[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 113-79]
HEARING
ON
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT
FOR FISCAL YEAR 2015
AND
OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
FULL COMMITTEE HEARING
ON
THE POSTURE OF THE U.S. NORTHERN
COMMAND AND U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND
__________
HEARING HELD
FEBRUARY 26, 2014
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
__________
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
One Hundred Thirteenth Congress
HOWARD P. ``BUCK'' McKEON, California, Chairman
MAC THORNBERRY, Texas ADAM SMITH, Washington
WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina LORETTA SANCHEZ, California
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina
JEFF MILLER, Florida ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania
JOE WILSON, South Carolina SUSAN A. DAVIS, California
FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
ROB BISHOP, Utah RICK LARSEN, Washington
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio JIM COOPER, Tennessee
JOHN KLINE, Minnesota MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam
MIKE ROGERS, Alabama JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut
TRENT FRANKS, Arizona DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa
BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts
K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas JOHN GARAMENDI, California
DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado HENRY C. ``HANK'' JOHNSON, Jr.,
ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia Georgia
DUNCAN HUNTER, California COLLEEN W. HANABUSA, Hawaii
JOHN FLEMING, Louisiana JACKIE SPEIER, California
MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado RON BARBER, Arizona
E. SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia ANDRE CARSON, Indiana
CHRISTOPHER P. GIBSON, New York CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire
VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri DANIEL B. MAFFEI, New York
JOSEPH J. HECK, Nevada DEREK KILMER, Washington
JON RUNYAN, New Jersey JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi SCOTT H. PETERS, California
MO BROOKS, Alabama WILLIAM L. ENYART, Illinois
RICHARD B. NUGENT, Florida PETE P. GALLEGO, Texas
KRISTI L. NOEM, South Dakota MARC A. VEASEY, Texas
PAUL COOK, California
JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma
BRAD R. WENSTRUP, Ohio
JACKIE WALORSKI, Indiana
BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama
Robert L. Simmons II, Staff Director
Catherine Sendak, Professional Staff Member
Mark Lewis, Professional Staff Member
Mike Amato, Professional Staff Member
Aaron Falk, Clerk
C O N T E N T S
----------
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2014
Page
Hearing:
Wednesday, February 26, 2014, The Posture of the U.S. Northern
Command and U.S. Southern Command.............................. 1
Appendix:
Wednesday, February 26, 2014..................................... 43
----------
WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 26, 2014
THE POSTURE OF THE U.S. NORTHERN COMMAND AND U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ``Buck,'' a Representative from
California, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services.............. 1
Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Ranking
Member, Committee on Armed Services............................ 2
WITNESSES
Jacoby, GEN Charles H., Jr., USA, Commander, U.S. Northern
Command and North American Aerospace Defense Command........... 3
Kelly, Gen John F., USMC, Commander, U.S. Southern Command....... 5
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Jacoby, GEN Charles H., Jr................................... 51
Kelly, Gen John F............................................ 76
McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ``Buck''.............................. 47
Smith, Hon. Adam............................................. 49
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Garamendi................................................ 130
Mr. Langevin................................................. 126
Mr. Rogers................................................... 128
Mr. Smith.................................................... 125
Ms. Tsongas.................................................. 129
THE POSTURE OF THE U.S. NORTHERN COMMAND AND U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, February 26, 2014.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:03 a.m., in room
2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Howard P. ``Buck''
McKeon (chairman of the committee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD P. ``BUCK'' MCKEON, A
REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED
SERVICES
The Chairman. The committee will come to order.
Good morning.
The committee meets today to receive testimony on the
posture of Northern Command and Southern Command. I am pleased
to welcome General Charles Jacoby, commander of NORTHCOM [U.S.
Northern Command] and NORAD [North American Aerospace Defense
Command], and General John Kelly, commander of SOUTHCOM [U.S.
Southern Command].
Gentlemen, thank you very much for your service to this
nation and for being here with us today.
This is the committee's first posture hearing on the fiscal
year 2015 defense authorization cycle.
However, with the delayed release of the President's budget
request, we are at a disadvantage in assessing whether your
priorities and requirements are addressed in the budget and the
Quadrennial Defense Review. To this end, I have requested a
list of unfunded requirements from each of your commands.
It is clear that continued cuts to defense are driving cuts
in personnel, readiness, and modernization. These have real
consequences in your areas of responsibility, and I hope you
will discuss that here with us today.
As the Department continues to face tight budgets and
reallocation of resources, we must be diligent in keeping our
hemisphere safe. There is anticipation that homeland defense
will continue to receive priority in the upcoming budget
request and important missions such as missile defense will
receive increased resources.
I am concerned, however, that certain NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM
exercises and training priorities have been cut in past years
due to budget shortfalls. I hope you will both discuss what you
have been able to put back into place and what gaps still
remain following the conclusion of the budget deal last
December.
General Jacoby, looking to our own border, we are
witnessing a surge of self-defense vigilante forces in Mexico,
as citizens don't trust state and military police forces to
address internal security threats.
I look forward to your thoughts about whether legitimizing
these forces is the correct path for Mexican security and what
the implications are for U.S.-Mexico defense cooperation.
General Kelly, I had the great pleasure of visiting several
countries in your area of responsibility last week. I was
struck by Colombia's progress from an almost failed state to a
nation of continued stability and economic growth.
In contrast, Venezuela's violent unrest and unstable
economic situation make it a dangerous place.
It was kind of a paradox. I traveled to some of these same
countries about 16 to 18 years ago, with Chairman Spence. And
in that time, we went to Venezuela, Chile, Argentina, Brazil,
and Panama.
This time, we couldn't go to Argentina or Venezuela, but we
were able to go to Colombia because of their huge turnaround.
That was a real positive.
And then the other ones have caused some unrest and some
problems.
But it was good to see that Brazil and Chile keep moving a
little bit better up the ladder.
I hope that you can discuss with us your lessons that your
command has learned about combating illicit networking that
poses a threat to our national security interests, while also
encouraging Latin American countries to build the capacities to
tackle their own internal threats.
Gentlemen, I look forward to your testimonies today, and I
thank you again for being here with us.
Mr. Smith.
[The prepared statement of Mr. McKeon can be found in the
Appendix on page 47.]
STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM WASHINGTON,
RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And welcome. General Jacoby, it is good to see you again.
Fond memories of your time commanding out at Fort Lewis.
And, General Kelly, fond memories of traveling with you
when you were with the Marine Corps' Liaison's Office, and
seeing you in Iraq after that.
So it is good to see both of you. Really appreciate your
leadership throughout your careers and in your current
position.
I think the chairman identified, you know, the top issue
for all of us in dealing with the budget. And, you know, it is
sort of like from bad to worse.
I mean, it is bad enough dealing with the budget
environment we have now. You know, we did sort of the soft
opening for the defense budget a couple days ago, and, you
know, we are alarmed at some of the cuts that were contained in
it, which is understandable.
But that is for the next 2 years, where we have relative
stability, at least by congressional standards. We passed a
budget. We have an idea of what the appropriations levels are
going to be.
And remind the committee that there are still on the books
now, 8 years of sequestration after that. And if you are
alarmed about what the numbers looked like that we saw 2 days
ago, and then we really need to step up and do something about
sequestration, sooner rather than later, to, number one, take
away the uncertainty that that gives to our, you know, planning
apparatus over at DOD [Department of Defense], but, number two,
to stop those bad things from happening. And you know, the
longer we wait, the worse it is.
So I am curious, to the extent you know how those budgets
will affect your two commands.
On NORTHCOM, you know, your first and chief mission is to
protect the homeland. We met yesterday, talked a little bit
about that. Missile defense is a key part of that, so I am
curious on your update on the status of that, on our national
missile defense system.
Also very interested in our ongoing relationship with
Mexico. As the chairman mentioned, it continues to be a
troublesome area. But it is evolving and changing. And I know
we have worked fairly closely with our Mexican partners in a
way that is helpful. Because, obviously, that is a threat to
our homeland as well, being right across the border.
Leading into that, SOUTHCOM leads into Mexico. And
obviously one of the foremost challenges in SOUTHCOM is dealing
with the drug trade and all the different points of entry that
it comes from.
So curious to get an update on how that is going and in
particular the interagency piece, because, obviously, I think
as much as any of our combatant commanders, General Kelly, you
work with other agencies to combat the drug problems that come
out of Latin America. So curious about that.
And also, of course, curious to get an update on
Guantanamo, on the cost issues, the health issues for the
prisoners down there, how it is going and what you see the
future of our presence in Guantanamo and the inmates who are
there.
Obviously, there are a ton of other issues, but we will get
to them in the questions and answering.
It is great to see both of you. Appreciate your leadership.
Look forward to your testimony.
I yield back. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the
Appendix on page 49.]
The Chairman. Thank you.
General Jacoby.
STATEMENT OF GEN CHARLES H. JACOBY, JR., USA, COMMANDER, U.S.
NORTHERN COMMAND AND NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND
General Jacoby. Chairman McKeon, Congressman Smith,
distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the
opportunity to appear before you today.
It is a pleasure to be here once again with my friend and
fellow combatant commander, General John Kelly of the U.S.
Southern Command.
On behalf of the men and women of U.S. Northern Command and
North American Aerospace Defense Command, I appreciate this
committee's continuing support of our unique and important
missions.
As the world grows increasingly volatile and complex,
threats to our national security are becoming more diffuse and
less attributable, while a crisis originating elsewhere in the
world can rapidly manifest themselves here at home.
This evolution combined with fiscal constraints demands
continuous innovation and transformation within the Armed
Forces, the national security architecture, and in our two
commands.
And while we must deal realistically with limited budgets,
the homeland must be appropriately resourced. Security of our
citizens cannot be compromised.
We must continue to enhance international partnerships,
provide defense support to civil authorities, and ensure the
defense of the Nation and North America.
USNORTHCOM and NORAD, as the operational commands in North
America, are critical components of a layered defense of the
homeland, deterring and responding to threats before they reach
our shores, threats ranging from aircraft, ballistic missiles,
terrorism, transnational criminal organizations, advance
submarine technologies, and cyber-attacks on our critical
infrastructure and all the time being prepared to respond in
support of our citizens in times of their greatest need.
In the performance of our aerospace missions, including
Operation Noble Eagle, NORAD, a unique and proven binational
command of Canada and the United States, defends North American
airspace and safeguards national key terrain by employing a
variety of capabilities.
Now, over the last year, NORAD's ability to execute its
primary missions have been subject to increased risk, given the
degradation of U.S. combat Air Force readiness.
Now, with vigilance and the support of the Air Force, we
have been able to sustain our effective day-to-day posture but
we remain concerned about mid- and long-term readiness
challenges.
With regards to missile defense, tangible evidence of North
Korean and Iranian ambitions confirms that the limited
ballistic missile threat to the homeland has matured from a
theoretical to a practical consideration.
Moreover, we are concerned about the potential for these
lethal technologies to proliferate to other actors. We are also
working with the Missile Defense Agency to invest in tailored
solution to address the challenges that advancing missile
technologies impose on our current ballistic missile defense
system architecture.
With the decreasing seasonal ice, the Arctic is evolving
into a true strategic approach to the homeland. As such, we
work with our premier partner, Canada, and other stakeholders
to develop our communications, domain awareness,
infrastructure, and presence in order to protect economic
interest, maritime safety, and our freedom of action.
Defending the homeland in depth requires partnerships with
our neighbors, Canada, Mexico, and the Bahamas. Our futures are
inextricably bound together and this needs to be a good thing
in the security context.
The stronger and safer they are, the stronger our
partnerships, the safer we all are collectively. And this
creates our common competitive security advantage for North
America.
For civil support, USNORTHCOM stands ready to respond to
national security events and provides support as a DOD core
task to lead Federal agencies for manmade or natural disasters
and our challenge remains to not be late to need.
Men and women of the USNORTHCOM and NORAD proudly remain
vigilant and ready as we stand watch over North America and
adapt to the uncertainty of the global security environment and
fiscal realities.
I am honored to serve as their commander and thank this
committee for your support of our important missions. I look
forward to your questions.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of General Jacoby can be found in
the Appendix on page 51.]
The Chairman. Thank you. General Kelly.
STATEMENT OF GEN JOHN F. KELLY, USMC, COMMANDER, U.S. SOUTHERN
COMMAND
General Kelly. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Smith, distinguished
members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to
appear here today and speak to you----
The Chairman. General, can you get that mic right up to
you?
General Kelly. Thanks for the opportunity to speak with you
today and talk about the soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines of
SOUTHCOM but also included in that is a tremendous civilian
work force that I have there, and that includes contractors.
I am pleased to be here, of course, with Chuck Jacoby
again. I want to assure you, as Chuck just did, that there are
no seams between NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM. We talk all the time,
we coordinate all the time, we have exchanged liaison officers.
There is no seam. And I know that tends to be a concern
sometimes here on the Hill.
I consider myself very, very fortunate, Mr. Chairman, to
work in this part of the world. Latin America and the Caribbean
are some of our staunchest allies and willing partners across a
broad range of issues.
Most of the countries in Latin America want to work with
us, they want to be our partners, they want our friendship,
they want our support, they want to work with us. They want to
engage to address a broad range of shared concerns.
For more than 50 years the U.S. Southern Command has done
exactly that, and that is engage with our partners across the
region. We have helped build strong capable military and
security forces that respect human rights and contribute to
regional security.
We have worked with the interagency and international
community to secure the southern approaches of the United
States. We have accomplished a lot even with minimal and
limited resources. But severe budget cuts are now reversing
this project, I believe, and forcing us to accept significant
risk.
Last year we had to cancel more than 200 engagement
activities and numerous multilateral exercises in Latin
America. Because of asset shortfalls we are unable to get after
74 percent of suspected maritime drug trafficking contacts.
And because of service cuts, we won't be able to
immediately respond to humanitarian crises or disasters in the
region without significant time lost in augmentation required.
Ultimately, the cumulative effect impact of our reduced
engagement won't be measured in the number of canceled
activities and reduced deployments, it will be measured in
terms of U.S. influence, leadership, relationships in a part of
the world where our engagement has made a real and lasting
difference over the decades.
And in the maritime domain, drug traffickers, criminal
networks, and other actors unburdened by budget cuts or any
canceled activities or any employee furloughs will have the
opportunity to exploit the partnership vacuum left by reduced
U.S. military engagement.
Mr. Chairman, members, I look forward to discussing these
and many other issues with you this morning. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of General Kelly can be found in
the Appendix on page 76.]
The Chairman. Thank you very much.
On Monday, Secretary Hagel and Chairman Dempsey announced
the updated defense strategy that builds on the QDR
[Quadrennial Defense Review] that we will be receiving and the
new budget.
I recognize that you are not at liberty yet to discuss the
details on that. But it is my expectation that combatant
commanders should be active participants in the QDR and the
budget process.
