[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 113-93]
HEARING
ON
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT
FOR FISCAL YEAR 2015
AND
OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES HEARING
ON
FISCAL YEAR 2015 NATIONAL DEFENSE
AUTHORIZATION BUDGET REQUEST
FOR MISSILE DEFENSE PROGRAMS
__________
HEARING HELD
MARCH 25, 2014
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
87-856 PDF WASHINGTON : 2015
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES
MIKE ROGERS, Alabama, Chairman
TRENT FRANKS, Arizona JIM COOPER, Tennessee
DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado LORETTA SANCHEZ, California
MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
MO BROOKS, Alabama RICK LARSEN, Washington
JOE WILSON, South Carolina JOHN GARAMENDI, California
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio HENRY C. ``HANK'' JOHNSON, Jr.,
JOHN FLEMING, Louisiana Georgia
RICHARD B. NUGENT, Florida ANDREE CARSON, Indiana
JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma MARC A. VEASEY, Texas
Tim Morrison, Counsel
Leonor Tomero, Counsel
Eric Smith, Clerk
C O N T E N T S
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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2014
Page
Hearing:
Tuesday, March 25, 2014, Fiscal Year 2015 National Defense
Authorization Budget Request for Missile Defense Programs...... 1
Appendix:
Tuesday, March 25, 2014.......................................... 27
----------
TUESDAY, MARCH 25, 2014
FISCAL YEAR 2015 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BUDGET REQUEST FOR
MISSILE DEFENSE PROGRAMS
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Cooper, Hon. Jim, a Representative from Tennessee, Ranking
Member, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces....................... 2
Rogers, Hon. Mike, a Representative from Alabama, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces............................... 1
WITNESSES
Bunn, M. Elaine, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Nuclear and Missile Defense Policy, Department of Defense...... 5
Mann, LTG David L., USA, Commander, Joint Functional Component
Command for Integrated Missile Defense, United States Strategic
Command........................................................ 3
Syring, VADM James D., USN, Director, Missile Defense Agency..... 4
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Bunn, M. Elaine.............................................. 83
Mann, LTG David L............................................ 36
Rogers, Hon. Mike............................................ 31
Syring, VADM James D......................................... 54
Documents Submitted for the Record:
Chart used by Mr. Rogers..................................... 95
Washington Post editorial board statement, March 2, 2014..... 96
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
Mr. Brooks................................................... 101
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Cooper................................................... 111
Mr. Garamendi................................................ 114
Mr. Rogers................................................... 105
FISCAL YEAR 2015 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BUDGET REQUEST FOR
MISSILE DEFENSE PROGRAMS
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
Washington, DC, Tuesday, March 25, 2014.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:32 p.m., in
room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Mike Rogers
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE ROGERS, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
ALABAMA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES
Mr. Rogers. This committee will come to order.
When this President was elected he promised to reset with
Russia, suggesting that the previous administration was to
blame for a negative relationship with Russia as well as the
rising of the seas and various other straw men. To support that
reset, he slashed our missile defenses, which Russia has never
liked. He didn't trade them to Russia. The President gave them
away for nothing. This isn't the third site which everyone,
including our allies, found out about in the middle of a
September night in 2009.
He also canceled the Multiple Kill Vehicle [MKV] program,
the Kinetic Energy Interceptor, and the Airborne Laser and
other programs. He didn't test the mainstay of the GMD [Ground-
based Midcourse Defense] fleet for 5 years. He has slashed the
missile defense budget from a projected $9.4 billion to $7.8
billion in just 1 year. Prior to ever proposing the sequester,
the President cut more than $3.7 billion out of Missile Defense
Agency budgets, and then pleads poverty when it comes to our
East Coast site to protect the United States from an Iranian
ballistic missile program, which the Intelligence Community has
consistently warned could reach maturity by 2015.
If you look at the missile defense budget over time, which
you can do on the TV monitors around the room--are those up--
you will realize that the fiscal year 2015 budget request
proposal by the administration is actually the lowest since the
Clinton administration's fiscal year 2001 budget, which was
prior to the U.S. withdrawal from the ABM [Anti-Ballistic
Missile] treaty.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 95.]
Mr. Rogers. But we have a reset with Russia. And, of
course, today we see the results of this reset on the ground in
Ukraine.
We see increasing signs of Putinist intervention in Estonia
and Georgia. And the President, where is he? He is deploying
additional U.S. forces to hunt down African warlords before he
even sent promised MREs [meals, ready to eat] to the Ukraine.
If you had told me in 2009 that this is where we would be in
2014, with another 2\1/2\ years of what passes for leadership
ahead of us, I would have told you not in America. No American
President would ever surrender our responsibility to lead in
favor of leading from behind.
We are here today dealing with the President's fiscal year
2015 missile defense budget request. We have come full circle.
The President will propose the policies he wants, but he can't
get them funded unless we let him. As chairman of this
subcommittee, I want to make it clear he will get no help from
me. Weakness is a choice. I choose peace through strength. That
is why my colleagues Ted Poe and Joe Heck join me in
introducing a bicameral resolution with Senator Rubio calling
on the President to declare Russia to be in violation of the
INF [Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces] Treaty, something we
have reportedly known about for years.
We simply cannot allow Vladimir Putin to continue to think
he can get away with whatever he wants without consequences, as
he is doing today in Ukraine and elsewhere. To the witnesses,
let me be clear these remarks and my concerns do not rest with
you. Admiral and General, your lifetime of service is a credit
to your Nation and we owe you a debt of gratitude to you and
your families. Ms. Bunn, I have reviewed your bio and know that
you are here today out of a sense of service to our Nation, and
I thank you.
But the present trajectory is all too reminiscent to me of
earlier years of failed leadership and retrenchment. My reading
of history informs me that each previous era was followed
quickly by a devastating, and likely avoidable, war. I don't
know that this time will be any different, but with unanimous
consent I will add my full statement for the record.
And with that, I recognize my good friend and colleague,
Mr. Cooper, from Tennessee.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Rogers can be found in the
Appendix on page 31.]
STATEMENT OF HON. JIM COOPER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM TENNESSEE,
RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES
Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thought you sounded
better with the mic off.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Cooper. And I am very glad that you did not read your
entire statement. Because if it was like what we heard, I only
shudder at the consequences. This must be an election year. I
thought that statement, from my good friend, was needlessly
alarmist and partisan. You know, I yearn for the days when
Americans pulled together and politics stopped at the water's
edge, especially in moments of uncertainty and some crisis
around the world.
I think it is a serious mistake to just have a political
policy of blaming everything on the President. I hope that the
chairman read the memo. Because in the committee memo it says
things like phase four of the planned deployment of 2020 is now
terminated. And the committee's own memo says as a result of
congressional budget actions. The President can be faulted for
many things, but some parts of the missile defense budget are
actually increased substantially.
And for the chairman to blame sequestration on the
President, saying that he proposed it, sequestration was never
intended to go into effect. The congressional supercommittee
was supposed to come up with a sensible solution to our budget
problems, and yet we still have no solution. So regardless of
the needless partisan fighting here, I think it is a mistake to
make broadside charges, like the President virtually ignoring
threats around the world. Give me a break.
We are all Americans, we all want a stronger country, we
all want a strong missile defense, and we all should pay for
it. So I hope my colleagues, particularly on the majority side,
will help us figure out to pay for the defense they brag about
so much. Because we have short-funded defense for a long time,
and also hamstrung the Pentagon by not allowing the Pentagon
the flexibility to put money where it needs to be put.
So I hate to make a statement like this, Mr. Chairman, but
you were a little bit out of bounds, I thought, in your
remarks. So let's have a better tone for the remainder of the
hearing.
Mr. Rogers. I thank my friend and colleague from Tennessee.
Lieutenant General Mann, you are recognized for your
opening statement.
STATEMENT OF LTG DAVID L. MANN, USA, COMMANDER, JOINT
FUNCTIONAL COMPONENT COMMAND FOR INTEGRATED MISSILE DEFENSE,
UNITED STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND
General Mann. Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Cooper, other
members of the subcommittee, thank you for your continued
support of our soldiers, civilians, and their families. This is
my first appearance before this subcommittee, and it is an
honor to appear before you today to discuss the importance of
missile defense for our Nation and the need to maintain these
capabilities in the face of a maturing threat and declining
budgets.
Today, I would like to briefly discuss global missile
defense operations in the Space and Missile Defense Command/
Army Forces Strategic Command's role as a force provider. To
accomplish our assigned missions, we have three core tasks.
First, to provide trained and ready missile defense forces
today. Secondly, to build future missile defense forces and
capabilities for tomorrow. And third, to develop future
technologies for the day after tomorrow.
In addition, I would like to outline the role of the Joint
Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense as
an operational integrator on behalf of Strategic Command. We
execute four tasks in support of these responsibilities. First,
to synchronize operational planning. Secondly, to support
ongoing operations in asset management. Third, to integrate
training and exercises and test activities. And finally, to
advocate for future capabilities.
This subcommittee's continued support of missile defense
and of our soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines, and
civilians, who develop, deploy, and operate these missile
defense capabilities is extremely essential. Again, I
appreciate the opportunity to talk about the importance of
missile defense, and look forward to answering any questions
that you may have.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of General Mann can be found in the
Appendix on page 36.]
Mr. Rogers. I thank you, General, and thank you for your
service.
Admiral Syring.
STATEMENT OF VADM JAMES D. SYRING, USN, DIRECTOR, MISSILE
DEFENSE AGENCY
Admiral Syring. Good afternoon, Chairman Rogers, Ranking
Member Cooper, distinguished members of the subcommittee. I
greatly appreciate the opportunity to testify in front of you
today. Our budget request for fiscal year 2015 will support the
warfighter and needs of the combatant commanders by continuing
the development of the integrated ballistic missile system to
protect our Nation, deployed forces, allies, and international
partners from an ever-increasingly capable enemy ballistic
missile.
My highest near-term priority remains the successful GMD
intercept flight test of the CE [Capability Enhancement]-II
Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle [EKV]. In January of 2013, we
conducted a highly successful non-intercept flight of the CE-II
EKV. The EKV's performance exceeded our expectations and
confirmed that we are on the right path to return the GMD
system to rigorous flight testing. I am confident that we have
fixed the problem we encountered in the December 2010 test, and
look forward to conducting FTG-06b intercept tests this summer.
Sir, I am also optimistic we have identified the root cause
of the intercept failure of the first generation EKV last July.
In FTG-07, the CE-I kill vehicle and the GBI [Ground-based
Interceptor] did not separate from the booster's third stage.
We have accounted for the issue in our preparations for the
upcoming flight test, and are working towards a correction to
the entire fleet before the end of this year.
With this budget, we will maintain our commitment to build
out homeland defenses from 30 to 44 GBIs, and take steps
significantly to redirect the GMD program and up our homeland
defense. In 2015, we will begin to redesign and approve the GBI
EKV. The new EKVs will be more producable, testable, reliable,
cost-effective, and eventually replace the kill vehicle used in
our GBI fleet. Because we believe that improving our
discrimination capability will improve the overall performance
of our existing homeland defense we will begin development of
long-range discriminating radar, with deployment planned in
2020.
The new long-range, mid-course tracking radar will provide
persistent coverage and improved discrimination capabilities
against threats to the homeland from the Pacific theater. Our
budget request continues our strong support of regional defense
initiatives, and includes investments in our future advanced
capabilities. Continuing efforts to improve the performance of
the Aegis weapons system, we will procure 30 Standard Missile
Block IB guided missiles in fiscal year 2015, plus advanced
procurement for a multiyear procurement request in fiscal year
2016.
We plan to increase the SM-3 delivery rate in the out-
years. In fiscal year 2015, we will also procure 31
interceptors for THAAD [Terminal High Altitude Area Defense]
and, pursuant to our agreement with the Army, fund additional
TPY-2 radar spares and an additional THAAD battery. Phase two
and phase three of the European Phased Adaptive Approach are on
schedule and will meet the Presidential mandate for deployment.
The Aegis Ashore site in Deveselu, Romania, will be
integrated into the Yukon command and control network, tested,
and operational by December 2015 to support phase two. This
budget also supports continued procurement of equipment for
Aegis Ashore in Poland, which is planned to be operational in a
2018 timeframe. The SM-3 Block IIA, under co-development with
the Japanese government, and an upgraded version of the Aegis
weapons system are also both on schedule and available for
deployment in 2018.
We are preparing for Aegis Ashore flight tests at the
Pacific missile range facility in Hawaii this year and again in
2015. In 2015, we plan to conduct 15 flight tests. We will
continue to test elements of the system to demonstrate that
they work before they are fielded. Our advanced technology
investments will enable us to deploy a future BMDS [Ballistic
Missile Defense System] architecture more capable of
discriminating and killing reentry vehicles with a high degree
of confidence. It is vital that we provide the warfighters the
most advanced, cost-effective, and reliable weapons systems
they need to do their jobs.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to the committee's
questions.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Syring can be found in
the Appendix on page 54.]
Mr. Rogers. I thank you, Admiral.
And Ms. Bunn, the floor is yours to summarize your
statement.
STATEMENT OF M. ELAINE BUNN, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR NUCLEAR AND MISSILE DEFENSE POLICY, DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
Ms. Bunn. Thank you, Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member
Cooper, distinguished members of the subcommittee. Thank you
for the opportunity to testify today on the Department's fiscal
year 2015 budget request. And I do want to thank all of you for
your contributions in providing for the common defense.
Missile defense is a critical national security priority,
both for the protection of the United States and for the
defense of our deployed forces and our allies. I would like to
submit my full written statement for the record, but I will
highlight a few key points now, if I could.
