[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
VERIFYING IRAN'S NUCLEAR COMPLIANCE
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JUNE 10, 2014
__________
Serial No. 113-173
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
DANA ROHRABACHER, California Samoa
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio BRAD SHERMAN, California
JOE WILSON, South Carolina GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
TED POE, Texas GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
MATT SALMON, Arizona THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina KAREN BASS, California
ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
MO BROOKS, Alabama DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
TOM COTTON, Arkansas ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
PAUL COOK, California JUAN VARGAS, California
GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois
RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III,
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania Massachusetts
STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas AMI BERA, California
RON DeSANTIS, Florida ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California
DOUG COLLINS, Georgia GRACE MENG, New York
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
TED S. YOHO, Florida TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
SEAN DUFFY, Wisconsin JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
Amy Porter, Chief of Staff Thomas Sheehy, Staff Director
Jason Steinbaum, Democratic Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
WITNESSES
The Honorable Stephen G. Rademaker, National Security Advisor,
Bipartisan Policy Center (former Assistant Secretary, Bureau of
Arms Control & Bureau of International Security and
Nonproliferation, U.S. Department of State).................... 6
Mr. John A. Lauder, senior advisor, 20twenty Strategic
Consulting, Inc. (former Director, Nonproliferation Center,
Intelligence Community)........................................ 16
Mr. Olli Heinonen, senior fellow, Belfer Center for Science and
International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of Government,
Harvard University (former Deputy Director General,
International Atomic Energy Agency)............................ 34
The Honorable Joseph R. DeTrani, president, Intelligence and
National Security Alliance (former Director, National Counter
Proliferation Center, Office of the Director of National
Intelligence).................................................. 45
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
The Honorable Stephen G. Rademaker: Prepared statement........... 10
Mr. John A. Lauder: Prepared statement........................... 18
Mr. Olli Heinonen: Prepared statement............................ 36
The Honorable Joseph R. DeTrani: Prepared statement.............. 47
APPENDIX
Hearing notice................................................... 84
Hearing minutes.................................................. 85
The Honorable Randy K. Weber Sr., a Representative in Congress
from the State of Texas: Material submitted for the record..... 87
The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress
from the Commonwealth of Virginia: Prepared statement.......... 89
VERIFYING IRAN'S NUCLEAR COMPLIANCE
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TUESDAY, JUNE 10, 2014
House of Representatives,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:07 a.m., in
room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Edward Royce
(chairman of the committee) presiding.
Chairman Royce. This hearing will come to order. This
morning we are focused on Iran's efforts to acquire a nuclear
weapons capability, and how to stop it.
International negotiations over Iran's nuclear program are
coming down to the wire. Indeed, an urgent push is going on as
we speak. Senior administration officials are sitting with the
Iranians today in Geneva. Some critical differences remain,
including the status of Iran's enrichment capability, which is
technology key to developing a nuclear weapon. Iran's stated
desire is to increase from its roughly 19,000 centrifuges today
to over 50,000. The future of Iran's ``plutonium bomb factory''
at Arak remains unclear. Iran continues to stonewall
international inspectors on its past bomb-making work. And just
the other week, the country's Supreme Leader characterized the
requirement that, as part of the final agreement, Iran limit
its ballistic missile program as in his words ``stupid, idiotic
expectations.'' I think we can presume that this is going to be
a hard climb here. Meanwhile, Iran continues its support for
terrorism abroad. It continues its quest for regional
domination, and the abysmal human rights record at home
continues where those who are not of the right belief system,
according to the theocratic state, are executed. A nuclear-
capable Iran would be a national security disaster.
While the sides might sound far apart, the Obama
administration will push very hard to reach a deal before the
July 20th negotiating deadline, and this committee may soon be
asked to judge a ``comprehensive agreement.'' Central to this
would be evaluating the verification measures needed to ensure
that Iran cannot cheat. So what types of conditions should U.S.
negotiators be demanding? What are the limits of verification?
How does the IAEA's reliance on Iran's cooperation impact its
work? Some cite the adage ``trust, but verify.'' In this case,
there certainly can't be any trust. The question today is, can
there be verification?
These questions are sharpened by the fact that Iran's
leaders have invested massive resources and decades of effort
into their own nuclear program there. Enrichment facilities
were built in secret, a violation of its agreement with the
IAEA. One was even dug into a mountainside on a military base,
another violation. As one witness will testify, ``when it comes
to Iran's nuclear program, they have a history of deception, a
history of covert procurement, and construction of clandestine
facilities that are acknowledged only when revealed by the
government's adversaries.''
This dangerous regime has tied its prestige to its nuclear
ambitions, and they are not peaceful. Given Iran's record of
clandestine activity and intransigence, clear consequences for
violating transparency and cooperation requirements must be
spelled out with zero tolerance for cheating.
An immediate test of Iran's willingness to cooperate rests
with the IAEA's attempts to clarify evidence the international
observer group has on the ``potential military dimensions'' of
Iran's programs. For several years, Iran has refused to provide
explanations or information to the IAEA on past bomb efforts.
This includes the Parchin military base, where Iran has gone to
great lengths to eliminate all traces of any clandestine
activity, including demolishing buildings and removing large
areas of soil from the site.
Iran's willingness to come clean on its past weapons
program should be an acid test for Western negotiators. We must
ask: What good is striking an agreement and removing sanctions,
our only leverage, if Iran keeps a capacity to secretly build
nuclear bombs?
Unfortunately, U.S. negotiators have already made a key
concession that will complicate the task of verifying Iran's
nuclear commitments. The Interim Agreement of last year would
allow Iran to maintain a mutually defined enrichment program.
This program could give Iran cover to develop a covert weapons
program, as technically speaking, the ability to produce low-
enriched uranium is perilously close to that needed for a
nuclear weapon.
If Iran is left with the capacity to enrich, a break-out
race to a weapon will be a permanent threat, a threat that
undoubtedly would increase as sanctions are eased and the world
turns its attention elsewhere. That is especially troubling,
given how Iranian leaders have spoken of Israel as in their
words, a ``one-bomb country.''
Many on the committee are very troubled that the Obama
administration has us on track to an agreement that leaves Iran
as a permanent nuclear threat to the region and to us. Today's
hearing will be this committee's latest warning against this
ill-considered course of action.
And I will now turn to the ranking member for his opening
statement, Mr. Eliot Engel of New York.
Mr. Engel. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. You
know, you and I have made a great deal, as have other members
of our committee, about the bipartisan nature of our committee
and how you and I have worked hard to make this the most
bipartisan committee in the Congress.
I must say after listening to your opening statement, I
agree with it fully. I share your concerns and I think these
are concerns of many, many members of this committee on both
sides of the aisle. So I want to thank you for calling this
timely and important hearing. And as the P5+1 in Iran continue
to negotiate, a potential agreement on Iran's nuclear weapons
program, we need to carefully examine how such a deal could be
fully verified. What are the requirements for a final deal?
What safeguards are needed to give us confidence that Iran has
truly ceased its drive to develop a nuclear weapons capability?
According to the IAEA, the Joint Plan of Action Interim
Agreement has paused many of Iran's advancements toward a
nuclear weapon. However, if this temporary agreement became
permanent, it would certainly be inadequate. The status quo
would leave us with too many unanswered questions and an Iran
that is too close to a nuclear breakout point. A comprehensive
agreement is necessary to end the permanent threat of a nuclear
Iran.
With just weeks away from the July 20th deadline that the
Joint Plan of Action set for a comprehensive deal, there have
already been rumblings that an extension will be needed. Just
last week, the head of the IAEA made clear that his agency
would not be able to finish its ongoing investigation of Iran's
nuclear program before July 20th. That actually might work in
our interests if negotiations are continuing, but there is no
deal and we need an extension.
The negotiations between the P5+1 in Iran have taken place
behind closed doors so we cannot evaluate the specific details
of the potential deal that is being discussed. I hope that we
will have an opportunity to hear from the administration in
open session when appropriate.
Whatever its final form, it is safe to say that this deal
will not be based, as you said, Mr. Chairman, on Ronald
Reagan's old axiom ``trust, but verify.'' On the contrary,
there is a tremendous amount of mistrust between the parties
and the Iranians deserve every ounce of suspicion. Tehran has
spent years developing a covert nuclear program and has
brazenly violated its obligations under the Non-Proliferation
Treaty. Under this cloud of mistrust, we must carefully examine
one of the most important parts of the deal, how do we verify
Iran's compliance? Iran may not make a mad dash for the bomb,
but everything I have seen and know about the Iranian regime
tells me that they will try to push the boundaries of any
comprehensive agreement and test the will of the international
community to respond.
One of my primary concerns is that even if negotiators are
able to reach a deal, we still don't what we don't know.
Building covert facilities, illicitly procuring equipment,
outsourcing its program elsewhere; these steps could put Iran
back on the path to a nuclear weapon.
Mr. Chairman, today's hearing is important because Congress
has an important role to play in this deal. I want to reiterate
that. Congress has an important role to play in this deal. Any
long-term sanctions relief must, and I say must, be approved by
Congress. And to pass such relief, we will have to be convinced
that the deal on the table is a good one which brings us back
to the key questions facing our panel today.
What are the minimum requirements for a good deal? I know
that Secretary Kerry has said ``no deal is better than a bad
deal.'' Well, I agree. The question is, will we agree on what
is a good deal? What sort of verification measures will be
needed to give us full confidence that Iran isn't cheating, or
worse, attempting to break out? And finally, if we can't reach
a deal with strong verification measures, what is the
alternative?
You know, I have been troubled by the negotiations with
Iran. I hope we do have a comprehensive agreement. I hope it is
verifiable and I hope that we are pleased with it. But you know
what troubles me is while we are negotiating with Iran, they
still continue to enrich. And it seemed to me that we could
have and should have made a deal saying to the Iranians, ``If
you want to talk with us for 6 months, you stop enriching while
we are talking.'' I don't think that was so much to ask. And
the fact that it wasn't done troubles me. I am told that it
wasn't done because Iran wouldn't agree to it. Well, if they
didn't agree to something as simple as that, what does that
tell us, I fear, about their acquiescence to any kind of
comprehensive agreement?
So I welcome the testimony of our panel of expert witnesses
to help answer these critical questions. But as far as I am
concerned, I want to see a dismantling of Iran's program, not
just a point where they are at nuclear break-out capacity, not
at the point where we perhaps push them back a few months. I
want to see them dismantle their program. And I thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Royce. Thank you, Mr. Engel. We go now to Ileana
Ros-Lehtinen of Florida, chairman of the Subcommittee on the
Middle East and North Africa, who has been focused on Iran for
a very long time.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much, Chairman Royce, and
Ranking Member Engel for holding this vitally important
hearing. While the administration continues to negotiate a bad
and weak deal with Iran, while keeping Congress in the dark, it
is important for us to continue to highlight the menacing
nature of the Iranian regime and the flaws in the
administration's approach to this deception. We are almost at
the end of the 6-month agreement, yet the administration has
failed to properly consult with Congress about important parts
of this deal. Where are the details?
Congress has been steadfast in our mission to prevent Iran
from acquiring nuclear weapons and it was only because of our
efforts on implementing Iran's sanctions that Iran has even
agreed to negotiate. I authored, with the support of so many
members of this committee, the strictest sanctions against
Iran, and now we are seeing all of that work undone by the
administration that misguidedly and dangerously trusts Iran
despite decades of evidence that tells us that the mullahs are
untrustworthy. Time to wake up. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Royce. Thank you, Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. We go now to
Representative Ted Deutch of Florida, the ranking member on the
Middle East and North Africa Subcommittee.
Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This morning's hearing
is on verifying compliance. I fear that the hearing topic might
be a bit premature. We are now coming up on the July 20th date,
the end of the 6-month period. And before talking about
compliance, we find ourselves asking what meaningful
discussions have taken place on reducing the number of
centrifuges? How close are we to a resolution on Fordow? What
is the plan to mothball Arak? Has there been any access to
Parchin, at all? And finally, and I think most importantly,
when will Iran come clean on the military dimensions of its
program?
These were the fundamental points that we had to deal with
during the 6-month period and as we approach the end of the 6-
month period, the notion that we can simply extend for another
6 months because we don't have a deal yet is not an acceptable
one. We need to have some sense that there is movement on the
part of the Iranians toward a resolution rather than only
delay. And I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today
on how we might do that. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Royce. Thank you, Mr. Deutch. Now we go to Mr. Ted
Poe, chair of the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation,
and Trade.
Mr. Poe. Since the Joint Plan of Action was signed by Iran
and the P5+1 in November, the administration has been
negotiating with the Iranians for a big final deal. I hope our
negotiators are not the same ones that worked in the big deal
to trade in the Taliban 5 for Bergdahl. The administration
seems to be giving away the courthouse and the mineral rights
as well. It seems the White House would rather have any
agreement, even a bad one, than no agreement at all.
Iran is insisting on the right to enrich, which will allow
them to cheat and come up with a bomb. This could take a few
months or maybe a few years. They could develop a bomb so fast
that we will not be able to detect it or stop it and then Saudi
Arabia, Turkey, and Egypt will want to develop nuclear weapons.
We must insist on absolute dismantling of nuclear weapon
capability in any agreement. We are not dealing with nice
people and cannot believe they will be honest about nuclear
development. We must remember the Ayatollah still insists on
the destruction of Israel and the United States and we must
remember the Iranians are still developing intercontinental
ballistic missiles, which could be used against the United
States. So I have a lot of questions to ask. Thank you Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Royce. Thank you, Judge. We go now to Mr. Brad
Sherman of California, the ranking member on the Subcommittee
on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade.
Mr. Sherman. I strongly agree with the statements of the
chair and the ranking member and reflect that this committee
was pushing for strong sanctions on Iran over the objection of
three administrations. Iran was brought to the table only
because Congress imposed sanctions, they were resisted by the
executive branch. In these negotiations, a lot of the focus is
on whether Iran will enrich. Of equal importance is whether
they will stockpile. Iran's resistance to enforcement
mechanisms betrays an interest in evasion. It is easier to
reactivate a centrifuge cascade than it is to reassemble
international sanctions.
Accordingly, we not only need to negotiate with Iran what
mechanisms there will be to detect evasion, but we need to
negotiate with our European and Asian partners what automatic
sanctions reapplication will apply if any violation is
detected.
And finally, our experience with the Soviet Union
illustrates that you can negotiate a deal and enforce a deal,
even with an untrustworthy partner and even if that partner has
greater capacity for evasion than Iran. So I think a deal is
physically possible. The question is whether we will reach one.
Chairman Royce. Thank you, Mr. Sherman. We are joined to
help us think through these critical issues, we are joined by a
distinguished group of experts here. Mr. John Lauder is a
senior advisor at 2020 Strategic Consulting. He previously
served as deputy director of the National Reconnaissance Office
for National Support and was director of the DCI Non-
Proliferation Center.
We have Mr. Olli Heinonen. He is a Senior Fellow at the
Harvard Kennedy School of Government's Belfer Center for
Science and International Affairs. Previously, he served 27
years at the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna,
where he was Deputy Director and head of its Department of
Safeguards.