With that in mind, what I would like is if you could relate
to us how you think the new strategy will affect your
particular commands?
General Jacoby. Thank you Chairman. You saw in the
Secretary's soft rollout, he went through some of his critical
priorities and I was happy to see, as I am sure everybody was,
that homeland defenses is articulated as the top priority.
I think, specifically during the last 4 or 5 months working
together as a team with the Secretary, the chairman and their
staffs, the homeland has been recognized and has received a
high priority in the evolution of our strategic thinking now.
And so, that phrase, ``The homeland is defended'' is
critical and so, you know, I think we should all be heartened
by that.
I have felt that priority during this very difficult budget
years where the services have turned themselves inside out to
provide ready forces for NORAD and for NORTHCOM, but I am
mindful that that comes at the expense of readiness of other
formations well into the depth of the service capacities and
capabilities.
So to put it more succinctly, Air Combat Command that
provides the fighter planes for my Noble Eagle has done its
best to give me top readiness for those capabilities, but it
has come at the expense of increased unreadiness across over 50
percent of our combat aircraft fleets.
So the homeland has received priority. But this is a zero-
sum game in readiness capabilities.
The Army has done the same thing. They have paid particular
attention to our chemical, biological, radiological, and
nuclear response capability. But again, that has come at the
expense of other formations that--they are not on the patch
chart to finish up the work in Afghanistan, their readiness has
plummeted.
So, this has been a tough year for the services. They have
tried very hard to meet this combatant commander's
requirements. But I know it is a tremendous challenge for them.
We appreciate the bipartisan budget agreement in terms of
providing tactical relief, particularly in the readiness
categories. But that is still inadequate to remove the shadow
of sequestration which starts back up again and proceeds for
another 8 years if something is not done. And that will make it
near impossible to make the quality strategic decisions that
will be required for the future.
General Kelly. Sir, of the six combatant commanders,
SOUTHCOM for at least a couple of decades has really been the
economy of force combatant command, that is to say it has
received the least in terms of budget in available assets and
things like that.
And frankly, that is okay in the sense that what goes a
long way in South America, Latin America, the Caribbean, is a
little bit. The problem with that, however, is if you only get
a little bit, and that is a lot in terms of what I do, but if
you only get a little bit and you lose even a little bit of
that, it really does severely impact you, and I think if all of
the combatant commanders, all of us, our responsibility is to
protect the homeland--ultimately to protect the homeland, I
think the last place you want to do that is where Chuck Jacoby
lives, on the borders.
Chuck oftentimes talks of winning the away game and we do
that very, very well. The U.S. military, the interagency I
think has won the away game consistently in the last 10 or 12
years.
But in my part of the world, because it is the economy of
force effort, and as we pivot to other parts of the world that
are deemed more important to the defense of the United States,
as I lose a little, I really do lose a lot.
Hopefully that answers your question, sir.
The Chairman. General Kelly, when you talk about losing a
little bit of a little bit, one of the big concerns I have is
the amount of drugs that you have been able to interdict with a
little bit. And then when you take away some of that capacity,
what do you see ahead of us if--I know the percentage of drugs
that you have been able to interdict versus what law
enforcement that spends a whole lot more money within our
borders is able to interdict, that is a pittance compared to
how much you have been able to stop before it gets to our
shores or across our borders.
If you lose the ability to interdict there, don't we see a
flood of drugs coming into this nation?
General Kelly. You know, the short answer to that, yes sir,
we do, we will. The drug effort in--the vast majority of all
drugs that are imported into the United States come up through
Latin America and--or are produced in Latin American and then
flow into Mexico and across the border somewhere along the
line.
The key is, we have tremendous intelligence in terms of the
production and the flow of drugs. I will use cocaine, as an
example, of cocaine out of Colombia. And they do--the
Colombians, heroic amounts of work in taking cocaine off of the
market or eradicating the growth of cocoa, arresting criminals.
Tremendous work. I can't give them enough credit.
Panama, very similar. But we have very, very good clarity
on the movement when it leaves continental Latin America and as
it flows up the isthmus, which is the traffic pattern of
choice.
But if you don't have airborne ISR [intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance] to pick it up as it is moving
across the ocean, and if you then don't have legal
enforcement--police enforcement, law enforcement to do the end
game thing, you simply don't get it.
So the example I would give you, in 2011 we got 172 metric
tons of cocaine, tons of cocaine, before it ever reached shore
in Honduras or in Latin America. Last year, 2012, because of a
lack of assets, 152 tons. That is 20 tons that got by us--20
more tons. This year they just finished 132 tons. It is all
about ships, ISR--and not many ships.
Typically, today we have on station four ships. One of
which is a British oiler. A key point that can fly a
helicopter. That British oiler, in 6 months, will get 20 tons
or 30 tons of cocaine that is flowing into the United States.
But, sir it is almost a scientific equation: Less ships, less
cocaine off the market.
By the way, when I get it, I get it--and it is an
interagency process, DEA [Drug Enforcement Administration], DOJ
[Department of Justice], I mean, it is just not DOD doing this.
In fact, we are to a large degree in support of the effort.
But, at the end of the day, we get all of this tonnage, we
spend 1.5 percent of the counternarcotics budget we get--again
this year or last year we got 132 metric tons, zero violence,
we get them 2 to 5 tons at a time.
Once it is ashore and on its way up through Mexico, it is
virtually in the United States, and no matter how hard our
very, very heroic border patrol and law enforcement people in
the United States work, best case, they will get 30 tons in the
course of a year with unbelievable violence--as you well know--
done against our country, our citizens.
And, at the end of the day--the end of the year, year after
year, 40,000 Americans die from these drugs, every year. It
costs America $26 billion a year to go after these drugs from a
law enforcement point of view. It costs America $200 billion in
primarily healthcare costs--for a fraction of that, in fact,
for 1.6 percent of that, I can get the vast majority of drugs--
cocaine, to use the example, flowing up from Latin America.
General Jacoby. Mr. Chairman, if John doesn't get it--if he
doesn't catch it in the transit zone, and we know that the
transit zone is not the only place to work, it is just a place
to work--but he gets it in bulk. If it hits the shore in Mexico
or into the upper portions of Central America and then crosses
into Mexico it is broken into very small loads and it is almost
impossible to do effective interdiction.
Nonetheless, our partners on the border have intercepted--
interdicted 39 percent more drugs over the last 3 years. So
they are doing their job, it is just an incredibly difficult
job. And that is why so much of our effort now together is
thinking about, how do we put pressure on the networks, how do
we put pressure on the organization and the men and women that
are trafficking these materials, as well as the interdictive
effect.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you, both, for the efforts you are
making, and I want to make sure the committee as we go through
the process really focuses in on this and makes sure that all
we can do to make sure that the resources are there to cut this
as close to the source and as far from our borders as we can.
So just one other thing that I want to mention. I know
there has been a lot of focus since the Secretary and General
Dempsey did this rollout and there has been a lot of focus on
the Army end strength of 440,000 and people have been very,
very concerned about that, because the feeling that it is the
smallest Army since just before World War II.
I want to just make one thing very clear, that 440,000 is a
number if sequestration goes away. And I don't know any way
that that is going to happen. But, what we are really looking
it is 420,000 when sequestration comes back in at the end of
the budget agreement that was just worked out.
So thank you very much.
Mr. Smith.
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Jacoby, can you tell us a little more about what is
going on with the Mexican drug war. We just had a high-profile
capture of Joaquin Guzman as a positive success. I think you
mentioned there has been a significant increase in vigilante
groups, you know, trying to combat the drug trade, you know, I
guess a relatively new government in Mexico.
What is the update on how that is going in your view? And
then, specifically the cooperation between your folks and the
Mexican authorities?
General Jacoby. Thank you, sir.
I think the Chapo capture really illustrates the commitment
this administration--this Mexican administration to continuing
the fight against the cartels themselves. And so this is very
important. We talked about--just now talked about the
difficulties of doing this by interdiction alone. We have got
to find ways to put pressure on these networks. As the
President rightly said in July of 2011, you know, this is a
national security threat to us, and it is exceeding the
capacity of all of our partner law enforcement agencies. And
that is why you see so many militaries in the region--to
include the Mexican militaries--committed to this fight.
To that end, the Pena Nieto administration has been able to
take Chapo off the street, the Sinaloa Gulf Cartel leader or
the Gulf Cartel leader and the Zeta Cartel leader. So that is--
the top three organizations have lost their top leadership over
the last year.
That is significant, and it is necessary. It is not
sufficient though. We have to continue to pressure the rest of
the networks, because they have a resilience and a depth to
those organizations that allow the next-leader-up capacity
within them.
But I am heartened and applaud their efforts and the
contributions that the Mexican military has made in this
important fight. Our relationship with the Mexican military has
continued to improve. They have asked for--we have worked with
them and provided training, all kinds of partnering, things
that we do together that really are as broad and rich as any of
our strategic security partners.
So we have trained with over 5,000 Mexican soldiers and
marines in the last year, and over the last 3 years it has been
almost a 500 percent increase in the number of things that we
do together that they have asked for us to do with them.
And it is a rich exchange and we are benefiting from it as
much as they are. So there is a lot of work to be done. The
threat is adaptable. It is empowered by its wealth and the
violence that they are willing to commit on their own people.
And so this is a long tough fight, and in the end it is a law
enforcement solution at the very end of this effort.
And so we are going to continue partnering with them. These
are common security concerns. But, I think the Chapo capture
just highlights the continued commitment--that is the important
part--the continued commitment to a very, very tough fight and
a very expensive fight.
Mr. Smith. Thank you.
And, General Kelly, on Guantanamo. Do you have an estimate
right now what the per prisoner cost is maintaining the
Guantanamo prison facility?
General Kelly. Yes sir, based on what I spend down there--
about $130 million a year, that comes out to--we got 155
detainees now. That is probably $750,000 a year. There is
another figure out there that is bigger than what I spend that
takes in every single kind of penny that is spent at
Guantanamo, but that is more of a--I won't speak to that
figure. It is larger, it is about $400 million. But, in terms
of what I spend down there to detain 155 prisoners right now
and take care of them medically and all of that, it is about
$750,000 a piece.
Mr. Smith. And as that population ages, can you talk a
little more about the medical challenges?
Now, as I understand it, you provide the best care you can
within, you know, what is available in Guantanamo, which is
quite a bit, but there is still limitation given where it is
at, but to bring in outside specialists--you can't take any of
the prisoners off of the base, so you would have to bring them
in.
So, as the population is aging, how are the costs being
affected? And how do you handle some of those medical
challenges in dealing with the inmates' medical needs?
General Kelly. Sir, any medical care that is not available
on the island--we have done this now since we have had
detention operations down there--we bring in medical folks--
military medical folks, typically from Norfolk or Charleston,
fly them down there, and we do it routinely.
If, as time goes by, these men start having some of the--
you know, the typical things associated with getting older and
they are more chronic, we would do the same thing, but it does
take a while to get them down there. So as time goes on I am
not so sure the medical care will increase, but the medical
care beyond what is on the island would not be available to
them.
Mr. Smith. Yes, more problematic.
Okay, thank you, that is all I have.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Thornberry.
Mr. Thornberry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you both for being here.
I would like to get y'all's views on two issues during the
limited time I have.
First is, Secretary Hagel and Chairman McKeon have both
announced efforts to reduce bureaucracy and overhead both at
the Pentagon and at combatant commands. And so I would be
interested in y'all's view about what should guide us as we
look at having more efficiency, more agility, lower costs at
all of the combatant commands, from your perspective?
General Jacoby. Thanks, Congressman.
That was really the opening round of ways to make savings
in order to be in compliance with the law. And so first thing
out of the chute, it was a stretch goal and we were directed to
reduce--over 5 years--20 percent in our combatant commands. And
so we understood that, that was our share of the load and we
have proceeded on that path. We have all submitted plans on how
we are going to do that, and we are committed to making those
reductions and those efficiencies.
Now, I want to say, sir, that, you know, it was a very
difficult year for us, it was a difficult year especially for
our civilians who we furloughed and then who bore the brunt of
the government shutdown. And, you know, we have worked
tirelessly for decades to build an effective team with our
civilians. And so they had a tough year.
And so this first year or so we are committed to not
removing civilians from the workforce any more than attrition
and not filling positions that have remained empty. And that is
our commitment to them and we are going to try to keep that
commitment.
We have done some minor reorganizations in the command. To
a large extent, we have passed missions and requirements to
components. But I will tell you that our components also took
drastic cuts.
So there is quite a bit of work being done to gain
efficiencies, to do it logically, to do it in a manner that
allows us to continue accomplishing our missions. Because for a
combatant commander, our guiding light is what is our mission,
what are we expected to accomplish, and how do we continue to
accomplish those missions in the best way possible.
One of the things I do is I write plans. I write major
plans that are directed by the President and by the Secretary
of Defense and that takes staff work. And that takes manpower.
And so, you know, this is--you don't do, you know, more with
less. You do less. And you do it slower and you don't get it
done on time.
Mr. Thornberry. Thank you, sir.
General Kelly, do you have something to add? And I want to
get to the other issues.
General Kelly. I just want to echo Chuck's comments about
the workforce and what, you know, the knothole we pulled them
through last year. No one deserves to go through that and I
pray that we don't ever do that again. They are hardworking
people. I don't have a lot of extra people working at SOUTHCOM.
They come early. They stay late. They do a lot of great work.
Mr. Thornberry. Okay. Thank you.
General Kelly, let me start with you on the second issue.
There was a change in the appropriations bill on human rights
vetting for the current year, which basically expands it from
just those retrained to those who retrain, equip, or provide
other assistance. There is concern that there is not enough
people at the State Department to vet these people; that it is
all going to get balled up. The default position is going to be
to deny.
I would be interested in your thoughts, if your folks have
had a chance to look at the effect of this change on your
ability to help train, equip, assist our partners in your
region.
General Kelly. Let me start, Congressman, by saying this,
that the human rights record, and I meet with human rights
groups here in Washington frequently and every time I go into a
Latin American country, in almost every case I will meet with
human rights groups. Some of them are very hostile; some of
them less hostile, if you will. So I have got an open door to
human rights.
Generally speaking, what they tell me is today the people
we work with are generally following the human rights rule. And
I would tell you, a lot of people talk about human rights in
the world. The U.S. military does human rights. We will not
work with someone who violates human rights in Latin America.
And I think that goes around the world. So that is the first
point.
The second point is we are already very, very restricted in
who we work with. I look to human rights all of the time, but I
will tell you the reason why the human rights record is getting
better and better and better in Latin American countries, and
in some cases very, very good, is because of the effect the
U.S. military has had in working with them over the last few
decades.
To your point about the new legislation, we don't know what
it means yet. We are literally standing by to let the lawyers
then tell us what it means. So, I have got to think it was
written to be more restrictive, so I am assuming it will be
more restrictive for us, but we are waiting for the general
counsel in the Department of Defense, I am sure are working
with the Congress, to figure out what exactly the words mean
and what we can do in the future.
