[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]





                         [H.A.S.C. No. 113-103]

                                HEARING

                                   ON

                   NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT

                          FOR FISCAL YEAR 2015

                                  AND

              OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS

                               BEFORE THE

                      COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                    ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS

                             SECOND SESSION

                               __________

                SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES HEARING

                                   ON

                   FISCAL YEAR 2015 NATIONAL DEFENSE

                      AUTHORIZATION BUDGET REQUEST

                         FOR NATIONAL SECURITY

                            SPACE ACTIVITIES

                               __________

                              HEARING HELD
                             APRIL 3, 2014

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                   ______

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                    SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES

                     MIKE ROGERS, Alabama, Chairman

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona                JIM COOPER, Tennessee
DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado               LORETTA SANCHEZ, California
MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado               JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
MO BROOKS, Alabama                   RICK LARSEN, Washington
JOE WILSON, South Carolina           JOHN GARAMENDI, California
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio              HENRY C. ``HANK'' JOHNSON, Jr., 
JOHN FLEMING, Louisiana                  Georgia
RICHARD B. NUGENT, Florida           ANDREE CARSON, Indiana
JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma            MARC A. VEASEY, Texas
                 Steve Kitay, Professional Staff Member
                         Leonor Tomero, Counsel
                           Eric Smith, Clerk
                           
                           
                           
                           
                           
                           
                           
                           
                           
                           
                           
                           
                           
                           
                           
                           
                           
                           
                           
                           
                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              

                     CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
                                  2014

                                                                   Page

Hearing:

Thursday, April 3, 2014, Fiscal Year 2015 National Defense 
  Authorization Budget Request for National Security Space 
  Activities.....................................................     1

Appendix:

Thursday, April 3, 2014..........................................    21
                              ----------                              

                        THURSDAY, APRIL 3, 2014
  FISCAL YEAR 2015 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BUDGET REQUEST FOR 
                   NATIONAL SECURITY SPACE ACTIVITIES
              STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Cooper, Hon. Jim, a Representative from Tennessee, Ranking 
  Member, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces.......................     1
Rogers, Hon. Mike, a Representative from Alabama, Chairman, 
  Subcommittee on Strategic Forces...............................     1

                               WITNESSES

Klinger, Gil I., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space 
  and Intelligence, Department of Defense........................     2
Loverro, Douglas L., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
  Space Policy, Department of Defense............................     4
Raymond, Lt Gen John W. ``Jay,'' USAF, Commander, Joint 
  Functional Component Command for Space, United States Strategic 
  Command........................................................     6
Sapp, Betty J., Director, National Reconnaissance Office.........     5
Shelton, Gen William L., USAF, Commander, U.S. Air Force Space 
  Command, U.S. Air Force........................................     2

                                APPENDIX

Prepared Statements:

    Klinger, Gil I...............................................    44
    Loverro, Douglas L...........................................    66
    Raymond, Lt Gen John W. ``Jay''..............................    91
    Rogers, Hon. Mike............................................    25
    Sapp, Betty J................................................    81
    Shelton, Gen William L.......................................    27

Documents Submitted for the Record:

    Attachment 1: JFCC SPACE Conjunction Assessment Customers....   107
    Attachment 2: JFCC SPACE Orbital Data Request Customers......   113

Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:

    Mr. Coffman..................................................   121
    Mr. Cooper...................................................   121

Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:

    Mr. Cooper...................................................   131
    Mr. Peters...................................................   136
    Mr. Rogers...................................................   125
    Ms. Sanchez..................................................   132
    
    
.    
  FISCAL YEAR 2015 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BUDGET REQUEST FOR 
                   NATIONAL SECURITY SPACE ACTIVITIES

                              ----------                              

                  House of Representatives,
                       Committee on Armed Services,
                          Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
                           Washington, DC, Thursday, April 3, 2014.
    The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 1:59 p.m., in 
room 2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Mike Rogers 
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

 OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE ROGERS, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 
      ALABAMA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES

    Mr. Rogers. This hearing of the House Armed Services 
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces will come to order. I want to 
welcome all of our witnesses here and thank them for their 
time, not only for being here, but the time it took to prepare 
for this hearing. It is very helpful to us.
    We have with us today General William Shelton, Commander of 
Air Force Space Command; Mr. Gil Klinger, Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of Defense, Space and Intelligence Office; Mr. Doug 
Loverro, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space 
Policy; Ms. Betty Sapp, Director of the National Reconnaissance 
Office; and Lt. General John W. ``Jay'' Raymond, Commander, 
Joint Functional Component Command for Space.
    And what I am going to do is submit the rest of my opening 
statement for the record so we can get to the opening 
statements of the witnesses. And with that, I will yield to my 
ranking member, my friend and colleague from Tennessee, Mr. 
Cooper.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Rogers can be found in the 
Appendix on page 25.]

STATEMENT OF HON. JIM COOPER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM TENNESSEE, 
        RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES

    Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to follow 
your fine example and do the same. And we welcome the 
witnesses. Thank you.
    Mr. Rogers. Thank you very much. General Shelton, we will 
start with you. You are recognized for 5 minutes.

STATEMENT OF GEN WILLIAM L. SHELTON, USAF, COMMANDER, U.S. AIR 
              FORCE SPACE COMMAND, U.S. AIR FORCE

    General Shelton. Mr. Chairman, Representative Cooper, and 
distinguished members of the subcommittee, it is an honor to 
appear before you once again as the commander of Air Force 
Space Command. It is also my privilege to appear with these 
colleagues from the national security space enterprise.
    Our nation's advantage in space is no longer a given. The 
ever-evolving space environment is increasingly contested as 
potential adversary capabilities grow in number and 
sophistication. Providing budget stability and flexibility in 
this very dynamic strategic environment is necessary to 
maintain and bolster the viability of our nation's space 
capabilities.
    Given this new normal in space, I believe it is--I believe 
we are at a strategic crossroad. It is a reality that requires 
us to address how we protect our space systems, challenge 
traditional acquisition practices, and consider alternative 
space architectures that are more resilient and affordable.
    I thank you for your support, and I look forward to working 
with Congress and this committee to keep you abreast of our 
efforts to provide relilient, capable, and affordable space 
capabilities for the joint force and for the nation. And I 
would also like to add that just this morning, we had a very 
successful defense meteorological satellite program launch out 
of Vandenberg Air Force Base on an Atlas V. Just bragging a 
little bit.
    Mr. Rogers. Don't blame you. Is that it?
    General Shelton. That is it, sir.
    [The prepared statement of General Shelton can be found in 
the Appendix on page 27.]
    Mr. Rogers. Thank you very much. Mr. Klinger, you are 
recognized.

  STATEMENT OF GIL I. KLINGER, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF 
   DEFENSE FOR SPACE AND INTELLIGENCE, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

    Mr. Klinger. Thank you, Chairman Rogers, Congressman 
Cooper, and members of the committee. The space domain has 
changed significantly in 50 years. This environmental change 
has occurred concurrently with the steady recovery and 
improvement of our space acquisition programs and practices. 
Our progress affords us an opportunity to take stock of risks 
resulting from the significant increase in threats to our space 
capabilities as well as the potential opportunities associated 
with the growth of both U.S. and foreign commercial and allied 
space capabilities and services.
    This rapid evolution and expansion of threats may create a 
potential strategic imbalance, in which adversaries are 
increasingly able to use space to support military operations 
and also threaten our ability to sustain use of our space 
capabilities. Meanwhile, our abilities have lagged to protect 
our own use of space and also deny the advantages of space to 
an adversary. We must rectify this imbalance as a national 
priority.
    We must consider the impact resulting from the Budget 
Control Act and sequestration. The simple truth is that most 
space systems on which the U.S. Government depends are likely 
to remain highly capital intensive, relatively costly 
investments. Moreover, many of the changes likely to be 
required to adapt to the changed threat require additional 
investments at precisely the same time as the Department is 
managing a significant drawdown in most other warfare areas.
    Perhaps no change has had more profound impact that the 
fundamental shift in the breadth, depth, and diversity of both 
the uses to which space capabilities are applied and the user 
population. In the past 25 years, a range of diverse space 
capabilities have become to defense and intelligence users what 
the dial tone on the telephone long ago became for all of us: a 
service whose presence we take for granted until the moment its 
availability is interrupted.
    Furthermore, our belated realization that space would 
become a contested battlespace leaves us with few planned or 
routinely exercised alternative means to meet our needs in the 
event of these interruptions. This change, when combined with 
the other shifts described here, confront the space acquisition 
community with a single major challenge, to maintain service 
continuity while simultaneously investing in technology 
innovation.
    We are at a strategic crossroads. We still utilize the 
advantages provided by capabilities brought about by past 
large-scale investments that often enjoyed a largely unfettered 
call on resources. Without wholesale sacrifices in other 
domains, we simply cannot afford that path in the future.
    The fiscal year 2015 President's budget reflects the DOD's 
[Department of Defense's] commitment to measured, affordable, 
pragmatic progress as we plan our future space capabilities. 
The Space Based Infrared System, Advanced Extremely High 
Frequency [AEHF], and Global Positioning System [GPS] are 
utilizing Space Modernization Initiative investments to improve 
affordability and capability in order to remain effective in 
the changed strategic and fiscal environment.
    The Department adjusted the profile for the Evolved 
Expendable Launch Vehicle, EELV program, and implemented a dual 
track strategy to reduce cost and stabilize key elements of the 
space industrial base. This approach consists of executing a 
contract for launch services over 5 years with the only 
existing qualified provider, while implementing a new entrant 
certification process in partnership with NASA [National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration] and the NRO [National 
Reconnaissance Office] that enables new entrants to compete as 
soon as they are certified. We believe this strategy achieves 
the optimal balance between required mission assurance and 
affordability.
    While we continue to use the Russian RD-180 engine to 
support NSS [National Security Space] missions, the Department 
has been prepared for the possibility of a potential RD-180 
supply disruption and has put in place several measures to 
mitigate the risk and impact. First, the nation has maintained 
an additional capability to launch national security payloads 
with the domestically produced Delta IV variant to the EELV. 
Second, as competition becomes a reality and domestic engine 
technology progresses, we become less susceptible to this 
foreign supply risk. Finally, our industry partner continues to 
maintain a supply of RD-180 engines in the United States, 
thereby insulating the Department against any near term 
disruptions to the launch manifest.
    We are evaluating whether it is in the long term U.S. 
national security interest and that of significant elements of 
our space industrial base to develop a next generation U.S. 
designed and built engine. This approach is part of the 
Department's reexamination of its strategy to ensure it is 
still capable of providing asssured access to space.
    I would like to thank you for your continued support and 
thoughtful engagement with us as we prepare for our future 
challenges. I would be pleased to take your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Klinger can be found in the 
Appendix on page 44.]
    Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Klinger. Mr. Loverro, you are 
recognized.