We have Ambassador DeTrani. Prior to assuming his role as
President of the Intelligence and National Security Alliance,
Ambassador Joseph DeTrani served as the senior advisor to the
Director of National Intelligence and he was Director of the
National Counter-Proliferation Center.
And we have Mr. Stephen Rademaker. Prior to joining the
Bipartisan Policy Center as a National Security Project
Advisor, Mr. Rademaker served as Assistant Secretary of State
for the Bureau of Arms Control and the Bureau of International
Security and Nonproliferation. Prior to that, he served as
Deputy Staff Director and Chief Counsel of this committee and
we welcome him back.
So let me say that without objection, the witnesses' full
prepared statement will be made part of the record. That is to
encourage you to synthesize this into 5 minutes and the members
here are going to have 5 calendar days to submit statements and
questions and any extraneous material for the record.
So Mr. Rademaker, if you would please summarize your
remarks, we will begin with you.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE STEPHEN G. RADEMAKER, NATIONAL
SECURITY ADVISOR, BIPARTISAN POLICY CENTER (FORMER ASSISTANT
SECRETARY, BUREAU OF ARMS CONTROL & BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY AND NONPROLIFERATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE)
Mr. Rademaker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Congressman
Engel. It is a real pleasure for me to appear here before the
committee. It is always nice to come home to the Rayburn Office
Building.
You know I joined the committee staff in 1993 and one of
the foremost issues of concern to the members of the committee
in 1993 was the risk that Iran might acquire a nuclear weapon.
And to me, it is really astonishing that here we are more than
20 years later and this remains one of the foremost threats to
U.S. national security. I just want to observe at the outset
that I think this committee has consistently paid attention to
this problem for more than two decades. You have provided
extraordinary leadership to our nation and I think the American
people are very well served by the leadership this committee
has provided under a number of chairmen over the last 20-plus
years. And I am glad to see that you are continuing to pay
attention to the problem as demonstrated by today's hearing.
I have submitted a prepared statement, so perhaps I will
just summarize the key points that I make. The first point I
make in my prepared statement is that Iran is not like other
countries that say they want to develop civil nuclear energy.
They have a track record of deception, of covert procurement.
The totality of the evidence strongly suggests that Iran is
interested in developing a nuclear weapon. So they can't be
treated like a normal country. And that is why the question of
verification of any agreement that is reached with Iran is
critically important and that is why this is a very timely
hearing that you are having today.
The second point I make and I say if you only take away one
point from my testimony today I want it to be this. Today, we
are very much focused on verification of the Joint Plan of
Action and the so-called Comprehensive Solution that is being
negotiated now between the two sides in Vienna. A lot of the
focus, most of the focus in verification discussions is valid.
How do we verify their compliance with the JPA? How do we
verify their compliance with the Comprehensive Solution? And I
think that is important, given Iran's track record and I am
joined by experts today that are going to have deep insights
into how we should go about trying to detect any cheating by
Iran on those agreements.
But my critical point to you is the focus of verification
has to be broader than just compliance with the current
agreement and the one that is being negotiated right now.
Verification has to look at what has happened in the past
because there are a lot of unanswered questions about the past.
It also has to be--this is even more important. I think we need
to be worried about permanent verification because, as I
explained in my testimony, the framework of the Joint Plan of
Action and my Comprehensive Solution is that there is to be a
long-term agreement here. But it is not a permanent agreement.
It is to be, by its terms, it is to be time limited. That has
been agreed to by the Obama administration and the P5+1.
So what is being negotiated, it will be an agreement that
applies for some period of time. I think the Iranians, my
understanding is the Iranians only want it to be in effect for
5 years. Other experts are saying it needs to run 20 years. I
don't know what the P5+1 is asking, but I think the duration of
this Comprehensive Solution is going to be somewhere between 5
years and 20 years. That remains to be negotiated.
So all of these discussions you are hearing now about
limits on the number of centrifuges and the amount of enriched
material that they can have, those limitations will apply while
the Comprehensive Solution is in effect. But the JPA is crystal
clear that when that term expires, when the agreed duration of
the Comprehensive Solution is reached, all of these limitations
end and then Iran becomes like any other country. Everything
goes away. And let me just read the language from the JPA. It
says, ``Following successful implementation of the final step
of the Comprehensive Solution for its full duration''--that is
the period that they agreed to--``the Iranian nuclear program
will be treated in the same manner as that of any non-nuclear
weapons state party to the NPT.'' And what that means is after
5 years or after 20 years or whatever the period is, nuclear
sanctions on Iran go away. That is the U.N. sanctions on Iran
have to go away. Our sanctions on Iran have to go away. All of
that is to end at that point. Restrictions on nuclear commerce
with Iran end. So Iran can't be singled out and treated
differently than other countries. We can't have export controls
that treat Iran differently than other countries. Nor can the
rest of the international community. Iran becomes a legitimate
partner.
So the idea of the Comprehensive Solution is that for a
period of time if Iran behaves, if they are not caught
cheating, and they uphold their commitments under the
Comprehensive Solution, at the end of the Comprehensive
Solution, they go from being nuclear pariah to nuclear partner.
And at that point they are subject to the same verification
that Germany or Japan or any other country is subject to. That
basically consists of two things. That consists of IAEA
verification under the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement that
applies to all countries. And then secondly, the additional
protocol is enhanced verification that Iran has committed to
ratifying and implementing under the JPA. But that is it. There
will be more robust verification agreed to under the
Comprehensive Solution and I think the parties are talking
about. But that more robust verification will end when the
Comprehensive Solution ends. And then we revert back to the
additional protocol and comprehensive safeguards, the same
verification that every other country in the world is subject
to.
I think it is a critical question for the committee to ask
whether you are prepared today to agree that if Iran behaves
for a set period of time, then we are prepared to end their
sanctions. We are prepared to end special scrutiny of Iran and
treat them as if they were Japan.
I point out in my testimony, there are other examples of
countries that have abandoned nuclear weapons programs and we
have accepted that. And once they abandon their nuclear weapons
program, we then treat them like a normal country. South Africa
is an example. Brazil and Argentina are examples. But what was
different in those cases was not only did they say they were
abandoning nuclear weapons programs, and not only did they take
steps in that direction, but in those cases there was also a
fundamental change in government. In South Africa, the
apartheid regime ended and Nelson Mandela took power. In Brazil
and Argentina, military governments gave up power to civilian
elected governments. And so it was logical in those cases to
accept that there had been a fundamental change, that the
government perhaps was no longer interested in nuclear weapons.
In the case of Iran, the vision of the JPA is there doesn't
need to be a fundamental change in government. Ahmadinejad can
be the leader of Iran when the Comprehensive Solution lapses
and Ahmadinejad will be treated as if he were Japan, his
country will be treated as if it was Japan. That is what is
spelled out. And so when we talk about verification, I think
yes, absolutely, we need to focus on verification of the JPA
and the Comprehensive Solution because for a country with
Iran's record we have to be suspicious that there will be
cheating. But we need to get to the bottom of what happened in
the past.
There are lots of unanswered questions and the JPA does not
compel Iran to answer those questions. It says if a mechanism
where there is to be a discussion, but there are no
consequences attached if Iran fails to cooperate. If the
questions remain unanswered, the JPA goes forward nonetheless.
And I think something needs to be done about that to make sure
we get answers about the degree to which they pursued a
military nuclear program in the past. Even more importantly, in
the future, after the Comprehensive Solution, I think the
committee needs to consider: Are you satisfied with the
standard safeguards and the additional protocol as the only
verification that will apply to Iran's nuclear program upon the
expiration of the Comprehensive Solution?
[The prepared statement of Mr. Rademaker follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
----------
Chairman Royce. Thank you, Mr. Rademaker. Mr. Lauder.
STATEMENT OF MR. JOHN A. LAUDER, SENIOR ADVISOR, 20TWENTY
STRATEGIC CONSULTING, INC. (FORMER DIRECTOR, NONPROLIFERATION
CENTER, INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY)
Mr. Lauder. Thank you very much, Chairman Royce, Ranking
Member Engel, members of the committee. Thank you for the
opportunity to be here today to help address this vital
national security topic, monitoring Iranian compliance with a
potential nuclear agreement.
I appear before you today in my private capacity as someone
who has labored on monitoring and verification over several
decades. The views that I will be presenting are my own and are
not intended to represent the views of organizations with whom
I have been affiliated, such as the intelligence community, the
Department of Defense, and the Defense Science Board Task Force
on the Assessment of Nuclear Treaty Monitoring and
Verification. My statement draws in part on those experiences
and on the Defense Science Board Task Force Report, as well as
some work on a non-governmental Task Force on Verification
Requirements for a Nuclear Agreement with Iran.
Neither of the two task forces makes a judgment as to
whether compliance with any particular nuclear agreement is
verifiable. Indeed, we do not yet know of the details of the
monitoring provisions that will emerge in the Iranian agreement
now under negotiation or if such an agreement will be
concluded. The Defense Science Board Task Force Report
underscores that monitoring nuclear programs is very
challenging and that the technical capabilities to do so are
limited. But the report suggests a number of steps that can be
taken to make monitoring more effective, to develop additional
tools and approaches and to mitigate, but not entirely
eliminate the risks.
Mr. Chairman, I submitted a statement for the record that
outlines key elements to facilitate compliance monitoring,
elements that I would respectfully suggest to be part of the
agreement with Iran and core to the way in which the United
States and the international community approaches monitoring
and implementation of the agreement.
The implementation of a monitoring regime should be
sufficiently rigorous to determine whether Iran has made a
fundamental strategic decision to abandon its pursuit of
nuclear weapons and toward a culture of compliance with
international agreements and norms. I believe that the
monitoring provisions to be included in the agreement will be
the main determinant of the agreement's success and establish
the essential foundation for all of the other provisions.
Effective monitoring needs to be able to detect both a rapid
breakout from some facilities known to us and a slow sneak-out
from covert facilities.
An agreement with Iran should hence provide one, a full
explanation of past Iranian nuclear activities with possible
military dimensions; and two, Iran answers previous questions
from the International Atomic Energy Agency about such
activities, explains who was involved, what actions were taken
and where they took place. There can be no international
confidence that the development of nuclear weapons capabilities
has ceased.
Second, a complete data declaration and robust inspection
of Iran's nuclear activities, material, and equipment. Critical
parts of Iran's nuclear programs are still not well understood
by the international community. A final agreement must allow
access to sites, persons, and records sufficient to make Iran's
nuclear programs transparent.
Third, an effective means of monitoring all of Iran's
procurement activities with possible nuclear applications. A
final agreement must prevent Iran from continuing to import
illicitly materials for its nuclear enterprise. The best way to
accomplish this is to set up an agreed channel for ending
nuclear imports that might be allowed by the agreement. No
import outside the channel should be permitted which will
reduce ambiguities in the information detected by the
monitoring process.
Successful monitoring regimes in the past have achieved
effective verification of compliance through a combination of
measures, which may be held out as a standard by which to judge
the adequacy of the monitoring regime to be applied in Iran.
Based on past experience, an Iranian monitoring regime should
include a combination of negotiated data declarations,
inspection measures, and national and international monitoring
to break tough challenges into manageable pieces, as well as a
consultative body for an anomaly in dispute resolution.
The key to all of these measures working effectively is the
synergy created among data declarations tell us where to look,
routine inspections, audited declarations, national and
international unilateral monitoring and intelligence means to
detect anomalies and challenge inspections, and the
consultative body seek to gather more information relevant to
the resolution of those anomalies. I recognize that not all of
the measures that I recommend in my statement will be easily
negotiable or ready for rapid implementation, but our goal
should be to bring Iran from its prior pursuits of nuclear
weapons capabilities into what I called earlier a culture of
compliance with international agreements and norms.
We should seek the newness in negotiations with Iran by
seeking agreement and a security agreement to effective
monitoring measures. We can also reinforce a culture of
compliance by vigorous implementing the monitoring regime. Some
of that implementation will fall to the International Atomic
Energy Agency. Others will need to be carried out by the P5+1
itself including by U.S. Government agencies.
Congress can play a positive and strong role in insisting
on effective verification, providing the resources necessary
for monitoring tasks, and being attentive to compliance issues
that may emerge.
Thank you again to the committee for the opportunity to
present some of my ideas on this vital topic. I look forward to
your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Lauder follows:]
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Chairman Royce. Thank you. Mr. Heinonen.
STATEMENT OF MR. OLLI HEINONEN, SENIOR FELLOW, BELFER CENTER
FOR SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, JOHN F. KENNEDY SCHOOL
OF GOVERNMENT, HARVARD UNIVERSITY (FORMER DEPUTY DIRECTOR
GENERAL, INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY)
Mr. Heinonen. Chairman Royce, Ranking Member Engel,
distinguished members of the committee, thank you for inviting
me to talk here today.
In my testimony today, I am focusing on the verification
aspects of a comprehensive deal. I am basing my remarks on the
implementation of safeguards agreement and available and
relevant Security Council resolutions in Iran, and
complementing them with experiences drawn, in particular from
the IAEA verification activities and monitoring activities in
South Africa after its dismantlement of its nuclear weapons
program, and some experience drawn also from safeguards
implementation in Syria and North Korea.
Timely detection and prevention of the development and
acquisition of nuclear weapons or a state's capability to
produce them is a complex task. Development of weapons of mass
destruction is one of the closest kept secrets of a state.
There are things, which we know, and there are aspects of such
programs which we can perhaps to a certain degree deduce, but
also features which we do not know.
Due to the fact that Iran has been running parts of its
program first clandestinely and then without satisfactorily
fulfilling its reporting obligations to the IAEA and
disregarding Security Council resolutions. The onus of proof
bears heavily on Iran to show that its nuclear program is
entirely peaceful.
David Albright, Andrea Stricker and I have recently made an
analysis on compromises which the negotiators crafting the
comprehensive final agreement should avoid. I will now
highlight some additional details which should be included in a
final agreement.
The strength of the IAEA verification system is access to
material, nuclear material, facilities, equipment, and people.
However, the safeguards are not the magic pill that once taken,
cures everything. No verification system can provide absolute
assurances that a treaty partner fully complies with its
undertakings. This is especially the case when applied to
problematic states that are noncompliant like Iran.
Throughout the history of discussions on the nuclear
program of Iran, Iran has always brought transparency,
transparency to build the confidence of the international
community to the peaceful nature of its nuclear program.
President Rouhani has recently offered again transparency as
one of the tools. Such transparency should be understood and
implemented in a meaningful and systematic way. Even in the
name of ``transparency'' where Iran decides to ``show'' a place
previously off limits, such inspection visits can bear
substance only if substantially new information and discussions
take place, explanations are provided and those are verified.
Hence, openness should be clearly defined and become a legally
binding undertaking, and not treated as good will visits to be
granted when problems arise.
Going further, according to the provisions of the
safeguards agreement, a state has to declare all nuclear
material in its territory. Thus, military sites do not form
sanctuaries, but the IAEA has the right to conduct inspections
under safeguards agreement and complementary access under
additional protocol when appropriate.
