    [House Hearing, 113 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

         PPACA IMPLEMENTATION FAILURES: DIDN'T KNOW OR DIDN'T DISCLOSE?

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   BEFORE THE

                        COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE
                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                        ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                   __________

                                OCTOBER 24, 2013

                                   __________

                               Serial No. 113-87

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

          Printed for the use of the Committee on Energy and Commerce
                           energycommerce.house.gov
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                        COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE

                              FRED UPTON, Michigan
                                     Chairman
    RALPH M. HALL, Texas                 HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
    JOE BARTON, Texas                      Ranking Member
      Chairman Emeritus                  JOHN D. DINGELL, Michigan
    ED WHITFIELD, Kentucky                 Chairman Emeritus
    JOHN SHIMKUS, Illinois               FRANK PALLONE, Jr., New Jersey
    JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania        BOBBY L. RUSH, Illinois
    GREG WALDEN, Oregon                  ANNA G. ESHOO, California
    LEE TERRY, Nebraska                  ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
    MIKE ROGERS, Michigan                GENE GREEN, Texas
    TIM MURPHY, Pennsylvania             DIANA DeGETTE, Colorado
    MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas            LOIS CAPPS, California
    MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee          MICHAEL F. DOYLE, Pennsylvania
      Vice Chairman                      JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois
    PHIL GINGREY, Georgia                JIM MATHESON, Utah
    STEVE SCALISE, Louisiana             G.K. BUTTERFIELD, North Carolina
    ROBERT E. LATTA, Ohio                JOHN BARROW, Georgia
    CATHY McMORRIS RODGERS, Washington   DORIS O. MATSUI, California
    GREGG HARPER, Mississippi            DONNA M. CHRISTENSEN, Virgin
    LEONARD LANCE, New Jersey                Islands
    BILL CASSIDY, Louisiana              KATHY CASTOR, Florida
    BRETT GUTHRIE, Kentucky              JOHN P. SARBANES, Maryland
    PETE OLSON, Texas                    JERRY McNERNEY, California
    DAVID B. McKINLEY, West Virginia     BRUCE L. BRALEY, Iowa
    CORY GARDNER, Colorado               PETER WELCH, Vermont
    MIKE POMPEO, Kansas                  BEN RAY LUJAN, New Mexico
    ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois             PAUL TONKO, New York
    H. MORGAN GRIFFITH, Virginia         JOHN A. YARMUTH, Kentucky
    GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida
    BILL JOHNSON, Missouri
    BILLY LONG, Missouri
    RENEE L. ELLMERS, North Carolina

                                 C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page
    Hon. Fred Upton, a Representative in Congress from the State of
      Michigan, opening statement....................................     2
        Prepared statement...........................................     3
    Hon. Marsha Blackburn, a Representative in Congress from the
      State of Tennessee, opening statement..........................     3
        Prepared statement...........................................     4
    Hon. Henry A. Waxman, a Representative in Congress from the State
      of California, opening statement...............................     4
    Hon. Tim Murphy, a Representative in Congress from the
      Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, opening statement................     6
        Prepared statement...........................................     6
    Hon. Joseph R. Pitts, a Representative in Congress from the
      Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, opening statement................     7
        Prepared statement...........................................     8
    Hon. Frank Pallone, Jr., a Representative in Congress from the
      State of New Jersey, opening statement.........................     9
    Hon. Diana Degette, a Representative in Congress from the State
      of Colorado, opening statement.................................    10
    Hon. John D. Dingell, a Representative in Congress from the State
      of Michigan, opening statement.................................    11

                                   Witnesses

    Cheryl Campbell, Senior Vice President, CGI Federal..............    13
        Prepared statement...........................................    15
        Answers to submitted questions...............................   116
    Andrew Slavitt, Group Executive Vice President, Optum/QSSI.......    17
        Prepared statement...........................................    23
        Answers to submitted questions...............................   132
    Lynn Spellecy, Corporate Counsel, Equifax Workforce Solutions....    28
        Prepared statement...........................................    30
        Answers to submitted questions...............................   140
    John Lau, Program Director, Serco................................    38
        Prepared statement...........................................    40
        Answers to submitted questions...............................   143

                               Submitted Material

    Article entitled, ``Obamacare Website Source Code: `No Reasonable
      Expectation of Privacy,''' The Weekly Standard, October 14,
      2013...........................................................   114

         PPACA IMPLEMENTATION FAILURES: DIDN'T KNOW OR DIDN'T DISCLOSE?

                                  ----------

                           THURSDAY, OCTOBER 24, 2013

                      House of Representatives,
                      Committee on Energy and Commerce,
                                                Washington, DC.
        The committee met, pursuant to call, at 9:07 a.m., in room
    2123, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Fred Upton (chairman
    of the committee) presiding.
        Present: Representatives Upton, Hall, Barton, Shimkus,
    Pitts, Walden, Terry, Rogers, Murphy, Burgess, Blackburn,
    Gingrey, Scalise, Latta, Lance, Cassidy, Guthrie, Olson,
    McKinley, Gardner, Kinzinger, Griffith, Johnson, Ellmers,
    Waxman, Dingell, Pallone, Eshoo, Engel, Green, DeGette,
    Schakowsky, Butterfield, Barrow, Matsui, Sarbanes, McNerney,
    Welch, Tonko and Yarmuth.
        Staff Present: Clay Alspach, Chief Counsel, Health; Gary
    Andres, Staff Director; Ray Baum, Senior Policy Advisor/
    Director of Coalitions; David Bell, Staff Assistant; Mike
    Bloomquist, General Counsel; Sean Bonyun, Communications
    Director; Megan Capiak, Staff Assistant; Karen Christian, Chief
    Counsel, Oversight; Noelle Clemente, Press Secretary; Paul
    Edattel, Professional Staff Member, Health; Julie Goon, Health
    Policy Advisor; Brad Grantz, Policy Coordinator, O&I; Sydne
    Harwick, Legislative Clerk; Brittany Havens, Legislative Clerk;
    Sean Hayes, Counsel, O&I; Robert Horne, Professional Staff
    Member, Health; Kirby Howard, Legislative Clerk; Alexa Marrero,
    Deputy Staff Director; Nick Magallanes, Policy Coordinator,
    CMT; Carly McWilliams, Professional Staff Member, Health;
    Brandon Mooney, Professional Staff Member; Gib Mullan, Chief
    Counsel, CMT; Katie Novaria, Professional Staff Member, Health;
    Monica Popp, Professional Staff Member, Health; Andrew
    Powaleny, Deputy Press Secretary; David Redl, Chief Counsel,
    Telecom; Chris Sarley, Policy Coordinator, Environment and
    Economy; Charlotte Savercool, Legislative Coordinator; Heidi
    Stirrup, Health Policy Coordinator; Tom Wilbur, Digital Media
    Advisor; Ziky Ababiya, Minority Staff Assistant; Phil Barnett,
    Minority Staff Director; Stacia Cardille, Minority Deputy Chief
    Counsel; Brian Cohen, Minority Staff Director, Oversight and
    Investigations, Senior Policy Advisor; Hannah Green, Minority
    Staff Assistant; Elizabeth Letter, Minority Assistant Press
    Secretary; Karen Lightfoot, Minority Communications Director
    and Senior Policy Advisor; Karen Nelson, Minority Deputy
    Committee Staff Director for Health; Stephen Salsbury, Minority
    Special Assistant; and Matt Siegler, Minority Counsel.

       OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. FRED UPTON, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
                  CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MICHIGAN

        Mr. Upton. Good morning. First off I would like to note to
    our Florida colleagues who are unable to be with us this
    morning, sadly they are attending the funeral of our late
    colleague, former Appropriations chair Bill Young, who was
    certainly a friend to all here and a mentor to so many of us on
    both sides of the aisle. He is going to be deeply missed and
    particularly in his legacy his establishment of the bone marrow
    registry, something that literally will save tens of thousands,
    if not more, lives. And we appreciate that work.
        Today the Energy and Commerce Committee continues our
    ongoing oversight of the healthcare law as we examine the many
    problems, crashes, glitches, system failures that have defined
    open enrollment.
        Over the past several months leading up to the October 1st
    launch, top administration officials and lead contractors
    appeared before this committee, looked us in the eye, and
    assured us repeatedly that everything was on track, except that
    it wasn't, as we now know too well. So why did they assure us
    that the Web site would work? Did they not know, or did they
    not disclose? That is what we are looking to find out with the
    contractors today and with Secretary Sebelius next week.
        Companies that are here today all testified before the
    Health Subcommittee on September 10 about their work building
    the Federal exchanges and healthcare.gov. And in that hearing
    and in briefings with committee staff, these companies
    represented that the exchanges would be ready for open
    enrollment on October 1st. They also explained that their
    testing of the system had not identified any significant
    problems.
        This is not about blame; it is about accountability,
    transparency and fairness to the American public. The broken
    promises are many. The President promised Americans that they
    could keep their health plans if they liked them no matter
    what, yet here we are 24 days into open enrollment and more
    people are receiving cancellation notices in just 2 States than
    the 476,000 Americans that the administration boasts have begun
    applying in the entire country. This is a troubling fact, but
    we still don't know the real picture as the administration
    appears allergic to transparency and continues to withhold
    enrollment figures.
        This is more than a Web site problem, and, frankly, the Web
    site should have been the easy part. I'm also concerned about
    what happens next. Will enrollment glitches become provider
    payment glitches? Will patients show up at their doctor's
    office or hospital to be told that maybe they aren't covered or
    even in the system?
        In a few months families in Michigan and across the country
    are going to face penalties under the law's individual mandate.
    How can the administration punish innocent Americans by forcing
    them to buy from a system that does not work and whose rollout
    has been nothing short of a disaster?
        The American public deserves answers. Today we're going to
    get them from the lead contractors. Next week will be Secretary
    Sebelius' turn.
        And I now yield 2 minutes to the vice chair of the
    committee Mrs. Blackburn.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Upton follows:]

                     Prepared statement of Hon. Fred Upton

        Today the Energy and Commerce Committee continues our
    ongoing oversight of the health care law as we examine the many
    problems--crashes, glitches, systems failures--that have
    defined open enrollment. Over the months leading up to the
    October 1 launch, top administration officials and lead
    contractors appeared before this committee, looked us in the
    eye, and assured us repeatedly that everything was ``on
    track.''
        Except that it wasn't, as we now know all too well.
        So why did they assure us the Web site would work? Did they
    not know? Or did they not disclose? That's what we are looking
    to find out, with the contractors today, and with Secretary
    Sebelius next week.
        The companies that are here today all testified before the
    Health Subcommittee on September 10 about their work building
    the federal exchanges and healthcare.gov. In that hearing, and
    in briefings with committee staff, these companies represented
    that the exchanges would be ready for open enrollment on
    October 1. They also explained that their testing of the system
    had not identified any significant problems.
        This is not about blame--this is about accountability,
    transparency, and fairness for the American public. The broken
    promises are many. The president promised Americans could keep
    their health plans if they liked them, ``No matter what.'' Yet
    here we are, 24 days into open enrollment, and more people are
    receiving cancellation notices in just two states than the
    476,000 Americans that the administration boasts have begun
    applying in the entire country. This is a troubling fact--but
    we still don't know the real picture as the administration
    appears allergic to transparency and continues to withhold
    enrollment figures.
        This is more than a Web site problem--and frankly, the Web
    site should have been the easy part. I'm also concerned about
    what happens next. Will enrollment glitches become provider
    payment glitches? Will patients show up at their doctor's
    office or hospital only to be told they, or their coverage,
    aren't in the system?
        In a few short months, families in Michigan and across the
    country will face penalties under the law's individual mandate.
    How can the administration punish innocent Americans by forcing
    them to buy from a system that does not work and whose rollout
    has been nothing short of a disaster?
        The American public deserves answers. Today we will get
    them from the lead contractors. Next week will be Secretary
    Sebelius' turn.

                                    #  #  #

    OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MARSHA BLACKBURN, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
                  CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF TENNESSEE

        Mrs. Blackburn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I want to thank our witnesses for being here. We are
    looking forward to getting your perspective of what went wrong
    and how it went wrong with this rollout. We were repeatedly
    told by members of the administration that everything would be
    working properly, and it would all be done on time, but these
    false administration assurances seem to sway some people on the
    other side of the aisle, and they believed fully that things
    were going to be done on time.
        Well, yesterday Mr. Waxman and I were agreeing on some
    things in a hearing, but last month we were disagreeing. And he
    had said that nothing could be found from our committee's
    investigation of exchange implementation and readiness, but we
    were quite concerned. That definition of ``nothing'' has turned
    out to be design choices in the exchanges that hide
    unaffordable premiums, massive glitches, dead ends, error
    messages, system breakdowns, and Americans spending countless
    hours trying to navigate exchanges not ready for prime time.
        So I hope all of our colleagues are going to work together
    and join the efforts to do proper oversight of the healthcare
    law. This is taxpayer money on the line. We need to be
    judicious, and the past 3 weeks of exchange messiness have
    demonstrated that nobody can be a blind cheerleader for the
    Affordable Care Act when they see all these problems right
    before their very eyes.
        At this time I yield--is the gentleman from Texas Mr.
    Barton? I will yield back to the chairman.
        [The prepared statement of Mrs. Blackburn follows:]

                  Prepared statement of Hon. Marsha Blackburn

        Thank you to our witnesses for joining us. I look forward
    to hearing your perspectives on just what has gone wrong so far
    with this roll out.
        We were repeatedly told by members of the administration
    that everything would be working correctly and on time.
        These false administration assurances seemed to sway some
    of my colleagues on the other side of the aisle.
        At last months' hearing, Mr. Waxman declared ``nothing''
    could be found from our committee's investigation of exchange
    implementation and readiness.
        Apparently Mr. Waxman's definition of ``nothing'' includes
    millions of Americans losing their coverage, design choices in
    the exchanges that hide unaffordable premiums, massive glitches
    and system breakdowns, and Americans spending countless hours
    trying to navigate exchanges not ready for primetime.
        I hope Mr. Waxman decides to join our efforts to do proper
    oversight of the health care law.
        These past three weeks of exchange messiness demonstrate
    that no member of this body should be a blind cheerleader for
    the Affordable Care Act and ignore the problems before their
    very eyes.

                                    #  #  #

        Mr. Upton. The gentlelady yields back.
        The chair would recognize for an opening statement my
    colleague, the ranking member of the full committee, Mr. Waxman
    from California.

    OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. HENRY A. WAXMAN, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
                 CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

        Mr. Waxman. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        The Affordable Care Act is an enormous success with one
    obvious exception: It has a poorly designed Web site.
        The law has already accomplished a lot. Millions of
    Americans, especially seniors, have saved hundreds of dollars
    on prescription drugs. Young people have gotten health
    insurance coverage. Millions of families have received rebates
    from their insurance companies that use more than 20 percent
    for their overhead costs. Preventive care is now a free benefit
    in Medicare and private insurance. Every day we hear more
    stories of people saving thousands of dollars and finally
    getting the security of quality health insurance.
        What hasn't happened, and what has not been successful, is
    the early performance of the Web site, and that has caused
    understandable frustration and anxiety as Americans have tried
    to sign up for the coverage. The heart of the law is getting
    insurance coverage, private insurance coverage, that others
    have who work for large employers like the Federal Government.
        Democrats want healthcare.gov to work, and we want to know
    what is wrong with the Web site and how we can help fix it. We
    want to learn what the contractors can tell us about the
    problems and how they can be addressed. That is what all my
    colleagues should want, including my Republican colleagues, but
    that has not been their agenda so far. We have already
    documented a record of Republicans attempting to sabotage the
    Affordable Care Act, which they know would result in denying
    coverage to millions of uninsured Americans who cannot find
    insurance under the market system that excludes them if they
    have preexisting medical conditions or if they can't afford
    their coverage.
        From voting more than 40 times to repeal the law, from
    intimidating organizations that have tried to help the law
    succeed, Republicans have encouraged their Governors to
    obstruct implementation, deny Medicaid coverage even though 100
    percent is being paid for by the Federal Government, and even
    by shutting down the government in order to try to repeal this
    law. Republicans have not shown us that they are trying to make
    this law work so far.
        Well, we all want answers because we want families to have
    affordable health insurance. We have already seen extraordinary
    demand for this coverage being offered through the exchanges.
    One of the reasons that we were given that the Web site didn't
    work is that it crashed when so many people were trying to
    access it. We know that people want to shop and have a choice
    between different health insurance plans that are being offered
    to them and have already been lined up to offer them private
    health insurance.
        We are encouraging our constituents to use other means of
    signing up in the meantime, like call centers and written
    applications, while the Web site problems are being fixed.
    We're pressing the administration to be redouble their efforts
    to fix the Web site, and we welcomed yesterday's announcement
    giving Americans more time to sign up for the insurance.
        Everyone has a responsibility for get health insurance. We
    expect people to observe that responsibility. But I cannot see
    that anyone is going to be penalized under the law if they have
    not been able to buy health insurance during this time where
    they have not had access to the exchanges.
        We need to start listening to our people who sent us to
    Congress. They don't want the government shut down. They don't
    want Congress to drive the country to the brink of default.
    They want this law to work. But they do want us to make sure
    that we hold everybody accountable and insist that the law and
    the promise of affordable health care become a reality for all
    Americans, and that means we've got to get this Web site fixed.
    And that's why I'm pleased we're going to hear from the four
    contractors today and next week from the Secretary.
        If we want this law to work, we've got to make it right,
    we've got to fix it; not what the Republicans have been trying
    to do, nix it and repeal it. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield
    back my time.
        Mr. Upton. The gentleman yields back.
        The chair would recognize for an opening statement the
    chairman of the Oversight Subcommittee Mr. Murphy.

       OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. TIM MURPHY, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
             CONGRESS FROM THE COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

        Mr. Murphy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        As chairman of the Oversight and Investigations
    Subcommittee, I have heard numerous promises from the
    administration officials that all was well with the healthcare
    law. Not true. Either these officials were shockingly unaware
    of what was happening inside their own agencies, or
    deliberately misleading our committee and the public hoping
    this would all suddenly turn around.
        Two weeks before enrollment began, HHS's insurance czar
    told us that consumers could go online, shop, and enroll by
    October 1st. Not true.
        We were promised a Web site where people could easily
    compare plans and costs. Five hundred million dollars later, we
    find the American public has been dumped with the ultimate cash
    for clunkers, except they had to pay the cash and still got the
    clunker.
        Secretary Sebelius has admitted HHS didn't do enough
    testing, but was her agency warned ahead of time that this was
    an issue? Were the contractors able to work with each other and
    complete end-to-end testing?
        In testimony today, QSSI states that the late decision
    requiring consumers to register for an account before they
    could browse for insurance products was a major contributor to
    the Web site's October 1st crash and burn. Who made this major
    decision just before launch? And were they trying to hide from
    the public the true cost?
        Now the President is committing untold amounts of money for
    an undisclosed plan spearheaded by an individual without
    technology experience to fix this huge problem, but if 55
    different contractors couldn't successfully build, test and run
    a Web site, how do we expect anyone else to be able to do this?
        Given all these questions, Congress should press pause on
    the tech surge and figure out what went wrong first before
    throwing good money after bad and forcing the public to use a
    broken site.
        In addition to explaining why this disaster happened, we
    want an explanation on how this system will be fixed, what it
    will cost, and how long it will take. After footing the bill,
    the American people deserve something that works or start over.
    Take responsibility. Tell us what's wrong. Fix it, or try
    something else.
        I yield back.
        Mr. Upton. Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Murphy follows:]

                     Prepared statement of Hon. Tim Murphy

        Thank you Mr. Chairman.
        As Chairman of the Oversight and Investigations
    Subcommittee, I've heard numerous promises from administration
    officials that `all was well' with the healthcare law.
        That wasn't the case. Either these officials were
    shockingly unaware of what was happening inside their own
    agencies or deliberately misleading our committee--hoping this
    `train wreck' would turn around.
        Two weeks before enrollment began, HHS's insurance czar
    told us that consumers could go online, shop, and enroll on
    October 1st. He didn't equivocate. He didn't hesitate.
        So what happened between the Administration's bravado and
    the launch of a clumsy system riddled with crashes, glitches,
    and errors?
        Did breakdowns occur with contractors or were they told to
    do it this way?
        Secretary Sebelius has admitted HHS didn't do enough
    testing, but was her agency warned ahead of time that this was
    an issue?
        Were the contractors able to work with each other and
    complete end-to-end testing?
        In testimony today, QSSI states that the ``late decision
    requiring consumers to register for an account before they
    could browse for insurance products'' was a major contributor
    to the Web site's October 1st crash and burn.
        Who made this major decision just before launch? And were
    they trying to hide from the public the data that would show
    the healthcare law was causing massive premium hikes?
        Was this site doomed to failure because contractors were
    told to build a flawed system by an agency that put politics
    before people's healthcare.
        Now, the President is committing untold amounts of money
    for a secret plan spearheaded by individual without technology
    experience to fix a technical problem.
        But if 55 different contractors couldn't successfully
    build, test, and run a web site in three years at a total cost
    of over $500 million, why should we believe the Administration
    is capable of fixing it in two weeks?
        You were supposed to design a web site that was supposed to
    compare costs and insurance plans. What the public got instead
    was a half-a-billion dollar clunker. We want to know--who
    messed up?Given all these questions, Congress should press
    `pause' on the ``tech surge'' and figure out what went wrong
    first, before throwing good money after bad, and forcing the
    public to use a broken site to buy a product they don't want--
    or pay a new tax.
        In addition to explaining why this disaster happened, I
    want an explanation on how this system will be fixed, what it
    will cost, and how long it will take.I yield back.

        Mr. Upton. I yield to Mr. Pitts.

    OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH R. PITTS, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
             CONGRESS FROM THE COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

        Mr. Pitts. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        HHS officials repeatedly assured this committee that the
    administration would be ready for October 1, 2013. This past
    July, the Secretary stated that HHS would, quote, ``flip on the
    switch on October 1st and say to people, come on and sign up,''
    end quote.
        On August 1st, Administrator Tavenner told us in this very
    room that CMS would finish all end-to-end testing by the end of
    August. On September 10th, the Health Subcommittee held a
    hearing in which representatives for CGI Federal, QSSI,
    Equifax, and Serco, all of whom are here today, testified. Each
    contractor assured us that its components of the exchange would
    be ready on time, and yet, when the exchanges opened for
    business on October 1st, it was nothing less than an
    unmitigated disaster.
        We're now hearing reports that the administration was
    repeatedly warned that the site was not ready for an October
    1st launch. The Washington Post reported Tuesday that, quote,
    ``as late as September 26, there had been no test to determine
    whether a consumer could complete the process from beginning to
    end,'' end quote. Secretary Sebelius said just this week that
    almost no testing occurred.
        These past few weeks of exchange dysfunction, along with
    stories of hundreds of thousands of Americans losing their
    existing health plans, help underscore why Washington should
    not be running our private health insurance system.
        The botched rollout is all the more reason that the
    individual mandate penalty should be delayed. Average Americans
    deserve a waiver from Obamacare, too. It is only fair when the
    exchanges are such a mess.
        The companies represented here today were in charge of
    building the Federal exchange, but CMS was responsible for
    ensuring that everything worked together properly. So the
    question we have to ask ourselves is, in light of all the
    administration's assurances, is this--are they simply
    incompetent, or were they just lying to the American people?
        I yield back.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Pitts follows:]

                   Prepared statement of Hon. Joseph R. Pitts

        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        HHS officials repeatedly assured this Committee that the
    Administration would be ready for October 1, 2013. This past
    July, the Secretary stated that HHS would ``flip on the switch
    on October 1 and say to people, `Come on and sign up.'''
        On August 1, Administrator Tavenner told us in this very
    room that CMS would finish ``all end to end testing'' by the
    end of August.
        On September 10, the Health Subcommittee held a hearing at
    which representatives for CGI Federal, QSSI, Equifax, and
    Serco--all of whom are here today--testified. Each contractor
    assured us that its components of the Exchange would be ready
    on time.
        And, yet, when the Exchanges opened for business on October
    1, it was nothing less than an unmitigated disaster.
        We are now hearing reports that the Administration was
    repeatedly warned that the site was not ready for an October 1
    launch.
        The Washington Post reported Tuesday that ``as late as
    Sept. 26, there had been no tests to determine whether a
    consumer could complete the process from beginning to end.''
    Secretary Sebelius said just this week that ``almost no testing
    occurred.''
        These past few weeks of Exchange dysfunction, along with
    stories of hundreds of thousands of Americans losing their
    existing health plans, help underscore why Washington should
    not be running our private health insurance system.
        The botched rollout is all the more reason that the
    individual mandate penalty should be delayed. Average Americans
    deserve a waiver from Obamacare, too--it's only fair when the
    exchanges are such a mess.
        The companies represented here today were in charge of
    building the federal Exchange, but CMS was responsible for
    ensuring that everything worked together properly.
        So, the question we have to ask ourselves, in light of all
    of the Administration's assurances, is this: are they simply
    incompetent or were they just lying to the American people?
        I yield back.

        Mr. Upton. I yield to Mr. Barton.
        Mr. Barton. Thank you.
        I have slide 1 I would like to put up.
        Like all of Obamacare, what it appears on the surface is
    not what it is. This is the terms and conditions that you
    accept at some point early in the process, and that looks
    pretty plain Jane.
        Now put up slide number 2.
        What you don't see is this slide, which says, you have no
    reasonable expectation of privacy regarding any communication
    or data transiting or stored on this information system. At any
    time and for any lawful government purpose, the government may
    monitor, intercept, search and seize any communication or data
    transiting or stored on this information system. Any
    communication or data transiting or stored on this information
    system may be disclosed or used for any lawful government
    purpose.
        That is Obamacare in a nutshell; says one thing on the
    surface, does something totally different behind the scenes.
        In my questions, I'm going to ask the contractors about
    this total lack of privacy and what they knew about it.
        With that, I yield back.
        Mr. Upton. The gentleman yields back.
        The chair would recognize the ranking member of the Health
    Subcommittee Mr. Pallone from New Jersey.

    OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK PALLONE JR, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
                 CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY

        Mr. Pallone. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I just heard my chairman of the subcommittee, the Health
    Subcommittee, say once again he wants to delay the Affordable
    Care Act. And I have great respect for the gentleman from
    Pennsylvania, but, you know, here we go again, another cynical
    effort by the Republicans to delay, defund or ultimately repeal
    the Affordable Care Act.
        I'd like to think that somehow this hearing is above board
    and legitimate, but it is not. You know, the Republicans don't
    have clean hands coming here. Their effort, obviously, isn't to
    make this better, but to use the Web site and the glitches as
    an excuse to defund or repeal Obamacare.
        And I just think it is very unfortunate, because there are
    millions of people out there who have been trying to go on this
    Web site, I understand like 20 million, and they deserve an
    opportunity once this is fixed--and I know the administration
    is trying very hard to fix it, as are all of our witnesses here
    today--they deserve an opportunity to have health care and not
    be among those 30 or 40 million who are uninsured or, even more
    so, that don't have a good benefit package.
        I would just ask my Republicans, let the goal here be to
    fix it, not nix it. And if that were your goal, I would feel
    very good about this hearing. But I don't see that happening.
        One of the things I wanted to bring attention to is how
    Democrats take a much different approach to things. When
    Medicare Part D started up--and I have this chart here--there
    were all kinds of problems with the Web site. It went on for
    months. These are some of the headlines that appeared in the
    newspapers about the problems. But did the Democrats get up and
    say, oh, Medicare Part D is terrible, let's repeal it or defund
    it? No. We said, let's work hard to make it better. And that's
    what we did, and the glitches disappeared, and the program
    became a good program.
        And that is what I would like to see my Republican
    colleagues do today. But it's not the case. Time and time
    again, the GOP has tried to slow the progress of implementing
    the ACA. They were willing to shut down the government for 3
    weeks. Did we forget what was happening the last 3 weeks when
    they tried to shut down--well, they did shut down the
    government 3 weeks, and the reason was because they wanted us
    to defund, or make changes to, or delay the Affordable Care
    Act.
        I hear my Republican colleagues talking about that they
    care about money, whether it's Federal dollars or individuals'
    dollars. The information has come out now saying that the
    government or the gross national product lost $24 billion
    during the 3-week shutdown, half percent of the gross national
    product for the last quarter. You're talking about money? You
    don't care. What about all the money you lost in the 3 weeks?
    That didn't matter just because you wanted to delay the
    Affordable Care Act?
        Again, there's no clean hands here, my colleagues. Do you
    really care? I don't think so.
        I just wish that you would stop this obstruction, work with
    us on trying to make this a better system, and as my
    colleague--as Mr. Waxman said, this can be fixed if you'll work
    with us.
        I yield now to the gentlewoman from Colorado Ms. DeGette.

     OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DIANA DEGETTE, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
                  CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF COLORADO

        Ms. DeGette. Thank you, very much, Mr. Pallone.
        As we've heard, we're here today to find out what the
    problem is with the healthcare.gov Web site and how we can fix
    these multiple technical problems.
        Last month, as the chairman noted, we heard from CGI, QSSI,
    Serco and Equifax, the same four contractors who are here
    today. They told us that the Web site would work. We even asked
    them point blank; Mr. Pallone asked them, and I asked them.
    They told us that HHS was doing an excellent job of testing the
    product. They said there was nothing wrong, and they expressed
    nothing but optimism. And so 3 weeks later, here we are. We're
    still hearing reports of significant problems.
        Now, I appreciate all of the contractors coming today. I
    give them the benefit of the doubt when they say things are
    approving. But I want to stress for the Affordable Care Act to
    work, these problems need to be fixed, and these problems need
    to be fixed fast.
        We need to hear today exactly what they're doing to fix
    these issues, and we need to hear--we need to see clear
    examples of improvement and be provided with a timeline for how
    it will be fully optional.
        Mr. Chairman, this is not our first experience with
    introductions of new healthcare programs, as Mr. Pallone said.
    I was on this committee in 2006 when Medicare Part D was
    implemented during the Bush administration. Let's not forget
    what a mess it was and the significant problems seniors had
    with registering for the new benefit. But I also want to remind
    my colleagues on both sides of the aisle that the difficulties
    passed and were soon forgotten amid the success of Part D.
        And so I really take the gestures on the other side of the
    aisle seriously. And I hope that we can say that we worked
    together to ensure the success of healthcare.gov.
        Now, there's something else I remember from the
    introduction of the Part D benefit, Mr. Chairman. Every single
    one of us, whether or not we voted yea or nay for the law,
    worked together for our success. I found the newsletter that I
    sent out to my constituents after Medicare Part D in which I
    said I opposed the law that created this program, but people
    need to be armed with the information requested. And I would
    urge everybody on both sides of the aisle to do that.
        So my hope, Mr. Chairman, is that today marks the beginning
    of an effort on the majority's part to make sure that the
    healthcare law works and is successful and Americans can enjoy
    the benefits.
        I really think that it is important to make that happen.
    And I'm so happy, I'm so happy and touched really today to hear
    the majority expressing these concerns about making the ACA
    work better. And I really hope that they're legitimate in it,
    because this is what's going to give insurance to millions of
    Americans who have gone without health care for many, many
    years because they couldn't afford the programs.
        And with that I yield to the chairman emeritus of the full
    committee Mr. Dingell.

    OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN D. DINGELL, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
                  CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MICHIGAN

        Mr. Dingell. I thank the gentlewoman for yielding to me.
        This is a wonderful opportunity for us to make the
    Affordable Care Act work. I remind my colleagues that the last
    perfect law came off the top of Mt. Sinai with Moses, written
    on a stone tablet by the hand of God. Nothing so good has
    happened since.
        I urge us to use our best efforts then to see to it that
    this new law goes into effect and works, and that we carry out
    our responsibility to the American people to see to it that we
    do everything we can to support and defend the Constitution and
    the laws of the United States.
        I've heard some unfortunate things on the other side. They
    said, we have to do everything in our power to prevent
    Obamacare. Obamacare, get rid of it, period. All of a sudden
    now our friends on the other side have forgotten that. Well, I
    hope they will continue to forget it, because we have a chance
    to see to it that the American people get health care as a
    matter of right, not as a matter of financial privilege.
        I am very frustrated, at least as frustrated as anybody
    else in this room, about the problem facing healthcare.gov.
    This is unacceptable. It needs to be fixed. And we can, if we
    are willing to work together, do something to see to it that
    it, in fact, is fixed, and that it helps all of the American
    people.
        Now, slow Web site is better than the alternative, and
    where health care is a privilege only for the few, it doesn't
    seem to matter. But if it's for everybody, we have to address
    that question and see to it that we take care of all of our
    people.
        I look forward to exploring how the Web site can be fixed
    in this hearing today. I look forward to working with my
    Republican colleagues and my Democratic colleagues to see that
    we do a constructive job of making this new law work.
        I remind all that when we were dealing with Medicare Part
    D, which was not something that was originated on this side the
    aisle, we worked together to see to it that, in fact, it
    worked, and now it is an accepted and acceptable conclusion to
    a significant problem, which, by the way, is improved by the
    Affordable Care Act.
        Mr. Chairman, I thank you for your courtesy, I thank the
    gentlelady for yielding to me, and I hope we can work
    constructively on this matter today. It is a great opportunity.
        Mr. Upton. The gentleman from the great State of Michigan's
    time is expired.
        At this point I'd like to introduce the witnesses for
    today's hearing.
        Our first witness is Cheryl Campbell. She is the senior
    V.P. For CGI's Federal health and compliance programs and
    defense agency programs. She was appointed to this position in
    2009, and in this capacity she is the driver of strategy and
    execution for the practice to serve the needs of providers,
    government and public.
        Our second witness is Andrew Slavitt. He is the group
    executive V.P. For Optum/QSSI, and in this capacity he is
    responsible for business strategy, public policy, corporate
    investment, research and development, acquisitions and
    corporate governance. Prior to this role, he has served in
    other roles at UnitedHealth Group and was founder and CEO of
    HealthAllies, which was acquired by UnitedHealth Group in 2003.
        Our third witness is Lynn Spellecy. She serves as the
    corporate counsel for Equifax Workforce Solutions. In this role
    her responsibilities include advising the business on matters
    related to contracts, products, regulatory issues and client
    relationships. She also works with sales leaders and internal
    contracts staff and the broader legal department to manage
    workforce solutions, related issues related to litigation,
    human resources, government affairs and regulatory matters.
        Our last witness is John Lau. He is the program director at
    Serco. He is responsible for overseeing eligibility and
    enrollment support services, specializing in the implementation
    and management of large-scale Health and Human Services
    programs in the U.S., including Medicaid, CHIP and TANF. His
    experience includes initial implementation and start-up; risk
    identification and issue resolution using a commercial
    governance system; security and privacy; and the design,
    implementation and management of multimillion transaction
    healthcare documents and transaction processing systems,
    including California's SCHIP and Texas' eligibility system for
    Medicaid, CHIP and TANF.
        So at this point I will now swear in the witnesses. You are
    aware that the committee is holding an investigative hearing
    and, when doing so, has had the practice of taking testimony
    under oath. Do any of you have objection to testifying under
    oath?
        Seeing none, the Chair then advises you that under the
    rules of the House and the rules of the committee, you are
    entitled to be advised by counsel. Do you desire to be advised
    by counsel during your testimony today?
        Seeing none, in that case, if you would please rise and
    raise your right hand, I will swear you in.
        [Witnesses sworn.]
        Mr. Upton. You are now under oath and subject to the
    penalties set forth in Title 18, section 1001 of the U.S. Code.
        You are now able to give a 5-minute summary of your written
    statement, and, Ms. Campbell, we will start with you. Welcome.

       TESTIMONY OF CHERYL CAMPBELL, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT, CGI
    FEDERAL; ANDREW SLAVITT, GROUP EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT, OPTUM/
       QSSI; LYNN SPELLECY, CORPORATE COUNSEL, EQUIFAX WORKFORCE
            SOLUTIONS; AND JOHN LAU, PROGRAM DIRECTOR, SERCO

                      TESTIMONY OF CHERYL CAMPBELL

        Ms. Campbell. Chairman Upton, Ranking Member Waxman,
    members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to
    appear today. My name is Cheryl Campbell, and I'm a senior vice
    president at CGI Federal. I have responsibility for all of CGI
    Federal's projects at the Department of Health and Human
    Services and several other Federal agencies. I'm here today to
    reinforce CGI Federal's ongoing commitment to the success of
    the Federal exchange on healthcare.gov.
        Let me state unequivocally that CGI Federal is fully
    committed to its partnership with CMS. Our priority is for
    Americans to have a positive experience in applying, shopping
    and enrolling on the Federal exchange. To this end we dedicate
    the very best experts to optimize our portion of the Federal
    exchange.
        For a context let me first describe our role in the Federal
    exchange. The exchange is comprised of 6 complex systems that
    involves 55 contractors, including CGI Federal, 5 government
    agencies, 36 States, and more than 300 insurers, with more than
    4,500 insurance plans all coming together in healthcare.gov.
        CMS competitively awarded CGI Federal its portion of the
    Federal exchange, a software application called the Federally
    Facilitated Marketplace, or FFM. Specifically the FFM provides
    functionality for eligibility and enrollment, plan management
    and financial management. CMS serves as the systems integrator,
    having ultimate responsibility for end-to-end performance of
    the Federal exchange.
        It also is important to understand the complexity of CGI
    Federal's work on the exchange. The FFM is a sophisticated
    software application that combines a Web portal, a transaction
    processor, and sophisticated business analytics to
    simultaneously help Americans determine their eligibility for
    insurance, apply for subsidies, shop for health plans, and
    enroll in qualified plans. The technology works in real time
    with sophisticated analytic systems developed by other
    contractors, large-scale data repositories hosted in disparate
    Federal agency databases, and health plans for more than 300
    insurers.
        In short, the Federal exchange, including the FFM, is not a
    standard consumer Web site, but rather a sophisticated,
    integrated technology platform that, for the first time in
    history, combines the processes of selecting and enrolling in
    insurance and determining eligibility for government subsidies
    all in one place and in real time.
        Since award on September 30, 2011, CGI Federal has worked
    diligently to develop the FFM by following a rigorous process
    that is customary for large IT projects. The FFM passed eight
    required technical reviews before going live on October 1.
        While CGI Federal delivered the FFM functionality required,
    and some consumers were able to enroll on October 1, we
    acknowledge that issues arising in the Federal exchange made
    the enrollment process difficult for too many Americans.
    Consequently, CGI Federal's focus shifted immediately to
    solving consumer access and navigation processes on the
    exchange.
        The first set of issues on the exchange concerned another
    contractor's enterprise identity management, or EIDM, function.
    The EIDM allows consumers to create secure accounts and serves
    as the front door to the Federal exchange. Consumers must pass
    through this front door in order to enter the FFM application.
    Unfortunately, the EIDM created a bottleneck, preventing the
    vast majority of consumers from accessing the FFM. Since then
    CMS, CGI Federal and other contractors have worked closely
    together to troubleshoot and solve this front door problem.
        As more consumers are gaining access to the FFM and
    enrolling in qualified plans, the increased number of
    transactions caused performance problems, such as slow response
    times and data assurance issues. CGI Federal is addressing
    these problems through tuning, optimization and application
    improvements.
        Over the past 2 weeks, the Federal exchange has steadily
    improved. We have continued to dedicate the resources necessary
    to shorten wait and transaction times and improve data quality.
    We have confidence in our ability to deliver successfully. Why?
    Because the company that I represent here today has
    successfully delivered some of the most complex IT
    implementations for the U.S. Government, including
    FederalReporting.gov. We have partnered with CMS on
    transformative projects likes Medicare.gov, which has enabled
    more than 50 million beneficiaries to compare health and drug
    plans annually. We are widely recognized by independent parties
    for our expertise in IT systems and software, and have CMI
    Level 5 credentials that demonstrate our commitment to rigorous
    software-development processes. And as part of the fifth
    largest independent IT and business process services company in
    the world, we leverage deep resources and expertise of a global
    workforce.
        I will end this testimony where I began by reinforcing CGI
    Federal's unwavering commitment to working collaboratively with
    CMS to improve the consumer experience.
        Thank you.
        Mr. Upton. Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Ms. Campbell follows:]

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Mr. Upton. Mr. Slavitt.

                      TESTIMONY OF ANDREW SLAVITT

        Mr. Slavitt. Chairman Upton, Ranking Member Waxman and
    members of the committee, good morning. My name is Andy
    Slavitt, and I'm group executive vice president at Optum,
    business unit of UnitedHealth Group. Optum owns QSSI, one of
    the contractors working on the online healthcare marketplaces.
        Let me begin by saying that we understand the frustration
    many people have felt since healthcare.gov was launched. We
    have been and remain accountable for the performance of our
    tools and our work product.
        I will start by discussing our work on the data services
    hub, a large and complex project that was the subject of much
    interest in QSSI's work for the marketplace prior to the
    launch. Simply put, the data services hub is a pipeline. It
    transfers data, routing queries and responses between a given
    marketplace and various trusted data sources.
        Specifically, a consumer interested in purchasing health
    insurance goes to the marketplace's Web portal to fill out
    enrollment forms and select a plan. The consumer provides the
    marketplace with information, such as citizenship, which must
    be verified. The data services hub directs queries from the
    marketplace to various sources, such as government databases,
    that can verify that information and send the information back
    to the marketplace. As a technology pipeline, the data services
    hub does not determine the accuracy of the information it
    transports, nor does it store any data.
        The data services hub has performed well since the
    marketplace has launched. On October 1, the data services hub
    successfully processed more than 178,000 transactions, and it
    has processed millions more since. When occasional discrete
    bugs in the data services hub were identified, we promptly
    corrected them.
        In addition to the data services hub, QSSI also developed
    the EIDM, a registration and access-management tool used as one
    part of the Federal marketplace's registration system. The EIDM
    tool helps the marketplace create user accounts and is being
    used successfully currently in at least two other CMS
    applications.
        It's relevant to note that while the EIDM tool is
    important, it is only one piece of the Federal marketplace's
    registration system. Registration components developed by other
    vendors handle other critical functions, such as user
    interface, confirmation emails to users, the link that users
    click on to activate their accounts, and the Web page users
    land on. All of these tools must work together seamlessly to
    ensure smooth registration.
        After the launch healthcare.gov was inundated by many more
    consumers than anticipated. Many of the critical components
    developed by these multiple vendors were overwhelmed, including
    the virtual data center environment, the software, the database
    system and the hardware, and our EIDM tool.
        Now, it appears one of the reasons for the high concurrent
    volume at the registration system was a late decision requiring
    consumers to register for an account before they could browse
    for insurance products. This may have driven higher
    simultaneous usage of the registration system than wouldn't
    have otherwise occurred if consumers could window shop
    anonymously.
        In the days after the launch, QSSI worked around the clock
    to enhance the EIDM tool to meet this unexpected demand, and as
    I understand it, this has largely succeeded. By October 8th,
    even at high levels of registration, the EIDM tool was
    processing those volumes at error rates close to zero. The EIDM
    tool continues to keep pace with demand, and at CMS's request
    we are working with other vendors to plan for higher levels of
    peak activity.
        Finally, QSSI was one of several testers used to test the
    functionality of the Federal marketplace. In our testing role
    we identified errors in code that was provided to us by others.
    In this function we reported back the results to CMS and the
    relevant contractor, who in turn was responsible for fixing
    coding errors or making any necessary changes.
        To conclude, the data services hub has performed well, and
    after initial scalability challenges, the EIDM tool is now
    keeping up with demand. We are committed to helping resolve any
    new challenges that may arise in any way we can.
        Thank you for the opportunity to discuss QSSI's work. I'm
    happy to answer any questions you have.
        Mr. Upton. Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Slavitt follows:]

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Mr. Upton. Ms. Spellecy.

                       TESTIMONY OF LYNN SPELLECY

        Ms. Spellecy. Good morning, Chairman Upton, Ranking Member
    Waxman and distinguished members of the committee. My name is
    Lynn Spellecy, and I serve as senior director and corporate
    counsel for Equifax Workforce Solutions. In that role I am the
    primary attorney responsible for the day-to-day legal
    operations of that business unit, and I provide guidance,
    advice and legal support.
        I appreciate the opportunity today to provide an update
    related to the income verification services that Equifax
    Workforce Solutions is providing to CMS to assist them in their
    benefit eligibility determination requirements under the
    Affordable Care Act.
        The Equifax Workforce Solutions income verification
    solution is working as designed. Since the exchanges first went
    live on October 1, 2013, we have not experienced any problems
    or interruptions in the processing of data to CMS. We have
    received and responded to verification requests regarding
    individual applicants from the Federally Facilitated
    Marketplace as well as from State-based agencies.
        Equifax Workforce Solutions tested our verification
    solution before the October 1st, 2013, open enrollment start
    date to ensure that we could transmit data between our servers
    and the Federal data hub. We performed end-to-end testing with
    the Federal hub and considerable internal stress and volume
    testing to guarantee that we would be prepared for current and
    future applicant volumes.
        Now that the Federally Facilitated Marketplace is open, we
    are monitoring the flow of verification requests from the hub
    to our servers and back.
        Equifax Workforce Solutions' role in the Federally
    Facilitated Marketplace is limited. Equifax Workforce Solutions
    receives an income verification request only after an applicant
    successfully gains access to the Federal healthcare.gov or
    State-based marketplace Web site, creates a user name, and
    establishes a security authentication profile, and then enters
    an online application process. Equifax does not play a role in
    any of these steps, nor does Workforce Solutions play a role in
    identity proofing and authentication.
        We are neither involved in, nor do we have visibility into,
    the eligibility decision process or downstream display and
    processing of benefit elections.
        Although the majority of the verification requests to date
    have come through the Federally Facilitated Marketplace,
    Equifax Workforce Solutions is also verifying income for
    several State-based marketplaces and State Medicaid agencies.
        The Continuing Appropriations Act for 2014 included new
    requirements for the Department of Health and Human Services to
    ensure that the federally facilitated and State-based
    marketplaces verify that individuals applying for coverage and
    seeking premium tax credits and cost-sharing reductions are, in
    fact, eligible for these subsidies.
        Equifax Workforce Solutions looks forward to sharing our
    expertise and income verification services with CMS at HHS as
    they develop guidance regarding verification solutions for the
    Federal and State exchanges.
        Since the October 1, 2013, start date, Equifax Workforce
    Solutions has exceeded the operating specifications of its
    contract with CMS to provide income verification services for
    those seeking financial assistance under the Affordable Care
    Act. The extensive experience we've gained from providing
    income verifications to State and other Federal agencies for
    their eligibility reviews for government subsidies has prepared
    Equifax Workforce Solutions to successfully serve CMS in this
    new capacity. We will continue to monitor and test our
    interface with the CMS data hub and various State agencies to
    ensure maximum efficacy.
        Thank you for the opportunity to testify, and I welcome
    your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Ms. Spellecy follows:]

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        Mr. Upton. Mr. Lau.

                         TESTIMONY OF JOHN LAU

        Mr. Lau. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Congressman Waxman,
    other distinguished members of the committee. My name is John
    Lau, and I represent Serco, and I am the program director for
    our CMS contract in connection with the ACA. Thank you for the
    opportunity to again appear and discuss Serco's current status
    and performance of this program.
        For the next several minutes, what I'd like to do is
    provide a quick review of Serco's role in the program and then
    the current status of our work. Serco's contract is to provide
    eligibility support services in support of the paper
    application processing, as well as error and issue resolution
    on applications regardless of the mode in which the consumer
    submitted them.
        It's important, I think, to clarify that we have no role in
    the development of the Web site, we have no role in
    determination of eligibility, and we have no role in health
    plan selection. I think there had been some confusion about
    that. I'd like to make sure that that's clear.
        Our primary role in the early days of this implementation
    is to key-enter paper applications into the eligibility system.
    As time goes on, more of our work will entail inconsistency
    resolution in order to clear previously submitted applications
    for the eligibility determination process.
        Inconsistency resolution entails data verification and
    validation of the self-attested data from applicants. These are
    problems identified through the use of the data hub in the main
    system and then communicated to us.
        To date, Serco has successfully opened two of its four
    processing centers, those in Kentucky and Arkansas. A third
    will be opening next week in Missouri, and in about 4 or 5
    weeks the final site in Oklahoma. I've had no trouble
    recruiting and hiring competent staff in any of our areas, and
    have received a number of compliments from local officials and
    community groups about the professionalism of our recruiting
    efforts and outstanding ways we've onboarded and trained our
    people. We've instilled a sense of pride in what they're doing,
    and our staff is highly motivated and represent an eager
    workforce.
        Since the launch of the program on October the 1st, we've
    built upon our starting capacity with both staff members and
    processing efficiency. The volume of paper documents received
    since program launch has been steadily increasing, and even in
    a short period clearly is trending upward. This build-up has
    given us the opportunity to make adjustments and improve our
    processes as the nature of the inbound documents and the
    workload has become clearer.
        To date, we've received about 18,000 documents. About half
    of those are consumer applications, and we've succeeded in key-
    entering about half of those. The remaining half are generally
    applications that are missing important data, and those cannot
    be entered directly until those problems are resolved. We
    expect to be able to complete processing and entering those
    applications in the near future.
        Our challenges have included coping with the performance of
    the portal, as that is our means of entering data, just as it
    is for the consumer. With the relatively low volumes of
    applications we have received thus far, it has not presented a
    challenge.
        As I testified on September 10th, Serco was ready to
    process on 10/1, and we are processing today. And I very much
    look forward to your questions.
        Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Lau follows:]