Our first missile defense policy priority is the defense of
the United States against the threat of limited ballistic
missile attack. We currently have coverage of the U.S. homeland
against potential ICBM attacks from states like North Korea and
Iran. To ensure that we stay ahead of the threat, we are taking
several steps to strengthen our homeland defense posture. We
are deploying 14 additional interceptors in Alaska and a second
missile defense radar to Japan, and requesting funding for the
development of a radar that, when it is deployed in Alaska,
will provide persistent sensor coverage and improved
discrimination capabilities against threats to the homeland
from North Korea.
Also for homeland defense, as Admiral Syring mentioned we
are initiating a redesign of the kill vehicle for the Ground-
based Interceptor. Investment in the next generation kill
vehicle for the GBI is especially important, considering the
issues associated with the current kill vehicles that were
discovered during testing. As directed by Congress, MDA
[Missile Defense Agency] is also evaluating four potential
locations in the United States for additional interceptors.
Conducting the evaluation and the associated environmental
impact statement process will shorten the construction
timelines associated with deployment of a new missile site. We
have not made a decision to build an additional missile field
in the United States. While an additional missile defense site
could be used to improve our homeland defenses in the future,
our highest funding priorities are focused on improving
interceptor reliability and performance along with improving
sensor coverage and discrimination for homeland defense.
Strengthening our regional missile defense posture is also
a key policy priority. We are continuing to implement regional
missile defenses that are tailored to Europe, to the Middle
East, to Asia-Pacific. Our focus is on developing and fielding
capabilities that are mobile and capable of being redeployed,
as necessary, to address the threat. We are also encouraging
our allies and partners to acquire missile defenses and to
strengthen operational missile defense cooperation.
Our missile defense deployments to Europe are especially
important for reassuring allies of our commitment to the
security of the NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization]
Alliance. We already maintain a missile defense ship presence
in the eastern Mediterranean, along with a radar deployed in
Turkey; those have been there since 2011. And our plans to
deploy Aegis Ashore sites to Romania in 2015 and Poland in 2018
are, as Admiral Syring said, on schedule.
With regard to talks with Russia on transparency and
cooperation, Russia's intervention in Ukraine, in violation of
international law, led to the suspension of our military-to-
military dialogues, including DOD [Department of Defense]
civilians. And we have subsequently not continued to engage
Russia on the topic of missile defense.
In summary, we have made very significant progress
deploying missile defenses and cooperating with allies and
partners, but we cannot afford to stand still. The President's
budget request reflects our goal of retaining the flexibility
to adjust and enhance our defenses as the threat and
technologies evolve. Thank you for inviting me here today.
And I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Bunn can be found in the
Appendix on page 83.]
Mr. Rogers. I thank you, Ms. Bunn. And I will start off
with the questions.
Admiral Syring, I am concerned with Russia's behavior
threatening our allies, including the illegal invasion of
Ukraine and its violation of the INF Treaty. Are you concerned
about those things?
Admiral Syring. Yes, sir.
Mr. Rogers. Can you tell me what is the organic capability
of the Aegis Ashore to detect cruise missiles?
Admiral Syring. It is currently not configured for cruise
missiles. It is configured against the ballistic missile
defense threat.
Mr. Rogers. What would be the capability if we deployed the
SM-2s and the SM-6s at those sites, in addition to the SM-3s?
Admiral Syring. Again, sir, it hasn't been designed for the
SM-2. As you know, we have a seaborne capability with SM-2s and
SM-6s that is possible. Sir, I would have to defer to Policy or
State Department on that needed capability.
Mr. Rogers. What is the functional difference?
Admiral Syring. Essentially, the software, with a minor
hardware addition.
Mr. Rogers. You made reference in your testimony, and Ms.
Bunn confirmed, that you are on time for the Romania and Poland
Aegis Ashore sites. If the President were to come to you and
say I need you to step that up, as a consequence of the
Ukrainian activity by Russia, would you be able to, if he gave
you the money, if money was not the issue, to step that up and
make it happen quicker?
Admiral Syring. We have analyzed that. It can be done
quicker if money were available. But the budget request
supports a 2018 fielding at this point.
Mr. Rogers. Okay. I support the additional funding of the
GMD program that you have requested for a new redesigned kill
vehicle and new investments in discrimination. Absent these
investments, however, the GMD system is actually being cut in
your fiscal year 2015 budget. Why?
Admiral Syring. If I can, sir, talk about the overall--I
will talk about the GM program, but let me put it in the
overall homeland defense category. In terms of--you and I have
had many discussions on the need to improve our homeland
defense. And that includes increasing our discrimination
capability, increasing our long-range radar capability, getting
started with the redesign of the EKV; all fundamental parts of
homeland defense.
And those were marked increases in this year's budget. And
the GM budget did go down slightly. But with the addition of
the EKV and the other aspects of homeland defense, I am
confident we are on solid footing. That said, a big part of
what I will do, and have been doing, is looking inside the
fundamentals of the GM program, the first of which was the EKV
development which I recommended and then the Department
supported.
There are other aspects of the GMD program that I will be
looking at in the 2016 budget submission for increased funding.
Mr. Rogers. Are we making sufficient investments to pay for
the life cycle, maintenance and aging and reliability for this
10-year-old system which, as you know, was deployed with a 20-
year design life?
Admiral Syring. Not as much as I would like.
Mr. Rogers. Okay. And finally, Admiral Syring, and then I
will yield and, hopefully, have a second round of questions.
But I do want to ask you, your budget request for 2015 includes
funding for several important new initiatives for homeland
missile defense, including a new long-range radar, new
discrimination systems, and a new homeland defense kill
vehicle. What happens to these investments if the sequestration
returns in 2016, as is currently the law of the land?
Admiral Syring. Everything would be put back on the table
for reconsideration and, possibly, stopped.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you.
On that depressing note, I will yield to my friend and
colleague, Mr. Cooper, from Tennessee.
Mr. Cooper. The chairman and I actually get along very
well. We had a nice breakfast together, talking about
submarines. It is amazing to me that I was blindsided by his
statement. And also, I think, the tone is just unfortunate. But
rather than prolong that, I think it is important that the
public get the facts. Of course, we in a democracy operate at a
disadvantage because other nations don't have hearings like
this and they don't air their dirty laundry to the world and
they don't express disagreements.
I hope that the public understands that, you know, we can
have as strong a defense as we want to have, but just got to
pay for it. Not borrow the money from China, as we have been
doing. And in terms of getting more money for projects, the
Pentagon testified for us, the Secretary of Defense, the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and the Comptroller, that
currently, in the Pentagon, we have 25 percent surplus
capacity. And this Congress, this committee, refuses to allow
the Pentagon to do anything about that because those bases are
located in particular Members' districts.
So people who complain about a shortage of funding, and
then don't allow the Pentagon to prioritize, are people who are
not willing to fund our warfighters overseas and at home,
should stop complaining. This budget--you know, we wish it
could be better, and it can be better if Congress has the
gumption to vote for a better or stronger budget. Left unsaid
in the chairman's remarks is the last three tests of Ground-
based Interceptors have failed, and we have to acknowledge
that.
And that doesn't mean it is a bad program. When America
ventured into rocketry, many of our missiles failed. But we
solved those problems. We are a can-do nation and, as the
admiral testified, we will solve this problem. I hope your
confidence is not misplaced right now because the next test is,
what, in June? So----
Admiral Syring. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cooper. So, you know, I want to be an optimist about.
But the GAO [Government Accountability Office] and others have
reported that, you know, we should--and I think the admiral
supports this, we should fly before we buy. Don't get a pig in
a poke. This idea of concurrent development has stung this
committee and stung the American taxpayer for a long time. So
we want to be as strong as we can be, but there are certain
limits to technology so far. And let's push those limits, let's
make it happen.
Everyone wants to do all they can for Ukraine and the good
folks over there right now, but we have to be prudent and
thoughtful in the way we propose interventions. And this is not
a foreign policy committee. We should be an enabling committee
to allow the Pentagon to have the weapons systems and the
troops that it needs. Someone once said that sequestration was
worse than any enemy attack that had ever been launched on us
because it hit so many points in Pentagon programs that no
enemy could have been that innovative, that creative, that
forceful to disrupt so many of our operations.
Well, this committee has the power to start stopping that
mess if we have got the gumption to do so. So I appreciate the
witnesses being here. I hope that we can limit the political
talk during an election year. Everyone on this subcommittee, to
my knowledge, is for a strongest possible missile defense. You
know, we will make that happen. And quibbling over this or that
does not really strengthen the country.
I yield the balance of my time.
Mr. Rogers. We really are good friends. You ought to hear
me and my wife if you think this is bad. Who is next?
Mr. Franks of Arizona is recognized for 5 minutes for any
questions he may have.
Mr. Franks. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you,
Ms. Bunn, for being here and your contribution to the country.
And Admiral Syring and General Mann, I want to say a special
gratitude to you and all of the people in uniform. I think that
your station in this arsenal of freedom is almost impossible to
overstate in its importance. So many people across the world
may not realize it, but we all owe you a debt of gratitude for
your commitment to the peace and security, really, of the whole
world. And I am grateful to you.
With that, I have to go on record here as associating
myself very vigorously with the chairman's opening statement.
Some of the debates that he outlined not only were on target,
in my judgment, but far preceded any election year. And
sometimes the importance of facing mistakes presently is to,
hopefully, prevent repeating them. And so I want to go on
record that way.
Admiral Syring, today we see the smallest budget request
for missile defense in the 5 years that this President has
submitted a budget to Congress. And if one were only to look
objectively at our budget, I think he or she would think that
the world is much more safe and that the ballistic missile
proliferation is not rampant and at historic levels. But
putting aside my own personal feelings about what I believe to
be an extremely dangerous trend, I am curious about the future
of ballistic missile defense.
We have a request for only $13 million for directed-energy
technology. And can you tell the committee what other promising
technologies the agency is working on, and what is the best
hedge strategy, and what about the amounts we are spending
today for limited ballistic missile defense? And how we best
can prepare for the future to include the new EKV and the MKV.
Admiral Syring. Sir, let me cover all that at once. And I
will string this together in a coherent explanation. The $13
million that you spoke about is really the work that is going
on at the two facilities that are doing our experimentation:
MIT [Massachusetts Institute of Technology] Lincoln Lab, and
DARPA [Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency], which are
teamed; and then Lawrence Livermore out on the West Coast. They
are working on two very promising technologies in the solid-
state laser arena.
And it is technology, it is high-end technology. To do what
they are doing, with an eye towards someday how do you package
that into something that could be put into an airborne platform
or a sea-based platform, it is a very, very difficult problem.
They are both making progress. The DPALs--diode-pumped alkali
laser system--out at Livermore is tested to 4 kilowatts. It
will be to 10 kilowatts by the end of 2015.
MIT has made a little bit more progress, but for a
different reason--and I will explain that--is at 20 kilowatts
with a plan to scale to 30 by the end of--30 kilowatts by the
end of 2015. It is somewhat paced by funding, unfortunately.
But the reality of the budget is such that the technology is
moving in line with where the budget is in terms of technology
can only move so fast. We could go faster, but we are moving at
the pace of demonstration, at this point.
It is new inventions. It is critical to where we want to
be, both for discrimination technology in terms of being in the
hundreds of kilowatt regime, to the high-end, high-power laser
hard kill capability, which we need to be at a megawatt, or
higher even, which we demonstrated on an airborne laser. So
there is seed work going on there. There is work, as well, in
the classified arena, which I can't speak today about but would
be happy to talk to you and the committee about that in a more
substantial manner.
Certainly, lasers and laser technology is where we want to
be from a discrimination standpoint. And I would submit, down
the road, to change the cost equation on cost-per-kill on the
hard kill side, as well. So I agree with that.
Mr. Franks. Thank you.
Admiral Syring. There--if I can, just one more, sir. There
is also a lot of other classified programs that I can explain
off-line.
Mr. Franks. I look forward to that.
Mr. Chairman, some of us--and I know you are, as well--
concerned very much about the sequestration. And just for the
record, that was indeed proposed by our President. And there
are many of us on this committee that voted against that simply
because we were afraid that, indeed, the sequestration would
take place. And this makes it difficult, I know, for multiyear
procurement authority.
And related to the SM-3 IB, Admiral Syring, why is this
multiyear procurement authority from the Congress in fiscal
year 2015 so important?
Admiral Syring. Very important for us to get the production
quantities up. You and I have discussed that we, ideally, want
to be at 52 interceptors per year from a manufacturing
standpoint. Obviously, our request this year is less than that.
But I would just urge the committee to look at our fiscal year
2013 and 2014 budget requests, and the timing of those contract
announcements, in total. In terms of in the last few months we
have put 33, plus up to 50, interceptors under contract in the
last 6 months or so.
So 83 or 84 interceptors. These 30 will be added to that by
the end of the year. So in a period of 15 months we will have
put under contract over 100 interceptors. And as you know, sir,
that was paced by some of the technical development problems
that we had with the divert system. And we are past that, and
confident that we are in a stable baseline, and ready for a
multiyear.
Mr. Franks. Thank you, General.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman.
The gentleman from California, Mr. Garamendi, is recognized
for 5 minutes.
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you. I would like to go back to the
directed energy; a significant reduction year to year, down to
14. I personally have thought this would be something that we
should be spending substantially more money on and we ought to
be advancing it for reasons that we have discussed and probably
ought not go into in great detail here.
