[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
AL-QAEDA IN AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN:
AN ENDURING THREAT
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MAY 20, 2014
__________
Serial No. 113-156
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
DANA ROHRABACHER, California Samoa
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio BRAD SHERMAN, California
JOE WILSON, South Carolina GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
TED POE, Texas GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
MATT SALMON, Arizona THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina KAREN BASS, California
ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
MO BROOKS, Alabama DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
TOM COTTON, Arkansas ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
PAUL COOK, California JUAN VARGAS, California
GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois
RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III, Massachusetts
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania AMI BERA, California
STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California
RON DeSANTIS, Florida GRACE MENG, New York
DOUG COLLINS, Georgia LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
TED S. YOHO, Florida JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
Amy Porter, Chief of Staff Thomas Sheehy, Staff Director
Jason Steinbaum, Democratic Staff Director
------
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade
TED POE, Texas, Chairman
JOE WILSON, South Carolina BRAD SHERMAN, California
ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California
MO BROOKS, Alabama JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
TOM COTTON, Arkansas JUAN VARGAS, California
PAUL COOK, California BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III,
TED S. YOHO, Florida Massachusetts
C O N T E N T S
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Page
WITNESSES
Mr. David Sedney (Former Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Central Asia, U.S. Department of
Defense)....................................................... 4
The Honorable Michael A. Sheehan, distinguished chair, Combating
Terrorism Center, United States Military Academy at West Point. 15
Mr. Thomas Joscelyn, senior fellow, Foundation for Defense of
Democracies.................................................... 22
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
Mr. David Sedney: Prepared statement............................. 6
The Honorable Michael A. Sheehan: Prepared statement............. 18
Mr. Thomas Joscelyn: Prepared statement.......................... 24
APPENDIX
Hearing notice................................................... 44
Hearing minutes.................................................. 45
AL-QAEDA IN AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN: AN ENDURING THREAT
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TUESDAY, MAY 20, 2014
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:32 p.m., in
room 2200, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Adam Kinzinger
presiding.
Mr. Kinzinger. The subcommittee will come to order. Without
objection, all members may have 5 days to submit statements,
questions, and extraneous materials for the record, subject to
the length limitation in the rules. I want to say on behalf of
all of us, thank you to our witnesses for being here to talk
about what I think is an extremely important issue, the issue
of the future of what we are seeing with regards to al-Qaeda in
Afghanistan and Pakistan. As we actually look forward right now
at a post-2014 plan in Afghanistan, we see that the threat of
al-Qaeda, in my mind, has not diminished really at all from
what we saw pre-9/11. We continue to see a country that is
overridden by al-Qaeda. It is no secret that I support a
strong, robust, residual force to protect the significant
strides that we have made in Afghanistan.
I recently had the privilege of leading a CODEL to
Afghanistan and Pakistan this past November with the hope of
getting an objective view of what is needed on the ground by
our troops, our commanders, and our State Department personnel
serving in the region. I came away with renewed sense of
optimism on happenings on the ground. The Afghan forces have
been improving. The green on blue killings that was strategized
by our enemy to try to undermine the sense of trust that exists
have been on the decline. Infiltrators have been sharply cut
down, and we are no longer conducting unilateral missions
except for counterterrorism operations. With that said, al-
Qaeda remains very strong.
Reducing our footprint in Afghanistan will inevitably
curtail our ability to directly confront al-Qaeda in the
region. When making post-2014 troop level determinations, we
must fully evaluate the risk that comes with a too aggressive
drawdown. To arbitrarily pick a number based on political
expediency, diminishes the sacrifice that our brave men and
women continue to make in Afghanistan.
You know, I remember in 2001, I was actually driving to
work, and I had just graduated from Illinois State University,
and I remember hearing that a plane hit the World Trade Center
and it went through my mind as a newly minted private pilot, I
said, well, how in the world can a plane hit a building on a
beautiful morning? And then I heard a second plane hit the
World Trade Center, and then the field in Pennsylvania, and the
Pentagon not far from here.
And at that point, I think American life changed
completely. Up through the 1990s, we were under this impression
that America was a country that was protected by two oceans,
the idea of any kind of a terrorist attack was always for over
there, and not necessarily for here with the exception of the
occasional domestic terrorist. And that whole reality was
changed.
And as a country, we mobilized to this idea of defeating
al-Qaeda where they exist. This idea of finding America's
enemies that would seek to destroy us, and, in essence,
destroying them first and depriving them of their ability to
recruit more people and more fighters. And I think when you
look at the history of both Iraq and Afghanistan, we can judge
the last 10 to 13 years and say there were things we could have
done better. I think there are things we could have done worse.
When I look into Afghanistan today and I see girls going to
school, I see women with rights that they didn't have prior to
9/11, I see al-Qaeda with the fear that there is going to be a
missile that strikes them at any moment, I think we have made a
lot of gains.
And my big concern, and one of the things I look forward to
hearing from the witnesses about, my big concern is that for
the hope of political expediency, as I briefly touched on, we
are going to end what President Obama called ``the Good War,''
the war in Afghanistan, that we are going to end this
prematurely simply to follow a campaign promise.
So I do look forward to hearing from the witnesses and at
this point I will turn over to the ranking member, Mr. Sherman
from California, for 5 minutes for his opening comments.
Mr. Sherman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be in and out
of this room because for me, today is a festival of
subcommittees. We have not only this, but the Asia Subcommittee
and the Insurance Subcommittee all meeting simultaneously. I
thank the witnesses for being here. I was hoping to see my old
friend, Husain Haqqani who I know cannot be here for medical
reasons. This hearing will help us understand al-Qaeda's
evolving structure and hopefully help us craft a more effective
counterterrorism policy. Al-Qaeda has failed to carry out a
major attack on the United States' homeland, however, the
danger still remains. Al-Qaeda's structure, of course, has
become more decentralized with most terrorist activity now
conducted by its regional and local affiliates.
Over the past few years, al-Qaeda's core in Pakistan has
been weakened by the loss of key leaders, most notably, a truly
heroic attack that netted bin Laden, one that took incredible
courage from our special forces to carry out, and also took
very substantial political courage to order. I am sure that the
efforts by President Carter to rescue our hostages came to mind
when political leaders had to make the decision as to whether
to go forward with that mission. And of course, that decision
was correct.
Congress should work with the administration to reform the
Authorization for the Use of Military Force. I was here when
that was passed. It was passed in haste as it should have been
with great emotion, which was natural. But it now needs
substantial revision to balance our desire to deal with
terrorism on the one hand, and defend our privacy and liberties
on the other. And now, as we see Boko Haram and other terrorist
organizations that may not fall under the ambit of the
authorization to use military force, because they may not
exactly be linked, may be ideologically linked to al-Qaeda, but
such terrorist organizations pose just as great a threat to us
as the al-Qaeda franchises. So whether you are--whether you
have the al-Qaeda franchise in North Africa, or Yemen, or
wherever, or you don't, Islamic extremism poses a threat to the
United States.
Our systematic effort to dismantle terrorist organizations
must continue as the President himself said. We would like to
end this war. It is the longest in our history. But we can't
end it until the enemy is vanquished. As to whether we are
leaving Afghanistan too quickly and for political reasons, I
would have to disagree with our acting chairman. First of all,
remember, it was not this administration who picked Karzai and
installed him. And it is Karzai who, to this moment, is
prohibiting any troops from remaining in Afghanistan through--
past the end of this year.
