    [House Hearing, 113 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

            EXAMINING ISSUES FOR HAZARDOUS MATERIALS REAUTHORIZATION

    =======================================================================

                                    (113-63)

                                    HEARING

                                   BEFORE THE

                                SUBCOMMITTEE ON
                           RAILROADS, PIPELINES, AND
                              HAZARDOUS MATERIALS

                                     OF THE

                                  COMMITTEE ON
                       TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                        ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 SECOND SESSION

                                   __________

                                 APRIL 2, 2014

                                   __________

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                 COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE

                      BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania, Chairman
    DON YOUNG, Alaska                    NICK J. RAHALL, II, West Virginia
    THOMAS E. PETRI, Wisconsin           PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon
    HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina         ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of
    JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee,          Columbia
      Vice Chair                         JERROLD NADLER, New York
    JOHN L. MICA, Florida                CORRINE BROWN, Florida
    FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey        EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas
    GARY G. MILLER, California           ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
    SAM GRAVES, Missouri                 RICK LARSEN, Washington
    SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia  MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts
    CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan          TIMOTHY H. BISHOP, New York
    DUNCAN HUNTER, California            MICHAEL H. MICHAUD, Maine
    ERIC A. ``RICK'' CRAWFORD, Arkansas  GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California
    LOU BARLETTA, Pennsylvania           DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois
    BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas              TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota
    LARRY BUCSHON, Indiana               STEVE COHEN, Tennessee
    BOB GIBBS, Ohio                      ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
    PATRICK MEEHAN, Pennsylvania         DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland
    RICHARD L. HANNA, New York           JOHN GARAMENDI, California
    DANIEL WEBSTER, Florida              ANDRE CARSON, Indiana
    STEVE SOUTHERLAND, II, Florida       JANICE HAHN, California
    JEFF DENHAM, California              RICHARD M. NOLAN, Minnesota
    REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin            ANN KIRKPATRICK, Arizona
    THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky              DINA TITUS, Nevada
    STEVE DAINES, Montana                SEAN PATRICK MALONEY, New York
    TOM RICE, South Carolina             ELIZABETH H. ESTY, Connecticut
    MARKWAYNE MULLIN, Oklahoma           LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
    ROGER WILLIAMS, Texas                CHERI BUSTOS, Illinois
    MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina
    SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania
    RODNEY DAVIS, Illinois
    MARK SANFORD, South Carolina
    DAVID W. JOLLY, Florida
                                    ------

         Subcommittee on Railroads, Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials

                       JEFF DENHAM, California, Chairman
    JOHN J. DUNCAN, Jr., Tennessee       CORRINE BROWN, Florida
    JOHN L. MICA, Florida                DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois
    GARY G. MILLER, California           JERROLD NADLER, New York
    SAM GRAVES, Missouri                 ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
    SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia  MICHAEL H. MICHAUD, Maine
    CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan          GRACE F. NAPOLITANO, California
    LOU BARLETTA, Pennsylvania           TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota
    LARRY BUCSHON, Indiana               ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
    BOB GIBBS, Ohio                      JANICE HAHN, California
    PATRICK MEEHAN, Pennsylvania         ANN KIRKPATRICK, Arizona
    RICHARD L. HANNA, New York, Vice     ELIZABETH H. ESTY, Connecticut
        Chair                            PETER A. DeFAZIO, Oregon
    DANIEL WEBSTER, Florida              MICHAEL E. CAPUANO, Massachusetts
    THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky              NICK J. RAHALL, II, West Virginia
    ROGER WILLIAMS, Texas                  (Ex Officio)
    SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania
    BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania (Ex
        Officio)
    VACANCY

                                    CONTENTS

                                                                       Page

    Summary of Subject Matter........................................     v

                                   TESTIMONY

    Hon. Cynthia L. Quarterman, Administrator, Pipeline and Hazardous
      Materials Safety Administration................................     8
    William F. Downey, executive vice president for corporate affairs
      and chief security officer, The Kenan Advantage Group, Inc., on
      behalf of the American Trucking Associations...................     8
    Thomas E. Schick, senior director of distribution, Regulatory and
      Technical Affairs, American Chemistry Council..................     8
    Stephen Pelkey, chairman, Transportation Committee, American
      Pyrotechnics Association.......................................     8
    Elizabeth M. Harman, assistant to the general president for
      hazardous materials, weapons of mass destruction training, and
      grants administration, International Association of Fire
      Fighters.......................................................     8

     PREPARED STATEMENTS AND ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED
                                  BY WITNESSES

    Hon. Cynthia L. Quarterman:
        Prepared statement...........................................    39
        Answers to questions for the record from the following
          Representatives:

            Hon. Jeff Denham, of California..........................    47
            Hon. Janice Hahn, of California..........................    50
    William F. Downey, prepared statement............................    53
    Thomas E. Schick:
        Prepared statement...........................................    58
        Answers to questions for the record from Hon. Janice Hahn, of
          California.................................................    62
    Stephen Pelkey:
        Prepared statement...........................................    64
        Answers to questions for the record from the following
          Representatives:

            Hon. Jeff Denham, of California..........................    71
            Hon. Janice Hahn, of California..........................    76
    Elizabeth M. Harman, prepared statement..........................    77

                           SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD

    Hon. Corrine Brown, a Representative in Congress from the State
      of Florida, request to submit a list of issues surrounding the
      movement of hazardous materials compiled by the following rail
      organizations: ATDA, BLET, BMWED, BRS, IAM, IBEW, TCU and TCU
      Carmen, IBT Teamsters, TWU, and SMART--Transportation Division.     4
    Hon. Cynthia L. Quarterman, Administrator, Pipeline and Hazardous
      Materials Safety Administration, responses to requests for
      information from the following Representatives:

        Hon. Grace F. Napolitano, of California, regarding the safety
          and security of toxic gas shipments........................    23
        Hon. Corrine Brown, of Florida, regarding testing information
          that PHMSA has requested of the American Petroleum
          Institute..................................................    33
        Hon. Elijah E. Cummings, of Maryland, regarding PHMSA's
          assessment of penalties over the past decade...............    38

                            ADDITIONS TO THE RECORD

    Air Line Pilots Association, International, written testimony....    84
    John P. Tolman, vice president and national legislative
      representative, Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and
      Trainmen, written testimony....................................    93
    Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance, written testimony............    97
    Cynthia Hilton, executive vice president, Institute of Makers of
      Explosives, written testimony..................................   100
    LaMont Byrd, director, Safety and Health Department,
      International Brotherhood of Teamsters, written testimony......   107

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

            EXAMINING ISSUES FOR HAZARDOUS MATERIALS REAUTHORIZATION

                                  ----------

                            WEDNESDAY, APRIL 2, 2014

                      House of Representatives,
                  Subcommittee on Railroads, Pipelines,
                               and Hazardous Materials,
                Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:15 p.m. in
    Room 2167, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Jeff Denham
    (Chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
        Mr. Denham. The subcommittee will come to order. Before we
    begin, I have an administrative item to cover. I would like to
    ask unanimous consent that former chairman, Don Young, and
    Representative Rick Larsen be permitted to join the
    subcommittee for today's hearing, and ask questions.
        [No response.]
        Mr. Denham. Without objection, so ordered. Well, good
    afternoon, and welcome to the Subcommittee on Railroads,
    Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials. Our hearing today will
    focus on reauthorizing of the Hazardous Materials Safety
    Program of the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety
    Administration, PHMSA. The current authorization was part of
    MAP-21, which expires October 1, 2014.
        Our goal is to continue the advances made by MAP-21 in
    reducing regulatory burdens while ensuring hazardous materials
    are transported in a safe and efficient manner. We have a
    distinguished panel of witnesses today, and it is my pleasure
    to welcome back once again Ms. Cynthia Quarterman,
    Administrator of PHMSA, as well as--as you know, the
    Transportation Committee is working on a reauthorization of
    MAP-21, and I am proud that Chairman Shuster's leadership on
    the committee is looking at addressing a wide variety of
    transportation needs, including the reauthorization of the
    Hazardous Materials Safety Program. So, I look forward to the
    testimony and discussion today, as we move forward in that
    process.
        The movement of hazardous materials in commerce is integral
    to our Nation's health and economy. Hazmats include common,
    everyday products like paints, fuels, fertilizers, fireworks,
    explosive, alcohols, and batteries, that are essential to such
    industries as farming, medicine, manufacturing, mining, water
    purification, and entertainment industries.
        PHMSA is the agency within DOT entrusted with that mission,
    and determines what materials are hazardous, and promulgates
    and enforces, among others, the regulations that set forth the
    packaging, marking, labeling, placarding, and other
    requirements for the movement of these goods.
        Unlike other modal administrations within the DOT, PHMSA is
    unique in that its regulations apply across the modes, reaching
    to every form of commercial goods transportation. Our role is
    to ensure that these goods are moved in a safe, reliable manner
    that helps drive our continued economic growth.
        MAP-21 made several reforms and established new
    requirements for the transportation of hazmats. And I am
    looking forward to hearing about their ongoing implementation.
    A number of these requirements were important to developing new
    technologies and standards for hazmat transportation, improving
    the data collection analysis, and reporting of the agencies,
    and improving training for first responders and hazmat
    employees.
        MAP-21 also set new requirements and reviews of programs
    and processes to create more regulatory certainty, establish
    greater transparency, and cut red tape. In addition, the act
    enhanced enforcement power to ensure an already safe industry
    was made safer.
        I look forward to hearing from our witnesses, including
    PHMSA Administrator Quarterman; Mr. Downey, on behalf of the
    American Trucking Associations; Mr. Schick, of the American
    Chemistry Council; Mr. Pelkey, of the American Pyrotechnics
    Association; and Ms. Harman, with the International Association
    of Fire Fighters, regarding these issues concerning hazmat
    transportation.
        I would now like to recognize the ranking member, Corrine
    Brown from Florida, for 5 minutes for any opening statement she
    may have.
        Ms. Brown. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The subcommittee is
    meeting today to hear testimony on reauthorization of the
    Department of Transportation hazmat program, which was last
    reauthorized in MAP-21. This hearing is very timely, because
    the purpose of this program is to protect people and the
    environment from the risks of hazardous material
    transportation.
        In just a few weeks, on April the 28th, we will observe
    Workers Memorial Day to remember those who have suffered and
    died on the job, and to renew efforts to safeguard our Nation's
    workers. Just 44 years ago, Congress passed the Occupational
    Safety and Health Act, promising every worker the right to a
    safe job. Since that time, many in Congress have fought hard to
    make this promise a reality. But our work is far from done.
        Many jobs--hazards still exist, particularly in hazardous
    material transportation. Since I was first elected to Congress,
    one issue comes up every time we authorize the hazmat program:
    the authorizing of OSHA and DOT to protect hazmat workers. Let
    me be clear. The role these two agencies play in protecting
    hazmat workers is crucial. Yet some in the industry have
    proposed to eliminate OSHA jurisdiction, claiming that there
    are overlaps and confusing regulation. This is not the case.
        DOT has regulations on packaging and on safety procedures
    for loading and unloading materials. On the other hand, OSHA
    has regulations that provide for worker safety, including noise
    and air quality control, emergency preparation, personal
    protection equipment, and hazard communications. These
    regulations are not new. DOT and OSHA have shared this
    responsibility for decades, and these regulations are critical
    to maintaining the highest level of safety for hazmat workers.
        The fact is that 12 workers die every day in our country
    from work-related injuries. In 2013 alone, more than 4,300
    workers were killed at work. I am committed to maintaining a
    safe and healthy workplace for all American workers, including
    those in this critical industry. And I will work to defeat any
    proposal that would eliminate OSHA protection for hazmat
    workers.
        In my home State of Florida, we recently had several
    dangerous explosions involving hazmat material. In July of last
    year, eight workers were in critical condition following an
    explosion at a Blue Rhino plant that was--forced an evacuation
    of area residents and shook houses 10 miles away. In July of
    2007, a devastating explosion at the T2 chemical plant located
    close to my home in Jacksonville, Florida, killed 4 people and
    injured 32.
        Not only must we ensure the safety of hazmat workers, but
    we also need to focus on the safety of those responding to
    hazmat accidents, like our Nation's firefighters. I want to
    give a special welcome to the Democratic witness from the
    International Association of Fire Fighters, Elizabeth Harman.
    With her help last Congress, we were able to enact strong
    training standards in MAP-21 for firefighters and other
    emergency responders, and ensure continuing funding for
    important firefighters training program. According to DOT, more
    than 2 million emergency responders received training through
    their program.
        With that, I welcome the witnesses and look forward to
    hearing your testimony.
        Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to include in today's
    hearing record a written statement from the Transportation
    Trades Department of AFL-CIO and 10 labor unions.
        Mr. Denham. Without objection.
        [The information follows:]

        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Mr. Denham. I would like to again welcome our witnesses
    here today. I ask unanimous consent that our witnesses' full
    statements be included in the record.
        [No response.]
        Mr. Denham. Without objection, so ordered. Since your
    written testimony has been made part of the record, the
    subcommittee would request that you limit your oral testimony
    to 5 minutes.
        Ms. Quarterman, you may proceed. Thank you for joining us.

