[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
BOKO HARAM: THE GROWING THREAT TO SCHOOLGIRLS, NIGERIA, AND BEYOND
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MAY 21, 2014
__________
Serial No. 113-172
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Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
DANA ROHRABACHER, California Samoa
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio BRAD SHERMAN, California
JOE WILSON, South Carolina GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
TED POE, Texas GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
MATT SALMON, Arizona THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina KAREN BASS, California
ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
MO BROOKS, Alabama DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
TOM COTTON, Arkansas ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
PAUL COOK, California JUAN VARGAS, California
GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois
RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III, Massachusetts
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania AMI BERA, California
STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California
RON DeSANTIS, Florida GRACE MENG, New York
DOUG COLLINS, Georgia LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
TED S. YOHO, Florida JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
Amy Porter, Chief of Staff Thomas Sheehy, Staff Director
Jason Steinbaum, Democratic Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
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Page
WITNESSES
The Honorable Sarah Sewall, Under Secretary for Civilian
Security, Democracy, and Human Rights, U.S. Department of State 7
Ms. Amanda J. Dory, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
African Affairs, U.S. Department of Defense.................... 19
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
The Honorable Sarah Sewall: Prepared statement................... 10
Ms. Amanda J. Dory: Prepared statement........................... 21
APPENDIX
Hearing notice................................................... 66
Hearing minutes.................................................. 67
The Honorable Edward R. Royce, a Representative in Congress from
the State of California, and chairman, Committee on Foreign
Affairs: Material submitted for the record..................... 69
The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress
from the Commonwealth of Virginia: Prepared statement.......... 72
BOKO HARAM: THE GROWING THREAT TO SCHOOLGIRLS, NIGERIA, AND BEYOND
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WEDNESDAY, MAY 21, 2014
House of Representatives,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:53 a.m., in
room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ed Royce
(chairman of the committee) presiding.
Chairman Royce. This hearing will come to order.
Today, as we meet here, we have nearly 300 young girls from
Chibok, in Northern Nigeria, that remain Boko Haram kidnap
victims.
It has been 5 weeks since they were abducted. Every passing
minute makes their successful rescue less likely. And we meet
today to ensure that the United States is doing everything it
can to assist in their rescue. Just yesterday, the House passed
a resolution pressing for more aggressive action.
Many around the world are just now hearing of Boko Haram.
Sadly, though, for communities in Northern Nigeria, they know
the death and destruction that this group brings only too well,
and they have known it for a number of years.
They have known it for a number of years because, as Boko
Haram has spread, they have continued to burn schools. As of
today, over 500 schools have been destroyed. Over 100 teachers
have been killed.
This morning committee members had the chance to meet with
Deborah Peter. Deborah, a young woman of just 15 years of age,
is from Chibok, Nigeria, the same town where the recent
abductions took place. Ms. Peter is seated in the front row.
She is one of only three Boko Haram survivors in the United
States. She courageously shared her traumatic experience at the
hands of Boko Haram with us this morning. Her father and her
brother--her father was a pastor--were executed in front of her
eyes for not renouncing their Christian faith. His church was
burned to the ground. We thank Deborah for being with us today.
We thank her and her friends for traveling from rural Virginia
to share her traumatic story in the hopes that the world will
act.
We are faced with two challenges in Northern Nigeria; in
the near term, seeing these girls rescued, and in the long
term, rendering Boko Haram unable to threaten the region. This
is a group that has killed thousands, thousands, of Nigerians
to date. And their loose title of the translation ``Boko
Haram'' is ``Western education is a sin.'' Their mission is to
carry out a war against those who educate or empower women. And
the greatest sin to them is not treating women as chattel,
which they do, or enslaving women, which they purport to
justify, or selling women. No. The greatest sin to them is to
be involved in educating or teaching young women how to read
and write.
And over time this group, Boko Haram, has developed a vast
arsenal of weapons. They are an al-Qaeda affiliate. They have
sworn their allegiance to al-Qaeda. They have received training
from al-Qaeda groups. They have built up their resources with
that support. And this means greater terror for the people in
Northern Nigeria and greater challenges for Nigerian security
forces.
Unfortunately, these forces suffer unprofessional elements
with poor morale. I have been in Nigeria several times. It is a
struggle for the Nigerian military to cope with this threat,
which has led some to say that we should not get involved. But
it tells me otherwise. It tells me that U.S. involvement is
critical. U.S. forces are well positioned to advise and assist.
We can advise and assist Nigerian forces in the search and the
rescue of these girls. In this role, U.S. forces expertly
trained to deal with hostage situations, jungle environments,
and in tracking could help Nigerians with intelligence,
planning, and logistics. If some U.S. laws would hinder such
assistance, the administration should use its waiver authority
under these extraordinary circumstances.
Why do we care? We care about Deborah, her friends and
family. We care about a girl's right to an education. We care
about human rights and religious liberty and the future of
Africa's largest country, largest in population, largest
economy.
We have direct security interests. Commanders at the
Pentagon have stated that Boko Haram is, in their words, a
``threat to Western interests'' and one of the highest
counterterrorism priorities in Africa.
Pressure from this committee was critical in getting the
State Department to designate Boko Haram as a Foreign Terrorist
Organization. Indeed, the administration made that announcement
in this room under pressure from us on this committee.
As many have noted, it shouldn't have taken so long. We
want to hear from the State Department and the Pentagon
witnesses on the strategy we now have in place.
Boko Haram, with heavy weapons and grenade attacks, is
waging a brutal war against schoolgirls carrying backpacks,
books, and pencils. We can't sit on the sidelines.
And I will now turn to the ranking member for his opening
comments, Mr. Eliot Engel of New York.
Mr. Engel. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for
holding this very timely hearing on Boko Haram.
I would like to thank our witnesses, Dr. Sewall and Ms.
Dory, for being here today.
And, of course, I would like to welcome Ms. Deborah Peter,
a brave young survivor of a Boko Haram attack in 2011. She met
with members of this committee earlier this morning to describe
her harrowing experience.
Deborah, we are all grateful for your courage and your
commitment to seeing that these horrible abuses are stopped so
that no other family goes through what your family has gone
through. Thank you for your courage. We are all very, very
proud of you.
And I must also say, since I had the opportunity to meet
with her privately, how proud any parent would be of having a
daughter like Deborah.
So thank you, Deborah.
Mr. Chairman, Boko Haram is an Islamic extremist group,
increasingly active since 2010. It operates mainly in Northern
Nigeria.
As we all know, one of Boko Haram's most recent atrocities
took place on April 14 of this year. That day nearly 300
schoolgirls were doing what young women and girls all over the
world do every day, studying for tests, playing with friends,
building a future for themselves.
That day Boko Haram, which roughly translates to ``Western
education is forbidden,'' abducted these girls; tore them away
from their families and their communities.
Today, more than a month later, we still don't know where
they are. Our thoughts are obviously with their families, and
we pray that they are safely reunited as soon as possible.
The United States and other international partners have
offered assistance to bring the schoolgirls home, and we all
hope those efforts will prove successful.
I agree with Chairman Royce that we must do everything in
our power to bring those girls home and the United States can
be very helpful in assisting this process.
But even as we work to address the crisis, we need to focus
on the larger challenge: Stopping Boko Haram's reign of terror
in Nigeria and beyond.
Just yesterday Boko Haram set off two bombs in the city of
Jos, killing over 100 people--100 innocent people. Two weeks
ago the group attacked a market in the town of Gamboru, killing
more than 300 people.
Back in 2011, in one of their most high-profile attacks,
the terrorist group bombed the United Nations' headquarters in
Abuja, killing at least 21 people and injuring more than 120.
You really have to be bold to attack a United Nations
headquarters.
So, all told, Boko Haram has murdered more than 5,000
people over the last 4 years. Their victims are both Christians
and Muslims, men, women, and children, and, of course,
teachers.
Before this brazen kidnapping, Boko Haram was virtually
unknown around the world. As more of their violent history has
come to light, the international community has reacted with
shock, horror and disbelief. But the sad reality is that Boko
Haram is not new and neither are their tactics.
I think our witnesses can shed more light on the situation
for us and for everyone following the plight of these young
girls.
How did Boko Haram emerge and grow into an extremist
threat? What has allowed them to thrive as on organization? And
what challenges does the U.S. face in working with Nigeria to
disrupt and dismantle the group?
Let me just say, contrary to some of the reporting I have
seen, I know the difficulty in weakening Boko Haram has not
been due to a lack of effort or an unwillingness to help.
In fact, one of our major challenges is working with the
Nigerian military itself. Its approach in Northern Nigeria has
often alienated the very population that could be providing
valuable information about Boko Haram's activities.
But instead of forming these relationships, unfortunately,
the military has too often built a record of indiscriminate
destruction themselves, theft of personal property, arbitrary
arrests, indefinite detention, torture, and extrajudicial
killing of civilians, much of this with impunity.
In addition, despite a recent intelligence-sharing
agreement, there are legitimate concerns that intelligence
shared with the military to assist them in their operations
might be leaked. And to make matters worse, this corruption is
rampant throughout the force. Nigerian security forces are the
best funded on the African continent. Yet, many of the funds
are siphoned off by corruption and troops often aren't paid a
living wage, generating increased frustration in the ranks and
fueling low-level corruption.
So how exactly can the U.S. engage with a military force
that sometimes lacks professionalism and often seems to fail
with respect to human rights? And how do we convince Nigerian
leaders that they aren't doing enough and, in fact, may be
making the problem worse?
Lastly, while we are very focused on recovering these girls
and stopping Boko Haram, we need to look at the broader
context.
Years of economic stagnation and neglect have afflicted
Northern Nigeria and created the sort of environment where
terrorist groups thrive.
In places where there is no support or opportunity,
extremists find it easier to prey on vulnerable populations,
preaching false ideologies of violence and hatred.
To push back against this tide, I believe Nigeria's
Government must address these issues of corruption by improving
the professionalism of its security forces, and providing
additional resources for education, infrastructure, and
economic activity. In short, Nigeria must take a more holistic
approach to counterterrorism.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses about how the
U.S. can more effectively engage with the Nigerians when
addressing the scourge of Boko Haram today.
I regard Nigeria as our partner in this, and the United
States needs to be helpful to them. We need to build an
environment that forces development and prosperity in Northern
Nigeria for tomorrow.
So thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing.
And thanks to the witnesses and Deborah for appearing here
today.
I yield back.
Chairman Royce. Thank you, Mr. Engel.
We go to Mr. Chris Smith, chair of the Africa subcommittee,
for 1 minute.
Mr. Smith. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And, again,
thank you very much for convening this extremely important
hearing.
Obviously, words are inadequate to express our concern--and
I say that collectively for all of us--for the welfare and
whereabouts of the abducted girls, as well as the outrage
toward Boko Haram for this absolutely horrific act of
aggression and violence against these young women.
My good friend and colleague, Mr. Engel, just mentioned how
Boko Haram was largely unknown around the world until this
infamous incident, but not to Chairman Royce or Eliot Engel or
Ranking Member Bass or me or any other member of this
committee.
We have been raising the concerns of Boko Haram for years.
Especially since 2011, when they seemed to transition into a
more lethal stage with the bombing of the U.N. mission in
Abuja, but, also, the very real problem of not being designated
a Foreign Terrorist Organization.
I held two hearings on Boko Haram. Emmanuel Ogebe was at
one of those hearings. As a matter of fact, I went with him. He
joined us in Jos and in Abuja. We met with people who had been
victims of fire bombings, and Christians as well as some
Muslims, who were targeted for killings by these thugs.
He made it very clear then--he is now accompanying Deborah
Peter--how this is only going to get worse unless all means are
used to destroy this terrible threat.
And it took years to get the designation of the Foreign
Terrorist Organization (FTO). I am looking forward to what the
answer may be. It wasn't until we had another hearing that it
was announced that, yes, it would be designated a FTO.
I don't know--I still can't understand what the delay was
when--I asked Ambassador Johnnie Carson repeatedly at one of
those hearings--and that is the one that Mr. Ogebe testified
at--why? Why the delay?
I mean, we all need to be on the same page now and work as
never before to assist the Government of Nigeria. But we lost
some precious time, in all candor, by not designating Boko Hara
as a Foreign Terrorist Organization earlier rather than later.
Yield back.
Chairman Royce. Thank you.
Congresswoman Karen Bass isn't with us today as the ranking
subcommittee member. She is in Africa.
So we will go to Mr. Brad Sherman, chairman of the
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade.
Mr. Sherman. Boko Haram is but one of many organizations
using terror to try to impose a contorted version of 9th
Century Islam. It touches our hearts to see the victims from
North Africa, through the Middle East, and through South Asia.
But it is also a threat to the United States. Whether these
groups claim to be affiliated with al-Qaeda or don't claim the
al-Qaeda franchise, whether their chief focus is local and
their secondary focus is worldwide Jihad or the reverse, the
war against violent extremism is not one that we can declare to
be over just because we are tired of it. It has been one of our
longest conflicts, exceeded at this point only by the Cold War,
but it has to be won. We have to turn off the money to groups
like Boko Haram.
And I hope that we will get some testimony as to the Gulf
oil, state and other money that is or is not being detected
going to these groups.
And we have to provide the military aid to the Nigerian
Government and other host governments to deal with this
extremism.
I yield back.
Chairman Royce. Thank you.
Lastly, we go for 1 minute to Mr. Ted Poe, a former judge
and the chair of the Subcommittee on Terrorism,
Nonproliferation, and Trade.
Mr. Poe. Boko Haram showed the world its evil ways when it
arrogantly kidnapped over 200 innocent schoolgirls, threatened
to marry them off to their fighters and traffic them out of the
country as property and as slaves.
As a judge, I have seen the ills of human trafficking and
other despicable acts. And this is the ultimate human rights
violation, but it is not a surprise, given who these outlaws
are.
Unfortunately, the State Department did not want to
designate Boko Haram as a Foreign Terrorist Organization until
14 months after the FBI and other government organizations made
their plea to designate the group.
In fact, the State Department didn't make the announcement
until the day before my subcommittee held a joint hearing with
Mr. Smith's subcommittee on the threat of Boko Haram in mid-
November of 2013.
