[House Hearing, 113 Congress] [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office] [H.A.S.C. No. 113-89] HEARING ON NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2015 AND OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION __________ SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES HEARING ON FISCAL YEAR 2015 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BUDGET REQUEST FROM THE U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND AND THE POSTURE OF THE U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES __________ HEARING HELD MARCH 13, 2014 U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 87-801 WASHINGTON : 2014 ----------------------------------------------------------------------- For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; DC area (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402-0001 [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES MAC THORNBERRY, Texas, Chairman JEFF MILLER, Florida JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island JOHN KLINE, Minnesota SUSAN A. DAVIS, California BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania HENRY C. ``HANK'' JOHNSON, Jr., RICHARD B. NUGENT, Florida Georgia TRENT FRANKS, Arizona ANDRE CARSON, Indiana DUNCAN HUNTER, California DANIEL B. MAFFEI, New York CHRISTOPHER P. GIBSON, New York DEREK KILMER, Washington VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas JOSEPH J. HECK, Nevada SCOTT H. PETERS, California Peter Villano, Professional Staff Member Mark Lewis, Professional Staff Member Julie Herbert, Clerk C O N T E N T S ---------- CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 2014 Page Hearing: Thursday, March 13, 2014, Fiscal Year 2015 National Defense Authorization Budget Request from the U.S. Special Operations Command and the Posture of the U.S. Special Operations Forces.. 1 Appendix: Thursday, March 13, 2014......................................... 25 ---------- THURSDAY, MARCH 13, 2014 FISCAL YEAR 2015 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BUDGET REQUEST FROM THE U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND AND THE POSTURE OF THE U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS Langevin, Hon. James R., a Representative from Rhode Island, Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Intelligence, Emerging Threats and Capabilities............................................... 1 Thornberry, Hon. Mac, a Representative from Texas, Chairman, Subcommittee on Intelligence, Emerging Threats and Capabilities 1 WITNESSES Lumpkin, Hon. Michael D., Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, Office of the Secretary of Defense........................................... 2 McRaven, ADM William H., USN, Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command........................................................ 4 APPENDIX Prepared Statements: Lumpkin, Hon. Michael D...................................... 29 McRaven, ADM William H....................................... 42 Documents Submitted for the Record: [There were no Documents submitted.] Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing: Mr. Gibson................................................... 60 Mr. Johnson.................................................. 59 Mr. Langevin................................................. 59 Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing: Mr. Carson................................................... 67 Mr. Gibson................................................... 68 Mr. Thornberry............................................... 63 FISCAL YEAR 2015 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BUDGET REQUEST FROM THE U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND AND THE POSTURE OF THE U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES ---------- House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Intelligence, Emerging Threats and Capabilities, Washington, DC, Thursday, March 13, 2014. The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:24 p.m., in room HVC-210, Capitol Visitor Center, Hon. Mac Thornberry (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MAC THORNBERRY, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES Mr. Thornberry. The subcommittee will come to order. Again, appreciate everyone's flexibility with rooms and times. And we are anxious to have this open hearing, and then, as Members know, we will continue in closed session downstairs just across the hall from the Intelligence Committee once the closed session has concluded. I will just say welcome to our witnesses. I believe this will be the first time that Assistant Secretary Lumpkin has testified in front of our subcommittee. We are glad to have you. Admiral McRaven has been testifying a lot lately on both this side and the other side of the Capitol. We are always grateful for your openness and your willingness to engage with this committee on all--a whole range of issues, and that includes being here today. So, with that, I will yield to the distinguished gentleman from Rhode Island for any comments he would like to make. STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES R. LANGEVIN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM RHODE ISLAND, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary Lumpkin and Admiral McRaven, I want to thank you very much for being here today. And we truly appreciate your service to the Nation, and we certainly hope that you will pass on our gratitude to all the men and women who serve under each of you in your charge when you see them next. And, again, thank you again for the work that you are doing. The report of the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review [QDR] makes clear that our special operations forces [SOF] will remain an integral part of the way the United States addresses our global and national security interests today and in the future. Even as we draw down in Afghanistan, the QDR calls for the growth in SOF and for them to remain decisively committed to our fight against Al Qaeda. It also highlights their role in dealing with other transnational threats, countering the spread--or use of WMD [weapons of mass destruction] and, of course, the critical part in helping to build the capacity of our partner security forces as well. Clearly it is a busy future for SOF, and even in our era of reduced defense resources, that is why I am pleased to see Secretary Lumpkin's renewed effort at strengthening SO/LIC's [Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict's] oversight over SOCOM [Special Operations Command] and ensuring that Admiral McRaven's forces are properly trained, manned, and equipped. I know that Admiral McRaven presented SOCOM's posture statement to the full committee earlier this month, but I am glad to see you here today together. It is not unlike the service posture hearings we have at the full committee with the service secretaries and the chiefs together. Not to detract from the role the subcommittee plays but, rather, to emphasize the importance of SOCOM and the role of SO/LIC, perhaps this is the way the full committee should treat SOCOM's posture statement in the future. So now, as we proceed, I will be interested to hear if your acquisition authorities remain flexible enough to provide SOF what it needs without duplicating other service acquisition efforts. Are your research and development accounts funded so that you can continue to set the pace to superior technology? Does your set of existing authorities, both statutory and command, provide you with the space in which to properly operate? And, finally and most importantly, how are your people and their families faring, and what can we do to help you take care of them properly? Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I yield back. Mr. Thornberry. I thank the gentleman. Without objection, your full statements will be made a part of the record. And if you would like to summarize, Secretary Lumpkin-- again, thanks for being here--you may proceed. STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL D. LUMPKIN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Secretary Lumpkin. Thank you, Chairman Thornberry, Ranking Member Langevin, distinguished members of the committee. Thank you for your steadfast support for our special operators and the U.S. Special Operations Command. The authorities and appropriations that Congress has provided the Department of Defense have allowed us to prosecute the current fight and ensure we are prepared to confront emerging threats and to protect the homeland. I am pleased to testify here today with Admiral Bill McRaven, who has expertly led the United States Special Operations Command over the past 3 years. The threat we face, especially from Al Qaeda, is continuing to change. Although the scale of the threat to the homeland has diminished, threats to our interests overseas are actually increasing. With their leadership depleting, Al Qaeda still retains sanctuaries in remote areas of Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia. Terrorist organizations are also expanding in Syria, North Africa, and the Sahel. The threat continues to evolve. We must maintain pressure on terrorist organizations to protect the homeland. We are in a time of transition. We face a yet undetermined drawdown in Afghanistan and new fiscal realities. It may become more difficult to maintain pressure on Al Qaeda in their traditional safe havens. I closely monitor how the cuts to the services impact the readiness of USSOCOM. We are assessing the impact on critical enablers. For example, we are ensuring that the cuts to the ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] fleet will not erode our capabilities to find, fix, and finish targets. As we transition in Afghanistan and redistribute SOF into other theaters, we need to ensure our operations and maintenance accounts are resourced to support operations. In accordance with the fiscal year 2014 National Defense Authorization Act, ASD [Assistant Secretary of Defense] SO/LIC and the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, Logistics are strengthening our roles in the oversight of USSOCOM to maximize efficiencies and maintain oversight responsibilities over Major Force Program-11 funds. These include routine interactions between my staff and USSOCOM and frequent dialogue between me and Admiral McRaven. We owe the President the best strategic options to accomplish our national security objectives. This includes-- this is conducted in close coordination and honest discussion with the Congress as you exercise your oversight, authorization, and appropriations responsibilities. We are moving from a state of perpetual war to perpetual engagement, engaging with partners to build their capacity, engaging problems before they become too big to fix, and engaging in direct and indirect action to disrupt and destroy our enemies. As we move towards a globally networked perpetual engagement, our efforts are grounded in experiences that demonstrate the success of this approach. Colombia and Philippines are case studies in how small investment of SOF resourced for an enduring timeframe can have positive results. In the Philippines, a task force of about 500 special operators and supporting general purpose forces helped degrade a serious transnational terrorist threat from Abu Sayyaf and Jamaah Islamiyah. In Colombia, we provided counterinsurgency training and humanitarian assistance to prevent narcotics traffickers from developing sanctuaries. This effort in Colombia not only resulted in a far more secure and prosperous nation now, it has emerged as a great exporter of regional security. We have the same opportunities in Africa and the Middle East. Our support to the French in the Sahel has been critical in stemming the tide of extremism in Mali. Modest support to AMISOM [African Union Mission to Somalia] in the Horn of Africa has helped reverse the trajectory of al- Shabaab. These discrete activities and operations constitute a global SOF network required for perpetual vigilance. I am proud to represent the sailors, soldiers, airmen, marines, and civilians of USSOCOM. Their sacrifice in this war are immense. Since October 2001, 385 special operators have been killed in action and another 2,160 have been wounded. I am committed to do everything I possibly can to ensure these brave warriors have the best training, equipment, and support we can provide. Working closely with Congress, we will surely have the right strategies and policies in place to employ them effectively. Thank you for your support, and I look forward to your questions. [The prepared statement of Secretary Lumpkin can be found in the Appendix on page 29.] Mr. Thornberry. Thank you. Admiral. STATEMENT OF ADM WILLIAM H. MCRAVEN, USN, COMMANDER, U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND Admiral McRaven. Chairman Thornberry, Ranking Member Langevin, distinguished members of the committee, thank you again for the opportunity to address you today. I would also like to recognize my friend and colleague, Assistant Secretary Michael Lumpkin. Mike and I have a long history together, and I greatly value ASD SO/LIC's partnership and oversight of USSOCOM. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to say that, since my last hearing, SOCOM has made some great strides in dealing with current conflicts, preparing for the future conflicts, and, most importantly, taking care of our people. SOCOM continues to provide the finest warriors in the world to the fight in Afghanistan and, as we approach the end of 2014, your special operations forces will be ready to adjust to whatever decisions are made regarding our future employment in that country. Globally, we are developing plans to better serve the geographic combatant commanders [GCCs] and the chiefs of mission who, owing to the past 12 years of engagement in Iraq and Afghanistan, have gone under-resourced with SOF forces. SOCOM, as the Department of Defense's [DOD] synchronizer for the war on terrorism, is also working hard to help better coordinate our activities locally, regionally, and globally with both the GCCs and the U.S. ambassadors. I believe the future of U.S. special operations will be in helping to build partner capacity with those willing nations who share our interest. This will mean strengthening our existing allied relationships and building new ones. No nation alone can stem the rise of extremism. We need our friends and allies more now than ever before. Our future as a special operations force is also inextricably linked to the general purpose force in the interagency. The past 12 years have shown us that a whole-of- government effort is required to be successful against extremism, and in SOF we have always, always, relied heavily on our fellow soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines for support around the globe. Finally, we have gone to great lengths to take care of our most precious resource, our people. The Preservation of the Force and Families initiative, or the POTFF, has already seen a marked improvement in the morale and well-being of those who serve in SOF. While we still suffer from the tragedy of high suicide rates, I believe we have laid the foundation for keeping our force and their families strong and resilient into the future. Once again, sir, thank you for your interest and unwavering support for the men and women in the special operations community and to those members of the committee, thank you. I look forward to your questions. [The prepared statement of Admiral McRaven can be found in the Appendix on page 42.] Mr. Thornberry. Thank you. I appreciate the testimony of you both. Admiral, I was struck when you testified in the full committee posture hearing, and I believe you said, essentially, the most important thing we can do to fight terrorism is working with others. And you just reiterated that the future of special operations is building partnership capacity. Have I got that right as far as the most important thing we can do, in your view, to fight terrorism? And then, secondly, my perception is we are very good, best in the world, at a variety of direct action and so forth, but we are still evolving our authorities, our organizations, our skills even, on building partnership capacity, this thing that you say is the most important. Do you agree with my perception of where we are? Admiral McRaven. Sir, I do. And to maybe not clarify my words, but to add some emphasis on this, I think the most important thing to kind of fight the extremist threat that is out there is keep the pressure on them. I think the way we do that in the special operations community is by building partner capacity so that the host nation where the extremists live, they can take care of their own security problems. So I do think that that is the best tool we have, recognizing, however, that we are always going to have to be in a position to conduct direct action against those irreconcilables. Mr. Thornberry. Okay. Let me just ask one other question right quick. I had a Member of Congress within the past few weeks come to me and say, ``Look at how much money Special Operations is asking for in the President's budget. That is nearly as much money as the Marine Corps is asking for, and they have a lot fewer people.'' What is your answer to the question of why Special Operations Command, with fewer people, requires the funding that it does require? I mean, it is one of the only--one of only--really, two areas in the budget where funding is going up was special operations and cyber. But what is your answer to folks who say, ``Why is this so expensive?'' Admiral McRaven. Yes, sir. The fact of the matter is it takes a lot to kind of grow a special operations operator. So when you look at the time from the time we bring them into the SOF community--and most of them, historically, the data will show that they spend about 7 to 8 years in the general purpose force. So you see the general purpose force already picks up a certain amount of the financing of the base-level training. So by the time they hit, you know, E-5, some of them E-6, that is when they come into the special operations community. Then to really make them world-class in--whether that is language, cultural training, direct action training, reconnaissance, it just takes more to train an average SOF soldier than it does a basic infantryman in the Marine Corps or in the Army. And, obviously, as we look at the technology that we are able to apply against a problem set, that really isn't scalable, to some degree, across broad brigades or battalions. It is scalable if you want to provide everybody in your squad a radio. If you want to make sure that ISR is supporting a platoon or an ODA [official development assistance] level operation, we have the resources to do that because it requires special technology and specially trained people to do the missions that we are being asked to do. Mr. Thornberry. Thank you. Mr. Langevin. Mr. Langevin. Thank you again, gentlemen. So, Admiral McRaven, as you--I am sure you know that this committee has been very interested in support of the development and fielding of directed-energy weapons to support military applications, and we understand that SOCOM, supported by JIEDDO [Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization], has been funding development of a manned portable high-energy laser system to address SOCOM particular needs. Could you talk a little bit about the status of this development effort as well as what actions have been taken to test and potentially field such a weapons system. Admiral McRaven. Yes, sir. As you point out, we have been working with the JIEDDO. They have provided us some funding to do some initial testing with the manned portable high-energy weapons. I do think that we have a future in looking at the high- energy weapons. The problems we have right now, of course, is we are going through to make sure that we are in compliance with the law. The laser safety law is something we have to make sure that whatever manned portable device we have is compliant with that, and then there are some health laws and others that we have got to take into consideration as we are doing the testing. We have done some basic-level testing in the continental United States. The results of that I have not seen, sir; so, I am happy to get back to you and take that one for the record. [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 59.] Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Admiral. And right now what is the current status of SOCOM's Undersea Mobility Program? And what gaps do you foresee? Admiral McRaven. Sir, we have two areas in our Undersea Mobility that we are looking at. We have a smaller version, a wet submersible, the SWCS [shallow water combat submersible] we refer to it, and then we have our dry combat submersible. So the dry combat submersible, we currently have a vessel that we are leasing, and we are doing some test and evaluation on that. And then we have two prototypes that are being built, one in the U.K. [United Kingdom] and one in Italy. The eventual program of record is looking at a total of three dry combat submersibles. This really puts us in a position to have our SEALs [Sea, Air and Land forces] in this case, but other operators, in a dry environment as they transit from point A to point B. The shallow water combat submersible, the SWCS, is a new variation, new technology based on our old SEAL delivery vehicle. So a wet submersible, a little bit more limited capability than the dry submersible. But, frankly, we need both. The wet submersible will be able to get into regions where the dry submersible will not, but you have to have both capabilities. So we are looking at a program of record of about 10 shallow water combat submersibles. The dry combat submersible, sir, is on track, and we are pleased with the direction we are heading. We have been working with the Navy on classifying this, as you know, classification, making sure that we are meeting industry standards for dry combat submersibles, and the Navy again has been working with us and doing this. This submersible, the dry combat submersible, will not be attached to a larger submarine. So that actually allows me to buy down some of the risk as we are building the vessel itself. The shallow water submersible, again, we are working with the Navy in developing that. And while we have had a little bit of slippage in the development because it is a new piece of equipment, I am confident we will be on track to produce the right number, sir. Mr. Langevin. And I know that the submersible--that we had problem--technical problems with those in the past. Have those been substantially overcome? Admiral McRaven. Yes, sir. In fact, sir, that is why we are actually going through an industry standard and looking at prototypes before we get into a final build. So by looking at how industry works their dry submersibles, we think we are going to learn a lot in terms of kind of a systemic approach to building the dry submersible that industry is very good at doing. And then we will take the lessons learned from there and incorporate them into our long-term dry combat submersible. Mr. Langevin. Thank you. So the Secretary of Defense has recently commented that SOF will grow to 69,700 personnel from roughly 67,000 today, and the fiscal year 2015 budget request includes this growth with declining budgets. How will you ensure that this force will not become hollow? How will you ensure you are not choosing quantity over quality? And this is for both witnesses. Secretary Lumpkin. I think the key is, when we look at the numbers of SOF, we are not actually--even though from a programmatic view it is 72,000 going down to the 69,700, that is not actually a cut in the force. It is actually just stemming the growth of the force. So because it has been a metered and well thought-out process on how we would grow the force, I think that we are definitely in a position and a trajectory to make sure that the force is robust. What I am concerned most about is the cuts in the other services that provide the enablers for U.S. Special Operations Command. These are the things that are not organic to them, whether it is the ships that support them or, as I mentioned in my opening comments, the ISR that supports them. So that is what I am diligently working on and focusing on because that is my greatest concern on making sure SOF maintains its capabilities. The services have been absolutely great, but there are competing requirements that they are having to resource. So I am working diligently with them to make sure that doesn't happen. Mr. Langevin. Admiral, do you care to comment? Admiral McRaven. Yes, sir. The only thing I would add is our basic qualification courses that we do at basic SEAL training or the special forces qualification course we have had to ramp up over the years as the demand signal for SOF increased. So now we are fortunate to have the infrastructure in place to be able to meet the demand signal of the increasing force size. So I am not concerned at all, sir, that the quality of our force will diminish. I can tell you from my experience the quality now is better than it has ever been, and I am pleased to say--and that is across the board with our soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines, sir. Mr. Langevin. Thank you. Thank you, Admiral. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. I yield back. Mr. Thornberry. Thank you, gentlemen. Just to remind all Members, after this open session, we will head downstairs for a closed session, hopefully, all before votes resume. The gentleman from New York, Mr. Gibson. Mr. Gibson. Well, thanks, Mr. Chairman. And I welcome the panelists as well and express my deep gratitude for your leadership and to your command for their achievements and their sacrifices and their families. I am going to ask a question on integration and cooperation, recognizing we are in open session here, fully understanding that, but also recognizing that the American people are looking for confidence in what we are doing. So to the degree that you can bring it up to in the unclassified level, your response helps me communicate so we can keep that confidence going. In 2009, a radicalized youth gets on an aircraft and is en route to our country, lights himself on fire, and it is not our system that saves us. It is really a brave soul on the aircraft puts him out. And it turns out that weeks prior this young man's father had called our country and--expressing that he didn't recognize his son, that he was talking crazy talk that he could attack our country. And when I had a chance to come here in 2011, I chatted with Admiral Olson, and I asked him--I said, ``Did that call ever land on your desk?'' And he said, ``No.'' And so, you know, working with General Clapper, we worked an amendment in the intel authorization bill to try to, you know, take some of the effective action that I saw firsthand in Iraq in terms of flattening intelligence, linking it with operations, and trying to elevate that up to a national-level asset. And about 10 months or so later he came back and said, ``You know, we are making progress on the cloud in terms of sharing information and, also, budgeting so that we can have better integration.'' So I am interested in hearing how we have been doing in the last year on integration within the whole of government--I appreciate your opening remarks on that score--and then, also, cooperation. I couldn't agree more, associate myself, with the remarks talking about how important it is that we work with our friends and allies. And I think that goes across the whole of government as well in terms of our diplomacy and how we work and interact with countries across the world. And then, of course, as--part of that is the deterrent and when deterrence fails and when we have irreconcilables, is taking direct action there. So I am interested in that and certainly understanding the classification, but to the extent that I could get a response that helps me communicate to the public the confidence that I have with you. Secretary Lumpkin. The collaboration on the intelligence front within the interagency is phenomenal. I mean, my relationship with the folks at NCTC [National Counterterrorism Center], CIA [Central Intelligence Agency], FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation], DHS [Department of Homeland Security]--I mean, and it is just not my relationships. It is the departments and how we dialogue and we discuss. So we are firing on all eight cylinders. I mean, the machine is working. So I feel very confident on the information and intelligence sharing that is happening. The other piece is the information and intelligence with our allies and our partners, and that becomes--because this is truly a global challenge that we are facing, the security of the United States, because many of the threats, of course, come from outside the country. And that is a work in progress. I mean, as we build our relationships and we continue to build the partner capacity, part of this is to make sure we can also have this information and intelligence sharing across the national security spectrum. Admiral McRaven. And, sir, I would echo the Secretary's comments. You know, I have a personal and professional relationship with Tish Long at NGA [National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency]; Mike Flynn at DIA [Defense Intelligence Agency]; John Brennan at CIA; Jim Clapper, DNI [Director of National Intelligence]; Matt Olson at NCTC. I mean, these are personal and professional friends, and they do not hesitate to reach out to me personally if they think there is intelligence that is worth knowing. But in the case of Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, the underwear bomber you were referring to, I am not sure we will ever be good enough to see, you know, these individuals that are radicalized out in the middle of Yemen, in his case, just because, no matter how good our intelligence gets, it is very difficult sometimes to get that detailed and that in-depth on a particular target. So this is why I think, again, we need to continue to build our relationships with other host nations so that they may see things that we don't see. And those relationships, sir, as you indicated, they need to be at the intelligence community level, the law enforcement, the mil to mil, the diplomatic levels. And I am a very big believer in partnering, and I think this is where the tripwires will be crossed in our ability to find threats that maybe our intelligence community wasn't looking for, but the law enforcement community was, or just somebody comes in from the tribal region and says, ``Hey, something doesn't seem right here.'' So--but, again, I would echo the Secretary's sentiments that our relationship today is as good as I have ever seen it in my 37 years of doing this. Mr. Gibson. Well, thanks, gentlemen. My time is just about expired. So I would ask for the record, if you have recommendations as we move towards the mark where we could continue this trend, whether it be with regard to resources or approvals, authorities, would welcome that. [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 60.] Mr. Gibson. And I thank you, gentlemen. I yield back, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Thornberry. Thank you. Mrs. Davis. Mrs. Davis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, Secretary Lumpkin and Admiral McRaven, thank you for being here. It is good to see you both. I wanted to ask you first, Secretary Lumpkin, about the Combating Terrorism Technical Support Office [CTTSO]. And you mentioned that in your statement, and I certainly have been very supportive of a whole-of-government approach. Could you share with us, I think, why this investment is critical? But I also at the same time know that we have a development and acquisition center. It seems like there is several different entities, and I suspect they interact, but I am a little concerned. Is there replication and--or duplication, really? And what about the other services? Is there some way--as we talk about cost, is there some way that some of that effort maybe could be more helpful to the other services or vice versa? I mean, how much of this is going on that we could streamline a little bit more? Secretary Lumpkin. Thank you for the question. The Counterterrorism Technical Support Office, or CTTSO, is truly a unique enterprise in the fact that it partners with not only the State Department, but each of the services, the combatant commands, and our international allies in order to work research and development projects. So we have U.S.-U.K. projects. We are working projects in support of the U.S. Army where we can actually do cost-sharing and bring monies together for a common goal. So it truly is a place where we do exactly what you are saying, is that we can support people's requirements and we can leverage it across the entire defense sector not only in the United States, but, also, with our partners. So we can take an idea, whether it is a new type of ammunition that we need to look at in our support of special operations or even law enforcement, and then we can work together to do the development and then share the results and maybe even find a company or a technology that can provide something that we truly don't have today. So it is---- Mrs. Davis. So is that different from DARPA [Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency] or does DARPA interface with that? Secretary Lumpkin. There are discussions that go on. DARPA and CTTSO--CTTSO is largely focused on truly the combating terrorism piece, whereas the DARPA has a much larger---- Mrs. Davis. Larger frame. Secretary Lumpkin [continuing]. Aperture that they are looking at. So the other piece of it is the CTTSO gives us the ability to--if there is a project that we want to put in the future and we see it coming, we can do the initial research and development in order to support a future project. So it is quite agile and gives us the flexibility to do what we need. Mrs. Davis. Admiral McRaven, did you want to comment on that? And can we--maybe could we save in some other areas if we put, you know, really the resources that you need to do this right? And do you have those resources today? Do you think that we do? Secretary Lumpkin. I think, again, the beauty of CTTSO in itself is that it is not just DOD money. I mean, because we are taking money--I mean, leveraging money from the interagency as well as the international community. So we have this pooling of resources for a common goal, and I think that is the real beauty of it. Mrs. Davis. Is there also a way--and we know from certainly the San Diego community and others that there are many businesses that would like to be engaged in some way, and sometimes what they share with us is it is very difficult for them to get the attention for something. And I am just wondering, how do you do that in terms of the business piece to that so that we can bring those things online, innovate quickly, and get the job done? Secretary Lumpkin. Well, we have an open forum for business that we do once a year before--and make sure they understand what we anticipate the requirements are. In fact, I just did the opening comments for it here last month. So I think it is generally the first week in February we do that. So we open it to business. We did it at the Reagan Center this year, and we had over 600 businesses in attendance who came to see what we were looking for at the future. Mrs. Davis. Admiral McRaven, General Dunford was with us this morning talking about Afghanistan and where the gains--the good stories and some of the concerns. What are your concerns when it comes to their special ops forces? Admiral McRaven. Ma'am, I am very confident in their special ops forces. In fact, I just received a detailed brief today from our folks in Afghanistan. We are very pleased, very proud, of the great work the Afghans have done and that, frankly, my forces have done in training them. I think they have a very capable commando element, special forces element, and we are pleased with the development of the Afghan Local Police. So I think, as long as we can continue to be in a position to shepherd these forces as they go forward into the future-- and it doesn't require a lot to do that, but I do think we need to continue to be in a position to train, advise, and assist for a little bit longer in order to make sure that all the processes that General Dunford and General Allen before him and others before them have put in place and make sure those are functioning processes, pay, maintenance, those sorts of things. I think, if we can get to that point, then they will be successful in the future. And so we certainly look forward to having the opportunity to continue to partner with our great Afghan special forces. Mrs. Davis. Thank you. Mr. Thornberry. Mrs. Hartzler. Mrs. Hartzler. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, gentlemen, for your service. In your testimony, Secretary Lumpkin, you mentioned the advances that Colombia has achieved. And I just had the opportunity to go with Chairman McKeon on a CODEL [congressional delegation] to Colombia, Chile, Brazil, and Panama, and I was so impressed with what the Colombian people and the military has done and how they have really taken it to the FARC [Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia] and they have pushed them down and now they are in negotiations on that operation. But while we were there, the general in charge was very adamant, saying, ``We are on the 10-yard line. We are so close, but please don't leave us yet. The game is not over and, if you leave, it would be a game-changer for us. We need that.'' So considering advances there that you mentioned in your testimony, how much longer do you anticipate that we will be engaged there with them? And what level of involvement do you foresee us pursuing still with them? Secretary Lumpkin. Thank you for the question, because, you know, it is interesting from my days. I mean, my first time in Colombia was in the late 1980s when I was in uniform at the time. To see where it has gone from that period to now is amazing. And they are--the comment was absolutely correct, on the 10-yard line, and we need to make sure we sustain our presence and partnership with the Colombians in this effort. I think the key is that we looked at it from the outset, when the development of Plan Colombia came into place, was--is that it was going to be an enduring commitment on our part. And we--when we looked at it for that way, we knew that we weren't looking--we weren't playing the short game here. It was going to be the long game, and we focused on that. And the enemy gets a vote, you know, as far as how long it is going to go; so, I am hesitant to say that it is going to be X number of years or months or what have you. But I think that the fruits of our labor and our efforts and the resources, it is a tremendous return on investment long term. And I think it has served as a model that we could use in other regions and other areas and countries that--where there are challenges, because there is many countries that are challenging for us now that aren't near as bad as the situation that Colombia was in the late 1980s. Mrs. Hartzler. It did give me hope for other countries. And do you see it possibly being used as a model for Mexico? I know that NORTHCOM [U.S. Northern Command] has added a Special Operations Command, North there to establish that. So what lessons do you think that we can translate from Colombia to, say, Mexico? Secretary Lumpkin. I am kind of hesitant to say which country it would go to. But I think the key is that there has to be a comprehensive plan that is supported by the interagency that we make a commitment to and we know, again, it is a mindset of having the long game here and that there is going to be this enduring commitment to see it through to the end and having very clear metrics that we had with the Colombians and the Colombians clearly had skin in the game, which was key. And so it is about everybody sitting around a table, understanding, with tremendous support from the Congress, and making sure that this was resourced. And it wouldn't have happened if the Congress had not been decisively engaged at the beginning. Mrs. Hartzler. If you were to list the five things--and that is what I kept trying to narrow down while I was there-- what were the keys to the success here that we could translate to other countries? And some of the answers that I got was, one, first of all, the people have to stand up, have to be fed up with it. The people of the country have to say enough is enough and be willing to get behind leadership. And the second thing they said was to have strong leadership within their own government, willing to take them on, who are not corrupt and that sort of thing, but then having our engagement, too. Now, those are three things from just visiting with a few people. But I would like to hear your top five things, lessons from Colombia, why has that worked or why is it working, that we can translate to others. Secretary Lumpkin. If I could, just off the top of my head, I think that the top five things would be, first of all, as you mentioned, the people, but it is also a sense of nationalism. They saw themselves as a cohesive unit as a country. And I think that is actually key because it wasn't fragmented. The other one was the interagency commitment and the support of the U.S. Congress on our part and that we could enter something knowing that we were looking at a long-term relationship. So we weren't rushing against timelines, but, rather, had key milestones because it was milestone-based. I think that the other piece is it was resourced to the level that it needed to be resourced. And I believe that we-- and my final one here is because there was a commitment and we had the relationship and the skin in the game of the Colombian people. Mrs. Hartzler. Very good. Secretary Lumpkin. Thank you. Mrs. Hartzler. Thank you for all you do. Mr. Thornberry. Thank you. Mr. Johnson. Mr. Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral McRaven, you along with General Odierno and General Amos have embraced the concept of the human domain in a white paper entitled ``Strategic Landpower'' with great vigor. This concept is built upon the lessons of the decade of war from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff along with his staff, and that noted--and it noted that the failure to understand the operational environment was the primary reason for the problems encountered in Iraq and Afghanistan. Do you agree with that assessment? And, if so, why? Admiral McRaven. Sir, we have had a great conversation between the Commandant, the Chief of Staff of the Army, and myself about the human domain. My point has always been you have to take the population into consideration, I think, regardless of what you are doing, whether it is a major conflict or whether it is an insurgency. And as we look at the human domain as kind of the totality of the cultural, the ethnic, the social fabric that makes up the people that live in a particular area, you have to know that before you can make any decisions, whether those are, you know, large maneuver decisions for the Army, expeditionary decisions for the Marine Corps or counterinsurgency decisions for SOF. So the human domain, to me, really is a fundamental area where we in the special operations community have to focus our time and our attention. We have to understand everything about the culture before we, you know, go off and make decisions that are going to affect those people in a certain area. Mr. Johnson. And thank you. Does a program like the Human Terrain System support the human domain concept? Admiral McRaven. Sir, I am only vaguely familiar with the Human Terrain System. We have a number of programs out there that look at the human terrain. I am not familiar with that exact system. Having said that, we have a number of systems that layer our knowledge of the human terrain. So if you look at a valley in Kunar Province, for example, the systems we have out there can tell you the ethnicity, they can tell you the cultural ties, they can tell you the tribal relationships. They can begin to layer this information one on top of the other. That gives us a much better appreciation for the dynamics in a certain region in Kunar or in Latin America or in Africa or wherever. So we use a number of systems to, again, layer that information so we have a better understanding of the problem set we are dealing with. Mr. Johnson. Do you think that SOCOM would be a good fit for the Human Terrain System? Admiral McRaven. Sir, if I can take that for the record and get back to you. Again, I am not personally familiar with that specific system, but I will find out and get back to you, sir. [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 59.] Mr. Johnson. All right. Thank you. What status of operations--excuse me. What special operations forces core mission areas and activities remain of critical importance to United States national security? In other words, given fiscal constraints, what should remain off of the chopping block to ensure that we do not hollow out the forces? Secretary Lumpkin. All of the core missions that are codified in Title 10 remain valid and necessary; so, I don't recommend shedding any mission sets from the U.S. Special Operations Command inventory. Mr. Johnson. Okay. According to the May 2013 Presidential Policy Guidance on standards and procedures for the use of force in counterterrorism operations outside the United States and areas of active hostility, lethal action may only be taken in the case that an assessment has been made that capture is not feasible at the time of the operation. Which individuals or which entity is responsible for making the original determination that capture of any given target is not feasible? Secretary Lumpkin. We have an interagency process that works and discusses that particular issue and makes recommendations. Mr. Johnson. What would be the titles of those interagency personnel? Secretary Lumpkin. PPD-1, which is the Presidential Policy Directive Number 1, outlines the process for decisionmaking along this way. So, normally, it is a process of interagency meetings, deputies meetings, principals meetings, and ultimate recommendations. Mr. Johnson. So it is a collective decision? Secretary Lumpkin. It is a process that works through where we make sure everybody's concerns and equities are known. It makes recommendations. Mr. Johnson. How quickly can it be called to act? Secretary Lumpkin. Quite rapidly, when necessary. Mr. Johnson. All right. Thank you. Secretary Lumpkin. Thank you. Mr. Thornberry. Mr. Nugent. Mr. Nugent. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I want to thank the Secretary and Admiral McRaven again for you being here in the last 2 weeks. And, Admiral, I really do appreciate your candor in regards to how you have discussed issues, particularly as it relates to our conventional forces. Obviously, I know we are here about SOCOM, but you can't have one without the other, and I think sometimes people get somewhat confused about that. And just for my good friend, Mr. Johnson, I mean, if you are ever interested in finding out what the criteria is and how decisions are made, we do have that in classified setting that goes over those particular issues, because I had the same concerns that you had, Mr. Johnson. So the committee has done a good job in that. But, Admiral, today was the first time I heard that we were not going to use the dry combat submersible off of a submarine. Did I hear that correctly? Admiral McRaven. Sir, we have--right now our path is to take a look at what we have in terms of prototypes out there. So, as I said, we are leasing one vessel. We have two prototypes we are building. However, the intent right now is, because we think our major platform, the SSGN [nuclear-powered guided missile submarine], is scheduled for retirement in the mid-2020s, we are preparing to be in a position, you know, not to build a submarine that is tied necessarily to the SSGN or to the follow-on vessel. Now, having said that, we are absolutely, absolutely, looking at alternatives that would mate to a U.S. submarine. Right now, however, these prototypes are designed to industry standards first, and then we will learn from the industry standards to make a decision on what the final product will look like. Mr. Nugent. Obviously, to do that, I mean, you do have to have some type of a dry facility on the sub--on the deck of a sub. Admiral McRaven. No, sir. Not necessarily. Mr. Nugent. Okay. Admiral McRaven. So there--I mean, there are alternatives out there that would imply that you do not necessarily have to have a hangar, as we think of it---- Mr. Nugent. Right. Admiral McRaven [continuing]. In order to be able to launch a dry submersible. So, again, while we are not heading down that path right now, we are looking at alternatives that would put us in a position, if necessary, to be able to have the dry combat submersible launched from a U.S. submarine. Mr. Nugent. Having the ability to do that, launch it from a submarine, does that increase your capabilities? Admiral McRaven. Sir, it does. Clearly, the clandestine nature of a large submarine puts us in a position to gain the element of surprise in certain areas. However, having said that, you know, without going into too much detail in the open session, we have good tactics and good procedures that can get us close enough and, as we build the technology, we think we will be in a position with the dry combat submersible to meet most of our targets that we have looked at. Mr. Nugent. Both of these submersibles that you are talking about, the dry and the wet, replace--what is the legacy model sitting out there? Admiral McRaven. Sir, the legacy model now on the wet side is the SEAL Delivery Vehicle or the Swimmer Delivery Vehicle [SDV], Mark 8, Mod--I'm not sure where we are now--Mod 3, Mod 4. I was raised on the Mark 8 SDV almost 30 years ago. We have continued to upgrade it, however, and the technology on the Mark 8 today is reasonably good. But, frankly, the new technology that is coming online will make the next shallow water combat submersible really a generational leap beyond what the current capacity is. We have no dry combat submersible in the inventory right now. Our Advanced SEAL Delivery System is no longer active. So, we are down to--we have no capability within the dry side. Mr. Nugent. And the wet obviously limits you in regards to distance that you can travel based upon the operator's ability to operate after being exposed to extremely cold water. Is there anything else that is, I guess--is big Navy on board with the opportunity to utilize a dry combat submersible housed somewhere on another submarine to be named? Admiral McRaven. Yes, sir. So we are partnered with the Navy in this process. One of the reasons we are going with the industry standard is because, if you mate a dry submersible now with a Navy vessel--with a Navy submarine, then you have to comply with Navy standards. And, frankly, we think the industry standards are good enough for our operations right now. If we had to do it in compliance with the Navy standards now, we think it would cost much more to meet those standards and may not, may not, give us a better capability. So that is why we are exploring a number of different options, to find out whether or not the industry standards will be good enough for our future dry combat submersibles. Mr. Nugent. And I would think as we--you know, as we move along and budgets are tight, that is a good way to go, looking at industry standards, because every time we try to invent a new mousetrap--I hate to say it--one of my sons has one of those on his leg when he flies a Black Hawk--not too good. So I appreciate it. And, Admiral, we are certainly here to support you. Thank you. I yield back. Mr. Thornberry. Thank the gentleman. All sorts of implications for the larger acquisition reform effort in the exchange that you all just had, it seems to me. Mr. Carson. Mr. Carson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary Lumpkin, looking across the globe and considering the threat of transnational terrorism, what are your largest concerns? What are we assuming? Where are we assuming risk in current strategies? And are we postured to counter these threats? Secretary Lumpkin. Not only am I the Acting Assistant Secretary for Special Operations, but I am also performing the duties of the Under Secretary for Policy right now. So I have an opportunity to take a--I have a much broader view than I would normally have just looking at it from the SOF perspective. The world is just a much smaller place now. So when you ask what are the threats and--I would say the threat is it is coming from everywhere, I mean, in the sense that it is totally--space is fungible now. People can move from place to place, and the world is just much smaller. So there aren't--while there are lines where the threat comes more directly, it can come from anywhere. So, for us, it is about having that--truly a global presence and having this networked approach that USSOCOM has built so well, as to making sure that each of the theater special operations commands and the SOF operators across--and there is--each geographic combatant commander has a TSOC, a theater special operations command--has got the ability to talk to each other. And each one of them now works in supporting the geographic combatant command, but for Admiral McRaven at USSOCOM, and he has the ability to synchronize their operations. And I think that is key to--that allows me to sleep at night so I am not worrying about this and it keeps me up. So I think we are postured for success, but the key is just making sure that that global SOF network remains resourced, active, and viable. So would you like to add something? Admiral McRaven. Well, I am glad you are sleeping at night. But I will tell you that the Secretary nailed it. When we talk about kind of the evolution of U.S. special operations-- and I