But I am looking at this, and wondering if we were to move
$10 million from another part of your account to directed
energy--for example, delay the purchase of a missile for a
month, 2 months--and put in directed energy, what would that
mean to that missile program if we were to switch around and
add another $10 million or, let's say, $15 million to the $14
million that is there.
Admiral Syring. Every----
Mr. Garamendi. So which program would you like to cut by
$15 million?
Admiral Syring. Sir, as you know, every interceptor, as I
told Mr. Franks, is important to the warfighter, at this point.
We are trying to get our interceptor quantities up for both
that and SM-3 at rates that we are not yet to.
Mr. Garamendi. Okay, so we don't go to interceptors. Where
would you like to take $15 million?
Admiral Syring. Can I take that for the record?
Mr. Garamendi. No.
Admiral Syring. If I can, sir, just answer the--I will
answer the question directly, in terms of there is a pace to
technology maturation here on both of the concepts that we are
pursuing. And throwing--I don't want to say ``throwing''--
adding more money could help a little, but not a lot. And as
long as we stay on track to demonstrate this by the end of
2015--and I gotta tell you, sir, both concepts are promising
for different reasons--as long as you hold me to that, and I
make the goal of where I said I was going to be by the end of
2015, I think we are on the right track here.
The scaling and packaging is the next big hurdle that we
are looking at in parallel.
Mr. Garamendi. So there is no program--so every other
program is more important than--a few moments ago you said you
could and would put more money into it if you could--had that
money available. So every other program is more important than
this one, than adding money to this one.
Admiral Syring. The pace at which we are moving, and the--
where we are with the experiments and the tests that are going
on, are driven more by the technology than money at this point.
Mr. Garamendi. Okay. You and I are going round and round,
and we are not going to get to a conclusion. But the
information I have is that another $10 million to $15 million
would substantially advance this program.
General Mann. Congressman, if I----
Mr. Garamendi. General, it looks like you want to jump into
this.
General Mann. Well, I would just like to add, as you know
the Army is also involved in directed-energy technologies. And
we have already successfully tested a 10-kilowatt system back
in December, currently about to do another joint test of that
10-kilowatt system in May down in Florida. In addition, we are
looking at taking that technology, which right now has a range
of a little bit more than 5 miles--and it is really primarily
focused against cruise missiles, UAVs, counter rockets,
artillery mortars, and whatnot.
We are looking at taking that technology and, hopefully,
being able to mature it, as Admiral Syring is talking about, to
a 50-kilowatt capability that will give us extended range. So--
--
Mr. Garamendi. Is that--please continue.
General Mann. So I just wanted to add that in addition to
what the Missile Defense Agency is working on we also, internal
to the Army, are also looking at that because of the nature of
the threat out there; cruise missiles, UAVs and the RAM
[rocket, artillery, and mortar] threat that is out there.
Mr. Garamendi. Is your technology different than the two
technologies that Missile Defense is pursuing?
General Mann. It is solid state, it is directed. His is a
little bit looking at a higher level, looking at a different
threat set than what we are looking at. We are really looking
at a lower-level threat set.
Mr. Garamendi. I think there is--we have three different
technologies, then. Raising the question of three different
technologies because the Army wants to do it different than
Missile Defense, or is it something different in the
technology, some reason why we have--why we are pursuing three
different technologies?
General Mann. I would say, and I will defer to Admiral
Syring, I think that the premise of the technology as far as
being directed energy is pretty much the same. But we are
looking at different threat sets. And taking out an air-
breathing threat, or taking out a ballistic missile is a lot
different than taking out a mortar.
Mr. Garamendi. I understand that, but that is not where my
question is going. I am out of time, but I want to find out why
we have three different technologies and whether we might want
to choose one or the other--or one of them, and move forward
with that at some point in the near future.
I will let it go at that. I am past time. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman.
Go now to the gentleman from Colorado, Mr. Lamborn, for his
5 minutes of questions.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And Admiral Syring or
General Mann, how important is it that we keep moving forward
on an East Coast site to stem the threat of an Iranian attack?
General Mann. I will go ahead and start, because Admiral
Syring has been getting a lot of love in here up front here.
So----
[Laughter.]
Mr. Lamborn. That is true. We love him.
General Mann. You know, obviously, by having an East Coast
site it does provide dispersal of our systems, rather than just
being a Greeley or at Vandenberg Air Force Base, having a third
site will basically disperse the arsenal, number one. Number
two, because of the location of the East site it gives us more
battle space or more decisionmaking time for threats emanating
out of the Middle East. So from that standpoint, that is also
additive.
And third, it is more--pardon the vernacular--more arrows
in the quiver. We have more capability, not necessary--or,
excuse me, more capacity, not more technological capability.
And so as a result, we have more of an ability to address a
raid-size threat that might be used against the U.S.
Mr. Lamborn. With that in mind, from the operational
perspective that you just gave us, should we be doing more from
a planning and budget perspective? I mean, the administration
is going along with what Congress has directed it to do, but no
further. Should we, and could we, be doing more?
General Mann. We could always do more. I think if you are
looking for my recommendations, Congressman, I would say that
dealing pragmatically with the budget the way it is, I think
that the best investment for the taxpayer is to increase our
sensor capability and discrimination. That, right there--and
increasing the reliability of EKVs. That is where, if you were
asking for my recommendation, that is where I would put the
next dollar.
Mr. Lamborn. Admiral, do you or, Ms. Bunn, do you have
anything to add to that?
Admiral Syring. The warfighting advantage was well-
explained by General Mann. We, obviously, agree with that
entirely. In terms of are we doing enough, the work that we
started with the four--the downselect of the four sites, and
all of the EIS [environmental impact statement] work that is
going to go on over the next 2 years, is setting the stage for
a decision if the Department were to make that decision. And
that has got to play out.
We are aggressively--we are on an aggressive EIS timeline,
if you compare it to history. And there is a lot of work that
has to go on in terms of site surveys, all of the town halls,
everything that will go on in parallel. I think you will see
the combatant commanders debate this requirement and debate the
need. And I think General Jacoby and Admiral Haney will be in a
good position to address that next year.
I think that we are--I think, as General Jacoby testified,
we are setting ourselves up in time for a decision. And you
have heard me talk about the need to think near-term, mid-term,
and far-term. And I have always characterized the mid-term as
the 2020 timeframe.
Mr. Lamborn. Okay.
Ms. Bunn.
Ms. Bunn. I think it has been well-addressed, and I would
agree with----
Mr. Lamborn. Then let me ask you a question. Are we doing
enough against potential Chinese threats, including cruise
missiles or submarine-borne ballistic missiles?
Ms. Bunn. As far as defense of the homeland, our homeland
defense is geared toward states such as North Korea and Iran.
With regard to regional missile defense, China does have a
number of short- and medium-range ballistic missiles. And that
is part of why we are going forward in the Asia-Pacific.
Mr. Lamborn. Well, and I didn't mean, you know, hundreds of
missiles. I meant a rogue missile or an unauthorized or
accidental launch is what I was referring to.
Ms. Bunn. Yes, sir. We haven't designed against missiles
from Russia or China. But if there were an accidental or
unauthorized launch, we would do what we could to defend
against it.
Mr. Lamborn. All right.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman.
The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Georgia, Mr.
Johnson, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you all for
being here. I would ask each of you to respond to this
question. Has the improved missile defense of ballistic missile
systems made cruise missiles more attractive to our
adversaries? And if you could also just give your--give us your
current assessment of the cruise missile threat.
General Mann. Thank you, Congressman. I think it is fair to
say that cruise missile technology is being looked at by a
number of nations. Nine right now are currently producing this
capability. I think 20 more are looking into this kind of
technology. So I think it is fair to say that cruise missile
technology is something that many nations are looking at. And,
as a result, you know, we also are looking at our defenses
against that.
Right here in the National Capital Region [NCR], as you
know, we are about to put the joint attack cruise missile
defense elevated sensor, that Aerostat [Tethered Aerostat Radar
System] there at APG, at Aberdeen Proving Ground, to do a test
on behalf of NORTHCOM [U.S. Northern Command] to look at how do
we do a better job of sensing an incoming cruising missile and
being able to defeat it, utilizing some of the systems that we
have around this area like the NASAMS [National Advanced
Surface-to-Air Missile System] missile, for instance.
So that is one of the things that we are looking at right
now, at how do we bolster up, in terms of the NCR, our ability
to address that threat. I talked earlier about high-energy
laser technologies. And that is something that the Army is also
looking at in terms of countering the cruise missile threat
that might be out there. So this is definitely an area that
many countries are looking into.
Admiral Syring. I would just add to the general's point
that I--from a ballistic missile standpoint, which is my job, I
don't see any of that threat deescalating in favor of cruise
missile threat. I see these both increasing at a very rapid
pace.
Ms. Bunn. I would agree that we don't want ballistic
missiles to be a free ride for a potential adversary, nor
cruise missiles either.
Mr. Johnson. Thank you. Also, understanding that you are
performing environmental impact statements for four potential
sites, what is the rough-order estimated cost of the East Coast
missile defense site?
Admiral Syring. The estimate that we have gone on record is
in the rough order of $3 billion to $4 billion, which would
include the site and 20 interceptors. Now, that will be refined
as we study, in more detail, the four sites that we are looking
at. And that cost estimate will be submitted as part of the
contingency plan updates that we provide the Congress over the
next 2 years.
Mr. Johnson. I want to ask all of you this question. Is one
successful flight intercept sufficient to give us sufficient
confidence to invest additional billions of dollars in
deploying and procuring 14 additional GBIs?
Admiral Syring. Let me take that, and then General Mann,
from a deployment standpoint, can address the warfighter
confidence with deployment. As the chairman has said, as the
ranking member has said, the last three flight tests are--we
are 0-for-3 in terms of intercept tests.
Mr. Johnson. They were what?
Admiral Syring. Zero-for-three in the last three intercept
tests that were conducted. The history of this program is that
in intercept tests in the GM program it is actually 8 for 16;
15 if you count it somewhat different. The CE-I, and I won't
throw too much configuration jargon here, but the oldest
version that was deployed first was actually 3-for-3 before the
last failure in July. So 3-for-4 of that version.
What we are talking about in terms of that is one of the
three past failures, there were two failures in a row of the
new one, of the new configuration. One failed because of the
lock wire missing, and one failed because of excessive
vibration in the inertial measurement unit. Both very
mechanical in nature. The first one, obviously, quality in
nature. So your point is, if we go and test again this summer
what does that mean in terms of our confidence to continue
production and deployment of the missile.
And I will let General Mann ask the--answer the deployment
question. But if you think about sort of the new version, with
the corrections, was flown back in January of 2013 very
successfully. It was a non-intercept flight, but we put it in
space and put it through its paces. This will be the intercept
test, this summer, of that configuration.
And in this year's budget request there are three more
intercept tests scheduled for 2015, 2016, and 2017, of the
latest configuration. And I would say all of those will be the
benchmarks of confidence for the warfighter to deploy the
system.
General Mann. Congressman, I agree with General Jacoby's
assessment. We have confidence in the current capability. Do we
need to do more? Do we need to continue to do the necessary
testing? Yes. But we have confidence in the operational
employment, the rules of engagement that we would use that
would address maybe some reliability or some uncertainty
associated with the system.
I think what is key is that, as Admiral Syring was talking
about, is that we sustain a make-sense test program, from year
to year, we maintain that. Make sure that has the
predictability that it needs. That we continue ongoing efforts
to redesign or to upgrade the current EKV, as well as looking
at leap-ahead technologies. So don't know if that answers your
question.
But I think that the way ahead is pretty well stated. We
will see what happens with this test coming up. And also, as
Admiral Syring stated, before last summer's CE-I failure they
had three successful intercepts right before that.
Mr. Rogers. The gentleman's time is expired.
The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Ohio, Mr.
Turner, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just one quick comment
in defense of our chairman. I believe our chairman cited the
Washington Post's March 2nd editorial that had the heading
``President Obama's Foreign Policy is Based on Fantasy.'' And I
just want to underscore the fact that the Washington Post is
certainly not up for reelection, and they certainly are not
seen as being partisan against the President.
So considering that they are--that their comments are
consistent with our chairman, I believe that it is certainly
important for him to raise the issues as to how the policy of
the administration affects the issues that are within the
jurisdiction of this subcommittee. I would like to ask, if the
chairman has not, that that editorial be entered into the
record of this hearing.
Mr. Rogers. Without objection.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 96.]
Mr. Turner. Ms. Bunn, we had a chart that was up that said
that this is the budget request for missile defense represents
the smallest missile defense budget request since Bill Clinton
was President. I was reading your bio. It struck me, and it
seems, and I hope I am not mistaking this. But I was reading
all the different positions that you have. It seems that your
position, which now includes missile defense policy, that the
last time that you had a title that also included the words
``missile defense policy'' was the Clinton administration. Is
that correct?
Ms. Bunn. Yes, sir. That was the last time. The first time
was in the Reagan administration, and then the George H.W. Bush
administration.
Mr. Turner. Well, sometimes things repeat themselves. What
disturbed me about that was, when I read the conclusion to your
statement, it says, ``The ballistic missile threat to the
United States or our allies and partners, and to our forces
overseas, is evolving. And we continue to grow and adapt our
homeland and regional missile defense posture and international
cooperation to address it.''
Now, from my perspective in looking at that chart, and
where we have been and where we are going, I mean, we were
going to be at a position where the Alaska missile field was
complete and there were going to be GBIs, ground-based, forward
deployed in Europe. This administration cut completing the
Alaska field, and then cut the forward base missiles that was
to be the third site. Do we have any request for the
implementation of what had been the phase four of the Phased
Adaptive Approach by the administration?
