[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
EXAMINING THE FEDERAL PROTECTIVE SERVICE: ARE FEDERAL FACILITIES
SECURE?
=======================================================================
(113-71)
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, PUBLIC BUILDINGS, AND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON
TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MAY 21, 2014
__________
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COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania, Chairman
DON YOUNG, Alaska NICK J. RAHALL, II, West Virginia
THOMAS E. PETRI, Wisconsin PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon
HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of
JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee, Columbia
Vice Chair JERROLD NADLER, New York
JOHN L. MICA, Florida CORRINE BROWN, Florida
FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas
GARY G. MILLER, California ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
SAM GRAVES, Missouri RICK LARSEN, Washington
SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts
CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan TIMOTHY H. BISHOP, New York
DUNCAN HUNTER, California MICHAEL H. MICHAUD, Maine
ERIC A. ``RICK'' CRAWFORD, Arkansas GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California
LOU BARLETTA, Pennsylvania DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois
BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota
LARRY BUCSHON, Indiana STEVE COHEN, Tennessee
BOB GIBBS, Ohio ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
PATRICK MEEHAN, Pennsylvania DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland
RICHARD L. HANNA, New York JOHN GARAMENDI, California
DANIEL WEBSTER, Florida ANDREE CARSON, Indiana
STEVE SOUTHERLAND, II, Florida JANICE HAHN, California
JEFF DENHAM, California RICHARD M. NOLAN, Minnesota
REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin ANN KIRKPATRICK, Arizona
THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky DINA TITUS, Nevada
STEVE DAINES, Montana SEAN PATRICK MALONEY, New York
TOM RICE, South Carolina ELIZABETH H. ESTY, Connecticut
MARKWAYNE MULLIN, Oklahoma LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
ROGER WILLIAMS, Texas CHERI BUSTOS, Illinois
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania
RODNEY DAVIS, Illinois
MARK SANFORD, South Carolina
DAVID W. JOLLY, Florida
------
Subcommittee on Economic Development, Public Buildings, and Emergency
Management
LOU BARLETTA, Pennsylvania, Chairman
THOMAS E. PETRI, Wisconsin ANDREE CARSON, Indiana
JOHN L. MICA, Florida ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of
ERIC A. ``RICK'' CRAWFORD, Arkansas Columbia
BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas, Vice Chair MICHAEL H. MICHAUD, Maine
MARKWAYNE MULLIN, Oklahoma TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania RICHARD M. NOLAN, Minnesota
MARK SANFORD, South Carolina DINA TITUS, Nevada
BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania (Ex NICK J. RAHALL, II, West Virginia
Officio) (Ex Officio)
CONTENTS
Page
Summary of Subject Matter........................................ iv
TESTIMONY
Panel 1
Mark L. Goldstein, director, Physical Infrastructure Team, U.S.
Government Accountability Office............................... 3
Leonard E. Patterson, director, Federal Protective Service,
National Protection and Programs Directorate, U.S. Department
of Homeland Security........................................... 3
Panel 2
David L. Wright, president, AFGE Local 918....................... 23
Stephen Amitay, Esq., executive director and general counsel,
National Association of Security Companies..................... 23
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY WITNESSES
Mark L. Goldstein................................................ 33
Leonard E. Patterson............................................. 51
David L. Wright.................................................. 57
Stephen Amitay, Esq.............................................. 69
SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD
David L. Wright, president, AFGE Local 918, correction to written
testimony...................................................... 81
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EXAMINING THE FEDERAL PROTECTIVE SERVICE: ARE FEDERAL FACILITIES
SECURE?
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WEDNESDAY, MAY 21, 2014
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Economic Development, Public
Buildings, and Emergency Management,
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:06 a.m., in
Room 2167, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Lou Barletta
(Chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Barletta. The committee will come to order.
Today we are examining the Federal Protective Service and
the security of our Federal buildings and facilities. FPS, with
1,300 personnel, including law enforcement officers and nearly
14,000 contract guards, is charged with protecting over 9,000
Federal buildings and facilities across the Nation owned or
leased by the General Services Administration. While FPS is not
responsible for all Federal facilities, its role is central to
protecting Federal workers and visitors to Federal buildings
nationwide.
Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, our country has taken
steps to prevent and be better prepared for terrorism and other
threats, and unfortunately public buildings are proven targets.
Whether because of their symbolism or because of the number of
Federal employees and visitors that use these facilities, the
threat to Federal buildings has a long history. In 1995,
Timothy McVeigh and his coconspirators used a truck filled with
homemade explosives to bomb the Alfred P. Murrah Federal
Building in downtown Oklahoma City, killing 168 people,
including 19 children. In 2010, Andrew Stack targeted a
building in Austin, Texas, housing 200 IRS employees by
crashing a small plane into the building. Active shooter
incidents have been an ongoing threat as well, including
shootings at the Navy Yard here in Washington, DC, Fort Hood in
Texas, the U.S. Capitol Building, and the United States
Holocaust Museum.
Because of these clear threats and the steps taken since
the Oklahoma City bombing, we should, nearly 20 years later,
have significantly improved the security of public buildings.
Unfortunately problems persist. Over the past 5 years, the
Government Accountability Office, or GAO, and others continue
to identify very real deficiencies. Penetration testing done by
the GAO and FPS has revealed fake bomb components, knives, and
guns have been secreted past security. The oversight of
contract guards and their training needs improvement; and,
while the guards are armed, they lack training and clear
direction on active shooter situations. Partnerships with local
law enforcement agencies are patchy, raising questions as to
whether State and local law enforcement agencies are clear on
their authority to respond to incidents on Federal property.
The facility risk assessments conducted on Federal buildings to
help identify their risks and needed security measures are
behind schedule and sometimes ignored by customer agencies.
And on top of all this, confidence in FPS may be eroding.
Just this month DHS has taken steps to remove FPS from
overseeing security at its Nebraska Avenue Complex. But we
should also put all of this into context. The reality is,
building security is difficult. If it were not, these problems
would have easily been resolved years ago. We have seen that
even with the best security, there is still a risk a terrorist
could be successful. And there have been improvements,
including FPS's revamping of its risk assessments, improved
partnerships with local law enforcement, particularly here in
the Nation's capital, and a strengthened working relationship
with GSA.
Today, I hope this can be a productive hearing. We need to
understand the challenges and problems, but we also want to
hear solutions. Ultimately, whether it is the members of the
public or Federal workers, those who come to Federal buildings
must have confidence we are doing all we can to protect them. I
look forward to hearing from our witnesses today, and I thank
you all for being here.
I now call on the ranking member of the subcommittee, Mr.
Carson, for a brief opening statement.
Mr. Carson. Thank you, Chairman Barletta.
I want to thank Chairman Barletta for holding today's
hearing. I also want to welcome today's witnesses to the
subcommittee hearing on the Federal Protective Service.
As a former law enforcement officer with over a decade of
experience, I have a strong interest in examining FPS and
ensuring that it is functioning at the highest possible level.
That said, I find the issues facing FPS deeply troubling. FPS
is responsible, as we all know, for protecting Federal
employees and visitors in approximately 9,600 Federal
facilities across this Nation. Yet the Department of Homeland
Security inspector general and the GAO have issued at least six
reports since 2009 detailing serious challenges that FPS has
been having in meeting this expectation.
The shortcomings detailed in these reports are troubling.
They effectively highlight that FPS relies on a private
contract guard force of over 15,000 guards to provide security
to Federal facilities under the control of the GSA. The GAO has
consistently noted that FPS lacks effective management controls
and systems to ensure its contract guards have met their
training and certification requirements, which are necessary to
ensure a baseline of security in these buildings. In addition,
it is unclear whether many of these contract guards have been
trained on how to respond to active shooter incidents or use x-
ray and magnetometer equipment. These contract guards are often
the first line of defense for our Federal buildings and the
people inside, and we must have assurances that they are
prepared to offer the highest level of protection.
More broadly, GAO has reported that FPS has limited ability
to manage risk across Federal facilities and implement security
countermeasures. FPS lacks a comprehensive strategic approach
to providing security to the buildings in GSA's inventory.
These problems are worsened by an inability to ensure it has a
sufficient amount of law enforcement officers and inspectors
necessary to conduct regular security assessments. It is also
uncertain whether the current fee structure is sufficient to
fund this strong law enforcement presence.
Now, we have to be very mindful that Federal facilities,
where Federal employees work, particularly the Pentagon, the
Navy Yard, and Oklahoma City Federal buildings, have been the
sites of major attacks. Federal facilities are symbols of our
Government that terrorists want to take down. But terrorism is
not the only threat. We must stay vigilant to protect Federal
employees and our constituents who visit these buildings on a
daily basis. Congress cannot afford to wait for an attack
button to push on FPS reform.
We are holding this hearing today to help us learn from our
stakeholders and our leaders how to better protect millions of
Federal workers and visitors to these facilities. I thank the
witnesses, and I thank the chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Barletta. Thank you, Ranking Member Carson.
We will have two panels today. On our first panel we have
Mr. Mark L. Goldstein, director, Physical Infrastructure Team,
U.S. Government Accountability Office; and Mr. L. Eric
Patterson, drector, Federal Protective Service, Department of
Homeland Security.
I ask unanimous consent that our witnesses' full statements
be included in the record. Without objection, so ordered. Since
your written testimony has been made a part of the record, the
subcommittee would request that you limit your oral testimony
to 5 minutes.
Mr. Goldstein, you may proceed.
TESTIMONY OF MARK L. GOLDSTEIN, DIRECTOR, PHYSICAL
INFRASTRUCTURE TEAM, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE; AND
LEONARD E. PATTERSON, DIRECTOR, FEDERAL PROTECTIVE SERVICE,
NATIONAL PROTECTION AND PROGRAMS DIRECTORATE, U.S. DEPARTMENT
OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Goldstein. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the
subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to be here today
and discuss the Federal Protective Service. Recent incidents at
Federal facilities demonstrate their continued vulnerability to
attacks and other acts of violence. As part of DHS, FPS is
responsible for protecting Federal employees and visitors in
approximately 9,600 Federal facilities. To help accomplish its
mission, FPS conducts facility security assessments and has
approximately 13,500 contract security guards deployed to
Federal facilities. FPS charges fees for its security services
to Federal tenants' agencies.