The generals, our military staff has determined what is an
appropriate number of forces to leave there with the goal of
combating terrorism and training the Afghan Army. This is not a
political decision. This is an appropriate military decision,
and I think that we ought to unify behind it.
The United States, hopefully with a new President of
Afghanistan, will remain active in that country. We continue to
offer $25 million reward for Zawahiri. We continue to seek out
the other key al-Qaeda leadership.
I would like our witnesses to focus on a number of issues.
One of those is the current strength and capacities of Afghan
security forces, and their adversaries, the Taliban, the
Haqqani network, al-Qaeda itself. The second is the nature of
the ISI's relationship with the Afghan Taliban, the Pakistani
Taliban, the Haqqani network, and al-Qaeda, and Islamabad's
cooperation with the United States. And this is a truly
difficult to understand situation. It is clear that there are
elements of the Pakistani Government that are cooperating with
terrorists, and it is clear that there are terrorists who,
given the chance, would murder the entire family of many of the
leaders in the Pakistani Government.
It is the politics I don't completely understand. Perhaps
the witnesses will shed some light on it. I hope they also
focus on how well the Gulf states are in stopping terrorist
financing and whether there are any elements of the terrorist
organizations that we are talking about here that some of those
countries find acceptable as a recipient of charitable dollars.
And so we have a lot to hear and I will yield back.
Mr. Kinzinger. Well, thank you, Mr. Sherman. Without
objection, all of the witnesses' prepared statements will be
made a part of record. I ask that each witness please keep your
presentation to no more than 5 minutes and we will begin with
our first panel of witnesses.
Mr. David Sedney is the former Deputy Assistant Secretary
of Defense for Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Central Asia in the
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and
Pacific Security Affairs. Mr. Sedney has received the Secretary
of Defense medal for Meritorious Civilian Service, Department
of State's Superior Honor Award six times, and the Department
of State's Meritorious Honor Award twice. It is nice to have
you here, sir. Mr. Sedney, we will start with you. You have 5
minutes.
STATEMENT OF MR. DAVID SEDNEY (FORMER DEPUTY ASSISTANT
SECRETARY FOR AFGHANISTAN, PAKISTAN, AND CENTRAL ASIA, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE)
Mr. Sedney. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking
Member, representatives, thank you for holding this hearing,
the subject of which I think is vital to national security. As
both of you have pointed out in your statement, al-Qaeda
remains a threat to the United States. There is a narrative
about al-Qaeda that I think is proving to be increasingly
wrong, and that narrative is that al-Qaeda is much less of a
threat today and is on the way to extinction or to strategic
defeat. That narrative, I find is belied by the facts, and I
think it is very important for us to look at this and my co-
panelists are more experienced in some of the ramifications,
but I look at it very much from the perspective of Afghanistan
and Pakistan. We went into Afghanistan after 9/11 as you
described, Mr. Chairman, with the explicit intention of
defeating al-Qaeda and making sure that the Taliban couldn't
come back to Afghanistan and make a safe haven for Afghanistan
again for themselves and for al-Qaeda or similar terrorist
organizations.
We have succeeded for the time being in Afghanistan. Al-
Qaeda is virtually not present in Afghanistan except for a
small group in Nuristan, which is primarily right now focused
on events inside Afghanistan, is not, at least in my judgment,
is not a direct threat to the United States now, but could be
in the future if pressure was not continued to be placed on
them.
However, where did al-Qaeda go? It went to Pakistan. And as
the ranking member described, we have kept, as you, Mr.
Chairman, have described, we have kept strong pressure on al-
Qaeda, but we have not managed to defeat al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda
still has a number of leaders there. There are still numbers of
adherents for al-Qaeda go to Pakistan seeking training, seeking
entry. Al-Qaeda is very choosey about who they let into their
ranks, but they continue to have people who want to join. The
reason for that is what is important about al-Qaeda is not so
much any individual leader, it is the organization. And what is
important about the organization is the ideology behind it. And
that ideology is based on a belief that it is the destiny of
humanity, to live under a caliphate similar to that which ruled
in what is now Saudi Arabia almost 1,500 years ago. The al-
Qaeda have been very explicit in that that is their goal, the
recreation of a caliphate and to have it first in the areas
where their religion began, but then to have it spread
throughout the entire world.
So this is really an ideological conflict, and the
attraction of people who come to join al-Qaeda is an attraction
of ideology. They believe in that vision as well. They see the
United States and our western allies as an obstacle to
achieving that vision, and they see the country of Afghanistan
as a place where they played a major role. This is again their
narrative, in defeating one of the two superpowers of the 20th
century, the Soviet Union, and that they are now in the process
of defeating the second superpower, now the world's only
superpower, the United States in Afghanistan. And they do so
because they have this narrative because they are less worried
about what happened yesterday, what's happening today, or what
is happening tomorrow, than what their destiny is, which is to
take over, first Afghanistan, and then other areas that they
want to have the caliphate in.
The effort in Afghanistan after the United States pushed
the Taliban out and pushed al-Qaeda out in 2001, has been an
extremely strong and resilient effort on the part of the
Taliban with the support of al-Qaeda. When I was in Afghanistan
from 2002, 2003, and 2004, we clearly had some initial
successes, but we saw the buildup of opposition to the
government there, and it was very effective. By 2008,
Afghanistan was close to falling to the Taliban, and if they
had, they would have brought al-Qaeda back with them.
President Obama announced a surge, and put in place a surge
that pushed the Taliban back, but has far from negated the
Taliban's ability to threaten the state of Afghanistan. One of
the most important successes in response to the ranking
member's question about the capability of the Afghan security
forces, is success of the Afghan security forces, particularly
the Afghan Army, which in the recent elections had not just a
lead role, but almost completely exclusive responsibility for
protecting those elections against the Taliban's declared
intention to prevent those elections from happening. Not only
did they not prevent them from happening, but the elections
succeeded beyond anyone's expectation, with almost twice as
many people voting in this year's election as did 5 years ago.
That is a strategic defeat for the Taliban and a strategic
defeat for al-Qaeda. That is the kind of strategic defeat that
we need to continue to inflict by having the kind of strong
military, civilian, and assistance presence in Afghanistan that
you described, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Kinzinger. Thank you, Mr. Sedney.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Sedney follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
----------
Mr. Kinzinger. The Honorable Michael Sheehan is the
distinguished chair of the Combating Terrorism Center at the
West Point Military Academy. Ambassador Sheehan has held
positions at the New York Police Department, United Nations,
U.S. Department of State, and was appointed by President
Clinton as Ambassador-at-Large for Counterterrorism. Honored to
have you here, sir. You have 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE MICHAEL A. SHEEHAN, DISTINGUISHED
CHAIR, COMBATING TERRORISM CENTER, UNITED STATES MILITARY
ACADEMY AT WEST POINT
Mr. Sheehan. Thank you, sir. Thank you, Mr. Chairman,
Ranking Member. I will keep my remarks short. My general theme
is that we need to be a little bit more optimistic in what we
are going to be able to achieve in Afghanistan and in fighting
al-Qaeda and its affiliates around the world because sometimes
our pessimism undermines our will to persevere in a war that I
think is very winnable if we maintain certain tracks of action.
Let me highlight five key points from my written testimony,
if I could, Mr. Chairman. First, that our CT policy in the
AFPAK region for the last 13 years, actually has been an
enormous success by the most important metric, and that is to
prevent al-Qaeda from coming to our homeland and attacking
again. It is very important to recognize this. We can push
these guys back when we are determined.
