying in
FY14 for its share in terms of contribution to NATO nuclear sharing?
Are there plans to re-evaluate the number of B6s that will undergo
the life-extension program? And is nuclear sharing with NATO consistent
with Article 1 of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty which says
``nuclear states will not assist non-nuclear weapon states in acquiring
nuclear weapons''?
Ms. Bunn. There are no plans for NATO Allies to make direct
contributions to the cost of the B61-12 Life Extension Program (LEP)
because the United States requires the B61-12 for its own nuclear
deterrence requirements; and because U.S.-only funding for the B61-12
LEP ensures that the United States retains total control of design and
capability decisions. This allows the United States alone to ensure the
weapon has the desired characteristics for the strategic bomber mission
as well as the dual-capable aircraft mission.
NATO basing nations provide substantial financial support to the
nuclear mission at NATO main operating bases. In addition to providing
aircraft, aircrews, load crews, and security forces, they also provide
facilities and much of the supporting infrastructure and equipment for
the U.S. munitions support squadrons. Because these facilities serve
both national and Alliance purposes, and are funded through individual
Alliance country budgets, it is not possible to provide an accurate
assessment of exactly how much NATO basing nations have contributed in
Fiscal Year 2014 toward NATO nuclear burden-sharing, although it is
substantial.
Funding of security enhancements and upgrades, as well as funding
of infrastructure upgrades (investment) at the specific European weapon
storage sites, is provided through the NATO Security Investment Program
(NSIP). There have been four NATO weapons storage-related upgrades
(Capability Package upgrades) since the original NATO Capability
Package was approved in 2000. The total contributions are as follows:
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Program Name Total (M) U.S. Contribution
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Initial WS3 Installation $215M USD $51.6M USD
Basic Capability Package (July 2000) 12.8M EUR 3.0M EUR
Addendum 1 (February 2005) 17.9M EUR 4.3M EUR
Addendum 2 (April 2006) 13.0M EUR 3.1M EUR
Addendum 3 (March 2009) 13.0M EUR 3.1M EUR
Addendum 4 (August 2011) 108M EUR 26.2M EUR
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. costs above are estimates that are based on a 24 percent
burden-share. The U.S. burden-share is generally 22-24 percent of the
total NSIP costs.
The number of B61-12 weapons to be produced through the LEP was
evaluated by DOD and approved by the Nuclear Weapons Council at the
onset of the program. This requirement is continuously reviewed
throughout the 6.X life cycle management process. The projected
quantity of weapons to be refurbished is based upon the requirements
for extended and strategic deterrence commitments as outlined in
various plans and policy documents. Should the guidance and/or
direction in these documents change, the quantity of B61-12 bombs to be
produced would be adjusted accordingly. NATO's existing nuclear burden-
sharing arrangements are consistent with Article 1 of the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Allied funding of a portion of the B61-12
LEP, by changing the status quo, might create the perception that the
actions of the United States and its NATO Allies are inconsistent with
the NPT.
Ms. Sanchez. United States taxpayers are expected to cover much of
the modernization of the B61s through a life extension program which is
to cost around $2.1 billion.
Are there any plans for NATO countries to contribute to the cost of
the B61 life extension program of the B61? How much is NATO paying in
FY14 for its share in terms of contribution to NATO nuclear sharing?
Are there plans to re-evaluate the number of B6s that will undergo
the life-extension program? And is nuclear sharing with NATO consistent
with Article 1 of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty which says
``nuclear states will not assist non-nuclear weapon states in acquiring
nuclear weapons''?
Admiral Benedict. I defer to the Office of the Secretary of Defense
to provide the answer to your questions.
Ms. Sanchez. United States taxpayers are expected to cover much of
the modernization of the B61s through a life extension program which is
to cost around $2.1 billion.
Are there any plans for NATO countries to contribute to the cost of
the B61 life extension program of the B61? How much is NATO paying in
FY14 for its share in terms of contribution to NATO nuclear sharing?