        TESTIMONY OF HON. CYNTHIA L. QUARTERMAN, ADMINISTRATOR,
    PIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION; WILLIAM
     F. DOWNEY, EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT FOR CORPORATE AFFAIRS AND
      CHIEF SECURITY OFFICER, THE KENAN ADVANTAGE GROUP, INC., ON
    BEHALF OF THE AMERICAN TRUCKING ASSOCIATIONS; THOMAS E. SCHICK,
       SENIOR DIRECTOR OF DISTRIBUTION, REGULATORY AND TECHNICAL
    AFFAIRS, AMERICAN CHEMISTRY COUNCIL; STEPHEN PELKEY, CHAIRMAN,
     TRANSPORTATION COMMITTEE, AMERICAN PYROTECHNICS ASSOCIATION;
    AND ELIZABETH M. HARMAN, ASSISTANT TO THE GENERAL PRESIDENT FOR
    HAZARDOUS MATERIALS, WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION TRAINING, AND
       GRANTS ADMINISTRATION, INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF FIRE
                                FIGHTERS

        Ms. Quarterman. Thank you for having me. Good afternoon,
    Chairman Denham, Ranking Member Brown, and members of the
    subcommittee. Thank you for inviting me here today to testify
    on PHMSA's progress in implementing Title III of the Moving
    Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act, also known as MAP-
    21.
        Safety is the top priority for Secretary Foxx, the
    Department of Transportation, PHMSA, and all of its employees.
    All of us at DOT appreciate your dedication and leadership in
    advancing hazardous materials transportation safety. For a
    relatively small agency with limited resources, the staff at
    PHMSA works diligently to protect the American people and the
    environment from hazardous materials transportation incidents,
    and have made great strides in implementing the provisions
    included in MAP-21.
        Since MAP-21's enactment in 2012, PHMSA has met or will
    meet more than 90 percent of the established timelines for the
    32 separate provisions assigned to the agency. This is very
    significant, especially given the many challenges and emerging
    issues that PHMSA has faced over the same time period,
    including efforts to enhance the safe transportation of crude
    by rail, and continuing to consistently reduce the number of
    major hazardous materials incidents, as we have done over the
    past 25 years.
        A significant contributor to PHMSA's success has been the
    strategy and action plan we developed and implemented to
    bolster compliance with hazardous materials regulations. As the
    transportation sector continues to evolve and become more
    interconnected with the international community, PHMSA has
    attempted to adopt smarter strategies to adapt to the
    challenges.
        As part of our enforcement strategy, and through the
    authority of MAP-21, PHMSA raised its maximum civil penalty
    amount for violations resulting in death, illnesses, and
    injuries. In addition, PHMSA is moving forward with advancing
    efforts in hazardous materials research and development. Our
    hazardous materials technical assessment research and
    development and analysis program is allowing us to work
    cooperatively with stakeholders to identify and mitigate
    hazardous materials risks, and to promote innovative approaches
    to support a safe, multimodal hazardous materials
    transportation system.
        We are also working to develop uniform performance
    standards for training our hazardous materials inspectors and
    investigators to ensure field staff continue to accurately
    identify instances of noncompliance and take appropriate
    enforcement actions.
        In addition to the nonregulatory efforts to improve safety
    I just described, PHMSA is continuing to fulfill our commitment
    to streamline hazardous materials regulations and processes.
    Since 2011, PHMSA has been reviewing and analyzing special
    permits to determine which ones can be converted into the
    hazardous materials regulations. We are currently working on a
    rulemaking effort that will address the conversion of active
    special permits into regulations that we expect to be published
    by October of this year.
        These are just a few of the many actions PHMSA has
    undertaken to address and implement the mandates included in
    MAP-21. As I have stated earlier, PHMSA is committed to
    improving transportation safety, and I believe our approach is
    working. Our safety mission is guided by our vision that no
    harm results from hazardous materials transportation, and I
    truly believe our efforts will continue to prevent and mitigate
    accidents and move us closer to our goal of zero deaths and
    incidents.
        Thank you again for the opportunity to speak today. We look
    forward to continuing to work with Congress to safeguard
    people, property, and the environment from hazardous materials
    transportation risks. I would be pleased to answer any
    questions the committee may have.
        Mr. Denham. Thank you, Ms. Quarterman.
        Mr. Downey?
        Mr. Downey. Chairman Denham, Ranking Member Brown, and
    members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to
    testify today about reauthorizing the Hazardous Materials
    Transportation Act.
        My name is William Downey, and I am the executive vice
    president and chief security officer for The Kenan Advantage
    Group, which is located in North Canton, Ohio. We are North
    America's largest tank truck transporter and logistics provider
    to the petroleum, specialty products, and merchant gas
    industries. We employ approximately 9,000 people, and we are
    the only fuels delivery carrier with a nationwide presence. I
    am testifying today on behalf of the American Trucking
    Associations and the National Tank Truck Carriers. ATA and NTTC
    are members of the Interested Parties group, and endorse their
    comprehensive recommendations for hazmat reauthorization.
        Of the roughly 800,000 shipments of hazmat on a daily
    basis, in terms of product value, tonnage, and number of
    shipments, trucks move more hazmat than all other
    transportation modes, combined. Today I propose three
    commonsense solutions to improve the safe, secure, and
    efficient transport of hazmat. First, the present background
    screening process for hazmat endorsement on a commercial
    driver's license can be reformed. Second, the proposed wet
    lines rule can be halted. And, finally, the State hazmat
    permitting process can be improved.
        On background screening, presently a TSA-administered
    fingerprint-based background check is required for all hazmat
    CDL endorsements. This costs $86.50 in States that use TSA's
    contractor, but as much as $150 in States that perform the
    checks themselves. This security check is required for
    transporting all hazmat, including paint, nail polish, or
    alcohol-based products like perfume. None of those products
    pose a weaponized threat.
        Congress should limit fingerprint background checks to
    drivers transporting weaponized hazmat, also called ``security
    sensitive hazmat.'' All hazmat drivers would still be required
    to pass the relevant safety tests, as well as the name-based
    background checks. Drivers transporting security-sensitive
    hazmat would also be required to undergo a fingerprint-based
    background check before acquiring another card demonstrating
    the driver poses no terrorist threat. This proposal passed the
    House in 2009 with bipartisan support as part of the SAFE
    Truckers Act.
        To my second recommendation, wet lines are fuel-loading
    pipes used to fill and drain cargo tanks. MAP-21 banned PHMSA
    from issuing any final wet line regulation until GAO studied
    the rule. PHMSA's proposed regulation had very few benefits and
    high cost. Because of this, and the fact that better
    alternatives are available, GAO recommended withdrawing the
    rule. But, PHMSA has not done so. Instead, PHMSA has indicated
    their intent to promulgate a rule, anyway. Given GAO's finding,
    and PHMSA's refusal to withdraw the rule, a legislative ban is
    both appropriate and necessary.
        Finally, hazmat regulations forbid States from enacting any
    regulation or permit requirements that are not substantively
    the same as Federal regulations. However, States may require
    motor carriers to apply for permits to transport hazmat in
    their States. State permits are, unsurprisingly, substantively
    the same as Federal requirements. Carriers compliant with
    Federal requirements will, by definition, also be compliant
    with State requirements.
        Five States--Michigan, Nevada, Ohio, Oklahoma, and West
    Virginia--are currently members of the Alliance for Uniform
    Hazmat Transportation Procedures. The alliance States have
    amalgamated their application process online. A carrier can
    visit the site once, provide all the necessary information
    through a single interface, select the States in which the
    carrier transports hazmat, and pay a single composite fee.
    States that wish to require hazmat permits should be compelled
    to join the alliance. States already participate in similar
    programs for administering fuel taxes and processing motor
    carrier registrations.
        ATA and its members, along with The Kenan Advantage Group,
    support safe and secure transportation of hazmat. Hazmat
    regulations can be improved by reforming hazmat endorsement
    background check, forbidding PHMSA from issuing a final warning
    on the wet line rule, and compelling all States to join the
    alliance for issuing hazmat permits. All three, I believe, are
    very commonsense approaches.
        On behalf of The Kenan Advantage Group and ATA, I would
    like to thank you for this opportunity, and I would welcome any
    questions from the Members.
        Mr. Denham. Thank you, Mr. Downey.
        Mr. Schick, you may proceed.
        Mr. Schick. Good afternoon, Chairman Denham, Ranking Member
    Brown, members of the subcommittee. My name is Tom Schick, I am
    here on behalf of the American Chemistry Council. We appreciate
    this opportunity to testify on reauthorization of the Hazardous
    Materials Transportation Act.
        ACC represents the leading companies engaged in the
    business of chemistry. Our members apply the science of
    chemistry to make innovative products and services that make
    people's lives better, healthier, and safer. I would like to
    underscore the important role that the products manufactured
    and shipped by our members serve in virtually every aspect of
    our lives. The Nation depends on our industry to produce the
    chemicals that are necessary for safe drinking water, life-
    saving medications, medical devices, safe and plentiful food
    supply, energy-saving solar panels, and much more.
        Our members rely on all transportation modes to deliver
    products wherever they are needed to get the job done, from
    water treatment, to farms, to factories. Because a number of
    the shipments involve hazardous materials, we work constantly
    with our transportation partners to find ways to build upon an
    already impressive safety record. Through ACC's Responsible
    Care initiative, our member and partner companies are committed
    to continuous safety improvement in every aspect of
    transportation. Collectively, we have invested billions of
    dollars in training, technology, and equipment, and will
    continue to do so.
        We have also worked to establish a strong and successful
    partnership with emergency responders. For example, our
    members, working with other stakeholders, developed
    transportation community awareness and emergency response,
    known as the TRANSCAER program. This is a voluntary training
    effort to help communities prepare for possible hazmat
    incidents.
        Emergency responders also have access to a wide range of
    experts through ACC's CHEMTREC Center. When an incident does
    take place, the center provides the information on the best way
    to handle all types of hazmat. CHEMTREC provides this service
    24 hours a day, 7 days a week, at no cost to emergency
    responders, other callers, Government, or taxpayers. We invite
    the members of the subcommittee and the staff to tour our
    CHEMTREC Center in northern Virginia, or attend a TRANSCAER
    event.
        Turning to HMTA reauthorization, we believe the Federal
    Government must continue to play the central role in ensuring
    safe transportation of hazmat. Congress has wisely established
    a comprehensive national regulatory system that is administered
    by DOT. HMTA has worked well in making the transportation of
    chemicals and other hazardous materials safe for the public,
    for workers, and emergency responders.
        As you consider legislation to reauthorize HMTA, we
    strongly support the uniform national regulatory program that
    assures that all aspects of hazmat transportation are
    consistent across this country. We also support DOT's excellent
    work in harmonizing, to the maximum extent possible, U.S.
    hazmat regulations with international standards. This
    harmonization not only facilitates commerce in these important
    products, but also promotes safety through consistent hazard
    communication requirements, and consistent procedures and
    equipment.
        We are concerned, however, about two aspects. One is the
    loading and unloading of hazardous materials. Several years
    ago, DOT withdrew from the regulation of loading and unloading
    in certain circumstances. Yet DOT, as well as others, are
    critically aware of the importance of loading and unloading in
    safety. We think that loading and unloading are fundamental to
    safe transportation, and that Federal regulation is the way to
    provide that uniformity to enhance the training of hazmat
    employees and the preparedness of emergency responders. So we
    would like to see DOT re-establish its full regulatory position
    on loading and unloading.
        Turning to special permits, these allow safety-based
    variations from the existing rules. Applicants for special
    permits come forward voluntarily with proposals, and these can
    only be approved if DOT finds there is at least an equivalent
    level of safety to what the regulations require. Special
    permits are a win-win process. The applicants gain operational
    flexibility at no loss of safety. Other parties can learn from
    and even use the same special permits, if they are approved by
    DOT to do so. And the Department learns about new procedures
    and technologies that can later be incorporated into the
    regulations. In fact, MAP-21, as mentioned earlier, has DOT
    doing that.
        There has been some talk about user fees for special
    permits. We oppose that at ACC. Special permits are an inherent
    and beneficial part of the regulatory process that governs
    hazmat transportation. We think it is appropriate to maintain
    that function without imposing user fees that could interfere
    with the development and implementation of new safety
    enhancements.
        In conclusion, the country depends on HMTA and the safe and
    reliable system to move hazmat. Where improvements are deemed
    appropriate, we can all work together to continuously improve
    it. We look forward to cooperating with you in this, and I
    would be glad to answer any questions.
        Mr. Denham. Thank you, Mr. Schick.
        Mr. Pelkey, you may proceed.
        Mr. Pelkey. Good afternoon, Chairman Denham, Ranking Member
    Brown, other members of the subcommittee. I sincerely
    appreciate the opportunity to appear before you this afternoon
    to discuss issues regarding hazardous materials
    reauthorization, an issue of vital importance to the U.S.
    fireworks industry. I am Stephen Pelkey, president and CEO of
    Atlas Advanced Pyrotechnics, headquartered in Jaffrey, New
    Hampshire. I also currently serve on the board of directors of
    the American Pyrotechnics Association, and as the chairman of
    the APA's Transportation Committee.
        Atlas was founded in 1950 and is a prominent professional
    fireworks display company, producing award-winning displays
    throughout New England the world. Atlas employs 24 full-time
    workers. During our busy Fourth of July season, our employment
    rolls swell to 750 employees.
        I am here today on behalf of the APA. APA participates in
    the Interested Parties for Hazardous Materials Transportation
    coalition, commonly referred to as the IPs. I have been tasked
    to address the IPs and APA's number-one priority, which
    concerns the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration's
    Hazardous Material Safety Permit Program, and the ongoing
    delays in reforming this vital program.
        The HMSP program has been seriously flawed since inception,
    and I have detailed those flaws in my written submission. At
    the present time, to retain an HMSP, a carrier must maintain
    out-of-service inspection rates for vehicle, driver, and hazmat
    violations below a set percentile. HMSP holders are judged
    against all other carriers under the vehicle and driver rates.
    However, they are judged against themselves when determining
    the hazmat out-of-service rate, which is based on violations
    that, for the most part, are not crash-causal. And this is the
    most troubling and difficult area in which to maintain
    compliance.