Number two, the AFPAK area, both sides of the border is a
unique place on the planet that breeds international terrorism
and a brand of international terrorism with a history of
targeting the United States' homeland.
Number 3, Afghanistan is a winnable war, but we must narrow
our objectives, be a little bit more optimistic, and we are
going to need to stay the course a little bit longer, but it is
winnable. We should not despair. There is too much pessimism
coming out of the news every day that the Pakistani Government
is hopelessly corrupt, the Afghan Government is corrupt, the
Pakistani Government is helping the Taliban, that things are
horrible. We need to remain a little bit optimistic in order to
persevere.
Fourth, a U.S. military and intelligence presence is
absolutely essential to be in Afghanistan in order for us to
continue our war against al-Qaeda central, which currently
resides in Western Pakistan primarily in the FATA, as you know,
the Federally Administered Tribal Area.
Fifth, we need to guarantee our mission in Afghanistan. If
required, in my view, with U.S. air power, directed by our SOF
elements that are on the ground there, if the Kabul government
is threatened to be toppled by the Taliban. And if you recall
that combination of U.S. air power and U.S. special forces
after 9/11, they routed the Taliban within a few months. That
is a very lethal combination. Of course, that type of
authorization will only be provided by the President of the
United States and the highest levels in Afghanistan. Let me
quickly elaborate on these five points.
First, about our counterterrorism policy's enormous
success. We have to remember that prior to 9/11 when al-Qaeda
was not under pressure, they attacked us three times
strategically in 37 months. That is a strategic attack every
year. They attacked our Embassies in East Africa, the USS Cole,
and the 9/11 attacks from 1998 to 2001. If you leave al-Qaeda
alone, they will have the capability to attack us strategically
either at home or in core assets that are abroad. That is a
clear lesson of that time. But when we are able to put pressure
on them, as we have in the FATA primarily over the last 3
years, we prevented them from being able to organize those
types of strategic attacks, and they have tried to do so. I
will go into some of those examples if I have time later.
Secondly, the AFPAK area is unique. It is the heart of al-
Qaeda that attacked the U.S. historically. It is a unique
place, a stew of foreign fighters, wannabe terrorists and
numerous violent jihadi groups with agendas against
Afghanistan, United States, India, Pakistan. Many of them are
supported by the Pakistani Government for different agendas.
They mix together, in a very lethal combination of
organizations that sometimes work together, sometimes
independently, but they are very problematic.
We should recall my nightmare from when I was at NYPD
someone like Faisal Shahzad, the Times Square bomber, lived in
Connecticut, smart guy, married, Wall Street guy, traveled to
Pakistan four times, wanted to get to al-Qaeda, but couldn't
and was trained by the TTP. Fortunately, his training was bad
and the bomb in Times Square fizzled out. In my view, that was
not an accident. His failure was a direct result of the
pressure we put on those groups in the FATA. If we removed the
pressure, they will reconstitute the safehouses, training
areas, lines of communication, indoctrination places that
existed prior to 9/11 when I was Ambassador-at-Large for
Counterterrorism and I was looking through different aerial
images of bin Laden in his camps and we weren't able to get to
him. They were not under pressure and they were able to attack
us. We can never allow that to happen again.
Third point, the U.S. presence in Afghanistan is essential
to continue providing, to continue pounding al-Qaeda in
Afghanistan and Pakistan. There is simply no other viable
alternative than Afghanistan, especially now after Ukraine, the
countries up in the north, it is very unlikely we are going to
be able to do anything there, and it is too far away. The
seaborne area where we conducted operations, launched missiles
from the Indian Ocean in 1998 and 1999, that doesn't work very
well either. We need to be in Afghanistan not only because it
is close, but to continue our human intelligence, our other
intelligence operations that enable us to pound al-Qaeda in the
FATA, or in Afghanistan if they try to get back in there.
Number four. This is a winnable war. Too often we despair.
The Taliban are not 10 feet tall. They do have sanctuary in
Pakistan, however, which is extremely problematic. An
insurgency always needs sanctuary, either in a--ideally, across
a border which gives them some protection, or in some remote
area within the country. The Taliban used both, but the border
area of Pakistan, the support they get from them is extremely
problematic, and we should understand while that happens, and I
don't see it stopping any time soon, the Taliban is going to be
around for a long time. They will likely control areas in
Afghanistan for a long time. And they will be able to conduct
the periodic terrorist attacks in Kabul that we see. But I hope
that the Afghan Government can persevere through that.
The conditions of the 1990s when the Taliban took over
Afghanistan do not exist now and their prospects are dim for
repeating that. One of it has to do with the security forces
that are in Afghanistan that David Sedney talked to. This is a
serious army. We also, I have been out many times with their
special forces units that were trained by our special forces
units about 14,000 or 15,000 of them. These are tough fighters
committed to action, multiethnic, and a serious fighting force.
So it is a very different situation in the 1990s.
Fifth and finally, I believe we must guarantee our
commitment to Afghanistan with our U.S. Air Force there
supported by SOF on the ground, just in case the Taliban try to
run of the ring highway like they did in 1995 and 1996. If they
were to do that with a major offensive, we can pound them,
route them into submission and keep the government secure.
So in sum, the area of Afghanistan and Pakistan is a vital
interest to U.S. security. It is uniquely a terrorist threat to
our homeland. We must remain in Afghanistan in order to deal
with the threat in Pakistan. Perhaps 10,000 or some other
number that is kicked around may be enough. But we need to have
the right forces there in order to sustain that operation. And
we should be optimistic that we can do that. And my final
point----
Mr. Kinzinger. I will have to ask you to wrap it up very
briefly, sir.
Mr. Sheehan. My final point, Mr. Chairman, is that al-
Qaeda, unique among other organizations, seeks WMD and would
use it tomorrow to kill us in mass numbers. Thank you.
Mr. Kinzinger. Well said. Thank you Mr. Ambassador.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Sheehan follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
----------
Mr. Kinzinger. Mr. Tom Joscelyn, is that correct?
Mr. Joscelyn. That is correct.
Mr. Kinzinger. All right--is a senior fellow at the
Foundation for Defense of Democracies, and Senior Editor of The
Long War Journal, a publication dealing with counterterrorism
and related issues. Much of his research focuses on how al-
Qaeda and its affiliates operate around the globe, and sir, you
have 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF MR. THOMAS JOSCELYN, SENIOR FELLOW, FOUNDATION FOR
DEFENSE OF DEMOCRACIES
Mr. Joscelyn. Thank you, Congressman, and thank you to this
committee for inviting me to testify again before you. It is a
great honor. I am just going to make five quick points. I am
the counterterrorism nerd, and I tend to delve in the weeds and
I promise not to do that here very quickly. My five quick
points are, one of the big things really sort of was eye-
opening for me, I think, for The Long War Journal was that most
of al-Qaeda's assets since its existence, since its founding in
1988, have actually not been focused on attacking us. That is
somewhat of a stark revelation.
Actually, most of their assets have been focused on other
things, mainly waging insurgencies against ``local
governments,'' trying to seize power for themselves throughout
the Muslim world and throughout South Asia all the way through
the Middle East, and into North Africa. That is important
because I think that it is not by any accident that what is
going on around the world where al-Qaeda groups, al-Qaeda-style
groups start popping up throughout this whole wide area.