STATEMENT OF DOUGLAS L. LOVERRO, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF 
        DEFENSE FOR SPACE POLICY, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

    Mr. Loverro. Thank you. Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member 
Cooper, and members of the subcommittee, I am pleased to join 
my colleagues to testify on the Department of Defense space 
programs and policies.
    I first testified in front of this subcommittee on these 
topics about 1 year ago, and I welcome the opportunity to 
continue that discussion today. As I stated last year, space 
remains, and will continue to remain, vital to our national 
security. It underpins DOD capabilities worldwide. It enables 
U.S. global operations to be executed with precision on a 
worldwide basis, with reduced resources, fewer deployed troops, 
lower casualties, and decreased collateral damage.
    Space empowers both our forces and those of our allies to 
win faster, and bring more of our warfighters home safely. It 
is a key to U.S. power projection, providing a strong deterrent 
to our potential adversaries and a source of confidence to our 
friends. But the evolving strategic environment increasingly 
challenges U.S. space advantages.
    Space is no longer the sole province of world powers. It is 
a frontier that is now open to all. In the last several 
decades, space has become more competitive, more congested, and 
contested. Those terms, the so-called three C's, have been used 
extensively, and I believe it serves us well to put them into 
context.
    On the first, as an American, I welcome the competitive 
aspect of today's space environment. I am highly confident that 
with the right policies, the United States is well positioned 
to remain ahead in that environment. The changes you authorized 
2 years ago on export control reform, and the changes NASA and 
the Department of Defense have embraced on commercial launch, 
are just two of the many steps we are taking. I am not worried 
about the competitive nature of space.
    On the second ``C,'' congestion, I am not quite so 
welcoming, but I am optimistic. Congestion and debris in space 
is a real issue, and it threatens to put our use of space at 
risk. But the policies and programs of the United States, 
programs like the Air Force's Space Fence, are aimed at 
reducing that risk.
    Likewise, the work that we and the Department of State are 
doing internationally at the United Nations to set rules of the 
road for outer space, are aimed at bringing a similar focus on 
this issue to the community of spacefaring nations. So I am 
somewhat confident that we are on the right course in dealing 
with congestion.
    But what worries me the most, is the last ``C,'' the 
contested nature of space, which we now face. Over the last 15 
years, other nations have watched us closely and have 
recognized that if they are to challenge the United States, 
they must challenge us in space. And they are endeavoring to do 
so.
    The United States has successfully addressed such 
challenges before in other domains, and now we must likewise 
respond in space. We don't do so against the backdrop of a 
decreasing budget that challenges both the ability and speed 
with which we will act, but that in no way diminishes the 
importance of successfully sustaining the crucial advantages 
that space provides.
    Our strategic approach for these issues remains consistent 
with what we outlined in the 2011 National Security Space 
Strategy, and reaffirmed in DOD Space Policy in 2012. In the 
written testimony I submitted to the subcommittee, I have 
outlined the five key elements of this strategic approach: 
promoting the responsible and peaceful use of space, enhancing 
the resilience of DOD space architectures, partnering with 
like-minded nations in international organizations and 
commercial firms, and deterring aggression and defeating 
attacks while preparing to operate in a degraded environment.
    My testimony describes these in specific details. I look 
forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Loverro can be found in the 
Appendix on page 66.]
    Mr. Rogers. Thank you. Ms. Sapp, you are recognized.

 STATEMENT OF BETTY J. SAPP, DIRECTOR, NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE 
                             OFFICE

    Ms. Sapp. Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Cooper, and other 
distinguished members of the committee, I am pleased to appear 
before you today on behalf of the NRO. It is a real honor for 
me to appear today beside my DOD partners. I would like to 
begin with a few words about the state of the NRO today.
    Last year, our acquisition program successfully delivered 
and launched two new satellites into orbit. We are on track to 
continue our launch and acquisition success this year. We have 
one launch that we have done and three more to go.
    Our research and development program has done equally well, 
allowing us revolutionary increases in collection capability at 
risk levels compatible with successful acquisition programs. 
For the fifth year in a row, the NRO received a clean audit 
opinion on our financial statements, further proof of our 
commitment to excellence and conscientious stewardship of 
taxpayer dollars.
    Lastly, I would like to highlight the real bottom line for 
the NRO, our support to the warfighter. The NRO provides a wide 
array of focused capabilities to help solve specific critical 
ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] needs for 
the DOD. This past year, the NRO deployed a high-altitude 
system known as HALO to support three-dimensional, high-
resolution mapping of geographically restricted areas in 
Afghanistan. HALO flew 65 missions between September and 
December, collecting over 72,000 square kilometers of 
precision, wide-area mapping data, with an accuracy of 20 to 40 
centimeters.
    HALO gave intel analysts potential insurgent routes and 
operational planners a precise terrain data necessary to 
develop force protection and interdiction missions. HALO is 
just one example of the NRO services, products, and tools 
directly contributing to the highest priority missions across 
the Department. And I am extremely proud of the critical 
contributions our systems and our personnel provide on a daily 
basis.
    The tremendous successes we have enjoyed in acquisition, 
launch, R&D [research and development], and in critical mission 
support activities are a testament to the quality of the NRO 
people. Ensuring we maintain that quality is fundamental to our 
future success. This year we are taking steps toward a more 
stable integral workforce to do just that.
    We will also continue to rely on the DOD and the 
Intelligence Community to provide us with rotational personnel 
who will bring the diversity of thinking also necessary for 
organizational success. Our goal is to ensure that we have the 
NRO workforce that can continue to provide the nation with 
premiere space reconnaissance capabilities for national 
security.
    I want to thank the committee for the support you have 
shown me, and the men and women of the NRO. Thank you again for 
the opportunity to be here today.
    [The prepared statement of Ms. Sapp can be found in the 
Appendix on page 81.]
    Mr. Rogers. I thank you. And General Raymond, you are 
recognized.

 STATEMENT OF LT GEN JOHN W. ``JAY'' RAYMOND, USAF, COMMANDER, 
  JOINT FUNCTIONAL COMPONENT COMMAND FOR SPACE, UNITED STATES 
                       STRATEGIC COMMAND