The purpose of the verification is to reestablish Iran's
nonproliferation records. In order to achieve that, Iran has to
fully comply with its safeguards obligations. Under the
safeguards agreement, IAEA statutes, IAEA protocol, and fully
implement the verification and clarification requirements made
by the IAEA Board of Governors and U.N. Security Council. But
in addition to that, additional measures are needed. Iran has
to provide complete declaration on all aspects of its past and
current nuclear program including the military dimensions. Iran
has to provide information on the production of source
material, like yellowcake, including imports of those
materials. It also goes beyond the requirements of the
safeguards agreement.
In addition to that, Iran has to provide information on all
imports and domestic production of single-use and dual-use
nuclear items as specified in the guidelines of the Nuclear
Suppliers Group. And in addition to that, Iran has to provide
IAEA unconditional and unrestricted access, including short
notice inspections to all areas, facilities, equipment,
records, people, and material as required by the IAEA.
And then finally, a few words regarding the possible
military dimension. Why does it matter? There are records that
much of the material came to a halt in 2003. On the other hand,
IAEA has assessed in its reports that some of this work has
continued since then. It is important to understand the status
of Iran's military-related efforts, noting that one of the last
duties of people and organizations involved was the document
work they have done. One plausible reason for such effort would
have been to save the information for future use.
Unless properly addressed, it would be difficult to create
a meaningful and robust verification regime for Iran. It would
also render difficult for the IAEA to determine with confidence
that any nuclear weapons activities are not ongoing. Without
addressing those questions, the IAEA will not be able to come
to a conclusion that all nuclear material in Iran is in
peaceful use which is an essential element in building
confidence of the international community over Iran's nuclear
program.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Heinonen follows:]
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Chairman Royce. Thank you. Ambassador.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JOSEPH R. DETRANI, PRESIDENT,
INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY ALLIANCE (FORMER DIRECTOR,
NATIONAL COUNTER PROLIFERATION CENTER, OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR
OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE)
Ambassador DeTrani. Thank you, Chairman Royce, Ranking
Member Engel, distinguished members of the committee. Thank you
for inviting me and having this important hearing.
Let me just say that effective monitoring of an agreement
with Iran will be exceptionally challenging. Iran has a
demonstrated record of violating its safeguards agreements with
the IAEA. The lack of transparency into Iran's nuclear program
was cited and documented by the IAEA in numerous reports from
the Director General to the Board of Directors. Iran was
negligent certainly in declaring the Fuel Enrichment Plant at
Natanz in 2002 and the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant in 2009. In
fact, Iran acknowledged both facilities only after they were
exposed by an opposition group and reported in the press. So I
mean there is a record here that one has to be very, very
cognizant of as was indicated by the chairman and others this
morning.
The IAEA Director General report of 8 November 2011, I
think a very important report, provided disturbing details
regarding Iran's nuclear warhead development efforts that would
allow Iran to acquire the expertise necessary to produce
nuclear weapons. Although there was previous IAEA reporting on
``weaponization,'' this report was stark in its concern about
the military dimension of Iran's nuclear program. This is a
very, very central part of the issue here. Indeed, it is a
covert--having covert facilities, but the militarization of
their nuclear program.
Director General Amano on 2 June 2014, just a few days ago,
said the IAEA needed time before they could provide credible
assurance of the absence of undeclared nuclear material in
Iran.
A robust monitoring and verification protocol will be
necessary to deal with Iran's nuclear program. This will be
very difficult, a difficult program to implement effectively.
At a minimum, it will require unfettered and I emphasize
unfettered access to people and places. Indeed, if Iran were in
compliance with the six U.N. Security Council resolutions, all
forbidding Iran from enriching uranium, the monitoring and
verification process would be easier. And indeed, if Iran, as
they say, was interested in a peaceful nuclear program, it is
not only through enrichment of uranium that one could achieve
and acquire a peaceful nuclear program.
Since Iran reportedly will now be permitted to enrich
uranium at some level, the IAEA's task will be considerably
more difficult. Some of the monitoring issues are an accurate
baseline of Iran's nuclear program is necessary for any
meaningful monitoring program that will attempt to verify
compliance with a safeguards agreement. Iran has declared 15
nuclear facilities at 9 locations. Is this the totality of
their program? As stated above, the IAEA cannot provide
credible assurance of the absence of undeclared nuclear
material in Iran. Assurances that there are no covert nuclear
facilities in Iran capable of enriching uranium are necessary.
Technically, locating covert uranium enrichment facilities is
difficult, since spinning centrifuges are silent, with no
signature or signal. Our experience with North Korea strongly
reinforces this point.
Iran announced its intent to construct 10 additional
uranium enrichment facilities and to build a greater number,
approximately 60,000 additional sophisticated centrifuges.
Again, monitoring the declared facilities deploying
sophisticated centrifuges with greater capacity and confirming
the non-existence of additional covert facilities will be a
real challenge.
A comprehensive declaration from Iran on their nuclear
program is a necessary first step for any monitoring and
verification program. In addition to all related facilities, a
list of the scientists and technicians who are working at these
facilities is necessary. IAEA monitors will require unfettered
access to these individuals and to their relevant records and
notes.
The right to take samples at every facility is necessary,
with said sample undergoing testing at
U.S. or IAEA labs.
The issue of weaponization must be pursued, with access to
known and suspected high explosive test sites, and all relevant
records. Information dealing with miniaturization and the
mating of a nuclear warhead to an Iranian missile must be
pursued, for obvious reasons.
Access to all related nuclear R&D work and sites will be
necessary, with and I emphasize this ``any time, any place''
access to the facilities that manufacture, assemble and test
centrifuges.
Technical coverage of Natanz and Fordow, with cameras,
sensors and inspections, will be necessary, 24/7.
Technical monitoring of Arak, Iran's plutonium facility
approaching completion, will be required since this facility
has one purpose, one purpose, using plutonium for nuclear
weapons. If Iran is committed to a peaceful nuclear program,
Arak should be dismantled, not monitored.
Those are some of the issues that a monitoring and
verification protocol will have to address. The task will be
massive, especially if Iran is permitted to construct
additional fuel enrichment plans, similar to Natanz and Fordow,
deploying improved centrifuges with greater capacity.
Determining that permitted enrichment does not exceed the 5
percent, this is so critical, a low enriched uranium level will
also be a challenge, if Iran is permitted to enrich uranium at
numerous facilities. Indeed, determining that there are no
covert uranium enrichment facilities will be a principal
challenge for any monitoring and verification protocol. Thank
you.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador DeTrani follows:]
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----------
Chairman Royce. Thank you, Ambassador. So you say the issue
of weaponization must be pursued.
Ambassador DeTrani. Absolutely.
Chairman Royce. And we have all said Iran has to sit down
and come clean for all of the reasons enumerated.
Chairman Royce. Yet, the head of the IAEA says we are not
getting any cooperation from Iran on this.
Ambassador DeTrani. That is a fair point, Mr. Chairman,
absolutely. And you mentioned in your opening statement Parchin
and the high explosive test sites. There is no question, they
have to come clean on all these issues, no question.
Chairman Royce. But what if they are not forced to come
clean? What are the implications of that?
Ambassador DeTrani. I think there are sanctions in place. I
think there are consequences if you are not coming clean. I
think that is what the monitoring and verification protocols
are all about, coming clean.
Chairman Royce. This is a signed agreement we are trying to
come to agreement on in terms of these issues to satisfy this
issue of a weaponization. Of course, anyway, let us go back one
point though to Mr. Rademaker's key focus on his testimony. The
last line of the Interim Agreement notes that after
implementing the final step of the Comprehensive Solution for
the agreed amount of time, then Iran is treated ``the same,''
the same as any non-nuclear weapons state that is a party to
the NPT.
Mr. Rademaker, I think in your written testimony you said
this is a giant get out of jail free card for Iran because it
means at that point in time no more sanctions, no more
restrictions on procuring nuclear items, no more restrictions
on the number of centrifuges it can spin or the level to which
it may enrich uranium, at that point in time, under the Interim
Agreement, we have already conceded that whatever the time
frame after that. You treat Iran like you treat Japan or
Germany, completely legitimate. And what does that mean then
for verification? What is the consequence? Because it's really
just a question of trust, isn't it? We began with the argument
referring to trust but verify, but it is completely a question
of trust if at the end of the agreement everything is lifted
and there is no more verification.
Mr. Rademaker?
Mr. Rademaker. Mr. Chairman, I think you put your finger on
what I see as the biggest single verification challenge before
us. And that is--it is really a conceptual challenge. The
concept of the Joint Plan of Action is that there is this work
out period where Iran is to behave. It is to fulfill its
obligations and if they are not caught cheating during that
time, then all the limitations come off and they are treated
like any other country. Given Iran's track record, the clear
evidence for decades, the current government has shown a
concerted effort to--has pursued a concerted effort to develop
a nuclear weapon. If they behave for 5 or 10 or 15 years, are
we prepared at that point to say, okay, we will let bygones be
bygones and going forward you will be treated like any other
country? That is the promise.
Now what I suggest in my testimony is logically for the
Iranians an incredibly good deal. This is a get out of jail
free card. All they have to do is behave and then--so if what
they want is a nuclear weapon, they have been struggling. They
have been under international sanctions. They have been under
restrictions on their ability to import components. It has been
a slog for them to get to where they are and they have been
very persistent and they have stood up this program really only
with help from the A.Q. Khan Network, otherwise, they procure
things, but it has been covert.
If they behave for the period of the Comprehensive
Solution, they will be able to move forward with a civilian
nuclear program with international cooperation. I mean that is
promised to them in the JPA. And the logical thing for them
would be to take that deal, behave, then once the Comprehensive
Solution expires, then very aggressively stand up a far more
robust civilian infrastructure than they have been able to
stand up now. Go to tens of thousands of centrifuges, much
larger quantities of enriched material. And then if they choose
to break out, do so with a much larger infrastructure in place
with a much larger stockpile of 3.5 percent enriched material
or even 20 percent enriched material because once the
Comprehensive Solution ends, they can go back to producing as
much 20 percent material as they want.
Chairman Royce. One of the arguments made to me by one of
the ambassadors of one of the Arab states was if this comes to
pass and Iran, of course, is continuing its effort to
destabilize other countries in the region and he listed country
by country where they were--from Yemen, where they are trying
to topple a government and are very close to doing so, to their
efforts throughout the region. When he exhausted all of the
examples, he said a regime with that intent and also having the
intent to obtain nuclear programs capability, you are in danger
of leaving them with a hegemon in the region. And with their
ambitions intact, both in terms of their capability of this
weapon and knowing right now that they can destabilize other
regimes and knowing that when you lift sanctions on them, that
is going to be more hard currency that they will use to
destabilize their neighbors. The argument he was making I think
was the veiled threat that other states would then do the same
thing, attempt to rush to a nuclear weapon in order to try to
offset the aggressive nature of this regime.
What do you think this portends for proliferation concerns?
Mr. Rademaker. Are you directing that question to me, Mr.
Chairman?
Chairman Royce. Yes, Mr. Rademaker.
Mr. Rademaker. I think we already have some history here
that is instructive. In 1995, Iran announced that they wanted
to build a civilian nuclear power reactor at Bushehr and Russia
signed a contract with them to help. And for about 10 years it
was the policy of the United States under both the Clinton
administration and probably the first half of the Bush
administration to oppose that and say Iran, this oil-rich
country, ample energy resources, what do they need
an deg. nuclear power reactor for? We need to stop
this. And it was a high priority for the U.S. diplomatically to
turn off the Bushehr reactor.
One of the reasons we wanted to turn it off was because we
were afraid it would provide a justification for setting up an
enrichment capability to fuel the reactor and in fact, that is
exactly what the Iranians did covertly initially and then when
they were caught, then the Natanz facility was revealed. And
they justified it because they said they needed the fuel for
their reactor.
And so then the focus of our diplomatic activity shifted to
their enrichment program and by about 2005, the Bush
administration decided to give up in the losing effort to
prevent completion of the Bushehr civil power reactor. And I
was in the Bush administration at the time. Our talking points
changed. We stopped talking about how they shouldn't have a
nuclear power plant. We started focusing on just the enrichment
facility. The moment we did that, what happened? Suddenly, it
turned out a lot of Middle Eastern countries were interested in
having civil nuclear plants, too.
Chairman Royce. Yes.
Mr. Rademaker. And the 123 agreement was negotiated with
UAE and Saudi Arabia, Jordan, other countries started talking
about how they wanted civil nuclear power. Now I think the
Obama administration is proceeding on the assumption that we
can change policy again and we can sign off on enrichment in
Iran. And so okay, we are prepared to accept an enrichment
capability in Iran.
Chairman Royce. We should learn from past mistakes.
Mr. Rademaker. And that the other countries in the region
aren't going to immediately, when that happens, say well, guess
what, we need enrichment too.
Chairman Royce. Right.
Mr. Rademaker. And then how do we say, how does the United
States say to Saudi Arabia well, you know, actually, we only
trust Iran to have enrichment. We don't trust you, Saudi
Arabia, our ally. We only trust Iran.
Chairman Royce. My time has expired.
Mr. Rademaker. I think it becomes untenable.
Chairman Royce. I am going to go to Mr. Engel. Thank you.
Mr. Engel. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let us continue that. I
am troubled, I said in my opening statement, that while we are
talking with Iran, they continue to enrich. I still don't
understand how that happened. I just don't understand it.
And you mentioned, Mr. Rademaker, the 123 Agreement with
the UAE. I had the UAE Ambassador in my office and he mentioned
that agreement, which does not allow the UAE to enrich for
peaceful purposes on their soil. Canada has nuclear weapons for
peaceful purposes. They are not allowed to enrich on their
soil.
If we sign an agreement with Iran that ostensibly says
well, they can enrich on their soil, but only for peaceful
purposes, how do we ever get any of the other countries to not
enrich on their soil? Aren't we then opening the door to you
name it, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt. Why should any of those
countries negotiate a deal where they will not be allowed to
enrich on their soil for peaceful purposes when clearly we are
giving it away to Iran?
Mr. Rademaker. I agree entirely with your question. In
fact, it was the point I was just making. I think once the
United States says we are prepared to accept enrichment in
Iran, this whole effort over the past decade to stem the spread
of that technology to other countries it becomes untenable
because how do we explain to any country that, especially
allies, friends of the United States? You are our friend, so we
are not going to let you have this technology.
Now Iran, we are prepared to let them have it. I couldn't
write the talking points for our diplomat to explain to our
allies why we don't trust them to have something that we trust
Iran to have.
So I think what happens when we permanently accept
enrichment in Iran is by default, we have to accept it anywhere
else that wants it. I don't know how--you can try and make it
financially attractive for them to not go in that direction,
but for a country that is determined to have it, to tell them
as a matter of policy it is the policy of the United States
that only Iran gets to have it and not you, I think it is not a
case that you can persuasively make.
Mr. Engel. Rouhani has said to CNN that Iran won't
dismantle a single centrifuge. The Joint Plan of Action calls
for a Comprehensive Solution that says that ``would ensure
Iran's nuclear program would be exclusively peaceful.''