        Unlike large, long-haul freight of all-kind transporters
    that operate year-round and are inspected frequently, display
    fireworks transporters operate primarily on a seasonal and
    periodic peak-time basis, typically driving much shorter
    distances and many fewer miles. Thus, we have far fewer
    inspection opportunities to offset any potential violation.
        In order to stay above the designated hazmat threshold, a
    carrier must have 14 clean inspections to overcome the effects
    of just 1 bad inspection. Atlas has firsthand experience with
    this extremely flawed program, as we unfortunately lost our
    permit in 2011 as a result of receiving several erroneous out-
    of-service citations that put our company above the hazmat
    disqualification threshold. Without a permit, in order for us
    to stay in business, we were forced to ship products in
    separate trucks, each legally transporting the less than 55
    pounds of fireworks, the threshold which triggers the
    application of the HMSP.
        For the better part of a year, we put 8 to 10 trucks,
    separate trucks, on the road, legally moving less than the 55
    pounds in each vehicle to each of our contracted display sites,
    as we aged out of the 12-month period to renew our permit.
    Needless to say, this placed an undue burden on our company,
    and one has to question whether public safety was enhanced by
    having multiple vehicles on the road, rather than transporting
    these products in just one vehicle.
        We appealed the erroneous paperwork-related citations to
    Federal Motor Carriers' DataQs. However, the State authority
    issuing the citation incorrectly entered the citation as ``no
    shipping papers offered.'' As Federal Motor Carrier Safety
    Administration chose to side with the State authority, rather
    than provide us with an opportunity and appropriately appeal
    the citation directly to Federal Motor Carrier.
        While we understand limited agency resources necessitate
    the delegation of enforcement to the States, we believe it is
    not appropriate that the agency has delegated its ultimate
    authority to determine whether a hazmat safety permit should be
    renewed or denied. The APA, along with several other IPs has
    been advocating for the need of an administrative process that
    would also allow Federal Motor Carrier to intervene outside of
    the DataQs. We will call this an additional level of safety
    review to determine a carrier's fitness prior to the denial of
    a permit.
        In 2011, Federal Motor Carrier agreed that the HMSP program
    was flawed, and accepted our petition for rulemaking. However,
    we are disappointed that the agency has not made reform of this
    program a priority. While the agency's recently released
    assessment report to Congress recognized the need to provide a
    means for corrective actions and/or second level of review for
    carriers, the agency does not establish a timeframe to address
    this ongoing problem.
        I am pleased to see a number of recommendations outlined in
    the assessment. Several of the recommendations, however, will
    require rulemaking, which is a lengthy process. In short,
    hazardous material safety permit holders will have no prospect
    of immediate relief. Providing HMSP holders an opportunity for
    an additional level of safety review before their permit is
    denied must be a priority.
        We are grateful to members of this subcommittee who have
    joined in efforts to reform this program. Atlas is committed to
    ensuring safety in the handling, transportation, and execution
    of our fireworks displays. Atlas and members of the APA will
    continue to provide safe and spectacular fireworks displays and
    delight and thrill American families across our great Nation.
        Mr. Denham. Thank you, Mr. Pelkey.
        Mr. Pelkey. And I thank you for this opportunity to
    testify.
        Mr. Denham. Thank you for your testimony.
        Ms. Harman?
        Ms. Harman. Good afternoon, Chairman Denham, Ranking Member
    Brown, and members of the subcommittee. My name is Elizabeth
    Harman, I serve as the assistant to the general president for
    hazmat, WMD training, and grants administration for the
    International Association of Fire Fighters. I am pleased to
    appear before you today on behalf of IFF General President
    Harold Schaitberger and the 300,000 firefighters and emergency
    medical personnel who comprise our organization.
        Fire departments in the United States receive over 350,000
    calls related to hazmat response each year. When an incident
    involving hazmat does occur, the individuals tasked with
    responding to the incident are most--almost, without fail,
    firefighters. Unfortunately, despite the potential for such an
    incident in every community in America, too many firefighters
    are insufficiently trained to ensure a safe and effective
    response.
        The reasons for the lack of properly trained firefighters
    vary, although, for the most part, it is simply a lack of
    funding. Nationwide, fire departments' funds are stretched
    thin, a situation which has been exasperated by the recent
    recession. In tight budgetary environments, training is often
    among the first items to be cut. Unfortunately, the lack of
    adequately trained personnel in the fire service means there
    are significant portions of the country where first responders
    are not prepared for an incident. This is an untenable
    situation which must be rectified.
        We must ensure that firefighters receive the type of
    training that is most appropriate for emergency response.
    Unfortunately, of the training that is being provided to
    firefighters, much is provided at an insufficient level. OSHA
    regulations identify special competencies for employees who are
    engaged in emergency response. Awareness level training is
    intended for individuals who are likely to witness or discover
    hazardous substance release, and notify the proper authorities,
    which, in most cases, would be a fire department.
        Operations level training is intended for workers who
    respond to releases or potential releases of hazardous
    substances. Their function is to contain the release from a
    safe distance, keep it from spreading, and prevent exposures.
    These regulations clearly indicate operations level training is
    the minimum level intended for firefighters. This is also
    supported by national consensus standards, such as NFPA 472.
    Providing awareness level training to firefighters is not
    sufficient. There is little point in training firefighters to
    learn how and when to call the fire department.
        Unfortunately, the number of firefighters receiving
    awareness level training, rather than operations level
    training, is growing. Congress has begun to address the
    inadequacies of hazardous materials training among
    firefighters. In MAP-21 Congress required that all training
    delivered to firefighters via PHMSA's hazardous material
    emergency preparedness grant program must be at the operations
    level or greater. While a positive step in the right direction,
    training provided via HMEP represents only a tiny fraction of
    the training received by firefighters nationwide.
        Congress should explore ways to encourage States and
    localities to provide all firefighters with operations level
    training, regardless of the funding source. We must also ensure
    that training is provided in a manner that must be customized
    and incorporate real-world events. Under the HMEP grant
    program, the IFF has received an annual grant to train
    instructors to deliver hazardous materials training to
    emergency responders nationwide in communities of all sizes. We
    have also recently, due to amendments in MAP-21, begun direct
    delivery of training, in addition to administering our train-
    the-trainer program.
        We believe our training provides the best model for
    training firefighters to respond safely and effectively to
    real-world hazmat incidents. We provide training to both
    professional and volunteer fire departments at no cost to them.
    The grant has enabled the IFF to sufficiently increase training
    rates in the first responder community. The IFF's unique
    training model provides responders with real-world training in
    hazmat response that few institutions can match. Instructors
    train through the IFF's program deliver training directly to
    responders in their own communities, allowing them to tailor
    their presentations to address unique concerns or challenges
    facing a particular community, such as a specific hazmat
    shipping route.
        The IFF model also utilizes highly experienced firefighter
    instructors to each its courses in a peer-to-peer setting.
    Independent evaluations of this training have found the
    programs to be cost effective, and evaluations have found the
    instruction to be highly effective. Simply put, the IFF
    provides exemplary hazmat training at a time when first
    responders need highly effective, appropriate training more
    than ever. We encourage the subcommittee to continue funding
    this valuable program, and use it as a model when considering
    expanding training opportunities for firefighters.
        PHMSA also has an important role to play in making it
    easier for responders to identify hazardous materials. The
    paperless hazardous communications pilot program established by
    MAP-21 represents a significant step forward in the development
    and advancement of identification tools. Providing first
    responders with access to updating e-shipping papers will help
    responders identify hazardous substances during a hazmat
    incident without putting personnel at risk.
        As PHMSA continues to develop HM-ACCESS, the program's
    success will depend upon meeting certain key criteria. First,
    responders must have access to e-shipping information. HM-
    ACCESS must conduct pilot tests in all forms of transportation.
    And PHMSA should consult with first responders, including rank-
    and-file users, at every step of the system's development.
        This concludes my testimony, and thank you for the
    opportunity to testify today. I am happy to answer any
    questions you may have.
        Mr. Denham. Thank you, Ms. Harman. I will now recognize
    each Member for 5 minutes' worth of questioning. Mr. Young, you
    are recognized.
        Mr. Young. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I do appreciate the
    courtesy.
        Administrator Quarterman, in the wake of the recent train
    derailments involving crude oil, the Department of
    Transportation issued a safety alert announcing that Bakken
    crude oil could be more volatile than conventional crude oil,
    and may need to be handled differently. Instead of focusing on
    the cause of the derailment, your agency seems to be
    preoccupied with the characteristics of crude oil. When crude
    oil is transported by railcar, it is labeled as group one, two,
    and three. And which of these packing group, Mr.-- Madam
    Administrator, is the most dangerous?
        Ms. Quarterman. Thank you for your question. The
    Administration is not just focused on identifying the
    characteristics of the crude oil. In fact, we have a three-part
    approach, which includes, as the very first step, prevention of
    incidents. The second is mitigation of incidents, should they
    occur. And the third is making response available to incidents.
        In terms of the packing group that is the most dangerous,
    packing group one, sir.
        Mr. Young. And Bakken oil is number two, if I am not
    mistaken. Bakken oil is two.
        Ms. Quarterman. Bakken oil may be one or two. We have seen
    from our testing----
        Mr. Young. It is two. It is two. One is the most volatile.
    Bakken oil is two.
        At the last safety hearing you said that cars are not a
    silver bullet, and we should be focused on preventing
    derailments. Yet yesterday, you publicly complained that the
    oil industry has not shared Bakken crude characteristics with
    your agency. What is the number one cause for rail--tankers to
    be derailed?
        Ms. Quarterman. I think we have been clear from the
    beginning, sir, that it is a multi--it is a very complicated
    problem which requires a comprehensive approach. Included among
    that approach are determining the characteristics of the crude.
    And, as I said at the beginning, prevention is the very first
    leg of the three-legged stool that we think will prevent this
    from occurring, and we have been working very hard----
        Mr. Young. In all due respects, madam----
        Ms. Quarterman. Sure.
        Mr. Young. In all due respects, where is the problem of any
    rail going off because of what you are carrying?
        Ms. Quarterman. [No response.]
        Mr. Young. There is none. It is at the rail. It is not the
    liquid which you are carrying in the container. This is not a
    new process.
        Ms. Quarterman. Everything has to be----
        Mr. Young. This has been going on for years and years and--
    --
        Ms. Quarterman [continuing]. Considered, sir.
        Mr. Young [continuing]. Years and years, and I--my interest
    in this, we have--we transport volatile fuel in tank cars, as
    they are made today, the same cars that are used in the Bakken
    field, and yet there seems to be some interest in your agency
    to say that it is the car's fault. It is the rail's fault.
        Ms. Quarterman. I am not here to ascribe blame to anyone. I
    am here to tell you that, as a multiple--it requires multiple
    responses. It is a comprehensive approach which includes
    prevention. Yes, you are correct, we need to ensure that train
    cars stay on the track, absolutely true. But we also need to
    ensure that the package itself is appropriate, and that the
    materials that are in the package are appropriately packaged,
    and that the materials are appropriate to be shipped.
        Mr. Young. Mr. Chairman, my interest in this is this is
    another agency that doesn't understand what in the world they
    are doing. A multiple facet, and you are going to package
    something different that has been packaged all these years, and
    you say we have to have a new way, area, time of packaging
    crude oil that--makes no difference what we have been doing all
    these years. Happens to be more volume. There is probably rails
    that have been misused, and that is where we should be
    concentrating.
        And, by the way, how many of the oil companies have shared
    their data with you on Bakken oil?
        Ms. Quarterman. I believe we have received information from
    three companies so far.
        Mr. Young. It is four, but that is OK. I just--because they
    have communicated with you. And have they ever said anything
    about the cars?
        Ms. Quarterman. I beg your pardon?
        Mr. Young. Have they ever said anything about the cars?
        Ms. Quarterman. Well, as I said, I believe that there were
    three companies that provided information to us. And in terms
    of the cars, I don't understand your question.
        Mr. Young. No. What I am saying--have they ever said
    anything about the cars being inadequate to carry the fuel?
        Ms. Quarterman. Have the companies----
        Mr. Young. Yes.
        Ms. Quarterman [continuing]. Said that the cars were--I
    have no idea.
        Mr. Young. No? OK. Mr. Chairman, again, what I don't want
    to see is an agency, ``OK, we are going to have a silver
    bullet, we are going to produce new cars, double hull,'' da,
    da, da--has nothing to do with these derailments. As ex-
    chairman of this committee, that is what we should be
    concentrating on, not the other stuff. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Mr. Denham. Thank you, Mr. Young. Ms. Brown?
        Ms. Brown. I think we need to follow up on this discussion,
    because the last meeting we had AAR said the cause was
    inadequate, and they are beginning to develop additional cars.
    But in addition to that, it really doesn't matter if your city
    explodes, whether the car was at fault or whether what they was
    carrying is at fault. We need to make sure that we do the
    multiplicity of things, including prevention. That is the first
    thing.
        But the question that I have here is that we asked the last
    time, and seeing your testimony, that the Petroleum Institute
    said that they were cooperating. I need to know. Have they
    provided you with the information that you need for the
    testing? And, if not, what is it that we need to do to make
    sure that you are getting what you need, whether it is this
    crude, the oil crude, or this new crude we using? If it kills
    you, then it is the same.
        Ms. Quarterman. Well, let me just say that we are working
    hard with all the stakeholders involved in this, and asking
    them to come to the table and cooperate with us, in terms of
    providing information, whether they be a rail industry or a
    petroleum industry.
        We have, as I mentioned, a few companies who have come
    forward, and we applaud----
        Ms. Brown. How many companies are we talking about?
        Ms. Quarterman. We have had three companies provide us
    detailed information. We have had conversations with several