    General Raymond. Chairman Rogers, Representative Cooper, 
and members of the subcommittee, it is an honor to appear 
before you as the United States Strategic Command's Commander 
of the Joint Functional Component Command for Space. This is my 
first opportunity to address the committee and I look forward 
to working with each of you to advance our nation's space 
capabilities.
    I am proud to represent the 3,300 soldiers, sailors, 
airmen, and Marines, and civilians that make up the Joint 
Functional Component Command [JFCC]. These professionals, along 
with our exchange officers from Australia, Canada, and the 
United Kingdom, ensure our nation, our allies, and our joint 
warfighters have continued access to the space capabilities 
that enable the American way of life.
    To meet the demands of the dynamic space environment, my 
command is focused on three operational objectives: providing 
timely warning and assessment; supporting national users and 
joint and coalition forces; and three, protecting and defending 
our space capabilities. JFCC Space is, and will continue to be, 
the world premier provider of space capabilities, even as it 
faces constantly evolving operating and threatened environment.
    I am confident that the men and women of JFCC Space are 
prepared to meet these challenges with a spirit of dedication 
innovation and devotion to duty, providing the warfighter 
assured access to the world's premier space capabilities. I 
thank the committee for your continued support as we strive to 
preserve and enhance the space capabilities which are so vital 
to our nation. Thank you.
    [The prepared statement of General Raymond can be found in 
the Appendix on page 91.]
    Mr. Rogers. I thank you and thank all of you for those 
opening remarks. We will start with questions now. I recognize 
myself first.
    We all know the importance of the launch, and without an 
effective launch program we don't have a space program. But 
unfortunately we have--but fortunately, we have an exceptional 
space launch program and as we just heard a little while ago, 
United Launch Alliance, their Delta and Atlas rocket lines are 
up to 168 successful launches in a row.
    With that said, we currently use a rocket engine made by 
Russia, the RD-180, to launch many of our most important 
satellites into space. Do you think that developing a 
competitively acquired, next generation engine, available to 
all U.S. providers, that could effectively replace the RD-180 
is important? Start with you, General Shelton, and we will go 
down the line.
    General Shelton. Mr. Chairman, we are studying the problem 
of potential interruption of RD-180 supply right now. Those 
study results will be available in late May.
    And certainly one of the options we are thinking about is 
production of an indigenously produced engine. It certainly has 
it advantages, two that I can think of right off the top of my 
head. One is no longer relying on a foreign supplier. And 
secondly, an increase in the U.S. rocket engine industrial 
base.
    I think both of those would make a great contribution to 
the overall launch program, and I would be a strong supporter 
of that, if we can find the money to do it.
    Mr. Rogers. Well, and that is the point I want to remind 
all the witnesses. Money is our problem. Your job is to come up 
with strategy and how to execute what we need to get done and 
let us worry about the money.
    Mr. Klinger, I know you made reference to this in your 
opening remarks, but I would hear your thoughts in response to 
that direct question.
    Mr. Klinger. Thank you, sir. Excuse me. I think General, I 
would echo General Shelton's comments. I would just add a 
couple of things.
    I think in the long run it is in the interest in the United 
States Government to develop a next generation, U.S.-produced 
rocket engine. That said, in addition to the 45-day study to 
which General Shelton referred, we are going to have to find a 
way to reconcile three different kinds of objectives that are 
to some degree not intentioned, but they will probably compete 
for the same body of resources.
    We, of course, are looking for a next generation--if we 
pursue a next generation engine, it would be based on liquid 
oxygen and kerosene. If you look--as you well know, the 
ballistic missile community relies on solid rocket motors and 
both the Navy and the Air Force are interested in pursuing 
upgrades and modernization to our solid rocket motor 
capability.
    At the same time, as we look to our partners in the civil 
space program, NASA, they rely on cryogenic engines. Because my 
personal belief is that this is a national level decision, in 
terms of a new engine, I think part of the work we have to do 
in the executive branch over time is to reconcile those needs 
with what will inevitably be scarce resources.
    Mr. Rogers. Mr. Loverro.
    Mr. Loverro. Yes, Mr. Chairman. Again, I think I can echo 
both General Shelton and Mr. Klinger, and I suspect you will 
get five echoes of the same answer as we move down the table 
here.
    There is no question in my mind. Our national space 
transportation policy and the policy of the U.S. encourage us 
to have U.S. domestic launch capability and that just doesn't 
say half of or part of it. It says U.S. domestic launch 
capability. I don't think you can meet that policy and not face 
the question of having domestically produced a engine in this 
nation.
    I think we need to find a way to do that. It is a critical 
space industrial based thing for the long term. Not just for 
the short term, but for the long term. And it is critical to 
make sure that we maintain a secure supply of equipment like 
this as we have seen in recent months.
    So, I very much support the notion that we need to do this. 
Clearly it is a balancing of resources. I think that there are 
many, many ways to address this issue from a funding 
perspective, some that you have mentioned. Other ways to do 
this industrially. There is not just one company who is reliant 
on Russian engines; there are many.
    And there are at least several agencies of the U.S. 
Government who are so interested. So we certainly believe that 
this is something we need to address.
    Mr. Rogers. Great. Ms. Sapp.
    Ms. Sapp. As Doug said, I am one of those agencies that is 
very interested. I obviously buy ULA [United Launch Alliance] 
boosters and I buy those through the Air Force. So we count on 
the Air Force to have those available for us. We have all 
recognized that the RD-180 is a vulnerability, a risk. We have 
known for quite some time. And certainly we would all feel 
better if that was produced in the United States.
    Mr. Rogers. General Raymond, I won't burden you with this 
one because you are a user. But I do appreciate those comments. 
And I did expect all of y'all to make that response. But it is 
important for us to put on the record that people in your 
positions acknowledge this is something that is important for 
us to do as a nation.
    Next, I want to talk about the acquisition strategy for the 
Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle program. I understand that 
there are two elements of this strategy in the near term. There 
is a block buy contract with ULA as well as opportunities for 
competition with new entrants.
    General Shelton, can you tell us why the program is 
currently structured the way it is, the current status, and the 
benefits to this approach?
    General Shelton. Mr. Chairman, it is pretty simple. It is 
constructed this way because that was the most cost effective 
way to go at launch capability. We have got to have a way to 
get national security payloads into space. We want to make it 
more affordable.
    So the first phase of this program was intended to give 
United Launch Alliance the only certified provider, the only 
capability of getting the full suite of national security 
payloads into space. Giving them a launch--rather a business 
base that they could spread out over time gives them an 
economic order quantities with their second and third tier 
suppliers. It gives them the ability to plan for longer term. 
They don't have to take as much corporate risk so they can give 
us a much better deal.
    The introduction of competition was also considered in 
this. We don't have anybody certified yet. Obviously SpaceX is 
coming along, and we will have them certified, we are confident 
in the not too distant future, a lot of work to do before we 
get there, but we think we can get them to certification. Then 
they can compete for a subset of our national security 
payloads, because they don't have lift capability yet that 
would lift all of it. But we will put them in competition and 
it will be a heads-up competition on mission assurance, price, 
and other factors.
    And then in the third phase--really, it is phase 1, phase 
1A, and this phase 2, we will be full and open competition for 
what was originally intended to be 14 different missions. 
Because of the budget pressures we have come under, because the 
GPS constellation is doing much better, we were able to push 
some satellites out beyond the FYDP [Future Years Defense 
Program] and that gives us only seven, maybe an eighth, but for 
sure seven missions that we would be able to compete.
    I know some people are concerned about that. They think it 
is taking away competitive capability. That was budget based. 
It was not based on any reduction of our desire to have 
competition. In fact, we would like competition just as soon as 
possible.
    We think we will have at least one mission for competition 
next year and then we will see what the next few years bring 
along. But it will be at least seven missions.
    Mr. Rogers. What do you think would be the impact of 
breaking up the currently structured block buy?
    General Shelton. Yes, sir. I talked about cost effective 
being the first thing. There is no question that would add 
extra expense into the launch program. And I am talking about 
significant expense. Any option you would consider, if you 
said, okay, we are going to have to be able [to] compete all 
the rockets that we have got in play right now, it is 
definitely going to drive the prices up because, again, those 
economic order quantities wouldn't be there.
    If we were restricted from using the RD-180 engine, that 
would drive us to Delta only. Delta is a little bit more 
expensive, in fact, significantly more expensive in some cases 
than the Atlas. So almost anything we did to the current 
strategy is going to drive costs.
    Mr. Rogers. Great. Thank you very much. The chair now 
recognizes Mr. Cooper.
    Mr. Cooper. Thank you Mr. Chairman. Mr. Loverro, in your 
testimony, I was pleased to see that you would responded to 
some of our questions last year, and that AFRICOM [Africa 
Command] is shifting a lot of its satellite needs away from a 
Chinese satellite to commercially available. And you state in 
your testimony that process will be complete this May?
    Mr. Loverro. Yes, sir. We have been very aggressive about 
that. I made a commitment to this committee last year that we 
would push as hard as we could to go ahead and make that shift. 
And we have done that, working with AFRICOM, who has been a 
fantastic partner in doing so.
    In fact, I would say they have led the pack in doing so. 
They have managed to find alternatives for 75 percent of that 
communication capability. The last 25 percent they have not 
been able to get off yet, but they anticipate--we fully 
anticipate that by May we will be off that last 25 percent. If 
that changes, I will certainly let you know. But we are on the 
exact right path, and I really want to thank the commander of 
AFRICOM and his communicators for the work they have done to 
support that.
    Mr. Cooper. I also see in your testimony that you had plans 
to move a C-Band radar from Antigua to Western Australia. And 
that would have allowed us to look at low altitude things, but 
I presume not low enough to have seen that lost Malaysian 
airplane, right?
    Mr. Loverro. No, no sir. Probably not. It is not tuned for 
that. That radar right now is being disassembled in Antigua on 
its way to Australia. But even if it had been there, I don't 
think it would have been much good for that.
    Mr. Cooper. Finally, on your testimony, you talk about the 
declassification of the geo-orbiting satellites that will allow 
us to monitor debris at that level. So that would be kind of 
the high version of the Space Fence?
    Mr. Loverro. Yes, sir. Not quite like the Space Fence. The 
Space Fence has a far greater ability to, excuse the 
vernacular, suck up a whole bunch of data and go ahead and sort 
through that. GSSAP [Geosynchronous Space Situational Awareness 
Program] is--because of the nature of how the geosynchronous 
orbit works, it is a much slower process. But it allows us to 
see things we can't see from the ground. And that is to 
identify pieces of debris or other hazards that may exist up in 
geosynchronous orbit.
    Mr. Cooper. I appreciate General Raymond being newly on 
duty here and I asked him earlier today what it was like to 
tell folks who had satellites in orbit that their satellite 
might be in danger from space debris. I couldn't help but 
think, is it appropriate, possible, to even charge for those 
calls on a subscription basis? Because that is an incredibly 
valuable service we are offering to the world for free. I am 
not sure that they necessarily appreciate the time and effort 
it takes to warn them about their own assets. Is that even a 
conceivable thing for the community to do? Because these 
warnings aren't free.
    General Raymond. Sir, thanks for highlighting the work that 
our airmen, sailors, and soldiers, and Marines do for the 
world. We actively track over 23,000 objects in space. About 
1,100 of those are active satellites and we provide warning of 
potential collision between either satellites or debris.
    It is in our best interest to do that as well. Because as 
we have seen in other cases where we have either had a breakup 
or a satellite break up into pieces, it impacts our ability to 
operate in the space domain, as well. So it is in our best 
interest as well for a safe and secure operating environment 
and we do that for the world, and for ourselves at the same 
time.
    Mr. Cooper. If you wouldn't mind, if it wouldn't be too 
much trouble to compile some simple list about who are the most 
frequent users of your services are, that would be a helpful 
thing for us to start understanding.
    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix 
on page 121.]
    General Raymond. I will, sir.
    Mr. Cooper. General Shelton, this is apparently the third 
year that the Air Force has chosen not to support Operationally 
Responsive Space, ORS. So that's presumably money the Air Force 
thinks we could save by zeroing out that item in the budget?
    General Shelton. Yes, sir. This really is budget driven. 
And it is not that we don't support the ORS concepts. In fact, 
what we would like to do is push ORS concepts into all space 
and missile centered system programs. So that should be the way 
we acquire satellites in the future, using those principles of 
acquisition and authorities, using the speed of acquisition, 
using some of those special techniques in terms of how we build 
satellites.
    So we are pushing that across the center. We are doing a 
good job of incorporating those lessons learned. What we were 
talking about was a specific program, separate and distinct, 
and so we have recently decided to go ahead with an ORS--I 
believe it is being called an ORS 5, which would be a trail 
blazer for the Space Based Space Surveillance follow-on 
satellite, and teach us some lessons as we go into the 
acquisition for that program. So I think we are using the 
principles to good effect.
    Mr. Cooper. But this might be a way that this committee--
this Congress could save some money.
    General Shelton. That was what we had proposed, sir.
    Mr. Cooper. Yes. I have no more questions, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Rogers. The chair now recognizes Mr. Lamborn. Oh, Mr. 
Coffman. I am sorry. They are Coloradans, you know; they all 
look alike.
    [Laughter.]
    Mr. Coffman. Thank you.
    Mr. Rogers. Mr. Coffman.
    Mr. Coffman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First of all, I think 
speaking to all of you, I think that Russia is certainly not an 
ally of the United States. They are not a reliable partner with 
the United States. And for us to be reliant upon them for our 
rocket engines is, I just think it is unwise and I think we 
need to move forward with finding a domestic supplier for that.
    General Shelton, the Air Force has proposed to purchase one 
GPS satellite this year instead of two, as originally planned. 
Over the program, how much money would be saved if we purchased 
in a more economic manner as was originally planned, two 
satellites, this year?
    General Shelton. Sir, I am going to have to take that one 
for the record. I can't tell you that right off the top of my 
head. I know that again, one of those budget driven decisions. 
It is maybe not the most economic way to do it. But given the 
money we had available to us, this was the most efficient way 
to get it done, you know, with the constrained top line.
    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix 
on page 121.]
    Mr. Coffman. Sure, okay. Mr. Klinger, did the Cost 
Assessment and Program Evaluation [CAPE] review this and offer 
an opinion on the most economical way to buy those satellites?
    Mr. Klinger. I think the way I would answer your question 
is, sir, that the CAPE did an analysis when we incurred, as you 
are probably familiar, a Nunn-McCurdy breach with respect to 
the EELV program when we came out of sustainment. During that 
time, CAPE did conduct another independent cost estimate.
    We did vet both within the Air Force itself as well as in 
cooperation with the Office of the Secretary of Defense [OSD], 
very closely, the array of choices we had prior to coming to 
resolution of the contract that you are now familiar with, with 
regard to the 36-core block buys. So that was thoroughly vetted 
both within the Air Force and throughout the Department.
    Mr. Coffman. Okay. General Shelton, I think we have one 
launch provider that is certified to carry the entire national 
security manifest. Is that correct?
    General Shelton. Yes, sir. That is true.
    Mr. Coffman. Okay. Do any potential new entrants currently 
possess the necessary facilities required to process and launch 
the full manifest?
    General Shelton. Not yet, sir. SpaceX is obviously the 
Falcon IX version 1.1----
    Mr. Coffman. Okay.
    General Shelton [continuing]. Can go up to a certain level. 
They have got plans to develop a heavy vehicle but that is not 
that far along yet.
    Mr. Coffman. Okay. Would you agree that the new entrants be 
certified to support the full manifest before being allowed to 
bid?
    General Shelton. No, sir. Not necessarily. We would allow 
them to bid and will allow them to bid without that full suite 
of capability, the full lift capability, for all of our 
payloads. So we are happy to compete one satellite at a time.
    Mr. Coffman. Okay. Will new entrants be required to comply 
with the same auditing oversight and accounting rules that are 
currently applied to ULA?
    General Shelton. I believe that is true, but that is an 
acquisition question that I would----
    Mr. Coffman. Okay.
    General Shelton [continuing]. Ask Mr. Klinger if he 
wouldn't mind commenting on that.
    Mr. Coffman. Sure.
    Mr. Klinger. I think the terms of the specific contract for 
a new entrant, since that would be awarded competitively, the 
Air Force would have to decide that. But certainly from a 
mission assurance perspective, there is no question in my mind 
that the Air Force will insist, as would the National 
Reconnaissance Office, I believe Ms. Sapp would agree, on the 
same level of mission assurance requirements associated with 
what we utilize now for the EELV systems that we currently 
have.
    Mr. Coffman. Okay. General Shelton, Mr. Klinger, Ms. Sapp, 
what steps has the Department of Defense taken to improve the 
management of requirements in order to reduce program risk?
    General Shelton. Are you talking about requirements just 
across the board?
    Mr. Coffman. Right.
    General Shelton. Yes, sir. We are very judicious about our 
requirements to make sure that, one, we aren't gold-plating 
things, but also that we don't allow the requirements to creep 
up on us in the midst of the procurement. That is what really 
drives a lot of cost and technical risk as well. So we are very 
disciplined about how we maintain a hold on the requirements.
    Mr. Klinger. Sir, I think both within OSD and across the 
services, we have a number of initiatives going on to improve 
our ability to respond and improve our acquisition system. But 
one example that I would highlight under my boss, Frank 
Kendall, the Under Secretary for Acquisition, Technology and 
Logistics, one of the things that he is working hard on, with 
the services, and in particular the joint staff, is to pull the 
early phases of acquisition of any system closer to the 
requirements development process, thereby enabling an iterative 
process of exchange of information between the users who 
ultimately define the operational requirements for a given 
system, and the acquirers who have to then make that into a 
system implementation.
    The bottom-line goal of this is to ensure that we have a 
clear picture of what we are paying for in terms of 
performance, and where the bright points are where--so that we 
are not paying 20 or 30 percent for the last 2 or 3 percent of 
performance of a given system. That is a work in progress.
    Mr. Coffman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
    Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman. The chair now recognizes 
Mr. Carson.
    Mr. Carson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. For Lieutenant General 
Raymond, has STRATCOM [Strategic Command] evaluated 
disaggregation or provided any position on the issue, sir? And 
how does disaggregation contribute to deterrence?
    General Raymond. Sir, what STRATCOM does is talks about the 
importance about being able to protect and defend our 
capabilities, the how you go about doing it, the architectural 