Is there a way to ensure that Iran's nuclear program would
be exclusively peaceful without dismantling some centrifuges?
Anybody care?
Ambassador DeTrani. There is no question the number of
centrifuges is extremely important, certainly for the monitors.
When you have a number, and especially if they are even more
sophisticated and they are spinning and they are putting out
that much more capability, absolutely, there is no question
about the numbers are important.
Mr. Engel. Let me talk about an editorial that was in the
Washington Post a few weeks ago, 3 weeks ago, perhaps. The
editorial argued, and I said this in my opening statement, that
we can afford to wait, that perhaps time is on our side if the
date comes up in July and we don't have a comprehensive
agreement, that it might be in the best interest of the United
States to put it back another month or 2 or 3 or 4, that Iran
is still undergoing a lot of economic difficulty as a result of
the sanctions and that we might have more leverage if we let
the date lapse beyond the July 20th date. That was essentially
a Washington Post editorial. Anybody have any thoughts on that?
Mr. Heinonen?
Mr. Heinonen. First of all, we should not forget that this
whole Plan of Action is very limited. Today, we don't know how
many centrifuges Iran has. IAEA has got some declaration about
the manufacturing of the replacements of the centrifuges, but
it has not got the total number of centrifuges produced. So
what is happening now in the next few months Iran is still
likely building additional centrifuges. It is manufacturing
components for the Arak reactor and it maintains the skills of
the labor, in addition producing additional enriched uranium.
So in my view, one should put a cap to this and not to wait.
The problem doesn't become easier by waiting.
Mr. Engel. So you disagree essentially with what the
Washington Post editorial was saying about the fact that Iran
is still being hurt with sanctions and they will continue to be
hurt and time will not be on their side. You essentially
disagree with that?
Mr. Heinonen. I think it is a little bit wishful thinking.
Mr. Engel. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Royce. Mr. Engel, we will now go to Ileana Ros-
Lehtinen.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. I have
been on the record disapproving the Interim Agreement and any
subsequent agreement that does not require Iran to cease all
enrichment activities and dismantle its nuclear infrastructure.
We know that Iran can't be trusted. We have decades of covert
activities related to its nuclear program to back that up. Yet,
we are now relying on two things, number one, that Iran is
honest with us on disclosing all of its nuclear activities; and
two, that the verification, monitoring, and transparency
programs that we have in place are strong enough to detect when
Iran is cheating. But all of the verification and monitoring
system operate under the framework that is presented to us by
Iran, only what Iran has declared as part of the program.
In last month's IAEA Board of Directors report on Iran's
nuclear program, the Director General stated that the IAEA
cannot provide credible assurances about the absence of
undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran unless and
until Iran provides the necessary cooperation with the agency.
And we are all familiar with the Pentagon report that stated
that the United States does not have the capability to locate
undeclared or covert nuclear facilities or programs. So it is
still very possible that Iran could be continuing its covert
activity and neither the IAEA nor the U.S. would have any idea.
And this Joint Plan of Action did nothing to strengthen
verification and monitoring programs or force Iran to abide the
additional protocols.
Mr. Heinonen, thank you. You testified to our Middle East
and North Africa Subcommittee in January and you stated that
the JPOA provide IAEA inspectors access only to surveillance
records, not anywhere else at the facilities, that the
surveillance measures are designed to cover only certain
activities. How comprehensive are these surveillance records?
Is it possible that we are only getting access to what Iran
wants us to see, not getting the full picture that the cameras
perhaps only focus on the door and not what is going on in the
room? And also, bad state actors that seek to acquire nuclear
weapons--and I am thinking of North Korea, Iran, obviously,
Libya, Syria--do so surreptitiously. So what we now have is the
administration and the P5+1 negotiating on a basis of only what
has been declared.
Doesn't the success of any IAEA verification and monitoring
program depend on access to all sites, all programs, all of the
information, and people and equipment in order to get the full
picture?
One other major area of concern that we should all have and
which goes largely unaddressed many times is the possible
military dimensions of Iran's nuclear program. The 2010 U.N.
Security Council resolutions on Iran ordered the regime to
fully cooperate with the IAEA on all outstanding issues,
particularly regarding the possible military dimensions of the
program. That is not happening and the latest Board of
Governors report states that not only is Iran not complying,
but there have been extensive activities that may have taken
place at Parchin, especially seriously undermine the IAEA's
ability to conduct effective verification.
So my last question is, we are nearing the end of the 6-
month time frame. There has been no access to Parchin. Does
this undermine the credibility of the deal and the so-called
monitoring and verification measures that we have in place? So
that question and Mr. Heinonen, are we only seeing what Iran
wants us to see? How comprehensive are the surveillance
records?
Mr. Heinonen. IAEA has several measures in place and
surveillance is only one. IAEA measures the nuclear material
that flows in Natanz. IAEA has short notice inspections at
intervals between 1 or 2 weeks. So there are additional
measures which complement each other, so we are not relying
entirely on the surveillance. But it is important that this
surveillance is modified so that it actually covers all the
centrifuges and not just exit and entrance routes. I think more
important that it calls for remote monitoring more so that we
don't use this valuable IAEA inspection resources sitting at
the side and reviewing computer screens.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. We should modify it to include all of
those?
Mr. Heinonen. Yes. All this and this is what I say in my
written testimony. And then one small remark still, whenever we
verify the correctness and completeness of declarations and
look at items which may have been declared, we need to remember
that this is a very consuming process. This doesn't come in 1
month or even \1/2\ year. And I give an example of South
Africa. So we started this verification in 1993 and task force,
the only thing--because South Africa nuclear program ran many,
many years without any IAEA surveillance. So it took until 2010
when the IAEA was finally able to say that all nuclear material
in South Africa is in peaceful use. So it took that long time
to come to this conclusion, based on the practices and
procedures of the Iran. So Iran will face something very
similar.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Royce. Let us go Mr. Brad Sherman of California.
Mr. Sherman. Thank you. Mr. Lauder, I am interested in your
analysis that we have got to look at break out possibility and
sneak out possibility. I am not sure I understand what you mean
by culture of compliance. Let us face it, Nelson Mandela was
not taking over in Tehran. I think the culture will always be
to try to maximize their nuclear capacity.
Mr. Rademaker, you brought to our attention what we knew
and that is after some period of time, Iran will be, at least
according to this agreement just like any other non-nuclear
state, except they will have signed and presumably ratified the
additional protocol. Let us say that is the situation. Let us
say that everything they have now is frozen and de-thawed 10,
15 years from now. And they are subject to the additional
protocol and that is about it. And they want to sneak, not
break out. How long before they have a bomb? How long before
they have a dozen?
Mr. Rademaker. I think my personal concern is that will be
up to them because----
Mr. Sherman. Assume that they make an all-out sneak out
effort, subject only to the additional protocol, how difficult
is it to sneak out if you are subject to the additional
protocol?
Mr. Rademaker. I think there are two dimensions to break
out and usually we talk about how quickly can they do it and
that is an important thing to----
Mr. Sherman. I am talking about how quickly they can do it
without being detected.
Mr. Rademaker. Right, but let me say I think for a country
like Iran, the notion that they are going to race, they are
going to violate an international law, they are going to race
to produce one nuclear weapon----
Mr. Sherman. Mr. Rademaker, you don't seem to be
understanding my question. I am not talking about break out. I
am talking about sneak out. That is to say undetected efforts
to develop a nuclear weapon, assuming they don't want to be
detected, but they are diligent, hard working, and well
financed. What can they put together in a few years of being
subject only to the additional protocol?
Mr. Rademaker. Basically, they will be able to put together
everything they want. They will be able to stand up a vastly
more robust infrastructure with tens of thousands, hundreds of
thousands of centrifuges, tons of----
Mr. Sherman. And under the additional protocol, can they
then divert the low-enriched uranium to a secret facility and
put it up to weapons grade? Again, assuming they don't want to
be caught.
Mr. Rademaker. The more robust their infrastructure, the
more quantity of nuclear material they have, the easier it will
be.
Mr. Sherman. Why don't I shift to one of the other
witnesses?
Mr. Lauder, can you answer the same question? If they are
subject only to the additional protocol and they don't want to
get caught, what can they do?
Mr. Lauder. One of the reasons that I use the phrase sneak
out in my oral remarks is the international community has
focused a lot about the rapid break out from known facilities.
One of our concerns has to be just as you indicated in your
question, Mr. Sherman, that if Iran moves at a slower pace, but
behind the scenes at facilities that we don't know about, it
can continue down that path to nuclear weapons in ways that
normal IAEA procedures would not necessarily be able to detect.
That is one of the reasons----
Mr. Sherman. Would they be able to put together without
being detected, subject only to the additional protocol five
bombs in the 5 years after this agreement is eclipsed?
Mr. Lauder. I go back to testimony that the Director of
National Intelligence Clapper gave before the Hill where he
said that the fundamental constraining element or the
fundamental point is what decision that Iran will make. If
Iran----
Mr. Sherman. They already told you the decision. The
decision would be develop a nuclear capacity and don't get
caught. Work hard. Assuming that is the decision, does anybody
have an answer to the question?
Mr. Lauder. In terms of time frame?
Mr. Sherman. Yes. I said could they do five bombs in 5
years subject only to the additional protocol?
Mr. Lauder. Yes.
Mr. Sherman. I just picked that number out. Does anyone on
the panel have a better estimate of what they can do subject
only to the additional protocol assuming they don't want to get
caught?
Mr. Heinonen?
Mr. Heinonen. Certainly that is important for the IAEA in
terms of verification, but we should not forget here that
actually Iran can do a plan how to do it. They see which are
the strengths of the IAEA, which are the weaknesses, and they
actually can do high product routes, do something at particular
facilities, do something in undeclared and in a combination you
have this what you are afraid of. So I think this needs quite
a--a kind of analysis, a rethinking of how the verification
system is set up, and its capabilities.
And I also want to bring to your attention that actually
this whole thing will be a step-wise process. Once the----
Mr. Sherman. I want an answer to this question. Does
anybody disagree five bombs in the 5 years after they are
subject only to the additional protocol?
Ambassador DeTrani. I don't disagree. And that is why we
need more than the additional protocol.
Mr. Sherman. You say you don't agree or you disagree with
five bombs in 5 years?
Ambassador DeTrani. With the additional protocol, that is a
possibility, because it is still managed access. You need
unfettered access to everything.
Mr. Rademaker. I agree with that, but let me just say I
have a slightly different concern and that is not how quickly
could they break out or how effectively could they sneak out.
But if they choose at some point in the future to become a
nuclear weapons state, not sneaking, but they just say okay,
circumstances have changed, we need to have nuclear weapons, if
they do that today, they can make a mad dash and in some period
of months they will have maybe two or three nuclear weapons. If
they have a vastly more robust civil nuclear infrastructure
after the expiration of the Comprehensive Solution and at that
point decide okay, now we're abandoning the NPT in a nuclear
weapons state, what will they have? It won't be two or three
nuclear weapons. It will be dozens. So what they will have upon
breaking out with the much larger infrastructure that they will
be admitting to have----
Mr. Sherman. Knowing my time has expired, I think they will
sneak out and then break out because if they have five nuclear
weapons, our response to their announcement of break out and
our response to their test will be considerably more similar to
how we treated North Korea than how we treated Gaddafi or
Saddam Hussein. I yield back.
Chairman Royce. We go now to Mr. Chris Smith of New Jersey.
Mr. Smith. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, especially
thank you for calling this extraordinarily timely hearing and
for the insights provided by our distinguished witnesses.
As you know, Mr. Chairman, last week on June 4th we
recognized the 25th anniversary of the Tiananmen Square
massacre and I raise this because Bill Clinton, on May 26,
1994, delinked human rights with trade. Beijing knew that human
rights were a superfluous, an adjunct, a talking point. It was
not nuclear. They had no real consequence if they violated them
with impunity and I am very concerned fast forward to the Joint
Plan of Action that when Iran looked us in the eyes, they knew
that they could get major concessions and they already have
achieved that with the sanctions regime. How are we ever going
to put that back together? And this could be analogous to
``Peace in our time,'' the infamous Neville Chamberlain quote
he said after meeting with the Germans.
These are game-changing days. And I am very concerned--
Secretary Rademaker, your testimony and your service has been
extraordinary over the decades--you have reminded us that Iran
has a deplorable history of deception, covert procurement, and
construction of clandestine facilities which are acknowledged
only when revealed or exposed, a catch me if you can mentality.
It reminds me of Hans Blix traveling around Iraq looking for
weapons of mass destruction. Iran, as we know, defied six
binding resolutions, demanding that they suspend uranium
enrichment. That now has changed. That is no longer what we
have demanded through the JPA. And as you pointed out, in the
signing of the JPA, Iran persuaded the United States and others
to set aside its policy of no right to enrichment.
You also called the biggest concession the idea of the ill-
defined time period, wait out a certain period of time, it is
not defined, and at that point you elaborated that a few times
in your statement just a moment ago.
My questions would be one, human rights are very often the
canary in the coal mine. In meetings and in conversations with
the Foreign Minister of Iran have said you can do a grand
stroke, release the political prisoners, release Saeed Abedini
and then we will say hey, they may be meaning business here.
There may be a sense of sincerity. I find it almost laughable
in the preamble when it says on November 24th Joint Plan of
Action, ``Iran reaffirms that under no circumstances will Iran
ever seek or develop any nuclear weapons.'' If you believe
that, I will sell you the Brooklyn Bridge.
So of course, trust and verify, on-site verification are
all absolutely required, but I think we are setting up
ourselves to fail. And now with Russia--what kind of friend or
colleague or partner are they going to be, given everything
that has happened in Kiev and certainly in the Ukraine?
So a couple of questions. The whole idea of the duration,
Mr. Secretary. If you could really elaborate that even further.
Twenty years, 25 years, it ought to be forever and as you said,
to think that Iran might be construed to be Japan, and I think
in your testimony you made some very, very good points about
the whole idea that Argentina and they matriculated from a
dictatorship to democracy, South Africa. So the examples were
very well taken and you also said something if you can
elaborate quickly on your need to anticipate that the executive
branch officials are going to become deeply invested in the
success of the JPA. Almost like a mission accomplished
mentality when the threats to the region and the world are so
high that that kind of political chicanery should be nowhere on
the map. So if you could respond?
Mr. Rademaker. Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman, I am happy to
respond. It is certainly a conceptual thing. The concept of the
JPA is we are not going to insist on a change in government. We
are not going to insist on a change in your guiding philosophy.
We are just going to look at your behavior for a set period of
time. And if you behave as you promised, then it is your get
out of jail free card. You will be able to go forward as a
fully accepted, legitimate member of the nuclear club.
And that is being promised to them up front with no--all
they have to do is comply with whatever is in that agreement
and nothing more.