appreciate the opportunity to roll this out--you know, we have had a special operations enterprise for decades. We have been globally dispersed for the last 27 years that USSOCOM has been around. Now that global enterprise--because of our ability to bring them together with communications, now we have taken those thousand disparate nodes and we have connected them through communications. And starting last October we established a very disciplined what we call battle rhythm. So video teleconferences--whereas the Secretary said I have four video teleconferences a week, my staff has them every day with the entire network now. And so we talk about the global SOF network. That is just the name. The enterprise has been there forever. Communications has allowed us to connect those various nodes, and now we can better meet the geographic combatant commander's requirements because we are much better synchronized. And so the Secretary exactly characterized it. But the point I wanted to raise is, for decades, we have had thousands of people out on the battlefield. Until recently we haven't been able to connect them globally through both communications and authorities, and now we have that ability. Mr. Carson. To that point, Admiral, I have been interested in some time in service member mental health, particularly providing mental health assessments throughout deployment. Can you give us some assessment of SOCOM's embedded behavioral health programs and the impact that they have had on resiliency, for that matter, in your units? Admiral McRaven. Sir, thank you for the question. We have our program called the Preservation of the Force and Families. And my predecessor, Admiral Eric Olson, did a lengthy task force study before I took command, spent about 10 months looking at--talked to 7,000 soldiers, about a thousand spouses, 440 different units. That report landed on my desk when I took command, and clearly what the report showed was that the force was frayed. And I can tell you in the last, you know, almost 3 years that I have been in command, the force has continued to fray. But I am confident now that, as this body has provided us the resources necessary, we are getting ahead of the problems. So we are investing in the psychological performance, we are investing in the physical performance capabilities, and we are investing in family resiliency. And we think the family resiliency piece is absolutely critical, and we do so with the support of the services. We leverage every service program out there. But we greatly appreciate what the Congress has allowed us to do in terms of the Preservation of the Force and Families. Mr. Carson. Thank you, sir. Mr. Chairman, I yield back. Mr. Thornberry. Thank you. Mr. Franks. Mr. Franks. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you both for being here. If it is all right, Admiral McRaven, I will start with you. I am always grateful to men like you that give your life to the cause of freedom. My 5-year-olds have a better chance to attain that and live in that freedom, and I appreciate that, along with all the folks there behind you that wear the uniform. You know, it has been the conviction of many of us that the threat and the challenge in terms of our national security should drive the budget rather than the reverse. And you know that, as much as we try to put that concept forward, that it usually is the victim of sometimes mathematics. But you have outlined some pretty significant challenges that you face, and you have mentioned that the force is frayed. And I just noticed that the initiative fund that you submitted in the fiscal year 2015 budget, the Opportunity, Growth, and Security Initiative, included--includes 14--I am sorry--$400 million for SOCOM readiness and infrastructure. And maybe give us just a quick idea of what those requirements are. And why were these not included in the fiscal year 2015 budget request? Admiral McRaven. Yes, sir. So the $400 million is actually broken down into two parts. One of them, 300-some-odd million, is for readiness. So we are going to go back and--where we had to take cuts in order to meet the budget numbers were in flying hours and steaming hours and training hours. So we will be able to put, I think, $350 million or so back into readiness to make sure that we are able to improve the readiness of our folks back in the continental United States. It has never affected the readiness of our forces deploying forward. We always make sure that they are absolutely ready to go forward wherever that might be, whether it is Afghanistan or anywhere else on the globe. But in the past we have taken some liberties with the readiness in the continental United States until they were ready to go forward. Having said that, there were also three programs within that $400 million that are part of our Preservation of Force and Families. There are MILCON [military construction] projects that we are looking at. And so we are grateful for this additional money coming in because we will be able to solve some of our readiness problems and, hopefully, some of our MILCON projects with the Preservation of the Force and Families. Mr. Franks. Well, thank you, sir. You know, as much as we try, whether it is QDR or whatever it might be--try to ascertain what our challenges are, it seems that the serendipity always outpaces our predictive capability. And so the only real answer is to have a comprehensive force that can meet whatever potential threat might come. And it seems to me that may be one of the greatest things that we are overlooking here. We think that, you know, we are getting a leaner, meaner machine. And I appreciate that. But we need to have the overall capacity, ultimately, to handle what comes that we can't predict. And so it is--with that in mind, Secretary Lumpkin, you have talked about a globally networked perpetual engagement for our special operations troops, and that is the same force that Admiral McRaven, in my judgment, wisely and rightly has indicated is fraying from the demand placed on them. And at the same time, in asking for diplomatic immunity here, this administration has depended on our special operators to sort of be the glue for our worldwide military operations during a time that we are withdrawing and, really, backing off of our obligations to friends and allies alike across the globe. And to top it off, the budget is being cut. So there is a breaking point to all of this. And I am just wondering what your own assessment of that breaking point is. Secretary Lumpkin. Going back to the QDR and--the QDR is a strategy-driven document. It happens to be budget-informed in order to recognize the realities of what we have as far as from a budget and what we have to operate with. That said, the global engagement piece, I mean, this is about fulfilling our obligations and our commitments to our allies and our friends to help them build the partnership capacity, to build the capacity to deal with these security challenges that become too big to fix, and to leverage their capabilities to do things on their own so we don't have to have this big military general purpose force to roll in and do that. But this was--when we did QDR 6 and QDR 10, this was the reason we built the force. And QDR 6 was to grow the special operations force in order to focus and allow us to do this building partnership capacity mission. And the QDR 10 was focused on giving USSOCOM those organic enablers to do those missions whenever possible to reduce their reliance on the other services when feasible. So that is--as we look at 2014 and we took in mind is--the end of combat operations in Iraq and we are looking at a reduction, we don't know what the--whether we are going to end up with a bilateral security agreement in Afghanistan at this juncture. But at some point our footprint will be reduced in Afghanistan, and those forces--there is a demand signal by the geographic combatant commanders. They want more SOF in their theater. And with the post-2014 Afghanistan and, as we draw down the forces, it will give us the ability to meet those unmet demands within the GCC. So they can do that capacity building with our partners and our allies. Mr. Franks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, gentlemen. Mr. Thornberry. Thank you. Talk about MILCON reminds me that I believe we have an outstanding request for special operations military construction that was requested to be submitted with the budget. I don't think we have quite gotten it yet. So, Secretary Lumpkin, I might just put that on your radar screen, if you don't mind, when you go back to the building, to check and see where that is. You were talking earlier that, in addition to being the Assistant Secretary for Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict, you are the Acting Under Secretary for Policy. You are also in charge of the task force looking for one of our folks who has been taken captive. Correct? Secretary Lumpkin. I am the Department lead for that endeavor. Yes. Mr. Thornberry. Looks to me like you have got a full plate. Secretary Lumpkin. I keep busy. Yes, sir. Mr. Thornberry. Well, have they nominated somebody for Policy yet? Secretary Lumpkin. Yes, sir. Been nominated, had the hearing. We are waiting for the confirmation process to work its way through. Mr. Thornberry. Okay. When you testified in front of the Senate, I know you were asked about the Authorization for the Use of Military Force [AUMF]. And, frankly, I have gotten a little confused over the years what the administration policy is towards that. Sometimes we hear that it is don't mess with it. Sometimes it is change it. Can you help me understand the administration's policy? And from your experience, isn't it getting harder and harder to do the things that we ask our special operators to do around the world, relying back on the Authorization for the Use of Military Force that was passed in September 2001? Secretary Lumpkin. Thank you for the question, sir. I truly do appreciate it. In May of last year, the President in his May speech at National Defense University mentioned about revising and eventually repealing the AUMF as a goal. I truly believe that the AUMF has served us well. It continues to serve us well. It gives us the ability to keep this Nation safe and do the missions that we need to do. That said, my comment to the Senate was that we are at an inflection point. We are at a point that is--it is always good to relook at authorities because they evolve. The threat evolves. And so I would encourage a look at the AUMF, make sure it is doing everything we need it to do. And if it is not, if it needs to be taken in or expanded or whatever, it is a chance to do that if we are going to take a look at it. And that is what I support. Mr. Thornberry. Okay. Well, I agree, actually. And what I also agree with is that we should not ask our men and women to go and do something anywhere in the world that they are not fully backed up with law to do. And I worry about this strain as we get further and further away from 9/11, and the exact wording of the AUMF makes it harder and harder to draw those connections. So. Speaking of authorities, Admiral, let me just touch back. We talked at the beginning about working with others. One of the things that has been requested is an extension of the 1208 authority as well as increasing the dollar limit on that. In this forum, can you describe for us the role that 1208 plays, how important you think it is in the menu of options that special operators have to work with others, with 1206 and global security. Admiral McRaven. Yes, sir. And then I would like to defer to Secretary Lumpkin because he has been very supportive of increasing the amount of money for our 1208. Sir, I would tell you 1208 is probably the single most important authority we have in our fight against terrorism. It allows us to build forces, to train them, to equip them, and to do so with, I think, the right amount of oversight. And right now we are finding that this is a--again, about building partner capacity. This is a growth industry. So whereas a couple of years ago we had a certain level of authority, we found that our expenditure rates didn't really match the authority. Now already we are closing in on the $50 million authority, and I think the demand signal--I know the demand signal out there is even larger than that. So Secretary Lumpkin has put forth a proposal to increase the authority, and I am in strong favor of that. However, one of the problems we run into is, as we look at how we build partner capacity, we do have to have a patchwork of various authorities. So we do use 1206 when appropriate; 1207, the Global Security Contingency Fund; 1208. And we make it work, but there is an awkwardness to it and sometimes limitations to it. Some of the authorities allow us to work with the Minister of Defense, but not the Minister of Interior [MOI], where, in some cases, their counterterrorism forces actually are in the MOI, or some allows us to build minor military construction, you know, a small shoot house or a small barracks; others don't. So what we try to do is find the right authority for the right situation, but that is not always easy. 1208 is the-- gives us the greatest latitude, but it is strictly focused on counterterrorism, whereas 1206 and 1207 give us a little bit more latitude in other areas. Secretary Lumpkin. And, if I may, I absolutely agree with the admiral in the sense that 1208 is a tremendous tool for us. And we are rapidly approaching our maximum authorization of the $50 million, and we are not