part of that is more of a services organize, train, and equip. 
And I would offer General Shelton up to make a comment on that.
    Mr. Carson. Yes, sir.
    General Shelton. Yes, sir. There are a number of studies 
underway right now to determine whether or not disaggregation 
is the right approach. It seems like it is a good thing to 
pursue based on the need for additional resilience in our 
constellations given the new threats that are coming into the 
space environments.
    So, hosted payloads is a possibility, disaggregation is a 
possibility, having more reliance on commercial sources, having 
international cooperation. There are a number of things that we 
are studying right now to determine the best way ahead to 
address the new threats in space and also to address the 
possibility of premature failure of our assets, making them 
more resilient is the overall goal.
    Mr. Carson. Yes, sir. And General Shelton, to that point 
sir, as threats to space evolve and become more vulnerable to 
your earlier point, are we planning contingencies for that 
matter where we simply don't rely on space at all? Is adequate 
training an ongoing issue in this regard?
    General Shelton. Yes, sir. In my opinion, there is not an 
alternative that I see, near term or mid-term, an alternative 
to reliance on space capability. We don't get to choose where 
we are going to fight. We don't get to choose where disasters 
might occur. And our reliance on space is so heavy that there 
is just really no alternative out there. So, just like we 
haven't decided to walk away from the airplane because it got 
tough to fight in the environment----
    Mr. Carson. Yes, sir.
    General Shelton [continuing]. We need to figure out how we 
are going to be able to fight through this environment, as 
well.
    Mr. Carson. That is good. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield 
back.
    Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman. The chair now recognizes 
the gentleman from Alabama, Mr. Brooks, 5 minutes.
    Mr. Brooks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have a question for 
Mr. Klinger and General Shelton. I am holding a piece of paper, 
a document that my staff informs me is being used by United 
Launch Alliance competitors to claim that ULA's Evolved 
Expendable Launch Vehicle, single launch costs have more than 
tripled.
    Mr. Klinger and General Shelton, do you agree with how this 
information is being used? And can you describe the vast 
requirements that United Launch Alliance must meet and how and 
why the block buy supported the reduction of costs?
    General Shelton. Sir, I would tell you that information is 
not being used correctly. I would tell you that it is an 
extrapolation of 2012 data up through 2030. It doesn't give us 
any credit for the block buy approach. It doesn't give us any 
credit for the introduction of competition.
    It doesn't give us any credit for the remarkable success 
record that we have seen with this program. It just tries to 
paint a picture of one versus another and it is literally 
apples and oranges from my viewpoint.
    Mr. Brooks. Mr. Klinger, do you have anything to add?
    Mr. Klinger. Yes, sir. In addition to echoing General 
Shelton's comments, I would offer the following thoughts.
    One has to place the EELV program's development against the 
backdrop of the environment in which we are operating. Put 
bluntly, when we started this program in the late 1990s, we 
made a series of assumptions, both mainly about the development 
of a large commercial demand that the U.S. Government was going 
to take advantage of, and therefore defray a lot of our costs. 
And that is why the original costs for the EELV boosters was 
set at a level that was much lower than our current costs.
    But the reality is the following: virtually every 
assumption we made about the world that would come to be 
realized at the start of the program has not come to pass. 
Effectively the bottom fell out of the commercial space launch 
market with the collapse of the Internet boom, because a number 
of commercial ventures that would have placed a large number of 
satellites into orbit, and therefore required a large number of 
boosters, never happened. Therefore the larger burden 
associated with EELV costs was therefore transferred to the 
government.
    I don't believe that the context in which that information 
is being used is accurate. I would offer the following point. 
As my colleagues have mentioned that we are all in favor of 
competition, here is one example had we had competition earlier 
that cost increase, though contextually inaccurate, probably 
would have been mitigated because there would have been a 
greater incentive first for Lockheed Martin, then Boeing, and 
subsequently United Launch Alliance to streamline their 
operations and find reasons to cut costs. In fact, I think we 
are reaping the benefits of the impending competition right 
now, when you look at the new contract that the Air Force has 
signed with the government, about the 36 cores.
    Mr. Brooks. If I can have a follow-up question that is 
similar to the first one. And this one is for General Shelton, 
Mr. Klinger, and Mr. Loverro. The Air Force has signed a 
contract with the United Launch Alliance for a block buy for 36 
rocket cores over 5 years. This was a new approach, rather than 
buying on an ad hoc, as needed basis.
    Can you tell how this approach came about and what the 
benefits are? How much money has the taxpayer saved as a result 
of the block buy? And what would be the risk of breaking the 
contract?
    General Shelton. Let me go at these in reverse order. The 
risk would be significant, sir, because we would have to do a 
significant amount of work--engineering work, probably, to get 
payloads onto a different kind of booster.
    The other risk that would be significant would be cost. 
There would undoubtedly, undoubtedly be much, much greater cost 
per booster in the program, because, again, we don't have 
economic order quantities assigned to that current provider, 
the only currently certified provider.
    It came about because all those things were in place. We 
had one certified provider. We needed to give the industrial 
base some certainty on the business base. So that is the 
approach that was taken and as I said earlier to the chairman, 
it was all about cost effectiveness.
    Mr. Brooks. Do any of the other gentlemen have anything to 
add?
    Mr. Klinger. I would offer, in addition to echoing General 
Shelton's points, I think one measures costs not only in dollar 
value but in this case, from an acquisition perspective, in the 
adverse impact on the industrial base. I don't think one can 
overstate the importance of the benefits that that block buy 
provides to a sector of our space industrial base that was at 
best on unsteady footing.
    And I am not talking about the prime contractors here. As 
General Shelton mentioned, it is the second and third tier 
suppliers, who supply components and subsystems for ULA 
boosters, that are in a much better condition than they 
otherwise would have been, had we not had the block buy.
    I think the short answer to what would happen if we had to 
break that contract, we don't know what it would ultimately 
cost. We know that it is at least in excess of $370 million 
dollars. We don't know the exact figure.
    But what we do know is that, as General Shelton also 
mentioned, we would simply have to probably go back and 
negotiate on a mission-by-mission basis for launch services. 
And our experience, as you know, our experience with that from 
a cost standpoint has not been good.
    Mr. Rogers. The chair now recognizes Mr. Lamborn for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Lamborn. Thank you Mr. Chairman for having this 
hearing. General Shelton, good to see you again. And I know we 
have touched on some of these questions before, so this is 
maybe a little bit of recapping.
    But how many launches has the Air Force done as part of the 
Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle program, how many of them 
were successful? And who was the provider of those various 
launches?
    General Shelton. Yes, sir. We have done 68 national 
security launches under the EELV program. There have been 68 
successes and United Launch Alliance is the provider.
    Mr. Lamborn. Okay, thank you. Changing gears, and I don't 
know who would be the best person to respond to this, but it 
has to do with space situational awareness and JMS [Joint Space 
Operations Center Mission System], and we have talked about 
this in previous hearings. And I know that there has been talk 
about establishing contracts with commercial providers for some 
of the capabilities of JMS.
    So can you update us on how that is working and how those 
relationships are developing, if so? And then I have maybe a 
follow-up on that.
    General Shelton. Yes, sir. We have been very successful 
with the JMS program, introducing commercial software, what we 
call commercial-off-the-shelf software. Two companies are on 
contract right now, AI and AGI, and both of those are providing 
great services to us.
    So we have broken through some of the initial concerns 
about that and like I said, we have got at least a couple of 
providers on contract now.
    Mr. Lamborn. What would you recommend, General, as far as a 
way forward that we can exploit the advantages that using a 
commercial partner, a private sector partner, to reduce risk of 
just having one supplier or maybe putting some of the cost risk 
upon the vendor instead of the taxpayer and the DOD assuming--
what are some of the things you see going forward in that 
relationship? And what can we do as a committee to help out?
    General Shelton. Sir, I think the best thing the committee 
can do is to continue to support the program, because the 
overall architecture of the program absolutely was designed to 
be open and available for drop in and pull out kinds of 
software packages. So we have got this architecture that is now 
ready to plug things in, use it for a while. If we don't like 
that, if there is another thing that comes along, we pull that 
old software out and plug in new. So it is absolutely ready for 
commercial sources.
    Mr. Lamborn. Okay, thank you. And to finish up with some of 
the launches that have been postponed, and this may have been 
asked or described before I got in the room. I was a few 
minutes late getting here because of something else. But, what 
is the status of launches that have been postponed and when 
will they be taken up?
    General Shelton. Yes, sir. I believe what you are referring 
to is there were 14--we contracted with ULA for 36 cores. There 
were 14 missions that we thought that we were ready to compete. 
As we developed the fiscal year 2015 budget, because of 
affordability and because the GPS constellation was doing well, 
we were able to slip out some of those satellites outside the 
FYDP. So they will still be available for competition. Just not 
in this particular phase of the program. So, it is not like 
those requirements go away. It is just the timing of those.
    Now, one satellite is frankly too heavy for the only, what 
appears to be the only additional new entrant to the game, 
here. And another one was reassigned to ULA to keep our 36-core 
commitment.
    So, the 14 boil down to 7 in this particular budget. There 
may be an eighth we can look at. We are looking at that right 
now as an opportunity to provide a competitive opportunity for 
that eighth satellite.
    Mr. Lamborn. Okay, thank you. And Ms. Sapp, for the NRO and 
the important work that it does, is there anything more that 
our committee can do? I am just going to throw a general 
question out for you. Is there anything more that we can be 
doing to helping make sure that you have the resources and the 
assets you need to successfully do your job?
    Ms. Sapp. No. I appreciate the question. The NRO does quite 
a bit to support the DOD and we really appreciate this 
committee's support of the NRO.
    Mr. Lamborn. Okay. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman. And the chair now 
recognizes Mr. Langevin for his questions.
    Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank the 
panel for their testimony and for the great and important work 
they are doing on behalf of the country. I guess I would like 
to turn first to, well, to space launch if I may.
    EELV launch costs have steadily risen over the last decade. 
DOD and ULA have recently cited gains and efficiencies. Now if 
you have already covered this, you can let me know. I know I 
came in late, but my question is why weren't these efficiencies 
and cost savings pursued and achieved before the new 
competitors, such as SpaceX, arrived in the marketplace? And 
how has the potential for competition affected price?
    Mr. Klinger. I think, Congressman, that we did cover a 
piece of this. But I will add to my earlier remarks. I think if 
you look at the start of the EELV program in terms of the 
initial program, we effectively had no choice.
    We were flying out the Titan IV. We had also incurred a 
series of five catastrophic launch failures over a very short 
period of time. Three of those were Titan IV failures. Two of 
those were Delta III failures. So we were in a position that we 
had to create, along with industry, a new launch capability for 
national security payloads.
    The costs have risen, as I mentioned earlier, in no small 
part because all of the assumptions, and the major assumptions 
that we made, that underpinned the original creation of the 
EELV program have simply not come to pass, or turned out to be 
wrong, most notably amongst them, the disappearance of what was 
anticipated to be a very significant increase in commercial 
demand for space launch capabilities. In fact, that is what the 
government was counting on to defray a large portion of the 
costs and the result of which would have been significantly 
decreased launch service costs by virtue of the volume of 
launches that would be provided beyond those that were needed 
by the government.
    In terms of competition, I think it is a situation in which 
we are now seeing the benefits of impending competition 
reflected in two ways. Number one, the most concrete way is the 
36-core block buy, which I think 5 or 7 years ago would have 
been much harder to achieve, in no small measure because there 
was absolutely no--it would have been no incentive at that 
point for the United Launch Alliance to move down a path in 
which it was going to not only be willing to engage in that 
type of negotiation with the government, but in addition, ULA 
would not have really had any incentive to streamline its own 
internal operations because it was a monopoly provider, or the 
sole provider in effect at the time. So I think that the large 
change in the landscape in the last 3 or 4 years has not only 
been the impending, for them, specter of competition, on the 
landscape.
    The other thing is that, I think you are familiar with the 
Better Buying Power initiatives that OSD and the services have 
been implementing. And in some sense, those initiatives 
directed at lowering our costs are bearing fruit in terms of 
the contracts like the one we see in EELV.
    Mr. Langevin. All right. Before my time expires, let me 
also switch to, and General perhaps this will be you or for 
Director Sapp. As we face increasing counter space threats, 
what are the benefits and challenges of disaggregation for the 
space architecture, and how will the Department decide whether 
to apply disaggregated architecture principles to future space 
system acquisitions?
    General Shelton. Yes, sir. We are in the midst of those 
studies right now, trying to determine if that is the 
appropriate response to the threats we see in space. 
Disaggregation obviously spreads the capability over more 
platforms. It is distributed architecture as opposed to 
creating big satellites that would be potential targets.
    And even if you talk about a premature failure of a 
satellite, it would leave a large geographic hole in important 
constellations, such as Advanced Extremely High Frequency 
satellite, or the Space Based Infrared System. Those systems 
that are very necessary in times of conflict to the United 
States.
    So I think those are existential capabilities. I think it 
is essential that we look at survivability and resilience in 
those constellations.
    Mr. Langevin. Thank you, General. I appreciate that. I know 
my time expired, so I thank the panel for being here. I will 
have some additional questions I would like to submit for the 
record. And I would appreciate a response on those. Thank you, 
Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
    Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman, and the chair recognizes 
Mr. Bridenstine, 5 minutes.
    Mr. Bridenstine. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. We spend a 
lot of money on both military and commercial satellite 
communication systems. And I wanted to ask you how well these 
two enterprises, both the military and the commercial satellite 
communication systems are managed? And if there are benefits, 
and what those benefits might be to having a single manager? 
General Shelton?
    General Shelton. When you say single manager, Congressman, 
are you talking about single manager inside the Department of 
Defense, or across the United States Government, or----
    Mr. Bridenstine. So, my understanding is we purchase, you 
know, communications from commercial satellite providers, and 
we have our own military satellites as well.
    General Shelton. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Bridenstine. And between these two, are they managed by 
the same person? Are they managed separately? When you think 
about--I guess my overall question is, when you think about 
procurement, multi-year procurement of commercial satellite 
communication systems is something that I think could save 
money, and enable us to be more productive for the future. But 
I wanted to get your assessment on that.
    General Shelton. Now I understand the question. We are in 
some pathfinder efforts right now to look at the way we acquire 
commercial services. We obviously have, as you said, we have 
dedicated military satellites for what we would call wideband 
communications. But that is not nearly enough bandwidth to even 
support the efforts in Afghanistan, previous efforts in Iraq, 
and really the efforts around the world.
    So, we also go out on what I would call the spot market and 
buy those commercial services. A very inefficient way to do 
business. So our pathfinder is looking at, what if we bought a 
transponder on a commercial satellite? How would that work out? 
What if we went increasingly all commercial and didn't have 
dedicated military wideband satellites?
    So there is a range of options here, and we are looking at 
the full suite of those options, trying to determine what would 
be most cost effective.
    Mr. Bridenstine. When you buy commercial, General, can you 
specify--when you buy commercial, are you buying with OCO 
[Overseas Contingency Operations] funds? Is there a procurement 
program for it? Can you talk about that?
    General Shelton. There are--I think a lot of it is OCO 
funded. But through the Defense Information Services Agency, 
DISA, they go out and procure those services. So some of it is, 
again, just bandwidth demand that is out there steady-state, 
they procure that with non-OCO funds. But the strictly wartime 
effort bandwidth that is required is obviously OCO funded.
    Mr. Bridenstine. As far as a base level of necessary 
communications that STRATCOM can assess will be needed for the 
future, you know, there are challenges, right? We don't know 
where the next conflict may be. We don't know necessarily if we 
are going to have the communications capability in whatever 
region that may be. How do we mitigate some of these risks?
    General Shelton. That has been the basis of providing the 
dedicated military satellite communications capability, at 
least a basis, a worldwide basis, that you can count on. And 
then you could surge from there with commercial capability. As 
we look to the Pacific, there is not as much bandwidth 
available to go after in some of those areas in the Pacific. So 
we will have to have a different strategy. Hence, these 
pathfinder efforts.
    Mr. Bridenstine. Okay. Mr. Klinger.
    Mr. Klinger. Congressman, just a couple of things to add to 
the points General Shelton made. We have an ongoing analysis of 
alternatives that is underway in the Department, focused on 
protected satellite communications to include looking at non-
space alternatives. And the focus of that effort is to identify 
alternatives beyond advanced AEHF vehicle six, which is the 
last vehicle in the existing program.
    We also are trying to assess the viability of acquisition 
options that will balance the need to save money with the need 
to maintain operational effectiveness. And that really requires 
on three things, the stability of the requirement, the 
stability of the funding, and whether in fact there are 
substantial savings to be had by procuring--using a different 
approach.
    You made reference earlier to multi-year procurement. I 
would just note the following: we and the committees continue 
to look at that. But there are some structural obstacles, and I 
would note scoring in particular, not to get into the arcane 
details of the budget process. But finding a way to preclude or 
mitigate the requirement that the Department would have to 
budget in a single year for a multi-year procurement of 
commercial services, is a major issue that we would need to 
work through with the Congress.
    Mr. Bridenstine. Thank you.
    Mr. Rogers. Thank the gentleman, and thank the witnesses. 
We are going to recess. Well, no, we are going to adjourn this 
open hearing. But before we do I want to remind you that we are 
going to leave the record open for 10 days for Members who have 
additional questions that we couldn't get to in this hearing--
submitting them--I would ask you to respond to those in a 
timely manner. And with that we will adjourn this hearing and 
come back after this series of votes, which we should be back 
in about 20-25 minutes, and go to the closed hearing.
    [Whereupon, at 2:59 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]