Ms. Bunn. Sir, when I said--talked about the growth, I was
referring to the additional 14 interceptors that we have
decided to deploy.
Mr. Turner. To where?
Ms. Bunn. For the--for homeland defense.
Mr. Turner. Where are they deployed?
Ms. Bunn. They will be deployed in Alaska.
Mr. Turner. But those are the ones that were already
scheduled. So you can't say you are growing something, when you
have cut it and then you decide to put back a portion, but not
all, of what you cut. So my question to you was, is there any
budgetary request that includes funding of any portion of the
implementation of what was phase four, the Phased Adaptive
Approach?
Ms. Bunn. No, sir----
Mr. Turner. No, there is not.
Ms. Bunn. The replace----
Mr. Turner. So we don't grow, we actually only have a
replacement of missiles that the Bush administration had
proposed, correct? You can turn your mic back on. I am not
finished.
Ms. Bunn. Sir, they had originally wanted 14 more. A
decision was made to go toward defending Europe against Iranian
threats. And so that was--funding was----
Mr. Turner. So the answer is just yes, right? I mean,
just----
Ms. Bunn. The answer is yes.
Mr. Turner. Right, right. So you haven't grown it. You
first cut the missiles in Alaska, then you cut the forward
deployed missiles, then you are going back and putting some
more in Alaska. And that is still not a net growth. We are
still behind. You say we cannot afford to stand still. We are
not, we are moving backwards.
I appreciate the analysis that we had on the third--what
the--excuse me, the East Coast missile defense, gets us. And
there are terms that people banter around on validated military
requirement. And I wanted you to help us on that. Because it
seems to me there are only three ways to criticize this. That
there is no threat, we don't need it yet, and money. And I
think we can resolve all those.
But then they throw in this validated military requirement.
Admiral Syring, could you please describe what validated
military requirement is, and tell us how does that relate to
any MDA system for the Phased Adaptive Approach for SM-3 to an
interceptor, any?
Admiral Syring. Yes, sir. As you know, MDA is not under the
JCIDS [Joint Capabilities Integration Development System]
process and the joint staff requirements process. When I talk
about a validated requirement in missile defense terms, I am
think--I am talking about a requirement that is on the STRATCOM
[U.S. Strategic Command] priority capability list or the
NORTHCOM integrated priority list. And if there is a
requirement that is in there that talks to, for example, the
East Coast missile site that, to me, is a requirement.
And we can go back to those lists and we can trace things
that we are building, systems that we are providing, to those
requirements in the capabilities list.
Mr. Turner. Well, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate that our
debate continues to be on the issue of threat and timing and
money. Because I think anybody who has had any of the
classified briefings on this know that the threat is there, the
timing is now, and the dollars need to be placed there by this
Congress. Thank you.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman. And just for the record,
I know I have had this conversation with both General Mann and
Admiral Syring in private, but I very much support directed
energy and I support what Mr. Garamendi was talking about a
little while ago. And if, in fact, it is just a matter of y'all
needing some more money, I hope you will let us know. Because
we may not be able to get you to find it, but we will figure
out a way to find it. Because I think that is the future, and I
would like to see us be aggressive in pursuing that technology.
Oh, Mr. Brooks. He came back. I am sorry. The chair now
recognizes Mr. Brooks for any questions he may have.
Mr. Brooks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Syring, on virtually all major missile defense and
strategic missile programs, such as PAC-3, Aegis, THAAD, and
Minuteman, testing is typically conducted multiple times a year
to ensure ongoing reliability and operational readiness.
However, since the inception of the Ground-based Midcourse
Defense program, testing occurs sometimes less than once a
year. And, unfortunately, testing seems to be driven more from
problems that arise instead of catching issues that could be
caught long before they arise if a more robust testing program
was in place.
Do you agree that the more testing we do on a more frequent
basis would help the GMD system?
Admiral Syring. Yes, sir.
Mr. Brooks. Why?
Admiral Syring. Testing is the ultimate graduation exercise
to the systems that we are fielding. And ground-based testing
is necessary, but not sufficient. Ideally, sir, you are
absolutely right. That we want to be, you know, out in front
and testing the new capabilities, new reliability improvements
that are added to graduate them to the fleet. And that is where
we want to be on an annual basis, at a minimum.
Mr. Brooks. Well, what is holding us back from conducting a
more robust testing program?
Admiral Syring. Technical issues on the new interceptors
was the biggest reason for the delay. And you know when I came
in as the director my priority was to go back and get a CE-I
interceptor flight-tested as soon as possible, and we did that.
Mr. Brooks. Is funding an issue with respect to those
technical issues?
Admiral Syring. Funding is always an issue, and we are
always prioritized. But I can assure you that we didn't go any
slower because of funding to resolve the technical issues.
Mr. Brooks. All right, thank you.
General Mann, please switch hats for a moment to your hat
as commander of space--excuse me, Army Space and Missile
Defense Command. Why is the Conventional Prompt Global Strike
capability important?
General Mann. Congressman, that capability provides us the
ability to strike anywhere in the world in under an hour. And
don't necessarily need to have a forward-deployed element that
is out there to be able to do that. It also allows us to
address time-sensitive targets or targets that are fleeting. I
would say it also provides a capability if we were to enter
anti-access or area-denial environment, where the lodgment or
the forward operating bases may be contested. So it does
provide a capability to be able to address some of those
issues.
Mr. Brooks. I have been informed the Navy is evaluating the
basing of such capabilities on submarines. Do you support that
view?
General Mann. Congressman, I know that, you know, the Navy
is looking at this technology. What I can tell you is, my
command, as you know, very, very proud of the efforts of the
folks there in Redstone as well as Sandia Labs on our
successful test that took place back in November 2011. And we
are encouraged, we are on track to execute the August test.
And then from there, you know, we will take direction from
OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense] as to where they want
to go. I do know that the Navy is looking at this. They are
looking at it in terms of the size configurations and how it
could possibly be placed on different platforms.
Mr. Brooks. And this is a question for any of you. How much
does America spend on Ground-based Midcourse Defense?
Admiral Syring. We have spent--and, Mr. Chairman, if I can
just check this for the record--$24 billion to date, $30
billion by 2019.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 101.]
Mr. Brooks. How about in the last fiscal year how much was
spent? Do you know offhand?
Admiral Syring. In fiscal year 2014 it was roughly a
billion dollars. With all of the homeland defense improvements
in this year budget we are at $1.3 billion.
Mr. Brooks. The reason I mention that is that there was
some discourse about BRAC [Base Closure and Realignment]. And
certainly, to the extent BRAC can be more efficient, that is
something Congress ought to consider. But at the same time, it
seems like that is a drop in the bucket when you look at $750
billion a year that this government is spending on means-tested
welfare or wealth transfer programs.
And I would submit that is a place that perhaps we need to
be looking at in order to help prevent the degradation of our
national security capabilities. Or perhaps look at the $40
billion to $50 billion a year we spend giving away to foreign
entities money, again, that we have to borrow that we can't pay
back to give it away. And so as we are looking at BRAC, I would
hope that the members of this committee and the Members of
Congress generally would also look at all these much more
glaring expenses that, at least to me, are a lesser priority
than funding our national security.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman. And I am impressed,
Admiral Syring, that you remember those numbers, those spending
numbers. That was pretty good.
I only have one question left, and that is for Ms. Bunn. As
you know, this committee, in its report to accompany the fiscal
year 2014 NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act] directed
DOD and the Department of State to provide the full report on
its dealings with Russia on the U.S. missile defenses. We have
a responsibility to our constituents to understand what has
been proposed. Especially when we understand, as was just
confirmed, that the Obama appointees had sought to provide
Russia classified information on our missile defenses.
I understand that the Department of Defense is offering to
brief us, and that may be sufficient. But I see nothing about
the State Department responding. Why is that?
Ms. Bunn. Congressman, when--in December, when the Under
Secretary for Policy came to brief Chairman McKeon and others,
there was a State Department representative with him. He
briefed them on the MDA presentations that had been used with
Russia. We have now compiled others. As you know, you have
gotten a recent letter saying perfectly willing to come and
brief on those, as well.
I suspect that State will be with us. And otherwise, you
would have to ask the State Department.
Mr. Rogers. Okay, thank you.
The chair now recognizes the ranking member for any
questions he may have.
Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would be happy to
yield to my friend from Texas, who has been here waiting at the
hearing for some time, if Mr. Veasey would like to use my time.
Mr. Veasey. Is this the appropriate time to ask about the
missile defense? That is what I wanted to talk about. Okay,
yes.
I wanted to ask you about requests for missile defense
funding. How did that fare in the fiscal year 2015 budget
request?
Admiral Syring. We were successful in the Department
requesting 7--just under $7.5 billion.
Mr. Veasey. Okay. Were your requests prioritized?
Admiral Syring. Yes, sir.
Mr. Veasey. They were. Okay.
Admiral Syring. And I would just add, very strongly
supported by the Department.
Mr. Veasey. Okay, good. Good. Do we--and I wanted to also
ask--and I think that either one of you can answer this
particular question about the left-of-launch. And I wanted to
know, do we have sufficient intelligence to inform left-of-
launch options?
General Mann. I think that is an area that I think all the
combatant commanders would agree is an area that we need to
continue to improve our capabilities for left-of-launch. You
know, obviously this is a policy issue. But in terms of the ISR
[intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance], improving our
ISR abilities to be able to see where threat systems are at or
located on the battlefield, I would say this is an area,
obviously, that we can always do better.
Admiral Syring. I can just add, I think you heard, for the
record, from General Jacoby that he would--that that is at the
top of his priority list is increased indications and warning
capability.
Ms. Bunn. And I would add that we need a mix of
capabilities to deal with adversary ballistic missiles. Part of
that has to do with missile defense, and part of that has to do
with other capabilities for strike. And the intelligence
ability, the ability to find and fix those, is one that we--is
very important.
Mr. Veasey. Thank you.
Mr. Rogers. The gentleman from Arizona, Mr. Franks, is
recognized.
Mr. Franks. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. It has been an
interesting discussion here. And Admiral Syring, I assure you
the last thing I want to do is to keep hammering on you or put
you in an awkward position in any way. But we have, I think,
what is it, about 30-plus Aegis-capable ships and a test site
in Hawaii. And we have Ashore sites coming online in Romania
and Poland, I think it is. They are on time in 2015-2018, both
of those?
Admiral Syring. Correct, sir.
Mr. Franks. And with all of these avenues to defend from,
the fact remains that we have cut more than 90 SM-3 IBs out of
the FYDP [Future Years Defense Program], and more than 20 in
this year's budget alone. And I--you know, I want you to know I
understand that this is a challenge that has been forced upon
you. But in the ways that you--in the way that you feel that
you can, can you give us any guidance to this committee as to
why these cuts should take place?
And can we work together to try to maybe right this ship if
we are under--giving less rounds than we may need, at some
point, to justify--not only justify, but to populate these new
avenues of these sites that are coming online?
Admiral Syring. Thank you, Mr. Franks. As you know--and I
will talk to the total quantity here in just a second--as you
know, we also requested advanced procurement in this year's
budget, which will set the stage for the multiyear procurement
request in 2016 through 2019. And the goal--negotiation goal,
objective--is to get as close to 52 per year through the
multiyear procurement savings, which have to be at least 10
percent, and we are hoping to be more like 15 to 20 percent to
get the quantities back up towards 52.
And, sir, it was a balance of risk this year. And I
explained this; we were late to award the 13 quantity, we just
awarded the 14 quantity. The 15 quantity will be added on. If
you look at those three together it is 115 missiles in a period
of 15 months. And given the other priorities in the budget,
sir, that was a choice that was made to get the homeland
defense initiative started.
Mr. Franks. I don't question your choice at all. It does
underscore the need to try to head off the sequester in 2016.
Let me--let my final question be to all of you here. Just one
general comment. What do you believe you need most from us now?
What is the most important thing that we can do to empower you
to do the jobs that you are so capably already doing?
General Mann. Address sequestration. Obviously,
predictability in terms of funding. And as Admiral Syring has
articulated, as far as priority the best use of taxpayer
dollars, I would say the support for long-range discrimination
as well as to maintain confidence in our GBIs that we have up
there, as well as leap-ahead technologies.
Mr. Franks. That is a really good answer. Okay.
Admiral Syring. I am comforted by your support, by the
committee's support, with our sensoring and discrimination
effort that needed to get started to make the best use of the
interceptors we have, sir, as we have discussed. And I just ask
for that continued support. The second part is advanced
technology and support to continue to accelerate those efforts,
some of which we can't talk about here.
But I agree with you entirely in terms of we can't just
keep building bigger and bigger missiles. At some point we have
got to bring that technology along. And it has got to be
disruptive.
Mr. Franks. Ms. Bunn.
Ms. Bunn. Instead of talking to hear myself talk,
Congressman, I will just say amen and amen.
Mr. Franks. That is a good answer.
Thank you.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you.
The chair now recognizes Mr. Langevin for any questions he
may have.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I want to thank
our panel for being here today. And I apologize I was not here
earlier. That is the downside of this job, you have to be in
five places at the same time all at the same time. But thank
you for your testimony. And I know that was a pretty robust
discussion on directed energy so I won't delve back into that
area.
But I would like to ask a question with respect to
acquisitions and procurement. So in May 2013 GAO had concluded
that despite some progress, and I quote: ``MDA has undertaken
and continues to undertake highly concurrent acquisitions.