The second point I would like to make is that there is
still a lot of confusion about how to define al-Qaeda. You hear
a lot of talk about al-Qaeda core and everything else as
affiliates. I think what is really meant by al-Qaeda core is
actually what is known as the general command of al-Qaeda, and
this is actually an organization to Mr. Sedney's point, that
still exists. If you go back to the 9/11 Commission Report,
there were several committees in the al-Qaeda prior to 9/11.
These committees still exist. They have been reorganized, they
have been restaffed, but there is still an infrastructure of
bureaucracy that al-Qaeda exists. So despite all the successes
we have had in killing and capturing top al-Qaeda leaders, they
still have this organization.
And if you go back to my testimony before this committee
last July, I pointed out that this organization is not confined
to South Asia, that some of its leadership in the general
command is actually elsewhere. And my big point was that al-
Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula is headed by the protege and
former aide-de-camp to Osama bin Laden. And in fact, a couple
of weeks after my testimony, that same guy, Nasser al-Wuhayshi,
was actually appointed to be the general manager of al-Qaeda
globally.
Okay, now this is a core function. So we talk about core
here, core al-Qaeda and these terms are very loosely defined.
They don't make a lot of sense to me. I think what you really
have is an international network organization that has what
they call their general command which makes decisions for the
organization.
And on the third point is, what is this organization
actually doing in the Afghanistan and Pakistan region? Well,
one of the main things they have been doing, yes, they have
been plotting attacks against us unsuccessfully and trying to
have mass casualty attacks in the West. They have absolutely
been trying to do that. But one of the other things they have
been doing, and primarily where their focus has been, is what
they call their shadow army, which sounds kind of spooky and
conspiratorial and it kind of is. But what they have done is
they built this, basically a force multiplier for the
insurgents in the region to try and make their attacks more
efficient and effective against Afghan forces, coalition
forces, and those type of things.
Now, why is this important? Well, a lot of times we can't
actually detect al-Qaeda's hand. They don't announce exactly
what they are doing a lot of times, but we can see it if you do
very careful analysis. And so al-Qaeda is still very much in
the region, still very much in the fight in Afghanistan.
Everybody knows about their hub in Kunar and Nuristan where
they have a very prominent al-Qaeda leader leading the charge.
But we detect them elsewhere in other provinces. And in fact,
one of the few documents released from bin Laden's compound
reveals that Osama bin laden told his minions basically to
disperse out of Northern Pakistan to several provinces in
Afghanistan, and we have been able to track operatives who took
him up on that.
The fourth point is that one of the reasons why al-Qaeda is
still alive or still in the game is they have developed what we
call strategic depth in Afghanistan and Pakistan. And so what
former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates called the syndicate
model. Now, I wish I had come up with this phrase, syndicate,
to describe it, because it is actually better than anything I
have got. But Gates is right. And what it is, is they have
these close relationships with all of these other groups in the
area, and a lot of these other groups, to Ranking Member
Sherman's point, actually are sponsored by the ISI. And so what
al-Qaeda has been able to do, as we kill or capture senior al-
Qaeda leaders, a lot of times they have been able to replace
those leaders with guys from other groups in the syndicate. And
that is what makes them so effective and sort of keeps them
going.
And finally, when we talk about just a final point about
the international network of al-Qaeda and what it really is,
this general command, as I said, doesn't just exist in South
Asia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, actually it stretches across
several countries. And some of these groups in these countries,
these, what we call affiliates or something along those lines,
I don't actually like the word ``affiliates.'' Some of these
are actually regional branches of al-Qaeda that have sworn
allegiance to bayat to Ayman al-Zawahiri, the head of al-Qaeda.
They answer up the command in the chain to senior leadership in
Pakistan, and elsewhere, and the best example of that is today
is Syria, where we see this traffic going back and forth
between Pakistan and Afghanistan and Syria.
And it shows, to my mind, that we are not dealing with this
sort of discrete core entity in Pakistan and Afghanistan that
can be droned to death, but in fact, an international network
that poses a lot graver challenges. And I will leave it there.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Joscelyn follows:]
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----------
Mr. Kinzinger. Well, thank you. And again, thank you to the
witnesses for being here and providing us with your fantastic
insight. I will go ahead and start with my questions. You know,
I have always been amazed America has had this, and I guess it
is a testimony to how, in essence, opposed to war we are at our
base, at the heart, but any time we get engaged somewhere, we
immediately start talking about the withdrawal strategy and how
to leave and how to get out, and I will say that Afghanistan
has been a very long war. We understand that, but I will remind
people that America has not yet been defeated on the
battlefield. When we engage with Taliban or al-Qaeda, we win.
So the only way we will ever been defeated in Afghanistan
is if our willpower is defeated, not necessarily our military
might. And so my concern, and my questions will somewhat center
around the fact of, you know, in 10 or 20 years the history is
going to write the decisions that we made today. And we have
two options: We can either have the history books read that,
you know, the Afghan people had victory, and the Afghan people
were able to secure their own country, and women still have
freedom, and they can go to school, and they can be successful,
or we can read the thing that said America at a time when we
were pressing the fight against al-Qaeda and the Taliban
decided that we had had enough. I guess 1 percent of America
actually serves in the military. I served and still continue to
serve in the military, but yet, somehow we have a war fatigue
despite 99 percent of Americans having never served.
I also would like to remind Mr. Sherman--he is not here. I
am not talking bad about him, but Mr. Karzai will be gone
shortly, and we will have a new President of Afghanistan, I
think, which will be a positive development. Let me ask the
entire panel and try to keep it as brief as you can. How many
us troops do you believe are required to remain in Afghanistan
post-2014, to combat al-Qaeda and al-Qaeda's allies? And let's
keep it as short you can. We will just start this way.
Mr. Sedney. I believe a total force of around 16,000, that
would be about 10,000 U.S., and about 6,000 NATO is the minimum
necessary to carry out those dual goals of having the
capability to carry out counterterrorism operations and train,
advise, and assist and equip the Afghan Army. A smaller number
than that becomes purely a self-defense force. They are only
there defending themselves and don't accomplish anything.
Mr. Kinzinger. It is just cooking food and protecting the
fences, basically. Mr. Ambassador.
Mr. Sheehan. I would agree with that number, sir. That is
the number that is kicked around interagency, the Department of
Defense and CIA primarily. My concern is that if we go below
that, that the CIA will have to withdraw even further back, and
that we are going to lose our insight into the FATA. Also, the
military needs to be there to protect the counterterrorism
assets that conduct the attacks against al-Qaeda. So I agree
that number is a minimum.
Mr. Kinzinger. I just remind everybody what we see in Iraq
today, right, the western--the place where the Marines fought
the hardest they have fought since Khe Sanh, is now controlled
by ISIS, because the administration, I believe for a political
reason, so they could follow through on a political promise,
pulled all of the troops out of Iraq and we find ourselves
today with a lawless Western Iraq, also based out of Syria. Mr.
Joscelyn, in terms of the number of troops.
Mr. Joscelyn. I am actually not a military expert so I will
defer to these gentlemen, but I think 10,000 to 20,000 sounds
about right in terms of the numbers to protect our forces and
actually keep in the fight there in the region. One of the big
things that you have to keep your eye on is the ability for the
drone air strike campaign to keep going, and the bottom line
is, unless we have the proper forces in place to protect those
assets and protect those bases, in addition to taking the fight
to the enemies in Afghanistan, then that is going to
necessarily impact our ability to strike in Pakistan and
elsewhere.