General Jacoby. Mr. Chairman--I am sorry, sir.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Gallego.
Mr. Gallego. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
There is a time in the life of every problem where it is
already big enough to see, but it is still small enough to
solve. And it seems to me that what I understood you all to say
is that an investment early-on, closer to the source in South
America, before any of the drugs or before they hit Mexico in
particular, is the best investment of our money.
Is there some data that you all can share with the
committee that would back that up?
General Jacoby. Thank you, sir.
Particularly in the distribution part of the enterprise, I
think that is exactly the case. But there is more than the
distribution side of the drug problem. There is the production
side, but there is also the finance side and the leadership
side and the consumption side. And so I think that our point,
one of our larger points to make on this is that this is a
series of threat networks that are dealing in illicit activity.
And the primary money winner for them right now is drugs. But
when you put pressure on the drug piece, they go into
kidnapping and extortion and the transit of illegals.
And so these are powerful and rich organizations, which I
think we need to make a concerted effort across those networks.
But on the distribution side, it is very much better to work
the distribution portion of the criminal enterprise early in
the chain. But I think it is a larger issue than that, sir.
Mr. Gallego. General Kelly.
General Kelly. Yes, Congressman. This network that brings
things to the United States, it is incredibly efficient. It is
more efficient than FedEx [Federal Express] could ever hope to
be. And anything can travel on it. Most of what travels on it
is drugs--heroin, methamphetamines, cocaine. But people travel
on it, all sorts of guns travel on it, money travels on it. It
is incredibly effective. It is just now drugs are the big
money-maker for them.
As I mentioned a little earlier, I spend 1.5 percent of the
counternarcotic budget--1.5 percent. I get the vast majority of
cocaine with no violence in large amounts. And we capture these
traffickers, bring them to the U.S. court system, and they
cooperate to a man. And we gain a great deal of intelligence
from them.
I can see, when I say ``I,'' SOUTHCOM and Joint Interagency
Task Force South in Key West, we can see it with amazing
clarity, this drug movement. But 74 percent of it, I watch go
by. I can't touch it. And when I say I watch it go by, in the
maritime domain to Honduras primarily, because I don't have the
assets to stop it.
Mr. Gallego. The district that I represent in Texas is a
little over two-thirds, I think, of the Texas border with
Mexico. So this is a huge issue for me at home. And I wonder,
are you--can you tell me, if you were to compare, for example,
how many tons of drugs were caught by law enforcement in the
U.S. side versus how much was caught in Mexico versus how much
was caught before, how would those numbers compare? You know,
drugs caught before they land in Mexico; drugs caught in
Mexico; and drugs caught in the U.S., how would those numbers
compare?
General Kelly. I got 132 tons last year. Let me start at
the beginning.
The Colombians, again, just can't give them enough credit;
200 tons and eradicated 40,000 acres of coca before it was ever
harvested. I got 132 tons in the transit zone before it got to
Honduras. Almost nothing is taken off the flow between Honduras
and the Mexican border. You know--a handful of tons.
Last year, and it is up big-time, but our border officials
on both sides of the border, we think that about--we got about,
all around the country, we got about 30 tons. So----
Mr. Gallego. Their 30 tons all around the country, in
comparison to your 132 tons.
General Kelly. 132 tons. And again, the cost is I get it
for 1.6 percent of the budget; zero violence. And you have to
keep thinking about the violence, because once it gets ashore,
it is--you can use Honduras as an example--it is the most
dangerous country on the planet. Guatemala is almost as
dangerous; 70,000 Mexican deaths in the last 7 years I think in
their drug fight. And then when it gets into the United States,
just the local violence of distribution, dealing this stuff, it
is just incredibly violent.
Mr. Gallego. Thank you so much. I want to thank each of you
for what you do.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Kline.
Mr. Kline. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen, for being here, for your testimony.
I want to pick up a little bit where I think Mr. Smith was.
I had to step out for a few minutes to talk to some disabled
American veterans, which we also need to keep in mind, as well
as those still serving.
I think probably both of you know, it has been in my mind,
and I have spoken in hearings before and tried to move some
legislation looking at ways that we might be able to combine or
eliminate some of the COCOMs [combatant commands], frankly.
So let me, with that sort of thinking in mind, let me
address both of you for just a minute. I look here at NORTHCOM
and SOUTHCOM particularly. NORTHCOM has responsibility for
support for domestic disaster relief efforts; support for
counterdrug and counterterrorism efforts; support for domestic
WMD [weapons of mass destruction] incident response, and
consequence management support, too; and DOD liaison with law
enforcement agencies, and support for events of national
significance.
All important, no doubt. None of those are what we would
call traditional warfighting.
SOUTHCOM, General, with all respect, there is sort of no
potentially state-on-state conflict down there, although we
obviously watch Venezuela pretty closely. One never knows. But
you have got countering transnational organized crime, building
partner capacity, planning for contingencies--always a good
thing I guess--including responding to a natural disaster, mass
migration event, attack on the Panama Canal, or evacuating
American citizens.
So, as General Jacoby says, he does a lot of planning. And
I assume, General Kelly, that you do as well, and that you are
able to keep those plans secret. But I am wondering, it does
seem to me that in these times when we are talking about, as
advertised, shrinking the Army back to pre-World War II levels.
And General Kelly, I know you have got your purple suit on, but
if I can sort of see the green suit through there, you know
what is happening to the Marine Corps and how it is shrinking
in size. That we ought to be giving serious consideration to
combining or consolidating some of these commands. We have two
four-stars sitting here. You undoubtedly have some two- or
three-stars in the organization. You have got a lot of SES's
[Senior Executive Service] and all of those things that it sure
seems to me would make sense to seriously consider combining
some COCOMs.
And so I know neither one of you wants to rat out your
COCOM here, but why couldn't we, if not specifically for you,
generically do some combining of these major commands? And I
don't care--we can start with either one of you.
General Jacoby. Thank you, sir.
I think we are in an environment where we have to take all
of these potential efficiencies seriously. This particular idea
has been examined at least three times in major ways by the GAO
[Government Accountability Office] and others, and by the
Department of Defense since the early 2000s. It was reexamined
again.
But I think that you have to look beyond just the question
of how can I gain efficiencies. It really has to do with your
strategy, and how do you execute your strategy. And so it is
part of the U.S. strategy to continue to engage the world and
to defend our interests and deter and address instability
around the world with our global--our geographic combatant
commanders.
In the homeland, we have looked at this closely. My most
important relationships on a day-to-day basis are 50 governors
and then throw in Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands.
And so that is a wide audience and number of folks that we
are working with across all the defense support, the civil
authority tasks that we do.
But I also have a very, very intensive homeland defense
task which I think is growing because of the growing threats
and vulnerability to our countries. And so my responsibilities
range all the way from nuclear command and control to ICBM
[intercontinental ballistic missile] missile defense
requirements, cruise missile requirements and all those are
going up, they are not going down.
And then there is something different and important about
the partnerships that we have on the approaches to the
homeland. The Arctic is going to be more of an approach to the
homeland, it is going to be a strategic approach to the
homeland and is going to require the same Defense Department
interest and engagement and activity that any of the approaches
to the homeland have and any of the bodies of water in which we
want to have a safe, competitive advantage.
Canada and Mexico are not just partners, they are neighbors
and they are integral to the defense of our homeland, and I
think that that makes it a special case and not just another
couple of countries for us to engage with.
So I think that it is important to examine these things. It
was examined. We are not making a major strategic shift. And so
I think that that is off the table for now.
But if sequestration comes, if it continues, we are going
to have to go back to the well across all of the dimensions of
the strategy.
Thank you sir.
Mr. Kline. All right. I see my time has expired. Mr.
Chairman, sequestration is here so it is important that you
added the--if it continues and General Kelly you don't get a
chance to defend SOUTHCOM, but I assume that you would tell us
that it couldn't be consolidated either.
If that is not right, start shaking your head and I will
find a way to get back to you.
Okay.
General Kelly. I should--I think there should be a
SOUTHCOM, even if there was only the combatant commander.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Kline. I yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Enyart.
Mr. Enyart. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Kelly, I am sure you are familiar with the great
successes of the National Guard State Partnership Program in
Central Europe and incorporating the former Warsaw Pact
nations. Many--most of them now into NATO [North Atlantic
Treaty Organization] and of the great contributions those
nations have made in our efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan.
And I know that Colombia now has a State Partnership
Program and I am wondering what future nations may adopt a
State Partnership Program? And how you see the future of that
impacting your operations in SOUTHCOM?
General Kelly. State Partnership Programs, I think I have
24 of them in the region. They are important to me, that is
exactly the kind of--particularly I think for my part of the
world, a little bit goes a long, long way.
So to have some great National Guard folks come down and
work for a short period of time with one of the--you know, one
of the host countries in some way. And these are small--as you
know, these are small contact points. But it really does go a
long way to tie the United States in general to these
countries.
So they are pretty important to me in--right now that I
don't think we have anyone that is expanding. In fact,
unfortunately, I think it is Kentucky and Ecuador--the
Ecuadorians are kind of--somewhat cool to our presence right
now, so they are not having the opportunity to do very much.
But certainly I would be open to any country in the region
wanting to have a relationship with one of our National Guard
States.
Mr. Enyart. Generally, I know we have seen a lot of
headlines recently about the instability in Venezuela. And I am
wondering how you view that as impacting the wider
relationships in South America?
General Kelly. I mean, I think, you know, as we watch what
is happening in Venezuela, the economy is, to say the least, in
trouble and there is obviously discontent there.
But they are not having an awful lot of political impact, I
don't believe, with the countries that surround them. Generally
speaking, there are a few countries, the ALBA [Bolivarian
Alliance for the Americas] countries that are somewhat
associated with them. One of the concerns I do have though is
that the Venezuelans traditionally have given a great deal of
petroleum, oil to a number of countries, Cuba as a example,
Nicaragua, some other countries, at almost give-away--at
literally give-away prices.
If they can't continue that and they are already talking
about perhaps not being able to continue it, these countries
could not get by with buying fuel, you know, in kind of the
global rates. So we would see some issues there. And again, a
lot of these countries, Cuba's economy is kind of close to the
edge.
If they were to have to start spending a significantly
large amount of money for fossil fuels, that would have an
impact on their economy.
And when countries in Latin America--I think almost in
countries anywhere, when the economies start to go south, the
migrants start to move north, if you will. And that would be my
concern.
Other countries like Haiti that get virtually all of their
fuel from Venezuela, an economy that is teetering on the edge,
they just couldn't afford it. And there are a number of other
countries like that that depend on the petroleum products that
they get from Venezuela at, as I say, almost give-away prices.
So I am concerned about that because the migration piece is
part of the one of the things I have to think about.
Mr. Enyart. General Jacoby, I don't want to give you a free
ride. So I will drop down and I have some more for General
Kelly.
But General, as the Army draws down from the winding down
of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, do you believe that it is
necessary for the security of NORTHCOM and for the homeland
that the Army have a rapidly expansible capability, that is
that it could grow back rapidly in the event that we need to?
General Jacoby. Thanks, Congressman.
I think that historically, expansible Army has been part of
how we have approached defense. I think the requirements today
for readiness and for deployability are higher than they ever
have been historically.
So I think there is a different construct. But I think that
having the ability to expand the force in times of crisis has
been a historical mechanism that we have always sought to have.
Mr. Enyart. I am sure, General, that the 50 governors that
you referenced before as well as the governors of Puerto Rico
and the Virgin Islands would support you in that--support you
in maintaining a strong and ready National Guard.
General Jacoby. Yes, sir. Thank you.
Mr. Enyart. Thank you. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. I would like to point out that we have a
former chairman in the room, Chairman Hunter, want to really
make it welcoming for former chairmen around here.
[Laughter.]
[Applause.]
Dr. Heck.
Dr. Heck. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
To General Jacoby, first, thanks for what you are doing at
NORTHCOM and keeping the homeland safe. I had the great honor
of being able to serve at NORTHCOM, first under General
Eberhart and then under Admiral Keating, way back before we
actually hit FOC [full operational capability].
My question has to do with the dual status commander
program. Can you give me an update on how well that is working,
progress, how it is functioning, any obstacles and any cases
where it has been utilized and whether it was a success or not?
General Jacoby. Doctor, thanks, thanks for that question.
You know, the dual status commander was a very, very
positive step forward that the Council of Governors and the
Department worked together on and the Congress enabled for us.
And we have used it over 16 times since I have been in
command and 4 times over the last year to great effect.
And what I find so exciting about it actually is how much
flexibility and adaptability it gives me and it gives the
governors and the adjutants general in providing support and
are--a vast array of civil support tasks from national
specialist security events like the Super Bowl to an emergent
disaster like Colorado flooding and wildfires.
And we have been successful using dual status commanders,
who have actually this year incorporated title 10 forces right
next to guardsman and State Active Duty in title 32 to great
success.
So it is a super program. Right now, this year we trained
over 200--we have trained over 200 now, dual status commanders
and every State has multiple dual status commanders and we have
begun training some title 10 senior leaders so that we can
provide title 10 deputies or title 10 dual status commanders
tremendous flexibility.
Another thing that we have done is we have instituted
training update programs for as things evolve and change. So it
is a very positive program and I think it has built great trust
and confidence amongst the States and NORTHCOM.
Dr. Heck. During the time it has been used, have there been
both title 10 and title 32 commanders, or has it all been title
32 functioning in dual status?
General Jacoby. It has all been title 32, except for on a
couple of occasions we have had a title 10. And historically it
has been a title 10 for the Boy Scout Jamboree.
But the vast majority, as is the direction of the statute,
is the customary and usual way that we command it is with a
National Guards commander.
Dr. Heck. Thank you. And General Kelly, likewise, for
everything that you are doing in trying to keep illicit drugs
from hitting our shores.
You know there has been a lot of discussion about whether
or not we should start changing our focus from drugs that are
being produced in other countries, to more of the prescription
drug abuse problem that we see here in the United States.
More people are dying from prescription drugs than they are
from cocaine and heroin, combined.
If that argument takes hold, how do you see--I mean, and
you are doing this at a very small cost to the overall drug
control budget. If you start seeing a shifting of focus to
perhaps more prescription drug abuse problems, how do you see
that impacting your ability to do the work that you are doing?
General Kelly. You are spot-on with the abuse of
prescription drugs. But that is actually reversing now because
of the various regulations and what-not that the government has
put in place to control the amount of drugs that are
prescribed.
They have done some things to the drugs to make sure that
they are not injectable, things like that. So we actually see
the use of prescription drugs going, for a lot of reasons as I
say. And it is very, very expensive and so what we see
replacing prescription drugs is heroin.