    companies who have provided more anecdotal information. My
    statement went more to the American Petroleum Institute, who
    has not provided any individual information on that. They have,
    however, come forward to put together a working group to look
    at classification piece, and try to come forward with the
    standard, and we appreciate that assistance.
        Other organizations have also stepped forward: the American
    Petroleum--wait, fuel--the Association of Fuel and Petroleum
    Manufacturers have indicated that they are going to put
    together some information for us. My statement really went to
    the American Petroleum Institute, who has not supplied any data
    with respect to the characteristics of the crude. And one would
    think that they would know.
        Ms. Brown. Two questions. What, as far as the material is
    concerned, the firefighters, when we train them--and this is
    for you also, Ms. Harman--how can we make sure that they have
    the adequate equipment and training so that they can protect
    themselves when we have an explosion? We have had two in
    Florida where people were killed. And we have got to make sure
    that that does not happen.
        Ms. Harman. Thank you very much. That is an excellent
    point, and I appreciate your comments in your opening comments.
    And you may not be aware, we do have some of our instructors
    from Jacksonville, Florida, who are part of our instructor
    cadre that teach all over the United States, as well as Canada,
    with other funding sources.
        And training, for us, is key. Training for urban areas,
    rural, and suburban, is key. And there are times when our
    instructors will arrive at locations. They know they need the
    training, they have requested the training. And I can tell you
    when our instructors arrive there, they don't necessarily have
    the proper equipment to do what they need to do. And that is
    where our training model that comes into play brings those
    outside experiences, folks that have dealt with experiences--
    unfortunately, like you have in Florida--to bring that to those
    smaller, rural areas, to say, ``You know what? You need this
    equipment, you need that equipment.''
        Then, the next question is, ``Where is the funding that
    comes from that?'' They are small departments working off a--
    rural volunteer fire departments working off budgets of $89,000
    a year. There are large metropolitan areas that are working on
    much larger budgets. But the key to this equipment is true
    operations-based training, which, at times, is your basic
    firefighting equipment and a whole lot of water. Sometimes foam
    is at play in some of this, but if it is a running liquid that
    is going, foam is not going to eventually help that. So, our
    instructors will help guide those departments where they need
    to go.
        Ms. Brown. Ms. Quarterman, you mentioned in your testimony,
    or the last time, there are grants available. How do you let
    the community know that these grants are available for
    training, and to educate the community?
        Ms. Quarterman. Yes, there are grants available: the HMEP
    grants, which were referred to earlier. And when those grants
    come out we have a--obviously, we send out a press release, we
    tweet it around the country, we talk to individual members to
    let them know that this is available to their States and
    localities. And in this past instance, we have included a
    special provision related to crude oil.
        Let me just add to what Ms. Harman said on the firefighter
    front. We have put together a working group to talk about the
    Bakken crude in responding to those incidents. As was mentioned
    earlier, we sent out a safety alert, which was focused, in many
    ways, to the emergency response community, so that they would
    know that when they see these trainloads of crude going across
    the country, it is not crude that they may be accustomed to
    responding to. It is really a much lighter, more volatile
    crude. Thank you.
        Mr. Denham. Thank you, Ms. Brown.
        Ms. Brown. Thank----
        Mr. Denham. Mr. Hanna?
        Mr. Hanna. Thank you, Chairman. Administrator Quarterman,
    can you answer a quick question for me? Are more hazardous
    materials--meaning oil, gas, et cetera, natural gas, propane--
    carried underground than over ground?
        Ms. Quarterman. I think the answer is yes.
        Mr. Hanna. So that the XL pipeline might not be a bad idea?
        Ms. Quarterman. That is not under my authority----
        Mr. Hanna. No, I realize that. I just couldn't resist.
        [Laughter.]
        Mr. Hanna. The--Mr. Pelkey--thank you. You said that you
    need 14 positive inspections to offset 1. Is that regardless of
    the size or number of trips that your particular business is
    making?
        Mr. Pelkey. Yes. There is a certain threshold that you have
    to maintain under for any hazmat type of----
        Mr. Hanna. So that--the conclusion would be that if you are
    not a big company, you may never get back to a point where you
    are making--you have made enough inspections. You may be--find
    yourself in a position where you are begging to be inspected,
    because you need to get past that 14 threshold.
        Mr. Pelkey. Correct.
        Mr. Hanna. So, shouldn't it be more flexible for somebody
    who is small, as opposed to big? I mean, does 14 fit every
    company?
        And, let's--conversely, if you are a huge company, you may
    get inspected 14 times in a day, which lets them--you know,
    they would actually be able to have an error a day, because
    they are off the hook the next day. Am I getting that----
        Mr. Pelkey. Thank you, Congressman. That is a great
    question. It is further exacerbated because most display
    companies across the country normally would perform their
    duties and their work over this July 2nd, 3rd, 4th of July, New
    Year's Eve or Labor Day. And in most cases, there aren't any
    enforcement teams that are out there that are inspecting on
    those particular----
        Mr. Hanna. So you----
        Mr. Pelkey [continuing]. Nights and weekends, and you are
    lucky to see one. If you did receive one--and sometimes you
    do--often times you wouldn't even have a hazardous material
    authorized person to inspect. Therefore, you would be going
    through the inspection process----
        Mr. Hanna. So you can't get a ticket if you beg for one on
    the wrong day.
        Mr. Pelkey. We have gone through, and several of our
    members of the American Pyrotechnics Association have gone
    through a stop, a weigh point, and begged for an inspection,
    for a hazmat inspection, and there just isn't a certified
    inspector there.
        Mr. Hanna. Mr. Schick, did you want to say something?
        Mr. Schick. I am not going to--we don't operate motor
    carriers, for the most part----
        Mr. Hanna. Right, right.
        Mr. Schick [continuing]. I am not going to join into that
    one.
        Mr. Hanna. Well, thank you very much. Chairman?
        Mr. Denham. Mr. Hanna yields back. Mr. DeFazio?
        Mr. DeFazio. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would--he is not
    here, but I would respectfully disagree with the former
    chairman. We need to know what materials are being carried, and
    both obviously deal with operational issues, which is FRA, and
    they are not before us today, and deal with, you know, the
    actual containment of those materials. And it does make a
    difference, in terms of the containment. It certainly makes a
    difference to the first responders, in terms of the knowledge
    of--the training and the materials to deal with that. So I
    would have some disagreement there.
        But on--Madam Administrator, on February 26th we held a
    hearing. And, as you might remember, we had some discussion. I
    was trying to find out about a potential date for rulemaking
    for the new tank cars. I am wondering what the current status
    is. Have you completed your work? Is it at the Secretary's
    office? Is it down there with the trolls at OMB? Where is it?
        Ms. Quarterman. We have made great progress since we--I
    last testified before you. We have a--shall we say a draft in
    circulation? So we are working very hard, and hoping to move
    that rule out very soon.
        Mr. DeFazio. Can we just go back to what ``very soon''
    might mean? Not to belabor my point from the last hearing, but
    I would like--here is the issue--we have one major rail company
    looking at making a huge investment. Whether or not they will
    have a safe harbor if they go ahead with their improved tank
    car, whether or not other people will buy the AAR version, or
    whether or not people will try and make the 111's safer,
    depends upon both the rule you put forward, what it proposes,
    and what conditions it puts on the existing cars.
        Ms. Quarterman. No, I agree with that, and we have been
    having ongoing conversations with those folks, as well. So we
    know that commitments are being considered, and that is why we
    are working as fast as we possibly can to get a rule out.
        Mr. DeFazio. OK. So I am not going to get much further with
    that.
        So, there is another issue, which I actually was surprised
    by. I have been on the Aviation Subcommittee for a very long
    time, and I had no idea that the lithium batteries are
    nominally the jurisdiction of PHMSA, but have been delegated to
    FAA. And I would note that I think we are 8 years or so into a
    rulemaking, which I hope doesn't happen with tank cars. Can you
    give me any idea about what DOT is doing to harmonize our
    standards with those of ICAO, which would seem to be reasonable
    to me?
        Ms. Quarterman. Absolutely. Yes, it is actually our
    rulemaking, and we are responsible for hazmat, no matter how it
    moves, as well as operational issues related to hazmat in
    different modes. We have a rule that we are hoping to get out
    very soon to complete our harmonization with ICAO on the
    lithium battery, as well.
        Mr. DeFazio. OK. And is that rule somewhere other than in
    your agency?
        Ms. Quarterman. It is.
        Mr. DeFazio. Would it be down at OMB?
        Ms. Quarterman. I think it is all public, where it is. It
    is----
        Mr. DeFazio. Is it there? I mean you can tell me yes or no?
        Ms. Quarterman. Yes, it is.
        Mr. DeFazio. Yes. I can find it, yes.
        Ms. Quarterman. Yes.
        Mr. DeFazio. OK. I once had a colleague, Al Swift, from
    Washington State. And he described to me the people at OMB. He
    says, ``DeFazio, they are the trolls with the green eyeshades
    that hide under the bridges, and they come out and gnaw on your
    leg every once in a while.''
        I know OMB is concerned about cost effectiveness, but when
    it comes to saving lives or keeping an airplane in the air, I
    think they need to move more promptly. So now I know where to
    direct my concerns. Although, in terms of the tank car, I think
    they are still to you; in terms of lithium batteries, it is to
    OMB.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Denham. Ms. Quarterman, the GAO report on the safety of
    wet lines raised significant concerns with the accuracy of the
    data, and found that the costs and benefits were not accurately
    presented in the proposed rule. Yet PHMSA refuses to withdraw
    proposed wet lines rule. Do you plan on withdrawing the
    proposed rule? And why, or why not?
        Ms. Quarterman. Let me just say for my friends at OMB who
    work really hard on our issues, that, you know, that they are
    supportive, I think, of safety, as well.
        On your question on wet lines, we are in the process of
    reviewing the results from the GAO study to determine--I mean
    they were critical of our regulatory evaluation, determining
    the costs and benefits associated with the wet lines rule. So
    we are still in the process of reviewing that, looking at the
    data that we have associated with that, looking at the
    recommendations that they gave to us about how we might improve
    that data.
        And then, we will determine whether we withdraw the rule or
    move forward with it. Whether we do either, we will certainly
    want to improve the safety of wet lines, whether it is through
    a rulemaking or something else. My colleague, Mr. Downey,
    mentioned that there are other options available. I welcome him
    to come talk to our staff about ways that we might improve wet
    lines in the future.
        Mr. Denham. So, just to be clear, you do not disagree with
    the GAO report.
        Ms. Quarterman. They drew some conclusions about our
    analysis, our cost benefit analysis. We are going back to look
    at their recommendations, and try to improve that, and then we
    will make a determination on how to proceed.
        Mr. Denham. Thank you. And what is your timeline on that?
        Ms. Quarterman. We don't have a timeline, that I am aware
    of, at the moment. You know, the next few months we will be
    looking at that.
        Mr. Denham. This is something you intend on either--making
    a recommendation one way or another within the next couple of
    months?
        Ms. Quarterman. Yes. We have been a little busy recently.
        Mr. Denham. Thank you. Mr. Downey, you expressed concern
    about the wet lines rulemaking. How would you propose that
    PHMSA use its resources in order to withdraw its proposed
    rulemaking?
        Mr. Downey. With the GAO report, but also the independent
    evaluation that was done. Our position is that we can take the
    dollars that would be required to retrofit our trailers, or buy
    new trailers with some type of device that would evacuate the
    wet lines, and put those dollars to training or other types of
    technologies that would prevent accidents, such as anti-
    rollover stability equipment.
        Mr. Denham. Thank you. Mr. Schick, you are supportive of
    PHMSA's regulating loading and unloading of hazardous
    materials. What are the benefits PHMSA's--what are the benefits
    of PHMSA's doing so? And, specifically, will it help the
    preparedness of emergency responders?
        Mr. Schick. Mr. Chairman, we are totally supportive of
    that. As I said in the written testimony, they had somewhat
    withdrawn the application of their authority, which they pretty
    clearly have. We think that that is primarily for operational
    safety and operational efficiency of the shippers and the
    consignees who do the loading and unloading and are present
    when that happens. It is important for safety for everyone that
    the same kind of activity, say the same unloading conducted
    with the same equipment from the same, let's say, cargo tank,
    be under PHMSA's jurisdiction, so they have oversight over
    everything. It should not matter whether the person doing the
    unloading happens to be the employee of the trucking company or
    happens to be the employee of the consignee.
        I think since that happens mostly on site, it is primarily
    for those kind of operations, rather than emergency responders.
    But more fundamentally, the loading and unloading are known to
    be potential causes of accidents. So, if you are looking to
    prevent accidents, obviously you want your loading and
    unloading to be done in a safe manner. And we believe that if
    it is done in a consistent manner under Federal oversight, as
    opposed to possibly disparate ways under different State and
    local jurisdictions, that will enhance safety.
        Mr. Denham. Thank you. And can you also explain the
    concerns you have with imposing further costs on special
    permits and approvals of applicants?
        Mr. Schick. Yes, I can, sir. As I said in testimony, the
    special permit applications actually come from parties--it
    could be shippers or carriers, it could be Government agencies
    who are in the role of a shipper, for example--that have come
    up with a new way to do something. But they know, full well, it
    does not fit under the current written PHMSA regulations. So
    they come forward, they acknowledge that, they make a
    presentation to the agency, and the agency evaluates it. It
    cannot proceed to grant a special permit unless it is shown to
    be at least as protective as what the rules apply.
        If it passes that test, and it can be put into place by the
    applicant who gets a special permit, other parties who do the
    same thing can also use that, and the agency, in effect, gets
    research and development. They get new ideas brought to them,
    and they get to look at them. And then, over time, they can
    move those into the regulations. So everyone benefits.
        Mr. Denham. Thank you. Ms. Napolitano?
        Mrs. Napolitano. Thank you, sir. Ms. Quarterman, what steps
    are being taken to ensure the safe, secure shipment of chlorine
    and other toxic gases? The railroad companies recently
    partnered with DOT and TSA to put in place the procedures to
    further improve the safety and secure shipment of the gas.
    Could you share some of those procedures, quickly?
        Ms. Quarterman. I will have to get back to you for--on the
    record on that.
        Mrs. Napolitano. Would you report that back, please?
        Ms. Quarterman. Yes, absolutely.
        [The information follows:]