While some concurrency is understandable, committing to product
development before requirements are understood and technologies
are mature, or committing to production and fielding for
development is complete, is a high-risk strategy that often
results in performance shortfalls, unexpected cost increases,
schedule delays and test problems. It can also create pressure
to keep producing to avoid work stoppages,'' end quote.
So previous EKV development and deployment have been
rushed, with deployment preceding operationally realistic
testing. How will MDA reduce acquisition risk for the
development of the new common kill vehicle [CKV]?
Admiral Syring. First, Congressman, good to see you, sir.
We agree with the GAO's assertion on concurrency. And we have
taken action to rectify that within the Missile Defense Agency,
where every program today is required to address concurrency in
the execution briefs that I receive quarterly. In terms of what
areas of concurrency do you have, how are you managing them,
what risks do you have and what are you going to do to decouple
efforts, if required.
You can't ever manage in a zero concurrent nature in a
program that is unaffordable and will never deliver. It is a
matter of managing that concurrency and understanding it.
Specifically to your question on the EKV-CKV, I can assure
you--I have told people this--we have one chance to get it
right. And circumventing the system engineering, design cycle,
prototype testing, and qualification will not happen. There is
a very rigorous process that is followed for properly
engineered missile systems.
I have got a lot of experience with the Aegis development
and the Standard Missile, in particular, that history of
following that process. And I assure you that it will be
followed in the EKV development.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Admiral, I appreciate those
assurances. I know the committee's going to want to continue to
follow this closely. So thank you for your work in that.
I will ask one question, I think, that hasn't been asked on
directed energy in this respect to requiring collaboration with
partners. Are there opportunities for collaboration with
partner nations in directed-energy research? And if so, can you
outline what those are, both current and future?
Admiral Syring. Currently, none. There are opportunities
which, as we flush those out over the next few months to a
year, we will get back to you on. But there are several
opportunities abroad that we are thinking through.
Mr. Langevin. Okay, very good. Thank you all for the work
you are doing. I am going to stop there. I will yield back the
balance of my time, and I appreciate you all being here today.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman.
Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Huntsville,
Alabama, Mr. Brooks, for any additional questions he may have.
Mr. Brooks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ms. Bunn, do you know why Dr. Miller, the previous Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy, sought approval to release
MDA's velocity at burnout information to Russia?
Ms. Bunn. Sir, what Dr. Miller asked for was an assessment
of the risk of doing so. They provided that--MDA provided that
analysis, and it was not released.
Mr. Brooks. Why did he seek that assessment?
Ms. Bunn. It was part of the efforts that have gone for
several administrations to convince the Russians that our
missile defense capabilities in Europe don't pose a threat to
their strategic deterrent. The talks, where we keep saying we
are not going to accept limits, the Russians keep seeking
limits. We were looking for other ways to address this without
seeking limits. So that was the reason.
Mr. Brooks. Do you support such a release of MDA's velocity
at burnout information to Russia or any other potential foe of
the United States of America?
Ms. Bunn. Given the risk assessment that MDA did, I would
not.
Mr. Brooks. And Admiral Syring, did you approve a release
of the velocity at burnout data at any point in time?
Admiral Syring. No, sir.
Mr. Brooks. And was that a part of the assessment that Ms.
Bunn has just finished testifying to?
Admiral Syring. Yes, sir.
Mr. Brooks. And why would a foe of the United States of
America find that velocity at burnout information of value?
Admiral Syring. Let me try to answer that unclassified. And
if I need to go classified, I would ask that I come see you
about that. It gets to methods and means of employment that
could be derived from such equations.
Mr. Brooks. And this would be a question for any of the
three of you that wish to answer. Do you have a judgment as to
whether the release of velocity at burnout information, in any
way, shape or form, has the potential to undermine America's
national security capabilities, in particular with respect to
missile defense?
Admiral Syring. In my view, yes, and the uncertainty of
where that information would go. And, my firm recommendation
not to release it.
Mr. Brooks. General Mann, do you have an opinion?
General Mann. I agree.
Mr. Brooks. And Ms. Bunn?
Ms. Bunn. As I said, given the risk assessment that MDA
produced, I would not favor releasing that.
Mr. Brooks. All right, thank you.
Ms. Bunn. Same----
Mr. Brooks. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman.
The chair now recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr.
Garamendi, for a second round of questions if he has any.
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
You are going to be doing another test firing, Admiral. If
it doesn't work, what is plan B?
Admiral Syring. If it doesn't work, it could fail for many
different reasons. And we will go through that as we do with
every failure. An analysis of what failed and why it failed.
Mr. Garamendi. So plan B is to continue to pursue the
current technology.
Admiral Syring. The success or failure of this test this
summer, as I have talked to you, sir, about is in no way going
to change my decision or recommendation to pursue the
redesigned EKV.
Mr. Garamendi. Okay. There was a question raised earlier
about this new missile defense site somewhere on the East
Coast. And I thought I heard one, or maybe two of you--Ms. Bunn
and maybe Admiral--or General, I am not sure which of the three
of you, say that the current array of missiles provide adequate
protection from the present and known threats from Iran and
North Korea. Is that correct?
General Mann. Yes, Congressman. It does provide a limited
defense against threats emanating from North Korea and Iran.
Mr. Garamendi. Now you used a qualifying word there, so
let's go at that word ``limited.'' What do you mean by that?
General Mann. Excuse me. Given their current capability, it
does provide the protection. But we all know that these
countries are continuing to increase their arsenal and their
technology. And down the road, they might reach a point in
terms of numbers, just the numbers of missiles that they could
employ that it could overwhelm the system.
Mr. Garamendi. Okay.
General Mann. Down the road.
Mr. Garamendi. So now the solution there might be to
increase the number of missiles in Vandenberg and Alaska? Or to
have a new missile defense site?
General Mann. Or it could be to also continue to increase
the reliability and the effectiveness of the current fleet,
too. And that would also have an operational employment aspect
to it. And that is the reason why we support the Missile
Defense Agency's current approach in terms of increasing the
effectiveness and the efficiency of the current systems, as
well as looking ahead.
Mr. Garamendi. So there are multiple ways of going at this
problem of increased capability by Iran and North Korea and, I
suppose, somebody else out there that might come along. And
that might be to make a better kill system. One that is more
accurate, more agile. And increase the number of missiles at
the present site. It seems to me the system that you have set
up--correct me if I am wrong, now--is one in which you want to
first make sure you know what is going on.
And this is the increased capacity of the radar systems.
That that is the high priority. Get that done so you know what
is coming in. Secondly, develop a missile that actually will
work, that has multiple capabilities. And then make a decision
about adding to the existing number of missiles and, possibly,
an additional missile site. Is that the track you are on?
General Mann. I would add to that, Congressman. I would add
to that. I think also it gets back to--and I think some of
the--I think General Jacoby also highlighted the importance of
making sure, in terms of indications and warning, that we
continue to work on our ability to locate threat systems. I
think that is really the first step. To make sure that, number
one, we are able to identify those threat platforms that are
out there.
And, in addition to increasing our sensor, our ability to
discriminate, to be able to find the target within a threat
complex. And then to be able to utilize the GBIs now, and in
the future, in the most efficient means possible.
Mr. Garamendi. And that is the track that is in the current
budget.
Admiral Syring. Yes, sir.
Mr. Garamendi. With the exception of directed energy.
Admiral Syring. There are aspects of directed energy that
we need to spend some time with in a classified forum so I can
complete--give you the complete picture.
Mr. Garamendi. I will yield back my time. Thank you.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman.
The chair now recognizes the ranking member for any
questions he may have.
Mr. Cooper. I thank the chair. I just wanted to thank the
witnesses not only for their testimony, but for their hard work
every day in defending America. I think the most important
single word that was uttered in this hearing was uttered by
General Mann in response to, I think, Mr. Franks' question of
what we could do to help you do your work better.
And basically, you said sequestration. Get rid of
sequestration. So I hope the committee heard that testimony,
and I hope this committee will act to eliminate sequestration.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman.
Any other questions from any members? Okay, I hear none.
And I completely echo the ranking member's statement. I have
made it clear to the chairman of the full committee and to our
House leadership that it is my number one priority to see
sequestration, defense sequestration in particular, rolled back
and eliminated. I think it is going to do great damage to this
country. So, hopefully, we will be successful. But I can assure
you it is a top priority of mine over the next year so--while
we navigate these waters.
But thank you all again for your time and your expertise
and your service to our country. And with that, we are
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:51 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
March 25, 2014
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
March 25, 2014
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[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]
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DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
March 25, 2014
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[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]
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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING
March 25, 2014
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RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. BROOKS
Admiral Syring. In fiscal year (FY) 2015, the Department of Defense
is requesting $1.003 billion (B) for Ground-based Midcourse Defense
(GMD) Research, Development, Test and Evaluation activities, and $146
million for GMD operations and maintenance for a total of $1.149B in FY
2015. Over the Future Years Defense Program, when GMD procurement, the
Sea-based X-Band Band Radar, and the planned procurement of the long-
range discrimination radar are included the total budget from FY2015 to
2019 is $7.048B. [See page 19.]
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
March 25, 2014
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ROGERS
Mr. Rogers. Have you been briefed on Russia's missile defense
capabilities? Do you believe Russia intends for them be used against
U.S. missiles?
General Mann. I am familiar with intelligence assessments of
Russia's missile defense capabilities. Russia's missile defense
capabilities consist of both fixed and mobile systems. Current fixed
ballistic missile defense systems are designed to counter an
intercontinental ballistic missile force and would be employed to
defend major population centers around Moscow. Russia also maintains a
mobile ballistic missile force designed to defend against shorter range
tactical ballistic missile systems.
Just as ballistic missile defense is an integral part of U.S.
military strategy, I believe that Russia maintains ballistic missile
defensive capabilities for similar reasons. When under the threat of a
ballistic missile attack by any nation, including the United States,
Russia must be expected to employ its defensive capabilities to protect
its interests.
Mr. Rogers. What would you worry about if Turkey acquired a Chinese
missile defense system? Why would you not want that system to be
connected or networked with U.S. systems? What if the system was
established as an ``indigenous'' system, but clearly was comprised of
Chinese technology and systems?
General Mann. The Department is committed to the deployment of
Ballistic Missile Defense System assets that enhance missile defense
capabilities within the European region and the NATO missile defense
initiative. If Turkey acquires a Chinese missile defense system, my
concern is its impact to our coalition operations and the compatibility
between our forces. Efforts continue to ensure future interoperability
of U.S. contributions to the NATO capability. However, it is the
Department's position that the Chinese missile defense system cannot be
interoperable with NATO due to the potential risks and vulnerabilities
associated with either the Ballistic Missile Defense System or the NATO
missile defense initiative.
Mr. Rogers. The National Missile Defense Policy Act of 1999
requires that we deploy national missile defenses capable of defending
the United States from ``accidental or unauthorized'' ballistic missile
attack, among other attacks. Can you please tell me, are we protected
from an accidental or unauthorized ballistic missile attack from a
Chinese ballistic missile submarine, which, as you know, the Chinese
are now deploying? If not, when will we?
General Mann. It is difficult to provide a specific assessment. The
Ballistic Missile Defense System is not designed to counter peer or
near-peer ballistic missile threats. The level of residual capability
to defend against such an incident would be influenced by the degree of
indications and warnings, the location of the launch and target impact
area, and the accessibility of sensors and interceptors. Upon request,
further details could be provided via a classified session or paper.
Mr. Rogers. Please switch hats to your hat as Commander of Army
Space and Missile Defense Command. Why is the Conventional Prompt
Global Strike capability important?
I understand the Navy is evaluating the basing of such a capability
on submarines. Do you support such studies? How would SMDC remain
involved during such consideration?
General Mann. An operational Conventional Prompt Global Strike
(CPGS) system would provide the National Command Authority a
conventional munitions capability to address strategic and time
sensitive targets in areas without forward deployed forces. I support
OSD's continued effort to develop and field a CPGS capability. Per
OSD's direction and guidance, I anticipate that USASMDC/ARSTRAT will
continue to support technology development as the CPGS capability
matures.
Mr. Rogers. Two administrations, including the current one,
supported forward-deployed missile defense sites in Poland to provide
added and needed protection of the homeland. Those homeland defense
deployments have now been cancelled. Have we replaced them in any way?
What could an East Coast missile defense site provide you to defend
the United States?
Why is it important to continue planning for such a deployment?
General Mann, as the warfighter, do you have an opinion?
General Mann. As outlined by the Secretary of Defense in March
2013, steps were taken to bolster homeland defense. The Department is
increasing capacity and capability to its homeland defense architecture
with the programmed increase of 14 additional Ground-based Interceptors
as well as the development of advanced kill vehicle technology. These
initiatives and Missile Defense Agency's design and development of a
Long Range Discrimination Radar will serve to provide an enhanced level
of protection against a limited ballistic missile defense attack.
While a decision to deploy a third interceptor site on the U.S.
East Coast has not been made, an operational site would disperse
inventory and increase both ground based interceptor capacity and
battlespace, e.g., provide more decision time. While a third site does
provide enhanced homeland defense capabilities, it is not the top
operational priority. Improving our sensor capabilities, to include
persistent discrimination and enhanced tracking of threat missiles, as
well as improving the ground based interceptor reliability are higher
ranking Warfighter priorities.
In my opinion, it is prudent for the Missile Defense Agency to
complete the environmental impact statements at the four potential U.S.
interceptor sites, which will reduce the operational timeline in the
event the Nation decides to field a third site.
Mr. Rogers. Are you developing missile defenses to defend the Navy,
in particular our carrier battle groups, from China's ``carrier
killer'' ballistic missile (known as the DF-21D)?
Admiral Syring. [The information referred to is classified and is
retained in the committee files.]