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Mr. Upton. Well, I thank each and every one of you.
        At this point we will move to questions from Members and
    alternate between Republicans and Democrats.
        I just want to say, as we've seen the taxpayers spend about
    half a billion dollars, that I guess that constituents across
    the country really expected a user-friendly program, a system,
    and whether it's like ordering a pizza, an airline flight, a
    rental car, a hotel, it's a standard that many were expecting
    to see, and I think most, at this point, would say it's really
    not ready for prime time.
        Listening to your testimony, each of you, I heard words
    like performing--your goal was to perform well, you want a
    positive experience, working or design to try and do that, and
    that's not what we've heard from folks at home.
        So my first question is was it ever an option to delay
    going live on October 1st? Did any of you come forth to the
    administration and say, this thing may not be ready on October
    1st; we might want a delay until we get it right? Any hands up?
    No.
        Prior to October 1st, did you know that the healthcare.gov
    Web site was going to have crippling problems, or did you not
    know about these problems and chose not to disclose them to the
    administration when you figured out that it wasn't working the
    way that perhaps it was designed to work? And maybe I will get
    comments from each of you as it relates to those two questions
    and start with Ms. Campbell.
        Ms. Campbell. Sure.
        Mr. Upton. I mean, you all testified in September, and so,
    I mean, either you didn't know about these problems or you knew
    about them and chose not to disclose them. Which one is it?
        Ms. Campbell. Well, Chairman, from a CGI perspective, our
    portion of the application worked as designed. People have been
    able to enroll, not at the pace, not at the experience we would
    have liked. But the end-to-end testing was the responsibility
    of CMS. Our portion of the system is what we testified in terms
    of what was ready to go live, but it was not our decision to go
    live.
        Mr. Upton. It was not your decision to go live?
        Ms. Campbell. It was CMS's decision. It was not our
    decision one way or the other.
        Mr. Upton. Did you ever recommend to CMS that perhaps they
    weren't ready, and they might want to delay the date?
        Ms. Campbell. It was not our position to do so.
        Mr. Upton. So you chose not to share those thoughts with
    them; is that right?
        Ms. Campbell. Let me clarify my statement. CMS had the
    ultimate decision for live or no-go decision, not CGI. We were
    not in a position; we're there to support our client. It is not
    our position to tell our client whether they should go live or
    not go live.
        Mr. Upton. So who at CMS were you sharing that information
    with or those decisions? Anyone in particular?
        Ms. Campbell. Once again, Chairman, it was not--I did not
    have, nor did CGI have, an opinion on a decision for CMS to
    make on a live or no-go decision.
        Mr. Upton. Do you know who at CMS made that decision to go
    live?
        Ms. Campbell. It's a body of individuals at CMS.
        Mr. Upton. Mr. Slavitt?
        Mr. Slavitt. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        So we had a limited view of the entirety of the project.
    What I can speak to is we were confident in the ability of the
    data services hub, which was a very complex component where we
    spent the bulk of our effort. We were confident that it would
    work on October 1st, and, in fact, it has.
        Other than that, we had--all of the concerns that we had,
    which were mostly related to testing and the inability to get
    as much testing as we would have liked, we expressed all of
    those concerns and risks to CMS throughout the project.
        Mr. Upton. So you shared that there were real difficulties
    in the testing with them?
        Mr. Slavitt. All of the risks that we saw, and all of the
    concerns that we had regarding testing were all shared with
    CMS.
        Mr. Upton. And what was their response to when you shared
    some of the pitfalls in terms of what was going on?
        Mr. Slavitt. My understanding is they understood those and
    were working on them. But I don't know further.
        Mr. Upton. Did they ever come back to you in terms of the
    shortcomings and what needed to be done, any concerns that were
    raised by them?
        Mr. Slavitt. I never got a depiction from them, but we did
    fully talk about the risks that we saw, and we passed those
    along all along the way.
        Mr. Upton. Ms. Spellecy?
        Ms. Spellecy. Our solution was ready to go October 1st,
    2013. We successfully completed end-to-end testing between
    Equifax Workforce Solutions and the CMS data hub prior to that
    date, so we did not anticipate any sort of problems with our
    connection and have not experienced any.
        Mr. Upton. Mr. Lau?
        Mr. Lau. We, too, were ready to process on 10/1, had done
    extensive internal testing of our processes and systems. And
    our first awareness of difficulties with the hub was 10/1--or
    the portal, I'm sorry, was on 10/1 when we attempted to do key
    entry.
        Mr. Upton. So you didn't test it prior to October 1st?
        Mr. Lau. No. No, sir.
        Mr. Upton. Mr. Waxman.
        Mr. Waxman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        As we evaluate the problems with this Web site, I think
    it's important that we focus on the facts. My Republican
    colleagues have been predicting that healthcare reform would be
    a disaster for 3 years now, and every time they've been wrong.
    They said insurance rates would skyrocket. In fact, they are
    lower than predicted. They said healthcare costs would soar. In
    fact, they've grown at a record low rate. They said Medicare
    would be undermined. In fact, it's stronger than ever, and
    seniors are saving billions of dollars on prescription drugs.
        So what we need to do is separate the facts for us to reach
    a determination here. Some have said that fixing the Web site
    would take 6 months to a year. Others have said there are 5
    million lines of code to rewrite. Some have urged Health and
    Human Services to pull down the entire system and start from
    scratch.
        Ms. Campbell, I hope you can help us put these dire
    predictions in perspective. Does CGI expect that it will take 6
    months to a year to get the application and enrollment process
    working smoothly on healthcare.gov?
        Ms. Campbell. We do not. We anticipate that the system, as
    we have seen, is improving day over day, and that we anticipate
    that people will be able to enroll in the time frame allotted
    that's necessary for them to have insurance for the January 1
    time frame.
        Mr. Waxman. That means what date? Don't they have to have
    an application in by December 15th for it to be effective
    January 1?
        Ms. Campbell. That's correct, sir.
        Mr. Waxman. So you anticipate by that date the system will
    be working?
        Ms. Campbell. The system will continue to improve. From our
    perspective, as painful as it sounds, I know that the
    experience has been a difficult experience, the system is
    working. People are enrolling. But people will be able to
    enroll at a faster pace. The experience will be improved as
    they go forward. And people will be able to enroll by the
    December 15th time frame.
        Mr. Waxman. Very good. Does CGI have to rewrite 5 million
    lines of code to fix the problems we have seen thus far?
        Ms. Campbell. No, sir. I can tell you that 300-plus
    employees that I have back in the office would--I think they
    would all walk out if I told them they had to rewrite that many
    lines of code.
        Mr. Waxman. Do you believe it is going to be necessary to
    scrap the entire healthcare.gov system and start from scratch?
        Ms. Campbell. I do not, sir.
        Mr. Waxman. So you think the Web site will be fixed in time
    to ensure Americans who want to get coverage for next year,
    that it will be available to them?
        Ms. Campbell. I do, sir.
        Mr. Waxman. OK. Why are you so confident? Can you explain
    that, these problems are going to be fixed in time?
        Ms. Campbell. Because as I said, we are seeing improvements
    day over day. We are continuing to run queries against our
    database. We are reviewing system logs, we are fine-tuning our
    servers, we are analyzing the code for anomalies. And every day
    we are seeing where we are finding challenges in the system and
    making those corrections, as you would with any system that
    will go live. When a system goes into production, these are the
    things you would typically find after production. Maybe not to
    the level of detail that has happened in this experience. But
    when a system goes live, these are the things you typically do.
    You continue to provide system builds and put performance
    tuning to the application to make sure that it continues to
    improve time over time.
        Mr. Waxman. Thank you. Mr. Slavitt, your company has been
    deeply involved in troubleshooting and fixing the problems on
    healthcare.gov. Do you have any reason to believe the problems
    that are being experienced at this launch will prevent
    Americans from getting insurance for the coming year?
        Mr. Slavitt. Congressman, I am confident that the data
    services hub had you been that QSSI developed and the EIDM
    registration tool are working well today and will continue to
    work well.
        Mr. Waxman. You had problems with your part early on, but
    you fixed them, didn't you?
        Mr. Slavitt. For the first 7 days, correct.
        Mr. Waxman. OK. So problems can be fixed.
        Mr. Slavitt. We doubled the capacity of that registration
    tool within 7 days.
        Mr. Waxman. Ms. Campbell, did CGI system pass its test
    before the system went live?
        Ms. Campbell. Yes, it did.
        Mr. Waxman. And my understanding is that you felt that the
    system was ready to go on October 1, is that right?
        Ms. Campbell. That is correct.
        Mr. Waxman. Neither you nor anyone else at the table
    thought or made a recommendation not to go forward on October 1
    because you didn't think the system was ready. Is that a
    correct statement?
        Ms. Campbell. That is a correct statement.
        Mr. Waxman. Mr. Slavitt?
        Mr. Slavitt. I refer back to my earlier answer. We did not
    make a recommendation. We simply made everyone aware of the
    risks that we saw.
        Mr. Waxman. OK. Ms. Spellecy.
        Mr. Spellecy. No, we did not make recommendations.
        Mr. Waxman. Mr. Lau.
        Mr. Lau. We did not either.
        Mr. Waxman. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Upton. The chair recognizes the vice chair of the full
    committee, Ms. Blackburn from Tennessee.
        Mrs. Blackburn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you all
    for your testimony. I would like each of you to submit in
    writing for me how much you have been paid to date, and then
    how much you are being paid on retainer or either to clear up.
    And so if you will submit that to us for the record, that would
    be wonderful. HIPAA compliance. Were you all trained in HIPAA
    compliance prior to beginning your contract? I will just go
    right down the line. Ms. Campbell?
        Ms. Campbell. Yes.
        Mrs. Blackburn. Mr. Slavitt?
        Mr. Slavitt. Yes, we do extensive HIPAA training.
        Mrs. Blackburn. OK. Ms. Spellecy?
        Ms. Spellecy. Yes.
        Mrs. Blackburn. Mr. Lau?
        Mr. Lau. Yes.
        Mrs. Blackburn. OK. Did your companies meet as a group with
    HHS before you started the process? Anyone? Did your companies
    meet together with HHS to discuss the integration? Mr. Lau, go
    ahead.
        Mr. Lau. Yes, for the security people from CMS and Serco
    and others have coordinated the security.
        Mrs. Blackburn. All right. Let me ask each of you a
    question. How many people in each of your companies have
    physical access to the database servers storing the enrolling
    information? Ms. Campbell?
        Ms. Campbell. Zero from CGI.
        Mrs. Blackburn. Pardon me?
        Ms. Campbell. We have zero access to the database.
        Mrs. Blackburn. Zero. OK.
        Mr. Slavitt. I believe the answer is also zero for our
    QSSI.
        Mrs. Blackburn. Ms. Spellecy for the verification?
        Mr. Spellecy. We have no access to CMS's servers.
        Mrs. Blackburn. OK. Mr. Lau?
        Mr. Lau. Two thousand people.
        Mrs. Blackburn. Two thousand people have access to the
    database?
        Mr. Lau. Through the key entry of the applications.
        Mrs. Blackburn. OK. You know under HIPAA regs, no one is
    supposed to have direct access to that database. OK. Under the
    current technology infrastructure, how many separate servers or
    virtual servers in the cloud are being used to host and store
    data for healthcare.gov? And Ms. Campbell, Mr. Slavitt, I think
    that is primarily to you.
        Ms. Campbell. I don't have the exact number. What I can
    tell you is that from a CGI perspective, we have anywhere from
    80 to 100 servers.
        Mrs. Blackburn. So you have 80 to 100 different servers
    that are holding information.
        Ms. Campbell. That are passing information through our
    system.
        Mrs. Blackburn. OK. Mr. Slavitt?
        Mr. Slavitt. Ms. Blackburn, I don't have--Congresswoman
    Blackburn, we don't have the answer to that question
    specifically as to how many servers. We can follow that up
    with--we don't store any data, however, any personal consumer
    data in any of our systems.
        Mrs. Blackburn. OK. Then Ms. Campbell and Ms. Spellecy, let
    me ask you this: The application information, is that being
    stored separately from the patient database information? Ms.
    Campbell?
        Ms. Campbell. Could you repeat the question again?
        Mrs. Blackburn. OK. The applicant servers and the patient
    database servers, are these--are you holding this information
    on your patients and on the database separately? Are you
    holding those separately?
        Ms. Campbell. So we are not holding any information.
        Mrs. Blackburn. You are not holding any. OK.
        Mr. Spellecy. We are provided only with limited
    information, Social Security numbers, names, and date of birth,
    which we use to match against our system.
        Mrs. Blackburn. OK. Mr. Lau, you mentioned that you all are
    working through the paper entry, and then the data entry from
    the paper applications?
        Mr. Lau. That's correct, yes.
        Mrs. Blackburn. OK. So where are you physically storing the
    data that is collected and given to you?
        Mr. Lau. When the paper comes in, it is scanned and
    converted to electronic images. Then the paper is destroyed
    once the image has been verified. The electronic image is put
    into a database and kept only until the information is key
    entered, and then it is put in archive and will be retained no
    more than 30 days.
        Mrs. Blackburn. Retain it no more than 30 days. OK. Let me
    ask each of you, does your current system keep detailed error
    logs that can be referenced with the difficulties that are
    surrounding healthcare.gov? Ms. Campbell, I will begin with
    you.
        Ms. Campbell. Yes, we have error logs.
        Mrs. Blackburn. OK.
        Mr. Slavitt. Yes, we do keep error logs for our products
    and tools.
        Mrs. Blackburn. OK.
        Mr. Spellecy. Yes, we keep error logs.
        Mrs. Blackburn. All right.
        Mr. Lau. We keep track of successful or unsuccessful
    applications.
        Mrs. Blackburn. OK. Do you want to submit these error logs
    to us?
        Ms. Campbell. I will have to confer back with CMS as to
    what documents we can and cannot provide.
        Mrs. Blackburn. OK. You know, it would be interesting to
    see those error logs, because I think it would give us an idea
    of how many people are actually accessing this system and then
    the problems that you have had with scaleability on this. I
    think we would like to see what is causing these systems to
    crash and where the security flaws may be in this also. And
    with that, I am over time. I will yield back.
        Mr. Upton. Thank you. Mr. Dingell.
        Mr. Dingell. Thank you for the courtesy, Mr. Chairman. We
    are having some questions before us which are very important. I
    note the problems are not surprising, given the fact that there
    has been considerable obstruction to the program going forward.
    I received a letter from a constituent recently. She said, I
    only make $12 an hour, and am buying my own health insurance on
    the open market. I can barely afford it, so I need to purchase
    it through an exchange, and will therefore be eligible for a
    subsidy, making health care affordable at last.
        This is what the debate is all about. There are problems.
    But we have time to fix it. So let's work together to get this
    matter resolved so that the people benefit and do not suffer.
    These questions are for Cheryl Campbell of CGI Federal. One--
    and these are yes or no, if you please. Is CGI responsible for
    developing the software for Federally Facilitated Marketplace?
    Yes or no?
        Ms. Campbell. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Dingell. Did CGI obtain this contract through a
    competitive bidding process?
        Ms. Campbell. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Dingell. Does CGI have experience providing other
    information technology services to the Federal Government? Yes
    or no?
        Ms. Campbell. Yes.
        Mr. Dingell. Did CGI conduct testing of your software for
    the marketplace Web site prior to October 1, when the launching
    took place? Yes or no?
        Ms. Campbell. Yes.
        Mr. Dingell. Was CGI responsible for testing the function
    of the entirety of healthcare.gov?
        Ms. Campbell. No.
        Mr. Dingell. No. If not, who was?
        Ms. Campbell. CMS.
        Mr. Dingell. OK. Do you believe that it is unusual for such
    a large project to experience some problems after it launches?
    Yes or no?
        Ms. Campbell. No.
        Mr. Dingell. Despite the initial problems with the Web
    site, have consumers still been able to enroll in the health
    insurance plans? Yes or no?
        Ms. Campbell. Yes.
        Mr. Dingell. Do you believe that the progress has been made
    getting the Web site to run as intended since launch three
    weeks ago? Yes or no?
        Ms. Campbell. Yes.
        Mr. Dingell. These questions are for Mr. Lau of Serco. Mr.
    Lau, is Serco responsible for handling and processing paper
    applications for health insurance in the marketplace?
        Mr. Lau. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Dingell. With all the problems with the Web site, many
    consumers are now turning to paper applications. Does Serco
    have the capability to handle a larger amount of paper
    applications than was originally expected? Yes or no?
        Mr. Lau. Yes.
        Mr. Dingell. The last question is for all witnesses, and we
    will start with Ms. Campbell. Do you all commit to working with
    CMS, Congress, and all the stakeholders until the Web site is
    fixed and functioning as intended? Yes or no?
        Ms. Campbell. Yes.
        Mr. Dingell. Sir?
        Mr. Slavitt. Yes.
        Mr. Spellecy. Yes.
        Mr. Lau. Yes.
        Mr. Dingell. Now, I would appreciate it very much if you
    would each submit for the record a summary of actions that you
    have taken to fix the Web site after the October 1 launch.
    Could you please do that?
        Ms. Campbell. Yes.
        Mr. Dingell. All right. Now, I would also ask that you
    submit also for the record suggestions for there to be changes
    and improvements in the way the matter is being dealt with by
    the Federal Government and any changes that you might deem
    would be useful in seeing to it that the matter goes forward as
    it can and should? Could you do that for me, please?
        Ms. Campbell. Yes.
        Mr. Dingell. OK. That question, I hope you understand, is
    to all of you. So I hope that you will all please assist. I
    want to thank you all. It is clear that we have plenty to do in
    the coming weeks. And I hope and pray that we will be up to the
    task. I urge my colleagues on the committee, this is a time
    when we can work together on something good. Maybe we didn't
    agree with the program or with the legislation. But we do now
    have a duty to see to it that it works for the benefit of the
    American people, and that we achieve the benefits which we hope
    we can achieve. I would note that this legislation originated
    under the hand and pen of my dear friend Bob Dole, and of John
    Chafee, and is therefore, I think, subject to the charge that
    it has some bipartisanship, even though little could be found
    during the process of it. I yield back the balance of my time,
    with thanks.
        Mr. Upton. Thank you. Mr. Barton.
        Mr. Barton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to put slide
    number two back up. Right there. Now, unfortunately that blue
    highlighted thing is hard to read, so I am going to read it
    again. This is the part of the signup that is hidden. The
    applicant does not see this, but it is in the source code. And
    what that blue highlighted area that has been circled in red
    says is, ``You have no reasonable expectation of privacy
    regarding any communication or data transiting or stored on
    this information system.'' Now, Ms. Campbell and Mr. Slavitt,
    you all both said that you are all HIPAA compliant. How in the
    world can this be HIPAA compliant when HIPAA is designed to
    protect the patient's privacy, and this explicitly says in
    order to continue, you have to accept this condition that you
    have no privacy, or no reasonable expectation of privacy?
        Ms. Campbell. So, sir, that would be a decision made by
    CMS.
        Mr. Barton. So this is news to you? You are the main prime
    contractor. You have never seen this before?
        Ms. Campbell. Sir, that is not--we are the prime, one of
    the prime contractors, yes.
        Mr. Barton. Have you seen this before? Are you aware this
    was in the source code?
        Ms. Campbell. This requirement----
        Mr. Barton. Are you aware this was in the source code? Yes
    or no.
        Ms. Campbell. Yes.
        Mr. Barton. You were aware. OK. Do you think it that's
    HIPAA compliant? How can that be? You know it is not HIPAA
    compliant. Admit it. You are under oath.
        Ms. Campbell. Sir, that is CMS's decision to make what----
        Mr. Barton. I asked if you thought that--you just told Mrs.
    Blackburn that it was HIPAA compliant. You know that's not
    HIPAA compliant. You admit that you knew it was in there. It
    may be their decision to hide it, but you are the company--not
    you personally, but your company is the company that put this
    together. We are telling every American, including all my
    friends on the Democrat side, and their they are huge privacy
    advocates. Diane DeGette is cochairman of the privacy caucus
    with me. But you are telling every American if you sign up for
    this, or even attempt to, you have no reasonable expectation of
    privacy. That is a direct contradiction to HIPAA, and you know
    it. Yes or no?
        Ms. Campbell. Once again, CMS had us comply to a set of
    rules and regulations that they have established under our
    contract. And that is a CMS call. That is not a contractor
    call.
        Mr. Barton. To break the law. You are now saying that CMS
    made a decision to break the law. Do you agree with that
    decision?
        Ms. Campbell. Sir, I cannot speculate on CMS.
        Mr. Barton. Let me ask Mr. Slavitt.
        Mr. Slavitt. This is the first time I am seeing and
    becoming familiar with that source code.
        Mr. Barton. OK. So you weren't aware of it?
        Mr. Slavitt. I was not aware of it.
        Mr. Barton. OK. Well, let me go back to Ms. Campbell. She
    has at least admitted she knew about it. Who made this decision
    to hide this or put it in the source code in the first place?
        Ms. Campbell. I can't give you that answer.
        Mr. Barton. All right.
        Ms. Campbell. I don't know the answer to that question.
        Mr. Barton. All right. Who do you report to?
        Ms. Campbell. I can go back to my people.
        Mr. Barton. Was it some junior underling at CMS? Was it the
    director of CMS? I mean, who generically generally made
    decisions at the policy level that your company interfaced
    with? Give me that person's name.
        Ms. Campbell. There are many decisions made under this
    program over this last 2, 2 \1/2\ years.
        Mr. Barton. So is this another example of where things just
    go into a cloud? I mean, all you are is the contractor that
    spent 3- or $400 million? It goes to some amorphous cloud and
    then it comes back from down on high? Who wrote that?
        Ms. Campbell. I am not clear as to who wrote that.
        Mr. Barton. All right. Let me ask it this way: Do you think
    that should be in the--do you think that should be a
    requirement to sign up for ObamaCare, that you give up any
    reasonable expectation of privacy?
        Ms. Campbell. Sir, that is not my jurisdiction----
        Mr. Barton. You are a U.S. citizen.
        Ms. Campbell [continuing]. One way or the other.
        Mr. Barton. Well, I will answer. I don't think it should
    be. I don't think it should be. My time is about to expire. Let
    me ask one more question. Ms. Campbell, did you all do any kind
    of a pilot program on this before it was rolled out?
        Ms. Campbell. No, there was no pilot program.
        Mr. Barton. OK. And you said that it was complicated and
    big, but it was meeting your expectation. Do you think it is
    right that 99 percent of the people that try to go through the
    system get rejected, can't even complete the application? Is
    that a system that you are proud of?
        Ms. Campbell. Sir, this is a system that we are working
    every day to make improvements.
        Mr. Barton. Well, in my opinion, if we have a system that
    almost no one can successfully navigate, that we have to go to
    the paper system of this gentleman's company down here, that is
    a system that has failed. With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield
    back.
        Mr. Upton. Thank you. Mr. Pallone.
        Mr. Pallone. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I started out in my
    opening statement saying there was no legitimacy to this
    hearing, and the last line of questioning certainly confirms
    that. HIPAA only applies when there is health information being
    provided. That is not in play here today. No health information
    is required in the application process. And why is that?
    Because preexisting conditions don't matter. So once again,
    here we have our Republican colleagues trying to scare
    everybody.
        Mr. Barton. Will the gentleman yield?
        Mr. Pallone. No, I will not yield to this monkey court or
    whatever this thing is.
        Mr. Barton. This is not a monkey court.
        Mr. Pallone. I am not yielding. I am trying to tell you the
    problem here.
        Mr. Barton. Protecting American citizens is a legitimate
    concern of this committee.
        Mr. Pallone. Preexisting conditions don't matter, HIPAA
    doesn't apply, there is no health information in the process.
    You are asked about your address, your date of birth. You are
    not asked health information. So why are we going down this
    path? Because you are trying to scare people so they don't
    apply, and so therefore the legislation gets delayed or the
    Affordable Care Act gets defunded or it's repealed. That is all
    it is, hoping people won't apply.
        Well, the fact of the matter is there are millions of
    people out there, over 20 million that are going on this site,
    and they are going to apply, and they are ultimately going to
    be able to enroll. In fact, many of them already have enrolled.
        I think my Republican colleagues forget that a lot of
    people are enrolling through State exchanges rather than the
    Federal exchange. And if it wasn't for the fact that many
    Republican governors, including my own from New Jersey, had
    agreed to set up State exchanges, then we wouldn't be putting
    so much burden on the Federal system. But I just want to give
    you some examples.
        In New York and Washington, over 30,000 people have
    enrolled in coverage. In Oregon, over 50,000 people have
    enrolled. In California, over 100,000 have started
    applications. In Kentucky, nearly 16,000 people have enrolled.
    So, you know, this Web site, this Federal Web site is not the
    only way that you apply. In fact, you can go to your community
    health center, you can go to the 1-800 number, you can go to--
    there are many ways for people to enroll. And all we talk about
    here is the Web site because you are trying to make a case that
    people should not enroll.
        Now, I want to ask two questions. Ms. Campbell, am I
    correct that CGI is doing work in several States in addition to
    the work on healthcare.gov? And would you comment on that,
    please, in these States?
        Ms. Campbell. That is correct. We are supporting a number
    of States. And those States, we are a prime contractor in
    Colorado, a prime contractor in Hawaii, a prime contractor in
    Massachusetts, a prime contractor in Vermont. We are a
    subcontractor in California, a subcontractor in Kentucky, and a
    subcontractor in New Mexico.
        Mr. Pallone. And that appears be to be going well.
    Obviously, a lot of people have enrolled, as I set forth
    previously. I know that when Mr. Waxman asked a question, you
    said you had confidence that whatever problems exist in the
    Federal data system or Web site, that they would be fixed by
    December 15th, and you expect that the millions ofuninsured
    people and others who were trying to enroll would be able to by
    then so that their insurance would be effective January 1st.
    Was that my understanding?
        Ms. Campbell. That's correct.
        Mr. Pallone. OK. And I wanted to ask Mr. Slavitt, the data
    hub that your company set up is working well to connect to the
    Federal data when residents of those States apply. So what I am
    asking, Mr. Slavitt, is if I go through New York or California
    or some of the other States that have responsible governors
    that have set up these State exchanges, unlike mine in New
    Jersey, that if you do that or you go through, you know, the 1-
    800 number, or you go through the other means that you can to
    apply in person, that they can access the hub. Is that correct?
        Mr. Slavitt. That is correct.
        Mr. Pallone. OK. So again, I am just trying to point out to
    my colleagues the success of all the State exchanges. And
    again, a lot of people are being able to enroll. I think the
    figures show that when State governors work to expand Medicaid
    and work to make sure their own citizens get coverage, they
    make a big difference. And they also show, these statistics,
    how shortsighted it is of Republican governors to refuse to
    expand the Medicaid program in their States, because that's
    another big factor to the ACA that really isn't being discussed
    today.
        Again, I never cease to be amazed how the GOP uses tactics
    to try to scare people. And that is again what is happening
    here today. And I was hoping this hearing wouldn't end up
    accomplishing that goal. And I would just ask the public,
    please, try to find means to enroll. There are a lot of things
    other than the Federal Web site. And don't be scared by my GOP
    colleagues into thinking that somehow you are going to lose
    your privacy. There is no health information provided as part
    of this exercise. Thank you, gentlemen.
        Mr. Upton. Mr. Hall.
        Mr. Hall. Mr. Chairman, thank you. This hearing is entitled
    PPACA Implementation Failures: Didn't Know Or Didn't Disclose.
    And I guess this hearing is really to set us in a little better
    shape to deal with Ms. Sebelius. I think she is going to be
    here next week. President Obama often attempts to paint
    Republicans as being out of order, downright crazy in their
    criticism of the health care law. I want to talk about that
    just a minute before I ask my questions.
        I hear from my district and from Americans across the
    country that the craziest part of the last few weeks is seeing
    the President's top health care official laughing on Jon
    Stewart while Americans are having to deal with the
    consequences with the President's flawed health care law. For
    example, I have a teacher there in my hometown where she has to
    face premiums that will consume nearly a quarter of her monthly
    income.
        Or another constituent who has tried to comply with the
    law, but has not yet received information about their coverage
    as promised, and claims, quote, I am very concerned that our
    family will not be in compliance and we will face IRS fines.
    They are calling for a repeal of the individual mandate. And
    most of them are calling for that. Yet another who has been
    advised that their current coverage will end December 31st,
    2013.
        So much for keeping what you have. And it is a concern the
    dysfunctional health care government will expose me to an
    unwanted liability if I can't get coverage through the Web
    site. Now, how verbose is this? You know, the Founding Fathers,
    in 1776, declared their independence. The next year they wrote
    a Constitution that was 4,500 words. This wording in here, the
    regulations, not voted on by Congress, contains a massive
    11,588,000,000 words. I just don't know how anybody could ever
    answer these things. And I want to ask you, in an environment
    where people are already worried about whether or not they have
    a job, and there is no jobs now, and if we go on like we are
    going now, there will be no employers a year from now, they now
    have to worry about navigating a flawed law where their chances
    of finding affordable coverage are often less than before the
    law's existence.
        So my question to each of you is CMS has had 3 years, and
    most of you had over a year to ensure that this law could work.
    Now, what do you want me to tell the Americans who are
    terrified of really facing IRS fines for not being able to
    access coverage they actually can't afford?
        I guess we will start with you, Ms. Campbell. You weren't
    allowed, or you chose not to use your opinion or to make
    suggestions. But are you in a position to give me some words
    that I could give to these people to give them any hope that
    their government, that we are doing our job here in Congress,
    that you have done your job that you were hired out to do? Is
    there hope?
        Ms. Campbell. So if I understand the question, you are
    asking is the system going to be there for them to sign up?
        Mr. Hall. I beg your pardon?
        Ms. Campbell. Can you repeat the question?
        Mr. Hall. Yes. Just give me something to tell these people
    that I have related to you that are real people, honest people
    that have to live with what you all have created. You set up,
    you run the Web site for people to sign up, or exchange.
        Ms. Campbell. And we are continuing----
        Mr. Hall. You must know a whole lot more than I know to
    know what to tell these people. I am asking you to give me some
    help along that line. If you can't express your opinions to the
    people that you report to, you sure can express them to me.
        Ms. Campbell. So I would tell your constituents that the
    system is improving day over day, and that we are continuing to
    work to make improvements for them to be able to enroll.
        Mr. Hall. Did you really start with one in Delaware?
        Ms. Campbell. Pardon me, sir?
        Mr. Hall. Did you really start out with one in Delaware?
    That is what the liberal press is reporting.
        Ms. Campbell. I am not familiar.
        Mr. Hall. How about my time? How much more time do I have?