To me, the Congress, the American people are being asked to
buy a pig in a poke because we don't know who is going to be
the leader of Iran in 5 or 10 or 15 years when this thing
expires. We don't know what they are going to be doing with
respect to promoting terrorism around the world. We don't know
how much they are going to be meddling in Syria or Iraq. We
just don't know. And yet we are making this commitment up front
that you behave and here are all the benefits you get. And I
guess I would suggest that the judgment whether they are to be
considered rehabilitated and treated like a normal nation is
one that is really premature to make today. The judgment may be
to be made much closer to the event and I don't see that in
this framework. I mean we are making the judgment today that if
they behave for 10 years or whatever the agreed period is, they
will be deemed rehabilitated.
And Congress will have an important role here, because I
believe the administration is going to need you to enact
legislation permitting them to waive some of the sanctions that
are currently in place and so legislatively you will address
this and I think in that context you ought to be thinking about
to what extent are we prepared to accept this concept that all
verification, all extraordinary verification ends and they
become treated like--they become subject only to the
verification that other countries are subject to.
The trust, but verify, that is the wrong concept for a
country with a track record like Iran. For Iran, it can't be
trust. It has to be verify, but verify. You know, I don't know
how trust can be part of the equation given their track record.
Chairman Royce. We go now to Mr. Gregory Meeks of New York.
Mr. Meeks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for this
important hearing. I for a long time have been worried about
Iran getting a nuclear weapon. I think that one thing that
everybody on this committee says and I heard the President say
it also that it is unacceptable, that that is a no starter for
Iran to have a nuclear weapon.
And I was just thinking, listening to you, Mr. Rademaker,
at the beginning of your statement, which really concerned me,
was that on your return here, we are still talking 20 years
later or 25 years later, we said that the threat was in 1992
about Iran getting a nuclear weapon. And unfortunately, here we
are today in 2014 with the same concerns which I would believe
that various administrations, Democratic and Republican, have
had different strategies in trying to make sure that we can
assure ourselves of Iran not having a nuclear weapon.
And here we are still at this juncture and this President
has proposed trying to see what we can do talking with Iran,
not only by ourselves, but an unprecedented level with some of
our allies and some folks who may not because I think you have
to have everybody there with the P5+1.
And as I hear the dialogue going back and forth, the
question that I ask myself sometimes, and I guess the first
question that I would ask you because it just seems as though
when we were successful with sanctions, it was when it became
multilateral and not just unilateral. And if we want to make
sure that we contain Iran and make sure they don't have a
nuclear weapon and if they violate any of the--don't allow the
IAEA to get in or anything of that nature, then I would think
that if we have to ramp up sanctions, we would want to be able
to do that with other nations because that seems as though when
it has been successful.
And so given Iran's history that--and what I have heard
thus far which makes sense to me if they don't follow through
and they are not going to follow through, then we are going to
need to make sure that we still have unity among ourselves so
that we can make sure that those sanctions that we have to put
on or implement are not sanctions that is just done by the
United States, but are sanctions that are also done by P5+1
countries, so they become very important to us I think.
I am going back and forth and I am thinking so the effort,
at least the initial effort that is being made to have
negotiations under the P5+1 and to make sure that the IAEA has
access to whatever they are doing there, it seems to me
tremendously important because we have not been there before.
We want to verify what they are doing and what they are not
doing extremely. I guess I am trying to get a sense from you,
do you think that the effort that is at least being made thus
far so in regards to the conversations that are taking place,
we don't know what the end results are going to be because if
they are a failure, then we have got to make sure that we ramp
up these sanctions, etcetera. Do you think that we should make
the effort that is made currently by the administration? To
anyone.
Ambassador DeTrani. I certainly believe we should make the
effort, no question. And that is why the monitoring and
verification protocol is so, so important. All the points you
made, Congressman Meeks, exactly right. Unfettered access, we
are concerned on the weaponization. We are concerned on the
covert facilities there. They have not been forthcoming,
absolutely.
And the U.N. Security Council Resolution 1929 speaks to
this issue. Iran should cooperate fully with the IAEA on all
outstanding issues, particularly those which give rise to
concerns about military dimensions of their nuclear program. So
even if you have the U.N. Security Council coming forth with a
resolution saying this, so we go forth. So the key would be a
very robust, meaningful, monitoring and verification regime.
Mr. Meeks. Anybody else?
Mr. Rademaker. I guess I have said some critical things
about the JPA, but you shouldn't infer from that I oppose the
idea of trying to negotiate with Iran an end to their nuclear
weapons program and an end to the risk of nuclear proliferation
to Iran. I think a negotiated solution is by far the best
outcome as opposed to continuing with sanctions. We continue
with sanctions and they continue with their nuclear
development. That is not a good solution. Military attack is a
temporary solution, but not a permanent solution. So negotiated
solution is ideal if you can get it, but it has always been
possible to negotiate an agreement with Iran. All we have to do
is agree to their demands and we have got a deal. That is
obviously not acceptable. So you want to negotiate and you want
to get a deal that actually addresses----
Mr. Meeks. We know it is not easy. If it was easy, it would
have been done. We know it is hard. This is hard stuff. And
that is why this hearing is good. That is why listening to you
and having this dialogue is good and hearing sides and hearing
from folks and hearing from other countries is good because
this is not easy. If it was easy, we would be done. This is
hard stuff. And thank you for your testimony. I am out of time.
Chairman Royce. We go now to Mr. Rohrabacher from
California.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank
you, Chairman Royce for calling today's hearing. And all of us
should agree that one of the great foreign policy challenges we
face and challenges we face are preventing a nuclear armed
mullah dictatorship in Iran. I think that one of the things
that has been lacking in this discussion so far today is the
fact that we wouldn't care--there is a fundamental difference
here is that we wouldn't care if this was Brazil. We wouldn't
care if this was Ireland wanting to have this nuclear facility
that could result in a nuclear bomb. What we have is one of the
world's worst human rights abusers, China being the worst and
this mullah dictator has jails filled with people that want to
get along with the rest of the world.
So perhaps the only way that we are going to succeed in not
permitting the mullah dictatorship from having a nuclear weapon
from what I am gleaning from what you are saying, frankly, the
only way we are going to succeed is we get rid of the new
mullah dictatorship in Iran. The bottom line is if we can't
convince them and I am taking it from what I heard today that
we are not going to be able to--not to take their word for it
that they are not going to utilize this new capability. I don't
believe that we are going to convince them that through a
culture of compliance that they are going to change their ways
because they want to fit into the culture. We either have to
get rid of them or they are going to have the bomb. And when
they have the bomb they may well, as we know they are fanatics.
So the question is, shouldn't we be supporting--instead of
relying on negotiations with the mullahs, shouldn't we be
supporting those elements in Iran that would like to overthrow
the mullahs and establish a real democracy? Does anyone want to
go on record as saying that? I guess not.
Mr. Lauder. If I could, I used that phrase culture of
compliance as an aspirational goal in the sense that what we
are ultimately trying to do through negotiated measures,
through sanctions, through all the steps that the international
community has taken is to bring about a more open and moderate
Iran and this is one set of tools. There is obviously a variety
of tools. And the inspection process itself, as we found in the
Soviet Union----
Mr. Rohrabacher. Let me just say, I don't believe that the
mullahs want to be cool and go along with what the culture is
all about, when we establish this new culture. I want to--I
have got 2 minutes left or 1\1/2\ minutes. Are the Russians
still engaged in the engineering and the development of the
technologies that are going on, the centrifuges that will make
the weapons possible? Are the Russian engineers engaged in
this?
Mr. Heinonen. Sir, actually the IAEA knows very little
about the involvement of other countries in Iran's nuclear
power program because of the limitations of the inspections.
Therefore, the IAEA has not been able to fully investigate, for
example----
Mr. Rohrabacher. I am asking--I have got 1 minute left. Are
the Russian engineers still engaged in this project?
Mr. Heinonen. I think that for the enrichment program,
there has not been direct Russian engineers directly involved.
There are some assumptions on the weaponization part of the
individual, but it appears that no Russians were part of the
enrichment program.
Mr. Rohrabacher. So right now, in terms of the actual
building of this facility was a Russian project, was it not?
Mr. Heinonen. No.
Mr. Rohrabacher. It wasn't?
Mr. Heinonen. It was a Bushehr power plant which nuclear
power plant----
Mr. Rohrabacher. That is what I am talking about, the
nuclear power plant. Was the nuclear power plant built by the
Russians?
Mr. Heinonen. Yes, that is true.
Mr. Rohrabacher. And the centrifuges wouldn't make any
difference if they didn't have the nuclear power plant, right?
Mr. Heinonen. I don't think they need the centrifuges for
their nuclear power plant.
Mr. Rohrabacher. No, no. I understand that. The point is
when the Russians came on board, I remember going to the
Ambassador in 1999, our American Ambassador, suggesting we give
the Russians an alternative place to build several nuclear
power plants because this would lead to this moment. And
nothing happened. I said the same thing to Condoleezza Rice
about a year later and nothing happened.
When the Russians first started building this nuclear power
plant, we were leading up to this day and I would hope that--I
am sorry that it looks like our cooperation level with the
Russians has actually gone down since this moment and perhaps
this is something that would show a sign of good faith on their
part if they would start cooperating with us in dealing
specifically with the Iranians.
Will you indulge me for one more question? Was there an
offer, do any of you know of an offer by the Russian Government
to refrain and to withdraw from this project early on before
the nuclear power plant was done, before that part of the
project was done? Do you know of any offer made by the Russians
to withdraw from this project any time which could have
prevented us from coming to this point? I have been told there
was an offer and that we didn't pay any attention to it and
that was under George W. Bush's administration. Thank you very
much.
Chairman Royce. Thank you, Mr. Rohrabacher. We go now to
Mr. Ted Deutch of Florida.
Mr. Deutch. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr.
Rademaker, you said you referred back to two decades ago when
we were concerned about Iran's nuclear program. And I am trying
to get a sense from the panel going forward, we are talking
about verifying a comprehensive agreement. And yet, for as long
as we have worried about the nuclear program in Iran, how
confident were we that there wasn't a facility--I don't recall
when Natanz was discovered, you can speak to that. But
certainly Fordow, how confident were we that there weren't
other facilities, nuclear facilities beyond Natanz? Let us
start with that, Mr. Rademaker.
Mr. Rademaker. The answer to your question is, we were
never confident that there is no secret facility. Natanz was a
secret facility until it was revealed in 2002. And then for a
long period of time that was the only enrichment facility that
we knew of in Iran. And then the Fordow facility was revealed
and it was again, an even more secretive, underground facility.
So today, is there yet a third underground enrichment
facility somewhere in Iran under construction, in operation? I
don't think anybody, given that record, that history, I don't
think anybody can come to you and say we are confident that
there is not. That is why the question regarding our patience
is critically important, both in the near term through the JPA
and the Comprehensive Solution, but also as I suggested in my
testimony, even afterwards, because afterwards, when the
Comprehensive Solution expires, the level of verification is
going to go way, way down.
Mr. Deutch. Is there anyone else on the panel that is
confident that these are the only enrichment facilities in
Iran?
Mr. Lauder. I think as Mr. Rademaker has said, one of the
reasons why I think all of us have been strong proponents of
additional monitoring measures that are comprehensive and go
beyond just certain facilities is to try to reduce the
uncertainty about what is going on elsewhere in Iran that maybe
we don't fully understand. And that is also why it is very
important to get that precise and detailed, comprehensive, and
complete accounting from Iran about its past activities. That
needs to be part of the agreement.
Mr. Deutch. And that is what troubles me the most. We are
now a little more than a month away from the expiration of the
6-month period and we have been talking for how long have we
been talking about the military, possible military dimensions,
Mr. Heinonen? When was the first IAEA report that talked about
the military dimensions program?
Mr. Heinonen. Actually, the first time it was mentioned
indirectly was in spring 2004, if I remember correctly.
Mr. Deutch. So we are negotiating during this interim
period to get to a comprehensive agreement for a decade, for a
decade. We have worried about possible military dimensions of
the program. That is what has been driving the congressional
action. That is why we have been engaged in these deliberations
for now some several decades. But for 10 years, we have worried
about this. We have known about this. And yet, what access have
we been given thus far during this initial period when the goal
is to negotiate a comprehensive agreement, what access have we
been given to the other areas that we might be interested in to
ensure that Iran has come clean on the military dimensions of
its program?
Mr. Ambassador?
Ambassador DeTrani. Sir, that is why we want a robust
monitoring and verification regime as we go forward, knowing
what you just said.
Mr. Deutch. I appreciate that. The question is, it is a
chicken and egg situation, right? I mean how do we agree to any
sort of comprehensive agreement with an adequate level of
verification if to date on the most concerning issue about
Iran's nuclear program, the Iranians haven't been willing to
provide any access at all.
Ambassador DeTrani. That is a fair point, sir. That is why
persistent and continuous access to all the facilities, the
ability to take samples, the ability to question people, to see
documents and everything is very basic to a robust monitoring
and verification program.
Mr. Deutch. And certainly before we would ever entertain
the possibility of extending this interim agreement for another
6-month period, certainly we should expect that the Iranians
would at least be willing to grant us that access in the areas
that for more than a decade we had these concerns.
Mr. Rademaker?
Mr. Rademaker. I just wanted to interject the point that
regrettably, this is another area where the JPA is deficient.
The JPA, I can read you the sentence. There is one sentence in
the JPA that talks about the history. It doesn't use the word
military dimension, but that is what they are talking about.
Let me just read you the sentence. This is how this
question, this critically important question is addressed in
the JPA. It says they are to create a joint commission of the
two sides, the P5+1 and the Iranians. There will be this joint
commission. And ``it will work with the IAEA to facilitate
resolution of past and present issues of concern.'' That is all
it says. So there is a mechanism that is going to work with the
IAEA to try and figure this out. Nothing in the JPA depends on
it actually being worked out.
In other words, if this mechanism utterly fails to achieve
satisfaction for the IAEA, that is unfortunate, but it doesn't
stand in the way of the rest of the JPA. So what is going on
here? I have to say I think regrettably what happened was our
negotiators found this to be a very hard issue because I think
the Iranians have a lot to hide. There is a lot of history here
they don't want to talk about. So this became a sticking point
in the initial discussions and the answer, the negotiators, the
P5+1 ultimately settled on was we are going to ship this issue
to the IAEA. It is going to become the IAEA's problem to get to
the bottom. We will have a joint commission that will try to
work with them, but if we don't get to the bottom, well, that
is just too bad.
Mr. Deutch. I am out of time, but Mr. Chairman, I
appreciate that and I just hope that given that it is now more
than a decade that we have worried about military dimensions of
the Iranian nuclear program per the IAEA, longer for a lot of
the rest of us, that at a bare minimum Congress should be
informed of the very detailed nature of whatever talks have
taken place surrounding that issue before we should be asked to
budge an inch on any sanctions and in fact, whether to respond
beyond 6 months. I yield back.
Chairman Royce. Mr. Deutch, I think you and I should talk
after this hearing on that very subject.
Let us go now to Mr. Steve Chabot of Ohio.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Last year, the Asia
Subcommittee which I chair and the Middle East Subcommittee
chaired by Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, held a joint hearing to discuss
the linkages between covert and illicit activities in Iran,
North Korea, and Syria. It has been reported for some time that
North Korea has been assisting and supplying Iran's missile
program.