Are there plans to re-evaluate the number of B6s that will undergo
the life-extension program? And is nuclear sharing with NATO consistent
with Article 1 of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty which says
``nuclear states will not assist non-nuclear weapon states in acquiring
nuclear weapons''?
General Harencak. There are no plans for North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) partner nations to contribute directly to the cost
of the B61 life extension program.
Under the unique nuclear sharing arrangements in NATO, our allies
participate in nuclear planning, possess nuclear-capable aircraft, and
provide special facilities, certified equipment and highly trained
personnel to safeguard, load, and employ U.S nuclear weapons. There are
currently no plans to re-evaluate the number of B61s that will undergo
the life extension program. Initial assessments indicate a very limited
percentage of program savings could be achieved even if substantial
numbers and capability are reduced due to the fixed and variable cost
of all facets of the Life Extension Process. Life extended B61s will
fulfill gravity weapon requirements for both strategic and non-
strategic extended deterrence roles. The construct through which the
U.S. provides extended nuclear deterrence to NATO is consistent with
our obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The
arrangement directly contributes to our non-proliferation goals by
reassuring non-nuclear U.S. allies and partners that their security
interests can be protected without their own nuclear weapons.
Ms. Sanchez. United States taxpayers are expected to cover much of
the modernization of the B61s through a life extension program which is
to cost around $2.1 billion.
Are there any plans for NATO countries to contribute to the cost of
the B61 life extension program of the B61? How much is NATO paying in
FY14 for its share in terms of contribution to NATO nuclear sharing?
Are there plans to re-evaluate the number of B6s that will undergo
the life-extension program? And is nuclear sharing with NATO consistent
with Article 1 of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty which says
``nuclear states will not assist non-nuclear weapon states in acquiring
nuclear weapons''?
Admiral Richardson. I defer to the Office of the Secretary of
Defense to provide the answer to your questions.
Ms. Sanchez. United States taxpayers are expected to cover much of
the modernization of the B61s through a life extension program which is
to cost around $2.1 billion.
Are there any plans for NATO countries to contribute to the cost of
the B61 life extension program of the B61? How much is NATO paying in
FY14 for its share in terms of contribution to NATO nuclear sharing?
Are there plans to re-evaluate the number of B6s that will undergo
the life-extension program? And is nuclear sharing with NATO consistent
with Article 1 of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty which says
``nuclear states will not assist non-nuclear weapon states in acquiring
nuclear weapons''?
Mr. Huizenga. The total program cost estimate of the B61-12 Life
Extension Program as reported in the last Selected Acquisition Report
dated 30 September 2013 is $7,344M with an additional $0.811M leveraged
from NNSA stockpile services and campaigns.
The B61-12 is a critical component of the U.S. commitment to NATO
through extended deterrence. NATO allies participate in the security
alliance through sharing arrangements involving the use of facilities,
aircraft and personnel but not in the direct development or production
of U.S. nuclear weapons. These arrangements and planned activities to
assure aircraft compatibility with the B61-12 are best explained by the
Department of Defense.
During the testimony, Mr. Weber stated that the number of B61-12s
is subject to change as our nuclear posture evolves and will be
assessed annually. Yes, U.S. deployment of nuclear weapons on the
territories of our NATO allies is consistent with Article I of the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). This article
of the treaty deals only with what is prohibited, not with what is
permitted. Under Article I of the Treaty, ``Each nuclear-weapon State
Party . . . undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever
nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such
weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; . . . .'' No such
transfer occurs under NATO nuclear defense planning. The issue of U.S.
deployment of nuclear weapons on the territories of our NATO Allies was
thoroughly considered during the negotiation of the NPT in the 1960s.
This issue was of significant interest to NATO Allies and to the Senate
during the NPT ratification hearings.
Ms. Sanchez. United States taxpayers are expected to cover much of
the modernization of the B61s through a life extension program which is
to cost around $2.1 billion.
Are there any plans for NATO countries to contribute to the cost of
the B61 life extension program of the B61? How much is NATO paying in
FY14 for its share in terms of contribution to NATO nuclear sharing?