Infinitely cheaper. A single OxyContin pill in an upscale
neighborhood in the United States could cost $80 to $100. In an
inner city neighborhood, the same pill could cost maybe $60. A
bag of cocaine--a bag of heroin, $7 or $8.
So we are seeing more and more heroin--in fact there is a,
I think, been a 60 percent increase in the use of heroin in the
country in just the last couple of years. So the good news is
prescription drugs are going down in terms of abuse. The very,
very bad news is heroin is going up and unlike in the past,
upscale neighborhoods--and if you just read recently the kind
of deaths we have seen, it is really tragic to me that it has
to be some high public face individual, usually, you know, an
actor or something to die--I mean, it is tens of thousands of
young kids from the cities that have been dying from heroin and
drugs in general. And no one seems to have cared very much.
So I guess it is good that we have had a couple high
publicity deaths so that now people are starting to take
notice. But all of that heroin comes out of Latin America, up
through Mexico. The poppies are grown in Latin America. We
don't get heroin from overseas anymore; it is all done.
These drug networks that we are talking about, and Chuck
has referenced, are so good at what they do--they are just
international businessmen, the worst kind though, and they are
just--they diversify, they go after whatever they make a
profit.
Dr. Heck. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chair, I yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Langevin.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Jacoby, General Kelly thank you for being here
today, and for your service to our Nation. And I hope you will
express our appreciation to all those who are under your
command for the work that they do every day to keep our country
safe.
General Jacoby, if I could start with you, we are all aware
of the growing challenges of maintaining security in
cyberspace. Which is a--obviously a recurring theme that we
have been talking about quite a bit.
A 2013 report from the Director of Operational Testing and
Evaluation concluded that, and I quote--``Network defenses are
insufficient to protect against a determined or well-resourced
cyber adversary and war fighter missions should be considered
at moderate to high risk until they can be demonstrated to be
resilient in a contested cyber environment,'' end quote.
General, could you share your perspective on the cyber
threat to domestic security operations and also to elaborate on
how the NORAD-NORTHCOM Joint Cyber Center is collaborating with
civilian and military partners in cyberspace?
General Jacoby. Thanks, Congressman. I thought Director
Clapper's testimony was really helpful on this in highlighting
his concerns about the cyber threat, and those are echoed here
in the homeland.
I mean, the cyber nets that are most vulnerable and most
important to us are the ones that reside in the homeland. In
our case, we have our mission nets which are critical for the
defense of the Nation. So their defense is essential and to
address that, we have received and are standing up our first
Cyber Protect Team, 28 trained soldiers and airmen with NSA
[National Security Agency] training, CYBERCOM [U.S. Cyber
Command] training.
And so we also work hard to try to exercise in a cyber-
challenged environment with specially trained red teams. So it
is understanding our own vulnerabilities as well as
understanding the threat at the same time. We are working hard.
There are a lot of legacy systems out there that didn't have
the cyber mission assurance that we might have put in today in
the past so there is some catch-up to do as well.
And we are busily working on that.
I would say it is critical in our country that we develop
relationships and partnerships that the President has laid out
in his recent executive order on cybersecurity, to ensure that
we understand the interdependencies between private,
commercial, and government systems and we understand how to
share information in a way that doesn't disadvantage our
civilian--commercial partners. And to that end we have a very
close working relationship with DHS [Department of Homeland
Security], which really has the bulk of our cybersecurity
partnerships and concerns and also with the FBI [Federal Bureau
of Investigation] as we have concerns with what is illegal
activity.
I think, in the future, we are building structure total
force solutions to this in keeping with the blueprint from
CYBERCOM on what we think the requirements are in the future. I
believe that we are going to require legislation, policy, and
regulations that help us understand the mission space and that
brighten up the lines in the road for the Department of
Defense, but we are making progress to that end in terms of
understanding our vulnerabilities and developing our
requirements.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you for your focus on this, General. It
is obviously important.
The same DOT&E [Director of Operational Test and
Evaluation] report observed that, and I quote--``Less than one-
third of all fielded systems observed in assessments over the
past 5 years have had a current inter-operability
certifications,'' end quote.
What has NORTHCOM been doing to improve operability and
information sharing about cybersecurity threats and network
system defenses?
General Jacoby. We really are looking at ways to improve
within the command, and then between our partners.
I will tell you that one of the important challenges is to
ensure we are interoperable in the NORAD realm with Canada.
That relationship with Canada allows us to highlight really the
interdependencies and relationships between countries in our
networks, between systems in our networks like energy systems
and transportation systems. And so, you know, we are doing work
as NORAD with our Canadian partners to make sure we understand
those linkages and vulnerabilities.
Really, the lead agency for the Department is CYBERCOM in
terms of ensuring the standards in which we secure. And I think
that they are doing a good job in getting that word out, and by
helping us stand up our Joint Cyber Center and helping us with
key subject matter experts we are going to continue to work to
meet those standards.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you.
The Chairman. Time expired.
Mr. Conaway.
Mr. Conaway. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, thank you. If you have already answered this
question, I apologize, but General Kelly let me get your
thoughts on extremist elements within Central America--within
South and Central America, particularly Venezuela, and what
foothold they might or might not be getting.
Islamic jihadists.
General Kelly. Yes, there is some activity.
There is an awful lot of proselytizing and missionary work
if you will, but Iran has expanded--I think we addressed this
last year in the hearing--expanding their presence in Latin
America. Don't really know what they are up to. Not really well
received by many governments with the exception of Venezuela.
So we watch it, but no real threat right now from that
vector. But, something obviously to watch.
Mr. Conaway. All right. I apologize for not being here. I
will re-plow any new ground, but again thank you very much for
both your service.
And I yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mrs. Davis.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And General Jacoby and General Kelly, thank you very much
for your service.
There has been a lot of talk about interdiction today and I
wanted to focus on Secretary of Defense Hagel's announcement--
discussion on Tuesday about the curtailment of the Navy's
planned LCS [littoral combat ship] purchases from 52 to 32.
Obviously, we are not anywhere near that right now, but in
light of all that we have talked about this morning and the
fact that South American drug traffickers are increasingly
using semi-submersibles to traffic drugs into the U.S.-NORTHCOM
area of operations, how do you think that this cutback if you
will in terms of purchases would effect the effort?
Is that part of what you are talking about of needing
resources to fight this?
General Kelly. Congresswoman, you know, I don't own a lot
of forces. Decisions made in the Pentagon as to where, in this
case, ships would flow--to pivot the Pacific as an example, or
to the Persian Gulf--so those decisions made inside the
Pentagon. I get what I get. And I would just say, you know,
more ships are better. Less ships are worse.
I need a platform--I do my best work--the interagency does
its best work in terms of getting massive amounts of cocaine
out of the network flowing, I need a helicopter and I need a
ship that the helicopter can land on.
I don't need an aircraft carrier; in fact, I will take an
oiler if it has a helipad where a helicopter can operate from
or a Coast Guard cutter, they do magnificent work and really
are the lead agency in my part of the world in terms of law
enforcement aspect of this thing.
But I need some kind of platforms and the decision is made,
it has been made now for a number of years, that SOUTHCOM
doesn't get what it has asked for. That is a decision I won't
criticize.
But, if you are asking, could I use more ships and take out
more product off the network, I would say yes.
Mrs. Davis. But I guess, just generally though, I mean, if
there are a number of platforms perhaps--are you suggesting
that maybe the LCS isn't as critical perhaps or that even the
number of 52 would not have--would be more than or--is there--
--
General Kelly. Again, not to speak about LCS, I need a ship
that can land a helicopter on it. Right now, one of the
things--one of the ships in my part of the world that is just
doing yeoman work is a British oiler; doesn't have a gun on it,
but it has got a helipad and the helicopter can refuel there.
And it is doing--and that helicopter is doing great work.
Mrs. Davis. All right, thank you.
General Jacoby, also talking about some of the concerns
that we have had about expandability. There is a potential
reorganization of the National Guard's aviation units and I am
wondering how you feel that that would effect the ability that
you have as the USNORTHCOM commander.
Would it make a difference in your ability to fulfill the
defense and support of civil authorities----
General Jacoby. Yes, I am aware of the initiatives that the
Army has been forced to take, and I know that these are, you
know, tremendously difficult decisions that the chief and the
Secretary had to make. And I have great respect for the
challenge they have had trying to navigate that.
In particular, I think that the--from the NORTHCOM
commander perspective, I am a requirements guy, and so I don't
have the need for an armed Apache in the homeland, but I will
take more Black Hawks. And I will take more LUHs [light utility
helicopters] and I think the Army plan gives more Black Hawks
and more LUHs so that supports the homeland. And I don't need
armed attack aviation in the homeland.
But it is not as simple as that. I know that. And so my hat
goes off to the Army for being able to manage scarce resources
in order to create the most combat-effective total force.
But my requirement? I will pick Black Hawks.
Mrs. Davis. Do you feel that your voice is heard in that?
General Jacoby. Sure.
Mrs. Davis. Okay.
General Jacoby. Thank you.
Mrs. Davis. Yes, I want to be sure that you are having the
input and that it is making a difference.
Thank you.
General Jacoby. Well, yes, ma'am.
Mrs. Davis. Okay. And also just, General Kelly, there is
talk about the USS Comfort not deploying this year. How will
that affect your priorities and the humanitarian efforts?
General Kelly. Very briefly. I know we are running out of
time. But the Comfort is a really, really big engagement deal
in Latin America. They look forward to it. It has huge impact
on the local communities that it visits. And it really does--it
really is appreciated. And it is a great image of what the
United States does for the world--a big American flag but no
guns. And that is--the places it visits, it has huge impact.
And to have lost that this year was very, very disappointing.
Mrs. Davis. All right.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Scott.
Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, both of you made comments about our civilian
workforce. I want to thank you for those comments and your
commitment to that workforce. I represent Robins Air Force Base
and Moody Air Force Base. And I can tell you when you talk with
that workforce that is out there supporting the warfighter,
they feel exactly the way your comments--your written comments
reflect. And we need to make sure that we are taking care of
them. So I appreciate your comments in recognizing them, and
your commitment to them.
Moody Air Force Base, I can't go without saying that is
home of the A-10. I do a few Wounded Warrior hunts a year, and
any of the men that I have talked about that have been in
contact with the enemy are very proud of that weapon system and
don't think there is another system that has done as much to
protect our troops in contact as that weapons system has proven
to be capable of.
With that said, I want to move to, General Kelly, your
comment about insufficient maritime surface vessels and
intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance platform impairing
your primary mission. I traveled with the chairman to Colombia.
It is very clear that they are capable of handling the ground
game there. But it is also very clear that we are the country
that has to provide the intelligence, the ISR platforms to tell
them where the mission is.
The JSTARS [Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System]
fly out of Robins Air Force Base. It is a battle management
platform. There have been a lot of proposals to improve that
platform. And I would just like for both of you to describe the
ways in which the JSTAR asset has been used in your areas of
operation.
General Jacoby. JSTARS is one of those assets, Congressman,
that really defines, you know, high-value, low-number asset.
And so, I have used it my whole career, particularly in Iraq
and Afghanistan, usually along borders; you know, usually to
great effect. It has been adapted over and over again. It is
one of those great pieces of kit that has proved its worth over
time.
And we have been able to take advantage of it in support of
law enforcement when asked for that type of capability. We have
been occasionally able to get it to support law enforcement
around the southwest border and they have done a terrific job.
General Kelly. Congressman, my organization when we are
going to get a JSTARS, there is glee. It is a game-changer over
the Caribbean. We only get JSTARS as training missions. So they
are flying to just simply train. The airplane, of course,
doesn't know where it is flying over, so they come down to the
Caribbean. We put them into the drug fight. We see everything
when the JSTARS are on station.
Frankly, we do the same thing on other training missions
with bombers--B-52 bombers and B-1 bombers, with pods on them.
So I will take anything I can get, but if I can get a JSTARS,
it is a game-changer.
Mr. Scott. Well, thank you for those comments. And it is a
big ocean out there and the radar on that JSTAR platform gives
you the ability to look at an awful lot of it in one pass.
With that, I will just say thank you. I do think that the
mission that is going on in getting the drugs, stopping the
drugs before they ever get to America is an extremely important
one, and I am glad that your men have been as effective in
doing that as they have been.
And with that, I will yield the remainder of my time.
The Chairman. Thank you.
I just want to point out, on that trip, we were able to see
the submersibles that they bring a lot of the drugs in. And I
remember as they were talking to us, they talked about having
two frigates that were just several hundred meters apart and a
submersible in between that they couldn't see.
So it does take a helicopter or JSTAR, other means
coordinated with the ships that are there to interdict. So all
of these are very important items.
Mr. Veasey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Kelly, I want to ask you some additional questions
about illegal drugs. You know, one of the drugs that oftentimes
comes in from borders is marijuana. And several States now have
taken initiatives to legalize marijuana or decriminalize
marijuana. And I wanted to know what effect do you think that
is going to have on the war on drugs?
General Kelly. Thanks for that question, Congressman.
I think the first thing you have to take note of is
countries that have decriminalized or legalized drugs are all
now trying to figure out ways to turn back the clock. Legal or
decriminalized drugs bring crime, bring higher addiction rates,
bring higher, you know, substance abuse problems. And they are
all trying to turn back the clock.
As far as Latin America goes, we have been encouraging
these countries to be in the drug fight for 25 years. The
levels of violence that our drug problem has caused in many of
these countries is just astronomical. And so, when we talk
about decriminalizing, the example I would give you is the two
States that voted to decriminalize marijuana, or legalize
marijuana.
Most of the states--countries I deal with were in utter
disbelief that we would, in their opinion, be going in that
direction, particularly after 25 years of encouraging them to
fight our drug problem in their countries and, you know, in
their littorals.
So that is kind of where they are on it. They are very
polite to me, but every now and again when they are not so
polite, the term ``hypocrite'' gets into the discussion. But
frankly, the crime rate is so high in many of these countries
and the fact that they see us turning away from the drug fight,
that--they are starting to chatter a lot about, ``Well, why
don't we just step back and let it flow.'' We do a lot on the
high seas, but Mexico, Panama, Honduras, Guatemala, they are
in--Colombia--they are in this fight big time with us. But at
the end of the day, it is really our problem. And I think it is
a false choice on their part, and I tell them this, to step
back and let it flow will continue to bring you high crime
problems. To stay in the fight is the way to go.
But to answer your question, I guess, it is hard for me to
look them in the eye and tell them ``You really need to, you
know, stay shoulder to shoulder with us,'' because they see us
in a sense giving in.
I don't know if that answers your question, Congressman.
Mr. Veasey. Are the cartels that deal with moving
marijuana, are they starting to look at moving to another
product? I mean, to shift--move the marijuana into the United
States? Are they starting to consider moving to another product
or is it just not having any effect, as you can tell right now?
General Kelly. They are already completely diversified.
They move cocaine, heroin--they make heroin. They make
methamphetamines. They make cocaine, and they transport it.