Mr. Kinzinger. How would you all rate the administration's
current counterterrorism strategy? Does it have one, and if so,
is it successful? I guess we can start with you, sir, again,
and then right to left. My right to left.
Mr. Joscelyn. Well, I think the administration has had
success in taking out certain key senior al-Qaeda leaders,
obviously, including Osama bin Laden. I think the Bush
administration had success in that regard before them. I think
the problem, again, is I think both administrations early on
made the same mistake, which is, they define al-Qaeda as this
sort of this top-down pyramid with a hierarchical structure,
that if you sort of lop off the top of the pyramid, the whole
thing crumbles. They had that debate, that discussion about how
to organize themselves about 20 years ago, and they decided
against that organizational structure. And, you know, we still
fight them a lot of times like they are structured that way and
so they are growing in other ways.
Mr. Kinzinger. Thank you. Mr. Ambassador, how would you
rate the current administration's----
Mr. Sheehan. I should mention, Mr. Chairman, I was the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low
Intensity Conflict. I just left that job last year, so I was
part of the administration. So do I think they have good
strategy? I do. Their strategy is to conduct kinetic and direct
action strikes against those organizations that directly
threaten the United States or U.S. personnel. For other groups
that have not yet directly threatened the U.S., the strategy is
more to assist the host country for them defeating them. So far
they have been successful. I think they need to stay the
course. The bottom line metric is protecting the homeland. That
has been done. But there are a lot of problems out there. I
think they need to stay the course like they have done the last
few years and I hope they will.
Mr. Kinzinger. Mr. Sedney.
Mr. Sedney. I agree with my former colleague. We served
together at the Pentagon, Ambassador Sheehan, that the
administration has had a lot of successes in--on the
counterterrorism field. However, it is not just--you can't
distinguish counterterrorism from all of the other aspects of
our state and governmental policy. And I think, for example,
the long debate over the last 2 years about whether there
should be a zero option in Afghanistan has led to improved
morale for al-Qaeda and others, has led other states such as
Pakistan to hedge their policies against the possibility of a
zero option in the United States.
So while the counterterrorism policy, which I would say is
sort of a subset of the overall policy, I think has a lot of
successes, I think the overall ability to counter that has been
undercut by the fact we have not made that definitive
commitment to Afghanistan that you mentioned before.
Mr. Kinzinger. And I think if we exercise the zero option,
I think we will double or triple the size of al-Qaeda
overnight, because we will hand them the strongest moral
victory that they have had in decades. And let me just finally
say, because I want to live by example, as someone that has to
bring the gavel down on people, 5,000, 10,000, 15,000 troops
are kind of a high-risk option, medium risk, and low risk
option. In my mind, I think we need to put the number of troops
in theater to provide the low-risk option, both to protect our
men and women in the field and also to protect the victory for
the Afghan people.
So I appreciate all you all answering my questions. At this
point I would like to recognize Mr. Schneider of Illinois,
another from the same great State for 5 minutes.
Mr. Schneider. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to thank
the witnesses for your testimony and insight, but also for your
service long before this.
Ambassador, I would like to touch on something you said.
You talked about Afghanistan or AFPAK being unique and
distinctive. As you were saying, though, I was thinking about
what is taking place in Syria, in Yemen, in Sinai, and thinking
that while each of these are unique, there seems to be a lot of
commonality. And so I guess I will start with a series of
questions. Is what makes Afghanistan Pakistan so unique from
the others? What lessons apply across the others? What
coordination do we see with the affiliates of al-Qaeda in these
other regions? And what happens, A, if we win, and as I will
throw out to the whole group, if we are able to win, as you
say, in Afghanistan, does that just push the balloon out to
bulging in these other areas?
Mr. Sheehan. Thank you, sir. Let me try to answer a few of
those questions. First of all, why is it unique, because of
their track record. They actually have killed people and blown
things up in the U.S. and against our other targets, them and
AQAP. So it is the al-Qaeda central in AFPAK that is my number
one concern for attacking the homeland, secondly the AQAP,
which also has a track record. The other organizations right
now, though potentially very, very problematic, are currently
focused on the local fight. Whether eventually they shift to
Europe first and then the U.S., we will see. Certainly, the
potential is there. They are the same type of folks that are
committed to attack us, so we have to be prepared for them to
be able to shift their focus now which is local, to the local
enemy as they called it, the near enemy, to the far enemy which
is the United States and Europe. It remains to be seen when and
if they will do that. But that's why they are unique. Pakistan
is also unique because of the various groups that are there
that have been supported by the Pakistani state, groups like
the Lashkar-e-Toiba that have attacked in India, directed by
the Pakistani intelligence, murdering people in a hotel in
Mumbai. This is a unique situation, where a state is actually
involved in these organizations that are part of the stew I
talked about earlier that directly threaten us.
And so these are very serious organizations like the
Haqqani network, the Pakistani Taliban. They are very well
funded. They are ideologically determined, and they have
capability and they have a track record. That is why I worry
about that area. That is why I believe we have to stay there
and continue pounding these people relentlessly for quite a
while.
Mr. Schneider. Mr. Sedney?
Mr. Sedney. I agree entirely with the Ambassador's analysis
and leave that to the others.
Mr. Schneider. Mr. Joscelyn, thoughts?
Mr. Joscelyn. My caveat there is that while other parts of
the al-Qaeda network have not yet been successful or attempted
a mass casualty attack on the U.S., there is always a potential
there for that. The problem is that many of the senior al-Qaeda
leaders, or some of the senior al-Qaeda leaders who were part
of that general command in Afghanistan and Pakistan have
relocated elsewhere. For example, in Syria just last week, the
Treasury Department highlighted a very senior al-Qaeda
operative, a guy who was on the military committee for al-
Qaeda, he is involved, according to the Treasury Department,
with a group in Syria that is plotting attacks against Western
targets. So these are--their leadership is sprinkled amongst
several different countries, not just Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Mr. Schneider. Maybe the question, coming back to
Ambassador Sheehan, you talk about victory or winning in
Afghanistan. Does, however you define a victory in Afghanistan,
just shift the battlefield, shift the front to one of these
other areas?
Mr. Sheehan. It will to certain extent, sir, they will
move, I think. But by the way, I don't think there will ever be
a definitive victory in Western Pakistan for decades. These
people, this is at least a multigenerational fight. They are
not going away. They are burrowed into the mountains up there.
They are committed. We are going to be there a long, long time.
But as Tom said earlier, they are already dispersing. And they
already are starting to direct these--taking advantages of
countries that have lost their rule of law, or have
ungovernmental places now we are seeing in Northern Nigeria.
They take advantage of those places, Mali, Libya, et cetera,
and are stirring up a very fertile ground to recruit radical
jihadis of the same ideology. So they are already doing that,
but having said that, I still don't think they are going away
in Pakistan.
Mr. Schneider. I know I have a time limit. I turn to Mr.
Sedney. As you talk, where you are going to see these lines, I
think, is where there seams, whether it is in Nigeria, or in
Syria, where you have failed states, and there are gaps and
seams that these groups can operate within. The challenge
ultimately becomes, as you talked about it, Mr. Sedney, a sense
of ideology, or destiny. Is there any path, any strategy we can
put together that will address the ideology as opposed to just
the tactics of terrorism?