Are there plans to re-evaluate the number of B6s that will undergo
the life-extension program? And is nuclear sharing with NATO consistent
with Article 1 of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty which says
``nuclear states will not assist non-nuclear weapon states in acquiring
nuclear weapons''?
Dr. Winokur. Cost information and strategic planning related to
nuclear weapons programs are outside the jurisdiction of the Defense
Nuclear Facilities Safety Board. (Board).
Ms. Sanchez. United States taxpayers are expected to cover much of
the modernization of the B61s through a life extension program which is
to cost around $2.1 billion.
Are there any plans for NATO countries to contribute to the cost of
the B61 life extension program of the B61? How much is NATO paying in
FY14 for its share in terms of contribution to NATO nuclear sharing?
Are there plans to re-evaluate the number of B6s that will undergo
the life-extension program? And is nuclear sharing with NATO consistent
with Article 1 of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty which says
``nuclear states will not assist non-nuclear weapon states in acquiring
nuclear weapons''?
Mr. Held. a. The B61-12 is a critical component of the U.S.
commitment to NATO through extended deterrence. NATO allies participate
in the nuclear alliance through nuclear sharing arrangements involving
the use of facilities, aircraft and personnel but not in the direct
development or production of U.S. nuclear weapons. These agreements,
future changes and planned activities to assure continued compatibility
with the B61-12 are best explained by the Department of Defense.
There are no plans for North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
partner nations to contribute directly to the cost of the B61 life
extension program.
Under the unique nuclear sharing arrangements in NATO, our allies
participate in nuclear planning, possess nuclear-capable aircraft, and
provide special facilities, certified equipment and highly trained
personnel to safeguard, load, and employ U.S. nuclear weapons.
There are currently no plans to re-evaluate the number of B61s that
will undergo the life extension program. Initial assessments indicate a
very limited percentage of program savings could be achieved even if
substantial numbers and capability are reduced due to the fixed and
variable cost of all facets of the Life Extension Process. Life
extended B61s will fulfill gravity weapon requirements for both
strategic and non-strategic extended deterrence roles.
The construct through which the U.S. provides extended nuclear
deterrence to NATO is consistent with our obligations under the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty. The arrangement directly contributes to our
non-proliferation goals by reassuring non-nuclear U.S. allies and
partners that their security interests can be protected without their
own nuclear weapons.
b. During the testimony, Mr. Weber stated that the number of B61-
12s is subject to change as our nuclear posture evolves and will be
assessed annually. As stated above, the U.S. does not have a cost
sharing agreement with NATO for the development or production of
nuclear weapons.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GARAMENDI
Mr. Garamendi. When was the last time of the DOD completed an
assessment of the required number of B-61s required to receive the LEP?
Would the DOD concur that in assessing the costs of the LEP program we
should conduct a detailed analysis of the number of B-61s we retain in
the future inventory?
Mr. Weber. The 2013 Nuclear Posture Review Implementation Study
reevaluated the future stockpile needs and assessed required numbers.
The planned number of B61-12s is derived from that analysis. The total
number required for the future inventory should be analyzed as military
requirements evolve.
Mr. Garamendi. Are there DOD plans to re-evaluate the number of
B61s that would need to undergo the planned life extension program? Do
you think we will need to maintain a triad indefinitely? Who thinks
about long-term requirements and next-generation threats at STRATCOM?
Do we need a new nuclear cruise missile if we will also develop a new
nuclear-capable, stealthy bomber? Why?
Ms. Bunn. The required number of B61-12s planned for inclusion in
the life-extension program (LEP) is reviewed as part of the 6.X life
cycle management process. The current quantity of weapons to be
included is based upon the requirements for extended and strategic
deterrence commitments contained in various plans and policy documents.
Should the guidance and/or direction in these documents change, the
quantity of weapons to be produced would be reevaluated and adjusted
accordingly.