Interesting timing, wouldn't you think? We should have
listed Boko Haram earlier. Instead, we worried about diplomatic
relations. Nonsense rules the day.
After fighting the FTO designation for so long, I am
curious how the State Department has implemented the
designation and what, if anything, we are doing to stop this
Foreign Terrorist Organization. Do we have a plan? What is the
plan?
I yield back.
Chairman Royce. We are joined this morning by
representatives of the Department of State and the Department
of Defense. We welcome them.
Prior to being sworn in earlier this year as Under
Secretary of State for Civilian Security, Democracy, and Human
Rights, Dr. Sarah Sewall served as a senior lecturer in public
policy at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard
University. Dr. Sewall also served as Deputy Assistant
Secretary for Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Assistance at the
Department of Defense from 1993 to 1996.
Ms. Amanda Dory is the Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense for African Affairs in the Office of the Secretary of
Defense. A career member of the Senior Executive Service, Ms.
Dory previously served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Strategy. She is a recipient of the Presidential Rank Award
for her work on the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review.
And without objection, the witnesses' full prepared
statements will be made part of the record. Members will have 5
calendar days to submit any statements or questions to the
witnesses or to submit any extraneous material for the record
here.
And we will start with Dr. Sewall. If you would summarize
your remarks and hold it to 5 minutes. And then afterwards we
will go to questions. Dr. Sewall.
Ms. Sewall. Thank you very much. Chairman Royce--here we
go.
Thank you, Chairman Royce.
Chairman Royce. Thank you. Make sure your microphone is on
there.
And, also, without objection, I would like to include for
the record Ms. Deborah Peter's testimony, which she recounted
and gave us this morning, members of this committee who met
with her. We are going to make that part of the record. And
thank you, Deborah, for that.
All right. Dr. Sewall.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE SARAH SEWALL, UNDER SECRETARY FOR
CIVILIAN SECURITY, DEMOCRACY, AND HUMAN RIGHTS, U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF STATE
Ms. Sewall. Chairman Royce, Ranking Member Engel, and
members of the committee, thank you for inviting me here today
to discuss Nigeria's struggle against Boko Haram, one of the
most lethal terrorist groups in Africa today. And thank you,
Mr. Chairman and the committee, for your longtime leadership on
African issues.
Over a month ago the world was outraged when Boko Haram
kidnapped some 250 young women from a secondary school in
Chibok, and the United States swiftly joined the effort to help
the Government of Nigeria safely recover the hostages.
President Obama pledged our full support, and President
Goodluck Jonathan readily accepted Secretary Kerry's offer of
assistance.
Today in Nigeria's capital, Abuja, a robust
multidisciplinary team from the United States Government is
working hand in hand with Nigerian counterparts and teams from
half a dozen other countries, such as the United Kingdom and
France.
Our military and civilian experts in intelligence, military
planning, hostage negotiations, strategic communications,
civilian protection, and victim support have been given
unprecedented access and cooperation to assist Nigeria's effort
to safely recover the kidnapped schoolgirls.
This effort, one that would be daunting for any government,
will necessarily entail not just a diplomatic approach, but,
also, law enforcement and diplomat--not just a military
approach, but, also, a law enforcement and diplomatic effort.
During our trip last week, AFRICOM Commander General David
Rodriguez and I met with Nigeria's top security officials to
stress America's support for Nigerian efforts and to reiterate
the need for Nigeria to redouble its efforts to defeat Boko
Haram while respecting human rights and ensuring the protection
of civilians.
This past weekend Under Secretary of State for Political
Affairs, Wendy Sherman, continued America's conversation with
Nigerian President Jonathan, heads of state from neighboring
countries, and other key partners at a summit in Paris convened
by French President Hollande. Coming 1 day after Boko Haram
killed and kidnapped Chinese nationals in North Cameroon. The
kidnappings underscored why Boko Haram is a regional challenge.
And while the kidnappings have cast a spotlight on this
terrorist organization, I want to emphasize that, for roughly a
decade, the United States has been working to help the people
of Nigeria and the Nigerian Government address this terrorist
threat.
Today I would like to highlight some of the kinds of
security assistance that we have more recently been providing
to help Nigeria address Boko Haram.
Fiscal years 2012, 2013, Department of State planned
approximately $35.8 million in security assistance programs
that would benefit Nigeria, subject to congressional
notification and approval.
We are working with vetted police and civilian security
components to build Nigerian law enforcement capacities to
investigate terrorist cases, effectively deal with explosive
devices, and secure Nigeria's borders. We do this because the
most effective counterterrorism policies and practices are
those which respect human rights and are underpinned by the
rule of law.
We are also focusing on enabling various Nigerian security
services, including the police, intelligence agencies, and the
Ministry of Defense, refusing multiple information streams to
develop a better understanding of Boko Haram.
We engage in robust dialogue with our Nigerian counterparts
on these activities, including through the U.S.-Nigeria
Binational Commission's Regional Security Working Group. There
is also a lengthy history of DoD involvement, which I will
leave to my Defense Department colleague to describe.
The Department has also considered other steps to support
the fight against Boko Haram. As you know, its leaders do not
have bank accounts and the organization is not structured as
many other terrorist organizations against whom the United
States has used particular legal designations.
After careful deliberation and consultation with the
Nigerian Government, the United States decided in June 2012 to
designate Boko Haram's top commanders as specially designated
global terrorists, which allowed us to implement an asset
freeze, a travel ban, and a prohibition on providing weapons or
material support to these designated individuals as relevant.
In June 2013, we decided to add Abubakar--forgive my
pronunciation--Shekau, Boko Haram's official leader, to our
Rewards for Justice Program with a $7-million reward for
information leading to his arrest.
In November 2013, after implementing and assessing these
earlier steps and building on our long record of security
cooperation, and shortly after Nigeria and the United Kingdom
made their own designations, we also designated Boko Haram as a
Foreign Terrorist Organization.
Our approach reflected our evolving assessment of Boko
Haram's threat potential, the utility of additional sanctions
of different types, and our close coordination with our
partners.
Significantly, while Nigeria had been reluctant to seek
international attention to the Boko Haram crisis, it has now
moved forward, in part, at our urging to request that the
United Nations Security Council designate Boko Haram under its
al-Qaeda regime.
And while these efforts will make a difference, we continue
to have concerns that corruption and human rights violations by
government forces, particularly those forces that have operated
in the northeast, continue to undermine the government's
attempts to defeat Boko Haram militarily.
Given these concerns, we continue to press the Government
of Nigeria to demonstrate that it is working to protect
civilians where Boko Haram is not, and this means ending
impunity for human rights violations by security forces.
Let me be clear that there is no equivalence between the
actions of the Nigerian military and those of Boko Haram, a
terrorist group that seeks to murder civilians in large numbers
and terrorize the civilian population as a matter of policy,
killing over 1,200 people in 2014 thus far.
Yet, we also know the power of popular grievance narratives
against the government, and it's incumbent upon Nigeria's
Government to demonstrate through specific steps the will to
ensure its forces protect human rights for all of its people
and end impunity for those that use violence indiscriminately.
Consistent with our council 2 months ago, the Government of
Nigeria announced a multifaceted, quote, deg. ``soft''
approach to countering Boko Haram, and we are eager to see it
implemented.
And we are also eager to see the Nigerian Government
address the underlying concerns that impede their ability to
address Boko Haram.
In closing, I will say that the State Department, like the
American people, hopes very much to see the Nigerian
schoolgirls reunited with their families soon.
But we are also prepared for a long, tough fight to defeat
Boko Haram and to help the Nigerian people realize the
political and economic potential of their great country.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Sewall follows:]
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Chairman Royce. Ms. Dory.
STATEMENT OF MS. AMANDA J. DORY, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Ms. Dory. Good morning, Chairman Royce, Ranking Member
Engel, members of the committee.
Thank you for calling us together to address the deeply
disturbing abductions of more than 270 schoolgirls from
Northern Nigeria by the terrorist organization Boko Haram some
5 weeks ago. The global community has been horrified by this
barbarous act.
Within the context of the U.S. Government response, the
Department of Defense is taking action to help the Nigerian
authority's efforts to recover the girls safely and address the
growing threat of Boko Haram.
Sixteen DoD personnel from multiple locations have joined
the multidisciplinary team of experts led by the State
Department at our Embassy in Abuja.
Their initial efforts have been to work with Nigerian
security personnel to identify gaps and shortfalls and provide
requested expertise and information, including the use of
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance support.
We are also working closely with the U.K., France, and
other international partners in Abuja to coordinate
multilateral actions.
Our intent is to support Nigerian-led efforts to safely
recover the girls and help catalyze greater efforts to secure
the population of Nigeria from the menace of Boko Haram.
To be clear, immediate and long-term solutions to Boko
Haram must be developed and implemented by the sovereign
Government of Nigeria if sustained security is to be achieved.
Extant in its current form since 2009, the Boko Haram
threat has grown over the past several years, extending its
geographic reach and increasing the sophistication and
lethality of its attacks.
Along with other U.S. departments and agencies, DoD has
been engaging for some time with the Government of Nigeria to
help build its capacity to respond.
Beginning in January 2011, we have used the State
Department-led U.S.-Nigeria Binational Commission as our
principal forum to tackle the challenge of enhancing
counterinsurgency efforts while developing a civilian-centered
approach to security that is comprehensive, engaging law
enforcement, border security, as well as the underlying
contributors to instability, such as governance, education,
health, and economic development.
For its part, DoD is supporting the establishment of
counter-IED and civil-military operations capacity within the
Nigerian Army as part of Nigeria's security doctrine.
We have also supported the establishment of a national-
level intelligence fusion capability to promote better
information sharing among the various Nigerian national
security entities.
Most recently, in late April of this year, we began working
with Nigeria's newly created counterterrorism-focused Ranger
Battalion.
As has been demonstrated recently, Boko Haram uses the
lightly controlled borders between Nigeria and its neighbors
for cross-border operations.
Last week, France hosted a very timely summit at which
heads of state from Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon, Benin, Niger,
along with the U.S. and U.K., sought to improve regional
collaboration.
For our part, DoD and the Department of State are working
closely together on a proposal to enhance border security along
Nigeria's common borders with Chad, Niger, and Cameroon in
support of a regional response to counter the threat posed by
Boko Haram.
The concept is to build border security capacity and
promote better cooperation and communication among the security
forces of each country with the aim of reducing Boko Haram's
operational space and safe havens.
As committed as the U.S. is to supporting Nigeria and in
returning these girls safely, Nigeria's fight against Boko
Haram is a very challenging case. In the face of a new and more
sophisticated threat, Nigeria's security forces have been
greatly challenged by Boko Haram's tactics.
Also troubling have been the heavy-handed approaches by
security forces during operations against Boko Haram,
approaches that risk further alienating local populations.
Consistent with U.S. law and policy, we review all security
units nominated for assistance, and we do not provide
assistance when there is credible information of human rights
violations. With this important consideration in mind, we have
worked to engage where we are able.
No discussion of how to address Boko Haram would be
complete without addressing some of the political dynamics in
Nigeria and the underlying security environment.
In spite of its vast oil wealth, Nigeria continues to face
enormous development challenges. When these factors are
combined with pervasive corruption and Boko Haram's brutal
terrorization of the population, Northern Nigerians lack a
reliable source of security.
The long-term solution to Boko Haram cannot come solely
from Nigeria's security forces, but, rather, also requires
Nigeria's political leaders to give serious and sustained
attention to addressing the systematic problems of corruption,
the lack of effective and equitable governance, and the
country's uneven social and economic development.
While continuing to draw attention to these broader
factors, we will remain sharply focused on the heartwrenching
event that triggered this broader awareness of Boko Haram's
depredations.
DoD is committed to supporting Nigeria's efforts to locate
and recover these girls. This will not be an easy task, as
hostage recovery is a high-risk undertaking in the best of
circumstances.
If this terrible episode is to resolve with the girls' safe
returns, the Government of Nigeria must continue to match its
public statements with a serious and focused response that
draws on all elements of its government, the influence of key
social and religious figures, and the resources international
partners are making available to assist.
Thank you.
Chairman Royce. Well, thank you for that testimony.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Dory follows:]
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Chairman Royce. As you testified, you do not provide
assistance when human rights violations occur. However, there
is a provision whereby, in an extraordinary circumstance, we
could.
And here is the argument that I would make about Boko Haram
and why this is an extraordinary circumstance. You have a
situation here where we are focused on the kidnapping of 300
girls some weeks ago, but, in the meantime, more have been
kidnapped.
As we talk about it, an additional group of schoolgirls
were kidnapped. As we talk about it, additional attacks have
occurred, 118 killed this morning, you know, 300 killed a few
weeks ago.
As we talk about it, 500 schools have been destroyed, and
Boko Haram--their modus operandi is to destroy the schools and
then recruit young uneducated men into their ranks and teach
them Jihad.
And so, as the Jihad mushrooms out across North Africa and
into Cameroon and into Chad and into neighboring states, we
say, ``Well, you know, human rights violations have occurred in
Nigeria; so, we are limited in what we can do.''
The difficulty is that Boko Haram is in a process of
expanding their terror and the frequency of these attacks, the
attacks on girls, that has been an evolution.
They have intimidated and frightened the Nigerian military,
they are now to the point where a lot of military units have
run away. And so they can go in and take girls and then, you
know, they can turn them into concubines or sell them or, you
know, enslave them, because that is what they are actually
doing. They are enslaving.
And I would say that is an extraordinary circumstance that
might necessitate the U.S. We have U.S. forces well positioned
to advise and assist Nigerian forces in the search for these
girls and, in this role, U.S. forces are trained to deal with
hostage situations. Unfortunately, the Nigerian forces are not.
They are trained to deal and track in jungle environments.
They can advise and assist right up to the point of an
attack. They don't have to be involved in the attack. But they
could use those unique assets that the U.S. has in terms of our
spy satellite capabilities and et cetera in order to track and
rescue these girls.
This would be very similar to the mission that we have
approved with respect to the Lord's Resistance Army. And for a
number of years, if you think about it--how many years did it
take us to galvanize some support against Joseph Kony?