My testimony discusses challenges FPS faces in, number one,
ensuring contract security guards deployed to Federal
facilities are properly trained and certified; and, number two,
conducting risk assessments at Federal facilities. It is based
on GAO reports issued from 2009 to 2014.
As part of our work, we found that the Federal Protective
Service continues to face challenges ensuring that contract
guards have been properly trained and certified before being
deployed to Federal facilities around the country. In September
2013, for example, GAO reported that providing training for
active shooter scenarios and screening access to Federal
facilities poses a challenge to FPS. According to officials at
five guard companies, their contract guards had not received
training in how to respond during incidents involving an active
shooter. Without ensuring that all guards receive training in
how to respond to active shooter incidents, FPS has limited
assurance that its guards are prepared for this threat.
Similarly, an official from one of FPS's contract guard
companies stated that 133 guards, about 38 percent of its 350
guards on 3 different contracts, had never received screener
training. As a result, guards deployed to Federal facilities
may be using x-ray and magnetometer equipment that they are not
qualified to use, raising questions about their ability to
fulfill a primary responsibility of screening access at control
points at Federal facilities. GAO was unable to determine the
extent to which FPS's guards have received active shooter
response and screener training, in part because FPS lacks a
comprehensive and reliable system for guard oversight.
GAO also found that FPS continues to lack effective
management controls to ensure its guards have met its training
and certification requirements. For instance, although FPS
agreed with GAO's 2012 recommendations that it develop a
comprehensive and reliable system for managing information on
guards' training, certifications, and qualifications, it still
does not have such a system. Additionally, 23 percent of the
276 contract guard files GAO reviewed did not have required
training and certification documentation. For example, some
files were missing items such as documentation of screener
training, CPR certifications, and firearms qualifications.
Additionally, we also found that assessing risk at Federal
facilities remains a challenge for FPS. GAO found in 2012 that
Federal agencies pay FPS millions of dollars to assess risks at
their facilities, but FPS is not assessing risks in a manner
consistent with Federal standards. In March 2014, GAO found
that this is still a challenge for FPS and several other
agencies. The Interagency Security Committee's Risk Management
Process for Federal Facilities standard requires Federal
agencies to develop risk assessment methodologies that, among
other things, assess the threat, vulnerability, and consequence
to undesirable events.
Risk assessments help decisionmakers identify and evaluate
security risks and implement protective measures. Instead of
conducting risk assessments, FPS uses an interim vulnerability
assessment tool referred to as the Modified Infrastructure
Survey Tool, or MIST, to assess Federal facilities until it
develops a longer term solution. However, MIST does not assess
consequence, the level, duration, and nature of potential loss
resulting from an undesirable event. Three of the four risk
assessment experts GAO spoke to agreed that a tool that does
not estimate consequence does not allow agencies to fully
assess risks. The FPS has limited knowledge of the risks facing
about 9,600 Federal facilities around the country as a result.
FPS officials stated that consequence information in MIST was
not part of the original design of the system, but they are
exploring ways to incorporate it.
Finally, I would note that since fiscal year 2010, GAO has
made 31 recommendations to improve FPS's contract guard and
risk assessment processes, of which 6 have been implemented, 10
are in process, and 15 have not been implemented.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my oral statement. I would be
happy to respond to questions that you or members of the
subcommittee have. Thank you very much.
Mr. Barletta. Thank you for your testimony, Mr. Goldstein.
Mr. Patterson, you may proceed.
Mr. Patterson. Thank you, Chairman Barletta, Ranking Member
Carson, and distinguished members of the committee. My name is
Eric Patterson, and I am the director of the Federal Protective
Service within the National Protection and Programs Directorate
of the Department of Homeland Security. I am honored to testify
before the committee today regarding the mission and operations
of the Federal Protective Service.
FPS is charged with protecting and delivering integrated
law enforcement and security services to more than 9,000
facilities owned or leased by the General Services
Administration and safeguarding more than 1.4 million daily
occupants and visitors. In performing this mission, FPS
directly employs more than 1,000 sworn Federal law enforcement
officers to provide uniformed police response at FPS-protected
facilities, participate in joint tactical exercises with
various Federal, State, local, and tribal law enforcement
personnel, and conduct facility security assessment of FPS-
protected facilities nationwide.
Utilizing the Modified Infrastructure Survey Tool, or MIST,
our inspectors document the existing protective posture at a
facility, compare how a facility is or is not meeting the
baseline of protection for its facility security level, and
provide recommendations to tenant facility security committees
regarding appropriate countermeasures to mitigate the risk. FPS
designed its FSA process to meet the requirements of the
Interagency Security Committee's--ISC--Risk Management Process
for Federal Facilities, and FPS is in the process of submitting
the FSA process, including the MIST tool, to the ISC for
validation.
Utilizing this tool, FPS is on track to have completed
assessments at all FSL Level III through V facilities in the
FPS portfolio by the end of calendar year 2014. I am also
pleased to report that the second generation tool, MIST 2.0, is
currently in systems acceptance testings. This system will
feature, among other improvements, an enhanced user interface
and improved visibility and protection measures across the FPS
portfolio. At this time we expect deployment of this system to
begin in the fall of 2014.
FPS inspectors also oversee guard posts staffed by
approximately 13,000 FPS-contracted Protective Security
Officers. PSOs are responsible for controlling access to
Federal facilities, detecting and reporting criminal acts, and
responding to emergency situations. PSOs also ensure prohibited
items, such as firearms, explosives, knives, and drugs, do not
enter Federal facilities.
All PSOs must undergo background investigation checks to
determine their fitness to begin work on behalf of the
Government and are rigorously trained. However, it is important
to note that PSOs are not sworn law enforcement officers.
Rather, PSOs are employees of private security companies, and
FPS does not have the authority to deputize PSOs in a law
enforcement capability. An individual PSO's authority to
perform protective services is based on State-specific laws
where the PSO is employed.
FPS partners with private sector guard companies to ensure
that the guards have met the certification, training, and
qualification requirements specified in the contracts.
Additionally, FPS is working closely with the National
Association of Security Companies--NASCO--to develop a national
lesson plan that will establish a basic and national training
program for all PSOs to ensure standards are consistent across
the Nation. These efforts will further standardize training
PSOs receive and will provide for great capability to validate
training and facilitate rapid adjustments to training to
account for changes in threat and technological advancements.
To ensure high performance of our contract PSO workforce,
FPS law enforcement personnel conduct PSO post inspections and
integrated covert test activities to monitor vendor compliance
and countermeasure effectiveness. Additionally, vendor
personnel files are audited periodically to validate that PSO
certifications and training records reflect compliance and
contract requirements.
To supplement this current audit process, FPS has partnered
with the DHS Science and Technology Directorate to develop a
prototype Post Tracking System. This system will be capable of
authenticating an individual PSO's identity and tracking PSO
time on position and training and certification records in real
time. We expect the first iteration of this system to begin
tests within 12 months.
We continuously strive to further enhance, integrate, and
transform our organization to meet the challenges of an
evolving threat landscape and are committed to closing out
outstanding Government Accountability Office recommendations
pertaining to FPS operations. To facilitate the closure of open
GAO recommendations, FPS has implemented a program management
approach. Utilizing this process, FPS has closed two open GAO
recommendations this year and expects to submit documentation
for closure of eight additional GAO recommendations by the end
of June 2014. In total, FPS hopes to close 10 to 15 of the 31
open GAO recommendations before the end of this fiscal year.
In closing, I would like to acknowledge and thank the
distinguished members of this committee for the opportunity to
testify today. The Federal Protective Service remains committed
to its mission of providing safety, security, and a sense of
well-being to thousands of visitors and Federal employees who
work and conduct business in our facilities daily. I would be
pleased to answer any questions you may have. Thank you.
Mr. Barletta. Thank you for your testimony, Mr. Patterson.
I will now begin the first round of questions, limited to 5
minutes for each Member. If there are additional questions
following the first round, we will have additional rounds of
questions as needed.
The Federal Protection Service is directly responsible for
protecting Federal buildings and the 1.4 million workers and
visitors to those facilities. The Public Buildings Act, crafted
by this committee, gave FPS law enforcement authority for that
very purpose, to protect buildings and the people in them. Yet
after moving from GSA to DHS in 2003, there has been GAO report
after report detailing serious security deficiencies at Federal
facilities. Given the importance of this mission, one would
expect the Department of Homeland Security to make Federal
building security a top priority.
Yet these problems continue. Just recently we received a
copy of a May 1 memo from the DHS Chief Security Officer to the
DHS Under Secretary for Management that removed the Federal
Protection Service from its lead role of providing security at
the Homeland Security headquarters complex on Nebraska Avenue.
My first question, Mr. Patterson, is why was the Federal
Protection Service removed as the lead security provider at the
DHS headquarters, and does this mean that DHS has lost
confidence in FPS?
Mr. Patterson. To answer your question, sir, to my
knowledge, this was not an issue of performance. I do not
believe that the Department has lost confidence in the Federal
Protective Service. I believe this was an issue of efficiency
and unity of command that is supporting the Secretary's vision,
and, in effect, FPS will continue to provide security, which
will include law enforcement and canine support. We will
continue to do assessments, and we will have a robust presence
at the facility as we always have. Currently this is about
contract management and not about losing confidence in our
ability to provide security and law enforcement support.
FPS supports 2,100 DHS facilities across the Nation, to
include ICE headquarters, FEMA headquarters, CBP headquarters,
Secret Service headquarters, TSA, and the U.S. Coast Guard
headquarters. And we do a very good job there, we have a robust
presence there, and I am sure we will continue to provide the
same level of support to the NAC. We are proactive partners
with the Office of Security in ensuring a safe and secure
environment at the NAC.