As stated in the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, although the United
States seeks the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons,
as long as they exist, the United States will maintain a safe, secure,
and effective arsenal. The President stated last year in his new
nuclear employment guidance that retaining all three Triad legs will
best maintain strategic stability at reasonable cost, while hedging
against potential technical problems or vulnerabilities and
geopolitical uncertainty. Since we cannot predict what the future
holds, the Triad will provide the next generation of U.S. policymakers
with a flexible and resilient range of capabilities to provide
effective deterrence.
Commander, U.S. Strategic Command's Resources (J8) and Intelligence
(J2) directorates continuously review and collaborate on both
requirements and threats, especially in light of on-going nuclear
modernization efforts being conducted by several nuclear-capable
countries.
We do need the Long-Range Stand-Off (LRSO) cruise missile, which is
the Air-Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM) replacement, and the new Long
Range Strike-Bomber (LRS-B) that the U.S. Air Force is developing. The
stand-off capability of the LRSO is important since it will also be
carried by B-52 and B-2 bombers which are less stealthy than the LRS-
B's design. We want an arsenal that contributes to effective
deterrence, is survivable and flexible, and provides options for the
President. Having both a penetrating bomber and the stand-off
capability of a cruise missile is necessary if we want an arsenal that
possesses these traits, especially with the advent of regional nuclear
powers whose intentions and decision processes are far from transparent
and whose military capabilities are increasingly advanced.
Mr. Garamendi. The GAO concluded in a recent report that DOD may be
significantly underreporting its 10-estimate for the modernization of
nuclear delivery systems, and does not include potential estimates for
Air Force efforts to either modernize the ICBMs or develop a new
bomber. Will you commit to providing a comprehensive and detailed plan
to the committee on what the costs will be in the next 10 years? And as
most of the costs for modernization will increase beyond the next 10
years, do you have an understanding of when the costs will peak and
what planning is needed over the next 20 years?
Ms. Bunn. I am committed to working with my DOD and other Nuclear
Weapon's Council (NWC) counterparts to provide the most accurate and
detailed estimate possible of the costs associated with the efforts to
modernize the Triad over the next 10 years. The NWC baseline plan lays
out a cost-effective modernization path to providing an updated Triad
that meets both military and policy requirements well beyond the next
20 years. As you are aware, DOD and DOE report annually on the costs
associated with the modernization plan over the subsequent 10 years in
the Section 1043 report; the most recent version was delivered to
Congress on May 7th, 2014.
Mr. Garamendi. Is DOD planning to re-evaluate the number of B61s
that would have to undergo life extension? What was the analysis that
determined the number of B61s required? Please provide a copy of this
analysis.
Ms. Bunn. The number of B61-12 weapons to be produced through the
Life-Extension Program (LEP) was evaluated by DOD and approved by the
Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC) at the onset of the program. As part of
the evaluation, the NWC received input and recommendations from several
stakeholders and all members of the Council. The required number of
bombs is continuously reviewed throughout the 6.X life cycle management
process, and the current projected quantity of weapons to be
refurbished is based upon the requirements for extended and strategic
deterrence commitments as outlined in various plans and policy
documents. Should the guidance and/or direction in these documents
change, the quantity of B61-12 bombs to be produced would be adjusted
accordingly.
I will work with the NWC Chair to provide you with a brief on the
B61 requirements analysis process.
Mr. Garamendi. Are you confident NNSA can perform 4-5 concurrent
life extension programs?
Ms. Bunn. At the present time, the Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC)
baseline plan does not exceed two concurrent Life-Extension Programs
(LEPs) at any one time. I am confident that NNSA can execute the NWC's
priorities; although in the current fiscal environment it faces
increased risk due to the prospect of inconsistent and unstable
funding. The NWC is actively updating the baseline plan as well as
evaluating NNSA's progress to ensure a stable and steady workflow for
the highly talented individuals who are working on these LEP programs.
Mr. Garamendi. The GAO concluded in a recent report that DOD may be
significantly underreporting its 10-estimate for the modernization of
nuclear delivery systems, and does not include potential estimates for
Air Force efforts to either modernize the ICBMs or develop a new
bomber. Will you commit to providing a comprehensive and detailed plan
to the committee on what the costs will be in the next 10 years? And as
most of the costs for modernization will increase beyond the next 10
years, do you have an understanding of when the costs will peak and
what planning is needed over the next 20 years?