I think it was about 15 years of Joseph Kony marauding and
kidnapping young boys and making child soldiers out of 12-year-
old boys and young girls and making them concubines. I think
15,000 was roughly the number of people he slaughtered before
we finally put him on defense by authorizing U.S. forces to
help track him.
So now he is the one that is being tracked instead of the
one tracking others. Right? It used to be he would maraud--he
would take his band into Congo or Northern Uganda or Southern
Sudan or Central African Republic and just create mayhem.
But now at least he is on the run. Somebody said this
morning, ``Well, we haven't got him yet.'' No. We haven't
caught him yet, but he is on the run. And there is little doubt
that they are going to run him down, and it is a completely
different situation than it was a couple of years ago when he
was on the offensive.
Now, you have got the same situation here. And, frankly, we
should do the same thing. For the sake of humanity, we should
do the same thing. We should not allow this cancer to spread
the way it has.
We heard from Deborah this morning--Deborah Peter--about
the uncompromising position where they tell her father, you
know, that he has to quit. He was a pastor.
You know, they burned the church, they killed him, they
killed her young brother, and now they have kidnapped her
schoolmates. I think the time is at hand for the United States
to help build the morale.
Think about what this would mean to the Nigerian forces if
we were willing to give them this assistance. You could ensure
that the strategy for the rescue operation launched by them is
very well planned.
You could boost the morale and effectiveness of the
Nigerian forces, and you could ensure that our intelligence,
reconnaissance, and surveillance assets are put to best use.
So I would just ask for your response, if you could, to the
observation. Is there any reason why we can't offer that waiver
and treat this the same way we have treated going after Joseph
Kony?
Ms. Dory. I think the waiver issue I would defer to my
State Department colleague in terms of the specific provisions
of Leahy.
But what I could quickly do is agree in terms of some of
the diagnostics as you look at the situation with the Lord's
Resistance Army and why we are on a successful path
collectively at this point, and how that pertains to the Boko
Haram situation.
You have identified, Congressman, the elements of success.
You have neighbors who are working together under a regional
task force construct to address the LRA challenge.
You have a Ugandan Government dedicated to addressing the
governance and the economic concerns of Northern Uganda, which
helps give rise to the phenomenon of the Lord's Resistance Army
in the first place.
With external support, Uganda and the other forces have
been able to develop an intelligence and information picture
that has been very important and then launched a very
successful information campaign that reaches the populations in
the affected areas that are then able to further assist in the
tracking operations.
So I think many of those elements are very relevant to how
we could productively work with Nigeria and its neighbors going
forward vis-a-vis Boko Haram.
Chairman Royce. And, Ms. Dory, I would just add one other
thing for your consideration.
And maybe Dr. Sewall would like to comment on this as well.
But the one difference is that, with Boko Haram, we have a
group that is a threat to U.S. interests as well, to quote the
State Department testimony over on the Senate side, or perhaps
it was the Defense Department.
But there is no question that a Jihadist group like this,
that directs its efforts and its bombing against those who
believe in empowering women or teaching women, is also a threat
to the United States and our interests.
So it would seem to me that, if we are going to authorize
this with respect to going after Joseph Kony, we certainly
should do it here.
Dr. Sewall?
Ms. Sewall. Thank you for your observations. And I share
your sense of urgency about the matter.
I think, with respect to the specific question concerning
sanctions, it is my understanding that there is limited waiver
authority in the case of national security emergencies and that
the decision rests at the highest levels of the government with
regard to exercising a national security emergency exception.
Chairman Royce. Is it under consideration as an exemption?
Ms. Sewall. I can't speak to what the senior members of
this government are discussing with regard to Leahy. I think
the focus right now is very much on the safe rescue of the
girls. And so, when I----
Chairman Royce. Yes. But the Leahy Amendment is what
prohibits our active cooperation. In the steps that I just
enumerated here, you know, in the tracking on the ground and to
be able to plan that attack on the ground, that is the whole
point.
I mean, we had the testimony by the Defense Department last
week in the Senate that, ``This vetting is a persistent and
very troubling limitation on our ability to provide
assistance''--they are talking about the Leahy provision here--
``particularly training assistance that the Nigerians so badly
need.'' So this is a problem.
Ms. Sewall. And so I would like to address it.
The issue is to disaggregate the immediate crisis and what
options are available to deal with supporting the Nigerians in
their effort to rescue the girls versus longer-term systemic
and force-wide engagement.
And I think it is very important to both disaggregate those
and then to look at the facts as they pertain to each case.
In the first case, I spoke yesterday to the deployment team
in Abuja, and they are very pleased with the growing level of
cooperation that exists, both within the Intel Fusion Center
and with their broader discussions with their Nigerian
counterparts.
They are hopeful that U.S. assistance will be increasingly
useful to the Nigerians in their effort, and they, nonetheless,
rely on choices made by the Government of Nigeria in terms of
what they would like to avail themselves of and how to proceed.
More broadly, the security systems issue--and, again, I
think Amanda Dory can speak in great detail about the level of
security assistance that is occurring right now.
But we have been able to, pursuant to the Leahy Law, create
essentially two new battalions with whom we are working--one is
specialized counterterrorism force, and the other a Ranger
Battalion to create their specialized military capabilities
with regard to the kind of military challenges that Boko Haram
presents.
Chairman Royce. Here would be my suggestion. Thank you.
Here is my suggestion. Ask for a temporary waiver. If you don't
want the permanent waiver, ask for a temporary waiver,
designate this as an extraordinary circumstance, and get to an
answer to the point that your colleague made from the
Department of Defense that it is a ``persistent and very
troubling limitation on our ability to provide assistance,
particularly training assistance, that the Nigerians so badly
need.'' That is the statement from the Department of Defense.
It needs to be addressed.
But I need to go to Mr. Engel. My time has long since
expired.
Mr. Engel.
Mr. Engel. Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I was in favor of declaring Boko Haram as a terrorist
organization, but I want to address the undercurrent with some
of my friends on the other side of the aisle that somehow the
lack of designating them as a terrorist organization earlier
contributed somehow to this kidnapping. I think that is absurd.
You know, when the State Department didn't designate Boko
Haram as an FTO, it wasn't because anyone was being careless.
It wasn't because they weren't paying attention. It was a
policy decision based on facts on the ground.
Facts changed and the Department issued a designation. It
is not clear what the designation does--asset freezes and Visa
bans and prohibition of material support--that that has
actually made a difference.
But, you know, designating Boko Haram as an FTO earlier
would have helped the organization's fundraising and recruiting
efforts. Organizations like Boko Haram aren't afraid of being
branded terrorists by the U.S. That word is a badge of honor.
I am also told that the Nigerian Government didn't want the
designation. That is the reason the State Department didn't
issue it.
And in May 2012, 25 leading experts on Nigeria wrote the
State Department, saying that an FTO designation for Boko Haram
was a bad idea.
And in 2012, the State Department did designate the top
three leaders of Boko Haram as specially designated nationals,
which are terrorists, meaning that we could go after them and
their network.
And, in fact, Secretary Clinton visited Nigeria in 2012 to
consult with the Nigerian Government on how we could work
together.
So while I have been in favor of declaring them as a
terrorist organization, I don't think anyone can seriously
think that, if we had done it earlier, it would have somehow
prevented this kidnapping.
So I would like either Dr. Sewall or Ms. Dory to comment on
what I have just said.
Ms. Dory. Congressman--Ranking Member Engel, I think it is
fair to say that we work closely with host nation governments
regardless of the designation issue. Boko Haram has certainly
been on the radar screen in terms of the type of security
cooperation that has been effective with Nigeria since it
emerged in the Nigerian context years ago.
So the point about the formal designation, it brings some
additional tools to bear. Principally, in the financial domain,
you mentioned the Visa bans as well. So it can be helpful from
that perspective. But it does escalate, in a sense, and that
can be why, when engaging with host nations, they may be
reluctant to have such an international designation because it
draws more attention to the problem, potentially, in
unproductive ways.
So I think that is making a linkage to at what point did
the designation occur and the practical engagement that has
been underway with the Nigerians are really separate issues.
Ms. Sewall. I think the key point is the extent to which
sanctions actually achieve their objectives.
And I think one of the reasons why the administration
decided in June 2012 to designate the three top commanders of
Boko Haram as specially designated terrorists was because most
of the tools that would be available against Boko Haram, as an
organization, were then available to use against those three
recognized leaders.
The Rewards for Justice Program was an additional effort to
find ways to put pressure on the organization. And what
fundamentally changed in the context of the FTO designation
that followed both of those actions was the ability to take
action against the group as opposed to its three top leaders.
So I think it is in that context that it is very important
to look at the evolution of U.S. actions, and the primary
significance, I think, was in the June 2012 designation of the
three Boko Haram top leaders as specially designated
terrorists.
Thank you.
Mr. Engel. Thank you.
Let me ask you both this: Given the enormous domestic and
international attention following these kidnappings, has the
Nigerian Government--I said some of it in my opening remarks,
and, Ms. Dory, you mentioned it as well--has the Nigerian
Government become more receptive to our messages, urging them
to change their approach to Boko Haram? And what concrete
things have they done to shift their strategy and their
relationship with us?
Ms. Dory. I believe the quick answer is ``yes.'' The
intensity of international public opinion and support is
productively contributing to our dialogue with the Government
of Nigeria.
I think their willingness to accept the multidisciplinary
team and their robust engagement with it since its arrival are
the most concrete indicators in the near term.
Ms. Sewall. In my recent visit with AFRICOM Commander David
Rodriguez, we stressed both of the points that you referenced,
both the need to take rapid action to rescue the girls and the
need to fundamentally rethink their approach to
counterinsurgency.
We talked a lot about the evolution of the U.S. approach to
counterinsurgency and the ways in which it is critical to think
of a holistic approach, the ways in which a careful approach to
violence is absolutely vital for attaining the cooperation and,
therefore, the intelligence from the local population, one of
the main hindrances in the fight against Boko Haram thus far.
And we also spoke frankly about our concerns about the
inability of a seemingly very large defense budget to translate
into the receipt of bullets and workable trucks at the level of
the 7th Division in the northeast.
Mr. Engel. Does the State Department have an estimate of
how many people the Nigerian security forces have killed over
the last 4 years in Northern Nigeria?
Ms. Sewall. We do not have an estimate.
But I will tell you that, given my own background as
someone who urged the United States Government to count
civilian casualties during its counterinsurgency campaigns,
this was an issue that I raised repeatedly with all four of the
military officials with whom we met.
And my strong advice to them was that they would be unable
to evaluate and reform their efforts to protect civilians and
to more directly avoid killing civilians by mistake unless they
very carefully tracked those casualties.
So it is my hope that, going forward, we will be able to
see progress in that regard.
Mr. Engel. The chairman and I agree on what we in the
United States must do in order to help bring these girls back
in terms of working with other countries and forces.
Could you outline for us what are some of the operational
challenges to finding and rescuing these girls.
Ms. Dory. Thank you.
The operational challenges are significant. You have seen
some of the comparisons in terms of the vastness of the terrain
in which the girls may be located.
We are working with our Nigerian counterparts and other
international partners to develop a better understanding of
where they may be, but our sense at this point is that they
have been dispersed into multiple smaller groups. They may or
may not all be in Nigeria.
So the sheer number of individuals involved, the complexity
of the terrain--jungle for a great part of it--and the movement
that could be associated over the weeks that have elapsed,
creating a greater area of operations, make this a very
difficult environment in which to contemplate what a recovery
might look like.
Just to give an example, if you think back to the hostage
incident in Amnas, Algeria 2 years ago, where you had 800
hostages who were in a single location and the Algerian
Government and military took action as the AQIM and Mokhtar
Belmokhtar began to separate and disperse the hostages, they
engaged in an assault that left 40 of the hostages dead, and
that was in a desert environment and the hostages were all
concentrated together.
So it would be hard to overestimate the complexity, first,
of locating the hostages and then in considering how that might
be resolved successfully.
If we had an FBI witness here today, he or she, I imagine,
would indicate that the vast majority of hostage recovery
situations are resolved through dialogue and negotiations and
not through rescues and assaults.
Mr. Engel. Thank you.
Anything to add, Dr. Sewall?
Ms. Sewall. I think any military experts in hostage
recovery would also tell you that a dialogue is often very
helpful even in the event that dialogue fails.
And so I think we have to be respectful of the ways in
which the Nigerians may choose to try to achieve the safe
return of the girls.
Mr. Engel. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Royce. We go now to Mr. Chris Smith from New
Jersey.
Mr. Smith. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you for your testimony.
A couple of questions. I know this--and I am cognizant this
is an open hearing. But do you have reason for optimism that
progress is being made in ascertaining the whereabouts of these
abducted young women and any indication at all about their
welfare and well-being, their health?
Ms. Sewall. I would say that the team, when I spoke to them
yesterday, was very pleased by the level of cooperation, was
very pleased by the multiple sources of information flowing
into the Intel Fusion Center, was encouraged by the
professionalism and the commitment of the Nigerians in the
Intel Fusion Center, and was hopeful that the degree of
intelligence information would continue to increase over time.
Given time, I am hopeful that we will make progress. And I
think that is the extent to which I can respond in this
context.
Mr. Smith. Thank you very much for that.
Let me ask you with regards to the designation of FTO
status, which I think is a very serious issue. On July 10,
2012, I chaired a hearing. Assistant Secretary for African
Affairs Johnnie Carson testified, and I asked him repeatedly at
that time why Boko Haram was not designated a Foreign Terrorist
Organization. And he said, while acknowledging it is a very
important question, that he believes that the larger element--
he goes,
``We believe that the larger element of Boko Haram is
not interested in doing anything but attempting to
discredit, disgrace the Nigerian Government.''
He went on to say--this is Ambassador Carson speaking--
``I would remind people that the phenomena of Boko
Haram is one of discrediting the central government in
power for its failure to deliver services to the
people.''
In retrospect, do you believe that was an assessment that
had validity, I mean, services to the people, that is why they
are doing this?