Mr. Sedney. Yes, there is, and I think it is emerging
sometimes despite our lack of a coordinated effort on that, and
that is what is happening in Afghanistan right now because,
yes, al-Qaeda has been trying to support the Taliban. The
Taliban have been trying very actively, but in the elections
that took place last month in Afghanistan, young people turned
out. And the message from these young people across all ethnic
lines, the message for women was that the vision of the
future--that the al-Qaeda and Taliban put out of a return to
the caliphate of an inward-looking, backward-looking,
oppressive regime, they rejected that. In the Afghan media, the
number one headline after the elections was, we said no to the
Taliban. By saying no to the Taliban, they said no to al-Qaeda.
That is a competing vision for the future that can be
applicable in other societies as well. Every one of the other
societies you mentioned, every other place that al-Qaeda can go
also has young people.
That is the battleground. And if Afghanistan, despite all
of the problems it has had, can be a success, then those other
states can be a success, too. But I agree entirely with
Ambassador Sheehan. This is not something that is going to
happen by a certain date or time. It is a multigenerational
struggle, and it is one that it is going to be very hard for us
to have the commitment that is needed.
Mr. Schneider. Well, thank you. I wish we could spend more
time. I am out of time but, again, thank you for your time and
service.
Mr. Kinzinger. Thank you, Mr. Schneider. I now recognize
the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Perry, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Perry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Joscelyn, let me
direct it, I am sorry, to Mr. Sedney. Do the Afghan national
security forces currently have the capabilities and equipment
to combat, or have the skills to combat al-Qaeda?
Mr. Sedney. They have some of them. They have the basic
fighting ability. They have the fighting spirit. They have the
on-the-ground organization tactically. What they lack, are key
enablers. The most important one is the one that Mr. Sheehan
already highlighted is air power, both transport and attack
aircraft as well as helicopters. They lack advanced
capabilities in intelligence, which is really key to the kind
of struggle they are fighting. And in areas of logistics and
organization, they still need to make a great deal of progress.
So, those are the kind of capabilities that require years
more for them to be successfully acquired, and without that,
they risk degrading in the future. So they have a good start,
but we need to stay the course.
Mr. Perry. I would concur with that. I just wanted to hear
your assessment. I would turn the good Ambassador here,
regarding a report that we have in our reading here, that in
October 2013, there was a police raid in Islamabad regarding a
house that was purpose built as it is described with a lab in
the basement dedicated to the research and development of
explosives-laden drone aircraft. If I couple that with your
comment regarding al-Qaeda's specific, and very particular
interest in WMD, can you put those two together for me and
describe the threat as you see it if there is a nexus between
the two? And then who are the enablers to that threat?
Mr. Sheehan. Yes, sir. Everybody wants drones now and
actually you can buy a drone in a store here in the United
States. You can buy a helicopter with a camera on it. Putting a
weapon on it is much more difficult. So I don't think they are
ever going to have that capability in the near term to put a
weapon on a drone. Will they be able to have the capability to
perhaps purchase some kind of rudimentary drone, perhaps. But I
don't see it.
On WMD, this is something that I focused on for about 15
years, al-Qaeda's ability to get it. Right now, you know, they
had a ricin program. They might have had anthrax program. They
have looked around for dirty nuclear bombs, radiological bombs,
a little bit on the chemical side, but they really kind of
given up on that right now. They would like to go back to it,
but quite frankly, it is too hard for them. The reason it is
too hard for them, because they are under enormous pressure.
They are under enormous pressure in their headquarters and they
are under enormous pressure also in Europe and the United
States. Prior to 9/11, and I was Ambassador prior to 9/11. I
was doing al-Qaeda before 9/11. There was no pressure on this
organization, overseas, or in the U.S. They moved around, 19
people came into the United States, blow up our Trade Center
with impunity. That has dramatically changed.
They are still here in the United States, but they are
under pressure. It is difficult for them to obtain those type
of weapons. And when I was at NYPD, we worked very hard to
protect a radiological chemical and other sources that they
might be able to tap to conduct that type of attack. So right
now I think they are years away from coming up with that kind
of capability.
Mr. Perry. So who would be, you know, their enablers in
that regard? If you talk about weaponizing a crude drone, not a
drone, with VX, or something of that nature. Are we looking at
Syria? Are we looking at friends in Pakistan in the government,
in the intelligence services? Who are we looking at?
Mr. Sheehan. Yes, sir, it is a good question. I think it is
a--you are right, that it would probably require a state to
give them real capability for a WMD. It is just too hard to
weaponize these things. I have spent a lot of time trying to
figure those--how to weaponize them and it really comes down to
a state, otherwise, it is going to be a very small attack.
Certainly, Syria won't help al-Qaeda. They are fighting them.
The Pakistanis helping al-Qaeda, that is our worst nightmare.
We hope that never happens.
Mr. Perry. And is there evidence to support the theory that
there are members of the Pakistani Government, whether it is
the intelligence services or otherwise, that are willing to be
very helpful in that regard? How much of a concern do we have,
should we have? When I talk about Syria, I just meant the
environment where the opportunity exists to receive the
contraband, so to speak.
Mr. Sheehan. Right, sir. I believe that perhaps this is one
of our most important intelligence requirements is to keep our
eye on the Pakistani intelligence and other people as to their
relationship with some of these groups. Because certainly, they
have had long, long relationships, decades of relationships
with some of these families, people, and groups, and would it
be impossible for some of these, either rogue or directed
people, to provide dangerous weapon systems to some of these
organizations? It is possible. Especially the organizations
that they might arm to attack in Kashmir or in India. Those
same type of weapon systems can then be turned against us. But
I don't believe the Pakistani army, Pakistani Government would
count on such an activity. It would come from below, perhaps,
from a rogue, and I don't see any evidence of that happening
right now. It is something we have to keep an eye on.
Mr. Perry. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Kinzinger. Thank you, Mr. Perry. At this point, seeing
now that it is--we will go into a quick round two, and then we
will let you all go, because I think we have a few more
questions, still. Let me just ask to whoever can answer this
question. I recently saw an article in The Daily Beast. It was
entitled, ``CIA falls back in Afghanistan.'' Describe the CIA
efforts to dismantle their operations in Afghanistan, and how
is this going to be harmful to the effect to combat al-Qaeda in
Afghanistan? I will just throw that out to whoever can answer
that.
Mr. Sedney. To a large degree, I know I am really not in a
position to comment on that issue in an open hearing, Mr.
Chairman. I would have to be in a closed hearing to make a--to
give you my views on that issue. One thing that I will say,
that I did travel to Afghanistan in December and a number of
Afghans raised concerns to me about that issue. That is
something that I learned in an unclassified setting. But aside
from that, I apologize, I am not able to answer that question
in this setting.
Mr. Kinzinger. Understood. Go ahead, sir.
Mr. Joscelyn. The key commander who figures in those press
reports is Farouq al-Qahtani and to your point, Congressman,
about al-Qaeda and the Taliban not having a lot of success
against us historically in a direct fight against American
forces, that is absolutely right. Unfortunately, Farouq al-
Qahtani is one of the few guys who actually did have some
success against American forces in a head-to-head fight. And he
is the head of the organization in Kunar and Nuristan.
Now, those are remote regions of Afghanistan. That is a
good thing. However, I think if you look at al-Qaeda more
wholistically, you realize that we need that ongoing CIA help
to fight them beyond Kunar and Nuristan.