Admiral Benedict. I commit to continue to support the Department of
Navy's submission of nuclear deterrent modernization budget estimates
in accordance with section 1043 of the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2012.
Mr. Garamendi. The GAO concluded in a recent report that DOD may be
significantly underreporting its 10-estimate for the modernization of
nuclear delivery systems, and does not include potential estimates for
Air Force efforts to either modernize the ICBMs or develop a new
bomber. Will you commit to providing a comprehensive and detailed plan
to the committee on what the costs will be in the next 10 years? And as
most of the costs for modernization will increase beyond the next 10
years, do you have an understanding of when the costs will peak and
what planning is needed over the next 20 years?
General Harencak. In response to the Government Accountability
Office (GAO) report, the Air Force has incorporated 10-year cost
estimates for both the Long Range Strike-Bomber and Intercontinental
Ballistic Missile modernization in the Fiscal Year 2015 Report on the
Plan for the Nuclear Weapons Stockpile, Nuclear Weapons Complex,
Nuclear Weapons Delivery Systems, and Nuclear Weapons Command and
Control System, as specified in Section 1043 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012. The Air Force will continue
providing such estimates to the Congress in the future.
These estimates are based on programmed amounts reflected in the
Zero Real Growth (ZRG) Program Force Extended (PFE) data contained in
the annual Air Force Integrated Planning Force. These budget values
reflect the 20-year balanced Air Force funding plan at the constrained
funding levels required to meet current fiscal requirements. Budget
figures in this plan are used as the basis for affordability goals for
future modernization and sustainment efforts that have not yet become
formal acquisition programs (pre-Milestone B), such as Ground Based
Strategic Deterrent.
Mr. Garamendi. What are your top concerns with regard to providing
adequate safety across the nuclear enterprise?
Dr. Winokur. The Board's top safety concerns with regard to
providing adequate protection across the nuclear weapons enterprise are
summarized below.
Earthquake Hazard at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL): The
Board believes continued dialogue with the Department of Energy (DOE)
is necessary to fully resolve issues regarding adequate protection of
public health and safety in the event of an earthquake affecting the
Plutonium Facility at LANL. The design basis seismic accident scenario
results in unacceptably large offsite radiation dose consequences to
the public. The Board's Recommendation 2009-2, Los Alamos National
Laboratory Plutonium Facility Seismic Safety, identified the need to
improve the safety posture of the facility.
Aging Infrastructure: In our recent Report to Congress: Summary of
Significant Safety-Related Aging Infrastructure Issues at Operating
Defense Nuclear Facilities, the Board identified safety- related
concerns regarding aging infrastructure at DOE defense nuclear
facilities. These facilities included Chemistry and Metallurgy Research
(CMR) Facility at LANL, the 9212 Complex at the Y-12 National Security
Complex, and the Hanford Single-Shell and Double-Shell Tanks as
examples of some of the most significant safety-related aging
infrastructure issues that exist today in the DOE defense nuclear
complex.
Two of the most critical facilities with respect to aging
infrastructure are the CMR Facility at LANL, constructed in 1952, and
the 9212 Complex at the Y-12 National Security Complex that began
service in 1951. DOE deferred funding for the CMR Replacement Project
for 5 years, and expects to operate the existing CMR Facility through
2019. The 9212 Complex is comprised of Building 9212 and 13 collocated
buildings, portions of which have been in operation for more than 60
years. The Uranium Processing Facility (UPF) is scheduled to replace
the 9212 Complex, but DOE does not plan to commence operations in UPF
until 2025.
Complex-wide stabilization and disposition of the remnants of
nuclear weapons production activities enhances public health and safety
near DOE sites. The cleanup of legacy waste at Hanford presents the
most significant challenge in this regard. DOE stores more than 50
million gallons of high-level radioactive waste in 177 underground
tanks at the Hanford site. Many of the old single-shell tanks have been
known to leak. In addition, Hanford's double-shell tanks are aging and
are expected to be in use well beyond their design life. DOE identified
a slow, but continuing leak from the primary (inner) tank of double-
shell tank AY-102 in August 2012. The Board has been closely following
DOE's response to the leak, including DOE's evaluations of other tanks
containing similar waste and the potential impact on the overall waste
retrieval and treatment strategy.