They also do the same thing with illegal aliens, sex slaves--
something to the tune of 18,000 sex slaves a year, mostly
adolescent young women, move through this network into the
United States every year. Anything can move on this network.
They are already diversified. They are now starting to
diversify into illegal mining, illegal logging for certain
types of wood--anything to make a buck. And the profits that
come out, just the drug profits that come out of the United
States is something to the tune of $85 billion a year, of which
only $1 billion is required to keep the drug flow going. The
rest of it is just profit.
Their biggest problem, frankly, in our interagency, the
Department of Treasury, FBI, Department of Justice--is getting
after this. But their biggest problem is taking $85 billion
worth of U.S. currency and laundering it.
Mr. Veasey. So even--just let me get your opinion on this--
so even if you were to see this trend of legalization or
decriminalization here in America take effect, because of this
diversification, can we not expect to save any money on the war
on drugs from the, you know, Pentagon's point of view?
General Kelly. The more we decriminalize or legalize drugs,
God forbid, the more we do that, the social price of dealing
with the additional crime, because there will be additional
crime, the additional health care and all of that will go up
exponentially. This costs a lot of money. It is astounding to
me that we are--we have just kicked off--the Federal Government
has just kicked off a $100 million program to try to get people
to stop smoking tobacco, yet we are opening up other areas of
substance abuse. It is just astounding to me we are doing this,
but----
Mr. Veasey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Nugent.
Mr. Nugent. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I truly do appreciate both your gentleman's service to
our country. It means a lot.
And when you talk about the drug flow, I will concur with
you, after 38 years in law enforcement. You know, we would get
a small, small smidgen of the drugs off the street; cost a lot
of money to do that. It is much more cost-effective, I would
think, to do it the way we have been doing it, and particularly
out in South America.
But I wonder, you know, last year, I believe, General
Kelly, you may have testified to the fact, the amount of
dollars that are clearing the profit. Do we have any ideas as
to where those dollars are going? Obviously, going back to the
cartels, but is that money being utilized for anything other
than furthering their criminal activities or others? Do we have
any idea?
General Kelly. It all goes back into some type of criminal
activity. As I say, their biggest problem is laundering the
money. There is so much of it. And they have ways to do that.
And as I said, the FBI, the DEA, the DOJ, and the Treasury are
really working that hard and increasing their efforts to do
that.
But as an example, we know some of that money and as it
goes through the laundering process, we know that elements of
some Islamic radical organizations, both Shia and Sunni are
involved in that, and take, we are estimating tens of millions
of dollars into their organizations.
Cocaine that moves into Africa--the vast majority of
cocaine that is produced, and virtually all of it that is
produced in Peru and the other two big producers, Peru, number
one, Bolivia, number two, that cocaine moves through Latin
America to Africa and then up into Western Europe and the
Middle East.
We know that Al Qaeda affiliate organizations have taken
money out of that as it moves, kind of as a whole. So it is
going into every imaginable nefarious kind of activity to
include Islamic radicalism.
I don't know if that answers it, but----
Mr. Nugent. It does. And my concern is obviously, it seems
like this is sort of an afterthought in regards to the
Pentagon's decision in regards to giving you the assets that
you need to have.
Now, understand it is, you know, in war time, those assets
are going to be placed in other locations but this is really--
and you have talked about it, the commitment of our allies in
this fight.
It seems like we have a very small commitment at the end of
the day where we could have greater returns if we just up that
commitment just a--even a small amount, versus trying to wait
until it gets back in the United States, where once it gets
diffused into our criminal justice system or what we have to go
through to get it, becomes really difficult.
You know, I would like to see more assets, obviously,
provided to you within that combat command. But in particular,
as it relates to just what you talked about, doesn't have to
be, you know, a multi-billion dollar aircraft carrier, it can
be something as simple as refitting some--you know, a ship, a
platform to give you the assets, the helicopter assets. And
General Jacoby, the question was--or a statement was made in
reference to, you know, the National Guard and the Army's look
at how they are going to refit or take away the attack assets
of the National Guard.
And then I understand the National Guard's reluctance to
give that up because they are kind of a mirror image of the big
Army. But I will agree with you from this aspect that it would
be more important at least from the State aspect to have more
Black Hawks.
General Jacoby. Right. So I want to make clear,
Congressman, thanks for bringing that back up that you know, I
am looking at it from the NORTHCOM commanders' requirement.
Mr. Nugent. Right.
General Jacoby. I would love for our governors and our
adjutants general to have that kind of capability to meet the
needs of their people.
I understand it is a more complicated question that--but I
really think the Army is being driven to this, you know, by the
Budget Control Act and by the realities of the fiscal
environment and they have to manage these shortages in order to
put the best total force together to meet all of the missions
sets of the combatant commanders.
Mr. Nugent. One last thing, in reference to the Black
Hawks, in particular, as it relates to the Army National Guard,
but we have an Army Reserve out there with a number of Black
Hawk assets that really don't ever get called into play to
support the State mission.
General Jacoby. Thanks, and I want to thank Congress for
making that possible and NDAA [National Defense Authorization
Act] 2012 that allowed us to use title 10 Reserves for the very
first time. Used to be against the law, now we can use them.
And so, I am working very closely with General Grass and
with the directors of the different Reserve forces to ensure
that we come up with methodologies and mechanisms to get them
effectively employed.
Mr. Nugent. I thank you for your time.
I yield back.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Bridenstine.
Mr. Bridenstine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, thank you General
Jacoby and General Kelly for your testimony today.
I am a Navy pilot. I have spent a lot of my time deployed
to the Southern Command, the forward operating locations that
we have--in El Salvador, Colombia, Curacao. I have spent many
months on watch at the Joint Interagency Task Force South. I
have seen, first hand, how wonderful the intelligence that we
get coming from SOUTHCOM is.
I have also been excessively frustrated when we get such
great intelligence from people who are taking great risk upon
themselves, we get phenomenal intelligence and this is not--it
doesn't come easy, but it comes. And when it comes, I fly an
aircraft called an E-2 Hawkeye, it is one of those intelligence
surveillance--that reconnaissance aircraft that you talked
about, General Kelly, that we don't have enough of.
Interestingly, my squadron has been cut in March of 2013,
and so it doesn't exist as an asset or resource in this fight.
But even when it did exist, we would get the intelligence,
we would see the target, we would make every effort to track
and interdict the target, and over, and over, and over again,
the end-game assets were not available.
The Coast Guard cutters that you talked about, the Navy
cruisers that could, you know, carry helicopters, put a Coast
Guard law enforcement detachment on those ships, even though
they are DOD assets, you can put law enforcement detachments on
those assets to avoid, you know, the Posse Comitatus
challenges.
The question I have for you, General Kelly, when you think
about the national security of the United States and this is
one of the challenges I have, quite frankly, on Capitol Hill.
We have a real national security threat to the United States of
America, that SOUTHCOM is specifically designed to deal with.
And I have just heard today, even, as a matter of fact,
people talking about combining NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM. SOUTHCOM
is already one of the regions in the world that is the most
disregarded by the United States of America and it needs--that
needs to change.
When you talk about the integration of transnational
criminal organizations with leftist, totalitarian government,
and now the integration of terrorist organizations in the
Middle East, this is a real national security threat for the
United States of America.
General Kelly, I was wondering if you could take a minute
and talk about some of these challenges?
General Kelly. I don't guess I could say it any better than
you just said it, Congressman. But specifically on the
integration, in the end-game piece, you are right.
We have phenomenally good intelligence we watch come out of
all over Latin America. The good news is now more and more and
more, we have partners--and again, I would say Colombia,
Panama, and some of the other countries that are in real
crisis, by the way, in the northern part of Central America
that are in the fight with us. So they are getting more and
more. But the frustrating thing is, you are right, I mean,
about 75 percent of it that we watch, we can't touch. We only
really engage about 25 percent of it.
I keep saying this but it is very, very important--no
violence to speak of. They stop, we board, we get 5 tons, and
we take them and arrest them and they go into the U.S. legal
justice system.
When it gets ashore and comes into the United States, the
distribution system is just an amazing thing. And these cartels
are just not, you know, south of the border. They deal--manage
the distribution within the United States.
We estimate it is about 1,200 retail outlets, if you will,
that these cartels control all over the United States. And then
of course, it is then distributed down.
So there is not much you can do in spite of all the amazing
heroic deeds of our law enforcement people at the border and
all over America. Once it is in it is just part of this
distribution network that it is almost impossible to touch.
Mr. Bridenstine. Sorry about that. When you talk about the
pivot to the Pacific. A lot of us on this committee, we have
heard a lot of testimony about the pivot to the Pacific.
And it is pretty clear to me that in many cases, unless we
plus-up the Navy significantly, the pivot to the Pacific looks
very hollow.
And the threats to America see it that way, quite frankly.
I understand the Straits of Malacca, they need to be secured.
We have got to protect the seas, we have got to protect freedom
of movement. We all agree with that.
But this massive pivot to the Pacific, you were mentioning
earlier, economies of force, which is a critical thing that I
think Congress needs to understand which is a very small
investment in the Caribbean, a very small investment in
SOUTHCOM, the eastern Pacific.
These investments can yield a tremendous amount of benefit
to the United States of America from the national security
threat that is very real coming from Central and South America.
And yet, you can take this enormous region of the Pacific
and do a pivot to the Pacific with a small force and it
actually hollows us out and makes us look weak.
If you could just share a testimony real quickly, if you
had all the resources you needed----
Mr. Conaway [presiding]. Gentleman's time is expired. We
have got other folks who want to ask questions, Jim.
Mr. Bridenstine. Roger that, Chairman. We will talk later.
Mr. Conaway. Now, Mr. Garamendi, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you. I am almost wanting to yield my
time to Mr. Bridenstine, because he is talking exactly where I
wanted to go. But I won't do that.
Instead I would have a--just one of the sentences in your
testimony, General Kelly, ``As the lowest priority, geographic
combat command, USSOUTHCOM will likely receive little if any
trickle down of the restored funding.''
And just following on what my colleague was talking about,
there are threats and then there are immediate threats, and
clearly the issue we are talking about here of the Caribbean
and the drug issues are immediate threats.
I am also the ranking member of the Coast Guard
Subcommittee, and so the integration of the military with the
Coast Guard is critical. Both of them have suffered with the
sequestration and with attention going elsewhere.
So this really for my colleagues as well is that we really
need to pay attention to the funding for these two commands,
for the SOUTHCOM command as well as for the Coast Guard and the
interrelationship.
Specifically, General, the ISR platforms, the unmanned
platforms, we covered some of this a moment ago but not the
unmanned piece of it. Are they sufficient? What is it going to
take? What are the best platforms available on the unmanned
vehicles?
General Kelly.
General Kelly. I mean, the--yes, sir. The unmanned drones,
ISR, we don't get--we don't see that very much where we are. I
mean, that is one of those assets that is probably in more
demand than JSTARS. So we don't see those very much.
But interesting enough, the Colombians have purchased their
own, now. We used to provide them some help in this regard. The
Colombians--they are not armed right now, but they have
produced them or bought them from the Israelis.
They are doing great work over Colombia and in their
littorals. But we don't see an awful lot of the unmanned ISR
capability, it is almost all manned is what we work with.
And some of this now is contract. I have got some contract
airplanes that do great work for us because we simply can't get
access to the E-2s and some of the other things we have talked
about here this morning
Mr. Garamendi. I was in Colombia last week and we visited
with President Santos on these issues. Also happened to have
been in Cartagena when the LCS Coronado was there. Talk about a
very expensive platform, and I was struck by your description
of a tanker--an oil tanker--with a platform for a helicopter
being very useful, probably 100th of the cost of that LCS,
which is quite a ship.
I think the bottom line here is that we have an immediate
threat, and we are simply not providing the resources to deal
with it, either the Coast Guard, the issue of new cutters--
offshore cutters and the like.
I want to just take my last couple of minutes here and
really shift to the north and the Arctic, again, the
interrelationship between the military and the Coast Guard. And
General Jacoby, if you could just discuss this relationship or
the interrelationship of them.
General Jacoby. Thanks, Congressman.
We have a great relationship with the Coast Guard and,
along with the Canadians, they are the premier----
Mr. Garamendi. Let's talk assets for a moment. You came out
with a report last fall about the Arctic--the role of the
Arctic, and if you could just pick that up, what do we need
from the military side, and from the Coast Guard side in the
Arctic?
General Jacoby. So the question is, what do we need and
when do we need it?
You know, the Arctic is a harsh environment, it is melting
and it is going to become more navigable and there is going to
be increased human activity. We just don't know the pace of it.
So it is a very difficult question, what do we need and when.
We are going to need icebreakers. We are going to need ISR.
We are going to need communications above 60. We are going to
need better mapping of the littorals in the Arctic.
So those things are going to be required in the future. The
next 5 years, and in the next 10 years are real challenges.
What should our investments be for 15 years out when it really
is----
Mr. Garamendi. I would appreciate more specificity.
We understand the word, more, around here. But we need
specificity--more specificity.
With regard to the cutter in the Coast Guard
reauthorization there is money for a cutter, about one-fifth of
what would be needed. Where we would find the other money is
going to be unknown.
Revamping, we have got some questions about rebuilding,
revamping an existing Coast Guard cutter to serve the purposes
in the Arctic, but I would appreciate specific information
about the assets that are going to be needed for the Arctic, as
well as for SOUTHCOM.
Thank you very much. I am out of time.
I yield back.
Mr. Conaway. Mr. Garamendi's time has expired.
Mr. Turner, 5 minutes.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Jacoby, thank you for being here today and for all
of your leadership.
One of the issues that we struggle with in this committee
is the issue of missile defense. As you know, the threat is
proliferating both of weapons of mass destruction and with
specific missile technology that can place mainland United
States at risk.
The President has now canceled two missile defense systems
that were intended to protect mainland United States, both
the--what was known as the third site, which the Bush
administration had proposed, and even phase four now of the
Phased Adaptive Approach, which was intended to provide that
mainland coverage.
This committee and Congress, through the National Defense
Authorization Act, has continued to advance a, what the
administration would have called a hedging strategy, but we
actually consider to be a sound strategy of locating a missile
defense site on the East Coast that would give us that
additional ability that has been lost with the third site and
with the Phased Adaptive Approach, and also would give us
greater ability to protect that site with it being within our
homeland.
In fiscal year 2014, the NDAA, we included a requirement
and funding for the Missile Defense Agency to update its plans
and required documentation for this potential East Coast
missile defense site. We are obviously looking for your insight
and support for that effort. We both authorized and
appropriated--which means, Congress had to do a great deal of
deliberation in deciding to move forward with the East Coast
missile defense site.
We want to reduce the deployment timeframe when the United
States decides to deploy the site. Waltwood, a third
interceptor site on the East Coast of the United States,
provide for missile defense coverage to the United States.