      
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                            A P P E N D I X

                             April 3, 2014

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              PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

                             April 3, 2014

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                   DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

                             April 3, 2014

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                           Attachment 1:  JFCC SPACE Conjunction Assessment Customers
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                                  Primary Owner/Operator                                          Country
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Aalborg University, Denmark                                                                DEN
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ABAE--Agencia Bolivariano para Actividades Espaciales                                      VENZ
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Al Yah Satellite Communications                                                            UAE
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Algerian Space Agency                                                                      ALG
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Algerian Space Agency                                                                      ALG
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Amateur Radio Research and Development Corporation (AMRAD)                                 US
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AMSAT                                                                                      US
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AMSAT UK                                                                                   UK
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Arab Satellite Communication Organization (ArabSat)                                        AB
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Asia Broadcast Satellite                                                                   RP
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Astronautic Technology Sdn Bhd                                                             MALA
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Auburn University                                                                          US
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Azerkosmos                                                                                 AZER
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Bigelow Aerospace                                                                          US
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Boeing                                                                                     US
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Boeing/USAF/CCAR                                                                           US
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Bolivian Space Agency                                                                      BOL
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Boston University                                                                          US
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Broadcasting Satellite System Corporation (B-SAT)                                          JPN
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Budapest University of Technology and Economics                                            HUN
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California Polytechnic University, San Luis Obispo                                         US
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Canadian Department of National Defence (DND)                                              CA
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Canadian Space Agency                                                                      CA
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Carlo Gavazzi Space                                                                        GER
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Centre National d'Etudes Spatiales (CNES)                                                  FR
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Cornell University                                                                         US
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Darpa                                                                                      US
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Defence Science Organisation                                                               STCT
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Deimos Imaging                                                                             SPN
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Delft University of Technology                                                             NETH
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DigitalGlobe                                                                               US
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Echostar                                                                                   US
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Ecuadorian Civilian Space Agency (EXA)                                                     ECU
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Emirates Institution for Advanced Science and Technology (EIAST)                           UAE
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EOS Creative Technology Solutions                                                          AUS
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European Aeronautic Defense and Space (EADS) Company, Astrium                              FR
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European Organisation for the Exploitation of Meteorological Satellites (EUMETSAT)         EUME
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European Space Agency                                                                      ESA
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Eutelsat                                                                                   EUTE
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FaCH (Chilean Air Force)                                                                   Chile
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Federal Polytechnic School of Laussane (EPFL)                                              SWTZ
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FH Aachen, University of Applied Sciences                                                  GER
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French Defence Force                                                                       FR
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GE                                                                                         US
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Geo-Informatics and Space Technology Development Agency (GISTDA--Thai Ministry of Science  THAI
 and Technology's Space Agency)
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German Aerospace Center (GSOC)                                                             GER
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German Space Situational Awareness Centre (GSSAC)                                          GER
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Gil Moore--Utah State University                                                           US
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Globalstar                                                                                 GLOB
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GOMSpace                                                                                   DEN
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Government of Japan                                                                        JPN
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Hellas Sat                                                                                 GREC
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Hisdesat                                                                                   SPN
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Hispasat                                                                                   SPN
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H ORS-1 Focus: Urgent Need. ORS-1 is delivering capability 
to the war fighter today and is the first dedicated system for United 
States Central Command (USCENTCOM). The program cost was $226M and 
fielded in under 32 months by exercising streamlined acquisition, 
shortened decision-making chains, and novel engineering and technical 
solutions.
    Significance: ORS-1 built the enabling infrastructure with emphasis 
on ground systems architecture. ORS-1 achieved numerous ``firsts'' 
adding fundamentally new capabilities to tackle some of the nation's 
hardest information gathering problems and a first-ever focused 
capability for USCENTCOM. ORS-1 provides superb collection capability 
and USCENTCOM, as well as other Combatant Commands, continues to rely 
on its capabilities as an integral component to their intelligence, 
surveillance and reconnaissance architecture and collection plan. These 
architecture advancements will be utilized for future missions.
    Status: ORS-1 was officially transferred to Air Force Space Command 
in January 2012. The system is operated by the 50th Space Wing, 1st 
Space Operations Squadron.
     ORS-2 Focus: Enabler. ORS-2 is a modular, reconfigurable, 
multi-mission satellite bus developed using a Modular Open Systems 
Approach. The completed bus and its associated hardware (space common 
data link radio) along with the Gryphon cryptology unit (software-based 
encryption for satellite command and control) were delivered to the ORS 
Rapid Assembly, Integration and Test Facility.
    Significance: ORS-2's Gryphon unit was first demonstrated on the 
ORS-3 enabler mission. ORS-2 will establish a baseline for future 
reconfigurable, scalable, and open systems.
    Status: The ORS office plans to transition the system to the AFPEO/
SP.
     ORS-3 Focus: Enabler. The ORS-3 mission demonstrated an 
integrated payload stack for a low-cost payload capability and 
decreased range costs through automated targeting and range safety 
processes. These enablers not only focus on the ability to execute a 
rapid call-up mission, they reduce engineering hours from months to 
days in both cases, resulting in decreased launch costs.
    Significance: ORS-3 demonstrated commercial launch practices and 
addressed complexity of integration of multiple payloads for 
efficiencies in future launches.
    Status: This launch occurred in November 2013 from the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration Wallops launch facility.
     ORS-4 Focus: Enabler. The ORS-4 mission will demonstrate a 
new, cost-effective, small launch capability that includes the 
development of three new solid rocket motors. This will demonstrate an 
alternative launch vehicle concept that reduces total mission cost 
through simple and repeatable processes.
    Significance: ORS-4 is the pathfinder launch to significantly drive 
down launch and range costs and allow more affordable access to space 
for a smaller-scale, modular space vehicle. The long-term benefit is to 
also scale the Modular Space Vehicle to house various payloads for 
rapid development and deployment of space assets.
    Status: This launch will occur 3rd quarter FY14. A strategy of 
transitioning the Super Strypi is being developed by the ORS Office and 
its mission partner, Sandia National Laboratories. This strategy should 
be completed by 3Q FY14.
     ORS-5 Focus: Urgent Need. Commander USSTRATCOM tasked the 
ORS Office to provide a formal assessment and recommendation to support 
Joint Force Commanders' urgent needs compiled by the USSTRATCOM/J8 
staff. ORS-5 will apply the remaining FY13/FY14 ORS funding 
(approximately $60M) to address space situational awareness needs.
    Significance: ORS-5 will demonstrate the tenets of ORS and address 
the guiding principles outlined in congressional language. This mission 
should enable ORS to step down from the $200M missions toward the 
congressional cost goal of $60M. Other objectives include moving toward 
smaller and more cost-effective launch alternatives, use of commercial 
practices, and incorporation of commercially mass-manufactured 
components to lower cost, shorten delivery time and strengthen the 
industrial base.
    Status: On February 25, 2014, the ORS EXCOM approved a space 
situational awareness payload to meet USSTRATCOM-validated urgent 
needs, address rapidly evolving threats and serve as a pathfinder for 
the Space Based Space Surveillance system follow-on. ORS-5 is planned 
for launch in 2017.
    Mr. Rogers. Will these missions provide value to the warfighter?
    General Shelton. ORS-2 will establish a baseline for future 
reconfigurable, scalable, and open systems. ORS-4 will demonstrate an 
alternative launch vehicle concept that reduces total mission cost 
through simple and repeatable processes. ORS-5 will provide significant 
risk reduction to the Space Based Surveillance System follow-on and 
serve as an opportunity to continue driving down the cost and time to 
space by changing how we leverage commercial capabilities and 
incorporating ORS principles into programs of record.
    Mr. Rogers. To what extent has DOD validated the assertion that 
disaggregated architectures offer to greater resiliency, operational 
efficiency, and/or cost savings? What is the status of the CAPE studies 
on disaggregation? Are there any initial findings?
    General Shelton. Disaggregation is one technique being examined to 
achieve resiliency of our satellite constellations. Our goal is not to 
validate merely one technique, but to find the best method or 
combination of methods that enable the ability to continue providing 
required space capability in the face of adverse actions or premature 
failure. Toward this end, the recently concluded Weather Satellite 
Follow-on analysis identified disaggregated alternatives that leverage 
civil, international and DOD capabilities in multiple orbits. We are 
also engaged in analyses of alternatives for the Space Based Infrared 
System Follow-on (SBIRS-FO) and Protected Satellite Communications 
Services (PSCS) capabilities that are evaluating disaggregated options 
within their tradespace of possible solutions. These analyses will 
inform the decision on the most resilient and cost effective solutions 
for follow-on programs. We have yet to validate any particular 
technique as the best approach; however, we are certain that business 
as usual is unsustainable in the face of a growing threat, stressed 
budgets and growing demand.
    Mr. Rogers. There have been major advances in Overhead Persistent 
Infrared with the launch of the Space-Based Infrared System. Are we 
leveraging this capability to the fullest extent?
    General Shelton. We have been exploiting additional capabilities 
since we operationally accepted two SBIRS Geosynchronous Earth Orbit 
(GEO) satellites last year; however, we are still working to realize 
the full potential of the sensors on these satellites. The SBIRS GEO 
scanning sensors have been fully integrated into the Air Force Space 
Command OPIR constellation. They are providing excellent service and 
have already demonstrated capability superior to that of the legacy 
Defense Support Program sensors. We will not, however, achieve full 
capability on SBIRS GEO until the SBIRS ground segment is capable of 
processing data from the GEO staring sensor. This will occur with 
implementation of the SBIRS Block 10 ground segment upgrade in Spring 
2016. The staring sensor will allow SBIRS to begin meeting all program 
theater missile warning and technical intelligence mission 
requirements. We are already sharing un-tuned staring sensor data with 
the technical intelligence community so they can calibrate their 
systems. We will not know the staring sensor's full capabilities until 
we have a chance to operate them following the Block 10 upgrade.
    Mr. Rogers. The National Space Policy, signed by the President, 
states that ``The United States will employ a variety of measures to 
help assure the use of space for all responsible parties, and, 
consistent with the inherent right of self-defense, deter others from 
interference and attack, defend our space systems and contribute to the 
defense of allied space systems, and, if deterrence fails, defeat 
efforts to attack them.'' Can you provide your thoughts on the 
importance of an effective space defense?
    Mr. Klinger. Our current national security space systems and those 
we are planning for in the near future trace their origins primarily in 
response to the Cold War stand-off with the Soviet Union. For the first 
thirty years of the Space Age our systems were designed principally to 
respond to the threat of nuclear war with the USSR. Since the end of 
the Cold War, the space domain has changed radically in fifty years. It 
has evolved from a relatively uncontested sanctuary to a likely theater 
of combat operations. Space has become equally pervasive in all aspects 
of our thinking about warfare and military operations--from major 
campaigns like Operation ENDURING FREEDOM to smaller scale relief 
operations in response to humanitarian crises, such as Operation 
UNIFIED ASSISTANCE to aid tsunami victims. Our asymmetrical advantage 
in space also creates asymmetrical vulnerabilities. Our adversaries 