At the Savannah River Site (SRS), operations at H-Canyon, HB-Line,
Defense Waste Processing Facility, and the Saltstone Production
Facility have permitted steady progress in immobilizing radioactive
materials in 47 high-level waste tanks. However, factors such as budget
constraints and facility aging continue to complicate the disposition
of legacy waste at SRS. The Board's oversight will continue to focus on
the on-going high-level waste operations and the completion of the Salt
Waste Processing Facility.
Early Integration of Safety in Design: The Board believes early
integration of safety in large, complex design projects and timely
resolution of safety-related issues are key factors to providing
adequate protection of public and worker health and safety. DOE has
struggled with the early integration of safety into its large, complex
design projects and the timely resolution of safety related issues.
During 2013, DOE made progress in resolving certain safety issues
affecting complex design and construction projects. On other issues,
however, DOE encountered problems with closure and integration of
safety into the design process. DOE continued to struggle with open
safety issues at the Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant at the
Hanford Site. Beginning in 2012, DOE slowed the construction of two of
the plant's key facilities--Pretreatment and High-Level Waste--to
resolve safety issues and to reevaluate the project's design. Many of
these issues have been outstanding for years.
Activity-Level Work Planning and Control: The Board's Technical
Report-37, Integrated Safety Management at the Activity Level: Work
Planning and Control, and accompanying Board letter issued on August
28, 2012, outlined challenges in the safe performance of work at DOE's
defense nuclear facilities. DOE responded by proposing new
implementation and oversight guidance and is in the process of
enhancing oversight of activity-level work planning and control by
headquarters, field offices, and contractors. The Board's future review
efforts will assess the need for additional DOE requirements to support
improved work planning and control.
Criticality Safety at the Los Alamos National Laboratory: In May
2013, the Board's staff conducted a review of the criticality safety
program at the Plutonium Facility at LANL. The staff review team
identified several criticality safety concerns, including widespread
weaknesses in conduct of operations. On June 27, 2013, the LANL
Director paused programmatic operations in the Plutonium Facility, in
part, to enable laboratory management to address nuclear criticality
safety concerns identified by both internal and external assessments.
National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) managers briefed the
Board on a strategy to develop criticality safety evaluations (CSE) for
higher-risk operations prior to resumption. The Board is aware that
this plan has evolved such that the LANL Director intends to resume
many higher-risk operations without first developing compliant CSEs.
DOE directives and industry consensus standards require that CSEs
unambiguously demonstrate how fissionable material operations will
remain subcritical under both normal and credible abnormal conditions.
These CSEs identify controls to ensure safe operation. The Board
requested a briefing by NNSA on how federal and contractor managers
will ensure that adequate controls are identified as the contractor
resumes higher-risk operations in the Plutonium Facility.
Emergency Preparedness and Response: Emergency preparedness and
response is a key component of the safety bases for defense nuclear
facilities. It is the last line of defense to prevent public and worker
exposure to hazardous materials. The Board believes that the
requirements in DOE's Directives that establish the basis for emergency
preparedness and response at DOE defense nuclear facilities, as well as
the current implementation of these Directives, must be strengthened to
ensure the continued protection of workers and the public.
Problems with emergency preparedness and response have been
discussed at Board public hearings and meetings during the past three
years, as well as in the weekly reports of the Board's site
representatives. On March 21, 2014, and March 28, 2014, the Board
transmitted letters to the Secretary of Energy conveying its concerns
regarding the emergency responses at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant in
Carlsbad, New Mexico, to the truck fire and radioactive material
release events. These ineffective responses and the consequences of the
accidents demonstrate the importance of a strong emergency preparedness
and response program. The topic of emergency preparedness and response
at all defense nuclear facilities will continue to be a top priority
for the Board.