            Working closely with FRA and TSA, PHMSA established several
            critical requirements to ensure safety and security of toxic
            gas shipments. Key requirements and procedures include:

              Security Plans (49 CFR Sec.  172.800)--Each person
            who offers for transportation in commerce or transports in
            commerce a PIH material must develop and adhere to a
            transportation security plan. The security plan must be based
            on an assessment of the possible transportation security risks
            for materials transported, stored, or unloaded incidental to
            movement. Key components of the security plan include:
                    Measures to address assessed risks regarding
                personnel security, unauthorized access, and en route
                security;
                    Identification by job title of the senior
                management official responsible for development and
                implementation of the plan;
                    Security duties for each position or department
                responsible for implementing the plan; and
                    Training for hazmat employees.

              Rail Routing (49 CFR Sec.  172.820)--Rail carriers
            must assess available routes using, at a minimum, the 27
            factors listed in Appendix D to Part 172 of the HMR to
            determine the safest, most secure routes for security-sensitive
            hazardous materials. These factors address safety and security
            issues, such as the condition of the track and supporting
            infrastructure; the presence or absence of signals; past
            incidents; population density along the route; environmentally
            sensitive or significant areas; venues along the route
            (stations, events, places of congregation); emergency response
            capability along the route; measures and countermeasures
            already in place to address apparent safety and security risks;
            and proximity to iconic targets. The regulations require rail
            carriers to make conscientious efforts to develop logical and
            defendable routing decisions using these factors.
              Speed Restriction by Rail (49 CFR Sec.  174.86)--For
            trains transporting any loaded, placarded tank cars containing
            a material poisonous by inhalation, the maximum allowable
            operating speed is 50 mph.
              Enhanced Tank Car Design (49 CFR Sec. Sec.  179.100
            and 179.102-3)--Increased tank car design standards for head
            and shell puncture resistance, nozzles, and top fittings
            protection.