recognize our dependence on space and continue to think of ways to 
respond to our space advantage.
    From an acquisition perspective, it's evident that existing 
requirements validation, architecture development, and investment 
funding decisions do not account for the attrition, survivability, or 
resilience of our space capabilities in a contested domain. The rapidly 
changing environment, with new and evolving threats, in a difficult 
budget environment, requires a new approach to ensuring unfettered 
access to, and use of, space capabilities for the United States and its 
allies. Space domain mission assurance is essential for an effective 
space defense posture. In many programs the Department needs more 
analysis to implement optimal means of achieving that assurance. In 
order to implement an effective space defense, resilience should be a 
key performance parameter of our future space architecture, judging 
effectiveness relative to its contribution to resilience in addition to 
other requirements.
    In summary, we are undergoing a fundamental cultural shift in how 
we view the space domain. As we begin to fundamentally think about and 
approach the space domain as a theater of combat operations, we will 
develop and implement the required degree of resilience as part of an 
effective space defense posture.
    Mr. Rogers. How can we should change the current system to purchase 
commercial satellite communications services in a more cost effective 
and strategic manner?
    Mr. Klinger.
  Senate Report 113-44, dated June 20, 2013, included a section 
titled ``Satellite communications strategy'' in which the Secretary of 
Defense is requested to provide a 5-, 10-, and 25-year strategy for 
using an appropriate mix of Department of Defense (DOD) and commercial 
satellite communications (SATCOM) bandwidth. As part of the strategy, 
the Secretary was directed to consider the use of a capital working 
fund or other mechanisms for leasing or multi-year procurement of 
commercial bandwidth.
  In addition, in response to FY14 NDAA Section 913, DASD C3CB 
briefed the HASC on March 26, 2014 on a strategy to enable multi-year 
procurement of COMSATCOM services. Key objectives included a budgeting 
approach for stable funding, acquisition pathfinders to reduce risk, 
determination of best value contract terms, and planning and 
operational management process improvements to create the framework 
necessary to devise long term needs and manage for affordability and 
savings.
  In the strategy in response to Senate Report 113-44, DOD will 
address how commercial SATCOM is being used by DOD components, predict 
future demand, identify budgetary sources to fund the contracts, and 
instantiate an iterative process for managing the utilization of the 
purchased assets. This response is currently in final coordination 
within the Department and will be forwarded as soon as practicable.
  DOD recognizes that long-term contracts place the burden of 
defining the contract requirements, budgeting for contract execution 
(and potential termination), and managing the efficient utilization of 
the procured bandwidth on the DOD, not the satellite service provider. 
Consequently, execution of this strategy will require a unique 
management concept of operations.
  The strategy includes specific tasks and recommendations for 
pathfinder projects to test the results of the tasks against various 
multi-year contract methods.
    Mr. Rogers. To what extent has DOD validated the assertion that 
disaggregated architectures offer to greater resiliency, operational 
efficiency, and/or cost savings? What is the status of the CAPE studies 
on disaggregation? Are there any initial findings?
    Mr. Klinger. There is no current or planned CAPE study on 
disaggregation. Disaggregation is one option (as a subset of many 
resiliency options) that is being studied as part of AoA's for follow-
on systems for Protected Satellite Communications (SATCOM) and Overhead 
Persistent Infrared (OPIR) capabilities. There are no preliminary 
findings at this time to report to the Committee.
    Mr. Rogers. There have been major advances in Overhead Persistent 
Infrared with the launch of the Space-Based Infrared System. Are we 
leveraging this capability to the fullest extent?
    Mr. Klinger. For the ground layer, data processing and exploitation 
of the SBIRS GEO and HEO scanner capabilities is being leveraged to the 
fullest extent possible and GEO starer data is already being leveraged 
prior to final calibration later this summer. The program accelerated 
delivery of calibrated starer data for the technical intelligence and 
battlespace awareness missions. All scanner and starer data is flowing 
to the National Air and Space Intelligence Center for data analysis and 
algorithm development. The program of record and Joint Overhead 
Persistent Infrared Ground (JOG) program are delivering the 
foundational communication capabilities to enable and enhance data 
dissemination and processing. The JOG program is also integrating 
starer data into the Space Awareness and Global Exploitation (SAGE) 
software tool which fuses/integrates multiple data sources and already 
contains a mature set of algorithms for battlespace awareness targets 
of interest. SBIRS Block 10 will consolidate mission control into two 
ops centers (one primary and one back-up) in 2016, and the remaining 
Block 20 ground development will fuse and automate starer data for the 
missile warning and missile defense missions in the 2018 timeframe.
    In addition, SBIRS Space Modernization Investment (SMI) funds are 
already addressing how best to adapt the SBIRS architecture as part of 
the overall OPIR enterprise. We are looking at: investigation of 
evolving the current SBIRS design (e.g., simplified scanner); 
architecture studies to understand how best to adapt the SBIRS 
architecture beyond GEO 6 and HEO 4 as part of the overall OPIR 
Enterprise; wide field-of-view (WFOV) staring sensor technology for 
future satellite concepts and technology insertion; and associated 
sensor algorithm development. All of these SBIRS SMI efforts have 
universal application regardless of the specific direction resulting 
from the OPIR AoA.
    Mr. Rogers. The National Space Policy, signed by the President, 
states that ``The United States will employ a variety of measures to 
help assure the use of space for all responsible parties, and, 
consistent with the inherent right of self-defense, deter others from 
interference and attack, defend our space systems and contribute to the 
defense of allied space systems, and, if deterrence fails, defeat 
efforts to attack them.'' Can you provide your thoughts on the 
importance of an effective space defense?
    Mr. Loverro. The United States considers the use of space to be 
vital to its national interests from both an economic and security 
standpoint. Therefore, ensuring the ability to use space for the future 
is of utmost importance, especially in the contested space environment 
we envision. DOD Space Policy (DOD Directive 3100.10, ``Space Policy,'' 
October 18, 2012) describes the Department's overall strategy to deter 
threats to both U.S. and allied space systems by: (1) supporting the 
development of international norms of responsible behavior that promote 
the safety, stability, and security of the space domain; (2) building 
coalitions to enhance collective security capabilities; (3) mitigating 
the benefits to an adversary of attacking U.S. space systems by 
enhancing the resilience of our space enterprise and by ensuring that 
U.S. forces can operate effectively even when our space-derived 
capabilities have been degraded; and (4) possessing the capabilities, 
not limited to space, to respond to an attack on U.S. or allied space 
systems in an asymmetric manner by using any or all elements of 
national power.
    As we examine the specific question of space defense, it is in the 
context of these broad policy guidelines. Our preferred approach is 
deterrence--to persuade potential adversaries to refrain from 
conducting an attack or otherwise compromising the responsible use of 
space. We believe that this goal is best achieved by clearly denying 
the benefits of adversary attacks through substantial increases in the 
resilience of our space mission architectures. Architectural resilience 
ensures the continuity of space-derived services, maintains the 
effectiveness of U.S. conventional force projection capabilities, and, 
married to the stated intent of the United States to respond, 
significantly deters any likelihood of attack. It is my view that this 
is the most effective form of space defense.
    Making architectures more resilient is a combination of adequate 
protection, increased numbers of satellites, service diversity through 
the use of commercial, allied, and wholly owned elements, distribution 
of service nodes, well-reasoned disaggregation, and operational 
ambiguity--all to create a service that can stand up to an adversary's 
attack. These are the same force structure ideas we use in every other 
field of warfighting to help our systems survive in a hostile 
environment and to increase conventional force deterrence. 
Additionally, increases in resilience can be combined with other 
elements of space defense, such as active defensive operations, which 
can provide warning of or interruption to an adversary's attack, and 
the ability to replenish lost or degraded capabilities. Taken as a 
whole, we are confident these measures can defend critical U.S. 
interests in space for the long term.
    Mr. Rogers. How can we should change the current system to purchase 
commercial satellite communications services in a more cost effective 
and strategic manner?
    Mr. Loverro. Although there are short-term opportunities for 
improving the processes by which we purchase commercial satellite 
communications (SatCom) services (e.g., longer-term leases), full 
incorporation of commercial SatCom services into an operationally 
responsive, user-focused, and mission-reliant capability will require 
more than simple changes to buying or contracting practices. A recent 
DOD tiger team outlined a step-by-step approach to addressing some of 
these issues and proposed actions that could be taken in the short-term 
to reduce risks and uncertainties by establishing tools and completing 
``pathfinder'' activities necessary to inform a future strategic 
approaches.
    The team's study found that, based on historical lease data, and 
the recent Mix of Media study, the Department requires at least 3 GHz 
of commercial wideband SatCom bandwidth globally to satisfy its 
requirements through the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP). Further, 
as the Department begins to formulate its vision for a follow-on to the 
Wideband Global System, it must fully assess the operational, fiscal, 
and resilience implications of a more strategic relationship with 
commercial SatCom service solutions.
    Due diligence suggests that near-term risk mitigation strategies 
should be pursued immediately to gain crucial insights prior to the 
next series of SatCom investment decisions. Investment costs for the 
tiger team's recommended pathfinder activities are almost negligible 
compared to expected lease expenditures, and several of these 
activities may reduce lease expenditure costs in the near term.
    But the primary benefit related to utilizing commercial SatCom 
services would not merely be minor reductions in cost, but rather would 
include the array of benefits that may only be realized once commercial 
SatCom services are fully incorporated into DOD's operational model. To 
do so, DOD must identify the right combination of prospective 
solutions, and current and future pathfinder activities are critical to 
that understanding.
    Mr. Rogers. To what extent has DOD validated the assertion that 
disaggregated architectures offer to greater resiliency, operational 
efficiency, and/or cost savings? What is the status of the CAPE studies 
on disaggregation? Are there any initial findings?
    Mr. Loverro. The National Security Space Strategy and the DOD Space 
Policy (DOD Directive 3100.10, ``Space Policy,'' October 18, 2012) make 
clear that just as in all areas of warfighting, resilience must be a 
factor that is considered in developing and fielding future space 
architectures and systems. Although disaggregation has been viewed as a 
promising method to enable resilience, it is but one of several 
approaches we are examining to achieve overall space mission assurance.
    System-level studies, conducted by the Air Force, have indicated 
that for the two specific missions of Protected Communications (e.g., 
the Advanced Extremely High Frequency (AEHF) system), and Missile 
Warning (e.g., the Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS)), disaggregation 
appears to be viable, although further analysis is needed. Those 
conclusions are still being examined in analyses of alternatives (AoAs) 
led by the Office of the Director of Cost Assessment and Program 
Evaluation (CAPE) and the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD/AT&L). Alternative 
approaches to achieve necessary space mission assurance, such as 
defensive operations or reconstitution, could obviate the need to 
enhance the resilience of our space architecture through 
disaggregation, and other means, but these approaches also increase 
costs and are, themselves, untested.
    It is important to clarify, therefore, that the question is not 
whether disaggregation is needed to achieve resilience, but rather, 
whether resilience, through disaggregation, is more cost effective than 
other ways to achieve mission warfighting assurance, or whether the 
value of the mission itself warrants that investment in the first 
place. This is what we are examining in the relevant AoAs.
    Mr. Rogers. The National Space Policy, signed by the President, 
states that ``The United States will employ a variety of measures to 
help assure the use of space for all responsible parties, and, 
consistent with the inherent right of self-defense, deter others from 
interference and attack, defend our space systems and contribute to the 
defense of allied space systems, and, if deterrence fails, defeat 
efforts to attack them.'' Can you provide your thoughts on the 
importance of an effective space defense?
    Ms. Sapp. The NRO places a high priority on space protection, 
though specific details regarding space protection are classified. 
Situational awareness and protection, including the monitoring of 
space, terrestrial, and cyber threats, is a key element of NRO's 
survivability strategy. Continuous monitoring of these elements 
establishes both a baseline of normal activity and changes to the 
baseline associated with foreign counterspace actions. Such monitoring 
and awareness are critical for indicating when potential responses/
actions may be warranted. Actions available to operators include 
various courses of action and concepts of operation that either 
minimize or mitigate counterspace threats. The NRO has key partnerships 
with the AF to ensure that we have the strongest team possible in 
addressing these critical threats.
    Timely and appropriate response to space situational awareness 
indications and warning is particularly important due to operational 
requirements. Because of this, the NRO places a high priority on 
monitoring, categorizing, and characterizing potential threats through 
all possible means, domains, and partnerships. The NRO continues to 
refine a process to better respond to satellite interference and/or 
attack, but these activities are largely classified. In addition, the 
NRO has established a process and timeline for senior interagency and 
congressional leadership notification in the event of suspect or 
confirmed satellite interference and/or attack.
    Mr. Rogers. The National Space Policy, signed by the President, 
states that ``The United States will employ a variety of measures to 
help assure the use of space for all responsible parties, and, 
consistent with the inherent right of self-defense, deter others from 
interference and attack, defend our space systems and contribute to the 
defense of allied space systems, and, if deterrence fails, defeat 
efforts to attack them.'' Can you provide your thoughts on the 
importance of an effective space defense?
    General Raymond. An effective space defense is critical for 
national security and global economic stability.
    Mr. Rogers. Has STRATCOM evaluated disaggregation as a means to 
provide more resilience to current space constellations, or provided 
any position on the issue?
    General Raymond. U.S. Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) and U.S. Air 
Force Space and Missile Systems Center (SMC) are leading the study of 
disaggregated space system planning. They're studying SATCOM as their 
initial effort to better understand the concept.
    The space environment continues to evolve and there are attributes 
of disaggregation which may offer the possibility of attractive 
options; however, disaggregation requires more analysis to determine if 
this will be the best way ahead. Disaggregation is only one means by 
which we may create more resilient architectures to ensure continuity 
of space-derived services.
    Mr. Rogers. How are the warfighter requirements for satellite 
communications projected in the future? Is there a base level of 
necessary communications that STRATCOM can assess will be needed for 
the next several years?
    General Raymond. Combatant Commands, Services, and Agencies submit 
satellite communications (SATCOM) requirements to the Joint Staff and 
USSTRATCOM for validation on a quarterly basis. These requirements are 
then leveraged by the DOD when planning for future Military SATCOM 
systems and by the Defense Information Systems Agency when contracting 
for Commercial SATCOM services.
                                 ______
                                 