Mr. Garamendi. What will the increased funding over last year's
appropriations fund?
Dr. Winokur. The additional $2.1M over the Fiscal Year (FY) 2014
appropriation of $28M will fund nine additional full-time employees
(FTE) and an assumed 1% civilian pay raise.
Excluding additional workload requirements levied by the National
Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY 2013, the Board requires 120
FTEs to meet the scope of its oversight responsibilities. Both the FY
2012 and FY 2013 (apart from the impact of sequestration) enacted
appropriations provided funding for 120 FTEs. The President's Budget
for FY 2014 requested $29.9M to fund 120 FTEs; $28M funds approximately
116 FTEs. An additional 1$1.1M is needed to fund the assumed 1%
civilian pay raise and four additional FTEs to reach the required 120
FTE level.
An additional $1M is needed to fund five (5) additional FTEs (for a
total of 125) to address additional workload requirements levied by the
NDAA for FY 2013. The NDAA included several new provisions that
increase staff workload. The Board's staff must now support formal risk
assessments by the Board for new recommendations to the Secretary of
Energy. The recommendation process was also modified to require the
production of a draft recommendation and an opportunity for the
Secretary of Energy to comment before the recommendation is made final.
Additional staff workload is anticipated in the analysis of and
response to Secretarial comments. Finally, the NDAA for FY 2013
required that the Board enter into an agreement with an agency of the
Federal government having expertise in the Board's mission to procure
the services of the Inspector General (IG) of such agency in accordance
with the Inspector General Act of 1978. Subsequently, the Consolidated
Appropriations Act for FY 2014 assigned the IG of the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC) to also serve as the Board's IG, and
directly appropriated $850,000 to the NRC Office of the Inspector
General (NRC-OIG) for that effort. The NRC is proposing to dedicate
five full-time employees (to be located at the Board's headquarters) to
perform IG services for the Board. Having a dedicated, on-site staff of
five employees from the NRC-OIG performing IG services will generate
significant additional workload for the Board. Without additional FTEs,
the Board will have to absorb that workload to address IG concerns
within its existing FTEs. Consequently, the FTEs directly performing
the Board's safety oversight mission will decrease.
Traditional high-risk administrative areas that the NRC-OIG is
likely to focus on include purchase and travel cards, time and
attendance procedures, property accountability, and control of
classified information. The NRC-OIG has also preliminarily indicated a
potential focus on the following technical performance areas: processes
for safety oversight, construction oversight, oversight of
decommissioning, public meetings, oversight of controls to prevent
inadvertent criticality, and oversight of fire protection.
Communicating and coordinating with the IG staff, responding to
requests for data, explaining and documenting work processes, reviewing
draft reports, etc., will significantly increase workload in both the
Board's administrative and direct mission areas.
To address these additional FY 2015 workload requirements, the
Board requires additional staffing of five FTEs in the following areas:
A senior-level employee to serve as the Board's sole
interface with the NRC-OIG staff. Duties would include receiving and
reviewing requests for data from the IG staff to support audits and
other reviews, coordinating meetings, communicating data requests to
appropriate staff for response, reviewing responses provided to the IG
staff, maintaining a tracking log of pending and completed data
requests, etc.
Two mid-level employees in administrative areas to
support the additional workload generated from administrative audits
and reviews.
Two mid-level engineers or technical specialists to
support the additional workload generated by formal risk assessments
and Secretarial comments on draft recommendations, as well as the
additional workload generated from technical performance audits and
reviews.
Mr. Garamendi. Are you confident safety is a top priority for NNSA
and the Department of Energy?
Dr. Winokur. A focus on safety is essential in any nuclear
enterprise, and the standard for safety in a nuclear enterprise must be
much higher than that of a typical industrial activity. The Board
recognizes that safety is an integral part of the Rules and Directives
that govern the work of DOE and NNSA personnel at all DOE defense
nuclear facilities. The Board also recognizes that many DOE and NNSA
managers embrace the importance of nuclear safety as essential to the
protection of the workers and the public, and to the mission itself.