even halfway through the year yet. We are tightening up our obligation, looking at what we can--find other mechanisms to fund so we don't find ourselves up against a wall. But the other concern I have is that, in the event it is not renewed or we end up with a continuing resolution where it doesn't allow me to continue operations, stopping that particular mission set has significant impact operationally. So I would encourage and support getting an extended authorization sooner rather than later. Mr. Thornberry. Well, I am struck by the conversation you all were having with Mrs. Hartzler. This is an operational authority, not some of the other authorities. And, yet, operationally it still takes a while to help develop some of these capacities. And so we don't want to be shortsighted about it. Mr. Langevin, do you have other questions? Mr. Langevin. I probably will hold for the classified session. Mr. Thornberry. Okay. Does anybody else have open session questions? Mr. Hunter. Sure. Yes, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Thornberry. Mr. Hunter. Mr. Hunter. Really quick. JIEDDO. I am just wondering what do you see with JIEDDO going forward? You know, what do you do with JIEDDO right now? They have been supporting SOCOM for a long time. They are also supporting, you know, big Army, Marines, everybody else, too. But from your side of things, what do you want to see happening with them going forward? What parts of them should be kept and what parts of JIEDDO are just bureaucratic and won't be needed anymore once we get out of Afghanistan? Secretary Lumpkin. From a larger policy perspective, JIEDDO, as you are keenly aware, has been crucial and instrumental and been tremendously supportive to our operations and initiatives forward. So, for me, from a policy perspective, would really like to ensure we codify it in the Department long term and it doesn't go by the wayside as we move past--beyond our current operations. Mr. Hunter. Let me ask you this, though. When you codify it, you want to make sure it is really, really good. So you want to maybe cut out the parts that you don't think are being productive right now or not as productive or change those parts and keep the parts that are really good, if you codify it. So what parts would those be? What parts would you keep? What parts would you change? Or you can get back to me if you don't have that on you right now. Secretary Lumpkin. I will defer to see if Admiral McRaven has it, but I can get back to you on that. Admiral McRaven. Sir, we have a JIEDDO rep, as you know, in almost every location where we have our SOF forces. And, as the Secretary said, JIEDDO has been absolutely fabulous over the years. For us, you know, what JIEDDO has learned to do is to understand networks. So as we look at the terrorist threat, frankly, where JIEDDO started out focusing on IEDs [improvised explosive devices]--and, of course, understanding IEDs meant you had to understand the IED network--now the folks at JIEDDO, because they understand the foundation of network development, you can take that talent and that capability and overlay it on the threat networks elsewhere. So I am a very big believer that what JIEDDO has learned, the IED fights in Iraq and Afghanistan, is fungible as we move forward and have to fight networks globally. So I wouldn't portend to tell you where you could cut them or not cut them. I can tell you that they have been a tremendous resource to SOCOM and we greatly appreciate what they have done and, frankly, how they have, to some degree, reshaped themselves and looked at the broader network problem set. Mr. Hunter. Thank you. That is all I have got, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Thornberry. All right. Thank you both. With that, the open portion of this hearing will be adjourned, and we will move swiftly down one floor and across the hall. [Whereupon, at 3:30 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned, to be reconvened in classified session.] ? ======================================================================= A P P E N D I X March 13, 2014 ======================================================================= ======================================================================= PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD March 13, 2014 ======================================================================= [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] ======================================================================= WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING March 13, 2014 ======================================================================= RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN Admiral McRaven. USSOCOM is currently pursuing directed energy systems as a non-kinetic, stand-off anti-materiel solution. We have a requirement to surgically disable or disrupt a variety of fixed facility infrastructure and systems, with required capabilities ranging from breaching and access to disablement of critical equipment. The Man Portable High Energy Laser is one of several technologies under consideration for this critical mission. The MPHEL system was developed in close cooperation with the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization. Boeing Directed Energy Systems Albuquerque, NM has served as the lead contractor from September 2012 to present. The current prototype MPHEL system has an output power of 2 kilowatts and weighs approximately 750 pounds in a configuration the size of four large Pelican cases. The emphasis of further development will be on reducing the form factor, reducing weight, and increasing effective range. Initial testing of the prototype MPHEL system was conducted at Kirtland AFB, NM from January to February 2014, and produced positive results. The prototype demonstrated an ability to disable electronics devices, burn through various metals, and disable electrical systems. The prototype system will now be shipped to USSOCOM in May 2014 for user evaluation and target characterization, establishing the baseline for further development. At this time there are no plans to procure or field the MPHEL in its current form factor. Recognizing the importance of safety, and the unique legal implications of directed energy systems, USSOCOM engaged early with the US Army Institute of Public Health. A preliminary evaluation of the system was conducted in December 2013 to determine potential health hazards. Initial results placed the MPHEL in a mishap risk category of medium, and identified several proposed design modifications for future versions. The final report is pending. [See page 7.] ______ RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. JOHNSON Admiral McRaven. The human domain fills a critical conceptual gap in visualizing the operating environment. None of the existing domains (air, land, maritime, space, and cyber) sufficiently address the centrality of people to contemporary and future strategy, operations and activities. The human domain complements the other domains and more fully describes the contemporary and future operating environments. It is not new in warfare, and a host of related terms have been developed to describe it. Most of these terms insufficiently define the scope and scale of the centrality of humans within the operating environment. The Human Terrain System (HTS) is a U.S. Army program implemented by the Army's Training and Doctrine Command to develop, train, and integrate a social science based research and analysis capability that enables sociocultural understanding across the operational environment. In this regard, the HTS supports operations in the human domain by enhancing understanding of the cognitive, information, social, cultural, and physical elements that affect the domain. The HTS supports joint and coalition forces by providing social science support to military commanders in the form of Human Terrain Teams (HTTs) composed of individuals with social science academic backgrounds. HTTs deploy with tactical units to assist in bringing knowledge of the local population into a coherent framework. Developing this sociocultural understanding provides a method for considering the effects of military operations among local populations. Operations in the human domain require this identification and ability to influence relevant populations in order to enhance stability, prevent conflict, and when necessary, fight and defeat adversaries. The HTS continues to support commanders in Afghanistan with HTTs that provide sociocultural information and reporting to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), and to U.S. commanders and staffs in order to build understanding, peace and security. In August 2013, fourteen HTTs were deployed to Afghanistan. [See page 15.] ______ RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GIBSON Secretary Lumpkin. I believe our military forces and Geographic Combatant Commanders have the authorities and programs necessary to mitigate current transnational terrorist threats. Our forces leverage, integrate, and implement a wide variety of security assistance and military cooperation programs. The current authorities available, such as Sections 1203, 1206, 1207, and 1208, provide additional and focused tools that the Department of Defense and our Geographic Combatant Commanders use to build directly or to enhance the capabilities and capacities of our partner to counter the threats of terrorism or indirectly support counterterrorism operations. I do not recommend any immediate changes to existing counterterrorism authorities or program resourcing. However, the Department of Defense is taking a close look at our statutory authorities for assistance to foreign security forces to assess the extent to which they meet evolving requirements. We intend to engage with Congress to discuss our findings following this internal review. [See page 10.] Admiral McRaven. U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) is currently conducting information sharing initiatives under existing authorities. CDRUSSOCOM derives authority to share information and/or intelligence with foreign partners from National Disclosure Policy-1 and any applicable exceptions in accordance with CJCSI 5221.01D and DOD Directive 5230.11. USSOCOM is coordinating disclosure and/or release of information and/or with partners through the appropriate information sharing/foreign disclosure offices. [See page 10.] ? ======================================================================= QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING March 13, 2014 ======================================================================= QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. THORNBERRY Mr. Thornberry. Do our forces and geographic combatant commanders have the authorities they need to mitigate current and future transnational terrorist threats? What changes would you recommend, including potential changes to the AUMF? Secretary Lumpkin. With the strong support of Congress, the Department has gained several new authorities since 2001 that have been essential to conducting counterterrorism operations and building partner nation capabilities. Key authorities for partner capability building are found in uncodified, temporary provisions of law, and looking ahead we will be challenged to sustain our current capabilities should these authorities lapse. We would like to work with Congress to determine what is needed beyond the ``current fight.'' With respect to the AUMF, the President has said it needs to be revised and ultimately repealed. We look forward to working with Congress on this as well. Mr. Thornberry. A great deal has been written and said about the relationship between special operations forces and the CIA. What is your opinion of how the CIA and SOF should share responsibilities that interlock and overlap, given respective strengths and weaknesses? What coordination role does your office (Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict) play in helping to coordinate and de-conflict CIA-DOD operations and activities? What are some areas of improvement? Secretary Lumpkin. Close coordination and deconfliction between DOD and CIA is essential to protecting our national security interests, as is also the case with other departments and agencies as part of a whole-of-government approach. In those areas in which special operations forces and CIA have related responsibilities, we coordinate our efforts through a robust exchange of liaison officers and detailees who collaborate on a daily basis. At the headquarters level, the National Security Council Staff hosts regular meetings focused on counterterrorism coordination and deconfliction. As the ASD SO/LIC, I represent the Department and provide advice to the Secretary of Defense on these matters. In this capacity, I work closely with the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and the DOD General Counsel to ensure DOD operations are fully aligned with relevant intelligence policies and comply with all applicable laws. In the realm of DOD-CIA collaboration on counterterrorism operations, we are currently working on initiatives to strengthen and improve the flow of information, technology, and practical expertise to cross-level capabilities between the two organizations. Mr. Thornberry. What changes can you recommend to the present set of Security Force Assistance authorities such as 1206 and Global Security Contingency Fund? Are these the right types of authorities to satisfy future geographic combatant commander requirements