Would it be prudent if all the appropriate required
documentation was completed to deploy the site sooner than
later, and although there are those who have said at times it
is not presently needed, we know that the future development of
threats pose an environment in which that would be incredibly
helpful.
We would like your words on that, sir.
General Jacoby. Congressman, thank you.
A third site, if you built it, would give us better weapons
access, it would give us increased inventory and increased
battlespace with regards to a threat coming from the direction
of the Middle East.
So those are just facts. And that is what it would give to
the combatant commander--and that is me--the one that is
accountable for the defense of the homeland from the ICBM
threats.
Currently, we know that, in the Middle East, Iran continues
to--while we are doing the ``Five plus One,'' and we are all
hopeful that ``Five plus One'' contributes to safety and
security in the Middle East and our own country. They have not
stopped aspirational goals towards ICBM technologies. They have
successfully put a missile--space vehicle into orbit, and that
demonstrates the types of technologies that you need to develop
an ICBM.
So we are watching closely.
I think it was very prudent to direct us--or the Missile
Defense Agency--to do a site selection. There were four sites
that were determined. We were close partners with Admiral
Syring every step of the way, to include final say on what were
going to be the top four sites, and what were the
characteristics and criteria used for selecting.
Those have been selected and according to the directions we
received, we are moving forward on the EIS [Environmental
Impact Statement] for all four sites, which should put us in a
position to have those completed in the next 2 years.
So I think we are on the right path to provide options in
continuing development for a third site and the ability to
outpace a threat from the Middle East.
Mr. Turner. Well, sir I want to thank you for those
comments, because I have always said that everyone who
questions this site is just three classified briefings away
from being a real great fan of it. And everyone not having
access to those briefings and everyone not availing themselves
of that, your statements of support in this hearing of support
of that third site are certainly important, because it shows in
your judgment, the importance of our making certain that we
rise to the threat.
So I appreciate those----
General Jacoby. Congressman, I want to clarify that, I
think it is going to put us in a position to make a good
decision in a timely fashion.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, General.
Mr. Conaway. Ms. Speier, 5 minutes.
Ms. Speier. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, gentlemen, for being here.
I have just returned from a week in Colombia, where there
was a lot of good news in terms of the civility there and the
rule of law. We met with the President.
It appears though that Venezuela is a powder keg. And we
heard also that Central America is in grave condition and I
recognize in your statement, General Kelly, that you pointed to
the fact that Latin America remains the most unequal and
insecure region in the world, and I would probably suggest
Honduras has got to be at the core of that.
What more should we be doing?
It seems like we move into one area, it becomes secure, and
the trafficking just moves to other areas within Latin America.
General Kelly. You know, it is really a whole-of-
government--whole-of-world approach. You are right. If we--
recently we have had great successes--declining success, but
great successes interdicting the drugs as it moves up into
Central America.
And we have seen drug traffickers start to move product
now--up to 14 percent of it now we think is moving back to the
old network up the Antilles into the Dominican Republic and
Puerto Rico or directly into the United States.
So they are pretty adaptive people.
So to deal with this drug problem, obviously, starts kind
of in kindergartens and in grade schools and all of those kind
of--those programs to keep kids off drugs. And then, to fund
properly law enforcement inside the United States. And then to
pick up as much of this stuff as it moves along the so-called
transit zone into these Latin American countries. And then, the
source zones, that is to say who produces it, Colombia and
countries like that. And they are doing as I say a tremendous
job.
So it is really a whole-of-government--whole-of-the-world--
whole-of-world approach. There is not one single answer to it.
At the end of the day, in my part of the world, more
engagement--not necessarily money, but more opportunity to
advise these countries and to help these countries help
themselves.
So I am not asking for, you know, heavy brigades and Apache
helicopters and Marine amphibious forces. I am asking for the
ability to deal with countries that I am somewhat restricted in
dealing with right now, small engagements to teach human
rights, to teach how you interact and get at these problems.
So that would be my answer to you.
Ms. Speier. All right, thank you.
It is my understanding that we have not had a missile
defense test succeed since 2008, in that, we have had three
back-to-back test failures. So my question is are you confident
that we can test accurately and safely without failure.
General Jacoby. Thanks for the question.
I have now confidence that we are going to test. That is
the most important thing. And so there is budgeted money now
for a good steady test cadence that will allow us to understand
problems that might exist with the various systems, to fix
them, to develop new capabilities. I mean, I think that is
critical.
And so Admiral Syring and the Department have committed to
a very firm and robust testing schedule. We did have a
successful CE2 [Commander's Exercise Engagement] flight last
year. It wasn't an intercept flight, but it was a successful
flight. But I think it is really important when you are making
upwards of dozens of modifications on boosters and EKVs
[exoatmospheric kill vehicles] that we test.
There are countries that don't test. We are not one of
them. We test and make sure that what we have is a real system,
a credible system.
Ms. Speier. But, General, our tests have been test
failures, so----
General Jacoby. Well, in part. Yes, ma'am, I think we have
had a number of intercept failures. But if you look--it was a
5-year gap in the last intercept test.
So I think it is important to get back on a testing regime
and make sure that we determine and achieve reliability in the
system.
Those challenges are accounted for in our shot doctrine.
They are accounted for in our battle management. And the fact
is, that right now, the threat is a very limited threat.
But you bring up a great point. And as the combatant
commander, I insist that we continue testing and make the
modifications and make the improvement in the systems that not
just give us reliable--or a sense of confidence in the current
system, but also in the ability of the system to adapt and
become more effective over time, as we pace the threat.
Mr. Conaway. The gentlelady's time has expired.
Mr. Wittman.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Jacoby, General Kelly, thank you so much for
joining us today, and thank you for your service.
General Kelly, I want to begin with you. Can you give me an
indication--I noted last year there were a number of Navy ship
deployments in your AOR [area of responsibility] that were
canceled. Can you tell me about the impact of that, and what
you did to mitigate those canceled ship deployments?
General Kelly. Yes, sir.
First, we didn't have--we weren't going to get that many
ships, so we didn't, you know, lose much.
But in my AO [area of operations], not--you know, losing a
little is losing a lot.
Mr. Wittman. Yes.
General Kelly. How we mitigated it. Just more work with our
partners, providing intelligence. One of the--kind of a
breakthrough we had last year is we found a way legally to
share information with our partners, not tell them how we get
the information, but to share information with our partners.
And I can't say enough about the interagency aspect of this
fight. I mean, at many of our embassies, we have FBI, we have
DEA, we have DEA FAST [Foreign-Deployed Advisory and Support
Team] teams. These are really heroic men and women that work
with some of our partners, Honduras, Guatemala, people like
that. Amazingly effective people.
So we really started to work closer with our allies. And,
as I say, the breakthrough, the ability to start what we call
spot-on-the-map information, where we can tell them, ``If you
go here,'' you know, ``you will find something worth finding.''
And, again, we don't tell them how. And it is protected.
And then we have liaison officers out of my headquarters in--or
my JIATF [Joint Interagency Task Force] South headquarters in
Key West in which we have law enforcement liaisons in many of
the production countries we are talking about, or the countries
that do the most with us to go after this drug flow.
So that is how we have mitigated it. Because we have just--
I think we had on station last year one Navy ship. As a
requirement, it is for, well, a lot more than that. I won't go
into it.
A couple--two or three Coast Guard cutters. I mean, to the
gentleman's comments a few minutes ago, I mean, the lion's
share of the effort really is done by Coast Guard cutters and
DEA and FBI. Just really, really good people.
And, for that matter, Customs and Border Patrol, Border
Protection folks.
Mr. Wittman. Very good.
Let me ask an--other element of concern within the SOUTHCOM
AOR. As you heard alluded to earlier, an increased Iranian
influence in the area, more Islamic extremism, efforts being
projected in that particular area, can you tell me, what are
you doing in response to that, especially as it relates to our
embassies?
Can you kind of give us your overview about that?
General Kelly. We are keeping an eye on it. You know, we
don't know what they are up to. Generally, I would offer that
the Iranians need to be watched pretty closely. They--no
revelation here. They don't like us. No--you know, in terms of
what is in Latin America for the Iranians, I mean there are two
entirely different cultures, ways of looking at life, ways of
looking at God and everything else. So why are they so active?
They are active in a couple countries that receive them.
But, for the most part, what they have done is opened up a
number of embassies; certainly their right to do it. I think
they have opened 11 additional embassies in Latin America.
They have also opened what they call cultural centers, 33
of them, I think, throughout the area. These can be used for a
lot of different reasons, and we are just keeping an eye on
that.
But they are fairly active, again.
Mr. Wittman. I would like to ask both you gentlemen the
concerns and challenges that you see as far as military
readiness going forward. One of the areas that we have defined
as I think the biggest challenge going forward is how do we
make sure in this resource-challenged environment that we keep
a steady and consistent effort on maintaining readiness.
And, as you know, sequester made that extraordinarily hard.
In fact, I would argue, in some areas, it actually took away
readiness from the military.
So I would like to get your perspective.
General Jacoby, I will begin with you.
General Jacoby. Thank you, Congressman.
We consume service readiness. We are combatant commanders;
we consume service readiness.
The homeland has received a good healthy support as a
priority, so we are consuming readiness.
Now, I will tell you, that in the homeland, I don't have
the same readiness requirements as others do, because it is not
a deployment, an overseas deployment.
Mr. Wittman. Right.
General Jacoby. John Kelly is not getting that priority.
And he requires a little bit different kind of readiness in
order to get folks deployed.
And so, you know, the bipartisan budget agreement, it
bought us some time, bought us some breathing space. But every
force that is made ready for current use is just contributing
to a bathtub effect that will be accelerated if we continue on
with the law and sequestration numbers start up again in 2016.
Mr. Wittman. Okay.
General Kelly.
General Kelly. I can't add anything to that, but I would
like to add something, and that is the readiness of our people.
And, generally speaking, those of us in uniform get credit
for serving the Nation. Those of us in uniform are pretty well
taken care of.
But, frankly, there is a big aspect to our readiness in
terms of personnel, and that is our civilian workforce. And
that includes, in my opinion, contractors.
These are very, very dedicated men and women who we haven't
really been very nice to in the last year or so. It is amazing
to me that the morale I have in SOUTHCOM, in my headquarters
and throughout the region, in terms of my civilian morale, is
as high as it is.
They have a lot of confidence in me. We do the best we can
to share the good news and the bad news with them.
But our civilian workforce across the Federal Government is
just as important to us as those of us in uniform. So we need
to keep an eye on their morale and take care of them as well.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Conaway. The gentleman's time is expired.
Mr. Smith, 5 minutes?
Mr. Smith. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I just want to echo that last point on, you know, the
importance of the civilian workforce. The furloughs, the
uncertainty, it has been devastating.
And, you know, that is moving. It also makes it more
difficult to get the people that we need into that--you know,
that line of work. They have other options, and it makes it
more and more difficult.
I follow up on the missile defense issue. And this is
something you and I talked about last night.
Mr. Chairman makes the point about, you know, the
importance of an East Coast missile defense system. And, by and
large, he is right. You know, the more missile defense we have
to protect the homeland, the more we can discourage potential
threats, you know. And that is not even really classified. I
mean, we hit North Korea, we have hit Iran, we hit a whole
bunch of other places, and what could potentially happen out
there.
The concern that I have is sort of following up on Ms.
Speier's point, and that is that the system that we have right
now isn't working particularly well.
I want to spend money on missile defense. I think it is
critically important.
But to spend money on developing a new site so we can put
missiles and radars and sensors and spend $4 billion on a
system that can't hit a target in a test strikes me as
unintelligent would be the polite way to put it.
I would rather spend that money on what you just said, test
the existing system; get it to work. Get us to that point.
I am worried about even deploying more missiles, you know,
in our two existing sites, when they can't hit a target.
Why don't we spend money on radars and sensors and tests to
get to the point where we actually have a system that works?
Now, I suppose we could--of course, public hearings like
this undermine what I am about to say here--I suppose we could
just bluff. You know, we could convince our adversaries, oh, we
have got these missiles. They could work.
But unfortunately we are in an open society, so we can't do
that very successfully. They know even before I, you know, said
this, that those tests failed, because it is a matter of public
record.
So shouldn't we be wiser about how we spend that money, to
spend it on getting our missile defense system to the point
where it actually works, instead of just feeling good about
having it deployed?
General Jacoby. Congressman, I think we all want the same
thing. We want----
Mr. Smith. That is not entirely true.
If you sat here on the nights when we do the NDAA and we
argue about this stuff on this committee, I can assure you, we
do not all want the same thing.
But go ahead.
General Jacoby. Well, based on our conversation last night,
I think you and I want the same thing, which is----
Mr. Smith. That I will agree with.
General Jacoby [continuing]. Effective missile defense for
the people of the United States. And they deserve it. And they
have spent a lot of money and we have made a lot of effort.
You know, I believe that a lot of this has been
theoretical--a theoretical threat and a theoretical capability,
that the threat--the pace of the threat has become real. And
the threat is real, and it is practical. And we have got some
work to do to continue making sure that we have a practical
system in place.
But we are infinitely better off with the system that we
have, and I believe it does have the capability. It gives me
confidence against the current limited threat.
The question is, what is the right path to improve that
system, to outpace the threats, both from North Korea and any
others that could now a highly sought and proliferated
technology out there around the world.
Mr. Smith. And I would submit, just for the record, that
the wisest way to do that is not to spend money developing a
new site until we set the system that we need to rely on
working. Spend the money on that.
General Jacoby. Congressman, I hope that in my answer to
that question, I tried to indicate that I believe that it was
important that we do things simultaneously.
And so, there are things that we can do to be prepared to
make a decision on whether we need a third site or not in the
future.
But if you start everything from scratch on the day that
you decide you need something, then we are always behind.
And so, I think that we have taken--we have been directed
to take prudent steps. I don't think we are at a decision point
for a third site, but I think we have set ourselves up to make
a decision in a timely fashion. And I think that is smart to
do.
Mr. Smith. Yes. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Jacoby. Yes, sir.
Mr. Conaway. Gentleman yields back.
Back to Mr. Lamborn for 5 minutes.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you both for your service.
And, General Jacoby, I want to thank you in particular for
the great things that your team has done, helping our homeland
and helping locally in Colorado Springs for some of the
wildfires that we had. The assistance that your people gave was
tremendous. So thank you for that.
We have had some discussion about missile defense. And I
have to point out that there have been some budget cuts in the
last few years, last 4 or 5 years, that I don't think were
helpful.
The purpose of testing is to find out what is wrong and to
isolate those flaws and make improvements and--so that there is
success afterwards.
So, I am glad to see that we are finally, with this
administration, getting some further funding to reverse some of
that.
Do you feel confident that we have a good system in place,
not that it can't do better at testing and not that we can't
continue to make improvements, which I believe we are, but are
you confident that we have a good system right now?
General Jacoby. I am confident that the system in place
right now can handle the threat that exists right now. I think
that what we have learned now is that there has to be continued
smart investment that outpaces the threat.