I would also note parenthetically that Principal Deputy
Assistant Secretary Robert Jackson acknowledged last week that,
``In retrospect, we might have done the designation earlier.''
He then added, ``I think we will be quicker to make
designations based on our own assessments earlier based on
this.''
I actually went, as you may know, in September of last year
to Jos and to Abuja and repeatedly raised the question of
Foreign Terrorist Organization designations. And, frankly, in
government meetings on the Nigerian side, in meetings with our
own people in the Embassy, there was a very strong sense that
this could have a very valuable effect, particularly in
tracking where all the weapons are coming from.
Maybe they don't have bank accounts. Maybe they do. I don't
know. But if we really look and probe and try to discern who is
providing the AK-47s and the IEDs and the like that are killing
so many people, we may be able to put a tourniquet--or at least
begin putting a tourniquet on this bloodshed.
So your sense on that statement that this--you know,
statement that was made by, again, Johnnie Carson, ``The
phenomenon of Boko Haram is one of discrediting the central
government in power for its failure to deliver services to the
people.''
Ms. Sewall. I think it is hard to look at Boko Haram as an
insurgency that rests predominantly on the failings of the
State, but there is no question that the failings of the State
create a context in which disaffected voices are prey to
recruitment.
And when you look at the specifics of Boko Haram's tactics
in terms of forcible recruitment of persons, that is a way to
explain how it continues to survive, additionally.
I think, from the perspective of our efforts to counter
Boko Haram from the outside, from legal mechanisms that exist
outside of the Nigerian context in which the Nigerian decisions
are central, the important step, to me, was the June 2012
designation of the three leaders as----
Mr. Smith. Let me just ask you--because I am almost out of
time--should we have done the FTO designation earlier?
Ms. Sewall. I wasn't here; so, I don't know. I think that
the most----
Mr. Smith. You are in a very high position. I look back and
forth. We all do all the time.
Ms. Sewall. Right.
Mr. Smith. Should it have been done?
Ms. Sewall. Right. Well, I thank you for your leadership on
this important issue. And it is clear that the committee played
a very vital role in continuing to press the issue.
I think the important thing is that the three leaders were
designated in 2012, and the organization as a whole----
Mr. Smith. I understand that. I am almost out of time. I
will just ask very quickly.
Have there been attacks by Boko Haram against Americans?
Jos has the highest number of Americans in Northern Nigeria.
Following yesterday's bombings, have all Americans been
accounted for? And for the record, when the U.N. compound was
bombed, were any Americans present?
Ms. Dory. I am not aware that there were Americans involved
in the U.N. compound bombing. And I think, in terms of Jos, we
would have to check with the Embassy to see if there is a full
accounting of Americans. I am not----
Chairman Royce. You can get back to us, then.
Mr. Brad Sherman of California.
Mr. Sherman. Thank you.
Ms. Dory, perhaps you could give me a one-word answer. Boko
Haram has got a lot of weapons. Are they mostly captured from
the Nigerian military, purchased, or we don't know?
Ms. Dory. If I could give slightly more than one word, it
is a mixture, in our understanding. They have resources as a
result of kidnapping-for-ransom operations. So they are able to
purchase, to include----
Mr. Sherman. Are the weapons that we have seen them use or
captured from their caches or stores the same weapons found in
Nigerian military arsenals?
Ms. Dory. Some of them are also captured from Nigerian
security services or in raids against arsenals. So it is a mix.
Mr. Sherman. Okay.
Dr. Sewall, Mr. Mamman Nur is a high-ranking member of Boko
Haram. According to open sources, he may be a key link between
that organization and certain AQ affiliates, like Al-Shabaab.
He may have been behind the 2011 U.N. bombing.
Should we be designating this individual as a specially
designated global terrorist?
Ms. Sewall. I don't know the answer off the top, and I will
have to look into that and get back to you. I simply can't
answer that right now. I apologize.
Mr. Sherman. There are lots of reports in the press that
the Nigerian military knew hours in advance of this attack.
Do either of you have any information that would either
confirm or discredit, beyond what we have all read in the
newspapers?
Ms. Dory. I am familiar with the press reports, but don't
have additional information either way.
Mr. Sherman. Dr. Sewall, I am trying to understand the
attitude of the Nigerian Government. It is acting as if it is
almost disturbed that the whole world is now focused on Boko
Haram.
Can you explain why the Nigerian Government wasn't pressing
us to designate Boko Haram as a terrorist organization and
wasn't doing more to bring in international support in its
efforts against this terrorist organization?
Ms. Sewall. Well, I am not sure I can really speak for the
Nigerian Government, but I can share with you, Congressman, my
impressions based on the conversations that we had in our
recent visit.
And so I think the Nigerian Government believes that it has
heard the message about the need to change the way it does its
business.
It believes it has taken a more offensive approach in
recent months, and it has expressed the belief that the more
recent rounds of bombings have been the efforts by a desperate
group to gain attention.
I think that the Nigerian view about international
attention was misguided in some ways along the same lines that
I have heard commentary in the U.S. public discourse, which is
to say that the world ignored Nigeria and is now only now
focusing on Nigeria with the kidnapping of the schoolgirls.
And so I found myself reiterating the decade-long security
cooperation assistance that we had had and the messages that we
had been sending them about corruption, about the comportment
and accountability----
Mr. Sherman. And I will point out we would have designated
Boko Haram earlier had we not, I think correctly, taken into
consideration the views of the Nigerian Government. It is just,
I am confounded as to why the Nigerian Government wasn't
pushing us forward, why they were pulling us back.
We have designated certain individuals. We have designated
the entire organization. The view I have of Boko Haram is that,
of all of the Islamic extremist organizations, they are the
ones that are most in the jungle, the least likely to have bank
accounts, et cetera.
Have we successfully frozen any of the individual assets of
the specially designated global terrorists--frozen any of the
assets or been successful in going after Boko Haram?
A lot of discussion here is, ``Why didn't we do it
sooner?'' But we did do it over 6 months ago. And if they are
really an in-the-bush organization, that would have very little
effect on them, a great effect on us psychologically because we
like to feel like we have done something, like we indict
Chinese military officers because they are engaged in hacking.
But other than making us feel better, what have we been
able to accomplish with all these designations?
Ms. Sewall. I would need to refer you to my colleagues in
other agencies to speak to the specifics of the enforcement
actions pursuant to the sanctions designation. And perhaps in
the hearing tomorrow----
Mr. Sherman. But you are not aware of anything that the
designations of certain individuals as specially designated
global terrorists or the designation of Boko Haram as a
terrorist organization--to your knowledge, there isn't any
particular bank account, a particular intercepted or prevented
fundraising effort, no tangible effect of 6 months--well, more
than 6 months of such designations?
Ms. Sewall. Unfortunately, I really need to refer you to
the colleagues that do the enforcement. I am just not in a
position to answer the question. I apologize.
Mr. Sherman. I yield back.
Chairman Royce. Congressman Sherman, in answer to your
first question--or further answer to it--there was testimony
from the FBI, and I will just give you their quick response.
FBI Director James Comey testified that Boko Haram has
communications, training and weapons links with al-Qaeda in the
Maghreb, as well as Al-Shabaab based in Somalia, and al-Qaeda
in the Arabian Peninsula based in Yemen.
And then he also testified that these links, in his words,
``may strengthen Boko Haram's capacity to conduct terrorist
attacks against U.S. or Western targets in the future.''
So in terms of the weapons movements, that is the FBI's
testimony.
Mr. Sherman. It is good to have expertise both from there
and from here.
Chairman Royce. Right. Right.
We go to Mr. Mike McCaul of Texas.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me just say, last night I watched the video again of
Boko Haram, the leader with these 270 girls, and it is
horrific, and it is hard to stand back idly and watch that
happen, knowing that we could do more to help them.
The chairman raised the issue of the waiver process. And I
guess my question to Dr. Sewall is: If that waiver was granted,
what additional assistance could be given to this situation?
Ms. Sewall. I think one of the distinctions that I have
been trying to articulate is that the waiver really is geared
toward the training and material support for forces.
And some 50 percent of the Nigerian military at this point
in time are not eligible for that form of cooperation with the
United States because of the Leahy Law.
So we have been able to engage in security cooperation with
Leahy-vetted units, which is the remaining 50 percent.
In terms of the operational pieces, I guess I should turn
to my colleague, Ms. Dory, to speak about what additionally
might happen in a waiver.
But at this point we are doing everything that the
Nigerians want us to be doing, and we are there and available
to do more, completely consistent with the Leahy Law, with our
deployment teams, and our military planners there in Abuja.
Mr. McCaul. Ms. Dory, if that waiver is granted, what
additional assistance militarily could be provided?
Ms. Dory. Sir, it is predominantly a function of what type
of assistance is requested by the Government of Nigeria. We
have a complete menu of training activities, equipping
activities, advising, assisting, the usual inventory that the
Department can pursue in partnership with another country. But
it really rests with the host nation to identify in what areas
it wishes to cooperate.
Mr. McCaul. You mentioned earlier that a military operation
would be risky and risky to the hostages, and I understand
that.
But has there been any effort to have our FBI's hostage
rescue team assist with this?
Ms. Dory. There are FBI personnel who are part of the
multidisciplinary team, and I believe the services of the FBI's
hostage recovery experts are on the table.
Mr. McCaul. Well, I would hope so. I would hope the answer
is ``yes'' to that question. I think they could be very
valuable in this situation.
I chair the Homeland Security Committee. In 2011, we
released a report, ``Intel: Boko Haram Emerging Threat to the
Homeland.''
We asked that they be designated as an FTO back then
because it would support U.S. intelligence in their effort to
curb financing, to isolate it internationally, heighten public
awareness, and signal to other governments that the threat is
serious.
In September 2013, we issued a follow-up report, ``Boko
Haram, the Growing Threat to the Homeland,'' again asking that
the designation take place. Members of Congress additionally
made that request.
And, finally, the head of the Justice Department's National
Security Division sent a letter to the State Department
requesting that Boko Haram be put on this list.
Now, I know, Dr. Sewall, that, eventually, they were put on
the list. But, you know, it took years to get the Haqqani
Network put on the list. It took years to get Ansar al-Sharia
behind the Benghazi attack put on this list. We still can't get
the Quds Force to be put on this list.
Why is it so difficult for the State Department to put what
is so obvious on the Foreign Terrorist Organization list?
Ms. Sewall. I can't speak to the decisions that were made
before I came to the Department, sir. I am sorry.
And I know that there are many different considerations
that go into other decisions. I mean, in the context of the
Nigerian case, I think I explained that there was a discussion
with the government, there was a discussion about the nature of
the threat, and there was a discussion about the efficacy, the
true impact of the sanctions.
I can only speak to that case, and I unfortunately can't
speak to the prior cases.
Mr. McCaul. Well, it is not just Members of Congress. It is
not just the Justice Department. It is General Hamm. Carter
Hamm talked about this threat. Director Clapper, the DNI,
mentioned this threat. General Dave Rodriguez, Commander of
AFRICOM.
This is coming in from multiple points, you know, not just
Members of Congress, not my committee, but multiple points in
the military, the Justice Department.
I don't really understand, when you look at that video,
when it is so obvious that they are terrorists, why they
weren't put on the FTO, which just maybe--it may not have
stopped this event from happening, but at least we could have
put some pressure on their financial ties and their funding
mechanisms.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Chairman Royce. We go now to Mr. Gregory Meeks from New
York.
Mr. Meeks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First, Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for the way that
you have been conducting this hearing and the investigations
and the education that you have done to talk about the waiver,
to figure out how we resolve this.
You have done it in a manner--and I think I want the record
to be clear with me that I concur with you and your opinion on
how we should be able to assist the Nigerian Government.
I think that the research that you and your staff have done
is excellent, and I want the record to reflect that this is
clearly something that we all agree upon in that regard.
I want to say to Ms. Peter, who is sitting in the audience,
who I had to listen to her tell the horrible story in regards
to her family that happened before her eyes in 2011. No child,
no child, should have to see their parents killed and siblings
before their eyes. None. And it really angers me inside when I
hear that.
And when you hear and see this group, Boko Haram, who now
has kidnapped these 200 girls, but has killed boys, destroyed
churches, taken away hope, there is no redeeming factor for
individuals like that.
They are in the same category as al-Qaeda and Al-Shabaab,
and I want to make sure that we do everything that we can to
free those girls. I don't care whether it is negotiation,
whatever it is.
But let me tell you I don't want that to be the end of it.
You know, generally, I am a multilateral guy. And I think all
of the countries--I haven't heard any country, anybody, dissent
on the evil of this group.
So I want somebody--I don't see why that, once we get these
girls free--I am going to tell you, for me, I want drones, I
want something, because they don't belong on this earth.
Threatening people and having people living in fear, this
is something that I see that this world--not just this Nation,
but other nations all across, are coming together to say, ``We
are going to stop this.''
And we need to do it. We need to do it in Nigeria. We need
to do it in Syria, Pakistan and Somalia, wherever Al-Shabaab--
wherever these individuals are.
And then we have got to do more than that, because the
attacks on these girls--over 200 schoolgirls in Northern
Nigeria--we talked about it and it is a global outcry to keep
children safe in schools and protect their right to education.
But, unfortunately, we are all too aware of these same groups--
extremist groups that are doing the same thing.
So I am wondering whether or not there is a plan to ensure
that children--all children, especially those in conflicted
areas, are protected and have access to quality education.
I know you can't answer that question, but I am just upset
right now. I wish I could think rationally, as the chairman
does and has done.
That is why I think that it is a good thing that he is
doing this because you need rational thinkers at a time like
this and not having emotions taking over, as it is doing with
me.
But I am. Just listening to Ms. Peter's story has made me
that I can't, you know, do what the chairman has done. So I
thank God that the chairman is doing what he is doing right
now.
But, you know, it seems to me that I have got, like Ms.
Peter, the same year--15-, 14-year-old daughter, who is asking
me about this scenario and what are we doing and what should we
do. So when I am thinking that, I can't think rationally.
Tell me why--Ms. Sewall?
Ms. Sewall. First, Congressman Meeks, I want to tell you
that I can be every bit as irrational as you are on this issue.