Mr. Barletta. What were the problems at the Department of
Homeland Security headquarters that caused the Chief Security
Officer to take this action, and are there similar problems at
the other 9,600 Federal buildings FPS provides security for?
And finally, could you explain why FPS security is inadequate
for DHS but good enough for the other agencies?
Mr. Patterson. Yes, sir. I don't think this is an
indictment of FPS security. I think, again, this is a matter of
efficiency in managing a contract. We are going to continue to
provide security at the NAC. That is not the issue. The Office
of Security, I believe is looking to fulfill the Secretary's
vision to streamline and better conduct business at the NAC.
Mr. Barletta. Today, who is in charge of security at DHS
headquarters? And if there were an active shooter incident
right now, who would be the incident commander on scene, and
will the first responders know who is in charge? What would be
the role of FPS in that situation?
Mr. Patterson. Yes, sir. In that situation the Office of
Security and the Federal Protective Service share a
partnership. So it could be either the Office of Security or it
could be the Federal Protective Service. It depends on who is
first on scene. That is who is going to assume incident command
of the situation, and then it will evolve from there. At that
point, we will look to bring in the Metropolitan Police
Department and other support to help us in resolving that
situation.
Mr. Barletta. Mr. Goldstein, what percentage of security
guards have active shooter training? What percentage have
security screener training? And if security guards do not have
proper training, how would you expect them to be able to keep
weapons and bombs out of a Federal building or respond to an
active shooter?
Mr. Goldstein. Mr. Chairman, our study was not
generalizable, so I can't say for sure how many actually do
have that kind of screening today. However, what we found in
talking to several different guard companies around the country
was that there are still pockets of guards that do not. Several
years ago, we found that there were 1,500 guards in several
regions that did not have screener training. For the companies
we looked at now, there were still several hundred that do not,
and we would expect that there would be others, although, as I
say, it is not generalizable.
However, because of this problem persisting and the lack of
training that is required being actually provided, we do have
concerns that remain and that have remained for a number of
years now, as you know, about the ability and possibility of
bombs and other kinds of weapons getting into Federal
facilities because there is no assurance that the person
standing guard and responsible for putting things through a
magnetometer and an x-ray machine has the adequate training to
prevent something from coming through that shouldn't come
through.
Mr. Barletta. Thank you.
The Chair now recognizes Ranking Member Carson for
questions.
Mr. Carson. Thank you. Thank you, Chairman.
Director Patterson, how often does the FPS fine and
penalize contract guard companies for posting guards that do
not have the proper certification or incomplete training?
Mr. Patterson. I don't have that statistic readily
available for you, sir, but I can provide that to you.
Mr. Carson. Yes, sir.
Mr. Patterson. That would be resident with our contracting
office.
Mr. Carson. Yes, sir.
Director Patterson, based on the status quo, sir, how would
you expect contract guards to react to a Navy Yard type
shooting at a GSA-controlled facility?
Mr. Patterson. Yes, sir. We are working aggressively with
the National Association of Security Companies, NASCO, and
looking at, given the current laws, how we can work with the
security guard company to respond. We have just produced some
guidance to provide each one of the security guards 2 hours of
active shooter training. But what that really does is makes
them aware of what an active shooter event is. And that
individual will have the discretion, given the circumstances,
to actively pursue, depending upon, again, what the
circumstances are. Because each one of these companies is still
under the oversight of their State law.
So we are kind of caught between a rock and a hard place
right now. We would like to be able to train them to a standard
to where we can give them active shooter training and move them
to a position to where there is no question. But right now,
because we don't have that authority, it creates a little bit
of a dilemma.
Mr. Carson. Thank you, Director.
Mr. Goldstein, in your testimony, sir, you discussed the
fact that FPS is using MIST, a vulnerability assessment tool
that does not take into account the consequences of an
undesirable attack or an event. What is the impact of assessing
the consequences of a terrorist attack or serious crime
activities at a Federal facility?
Mr. Goldstein. The ISC standard requires that agencies look
at threat, vulnerability, consequence, and a list of a number
of undesirable events. And then for each of those undesirable
events they are required to determine whether there is a
threat, vulnerability, and consequence component for each
event.
In our work we have found that assessing consequence is
important because it helps to determine how best to protect a
facility, because we are talking obviously about limited
resources and we are talking about trying to protect, in this
case, some 9,600 facilities. But because of the way in which
the Federal Government and FPS actually look at each building,
it is kind of a cookie-cutter approach.
And there is no, and I have said this a number of times
here and elsewhere before this committee, there is no way that
FPS is able to examine threat, vulnerability, and consequence
across its portfolio to allocate resources across facilities.
It looks at each facility in a stovepipe kind of way and
therefore it becomes quite difficult to better provide
resources, which are as we all know quite limited, to FPS.
Mr. Carson. Mr. Goldstein, what is the value in FPS
individual facility security assessments currently, and are
these assessments thorough enough to properly assess the threat
to Federal employees and visitors to Federal buildings? And how
could current assessments even be improved for that matter?
Mr. Goldstein. It is our understanding that since MIST has
been in place, which is about 18 months or so, that FPS has
once again begun to do assessments, that they have done around
1,200, based on the information we have. But they had a backlog
when they started MIST of about 5,000, so that is still a
pretty considerable number that hadn't been done just from the
past. And at Level III and Level IV buildings they are expected
to be done roughly every 3 years.
So there is quite a lot of backlog that remains, as well as
pent-up demand for new ones. And when we have gone in and
looked as well, about 9 or 10 percent of them, hundreds of
them, thousands of them really, didn't even have a date
associated with them of when the last assessment was conducted.
So it is hard to know just how long it has been since many
major Federal buildings have actually had a risk assessment to
start with.
We also know that in the last couple years that a number of
other Federal agencies have done their own assessments, even
while they are paying FPS to do a separate assessment. So there
is a lot of duplication. And the IRS and the EPA and many other
agencies have done their own assessments for a whole variety of
reasons, including that some didn't like the standard to which
it was being done, some didn't like what was being shared with
them. And so there has been a variety of reasons for that as
well. So there has been a lot of duplication also.
We do believe that FPS has to do a better job, and
hopefully MIST 2, which Director Patterson has talked about,
will help them achieve that in being able to allow them to do
better assessments in the future.
Mr. Carson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Barletta. The Chair now recognizes Mr. Crawford for 5
minutes of questioning.
Mr. Crawford. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Patterson, I think the chairman addressed this earlier,
this memo from Greg Marshall, Chief Security Officer, regarding
the Nebraska Avenue Complex. And if I understand it correctly,
what you said was that it was essentially a command-and-control
issue, it wasn't necessarily anything related otherwise. Is
that accurate?
Mr. Patterson. Yes, sir, to my knowledge. Yes, sir.
Mr. Crawford. I am curious, on a facility with that level
of security, can you describe--I am concerned about the
proliferation of IEDs and Federal buildings being a target--can
you describe what is the protocol, the response protocol in the
event of an IED detection or a large-scale IED attack?
Mr. Patterson. Well, folks who are visitors have to go
through screening. If, at that point, there is a detection of
an explosive device, that area is cleared. We will then call
the Metropolitan Police Department, who will bring in their
explosive detection team to assess whether or not it is truly
an explosive device or not. If they assess that it is an
explosive device, then emergency evacuation plans for that
facility will be put into place.
Mr. Crawford. OK. I am concerned about, and I have had some
talks with other metro bomb squads and some of the Federal
agencies that are also equipped or staffed with bomb techs, in
the event of a large scale, do you have anything beyond just
relying on metro bomb squad, or are there some other Federal
agencies that might respond as a backup?
Mr. Patterson. Yes, sir. Because we are in Washington, DC,
the FBI is going to respond. The Metropolitan Police Department
is going to respond. We are probably going to have a Park
Service response. So there is going to be a significant
response. The challenge is, if we are talking about an
explosive device, we probably want to at least limit the scope
of the response until we determine the magnitude of the threat.
Mr. Crawford. Does FPS have any capacity, any kind of
technical capacity to deal with an IED? And that is to say, are
there bomb techs within the ranks of FPS?
Mr. Patterson. No, sir, we don't have bomb techs, but we do
have explosive ordnance dogs that we use. That is our first
line of defense. If we suspect that there is an issue we will
bring in the canine to give us an alert. And if they alert,
then clearly we begin to evacuate that area, and then we call
in the Metropolitan Police Department and others who have the
capability to further explore what the issue is.
Mr. Crawford. OK. And then outside of DC, I would assume
that there is a similar protocol in place with the local
municipalities that have the capacity to respond to an IED
threat?
Mr. Patterson. Absolutely, sir, yes. If an FPS dog isn't
available, we have relationships with local law enforcement
where we can leverage their assets as well. If we get a
positive hit, then we call on our partners. If it is the city
of Chicago, we call in city of Chicago. If it is a smaller
city, then whatever arrangements have been made for response,
then that is who we will call on.
Mr. Crawford. Do you have any relationships with DOD
assets? And by that, what I am getting at here is that, for
example, the United States Army has the primary responsibility
of providing support to law enforcement at every level within
the continental United States. Do you have those arrangements
in place with the DOD assets?
Mr. Patterson. We have a relationship with them to where we
can call them in if we need them.
Mr. Crawford. OK. Appreciate that.
One other thing. You said you had detection dogs?
Mr. Patterson. Yes, sir.
Mr. Crawford. So that means you have handlers that have
been trained?
Mr. Patterson. Yes, sir. We have got about 74, 75 canines
with their handlers across the United States. We have one up at
the Nebraska Avenue Complex for about 18 hours during the day.
Mr. Crawford. OK.
Mr. Goldstein, what percentage of Federal buildings has up-
to-date and complete security risk assessments?