        Mrs. Blackburn. Thirty-eight seconds.
        Mr. Hall. All right, I will yield. Yes, I will hear from
    any of you. I am asking for help. I want help. I have 700,000
    people that I have to report to. And I think about 690,000 of
    them hate the Obama law. My time is up. I will yield back.
        Mr. Upton. The gentleman yields back. The chair recognizes
    the gentlelady from California, Ms. Eshoo.
        Ms. Eshoo. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Having listened to
    several colleagues already, as well as the witnesses, I am
    struck by two things: First, that my colleagues on the other
    side of the aisle, if they are serious to pursue what I think
    is the much larger issue of Federal procurement, how it takes
    place, how we end up with contractors that say essentially
    everything is all right when it isn't, that is going to take a
    bipartisan effort to really bring about a fix. But we have to
    keep in mind that these are the people that shut the entire
    Federal Government down, caused pain across the country, and
    extracted some $24 billion out of America's economy. And the
    American people were put through hell.
        That was all over shutting down, or delaying, or defunding
    the Affordable Care Act. So, there isn't any love lost between
    the Republicans and the law. And that is their position. And it
    is abundantly clear. But I think that what the other thing I am
    struck with by today is in reading all of the submitted written
    testimony, when I read it last night, there wasn't anyone that
    wrote testimony and submitted it--let me put it this way. What
    you said was, and I read it more than once, that everything was
    A-OK. No one acknowledged anything.
        Now, we have got problems with this Web site. There is no
    question about it. Now, I represent Silicon Valley, and I find
    this very hard to follow. This is the 21st century. It is 2013.
    There are thousands of Web sites that handle concurrent volumes
    far larger than what healthcare.gov was faced with. You keep
    speaking about unexpected volumes, Ms. Campbell. And that
    really sticks in my craw. I have to tell you that. Because as I
    said, there are thousands of Web sites that carry far more
    traffic. So I think that is really kind of a lame excuse.
    Amazon and eBay don't crash the week before Christmas, and Pro
    Flowers doesn't crash on Valentine's Day.
        Now, in the testing of this between CGI and QSSI, can you
    describe exactly what kind of testing you did as the main
    contractors for this? I mean, there is an internal testing and
    then kind of an external. You turn it around and then you test
    it for the outside. Are you saying that you didn't test, that
    the tests worked very well, both inside and out, or that you
    turned it all over to CMS? Anybody want to answer? I mean what
    is happening? Do you have an answer?
        Ms. Campbell. Are you asking me that question?
        Ms. Eshoo. I am asking both of you. And you are using up a
    lot of my time by your silence. If you don't have an answer,
    just say that you don't. But maybe we can take something in
    writing. But the beta testing and the inside testing I think is
    clearly the main contractor's job. And you are essentially
    saying that everything was all right. It is not all right.
        Ms. Campbell. There was testing done throughout the
    process. CMS did the end-to-end testing. But each component did
    their separate testing, and we had independent contractors
    testing our system as well.
        Ms. Eshoo. And what was the net result of that? What you
    just described?
        Ms. Campbell. That the system was--that our portion of the
    system that CGI was responsible for, that our functionality
    worked.
        Ms. Eshoo. And it didn't.
        Ms. Campbell. Yes.
        Ms. Eshoo. It did not in the end result, correct?
        Ms. Campbell. When it became part of an integrated end-to-
    end system.
        Ms. Eshoo. You knew it was going to be integrated. There
    were many subcontractors. That wasn't a surprise. Do you have
    something to say about the testing?
        Mr. Slavitt. So let me be clear about our role in testing.
    Our work, the data services hub, was tested, tested well, and
    tested adequately. Additionally, we played a role as one of
    many independent contractors testing the code developed by
    other contractors. We tested every piece of code we received
    timely. We returned a full report of any bugs we found to CMS
    promptly and made everyone fully aware of all the potential
    risks and concerns that were made available to us.
        Ms. Eshoo. Well, I am now over my time. But I think that
    what we'd like to hear from you is when you're going to fulfill
    your contracts to the taxpayers of the country so that we can
    go on and have people insured. Taxpayers have paid you a lot of
    money. And you are essentially saying to us everything's all
    right when it's not. So I will submit some questions in writing
    as well. And with that, I will yield back.
        Mr. Upton. Thank you. Mr. Shimkus.
        Mr. Shimkus. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have a lot of
    questions. I am going totry to go fast. Mr. Slavitt, I am just
    going to follow up on Anna Eshoo's comments. We would like the
    names of the personnel at CMS who you provided the risks that
    you identified in your analysis of other contractors' code. Can
    you do that?
        Mr. Slavitt. Yes. Let me follow up with you on that.
        Mr. Shimkus. Yes. That's fine. For the record. And what I
    am going to encourage my colleagues to do is to ask for names.
    Because this amorphous CMS is--there are people there. And I am
    going to venture to guess that the regular bureaucrats did
    their job, the political appointees manipulated the system to
    hide data they didn't want the public to know. And we're going
    to find out who that is. Because that's the crux of this
    problem. I have got a letter from a constituent who basically
    says we have never been without health insurance. However, the
    Affordable Care Act may force us into the position of going
    without it.
        This whole battle is about whether Americans can have
    affordable health care. And this system is not helping in this
    debate. And I just want--my friend, Mr. Pallone, my friend, Ms.
    DeGette, I was ranking member when this bill got passed and
    signed into law. After it got signed into law, we had 13
    subcommittee hearings on things like smokeless tobacco,
    antibiotic resistance, health care pricing, national all
    scheduled electronic reporting authorization. Each one of those
    I asked for a hearing on the health care law. And it is in the
    Congressional Record. Statements like on April 28, 2010, we
    must hold hearings on the new Health Reform Act. May 6, 2010,
    we should also call Secretary Sebelius to testify. June 9,
    2010, we need a hearing on the new health care law. June 2010,
    shouldn't the committee hold hearings and take immediate
    action? My friend, Mr. Waxman, always sends us letters, I want
    to do this, I want to do that. We sent countless letters to the
    Democrat majority at the time asking for hearings on the
    recently passed health care law. And guess what? No hearings.
        So when Speaker Pelosi then said we've got to pass the bill
    before we know what's in it, we're finding out. We're finding
    out a flawed tech system that's a mockery. Now, let's talk
    about this. I accept the premise that you tested your
    individual section. But we're getting to the point of the
    integrated system. When was the integrated system tested?
    Starting with Ms. Campbell down to the end of the table. When
    was the integrated system tested?
        Ms. Campbell. During the last 2 weeks in September.
        Mr. Shimkus. And what was the result of that?
        Ms. Campbell. I don't have the results. You would have to
    get that from CMS.
        Mr. Shimkus. And who I would go to to get that information?
    Who is your point of contact at CMS?
        Ms. Campbell. So there are a number of people.
        Mr. Shimkus. Give me a name.
        Ms. Campbell. Henry Chao.
        Mr. Shimkus. Give me another name.
        Ms. Campbell. Michelle Snyder.
        Mr. Shimkus. Got another one?
        Ms. Campbell. Peter Oh.
        Mr. Shimkus. OK. Mr. Slavitt?
        Mr. Slavitt. So here is what we saw.
        Mr. Shimkus. Isn't that a beta test? Wouldn't it put the
    different components together and see if the system worked?
        Mr. Slavitt. So here is what we saw. We didn't see the full
    kind of integrated end-to-end system testing that you are
    talking about----
        Mr. Shimkus. Why not?
        Mr. Slavitt [continuing]. Until the couple of days leading
    up to the launch.
        Mr. Shimkus. Shouldn't we have had that?
        Mr. Slavitt. Ideally, yes.
        Mr. Shimkus. Ideally, yes. Wouldn't any other system,
    corporate entity rolling out something would test to see if it
    worked before it went out into the field?
        Mr. Slavitt. Yes.
        Mr. Shimkus. Mr. Slavitt, do you have names of who you
    talked to?
        Mr. Slavitt. I don't have any names with me.
        Mr. Shimkus. Will you provide those to us?
        Mr. Slavitt. We will be happy to follow up.
        Mr. Shimkus. Thank you. Ms. Spellecy.
        Ms. Spellecy. So we tested----
        Mr. Shimkus. I know you tested. A beta testing end to end.
    When did it happen?
        Mr. Spellecy. The information only comes to us after the
    application is completed. So we were testing up to the time
    that the system went live. And as far as we were concerned,
    everything that came to us we were able to process.
        Mr. Shimkus. Quickly.
        Mr. Lau. Our systems are not integrated with the main
    system. Our main interaction with it is key entry.
        Mr. Shimkus. And Mr. Slavitt, I would like the names by
    tomorrow you morning if you could do that. Finally, I want to
    go back to Mr. Campbell. ``See plans first'' feature that was
    just changed on the Web site. Who told you to do that?
        Ms. Campbell. I am sorry, could you repeat that? I didn't
    hear you.
        Mr. Shimkus. The ``see first plans.'' Remember the Web site
    failed. Part of the problem is people don't know what the cost
    of the plans are. You all made a change to say see plans first.
    Just reported yesterday by I think CBS. Who made that decision?
        Ms. Campbell. I don't know who made that.
        Mr. Shimkus. Can you give us the names?
        Ms. Campbell. We can get you a name.
        Mr. Shimkus. OK. Who made the decision that if you are
    younger than 50, you would be quoted a 25-year old health
    policy?
        Ms. Campbell. I don't have an answer for you, sir.
        Mr. Shimkus. Can you get us a name?
        Ms. Campbell. I can try. I can go back to my team to see if
    they have a name.
        Mr. Shimkus. OK. Who made the decision that if you are
    older than 50, you get quoted a 50-year old policy?
        Ms. Campbell. The same. I would have to go back to my team.
        Mr. Shimkus. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
        Mr. Upton. The gentleman's time has expired. The gentleman
    from New York, Mr. Engel.
        Mr. Engel. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You know, it amazes me
    how our Republican colleagues are so concerned about the
    Affordable Health Care Act since they tried to defund it, they
    tried to kill it, they shut down the government because of it.
    Do you think there is maybe a little bit of politics here?
    Perhaps they should work with us to improve the Affordable
    Health Care Act instead of playing gotcha politics here this
    morning and trying to scare people into not enrolling into the
    Affordable Health Care Act.
        There will be plenty of time to figure out who is
    responsible for the various problems facing the exchanges. What
    is more important to me is that Americans would be able to
    access the numerous benefits found in the plans offered through
    the exchanges.
        So let me ask, I know it's been answered before, but I want
    to just have a specific answer, how soon will it take to
    correct these glitches so that people can have unfettered
    access to the Web site? I know things are improving. But how
    soon will it be, do you think, so that the average American can
    do healthcare.gov and get right in without any of the glitches?
    Ms. Campbell?
        Ms. Campbell. What I can tell you is that I have a team of
    people working around the clock trying to quickly get this
    resolved. As I said, there is improvements day over day. I
    cannot give you an exact date as to when it will be completely
    to satisfaction.
        Mr. Engel. How about a guess?
        Ms. Campbell. I would prefer not doing that. I don't like
    to raise expectations.
        Mr. Engel. Mr. Slavitt?
        Mr. Slavitt. We don't happen to control the pieces of the
    Web site that I believe you are referring to. We are committed
    to continuing to maintain the capabilities that we have built
    so far, and we are committed to helping resolve any new
    challenges that arise anywhere in the project that we get asked
    to do so.
        Mr. Engel. All right. Well, let me say this. I hope it is
    as soon as possible. Because I think there are numerous
    benefits to this law, and I want to see the American people
    utilize this law, because I happen to think it is a good law. I
    am proud that it came out of this committee. And I am proud
    that we had many, many months of deliberation before we passed
    it.
        Now, New York State, my home State, has also been
    experiencing some technical and capacity-related issues since
    October 1. But I think in New York it's a good example of
    what's possible when the Federal Government has a willing and
    enthusiastic partner in a State implementation. As of October
    23rd, 174,000 New Yorkers have completed their application. And
    New York continues to make improvements to its exchange Web
    site, including quadrupling its processing capacity. And by the
    end of the week, individuals should be able to look up coverage
    based on various providers and doctors. But I think that with
    my Republican colleagues, given their new found interest in
    seeing that the ACA is successfully implemented, I hope that I
    can see these same colleagues starting to champion the Medicaid
    expansion in their home States so that their most vulnerable
    citizens can access health care coverage and stop calling for
    continued repeal votes.
        Now, many of us who were on this committee the last time,
    and this was mentioned before, but I want to emphasize it, a
    major new health benefit was introduced, and that was Medicare
    part D. It is easy to forget now, but when that program was
    introduced, there were significant problems. The Web site was
    balky, headlines gave out bad information. When the program
    opened, pharmacists called it a nightmare, a disaster, and all
    kinds of things like that. So Ms. Campbell, am I correct that
    CGI did some work for Medicare part D in the early years of the
    program.
        Ms. Campbell. That is correct.
        Mr. Engel. Well, then you probably remember, like I do,
    that these problems were solved, and soon enough, Medicare part
    D became a popular and successful program. And by the way, we
    improved that program by closing the part D drug donut hole in
    the Affordable Care Act. So that's one important lesson to
    remember now, that even if a program gets off to a rocky start,
    it does not mean that we need to jump to conclusions about its
    long-term success. And that's why I'm confident that even with
    the Web site problems, the Affordable Care Act will be
    successful. And there is another lesson to be learned from that
    experience. All the members of this committee, Democrats and
    Republicans, with Medicare part D, worked together to fix the
    problems.
        Democrats did not sit on the sidelines and root for
    failure. We pitched in and helped. Republican committee members
    in particular insisted that we be patient with the part D
    glitches. And some of the members of this committee, and can I
    quote what they said at that time, the new benefit and its
    implementation are hardly perfect, but I hope that we can work
    together as we go through the implementation phase to find out
    what is wrong with the program, and if we can make some changes
    to fix it, let us do it on a bipartisan basis. It is too big of
    a program, it is too important to too many people not to do
    that.
        And another member said any time something is new there is
    going to be some glitches. It is of no value, as a matter of
    fact, it is a negative value and of questionable ethical value
    I think if people only spend their time criticizing the
    glitches that have been in the program. As with any program
    that occurs, whether it is a public or private program,
    criticizing it, standing on the outside is not good. So let me
    just say that let's take that same approach we had with
    Medicare part D. Let's work together on both sides of the aisle
    to improve this program and not play gotcha politics. Thank
    you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Upton. Mr. Pitts.
        Mr. Pitts. Thank the chairman. A question to everyone, have
    any of you or your companies prepared memorandums or summaries
    explaining where the problems are with healthcare.gov? Ms.
    Campbell? And would you submit those for the record if you
    have?
        Ms. Campbell. If we are allowed to do so. We have to get
    permission under our contract with CMS.
        Mr. Pitts. But you have prepared summaries or memorandum?
        Ms. Campbell. I wouldn't call it memorandums. I would say
    we probably have, you know, just in the normal course we have
    provided information about what is happening on our system.
        Mr. Pitts. We would appreciate it if you would submit that
    to the committee. Mr. Slavitt.
        Mr. Slavitt. Nothing holistic like you are describing to my
    knowledge.
        Mr. Pitts. Ms. Spellecy?
        Mr. Spellecy. We don't have any involvement with
    healthcare.gov, so we do not.
        Mr. Pitts. Mr. Lau?
        Mr. Lau. Likewise.
        Mr. Pitts. All right. Just CGI and QSSI. The Washington
    Post reported this week, ``When the Web site went live October
    1st, it locked up shortly after midnight, as about 2,000 users
    attempted to complete the first step.'' Is this true? Ms.
    Campbell?
        Ms. Campbell. That is true.
        Mr. Pitts. Two thousand users?
        Ms. Campbell. I don't have the exact number. I just know
    that the system did have--thank you for that follow-up--I don't
    have the exact number. What I can tell you is that the system
    became overwhelmed.
        Mr. Pitts. So only 2,000, not millions the administration
    has claimed. So if it crashed with only 2,000 users, is volume
    really the issue, as the administration claims? Surely, the Web
    site was designed to handle more than 2,000 users. Ms.
    Campbell?
        Ms. Campbell. I was not--CGI is not responsible for the, as
    I call it, the front door. So I don't think I am in a position
    to answer that.
        Mr. Pitts. Who is responsible for the front door?
        Ms. Campbell. QSSI had the EIDM piece on the front end.
        Mr. Pitts. Mr. Slavitt.
        Mr. Slavitt. So what I can tell you is that the EIDM tool
    is, in fact, capable now of handling all the demands that are
    being placed on it from the system. I would point out that the
    EIDM tool is one part of a registration process that includes,
    I think, five vendors and multiple pieces of technology. So I
    can only speak to the EIDM tool and their functioning.
        Mr. Pitts. Now, I have listened to your testimony this
    morning. It sounded like that you think everything is A-OK.
    It's not OK. We've heard a variety of reasons as to the
    difficulties for why the site does not work. They include the
    inability to browse, required so many users to log in that the
    Web site was overwhelmed, poor coding, poor hardware, volume.
    Ms. Campbell, why doesn't healthcare.gov work properly?
        Ms. Campbell. Sir, if there was a silver bullet to answer
    to that question I would give it to you. It is a combination of
    a number of things. It is not just a component of what CGI is
    responsible for. It is the end-to-end aspect that is
    challenged. There is components across the entire system,
    across the ecosystem that can have an impact on the performance
    of the system.
        Mr. Pitts. Mr. Slavitt?
        Mr. Slavitt. We absolutely take accountability for those
    first days when our tool was part of the issue in terms of
    being able to handle all of the unexpected volume. And we
    absolutely will take accountability for helping in any way we
    can to help this project go forward. Fortunately, today, the
    data services hub and EIDM tool are performing well.
        Mr. Pitts. Now, you were here on September 10th when we
    conducted the hearing in the Health Subcommittee. Iexpressed my
    skepticism at the time. Forty days later we have seen the
    exchange rollout, nothing short of disastrous. I would like to
    ask again, CGI and QSSI, why were we told everything was OK a
    few weeks before one of the biggest IT disasters in government
    history? Ms. Campbell?
        Ms. Campbell. Once again, sir, the portion of the system
    that CGI was responsible for is where we had visibility.
        Mr. Pitts. Were you not aware of the problems consumers
    would face before October 1st?
        Ms. Campbell. We were not part of the end-to-end visibility
    throughout the system to understand exactly what would happen.
        Mr. Pitts. Mr. Slavitt?
        Mr. Slavitt. As I remember correctly, at that hearing there
    was a lot of focus on whether or not the data services hub
    would be ready. I think we were informed to be prepared to
    answer to this committee and to your subcommittee around those
    questions. We mentioned on that date that we thought the data
    services hub would be ready. It indeed was ready. I don't think
    we had visibility into the work of other----
        Mr. Pitts. Did you express any concerns about readiness to
    CMS?
        Mr. Slavitt. We expressed all of the concerns and risks
    that we saw based on the testing that we did see and didn't see
    that was unrelated to our work. Our work, as a matter of fact,
    we felt was on track, and we expressed that to them as well.
        Mr. Pitts. Ms. Campbell, my time is up. Would you submit
    those memorandum communications to us within 24 hours, please?
        Ms. Campbell. Once again, under our contract with CMS, if
    we have permission to do so. They are not memorandums. I am not
    even--I would have to go back and see what we do have for you.
        Mr. Pitts. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Yield back.
        Mr. Upton. Mr. Green.
        Mr. Green. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Some of us have been on
    the committee a good while. I don't know if any of you had
    experience, because we also had problems in 2003 when we
    created the prescription drug program. And this committee did
    that, and with much fewer participants.
        And so what we are seeing now sounds like we have a
    success, we just don't have the computer to deal with it. I
    support the Affordable Care Act, because I know how dependable
    and affordable insurance coverage is to our families in our
    districts. And the stories I have heard from people who are
    excited to sign up for the coverage remind me of why this law
    is important. Thousands of people in our district have been
    denied coverage in the past because of preexisting conditions,
    or paid for expensive coverage they couldn't rely on.
        That's why we need the Affordable Care Act's new benefits
    and protections, and that's why it's so frustrating that
    healthcare.gov has not worked the way we were promised,
    especially after hearing such optimistic testimony from these
    organizations in September. Ms. Campbell, and I know you have
    been asked this before, but repetition helps us learn, were you
    too optimistic in your prediction before our committee on
    October 1st?
        Ms. Campbell. I don't believe so, sir.
        Mr. Green. Well, what happened then? Because obviously you
    were optimistic, but in the last, you know, 23 days it's been a
    problem.
        Ms. Campbell. You asked about September 10th.
        Mr. Green. Yes.
        Ms. Campbell. September 10th we were quite optimistic that
    our portion of the system would work effectively when the
    system went live.
        Mr. Green. Well, again, it may have been too optimistic.
    Mr. Slavitt, Mr. Lau, and Ms. Spellecy, were you too optimistic
    in your earlier testimony before the committee?
        Mr. Slavitt. Congressman, we believe we have been prudent
    and cautious all the way through this project. We did express
    confidence to the subcommittee on September 10th that the data
    services hub would be ready on October 1st, and it was.
        Mr. Spellecy. No, sir, our portion of the system has worked
    as we testified it would on September 10th.
        Mr. Lau. And the paper processing capability has been up
    and running since October 1st as well.
        Mr. Green. Well, obviously there is a problem, and it's not
    like an ostrich, we can bury our head in the sand. We have to
    deal with it. Are each of you all willing to work to make sure
    that we fix this problem? Because if you don't accept there is
    a problem, then it's hard to fix it.
        Ms. Campbell. So sir, we do accept that there are
    challenges. There is no question about there are problems. And
    we are working together to solve those problems.
        Mr. Green. Well, Mr. Chairman, hopefully we will follow up
    in another month or so so that we can see what's happening and
    so we can do our oversight like we are supposed to do. Mr.
    Slavitt, one problem that many people have identified is QSSI's
    registration and access management tool for the site, the
    gateway to setting up an account. Was this system overwhelmed
    by volume when healthcare.com went live?
        Mr. Slavitt. So let me explain what happened and where
    things stand today with the registration tool. First of all,
    the registration tool utilizes leading commercial software. It
    is widely deployed, and it works in other settings across CMS.
        Mr. Green. I only have about a minute and 48 seconds left.
    So can you tell me was the system overwhelmed?
        Mr. Slavitt. The registration system was overwhelmed with
    concurrent users.
        Mr. Green. OK. And have those problems been fixed?
        Mr. Slavitt. We have expanded the capacity greatly in the
    registration tool since then, yes.
        Mr. Green. OK. Are there any other problems with the data
    hub or the registration gateway managed by QSSI that you are
    working to fix?
        Mr. Slavitt. I think problems come up, discrete problems
    come up routinely. Our team has early warning systems. They
    address those problems. And there is none that I am aware of
    outstanding.
        Mr. Green. Ms. Campbell, CGI is responsible for
    healthcare.gov Web site. Now that the registration gateway has
    been fixed, we hope, are you encountering new problems?
        Ms. Campbell. We are. We are looking at those problems and
    making those corrections as they come up.
        Mr. Green. And can you give us a background on those
    problems? If you would, give it to us in writing. And I know
    there is some question that you said that you all have a
    privacy agreement with HHS. I think we can take care of that,
    if we have to, on making sure this committee gets the
    information. Do you expect to continue to make improvements and
    fix problems over the coming weeks?
        Ms. Campbell. That is our commitment, sir.
        Mr. Green. Well, as you know, we are all impatient. Some of
    us on our side who believe in the Affordable Care Act and
    didn't start from day one trying to repeal it, want it to work.
    And we want to make sure, and I hope we have a majority of
    support for if we need do things to fix it, that it will get
    done. But I look forward to continuing to see you. I don't know
    if we ought to put a parking space out in front, Mr. Chair. But
    until we get this fixed, we might need to do that. And I yield
    back my time.
        Mr. Upton. Mr. Walden.
        Mr. Walden. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to
    thank all the panelists for their testimony today. And, you
    know, I was in small business for 22 years in the radio
    business. We dealt with software upgrades and changes in
    systems and all that. And I am feeling a lot of those emotions
    come back today, because when we would put a new system in,
    there would be multiple vendors, and every one of them's system
    operated perfectly except when it all came together. And then
    they all pointed fingers at somebody else. And I am feeling a
    lot of that today.
        Only as a person who represents three-quarters of a million
    people, and $500 million on the line, it is why we are here, is
    to figure out what went wrong. And I would just like to know on
    this whole end-to-end thing, because it sounds like each of you
    has said that you designed your system and tested it to the
    specifications you were given by CMS. Is that accurate? Yes or
    no. Ms. Campbell?
        Ms. Campbell. That is correct.
        Mr. Walden. Mr. Slavitt?
        Mr. Slavitt. Yes.
        Mr. Walden. Ms. Spellecy?
        Mr. Spellecy. Yes.
        Mr. Lau. Our systems are not integrated.
        Mr. Walden. All right. So you get to sit there and not
    quite get as much opportunity here today. But I want to go then
    to the first two. If you designed it to CMS's specifications,
    and you tested it and felt it was all good to go, where did
    this break down? In most systems you operate in, do you do end-
    to-end tests prior to the rollout? And if so, when would you
    have preferred that end-to-end testing have been done by CMS?
    Ms. Campbell?
        Ms. Campbell. Let's see if I can get all of those questions
    answered. So----
        Mr. Walden. I'll make it simple. When should the end-of-end
    test been started?
        Ms. Campbell. There's never enough testing for sure.
        Mr. Walden. When did it occur?
        Ms. Campbell. It occurred the last 2 weeks in September.
        Mr. Walden. So you think that's an adequate timeframe for a
    system this mammoth with one-sixth of the Nation's economy and
    millions of people coming into it. Did that give your company
    adequate time to make sure everything was integrated and going
    to work?
        Ms. Campbell. It would have been better to have more time.
        Mr. Walden. And how much more time would you have preferred
    to have?
        Ms. Campbell. I don't have an exact date.
        Mr. Walden. Did you make any recommendations to CMS about
    the need for end-to-end testing to occur sooner than the last 2
    weeks before this whole thing went live?
        Ms. Campbell. I did not, but I could check----
        Mr. Walden. Did anyone in your company make a
    recommendation?
        Ms. Campbell. I'd have to go back and check.
        Mr. Walden. I'd like to know that.
        Mr. Slavitt?
        Mr. Slavitt. Yes, ideally integrated testing would have
    occurred well before that date.
        Mr. Walden. How far in advance of a major Web site coming
    on line?
        Mr. Slavitt. Well, with enough time to correct flaws before
    they began. I couldn't give you an exact date.
        Mr. Walden. Do you do any work for anybody else outside of
    CMS where end-to-end testing is required?
        Mr. Slavitt. Yes.
        Mr. Walden. And in those situations, are those commercial
    situations or government?
        Mr. Slavitt. Both.
        Mr. Walden. And in those situations, what's the standard
    protocol; what's the recommended industry standard for end-to-
    end tests before rolling up a major Web site like this?
        Mr. Slavitt. Months would be nice.
        Mr. Walden. Months would be nice.
        Ms. Campbell, is that accurate for your company as well?
        Ms. Campbell. That's correct.
        Mr. Walden. And you were given 2 weeks, and yet months
    would have been nice. Is that what--I mean, if you were to do a
    contract for a system like this, what would you--what would you
    ask for in terms of doing the end-to-end test? Do you have
    standard industry recommendations?
        Ms. Campbell. Sir, we weren't given 2 weeks. That was CMS
    who decided to conduct the test in that 2-week time period. It
    wasn't--it wasn't ourselves doing the end-to-end test.
        Mr. Walden. Well, I think that's correct, but----
        Ms. Campbell. OK.
        Mr. Walden [continuing]. As a vendor, and you want your
    company to come out of this looking good, not getting to spend
    your time with us, as much as I'm sure you're enjoying it, but
    what should have the industry standard called for here? Have
    you ever undertaken bringing up a Web site, being part of
    something this big affecting this many people's lives?
        Ms. Campbell. I would say----
        Mr. Walden. What you know, have you ever done one this big?
        Ms. Campbell. Of this complexity.
        Mr. Walden. Correct.
        Ms. Campbell. I testified that this is by far, I think, the
    most complex in our country for a very--in a very long time.
        Mr. Walden. And I think you're right, and that's what I'm
    trying to get at. Where should the end-to-end test have been
    done? If you could have had--if your company could have made
    that decision, what would you have made a recommendation for
    the complete integrated end-to-end testing to begin; when
    should that have started?
        Ms. Campbell. It should have weeks--it would have had--we
    would have loved to have had months to be able to do this.
        Mr. Walden. Months. And that's the same--see, I was hearing
    from people of the outside as this all was coming together. I
    chair the subcommittee on Communications and Technology. As I
    would reach out and just ask, how do you think this is going to
    work, this is exactly how outside people predicted it would
    turn out, and here we are today.
        This isn't a partisan issue about health care or not.
    People expect this thing to work. I mean, I went through this
    in Oregon with our DMV. Department of Motor Vehicles spent I
    think it was 50 or $60 million back in the late 1980s and
    finally scrapped the whole system because it was a failure. We
    said stop.
        I don't want this to be a failure, but I don't want--I want
    you-all to get it fixed, but I'm very disturbed that CMS did
    not give you the adequate time that would be an industry
    standard to test this before every American said, OK, they tell
    me it's ready, I'm ready to go, because you-all came here and
    told us and, through us, the American people it was good to go,
    and it wasn't.
        Mr. Upton. Ms. DeGette.
        Ms. DeGette. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Ms. Campbell, you testified before the House subcommittee
    on September 10th, correct?
        Ms. Campbell. That's correct.
        Ms. DeGette. And at that committee, at that hearing you
    testified that CGI Federal was confident that it would deliver
    the functionality that CMS directed qualified individuals to
    begin enrolling in coverage, correct?
        Ms. Campbell. That's correct.
        Ms. DeGette. And in your written testimony of today, you
    also testified that CGM and others developed the design, and it
    passed the eight required technical reviews before going live
    on October 1st, correct?
        Ms. Campbell. That is correct.
        Ms. DeGette. And either at that hearing on September 10th
    or until just now, you have never testified that there was
    insufficient integrated testing to know whether the exchange
    was going to work, correct?
        Ms. Campbell. There were----
        Ms. DeGette. I never saw any of your testimony that you
    ever said in those hearings that more testing was needed, and I