I don't think there is a single American that doesn't detest
Boko Haram from the bottom of their hearts.
I have four daughters. I have three 17-year-old daughters
and I have one 12-year-old daughter. And when I left them to go
to Nigeria, you can imagine how heavily they weighed on my
heart.
And when I met with the activists that had been protesting
the government's response to the crisis, when I called the
principal of the school to express Americans' support for her
and for bringing the girls back safely, I was able to give
voice to the emotion that I think we all feel in the context of
this immediate crisis.
At the same time, it is abundantly clear that, if we are to
move to address Boko Haram as an enduring threat beyond the
question of these 200-plus schoolgirls, that the Nigerian
Government itself has to make changes. It has to address
corruption. It has to address the excessive use of violence.
There are ways we can support them in those efforts, and
there are ways that we can do specific things for them. But
those are fleeting things. Those will not solve the Boko Haram
problem.
The Boko Haram problem in Nigeria needs to be addressed by
Nigerians. The Boko Haram problem, as a regional threat, needs
to be addressed by the regional actors.
The value of this crisis is that it has brought together in
a conversation all the actors that are seized not just with the
schoolgirls, but with the enduring threat of Boko Haram.
And this moment offers the hope that we will coordinate the
assistance and focus the efforts to address the underlying
problems here, which are the scourge of Boko Haram. But any
sustained solution requires the Government of Nigeria to show a
degree of commitment and to take a set of actions that it has
thus far not committed to.
And so we cannot lose sight of the fact that this is not
our problem to solve, and we must seize the moment to bring
together all of the voices of concern about the schoolgirls and
about Boko Haram to press and support the Nigerian Government
in undertaking its own critical changes and reforms.
Chairman Royce. Thank you, Mr. Meeks.
We go now to Mr. Jeff Duncan of South Carolina.
Mr. Duncan. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I want to thank Mr. Meeks for his passion on this
issue. It is touching. And I share your passion.
I just hope that that same passion will continue to carry
forward as we talk about terrorists wherever they are, whoever
they are, attacking not just interests in Africa, but Americans
and folks that love liberty anywhere in the world. And so I
appreciate that and look forward to working with you going
forward.
I listened to Ms. Peter's story. And thinking about
Christians, in general, her father was a pastor. Her brother
could have grown up to be a pastor, is what the terrorists
thought.
So the question I have for you, Ms. Sewall: Do you think
Christians are specifically targeted in the Boko Haram attacks?
Ms. Sewall. I wish there was such discrimination in Boko
Haram attacks. Boko Haram attacks everyone who is Nigerian.
Boko Haram is an equal-opportunity threat for all Nigerian
citizens.
Mr. Duncan. Thank you for that.
I would like to delve into the links with al-Qaeda and the
broader al-Qaeda network.
Boko Haram's ties to other al-Qaeda-affiliated and
associated groups, as well as the focus by some of its members
on pursuing a more transnational agenda, have amplified
concerns of the group's threat.
U.S. officials have suggested that Boko Haram and al-Qaeda
in the Islamic Maghreb, or the AQIM, were likely sharing funds,
training, and explosive materials.
So could you provide some clarity--and I am going to ask
both of you this question and ask you to be brief--but could
you provide some clarity to the extent of cooperation and
support that AQIM has provided to this organization.
Ms. Dory. Congressman----
Mr. Duncan. Financial, material support. All that, please.
Ms. Dory. In this setting, there are limits on the ability
to go into detail. But we can absolutely confirm the categories
that you are talking about in terms of the cooperation between
Boko Haram and AQIM, in particular, where the ties seem to be
the strongest, that it does include training, facilitation,
financing of weapons. That is the type of influence and
material that is being traded back and forth between AQIM and
Boko Haram.
Boko Haram also has sought linkages with some of the other
AQ affiliates, as was discussed earlier, and the intensity of
those linkages is less clear.
But there is an all-member briefing tomorrow, at which I
think--a classified briefing tomorrow where we could get into
some of those details.
Mr. Duncan. Ms. Sewall, a question that just came to mind:
What is the State Department, the FBI, Treasury, doing to track
the money?
Do we have folks on the ground working with the financial
institutions in and around Nigeria and Africa, in general, to
trace this money to make sure that we know the sources and
whether there are any al-Qaeda links?
Can you tell me what we are doing in that regard, if
anything?
Ms. Sewall. Congressman, I wish I could. I don't have the
details on that. But I would be happy to go back to the other
agencies and to the specific elements of the State Department
that might be involved in this and get you a more fulsome
answer.
Mr. Duncan. Okay. I appreciate that.
The other thing is: Can you answer the question about the
extent of the cooperation that you know of between Boko Haram
and al-Qaeda affiliates? Material support, financial, anything
you might be able to add.
Ms. Sewall. Our understanding is that there is intermittent
support as much as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Dory
described.
Mr. Duncan. Are we connecting those dots within the State
Department?
Ms. Sewall. Sir, the State Department is always working
hard to connect the dots.
Mr. Duncan. Have any of the Nigerians who have been
prosecuted in U.S. courts in recent years for providing
material support to terrorist groups such as AQAP had any links
to the Boko Haram group? Do you know of any connections?
Ms. Sewall. I don't. But, again, I am not fully briefed to
answer that question to 100 percent certainty. And so I would
have to take it for the record, also.
Mr. Duncan. Okay. Last question before my time runs out:
Have we identified individuals within Boko Haram and put them
on the terrorist watch list to make sure that they don't
infiltrate the United States of America?
Do we know who these leaders are, members of this terrorist
organization? Have we put them on the list to make sure they
are not going to infiltrate the United States of America?
Ms. Sewall. I would be surprised if we haven't, given that
they have been designated as specially designated terrorists
themselves. But that is a DHS function. And so I can check on
that and get back to you as well.
Mr. Duncan. Thank you so much.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Chairman Royce. Thank you.
We go now to Mr. David Cicilline of Rhode Island.
Mr. Cicilline. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for this
hearing, and thank you for your sensitivity in bringing Deborah
Peter to us for our conversation earlier before this hearing.
It has been a tremendous honor to meet with her and to see
her extraordinary courage and horrifying to hear the story of
how she and her family were so brutalized by Boko Haram.
I know that every member of this committee is committed to
doing everything we can to hold these individuals accountable
and to rescue these girls.
So thank you for being with us today, Deborah.
When you look at the information we have learned about the
impact of this terrorist organization, in addition to more than
4,000 people having been killed in Boko Haram-related violence,
U.N. and Nigerian officials report that more than 6 million
Nigerians have been affected and more than 300,000 Nigerians
have been displaced.
So I think it is really important for us to understand and
for the world to understand the significant impact of this
terrorist organization.
So my first question to either Dr. Sewall or Ms. Dory is:
Do we have a sense of where Boko Haram gets its resources, its
weaponry and its financial support?
Ms. Dory. Congressman, I think I have briefly touched on
this already. But it is a variety of sources in terms of their
access to finances and equipment.
Some of it comes from their activities in Nigeria, whether
it is stealing resources, food, equipment from local
populations, whether it is taking them from the military and
other security services in the course of attacks.
You may be familiar with an incident where they destroyed
aircraft at a Nigerian Air Force base, for example. So that is
one source.
They also, through kidnapping for ransom schemes, have
financial resources at their disposal. So they are able to
purchase weapons and supplies on the open market, and there is
a connection into the Libyan arms markets in that regard.
Mr. Cicilline. And I know that you have said, Ms. Dory,
that the principal responsibility for defeating Boko Haram has
to come from the Nigerian people and that requires them to
focus on governance issues, reductions of corruption, ending
mass arrests and disappearances within the government, and
their own human rights record.
So what can we do and--what is the U.S. doing or what can
we do in addition to that to pressure the Nigerians to do that
so they have the capacity to respond to Boko Haram?
And what kind of leverage do we really have in this moment
to really make that case with the Nigerian Government? And do
you see any signs that they are serious about undertaking
whatever those recommendations might be?
Ms. Dory. I will take the question and, also, share it with
my colleague.
I think the head-of-state-to-head-of-state engagement that
we have seen over this issue is indicative of both our level of
concern and our level of support and our willingness to
communicate it at the highest levels.
So I think this is a very important time, both in terms of
the U.S. support and determination and, coupled with that, from
colleagues from around the world, all over Europe and beyond,
who are similarly outraged at the situation and resolved that
now is the time to provide maximum support and pressure as we
engage with the Government of Nigeria.
Mr. Cicilline. Last issue I just want to mention.
I have been working on a piece of legislation to address
this situation in which there is an emergency necessitating--or
that should authorize the issuance of a visa. And I am just
curious.
It seems as if--this related, actually, to a mother who was
attempting to come back to the United States to retrieve a
child who had been murdered in the U.S. for burial back in
their home country.
And there was actually not a provision in the existing
State Department protocol because she had no--not deep ties in
her home country, no business, no employment.
So, obviously, they argued that there was not a sufficient
basis to give her a visa for fear she would overstay it and
remain here.
But in the example that we heard about this morning, it
seems as if I am on the right track in trying to develop some
exemption, some emergency issuance of a visa, for those who
have been victims of terrorism or--you know, we can set out the
criteria.
But it sounded, at least initially, that Deborah was in a
situation in which she was not given a visa, which I think
everyone agrees doesn't make sense. And I would just like your
thoughts on that.
Ms. Sewall. I am sorry. I really know very little about the
visa process. And so I just don't feel comfortable commenting.
Thank you.
Mr. Cicilline. Thank you.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Royce. Thank you.
We go to Mr. Mo Brooks of Alabama.
Mr. Brooks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
In your judgment, does Nigeria currently have the police or
military capability of defeating Boko Haram?
Ms. Dory. Congressman, from my perspective, Nigeria's
military is the force with which I am most familiar. And they
have been a premier peacekeeping force for many decades,
focused external to their country, if you think about their
long history in that regard.
And the process of retooling from a peacekeeping
orientation to focusing on a domestic insurgency is something
that takes an entire recalibration in terms of how you engage
in your home country.
I would say----
Mr. Brooks. Might I infer from your comments that you just
made that the answer is ``no,'' that, as of today, they don't,
that things have to be done before they have that capability?
Ms. Dory. Part of it. When we speak of a capability, part
of it is the strategic approach and the mindset. And, as yet,
Nigeria has not yet finalized a counterterrorism strategic
approach. Which, I think, leaves gaps in terms of the
operational employment of the security forces, their training
and readiness for those types of missions and then the
equipment that is available to them.
Mr. Brooks. Dr. Sewall, do you have a judgment on whether
the Nigerian police or military have the capability of
defeating Boko Haram as of today?
Ms. Sewall. It is a great question, and I want to answer it
thoroughly. So I have to step back for just one moment and say
that the ability of a police force or a military force to
effectively defeat a virulent insurgency is limited.
And so that is just the first point to make, that this is
why the U.S. has been in a dialogue with the Nigerians for the
need for a holistic approach that includes economic
development, social engagement, political empowerment and a
host of other things.
In a narrow sense, the Nigerians have capability that we
would recognize as strong in the sense that they have a number
of forces, they have a certain number of equipment.
I think the challenge for both the police and the military
is how their assets and resources, human and otherwise, are
actually deployed.
And that is why the questions about corruption and that is
why the questions about, as DEPSEC Dory just said, the mindset
are so critical.
It took us----
Mr. Brooks. I am not sure if I am getting a response. I am
trying to get something simple, a ``yes,'' ``no'' or ``I don't
know.''
Do you have a judgment as to whether the Nigerian police
and military have the capability as of today to defeat Boko
Haram? ``Yes,'' ``no'' or ``I don't know.''
Ms. Sewall. So the United States, when it began its
invasion in Iraq, was the finest military force in the world--
--
Mr. Brooks. I am sorry.
Ms. Sewall [continuing]. And it was unable to----
Mr. Brooks. I am asking for a ``yes,'' ``no'' or ``I don't
know'' because I have limited time here. I can't go into a
monologue.
Ms. Sewall. It is complicated.
Mr. Brooks. It is complicated.
So maybe, maybe not? Is that a fair way to assess your
opinion.
Ms. Sewall. If you wish to describe it that way, that----
Mr. Brooks. Well, what short answer can you give me that
describes your opinion of whether Boko Haram today can be
defeated by the Nigerian police and/or military?
Ms. Sewall. I think that, with the appropriate political
redirection, as well as the concerted effort on the part of
specific capabilities, that the country of Nigeria, the
Government of Nigeria, can make significant progress in
defeating Boko Haram.
Completely eliminating, I would hedge on that. The
timeframe, I would hedge on that. But I don't think there is
any question that the Government of Nigeria both can and will--
--
Mr. Brooks. Thank you for your response.
The very first sentence of the Charter of the United States
in Chapter I, Article I, Paragraph 1, states:
``The Purposes of the United Nations are: To maintain
international peace and security, and to that end: To
take effective collective measures for the prevention
of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of
acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace.''
If we were to look at the history of Boko Haram in Nigeria:
August 26, 2011, a bomb attack on a U.N. building, 21 killed;
January 20, 2012, attacks in Kano State, 12 targets, over 150
people killed.
We have already talked about the young schoolgirls who were
kidnapped. May 5, 2014, an attack lasting 12 hours, 300 people
killed. The list goes on and on and on. You have provided two
pages of attacks.
As of today, what has the Obama administration undertaken
to secure a United Nations force to take on Boko Haram inasmuch
as that seems to be the primary purpose of the United Nations
Charter?
Ms. Sewall. So, the United Nations Charter, as you know, is
based on the concept of sovereignty. And so, typically, when
there is an insurgency within a government, the government is
expected to address the security threat and is free to seek
assistance.
Terrorism has typically been treated in a slightly
different venue. Boko Haram has elements of both. And so I
think that it is certainly--that there are a variety of ways in
which the international community can respond to what is
increasingly recognized as----
Mr. Brooks. Okay. Again, I don't think you are responding
to my question.
My question was: What has the Obama administration done to
request the kind of support from the United Nations that we
would need to eliminate Boko Haram's influence in Nigeria and
Central Africa inasmuch as that is the primary purpose of the
United Nations?