        Mrs. Napolitano. Thank you. Mr. Schick, you were talking
    about the training of loading and unloading. That is a real
    serious issue with me. I have one of the largest corridors of
    rail transportation and truck transportation in my area. And I
    visited some of the places where they build the double wall for
    chemicals.
        My concern is that we are providing training at one of the
    local university colleges for firefighting in hazmats. But are
    we training them in the proper procedures of loading and
    unloading?
        Mr. Schick. I don't believe, ma'am, that the firefighters
    would be doing the loading and unloading. I am talking about
    the loading that happens at the production site, and the
    unloading at the receiver's site.
        Mrs. Napolitano. Right, but----
        Mr. Schick. Rather than what might happen----
        Mrs. Napolitano [continuing]. If there is a spill, the
    firefighters have to come in and help clean up. Do they not?
        Mr. Schick. If it is on--if it is outside of
    transportation, there--certainly could be called in certain
    circumstances. If it happens during transportation, obviously,
    it is out in the public space, and it is a different issue, I
    think, in that sense.
        But, again, I think the loading and unloading itself is not
    done by the emergency responders. The National Transportation
    Safety Board a number of years ago--took a very close look at
    this back in 2001--this was at the time when PHMSA was in the
    process of drawing back its regulatory authority. And the NTSB
    said in no uncertain terms that they are not convinced that if
    RSPA--it was then called RSPA, Research and Special Programs
    Administration; it is PHMSA today--relinquished its regulatory
    authority over hazardous materials loading/unloading
    operations, other Federal, State agencies would be able--they
    are concerned whether they would be able to exercise the
    necessary safety oversight of these very specific areas of
    transportation. That is why we at ACC support--and I believe
    the large Interested Parties community generally supports--the
    re-establishment of loading and unloading as primary functions
    under DOT's jurisdiction, and not to leave it to disparate
    points of view.
        Another aspect from industry is if someone is involved in
    that at a plant site, if they are going to be transferred and
    have a job opportunity elsewhere within their corporation, it
    would also be helpful--it is not a safety issue, but it would
    be helpful, not only for the company, but for the personnel, to
    be able to go somewhere else and have the same rules apply.
        Mrs. Napolitano. But are the chemical companies required to
    report on-site accidents of loading and unloading?
        Mr. Schick. I would--I think I will ask Ms. Quarterman, who
    is here. I think that when the carrier is present, the carrier
    files a 5800 report, which is the report for the unintended
    release of hazardous materials. I think what happens without
    the carrier being present--even, as I said, with exactly the
    same process and equipment, I think you may be having PHMSA
    deprive itself of exactly that kind of knowledge.
        Mrs. Napolitano. Ms. Quarterman?
        Ms. Quarterman. If there is a loading and unloading
    incident that is associated with transportation, then, yes, it
    would be reported on the 5800 report.
        Mrs. Napolitano. OK, thank you. And, Ms. Harman, how much
    placarding information should be displayed on the railcars
    carrying material? And is this important to the local folks to
    be able to know what is being transported?
        Ms. Harman. Thank you for your question. Yes, it is
    absolutely critical that we understand what is being placarded.
    Your first responders that arrive to a scene of an incident
    like that, their job is defensive operations, not just to
    recognize, but also to prevent any further damage to the
    community, whether they have to dam and dike. They have got to
    notify the community, they have got to look up that particular
    item in the ERG book, and figure out if there needs to be some
    sort of evacuation, how far that needs to be. So, yes, it is
    absolutely critical that we are able to know what is in that
    container.
        Mrs. Napolitano. Where should be the best place for
    displaying of such material that is being transported?
        Ms. Harman. Right in the public view, of where those are
    located now. In addition, if there is an incident, and that is
    an obstructed view, the shipping papers are critical for us, as
    well.
        Mrs. Napolitano. Well, that question has come up in the
    past, because there have been some instances in my area in
    years past, and there was no way of getting to the cab, to the
    front of the locomotive. And so there was a question about what
    was inherently being carried.
        Ms. Harman. Right.
        Mrs. Napolitano. Because the placarding was not sufficient.
        Ms. Harman. Right. And the key for us--you know, worst case
    scenario--I mean, obviously, the placarding needs to be there
    for us. The shipping papers need to be there for us. Even if--
    when we move into an e-shipping, electronic world, you know,
    that shouldn't replace the paper shipping papers for us. There
    is always a way for us to go back to the basics. It is critical
    for firefighters.
        But if we cannot view those, it is going to be treated as
    any other flammable liquid until additional resources arrive.
        Mrs. Napolitano. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Hanna [presiding]. Ms. Esty?
        Ms. Esty. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am really glad we are
    having this hearing today. Just last year, we had one of these
    chemical spills in Fulton Park, in one of my cities in
    Waterbury, Connecticut.
        And, again, the issues Ms. Harman has raised about the
    preparedness of those who arrive at the scene and often do not
    know what they are encountering, and have to make life-and-
    death decisions immediately for a community. So I want to drill
    down a little bit more into some of those issues.
        So, Administrator Quarterman, does PHMSA currently have a
    system that can collect and analyze hazardous material incident
    data collected by emergency responders?
        Ms. Quarterman. We do not have the data that is collected
    by emergency responders. We do require reporting by anyone who
    has an incident, and we have that data, which we correlate. We
    have had conversations. My deputy is actually a former fire
    chief, and he has had conversation with several different
    firefighting organizations about what data they do collect, and
    the extent to which we might get some of that data and
    integrate it with ours, because we actually collect data not
    just for us, but for all the modes who have involvement in
    hazmat.
        Ms. Esty. So is there a reason we don't have a system that,
    as a regular course of business, collects this data?
        Ms. Quarterman. I--it is an ongoing conversation. Part of
    it has to be attributed to resources.
        Ms. Esty. All right. And following up on that, Ms. Harman
    had expressed concern about--that whatever systems are
    developed, that they need to be accessible 24 hours a day, and
    whether there is paperwork there or not. What provisions, if
    any, is--you know, is the agency looking at?
        And, in PHMSA, what is in place now to ensure that
    electronic communications are accessible in these dramatic
    incidents? It might be 2 a.m., chaos is reigning, somebody is
    trying to look at a sheet of paper and determine what these
    substances are, and what they should do.
        Ms. Quarterman. Currently, paper is the only thing that is
    available. We are in the process of putting together a pilot to
    do electronic reporting for movement of hazardous materials. We
    actually had a session last year including, most importantly,
    emergency responders, because we viewed their opinions as, you
    know, paramount, in terms of how do we move from paper to
    electronic. To what extent do we need paper? So that is an
    ongoing conversation.
        Obviously, when we have a pilot, hopefully this year, that
    will be a part of what we want to learn, a big part of what we
    want to learn, and make sure that things move smoothly.
        Ms. Esty. For Ms. Harman, I know that the National Fire
    Protection Agency estimates that 65 percent of departments that
    are responsible for responding for hazmat do not have formal
    training. What can we do in Congress? What can we do to address
    that? And, obviously, as we are seeing--as you can tell by the
    questioning about Bakken crude, we expect there are going to be
    more transportation within our borders on these issues.
        What do you recommend that we in Congress ought to be
    looking at? It is resources, obviously, some of that. But if it
    is just up to grants, I have got to tell you I represent 41
    cities and towns. Some of these towns are 4,000 people. And if
    we are leaving it up to the volunteer firefighters in Goshen,
    Connecticut, to know that there is funding available someplace,
    and a grant application maybe, that their 100 volunteers will
    get life-sustaining training, I don't think that is acceptable.
    I don't think that is acceptable for our communities, and it is
    not acceptable for our volunteers, who put their lives on the
    line. So, what should we be doing on the congressional level?
        Ms. Harman. Well, not the answer you want to hear, but
    continued funding is key for us. I mean training is key. The
    training is out there. There are multiple modes of training
    deliveries. There are fixed facility training. We are proud of
    the portable delivery training model that we bring. We have a
    strong demand for training right now. There is a wait list for
    classes that we can't even get to.
        The train-the-trainer model is important for us,
    particularly for those smaller communities. We don't see as
    many requests for train-the-trainer coming in, particularly
    now, and particularly from the smaller volunteer communities,
    because you have got folks in this economy not only trying to
    volunteer, but working multiple jobs, finding it difficult to
    do training. They take a train-the-trainer, now they have got
    to prepare themselves as an instructor to teach the rest of
    their community, and they may not have some of those larger
    scale incidents like you have had there in Waterbury to bring
    that experience into their facility.
        So, it is important, I think, for Congress to continue to,
    number one, enforce that operations level training. It should
    be the minimum level of training for all firefighters,
    regardless if they are career or volunteer, and encourage them
    to reach out to organizations. They have got to take a
    proactive approach. We are certainly there to provide training
    throughout career or volunteer. There is other funding sources
    that are there. There is online training modules that we offer.
    The resources are there, but it takes a level of effort to also
    get that.
        Ms. Esty. Also, if you could, quickly, give us your advice
    on gear, what sort of gear they ought to be looking at having.
        Ms. Harman. Gear is critical. I mean your traditional
    turnout gear for firefighters, which is your firefighting
    ensemble, a self-contained breathing apparatus, is key. A lot
    of water, a lot of hose. There has been a lot of discussion
    about foam, and foam caches set up. You know, a large-scale
    incident, I don't think any large jurisdiction is going to have
    enough foam to put out any of these. So it is really the
    traditional firefighter that you see now, if you were to call
    911 and showed up here, is the same firefighter that is
    initially going to show up on a scene like that in their
    regular turnout gear.
        Mr. Denham [presiding]. Thank you. Thank you. Mr. Michaud.
        Mr. Michaud. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And I want
    to thank the panelists, as well, for testifying today. This
    question is for Ms. Harman.
        As you are aware, last summer, when the train wreck in Lac-
    Megantic--the severity of that wreck. And, since then, several
    of my colleagues and I have advocated for multiple-person crews
    on freight trains, particularly those carrying hazardous
    materials or meeting trains carrying hazardous materials. We
    believe that this is a public safety issue, and the FRA
    actually believes it is a safety issue, as well. And if you
    look at past rail accidents, there are many incidents of
    multiple-person crews being able to mitigate the damage by
    separating the train from the burning cars, and being able to
    work with first responders.
        My question to you is, could you share with us your
    thoughts on how having multiple crewmembers on hazmat trains
    could improve safety and interaction with the first responders?
        Ms. Harman. Sure. We believe in multiple crews--are crucial
    for us to get the response done appropriately and efficiently.
    You know, the original driver of that train can easily be
    injured in the crash themselves. Having multiple people,
    particularly multiple people who are trained, who are trained
    to work collaboratively with the first responders so they don't
    meet for the first time at the scene of that incident, that is
    critical for us.
        Mr. Michaud. Thank you. The second question is for you, as
    well. I recently met with a mayor who is a head of the Maine
    Municipal Association and learned that many local fire
    departments only carry enough foam to extinguish a car fire.
    That would be incapable of responding to a major rail or truck
    disaster calling for additional foam from surrounding areas.
        I recognize that we probably can't ensure that every fire
    department in the country has the resources to respond to every
    kind of major disaster, but I do think that local fire
    departments should have the information to quickly locate and
    call for those additional resources in the case of an
    emergency. Is there something that we should do at the
    congressional level to facilitate this type of information
    sharing? Or do you have any ideas of what we can do, as far as
    foam, as it relates to major train wreck?
        Ms. Harman. No, that is an excellent question. We get a lot
    of questions on foam. How much is enough? How much is not
    enough? The true underlying resolve to a lot of this is pre-
    planning. It is knowing who your partners are, knowing what is
    coming through your community, knowing what you need to be
    prepared for, and potentially how much.
        As I said earlier, I don't think enough foam is going to
    cover any major incident. And it has to do with the pre-
    planning. And at times, really, if you are in a rural area and
    there is not an immediate threat to life or significant
    property, there is going to be a time where you are just going
    to let it burn off.
        So, you know, we are supportive of free planning, of
    collaborative training, and bringing folks together so that