    was there.
        Ms. Campbell. So, is your question whether I testified if
    testing was needed?
        Ms. DeGette. That's correct. Did you ever tell this
    committee that more testing was needed to make sure it would
    work?
        Ms. Campbell. I don't believe I--someone asked me that
    question.
        Ms. DeGette. Thank you.
        Now, Mr. Slavitt--I'm sorry, I have very little time.
        Mr. Slavitt, you were our only witness who was not here on
    September 10th, but Mr. Finkel from your organization was, and
    on September 10th, Mr. Finkel testified, quote, ``Our delivery
    milestones for data service hub completion are being met on
    time. We expect CMS data service hub will be ready as planned
    on October 1st,'' correct?
        Mr. Slavitt. I believe that's correct.
        Ms. DeGette. And in your written testimony today, you
    echoed that QSSI completed code for data services hub in June,
    that you did the testing, there was an independent security
    risk assessment completed on August 30; is that correct?
        Mr. Slavitt. Correct.
        Ms. DeGette. And today in your testimony you said that you
    shared the problems that you identified with CMS. Were those
    problems shared after the September 10th hearing then?
        Mr. Slavitt. Yes.
        Ms. DeGette. OK. And I would request that you would
    supplement your testimony today by telling us the problems that
    you identified to CMS. Will you please do that for us within 20
    days?
        Mr. Slavitt. Be happy to get that to you.
        Ms. DeGette. Thank you very much.
        Now, did your organization do testing with a number of 200
    people, and that testing failed? That's what we've been seeing
    in the press accounts.
        Mr. Slavitt. I'm not familiar with all of the accounts from
    the press. What I think you're referring to is the testing that
    occurred in the final days leading up to the October 1st
    launch.
        Ms. DeGette. And was that done with only 200 people?
        Mr. Slavitt. I know that that was a test--my understanding
    is that that was a test that failed once the systems began to
    be finally put together for the first time.
        Ms. DeGette. OK. But were there tests done with more people
    coming into it as well?
        Mr. Slavitt. Yes.
        Ms. DeGette. OK. Now, there's one more thing I want to talk
    about in the time I have, and that's this issue of privacy,
    because in my opening statement I said that I was really
    touched by the people on the other side of the aisle trying to
    work with us, but when I heard my friend and colleague Mr.
    Barton's statements, and I saw his slide, which fortunately I
    got a copy of since I couldn't see it, I realized that, in
    fact, a lot of people don't want the Affordable Care Act to
    work, and they are raising all of these specters. And this
    privacy issue is a specter, because Mr. Barton's questions--
    sorry he's not still here, because his questions came from an
    article in the Weekly Standard where there apparently is a line
    of code which says--and it's not visible to the user. It's
    somehow in there. It says, you have no reasonable expectation
    of privacy regarding any communication or data transiting or
    stored on this information system.
        And so, is this sort of some standard boilerplate, but Mr.
    Barton is assuming this violates HIPAA, but it would only
    violate HIPAA if people were putting their personal medical
    information into the application. And so I want to ask a couple
    of questions about that.
        As I understand it, you don't need any medical information
    to enroll people other than the question, do you smoke; is that
    correct, Ms. Campbell?
        Ms. Campbell. That is correct.
        Ms. DeGette. Is that correct, Mr. Slavitt?
        Mr. Slavitt. It's my understanding.
        Ms. DeGette. And is that correct, Ms. Spellecy?
        Ms. Spellecy. We wouldn't have visibility into that.
        Ms. DeGette. And what about you, Mr. Lau?
        Mr. Lau. That is correct.
        Ms. DeGette. So people aren't putting confidential medical
    information onto the Internet, and so, therefore, they wouldn't
    be violating HIPAA. And I am disappointed that my friend would
    go down this road, and I would ask unanimous consent to put
    that article in the record, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Upton. Without objection.
        [The information appears at the conclusion of the hearing.]
        Ms. DeGette. I have one last question. When can these
    exchanges be ready, and when can people get on them with
    reliability? Ms. Campbell?
        Ms. Campbell. As soon as possible. We're working as hard as
    we can.
        Ms. DeGette. Mr. Slavitt?
        Mr. Slavitt. Sure as our systems are currently ready. We
    are doing everything we can to maintain them, and we'll do
    everything we can to assist.
        Ms. DeGette. I just want to say, Mr. Chairman, my
    healthcare aide went onto the Virginia--to the national
    exchange, who lives in Virginia, last night. She was able to
    register. She was able to research plans. I hope this happens
    for all the rest of Americans.
        Mr. Waxman. Gentlelady yield?
        Ms. DeGette. I have no time left.
        Mr. Upton. The gentlelady----
        Mr. Waxman. The gentlelady yield. I just went on my iPad,
    and I was able to access the choices of plans to my
    constituents in California in the 5 or 10 minutes period.
        Mr. Upton. Gentlelady's time is expired.
        Mr. Terry.
        Mr. Terry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        And for Ms. Campbell on down, first two questions are more
    like yes-and-no questions.
        Did you or anyone from your company consult with or discuss
    today's testimony and your answers to potential questions with
    anyone from CMS to prepare for this hearing? Ms. Campbell.
        Ms. Campbell. We talked to CMS about our testimony, but not
    any details at all.
        Mr. Terry. And who did you discuss that with?
        Ms. Campbell. I don't recall. I didn't discuss it with
    anyone myself. I'll have to find out.
        Mr. Terry. Your people. So there's always intermediaries.
        Mr. Slavitt.
        Mr. Slavitt. No.
        Mr. Terry. Ms. Spellecy.
        Ms. Spellecy. No, we did not have specific conversations.
        Mr. Terry. Lau.
        Mr. Lau. No.
        Mr. Terry. OK. That's good.
        Did your company--again, from Ms. Campbell on to my right.
    Did your company or any of your subs use any people who work
    outside of the United States to assist in your respective parts
    or your contract with CMS, otherwise known as outsourcing?
        Ms. Campbell. No. We are very proud of the fact that we
    created jobs all in the United States.
        Mr. Terry. All of them?
        Ms. Campbell. All of them.
        Mr. Terry. OK.
        Mr. Slavitt. No.
        Ms. Spellecy. No.
        Mr. Lau. No, sir.
        Mr. Terry. Very good.
        Now, I'm concerned about the front door of this system, of
    this Web site. Now, is this system able to track how many
    people are accessing what we call the front door? Ms. Campbell?
        Ms. Campbell. We're not responsible for the front door.
        Mr. Terry. You know, it's very confusing, because in your
    testimony on the 10th, you did suggest--and somehow that piece
    of paper is missing right now--in your testimony that you
    provided that you said eligibility and enrollment will serve as
    the front doors for consumers to fill out the online health
    insurance application as one of the responsibilities. So I'm
    confused by that.
        Ms. Campbell. No, I understand. Sir, we're the face of--if
    you think about a house, we're the outside structure, but the
    front door that you go into----
        Mr. Terry. This is the siding that was put up, huh?
        Ms. Campbell. I don't know about that. My dad did
    construction all his life. He had a small business construction
    company, so----
        Mr. Terry. All right. Well----
        Ms. Campbell. I kind of think in those terms quite
    frequently.
        Mr. Terry. So then all of the front face accessing is Mr.
    Slavitt's world?
        Ms. Campbell. Ask the question again.
        Mr. Terry. Mr. Slavitt, are you responsible for the front
    door?
        Mr. Slavitt. Sir, I think the front door is a bit of a term
    of art. We supply a tool.
        Mr. Terry. All right. Let me interrupt you then because I
    have very little time. I'm not trying to be rude, but what I'm
    trying to get to is which of you was responsible for the
    application that allows CMS to know how many people are
    actually accessing this Web site? Is that you, Mr. Slavitt?
        Mr. Slavitt. So we have access to the data which shows how
    many people are coming through the EIDM registration tool.
        Mr. Terry. All right. And under that data that's then
    compiled of how many people, can you-all break it down to say
    how many people from Nebraska--since we don't have a State
    exchange like California does and have to go to the national
    one, can you determine how many people from Nebraska have tried
    to access?
        Mr. Slavitt. I don't know.
        Mr. Terry. Do you know how many people have tried to access
    on any particular day? Do you have that data, Mr. Slavitt?
        Mr. Slavitt. I don't have that as I sit here.
        Mr. Terry. Does your company have that?
        Mr. Slavitt. Yes, we do.
        Mr. Terry. And are you allowed to share that data with us?
        Mr. Slavitt. I will follow up right away after this.
        Mr. Terry. So, you are able to give us that data?
        Mr. Slavitt. Yes. We'll follow up and see if we can do
    that.
        Mr. Terry. Has CMS made any instructions to you regarding
    your ability to provide us the data of how many people have
    tried to access through the front door?
        Mr. Slavitt. No, not to me and not to my knowledge.
        Mr. Terry. All right. And, Ms. Campbell, do you have access
    to the information of how many people have tried to access the
    Web site?
        Ms. Campbell. We have some aspect of that data as well.
        Mr. Terry. Has CMS instructed you not to give that to--
    information to us?
        Ms. Campbell. We have under our CMS contract, we have to
    have permission from CMS first to provide that information.
        Mr. Terry. OK. So, has CMS allowed you to provide us that
    information yet?
        Ms. Campbell. No, that is----
        Mr. Terry. So if I ask you, you will deny or say that you
    can't answer that question even though we're a panel of Members
    of Congress----
        Ms. Campbell. I would say----
        Mr. Terry [continuing]. And you're under oath?
        Ms. Campbell [continuing]. That based on our contract that
    we have with CMS, we'd have to get permission.
        Mr. Terry. Mr. Slavitt, are you under the same contractual
    obligation with CMS?
        Mr. Slavitt. I actually don't know, but we'll check into
    it.
        Mr. Terry. Will you still provide us the information
    because you're under oath and we've asked you for that
    information?
        Mr. Slavitt. If we can, we certainly will.
        Mr. Terry. That was a good nonanswer.
        Mr. Upton. Gentleman's time is expired.
        I'll just remind colleagues that often the question is the
    order of seniority when the gavel falls on each side. So with
    that, I recognize Mr. Butterfield.
        Mr. Butterfield. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Thank all of you for your testimony today. It's been very
    enlightening. I will associate myself with the comments made by
    my colleagues throughout this hearing.
        Let me tell you I represent, like Mr. Hall said a few
    minutes ago, 700,000 people down in North Carolina. More than
    100,000 of those have no insurance whatsoever. They are eager
    to get enrolled, and we've got to get this thing right, and
    soon.
        Ms. Campbell, let me start with you. On Monday, Congressman
    Darrell Issa, the chairman of the House Oversight Committee,
    wrote a letter, which was publicly released, accusing the White
    House of injecting politics into decisions about the Web site.
    The reason I want to ask you about this is because Chairman
    Issa says that the source for his accusation is you and your
    company, CGI. According to Chairman Issa's press release, the
    White House made, quote, ``the political decision to mask the
    sticker shock of Obamacare to the American people.'' He is
    talking about the decision by HHS to disable to the anonymous
    shopper function on healthcare.gov Web site, but he suggests
    this decision was made instead by the White House for political
    reasons. Chairman Issa wrote this letter after receiving a
    briefing from CGI on last week.
        According to Mr. Issa's letter, quote, ``CGI officials told
    committee staff that CMS officials and employees constantly
    mention the White House when discussing matters with CGI.
    Although CGI officials were not able to identify who within the
    administration made the decision to disable the anonymous
    shopping feature, evidence is mounting''--and this is Mr. Issa
    speaking--``evidence is mounting that political considerations
    motivated the decision.''
        I'd like to ask you a few questions about this. First, did
    CGI provide a briefing to Mr. Issa's staff last week?
        Ms. Campbell. I was not there myself, but I believe that
    that meeting did occur.
        Mr. Butterfield. The meeting did take place, to the best of
    your knowledge.
        Ms. Campbell. I think it did, but I'd have to confirm. I'm
    not close enough to the situation.
        Mr. Butterfield. Do you know how many from your team
    participated in that meeting?
        Ms. Campbell. I do not.
        Mr. Butterfield. You did not participate?
        Ms. Campbell. I did not.
        Mr. Butterfield. Who do you answer to within your
    organization?
        Ms. Campbell. The president of CGI Federal, Donna Ryan.
        Mr. Butterfield. And do you know if Mr. Ryan participated
    in that discussion?
        Ms. Campbell. I don't believe so, but I don't know for
    sure.
        Mr. Butterfield. Let me ask you this just directly. Are Mr.
    Issa's allegations correct? Did the White House ever order your
    company, for political reasons, to mask the sticker shock of
    Obamacare by disabling this anonymous shopper function?
        Ms. Campbell. So let me answer two things. One, I don't
    believe that members of CGI actually made those statements
    direct in that manner. I think they may have been taken out of
    context, but I'd have to get back to you with confirmation of
    that. And to my knowledge, no, the White House has not given us
    direct instructions.
        Mr. Butterfield. I would like to get that information from
    you. It's a very serious allegation for the chairman of an
    oversight committee to make such a callous accusation.
        Based on the meeting with your company last week, Mr.
    Issa's letter wrote that, quote, ``evidence is mounting that
    political considerations motivated this decision.'' Do you have
    any evidence--and you just alluded to it--do you have any
    evidence that political considerations motivated this decision?
        Ms. Campbell. I'm not privy to anything of that sort.
        Mr. Butterfield. Do you have any knowledge of any White
    House role in specific decisions relating to the Web site?
        Ms. Campbell. Not to my knowledge.
        Mr. Butterfield. And are you aware of any political
    intervention by this White House relating to your work on
    healthcare.gov?
        Ms. Campbell. I am not.
        Mr. Butterfield. Thank you. You've been very kind.
        Mr. Chairman, we need to work together to make this program
    function efficiently and effectively, and I urge my colleagues
    to work with us, and let's work with these witnesses to get it
    right.
        Thank you. I yield back.
        Mr. Upton. Mr. Rogers.
        Mr. Rogers. Thank you. Thank you for being here today. I
    have a series of quick questions I'd like to get to.
        Ms. Campbell, how many change orders have you received by
    estimate and either formally or informally leading up to the
    launch in what function that they wanted you to perform?
        Ms. Campbell. We've received approximately eight change
    orders.
        Mr. Rogers. Eight change orders. When was the most recent?
        Ms. Campbell. I believe as recent as August of this year.
        Mr. Rogers. OK. That's good.
        Mr. Slavitt?
        Mr. Slavitt. I don't know the answer to that, but I think
    it was a low number, if any.
        Mr. Rogers. What----
        Mr. Slavitt. I don't know the answer.
        Mr. Rogers. OK. Are you both making changes now with code
    in order to fix any of the so-called glitches or nonperformance
    issues? Ms. Campbell, yes or no?
        Ms. Campbell. That would be yes.
        Mr. Rogers. Mr. Slavitt?
        Mr. Slavitt. Yes. We make modifications along the way,
    sure.
        Mr. Rogers. Great.
        And how many organizational boundaries between the piece of
    information traveling from the United States Government to the
    Web portal--how many boundaries, how many organizational
    boundaries, including the States and their access to
    information, does that piece of information cross?
        Ms. Campbell. I'd have to get back to you with that answer.
        Mr. Rogers. Give me an estimate, large number.
        Ms. Campbell. When you say ``organizational boundaries,''
    are you talking about like Homeland Security, IRS----
        Mr. Rogers. IRS, veterans, you have States that have access
    to other--cross other boundaries to get pieces of information,
    pretty significant number.
        Ms. Campbell. I'd have to get back.
        Mr. Rogers. Please get back for the record.
        Mr. Slavitt.
        Mr. Slavitt. All that I'm familiar with is the data that
    passes through the data services hub comes from a trusted data
    source such as a government entity, passes through the data
    services hub to those who request the query.
        Mr. Rogers. That concerns me a little bit that either one
    of you don't know the answer to that.
        When you did a security verification, and by an independent
    contractor, I assume, on August 30th, Ms. Campbell, did you do
    the same?
        Ms. Campbell. That's correct.
        Mr. Rogers. And was that an end-to-end system test that
    crossed every organizational boundary, or was that by the
    segment of which you controlled in the process, your segment of
    the contract? Ms. Campbell?
        Ms. Campbell. I would have to--I would have to go back and
    find out exactly, but I believe it was from wherever our system
    touched other parts of secure systems within the Federal
    Government.
        Mr. Rogers. Mr. Slavitt?
        So you don't know the answer oh that question.
        Mr. Slavitt?
        Mr. Slavitt. We had a complete test that was done to meet
    the standards of, I believe, NFDI. Our systems, as a matter of
    course, don't hold data; they just transport the data through
    it.
        Mr. Rogers. Sure. And you're familiar with the various
    levels of cyber weaknesses in any system, right, the boundary
    being the weakest point?
        Mr. Slavitt. Yes.
        Mr. Rogers. And so when you say you don't hold information,
    that is a very low standard in order to protect information. I
    don't have to be where it's held in order to obtain it. You're
    aware of that.
        Mr. Slavitt. Correct.
        Mr. Rogers. All right. So, what about--what are you doing
    for security on advanced persistent threats, and how is that
    checked, who is your independent contractor, did you red-team
    any of this in the last weeks before the launch of your system?
        Mr. Slavitt. I'm not familiar, but I'll--although I can
    certainly check about whether there were any security concerns.
    None were brought to my attention or made available. I believe
    it was MITRE Corporation who provided the independent security
    risk assessment.
        Mr. Rogers. And who certifies that your system on a daily
    basis is secure from external threat, cyber threat?
        Mr. Slavitt. Let me get back to you. I don't know the
    exact----
        Mr. Rogers. Is that CMS, or is it a private contractor?
    Would--somebody certifies that you're doing this. This is----
        Mr. Slavitt. Yes. Let me get back to you. I'm not----
        Mr. Rogers. Are you familiar that there is an ongoing
    security check into your particular system?
        Mr. Slavitt. I believe there is.
        Mr. Rogers. But you don't know?
        Mr. Slavitt. I want to get back to you on the details.
        Mr. Rogers. But you don't know the answer sitting here
    today.
        Mr. Slavitt. I don't know----
        Mr. Terry. Ms. Campbell, do you know the answer to that
    question?
        Ms. Campbell. Similar answer. MITRE was the independent
    security testing contractor.
        Mr. Rogers. And how about an ongoing basis? Who certifies
    that it is as secure as a system like this?
        Ms. Campbell. CMS has a SSO.
        Mr. Rogers. So, it's CMS secures their own system, or at
    least certifies that their own system is secure; is that
    correct?
        Ms. Campbell. With the support of MITRE is my
    understanding.
        Mr. Rogers. I understand that, but that's to your
    understanding.
        Ms. Campbell. That is correct.
        Mr. Rogers. So, the information flows from these systems,
    it goes to a data hub. You have designed the systems to
    transport information; is that correct?
        Mr. Slavitt. Right. Yes.
        Mr. Rogers. That's what your design is. Ms. Campbell, your
    infrastructure is designed to take a piece of information from
    the hub and get it to an end user, which would be whatever
    navigator is in front of that screen; is that correct, that you
    built the infrastructure for that to happen?
        Ms. Campbell. That's correct. A portion of it, yes, that's
    correct.
        Mr. Rogers. And, Mr. Slavitt, you wrote the code for that
    to happen.
        Mr. Slavitt. For the data hub, yes.
        Mr. Rogers. OK. So, in less than 2 weeks, you're telling me
    that you are constantly changing code, you're introducing new
    code, you can't quite tell me how that's secure. In any system
    that I have ever seen, 2 months for a functionality test is not
    appropriate, let alone a security check on this information.
        I am more nervous today than I was when I got here. I am
    shocked, shocked that on August 30th you get an independent
    check that says the system is fine, and you have introduced new
    code to that system probably daily, probably in the terms of
    hundreds of thousands of lines, at least tens of thousands of
    lines of new code, which creates new vulnerabilities in the
    system, and you don't even know the answer if these things are
    end-to-end security tested, number one; and number two, you're
    not even sure if it's in your piece is end-to-end ongoing
    security tested.
        I have to tell you, Mr. Chairman, this is a significant
    event, and you don't have to like Obamacare; you can hate it,
    you can love it, you can't wait to get in it. You cannot expose
    this much information with this low threshold of security in a
    day when there is 1.5 million people ripped off every day in
    cybersecurity. Were the folks who are systems administrators
    and people who are sitting in front of those portals, are they
    trained in spear phishing, one of the most basic levels of
    security protection; do you know, Ms. Campbell?
        Ms. Campbell. Sir, I have to push back a little in terms
    of, you know, to give the impression that CGI is putting willy-
    nilly code on a daily basis is incorrect.
        Mr. Rogers. Ma'am, you know better than that.
        Ms. Campbell. We have a bill process.
        Mr. Rogers. I am not suggesting that. You don't have to
    have willy-nilly----
        Ms. Campbell. We have a bill process. We have a systematic
    process----
        Mr. Rogers. Ma'am, I am reclaiming my time. This makes me
    more nervous. You don't have to have willy-nilly code. You can
    have the best code in the world. Every cybersecurity expert
    understands that when you introduce new code, it has other
    implications on a broader system even beyond your borders.
    That's what we're worried. We're not worried that you're
    putting bad code in. We're worried that you may be
    accidentally, as we know, with the functionality of your system
    doesn't work, it would be only logical to conclude if the
    functionality of the system doesn't work when it all came
    together, you cannot compose security.
        Mr. Upton. Gentleman's time is expired.
        Mr. Rogers. I need the answers to all of those questions by
    9 a.m. Tomorrow.
        Mr. Upton. Gentlelady from Illinois Ms. Schakowsky.
        Ms. Schakowsky. Ms. Campbell, I want to clarify one key
    point. Did CGI system crash in a test with only a few hundred
    people on the days before October 1st?
        Ms. Campbell. So, there was an end-to-end test that
    occurred, and the system did crash with about that number. I
    don't have the exact number, but it was part of the end-to-end
    test.
        Ms. Schakowsky. Thank you.
        I wanted to emphasize that the Web site has to be fixed,
    but it is not, as the Republicans contend, a fatal flaw, a
    contention that ignores millions of people who have already
    benefited, and the tens of millions of people that will benefit
    from the new coverage. In the first 3 weeks, there have been
    over 19 million unique visits to healthcare.gov and almost a
    half a million applications submitted nationwide, and some
    people are getting through.
        Susan, a constituent of mine wrote, ``Thank you, I was able
    to successfully access the Web site yesterday. I am very
    pleased that the cost of my coverage will be dropping
    approximately $5,000 a year when compared to my current
    individual coverage, ironically the same provider, Blue Cross
    Blue Shield.'' Or David, who said, ``Seven years ago I was
    diagnosed with melanoma. Last year I spent $11,000 on health
    care. ACA will save me $4,000 per year. I need this program. I
    know this because if I had no health insurance, I would be
    dead.''
        Every day since the passage of Obamacare, the Republicans
    have undertaken obstructionist efforts, including shutting down
    the government, that amount to congressional malpractice. And I
    want to flash back to when the Bush administration was
    implementing Medicare Part D, a law which many Democrats
    opposed because of the donut hole, which, of course, Obamacare
    will close.
        Secretary Leavitt--Secretary Leavitt said at the time--
    well, first of all, it launched November 8th, 2005, for
    enrollment. January 1st the program enrolled--began actually
    signing people up. February 22nd, Secretary Lovett said, quote,
    ``We are now at the 53rd day since the implementation of
    Medicare prescription drug coverage. After reviewing the
    numbers and experiences to date, I can report that we are
    seeing solid progress. We continue to work aggressively to
    solve the problems that inevitably occur in transitions this
    size.''
        That was Medicare Part D. And so, despite the glitches in
    Medicare Part D, Democrats worked with Republicans to ensure
    that the law was a success and that all Medicare beneficiaries
    have the information necessary to take advantage of Medicare
    Part D. In fact, Chairman--in fact, I joined with Chairman Fred
    Upton to request additional funding for community-based
    organizations to help seniors actually enroll in Medicare Part
    D, and I have that letter right here.
        So, unfortunately, the Republicans have actually taken
    steps to ensure that consumers do not know of the benefits and
    protections provided by Obamacare. In June, Senate majority
    leader Mitch McConnell, Senate Minority whip John Cornyn sent
    letters to major sports leagues warning them not to help
    consumers be educated about the benefits of Obamacare.
        And after Medicare Part D, Democrats like me hosted events
    in order to boost awareness and facilitate enrollment. This has
    not happened with Obamacare. Several Republicans Members have
    even stated they will not help constituents who call and ask
    for more information about the benefits of Obamacare and how to
    enroll, and those Republican efforts will only harm American
    families and small businesses and cut short the relief
    Americans need because insurance companies are no longer in
    control of their health care, and they are guaranteed access to
    affordable coverage that will be there for them when they need
    it.
        I agree that the Web site must be fixed, but the
    Republicans should stop their obstructionism, commit to working
    with Democrats as we did with you on Medicare Part D to fix any
    provisions that need to be fixed. Rather than to continue your
    efforts to nix the law, let's work together to fix it and not
    nix it, and I thank you and yield back.
        Mr. Upton. Gentleman from Pennsylvania Dr. Murphy.
        Mr. Murphy. Thank you.
        Ms. Campbell, when healthcare.gov went live on October 1st,
    it was not possible to browse this site in order to see the
    prices. You had to register. Who made that decision?
        Ms. Campbell. CMS made that decision.
        Mr. Murphy. Who within CMS?
        Ms. Campbell. I don't have the exact name of the person. I
    would say Henry Chao from CMS.
        Mr. Murphy. And are you aware of any White House
    involvement in that decision process?
        Ms. Campbell. I am not.
        Mr. Murphy. OK. So, what challenges arise when you switch a
    Web site where individuals can browse to one--just browse
    versus one where you're first asked to register? Does this
    require a substantial amount of work?
        Ms. Campbell. Well, it definitely puts a different--an
    additional burden on the system.
        Mr. Murphy. Do you have to write a new code to make that
    happen?
        Ms. Campbell. Well, for us to turn it off, it was just
    putting a flag in our system to not allow for anonymous
    shopping.
        Mr. Murphy. And how much more time does this then take then
    to test a system like that once you've made those kind of
    decisions?
        Ms. Campbell. It became part of the normal testing process.
        Mr. Murphy. But you never tested the whole system, right?
        Ms. Campbell. CGI did not.
        Mr. Murphy. OK. Now, to Mr. Slavitt, when were you aware--
    when were you made aware of the decision that the Web site
    would not allow browsing and would require registration first?
        Mr. Slavitt. We weren't made aware of this until the final
    days prior to the launch.
        Mr. Murphy. That final day being what date?
        Mr. Slavitt. I believe it was within 10 days.
        Mr. Murphy. Within 10 days.
        Do you know who made that decision?
        Mr. Slavitt. I don't know. We don't know who made the
    decision, we don't know when the decision was made, and we
    don't know why the decision was made.
        Mr. Murphy. And are you aware--but it was someone from CMS,
    HMS, the administration, the White House; do you have any idea?
        Mr. Slavitt. We don't know.
        Mr. Murphy. OK. Ms. Campbell, did you inform anyone at CMS
    or HHS of any concerns you had that this required more testing;
    more time was needed because the system wasn't going to be
    working?
        Ms. Campbell. More testing because of the anonymous
    shopping or----
        Mr. Murphy. Well, both. Let's start with the shopping
    issue, but the whole system. Did you inform anybody at CMS or
    HHS that you needed more time because the system wasn't
    working?
        Ms. Campbell. So, once again, the portion that CGI was
    responsible for went through its unit testing.
        Mr. Murphy. So you did through your testing, but you didn't
    look at the whole thing.
        Ms. Campbell. But we are not responsible for end-to-end
    testing.
        Mr. Murphy. All right. Mr. Slavitt, did you inform CMS or
    HHS, anyone there, that they needed more time, you didn't have
    enough time?
        Mr. Slavitt. We informed CMS that more testing was
    necessary. We informed CMS of the pieces of this system that we
    had tested that had issues. So, yes, we did.
        Mr. Murphy. All right. Mr. Lau, how many applications did
    you actually receive to fill out the process for people?
        Mr. Lau. As of today, I would estimate about 9,000.
        Mr. Murphy. About 9,000.
        And how many have you successfully completed?
        Mr. Lau. About half of those were successfully keyed in.
        Mr. Murphy. And do you have to go online, or is there
    another process for that? Do you have to go to the Web site?
        Mr. Lau. We work through the consumer portal.
        Mr. Murphy. Are you expecting more applications?
        Mr. Lau. We are, yes. The volumes are increasing.
        Mr. Murphy. All right.
        Ms. Campbell, so you're saying you haven't gone through and
    tested the whole system. You did your part. Mr. Slavitt, you
    said the same thing; am I correct? You both just tested your
    parts. You didn't check the whole system; am I correct?
        Ms. Campbell. So CMS has an independent contractor, QSSI,
    that tests our system.
        Mr. Murphy. OK. And, Mr. Slavitt, did QSSI test the whole
    system?
        Mr. Slavitt. We tested the portions of the system for the
    code that we received.
        Mr. Murphy. Who, as independent contractor--who tested the
    system?
        Mr. Slavitt. QSSI was one of the independent contractors.
    We tested code from CGI.
        Mr. Murphy. And did you find any problems?
        Mr. Slavitt. So we found problems in the code.
        Mr. Murphy. And would it require more time to fix it?
        Mr. Slavitt. Which in and of itself isn't necessarily a
    problem so long as they're fixed. We also----
        Mr. Murphy. Did you inform anybody at CMS or HHS that there
    were problems and you needed more time?
        Mr. Slavitt. We informed both CMS and the other contractor.
        Mr. Murphy. Who did you tell?
        Mr. Slavitt. I don't know the names of anybody we told, but
    I can tell you we informed CMS, and we informed the contractor
    responsible for the code.
        Mr. Murphy. Ms. Campbell, how much money did CGI get to do
    this whole project from the Federal Government, total?
        Ms. Campbell. Our total TCV is about $290 million.
        Mr. Murphy. I see.
        And, Mr. Slavitt, how much did your company receive to do
    all this.
        Mr. Slavitt. So the data services hub has been funded to
    just under $85 million.
        Mr. Murphy. All right. Now, let me ask you, Ms. Campbell,
    have you personally tried to log on and test the system for
    yourself doing the application process itself?
        Ms. Campbell. I have, but I have insurance.
        Mr. Murphy. And how long did it take you to do it?
        Ms. Campbell. It took the normal time that it would take an
    individual.
        Mr. Murphy. You were able to successfully get in. What
    State was that in? For what State?
        Ms. Campbell. I'm a Virginian.
        Mr. Murphy. And does Virginia have its own Web site, or was
    that a government Web site?
        Ms. Campbell. It's part of the government Web site.
        Mr. Murphy. And, Mr. Slavitt, did you personally try and
    get onto the system?
        Mr. Slavitt. Yes, I did.
        Mr. Murphy. And for what State?
        Mr. Slavitt. I think I put in Texas.
        Mr. Murphy. Is that where you're from?
        Mr. Slavitt. I'm not, but I was just testing the system.
        Mr. Murphy. Did it work?
        Mr. Slavitt. Well, I logged on to create an account, was
    able to do so. I just never received a confirmation email.
        Mr. Murphy. So it didn't work.
        Mr. Slavitt. Didn't work.
        Mr. Murphy. Thank you. Yield back.
        Mr. Upton. Gentleman from Kentucky Mr. Yarmuth.
        Mr. Yarmuth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Ms. Campbell, and Mr. Slavitt particularly, would you say
    that if far more States had decided to do their own exchanges,
    then the national exchange would not have experienced as many
    problems?