                   QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. COOPER
    Mr. Cooper. How will the Department decide whether to apply 
disaggregated architecture principles to future space system 
acquisitions? What role is there for using additional hosted payload 
opportunities? What, if any, additional knowledge is needed to make an 
informed decision on whether to disaggregate DOD space systems?
    General Shelton. DOD is conducting analyses of alternatives for the 
Space Based Infrared System Follow-on (SBIRS-FO) and Protected 
Satellite Communications Services (PSCS) capabilities. These studies 
are evaluating disaggregated options within their stable of possible 
solutions. Hosted payloads also are part of the solution set being 
examined in these studies. These analyses will inform the decision on 
the most resilient and cost effective solution for each satellite 
constellation.
    Mr. Cooper. To what extent have these potential benefits and 
limitations of disaggregation been proven out in pilots, 
demonstrations, or other tests, such as the Commercially Hosted 
Infrared Payload (CHIRP)? What knowledge or lessons have these 
provided?
    General Shelton. CHIRP demonstrated the viability of commercially 
hosted overhead persistent infrared (OPIR) payloads and gave tremendous 
insights into the applicability of wide field-of-view (WFOV) staring 
technology to the missile warning, missile defense, technical 
intelligence, and battlespace awareness missions. The sensor's ability 
to provide continuous coverage within the field-of-view proved to be 
particularly valuable in understanding short duration infrared events. 
Lessons learned from CHIRP will be applied to the Tactical WFOV Testbed 
and other ongoing OPIR Space Modernization Initiative (SMI) activities. 
These explore various space architectures, to include disaggregation, 
and develop/test lower-cost WFOV payloads to assess performance, cost 
and risk. CHIRP also provided many lessons on the benefits and 
constraints of a commercially hosted DOD payload.
    The Space and Missile Systems Center (SMC) also conducted several 
over the air demonstrations in CY13 to explore MILSATCOM 
disaggregation. These demonstrations provided early risk reduction for 
the Protected Tactical Waveform (PTW) which will be utilized for future 
disaggregated protected tactical satellite communications. These 
demonstrations provided insight into the maturity of many of the major 
PTW functions and how they behaved over the Wideband Global Satellites 
and Intelsat. Successful demonstration of the government reference PTW 
over operational constellations proves the feasibility of a low-cost 
future Protected SATCOM architecture.
    Lastly, SMC has several ongoing efforts that will further develop 
our understanding of the benefits and limitations of disaggregation. In 
the OPIR mission area, the Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS) Follow-
on Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) will assess a disaggregated system as 
one of alternatives to the current program of record. For MILSATCOM, 
the Protected SATCOM Services (PSCS) AoA is comparing the current 
program of record to a disaggregated satellite system or a new 
aggregated satellite system. And the Hosted Payload Office, established 
in 2011, is working to complete source selection for the Hosted Payload 
Solutions contract in June 2014. This contract will enable 
demonstrations and pilots for commercial hosting opportunities.
    Mr. Cooper. How will the Department decide whether to apply 
disaggregated architecture principles to future space system 
acquisitions? What role is there for using additional hosted payload 
opportunities? What, if any, additional knowledge is needed to make an 
informed decision on whether to disaggregate DOD space systems?
    Mr. Klinger. The Department is considering disaggregated solutions 
in several analyses of alternatives (AoA) studies, as we endeavor to 
create more resilient architectures. Disaggregation is only one 
solution; however, in the spectrum of solutions that can be implemented 
to address space architecture vulnerabilities in an effort to gain more 
resilience and more affordable capabilities. Similar effects may be 
achievable by diversification, proliferation, and distribution of the 
mission across commercial, USG or Allied satellites.
    Hosted payloads (assuming they are not hosted on USG satellites), 
have significant implications that must be assessed prior to an 
implementation decision. Alignment of commercial and USG development 
timelines, inability to command and control the vehicle, infrastructure 
requirements (user terminals, etc.), and counter-space and protection 
responsibilities of the USG are just a few of the concerns associated 
with the use of hosted payloads.
    Mr. Cooper. To what extent have these potential benefits and 
limitations of disaggregation been proven out in pilots, 
demonstrations, or other tests, such as the Commercially Hosted 
Infrared Payload (CHIRP)? What knowledge or lessons have these 
provided?
    Mr. Klinger. CHIRP was an acknowledged technical success as it did 
provide some valuable lessons on the viability of utilizing commercial 
services for hosted payloads and demonstrated the utility of Wide Field 
of View (WFOV) sensors. However, the Department is still in the very 
early stages of analyzing the concept of disaggregation. The benefits 
and limitations of disaggregation are currently being studied through 
the on-going Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) processes for Protected 
Satellite Communications Services and Overhead Persistent Infrared 
(OPIR). The results of these efforts are not available for report at 
this time. We are also leveraging information across all of the AoAs to 
explicitly address findings related to new concepts of operation. 
Finally, disaggregation is but one tool in the resiliency taxonomy 
which the Department is exploring and we are focused on the resiliency 
of our capabilities, not just individual systems.
    Mr. Cooper. Has STRATCOM evaluated disaggregation, or provided any 
position on the issue? How does disaggregation contribute to 
deterrence?
    General Raymond. U.S. Air Force Space Command (AFSPC) and U.S. Air 
Force Space and Missile Systems Center (SMC) are leading the study of 
disaggregated space system planning. They're studying SATCOM as their 
initial effort to better understand the concept.
    Disaggregation may contribute to deterrence by influencing 
adversary calculations on the cost and benefits of attacking our space 
assets. Making our architectures more resilient--disaggregation is one 
means by which we may do so--enables our ability to deny an adversary 
the benefits of an attack. Other means to enhance the resilience of our 
architectures include adequate protection, increased numbers of 
satellites, service diversity through the use of commercial, allied, 
and wholly-owned elements, distribution of service nodes, and 
operational ambiguity.
                                 ______
                                 