    they truly--they are not meeting for the first time at the
    scene of that incident.
        Mr. Michaud. Thank you. Does anyone else on the panel want
    to address the issue about adequacy of foam, particularly if
    you are in a rural area with a major train wreck?
        Ms. Quarterman. I will just comment on the end comment from
    Ms. Harman, in that my deputy has said the same thing. It is
    not intuitive for me, not being a firefighter, but he has said,
    you know, in an instance like that, you try to get the people
    out, and you probably just let the fire burn out. So----
        Mr. Michaud. OK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Yield back.
        Mr. Denham. Thank you. Ms. Hahn?
        Ms. Hahn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ms. Quarterman, I had an
    incident that just happened in my district in Wilmington,
    California, where 40 barrels of crude oil from a crack in an
    idle oil pipeline spewed into a residential neighborhood in
    Wilmington, California. Obviously, this spill endangered the
    health and safety of hundreds of my constituents, as well as
    caused untold amounts in property damage and cost to the local
    economy.
        And while the spill is still under investigation,
    information that we have learned so far suggests that the spill
    was caused by an internal corrosion of an idle pipeline that,
    unfortunately, still contained a lot of oil. The current owner
    of the pipeline believed that the idle pipeline was empty when
    it was received 15 years ago from the previous owner. And no
    inspection of the inside of the pipeline apparently is required
    under PHMSA or State guidelines.
        So, while there is a clear process for shutting down
    pipelines that are not intended to be used any more through the
    process of abandonment, and there is clear inspection and
    monitoring process for active pipelines, it seems to me there
    is no process for ensuring that idle, out-of-service pipelines
    that are believed to be empty, but are intended to be used
    again, are actually empty of hazardous material.
        I just feel like if at any point during this 15 years, if
    the current owner of the pipeline had verified that it was
    empty, or State officials would have verified it was empty, or
    the Federal Government would have verified it was empty, this
    spill would have never occurred. And I think it is this lack of
    verification that led to a hazardous pipeline spill and
    seriously, you know, endangered my constituents, who are
    already kind of the--on the short end of the stick, living next
    to the ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach, which is--any
    manner of hazardous event could happen on a daily basis. Also,
    this community probably sits on more pipelines than any other
    community, I believe, in southern California.
        So, am I not understanding it properly? Is there a process
    for any kind of verification of an out-of-service, idle
    pipeline, versus an active or abandoned pipeline? And, if not,
    why not? And is this a loophole that we should try to close?
        Ms. Quarterman. Well, as you know, the--this current
    situation is under investigation, so we can't really talk about
    the details of that situation. But you are right, that my
    understanding is that the pipeline was idle, as opposed to
    abandoned. Whether a pipeline is idle for 15 years, I think, is
    an open question. Certainly, if it is an abandoned pipeline, it
    should have been----
        Ms. Hahn. It has to be capped and----
        Ms. Quarterman. It has to be capped and cleaned. So that is
    something that we will follow up with you on as we go through
    the investigation----
        Ms. Hahn. Are you aware--is PHMSA aware of this kind of a
    loophole in----
        Ms. Quarterman. It is the first time I have heard anything
    about this before, so----
        Ms. Hahn. Right. I just think it is--might need to look at
    how we verify. It is all simple verification of a pipeline that
    has been deemed idle or out of service. Particularly when they
    acquire it from another company. Nobody--there was no third-
    party verification that, in fact, it was empty. And while it
    may not be a lot of crude oil to the oil company, they seemed
    to scoff when I was like, ``Forty barrels before you capped
    it?'' And they were sort of like, ``That is not that much.''
    But, obviously, in a residential neighborhood, that is an
    extreme problem and hazard and smell and----
        Ms. Quarterman. Well, it is a lot----
        Ms. Hahn. The equipment that has to come in to try to cap
    it, it was a big mess. But I feel like it might be something we
    should work together to solve.
        Ms. Quarterman. Absolutely.
        Ms. Hahn. My second question is about strengthening
    pipeline inspections. And right now, California has 5
    inspectors inspecting over 750 pipelines in the ground.
    Additionally, in accordance with PHMSA guidelines, companies,
    and not the actual inspectors themselves, are in charge of
    conducting inspections of pipeline. Inspectors are in charge of
    conducting audits of the companies' inspections. Is this the
    best process we have, going forward? And can you give me some
    assurance that we are--all pipelines are inspected in a timely
    manner?
        And how do we strengthen this current system so there is
    more accountability for the companies who have failed to
    adequately inspect their pipelines?
        Ms. Quarterman. Well, you will see in the Department's
    fiscal year 2015 budget, we have a large request for the
    pipeline safety program. Included in that is additional grant
    money for States to improve--and our inspection, I mean, the
    biggest part of that goes to our inspection force, adding many,
    many new people. So, the President's budget supports that right
    now.
        In terms of inspection--and in some ways it is a misnomer.
    I mean our staff does go out and review the documents of
    companies, but they also go out during construction, and doing
    some maintenance, so they do inspect to that.
        I think what you are referring to is an internal inspection
    of a pipeline, which is something that--the Government doesn't
    own these pipelines, so we have no way to put any equipment in
    them to verify that. So that is really reviewing the
    inspections, or the assessments that companies have performed.
    Absolutely, we need more resources.
        Ms. Hahn. Thank you. Thank you.
        Mr. Denham. Thank you. Thank you, Ms. Quarterman.
        Ms. Hahn. I yield back.
        Mr. Denham. Mr. Larsen?
        Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Mr. Chair. First off, I want to
    dispel a notion that PHMSA believes in a silver bullet
    approach. Ms. Quarterman was in my office 2\1/2\ months ago.
        And I think I am quoting you when you said, ``There is no
    silver bullet to resolving this issue.''
        But classification is part of it. Railcar safety is part of
    it. Training for first responders is part of it. There is
    probably other parts I am missing.
        But I want to understand the classification issue, because
    API was here with us last hearing and said in 6 months--not a
    2-year timeline they usually take, but a 6-month timeline they
    usually take to establish a new classification standard for
    Bakken. That is what they said. But the reports the last couple
    days seems to come across, from PHMSA's perspective, they
    expected information sooner than that.
        Am I conflating two issues, or am I--or are you--do you
    have a faster timeline than API has?
        Ms. Quarterman. There are actually two different issues.
    One, the work that API is doing is on an industry standard for
    classification, which is what they do quite frequently on
    different issues. And we have a staff person who is on that
    committee, working towards assisting in that classification
    standard. Should it be something that we agree at the end of
    the day is worthwhile, we could adopt it and put it in our
    regulations. That is one thing.
        The other thing is actual data about the attributes of the
    crude, itself. What is its initial boiling point? What is its
    flash point? What is its vapor pressure?
        Mr. Larsen. Yes, right.
        Ms. Quarterman. Those kinds of details, which Mr. Young may
    know, because he suggested this was a class II----
        Mr. Larsen. Right.
        Ms. Quarterman [continuing]. Crude, whereas we have some
    information of our own which doesn't necessarily support that.
        Mr. Larsen. OK.
        Ms. Quarterman. It could be class I or class II.
        Mr. Larsen. So you said that three companies--it could be
    four companies--have provided information. How many other
    companies have you requested information from and have not
    received information from?
        Ms. Quarterman. We went out, initially, to API and asked
    that they bring in some of their members. After that, we sort
    of expanded our reach, and we had a series of crude oil
    meetings where we invited not just API, we invited AFPM, who I
    mentioned is coming forward with some information. We also
    individually reached out to some of the biggest shippers. I
    forgot how many, I don't know if it was----
        Mr. Larsen. OK.
        Ms. Quarterman [continuing]. The top 10 or top 20, but we
    invited them all to come in and talk to us. And those who
    couldn't come, we sent a letter and said, ``If you can't come,
    we will set up a separate meeting for you, or we will call you,
    whatever we can to get as much information as possible.''
        Mr. Larsen. OK. And then, so that is where you are right
    now on trying to establish these basic data points about the
    Bakken crude. And those are--that is the basic data that you
    are trying to uncover currently.
        Ms. Quarterman. Yes. But let me just add that, you know, we
    can't wait for data from other companies or from any industry
    organization. We have been on the ground in an unprecedented
    effort, with our sister agencies, drawing crude oil from
    trains, from trucks, from pipelines, and sending it to labs and
    having it tested ourselves. So we are getting information on
    the attributes of that crude from the ground up.
        Mr. Larsen. Yes. And just--you know, as you know, in my
    district alone we have four refineries. We are moving from
    about zero gallons a day maybe last year, late last--or early
    last year, to about 12 million gallons a day of Bakken crude
    moving through the district on rail when all four facilities
    have their offload facilities built. So this has really become
    an issue quickly in our district. And part of it, part of the
    answer, has to do with firefighters.
        And, by the way, before I go further, not just the
    firefighters, all first responders, but certainly firefighters,
    Arlington Fire District and Darrington Fire District and folks
    from Clark County, Nevada; Boone County, Missouri; Colorado,
    all converging on Highway 530 to deal with the mudslide and be
    part of FEMA's incident command teams. And they are all doing a
    great job, and this last weekend they have been able to turn
    over and get some new people in, to give people some rest. And
    we appreciate what firefighters and other first responders are
    doing. I want to pass that on to you.
        And then, Mr. Schick, I want to take up your--you don't
    need to turn on the mic for this--I just want to take up your
    invitation to visit the facility, so long as you include a
    briefing on the--not just the CHEMTREC, but the----
        Mr. Schick. TRANSCAER, as well?
        Mr. Larsen. TRANSCAER as part of that. Can you do that?
        Mr. Schick. Yes.
        Mr. Larsen. Thank you so much. Yield back.
        Mr. Denham. Thank you, Mr. Larsen. Mr. Lipinski?
        Mr. Lipinski. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank you
    and Ranking Member Brown for holding this hearing today.
    Certainly the public safety in the transport of hazardous
    materials is a very important responsibility of this
    subcommittee, so I am glad we are here to look at PHMSA's
    progress since the authorization of MAP-21.
        One area that I know we all have a great interest and
    concern about is the transport of hazardous material by rail. I
    know Mr. DeFazio had covered some of the issues already. What I
    want to focus on is the paperless manifest for trains that
    carry hazardous materials. I know it is very important, it is
    an issue that has been raised in some of the accidents that
    have occurred is the need for first responders to know what is
    on the trains in case there is an accident, and find out what
    the risk is from any material on the trains.
        So, I was happy that MAP-21, I know, had a requirement for
    PHMSA to evaluate a paperless system. And I know that right now
    the railroads themselves are working on electronic systems. As
    I raised before on this committee to the AAR, that I think more
    should be done in order to make sure that this information is
    available to first responders.
        So, I wanted to ask Administrator Quarterman. Can you tell
    me where PHMSA is right now on this requirement that was put in
    in MAP-21? And I want to know if you are working with the
    railroads at all on what they are working on doing with these
    paperless manifests.
        Ms. Quarterman. We are working with all constituents. I
    mentioned earlier we had a workshop in July of last year, and
    included the emergency responders and all of the modes to talk
    about use of this electronic format. Right now there is a
    requirement in our rule for--on rail that the train consist
    must show where the hazardous materials are on the train, and
    it must be updated if it gets moved around, so that emergency
    responders will have that knowledge, or should have that
    knowledge if they go to fight a fire at--because of hazardous
    materials.
        Mr. Lipinski. And do you anticipate PHMSA issuing any
    further regulations in the space--in rail, or any other----
        Ms. Quarterman. We are at the pilot project phase. We are
    not at the regulation phase. I mean we really need to go and do
    a few pilots, see how it works before we talk about issuing any
    regs. So we are early on.
        Mr. Lipinski. OK. Well, I just wanted to make sure that we
    continue to work on this, and as we go down the road, and make
    sure that we do have the best system in place, so that first
    responders can have adequate information.
        And, with that, I will yield back. Thank you.
        Mr. Denham. Thank you, Mr. Lipinski. Ms. Brown?
        Ms. Brown. Thank you. Ms. Quarterman, this is a yes or no
    question. Yesterday we received your statement that the
    American Petroleum Institute and its members have not been
    cooperative with your agency, and have refused to provide
    testing information with your safety experts. Is that yes or
    no?
        Ms. Quarterman. Yes.
        Ms. Brown. OK. Could you give us in writing what questions
    that you have asked them and they have not responded to,
    please?
        Ms. Quarterman. I would be happy to.
        [The information follows:]