I don't know how we can be any clearer when the United
Nations says in its Charter:
``[T]o take effective collective measures for the
prevention [and removal] of threats to the peace, and
for the suppression of acts of aggression . . .''
So what has the Obama administration done to invoke the
United Nation's charter to get the United Nations to do their
job?
Ms. Sewall. Right now, the way the Obama administration has
interacted with the United Nations on the question of Boko
Haram is to encourage the Nigerian Government to designate Boko
Haram pursuant to the al-Qaeda list.
What the United States and the Obama administration has
been doing since President Obama has been in power is working
to strengthen Nigeria's capacity to defeat Boko Haram. So we
have been very actively engaged in this. This engagement began
before the Obama administration.
And, ultimately, the Nigerian Government has great progress
that it can make to defeat Boko Haram. It needs to decide and
commit itself to do that in ways that are similar to those
learning curves that we, the United States, have had to take in
defeating----
Mr. Brooks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for indulging.
Chairman Royce. Thank you.
We go to Gerry Connolly of Virginia.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Here we go again. So, Dr. Sewall, clearly it is the fault
of the Obama administration that these young girls were
kidnapped. Is that true?
Ms. Sewall. No.
Mr. Connolly. Someone in the administration embedded with
Boko Haram?
Ms. Sewall. Do you really want me to answer the question?
Mr. Connolly. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Sewall. No, sir.
Mr. Connolly. No.
Conspiracy to turn a blind eye to the activities of Boko
Haram?
Ms. Sewall. No, sir.
Mr. Connolly. Changing talking points to make sure that
somehow the administration was protected even at the expense of
innocent victims of Boko Haram?
Ms. Sewall. No, sir.
Mr. Connolly. Dilatory tactics by the administration to
prevent effective action by the United Nations, well known, I
might say to my friend from Alabama, for its effective actions.
So we were engaged in some kind of activity in New York to
slow it down and not designate them in a timely fashion or
coordinate international reaction to the unspeakable outrage of
the kidnapping of these young women?
Ms. Sewall. I would argue that the United States has been
among the most concerned about Boko Haram for the longest
period of time among all the actors within the international
community.
Mr. Connolly. Including at the United Nations?
Ms. Sewall. It has been a concern of American officials for
some time, as evidenced by our significant both personnel and
financial investments in enhancing----
Mr. Connolly. Including at the United Nations?
Ms. Sewall. Including at the United Nations insofar as we
have been supporting Nigeria's efforts to designate the
terrorist organization.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you.
So, I guess, from your testimony, there is no evidence
whatsoever of anything other than an administration deeply
concerned and doing everything in its power to try to assist
the international community and the Government of Nigeria and,
when necessary, to prod the Government of Nigeria to try to
take effective action to defang Boko Haram and to release these
young women. Is that correct?
Ms. Sewall. It is a high priority of the United States
Government, and we have been consistent in our efforts. Yes.
Mr. Connolly. It just strikes me as something not worthy of
the Congress, when we actually continue to fall into a false
narrative, to try to make partisan political points when we are
trying to do foreign policy.
There used to be a time--it was actually a Republican who
pronounced the philosophy that our partisan differences ended
at the water's edge for the sake of the country.
And it just seems to me something deplorable that any of us
would yield to the temptation--no one here, of course--to try
to make political points off of this kind of tragedy and to
hold the President and his administration somehow responsible
for every event, especially every unsavory or tragic event,
that occurs around the world is simply nonsensical. It may play
well on certain networks with certain pundits, but it is not
worthy of a great country and it is not worthy of this
Congress.
Why can't we come together to try to support a cohesive
policy to effectuate the goal, which is to lessen and dismantle
Boko Haram and to release safely these young women to their
families and try to prevent that kind of kidnapping activity
from ever recurring again? Isn't that really the goal of the
United States Government, Dr. Sewall? Ms. Dory?
And I need you to answer on the record. A shaking head
doesn't--we can't record that.
Ms. Sewall. I think all Americans share a concern about the
schoolgirls and the threat from Boko Haram, and I believe that
the United States will be stronger in supporting the desires of
the American people, as it speaks with one voice, in that
regard.
Mr. Connolly. Ms. Dory?
Ms. Dory. I agree with the objectives as you laid out, the
safe recovery of the schoolgirls and the effective addressing
of Boko Haram as a threat to Nigeria and the broader region.
Mr. Connolly. And those are our goals? Those are the goals
of this government. Is that correct?
Ms. Dory. Those are among our many goals when we are
relating to Nigeria and in the broader region.
Mr. Connolly. Yes. I am talking specifically, since this
hearing is focused on that, about the Boko Haram activity.
And, obviously, it is not only the desire of all Americans,
Dr. Sewall. It is, in fact, the pronounced policy of the United
States Government that we want them released. Is that not
correct?
Ms. Sewall. That is correct. General Rodriguez and I
traveled to Nigeria to convey that very point.
Mr. Connolly. That is right.
And one final question: Can you both reassure us that our
Government is doing everything in its power to effectuate that
end?
Ms. Sewall. The President, the Secretary of State, and the
entire government is doing everything it can to effectuate that
end.
Mr. Connolly. And from the Defense Department point of
view, Ms. Dory?
Ms. Dory. We have brought our maximum effort into the
engagement with the Nigerians and hope we can support them in
whatever way they will let us.
Mr. Connolly. I thank you both for your testimony. And I
assure you there are many of us up here who will be behind you
and side by side in trying to make that happen.
Thank you for your service to your country, and thank you
for trying to help us achieve a positive end in this tragic set
of events.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Royce. Mr. Scott Perry of Pennsylvania.
Mr. Perry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Sewall, it is my understanding that officials have
repeated--administration officials have repeatedly stated that
Boko Haram is not motivated by religious causes, but by issues
of economic deprivation.
Is the State Department also led to that conclusion?
Ms. Sewall. I am not sure whether there is a piece of paper
that describes the State Department's view about the
motivations of Boko Haram.
What I can tell you is that we know from watching Boko
Haram over the years that they are bent on destroying
institutions that support the people of Nigeria in the
northeast and that they have no compunction about killing any
Nigerian that is in their path.
Mr. Perry. I understand that. And I think we, as Americans,
understand that.
But I am trying to focus on how State Department views Boko
Haram and----
Ms. Sewall. We view Boko Haram as a terrorist organization.
Mr. Perry. Okay. And what is their motivation? If you
could, describe that. What are they motivated by? Not what are
their actions. What are they motivated by?
Ms. Sewall. Well, I am not in the head of their leader. I
have watched the video like you have. And so I----
Mr. Perry. I understand.
But you make assessments. You must make assessments.
Ms. Sewall. We do make assessments.
Mr. Perry. To understand the adversary and the enemy, you
must make assessments.
Ms. Sewall. We do make assessments. As in the case of the
LRA, sometimes it is easier to discern motivations than others.
Al-Qaeda is very clear about its motivations. Some other
terrorist organizations are a combination of criminally
motivated, egomaniacally motivated, and opportunistic.
And so I just----
Mr. Perry. Would you accept that they are motivated by
religious fanaticism--extremist Islamic religious fanaticism?
Ms. Sewall. I can speak to the elements of religion that--
--
Mr. Perry. I know you can speak to it.
Is that a clear assessment or would you assess it somehow
differently than I have just stated?
Ms. Sewall. If you are asking for an official State
Department assessment of the motivations of the leader of Boko
Haram, I will need to take that question back and return it to
you later.
Mr. Perry. All right. Well, I just want to give you this
information and you can roll that up into your assessment.
The leader of Boko Haram says that, ``Nobody can stop us
and live in peace except if you accept Islam and live by sharia
law.''
He also said that they will kill anyone who stands against
the will of Allah by opposing sharia and that they are fighting
a religious war against the Christians and has also said, ``By
Allah, we will kill whoever practices democracy.''
When he says things like that and he says that nobody can
live in peace except if you accept Islam and live by sharia, do
you see any economic nexus there?
Ms. Sewall. When he talks about religion as one lens
through which he defines his enemies, I think that is very
revealing. When he talks about democracy as being one lens
through which he defines his enemies, I think that is very
revealing.
When he decides that killing people who are seeking an
education, it constitutes his ideology. I think that is very
revealing.
So I think it is a mix of things, among which clearly, in
his rhetoric, religion is very important.
Mr. Perry. Well, is there an economic--because I have heard
the administration--I have got reports of the administration
saying----
Ms. Sewall. Okay, I understand now. Yes.
So the economic nexus is something that we have learned
through our own experience with combating both violent
extremism and counterinsurgency, which is to say, if you have a
well-governed, economically vibrant society, you are less
likely to have disenfranchised persons who can be lured by
extremist ideology of any type.
Mr. Perry. I understand the lure.
But that has nothing to do with their motivation. That is
how they recruit. Their motivation is otherwise. And I am
concerned about----
Ms. Sewall. Their motivation is economic insofar as DEPSEC
Dory was talking about kidnap for ransom as being a means of
financing themselves.
Mr. Perry. I understand that is the way of financing.
But administration officials say that their motivation, the
reason they exist, is due to economic deprivation that they
don't have.
But there are many countries and many people around the
world that don't have and that don't resort to kidnappings,
killings, bombings, and forced views on extremist religious
ideology. But I move on.
Does the administration--does the State Department accept
and acknowledge that there is a nexus with Boko Haram and at
least its leadership and the Muslim Brotherhood?
Ms. Sewall. Do you want to speak to that? I don't know.
Mr. Perry. Quickly, please, if you could.
Ms. Dory. Congressman, from the Department of Defense
perspective, I am not aware of a linkage. But I would be glad
to take that back.
Mr. Perry. All right. Well, I have got the linkage here
which shows where the leaders came from--and it goes way back
to the 1980s--the Muslim Brotherhood.
And here is my concern in my last 15 seconds. It seems to
me in some ways that the State Department is living in some
altered state of reality, that most of America, yet most of the
world, understands and recognizes and, if you can't acknowledge
your adversary and your enemy for who they are, there is going
to be no way that you can combat them effectively.
And I appreciate, Mr. Chairman, just your indulgence as I
close up.
This holistic approach should include something in the
national security strategy. And I can see no inclusion in the
national security strategy that either of you folks are
following. And that is my concern, because we can't fix the
problem if we don't identify it.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Royce. Mr. Juan Vargas of California.
Mr. Vargas. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for the
opportunity to speak.
I have to say I think you can see the emotions up here,
because we are very much outraged with what has happened, and I
think the American people are outraged.
But I have to ask this question: Where is the Muslim
outrage? I mean, I have to say that, if this happened and they
did it in the name of Christ, from the Pope on down to the
street preacher, everyone would be yelling and screaming,
``This is not right. This does not follow our religion. It is
wrong'' and people would try to find these girls and these
people.
So, I mean, I ask: Where is the outrage from the imams?
Where is the outrage? This is an insult to Islam. It has to be.
They are a peaceful people.
I had the opportunity and the privilege of having a Muslim
family live with me and my family for 2 years because of what
was going on in Kosovo. So we adopted this family and they
lived with us.
And they are wonderful people and they lived peacefully.
And they have two girls. I have two girls. And I have to say I
love my daughters as much as they love their daughters.
I have to ask: Where is the outrage? Could you answer?
I mean, again, if this was happening in the name of
Christianity, every official Christian group from, you know,
the Catholics down to the unorganized Christians, everyone
would think this was the biggest scandal in the world.
Where is the outrage?
Ms. Sewall. Well, where I heard the outrage when I was in
Abuja was from the voices that were demonstrating in the public
squares, which included community leaders and just community
members and concerned citizens, many of them from the Borno
State, who were by and large Muslim, and were outraged at the
perversion of Islamic tenets in the rhetoric of the Boko Haram
leadership.
So I think certainly in the context of Nigeria there is
outrage and it comes from the community that is most affected
by these events.
Mr. Vargas. Well, I have to say it doesn't seem like it. I
mean, as someone who watches the news all the time and I know
that the Muslim community in the world has gotten outraged over
other things, where they protested in the street and, you know,
have gotten very angry, understandably so in some instances, I
don't see that here.
I mean, I see us fighting and very frustrated over this
issue. I see us, you know, fighting over whether the
administration is doing enough, ``Why aren't we sending the
soldiers?,'' you know, ``We have people there. We ought to go
out and find them and shoot them and kill them and rescue these
girls.''
I mean, that is basically what we are saying up here. And
we are frustrated because we don't seem to be able to do that.
It violates a lot of laws. But I think, as every parent, that
is what we want to do, go find the bad guys and put them away
or shoot them.
But you don't see--you don't feel this outrage in the rest
of the Muslim world. You don't see it. It is shocking to me.
You would think that they would be turning in these people and
saying, ``Here they are. Come and get them. Here they are.''
And you don't seem to--maybe you could tell us. Maybe you
will tell us in a secured situation, a classified briefing.
But is there that type of help in the community there? Are
they helping us find the bad guys?
Ms. Sewall. So if the question is whether tactically on the
ground there is an outpouring of support to identify the Boko
Haram people, I think the way to characterize the situation in
Nigeria is that Boko Haram has so terrorized the local
population that they are very fearful of being perceived as
participants in the war by actively cooperating with the
government.
The situation, of course, is greatly complicated by the
fact that security forces from the 7th Division have often, in
their pursuit of Boko Haram, killed numerous civilians in
addition to Boko Haram. So by virtue of trying to draw
attention to an area, they could be jeopardizing their own
children. And so it is very difficult----
Mr. Vargas. No. That part is understandable.
I mean, you know, no one is saying that the Nigerian
Government has clean hands here. I mean, I think that is the
issue.
They have done some terrible things, and that is why I
think the population has a lot of issues. I mean, that is the
underlying problem you are trying to solve.
But at the same time, it seems, if there was more outrage
in the Muslim world, there would be more pressure to try to
find these guys and rescue these girls, and there doesn't seem
to be.
I guess that is really my question.
And I will yield back after that, Mr. Chairman.
But, again, I find it disturbing that there is not more
outrage, that the outrage comes from the Western world and the
outrage should be coming from the Muslim world. We have got to
do something here.
Thank you.