                   QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SANCHEZ
    Ms. Sanchez. How does the Air Force plan to manage this competition 
to ensure a level playing field? How should ULA's launch prices best be 
compared to those of SpaceX?
    General Shelton. The Air Force is committed to pursuing the 
benefits of competition in the EELV program as soon as possible. We 
will compete portions of the launch manifest each year in 2015, 2016, 
and 2017 allowing all certified New Entrants to compete (the 
certification process includes successful completion of launches and 
reviews of manufacturing and launch processing methodologies, as 
spelled out in the New Entrant Certification Guide).
    All offerors will be required to submit proposals in accordance 
with the instructions in the Request for Proposal (RFP), and the Air 
Force will evaluate them in accordance with the criteria stated in the 
RFP. We will seek Industry's inputs to the final instructions and 
criteria by providing a draft RFP for their review. The Defense 
Acquisition Executive will approve the final RFP.
    Ms. Sanchez. Given the risk of future additional launch slips 
beyond the changes that reduced the opportunities for new competitors 
in FY15-17, how is the Air Force planning to ensure opportunities for 
competition?
    General Shelton. The current launch procurement forecast is the 
result of programmatic decisions during the development of the FY15 
budget request affecting launch planning in general, not just 
competitive opportunities, and was driven both by satellite operational 
needs and declining budgets.
    The Air Force is aggressively taking steps to support competition 
while ensuring our responsibility to deploy National Security Space 
payloads into their orbits safely and under acceptable levels of risk. 
We are working early with declared New Entrants to certify their 
systems as soon as possible. We have a Cooperative Research and 
Development Agreement with SpaceX and we have recently added more 
government team resources to accelerate review of certification 
products, data and other supporting information throughout the 
certification process. The AF awarded SpaceX early integration 
contracts in March and April 2014 to support timely GPS III and SBIRS-
GEO integration requirements. NROL-79 is the remaining competitive 
mission in FY15. The AF delayed release of the RFP from January 2014 to 
June 2014 to provide additional time for new entrants to prepare.
    Ms. Sanchez. What is the requirement for maintaining the ELC line? 
Given the growing competitive environment in launch, should the 
government continue to pay for ULA's annual launch infrastructure in 
the longer-term or should the government work toward buying launch 
vehicles like satellites--as fully cost burdened items?
    General Shelton. We continue to fund EELV Launch Capability (ELC) 
to perform launch operations, maintain launch infrastructure (systems 
and expertise) and to provide the operational flexibility and cost 
predictability required to launch National Security Space (NSS) 
satellites. There is still only one launch provider in the U.S. who can 
lift the heavier satellites in the NSS manifest, such as Wideband 
Global SATCOM, AEHF, MUOS, and many classified payloads. Launch 
capability provides us the flexibility to meet mission requirements 
without continual requests for equitable adjustments (REAs) or schedule 
penalties driven by satellite vehicle (SV) acquisition/development 
issues, integration delays, range delays, and SV build delays. In 
short, the ELC portion of the launch business ensures we are 
continually prepared to launch national security payloads.
    Ms. Sanchez. EELV launch costs have steadily risen over the last 
decade. DOD and ULA have recently cited gains in efficiencies. How has 
the potential for competition affected prices?
    General Shelton. The FY15 budget request includes $1.2B in Air 
Force savings between FY14 PB and FY15 PB in the EELV program, and 
reflects the final portion of $4.4B savings for the DOD since the FY12 
PB high water mark for the program. This is a direct result of economic 
order quantity purchasing (36 cores over a 5 year period) while 
leveraging the benefit of competition with the incumbent. This FY15 
request demonstrates hard-fought gains in controlling launch costs.
    Ms. Sanchez. What role do you see commercial industry having in 
satellite architectures of the future?
    General Shelton. The commercial industry has a critical role in 
helping to define future satellite architectures through the 
introduction of business approaches, concepts for communication 
services, and internally developed technologies. That role continues in 
response to the ongoing conversations in support of future commercial 
satellite communications pathfinding risk mitigation. In partnership 
with commercial industry, the Department recognizes there are 
opportunities to develop and procure more affordable, resilient future 
satellite architectures.
    Unified S-Band (USB) and hosted payloads are two areas that the 
Space and Missile Systems Center is actively pursuing to take advantage 
of new developments in the commercial industry. Transitioning to USB 
will allow our satellites to take advantage of existing commercial 
satellite control networks and reduce the Air Force Satellite Control 
Network footprint. This will result in substantial cost savings, as 
well as development of dual band command capability, which will provide 
additional satellite control flexibility and resilience. And the Hosted 
Payload Office, established in 2011, is working to complete source 
selection for the Hosted Payload Solutions contract in June 2014. This 
contract will enable demonstrations and pilots for commercial hosting 
opportunities, the goal being to complement and supplement dedicated 
platforms while potentially providing significant cost savings and 
improved resilience across most mission architectures.
    Ms. Sanchez. Are NNSA requirements for nuclear detection being met 
in terms of integrating this requirement on GPS III and what is the 
deadline for resolving what the nuclear detection payload on the next 
GPS III vehicles will be? What challenges remain?
    General Shelton. NNSA is coordinating closely with the Air Force to 
ensure successful integration of their Global Burst Detectors (GBDs) 
onto GPS III SVs 01-08. The GPS program office is currently working 
acquisition strategies for GPS III SV 9 and beyond.
    Air Force Space Command is working with NNSA to firm up plans for 
the GPS III SV 9+ era. Interface definitions will be defined and 
coordinated over the next year.
    Ms. Sanchez. Given the risk of future additional launch slips 
beyond the changes that reduced the opportunities for new competitors 
in FY15-17, how is the Air Force planning to ensure opportunities for 
competition?
    Mr. Klinger. All launches over and above the 36 cores being sole-
sourced from ULA will be available for competition to all certified 
providers.
    The Department will continue to work to ensure the maximum number 
of competitive opportunities are available to all certified providers. 
The Air Force is working with prospective new entrants to gain 
certification, without imposing potential design or cost impacts on 
existing new entrant launch vehicles, and by providing the launch 
infrastructure necessary to meet National Security Space (NSS) launch 
requirements. The Air Force is partnering with our civil space 
agencies, NASA and NOAA, to identify launch opportunities which will 
demonstrate capabilities equal to those needed for NSS. The funding for 
these opportunities has been provided by our civil space partners.
    The Air Force has also recognized that new entrants will have 
different approaches to meeting some requirements. The Air Force is 
updating these requirements to specify vertical integration, and 
maintaining the requirement for minimum 20,000lb lift to Low Earth 
Orbit for new entrant providers, in order to maintain predictable 
requirements for new entrants.
    Ms. Sanchez. How does the Air Force plan to manage this competition 
to ensure a level playing field? How should ULA's launch prices best be 
compared to those of SpaceX?
    Mr. Klinger. The Department is working aggressively to ensure all 
future competitions will allow certified offerors the opportunity to 
compete on a full and open basis. For the Phase 1a competition the 
offers will be evaluated based on specific criteria developed for each 
mission. The Air Force will ensure a level playing field by having a 
readiness meeting with each contractor prior to RFP release.
    The new acquisition strategy, designed to introduce competition as 
soon as a new competitor is certified and in a manner to maintain 
mission assurance requirements, requires any competitor: to fly our 
most critical payloads to all required orbits; provide those 
capabilities from launch locations on both coasts; provide heavy lift 
launches; and meet the security and mission unique requirements of the 
National Security Space launch process for the EELV Phase II follow-on 
competition. Any price comparison between competitors must account for 
all of these requirements, as stipulated in the Acquisition Strategy.
    Ms. Sanchez. What is the requirement for maintaining the ELC line? 
Given the growing competitive environment in launch, should the 
government continue to pay for ULA's annual launch infrastructure in 
the longer-term or should the government work toward buying launch 
vehicles like satellites--as fully cost burdened items?
    Mr. Klinger. ELC provides the government with the flexibility to 
meet all current national security space launch needs. The EELV Phase 1 
Contract awarded to ULA on 18 December 2013 includes both a firm fixed 
price line item for the actual Atlas V and Delta IV launch vehicle, and 
a Cost Plus Incentive Fee line item for the majority of the Launch 
Capability support, i.e., the associated launch infrastructure 
readiness. This includes Systems Engineering and Program Management, 
Mission Integration, Base and Range Support, Maintenance Commodities 
and launch pad depreciation (the only Firm Fixed Price portion). This 
contract arrangement ensures that the government, in good faith, will 
make every reasonable attempt to lock in prices for the launch cores 
over the 5 year ordering period.
    The future acquisition strategy and contract structure that fully 
incorporates new entrants for future EELV procurements is still in 
development. The government will evaluate the competitive environment 
that exists when the future procurement occurs and determine the 
appropriate contracting approach. At this point the Department is 
evaluating plans that will take the costs currently funded in the ELC 
line and directly allocate them with individual launch service thus 
allowing the Department to phase out the ELC line on future EELV 
procurements.
    Ms. Sanchez. EELV launch costs have steadily risen over the last 
decade. DOD and ULA have recently cited gains in efficiencies. How has 
the potential for competition affected prices?
    Mr. Klinger. The Department recognized the rising EELV launch costs 
and directed the AF to develop a new acquisition strategy that 
reintroduced competition into the program with the hopes of realizing 
the benefits of competition in the form of reduced costs. The AF 
developed a dual track acquisition approach that encourages competition 
and also provides cost reduction by providing the incumbent contractor, 
United Launch Alliance (ULA), with a 5 year requirements contract that 
allows ULA to strike long term deals with their vendor base. This 
longer term contract has the added benefit of helping to stabilize an 
atrophying space industrial base.
    The combination of those two approaches has significantly reduced 
the cost of launch to the U.S. government, with program improvements 
that result in a $3Billion decrease in the new Acquisition Program 
Baseline, which includes extending the EELV program by 10 years (from 
2020 to 2030) and increasing the launch service quantity by 60 from 92 
to 152. It also takes advantage of a steady production rate to minimize 
costs adding stability and predictability for both Solid Rocket Motors 
and Liquid Rocket Engines.
    Ms. Sanchez. What role do you see commercial industry having in 
satellite architectures of the future?
    Mr. Klinger. The Department sees the commercial industry's role 
becoming more prominent in the years to come. We are currently at a 
point in time where all of our major space capabilities are on the cusp 
of re-capitalization decisions and we have the opportunity to pursue a 
more significant role for commercial capabilities. The options to 
implement this include partnerships that add real value e.g. improved 
resilience, to our National Security Space architectures. A renewed 
focus on resilience offers an opportunity and a virtual requirement 
that considers these systems as a fundamental feature of our space 
architectures. Their consideration as elemental to our architecture 
should address not only their capacity contribution, but also their 
ability to bolster deterrence and complicate the decision calculus of 
our adversaries. Over the years we have demonstrated the value of 
commercial contributions in areas such as remote sensing for our 
warfighters, Coalition partners, disaster relief and many other civil 
applications. We now have the opportunity to expand use of commercial 
capability, as called for in the National Space Policy.
    Ms. Sanchez. EELV launch costs have steadily risen over the last 
decade. DOD and ULA have recently cited gains in efficiencies. How has 
the potential for competition affected prices?
    Mr. Loverro. It is my opinion that competitive forces have been an 
important element of DOD's overall strategy to curb cost growth and, 
hopefully, eventually lower launch costs.
    More importantly, a well-managed, commercially competitive U.S. 
launch industry brings secondary benefits for DOD through 
competitively-inspired improvements in launch technology, range 
scheduling process, and a host of other areas, not to mention the 
overall national benefit of bringing commercial launch back to the 
United States. These are some of the primary reasons DOD is interested 
in facilitating new entrants into the space launch business and 
certifying those new entrants as quickly as possible.
    Ms. Sanchez. Are NNSA requirements for nuclear detection being met 
in terms of integrating this requirement on GPS III and what is the 
deadline for resolving what the nuclear detection payload on the next 
GPS III vehicles will be? What challenges remain?
    Mr. Loverro. Yes, the National Nuclear Security Administration 
(NNSA) is coordinating closely with the Nuclear Detection (NUDET) 
Detection System (NDS) and Global Positioning System (GPS) III Air 
Force teams to ensure successful integration of the Global Burst 
Detectors (GBDs) onto next-generation GPS III Satellite Vehicles (SV). 
There is no issue with SV 1-8, as NNSA will provide the payload on time 
to meet the integration schedule for these SVs as originally planned. 
If, as expected, the Air Force extends the contract and buys additional 
satellites, SV 9 & 10 will not have GBDs, but these are not needed to 
have a healthy system. NNSA has begun research and development to 
develop a new/modified GBD to use on SV11 and thereafter.
    According to the approved GPS Enterprise Schedule, the SV-11 
Available For Launch date is in the second quarter of Fiscal Year 2022; 
therefore, the NDS payload would be required in the second quarter of 
Fiscal Year 2020. NNSA development is on schedule to meet these 
deadlines. NNSA, Department of Energy laboratories, and Air Force NDS 
and GPS Space Vehicle teams are working successfully together with the 
SV contractor to determine NDS payload space allocation on the next-
generation GPS III SV. No other known challenges remain.
                                 ______
                                 
                   QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. PETERS
    Mr. Peters. What progress has the Department made to establish its 
Space Acquisition Strategy for commercial satellite services as 
required in the final conference report of the fiscal year 2014 
National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA)? A recent DISA report shows 
that military satellite communications bandwidth demand is increasing 
at a rate of 35% per year. It was surprising to learn that to meet 2012 
military bandwidth needs it takes 21 legacy satellites versus one 
modern commercial high capacity satellite. As the Department continues 
to develop its Space Acquisition Strategy, is the Department aware of 
the new technology that is available for high capacity satellites? How 
does the Department plan to incorporate the procurement of the best 
available commercial satellite services into the overall acquisition 
strategy that is being developed?
    General Shelton. A Space Acquisition Strategy for commercial 
satellite services is currently in work to answer the requirement of 
the FY14 NDAA.
    The Department is actively engaged with commercial partners 
regarding new technology available for high capacity satellites. 
Beginning in FY11, the Space and Missile Systems Center (SMC) has 
conducted several Broad Agency Announcements (BAAs) with the goal of 
better understanding these technologies and integrating them into our 
plans for more affordable and resilient future satellite architectures. 
SMC is executing a pathfinder beginning later this year to procure 
transponders on a highly inclined commercial satellite to meet a 
validated warfighter need over USAFRICOM. This cost-efficient 
pathfinder will satisfy specific mission requirements and inform future 
commercial satellite communications procurement approaches.
    The pathfinder planned for later this year is the first of several 
additional pathfinders intended to incrementally build via a ``crawl, 
walk, run'' approach toward a more efficient commercial acquisition 
process and optimized balance between Military and Commercial SATCOM 
procurement. The ultimate goal of these efforts is to increase 
affordability, efficiency and resiliency.

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