        Ms. Campbell. I can speculate. I would say probably, but I
    don't know for sure.
        Mr. Yarmuth. Well, I wanted to talk about the Kentucky
    experience, and I want to thank your company for its
    involvement in our State, because the experience in Kentucky
    has been extraordinarily successful, and even though there were
    problems for a few hours on the first day, again because of
    excessive demand, at least unprojected demand, but those were
    quickly rectified, and I have these statistics now for the
    first 21 days in Kentucky.
        We had 640,000 Kentuckians estimated without insurance, so
    assuming that most of those were--we took the people who
    contacted the system were mostly from that population, we've
    had 280,000 unique visitors to KYNECT, K-Y-N-E-C-T; 247,000
    have actually conducted prescreenings to determine
    qualifications for subsidies and so forth; 47,000 applications
    for healthcare coverage had been initiated, and 33,700 are
    completed as of the 21st; 18,370 individuals are enrolled in
    the new affordable health care; and I think, almost equally
    important, 378 businesses have started applications for health
    insurance for their employees.
        So, in terms of the numbers of people who can take
    advantage of the Affordable Care Act in Kentucky, a huge number
    have already done so, actually have enrolled in affordable
    insurance for the first time, in many cases, in their lives.
        You know, Mr. Shimkus talked about one person he got a
    letter from who said that he was not happy with what the
    prospects were, and we've heard a lot of these anecdotal
    stories. And, in fact, Fox News brought some people on last
    week, and one of the small businesspersons said, oh, he had to
    cut the hours of his employees and so forth. And a reporter
    from Salon, Eric Stern, followed up on that, found out that
    this man had actually only four employees, so he was not at
    all--not even covered by the Affordable Care Act. So we have to
    be very careful about people who say that they've done things
    or they've suffered because of the Affordable Care Act when, in
    fact, they haven't.
        But I've got a couple of cases from my district that I
    think are very valid experiences and also testify to how
    important this law is and the benefit of it. Jeff Bauer wrote,
    ``I am 62 years old, and my wife will reach that age before the
    end of year. In January, I parted ways with my employer of 39
    years. We were lucky to have never needed government assistance
    of any kind. We are pretty much a typical middle-class family.
    We asked our doctors if they anticipated any problems with us
    acquiring health insurance. They told us our health was good,
    and they did not anticipate any problems. We were dismayed to
    find that we were both turned down for coverage based on
    existing medical conditions. The conditions were not chronic or
    serious. Our only alternative was to select COBRA coverage,
    coverage for 18 months, with monthly premiums over $1,000. When
    COBRA expires July 2014, we would have go the next 20 months
    with no health insurance. But on Kentucky's health exchange, I
    was able to purchase our insurance for $800 less than our COBRA
    coverage. Previous medical conditions were not a factor, the
    exchange was user friendly, and I was able to complete the
    application with no problems. I would like to thank lawmakers
    and the President for representing those of us who only have
    little voices and had the courage to make this coverage
    available through the Affordable Care Act.''
        Another woman, Debbie Basham, 17 years ago was diagnosed
    with late third-stage breast cancer. She was able to get into a
    special trial at Duke, and she overcame her disease, but was
    left with a $200,000 bill that was not paid by the insurance
    company. Now, because of the Affordable Care Act, she cannot
    only can get coverage, she has no lifetime limits, no annual
    limits, and these are the things that will protect her and her
    family.
        So, I just want to say that the experience is not all
    negative, and I'm confident that eventually the national
    exchange, I hope very quickly, becomes as effective as the
    Kentucky exchange.
        So, I thank you for your testimony. I yield back.
        Mr. Upton. Dr. Burgess.
        Mr. Burgess. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Slavitt, I just will say that my experience was similar
    to yours. I live in Texas, so I did try, just while we were
    sitting here spending some time together this morning, try to
    sign up on the exchange for Texas, and I ended up with a
    similar result as you did.
        I just have to say, here we are 3 weeks into the open
    enrollment period, and I can't think that anyone on this panel
    this morning would think that that is acceptable that this
    system would still work so poorly regardless of the State
    involved.
        Ms. Campbell, can you tell me at this point how many people
    have signed up through CGI?
        Ms. Campbell. I cannot. And I need to clarify an answer I
    gave regarding 200 failures on the end-to-end test. It was
    actually an understanding. It was an end-to-end test on the
    EIDM where there were 200 failures.
        Mr. Burgess. On that first morning, October 1st, we were up
    late doing a vote, so probably about 2 o'clock in the morning I
    attempted to sign in then and met with the same response. The
    system asked my favorite kind of pasta or something along those
    lines and then froze up. And then, like Mr. Slavitt, I've never
    gotten a confirmatory email on any of the many, many times that
    I sent that information through.
        What happens to that information? Ms. Campbell?
        Ms. Campbell. That's on the EIDM side, so I'd have to
    defer.
        Mr. Burgess. So, what happens with that information? Can I
    ever get it back?
        Mr. Slavitt. So, I can relate my own experience. Of course,
    when I found out that I didn't get an email back, I called the
    QSSI team to see what happened. Indeed, EIDM had a record of my
    transaction, received the transaction, and we know that EIDM
    received my submission. We also know that they sent that
    transaction over to the marketplace. And, as I mentioned, EIDM
    is only a tool used in the registration process; it's not the
    registration process. Beyond that, I don't have any visibility.
        Mr. Burgess. But again, I ask my question, can I get that
    information back?
        Mr. Slavitt. I believe that information would still reside
    in the registration tool.
        Mr. Burgess. Well, I mean, there's only so many passwords
    that I have the mental capacity to make up, and I'm running
    through all of them with continuing to try to sign this up, so
    if you could return some of them back to me, I would greatly
    appreciate that.
        So, Ms. Campbell, you referenced a number in a question of
    Dr. Murphy about the amount of money that CGI had received for
    this contract.
        Ms. Campbell. So, to clarify, that's the total contract
    value through the outyears. That's not the dollars that we have
    received to date. The dollars that we have received to date is
    in the range of about $112 million.
        Mr. Burgess. So, are all of these fix-its that are
    occurring now, are those--were those included in that $12
    million bill, or are there ongoing invoices that are going to
    have to be reimbursed from CGI?
        Ms. Campbell. So, CMS implemented a cost-reimbursable-type
    contract, and as we continue to do the normal--our contract
    says that we are responsible for the development, and then it
    moves into operations and maintenance, which is continued bug
    fixes and things of that sort----
        Mr. Burgess. So, we're paying----
        Ms. Campbell [continuing]. The normal course. It's the
    normal course of a development in a production environment
    scenario.
        Mr. Burgess. And I'm not trying to be harsh here, but you
    are continuing to bill the taxpayers for the fact that your
    code did not work or your product did not work as advertised,
    regardless of whose fault it was. On October 1st, I think we'd
    all agree it wasn't working. The taxpayer is being billed for
    those invoices to fix things.
        Ms. Campbell. Sir, in October 1, the taxpayer couldn't get
    to our system.
        Mr. Burgess. Let me just add this as an observation. I
    mean, it seems like we've got several fingers, but no palm
    here. Was there anyone involved in sort of overseeing the
    entire--the entirety of this to make sure it worked from A to
    Z? Ms. Campbell?
        Ms. Campbell. That would be CMS as the systems integrator.
        Mr. Burgess. And who at CMS? Mr. Chao again?
        Ms. Campbell. As one of the individuals, yes.
        Mr. Burgess. Who else at CMS? Was the Administrator for CMS
    involved?
        Ms. Campbell. I can't say who was in that decisionmaking
    process.
        Mr. Burgess. How about you, Mr. Slavitt? Who was the unseen
    hand trying to put all of this together?
        Mr. Slavitt. CMS did play that role. I'm not aware of who
    within CMS.
        Mr. Burgess. Well, there was a comment on a blog post this
    morning on one of the local papers that said, ``When do I start
    to really freak out about this?'' See, the average American
    watching this hearing this morning, can we give them any
    comfort about that? When should the average American begin to
    really become upset about what they've seen here in the past 3-
    \1/2\ weeks? Ms. Campbell, do you have an observation?
        Ms. Campbell. I do not, sir.
        Mr. Burgess. Mr. Slavitt?
        Mr. Slavitt. Our team worked intensely in those first few
    days after the launch.
        Mr. Burgess. Here's the problem: Nobody believes this thing
    is going to get fixed when we keep getting answers like this.
    We're asking you for help, we're asking you to be transparent,
    and we get non answers to our questions. So I would submit that
    the average American looking in on this hearing this morning is
    going to feel like there's really nobody in charge, maybe
    somebody at CMS, but who's going to take the responsibility for
    getting this thing fixed and making it right, because heavens
    knows they've paid enough money to have it work right.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
        Mr. Upton. Gentleman's time expired.
        Mr. Welch.
        Mr. Welch. Thank you very much, and thank you for the
    hearing. We all have a real interest in trying to get this
    thing to work, that's for sure. But I do want to say a couple
    of things about what this hearing is not about, because it puts
    it in a bit of a context.
        It's not about whether we should take away the right of our
    kids up to age 26 to be on health care, our own healthcare
    policy. That's working great. It's not about whether the
    preventive care that has been made available for free to
    seniors on Medicare should be rolled back. That's working
    pretty good. It's not whether the $4 billion in Medicaid--
    Medicare fraud that's been found out and saved for the program
    was a bad idea. There is strong bipartisan support on that.
    It's not about whether the opportunity Americans have to now
    get healthcare coverage, even if they have a preexisting
    condition, should be rolled back. People are pretty happy with
    that. It's not about whether the donut hole that was such a
    burden for seniors on Medicare should be rolled back. What
    we've done in this law, as everyone knows, is provide a
    coverage to folks through that donut hole, so that's pretty
    good. And it's not about whether the Medicaid expansion that is
    part of this bill should be rolled back. In Vermont, that will
    be like 40,000 people that are going to get access to health
    care, and that's going to affect some of the hardest-working
    people in this country. Farmers who work hard make very little,
    but were not eligible to get Medicaid because they didn't have
    young children.
        So, Mr. Chairman, all of those things we're not having to
    question. They're working great. What we're talking about is a
    computer program that's messed up at the moment, and I've got
    some--we all have some historical experience with that. When
    the prescription drug program for seniors in Medicare Part D
    was put into place, it was a huge computer program, and there
    were lots of glitches, and the question that this committee had
    at that time, March of 2006, was what to do about it. And we
    had some really good advice from some really good Members. One
    of them said--who is a supporter of Medicare Part D--``As I
    mentioned earlier, the new benefit in its implementation are
    hardly perfect, but rather than trying to scare and confuse
    seniors, I would hope that we could work together as we go
    through the implementation phase to find out what is going
    wrong with the program, and if we can make some changes to fix
    it, let's do it, and let's do it on a bipartisan basis.''
        I'd say that statesman had it right, and that statesman was
    Joe Barton of Texas. Thank you.
        And we had another Member: ``We can't undo the past, but
    certainly they can make the argument they were having a hearing
    a month late, but the reality is that for the prescription drug
    program, the benefit is 40 years late, and the seniors who
    signed up for Medicare in those first days back in 1965, when
    they were 65 years of age, are now 106 years of age waiting for
    that prescription drug benefit. So I hope it doesn't take us
    that long to get it right, and I don't believe it will.''
        And that was Congressman Burgess, who serves with us on
    this committee now.
        And then another, I think, quote that was really terrific:
    ``Anytime something is new, there's going to be some glitches.
    And it is of no value, as a matter of fact, it is of negative
    value and of questionable ethical value, I think, sometimes if
    people only spend their time criticizing the glitches that have
    been made in the program, as with any program that occurs,
    whether it is a public or private program, criticizing it,
    standing on the outside and frightening seniors, frightening
    seniors into thinking that because there was complexities and
    difficulties, therefore they should not sign up.'' And that was
    Congressman Tim Murphy.
        And you know what? That advice they gave then is pretty
    good advice for us to take now. I adopt their comments as our
    path forward.
        And I'll ask just each person on this panel, can the
    computer challenges that we're facing right now, none of us
    want, it's a real hassle for Americans--it starts to undercut
    confidence in a program, whether it's eBay, Amazon.com,
    flowers.com, you name it, if their program is not working.
    There's frustration for anybody who goes on it. I just want to
    go down the panel. Can this be fixed?
        Ms. Campbell. Sir, we are working every day to get it
    fixed. Yes.
        Mr. Slavitt. We believe it can.
        Mr. Welch. Thank you.
        Ms. Spellecy. We hope so, but we don't have visibility into
    that.
        Mr. Lau. We have no direct involvement with that system.
        Mr. Welch. OK. Thank you. I yield back. Get it done.
        Mr. Upton. Dr. Gingrey.
        Mr. Gingrey. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
        The gentleman from Connecticut said what this hearing was
    not about, and he listed a litany of things that in his opinion
    are positive, but let me tell you what this hearing is about.
    It is about whether young people over the age of 26 and not
    eligible for subsidies, who are forced come January the 1st, if
    they had no insurance, to sign up for the exchanges and pay at
    least double what they normally would pay. It is about that.
        Here we are 24 days after the exchanges have come online,
    and yet we receive conflicting reports from the administration
    on the number of people who have successfully received
    coverage.
        When we met more than 6 weeks ago with this panel, I warned
    that companies charged with developing and implementing the
    Federal exchanges had not had the time to successfully produce
    and test such a complex system. We're hearing that today.
    During that hearing, we heard that all of your systems were
    functioning properly and ready to go on October the 1st. After
    what has been an unsuccessful first 3 weeks-plus of
    implementation, we now have to better piece together the
    timeline of problems and figure out who knew what and when did
    they know it.
        Ms. Campbell, in your testimony, you say that your company
    was selected as the best value to create Federally Facilitated
    Marketplace, FFM, in 2011 due to the fact that requirements
    were not well established at the time of the award and that the
    requirements did evolve over the next 2 years. How was CGI,
    your company, made aware of these changing requirements by CMS?
        Ms. Campbell. So we would receive change orders, and then
    we would respond back with a proposal, and then that proposal
    would be accepted, and then we would continue moving forward.
        Mr. Gingrey. When was the last time that the Federally
    Facilitated Marketplace requirements were changed by the
    administration? When did they apply to October the 1st?
        Ms. Campbell. I believe our last modification occurred in
    August of this year.
        Mr. Gingrey. Was there ever a point that CGI expressed
    doubt as to whether the updated requirements would affect your
    ability for a successful launch?
        Ms. Campbell. We, each time we received changes, we shared
    with CMS the risk associated with any changes that we were
    asked to provide support.
        Mr. Gingrey. Can you tell me today this morning who
    specifically you gave that information to express that concern
    to?
        Ms. Campbell. I'd have to go back to my team specifically
    but----
        Mr. Gingrey. Could you do that for me before 9 o'clock in
    the morning?
        Ms. Campbell. If I'm allowed to provide that information
    based on our terms and conditions of our contract at CMS, yes.
        Mr. Gingrey. Well, this is a government that prides itself
    on transparency. I'm certainly sure that you would be allowed.
    You also stated that CGI Federal delivered the functionality
    required by CMS. Did you ever have concerns that CMS was not
    requiring enough in terms of design and functionality, and were
    there ever internal concerns at CGI that CMS did not have the
    technical expertise to handle such an ambitious project?
        Ms. Campbell. So in terms of--CMS has a number of technical
    resources and it was their responsibility to be the systems
    integrator here, and we provided support and guidance as we
    could.
        Mr. Gingrey. Ms. Campbell, when, over the last several
    weeks when the Republican majority in the House of
    Representatives was trying desperately to keep the Federal
    Government open and submitted several bills to the Democratic
    majority Senate, Mr. Harry Reid, one of those requests, after
    the initial request was rejected, was to simply say, look, we
    will fund the entirety of the Federal Government at sequester
    levels, but we think it's a good idea to delay the rollout of
    ObamaCare for a year. Now that was summarily rejected again by
    Mr. Reid. We then came back and said would you just meet with
    us? Would you just allow us to meet with a bipartisan,
    bicameral committee and talk about this?
        And it's very possible if he had agreed to do that, that
    this delay of a year could have been negotiated down to a delay
    of 6 months. Let me in my few seconds left ask each one of you,
    particularly you and Mr. Slavitt, do you think that that 6-
    month delay would have given you sufficient time to have a
    successful rollout and to avoid all this embarrassment and
    expense?
        Ms. Campbell. I don't think I can answer that with a yes-
    or-no scenario.
        Mr. Gingrey. Well, is there any scenario under which you
    could answer it?
        Ms. Campbell. It's a--the system went live, there were many
    entry points upon which there is the ability for a person to
    enroll. The online app is one----
        Mr. Gingrey. I'm a little over time. Mr. Slavitt quickly.
        Mr. Slavitt. I don't know what flexibility there was in the
    time but certainly more testing always helps projects like
    these succeed.
        Mr. Gingrey. Well, Ms. Sebelius, the Secretary, ended up
    being interviewed by Dr. Sanjay Gupta on CNN and in The Wall
    Street Journal said she needed 5 more years, it could have
    taken, and she only had 2.
        Mr. Upton. The gentleman's time is expired.
        Mr. Gingrey. I yield back. Thank you.
        Mr. Upton. The gentleman from New York, Mr. Tonko.
        Mr. Tonko. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Thank you witnesses.
        I'm pleased to hear some concern expressed on the other
    side of the aisle regarding access problems that people are
    having in interacting with the health care government,
    healthcare.gov Web site, and look forward to working with them
    in a bipartisan way to make that happen.
        I sense two great demands out there. One, a great demand
    for this product called the Affordable Care Act, second a great
    demand placed by the public into our laps to get this business
    of connecting access to the system done in a bipartisan,
    professional way.
        I would also like to echo the comments of many of my
    colleagues in distinguishing between the unfortunate rollout of
    the Web site and the underlying promise of the law itself that
    all individuals will finally have access to affordable health
    care, and many of the benefits of that package are now well
    known and very much appreciated, no longer deniable by the
    industry because of preexisting conditions, students being able
    to stay on their parents' plan until the age of 26, seniors not
    having to pay as much money out of pocket for prescription
    drugs and eventually closing that donut hole, and the list goes
    on and on.
        While there might be problems with the Web site, we have
    heard it here this morning and it's worth repeating: we have to
    fix it, not nix it. We have to fix it, not nix it. It's an
    important mantra to guide us forward.
        Mr. Chair, where people are able to overcome these initial
    bumps in the road, they are discovering a quality product that
    will save families hundreds of dollars a month on health care
    costs. You don't have to take my word for it. Fox News
    contributor Sally Kohn upon discovering that her family will be
    saving $408 per month in my home State of New York said,
    ideologues may not like ObamaCare, but my wallet and my
    family's health sure do.
        So while we are here to address the real problems of an
    underperforming Web site, we can't ignore the larger story that
    affordable health care has finally become a reality for
    millions of Americans and that it is something we should not
    delay.
        Ms. Campbell, that being said, most of the bugs in the
    system we have heard about here today have been with the
    federally run Web site healthcare.gov, is that correct?
        Ms. Campbell. That's correct.
        Mr. Tonko. And how many States are currently participating
    in the Federally Facilitated Marketplace through the
    healthcare.gov Web site?
        Ms. Campbell. Thirty-six.
        Mr. Tonko. Now it was my understanding that the Affordable
    Care Act envisioned that the States would be taking the lead on
    designing and running these exchanges.
        Do you have a sense of why 36 States chose to let the
    Federal Government take the lead instead?
        Ms. Campbell. I have no further information to support
    that.
        Mr. Griffith. They don't like it.
        Mr. Tonko. I think it's clear to state this was how it was
    envisioned to work and would have been beneficial. From what I
    can tell, many States that refused to create a State-based
    exchange did so largely for ideological reasons.
        Now did CGI Federal participate in building the exchange
    Web sites in any of the States running their own exchanges?
        Ms. Campbell. Yes, we have.
        Mr. Tonko. And my sense is that the States that have taken
    ownership of the Affordable Care Act and designed and run their
    own exchanges are outperforming the Federal exchange, would you
    agree with this assessment?
        Ms. Campbell. That is correct.
        Mr. Tonko. Thank you, Ms. Campbell. And I do agree that the
    picture that we have seen in the State-based exchanges is
    vastly improved over what we are seeing through healthcare.gov.
    My home State of New York, which also experienced Web site
    problems at the outset, has now signed up nearly 174,000 New
    Yorkers for quality, low cost health insurance. That means that
    more New Yorkers have completed an application to receive an
    eligibility determination than any other State in our Nation.
        This is clear-cut evidence that the temporary setbacks can
    be overcome, and success can be achieved when the law is
    implemented the way it was intended--without malice and
    obstruction.
        In closing, I would implore my Republican colleagues to
    reject the politics of division and join with us in finding
    constructive solutions to these technical problems so that the
    many millions of Americans demanding and deserving access to
    the private sector-driven health care options they now have
    before them is a reality.
        With that, Mr. Chair, I will yield back.
        Mr. Upton. Mr. Scalise.
        Mr. Scalise. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate you
    having this hearing. I want to thank the witnesses for coming
    to testify. There's been a lot said about why we're having this
    hearing. One of the reasons is that our constituents are
    calling us on a daily basis reporting some of these many
    problems that we're talking about here today. And it's not just
    the failure of a Web site. Obviously there's a lot of focus on
    the failure of the Web site, but it's a focus on a failure of
    the law in general, the fact that there were so many broken
    promises made by the President about what this law would do: if
    you like what you have you can keep it.
        Thousands and thousands of people are losing good coverage
    they have. In Florida, it's reported I think MyBlue, 300,000
    people are going to lose the health care they have that they
    like. All across the country we hear that.
        Costs are going to be lower. You're seeing so many States
    report that costs are dramatically higher. In Chicago, in
    President Obama's own backyard, it's reported that 21 of the 22
    plans on the exchange that you go to, these low cost exchanges,
    have deductibles of $8,000 or more per family. People don't
    consider that a low cost when people are losing good private
    sector health care that they have.
        You're hearing of course promises the President quoted,
    this really gets in the conversation we're having today. This
    is the President's quote ``just visit healthcare.gov and there
    you can compare insurance plans side by side the same way you'd
    shop for a plane ticket on Kayak or a TV on Amazon.''
        Now while you all were testifying, I went on Amazon and
    looked for a TV. Within 1 minute I had over 300,000 options of
    TVs that I could purchase, and there were low cost TVs too.
        I tried to go on healthcare.gov and register. I spent--this
    was earlier this week. I spent more than 2 hours, probably had
    an experience similar to Mr. Slavitt, was kicked out four
    times, had to reenter data multiple times, was given blank
    screens a number of times, ultimately never even got to a point
    where I could see health care plans where I could compare, as
    the President promised, side by side, just like you look for a
    TV on Amazon. That's not the experience you get when most
    people go on line and purchase products.
        And this isn't just any product. This is a product that the
    Federal Government said you have to buy by law or else you get
    fined. And the other side wants to mock us because we're asking
    for at least a delay of the fine while people can't even go to
    the Web site that doesn't work.
        I used to program computers for a living. I understand how
    you design systems, big systems, small systems. I understand
    how you design test plans. I actually wrote test plans for
    systems. And you would test the system, you would do all-
    nighters until the system worked, and you wouldn't deploy it
    until it worked. And clearly that didn't happen in this case.
    So I want to ask, first of all, you all said that you track
    error logs.
        If I can ask down the line, starting with Ms. Campbell, how
    many errors have you logged since you've been tracking the
    errors in the system, Ms. Campbell?
        Ms. Campbell. I don't have that information, but I'll get
    back----
        Mr. Scalise. Can you get me that to the committee? Mr.
    Slavitt.
        Mr. Slavitt. I don't have that with me.
        Mr. Scalise. Ms. Spellecy?
        Ms. Spellecy. I have to get back to you for the record.
        Mr. Scalise. Mr. Lau?
        Mr. Lau. We really don't have access to that system.
        Mr. Scalise. We need to get those numbers. Clearly there
    are many.
        Mr. Slavitt, you said in your testimony that there was a
    late decision requiring consumers to register for an account
    before they could browse.
        Early off, it was promised that people would be able to go
    to a Web site and just shop around, look for a site, if you
    like something you find, you go buy it, like anything else you
    buy online. You don't have to give hours and hours of personal
    data and Social Security numbers before you buy a product. A
    company would go out of business.
        You'd said that there was a late decision made to change
    the system so that you have to give all the personal
    information before you can even shop around. Who made that late
    decision?
        Mr. Slavitt. We don't know who made the decision and we
    don't know when.
        Mr. Scalise. Ms. Campbell, do you know who made that late
    decision? Was it CMS?
        Ms. Campbell. It was CMS who made that decision.
        Mr. Scalise. Do you know who at CMS made that decision?
        Ms. Campbell. We don't have full knowledge of exactly the
    full chain of----
        Mr. Scalise. When CMS made the decision, how late in the
    game did they make the decision to change a drastic system like
    this?
        Ms. Campbell. For CGI, they asked us to turn that flag or
    functionality off at 2 weeks before going live.
        Mr. Scalise. Two weeks before going live. So they made a
    dramatic change to the system just 2 weeks before going live.
    Nobody would have done that in the private sector to make that
    kind of change to a system.
        Let me ask you this, because all of you were paid lots of
    money to do this, it's been reported over $500 million of
    taxpayer money spent to build this Web site, more money by the
    way than it cost to build Facebook. Facebook gets 700 million
    users a day, 700 million people use that site every day and it
    works. The first 5 years they didn't spend $500 million.
        Did you deliver--and I'll go down the line. Did you deliver
    the product that you were contracted to build, Ms. Campbell?
        Ms. Campbell. We have.
        Mr. Scalise. Mr. Slavitt.
        Mr. Slavitt. For the----
        Mr. Scalise. Did you deliver the project--did you deliver--
    --
        Mr. Slavitt. Yes.
        Mr. Scalise [continuing]. The product that you were
    contracted?
        Mr. Slavitt. Yes.
        Mr. Scalise. Ms. Spellecy?
        Ms. Spellecy. Yes.
        Mr. Scalise. Mr. Lau?
        Mr. Lau. Yes.
        Mr. Scalise. There's a saying in computer programing,
    garbage in, garbage out. If you're given a bad product to
    build, then ultimately what you'll deliver is a bad product.
    The focus is not just going to be on the failed Web site.
    Clearly they are some serious questions that need to be
    answered. All the taxpayer money that was spent to build a site
    that people can't even go on and use and then ultimately if
    they're able to get through they're finding the prices are
    dramatically higher. This will not mask the fact that the law
    fails in general.
        You wonder why we're calling for a delay of the
    implementation of this law, the delay of the fine that people
    will have to pay if they can't even use the Web site, 50
    percent of you who said you went to the Web site said you had a
    failure rate. You built the site.
        Mr. Upton. The gentleman's time has expired.
        Mr. Scalise. I yield back the balance of my time.
        Mr. Upton. Mr. Sarbanes.
        Mr. Sarbanes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank the panel.
    This is an important hearing. There are two stories that have
    unfolded in the last 3 weeks. One of them clearly is the
    problems with this Web site that need to be fixed, and I'm
    going to ask some questions about that in a minute. But the
    other story is the incredible demand and interest that
    Americans have in accessing this new opportunity for affordable
    health care. We saw it in the demand that came in on the
    Federal exchange which outstripped all the projections that
    people had for it. We've seen it in the State level exchanges,
    the State-run exchanges where there's been a lot of success in
    terms of people come there, browsing, applying for coverage,
    enrolling in coverage, and that story continues.
        That's the reason that we have to fix this. In other words,
    if there was no interest out there, there was no demand, and
    you had a Web site that wasn't working very well, you could
    say, well, maybe we don't need to fix this thing. But people
    really want this opportunity. That's the bigger story. The
    bigger story is that people want to access affordable health
    care coverage, and they're coming to these sites. So we have to
    fix it. That's why you keep hearing this refrain on our side to
    fix it, don't nix it.
        Now, let me ask you this. I assume that you've been
    involved, all of you, in big projects of this kind. This may be
    particularly complex. I get that. But I'm sure you've had the
    experience where you went to, you pulled the switch on a go
    live situation and it didn't work out exactly as you expected.
        Ms. Campbell, when that happens, I imagine CGI doesn't just
    sort of bury its head in the sand and give up, but you get
    about the business of fixing the thing so it can function
    properly correct?
        Ms. Campbell. That's correct. It's a normal course of what
    happens when a system goes into production.
        Mr. Sarbanes. Absolutely. Mr. Slavitt, I assume that if you
    encounter difficulties when you go live with a product, you
    don't light your hair on fire and run around in small circles,
    you get about the business of fixing, right?
        Mr. Slavitt. Yes, that's correct.
        Mr. Sarbanes. In fact, you did that in this instance from
    what I understand, right?
        Mr. Slavitt. Yes, that's correct.
        Mr. Sarbanes. And got some of the issues that were
    presented fixed in fairly short order. So I mean, you're
    professionals, you do this for a living, you understand we've
    got some problems here that need to be addressed. You're
    getting about the business of fixing them, and you're doing
    that because this is a platform that Americans need in order to
    access health care coverage.
        Let me ask you another question.
        Do you have any reason to think that the problems with the
    Web site that we've been talking about today in any way are
    affecting the quality of the underlying product that's being
    sold, in other words the plan options that are out there and so
    forth? Is there any reason for us to conclude that because
    somebody's having problems accessing an enrollment or doing an
    application because of the Web site, that that's somehow a
    commentary on the underlying product that ultimately they're