Given the history of North Korea and the failure of the
U.S. and international community to stop Pyongyang from
acquiring nuclear weapons, what lessons should be applied to
the situation with Iran moving forward? And what provisions, if
any, in the agreement prevent Iran from outsourcing their
nuclear program to another country as was the case with North
Korea.
I see you nodding, Mr. Lauder, so I will go to you first,
if you like.
Mr. Lauder. Well, I will start, but I am sure Ambassador
DeTrani will have something to add to this point as well.
One of the reasons why I argued in my statement that it is
very important to have an effective means of monitoring Iranian
procurement particularly if they are going to be allowed to
have a peaceful nuclear program as part of whatever agreement
emerges is to make sure that in the noise of those procurement
efforts that Iran is not able to outsource significant parts of
its nuclear weapons development program to other states or to
non-state actors, the A.Q. Khans in the world, to states like
Korea. And also, to get a good handle on what procurement that
they are obtaining, because there has been this long track
record of Iran looking for various sources throughout the world
that could aid in its nuclear developments.
Mr. Chabot. Ambassador DeTrani?
Ambassador DeTrani. Sir, let me just note for North Korea,
we have a real example here of how important verification and
monitoring is. In 2008, when we were proceeding with the
dismantlement programs to dismantle Yongbyon, there was a
verification and monitoring protocol that they agreed to
orally. When we asked for them to put it in writing because
that was a very robust monitoring and verification protocol, it
required, if you will, unfettered access, anywhere, any time,
samples taken out of the country, they refused to put it in
writing and that was the end. And since then they have not come
back to the table.
So to show how important that verification piece of the
equation is with North Korea, I would think the same with Iran,
with a very robust meaningful monitoring and verification
protocols that insist on the unfettered access and samples and
so forth. I think that will be very, very critical as we move
forward. And that is exactly what we offered North Korea.
Mr. Chabot. Let me just shift gears for just a moment.
Where does Israel fit in all of this and their views on Iran-
compliant issues and just what attention is being paid in that
area? Mr. Rademaker?
Mr. Rademaker. Israel is obviously very concerned about the
Iranian nuclear program and with good reason. Iran--Iranian
leaders have on multiple occasions made comments about how
Israel should be wiped from the face of the earth and wiped off
the map of the Earth. So for a country like Israel, that is
obviously alarming that we have those kinds of statements of
intention, coupled with technological activity that seems aimed
at producing a nuclear weapon which would actually enable them
to do precisely what they are saying they would like to see
happen.
So the United States has a lot to be worried about and I
think Iran's other neighbors in the Persian Gulf region have a
lot to be worried about. And Israel has a lot to be worried
about. Israel is paying a lot of attention to this problem. My
understanding is there is a great deal of apprehension in
Israel about the current course of diplomacy.
As I said earlier, it is always a possibility to negotiate
a deal with Iran, just agree to what they are asking for, and
you have a deal. And I think the Israelis are concerned that
the deal that was struck last year leans too far in the
direction of Iran's negotiating objectives, that they are
allowed to continue enriching, that they get sanctions relief,
the momentum in the direction of tightening sanctions has all
been reversed.
And then they are promised this get out of jail free card
that they can continue to enrich at a level that is being
negotiated right now and then when that period expires, they
can do all the enrichment they want. They can do all the
reprocessing they want. None of that will be limited. So the
Israelis, I think, are deeply concerned about that and my sense
is it has given rise to some tension in the bilateral
relationship between the United States and Israel.
Mr. Chabot. I think my time has expired, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Royce. We will go to Karen Bass of California.
Ms. Bass. Thank you, Mr. Chair. The Obama administration
has intimated that a final agreement that leaves Iran with a
nuclear weapons break out time is 6 months to a year may be
acceptable. I wanted to know from the panelists, whoever
chooses to answer, what you think of the idea of if a 6-month
break out window would be a sufficient period of time to detect
and counteract an Iranian break out? Sure, go ahead.
Mr. Heinonen. Well, certainly 6 months is a very short
period of time in international diplomacy. And it depends how
Iran will deviate from the agreement or how it may renegade.
There are several options available there. And if it goes, for
example, in such a way that the only evidence that the IAEA has
are the environmental sample results which normally take about
3 months to deliver, 6 months is much too short time because
you need to take evidence, additional samples, you can perhaps
analyze them first, but it has a lot of vulnerabilities and it
is also difficult to estimate the unknowns, what kind of
parameter you have there, how long will it take to find out.
You need to prove it, etcetera, so 6 months for me is the very,
very short end.
Ms. Bass. Yes, Mr. Lauder.
Mr. Lauder. If I could just add, I think some of us feel
that there may be too much emphasis on a time line because it
is very hard to say for sure well, Iran is 6 months away from a
weapon or it is 5\1/2\ months away from a weapon or even react
in that time. And I think that is why several of us have been
advocating that the really important thing to get right in this
agreement is to layer on sufficient monitoring measures so you
really have a sense of what is that attack status of Iran's
program to the extent that you can get it. Because everything
else falls from that.
Ms. Bass. Yes
.
Mr. Rademaker. Forgive me if I sound like a broken record,
but the 6-month break out time, that is fine. But bear in mind
that 6-month period will only apply during the period of the
Comprehensive Solution. When the Comprehensive Solution ends
and that is going to be 5 years, 10 years, 15 years.
Ms. Bass. Right.
Mr. Rademaker. Then all of the things that give us that 6-
month window go away. They will no longer be limited to the
number of centrifuges, the amount of the enriched material and
so at that moment that solution expires, it won't be 6 months
anymore it will be 6 weeks or 6 days.
Ms. Bass. Right. And I heard you say that earlier, so what
do you think it should be? So it shouldn't be 5 years. It
should be 10 years, 15 years, forever? What are your thoughts
about that?
Mr. Rademaker. On the Comprehensive Solution?
Ms. Bass. Right.
Mr. Rademaker. I think the enhanced verification
requirements, the restrictions--well, I don't think given their
history I don't think Iran should be ready to enrich at all. I
think it should remain the U.S. policy that they are not ready
to enrich, but the restrictions on what they can do and the
enhancement verifications that applies to that, I believe,
should extend indefinitely until the international community
can reach a judgment that it is satisfied that Iran is now like
South Africa. They turned the corner. They are no longer a
nuclear proliferation threat. I think it is going to take more
than just good behavior for a finite period of time. Then I
will feel comfortable that there is been a genuine change of
heart.
Ms. Bass. You and several of the other panelists mentioned
several countries, South Africa, I think was one. Are there any
other examples internationally where it has been without a
specific time line?
Ambassador DeTrani. Libya also declared their program and
gave that program up.
Ms. Bass. I am sorry, sir.
Ambassador DeTrani. Libya also gave up their program.
Ms. Bass. Thank you. I yield back the balance of my time.
Chairman Royce. Thank you, Karen Bass. Now we go to Adam
Kinzinger of Illinois.
Mr. Kinzinger. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and thank you all
for being here and helping educate us and talking about some of
these important issues. I mean as I look around the world and I
look around especially the Middle East, I guess I am excited
that the administration is so giddy about the prospect of
negotiations with Iran. I think a lot of the pending
negotiations we heard yesterday from the administration about
how they are hopeful that the situation going on with the
release of five Taliban will help lead to a reinvigorated
Taliban to come negotiate with the United States. I reminded
some folks of the administration that, in fact, Pakistan is in
negotiations with the Taliban right now and about a day or two
ago, 18 people were killed in an airport in a fight with the
Taliban.
Look at the situation in Israel, the Israel-Palestine
negotiations and all the effort that the administration is
putting into that which while we would all love that to be
solved, it is probably questionably a regional conflict, a
smaller conflict on the basis of conflicts that surround and
envelope the entire Middle East.
Look at the negotiations with Russia, how well some of
those have gone and Syria and the situation we find ourselves
in there. So I don't have a lot of hope in the future of
negotiations from this administration.
And I would ask if anybody, and I am going to ask this
rhetorically, and you can feel free to comment later, if you
can think of any success we have actually had with negotiations
with an enemy of the United States under this administration.
We had our boot on the throat of the Iranians at a time
when we really could have, I think, ended the question of
nuclear arms in Iran, but we backed away. And it is always
interesting to me how the Iranians feel like they can be in any
position at all to have any bargaining power at the table and
have any demands from the very beginning. We have determined
that they should not have the right to a nuclear weapons
program and I think that pretty much says it.
But that said, I want to go on to an issue that hasn't been
touched on yet very briefly. I can ask for your comment to the
level of your expertise. Can you talk about the Iranian
ballistic missile program? They are developing the ability to
deliver nuclear weapons through a ballistic missile program,
yet of course, they claim that they have no desire for the
weaponization of their nuclear program. So I am curious,
whoever wants to go first, if you can talk about the situation
where Iran finds itself right now with ballistic missiles.
Mr. Lauder?
Mr. Lauder. The Iranian ballistic missile program is a
capability that is of concern, ought to be a concern. And in
fact, it would be difficult to negotiate at this stage given
what has transpired already. But I would think that it would be
very important to begin to find a way to add additional
constrains on that program and to add additional monitoring
against the program.
You can recall in the heyday of arms control agreements
between the United States and the Soviet Union, for example, we
chose to focus on delivery vehicles because they were easier to
monitor in some ways that the nuclear weapons themselves and
the nuclear programs themselves.
And I think constraints and monitoring on the Iranian
ballistic missile program would be a very useful complement to
the types of things that we have been talking about so far in
this hearing.
Mr. Kinzinger. But do we have the ability to do that in the
law? I mean, look, when you are negotiating with the Russians
and you have arms limitation agreements, you have two super
powers, both with a vested interest in trying to calm a
situation. This is an asymmetric situation. I mean Iran is no
Soviet Union.
Do we really believe that we can put in place a way just to
monitor, and this is what I am going to ask, are there ways to
put in place to monitor what they are doing and to do it with
assurances that they are not hiding anything in the mountains
or underground?
Mr. Lauder. I think one of the challenges that we face, as
you quite rightly point out, is this is very much an asymmetric
relationship. This is not where the United States is concerning
some of its capability compared to something that we are asking
Iran to do. We are asking Iran to stop doing what it has been
doing illicitly against the international norms and
international agreement and we are trying to trade off
sanctions relief against that. We know how to monitor missiles.
We certainly have a track record of things that we could put in
place if we could bring Iran to that position.
Ambassador DeTrani. But your point is right on though that
is so central. Because if we are talking about weaponization
and miniaturization that is a delivery system. You have to look
at the ballistic missile program. And that is one program that
they have worked with North Korea on and so forth and they
continue to develop. So it is a very central piece to any
meaningful monitoring and verification protocol. The missiles
have to be very, very much a part of that.
Mr. Kinzinger. Mr. Chairman, I have a million other things,
but I will yield back.
Chairman Royce. We go now to Mr. William Keating of
Massachusetts.
Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to thank
the panel for their very important discussion this morning. I
think it underscores to me and many of our members the need for
Congress to be informed fully before the agreement is to go
forward. And many of the issues you brought up are critical
ones.
My role at the committee also is the ranking member on
Europe Eurasia emerging threats there. So I would like to shift
more into European perspective of things.
How do you assess the role of our European partners in the
PF+1 negotiations, especially with Catherine Ashton, stepping
down as a deg.the EU High Representative. Is that
going to have an effect at all and would you comment on that,
our partners and how they are viewing the situation and give us
your expertise in that area as well.
Ambassador DeTrani. So my only comment on that would be the
Europeans have to be extremely concerned. The last question
about the ballistic missiles because if North Korea has the
capability and they are working on it to touch Europe with
their ballistic missile system, if there is a nuclear program
and--they are needing it. So I think the European nations have
to be extremely concerned about the nuclear program, no
question.
Mr. Keating. Could any of you comment on the effect of the
U.S. dealing with our European partners as well, what things
could raise as potential conflicts, what things could we do to
ameliorate things going forward?
Mr. Rademaker. Sir, on your question about Cathy Ashton,
obviously she has been a central player. I think her departure
will make a difference although we don't know exactly what
difference it will be because we don't know who her replacement
will be. And everything will depend on personality of her
successor.
More broadly speaking, the observation was made earlier
that for our sanctions policy to work we need cooperation of
our economic partners and there have been plenty of hiccups
along the way but by and large in recent years the cooperation
has been pretty good. I think Congress has provided incredible
leadership in the sanctions area, the short hand that applies
to this is the Menendez-Kirk amendments to the Defense
Authorization Bill. There have been two of them. But the way,
they impose financial sanctions in a creative way designed to
discourage the importation of Iranian oil, but it was done very
cleverly and in a calibrated way that has actually worked. And
there is a lot of conversation about frozen Iranian assets in
foreign banks. These are not funds that are actually frozen,
but they are funds that are being held in those banks and they
can't be repatriated in cash form to Iran because of the U.S.
sanctions policy that Congress mandated and that other
countries are cooperating on.
So the partnership has worked pretty well. I think in terms
of the actual diplomacy, it is interesting. I was involved to
some extent when I served in the Bush administration and I mean
there are times that some of our European partners take a
harder line on Iran than the United States does. I think, for
example, the current French Government has been pretty firm in
its demands of the Iranians. So it is gratifying to see,
sometimes sobering to see, some of our allies take a harder
line on the Iranian nuclear program than the U.S. Government.
Mr. Keating. If the PF+1 moves forward though and there is
some kind of long-term agreement and some of the ambiguity or
the lack of robust verification that you talked about this
morning isn't in place, what are the concerns as a group? What,
for instance, would happen if the EU would move more ahead or
some of the countries and lifting those sanctions unilaterally
or as a group? Do you see that as a real concern going forward,
a kind of disengagement?
Ambassador DeTrani. Sanctions is a key. Lifting sanctions
like that would be, I think, a terrible move and it would move
us in the wrong direction. I think we have to be united on
something like this.
Mr. Keating. And then lastly, I just want to touch base a
little bit on Russia. The U.S. and the EU imposed on Russia's
oil and gas sectors at any point, what implication if any will
increase European demand for gas having our ability to sustain
international consensus regarding sanctions on Iran?
Mr. Rademaker. That is a pretty complex question having to
do with the functioning of global energy markets. But Iran and
Russia are major energy exporters and so I guess they both
benefit from higher prices and they both benefit from the
emergence of shortages. So it is one of the challenges that I
believe the United States faces in dealing with Russia, the
fact that I think something like 30 percent of European gas
consumption is Russian gas.
There is an effort now to build a pipeline across Turkey
and into southern Europe, ideally to be filled with Azeri gas.
The Iranians I think would be happy to put their gas in the
pipeline if they were allowed to do that. I think it is sort of
a central tenet of U.S. policy we don't want that to happen.
But the energy equation is a complex one and Iran as a
government is guilty of gross financial mismanagement and so
their energy resources are relatively undeveloped compared to
what they could be with better management.
Chairman Royce. We go now to Mr. Randy Weber of Texas.