Mr. Rogers. It appears the fiscal year 2014 budget request cuts
your directed energy budget to approximately $13 million. Can you tell
me, is this a sufficient budget request in your opinion? Does this
budget request match the potential for directed energy to be a game-
changing missile defense technology? How much of this program's budget
request is focused on missile kill or intercept?
Admiral Syring. All of MDA's budget request for directed energy is
focused on missile kill or intercept. MDA fully supports the PB15
President's Budget request for Directed Energy. Funding at the
requested level is sufficient and matches the potential for directed
energy to be a game-changing missile defense technology by supporting
the key demonstrations for two promising directed energy technologies,
Diode Pumped Alkali Lasers at LLNL and Fiber Combining Lasers at MIT/
LL.
We will base our PB16 budget submission on data and progress of
these two demonstration programs. Both laboratories achieved record
high output powers (20 kW for MIT/LL and 4 kW for LLNL) for their
respective technologies this past year. Each program is now progressing
towards higher power demonstrations to satisfy MDA's knowledge point
objectives. We are canvassing industry for both near-term and far-term
directed energy solutions. We are requesting industry proposals under
MDA's Advanced Technology Initiatives Broad Agency Announcement for an
airborne demonstration of a multi-kilowatt-class laser. The near-term
demonstration will reduce risk for a full scale system capable of
killing a missile. Additionally, there are multiple uses for this
technology at lower power levels.
Mr. Rogers. Have you been briefed on Russia's missile defense
capabilities? Do you believe Russia intends for them be used against
U.S. missiles?
Admiral Syring. [The information referred to is classified and is
retained in the committee files.]
Mr. Rogers. You stated at the hearing that the question of the
advisability of the release to Russia of velocity-at-burnout data
``gets to methods and means of employment that could be derived from
such equations.'' Please elaborate, including by classified response if
necessary.
Admiral Syring. [The information referred to is classified and is
retained in the committee files.]
Mr. Rogers. I support the additional funding in the GMD program
that you've requested for a new redesigned kill vehicle and new
investments in discrimination. Absent those investments, however, the
GMD system is actually being cut in your fiscal year 2015 budget. Why?
In other words, this budget is requiring GMD to do much more but
without an adequate topline increase.
Admiral Syring. Excluding discrimination improvements for Homeland
Defense and redesigned Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle, the GMD ``program
specific'' FY 2015 funding was reduced from President's Budget (PB)
2014 to PB 2015 to provide funding for additional Homeland Defense
discrimination capabilities and long-range radar capabilities funded in
other Agency program elements which will enhance the capability of the
GMD system.
Mr. Rogers. Are we making sufficient investments to pay for life-
cycle maintenance and aging and reliability for this 10-year-old
system, which, as you know, was deployed with a 20-year design life?
Admiral Syring. The FY 2015 budget request supports sustainment of
the GMD program. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) acknowledges the need
to look into all aspects of the GMD program to include life-cycle
maintenance, aging and reliability and is prioritizing requirements and
funding within available resources during the FY 2016 budget
development process.
Mr. Rogers. What investments do we need to make?
Admiral Syring. [The information referred to is for official use
only, and is retained in the committee files.]
Mr. Rogers. The missile defense budget request includes $175
million to conclude the Iron Dome agreement with Israel. I also
understand the Israelis are requesting a $176 million plus-up for Iron
Dome for fiscal year 2015. Do you support this plus-up?
Admiral Syring. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) supports the
President's fiscal year 2015 budget request of $176 million. We believe
the Israeli request for additional funds is premature.
Since contracts for the production and U.S. co-production for Iron
Dome are awarded by Israel, MDA has no privity of contract associated
with U.S. co-production of Iron Dome components. However, MDA is aware
that no co-production contracts between U.S. and Israeli industry have
been awarded. Therefore, there is nothing to substantiate the Israeli
claim of a higher U.S. industry production cost and higher non-
recurring engineering costs.
U.S. and Israeli industry are finalizing a teaming agreement
covering co-production of Iron Dome components. MDA understands that
this agreement will contain language that indicates U.S. industry costs
will not exceed Israeli industry costs by five percent on any
component; otherwise procurement of that component would revert to
Israeli industry. U.S. industry believes that it can demonstrate the
ability to meet cost targets for nearly all Iron Dome components once
contracts are awarded.
Finally, the Israeli assertion that the U.S.-Israeli currency
exchange rate necessitates additional funding is counter to the
Department of Defense Financial Management Regulation. It is not
feasible to continually adjust international agreements based on a
fluctuating currency exchange rate.
Mr. Rogers. What would you worry about if Turkey acquired a Chinese
missile defense system? Why would you not want that system to be
connected or networked with U.S. systems? What if the system was
established as an ``indigenous'' system, but clearly was comprised of
Chinese technology and systems?
Admiral Syring. The possibility of Turkey acquiring a Chinese made
missile defense system is a concern. In our opinion, without full
technical insight, NATO will not likely allow the Chinese system to be
connected to the NATO BMD system due to concerns about cyber-related
issues that stem from the possibility of a Chinese system connecting to
a NATO system.
Even if the Turks acquire an ``indigenous'' system that is clearly
comprised of Chinese technology and systems, without full technical
insight, we believe that it will still not likely meet the strict
standards that are required to be connected to the NATO system.
Mr. Rogers. The budget proposal for Fiscal Year 2015 includes a
proposal that MDA assume responsibility as the technical authority for
Integrated Air and Missile Defense programs. Can you please describe
how this will occur and why it was necessary, from your perspective?
Can you please, with this technical authority, provide your views
on the utility of the Air Force's 3DELRR system and whether other
planned service systems can perform this mission?
Admiral Syring. On October 1, 2013, the Missile Defense Agency
(MDA) was assigned responsibility as the single technical authority for
integrated air and missile defense (IAMD). We will leverage the MDA
system engineering process as described in BMDS Systems Engineering
Plan. We will lead and manage engineering activities in collaboration
with the Services in a Joint Systems Engineering Team chaired by MDA.
This team will provide recommended technical requirements for inclusion
in the IAMD technical baseline which includes related specifications
and interface control documentation. The Services will continue to
maintain configuration control over their Service-specific baselines
and will ensure that those baselines reflect requirements defined by
the IAMD technical authority.
The Department of Defense has been developing air and missile
defense capabilities for more than two decades; however, the
development of a joint force that can operate in an integrated and
interoperable manner has not been realized due to the challenges
associated with the integration. A single authority for the development
of technical requirements and coordinated development of air and
missile defense solutions will enhance the DOD's ability to integrate
across the Military Departments.
The Air Force's 3DELRR system provides surveillance capability that
can contribute to the future air picture and track air breathing
targets. MDA's focus to date has been on assessing options for
integrating sensors across the Services by using Service descriptions
and data for each of the sensors.
Mr. Rogers. Can you please describe the planning and evaluation
that is underway to consider whether any of the 14 GBIs that will be
procured starting next year will be two-stage GBIs?
Admiral Syring. [The information referred to is classified and is
retained in the committee files.]
Mr. Rogers. Your predecessor, General O'Reilly, testified in 2009
that MDA was going to deploy 30 GBIs and it was going to continue the
production of 14 GBIs on contract to maintain the ability to produce
additional GBIs for testing, refurbishment, future upgrades, etc. We
support the Department's decision to now deploy those 14 GBIs in
response to the North Korean threat, but what about testing,
refurbishment, and future upgrades of the currently deployed systems?
Is that funded in the FY15 budget request?
Admiral Syring. Yes, the President's Budget 2015 request funds
testing, refurbishment, and future upgrades of the Ground-Based
Interceptors (GBIs). The budget request funds GBI component testing and
refurbishing currently deployed GBIs to test and improve their
reliability including specific upgrades to the fleet to correct issues
identified with the FTG-06a flight test failure. It also funds a total
of six GBI intercept flight tests from fiscal years (FY) 2015-2019,
maintaining a test cadence of at least one flight test per year of the
Ground-Based Midcourse Defense system.
We have also requested $99.5 million in FY 2015 to redesign and
improve the GBI exoatmospheric kill vehicle (EKV). The redesigned EKV
will be built with a modular, open architecture and designed with
common interfaces and standards, making upgrades easier and broadening
our vendor and supplier base. The new EKVs will improve reliability and
be more producible, testable, reliable, and cost-effective and
eventually will replace the kill vehicle on our current GBI fleet. We
are currently assessing concepts, acquisition options, and timelines to
test and field the redesigned EKV. Our goal is to begin flight testing
the redesigned EKV in FY 2018.
Mr. Rogers. Can you please shed light on whether MDA is still
considering multi-year procurement or other efficient procurement
processes and authorities for procuring these GBIs? How much money
could be saved from such procurement approaches?
Admiral Syring. Given the status of the GBI flight test program, I
believe multi-year procurement authority is premature at this time. The
Missile Defense Agency's (MDA) President's Budget 2015 request includes
$150 million beginning in fiscal year (FY) 2016 for the procurement of
Ground Based Interceptors (GBI). We are evaluating various procurement
approaches that could potentially result in substantial savings over
the Future Year's Defense Program; however, it is too early for us to
identify potential cost savings.
Mr. Rogers. The National Missile Defense Policy Act of 1999
requires that we deploy national missile defenses capable of defending
the United States from ``accidental or unauthorized'' ballistic missile
attack, among other attacks. Can you please tell me, are we protected
from an accidental or unauthorized ballistic missile attack from a
Chinese ballistic missile submarine, which, as you know, the Chinese
are now deploying? If not, when will we?
Admiral Syring. [The information referred to is classified and is
retained in the committee files.]
Mr. Rogers. I am concerned by Russia's behavior threatening our
allies, including the illegal invasion of Ukraine and its violation of
the INF treaty. Are you?
Admiral Syring, can you tell me, what is the organic capability of
Aegis Ashore to detect cruise missiles? What would the capability be if
we deployed SM-2s and SM-6s at those sites in addition to SM-3s?
Admiral Syring, you stated at the hearing that the Aegis Ashore
system is not currently configured for cruise missile defense and that
the functional difference is, ``essentially, the software, with a minor
hardware addition.'' Please provide the following:
1. A detailed explanation of those software and hardware
additions and costs and schedules to make those changes if
directed to do so.
2. Coverage charts showing cruise missile defense of Europe
from Aegis Ashore sites so configured.
3. Coverage charts showing that coverage along with coverage
Aegis BMD ships at projected operating areas in Europe.
4. Coverage charts showing cruise missile defense coverage from
Aegis BMD ships deployed in Asia at their normal operating
areas.
Admiral Syring. [The information referred to is classified and is
retained in the committee files.]
Mr. Rogers. This is a painfully tight budget environment and I
appreciate you've done the best you could with what you were given. Can
you please tell me, if you had an extra dollar, would you look at the
deployment of an East Coast radar to aid in the defense of the homeland
from the Iranian ballistic missile threat?
What investments will be required to use Cobra Judy to add to the
missile defense sensor coverage of the United States along the East
Coast?
Same question but to SBX.
Admiral Syring. The deployment of an East Coast radar would provide
for a more robust defensive capability. The specific benefits of a
large X-band radar located on the East Coast are attached. The benefits
are based on analysis presented in a 2012 briefing to the House Armed
Services Committee. Because of threat developments and the results of
ongoing studies, an East Coast radar may be part of our future sensor
architecture requirements.
The Missile Defense Agency is updating the 2012 analysis for a new
report required by Section 235 of the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2014. The new report will address sensor
capabilities, including relocatable land- and sea-based capabilities.
We will provide an updated response upon completion of the report.
Cobra Judy is no longer available for integration into the Ballistic
Missile Defense System. The Navy removed the vessel from service and it
is being sold for scrap. The costs for relocating the Sea Based X-band
radar (SBX) to the East Coast follows:
Assume SBX returns to full operation (i.e., no longer in
Limited test support status)
Include $17.1 million (M) in fiscal year (FY) 2015 to
move SBX by heavy transport vessel
Include an off-shore support vessel ($30M/year). Resupply
would be conducted from the nearest port
Full Operations Atlantic (Base Year 2014 $M)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FY 2015 FY 2016 FY 2017 FY 2018 FY 2019 FY 2020 Total
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
135.7 141.7 146.9 125.8 112.6 135.1 797.8
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. Rogers. Two administrations, including the current one,
supported forward-deployed missile defense sites in Poland to provide
added and needed protection of the homeland. Those homeland defense
deployments have now been cancelled. Have we replaced them in any way?
What could an East Coast missile defense site provide you to defend
the United States?
Why is it important to continue planning for such a deployment?
Admiral Syring. Yes. On March 15, 2013 the Secretary of Defense
announced a series of steps the United States is taking to stay ahead
of the challenge posed by Iran and North Korea's development of longer-
range ballistic missile capabilities. Specifically, the Secretary
committed to shifting resources from the terminated SM-3 IIB program to
fund the deployment of 14 additional GBIs as well as the development of
advanced kill vehicle technology to improve the performance of future
GBIs. These steps enable added protection against missiles from Iran
while also providing additional protection against the North Korean
threat.
There has been no decision made to pursue a potential future
Continental United States (CONUS) interceptor site (CIS). However, such
a site would provide increased battlespace and capacity but it would
come with significant materiel and service support costs.
The Department is preparing a CIS contingency plan and conducting
an Environmental Impact Statement in accordance with section 227 of the
Fiscal Year 2013 National Defense Authorization Act. Preparation of an
EIS and contingency plan would reduce the time required to field a CIS,
should a decision be made to do so.