    trying to access? Ms. Campbell.
        Ms. Campbell. No, with 4,400 plans for people across within
    the 36 States that can apply, I would say that the plans are
    there for people to be able to shop.
        Mr. Sarbanes. Mr. Slavitt?
        Mr. Slavitt. No I wouldn't conclude that.
        Mr. Sarbanes. Ms. Spellecy?
        Ms. Spellecy. No.
        Mr. Sarbanes. Mr. Lau?
        Mr. Lau. No.
        Mr. Sarbanes. And in fact, the reports we're getting about
    the underlying product, the plan that people are going to have
    access to, the options that are available to them, that they're
    good quality products, and that they're going to be available
    at very reasonable premiums which is exactly, again, what
    people are looking for here. And certainly there is no
    suggestion that problems with the Web site are, at some point,
    going to mean that an enrolled beneficiary is going to have an
    issue accessing their doctor or accessing the hospital or
    anything like that.
        So the product is good. The Web site needs to be fixed to
    make sure that we can get that product to people. That's what
    you're engaged in now, and that's why we have to fix it, not
    nix it when it comes to this health care Web site.
        With that, I yield back my time.
        Mr. Upton. Mr. Latta.
        Mr. Latta. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank you
    very much for our witnesses for being here today and I greatly
    appreciate your testimony. And last night, I read through all
    of your statements beforehand. And if I could, because there's
    been a lot of questioning, of course, about the, on the testing
    side.
        And Ms. Campbell, if I could turn to your testimony, on
    page 2, you said, in recent years that CGI Federal has
    delivered some of the most complex IT implementation for U.S.
    Government including FederalReporting.gov and medicare.gov.
        And we've heard from you all saying that you only had at
    the very end about 2 weeks to really make sure this thing was
    integrated. When you were working on, let's just say for
    example, medicare.gov, how much testing did you do on that? Did
    they give youa time frame? What can you tell me about that
    testing at that time?
        Ms. Campbell. I'm sorry, I can't give you exact time
    frames, but we had sufficient time to test the system before it
    went live.
        Mr. Latta. Can you tell me what sufficient time is?
        Ms. Campbell. We had a number of months before the system
    went live.
        Mr. Latta. If you could, by tomorrow morning at 9 o'clock,
    I'd like to get that information from you to find out exactly
    how much time you did specifically have to test that system.
        What about on FederalReporting.gov? How much time were you
    given to test that system?
        Ms. Campbell. I'd have to get back to you. That wasn't in
    my area of responsibility.
        Mr. Latta. We'd like to have that by 9 o'clock tomorrow
    morning so we can get that information.
        And I think I heard this earlier, is healthcare.gov the
    most complicated of the systems that you've created?
        Ms. Campbell. It is by far for our country the most, one of
    the most complicated, large scale systems that's out there
    today.
        Mr. Latta. So what you're telling me is that you had months
    versus a couple weeks to do that testing.
        And let me ask you this: Did they, when medicare.gov or
    FederalReporting.gov, are you able, especially on the Medicare
    side, because you say in your testimony which successfully
    helps more than 50 million U.S. Citizens compare health and
    drug plans each year, is it set up the same way that
    healthcare.gov is that you first have to register before you
    can browse? Or can you browse and then get what you need?
        Ms. Campbell. You can browse first.
        Mr. Latta. Why would those two systems be different then,
    that you would have--any reason that was given to you by CMS or
    HHS that they wanted it reversed, since the one system seemed
    to be working?
        Ms. Campbell. I do not. CMS, I guess, had to, speculation,
    number of priorities, and maybe that wasn't one of the
    priorities.
        Mr. Latta. OK. Mr. Slavitt, if I could ask you a couple of
    questions in your testimony. Again, I found all your testimony
    all very interesting. And it's been talked about a little bit
    before, but in your testimony you stated on page 4 that appears
    one of the reasons for the high concurrent volume at the
    registration was a late decision requiring consumers to
    register for an account before they could browse for the
    insurance products. Again, whose decision was that?
        Mr. Slavitt. We don't know.
        Mr. Latta. You don't know whose decision that was? How did
    you get the information you were supposed to do that?
        Mr. Slavitt. I'm sorry. Can you repeat that?
        Mr. Latta. How did you get the information that you were
    supposed to switch things around like that then?
        Mr. Slavitt. One of the testers in our company that was
    responsible for testing the CGI software code was notified that
    there was code they no longer needed to test.
        Mr. Latta. Well, if we could also by 9 o'clock tomorrow
    morning get the name of the individual at CMS who asked for
    that, we would appreciate that.
        Going on in your, following up a little bit on your
    testimony, on page 4, again, it goes back, it says, in our role
    as tester we were tasked with identifying errors in the code
    that was provided to us by others. We reported the results back
    to CMS, and the relevant contractor who was internally
    responsible for fixing the coding errors or making any
    necessary changes.
        Do you know who that was back at CMS that you were supposed
    to report back to?
        Mr. Slavitt. I don't.
        Mr. Latta. If we could get that by 9:00 o'clock tomorrow
    morning.
        Do you know who that relevant contractor was that you were
    also supposed to be getting that information to?
        Mr. Slavitt. CGI.
        Mr. Latta. I beg your pardon?
        Mr. Slavitt. CGI.
        Mr. Latta. All right. And when you submitted, when you
    submitted those, that information back to CGI, did you hear
    back from them or what was--what happened with that information
    you sent them?
        Mr. Slavitt. I don't know what happened in every case, but
    what typically happens is we submit the results back and then
    the other contractors responsible for making those changes.
        Mr. Latta. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I see my time
    has expired. Thank you. I yield back.
        Mr. Waxman. Parliamentary inquiry, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Upton. Yes. You're asking for a second round already?
        Mr. Waxman. Congressman Rush and I have sent around 40
    letters to you requesting a hearing on climate change and we
    haven't gotten any responses. We would like to have a response
    by 9 a.m. tomorrow morning. Suddenly people have made up the
    idea that 9 a.m. tomorrow morning is some kind of deadline.
    That's--you can say it, it doesn't mean it happens. Thank you.
    I'll withdraw my parliamentary inquiry.
        Mr. Upton. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from
    California, Mr. McNerney.
        Mr. McNerney. Mr. Chairman I'd like to ask if I can
    postpone my questioning for another witness.
        Mr. Upton. Sure. Mr. Lance.
        Mr. Lance. Thank you very much. And to the panel, the
    September 10th hearing in the subcommittee, the Health
    Subcommittee, where you testified, Ms. Campbell, and your
    company testified, Mr. Slavitt. If you had the opportunity now,
    would you, in any way, amend the testimony you gave at that
    time?
        Ms. Campbell. No. My testimony was fine. I would not change
    anything based on what I knew at that point in time.
        Mr. Lance. Did you know at that time that there was no end-
    to-end testing?
        Ms. Campbell. I knew that that was something that was
    forthcoming.
        Mr. Lance. So you knew at that time that there was no end-
    to-end testing as of that date?
        Ms. Campbell. It was not our area of responsibility for
    end-to-end testing.
        Mr. Lance. You believe you had a responsibility to tell the
    subcommittee that at that time, there was no end-to-end
    testing?
        Ms. Campbell. I don't believe that question came up, sir.
        Mr. Lance. I suspect that's the case. The question did not
    come up. This is not a game of cat and mouse. This is the
    people of the United States, one of the most important
    proposals of the Obama administration. I'm sure that question
    did not come up.
        In your other activities with other entities, you have
    testified that there was always end-to-end testing.
        Is that accurate, Ms. Campbell?
        Ms. Campbell. That end-to-end testing is a component of,
    before systems go live.
        Mr. Lance. And you do not believe that you had a
    responsibility to indicate that end-to-end testing had not yet
    occurred with 20 days to go?
        Ms. Campbell. It was our client's responsibility for end-
    to-end testing, sir.
        Mr. Lance. Mr. Slavitt, would you respond to me on that
    issue?
        Mr. Slavitt. We wouldn't amend our testimony. We testified
    accurately to the delivery of a data services hub.
        Mr. Lance. Do you believe that you had a responsibility
    affirmatively to indicate that no end-to-end testing had yet to
    occur?
        Mr. Slavitt. Sir, I believe on September 10th we were
    expecting to receive the code that would allow the end-to-end
    testing to occur.
        Mr. Lance. So you are of the opinion that there would be
    end-to-end testing between September 10th and September 30th?
        Mr. Slavitt. That was our expectation.
        Mr. Lance. In your experience with other clients, does end-
    to-end testing occur before 20 days to go?
        Mr. Slavitt. Each project is different. I can't comment,
    Congressman.
        Mr. Lance. On another large project in which you were
    involved, is it usual that end-to-end testing occurs long
    before the last 2-1/2 weeks?
        Mr. Slavitt. We would certainly have liked to see as much
    time as possible for end-to-end testing.
        Mr. Lance. Would you suggest that this be delayed for 3
    months or 6 months given the experience so far regarding the
    individual mandate?
        Mr. Slavitt. No, I wouldn't have the information to make
    that determination.
        Mr. Lance. So you don't know?
        Mr. Slavitt. I don't know.
        Mr. Lance. You don't have an opinion. Do you have an
    opinion, Ms. Campbell?
        Ms. Campbell. I can tell you that I have a team of people
    working 24 hours a day to make these corrections that are
    needed to continue moving forward.
        Mr. Lance. I'm sure you do. And I certainly respect that.
    On the risk involved in change orders, this impresses me as
    being serious.
        Mr. Slavitt, regarding that, did you perceive a significant
    chance that there would be a huge problem because of the change
    orders with which you were involved?
        Mr. Slavitt. We didn't receive significant change orders on
    the data services hub that I'm aware of.
        Mr. Lance. Ms. Campbell regarding the change orders, the
    risks associated with that, you received several change orders,
    I believe you testified six or eight of them.
        Did you perceive a significant risk in that regard?
        Ms. Campbell. We did not.
        Mr. Lance. You do not think there would be a significant
    risk?
        Ms. Campbell. No. Over time, these change orders occurred
    over a 2-year time period.
        Mr. Lance. Some have commented that much of the problem
    exists because CMS decided to do its own inhouse analysis
    equivalent to someone who had never hung a picture deciding
    that he would become his own general contractor instead of
    subcontracting the responsibility for integrating the software
    of the multiple contractors.
        Do you agree that CMS should have hired a contractor in
    that regard, Ms. Campbell?
        Ms. Campbell. I've seen it both ways where the government
    has taken that job and quite often, they would bring in a
    separate contractor to do that job.
        Mr. Lance. In many cases, a separate contractor would be
    brought in. Mr. Slavitt.
        Mr. Slavitt. I don't know.
        Mr. Lance. You don't know. In my opinion, I think in the
    history of working with complicated IT systems, it's difficult
    to see that there was a more incompetent systems integrator. Do
    you have an opinion on that, Ms. Campbell?
        Ms. Campbell. I have no opinion on that.
        Mr. Lance. Mr. Slavitt.
        Mr. Slavitt. I don't.
        Mr. Lance. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Upton. Mr. McNerney.
        Mr. McNerney. I'm sorry, Mr. Chairman, I'm not ready yet.
        Mr. Upton. OK. Mr. Guthrie.
        Mr. Guthrie. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for
    testifying today. A lot of people don't realize because they
    didn't get out in the public like I think they should have,
    before the government shut down on September 30th, almost every
    Republican I think all but one voted to fund the government to
    fund the health care bill to sequester level, and only asked to
    get rid of the individual mandate for a year, delay it for a
    year. Because as businesses and other people have been treated
    with waivers and special delays we thought the hardworking
    taxpayers deserved because we didn't think the product was
    going to be ready for them to purchase. And it turned out on
    October 1st, it wasn't.
        So we wouldn't even have the government shutdown if we had
    people agree to give hardworking taxpayers the same treatment
    they gave businesses because the IRS wasn't ready to enforce
    that.
        Having said that, people say there are other alternatives
    and so we have good people in the great Commonwealth of
    Kentucky working for Mr. Lau who will take paper applications
    so there is argument, well, they can buy if they do paper
    application. So how do, you said you take the applications and
    enter the data? Where do you enter the data?
        Mr. Lau. Into the portal.
        Mr. Guthrie. The same portal that is having trouble being
    accessed online?
        Mr. Lau. That's correct.
        Mr. Guthrie. So even if people get frustrated, because I
    was watching my good friend here most of the morning try to get
    online, I think you've been kicked out four times since we've
    been sitting here as of today. You're going to take that
    information into the same data, so maybe you're making it
    easier. Do you have a special portal to get in or do you have
    to deal with the same kind of problems that he's been dealing
    with?
        Mr. Lau. The difference for us is that we don't have to
    establish an account. So our landing page on the portal is
    behind that.
        Mr. Guthrie. But you have to have an account for the people
    that you are entering, right?
        Mr. Lau. Well, in the initial days, you had to sign up,
    that's what we had been talking about before, establishing an
    account before you can do an application. So, for us, we just
    bypass the account establishment and begin keying in the data
    for the application.
        Mr. Guthrie. And that's what I want to get to. I'm glad you
    said that. And so when the President and Secretary Sebelius
    advised Americans to submit paper applications if they're
    having problems with the Web site, they still have to go to the
    same portal.
        Now we've been talking about entrance into the portal, the
    front door I think we've talked about a few times. But also,
    Ms. Campbell, I know to quote The Washington Post, ``About a
    month before the exchange opened, a testing group of insurers
    urged agency officials not to launch.''
        So when you--according to the Washington Post, unquote. So
    you had a test about a month before the exchange opened because
    CGI provides that information, were you involved with the
    testing with insurers?
        Was CGI? Not you particularly, was CGI involved with the
    testing with insurers?
        Ms. Campbell. I understand. So we do test with a set of
    insurers to make sure that obviously before we go live that our
    system is working appropriately.
        Mr. Guthrie. Did they recommend that you weren't ready to
    go live?
        Ms. Campbell. They did not recommend that to CGI--to my
    knowledge, preface that, to my knowledge, the insurers did not
    recommend that directly to CGI.
        Mr. Guthrie. Do you know if they recommended it to HHS?
        Ms. Campbell. I do not know.
        Mr. Guthrie. You don't know if they did that or not?
        Ms. Campbell. I do not know.
        Mr. Guthrie. Did HHS share that information with you that
    they weren't ready to go live?
        Ms. Campbell. Not that I'm aware of.
        Mr. Guthrie. So you're not aware this test took place with
    insurers a month before?
        Ms. Campbell. I'm sorry?
        Mr. Guthrie. CGI is not aware that this test took place
    with insurers a month before?
        Ms. Campbell. I didn't say that. I said, you know, to my
    knowledge, I'm not aware that insurers provided feedback to CGI
    or to CMS or HHS on their----
        Mr. Guthrie. Did you all discover errors during that test
    with insurers, problems with the system?
        Ms. Campbell. You know, the purpose of test, the nature of
    test is there it's there to find----
        Mr. Guthrie. Find the problems and you're able to fix----
        Ms. Campbell [continuing]. The issues that you have so that
    you can have an opportunity to correct those issues.
        Mr. Guthrie. Because there is still reports in the weeks
    before the start--there's still reports in news that insurers
    are saying there's missing data, duplicate applications,
    enrollments, incorrect data on applications and missing data,
    that's still taking place, or at least it was reported last
    week in the news. Is that still taking place?
        Ms. Campbell. When we receive a, what we call a, they call
    it a trouble ticket, or a defect ticket, or an issue ticket,
    then we are in the process of making corrections and then when
    we do the next build, we make corrections to the system. So
    there could be, there could have been a point in time where
    there were duplicative insurance forms and things of that sort
    or duplicative information, and we would have made corrections.
    Now where we are in that process at this very moment, I don't
    have the answer.
        Mr. Guthrie. I guess my point is, we wouldn't have had the
    government shutdown, believe it or not, and I know that didn't
    get out in the news, if we would have done the individual
    mandate delay, we didn't say get rid of the exchanges, get rid
    of what you were doing, not go live the next morning, just not
    mandate people to buy a product they can't buy.
        So my point that I'm trying to make here is there are other
    issues; it's not just not being able to get on the Web site,
    it's making exchanges work. And it's hard to believe that if
    that report is true, HHS didn't tell you that they were having
    trouble between, or that there had been a delay. And you know,
    it's concerning that those tests are taking place and it's been
    reported in the media, but it doesn't seem to have gotten to
    CGI from HHS. So my time is expired I yield back.
        Mr. Upton. The gentleman's time is expired. I would note
    that we have at this for 3 \1/2\ hours. Would the panel, would
    any of you like a 5-minute break? I see some nods. So why don't
    we take a 5-minute break and when we resume, we'll come to you,
    Mr. McNerney.
        [Recess.]
        Mr. Upton. OK, Mr. McNerney, you're recognized for 5
    minutes.
        Mr. McNerney. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank the
    witnesses for a long, grueling hearing this morning.
        First of all, I want to say I really don't blame my
    Republican colleagues for trying to change the subject from the
    costly and reckless government shutdown and the irresponsible
    threats to default our Nation's credit by focusing on a
    temporary short-term failing of our healthcare.gov Web site.
    Good job.
        My first question regards software development. I was a
    software developer before coming to Congress. And the
    healthcare.gov is a very big project, it's got a lot of moving
    parts to it. Any large project, including software, needs an
    orchestrator to coordinate all moving parts and make sure that
    things are fitting together well. Who was that or what
    organization was that orchestrator for this project?
        Ms. Campbell, you seem to be in the best position to answer
    that question.
        Ms. Campbell. Yes. That would be CMS.
        Mr. McNerney. CMS.
        Ms. Campbell. Yes.
        Mr. McNerney. OK. Was there a specific person at CMS, or
    was it a team of people at CMS?
        Ms. Campbell. It was a team of individuals.
        Mr. McNerney. Well, did the orchestrator--and this is a
    question for all four of you--create adequate specifications
    for the software, including a language? Now, when you have a
    software project that has moving parts or different parts, you
    want input and output specifications, you want what the
    individual parts are supposed to do. Was there sufficient,
    adequate specifications for your team to do their job in the
    time that was allowed?
        Ms. Campbell. So we were receiving requirements through the
    April, May timeframe and then some requirements----
        Mr. McNerney. Requirements.
        Ms. Campbell. Yes.
        Mr. McNerney. Were they formal specifications that could be
    used?
        Ms. Campbell. They were use cases and things of that sort.
        Mr. McNerney. Mr. Slavitt, would you like to answer that?
        Mr. Slavitt. We believe we received appropriate
    specifications.
        Mr. McNerney. Ms. Spellecy?
        Ms. Spellecy. We received sufficient specifications to
    integrate our part of the solution.
        Mr. McNerney. Mr. Lau?
        Mr. Lau. We had no role in the system development.
        Mr. McNerney. So what you all--I hear unanimously is that
    there were adequate specifications, and yet the software wasn't
    finished in time.
        Did the specifications include testing requirements that
    you received? Ms. Campbell?
        Ms. Campbell. So we did testing on our code, but there was
    also independent testing that was done as well.
        Mr. McNerney. Were they specified? Were they test-specified
    prior to development of the software?
        Ms. Campbell. Not prior to developing the software, but
    there were test scripts that were developed during the process.
        Mr. McNerney. Well, then, maybe there wasn't sufficient
    time. I mean, from my point of view as a distant observer,
    either the specifications weren't adequate, they weren't
    delivered in time, or the software wasn't developed according
    to specification. Which one of those three is the problem?
        Ms. Campbell. I would say with a system this complicated
    and level of moving parts, it's probably a little bit of all
    aspects of all three. There are things in our code that
    obviously we would like to improve on for sure. There are
    specifications that would have been better served if they had
    been more detailed, and if given more time, I think we would
    have been able to across the board, once again, end-to-end
    testing on the part of CMS, integration on the part of CMS.
    But, you know, given the luxury of time, and I think we all
    recognize that one never gets--no matter how great the system
    is, no one ever gets enough time for testing, but----
        Mr. McNerney. Well, software is particularly difficult to
    estimate the time needed. When I was in developing software, if
    you told your manager you would take 2 weeks, he would double
    that and then go to the next bigger timeframe, 2 months. So he
    would have made it a 4-month timeframe if you gave him 2 weeks.
    So time is always of the essence in software, especially since
    it is so error prone.
        So I guess there were political hindrances regarding the
    amount of time that was allowed, and there were structural
    issues. And I do believe that this is going to be fixed, but
    it's been painful, and we need to make sure that the American
    people have access to a decent healthcare Web site before
    December 15th, and if that doesn't happen, it's going to be
    more difficult hearings like this.
        Thank you.
        Ms. Campbell. Thank you, sir.
        Mr. Upton. Mr. Olson.
        Mr. Olson. I thank the chair, and I want to sincerely
    welcome and thank the witnesses, Ms. Campbell, Mr. Slavitt, Ms.
    Spellecy, and Mr. Lau, for appearing before this committee this
    morning and now this afternoon.
        And my guess is you might be a little nervous, somewhat
    tired because this has gone on for almost 4 hours, you probably
    haven't gotten a lot of sleep these past couple of weeks, and
    you're probably a little angry because the Commander in Chief,
    the skipper of Obamacare, our President, doesn't understand
    that the skipper is responsible for everything that happens on
    his ship, the good and the bad.
        As we've seen here this morning, there's a major league
    blame game going on within the administration, and you all,
    unfortunately, are the targets of some of that blame.
        And I am damn angry that I and 700,000 Texans I represent
    have been misled, misled, and misled.
        In this room 1 month ago, the Health and Human Services
    Deputy Administrator for Consumer Information opened up his
    testimony by saying, and I quote, ``CMS has worked hard to
    build, refine and test the infrastructure that will allow
    Americans to enroll in coverage confidently, simply and
    securely,'' end quote. We now know that that was one big, fat
    lie, and I proved it this morning.
        When Chairman Upton gaveled this hearing about 9 o'clock, I
    logged onto healthcare.com to try to enroll my family in my
    healthcare plan. Like you, Mr. Slavitt, and my colleague
    Michael Burgess, I tried to get on Texas' plan, and when I got
    my email back, my confirmation, I got this after 41 minutes:
    Please log in again. You're logged out now. Return to your
    marketplace account here. That's happening all over the
    country.
        And this lie is way beyond an awful computer program. This
    lie affects the health and well-being of every American.
        And my question would be about the testing that was done to
    get to this point, and I want to follow up on some of the
    questions from one of my colleagues, and this is mostly for
    you, Ms. Campbell, and you, Mr. Slavitt.
        Being a computer science major from Rice University and a
    former naval aviator who could not afford to have my computer
    drop offline as I'm rolling my plane to drop a torpedo to stop
    a Russian submarine from launching a ballistic missile, a
    nuclear missile, at our country, I know that that system is
    pushed and pushed and pushed and pushed and tested to fail.
        My goal is did CGI and QSSI take these steps, push, push,
    push and test your part to failure?
        Ms. Campbell. First of all, sir, you must be in my
    household. My husband, too, is a naval aviator.
        Mr. Olson. Fly Navy.
        Ms. Campbell. But we worked tirelessly around the clock to
    make sure that we were doing everything we could to make the
    product that we delivered on October 1. We're not excited, nor
    are we pleased with what we delivered on October 1, but, you
    know, in principle it worked. It is not working great, and
    we're working to improve it, but it is enrolling people.
        Mr. Olson. Mr. Slavitt, how about you, sir, did you push,
    push, push to make sure all the variables best you could do?
        Mr. Slavitt. We do believe the data services hub received
    adequate testing.
        Mr. Olson. Great.
        And so any idea what happened when your department is
    working pretty well, Ms. Campbell, and you, Mr. Slavitt, as
    well? Somehow CMS got it, and the product that came out fell
    apart. Any idea what happened there?
        Ms. Campbell. You'd have to ask CMS.
        Mr. Olson. And I plan on doing that.
        Mr. Slavitt, any idea?
        Mr. Slavitt. As I said a little bit earlier, the system
    didn't receive adequate end-to-end testing, and we took those
    results--those results were made available, and I think made
    aware of those results to CMS.
        Mr. Olson. So you all pushed the envelope, they just hit
    the on button, saw the light came on, and said this thing
    works. OK. A little facetious there.
        I want to close by asking a rhetorical question of all four
    of you all. If you were the President of the United States, and
    you woke up on September 30th of this past year knowing what
    you know, would you have rolled out the exchange on October
    1st? Ms. Campbell?
        Ms. Campbell. I can't begin to answer that question.
        Mr. Olson. Nope.
        Mr. Slavitt. I don't know what flexibility existed to
    change the dates.
        Mr. Olson. Not the date, but the program. Could you have
    stopped it? You know the problems. You guys know the problems.
    Would you have stopped it?
        Mr. Slavitt. I don't know.
        Ms. Spellecy. I can't answer that.
        Mr. Olson. Can't answer that one? It's rhetorical, guys.
        Mr. Lau. I'm not in a position really to answer that.
        Mr. Olson. Oh, come on, fellows. I guarantee if you ask the
    people in the audience, they would have all sorts of opinions
    on that.
        I yield back the balance of my time. Thank you.
        Mr. Upton. The gentleman's time is expired.
        Mr. Gardner.
        Mr. Gardner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to the
    witnesses as well for joining us today and talking about this
    very important issue.
        You know, I take this personally. This is a very serious
    issue for me, thousands of my constituents, millions of
    Americans. The President made a simple promise to all of our
    country. He said two things: If you like your healthcare plan,
    you'll get to keep your healthcare plan, period, and this will
    lower the cost of health care. But do you know what? In August,
    my wife and I we got a letter saying our health insurance plan
    had been canceled. We decided to not join the Federal Employee
    Health Benefits Plan. We got our own private insurance plan,
    because I wanted to be in the same boat as my constituents in
    Colorado.
        And yet despite the President's promise to me, to thousands
    of Coloradans, to millions of Americans, those insurance plans
    are being canceled, and they're being told they have to buy
    insurance through the Web site that doesn't work.
        The denial of this debacle is incredible. It's like trying
    to watch the Three Stooges in HD and expecting it to work. But
    that's exactly what we are seeing here.
        So to follow up on a couple of the questions--and we've
    seen the President on TV trying to apologize to the American
    people for this disaster, and he said the administration
    announced this week that the best and brightest are coming in
    to fix healthcare.gov, but they won't say who they are. So, Ms.
    Campbell, who are these best and brightest that are coming in
    to fix this Web site?
        Ms. Campbell. So first of all, CGI has some of the best and
    brightest, so I just want to make sure that that's on the
    record. We make sure that we hire----
        Mr. Gardner. Ms. Campbell, who are the best and brightest
    that have been invited by the White House to fix this problem?
        Ms. Campbell. I don't have individuals by name.
        Mr. Gardner. What companies are they? Who built the Web
    site? You built the Web site, correct? You built the Web site?
        Ms. Campbell. We built the application.
        Mr. Gardner. So who is coming in to fix the Web site now?
        Ms. Campbell. So advisers, not----
        Mr. Gardner. Who are the advisers?
        Ms. Campbell. I don't have names.
        Mr. Garrett. Where are they from? Who do they work for?
        Ms. Campbell. They have small businesses on their own.
        Mr. Gardner. So this decision was announced early in the
    week, and you don't know who the best and brightest are who are
    coming to fix this mess.
        Ms. Campbell. I don't have them by name, sir.
        Mr. Gardner. Well, who are they by company?
        Ms. Campbell. I will get back to you with names.
        Mr. Gordon. Could you get back to me by tomorrow?
        Ms. Campbell. I will do my best.
        Mr. Gardner. So the President of the United States has said
    that these are the best and the brightest, and you don't know
    what organization? Are they being paid?
        Ms. Campbell. Sir, give me an opportunity to get back to
    you with that information.
        Mr. Gardner. But you don't know whether they are being
    paid.
        Ms. Campbell. If they're there as a support person to CGI,
    they would be paid under our contract.
        Mr. Gardner. Well, if they're there as a support person for
    CGI, I assume you know who they are.
        Ms. Campbell. Sir, I don't have them by name. I just don't
    have----
        Mr. Gardner. QSSI, do you know who these best and brightest
    are that are coming in to fix this mess?
        Mr. Slavitt. No.
        Mr. Gardner. So are you still consulting with CMS on this?
        Mr. Slavitt. I'm just not familiar with this situation.
        Mr. Gardner. Ms. Campbell, with the President, you're still
    consulting, you're still in charge. Are you the systems
    integrator still, or is CMS?
        Ms. Campbell. Sir, we have never been the systems
    integrator, and we are not the systems integrator.
        Mr. Gardner. So who is in charge as systems integrator?
        Ms. Campbell. CMS is responsible for end-to-end.
        Mr. Gardner. OK. So they're responsible for end-to-end, and
    that brings me to another question. To Mr. Scalise you had said
    that CMS asked you to turn off browsing 2 weeks before October
    1st. Does that mean that you originally built a browsable Web
    site?
        Ms. Campbell. That is correct.
        Mr. Gardner. Why can't you just turn that on?
        Ms. Campbell. One, we've not been asked to turn it on. Now
    the system has gone live, it's not--well, we can turn on it
    on----
        Mr. Gardner. So the taxpayers paid for this----
        Ms. Campbell. It would have to be tested and make sure that
    now it's in a live environment----
        Mr. Gardner. Tested just like the other Web site wasn't
    tested?
        Ms. Campbell. I wouldn't say that it wasn't tested, sir.
        Mr. Gardner. No end-to-end testing.
        Ms. Campbell. I didn't say that there was no end-to-end
    testing. I said CGI didn't do end-to-end testing.
        Mr. Gardner. Inadequate end-to-end testing.
        So the taxpayers paid then for a browsable Web site; is
    that correct?
        Ms. Campbell. Yes.
        Mr. Gardner. Why can't you turn that on?
        Ms. Campbell. If given the instructions by CMS, we would be
    more than happy to turn it on.
        Mr. Gardner. Why is CMS--do you know what the cost of that
    was?
        Ms. Campbell. I can't tell you the exact cost of that
    particular component. It's part of the larger system.
        Mr. Gardner. Can you get back to us as soon as possible the
    cost of the browsable Web site that was built that is no longer
    in use or not being used and was asked to be turned off?
        Ms. Campbell. Sir, we were under contract to provide an
    application that happens to be one of the features of that
    application. We did not price it out as one particular
    component by itself.
        Mr. Gardner. Well, it's clear to me the reason why 2 weeks
    before October 1st happened, this browsable Web site was turned
    off to hide the cost, the true cost, that the American people
    are paying, because if it was a browsable Web site that we
    built, the taxpayers paid for, those real costs, the true
    costs, the upfront costs would be visible to the American
    people.
        CMS made a determination, a decision, that they would turn