to develop partner nation capabilities? Secretary Lumpkin. Many of the existing Security Force Assistance (SFA) authorities, including Section 1206 and the Global Security Contingency Fund (GSCF), are still relatively new. Since their creation, in Fiscal Year 2006 and Fiscal Year 2012, respectively, the Department of Defense has invested a significant amount of time and effort in developing the organizational structures and processes required for their effective use. We believe that Section 1206 has been a success and that the GSCF is now poised to succeed. However, the global strategic environment has evolved since the creation of these new authorities, and we anticipate that it will continue to evolve over the next several years. The threat of terrorism increasingly flows from Al Qaeda's dispersed affiliates and offshoots rather than from its core, presenting a diffuse set of threats against which to apply these authorities. Although we are drawing down in Afghanistan and uncertain about our level of presence there beyond 2014, many of the partners we trained and equipped to assist with stability operations there are now poised to assist with similar operations in other regions of the world. Recent events in Ukraine underscore the importance of continued engagement with our Eastern European and Baltic partners. Given this shifting dynamic, the Department of Defense is taking a close look at our SFA authorities to assess the extent to which they meet these diverse and evolving requirements. We intend to engage with Congress to discuss our findings following this internal review. Mr. Thornberry. A recent report on special operations forces by the Council on Foreign Relations suggested that, ``the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict has difficulty fully providing civilian oversight of U.S. Special Operations Command's policy and resources as directed by law.'' Do you agree with this assessment? Can you outline for the committee how that office conducts oversight of policy and resources of SOCOM? Secretary Lumpkin. My office provides civilian oversight of all special operations matters as required by 10 USC Sec. 138. As such, I provide oversight of special operations policy and resources matters and provide advice to implement Secretary of Defense and Under Secretary of Defense for Policy security priorities to meet the challenges posed by the global security environment. The relationship with the Commander, USSOCOM is collaborative and cooperative, with a common goal to develop the best possible special operations forces and to employ them effectively. Ultimately, I advise the Secretary of Defense and provide recommendations regarding special operations that are in the best interest of the Department. During each of the last three QDRs, the Department has reviewed, evaluated, and determined the appropriate resourcing of USSOCOM to improve the U.S. capability to combat terrorism on a global basis. With each of these reviews, SOLIC has also evolved and adapted as an organization to meet statutory and Department oversight requirements. SOLIC's oversight of special operations has further developed in partnership with the other parts of the Office of the Secretary of Defense staff, interagency counterparts, and Congress, and through coordination with the USSOCOM staff. I work closely with the Under Secretaries of Defense for Intelligence; Acquisition, Technology and Logistics; and Personnel and Readiness and leverage their subject matter expertise to provide oversight. I also work closely with the Director of CAPE, the DOD Comptroller, and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs to develop the optimum force structure, resources, and authorities to meet future special operations requirements. I will continue work closely with all relevant officials to ensure our nation sustains a ready, capable Special Operations force, prepared to meet the fiscal, operational, and global challenges we face today and into the future. Mr. Thornberry. In addition to more than 4,000 positions authorized for SOCOM and its components, the service component commands of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps, taken together, have more than 2,000 authorized positions to support SOCOM and its operations. Have you looked for efficiencies between and among SOCOM and its subordinate commands? If not, why not? If so, what did you find? Admiral McRaven. The numbers stated in the question are inaccurate. Of the 4093 billets, 2168 billets are in commands and organizations that do not perform Functional Combatant Command (U.S. Special Operations Command), or Service Component Command activities and functions. The following organizations do not meet the definition of a Functional Combatant Command or Service Component Command;
Joint Special Operations Command, a Sub-Unified Command Special Operations Command-North, a Theater Special Operations Command Special Operations Command-Joint Concepts, a Theater Special Operations Command disestablished in 2013 and manpower zeroed out in 2014 Special Operations Joint Task Force is an operational unit with rotational assignment to the U.S. Central Command theater of operations Regional Special Operations Coordination Center (RSCC) is not a direct reporting unit to USSOCOM, and none had been established in FY13. The manpower was identified on the JTD as a precursor to possible resourcing in FY14. RSCC is in Proof-of-Concept development, with activities authorized by Congress on a limited basis Special Operations Research and Development Center is a Service-like function that no other Combatant Command Headquarter possesses. DODD 5100.73 excludes all systems/weapons development and procurement activities that are not associated with HQ Management functions Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) is an educational activity/entity that no other Combatant Command Headquarter possesses. DODD 5100.73 excludes NDU, Naval Postgraduate School, Service Academies, the Defense Industrial University, etc. JSOU falls into this category and is not a function of a Functional Combatant Command, or Service Component Command The 2110 billets identified for the Service Component Commands are correct. Mr. Thornberry. Have you looked for efficiencies between and among SOCOM and its subordinate commands? If not, why not? If so, what did you find? Admiral McRaven. USSOCOM constantly evaluates its manpower requirements. Since 2007, USSOCOM has undergone numerous reviews, studies, and evaluations from OSD, JS, and internal reviews to find efficiencies, comply with DOD direction to eliminate contractors, replace military with civilians, cap the number of both civilians and military, and to streamline activities wherever possible. In addition to complying with all OSD and JS guidance, USSOCOM purposely evaluates our resources, both manpower and dollars to ensure we maintain a balanced, effective, efficient, and affordable portfolio of capabilities to meet the National Security and Defense Security Strategies while complying with the Laws, Regulations, Policies, and Procedures set forth by the President, Congress, Secretary of Defense, the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Services. Total requirements for manpower always far exceed available end-strength, are dynamic, evolving, and prioritized constantly to mitigate risk across the breadth of the Special Operations enterprise. Our budget submissions to Congress outline the most recent and up-to-date alignment of forces to meet our warfighting requirements within the resources allotted by OSD. Mr. Thornberry. The Opportunity, Growth and Security Initiative fund submitted with the FY15 budget includes $400 million for SOCOM readiness and infrastructure unfunded requirements. Please outline these requirements for the committee; and discuss why and how these requirements were NOT included in the FY15 base budget request? Admiral McRaven. USSOCOM's $400 million portion of the Department's $26 billion Opportunity, Growth and Security Initiative (OGSI) is outlined in the attachment. USSOCOM's request addresses the most pressing readiness and infrastructure requirements that could not be resourced within USSOCOM's FY15 President's Budget (PB). The FY15 PB resourced the highest priority programs required by special operations forces to conduct missions in support of Geographic Combatant Commanders' requirements. Mr. Thornberry. Can you outline some of the more difficult advanced technology requirements that SOF needs in order to maintain an edge on the battlefield? a. As we withdraw from major combat in Afghanistan, will the need for non-lethal weapons and directed energy weapons increase? b. How are you managing to stay ahead in research and development while your budget in this area has steadily declined over the past several fiscal years? Admiral McRaven. a. USSOCOM expects to remain engaged in global counterterrorism operations for the foreseeable future. United States Special Operations Forces (USSOF) will continue to operate in close proximity to their Afghan partners, as aggregate US Forces retrograde from Afghanistan. Today, USSOF forces are gradually migrating from rural areas to fixed bases in larger population centers. This will reduce associated operational risk, and allow for sustained advisory and engagement support at the appropriate operational levels necessary to enable the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) to unilaterally maintain operational momentum and evolve as an institution. Village Stability Operations will be completed December 2014 and on-going USSOF Security Force Assistance efforts, which have always been the focus of USSOF, are now reorienting away from the tactical to the operational level. This has led to emphasis being placed on the development of the Special Mission Wing, ANA Special Operations Command Headquarters and its brigades, the various Afghan Special Police headquarter elements and a variety of efforts designed to develop intelligence and their sustainment capacities. The limited tactical level advisory support continues and will predominantly occur from permanent bases, where the Afghan Security forces have established training centers. Given the limited nature of USSOF's future tactical operational role in Afghanistan, we do not see demand increasing for advanced technological requirements. However, as USSOF expands globally demands for a multitude of advanced technologies will grow enabling USSOCOM to remain at the tip of the spear and conduct our core missions, as directed by the President and Secretary of Defense SOF needs enhanced lethal capabilities against multiple types of moving targets that will provide greater accuracy and desired target effects while minimizing collateral damage to near-zero probability. SOF has long-standing requirements for a variety of less-than-lethal (LTL), scalable effects weapons (SEW), to include those for which directed energy may provide the optimal solutions. SOF's interests in LTL SEW capabilities include dissuading and disabling personnel, and rendering equipment and/or facilities functionally ineffective. Key technological challenges include smaller, light-weight and affordable power generation and multi-mode seekers for long-range precision weapons; LTL SEW technologies that render personnel or equipment ineffective to ensure mission success with greater force protection and less likelihood of civilian casualties; state-of-the-art light-weight personnel protective armor and multi-spectral sensory enhancement technologies; and broad spectrum, multi-sensory signature reduction. The critical aspect for all of these technologies is their compatibility with SOF tactics, techniques and procedures using SOF- or GPF-provided soldier, ground, airborne, and/or maritime systems. b. USSOCOM's S&T Directorate leverages other government agencies and labs, whenever able, to maximize the efficiency and effect of our limited RDT&E budget. USSOCOM's overarching FY15-19 S&T Integrated Priority List (STIPL) which includes Comprehensive Signature Management, Anti-Access/Area Denial, SOF Small Unit Dominance, Human Performance, and Battlespace Awareness, requires external support to address these high priority S&T needs. USSOCOM's S&T Directorate is coordinating Technology Discovery Sessions chaired by the SOCOM Deputy Commander and Acquisition Executive. In these sessions, SOCOM invites forward thinking senior industry and academic leaders to discuss such topics as technology investment strategies, how to avoid technological surprise, partnering opportunities, and how USSOCOM can best prepare for the future. SOCOM senior leadership establishes specific focused topics and invitees for two to three planned follow-on events per year. The following provide a few recent and relevant examples of collaboration with Service labs and centers. SOCOM S&T, in collaboration with the Systems Engineering Research Center (SERC), a University-Affiliated Research Center of the US Department of Defense, sponsored a joint SERC Capstone project with the University of Alabama and Stevens Institute of Technology resulting in the development of a SOF non-lethal capability to stop boats up to 50 meters in length. In collaboration with the Air Force Research Laboratory, we are developing wind sensing technologies which will dramatically increase AC-130 Gunship first-round accuracy. Similarly, our relationship with the U.S. Army's Medical Research and Materiel Command (MRMC) has enabled efficient development of critical lifesaving technologies for special