Mr. Weber. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Our colleague down on
the left, Mr. Meeks, said that negotiating with Iran is not
easy. And I think--is it Rademaker, is that how you say that?--
said that negotiating would be easy, my words, if we roll them
and play dead. You said if we give them everything they want.
Was it you that said that?
You know, my opinion is if we are not careful in these
negotiations, we are going to get what we got in the Guantanamo
trade. We get to keep one conventional weapon. They get five
nuclear weapons. So it turns out Adam Kinzinger was exactly
correct, negotiations have not been kind to us during this
administration if I can put it rather glibly. If we don't
realize that there is a danger in negotiating with Iran, we are
fooling ourselves. Anyone here on the panel remember when the
first time that Iran referred to the United States as the Great
Satan? Anybody?
Ambassador DeTrani. Was it when Khomenei came in '79?
Mr. Weber. November 5, 1979 when Ayatollah Ruholla Khomeini
called us the Great Satan. So for 35 years they have been
exporting terrorism, calling us the Great Satan. Soon after
that, I don't know what time, it was Israel was the small
Satan. So should we be saying, when we talk about negotiating
with Iran, the terrorists, here we are negotiating with a group
of people who will--radical, Islamic, fundamentalist, jihadist
terrorist, Khomeini--who the jihadist believe in exporting
terrorism to the extent that they will strap explosives on
young boys and girls to kill other boys and girls and innocent
men and women and we think we can negotiate with them?
I believe it was you, Mr. Lauder, who said that we need a
list of all of their scientists who are working on their
program. And I don't know if you saw the Wall Street Journal
article on May 27th where there is a group of opposition
leaders who have identified Mohsen Fakhizadeh, I think is his
name, as probably the father of their nuclear weapon. Would you
agree with that?
And Mr. Chairman, by the way, Mr. Chairman, if I may, I
would like to get this letter into the record.
Chairman Royce. Mr. Weber, without objection, we will
include that.
Mr. Weber. Okay. Would you agree with that?
Mr. Lauder. I think it is very important that we have
access as part of the monitoring machine the key personnel who
are part of Iran's nuclear program.
Mr. Weber. But do you agree that he is the father of their
nuclear program?
Mr. Lauder. I don't know. Most nuclear programs probably
have multiple fathers.
Mr. Weber. But do you know this gentleman?
Mr. Lauder. I know the name and know the individual, yes,
sir.
Mr. Weber. Mr. Ambassador, you are shaking your head.
Ambassador DeTrani. I have heard the name before, sir, yes,
absolutely.
Mr. Weber. Turn you mike on, please, sir.
Ambassador DeTrani. Sorry?
Mr. Weber. Turn your mike on?
Ambassador DeTrani. Yes, I have heard the name before, sir.
Mr. Weber. You have heard the name.
Ambassador DeTrani. And affiliated with the nuclear
program.
Mr. Weber. Would you give this credence then or is it just
something you heard in passing?
Ambassador DeTrani. No, I think there is probably something
to it.
Mr. Weber. Okay. You mentioned also, Mr. Lauder, that the
facility, first of all, that once we should get that list of
those involved, those scientists, we should have any time, any
place, access for 24/7. I think that was you that said that in
today's hearing which I can't agree more of. And we keep in
context that we have got terrorists who will kill innocent
children, men and women, and who have been lying and doing such
for over 35 years. How long do you think we ought to give them
a chance to prove themselves? Trust, but verify, 24/7, any
time, any place access, should it be 35 years? Should they stop
their exporting of terrorism to Syria or I should say
supporting in Syria and you can go right down the list,
Afghanistan, Iraq, all the terrorism they are supporting.
Should it be 35 years or is 35 months long enough or not long
enough?
We will start with you, Mr. Rademaker.
Mr. Rademaker. The question is----
Mr. Weber. How long should we expect them to be compliant
before we can trust them?
Mr. Rademaker. I have a hard time answering that. It is
sort of the Supreme Court on what is obscenity. I will know it
when I see it. I don't think you can measure this by a time
line. I think the measure of whether you can trust Iran will be
the totality----
Mr. Weber. Okay, I got you. I got you.
Mr. Rademaker. The atmosphere, who is in power there, what
policies are they pursuing.
Mr. Weber. I got you. What do we catch them with, if we are
diligent? I am almost out of time. Let us go to Mr. Lauder real
quick.
Mr. Lauder. And I agree with some of the comments Mr.
Rademaker made earlier that we have to be about this monitoring
and verification regime for the long term. There may be aspects
of it----
Mr. Weber. But 6 months. Karen Bass asked the questions, 6
months to break out. Six months is not long enough, agreed?
Mr. Lauder. Oh, for monitoring, oh, it has to be longer,
yes.
Mr. Weber. Mr. Heinonen, what do you think the length of
time ought to be?
Mr. Heinonen. More than 6 months, but it depends on the
compliance, how the compliance is dealt with, what kind of a
process will we have in place when something comes up when we
see that Iran has not complied. The track record is pretty poor
there. We have had a number of red lines which have been----
Mr. Weber. Forgive me.
Ambassador DeTrani. Sir, I would say this is going to be
indefinite. I am going to say the part of the NPT, the IAEA is
there. You are going to have to have those monitors. The extra
protocol and the unfettered access is going to have to be there
indefinitely.
Mr. Weber. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Chairman Royce. We will go to Mr. David Cicilline from
Rhode Island.
Mr. Cicilline. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you to
the witnesses for this very useful testimony on a very serious
issue. I think the hearing underscores the principal challenge
we face as a country and that is how do we reach agreement with
a party with very serious consequences that has been deeply
untrustworthy and deceptive. And I think in part our success
depends on our ability to monitor effectively and to respond
effectively to any failings in the agreement.
So I want to first ask the witnesses, the Joint Plan of
Action calls for a Comprehensive Solution that, and I quote,
``would ensure Iran's nuclear program would be exclusively
peaceful.'' We have also heard President Rouhani say that Iran
will not dismantle a single centrifuge.
So my first question is, is there a way to ensure that
Iran's nuclear program will be exclusively peaceful without
dismantling some centrifuges?
Ambassador DeTrani. Let me just start off by saying they
are talking about building additional centrifuges, even more
sophisticated centrifuges. That flies in the face of where we
are going here. It should be going the other way around. They
need fewer centrifuges. They should not be enhancing and that
is where it should be going.
Mr. Cicilline. Is it even possible to develop or sustain a
program which is exclusively peaceful that does not require
some diminution of the production of centrifuges?
Ambassador DeTrani. Certainly with the number they have now
and the figure is about 19,000 that people are putting out. We
saw recently, just a year ago they had enough uranium at the 20
percent purity level which would have given them maybe enough
to get one nuclear weapon. So yes, what they have now is
sufficient to get them in the nuclear business. No question
about it.
Mr. Cicilline. Mr. Rademaker, you were about to say
something?
Mr. Rademaker. Yes, Iran is, of course, telling you today
their nuclear program is exclusively peaceful. And they will
say actually we don't have to do anything because it is an
exclusively peaceful program. We, of course, don't accept that.
If your question is, how many centrifuges can they be operating
and we can be confident that it is exclusively peaceful? My
personal answer is that with the current government, with its
history, with everything we know about where they have been,
the answer is they should have for me to say I am confident
that their program is exclusively peaceful, the answer is zero
centrifuges.
Unfortunately, we are in a situation where under the JPA,
they are going to have some number of operating centrifuges and
that troubles me because I don't understand why they need any.
And I think it is something of a logical conundrum because
their argument is this is, we are developing infrastructure to
produce fuel for our civil nuclear program. Well, if you buy
that, then they actually do need a lot more centrifuges than
they have now.
And so this idea that you are going to negotiate some
number and it is going to be lower than what they have now and
that is evidence of a peaceful program, well, some minimal
number of centrifuges makes no economic sense in commercial
terms. It makes a lot of sense in military terms, but that is
sort of where we are. We are sort of negotiating them down to a
centrifuge program that the size will only make sense in the
context of a military program. I think it would have been more
logical to go with the requirement that they have zero
operating centrifuges.
Mr. Cicilline. Which actually gets to my next question. I
think many of us think if there were not sufficient constraints
in the Joint Plan of Action with respect to research and
development and sort of the view that the current state of
technology, as if it is frozen in time. I am wondering what
your thoughts are about what should be in the final agreement
that would impose responsible constraints on research and
development such as--I mean to ensure kind of the security of
our country and the limitation of any final agreement.
Ambassador DeTrani. Well, certainly access to facilities,
access to the scientists, the technicians, access to the notes,
the data, access to past records. I think it is important to
really go way back with Iran on this to confirm where they are,
to determine what is the state of capability. I think that is
all necessary.
Mr. Cicilline. But in addition to the knowledge of that are
there any limitations that we should attempt to secure in a
final agreement to actually limit research and development in
their nuclear capability?
Mr. Heinonen. First of all, we need keep in our mind that
these are dual-use technologies. Once you have a centrifuge,
you can produce uranium for peaceful purposes or nonpeaceful
purposes. So this is actually the measurement of the
intentions. And it is not a technical topic. It is the behavior
of a state, also economic rationales, as Mr. Rademaker has
said. I personally see it is very hard to argue that Iran needs
enrichment for Bushehr power plant. And their concern is that
nobody sells to them enriched uranium. But Iran doesn't have
uranium in its soil. So if you are not able to buy uranium, you
are well dressed, but nowhere to go with your enrichment plant.
So you need to think about the rationale I suggest is the case,
and then base your argument to that.
Mr. Cicilline. Thank you. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Royce. We are going to go to Mr. Ron DeSantis of
Florida.
Mr. DeSantis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have been struck
by watching the Ayatollah's reaction to how things have
unfolded. And he spoke the other day in front of a banner that
said, ``America cannot do a damn thing,'' I believe. And he
basically said that they have renounced the idea of any
military actions. And so I think I am trying to understand from
their perspective how he sees sanctions being eased, force
being ruled out. So what incentive does he have to want to
change his course of conduct? To me, he is absolutely
incentivized to want to continue to enrich and to have a
nuclear capability. Does anybody want to quibble with me about
from the Ayatollah's perspective, haven't we provided him, as
he sees it, a roadmap to continue on?
Mr. Rademaker. I think your points are well of concern.
What brought Iran to the negotiating in the first place? It is
pressure, economic pressure, political pressure. That pressure
has been relieved to some extent and certainly on the military
side I think they probably are a lot less concerned about the
threat to a U.S. military strike today than they would have
been a year or 2 ago.
We have negotiators who are meeting with the Iranians right
now. They are meeting today in Geneva. Maybe they are making
progress. I don't know, but I guess I am certainly concerned
that Iran right now, I think they know what they need to agree
to get a deal. They are refusing to make that deal. They are
holding out for better terms. Is that because they are under
less pressure and did they calculate the pressure is going to
diminish over time? In other words, with the current trajectory
is in their favor? Yes, I worry a lot. Maybe that our diplomats
are, too, because I think they are probably frustrated, they
can't get the Iranians to say yes to whatever proposal they are
making.
Mr. DeSantis. We sometimes, I think, my frustration with
seeing as how some of this unfolding particularly looking at
people in the State Department as they will deal with Iran and
treat them in a way that I think imputes too much of a Western
sensibility into how Iran conducts themselves. I don't think
they recognize enough the extent to which they are motivated by
their virulent form of the Islamic jihad, the ability to
continue to wage war against infidels, the United States being
the Great Satan. And so I just look at it and I think from
their perspective, I think they see them playing us like a
fiddle.
I understand we have negotiations. I am absolutely not
optimistic that that is going to be done and that Iran is going
to willingly disarm itself. I hope I am wrong, but I think that
is just where we are and I will yield back the balance of my
time.
Chairman Royce. Mr. Brad Schneider of Illinois.
Mr. Schneider. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Again, echoing what
has been said today. Thank you for calling this hearing and for
allowing us to conduct it in a bipartisan way on an issue of
grave importance.
Mr. Rademaker, let me start with you. You touched on in
your testimony and in subsequent conversations the fact that
Iran, the concern that the deal being negotiated is a time
based agreement, that Iran just sits tight for a period of time
and then it is free to proceed however the country wants to
under a term that we treat Iran like Japan. I think the sense
that we all need to understand that Iran is not Japan. Iran is
a revolutionary regime. It has got hegemonic ambitions and
clearly demonstrated nefarious intent and deeds. And the idea
that such a state can be treated like Japan, I would argue it
would be the exact opposite. Such a state can never be treated
like Japan, or treated in the same manner as the JPOA says, as
that of any non-nuclear weapon state party to the NPT. Iran is
different.
And as we sit here, today is exactly 40 days away from July
20th deadline set by the agreement. Again, as was previously
mentioned, there was talk about moving Iran back on the pathway
to a nuclear weapons capability. I think many of us have stated
here before and again today that moving Iran backwards is not
sufficient. The goal should be to move Iran off the path to a
nuclear weapon.
By that long way of an introduction, Mr. Rademaker, for the
whole panel, is there any reason why we should be giving, as
you stated, the goal of holding Iran to zero enrichment,
holding Iran to not having an Arak plutonium reactor, holding
Iran from fully disclosing their previous potential military
dimensions of their nuclear program?
Mr. Rademaker. First of all, congressman, I think you and I
are in violent agreement about our perspectives on this. In
answer to your question, the rationale for allowing them to
enrich, I am really the wrong person to ask to provide such a
rationale because where I come down is the correct answer is
they should not be allowed to enrich given their history. So I
think if you want someone to give you a reason to permit that--
--
Mr. Schneider. Does anyone have any case that would justify
allowing Iran to enrich? I think the sense is that we are all
in agreement that that shouldn't be. I know before November
24th last with the announcement of the agreement was made, the
conversation was, my terms, permanently closing any and all
pathways for Iran to acquire a nuclear weapon. It seems the
concern is that this is not closing those pathways at all.
Mr. Lauder, in your written testimony, you talked about the
sense of--well, how to deal with noncompliance. How do we deal
with noncompliance before we even have an agreement? What
should we be doing now to make sure Iran has the incentive to
go forward?
Mr. Lauder. Well, I think it is an excellent question and I
think it comes back again to this theme of to begin to have any
confidence that this agreement will be complied with, we have
to go back to Iran's past and have to press them to make a full
disclosure of what they have done in the past on their nuclear
program.
We still have the leverage of sanctions. We still have the
leverage of nothing is agreed to everything is agreed. But that
understanding of what Iran has done in the past becomes the
foundation, then, for the monitoring regime. And we do have to
remember that.
Mr. Schneider. Ambassador--I am sorry, Mr. Heinonen.
Mr. Heinonen. In 2003 when EU reached an agreement with
Iran, actually there was a paragraph there which required Iran
to come with the complete past history of its nuclear program
and it failed to do so. And I think that we need to look at
what was the reason for the failure? Were there some other
mechanisms which we should apply when faced with this? And I
think it is the most important element of this new agreement to
be concluded.
Mr. Schneider. Ambassador DeTrani?
Ambassador DeTrani. If I could just comment, sir.
Sanctions, they are biting. We know why the Iranians are back
at the table. They made it very clear. They need relief.