    off 2 weeks before October 1st the browsable Web site to hide
    the real cost of Obamacare from the American people.
        With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back my time.
        Mr. Upton. The gentleman yields back.
        Mr. Kinzinger.
        Mr. Kinzinger. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and again, thank
    you all for being here. It's a long day, I know, but we
    appreciate your being present.
        I want to kind of narrow in on another issue that hasn't
    really been too much discussed, and that's the Web site that's
    sending insurers bad information: multiple enrollments,
    cancelations for the person, and forms containing gibberish
    that are showing up at the insurance side of it.
        This could continue to be a problem even if functionality
    and other areas of the Web site improve. In fact, it could
    become a larger problem because now so few applicants are
    actually getting to the insurers that they're able to be
    reviewed individually. Taking this to scale might cause
    significant problems once people en masse start signing up.
        I'll ask you, Ms. Campbell, most news reporting is focused
    on front-end problems with the Federal exchange. I would like
    to ask a few questions about some troubling reports that I'm
    hearing. We hear there could be even bigger issues at the end
    of the system, at the end processes of the system. Both the
    Washington Post and the Wall Street Journal have reported that
    insurers are receiving error-ridden 834s, and from what I
    understand, an 834 is essentially an electronic transmission
    form that lets insurers know who signed up for their product on
    healthcare.gov. So reports indicate that one insurer got an 834
    with three spouses listed on it.
        Have you identified the specific problem and how widespread
    is it, what's causing it.
        Ms. Campbell. So thank you for that question.
        We have uncovered a number of those scenarios, not
    significant, but a number of those scenarios, and we are in the
    process of making corrections. Most of them are isolated; they
    are not across the board for all insurers. So we are working in
    solving those as they come to our attention.
        Mr. Kinzinger. So you're saying they're not very
    widespread; it's an occasional thing basically?
        Ms. Campbell. It is more isolated than widespread.
        Mr. Kinzinger. And specifically what steps have you taken
    to address that?
        Ms. Campbell. So it's part of our normal defect build
    process. So when that issue comes into the--what they call it,
    the contact center, we get a trouble ticket. We look at--the
    CMS determines the prioritization of that trouble ticket, and
    then we work based on those priorities with CMS, and then we
    change--implement our code changes and then update the system
    through testing and so forth----
        Mr. Kinzinger. So are you taking steps to guarantee--here's
    a concern. Let's say somebody enrolls in December, thinks
    they're enrolled. Maybe the trouble ticket happened or the 834
    or something got messed up, and so on January 1st they wake up
    and find out they actually did not enroll when, in fact, they
    thought they did. Is that a concern you have that may be
    addressed in trying to rectify this problem?
        Ms. Campbell. We're tracking when someone enrolls that
    there is--that actually enrolls, that there is a direct
    correlation to making sure that there is an 834 attached to
    that particular transaction to try and mitigate those things
    from happening.
        Mr. Kinzinger. OK. Some industry analysts are saying that
    healthcare.gov's other problems have disguised the issue. If
    applicants were being able to sign up easily, but the 834 forms
    were coming in with this many errors, the results could
    potentially be disastrous.
        And just to drill down a little bit more, reports indicate
    that dependents are being incorrectly coded as spouses. Have
    you identified that specific problem as part of the overall
    issue?
        Ms. Campbell. That one I've not heard. It doesn't mean it's
    not in our queue, but it's not one that I'm aware of directly.
        Mr. Kinzinger. And would you be able to--I know you have a
    lot on your plate. I would ask if you could provide to the
    committee by 9 a.m. Tomorrow the categories of problems with
    the 834s because that's something that we're very interested
    in.
        Ms. Campbell. If I'm able to provide that information, I
    will do so.
        Mr. Kinzinger. You wouldn't be able to provide that
    eventually, ma'am?
        Ms. Campbell. I said if I'm able to provide that
    information, I will.
        Mr. Upton. I promise you the hearing will be over by then.
        Ms. Campbell. Thank you.
        Mr. Kinzinger. With that, I thank you.
        I have a minute left. I'm going to yield to the gentleman
    from Ohio for a minute, Mr. Johnson.
        Mr. Johnson. I thank the gentleman for yielding, and this
    will give me a chance to sort of set the stage a little bit. I
    hold both a bachelor's and a master's degree in computer
    science, and I've worked for over 30 years in the IT industry,
    and I've implemented large-scale systems like this both within
    the military, within the Department of Defense, some of those
    systems globally. Some of them affected national security. Some
    of them held the success and failure of multibillion-dollar
    companies in the balance. So I speak your language, and I've
    been where you are, sitting trying to figure out what went
    terribly wrong in an implementation that has cost the American
    taxpayers over $400 million, and the cost is continuing to
    rise.
        These are more than glitches. They can't be fixed. I'm
    going to explain why I believe they can't be fixed when I get
    back. It can be replaced at another large cost to the American
    taxpayer, but they can't be fixed. I'll explain that when I get
    back.
        Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
        Mr. Kinzinger. I yield back.
        Mr. Upton. Mr. Griffith.
        Mr. Griffith. Mr. Chairman, thank you so much.
        Ms. Campbell, can you tell me who made the decision that
    everybody from 27 to 49 when they go into the Web site would
    receive a price based on the 27-year-old's price?
        Ms. Campbell. I don't have that information.
        Mr. Griffith. And likewise the same would be true for the
    person who is from 50 up would receive the 50-year-old price.
    You don't have that information either?
        Ms. Campbell. I do not, sir.
        Mr. Griffith. Was that somebody at CMS?
        Ms. Campbell. I would have to believe so.
        Mr. Griffith. OK. And can you also tell me in regards to
    the changes that were required not to have the browsers so that
    people could browse and find out what was going on, that change
    that came in 2 weeks before so that people couldn't just browse
    and take a look at it, that appears to me just to have been a
    political change. And I know you can't make that statement, but
    let me ask you this: When that request came in from CMS, did
    you tell them that that was going to cause difficulties with
    getting this exchange or getting this Web site launched by
    October 1?
        Ms. Campbell. So, you know, for us it's really a flag in
    our system, and so we just turned the flag on or turned it off
    for that particular component----
        Mr. Griffith. So you didn't think that was going to cause
    any problems with the system?
        Ms. Campbell. That's correct.
        Mr. Griffith. OK. And, Mr. Slavitt, if I read your
    testimony, it says that you reported that you all did some
    testing, and you reported back to CMS and the relevant
    contractor who was responsible for fixing the problems that you
    found. When did you finish that testing?
        Mr. Slavitt. We would do the testing whenever the code was
    made available to us.
        Mr. Griffith. OK. When was the last that you did testing
    and then notified CMS and the relevant contractor that there
    were coding errors or necessary changes that needed to be made?
        Mr. Slavitt. I believe that was all the way up towards the
    very end.
        Mr. Griffith. OK. And do you know who you were working with
    on that?
        Mr. Slavitt. I don't.
        Mr. Griffith. And can you find out for us?
        Mr. Slavitt. We'll get right back to you.
        Mr. Griffith. If you can get that to us, I'd appreciate it.
        And did you alert folks that if these problems weren't
    fixed, there would be problems? Did you alert CMS there would
    be problems with their Web site if they didn't get this fixed?
        Mr. Slavitt. We alerted CMS to the results of the test.
        Mr. Griffith. And, Ms. Campbell, do you know who told you
    all to turn off the browsing option?
        Ms. Campbell. I believe it was Henry Chao and members of
    his team.
        Mr. Griffith. OK. And did they give you any reasons for not
    making that option live, or am I correct--or am I fair, at
    least, to assume that it was a political decision?
        Ms. Campbell. I can't answer whether it was political or
    otherwise.
        Mr. Griffith. So you were not given any reason other than
    that?
        Ms. Campbell. I was not given a reason.
        Mr. Griffith. All right. And--OK. And I appreciate that
    very much.
        Thank you very much. I'm going to yield the remainder of my
    time to my friend and colleague from Ohio, Mr. Johnson.
        Mr. Johnson. I thank the gentleman for yielding. Let me
    continue. Here is why I believe this can't be fixed, it has got
    to be replaced. This, from what I have seen, based on my
    experience, this is indicative of failure somewhere along the
    line to employ the disciplined processes, methodologies,
    standards to deliver a system of this complexity. In layman's
    terms, so the American people can understand how complicated
    this is, this might help a little bit. You know, you can't
    recook eggs. You go into a restaurant and you order two eggs
    over medium and the server brings you out two eggs scrambled,
    you got two choices. You either eat the eggs that you got,
    which means you don't get what you ordered, or you send them
    back and the restaurant owner eats the cost of replacing those
    eggs. Somebody loses.
        In this case, it's the American people that are losing
    because what we have here is either the development team, of
    which you folks are a part, did not follow a disciplined
    methodology, and therefore you didn't see the red flags that
    were coming up, which calls into question your capabilities and
    qualifications, or you didn't notify anybody in CMS, as Ms.
    Campbell has stated, when you saw the red flags coming up,
    which calls into question your judgment.
        The only other possibility is that CMS ignored your
    recommendations and moved forward with implementing a flawed
    system. Folks, the eyes of the Nation are watching and
    listening to what's being said here today. Some of you are
    publicly traded companies. I suspect every government agency
    and every commercial company that you would do business with is
    watching what you say. I suspect your shareholders and stock
    analysts are also watching it, what you say, because they're
    going to try to determine: is it your capabilities and
    qualifications that are at fault? Is it your judgment that's at
    fault? Or did CMS ignore your recommendations? And that's what
    we've got to get to the bottom of. And with that, I will yield
    back my time. My friend yielded, and hopefully I am coming
    back.
        Mr. Upton. The gentleman is next in the queue. So you have
    got another 5 minutes.
        Mr. Johnson. All right. Well, thank you. Mr. Slavitt, you
    stated in your testimony that, and if I read this correctly,
    your performance is based on trusted data sources. Correct? For
    the hub?
        Mr. Slavitt. The data services hub, correct.
        Mr. Johnson. Is based on trusted data sources. You assume
    that that data is trustworthy, correct? Well, Ms. Campbell, in
    her testimony, stated that, and if I go back to it, let me get
    back to it here, that as performance----
        Mr. Waxman. The gentleman didn't let him answer.
        Mr. Johnson. I didn't ask a question yet. This is my time.
    I have haven't asked a question. But when I do, I will let you
    know.
        Mr. Waxman. I heard it.
        Mr. Johnson. When Ms. Campbell testified that when
    performance issues like slow response times and data assurance
    issues arose, they would be addressed through fine-tuning and
    optimization. So were you aware that data assurance issues were
    present? Did anybody tell you about that? Did CGI tell you
    there were problems with data assurance issues?
        Mr. Slavitt. I am not sure what was intended by that
    statement.
        Mr. Johnson. So CGI did not tell you that there were data
    assurance issues?
        Mr. Slavitt. If there are issues made aware to our team,
    our team addresses them discretely and promptly.
        Mr. Johnson. OK. Ms. Campbell, did you tell the independent
    tester that there were data assurance issues that you were
    aware of?
        Ms. Campbell. To make sure we have it in context, when
    testing occurs, right, which QSSI----
        Mr. Johnson. I know how testing occurs. It's a very simple
    question. Did your company tell them that there were data
    assurance.
        Ms. Campbell. I think you are taking it out of context. Now
    that the system has gone live, just as one of the gentleman
    commented on some of the errors that we are seeing on the 834s,
    we are now making those corrections.
        Mr. Johnson. Are you the PM for the contract for your
    company?
        Ms. Campbell. I am not the project manager.
        Mr. Johnson. So you do not interface directly every day
    with CMS, correct? On a daily basis, as the program manager for
    your company?
        Ms. Campbell. That is correct, I am not the program
    manager.
        Mr. Johnson. OK. Your contract required you to deliver,
    your company to deliver, a risk management plan. Have you
    delivered the risk management plan?
        Ms. Campbell. We have.
        Mr. Johnson. Can you provide a copy of it to this
    committee?
        Ms. Campbell. With permission from CMS, yes, we can.
        Mr. Johnson. OK. Well, we will certainly be asking CMS for
    that as well. The contract also required that you recommend
    standards and industry best practices and key performance
    indicators. Now, you have testified earlier that you didn't
    make any recommendations to CMS about the performance of the
    system. That it was totally CMS that made these decisions. But
    yet the contract requires that you recommend standards and key
    performance indicators to make sure that everything works
    right. Did you just decide not to do that or what?
        Ms. Campbell. So once again, for our portion of the system,
    we provided that information.
        Mr. Johnson. That's not what your contract says. Were you
    aware that you were supposed to be performing under the CMS's
    exchange lifecycle management?
        Ms. Campbell. And we do.
        Mr. Johnson. OK. You do. And tell me about the pre-
    operational readiness review and what it requires?
        Ms. Campbell. So I would have to give you--I wouldn't want
    to go into detail here.
        Mr. Johnson. OK. Well, let me go into detail for you. Here
    are some of the things that the pre-operational readiness
    review requires. Integration testing results. End-to-end
    testing results. Now, you have testified that CMS was
    responsible for end-to-end, but clearly, your contract requires
    you to provide to them end-to-end and integration testing
    results. Test summary reports. An LOE estimate to achieve the
    operational readiness review. In other words, an estimate of
    what it was going to take to fix those things that were found
    at the pre-operational readiness review. Do you know when the
    pre-operational readiness review was supposed to be conducted?
        Ms. Campbell. So to be clear----
        Mr. Johnson. No, when was the pre-operational readiness
    review supposed to be conducted?
        Ms. Campbell. As part of our system and----
        Mr. Johnson. When was the pre-operational readiness review
    supposed to be conducted? It's in your contract. Let me help
    you. It was Q4 of 2012. The operational readiness review, which
    also included a letter of estimate to support operations and
    maintenance, was supposed to be conducted in Q1 of 2013. Mr.
    Slavitt, did you participate in any of these reviews, the
    operational readiness review or the pre-operational readiness
    review?
        Mr. Slavitt. Are you asking if I personally? No, I did not.
        Mr. Johnson. You did not. Did your company?
        Mr. Slavitt. Our company participated in all the necessary
    reviews we committed to.
        Mr. Johnson. You said earlier that you were an independent
    tester. How can you be an independent tester when you are an
    integral developer of part of the system? How does that qualify
    you as independent?
        Mr. Slavitt. We independently test code developed by other
    contractors.
        Mr. Johnson. OK. But other contractors that are interfacing
    with you?
        Mr. Slavitt. Other contractors on the project.
        Mr. Johnson. Were either of those----
        Mr. Waxman. Regular order, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Upton. The gentleman's time has expired.
        Mr. Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Upton. The gentleman from West Virginia, Mr. McKinley.
        Mr. McKinley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Several questions
    here if I could, maybe, the two of you, Ms. Campbell, Mr.
    Slavitt.
        Can you explain to me first, Ms. Campbell, you said that--
    in your testimony some 3-\1/2\ hours ago, that the system works
    but not at an acceptable pace. Is the pace specified in the
    contract?
        Ms. Campbell. It is not specified in the contract.
        Mr. McKinley. So do you feel that you fulfilled your
    contractual obligations by October 1st?
        Ms. Campbell. Absolutely.
        Mr. McKinley. And do you believe that next week Secretary
    Sebelius will concur that you have fulfilled your contractual
    obligations?
        Ms. Campbell. I certainly hope she does.
        Mr. McKinley. Do you think she will?
        Ms. Campbell. I think she will.
        Mr. McKinley. OK. Do you know whether or not--are you
    familiar with, either one of you, IV&V or V&V?
        Ms. Campbell. Independent validation and verification, yes.
        Mr. McKinley. And verification, yes. Do you know whether or
    not that was used in this process? This engineering
    development?
        Ms. Campbell. I do not recall there being an IV&V
    contractor.
        Mr. McKinley. OK. How about with you, Mr. Slavitt?
        Mr. Slavitt. I don't know.
        Mr. McKinley. OK. Do you think it would have been
    justified? In retrospect. That's in retrospect.
        Ms. Campbell. At the start of the program, it probably--it
    could not have hurt.
        Mr. McKinley. OK. Do you have the developmental artifacts
    that would confirm your engineering solution that you developed
    in developing your software?
        Ms. Campbell. Yes, we do.
        Mr. McKinley. Is that--do you know contractually whether or
    not that will be available for an independent agency to review?
        Ms. Campbell. I would have to get--that would have to go
    through CMS contracts organization for approval.
        Mr. McKinley. OK. Go back to the question, how long did you
    have to test the site, or in the specifications did they tell
    you 2 weeks is all--that's all you have to have? I come from
    the construction industry that is very specific about when you
    have to have substantial completion of a project. Was there
    anything like that in this that said you must begin testing
    just 2 weeks before it's launched?
        Ms. Campbell. No. There were none of those specifications
    were in our original contract.
        Mr. McKinley. OK. But I also heard there were change
    orders.
        Ms. Campbell. Correct.
        Mr. McKinley. Was there ever a change that said you shall
    begin testing 2 weeks prior?
        Ms. Campbell. No. And once again, testing was not our
    ultimate responsibility. Testing of our code, make sure I am
    clear, testing of our code, our responsibility. But then it
    went through the CMS process for testing, independent testing
    done by QSSI. Then CMS doing the integrated end-to-end testing.
        Mr. McKinley. If you feel that you achieved your objectives
    by October 1st, can you tell me whether or not there were
    anything about liquidated damages if there are problems
    associated after October 1st that have to be corrected? Are
    there liquidated damages as part of your contract?
        Ms. Campbell. You know, I would have to get back to you on
    that. I don't recall. If it's a standard FAR clause, then it
    could very well be there as a standard FAR clause. I just don't
    know for sure. But being a cost-plus type contract, you know,
    now I am stretching because I don't know for sure.
        Mr. McKinley. I didn't think, and again I have not had a
    chance to complete the review of it, but I thought it was a
    performance-based with plus cost for incidental expenses. I
    didn't read it as being a cost-plus based contract. Are you
    saying it's a cost-plus, not a performance-based contract?
        Ms. Campbell. I believe it's a cost-plus contract. Cost
    plus fee type contract.
        Mr. McKinley. Cost plus fee.
        Ms. Campbell. That's what I believe. But I will get
    confirmation.
        Mr. McKinley. Could you get back at that magic 9 o'clock
    hour tomorrow, if you could? The one thing, just in closing, I
    tell you I am a little surprised by the whole panel. You have
    heard all the disappointment, both sides of the aisle here,
    over this thing not being satisfactory at this point. I haven't
    heard one of you apologize to the American public on behalf of
    your companies for problems that were associated with not
    having this thing ready. Are apologies not in order?
        Ms. Campbell. So in my opening statement I said that CGI,
    as well as myself, acknowledge, we acknowledge----
        Mr. McKinley. I am sorry. I am sorry that we--we tried, but
    there were changes made, we tried. I have not heard the word, I
    am sorry. I know men have a hard time saying that. But the
    whole panel, I haven't heard anyone say--look, as a contractor,
    when we didn't finish a project on time, we had to go to the
    owner and apologize and explain what happened. We're not ready
    here. And I don't understand why there is not an apology to the
    American public. We're sorry that there were glitches. It was a
    very complicated project, as you said. But I apologize. I
    haven't heard that from any one of the four of you.
        Mr. Upton. The gentleman's time has expired.
        Mr. Waxman. Can we get an apology for shutting down the
    government because people didn't like the health care bill?
        Mr. Upton. The chair will recognize the gentlelady from
    North Carolina, Mrs. Ellmers.
        Mrs. Ellmers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you to our
    panel. This has been a long process. And I do appreciate you
    coming and meeting with the entire committee today. And what I
    am learning from this situation is I do believe that you all
    did your best to get this process in order. And I am hearing
    repeatedly and repeatedly that this--the bottom line here is
    CMS is responsible for this failure. And I just, on behalf of
    your companies, you have the opportunity to throw them right
    under the bus as far as I am concerned. And we will get that
    information, I am sure. Ms. Campbell, I need to know, the
    American people need to know how many people are enrolled, how
    many individuals are now enrolled in health care coverage from
    the Web site?
        Ms. Campbell. So I am not able to provide that information.
        Mrs. Ellmers. You are not able or you do not have that
    information?
        Ms. Campbell. I don't have it, I don't have it with me, and
    I would have to have approval from CMS to be able to provide
    that information.
        Mrs. Ellmers. OK. Now to that point, I am going to ask you
    to please submit that by 9 a.m. tomorrow. But I do want to
    point something out. And I understand where you are coming
    from. I know you have a contract. I know CGI has a contract.
    All of you have had a contract with CMS. But you have to
    understand, CMS is a government agency. We oversee CMS. And CMS
    is the American people. So when we are talking about contracts
    here, that's really who we're talking about. We are talking
    about the American people. CMS is not a private company
    somewhere in the United States. They represent the American
    people. And we've got to get to the bottom of these issues. So,
    yes, we do need those numbers by 9 a.m. tomorrow. Mr. Lau, on
    that, how many paper applications have been completed up to
    this time?
        Mr. Lau. Somewhere between 3,000 and 4,000.
        Mrs. Ellmers. Three and 4,000.
        Mr. Lau. Yes.
        Mrs. Ellmers. OK. Now, to that point, now, the President on
    Monday in the Rose Garden gave a speech. And because of the
    glitches--I call them gaffes. They are much bigger than
    glitches, I believe. Glitches are little hiccups, and these are
    much more than hiccups. He referred to the 1-800 number and
    urged the American people to call the call center and to go
    through, you know, the hard copy process, essentially, or the
    paper process. To that point, now, Ms. Campbell, do you know
    that process? What happens if someone calls the 1-800 number?
    Where do they go? Where are they directed? And how does that
    process lay out? And I know you have to be brief because I do
    only have 2 minutes.
        Ms. Campbell. Right. Actually, it's a question that goes to
    Serco.
        Mrs. Ellmers. OK. That's fine. So you, to the best of your
    knowledge, you would not have knowledge of that at this point?
        Ms. Campbell. No, not----
        Mrs. Ellmers. Once it becomes a paper or a hard copy.
        Ms. Campbell. Correct.
        Mrs. Ellmers. Mr. Lau, what is the process?
        Mr. Lau. For paper?
        Mrs. Ellmers. If someone calls the 1-800 number and they--
    --
        Mr. Lau. We don't call the operate the call center. Someone
    else.
        Mrs. Ellmers. OK.
        Mr. Lau. The call center people, as I understand it,
    directly key enter the application to the extent people are
    willing to give that over the phone.
        Mrs. Ellmers. Where do they go from there? Are they going
    to the same portal system?
        Mr. Lau. Correct.
        Mrs. Ellmers. So they are going to the same portal system,
    the same failed portal system.
        Mr. Lau. It's the same portal system, yes.
        Mrs. Ellmers. It is. So what would be the average time
    then? And now I know you had mentioned about 3,000 applications
    being completed up to this point. So there are individuals, my
    understanding would be, that have gone onto that site, and they
    are still waiting to find out if they have been accepted or any
    further information. Is that correct?
        Mr. Lau. To which site?
        Mrs. Ellmers. Well, if someone called and there was a paper
    application processed or started, initiated.
        Mr. Lau. Right. I only know roughly how it works. I am not
    familiar with the data on that. We don't really----
        Mrs. Ellmers. OK.
        Mr. Lau [continuing]. Connect.
        Mrs. Ellmers. But to the best of your knowledge, because
    the portal system, which is the same portal system that this
    entire process goes through, and because it is experiencing the
    failures that it is, those individuals would, to your best
    assumption, would be continued to be waiting.
        Mr. Lau. I am not certain about that, because once they are
    entered into the system, then it's system processes that
    determine the length of time before which they would hear back.
        Mrs. Ellmers. But we can assume that since only 3,000 have
    been processed fully that it's a minimal number when you think
    about the trends.
        Mr. Lau. From the paper side that's exactly right.
        Mrs. Ellmers. Thank you. And Ms. Campbell, I just want to
    touch on one last thing. I know you had said that you had gone
    through the process. Did you actually complete--when you went
    through the process yourself individually, did you complete it?
        Ms. Campbell. I did not. I am not signing up for insurance.
    My company provides insurance.
        Mrs. Ellmers. But when you tested it yourself, I mean, my
    understanding is earlier you had said that you had actually
    tried it through the Virginia system, went to the Web site, and
    that you did or you did not complete it?
        Ms. Campbell. I did not complete the application.
        Mrs. Ellmers. You did not. OK. Thank you. Thank you. And I
    yield back the remainder of my time. Thank you.
        Mr. Upton. The gentleman from Louisiana, Mr. Cassidy, is
    recognized.
        Mr. Cassidy. Good news, I am the last one. A couple things,
    and I will go quickly. I will ask you to speak quickly as well.
    I only have 5 minutes. This has come up, a little bit
    repetitious, but to date, what have each of you been paid and
    what do you anticipate being paid further? It comes to mind,
    Ms. Campbell, you mentioned it is a cost-plus contract. So to
    date and anticipated future payments, what are they, please?
        Ms. Campbell. So to date, $112 million. And for the year, I
    believe $196 million. For this phase of our contract.
        Mr. Cassidy. And then going forward, do you have any
    concept?
        Ms. Campbell. The total TCV, the total contract value, with
    option years and everything exercised, would be $293 million.
        Mr. Cassidy. The $196 million is total and includes the
    112, it is not in addition to the 112?
        Ms. Campbell. It is part of the 112, the 196.
        Mr. Cassidy. It includes the 112?
        Ms. Campbell. Yes.
        Mr. Cassidy. Yes, sir, Mr. Slavitt?
        Mr. Slavitt. To date our services subcontract has been
    funded to about just under $85 million. That includes all the
    hardware and the software.
        Mr. Cassidy. That's OK. And then how much do you anticipate
    going forward?
        Mr. Slavitt. I don't believe that amount has been fully
    paid. I think that's what's been funded. I would point out that
    we have contracts for work we do----
        Mr. Cassidy. I have just got a minute, man, I am sorry. Ms.
    Spellecy.
        Mr. Spellecy. To date we have received less than $2
    million. And what we will be paid in the future depends on the
    transactions that we receive from the hub.
        Mr. Lau. The first year contract, with modifications, is
    $200 million. To date, we have probably received about $30
    million.
        Mr. Cassidy. OK. Next, Ms. Campbell, in your previous
    testimony here today, you said you are not responsible for the
    front door. Here is your testimony from September the 10th. You
    said your scope of activity was architecting and developing an
    FFM. And then later just immediately afterward you side the FFM
    will serve as the front door. I am not quite sure why today
    it's not a front door but on the 10th it was.
        Ms. Campbell. I know. It's a matter of interpretation. When
    we first--we were trying to give a way to explain what our role
    would be. It's really the face of the application. As I said,
    it's the front of the house. But the front door of the house is
    where EIDM would take over.
        Mr. Cassidy. And that's Mr. Slavitt.
        Ms. Campbell. That's correct.
        Mr. Cassidy. OK. Now also in your previous testimony I
    asked you, I asked you, Spanish was going to be part of the
    rollout and implementation. I asked if it's ready. And would it
    be a seamless experience for a primary Spanish speaker. You
    said for the online application, yes. There is reports today
    that the Spanish language Web sites are not up. And it's
    unclear as to when they will come up. Is that because the Web
    sites are not ready or because the administration has chosen
    not to take them online?
        Ms. Campbell. CMS directs which components go live and
    when.
        Mr. Cassidy. So is the Spanish language Web site ready? And
    if it were up, would it be functional?
        Ms. Campbell. It would be.
        Mr. Cassidy. OK. So it's the CMS decision not to begin it?
        Ms. Campbell. That's correct.
        Mr. Cassidy. Mr. Slavitt, I gather you are the front door
    now. Would it be--Mr. Shimkus asked why is someone who is 49
    years old being quoted a rate for someone who is 27? And why is
    someone who is 64 being quoted a rate for someone who is 50?
    Clearly misleading. So incredibly misleading. I am a doctor, so
    I understand the difference in health care costs for the two.
    Would it be technologically difficult to ask users their date
    of birth to generate a more accurate estimate?
        Mr. Slavitt. So I am not sure that I even understand the
    phrase front door in this context. The user questions are not
    part of the EIDM tool.
        Mr. Cassidy. So if you put in the DOB, the date of birth,
    is that technologically difficult to link that date of birth
    with actually what it would cost for a 50-year old gentleman as
    opposed to giving him the rates for a 27-year old person?
        Mr. Slavitt. That aspect of the site is not part of the
    EIDM tool, so I wouldn't know the answer.
        Mr. Cassidy. Is it part of your site, Ms. Campbell?
        Ms. Campbell. It is. It is part of my site.
        Mr. Cassidy. Would it be technologically difficult to
    actually more accurately give what a quote would be?
        Ms. Campbell. It would not be difficult to add date of
    birth.
        Mr. Cassidy. And then to connect that with an actual rate
    as opposed to a disingenuous rate.
        Ms. Campbell. So it would give a better accounting. It
    would not give a complete accounting.
        Mr. Cassidy. But a much better accounting. Big difference
    between 50 years old and 27 years old.
        Ms. Campbell. I totally agree with you.
        Mr. Cassidy. OK. Now, everybody on this panel, at least the
    ones that were here on the 10th, just swore this was all going
    to be ready, and yet now it appears that the administration had
    some idea that it was not going to be ready prior to its
    opening date.
        Let me ask, when the questions, when the problems became
    apparent did the administration impose any pressure in any form
    for you not to be forthcoming regarding the magnitude of the
    problems?
        Ms. Campbell. No.
        Mr. Slavitt. No.
        Mr. Cassidy. So even though you had pointed out to them,
    Mr. Slavitt, this might not be ready for prime time, and you
    just saw this kind of train wreck happening on the 1st, they
    never pushed back on you regarding that.
        Mr. Slavitt. We shared all of the results of the testing
    that we did, so they were fully aware of those tests.
        Mr. Cassidy. I yield back. Thank you.
        Mr. Upton. Thank you. Thank you, panel. I would just, for
    the record, like to note, particularly for CGI and QSSI, the
    committee did send letters to both of your companies on October
    6th asking for information about healthcare.gov's problems. And
    that deadline for the letter response was October 23rd.
        So members I know have asked a number of follow-up
    questions. I understand it may not be at 9 o'clock tomorrow,
    but if you could get that done as quickly as possible,
    particularly in light knowing that we have Secretary Sebelius
    agreeing to testify next week. We would like to have that
    information in hand so that we could be prepared for that. I
    appreciate your testimony, and you are now excused.
        [Whereupon, at 1:32 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
        [Material submitted for inclusion in the record follows:]

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