Mr. Goldstein. It is not possible to say, sir, at this
point in time. As I mentioned, there is a considerable backlog
at this point of past due assessments. Plus, the work we have
done in the past show that because there are a number of them
that have no date in the system at all, it is not possible to
determine when the last one was done. FPS is working to reduce
that backlog and to hopefully move forward with new ones so
that they can become up to date, but they are not at that place
today.
Mr. Crawford. Wow, that is kind of disturbing. So why the
backlog?
Mr. Goldstein. The backlog occurred over a period of time
for a couple of reasons. One, that the old system that was
being used, called RAMP, its functionality was not sufficient,
and they pulled the plug on the program. And so then a backlog
began to grow.
Additionally, I think over time, as the Federal Protective
Service changed the nature of its workforce from a police
officer force to an integrated force of inspectors that had a
lot of different duties, that this particular responsibility of
doing the assessment which fell on them and which many of them
were not trained for took up an increasing amount of time, but
they had other duties as well, including managing contract
guards and the contract guard contracts and other things. And
so they fell behind, quite frankly.
Mr. Crawford. Is this not that part of an annual review? I
mean, it seems to me that ought to be something done annually
to make sure that that assessment is up to date all the time.
Mr. Goldstein. It should be done on a Level III and Level
IV building every 3 years, but as I mentioned, it is simply not
occurring at this point in time.
Mr. Crawford. All right. My time has expired. I yield back.
Thank you, Chairman.
Mr. Barletta. Thank you.
The Chair now recognizes Ms. Norton for 5 minutes of
questioning.
Ms. Norton. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I very much
appreciate this hearing. There have been chronic problems at
FPS. And I would like to look at the difference between FPS
officers and a contract guard so that we understand who is
really guarding these buildings.
On page 2 of your testimony, you describe the law
enforcement authority of FPS officers, specific police powers,
including enforcing Federal laws and regulations, carrying
firearms, et cetera. Then, of course, on page 5 of your
testimony you distinguish these officers from the contract
guards who--and this is very important, I think, to just lay
right here on the record, it is in your testimony--the PSOs
rely on private person laws, such as citizen arrest laws. So
that means that they can do no more than I can do in a Federal
building. I mean, isn't that technically correct?
Mr. Patterson. Yes, ma'am. They are governed by the State
law as to the extent of their authority.
Ms. Norton. Were the Nebraska Avenue contract guards
replaced by Federal Protective Service officers?
Mr. Patterson. No, ma'am, they were not.
Ms. Norton. What is at Nebraska Avenue now?
Mr. Patterson. Contract Protective Security Officers.
Ms. Norton. So what was the difference? What was the
change?
Mr. Patterson. I am sorry?
Ms. Norton. What was the change at Nebraska Avenue?
Mr. Patterson. The change was in the oversight of the
contract. FPS had oversight of the contract. We had COR
responsibilities--Contracting Officer Representative
responsibilities. That is the day-to-day oversight of the
contract.
Ms. Norton. So FPS is supervising or in oversight over
these guards at the Department of Homeland Security on Nebraska
Avenue?
Mr. Patterson. We were. That particular responsibility has
been now moved to the Office of Security.
Ms. Norton. And that is unique then, only at the Department
of Homeland Security does that arrangement exist?
Mr. Patterson. No, ma'am. Only at the Nebraska Avenue
Complex. We still retain that responsibility at hundreds of DHS
facilities around the country.
Ms. Norton. I want to ask you to tell us why. I think we
would we have to ask the Department, but I think it is pretty
apparent why. They obviously felt they had to be made more
secure, and they went to professional security authorities.
Now, when FPS guards who guard all the rest of the
buildings and the Federal employees and the visitors, if
someone comes into one of those facilities and has a gun, with
or without a gun, and decides not to go through the
magnetometer, can a contract guard pursue that person?
Mr. Patterson. Yes, ma'am, and they can be detained. At
that point they will call the FPS MegaCenter, which will then
dispatch either an FPS inspector or the local authorities.
Ms. Norton. I ask that because there have been instances
reported where contract guards stood by, not when someone had a
gun, but when there was a disturbance, saying they could not
leave their post.
Mr. Patterson. Every day, ma'am, we have contract guards
who are engaged in responding to disturbances, especially at
Social Security offices.
Ms. Norton. The contract guard is not pinned on the post,
he can go anywhere in the facility where there may be a
disturbance, he can pursue someone with a gun even though he
does not have a gun?
Mr. Patterson. I am not sure that I understand what your
question is, ma'am.
Ms. Norton. Someone comes through.
Mr. Patterson. Right.
Ms. Norton. And remember what you are there for is for
surprises, not for the average person coming through. All
right, someone comes through with a gun.
Mr. Patterson. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Norton. I am trying to find out whether the contract
guard, who has no gun, can pursue that person.
Mr. Patterson. Well, our contract guards----
Ms. Norton. Or what he must do.
Mr. Patterson. Yes, ma'am. Our contract guards are armed.
And if they see the individual----
Ms. Norton. All of them are armed?
Mr. Patterson. They are armed, yes, ma'am.
Ms. Norton. Is there a central curriculum for how they are
trained?
Mr. Patterson. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Norton. Who provides that curriculum?
Mr. Patterson. We do. We lay out the requirements for the
training, and we are currently in the development of a national
program for training that we are working with NASCO to deploy.
Ms. Norton. My time is up, so I yield back for the moment.
Mr. Barletta. Thank you.
We will now begin our second round of questions. And I will
open with a question to Mr. Patterson.
Clearly FPS does not have enough Federal law enforcement
officers to respond to all Federal buildings in a timely
manner. You have to rely on contract guards as your first line
of defense, yet you noted in your testimony that the authority
of contract guards to use deadly force comes from State and
local laws and that in most cases they do not have the
authority to pursue subjects. In order to address the threat
posed by active shooters, would it be helpful for FPS to have
the authority to delegate some Federal law enforcement
authorities to contract guards? And do other agencies have this
ability? And how does it work in those cases?
Mr. Patterson. Yes, sir. If we look across the spectrum of
authorities, if you look at TSA, that is a Federalized force.
If you look at the U.S. Marshals Service, they have the
authority to deputize, which gives them extensive power to
direct their workforce in just about any direction that they
want. Then you have the Department of Energy, who has a guard
force protecting the nuclear plants and other facilities where
they have some limited law enforcement authorities that allow
them to arrest and do the things that they need to be done on
an immediate basis.
What we would seek would be to streamline our PSO authority
structure. What that means is that you give us an opportunity
to increase the authority of the PSO when we need. For
instance, during our response to Hurricane Sandy, we were being
requested to provide extensive support to the citizens in New
York, and to our facilities in New York. Our vendor quickly ran
out of PSO resources to provide to that event. We then began to
query our other vendors to see if they could help with that
response. What we found was that we had to go through the State
of New York approval process, which took quite a bit of time.
If we had had the authority to just empower PSOs at the Federal
level, we could have responded more quickly.
So it would also help improve the PSO training, because now
we could directly provide focused training on the areas that we
would want them to respond in. And it would also help with FPS
mission readiness. So, yes, sir, anything of that nature would
be of help.
Mr. Barletta. In some areas where FPS does not have many
law enforcement personnel, FPS relies on State and local law
enforcement to be the first responders to a Federal facility in
the event of an emergency. Do these State and local law
enforcement personnel have all of the authorities and tools
that they need to respond to an incident at a Federal facility?
And do you have agreements in place with the relevant State and
local authorities to ensure that they respond accordingly?
Mr. Patterson. From time to time, sir, we do have a
problem. If we are responding to an impromptu demonstration,
especially in some of our smaller cities and towns, if there is
an impromptu demonstration or national security event, we may
ask the local law enforcement folks to assist us.
In some instances their response is, ``We can't respond. We
would love to respond to you, but we don't want to be held
liable for anything. This is a Federal event, and we don't have
that authority.'' So if we were able to provide that authority
and say, listen, you are now functioning or acting on behalf of
the Federal Government, that would clearly give them some
relief and enhance their willingness to help us.
Mr. Barletta. There have been some concerns about FPS's
staffing levels for some time. In fact, language carried in the
appropriations bills have required a minimum staffing level.
You only have 1,300 employees, but we understand that up to 40
of those employees may have been reassigned to functions
outside of FPS. Is that correct? And how many FPS employees
have been assigned outside of FPS, and why?
Mr. Patterson. Yes, sir. Well, when we left ICE and we came
to NPPD, we lacked the infrastructure for things like human
resources and logistics and those things. So clearly we had to
come up with some staffing levels for that, and that is what we
have contributed to. That is the benefit that we derive when we
contribute these assets to NPPD. They help us in creating our
infrastructure.
Mr. Barletta. Mr. Goldstein, given the number of
outstanding work items at FPS, can FPS afford to assign its
employees to other parts of the Department?
Mr. Goldstein. That is probably not a question I can
directly answer because we haven't looked at where they are
assigned and what the rationale for those assignments are. But
it is clear that FPS still struggles with trying to get the
basic job done that we have talked about here this morning in
terms of risk assessments, in terms of contract guard
oversight, and things that you have brought up, sir. So I do
think that is something they need to look at routinely.
Mr. Barletta. The Chair now recognizes Ranking Member
Carson.
Mr. Carson. Thank you very much, Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Goldstein, are you aware of any of the shelf technology
that would effectively allow the FPS to digitize their
oversight of contract guard certifications and trainings, and
do you believe that this technology would allow FPS to improve
their oversight of contract guards immediately?
Mr. Goldstein. We haven't looked specifically at it, but in
the course of our work we have been told by many people that
there is off-the-shelf products that could readily do this job
and that FPS does not have to reinvent the wheel.
Mr. Carson. Director Patterson, you know, sir, Federal law
requires that FPS have just over 1,000 law enforcement
officers. How many law enforcement officers does FPS actually
need to meet its mission, and has FPS prepared a report that
indicates that based on an activity-based cost model for human
capital, that FPS needs significantly more law enforcement
officers, and what might that number be just generally?