Sanctions and sanctions, going after the financial system, the
institutions and so forth, there are a list of activities. This
is so key. And that is the pressure. That is the pressure to
keep them on a path. And once we keep that pressure on, my
personal views, my personal view, you keep that pressure on, if
they want relief, they are going to have to perform and that is
where the verification monitoring comes in and so forth. When
they are not performing, that pressure continues.
Mr. Schneider. Ambassador, I agree with you. Sanctions are
what brought Iran brought to the table. My personal belief is
that we need to make sure Iran understands that the no deal is
better--no deal is better than a bad deal. No deal is not the
sanctions we had in November 2013, but orders of magnitude
greater bite in those sanctions if there is not a deal to our
terms and thus close those gaps. With that, I yield back. Thank
you very much.
Chairman Royce. Thank you. We go now to Mr. Ted Yoho of
Florida.
Mr. Yoho. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and gentlemen, I
appreciate you being here. We have sat here several times over
the past 1\1/2\ years and I think some of you have been here
and I remember Ambassador Bolton was here and everybody was
pretty much in agreement that Iran was going to have
fissionable nuclear materials to construct a bomb, five to six
bombs by January or February of this year. Has Iran
accomplished that mission? Do they have enough material to do
that?
Ambassador DeTrani. I don't think we see that. Sir, the
sense is no, they do not. The concern was when they had 20
percent purity and enough kilograms to have maybe one.
Mr. Yoho. Yet, we don't have all the information. So we
can't say with certainty they don't have that, correct?
Ambassador DeTrani. Because we are just looking at the
declared facilities and there may be un-declared as the IAEA is
indicating.
Mr. Yoho. Mr. Lauder and Ambassador DeTrani, you were
saying that it is very difficult to monitor and verify Iran's
compliance to the Iranian-U.S. JPA agreement. Do you believe
these details should have been worked out prior to any
agreement starting and releasing sanctions? I mean if you are
going into a negotiation, you should have everything on the
table. I want to know everything you have before you move
forward. Would you agree with that?
Ambassador DeTrani. Sir, I don't have all the modalities of
the negotiators and what they were using. I believe they gave
them relief on a certain number of sanctions, so they could
move forward.
Mr. Yoho. If we can't verify now or monitor it, we should
have had a way to monitor that stuff all those parameters
before we move forward. I would hope so.
How about you, Mr. Lauder?
Mr. Lauder. I think it is very important before there is
further loosening of the sanctions which have brought Iran to
the table that we do get this complete and full accounting of
Iranian activities and have the declarations that we need as
the basis of our monitoring regime.
Mr. Yoho. In your opinion, does the current situation in
Iran's nuclear program or whatever they are doing in our
agreement, does it allow Iran to get closer to having a bomb if
we stay on the current track, Mr. Rademaker?
Mr. Rademaker. I think the Obama administration would argue
that the current arrangement diminishes the risk of nuclear
break out, because it limits the number of new centrifuges that
Iran can employ. Actually, it prevents them from continuing to
enrich to 20 percent, at the 20 percent level which they were
doing in the past. But on the other hand, there has been some
recent analysis done by the Bipartisan Policy Center. It is on
the Web site. They are not only producing 20 percent enriched
material, but their production of lower enriched, 3.5 percent
has gone up by about 25 percent.
Mr. Yoho. And what I have heard on this panel----
Mr. Rademaker. The advantages of progress is substantially
less than the Obama administration advertised.
Mr. Yoho. Right, but what I have heard on this panel today
is they have got way more centrifuges than they need to have
for nuclear power production. And so I think we are all in
agreement that they are moving in that direction. They have
been moving in that direction in the last 25 to 30 years,
playing the cat and mouse game.
Do you believe that the U.S.-Iranian Interim Agreement was
detrimental to the U.S. security or Israel's security or the
regional security the way it was negotiate and released the
sanctions at the time they did? Do you think it was detrimental
to do that, just kind of real quickly because I am running out
of time.
Mr. Rademaker. I think it was detrimental on the sanctions
side. I also think it was highly detrimental by basically
legitimizing centrifuge enrichment in Arak which, up until the
time of the agreement, was something we said was not permitted.
Mr. Yoho. Ambassador DeTrani, what do you think?
Ambassador DeTrani. Sir, the reporting is that Iran has
down blended and converted to uranium oxide their inventory.
This is coming out of the IAEA. They are talking about
framework for cooperation----
Mr. Yoho. Your microphone, please.
Ambassador DeTrani. I am sorry. The reporting from the IAEA
indicates that Iran has down blended and converted to uranium
oxide their inventory, all of their inventory of 20 percent
purity enriched uranium. The IAEA report speaks about the
framework for cooperation. So I think what we have just
recently seen from the IAEA is that there has been some
movement on the part of Iran in response to the relief on some
of those sanctions. But that is just a very interim type of
approach to it.
Certainly, if you are sitting in Israel and you are looking
at the existential threat, you are looking at something
different, so that is----
Mr. Yoho. That brings me up to my last question. Since
Iran--do you feel like they have abided by the terms of the
agreement?
Ambassador DeTrani. Sir, I don't have any particulars on
that, but according to the IAEA, the IAEA's most recent report
is a much more positive report than I have seen in the past
with the exception of the weaponization and the militarization.
Mr. Yoho. And if they don't abide by that, what should we
as a nation do? More sanctions, preemptive strike, prepare for
the day that they do get a nuclear bomb?
Ambassador DeTrani. Sanctions are biting. Sanctions are
big. Sanctions have had impact.
Mr. Yoho. I am out of time. I appreciate your time. Thank
you.
Chairman Royce. We go to Mr. Juan Vargas of California.
Mr. Vargas. I, too, want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for
having this meeting and also to the ranking member. As many of
you know, I have been very critical of the interim deal. I
thought it was a mistake. I believe that we first should have
gotten the final deal. Then we should have negotiated the
interim deals. In other words, we first should have made sure
that there was no path to getting a nuclear weapon. Then we
could have negotiated these interim deals because I did think
that the sanctions were working and I voted here to ratchet up
the sanctions because I think you had to get that fundamental
choice. Do you want your nuclear program and do you want to
militarize it as you are tempted to do or do you want a
functioning economy? We would continue to press the sanctions
until you didn't have a functioning economy. I think that that
would have been the right way to go.
Now we are here. And we are here and I think it is a very
dangerous situation that we are in because I do think that if
we are going to get to July 20th and for sure they are going to
have one more time. That is what we feared at the beginning. I
think that that is going to be the case. Then what do we do?
Then do we say well, we are not going to negotiate and make
ourselves look like the bad guys? Then it is harder to put the
sanctions back on again.
So where do we go from here? And I do want to comment, Mr.
Rademaker, I couldn't agree with you more wholeheartedly. If it
is a 5-year deal, if it is 10-year deal, or it is even a 20-
year deal, it is not a deal. I mean that is a bad deal. This is
a situation where you have to make sure you can force them to
comply all the way out because otherwise they will simply play
cat and mouse and outlast us 10 years and then they will get on
with their nuclear program. So where do we go from here? I mean
as we are approaching this point, I don't think we are going to
be able to----
Ambassador DeTrani. I agree on the monitoring and
verification, congressman. There is no question about it and we
have talked about unfettered access, any time, any place,
access to all the facilities, concern about covert facilities,
concern about weaponization. These are things that need to be
drilled down and pursued with great vigor indefinitely.
Mr. Vargas. Right. I believe we are going to get to the 6th
month, assume for a second, we get to the 6th month and they
want more time. What do we do? At that point, what do we do?
Mr. Rademaker. I think it is pretty clear that if we reach
the 6-month point without having reached agreement on the
Comprehensive Solution, I think there will be a 6-month
extension. In fact, the JPA at one point says it will take up
to a year to negotiate this, so even a draft of the JPA, they
were anticipating potentially a 6-month extension. I did want
to pick up on one thing you said. You said you think the right
thing to have done here would have been to negotiate the final
agreement and then come back and fill in the details. It pains
me to say this, but I think in fact that is what they did. I
mean the JPA does specify the final agreement.
The final agreement is that--I read it earlier. The final
agreement is that upon the expiration of the Comprehensive
Solution, the Iranian nuclear program will be treated in the
same manner as that of any non-nuclear weapon state to the NPT.
So the end state, the final state is no sanctions, no
restrictions on their ability to do whatever they want in the
nuclear area, subject to ordinary safeguards and----
Mr. Vargas. If I could interrupt just for a second. I mean
the issue of having any type of enrichment program, any type of
way for them to be able to reach that ability to, in fact,
create the nuclear weapon, having that facility----
Mr. Rademaker. But that is----
Mr. Vargas. I know what you are saying and I actually am
not disagreeing with you, but I think that in the final
agreement, what I would say is that if you are going to allow
any kind of nuclear power program it had to be one so tight
there was no way around it that you had to have the fuel coming
from somewhere else, monitored closely, that you would have to
have unfettered access to their country where they could
potentially be hiding things, that is the deal I mean because I
agree with you. That is why I think personally and again it is
very critical, I think that the people who are associated with
this deal were very good hearted and attempted to negotiate
with a Western type of nation and found out that that is not
who they are negotiating with. I think it was very naive.
Mr. Lauder, could I have you comment on that?
Mr. Lauder. I think to the extent to which the negotiations
continue, the opportunity needs to be seized and I agree with
Ambassador DeTrani in this respect, is to use that time to push
even harder to expand the monitoring provisions that Iran will
need to undertake. Iran is different. They have violating
international norms over an extended period of time. They have
not been compliant with the international agreement. It is
reasonable then to expect that Iran should need to undertake
additional monitoring provisions to build confidence in the
international community that they are changing their path.
Mr. Vargas. Thank you. My time has expired. I want to say
though I think Iran is like North Korea. If they get a nuclear
weapon, they will also threaten to bomb Los Angeles or else and
I unfortunately think they might have the nerve to do it. Thank
you.
Chairman Royce. Thank you, Mr. Vargas. We go now to Mr.
George Holding of North Carolina.
Mr. Holding. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think we can all
agree that if the Obama administration is to craft the final
agreement with Iran that it would be a huge foreign policy win
at least in the eyes of the administration, a foreign policy
win, a political win, truly in an environment of an
administration that is somewhat bereft of foreign policy wins
or accolades. My concern is that if they achieve what they
consider a win, that they will lack the political will to risk
tarnishing that win by calling out a violation that we find
substantively.
So my question and I have got just to run down the line and
have each of you all to respond to this is what internal
controls are there, red teams so to speak, that would ensure
that the politics of trying to salvage this foreign policy win
don't trump good sense in the White House as far as calling out
a violation.
Mr. Rademaker? I have got 30 seconds, so let us go down and
by the time everyone has done that, I will be out of time.
Mr. Rademaker. I honestly don't know what sort of checks
there might be within the administration. Every President can
structure decision making on foreign policy in his
administration in the way he sees fit. I would like to think
that there are people at the Defense Department that are
vigilant. That there are people in the intelligence community
drawing attention to problems, but I don't know. I think the
ultimate red team is the United States Congress and this
committee.
Mr. Holding. Perhaps that might have been helpful as the
President was considering exchanging Bergdahl for five Taliban
terrorists.
Mr. Rademaker. Well, the good news here I think for the
Congress is I think one of the things the Iranians are
demanding is to end all U.S. sanctions. In fact, they are
promised that in the JPA. I don't think the President has the
authority unilaterally to get rid of all of the sanctions. He
has waivers. He has the ability not to enforce certain laws,
but I think at the end of the day there are certain things that
only the Congress is going to be able to do and so for them to
fulfill their commitments to the Iranians in this negotiation,
they are going to need this committee and this Congress to pass
legislation. And that will afford you an opportunity to pass
judgment on the entire arrangement and for that reason I would
think it would behoove the administration to consult closely
with you now to make sure that you are prepared to accept----
Mr. Holding. Indeed. Mr. Lauder.
Mr. Rademaker. I don't know if that is happening, but
ultimately they need to persuade you that they struck a good
deal and if there are details that you are unhappy about, it is
probably better to let them know that now rather than after
they promised things to the Iranians that they are not going to
be able to deliver.
Mr. Holding. Mr. Lauder.
Mr. Lauder. I agree that perhaps the most effective red
team for this will be the U.S. Congress. You will have the
opportunity and I am presuming to say this as an outsider, but
this is not a treaty, but you will have the functional
equivalent of a resolution to ratification when you deal with
the sanctions question. And that is an opportunity to express
the Congress' views about the types of capabilities that need
to be--for monitoring that need to be nurtured in the U.S.
Government, that need to be funded in the U.S. Government, and
you can ask for a periodic compliance report to the extent to
which Iran is compliant with the agreement, what types of
anomalies are being detected, what has been done to resolve
that, to ask for both a periodic unclassified and classified
report. That certainly has been a feature of other agreements
in the past.
I think you used to like them when I was in the Executive
Branch because they were a lot of work and it led to a lot of
internal debate, but I think it is something to make sure that
the Iranians understand that their compliance is going to be
very important to the United States across all the branches.
Mr. Holding. Thank you. Mr. Heinonen?
Mr. Heinonen. Thank you. I agree with Mr. Lauder. And I
think the red team is actually the public opinion that you make
the deal open and open compliance reports. There is an
automatic assessment. This is important. It is important not
only to the security of the United States of America, but
regional security and we set a benchmark of how we are going to
deal, for example, in the future with North Korea. So this will
have a lot of ramifications and they don't end up here.
Mr. Holding. Mr. Ambassador?
Ambassador DeTrani. I believe ground truth will be the
monitors who are in the field, the IAEA and other countries
when they deal with them. I believe it is those foreign
governments that also have access and unique insights into what
is going on there. I think a strong case can be made that they
can speak to compliance issues and if Iran has gone on to their
own way and if they are cheating and so forth I think that will
come forth. I don't think anyone is going to be able to conceal
that aspect to it.
Mr. Holding. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Royce. Thank you, Mr. Holding. We thank all of our
witnesses for their testimony and I think you have given us a
lot to consider as the administration continues to negotiate.
I am particularly troubled that, as Mr. Rademaker put it,
this agreement puts Iran on the path from nuclear pariah to
nuclear partner and I don't think any member of the committee
is comfortable with that given the Supreme Leader's comments in
May in particular about expectations that we might try to limit
their ballistic missile program. As I quoted earlier he said,
``this is a stupid, idiotic expectation.'' But I didn't give
you the rest of his quote which to me is very revealing. He
said, ``The Revolutionary Guards should definitely carry out
their program and not be satisfied with the present level. They
should mass produce ballistic missile.'' He said, ``This is the
main duty of all military officials.'' Now he is not referring
to a space program here. And when you combine that with the
call for the head of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization to add
30,000 centrifuges last month to Iran's existing 19,000,
ignoring what the Iranian officials and what their leader is
saying on this subject as they move forward with their program
is very concerning to me and I especially wanted to thank Mr.
Engel and the other members of this committee and our witnesses
for the chance today to take a good, hard look at the on-going
negotiations. Thank you all very much and we stand adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:50 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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