            PHMSA posed the following questions to API and crude oil
            shippers prior to meetings in early February.

                  What tests or methods do you use to determine the
                properties of the crude oil to include its vapor pressure,
                flammable gas content, flash point, boiling point, hydrogen
                sulfide content and corrosive properties prior to offering
                it in transportation?
                  Who performs these tests and how frequently are
                they completed?
                  When you find high levels of gases in crude, what
                actions do you require of your oilfield personnel before
                loading into a transport vehicle? What information about
                the crude oil properties, if any, is provided by the
                producers to you prior to transportation? How is this
                information communicated?
                  What information do you share with truck and rail
                carriers about the crude oil properties?
                  Are there any prescribed limits involving vapor
                pressure, flammable gas concentration or hydrogen sulfide
                content above which the crude oil is not placed into
                transportation? If so, what are these limits and how are
                they determined?

            To date, PHMSA has received some testing information from
            individual crude oil companies but thus far the data has been
            limited. As part of ongoing efforts, PHMSA has supported the
            American Petroleum Institute Standards Committee initiative to
            develop industry standards for proper sampling techniques,
            testing criteria and frequency for crude oil. PHMSA is actively
            participating in the discussions during working group sessions
            and plans to continue up through expected completion in July.

        Ms. Brown. OK. Now, my next question, Mr. Downey, I was
    very involved with the wet lines issue. And, in fact, I went
    over to Baltimore to test it, you know. And I know that we are
    on tight budgets. And so, in your testimony, you said it would
    be better if you all use that money for anti-rollover
    technology, which is really the problem in the industry, and
    not the wet lines. Can you expound upon that, please?
        Mr. Downey. That is a very good point, Ranking Member
    Brown. In fact, I was in Baltimore at that hearing, as well.
    And if you look----
        Ms. Brown. And I went around----
        Mr. Downey. I know you did.
        Ms. Brown [continuing]. Before we went to the hearing.
        Mr. Downey. Yes, and one of our folks was there.
        Ms. Brown. I recommend the chairman do the same.
        Mr. Downey. I guess our point is that, looking at the cost
    benefit analysis that was done in the surveys, looking at the
    dangers of retrofitting some of the trailers--and I know that
    when you----
        Ms. Brown. I don't think your mic is on.
        Mr. Downey. It is. I believe it is----
        Ms. Brown. Well, pull it up, pull it up.
        Mr. Downey. Is that better?
        Ms. Brown. Yes, sir.
        Mr. Downey. OK, thank you. But looking at the risks to
    retrofitting the trailers--and when you were in Baltimore, I
    believe that they discussed that with you--we could take those
    dollars and minimize risk and put it into technology that would
    make the traveling public safer, keep our tractors and trailers
    on the road, with the anti-roll stability. That is our
    position. Does that answer your question?
        Ms. Brown. Yes, sir. And I would be interested in making
    sure that we get some directions to the agency in that vein,
    because, basically, in--from what I can gather, the information
    that we have gotten, that is where the problem is, and not with
    the wet lines.
        Mr. Downey. Yes. Yes, ma'am.
        Ms. Brown. OK. My last question, pertaining to making sure
    that we protect the firefighters and the first responders,
    and--do the firefighters have the gear to respond to the hazmat
    incidents? And I am particularly concerned about the crude oil,
    ethanol, and the lithium batteries. And those batteries, I
    understand, could play a major part when it comes to airplane
    crashes and other things.
        Ms. Harman. The traditional gear for--that firefighters are
    going to be wearing, donning and doffing as they show up to
    these scenes here, is your traditional turnout gear. That is
    your initial response. Your typical firefighter that is coming
    in here in their bunker jacket, their bunker boots, and their
    pants with their suspenders and their self-contained breathing
    apparatus, gloves, a lot of hose, a lot of fire--not fire--a
    lot of water. Your second set that is coming in are definitely
    going to be going more into the hot zone. Those are your
    technicians, those are your specialists. So that gear that is
    out there we believe right now is sufficient that is out there.
    There is new technologies coming out every day. We stay abreast
    of that, and there is a cost that comes to that. So we are
    always watching that to see, you know, how is this going to be
    afforded, how are these skill sets going to be acquired.
        But the gear that is there now, so long as the fire
    departments have the minimum level of what they need, and the
    training that they need to respond in an operational capacity,
    they should be pretty well set to go.
        Ms. Brown. Ms. Quarterman?
        Ms. Quarterman. Yes? You want me to answer the same
    question about gear?
        Ms. Brown. Yes.
        Ms. Quarterman. Yes, we agree that it is important. We
    would have to look at our grant language to ensure that it is
    something that we could fund through our existing HMEP grant
    program, the extent to which we can fund it.
        Ms. Brown. Is it possible to let the Members know when the
    grant applications are available?
        Ms. Quarterman. We would love to.
        Ms. Brown. So that we could make sure our communities know
    about it?
        Ms. Quarterman. Absolutely. If you don't know, we will make
    sure you know.
        Ms. Brown. Because are you saying that you put it in the
    Federal Register?
        Ms. Quarterman. We put it in the Federal Register, but we
    realize that not everybody reads that, so we have been tweeting
    it----
        Ms. Brown. And some small communities don't have a person
    that is looking for that all the time.
        Ms. Quarterman. Yes, we try to do a press release, as well.
    But we will absolutely let the Members know.
        Ms. Brown. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Denham. Thank you, Ms. Brown. Ms. Hahn?
        Ms. Hahn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ms. Quarterman, one of
    the other issues I have been dealing with for a long time, even
    before I came to Congress, is that I have a facility, LPG
    tanks, which are located in San Pedro. I think they were built
    in 1976, aging facilities, they can hold up to 25 million
    gallons of LPG. I have been trying to get them moved or shut
    down for as long as I can remember. They are on private
    property, so I am struggling with what to do. But the threat of
    leakage and vaporizing and igniting and--it sits next to a
    soccer field, an elementary school, residential neighborhood.
        So, just have two things on that. One, in 1986, I guess,
    Congress passed the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-
    Know Act, EPCRA. And after 9/11, DHS came in and many of these
    highly volatile facilities now are being classified as a
    possible homeland security threat. You know, attack on one of
    them, obviously, could produce the same effect as a natural
    disaster.
        So now, that has superseded EPCRA. So now I believe a
    member of the community has to go downtown to their fire
    department, look at documents in secret, not allowed to take
    out copies of those documents, so it really has undermined, in
    my opinion, a community's right to know the kinds of hazardous
    materials and threat to their livelihood that exists in their
    community.
        Is this something that you feel like we should do a better
    job of balancing? Is this something maybe you and Jay Johnson
    could have a conversation about? Because I really do think--I
    mean I am all about homeland security, but I am also about a
    community's right to know what kind of hazardous material is in
    their neighborhood, and what they need to do to prepare
    themselves against disaster.
        Ms. Quarterman. I agree with you, and we have a similar
    effect on the pipeline side, where, as we had created, I
    think--or the agency had created very detailed maps of the
    pipeline system, and put it on the web, and almost immediately
    had to pull it down because of 9/11, I think it is worthwhile
    to have that conversation.
        I have heard that some of those things are no longer as
    covered as they used to be. There are less concerns. But I
    agree with you, the public has a right to know where these
    facilities are, and to be prepared to respond. And certainly
    emergency responders need to be prepared to respond in those
    instances. So I will take you up on that, and have a
    conversation----
        Ms. Hahn. Great. And maybe even there is a compromise in
    how they--you know, besides going downtown to a fire department
    and looking at documents in secret, is there a compromise
    there?
        Ms. Quarterman. Absolutely.
        Ms. Hahn. Yes. And the other thing, what can I tell my
    constituents in San Pedro, California, that PHMSA is doing to
    protect them from a possible leak, vapor cloud, ignite? I mean,
    the threat of something happening with 25 million gallons of
    propane and butane is just a daily concern. And we can't figure
    out which agency could help us, you know, protect the community
    against a disaster.
        Ms. Quarterman. I am not sure that we have oversight of
    that particular facility. Our oversight is to pipelines and
    things that are moving in transportation. But I would say to
    your constituency that, you know, PHMSA is a small agency with
    a huge mission, and you will see the number of incidents going
    down, down, down over time.
        Our folks are dedicated to ensuring that nothing happens,
    and we really are moving towards zero incidents. So you walk
    around every day----
        Ms. Hahn. And this facility actually has a rail line now.
        Ms. Quarterman. Yes.
        Ms. Hahn. And so this product is being----
        Ms. Quarterman. Is moving in and out.
        Ms. Hahn. Is moving by rail. So----
        Ms. Quarterman. Most of the time nothing happens. We are
    all surrounded by pipelines, by trucks moving hazardous
    materials, by trains every moment of the day. So we are talking
    about an infinitesimal possibility of something going wrong. I
    mean, really, considering the amount of----
        Ms. Hahn. If it makes them sleep better at night.
        Ms. Quarterman. I know.
        Ms. Hahn. Well, if you would take a look into this facility
    and the railcars for me, I would appreciate it.
        Ms. Quarterman. Absolutely.
        Ms. Hahn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Denham. Thank you, Ms. Hahn. Mr. Cummings?
        Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much. Ms. Quarterman, in 2009
    this committee conducted an investigation of DOT's hazmat
    program, and were made aware of an internal DOT analysis which
    showed that 60 to 90 percent of all accidents were unreported,
    and that little had been done to address it.
        The audit also found that there were several invisible
    risks where DOT had little to no data, such as LNG facility
    incidents, hazmat incidents in the maritime mode, loading and
    unloading of rail tank cars, and environmental effects of
    hazmat spills.
        Four years later, in September 2013, the GAO reported that
    DOT's incident data is still significantly flawed, raising
    concerns for what should be a data-driven agency. What is DOT
    doing to improve its hazmat data, particularly data on
    accidents and incidents?
        Ms. Quarterman. We have had, since the September of 2009,
    we have had teams working on data quality, especially with
    respect to unreported incidents. We now do our own intelligence
    gathering, if you will, for incidents that are not reported to
    us on the 5800 report. And we include those within our
    database. So we are trying to get data from as many different
    sources as possible, and include it within our system. And then
    we go out, we follow up with anybody who has not reported that
    incident.
        So I think our data quality has improved a great deal. I am
    not familiar with the GAO report that you are referring to----
        Mr. Cummings. OK.
        Ms. Quarterman [continuing]. In 2013.
        Mr. Cummings. Well, do you think we are missing--still
    missing some of these incidents and accidents?
        Ms. Quarterman. I am certain we are missing some of these.
    I mean if they are not reported any place that we are looking,
    then we are not getting that.
        You know, the--we have very recently completed a data
    report about how we might do even more to clean up our data and
    make it better. But it is a resource-intensive exercise, and we
    need more resources to be able to continue to make our data
    better.
        We put in place an IT modernization program as part of the
    response to that 2009. We have had only small pieces of that
    funded. So it is an uphill battle, but I think we are doing a
    good job at cleaning up the data.
        Mr. Cummings. Well, in your testimony you indicated that,
    pursuant to MAP-21 legislation, PHMSA adopted a new rule on
    April 17, 2013, to remove the maximum penalty for a violation
    of hazardous materials rules, and to raise from $75,000 to
    $175,000 the maximum penalty for a knowing violation, and a
    violation resulting in death, serious illness, or severe injury
    to any person, or substantial destruction of property.
        How many times over the past decade has PHMSA assessed the
    maximum penalty for either a willful violation, a violation
    that resulted in death, or injury, or substantial destruction
    of property, and how--have any such penalties been assessed
    since the enactment of the new rule?
        Ms. Quarterman. I would have to go and get that data for
    you. I can tell you that our penalty authority has gone up. And
    for the first time, I think, in many, many years, we also
    revised our penalty guidelines, which sort of circumscribe how
    much the penalties are. In my view, the penalties are still
    extremely low. But I will provide that record for you----
        Mr. Cummings. Yes.
        Ms. Quarterman [continuing]. That answer for you for the
    record.
        Mr. Cummings. How soon can you get that to me?
        Ms. Quarterman. We should be able to do it in a week or so.
        [The information follows:]

            Question: How many times over the past decade has PHMSA
            assessed the maximum penalty for either a willful violation, a
            violation that resulted in death, or injury, or substantial
            destruction of property?
            Answer: Seven (three at $50,000 and four at $55,000).
            Question: Have any such penalties been assessed since the
            enactment of the new rule?
            Answer: Zero.

        Mr. Cummings. Chairman, I yield back. Thank you very much.
        Mr. Denham. Thank you, Mr. Cummings. I want to thank each
    of our witnesses for their testimony today. If there are no
    further questions, I would ask unanimous consent that the
    record of today's hearing remain open until such time as our
    witnesses have provided answers to any questions that have been
    submitted to them in writing, and unanimous consent that the
    record remain open 15 days for any additional comments and
    information submitted by Members or witnesses to be included in
    the record of today's hearing.
        [No response.]
        Mr. Denham. Without objection, so ordered. I would like to
    thank our witnesses again for their testimony.
        If no other Members have anything to add, this subcommittee
    stands adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 3:53 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]