Chairman Royce. Thank you, Mr. Vargas.
Ms. Dory has to be at the Pentagon for a meeting at noon,
and we appreciate her being here this morning.
I will remind members of an all-House closed session on
Boko Haram, which Eliot Engel and I and the House will be doing
tomorrow.
Dr. Sewall has agreed to finish with our members who
remain. So we appreciate that very much.
But, Ms. Dory, we will let you go. Thank you.
We go now to Ron DeSantis from Florida.
Mr. DeSantis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Sewall, I have been a little concerned with what I have
heard in two of the colloquies. I know that my colleague from
South Carolina, Mr. Duncan, had asked whether the Boko Haram
attack on the schoolgirls was anti-Christian in nature, whether
that was one of their motivations, and you seemed to suggest
that it was not.
Did I hear you correctly?
Ms. Sewall. I believe what you heard me say is that the
attack was against Nigerian schoolgirls.
Mr. DeSantis. But you don't think that it was an attack
motivated by being anti-Christian at all?
Ms. Sewall. Again, you are asking for--speaking to
motivation when I am unable to be in the mind of someone and, I
hope, never to be in the mind of someone like the leader of
Boko Haram.
Mr. DeSantis. And I don't expect you to. But I do think
that----
Ms. Sewall. And, of course, in the case of the schoolgirls,
I believe it was some 15 percent of them were Muslim. So it was
the education and the freedom and empowerment and the progress
that Boko Haram was attacking as it attacked the schoolgirls,
as much as it was anything to do with religion.
I am not denying that religion doesn't appear to be a very
important factor for the leadership, but that is--that is
different from saying it is the sole motivation. It is
different from trying to understand the impact of their actions
on Muslim civilians throughout the northeast.
Mr. DeSantis. And I appreciate that. And certainly you
can't get into their head. I just--and I don't necessarily say
that it is the sole motivation, but I think we have to realize
that this is an animating feature.
I mean, you can't get into his head, but you can listen to
what he says. And he said--and this is quoting from his
speech--``We know what is happening in the world. It is a Jihad
war against Christians and Christianity. It is a war against
Western education, democracy, and constitution. This is a war
against Christians and democracy. In their constitution, Allah
says we should finish them when we get them.''
So, clearly he believes that Christianity,
constitutionalism, liberal democracy--he is putting those
things together and he is saying that his belief and his
version of Islam is what is motivating him to do that.
And I think to try to--I mean, there was a colloquy with
Mr. Perry about--you know, are they an Islamic terrorist group?
Would you feel confident putting the fact that, yeah, there are
terrorist groups specifically operating in the name of Islam?
Ms. Sewall. Well, again, you know, when they recruit people
forcibly and make them fight for them, I don't know what
percentage of their force is essentially enslaved and what
percentage of their force represents the extreme and neolithic
views of the leadership.
I agree with you completely that their rhetoric includes
significant religious motivation, but it also includes
motivation that reflects westernization more broadly.
We know that modernization and westernization and
education, for that matter, is an equal-opportunity, inclusive
of all faiths process. And so they are motivated by something
that goes beyond just Christianity based on what they say and
what they do.
Mr. DeSantis. But the modernity conflicts with their faith,
and that is--and when he started his speech, he said, ``My
brethren in Islam, I am greeting you in the name of Allah, like
he instructed we should among Muslims. Allah is great and has
given us the privilege and temerity above all people.'' So the
anti-Western posture is flowing from this belief.
And it is interesting. You read his speech, you know, and
he starts getting into all kinds of issues. He says that he
believes in marrying off 9-year-old girls. He thinks that is
acceptable, and he cited a religious justification, the conduct
of Muhammad, for that. He defends slavery and criticizes human
rights. Again, he cited Islam as the reason for that. He
threatens to kill the President of the United States.
And so I think what we are dealing with here is--I mean,
you see the video of those schoolgirls being forced to wear
Islamic garb, being forced to recite the Koran. He is trying to
spread this ideology.
This group is spreading the ideology by the sword because
they know that it is fundamentally at odds with human reason
and that, if these girls are allowed to be educated in that
school, they are obviously not going to think that his ideology
is something that is very attractive.
So that is what we are dealing with here, and I just hope
that we can understand the motivation. If we try to put a
Western frame of reference on how they behave and say, Well,
maybe it is because they think there is some economic problems
or this or that, you know, some of those things may be a factor
at the margins.
But at the end of the day, I think that that speech and
their conduct make clear what their motivation is. And so I
would just hope that we would be willing and always have our
eyes open and not try to blind ourselves to reality.
And I yield back.
Chairman Royce. We go now to Lois Frankel from Florida.
Ms. Frankel. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Thank you, Dr. Sewall, for being a very calm-sounding board
here today and, Mr. Chair, for this bipartisanship. I would
call it a bipartisan show of humanity.
And I very much enjoyed meeting today also with Deborah
Peter, who has a lovely sparkle in her eye and a lovely smile,
wonderful resilience.
And she told us a very sad story of how she basically fled
Nigeria 2 years ago after she witnessed the murder of her
father and her brother and--because her father was the pastor
of a Christian church.
And then her 14-year-old brother was shot because, as
Deborah related, her--one of the terrorists said, ``Well, he
will grow up to be the pastor of the church.''
I hope, Mr. Chair, that we are going to be able to help her
with her visa issue and maybe--and to reunite her with her
mother.
And, Deborah, I wish you the best.
She is studying to be a doctor.
I know you will be a very fine doctor.
You know, when I heard about these such children being
kidnapped, I am sure I reacted like most people around the
world, which is I thought of the time when my son was much
younger and I would drop him off to school every day.
And I can't even imagine what it would be like to have
learned that his entire school had been kidnapped and then
maybe sold into slavery. I know that I would be screaming from
the top of my lungs and insisting that this government do
everything possible to get them back.
And there are some crimes against humanity that, no matter
where they happen, it requires a response. And I know it is
complicated, but I want to add my echo to what the chair and
what so many of my colleagues said. First of all, I thank the
President for sending a team, working with Israel, France, and
the United Kingdom to try to bring these girls back. But as
much as we can do, I want to add my voice to those who say we
must bring these girls home. And, you know, this is more than
just a crime against humanity.
I wanted to get into this education angle, because ``Boko
Haram'' means, I think, ``Western education is a sin.'' So--
because they know--they know that, when you educate children,
it is a step toward freedom, democracy, and peace in the
world--to have educated children, educated with a Western
slant.
And so, when we ignore--when we allow children to be
kidnapped because they are partaking in Western education, we
are failing our own children here.
So I hope we can do more. And along those lines, I wanted
to ask you--and I know this is a long-term situation.
But what are we doing to try to fight the corruption that
we are finding, which seems to be endemic in so many of these
governments that are having such serious problems around the
world?
Ms. Sewall. Thanks.
So, first, we don't shy away from the issue. We raise it as
in the bilateral conversation because it is ultimately a
limiting factor, not just in how we interact with the
government, but, also, in terms of the government's ability to
provide for and protect its citizens. We are vocal about our
concerns.
We also work with the--with specific elements within the
law enforcement sector to improve both investigatory capacity
and, in many cases, judicial capacity to identify and prosecute
corruption cases.
This has been a hallmark of our assistance in many
different areas of the world, and it is capacity-building in a
rule-bound, values-based, accountable and transparent ethos.
It is slow work. It is painstaking work. And it does
ultimately require the commitment of an ever-enlarging circle
of leadership within whichever country we are seeking to
support anti-corruption efforts.
And many countries take different approaches to trying to
address widespread and systematic corruption, and there are
different degrees of successes, different approaches. So we
continue to do whatever we are able.
In the case of Nigeria, it has been very specific training
and capacity-building. And we will continue to press this issue
because, you know, Nigeria is themost populace country in
Africa.
It is, you know, an economic juggernaut, and it is
extraordinarily diverse and extraordinarily important for a
whole host of American security interests.
They have elections coming up in 2015. The future of
democracy is very much an issue in those elections in terms of
both the transparency of the elections and the risk of violence
afterwards.
If Nigeria can address its corruption in a meaningful way,
there is no limit on what that country can become. And it is--
it is a huge opportunity there for the government to seize; so,
it is very much in their interest to address it. But the
conversation will be ongoing, and we will continue to press it.
Ms. Frankel. Thank you.
Yield back, Mr. Chair.
Chairman Royce. Thank you.
We go to Mr. Ted Yoho of Florida.
Mr. Yoho. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Doc, appreciate you sitting through this.
And I am looking at your title, Under Secretary of Civilian
Security, Democracy, and Human Rights. And you have been there
since February 2014. Correct?
Ms. Sewall. Yes, sir.
Mr. Yoho. I just find it interesting when I look back over
the history of Nigeria the amount of foreign aid that has been
given there--it is roughly--over $400 billion, which is six
times the Marshall Plan to rebuild Europe after World War II--
for one country; yet, it is wrought with corruption.
And the Department Under Secretary of Civilian Security,
Democracy, and Human Rights--we have been fighting that
campaign for, what, 20, 30, 40 years to try to correct that
problem over there?
And without putting blame on any administration, it is a
problem with what we are trying to accomplish and how we go
about it. We give money over and over again. Last year we gave
$693 million. In 2012 we gave $647 million.
The majority of their legislators make the highest wages in
any government in the world, more than the British Parliament,
yet the average wage--over 70 percent of the population lives
below 1.29 pounds a day, which is about--less than $4 a day.
And we are giving all this foreign aid, and then we have
the situation with what we have with the Boko Haram and the
situation we have with that. We are not getting to the root
cause of the problem.
How do you--what do you see that we do different than what
we have done in the past to change the dynamics? Because if you
don't change the dynamics, nothing is going to change.
They are going to continue to kidnap people, they are going
to continue to kill people, and they are going to continue to
have a corrupt government. And I saw the Obama administration
threaten to cut off all foreign aid to them, which I applaud.
How do we go further and change the dynamics over there?
And I would like to hear what you have to say about that.
Ms. Sewall. Sure. Well, I think, you know, again, if we
parse the question a little bit in the context of what kind of
aid do we provide and what do we get for it, my understanding
is that the bulk of our assistance certainly now--I can't speak
to 40 years ago, but certainly now--is in the realm of health
assistance, significantly HIV/AIDS assistance.
Mr. Yoho. But that is going to continue. I mean, the
problem is going to continue. If they don't care for their own
people, we can't go in there.
We can build any school you want, but if they are going to
come back there and just dismantle it, it is--what do you do to
the government to change government without telling them how to
live?
You know, what is that underlying cause or core value that
they want to see succeed in their country for their people? And
if they don't have that, we don't need to be giving them aid.
Ms. Sewall. So the government--the government is not
tearing down things. It is Boko Haram that is tearing down
things.
The issue of government performance in the northeast is
related to its failure to defeat Boko Haram, which has many
different components, as you are alluding to.
Mr. Yoho. Boko Haram is just a fruition of government not
being in check and taking care of what they need to because
they are not building the infrastructure.
If they are taking all that wealth--I mean, there is $11
billion in oil money that was funneled off that went to the--to
the politicians.
Back in the 1990s, there was a--the President, Sani Abacha,
died in bed with two Indian prostitutes worth $4 billion.
They are not taking care of their own country and, if they
don't want to take care of their own country, nothing is going
to change.
And I want to know what we are going to do from a foreign
policy standpoint to change the dynamics of that.
Ms. Sewall. So one of the important changes has been the
movement toward democracy. I mean, I think we can all agree
that that is a significant change in the context of Nigeria's
history. And so one of the more important things to do is to
support a transparent and accountable democratic process.
And I spent a significant amount of time talking to the
government about the upcoming 2015 elections and how it would
be run and how, hopefully, they won't be disenfranchising the
three states in the north by virtue of a state of emergency and
how we need to be planning now--encourage them to plan now--for
violence that predictably happens after the elections. So
democracy is one big theme of change.
But in terms of where I think you are coming from--and then
the issue of--if you have a democratic system that is vibrant,
you have the ability to hold people accountable.
And so the focus that the United States has had on
enhancing civil society voices to hold governments accountable
and to demand greater transparency in budgets, for example, is
a long-term process, but I think that is one hopeful mechanism.
Mr. Yoho. How can you do that when over 70 percent of the
population is below poverty? They don't have a voice.
Ms. Sewall. Well, in many countries, including our own,
there is great income disparity. But if you have a vote, you
have a vote. And so that is, I think, an important element of
democracy.
I think, in terms of when I--when I look at the State
Department's contributions to things that are occurring in--to
capacity-building within Nigeria, I think they are in line with
efforts to make the country more accountable and more
responsible both as an international security actor and as a
government.
So, for example, military training and education, enhancing
them in their role as regional peacekeepers, antiterrorism
assistance, piloting a program on woman, peace, and security,
helping them in the context of their regional security
responsibilities and their West African regional security
responsibilities, and improving rule of law, those are the
kinds of programs that the State Department facilitates that I
think are necessary elements of progress.
But I agree completely with your point, and I hope I made
it effectively in my opening remarks, that, ultimately, the
government does need to be accountable, and corruption is an
endemic problem.
Mr. Yoho. All right. I appreciate your response. I am out
of time.
I yield back.
Chairman Royce. And we are going to Steve Stockman of
Texas.
Mr. Stockman. I am listening to this debate, and it reminds
me of the 1930s. We had a similar problem where we were trying
to rationalize irrational behavior, and we didn't want to call
it anything.
We have a gentleman, if you want to call him a gentleman,
who is committing genocide in a country. And we can't say what
his motivation is, and we know what his motivation is. You may
not be able to say it, but it is hatred. And he continues to
hate.
And I really resent one of my colleagues saying that our
side is asking questions due to political motivation. We have
the deepest compassion. We want to resolve this.
But we can't--our side--we want to--we want to support the
President, but we cannot gather around a hashtag. We want to
see real action, and we want to call it--we want to call it
what it is.
This gentleman, or whatever you want to call him, hates.
And I hear the same words coming from this administration, that
they called the Speaker of the House. And the Speaker of the
House they called a terrorist, and I don't think he is the same
as what we are seeing in Nigeria.