However, at times, some in DOE and NNSA may lose focus on the
importance of safety, or may allow mission and schedule pressures to
trump safety. This balance between mission and safety can be
challenging for managers who must decide where to allocate scarce
resources. Furthermore, managers may have difficulty measuring safety;
an absence of accidents may be interpreted as an indication that safety
programs are no longer needed, leading managers to reduce the staffing
levels of safety personnel. The safety violations and accidents that
result are the types of situations that led Congress to create the
Board more than 25 years ago. Today and going forward, the Board
believes its mission is still essential to safeguard against these
situations where DOE or NNSA managers lose focus on safety due to
competing priorities.
The Board will be conducting two hearings this year to address
safety culture at DOE defense nuclear facilities and the Board's
Recommendation 2011-1, Safety Culture at the Waste Treatment and
Immobilization Plant. At these hearings, the Board will explore how DOE
balances mission and safety and whether safety is an ``overriding''
priority.
Mr. Garamendi. Please provide more details on possible MOX
alternatives that NNSA is considering with regards to the disposition
of the current nuclear stockpile.
Mr. Held. On April 29, 2014 the Department released its ``Analysis
of Surplus Weapon-Grade Plutonium Disposition Options''. Attached is a
chart from page 35 of this report which summarized the options.
Additional detail on each option can be found in the report which is
also posted here:
http://nnsa.energy.gov/sites/default/files/nnsa/04-14-inlinefiles/
SurplusPuDisposition
Options.pdf
[The chart referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 156.]
Mr. Garamendi. Can we achieve a 30 or potentially 50-pit production
capacity with existing facilities? Did NNSA consider using existing
facilities across the nuclear enterprise to contribute to the pit
analysis and production capacity at Los Alamos? And is NNSA an analysis
of alternatives before planning and designing potential new modular
facilities at Los Alamos National Laboratories?
What are your priorities for the plutonium strategy?
Mr. Held. The priorities for the plutonium strategy are to:
1. Achieve 30 pits per year in 2026 through Plutonium Sustainment
program investments and investments to optimize the use of existing
infrastructure at LANL (i.e., the Radiological Laboratory/Utility/
Office Building (RLUOB) and PF-4) for analytical chemistry (AC) and
materials characterization (MC).
2. Cease programmatic operations in CMR by 2019. This effort is
supported by the investments needed to optimize use of the RLUOB and
reuse laboratory space in PF-4. The NNSA believes that investments in
existing infrastructure will support 30 pits per year production; as
demand increases beyond 30 pits per year, additional space will likely
be needed. After deferral of the CMRR-Nuclear Facility, NF, an analysis
of options to use existing infrastructure for plutonium support
capabilities was performed. Results of this analysis indicated that AC
and MC capability needs could be met by optimizing existing
infrastructure at Los Alamos National Laboratory.
The proposed modular approach provides additional space and extends
the lifetime of PF 4. This proposal is in its pre-conceptual phase; an
appropriate alternatives analysis will be performed consistent with DOE
Order 413.3B as the project develops.
Mr. Garamendi. Do the pits and secondaries we hold in reserve serve
as part of the hedge for our nuclear deterrent?
Mr. Held. No. As described in the report submitted to Congress in
June of 2013, titled Report on Nuclear Employment Strategy of the
United States Specified in Section 491 of 10 USC, the hedge currently
consists of only fully assembled nuclear warheads.
Mr. Garamendi. Can you guarantee that NNSA can successfully perform
4-5 life extensions concurrently, as was planned in FY14? How many
concurrent LEPs does the FY15 plan envision?
Mr. Held. There are many conditions that are required to
successfully execute multiple life extensions concurrently. There must
be sufficient funding, work force balancing, adequate capacity, and the
absence of significant technical surprises. What I can guarantee is
that NNSA will do everything possible to ensure success, given the
requisite resources. The plan described in the FY 2015 Stockpile
Stewardship and Management Plan has a maximum of five life extension
programs running concurrently in FY 2023-2025, but they are different
types of efforts (e.g., development, production) requiring different
teams.
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