Mr. Kinzinger. And does core al-Qaeda still matter? I mean,
I still get confused with the idea of core al-Qaeda, and you
did a good job of explaining it, but to me, I think core al-
Qaeda kind of seems like a way of hedging this idea that we
have al-Qaeda on the run. We have got core al-Qaeda on the run
even though we have these huge offshoots. So does core al-Qaeda
still matter? I will start with you.
Mr. Joscelyn. I think the hedging point is right. I mean,
that was the only way to argue that al-Qaeda was being
decimated or defeated, because if you look at their expansion
elsewhere, it is kind of hard to argue that. But on a day-to-
day basis at our Web site, you can see us document
communications to and from al-Qaeda senior leadership including
Zawahiri and others in the core ``al-Qaeda'' with their
regional branches, and that includes in Yemen, or Syria, or
else elsewhere.
So, yeah, they do still matter. They are providing--and it
is not just ideological Shahidi guidance. We find them
providing, on occasion, tactical guidance in the day-to-day
fight.
In fact, I will point back to that Treasury Department
designation last week, a senior al-Qaeda member in that
designation relocated from Pakistan to Syria, and one of the
reasons he did was to help the al-Qaeda affiliate groups
acquire heavy weapons from different sources and throughout the
Gulf.
Mr. Kinzinger. I am going to go ahead and yield back my
time, and I am going to recognize Mr. Sherman for 5 minutes.
Mr. Sherman. Thank you. It is clear that Islamic extremism
hasn't been defeated. We have won some important victories. I
want to get away from the partisanship of, oh, well, al-Qaeda--
all Islamic extremism hasn't been destroyed, therefore this
President is bad, that President is good. Al-Qaeda happened
during this administration. Bin Laden was killed during that
administration. It is one effort. And Truman and Eisenhower
weren't bad Presidents just because at the end of their terms
the Soviet Union had not been defeated.
We are engaged in a long war. We don't like long wars. We
are going to have to win this long war. And I just got out of a
hearing called Pivot to Asia. Well, what is that pivoting away
from? I mean, I watched some basketball games. You can't pivot
and then pivot. The fact is that a few rocks in the Pacific
that remain uninhabited even though they are off the coast of
the most teaming continent, remain totally useless and
uninhabited throughout history, which is why nobody knows who
owns them, should not be our focus at a time when, as the
gentlemen have testified, there are forces that would pull off
another 9/11 if not confronted every single day.
I am trying to understand the Pakistani Government. As far
as I understand, those in Islamabad would not kill each other.
That is to say, you don't have an ISI general who would kill
another ISI general or a regular Pakistani army general or even
one of the elected leaders. Okay, there is one former unelected
leader who is in prison now. But aside from that.
And yet, correct me if I am wrong, there are elements of
the Pakistani Government waging effective war on the terrorists
and there are elements of the Pakistani Government cooperating
with the terrorists. I see some nodding heads, but perhaps I
could get an oral response.
Mr. Joscelyn. Well, I think that's right. I think there are
two issues: One is the direct relationship between parts of the
military intelligence establishment in Pakistan and al-Qaeda.
And I think those relationships do exist. Carlotta Gall from
The New York Times reported about the ISI's bin Laden's death.
I think the best way to fact-check that and get into what the
actual relationship is, and how that works, is probably to have
a more complete discussion about bin Laden's documents, the
extensive files that were found in his compound and what they
say. There has been reporting about what is in those files, but
they haven't been released. And there has been no sort of
systematic accounting for what is in them in this regard
publicly. I mean, from your perspective.
The second thing is----
Mr. Sherman. Then maybe Congress should get a classified
briefing as to what is in those documents, at least our
subcommittee, since that is the heart of what we do.
Mr. Joscelyn. I think that, Congressman, that is a great
idea. I think all congressmen should get a full briefing on the
bin Laden documents, and I mean the full contents of the
documents, and exactly asking how many files were captured, how
many have been exploited and translated and what they say in
totality about the----
Mr. Sherman. The idea that the administration or any
administration would actually tell Members of Congress
anything, is a wonderful fantasy.
Mr. Joscelyn. It is a wonderful fantasy. But a quick second
point is, there is also the question about the Pakistani
establishment as the U.N. calls it, relationship with these
other groups that all allied with al-Qaeda. In fact, we have
this monograph I contributed a chapter for my think tank where
I describe how all these groups, that are sponsored by the ISI
that are creatures of the ISI establishment are also allied
with al-Qaeda. And that is part of how al-Qaeda gets the
strategic depth. And I lay it all out in great detail how that
works, from the Afghan Taliban, to Lashkar-e-Toiba----
Mr. Sherman. Is there elements of the Pakistani
establishment who would be killed by the very people being
aided by the Pakistani establishment?
Mr. Joscelyn. Well, that is right.
Mr. Sherman. I see Ambassador Sheehan nodding, but how--you
know, those people that want to murder me, I usually don't
donate to. Can anybody give us----
Mr. Joscelyn. Right.
Mr. Sheehan. If I could.
Mr. Sherman. I do want to bring in one other factor, and
that was, our imposition of Karzai in Kabul creating the risk
in Pakistani military thinking, to being attacked from both
sides, a large Indian Embassy in Kabul, which I am sure is
doing wonderful development work, but there are so many other
poor countries around the world which could benefit from that.
And of course, it rings alarm bills in Islamabad. Why--so I can
understand a bit why some in Islamabad say well, we need the
Taliban because we can't trust Kabul, you know, why we didn't
install somebody who could--who is more acceptable to Pakistan
in Kabul, I don't know, but that was a long time ago.
Ambassador Sheehan.
Mr. Sheehan. One other observation I will try to talk a
little bit about Pakistan. In 2002 and 2003, there were three
attempts on the life of President Musharraf. At that time he
said, wait a second, what is going on here? These are groups
that my own organization is supporting and he did turn against
them fairly aggressively in that period.
Mr. Sherman. So that was with the second or third
assassination.
Mr. Sheehan. The third attempt.
Mr. Sherman. Okay.
Mr. Sheehan. But I think in order to understand Pakistan,
you have to understand their history and the trauma they have
gone through when Bangladesh broke off, and Balochistan almost
broke off, and Pashtunistan, they are always trying to break
off. And so Pakistan is paranoid about the break up of its
state with good reason, by the way. It is not a state that
truly exists. It is a state that is organized ad hoc, after the
World War II, and----
Mr. Sherman. So they are paranoid not only of India, but
also of separatism.
Mr. Sheehan. That is right. And so right now what they are
trying to do, is control Pashtun's power within their Federal
tribal areas and in Afghanistan to make sure they control that
so that they will never have a breakup of their state. That is
one of the reasons. It is much more complicated than that. But
I think you have to understand in terms of their paranoia about
a breakup of the state, also they talk about strategic depth
about India, which I never really quite understood, but I do
understand their desire to control those areas of Pashtunistan,
and what they do is they ride the strong horse to control that.
And often that strong horse may be a group like the Haqqani
network or others that are contrary to their own interest.
Mr. Sherman. Mr. Sedney.
Mr. Sedney. A couple of points. I agree with what my co-
panelists said, but it is even more complicated than that, in
response to your point, Representative Sherman. Even sometimes
the fact that somebody wants to kill you is outweighed by the
fact that they are even more valuable to you because of what
they can do to people who are more likely to kill you. In other
words, there is a calculation here. If I am really good at
killing you, and Mr. Sheehan is less good at killing you, maybe
you will support him, even though he wants to kill you, if he
will attack me. So that is the kind of complicated equation
that the Pakistanis find.