Mr. Patterson. Yes, sir, we have looked at that. And given
the circumstances of today, when we did the assessment, it is
about 1,300 law enforcement that would give us the proper
leveling for the commitment that we have today. But as that
commitment grows, absolutely that figure will change.
Mr. Carson. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield
back.
Mr. Barletta. The Chair now recognizes Ms. Norton.
Ms. Norton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to pursue that 1,300 figure. How many FPS officers
are there, and how many contract guards are there?
Mr. Patterson. Yes, ma'am. Today we have 1,000 sworn law
enforcement FPS officers, and the contract guard force
fluctuates depending upon the requirements. But today there are
about 13,000.
Ms. Norton. Have budget cuts or the sequester had any
effect upon contract guards or FPS officers? Have there been a
reduction in personnel, for example, in the last 2 years?
Mr. Patterson. No, ma'am, actually there has not been a
reduction of the FPS staff, but the sequestration did have an
impact on the contract guard force in that when buildings
closed, there was no requirement for contract guards.
Ms. Norton. But most buildings didn't close.
Mr. Patterson. There were many buildings that did close,
ma'am.
Ms. Norton. For those who didn't close, were--let me ask
you this--were FPS officers put on furloughs?
Mr. Patterson. No, ma'am. No FPS personnel were put on
furlough.
Ms. Norton. And contract guards were affected when
buildings closed, but otherwise they were on duty?
Mr. Patterson. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Norton. I would like to ask you, Mr. Goldstein, about
the supervision at committees, because you spoke about a
cookie-cutter approach, no cross-agency or cross-cutting agency
approach to security, but agency-by-agency security. Now, these
agencies each have committees. Now, these committees, of
course, consist of personnel who are no more than the people
who work in the building, and none of them have any security
background, training, or knowledge. Is that not the case?
Mr. Goldstein. Yes, ma'am, that is correct.
Ms. Norton. But they have some significant responsibility
for security in buildings. Would you describe the role of these
laypeople in security?
Mr. Goldstein. Yes, ma'am. We have done some work. It is a
couple years old now, but it takes a look at the facility
security committees, and it explains that the individuals who
make up those committees, as you rightly said, tend to be the
tenants of the building. And the tenant that has the largest
footprint in the building typically chairs that committee.
I have gone to, and my staff has gone to a number of
facility security committee meetings over the years, and they
do tend to be made up of laypeople. They tend to be, for
instance, perhaps the administrative assistant or office
manager for a specific agency, people like that. It tends to
be, frankly, a delegated job that many people don't really
want.
Ms. Norton. So what is it that they have to do with
security?
Mr. Goldstein. They are responsible for taking the
information provided them by the Federal Protective Service and
making decisions about what kinds of countermeasures they are
going to put in place, and then going back to their home
agencies to get the necessary funds for doing this. This is, as
you know, a process that could take a number of years.
Ms. Norton. And, of course, through what expertise can they
recommend changes in security and get the funds for that?
Mr. Goldstein. They rely on the expertise generally that is
provided by the FPS, as well as they may call on their own
security people from their agencies or departments to assist
them. But the problem, as we have described it, is you have the
security of Federal buildings essentially being decided by a
lot of laypeople over a very long period of time when
countermeasures may need to be put in place fairly rapidly.
Ms. Norton. Mr. Chairman, I believe these security
committees or agency committees are central points of
vulnerability. Obviously when you are talking to someone who
says he represents the head of the agency, and he says, for
example, I will take the Department of Transportation--I know
this only by chance. The Department of Transportation is close
to this very Capitol. If you go to the Department of
Transportation you have to get someone in the Department of
Transportation to come down, even if you have a badge from the
United States Congress. If you are a member of the public, you
can't get into that public building at all. Of course, if you
are a member of the public, you can come into the Capitol. You
can use our cafeteria. The Department of Transportation has a
beautiful new building with a new cafeteria, and we haven't
figured out a way for the public that paid for that building to
be able to come in if they have a kid to use the lavatory,
can't get into that building. And that has everything to do
with these agency committees.
Mr. Goldstein, do you believe these committees are
appropriate as the decisionmakers on how much security is
needed for a specific building so that you can have vast
differences between the Capitol and the Department of
Transportation, for example?
Mr. Goldstein. The Interagency Security Committee recently
put out some standards, which is going to help to hopefully
better professionalize these committees. But we have long had
concerns that this kind of--I call it a three-legged stool, GSA
has some responsibility, FPS has some responsibility, and the
individual facility security committees have some
responsibility--that that may not be appropriate today as a way
to direct and oversee security of Federal property.
Ms. Norton. This is, I think, an important issue for this
agency to secure. Nobody is in charge if there are three
possible people in charge. And I submit that these agency
committees of laypeople are who are really in charge of
security in buildings, not the FPS and not the contract guards.
Thank you very much.
Mr. Barletta. Thank you.
The Chair now recognizes the former chair of the Committee
on Transportation and Infrastructure, Mr. Mica.
Mr. Mica. Thank you, Mr. Barletta. And thank you for
holding this important hearing and following up and looking at
the Federal Protective Services and making certain that our
Federal facilities are secure, important responsibility.
A couple of questions. First of all, Mr. Patterson, threats
still remain, and probably one of the most devastating
attacks--well, most devastating attacks I can recall is the
McVeigh bombing in Oklahoma. Now that was a domestic terrorist
act, but international terrorist act we see the use of bombs,
the Boston bombing. We are probably overdue for another hit
because you can get a lot of explosives and create explosive
devices fairly easily, as we have seen.
How often are you briefed on intelligence, and who briefs
you? So can you tell the committee who you are getting your
intelligence information from, and then how often are you
meeting with those folks?
Mr. Patterson. Yes, sir, I can. Within the Federal
Protective Service, we are really beginning to build a very
structured intelligence-gathering apparatus.
Mr. Mica. No, but, again, there are agencies that do that.
Mr. Patterson. No, I am just saying how we collect it, sir.
What I am saying is that we have personnel assigned to the
Joint Terrorism Task Force with the FBI.
Mr. Mica. So you are getting most of your intelligence from
the Joint Task Force of the FBI?
Mr. Patterson. Oh, no, sir.
Mr. Mica. No.
Mr. Patterson. That is what I was going to say. We are
getting it from a variety of resources.
Mr. Mica. OK. Tell me who----
Mr. Patterson. Right.
Mr. Mica. Who----
Mr. Patterson. I will start at the lower level at the
fusion centers, from the States fusion centers.
Mr. Mica. From States?
Mr. Patterson. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mica. OK.
Mr. Patterson. We get them from State fusion centers.
Mr. Mica. How often do you meet with them?
Mr. Patterson. Well, our folks meet with them every day.
Mr. Mica. OK. Federal?
Mr. Patterson. Federal, from the FBI and from the Defense
Department. From all of the Federal intelligence and analysis
centers at the Department of Homeland Security.
Mr. Mica. How often do they meet?
Mr. Patterson. We talk to them every day.
Mr. Mica. Every day.
Mr. Patterson. Every day. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mica. And how is that information--the bulk of your
people are contract people, 15,000.
How is that information delegated? Now, you don't get to
every one of the 15,000, but someone in the chain has to be
made aware that a certain threat, a risk, is occurring and make
people aware of what we are looking for--who, what?
Mr. Patterson. Yes, sir. Once we receive a threat, that
information is then packaged in a way that we can communicate
that.
Because, depending upon what the threat is, it may be
classified. And if it is classified, then we will have to
figure out how we can get it down to our lowest level.
Mr. Mica. Well, you have 1,000 LEOs, I guess.
Mr. Patterson. Yes. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mica. And are they at each location? Is it--I mean, is
there someone at each location?
Mr. Patterson. No, sir.
Mr. Mica. No?
So--but there is someone who can get the information and--
--
Mr. Patterson. Yes, sir. We can distribute that to
personnel electronically----
Mr. Mica. Sure.
Mr. Patterson [continuing]. As the----
Mr. Mica. How often are some kind of warnings put out?
Daily? Weekly? Monthly? Periodically?
Mr. Patterson. It depends.
Mr. Mica. Sporadically? OK.
Mr. Patterson. Yes, sir. It depends.
Mr. Mica. All right. It would be good if you could give us
a little chain of the command, who you meet with and when, just
for the record. I would like to see it as part of the record,
if you could----
Mr. Patterson. Sure.
Mr. Mica [continuing]. And how you meet with them.
Because I think that most of what has happened, there is--
we still have--we still are not able to connect the dots. We
didn't connect the dots with the Boston.
Mr. Patterson. Right.
Mr. Mica. We haven't connected the dots at all. And it is
usually local law enforcement and others who are----
Mr. Patterson. Absolutely----
Mr. Mica [continuing]. Are at the final scene. But, again,
what I am--the deficit in intelligent information is what is
going to do us in.
Mr. Patterson. If I might----
Mr. Mica. That is what I want to know for the history of
the committee. Then I see you have a mass of dogs.
How many dogs for explosive detection?
Mr. Patterson. I think it is about 74 today.
Mr. Mica. Oh. I thought you had thousands.
Mr. Patterson. No, sir.
Mr. Mica. Is that contract, too, dogs or just----
Mr. Patterson. No. That is just----
Mr. Mica. Oh, you don't?
Mr. Patterson. No.
Mr. Mica. Then, I don't see a lot of explosive detection
devices at some of these checkpoints in the Federal buildings.
I see the metal detectors, which are useless when it comes--the
biggest threat right now is explosives. OK?
Mr. Patterson. Right. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mica. But I don't see a lot of them.
Do you have a lot of them out there?
Mr. Patterson. No. Not explosive detection devices. No,
sir.
Mr. Mica. See, I think you are missing the boat there. And
I think that is where our threat is.
Then, finally--I guess we let others over a little bit.
But you have 1,000 LEOs. Do they participate in live fire
testing----
Mr. Patterson. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mica [continuing]. Training?