operations forces. Uncontrolled external hemorrhage remains the leading cause of death on the battlefield. Despite recent advances in hemorrhage control technologies, controlling the bleeding in large wounds (``sharkbite'') remains difficult and a SOCOM Commander top priority. A ``Sharkbite'' project developed a novel wound stasis dressing to treat SOF non-compressible hemorrhagic injuries. The ``SharkBite Trauma Kit'' includes three revolutionary tools that are now pending FDA approval before transition to USSOCOM's PEO-SOF Warrior's Tactical Combat Casualty Care Program of Record and SOF medics. The collaboration may lead to a capability for the conventional force as well. Mr. Thornberry. How are the roles of women in SOF changing? Can you outline for the committee on SOCOM plans for assigning women in previously closed positions? Admiral McRaven. There are many women currently serving in SOF positions. Based on the January 2013 direction from Secretary of Defense, USSOCOM is reviewing all SOF positions closed to women with the intent of opening them all by January 2016. USSOCOM may only keep closed those positions that are specifically approved by both the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense. The decision to open or keep specific positions closed to women will be guided by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's guidance to ensure ``the success of our Nation's warfighting forces . . . ,'' that ``all Service men and women are set up for success with viable career paths . . . ,'' and ``to retain the trust of the American people.'' Mr. Thornberry. Can you update the committee on SOCOM's intelligence functions, requirements, and initiatives? a. What specific intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) requirements do you have? b. What manned and unmanned ISR systems are you investing in, and why? c. How do you coordinate with the Services in these areas? d. What role does your J2 (Intelligence) Director play in identifying and filling those unique requirements? e. How is SOCOM working to resource Theater Special Operations Command intelligence requirements? f. What role is SOCOM playing in the Defense Intelligence Agency's new Defense Clandestine Service? Admiral McRaven. (a) USSOCOM is working closely with SOF Theater and Component commands to refine air, ground, and maritime ISR requirements to support the Geographical Combatant Commanders (GCC). Future draw downs in Afghanistan do not change SOCOM's enduring global AISR requirement, but rather reflect a need to shift ISR capabilities to other areas of responsibility in support of GCC operations outside the Afghanistan-Pakistan region. Reference Memorandum for Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff-Airborne Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Support to Special Operations Forces dated 9 January 2012; or Joint Emergent Operational Need (JEON) for Airborne Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance in Support of Special Operations Forces dated 8 June 2012. (b) USSOCOM currently operates the U-28 as its primary manned ISR platform along with JAVAMAN aircraft in a GOCO capacity. USSOCOM plans to transition to the MC-12 that is being divested by the USAF. This transition will incur an initial investment to upgrade capabilities to meet the U-28 Mission. However, the MC-12 provides dual-engine capability, longer flight duration, and additional capacity for ISR equipment. USSOCOM's FY15-16 budget includes unmanned MQ-9 baseline investment funding to enable continued rapid development and integration of permissive ISR capabilities critical to global SOF operations on up to 50 MQ-9s and associated ground equipment to meet current and future permissive ISR requirements. This enables USSOCOM to transition from MQ-1/9 unmanned aircraft to a full MQ-9ER fleet by leveraging the replacement of USAF provided MQ-1B with USAF provided Extended Range MQ-9 Reapers. (c) USSOCOM is partnering with the Services to mitigate shortfalls like initiatives to promote best practices in full-motion-video (FMV) exploitation and develop relationships where SOF and Services can share the burden of exploitation. USSOCOM is working with the Services to ensure budget reductions of Service-provided assets, like permissive intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance aircraft, are protected to so that SOF can contend with future global threats and challenges. (d) USSOCOM J2 Intelligence Director conducts weekly ISR Councils to discuss/evaluate SOF ISR requirements and issues. USSOCOM J2 participates in both deliberate and urgent requirements, planning processes through Service Warfighter Talks, and formal requirement document coordination through either their Joint Capability Integration Development System (JCIDS) or the similar SOF Capability Integration Development System (SOFCIDS). USSOCOM coordinates closely with USD(I), ISR Task Force, Services, Components, and TSOCs to refine requirements, synchronize efforts, and advocate for ISR capability. (e) USSOCOM is working to capture Theater Special Operations Command intelligence requirements through weekly ISR Councils and TSOC Deep Dives as well as addressing requirements identified by TSOC Commanders during monthly Commander Decision Roundtables (CDRT). Requirements are validated through the JCIDS or SOFCIDS process and then resourced through the USSOCOM Strategic Planning Process. (f) USSOCOM fully supports the Defense Intelligence Agency's new Defense Clandestine Service. Over the past year DCS has established a presence in USSOCOM Headquarters to ensure we align our efforts and requirements. Due to classification, discussions on USSOCOM specific roles and interaction with the Defense Clandestine Service will need to be addressed in a closed session. ______ QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. CARSON Mr. Carson. Do you anticipate that this pace of deployment of SOCOM forces will change as we withdraw from Afghanistan? And given budget cuts, the unique training needs of special operators, and the necessarily small force size, how can SOCOM continue meeting its deployment requirements? Secretary Lumpkin. I anticipate as SOF requirements go down in Afghanistan, we will redistribute forces to other regions in a manner that is aligned to current, emerging threats and to achieve a more balanced SOF posture across the Geographic Combatant Commands. The Department considered this redistribution of SOF during the FY 2015 program review, and we believe we have properly resourced USSOCOM for training, readiness, and sustainment requirements in the years ahead. Mr. Carson. Once we have withdrawn from Afghanistan, which areas or countries do you believe will be the primary recipients of SOCOM deployments? And can you give us an idea of the types of missions you expect they will see, either alone or with partner nations? Secretary Lumpkin. Our goal is to realign and redistribute SOF across the Geographic Combatant Commands in a manner that is aligned to current and emerging threats. Consistent with the approach of working bilaterally when possible, SOF will retain the capability to advise and assist partners to take action to counter enemy threats and disrupt their planning, training, and recruitment. We will be postured to conduct direct action to protect U.S. persons from attack when necessary. At the same time, we will expand and enrich our engagement with security partners to build capacity, improve capabilities, and foster greater cooperation. This includes expanding bilateral exercises, joint exchanges, and other training events with international SOF partners. Mr. Carson. Do you anticipate that this pace of deployment of SOCOM forces will change as we withdraw from Afghanistan? And given budget cuts, the unique training needs of special operators, and the necessarily small force size, how can SOCOM continue meeting its deployment requirements? Admiral McRaven. Recently, we have been deploying between 8,000 to 10,000 Special Operations Forces (SOF) personnel throughout the globe, on a daily basis. I anticipate our pace of deployment to drop below our current deployed numbers in the near term if we draw down in Afghanistan, and will increase to comparable numbers of 8-10K deployed SOF as we mature our SOF Campaign Plan. This plan will focus our efforts on building partner nation capacity through persistent regional SOF presence, while posturing a SOF capability that can conduct direct actions against emerging terrorist threats--both requiring a trained and ready deployed force. Through prioritization of resources, we can continue to meet our deployment requirements with our current and proposed future budgets. Mr. Carson. Once we have withdrawn from Afghanistan, which areas or countries do you believe will be the primary recipients of SOCOM deployments? And can you give us an idea of the types of missions you expect they will see, either alone or with partner nations? Admiral McRaven. First, I believe that SOF will continue to be deployed to Afghanistan in some operational capacity. As we have drawn down from Iraq in December 2011 and now, Afghanistan, SOF personnel capacity has become available to deploy to other geographic regions. Since that time, the African continent has experienced the largest increase in deployed SOF personnel, and I believe will continue to be one of the primary recipients of SOF deployments in the future. As our SOF Campaign Plan focuses on building partner nation capacity, we will continue to execute those missions of Foreign Internal Defense, Civil Affairs, Information Operations, Stability Operations, and Humanitarian Assistance, while also executing direct actions against emerging terrorist threats. These direct actions will range from advise and assist, precision reconnaissance, and unconventional warfare, with a focus on Counter-terrorism. We will strive to partner with foreign nations at every opportunity to conduct direct and indirect operations, but we will always be prepared to execute alone. At the present time, the preponderance of our SOF operations on the African continent is being conducted with the support of other partner nations. Finally, I believe that the demand for SOF by the Geographic Combatant Commanders will outweigh our SOF capacity for future SOF Campaign Plan requirements. ______ QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GIBSON Mr. Gibson. What are some recommendations for improving intelligence collaboration across the whole-of-government? Secretary Lumpkin. DOD works with its partners in the Intelligence Community to ensure relevant intelligence information is shared appropriately. Recent initiatives include DOD funded inter-agency collaboration in the areas of counterterrorism, countering transnational organized crime (CTOC), and maritime domain awareness. DOD also provides domestic agencies with valuable instruction in the detection of improvised explosive devices, conducting terrorism analysis, and mapping cultural terrain. Lastly, DOD fosters interagency integration via the embedding of DOD personnel in other agencies, including the National Counterterrorism Center, FBI Field Intelligence Groups, and FBI joint terrorism task forces. Mr. Gibson. What are some recommendations for improving intelligence collaboration across the whole-of-government? Admiral McRaven. Intelligence collaboration has increased significantly as a result of 10+ years of war. The single thread that forced this collaboration, across the whole-of-government, is our national security interest. Looking toward the future, we must continue to wrap our challenges with policies, authorities, process, and information sharing architectures with this common unifying force of national security. We must continue to create conditions for success. For instance, we must resource efforts like the Department of Defense Intelligence Information Enterprise (DI2E) and the Intelligence Community Information Technology Enterprise (IC ITE), and force convergence between these communities of interest. DI2E and IC ITE convergence has the potential to significantly increase the speed of knowledge to decision/action by our most senior leaders of government. It will increase information transparency and knowledge sharing at all levels. Increased resources for DI2E and IC ITE will only achieve a technical solution and many could argue that technology is not a limiting factor. To a certain extent, they would be correct. Any advances to force convergence, from a technology perspective, must be accompanied by reformation of policy that inhibits collaboration. The policies that protect our nation's critical information and intelligence are the same policies that inhibit collaboration. The Intelligence, Law Enforcement, and Diplomatic communities operate within complicated yet essential frameworks to conduct the business of national security. We must continue to explore policy reforms that simultaneously safeguard our knowledge and increase transparency, while being mindful of intelligence oversight and information assurance. Likewise, any changes in policy must account for one of our greatest force multipliers, our coalition partners. The decade of war has been complimented by the efforts of our coalition partners. At the lowest tactical echelons, we achieve remarkable success on the battlefield. We must continue to seek reform in policies that enable government to government information sharing by empowering senior leaders and Commanders with greater latitude to make the call, ease restrictions, and increase collaboration.