And Congressman, one of the things we haven't talked about
yet. My first dollar would go to intel. So that, you know, if
your measure of effectiveness is that you are outpacing threat,
you need to know a lot about the threat. And so we need to do
more in understanding everything there is to know about North
Korean missile capabilities; everything there is to know about
Iranian programs, to make sure that we can make threat-informed
decisions, not just resource-informed decisions.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you. I appreciate that perspective. And
you did mention North Korea, and I think Iran would be in that
same list.
On a slightly different list, cruise missiles. What nations
now have the ability to send strategic ballistic cruise
missiles to the U.S. from great distances?
General Jacoby. Thanks, Congressman.
Cruise missiles are proliferating as well. But the nation
that has the highest level of sophistication and can pose the
greatest threat to North America is Russia. And they continue
to make very, very important advances in both conventional and
nuclear cruise missiles, both aerial-delivered and submarine-
delivered. The first of the 12 projected Severodvinsk cruise
missile-firing submarines--nuclear submarines is at sea and
being worked up. And the missile that it uses has already
demonstrated its effectiveness.
So, this is a capabilities question. And we have always
believed that having a capability and an intention to defend
the country against aerospace threats is a capabilities issue,
not just an intent issue. And so, we have been directed by the
Secretary to ensure that we are also looking at how to provide
effective defense against cruise missiles in a way that
outpaces any threats, to include Russians.
Mr. Lamborn. And what do you believe, General, should be
the way forward on that?
General Jacoby. Well, we have a way forward right now,
Congressman, and that is a three-phased approach that has been
approved by the Pentagon. And it starts with getting the
National Capital Region right. And right now, we are going
through a test phase where two things have been added or are
being added to the National Capital Region--the Stateside
Affordable Radar, in conjunction with a joint elevated net
sensor, the JLENS [Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense
Elevated Netted Sensor System] balloons.
And what they are trying to accomplish is integrating that
into an overall defensive plan that allows us to see, detect,
track, warn, and in the future hopefully engage cruise missiles
that could pose a threat to the National Capital Region.
Then the issue will be if the cruise missile threat
continues to evolve, how do we then take and export that
capability where we think we might need it to defend other
strategically or critical infrastructure locations in the
United States and Canada.
Mr. Lamborn. Okay. Thank you very much.
And lastly, funding for an improved kill vehicle. That is
something that we did include in the fiscal year 2014 National
Defense Authorization Act. I think it is valuable. What is your
perspective on that?
General Jacoby. The budget hasn't been released and missile
defense wasn't addressed in the rollout that the Secretary made
earlier in the week. I would be very happy to have funding
against an improved kill vehicle and I am hopeful that we will
see the ability to do that sometime in the future.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you very much.
Mr. Conaway. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Bridenstine for one more round?
Mr. Bridenstine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I wanted to ask, General Kelly, when you think about
economies of force and the asset layout that we currently have,
obviously the more hardware you get, there is diminishing
marginal return for every additional piece of hardware. But
clearly, we are not anywhere near diminishing marginal returns
at this point, given your lack of resources.
If you could have the order of battle that you most desired
to be as effective as possible, can you share what that might
look like? And let's just pretend for a second that we had
maybe a 2-year period of time when we were going to do a surge
operation in the eastern Pacific and into the Caribbean.
What would that order of battle look like, in your best
judgment?
General Kelly. Yes, sir. Our best estimates are if we had
16 helicopter-capable platforms--again, they don't have to be
warships necessarily--but 16 helicopter-capable vessels of some
kind, to include Coast Guard cutters, and sufficient ISR. And
as you know, actually you pointed it out before, intel is very,
very good. The tracking across the oceans, it is hit or miss
because our--of the isthmus in particular--is hit or miss just
because of the lack of ISR. But we need more ISR.
But at the end of the day, a vessel with a helicopter on
it, our requirement is for 16, but you can see by some of the
things we have talked about, when I had 5 or 6, we were taking
huge amounts of cocaine out of the flow. But 16 is the number.
And I have to say--I have to mention our--in addition to
our Latin American partners that work so closely with us, the
Dutch out of Curacao, they oftentimes will have a vessel in the
Caribbean. The Brits have one there now. The French will
oftentimes have one. And the Canadians have one. And they are
as valuable to me as a U.S. vessel.
In fact, last year, 67 percent of the seizures, they were
involved in. So you could make the argument in 67 percent of
the cases, we may not have gotten the drugs. That translates,
by the way, to 80 tons of cocaine. A helicopter flying off of a
Dutch buoy tender or oiler, or a French small boat--you know,
frigate-type thing, or a Canadian frigate, is just as valuable
to me as an American ship or Coast Guard cutter.
Mr. Bridenstine. The squadron I used to fly in, we--on
average, on an annual basis, we would bust about $2 billion
worth of cocaine. We were involved in that operation. And, of
course, the squadron has been eliminated, which means a lot of
that cocaine--I am not saying that we can't get some of it at
certain steps along the process--but a lot of it will be coming
into the United States. And of course, that is devastating for
our country and the children in this country.
General Kelly. One of the--yes, sir. One of the--maybe the
Congresslady made the point. You know, the consumption of
cocaine actually in the United States is down. The war on
drugs, if you will, if you look at the last 30 years, some
people declare surrender here in DC [District of Columbia], but
the fact is there is a lot more--there is a lot fewer kids
starting drugs. So there has been great success in the so-
called war on drugs.
Mr. Bridenstine. Right.
General Kelly. Well, I will point out that we have tried to
fight it in exactly the wrong place. And that is, in the United
States. It is just not cost effective to do it here. But the
use of cocaine is down, but guess what is up? Methamphetamines.
The use of prescription drugs is down, but what is up is
heroin.
Mr. Bridenstine. Right.
General Kelly. So, we are not addressing it, in my opinion,
nearly as much here in the States in the same way that we are
trying to address, say, the reduction of tobacco use. So it
would start here as much an education for particularly young
kids, but it starts with education. There is a medical aspect
to this. There is a law enforcement aspect to this.
But just like in any war, the worst place to fight it is in
the homeland.
Mr. Bridenstine. Right. We have got about 45 seconds left.
I will ask a question; answer it the best you can. If you don't
finish, then maybe we can get it on record in the future.
Which is Venezuela--obviously, we have a very leftist
government. We are seeing that the more power is centralized in
these governments in Central and South America, the people
ultimately rebel and it creates tremendous instability.
As a nation, maybe you could provide for the record what we
can do as a country to ensure that these efforts that are
destabilizing the region, of course, a region that we need
stability in for our own national security, what we can do as a
nation to prevent this kind of thing in the future.
General Kelly. Very briefly, Mr. Chairman, just engagement,
more engagement is better. And some level of understanding for
many of the countries that are struggling so terribly with
internal violence and crime brought on to a large degree by our
drug problem; a little bit of understanding as we work with
them to clean up things like human rights; to get their police
cleaned up--not cleaned up, but improved so that the police can
go back to being policemen and the military can go back to
defending the borders. So just a little bit more understanding.
Venezuela is Venezuela. We watch it closely. Who knows what
will happen. But there are others down there that are
struggling mightily, that look to us for just a little
understanding and a little bit of assistance. And I am not
talking a lot of money. Frankly, in some cases, I am not
talking money at all--just some advice and some training tips,
if you will.
Mr. Conaway. The gentleman's time has expired.
General Jacoby and General Kelly, thank you both for your
long, distinguished service. And we appreciate your attention.
And thank you very much for coming today.
The hearing is adjourned. Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 12:11 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
February 26, 2014
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
February 26, 2014
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
February 26, 2014
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SMITH
Mr. Smith. General Kelly, in your testimony, you stated, ``To
adequately address the complex medical issues of the aging detainee
population, we expanded and emphasized detailed reporting within our
comprehensive system to monitor the health, nutrition, and wellness of
every detainee.'' You also stated, ``Although Naval Station Guantanamo
and detainee hospitals are capable of providing adequate care for most
detainee conditions, we lack certain specialty medical capabilities
necessary to treat potentially complex emergencies and various chronic
diseases. In the event a detainee is in need of emergency medical
treatment that exceeds on-island capacity, I cannot evacuate him to the
United States, as I would a service member.'' Would you please provide
the committee with a detailed list of those complex medical issues? In
doing so, would you please describe: each medical issue; any necessary
treatment associated with the issue; the number of detainees affected
by the issue; any medical capability shortfalls associated with the
issue; and the estimated cost of treating the issue on site, if such
treatment or treatments would require the import of medical
capabilities that exceed on-island capacities?
General Kelly. Joint Task Force Guantanamo's Joint Medical Group
(JMG) offers excellent primary care medical, dental, and mental health
capabilities. U.S. Naval Hospital GTMO provides the referral
consultative services in general surgery, orthopedic surgery,
optometry, clinical nutrition, and physical therapy. This facility
currently operates at the level of a small community hospital. Further
subspecialty teams are sent from military treatment facilities in the
U.S. when needed. These teams diagnose and treat the more complex
health care issues. At present there are no detainees who have
consented to, demonstrated requisite compliance for, or have medical
conditions that would require care not available on GTMO. 82% of the
detainee population is in good health and cooperates with healthcare
providers who care for their medical issues. However, sudden
deterioration of existing conditions could create situations in which
medical needs exceed current capabilities. The Joint Task Force is
charged with providing detainees medical care to the extent
practicable, similar to standards applied to personnel of the U.S.
Armed Forces. There are several foreseeable and potentially unforeseen
medical conditions for which provision of on-island care to this
standard could not be achieved with current capabilities.
There are a number of detainees that have worsening chronic
illnesses that will potentially exceed in-place and deployable medical
capabilities. There are twelve (12) detainees with hypertension. They
are offered appropriate medical therapy and clinical nutrition services
to maintain a healthy weight. Four (4) refuse care. There are nine (9)
detainees with diabetes. They are offered appropriate medical therapy
and clinical nutrition services. Six (6) refuse care or inconsistently
comply with offered care plans. There are six (6) detainees with
Hepatitis. Five (5) have inactive hepatitis, while one (1) has chronic
active hepatitis with resulting significant liver injury. State-of-the-
art anti-viral therapy has been made available and has been refused.
There are several detainees that refuse recommended medical care on a
regular basis which negatively impacts their health.
Cardiovascular Disease (collectively heart disease, hypertension,
and diabetes): Detainees with cardiovascular disease represent our
greatest, most likely and most immediate potential need for
capabilities not currently available at GTMO. There are four (4)
detainees with heart disease. They are offered appropriate medical
therapy and see a cardiologist routinely. All have a history of care
refusal with variable current compliance with medical recommendations.
Routine current medical management strategy of optimized management of
blood pressure and use of medications to prevent episodes of chest
pain, along with dietary therapy and weight management comprise
clinically sound approaches to these detainees' conditions. Advance
cardiovascular procedures, including manpower and portable facilities,
would cost an estimated $1M per episode and take up to 30 days to
execute while significantly impacting beneficiary care at military
treatment facilities in the U.S. If there is an emergency
cardiovascular event (heart attack or stroke), emergency medical care
will be taken to treat the detainee.
Malnutrition (from voluntary fasting): There are a small number of
detainees at serious health risk related to their voluntary long term
non-religious fasting and resulting malnutrition. They are
appropriately managed medically and see an internal medicine physician
routinely. All are offered clinical nutrition services to maintain an
appropriate weight. No additional medical capabilities are required.
Liver Disease: One (1) detainee's chronic active hepatitis with
liver injury (cirrhosis) is expected to worsen but at an unknown rate,
potentially yielding end-stage liver failure. There are temporary
treatment options including surgical procedures requiring a high level
of post-operative intensive care that are not available at GTMO.
Definitive therapy would be a liver transplantation. It is conceivable
that one (1) or more detainees would eventually meet clinical criteria
for organ transplantation; however, it is not clear if detainees would
be eligible to participate in an organ recipient registry. The cost to
construct an organ transplant center would likely measure in the
hundreds of millions of dollars.
Kidney Disease: One (1) detainee has chronic kidney disease. It is
conceivable that his condition could deteriorate to the extent that the
detainee will require kidney dialysis. There is no dialysis capability
at GTMO. Dialysis machines are available for purchase for less than
$5K. Dialysis requires near permanent access to the blood stream
through a blood vessel shunt in order to perform the filtering of the
blood. This shunt would be suboptimal for the detention environment. A
full time dialysis team with frequent kidney subspecialty medical care
supervision would be required. Nurses who specialize in dialysis are
usually not active duty military and the addition of this capability
would thus require at least two civilian contracted positions at an
estimated $200K each.
Cancer: Although not an immediate concern, one (1) detainee death
has been attributed to colon cancer. As all detainees are men, it is a
statistical likelihood that there will be prostate cancer in the
detainee population. Another detainee has a thyroid nodule being
investigated for cancer. He is scheduled for a diagnostic biopsy. If
biopsy results indicate cancer, then surgical removal of the tumor with
a subsequent long course of chemotherapy and radiation will be required
if the detainee chooses such therapy. No oncology services are
available; no capability to prepare chemotherapy exists on GTMO nor is
there radiation therapy. While the specifics of required resources and
cost for treatment may vary significantly depending on the type of
cancer any given detainee has, this detainee's case points out the
significant medical capability shortfalls in cancer treatment available
at GTMO. Radiation therapy capability would cost an estimated $10M to
purchase or $3M per year to rent.
Mental Health: Behavioral health providers have recognized detainee
hopelessness and previous detainees have demonstrated psychosis.
Currently 47 detainees are followed as active patients. Diagnoses
currently managed are depression, anxiety, personality disorders, and
delusional disorder. They are appropriately managed by a dedicated
behavioral health team and have access to a psychiatrist routinely.
Care refusal is widely variable in this population. Currently no mental
health diagnoses exceed JMG care capabilities.
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN
Mr. Langevin. General Jacoby, how satisfied are you with the
current state of the responsibility chain for weapons of mass
destruction? Hypothetically, a weapon could be the responsibility of
numerous agencies as it was designed, created, packaged, and
transported to the country's borders and onto U.S. soil. Are you
satisfied with the status quo, and if not, what more should be done?
General Jacoby. I am satisfied with the current process and
delineated responsibilities; however, we always look to refine and
improve existing processes and procedures for dealing with this no-fail
mission. For example, the newly established Special Operations Command
North, under operational control of USNORTHCOM, now provides a focal
point for lead federal agencies (DHS, DOJ, FBI) to request specialized
active duty support to interagency operations.
Mr. Langevin. General Kelly, your statement included comments on
your command's efforts to ensure security of Department of Defense
networks and communications infrastructure in your area of
responsibility. In your view, what are the top U.S. network
vulnerabilities in the region and what are the top cyber or network
threats to our regional infrastructure in SOUTHCOM?
General Kelly. The integrated nature of cyberspace makes DOD
networks an attractive target for a broad range of worldwide actors.