Mr. Patterson. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mica. OK. Do you use simulation?
Mr. Patterson. We don't use simulation.
Mr. Mica. OK. I want a report back. I want to know why you
are not using simulation. It is more cost-effective. You can--
you can train them to the highest levels possible.
We use it for our military. None of your guys are in
combat. I haven't seen a lot of firing of weapons on the scene.
Our military are on the scene in combat, and a good portion of
their training now comes from simulation.
Mr. Patterson. Just----
Mr. Mica. You are behind the times. I want a report back to
the committee and to me on your proposal to use simulation for
training those LEOs. And stop using all the expensive, costly
live fire ammunition.
Mr. Patterson. May I ask you to clarify, sir?
Mr. Mica. Go ahead.
Mr. Patterson. Are we talking about the simunitions? I just
want to make sure.
Mr. Mica. Well, using simulations----
Mr. Patterson. OK.
Mr. Mica [continuing] Training, weapons training, situation
training----
Mr. Patterson. We----
Mr. Mica [continuing]. The whole thing.
Mr. Patterson. We do have--we do have weapons training
where we do simulating training, but we don't use simunitions.
What I am talking about is where the officer will have
devices that are strapped to him and, when another officer
fires a weapon, it will tell whether there was a hit or not.
Mr. Mica. OK. Well, I want to----
Mr. Patterson. We don't use that, but we do simulated
training.
Mr. Mica. I want to see exactly what you have.
Mr. Patterson. OK.
Mr. Mica. Give us a full report and then I want to see what
your new proposal is. And we can introduce you to people in
simulation training----
Mr. Patterson. OK, sir.
Mr. Mica [continuing]. Which is used for our military and
manpower readiness. Very, very cost-effective and it will save
you a lot of those expensive bullets.
Yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Barletta. Thank you.
The Chair now recognizes Mr. Mullin.
Mr. Mullin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Patterson, we have obviously had a lot of discussion
here on human resource and the management by the FPS.
But you guys are also responsible for managing relating
equipment, such as security cameras. Is that correct?
Mr. Patterson. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mullin. Well, the way I understand it is there are
indications that some cameras may not be working and there is
also no mechanism to track and maintain these cameras. Is that
correct, too?
Mr. Patterson. No, sir. We do track and maintain cameras.
We are developing a more robust system to do that more
effectively.
Every time that we go out and conduct a facility security
assessment, we are tracking that. When our inspectors go out
and visit their facilities, they are also looking at and
inspecting cameras in the field.
Mr. Mullin. What type of expense has FPS acquired or
incurred by these cameras, the installation, the purchasing and
install of them?
Mr. Patterson. Those are all paid for by the FSE, the
building, the folks who occupy the facility.
Mr. Mullin. So what percentage of the cameras do you guys
go out and check? And I say this because I have several
companies.
On my phone right now, I have an app where I can hit and I
can check in all my companies because of the security cameras
that we have around there. It is a very--it is an unbelievable
asset when utilized correctly----
Mr. Patterson. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mullin [continuing]. When utilized----
Mr. Patterson. Right.
Mr. Mullin [continuing]. Correctly, but it is also a huge
personal expense that our companies had to take on.
Mr. Patterson. Right.
Mr. Mullin. But the cameras are worthless if they are not
being tracked, if they are not being watched. And a percentage
of those isn't 10 percent. It is not 5 percent. But it is--it
is 100 percent of them. They are all installed for a purpose.
So what percentage does FPS actually look at?
Mr. Patterson. Now, when you say FPS----
Mr. Mullin. When you are tracking on, when you are looking
at them, when you are maintaining then, when you are making
sure they are even working----
Mr. Patterson. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mullin [continuing]. What percentage of that? Are you
saying just when you go visit the----
Mr. Patterson. No.
Mr. Mullin [continuing]. Facility?
Mr. Patterson. No, sir. We are about the business of
ensuring that all of the cameras work. And when they don't
work, then we move forward to work with the facility security
committee to either fix the cameras or replace the cameras.
Mr. Mullin. I guess what I am trying to get to is: Are you
actively seeking these?
Mr. Patterson. Yes.
Mr. Mullin. OK.
Mr. Patterson. We want to ensure that the cameras are
working. You are exactly right. A camera is ineffective or our
security becomes less effective if the cameras aren't
operating.
Mr. Mullin. Mr. Goldstein, what about with GAO and the
cameras that you guys have?
Mr. Goldstein. We have taken a look at some of the cameras
over time that FPS has. We have done work in which we have
shown that a number of facilities have not adequate cameras and
FPS wasn't unable to determine when crimes had been committed,
who committed those crimes, perhaps, when things were taken out
of the building.
We also know of a number of instances where other tenants,
particularly the courts, have become quite frustrated with the
Federal Protective Service because they did not feel that
maintenance of the cameras was sufficient, and they took over
those responsibilities and paid for them themselves.
I continue to hear anecdotally we have not done a
comprehensive report; so, it is not generalized. But we do hear
anecdotes all the time about frustrations with keeping these
cameras working and modernized.
Mr. Mullin. Mr. Goldstein, you are saying the same thing
that this committee has heard, too.
And, Mr. Patterson, that was what I was trying to get at,
the frustration behind it.
We have technology that is out there, and it is not being
utilized. And the tenants, these buildings, the ones that are
depending on these cameras--that is supposed to have a layer of
security. Instead, it is becoming a layer of frustration.
And there is a better way to do things, and I would be
curious if you guys could or if you would take a look at it.
Mr. Patterson. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mullin. See if there is a better practice, just the way
that we are doing it, just spot-checking it, just going through
it.
Obviously, you just heard from Mr. Goldstein the committee
has heard the same things, that there is a layer of frustration
that is taking place.
Mr. Patterson. Yes, sir. And I recognize there is a layer
of frustration. I spend quite a bit of time on the road talking
to the clerks of the courts, to IRS, Social Security----
Mr. Mullin. Mr. Patterson, the difference between talking
and doing is two different things. There is a lot of people up
there that give lip service. What we are asking for is service.
Mr. Patterson. Yes, sir. And I am not giving lip service. I
am giving service. I am ensuring that, when folks are
dissatisfied or not happy with our service, that we are
rendering service that we are supposed to. So, sir,
respectfully, I am not giving lip service.
Mr. Mullin. Well, I would hope that maybe next time we
visit we can see a plan that is laid out----
Mr. Patterson. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mullin [continuing]. Because I would like to think that
we could improve on this.
Mr. Patterson. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mullin. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Chairman, I appreciate you giving me the extra time.
Mr. Barletta. Thank you.
We will have one final round of questions.
Mr. Patterson, law enforcement authority for the FPS lies
in the Public Buildings Act. It is our understanding that this
authority has been re-delegated to other entities, such as the
Chief Security Office, FEMA, ICE, the Federal Law Enforcement
Training Center.
Why is this law enforcement authority being delegated
across DHS? And isn't this FPS's responsibility? Didn't this
delegation of authority create the unity of command problem at
the headquarters that DHS cited as the reason from removing FPS
as the security lead at the headquarters?
Mr. Patterson. Sir, I don't have an answer for you. I don't
know why the different elements have been granted that
authority. I don't have an answer.
Mr. Barletta. Well, this will conclude our first panel.
I would like to thank both for your testimony today and for
your time and cooperation. Thank you.
We will now call our second panel. On our second panel, we
have Mr. David L. Wright, president, AFGE Local 918, and Mr.
Stephen Amitay, executive director and general counsel,
National Association of Security Companies.
I ask unanimous consent that our witnesses' full statements
be included in the record. Without objection, so ordered.
Since your written testimony has been made a part of the
record, the subcommittee would request that you limit your oral
testimony to 5 minutes.
Mr. Wright, you may proceed.
TESTIMONY OF DAVID L. WRIGHT, PRESIDENT, AFGE LOCAL 918; AND
STEPHEN AMITAY, ESQ., EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR AND GENERAL COUNSEL,
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITY COMPANIES
Mr. Wright. Thank you, Chairman.
Chairman Barletta, Ranking Member Carson, members of the
committee, my name is David Wright. I am president of AFGE
Local 918, which represents FPS employees nationwide. I am also
an inspector with the Federal Protective Service since 1986.
Federal employees and facilities are very vulnerable to
attack from both criminal and terrorist threats. Are they as
secure as they should be? They are not. Is that security as
effective as this congressional office building? Definitely
not.
Solutions include accountability for FPS leadership,
pushing staff to the field, effective on-site security and
effective tools for risk assessment and recruiting.
Regarding the culture of accountability, in 2010, 2013, GAO
reported problems with guard screener training and
certification requirements. There is no excuse for these
failures.
Three years later they should have been fixed and the
responsible managers should have been held accountable.
However, often lost in the broad brush of GAO reports, these
are not organizationwide failures.
In several of 11 FPS regions, almost everything seems to go
well. Guards receive FPS training. Untrained guards are not
used for screening. Firearms qualification is monitored. And
guards are trained on active shooter scenarios. In these
regions, tenants trust FPS to deliver. For these, FPS field
employees simply refuse to fail.
FPS appeared to treat these failures as a structural issue
to be resolved by--to be solved by reorganization. This
resulted in an unclear direction funneled through an extra
layer of management who either ignored or missed problems.
DHS, aided by your oversight, should remove the extra layer
and fire or demote managers who fail to accomplish critical
tasks or uphold the FPS code of conduct. Building security is
not a T-ball game to build self-esteem. It is serious business
with serious consequences.
Regarding the shift of staff to where service is delivered,
the Federal law enforcement officers who deliver incident
response, arrest offenders and deliver assessments and guard
monitoring are short-staffed and struggle to get it all done.
Allocation of 68 percent of total staff to field law
enforcement is not indicative of a lean, agile and high-
performing organization.
An organization with less than 1,400 employees that has 8
senior executives, 39 GS-15s and 138 GS-14s, with over half of
these assigned to headquarters, is top heavy.