Mr. Rogers. From a policy perspective, can you please help me
understand why we deploy missile defenses to protect our aircraft
carriers from Chinese ballistic missiles but we do not deploy missile
defenses to protect our cities from Chinese nuclear missiles?
Ms. Bunn. We have the capability to protect our aircraft carriers
from ballistic missiles in order to ensure freedom of action and the
ability to project power around the globe to protect U.S. interests.
The DOD is committed to ensuring defense of the U.S. homeland
against limited long-range missile attacks from countries such as North
Korea and Iran. With regard to China and Russia, our homeland missile
defenses are not designed to counter their advanced long-range missile
capabilities because defending against the quantity and quality of
their ICBMs would be technologically impractical and cost prohibitive.
We remain confident that Chinese and Russian ballistic missile attacks
on the U.S. homeland are deterred by other means. Despite not being
capable of coping with large-scale Chinese or Russian missile attacks,
the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system would be employed to
defend the United States against limited missile launches from any
source.
Mr. Rogers. Why does Russia deploy missile defense? Why does it
have a nuclear-armed missile defense? Have you been briefed on Russia's
missile defense modernization plans? Does Russia design its missile
defense systems with U.S. nuclear forces in mind? Is Russia deterred
from building more advanced missile defenses out of a concern for
upsetting the ``strategic balance'' between the U.S. and Russia?
Ms. Bunn. Russia has long deployed missile defenses around Moscow;
we presume it is to protect Russian leadership from U.S.
intercontinental ballistic missiles. My understanding is that Russians
view the Russian system as not upsetting the strategic balance because
it complies with the terms of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, even
after the United States withdrew from the Treaty.
Mr. Rogers. Is it important Poland buy an interoperable NATO system
as it considers such a procurement for its air and missile defense
tender? Do you agree that the procurement of U.S. systems offer Poland
an opportunity to obtain state-of-the-art technology and to strengthen
bilateral relations?
Ms. Bunn. It is important that the missile defense system Poland
procures be interoperable with the NATO ballistic missile defense
system.
While we would naturally prefer that Poland procure a U.S. system,
the United States recognizes Poland's right to purchase whatever
missile defense system it chooses to purchase. If they choose to
procure a U.S. system, doing so would provide Poland the best state-of-
the art missile defense capability, would strengthen our bilateral
relationship, and would ease integration with U.S. national systems and
the NATO BMD architecture.
Mr. Rogers. What would you worry about if Turkey acquired a Chinese
missile defense system? Why would you not want that system to be
connected or networked with U.S. systems? What if the system was
established as an ``indigenous'' system, but clearly was comprised of
Chinese technology and systems?
Ms. Bunn. The possibility of Turkey acquiring a Chinese-made
missile defense system is a concern. Without full technical insight,
NATO will not likely allow the Chinese system to be connected to the
NATO ballistic missile defense system due to cyber-related concerns.
Even if Turkey acquires an ``indigenous'' system that is largely
composed of Chinese technology and systems, without full technical
insight, we believe that it would still not likely meet the strict
standards that must be met before any missile defense system could be
connected to the NATO system.
Mr. Rogers. The Commander of Northern Command has outlined a series
of tests and experiments of a homeland cruise missile defense. Do you
support this initiative? What countries are the principal threats?
Do you agree with the Commander that Russian cruise missiles pose a
rising threat?
Why is it that we deploy defenses against Russian cruise missiles,
which may be nuclear-capable, but not Russian ballistic missiles?
Ms. Bunn. Yes, I support those initiatives by the Commander of
USNORTHCOM. I am happy to discuss this further in a classified setting.
The ballistic missile defenses deployed for the protection of the
U.S. homeland are designed to counter a ballistic missile attack from
states such as North Korea and Iran. Development and fielding of a
system to address the numbers and sophistication of Russian and Chinese
long-range ballistic missiles would be technically impractical and
prohibitively expensive.
Mr. Rogers. According to the GAO, ``although the dates MDA plans to
declare technical capability for EPAA have not changed, the capability
to be delivered and the understanding of its performance is more
limited than initially planned.'' Ms. Bunn, please explain what is
going on here. Can you please provide the committee this week the
detailed technical requirements for the EPAA?
Ms. Bunn. The European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) is intended
to protect U.S. forces and NATO European populations and territory from
ballistic missiles launched from the Middle East.
The first EPAA phase became operational in 2011. The next two
phases remain on schedule with supplemental upgrades to be delivered as
they are developed, tested, and deployed. That means there will be an
operational missile defense site in Romania in 2015 and another site in
Poland in the 2018 timeframe, along with the deployment of more capable
versions of the Standard Missile-3 interceptor.
Planned evolutionary upgrades for elements of the ballistic missile
defense system are typical for any deployed system, and delivery of
upgrades will not negatively affect the ability of each element to
remain fully operational.
I defer to Admiral Syring for the detailed technical requirements
for U.S. missile defense capabilities in Europe.
Mr. Rogers. Is the Administration considering a NATO common pool of
SM-3 interceptors should the European Allies upgrade their ships with
the SM-3 capable launchers and radars?
Ms. Bunn. The Administration is open to all options that could
enhance European missile defense. Discussions about the creation of a
Standard Missile (SM)-3 interceptor pool have taken place at NATO. The
United States has encouraged Allies to make contributions to NATO
missile defense and would welcome Allied contributions to a common
interceptor pool. To date, no NATO European country possesses surface
combatants capable of firing SM-3 interceptors, and no NATO European
country has announced plans to modify its ships to do so.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. COOPER
Mr. Cooper. After three back-to-back flight intercept tests (two
CE-II and one CE-I failures), are you confident we have a reliable and
effective missile defense system?
General Mann. Yes. Although we have experienced a series of
unsuccessful tests, the Warfighter remains confident in our operational
capability to defend against a limited ballistic missile attack. Our
confidence is based on the successful results of the previous CE-I
flight tests, the January 2013 non-intercept controlled flight test of
the CE-II ground-based interceptor, the present operational employment
guidelines, and the Missile Defense Agency's ongoing testing,
modifications, and failure review board results.
Mr. Cooper. With North Korea and Iran developing additional
capabilities, are we staying ahead of the threat or are we currently
catching up to the threat? Can we reliably stay ahead of the threat?
General Mann. The Ballistic Missile Defense System currently
provides the capability to defend the homeland against a limited
ballistic missile attack from either country. As their ballistic
missile abilities mature, we must continue to enhance key system
components, such as sensor discrimination capabilities and the
reliability of the exoatmospheric kill vehicle, to remain ahead of the
intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) threat. Predictable
resources, the correct test cadence, and focusing on the most urgent
priorities, will greatly assist in outpacing a limited ICBM threat to
the homeland.
Mr. Cooper. Where would you spend your next dollar?
General Mann. Improving our sensor capabilities is the Warfighter's
highest Ballistic Missile Defense System priority. Persistent sensor
discrimination and enhanced tracking capabilities will provide
immediate qualitative improvements for countering ballistic missile
defense threats. The next Warfighter priority is increasing ground-
based interceptor reliability by redesigning the exoatmospheric kill
vehicle.
Mr. Cooper. Please explain the rationale for focusing on midcourse
defense, rather than boost-phase missile defense?
General Mann. The Missile Defense Agency developed and deployed
mid-course systems because the technology was more mature than boost-
phase systems and provided the Warfighter earlier capabilities to
counter a limited ballistic missile threat. The effectiveness of boost-
phase systems is currently limited by intelligence challenges and
exacerbated by the short reaction time required to counter the threat
missile. Presently, mid-course defense affords more time to track the
threat, make threat assessments, perform discrimination missions, and
engage the target than that of a boost-phase defense system. The
Missile Defense Agency, as well as each Service, continues to pursue
and develop technologies, such as high energy lasers, that have
potential for future boost-phase applications.
Mr. Cooper. Why is it in U.S. interests for the EPAA to be a U.S.
contribution to NATO? What would be the impact for U.S. and NATO
security if a NATO country suffered a missile attack from Iran?
General Mann. The United States is committed to common defense
through Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which provides that an
attack on one is an attack on all. The United States is contributing
the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) to missile defense not
only to protect Allied cities, but also to protect deployed U.S.
military personnel and U.S. citizens abroad.
Mr. Cooper. How did your requests for missile defense funding fare
in the FY15 budget request? Were your requests prioritized?
Admiral Syring. The Missile Defense Agency's (MDA) President's
Budget (PB) 2015 requests were prioritized and well-received. Our PB
2015 submission fared well especially given the Department's tight
budget constraints.
Mr. Cooper. After three back-to-back flight intercept tests (two
CE-II and one CE-I failures), are you confident we have a reliable and
effective missile defense system?
Admiral Syring. Yes, I am confident that we have a reliable and
effective missile defense system. Based on our analysis of the data
from the successful January 2013 non-intercept controlled flight test
of the CE-II GBI (CTV-01), we plan to conduct FTG-06b, an intercept
flight test, this summer. CTV-01 demonstrated the successful dampening
of the vibration environments that affected the navigation system and
resulted in the failure of the FTG-06a mission conducted in December
2010. FTG-06b will demonstrate the ability of the CE-II EKV to
discriminate and intercept a lethal object from a representative ICBM
target scene. The FTG-07 failure investigation is nearly complete. Once
the investigation is concluded, we will take steps to make any fixes to
the fleet that need to be made for both the CE-I and CE-II EKVs.
Mr. Cooper. Will you commit to neither deploy nor procure
additional ground-based interceptors (GBIs) until we have a successful
flight intercept test?
Admiral Syring. Yes. I strongly support fly-before-you-buy
acquisition. The Missile Defense Agency plans to conduct a successful
intercept flight test of each GBI configuration before procuring or
deploying such a configuration.
Mr. Cooper. With North Korea and Iran developing additional
capabilities, are we staying ahead of the threat or are we currently
catching up to the threat? Can we reliably stay ahead of the threat?
Admiral Syring. [The information referred to is classified and is
retained in the committee files.]
Mr. Cooper. Where would you spend your next dollar?
Admiral Syring. I support the President's budget request for fiscal
year 2015. The present BMDS design and Concept of Operations (CONOPS)
represent a performance plateau that the Missile Defense Agency (MDA)
investment strategy for EKV is formulated to overcome. The MDA
investment goals reduce the cost of kill vehicle (KV) production;
improve reliability, capacity, and capability at all inventory levels;
forestall obsolescence against the evolving threat; and maximize common
standards and technology across all future interceptor programs.
The MDA systems engineering process is based on allocating
integrated BMDS requirements that balance capability and feasibility
across weapons, sensors, and Command, Control, Battle Management and
Communications. Consistent with this process and our strategy for
improving the robustness of our Homeland defense capability, the MDA
will engineer and allocate integrated system requirements that will
drive balanced and integrated BMDS development activities for improved
discrimination and sensor capabilities. These activities executed in
parallel include development of the Long Range Discrimination Radar
(LRDR), improved discrimination algorithms and fire control, air and
space Electro Optical/Infrared capabilities, and the Next Generation
Kill Vehicle.
Mr. Cooper. What are the highest priority improvements being sought
in the redesigned EKV?
Admiral Syring. The priority for the redesigned exoatmospheric kill
vehicle (EKV) is to improve reliability and be more producible,
testable, reliable, and cost-effective in order to eventually replace
the kill vehicle on our current Ground Based Interceptor (GBI) fleet.
The redesigned EKV will be built with a modular, open architecture,
designed with common interfaces and standards, making upgrades easier
and broadening our vendor and supplier base. We are currently assessing
concepts, acquisition options, and timelines to test and field the
redesigned EKV. Our goal is to begin flight testing the redesigned EKV
in fiscal year (FY) 2018.
Mr. Cooper. Is there a boost motor production gap? What is the
acquisition strategy for the 14 additional boosters for test and
stockpile reliability starting in 2018? And would accelerating
production of boosters before confirming the new CBAU booster works add
to the existing acquisition risks, and would it even be needed to avoid
any potential production break?
Admiral Syring. No production gap is projected. In addition to the
planned Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) booster motor buys, the
Missile Defense Agency (MDA) Targets Program has also started to
procure similar configurations of these same motors as a reliable
launch vehicle for their varied target requirements.
For the additional 14 interceptors, acquisition strategies are
under consideration. The MDA will propose an acquisition strategy this
summer for the additional Ground Based Interceptors (GBIs).
The Consolidated Booster Avionics Upgrade (CBAU) obsolescence and
reliability upgrade effort is primarily focused on the avionics portion
of the boost vehicle. The rocket motors themselves are not part of the
boost vehicle CBAU, their acceleration (or even their slowdown) would
not increase acquisition risks. Accelerating booster production for the
additional 14 GBIs is not necessary to fill a production gap but would
have the potential to unnecessarily ``age'' the booster motors and
increase storage costs.
Mr. Cooper. Please explain the rationale for focusing on midcourse
defense, rather than boost-phase missile defense?
Admiral Syring. The Ballistic Missile Defense Elements that
intercept in the midcourse phase were more mature and ready for
testing, production, and deployment than boost-phase systems. The
Missile Defense Agency has taken the approach of identifying and
developing new technologies which could scale up from laboratory
experiments; and design concepts which, if successfully demonstrated,
could make future directed energy and kinetic energy boost phase
intercept concepts both feasible and affordable. The MDA's President's
Budget (PB) 2015 request continues this approach with significant
funding allocated for unclassified and classified programs that have
potential for boost phase applications in the future.
Mr. Cooper. Do we need to develop 2-stage interceptors earlier
rather than later? Why/why not?