Mr. Sherman. But in that analysis, Karzai would have to be
wanting to kill Pakistani leaders, and last I checked, that
wasn't his objective.
Mr. Sedney. Well, President Karzai and a number of other
Afghans over the years, have raised the issue of what is called
Pashtunistan which is essentially an extension of Afghanistan
to the banks of the Indus, which goes right to the heart of
that state identity that Ambassador Sheehan was saying. But one
final point about Pakistan that is important. Pakistan is not a
country. It is not a government. It is--there are a number of
systems there. The most important overwhelming one is the
military intelligence one. This is a country where last month
Hamid Mir, the Larry King, if you will, of Pakistan, the number
one journalist interviewer, who had interviewed almost all of
the top leaders of Pakistan on his show, was the subject of an
assassination attempt. He, before the assassination attempt,
had communicated to his family that if such an assassination
attempt took place it was ISI that was trying to kill him. So
just imagine in the United States, if----
Mr. Sherman. There are many in our establishment that would
want to kill various journalists, but--so far that hasn't
occurred.
Mr. Sedney. That is the kind of complicated geography of
politics and terrorism that the Pakistanis live under. And this
is a country that has some serious structural problems, as
Ambassador Sheehan has mentioned. That is until they are solved
which won't be for years, the al-Qaeda threat is going to
remain.
Mr. Sherman. And how many nuclear weapons do they have in--
don't bother answering.
Mr. Kinzinger. All right. The gentleman yields back. And I
now recognize the gentleman from Arkansas, Mr. Cotton, for 5
minutes.
Mr. Cotton. Thank you. And thank you all for your time
today. I read with interest over the weekend some news reports
about FBI Director James Comey who was reflecting on his early
tenure at the Bureau saying that when he had entered, he
expected to put the FBI back in its traditional footing of law
enforcement based on the public statements of the
administration and al-Qaeda being on the run.
He now says, and this is a quote from those stories:
``I didn't have anywhere near the appreciation I got
after I came into this job just how virulent those
affiliates had become. They are both many more than I
appreciated, and they are stronger than I
appreciated.''
Starting with you, Mr. Joscelyn, and then moving from right
to left, my right, your left, do you care to comment on what
Mr. Comey as a private citizen might have been missing and now
what he might be seeing as a senior official in the
administration?
Mr. Joscelyn. Well, I think the simple fact of the matter
is that they are putting the organizational relationships aside
for a moment, and that is my specialty, but putting that aside.
There are now more groups fighting in al-Qaeda's name or in al-
Qaeda's ideology, or espousing al-Qaeda's style of jihad than
ever, you know, and that goes from Africa, throughout the
Middle East, into South Asia. And so, you know, if you actually
delve into that each story is different in each location, but
you now have a threat that is much different than the one that
existed on 9/11. In some places it is a lesser threat, in some
places it is a growing threat and becoming more problematic.
Mr. Cotton. Mr. Ambassador?
Mr. Sheehan. I think there is two parts to it, sir. One, he
was getting intelligence briefs internationally. As Tom had
said, al-Qaeda is spreading and taking advantage of unlawful
places all around the world and growing in strength in a very
troubling way. But he also was probably briefed domestically.
When I was at NYPD, I was part of the Joint Terrorism Task
Force in New York City, and he probably found all of these
briefings about--within the United States the types of folks
that he needs to worry about. That right now, that the ones
that I worried about when I was in New York City were the ones
that would travel to Pakistan and come back, like Faisal
Shahzad, the Times Square bomber, or those that were willing to
get support from the outside and conduct an operation, and some
like the Boston bombers who did it pretty much on their own.
So I am sure he was getting those briefings, and probably
was surprised to find how many people within the United States,
given the chance, would be willing to take violence against
American citizens.
Mr. Cotton. And Mr. Sedney?
Mr. Sedney. I think that the new FBI director went in
thinking the way most Americans do, that this is really
something that has pretty much passed, this threat from al-
Qaeda. And going back to the point that Ambassador Sheehan
made, in our military, our intelligence, our law enforcement
agencies over the last 12-plus years, have made an incredible
effort. They have been hugely successful. A lot of that success
is not known. People are safe today. People are alive today
because of the many plots that have been stopped, and unless
you know all of the things that are coming after us, and unless
you know that they have been stopped and most of that can never
be told, then you don't appreciate the threat.
And I think that is, in many ways, a core message from all
of us here, that those threats are still happening, and the
threat of more to come is still happening. And yes, this has
been a long war. It is going to continue to be a long war, but
if we don't keep fighting it, it won't be just something that
we will read about in history books because then there will be
a question of whether there is history books to read.
Mr. Cotton. Thank you. The second news report I read with
interest recently said that Iran is recruiting Afghan refugees,
paying them several hundred dollars a month to fight in Syria,
on behalf of Bashar al Assad. I would presume transporting them
through Iran, through Herot and Farah Provinces. The reports
alluded to them being Shiites. I was wondering if you would
care to comment on the report and whether, in fact, this is
happening, where they are coming from in Afghanistan, and if
they are. But secondarily, do we see much evidence of links
between al-Qaeda in the Afghan-Pakistan border region doing the
same on the Sunni side in Syria? Again, starting with Mr.
Joscelyn.
Mr. Joscelyn. Well, I will take the latter part. Actually,
there is this relationship that I have documented and it is
very curious between al-Qaeda and the Iranian regime. And this
administration in July 2011, December 2011, February 2012,
October 2012, and 2013, and again earlier this year, has
repeatedly, through the State Department and the Treasury
Department, documented the relationship between the Iranian
regime and al-Qaeda the fact that there is this facilitation
network on Iranian soil that al-Qaeda uses to move fighters
around to Syria and elsewhere.
So this is something that the core, or general command
leadership in AFPAK is sort of very interested in doing and is
doing through Iranian soil, so it doesn't surprise me.
Mr. Cotton. Mr. Sheehan.
Mr. Sheehan. I agree with Tom, and it is interesting we
talk about Pakistan's dysfunction. The Iranians do the same
thing. Here they are supporting al-Qaeda members coming through
their country to join forces that are then fighting against
their own surrogates in Syria and against Assad who they are
supporting. So they, too, all operate on both sides of the
fence, and it is somewhat interesting. I have been out of
government. I read the same report, sir, and I believe it to be
plausible. And they are probably Shi'as that are being paid,
mercenaries. The Iranians are paying people to fight that war,
primarily Hezbollah, and others to help the Assad regime fight
the opposition.
Mr. Cotton. And Mr. Sedney.
Mr. Sedney. I agree. Again, this is another complex issue.
The al-Qaeda is clearly anti-Shi'a. Al-Qaeda is clearly anti-
Iran, but al-Qaeda has had leadership figures in Iran under the
semi-protection of the Iranian Government since certainly 2002.
And so Iran has been protecting those whose ideology is to
destroy the state. The role of the United States there is
important because going back to the point that I made to Mr.
Sherman, Iran also sees the United States as an enemy, and
certainly elements of the Iranian security forces are ready to
use any tool, even those that might threaten themselves, in
order to be able to do things that undermine the United States.
But this is a complicated thing. It is not just a good guy
versus bad guy. There are many varieties of bad guys out there.
Mr. Cotton. Thank you. I see my time, but hopefully not the
witness' patience is expired.
Mr. Kinzinger. All right, the gentleman yields back. Seeing
no other questions, the chair wishes to thank our witnesses and
the subcommittee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:41 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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