The remedy is Congress should establish a ceiling for SES,
limit GS-15s to 125 percent of the number assigned to the
regions at headquarters, and mandate reduction of headquarters
to 12.5 percent of total FTE, also, allow FPS to use building-
specific charges, to add FTE when officers are dedicated to the
facilities paying the charges, and restore the minimum field
law enforcement staff to its 2007 equivalent of 1,150.
Regarding effective on-site security services, unlike the
Senate and House office buildings where the on-site force is
comprised of Federal police officers, GSA facilities rely on
contract guards for this function. FPS guard contracts do not
use economies of scale to reduce hourly cost.
The size of the FPS procurement staff has doubled, but now
it takes 400 days to implement a new contract. Our remedy? Take
action to direct the use of Federal police officers for large,
multitenant facilities that are open to the public and provide
direction to efficiently consolidate guard contracts within the
same State or contiguous areas, also, mandate a reasonable
procurement staffing model and mandate cost-effective
procurement options, such as a potential use of GSA.
Regarding effective tools for recruiting and risk
assessment, FPS currently uses an interim risk tool called
MIST. The GAO recently found it was not compliant with the
governmentwide standards and that there are available tools
that do. Remedy is to mandate that FPS--mandate FPS
expeditiously acquire and field a compliant risk tool.
Regarding retention and recruiting, when applicants for
Federal law enforcement look at FPS, one of the questions is:
Are we covered by law enforcement retirement? When told we are
not covered by law enforcement retirement, the best and the
brightest start looking elsewhere.
At the national law enforcement memorial, where the names
of U.S. law enforcement officers who have died in the line of
duty are inscribed, we recognize the supreme sacrifice of those
heros.
Among the names inscribed at the memorial are six officers
of the Federal Protective Service who died in the line of duty.
Should any other FPS officer die in the line of duty, their
name will be added to that list. If we live and die as law
enforcement officers, Congress should recognize that service by
allowing us to retire as one.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify at this important
hearing. Dedicated officers in FPS and the employees in Federal
facilities await your expeditious action on these serious
matters.
Mr. Barletta. Thank you for your testimony, Mr. Wright.
Mr. Amitay, you may proceed.
Mr. Amitay. Thank you, Chairman Barletta.
Chairman Barletta, Ranking Member Carson, my name is
Stephen Amitay, and I am the executive director and general
counsel for NASCO, the National Association of Security
Companies.
NASCO is the Nation's largest contract security trade
association whose member companies employ more than 300,000
security officers across the Nation, servicing commercial and
governmental clients.
Since its founding in 1972, NASCO has worked with
legislators and officials at every level of Government to put
in place higher standards and requirements for security
companies and private security officers.
NASCO member companies provide security officers to
numerous Federal agencies, including the majority of the
protective service officers, or PSOs, under FPS.
Not counting the military services, there are approximately
35,000 contract security officers across the Federal
Government, and the use of contract security is an effective
and cost-efficient countermeasure for safeguarding Federal
facilities, employees and visitors.
Over the past several years, the GAO has identified
challenges that FPS faces in its missions to keep Federal
facilities secure, including issues related to the PSO program.
And NASCO has been working with FPS, Congress, GAO and GSA to
address these issues.
While the pace of progress on some issues may not be as
fast as GAO would like, progress is being made. And since the
appointment of Director Patterson in 2010, the degree of
dialogue and breadth of cooperation between FPS and its
security contractors has been unparalleled.
There is no doubt that Director Patterson and others at FPS
are committed to improving the PSO program and FPS and NASCO
are currently working together on a variety of initiatives that
will improve the PSO program.
To address deficiencies in FPS's capability to provide the
crucial x-ray and magnetometer training to PSOs, FPS has just
launched a pilot program conceived with NASCO that is training
and certifying security contractor instructors to provide the
training. Also, the x-ray and magnetometer training has
recently been revamped and expanded by FPS.
In the area of active shooter training, NASCO has met
several times with FPS to discuss FPS's development of new
active shooter training for PSOs, an effort which is definitely
on the fast track at FPS, and FPS is wisely looking at how
other agencies provide active shooter training to contract
security officers that they utilize.
NASCO is also working with FPS on revising and
standardizing PSO training lesson plans, and FPS envisions, as
recommended by the ISC and GAO, having all PSO training
instructors certified.
In other PSO program areas, FPS just came out with a much
needed revision of the PSO manual. Called the SMART Book, it
governs and instructs PSOs on how to act, and not following the
SMART Book is considered a contract violation.
Of note, there is a new chapter in the SMART Book on active
shooter response, there is better language on the issue of PSO
authority, and, most importantly, by design, the format of the
SMART Book will allow for making revisions as needed.
FPS is also undertaking a comprehensive review of PSO post
orders and seeking ways to improve its management of PSO
training and certification data.
For this latter effort, NASCO strongly recommends that FPS
explore commercially available technologies, and work closely
with its security contractors on this effort who are the ones
who have to provide and upload the data.
One PSO subject area that continues to present challenges
is a PSO's authority to act and liability for acting in
preventing or responding to an extreme situation, such as an
active shooter.
On this issue, Congress should consider providing DHS with
statutory authority to authorize PSOs to make arrests on
Federal property. Such arrest authority is already provided to
contract security officers at other Federal agencies.
And there are also other elements of the Federal facility
risk assessment and security process not related to PSOs that
need to be addressed. Take, for example, as has already been
discussed today, the decision to implement specific security
countermeasures for a facility.
In GSA-owned or GSA-leased buildings, FPS is responsible
for conducting the facility's security assessment and
recommending countermeasures, but the decision to implement
those recommendations is solely up to the facility's security
committee, which is made up of representatives from the
facility's tenant agencies.
However, as GAO has found, quote, tenant agency
representatives to the FSC generally do not have any security
knowledge or experience, but are expected to make security
decisions for their respective agencies. And with tightened
budgets putting pressure on tenant agencies to accept more
risk, it calls into question whether FSCs are actually making
informed risk-based decisions.
Countermeasures deemed necessary for security should not be
rejected because of either a lack of understanding or an
unwillingness to fund them. Last Congress, NASCO supported
legislation that required training for FSC members and allowed
DHS to challenge its decision not to implement countermeasures.
In closing, NASCO looks forward to continuing to work with
FPS, Congress, GAO and GSA to find ways to support FPS's
mission to render Federal properties safe and secure for
Federal employees, officials and visitors in a professional and
cost-effective manner.
Thank you.
Mr. Barletta. Thank you for your testimony, Mr. Amitay.
I will now begin the first round of questions, limited to 5
minutes for each Member. If there are any additional questions
following the first round, we will have additional rounds as
needed.
Mr. Wright, you highlight in your testimony challenges with
the staffing and the number of law enforcement officers. You
point out 67 law enforcement officers are assigned to
headquarters.
Do you know if they are assigned to FPS headquarters or
other parts of DHS?
Mr. Wright. Those 67 are assigned to FPS headquarters and--
the point being that those individuals do not respond to law
enforcement calls for service on a daily basis. In my mind,
they don't meet the definition of field law enforcement staff.
Mr. Barletta. Mr. Wright, you mentioned the delegation of
law enforcement authority of buildings to entities outside of
FPS and the duplication of security services at other agencies.
Can you explain. And how does this duplication impact the
security of Federal facilities and the chain of command?
Mr. Wright. Well, of course, most recently was the issue
with the NAC, which----
Mr. Barletta. Can you pull the mic a little closer to you
or some--yeah.
Mr. Wright. Yes.
Mr. Barletta. Thank you.
Mr. Wright. Most recently, of course, the issue with the
NAC in which Office of Security staff took control of NAC
security.
Recently, in past years, Immigration and Customs
Enforcement has stood up their own security unit. They use H.R.
1315 as their authority, and they assess their ICE buildings
across the U.S.
It is duplicative in nature. FPS conducts those surveys and
so does ICE. And that is probably the most recent example
besides NAC.
Mr. Barletta. Mr. Amitay, you highlight in your testimony
differences between how FPS oversees and manages its contract
guards as compared to other agencies. For example, you
highlight DOE and the U.S. Marshals Service.
What do those agencies do differently in terms of the
authorities and training they provide to their guards?
Mr. Amitay. The major difference is that those agencies,
with their contract security officers, the contract security
officers are authorized to make arrests on the Federal
properties where they are employed.
In DOE's case, this comes from statutory authority granted
to DOE through an act of Congress. This is something that we
would like to also be considered by Congress for the PSOs at
FPS.
However, there would be also additional training that would
be required if that additional authority is granted.
Mr. Barletta. Mr. Wright, have you looked at how private
contractors have been used to provide security at DOE, the U.S.
Marshals Service and, even at DOD, to identify how FPS can
better utilize and train its guards to improve security at
Federal buildings?
Mr. Wright. Of the three agencies that you cite--DOD, DOE
and U.S. Marshals Service--I have most--I have worked most
closely with the U.S. Marshals Service; so, I can cite
experience there.
The contract security officers in these Federal courthouses
are all hired as former law enforcement. They have all been
through some sort of law enforcement academy.
And I am unsure--they are deputized by the U.S. Marshals
Service, who have that authority. They are an effective force
in the U.S. courthouses. And I think it is that ability to
deputize by the marshals that is most important.
Mr. Barletta. Mr. Amitay, you mentioned that most of the
other Federal agencies, they use contract security officers--
contract with security companies to provide training.
Can you provide us with some examples of what other
agencies are doing in that regard and how they could be
applicable to FPS.
Mr. Amitay. Sure. For instance, at DOE, they require that
the contract security companies that they contract with to
provide all the training for the contract security officers
there.
This training is very comprehensive. It involves weapons
training. It involves use of intermediate force, basic
training, et cetera.
And all of that training, as is the case at many of the
agencies, is provided to contract security officers by company
instructors who are certified. The companies are responsible
for 100 percent of the training.