Admiral Syring. No. Employing 2-stage ground based interceptors
(GBI) is under consideration as part of the Department of Defense (DOD)
directed Homeland Defense Analysis of Alternatives (HLD AoA). The HLD
AoA is directed by the Office of the Secretary of Defense Cost
Assessment and Programs Evaluation. Combatant Commands and the Joint
Staff are participating. After completion of the HLD AoA in late 2014,
senior leaders will review the alternatives. Development and employment
of 2-stage GBIs are scheduled for flight testing in FY 2019 and FY
2020. This is consistent with the current Missile Defense Agency
Integrated Master Test Plan.
Mr. Cooper. Why is it in U.S. interests for the EPAA to be a U.S.
contribution to NATO? What would be the impact be for U.S. and NATO
security if a NATO country suffered a missile attack from Iran?
Admiral Syring. The U.S. European Phase Adaptive Approach (EPAA) is
needed to defend against the Iranian ballistic missile threat (capable
of striking deployed forces, allies, and partners in Europe). Moreover,
EPAA has been recognized as the U.S. contribution to North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) ballistic missile defense at the Lisbon
(2010) and Chicago (2012) Summits. I defer U.S.-NATO security issues to
OSD Policy.
Mr. Cooper. After three back-to-back flight intercept tests (two
CE-II and one CE-I failures), are you confident we have a reliable and
effective missile defense system?
Ms. Bunn. As a policy official who is often briefed by those who
develop and operate the system, I am confident that the Ground-based
Midcourse Defense system can defend the United States against a limited
intercontinental ballistic missile attack.
Mr. Cooper. Will you commit to neither deploy nor procure
additional ground-based interceptors (GBIs) until we have a successful
flight intercept test?
Ms. Bunn. Yes; in keeping with the Administration's policy priority
to ensure that new capabilities undergo testing that enables assessment
under realistic operational conditions before they are deployed, I will
not recommend the procurement or deployment of additional interceptors
until there is a successful intercept test.
Mr. Cooper. With North Korea and Iran developing additional
capabilities, are we staying ahead of the threat or are we currently
catching up to the threat? Can we reliably stay ahead of the threat?
Ms. Bunn. To date, neither North Korea nor Iran has demonstrated
the capability to target the United States successfully with a long-
range missile delivery system; however, North Korea's successful Taepo
Dong-2 space launch in December 2012 and Iran's repeated space launch
attempts demonstrate a commitment by both regimes to continue their
pursuit of such a capability. The decisions announced by Secretary
Hagel in March 2013 related to DOD's planned improvements to the
Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system as well as the other
initiatives reflected in the President's Fiscal Year 2015 budget would
help to ensure our ability to maintain our advantageous position
relative to the North Korean and Iranian long-range missile threats to
the homeland. DOD assesses the state of the North Korean and Iranian
missile programs continually and, as a matter of policy, remains
committed to staying ahead of the threat posed by these programs.
Mr. Cooper. Where would you spend your next dollar?
Ms. Bunn. My highest missile defense priority is ensuring the
effectiveness and reliability of our homeland missile defenses. To that
end, my next dollar of missile defense spending would be focused on
addressing the reliability issues associated with the interceptor kill
vehicle, and improving our sensors and discrimination capability.
Mr. Cooper. Please explain the rationale for focusing on midcourse
defense, rather than boost-phase missile defense?
Ms. Bunn. The United States is pursuing technologies that would
address or mitigate most phases of ballistic missile flight. In
addition, we are also looking at options left of launch. However, the
technology and operational concepts associated with midcourse
intercepts are the most mature. The Administration's focus on deploying
proven and cost-effective missile defenses to protect the U.S.
homeland, as well as our deployed forces and Allies, has led to a
concentration on the most mature systems that have been tested under
operationally realistic conditions.
In addition, intercepts in the midcourse phase of flight allow for
missile defense elements to be placed farther from the adversary. This
is advantageous for two reasons. First, many of the missile defense
elements can be placed on U.S. or Allied territory where it can be more
easily defended and operated on a more permanent basis. Second, because
the midcourse phase of flight is generally longer and happens later
than the boost phase, it allows more time to identify a ballistic
missile launch, then to track and engage the missile effectively.
Mr. Cooper. Why is it in U.S. interests for the EPAA to be a U.S.
contribution to NATO? What would be the impact be for U.S. and NATO
security if a NATO country suffered a missile attack from Iran?
Ms. Bunn. The United States is committed to common defense through
Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which provides that an attack
on one is an attack on all. The United States is contributing the
European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) to missile defense not only to
protect Allied cities, but also to protect deployed U.S. military
personnel and U.S. citizens abroad.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GARAMENDI
Mr. Garamendi. Do you need additional funds for an East Coast site
contingency in FY15? Why/why not?
General Mann. I support Section 227 of the Fiscal Year 2013
National Defense Authorization Act that directs evaluation and
environmental impact assessments of potential U.S. missile defense
sites. From a Warfighter's perspective, there is no need for additional
funding in Fiscal Year 2015. Should a decision be made to field a third
U.S. site, there will associated personnel and support costs. The
Department will plan and request these necessary resources through the
authorization and appropriations process.
Mr. Garamendi. What efforts are you pursuing to strengthen homeland
missile defense?
General Mann. Both the U.S. Army and the Joint Functional Component
Command for Integrated Missile Defense (JFCC IMD), as a component of
the U.S. Strategic Command, are continuing efforts to strengthen
homeland missile defense capabilities.
Within the Army, we provide trained and ready missile defense
forces and capabilities to address today's homeland defense
requirements. These forces constantly rehearse threat scenarios and
participate in missile defense exercises and wargames to ensure they
maintain their high state of readiness. The Army also continues to
pursue missile defense technologies and to provide critical testing
assets.
At JFCC IMD, we continue to collaborate across the military
enterprise to increase the integration of existing capabilities in
order to maximize efficiency and effectiveness to protect the homeland.
Specifically, we work in partnership with U.S. Northern Command, the
Missile Defense Agency, and the other Combatant Commands to synchronize
operational-level missile defense planning, identify and address gaps
and deficiencies within the system, conduct operations support and
asset management for missile defense forces, and to integrate Joint
ballistic missile defense training, exercises, and test activities.
Mr. Garamendi. General Mann, the primary benefit of a potential
East Coast site, if deployed, would be ``increased battle space.''
What is the primary benefit of increased battle space? Would
increased battle space make missile defense more efficient? If so, how?
Would increased battle space make missile defense more effective? If
so, how? Is the increased battle space merely more time to fire at
incoming targets, or more time to evaluate the results of intercept
attempts?
Is the Missile Defense Agency seeking to obtain or improve its
``shoot-look-shoot'' capability? What are the priorities for attaining
or improving this capability? ? Would increased battle space contribute
to improving a ``shoot-look-shoot'' shot doctrine?
What are the Missile Defense Agency's plans for deploying the
necessary sensors, such as an X-band radar, and discrimination scheme
that are necessary for a shoot-look-shoot shot doctrine against a
Middle East threat? Without better sensor capabilities, what would the
value of an additional site be, especially in comparison with improving
the existing sites and interceptors?
General Mann. A third operational missile defense site would
augment and disperse present ground-based interceptor inventory and
increase battlespace. The additional time provides the Warfighter
increased operational flexibility to assess a ballistic missile event,
react to unusual engagement conditions, and apply the most current data
to the engagement.
Increased battlespace does enhance the efficiency and effectiveness
of countering ballistic missiles. Increasing available reaction time
can lead to the optimal intercept location of a threat missile and
provides additional decision time to assess the results. The end result
of increased battlespace is more efficient and effective use of the
ground-based interceptor inventory.
Mr. Garamendi. Do you need additional funds for an East Coast Site
contingency in FY15? Why/why not?
Admiral Syring. We support the President's PB15 budget request. No
additional funds are required for this activity in fiscal year (FY)
2015. The FY 2014 Department of Defense Appropriations Act provided $20
million to fund the Continental United States Interceptor Site study,
contingency plan and Environmental Impact Statement.
Mr. Garamendi. What will a 10% increase in homeland missile defense
funding provide? How will it help increase confidence in an effective
homeland missile defense system?
Admiral Syring. The program of work supported by the fiscal year
(FY) 2015 President's Budget (PB) request is sufficiently resourced to
accomplish the Agency's mission to defend the homeland against a
limited ballistic missile attack. An additional 10 percent would be
allocated to top priority areas including improving the exo-atmospheric
kill vehicle (EKV) and improving sensor discrimination. A redesigned
EKV would enhance homeland defense by improving the reliability,
availability, maintainability, testability and producibility of this
key component. Additional investment in sensor discrimination would
enhance the ballistic missile defense architecture's ability to
discriminate and kill a reentry vehicle with a higher level of
confidence and thereby significantly improve Warfighter shot doctrine.
Both of these improvements are funded in the FY 2015 PB request and
additional resources would be used to accelerate currently planned
efforts.
Mr. Garamendi. What efforts are you pursuing to strengthen homeland
missile defense?
Admiral Syring. The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) President's Budget
2015 request continues to support extensive improvements to homeland
missile defense, including the following:
Deployment of 14 additional Ground Based Interceptors
(GBI) at Ft. Greely to achieve 44 operational GBIs by 2017
Fielding a second AN/TPY-2 radar in Japan
Discrimination improvements for homeland defense
including development and deployment of a long range discrimination
Radar, and near-term and mid-term discrimination initiatives
Upgrade/redesign of the GBI exoatmospheric kill vehicle
to improve reliability
Supports the Ground-Based Midcourse Defense Return to
Intercept program, identifying and correcting across the fleet the
failures from the FTG-06a and FTG-07 flight tests
Continued GBI component testing and refurbishing of
currently deployed GBIs to test and improve their reliability
Continued construction of the GBI In-Flight Interceptor
Communication System (IFICS) Data Terminal (IDT) at Fort Drum, New York
Continued operation of the Sea-Based X-band (SBX) radar,
and AN/TPY-2 radars
Continued procurement of THAAD interceptors
Procurement of THAAD equipment for an additional battery
by 2019
Preparation of a contingency plan and Environmental
Impact Statement for a potential future Continental United States
Interceptor Site
Continues missile defense upgrades of the Early Warning
Radars in Clear, Alaska and Cape Cod, Massachusetts
Mr. Garamendi. Admiral Syring, the primary benefit of a potential
East Coast site, if deployed, would be ``increased battle space.''
What is the primary benefit of increased battle space? Would
increased battle space make missile defense more efficient? If so, how?
Would increased battle space make missile defense more effective? If
so, how? Is the increased battle space merely more time to fire at
incoming targets, or more time to evaluate the results of intercept
attempts?
Is the Missile Defense Agency seeking to obtain or improve its
``shoot-look-shoot'' capability? What are the priorities for attaining
or improving this capability? ? Would increased battle space contribute
to improving a ``shoot-look-shoot'' shot doctrine?
What are the Missile Defense Agency's plans for deploying the
necessary sensors, such as an X-band radar, and discrimination scheme
that are necessary for a shoot-look-shoot shot doctrine against a
Middle East threat? Without better sensor capabilities, what would the
value of an additional site be, especially in comparison with improving
the existing sites and interceptors?
Admiral Syring. [The information referred to is classified and is
retained in the committee files.]
Mr. Garamendi. Do you need additional funds for an East Coast Site
contingency in FY15? Why/why not?
Ms. Bunn. The requested funding for site evaluation and
environmental impact studies at the locations identified by the Missile
Defense Agency is sufficient. Funding for any additional activity with
regard to an additional missile field in the United States would be
premature at this time.
Mr. Garamendi. What will a 10% increase in homeland missile defense
funding provide? How will it help increase confidence in an effective
homeland missile defense system?
Ms. Bunn. The program of work supported by the fiscal year (FY)
2015 President's Budget (PB) request is sufficiently resourced to
accomplish the missile defense mission of defending the homeland
against limited ballistic missile attack. An additional 10% would be
allocated to top priority areas including improving the exo-atmospheric
kill vehicle (KV) and improving sensor discrimination. A redesigned EKV
would enhance homeland defense by improving the reliability,
availability, maintainability, testability and producibility of this
key component. Additional investment in sensor discrimination would
enhance the ballistic missile defense architecture's ability to
discriminate and kill a reentry vehicle with a higher level of
confidence, and therefore should allow NORTHCOM to use a more efficient
allocation of interceptors in the future. Both of these improvements
are funded in the FY 2015 PB request, and additional resources would be
used to accelerate currently planned efforts.
Mr. Garamendi. What efforts are you pursuing to strengthen homeland
missile defense?
Ms. Bunn. We are committed to ensuring the reliability and
effectiveness of the current Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD)
system through testing and addressing reliability issues with the
interceptor kill vehicle.
In addition, the refurbishment of Missile Field 1 at Fort Greely,
Alaska, is underway, and the budget request includes funding for the
emplacement of additional Ground-based Interceptors (GBIs) at Fort
Greely, for a total of 44 deployed interceptors by the end of 2017.
We are also on track to deploy a second forward-based missile
defense radar in Japan. This deployment will provide improved early
warning and tracking of missiles launched from North Korea at the
United States.
The budget request includes funding for a redesigned kill vehicle
that will improve the reliability and effectiveness of the GMD system.
The redesigned kill vehicle will improve the reliability and
performance of the GBI, and will be easier to build, upgrade, and
maintain than the current versions.
The President's Fiscal Year 2015 Budget request also includes
funding for development of a Long-Range Discrimination Radar. This
radar would provide persistent sensor coverage and improve
discrimination capabilities against threats to the United States from
North Korea.
We are conducting Environmental Impact Studies for a potential
third missile site in the United States to field additional
interceptors if required.
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