And I would like to yield a minute to my colleague from
Alabama to respond to, I think, unfair criticism and the
balance to my friend from New Jersey.
But we have to start calling things what they are, and to
equivocate on what they are and who they are is a mistake.
Ms. Sewall. Could I just comment on that, sir?
Chairman Royce. Without objection, let's yield to Mr.
Brooks. And then we will have the response.
Mr. Brooks. Mr. Chairman, I take a moment to respond to the
rather partisan mischaracterization and distortion of my
remarks by Congressman Connolly of Virginia.
As the record shows and proves, I merely asked the
witnesses to detail what the Obama administration has done or
not done to encourage the United Nations in accord with the
first sentence of its Charter to engage in ``effective,
collective measures for the prevention of threats to the
peace.''
Mr. Chairman, I submit that question is directed at getting
the United Nations to do its job so that America does not have
to once again be the only sheriff in town in something all
Members of Congress of both parties can get behind without the
kinds of partisan attacks and responses that were recently
uttered.
Thank you for the time.
Mr. Smith. I thank my friend for yielding.
First of all, I want to make something very clear--and this
hearing has made me even more concerned than I was when I
walked in the door--and that is a fundamental misread of the
radical nature of Boko Haram as it relates to radical Islamic
belief.
As my colleague, Mr. DeSantis, pointed out so eloquently,
we have got to be able to call it for what it is. In 2012, 47
churches--Christian churches were attacked, 2 mosques; 2013, 53
churches attacked, 2 mosques.
I went to Jos. Mr. Emmanuel was there when we went to an
IDP camp. We met with hundreds of Christians who were targeted
for one and only one reason, because they were Christians.
And one man we brought here--and he sat where you sat--Mr.
Adamu--and said they put an AK-47 to his jaw, right around his
nose area, and blew his face off after he would not answer the
question correctly. ``Will you convert to Islam or not?'' He
said, ``No. I am ready to see my Lord. I am a Christian.'' And
they blew his face away.
That is the underlying fundamental raison d'etre of Boko
Haram. Yes. They hate Western education. They hate a lot of
things. But at the core, as Mr. DeSantis pointed out, I think,
so well, just watch what they say. It is about radical Islamic
belief.
And I wish you--you know, you said you wished they would
differentiate--or discriminate--they were so discriminating.
Yes. They will hate other Nigerians. They will hate other
Westerners. But Christians are their main targets.
Secondly, I want to strongly associate my remarks and
concerns with--concerns raised by Chairman Royce that the Leahy
Amendment is having the unintended consequence of precluding
best practices military training of well-vetted Nigerian
forces.
You said earlier--and I hope it was out of context--that it
is not our problem to solve this. Well, maybe not alone, but
certainly in tandem with the Nigerian Government and the
families who have lost their daughters and others who may be at
risk of losing their sons and daughters in the future.
One of the biggest takeaways I had on that trip was talking
to our own people who said, ``Leahy is a great thing. We are
all for Leahy. I voted for Leahy, would always vote for it.''
But it needs to be looked at in a calibrated fashion. There
can be stood up forces in the Nigerian military who are well
vetted to become a strike force and make all the difference in
the world.
And maybe they are about to do that, but it should have
been done for years--not months, years--and there is nothing
whatsoever partisan about this. I have raised this. Members of
the other side have raised first the FTO concerns.
And then we get again Johnnie Carson saying that--and I
quote this because I still am amazed at this: ``The phenomenon
of Boko Haram is one of discrediting the central government in
power for its failure to deliver services to the people.''
That is an insult to the poor. Poor people don't join the--
there is a radical Islamic perspective being promoted here and
a gang-like mentality. And, of course, al-Qaeda and the like--
and others like it are a part of it.
So please take back the idea of what Chairman Royce talked
about because we do think, I think strongly, we have got to be
able to help the military stand up capably.
I yield back.
Chairman Royce. Thank you.
Dr. Sewall.
Ms. Sewall. Thank you.
And, Congressman, I appreciate your passion, and I
appreciate your leadership on this issue for so very long. It
is very important that Congress be participating in the
formation of foreign policy.
And I want to be very clear because I don't want to be
misunderstood. The question that I was asked was whether there
was an official State Department position on the motivations of
Boko Haram, which I simply don't have with me.
If the question is does the leadership of Boko Haram and do
the actions of Boko Haram target Christianity, absolutely,
unequivocally. More fundamentally, they target other things,
too, and they are a threat to the government and to the region.
And so I loved the very clear-eyed characterization that
was just offered, which is that Boko Haram is motivated by
hatred. I don't think anybody would disagree with that. I
endorse it 100 percent. And I think it simplifies the problem
because we all recognize that Boko Haram is a threat that must
be addressed.
I think, in terms of the Leahy Law, well-vetted units we
work with--we work with now. We have been working with them for
years. The problem can arise when units cannot be vetted.
But where units are vetted--and only 50 percent have not
been able to be vetted--the United States is engaging in robust
security cooperation.
And so I think it is just very important, as we look at the
Leahy Law and as we remember that the fight in Nigeria is
fundamentally about human rights and freedoms, we would wish to
honor the Leahy Law's commitment to human rights in that
context.
And it is only if we were to find that we could not do
that, be both consistent to the Leahy Law's commitment to human
rights and work in support of the human rights of Nigerians,
that we would need to look at alternatives.
So I just wanted to both be very clear about my endorsement
of the characterization as the motivation of Boko Haram as
being hatred--and I think that is a very powerful and unifying
way to think about the problem, which is a regional, if not
international, problem--and agree with you that, in the context
of the Leahy Law where units are well vetted, we should--and we
are--work closely with them to enhance Nigeria's capacity to
address this horrific threat.
Thank you.
Chairman Royce. Thank you, Doctor.
I am just going to clarify this point, because this
testimony was as late as last week by the Defense Department
testifying in the Senate.
And I will quote--because this gets back to the point at
hand: ``The Leahy Law is a persistent and very troubling
limitation on our ability to provide assistance, particularly
training assistance that the Nigerians so badly need.''
With my opening line of questioning, I laid out the
difficulty. The difficulty is finding a way for our forces to
assist with the capabilities that we bring, which are unique,
to help track on the ground and rescue these girls.
And so, without that waiver to come down to the bottom
line, without that waiver to allow them to do that, and
direction from the administration to have, you know, our Navy
SEALs with this special capability that they have, you know,
the ability to download information from satellite technology
in the field and from drones and the ability to track in the
jungle, the ability to sort of stand up that Nigerian unit and
plan that operation right up to the point where Boko Haram is
engaged and then allow the Nigerians to carry it out. But if we
do that, then our likelihood of success is many multiples, in
the viewpoint of everyone who has looked at this--many
multiples of what it would be.
And since we have had the offer from the British and from
the French to engage and assist, it would be very wise simply
to go back, get us that waiver.
Because this is an extraordinary circumstance. I made the
point before. I just want to reiterate it because I don't want
us to get off the subject.
Ms. Sewall. I didn't have a chance to respond before.
Could I respond now, Mr. Chair?
Chairman Royce. Yes. Absolutely.
Ms. Sewall. Thank you so much.
So there are two different issues, and I am guessing--I am
not familiar with the DoD comment, but I am guessing that the
concern about Leahy as a constraint was a concern in reference
to the units for whom we were unable to vet, which is some 50
percent of the Nigerian military.
I don't wish to suggest it is not a problem, but it is 50
percent. And so I just want to differentiate that from the
question, which, Mr. Chairman, you are rightly putting, about
the need to be cooperative in a very operational sense with the
effort to return the schoolgirls.
And here we are. By virtue of an agreement that I carried
with me to Abuja, we have now intelligence-sharing
arrangements. We have planners----
Chairman Royce. Dr. Sewall, to get to the point, if you
will recall my original testimony, you know what we do with the
Lord's Resistance Army. We put our Special Ops in the field, on
the ground, with Ugandan units and other units in order to
track, in order to try to suppress Joseph Kony. Okay?
Ms. Sewall. It is not a Leahy motivation, is what I am
trying to----
Chairman Royce. So in this particular case, we--we have a
situation where we are not doing this. What I am suggesting to
you is we are not doing it.
When the issue is raised, the response is, ``Well, we would
have to have a waiver to do that.'' Well, if that is the case,
get a waiver, not from you----
Ms. Sewall. I don't believe it is the case.
Chairman Royce. We are not doing what we need to be doing
on the ground in order to track and rescue these girls. This is
what this whole debate is about, not the rhetoric around it.
Ms. Sewall. I think----
Chairman Royce. We are not doing it. So if you don't need a
change to do it, if you don't need a waiver to do it, go back
and report----
Ms. Sewall. Yes. I will. I will take your----
Chairman Royce [continuing]. That, in Congress, we feel it
needs to be done now.
Because the longer we wait and debate it, the farther
removed these brigands get with their captives and the harder
it is going to be to apprehend and rescue these girls. It
should have been done immediately.
And in the future, if a situation like this comes up, I
would just suggest you have the discretion. Use it. Immediately
go into the field and assist in the rescue.
Now, without objection, we have a member who is not a
member of this committee. But Sheila Jackson Lee wanted
unanimous consent, if we could, for her to ask a question. So
she might ask one question now.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me thank the chairman and ranking
member for their enormous courtesies.
And thank you, Dr. Sewall and Ms. Dory, for your presence
here today.
I started going to Nigeria in the 1970s. I studied at their
universities. And I actually stayed in the home of a family.
The father was an engineer.
And I feel the consternation in this committee, but I will
tell them that the enormity of people in Nigeria are not
corrupt and are looking for opportunities to do what is being
said in this committee, to build this country into one of the
best and most productive countries for their young people, not
only in Africa, but in the world.
I am very grateful for this committee that has focused on
Africa with its subcommittee, but, more importantly, by its
members. And I encourage our colleagues to go as you have gone
and many others. I hold in my hand the list of kidnapped girls,
and I do it and carry it with me all the time because these are
names and people.
So I would like to pose a question around your testimony
about the rescue, but more importantly as well, about the
regionalism of Boko Haram from Chad to Niger to Cameroon, Togo
and beyond. Ghana is not far from Nigeria.
And so the first question is--Members of Congress, women,
went to the Nigerian Embassy and asked the country to establish
a relief fund for the families, just announce and put in--put
dollars in for the pain, the displacement--many of them may be
trying to follow where the girls are, want to see whether the
State Department--beyond our monies that we are giving for them
to establish a relief fund.
Secondarily, in your testimony, you said that you were able
to work with new battalions, special forces and Rangers. I
think you were talking about in the Nigerian military, that
they were established as that.
I am concerned that rescue would generate--that we would
not endanger the girls. However, I do know that it is very,
very concerning that there is not that concerted push using
these particular battalions and special forces.
So my question is on the relief fund and how can we
collaborate with the African Union on the regional aspect. Is
there any grounds for the U.N. peacekeepers? I know that
Ambassador Powers is not here. And is there any way that you
can encourage President Jonathan that his voice now, even
though it is painful--his voice continuing to speak of their
concern to the world is crucial?
He made one point. And I will tell you I take a little
credit for that because we were calling into Nigeria the day
before the World Economic Council to indicate that he needed to
say something, of which he said a little bit when he made his
opening remarks. But now there is dead silence at least coming
this way.
So I ask: In your engagement, can you explain to them that
it is important? We know how great Nigeria's potential is and
what they have done, and I want to promote it all the time.
But can we focus on this siege? Because this terrorist
group is not going away unless we get our hands around it in an
appropriate manner.
Ms. Sewall. Thank you, Congresswoman.
I am not aware of any new State Department initiatives to
create a victims fund, if that is the--I understand----
Ms. Jackson Lee. No. It is for Nigeria to create a relief
fund----
Ms. Sewall. I see.
Ms. Jackson Lee [continuing]. And for the State Department
to encourage them to do something for all of those families and
pronounce it publicly and nationally.
Ms. Sewall. So I think it is fair to say that, while I did
not specifically emphasize that initiative, in all of our
engagements with Nigerian officials, from the President
throughout the administration, we are communicating very
clearly that their leadership and their vocal leadership and
their expressions of empathy with the people of the northeast
in the fight--who are the victims of the fight against Boko
Haram is absolutely critical and that more can be done to
convey both the attention and the commitment and the empathy on
that point.
I think, as you point out--in terms of the regional
ramifications, I believe this is a very important moment for
concerned nations, if not the international community as a
whole, to convince Nigeria of the need to redouble its efforts,
to rethink its tactics in this fight, to flesh out its
commitment to a soft approach and to identify clearly what that
means in terms of the nonmilitary elements of a strategy to
combat Boko Haram, to strengthen all regional platforms to both
better understand the nature of the problem and to facilitate
actions to address the problem concretely.
So I think this is a very important moment. And while the
tragedy of the kidnapping is a heartbreak for us all, I
certainly hope that we can use this as a way to do as you say,
which is to improve collective efforts to address the
underlying problem of Boko Haram, which is not likely to
disappear in the next year.
Thank you.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I thank the chairman very much.
And I just want to conclude by saying I heard my
colleagues, and I truly believe that the religious aspect looms
very large. Because this started many years back and Christians
were at the direct hit of Boko Haram. It has obviously spread.
And I will finish by saying that we have tracked--and I
know you have--millions of dollars that have come from the al-
Qaeda structure to Boko Haram. It is really an international
issue, and it really is an issue that will impact the United
States maybe at some point.
And I think it is very important that we are in it for that
reason and the reason for the love and need for these children
to be returned to their families and the respect we have for
the continent and its friendship to us.
And I yield back.
Chairman Royce. Well, we appreciate both of our witnesses
being here this morning.
Dr. Sewall, we appreciate you finishing out the panel.
Thank you very much.
The situation with these girls is critical. Members of the
committee want to do all that they can to assist State and
Department of Defense with any additional authority we may need
in order to help secure a rescue.
What I was suggesting, the technical terminology for it, is
an upgrade to an advise-and-assist role. So if that could be
conveyed, I very much appreciate it.
And, also, we very much appreciate Deborah Peter being with
us.
Thank you so much for your meeting with the members of our
committee this morning, Deborah.
With that, we stand adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:43 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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