A big issue at FPS is that, for some reason, FPS has held
back from its contractors the authority to provide the x-ray
magnetometer training and, because of FPS personnel and
training resource issues, as Mr. Goldstein pointed out,
sometimes that x-ray magnetometer training is not provided to
the PSOs.
Mr. Barletta. Thank you.
The Chair now recognizes Ranking Member Carson for his
questions.
Mr. Carson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Wright, what is the FPS's relationship with the
facilities security committee from the union's perspective? And
do you believe that the committees generally rely on FPS's
expertise when evaluating recommendations for countermeasures?
Mr. Wright. As an inspector, I have worked with facility--
differing facility security committees across the Government.
Firstly, it is a matter of how serious the agencies take
that facility's security committee. If it is a smaller property
with fewer agencies, even less budget, they don't tend to take
those facilities' security committee recommendations seriously.
We are--FPS is the experts at the table, for the most part.
As you go up in the size of buildings, you have more tenants,
more agency heads. These committees tend to--like any other, in
some cases, undesirable task, it becomes a collateral duty.
My experience is that, when it becomes a collateral duty or
especially when agency funding is not available for security,
then it is--the recommendations don't make it through.
No matter what an inspector says, these issues--these
countermeasures are not going to be funded. And that is the--
the primary problem with facility security committees is no
agency is funded for security countermeasures.
Mr. Carson. Mr. Amitay, how often are members of your
association fined or penalized for not having proper
documentation for their contract guards? And, also, to your
knowledge, sir, has any contract guard company working with FPS
been debarred for not fulfilling their contractual duties?
Mr. Amitay. In terms of the information on the rate or the
amount of times that contractors have been fined for not having
officers who have their training and certifications, I don't
have that information.
But NASCO fully believes that, in those situations, proper
action should be taken. When such a situation occurs, I think
that contractors have to pay back FPS for the hours worked by
such officers. Then there is also monetary fines. It should
affect their performance rating for potential future contracts.
We have no problems with FPS being able to enforce the
provisions of the contract against contractors, but I think on
the training and certification accuracy, it is also an issue of
who has the right data.
FPS's data management system is very problematic.
But, definitely, if there are PSOs being put on post who
don't have the trainings and certifications in violation of the
contract, that company should be held in violation of the
contract and punished.
Mr. Carson. Thank you, sir.
Lastly, Mr. Wright, how does the lack of recognition of FPS
officers as law enforcement officers for purposes of retirement
after retention, recruitment and morale of officers--has it--
clearly, it has an impact, but is it substantial enough that we
need to look more deeply into this?
Mr. Wright. It affects in the sense that sometimes you have
law enforcement officers past the age of the minimum--or the
mandatory retirement of 57 years old.
You tend to have officers that stick around perhaps a lot
longer than they should for their own safety and for the
public's safety.
Mr. Carson. Sure.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back my time, sir.
Mr. Barletta. Mr. Wright, what is the current protocol to
respond to an active shooter in a Federal building where an FPS
officer may not be on the scene? And can you walk us through
the role of the contract guard in that scenario.
Mr. Wright. Contract guards are limited by their--their
post orders, which are basically subscribed by their private
contract.
The contracts spell out what the guards--what services will
be provided. That is translated to what the facility needs and
goes into the post orders.
Generally, guards do not leave their post. Guards are
responsible for maintaining that post, locking doors, letting--
you know, letting the tenants out and letting the good guys in
to come--to pursue the active shooter.
But, generally, these guards will not leave the post, and
that is per post orders and, basically, per contract, which is
also tied to State and locality issues with their authority.
Mr. Barletta. So in a scenario where an active shooter by--
a guard may be on another floor and begins shooting, the guard
doesn't leave his post? There is no authority that that guard
would have to do other than to wait for help?
Mr. Wright. Correct. Technically, the guard should not
leave that post. In some Federal buildings, you do have a
rover, which is not tied to a post, but those are few and far
between.
What is going to happen when it happens? We have a lot of
good security officers in the field. I think, just like any--
like any law enforcement officers, individuals are going to do
what they have to do, and then you face the consequences of
what comes after.
Mr. Barletta. Mr. Amitay, you highlight in your testimony
the steps FPS has taken to improve post orders for the guards
at Federal facilities.
Are those orders clear on what is expected and what the
authorities are of the contract officers?
Mr. Amitay. They are getting better at providing that
guidance. One thing that we have emphasized at FPS is that post
orders need to be facility-specific and they need to be
tailored to the building.
In FPS's current review of post orders, they are trying to
provide better instructions and guidance to the PSOs, and there
is better guidance in the new PSO manual.
And I would just like to just respond--or just to comment
on that last question.
I would note that, in 2010, there were three active shooter
incidents involving Federal facilities. One was at the
Holocaust Museum, one was at the Pentagon, and one was at a
Federal courthouse.
In all three incidents, an active shooter came in and had a
gun and started shooting at the personnel--security personnel
on duty. In all three incidents, the active shooter was
neutralized.
In two of those incidents, security personnel were contract
security officers. In one of the incidents, it was a law
enforcement officer.
So the PSOs--they do have the guidance and instructions to
engage an active shooter and protect self and third parties.
And that goes to the issue of the State law and the State
powers. And under most State licensing laws, an armed security
officer definitely has the authority to use his weapon to
neutralize an active shooter.
Mr. Barletta. Thank you.
The Chair recognizes Ranking Member Carson.
Mr. Carson. Thank you, Chairman.
My last question: Mr. Amitay, in your testimony, you
indicate that members of your association use off-the-shelf
technology to effectively manage your contract guards' training
and certifications.
Have you shared this technology with FPS? And, if so, when?
And have they indicated that they would use this technology? If
not, why not?
Mr. Amitay. That is a great question.
I was actually talking with the PSO program manager the
other day about this issue after I read in previous FPS
testimony about how FPS is working with the science and
technology division to prototype a guard tracking system, when
those systems are commercially available.
Now, I think some of the difficulty for FPS in using
commercially available systems is in the layers of security
that FPS would need to put on its security officer
certification and tracking data management system, but the
bottom line is that, whatever system they use, it is going to
have to interface with the systems that are being used by the
contract security companies.
And there are--as Mr. Goldstein said, there are
commercially available technologies that FPS might be able to
use, but without a doubt, that is a big problem.
And I think it can be solved though because there is no
reason why there can't be a database management system where
both the security contractors and FPS can access, upload data.
The idea that security contractors are sending in paper
forms and then FPS is manually uploading that just seems an
anachronism.
Thank you.
Mr. Carson. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Barletta. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from
Pennsylvania, Mr. Perry.
Mr. Perry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The question will be directed to Mr. Amitay.
Am I pronouncing that correctly?
Mr. Amitay. Yes.
Mr. Perry. Thank you.
So it is my understanding that the Federal Protective
Service has four alarm-monitoring facilities, or MegaCenters,
that monitor Federal Government security alarm accounts, one in
Maryland, one in Michigan, Pennsylvania and Colorado. The
centers also have the law enforcement function of dispatching
Federal Protective Service officers on emergency call.
Has your agency ever done an analysis on what the overall
operational cost is to maintain the four facilities, including
staffing, and whether it would actually be more cost-effective
for the taxpayer to move the alarm-monitoring function to a
commercial monitoring center?
Mr. Amitay. We haven't looked into that. But alarm-
monitoring is not an inherently governmental function and, so,
I think that is something that someone could look at.
When the PSOs see something or there is a problem, they
should always contact the MegaCenter unless there is an FPS law
enforcement officer on-line.
But in terms of the management and operation of those
MegaCenters, whether it can be privatized, we have not looked
at that.
Mr. Perry. Would that be something that you would seek to
do from a cost-saving standpoint? Is there a concern that there
would be a breach in security or, you know, a diminution of
security by doing such a thing?
Mr. Amitay. I think, whereas the FPS MegaCenters act more
in a management function for FPS over the contract security
officer force, I think that FPS would want to retain control of
that management function, but that is just something that we
have never looked at.
Mr. Perry. OK.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Barletta. Thank you.
And thank you for your testimony. Your comments have been
helpful to today's discussion.
If there are no further questions, I would ask unanimous
consent that the record of today's hearing remain open until
such time as our witnesses have provided answers to any
questions that may be submitted to them in writing and
unanimous consent that the record remain open for 15 days for
any additional comments and information submitted by Members or
witnesses to be included in the record of today's hearing.
Without objection, so ordered.
I would like to thank our witnesses again for their
testimony today.
You know, I am very concerned about what we have learned
today. The FPS is directly responsible for protecting 1.4
million workers and visitors at Federal facilities.
We know by experience that Federal facilities are targets.
GAO has documented numerous security shortfalls over the years,
and their recommendations remain largely incomplete.
Yet, rather than focus on the Department's efforts on
addressing these problems and enhancing FPS, we learned the
Department has removed FPS from its lead security role at DHS's
headquarters.
We learned DHS has reassigned FPS's resources and staff for
other purposes outside of protecting buildings, stretching
already thin resources even thinner.
And we learned DHS has taken law enforcement authorities
for protecting Federal buildings and delegated some of them to
the Department's security officer, to FEMA, to Immigration and
Customs Enforcement and the Federal Law Enforcement Training
Center.
Unfortunately, this looks a little like what we saw happen
to FEMA. When FEMA was moved to DHS, DHS dispersed its
authorities and responsibilities throughout the Department,
creating real confusion as to who was in charge for responding
to a disaster. And we saw the results of that in the poor
response to Hurricane Katrina.
I hope that this is not what is happening here. But when I
look at this May 1 memo, it says there is no clear unity of
command at NAC. This is very disconcerting.
Frankly, I wonder if we had the correct witnesses here from
DHS because it seems decisions are being made about FPS from
somewhere else in the Department and it is not clear by whom. I
expect we will have a number of followup questions as we assess
what we have heard today.
If no other Members have anything to add, this subcommittee
stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:10 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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