USSOUTHCOM networks in the AOR are no exception. DOD computers,
networks, and communications infrastructure in the USSOUTHCOM AOR are
threatened by both regional and global actors (1) who may directly or
indirectly threaten our systems or the regional infrastructure (2) upon
which we rely. State-sponsored actors are increasingly able to launch
sophisticated attacks against the networks that control critical
Department of Defense networks and infrastructure. We also do not
discount concerns regarding the potential impact of insider threats
either as a result of free will or coercion.(3)
We have multiple communications infrastructures supporting our
Security Cooperation Offices, Joint Task Forces, and Headquarters
locations--all are susceptible to these threats. The number of
different networks with independent and duplicate vulnerabilities in
the current theater architecture requires us to replicate security
tools, as well as situational awareness, and defensive processes. From
a technical perspective, we are aligned with and developing plans to
migrate to the DOD Joint Information Environment (JIE) in accordance
with DOD Chief Information Officer directives by the FY18-19 time
frame. JIE has several components that mitigate and reduce security
related vulnerabilities, the greatest of which is to reduce duplicate
networks and applications, as well as to integrate security tools and
processes. JIE also offers some means to reduce threats associated with
the insider threat.
Much work has been done by USCYBERCOM, with the COCOMs and
Services, in the areas of resources, training, tactics, techniques, and
procedures (TTPs) to deal with the threats and vulnerabilities of the
cyber domain. Unilateral operations in this domain are by far easier--
but the reality is that in our AOR, we operate in bilateral and
multinational modes for the majority of our operations. Our partner
nations have significant variations in resources, training, and TTPs to
mitigate vulnerabilities or address threats as compared to how DOD
operates and our policies limit what we can share or how we can assist
them.
(1) External threat actors include nation states, as well as non-
state actors. (2) The term infrastructure here is not limited to
regional commercial telecommunications networks. The cyber threat also
threatens regional power grids, supply chains, transportation networks
and financial systems of nations in the AOR which would not only impact
the USSOUTHCOM mission, but could cause economic and other disruptions
for affected countries. (3) Malicious insiders may exploit their access
at the behest of foreign governments, terrorist groups, criminal
elements, unscrupulous associates, or on their own initiative.
Mr. Langevin. General Kelly: what advanced technologies, now in the
research and development phase, do you foresee would be most beneficial
to our mission in the SOUTHCOM AOR?
General Kelly. My specific priorities for advanced technologies in
the Research & Development phase that are most beneficial to our
mission include: advanced radio and laser detection and ranging (RADAR/
LIDAR) concepts to help our forces and our partners deny the enemy the
camouflage, concealment and deception afforded by the dense jungles in
the SOUTHCOM AOR; innovative technologies to enable the Afloat Forward
Staging Base for use by our interagency and partner nation forces; and
technologies that strengthen our operational capabilities in the cyber
domain.
My general priorities lie in technology areas that would mitigate
our limitations in capacity and resources. These include: persistent
Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) technologies that
enable innovative uses of new platforms to improve wide area detection
and monitoring, as well as ISR systems that target the vast littorals
and extensive riverine basins in theater; non-lethal technologies that
enable more effective interdiction of targets such as go-fast boats,
Self-Propelled Semi-Submersibles (SPSSs), and Fully Submersible Vessels
(FSVs); operational energy initiatives that increase efficiency and
decrease logistical burdens for remote locations; information sharing
technologies that enable us to more effectively operate with our
partners, both international and interagency; and technologies to
counter the ever-evolving and growing use of Improvised Explosive
Devices (IEDs) in the region, as experienced by Colombia, which has the
second highest rate of IED incidents in the world.
We also actively participate in a broad array of technology
development projects, primarily from OSD's Joint Capability Technology
Demonstrations (JCTDs), one of the few formal programs designed to
directly support COCOM capability gaps. Additionally, we maintain close
ties with defense agencies such as DARPA and DTRA, as well as with the
National Laboratories, to continually assess the current state of
technology, and provide operator insight into future development. While
it is important to maintain a technical edge across the full spectrum
of military operations, we must be cognizant of the technology gap that
exists when working with our partners, both at home and abroad.
Building our partners' capacity to improve regional security is a
critical aspect of our technology development goals.
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ROGERS
Mr. Rogers. Please describe your plans for cruise missile defense
of the United States. Why is this threat getting your attention now?
General Jacoby. [The information referred to is classified and is
retained in the committee files.]
Mr. Rogers. Can you describe which states have cruise missiles
capable of ranging the United States?
General Jacoby. Cruise missile technology has continued to advance
at a high pace as a lower-cost alternative to manned strike platforms.
Today, Russia is the only nation-state assessed to possess cruise
missiles capable of ranging the United States, and is a known
proliferator of cruise missile capability. China likely has the
technical expertise to develop this capability in the future, but to
date we have not seen a Chinese intent to do so.
Mr. Rogers. Are we developing a cruise missile defense capable of
defending the national capital region from Russian cruise missiles?
General Jacoby. Yes, we have a three-phased approach to cruise
missile defense that Department has fully endorsed. The first phase
looks at our existing structure in the National Capital Region and adds
new surveillance and fire control systems. From there we plan to move
to a second phase--our objective Defense Design--which provides a
steady-state integrated air defense system capable of protecting our
nation's capital from threats, such as emerging Russian cruise missile
programs. As our newer systems mature and are integrated into our
existing force structure, my goal is to outpace the threat by
leveraging improved sensors, command and control networks, and
adaptable deployable capabilities to expand beyond the National Capital
Region.
Mr. Rogers. In the FY14 NDAA, we included a provision and funding
for the Missile Defense Agency to develop and deploy a next-generation
kill vehicle. Why is that important to you?
Do you support that provision? Why? We have, as you know, a large
and capable radar originally developed for deployment in the Czech
Republic. What are the pros and cons of deploying that radar as an
additional long-range discriminating radar?
General Jacoby. I strongly support the provision to redesign the
Exo-Atmospheric Kill Vehicle. From a warfighter perspective, this
redesign will significantly improve system reliability by taking
advantage of new and proven technologies, such as Iron Dome, Terminal
High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), and the Navy's standard missile
system.
I believe the Missile Defense Agency is best-suited to answer your
additional long-range discriminating radar question due to the
technical nature of the pros and cons.
Mr. Rogers. Why is Cobra Dane important to you as the NORTHCOM
commander? Are you comfortable that there is a plan to ensure its long-
term availability to you?
General Jacoby. [The information referred to is classified and is
retained in the committee files.]
Mr. Rogers. Have you examined whether Cobra Judy is an attractive
option for additional missile defense radar capability?
General Jacoby. [The information referred to is classified and is
retained in the committee files.]
Mr. Rogers. How closely have you examined the suitability of SBIRS
and other on-orbit space assets for providing additional missile
defense capability?
General Jacoby. We are supporting USSTRATCOM in their efforts to
prepare the FY14 NDAA-directed evaluation of options to improve
ballistic missile defense capabilities. This evaluation will consider
current Federal Government capabilities, as well as future systems,
including a full review of on-orbit assets, such as the Space-Based
Infrared System (SBIRS).
Mr. Rogers. The President's EPAA originally supported forward-based
homeland missile defense capability in Europe, as did the previous
administration. Can you tell me what did a forward-based missile
defense capability provide for the security of the United States? What
defensive capability are we still missing now that those sites are no
longer in the program of record?
General Jacoby. The purpose of the forward-based homeland missile
defense capability was to add to the protection of the U.S. homeland,
which is defended by our current Ground-based Interceptors (GBIs)
against missile threats from the Middle East. By shifting resources
from the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) capability, DOD was
able to fund an additional 14 GBIs being deployed to Fort Greely, AK,
as well as advanced-kill vehicle technology that will improve the
performance of our GBIs against threats from the Middle East faster
than could have been achieved by EPAA Phase IV. I believe these
improvements will provide better capability than previous forward-based
capabilities.
Mr. Rogers. In the FY14 NDAA, we included a requirement and funding
for MDA to update its plans and required documentation to a potential
East Coast missile defense site. Do you support this effort which we
authorized and appropriated funding for to reduce the deployment
timeframe when the United States decides to deploy this site?
a. What would a third interceptor site on the East Coast of the
U.S. provide for missile defense coverage of the United States?
b. Would it be prudent, in your opinion, if all of the appropriate
required documentation was completed, to deploy this site sooner rather
than later?
General Jacoby. I believe planning for a third site is prudent and
places us in a position to make an informed deployment decision in a
timely fashion. If built, a third site would give us better weapons
access, increased inventory, and increased battlespace for threats
coming from the direction of the Middle East. However, even after the
Environmental Impact Statement process is completed, any future
deployment decision to build a third site should still be based upon
known and anticipated threats.
Mr. Rogers. Please describe the Iranian ballistic missile threat.
Have you seen it abate in any way over the past year?
General Jacoby. Iran possesses a substantial force of short- and
medium-range ballistic missiles capable of striking targets throughout
the Middle East and parts of Europe. To date, Iran has not demonstrated
a ballistic missile capable of reaching intercontinental distances.
However, it has an organic engineering capability that may result in a
more sophisticated ICBM threat, to include more advanced decoys and
countermeasures technology. Thus, while the Iranian missile program has
experienced some setbacks in recent years, Iranian engineers continue
their efforts to improve the country's ballistic missile capabilities
and are on track to flight test an ICBM range capability as early as
2015. Iran will not likely remain a simple, unsophisticated threat in
the future, and we will need to keep pace with them.
Mr. Rogers. The 2012 Iran military power report of the DOD stated
Iran may be technically capable of testing an ICBM by 2015, which is
next year. Do you have any reason to believe that that estimate is
incorrect?
a. Have you seen evidence of Iran flight testing space launch
vehicles in the recent years?
b. Is space launch technology applicable to Iran's ballistic
missile program?
c. Are Iran and North Korea rekindling their past ballistic missile
and nuclear weapon cooperation?
d. Can you explain the significance of North Korea assisting Iran
with ballistic missile development?
General Jacoby. We continue to assess that Iran may be technically
capable of testing an ICBM by 2015, though we do not know if Tehran has
the intent to do so. Iran continues its attempts to place satellites
into orbit using boosters that incorporate ballistic missile
technologies.
The current extent of the North Korean-Iranian ballistic missile
and nuclear cooperation is unclear. However, following North Korea's
successful demonstration of long-range missile technologies during the
country's December 2012 satellite launch, there may be the potential
for North Korean engineers sharing lessons learned with their Iranian
counterparts as they have done in the past--we are watching this
closely.
Mr. Rogers. It has been reported in the press and publicly
proclaimed by the Chinese themselves that they are deploying a new
submarine-based ballistic missile capability. Are you comfortable that
you are well-postured today to deal with an unauthorized launch by a
Chinese ballistic missile submarine?
For that matter, are you well-postured to appropriately defend
against an unauthorized launch from either China or Russia?
General Jacoby. [The information referred to is classified and is
retained in the committee files.]
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. TSONGAS
Ms. Tsongas. How is the operational effectiveness and efficiency of
the National Capital Defense structure expected to be improved with the
integration of JLENS? Are there criteria for mission impact parameters
such as improvement of response time for decision making and management
of available assets for response?
General Jacoby. [The information referred to is classified and is
retained in the committee files.]
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GARAMENDI
Mr. Garamendi. Please provide specific details that your command's
need regarding ISR support and Coast Guard assets. Your testimonies
highlighted that your AORs require additional resources to support drug
interdiction and that more Coast Guard and ISR capability would be
needed as we further develop Arctic strategy.
General Jacoby. For drug interdiction: USNORTHCOM has validated ISR
requirements to support interdiction by our law enforcement partners,
to include the U.S. Coast Guard. The capabilities we require include
full motion video, forward-looking infrared and moving target indicator
at the medium to high-altitude range. These requirements may be met by
manned and unmanned platforms. I view our required and authorized
support of law enforcement partners to find and fix illicit traffickers
entering the United States or its territorial waters as also having
Homeland Defense dimensions because of the threat to national security
posed by illicit traffickers.
Mr. Garamendi. Please provide specific details that your command's
need regarding ISR support and Coast Guard assets. Your testimonies
highlighted that your AORs require additional resources to support drug
interdiction and that more Coast Guard and ISR capability would be
needed as we further develop Arctic strategy.
General Kelly. Historically, SOUTHCOM has been undersourced on DOD
naval surface asset allocation and that allocation has continued to
decline due to budget cuts being borne by the Services. In order to
remain effective at countering illicit traffic (CIT) we require
additional surface assets, either DOD or USCG, and DOD ISR systems to
respectively (1) partially fill the naval surface force gap and (2)
increase the effectiveness of allocated resources.
For FY15, SOUTHCOM has been allocated 24% of its total drug
interdiction surface force out of a 22 total ship presence requirement.
This total surface force allocation is well below that required to
either achieve the national illicit traffic interdiction goal of 40% or
put effective pressure on transnational criminal networks. But
successful and efficient interdiction of illicit narco-traffic in the
maritime domain is not only predicated upon surface force allocation;
ideally it requires a complementary package that includes flight-deck
equipped surface assets with embarked Airborne Use of Force (AUF)-
capable rotary wing air asset(s), robust intel capability, persistent
Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA), and a high speed Over the Horizon (OTH)
smallboat with an embarked Coast Guard boarding team.
USSOUTHCOM's airborne ISR requirements have historically been
sourced at 5%, which represents a fraction of the total DOD globally
allocated airborne ISR assets. This limited airborne ISR allocation
does not provide USSOUTHCOM with sufficient ISR capacity to support
partner nation efforts to disrupt threat networks in Central America
while maintaining our enduring support to Colombia. Persistent ISR
capabilities are critical to boost our surface asset efficiency--our
historical data shows that a ship alone has a 9% detection rate, but
when we add a rotary element and ISR (MPA) to the mix we increase that
detection rate to 70% thus increasing that ship's overall effectiveness
within the Interdiction Continuum. In FY2013, whenever this ship-helo-
MPA package detected an illicit event that event ended in disruption 86
percent of the time--an impressive probability of interdiction
approaching 90 percent. Although it will not eliminate the gap, any ISR
efficiency boost can help us deal with lower than required surface
presence in our 42 million square mile Joint Operating Area. This could
include deploying systems such as the Navy's P-3 or follow-on P-8, and
the Air Force's E-8, E-3, or MQ-9.
We rely heavily on the USCG allocation to provide the majority of
our assets, and therefore look to the Department of Homeland Security
to help us meet our CIT mission by increasing its allocation of USCG
surface assets. To date, the Coast Guard has been extremely proactive
and flexible in their efforts to help in this fight, which includes
their deploying Helicopter Interdiction Tactical Squadron (HITRON)
helicopters aboard surface assets other than their service's cutters.
Any resource action that directs more flight-deck equipped cutters
(USCG) and surface combatants (USN, Allied) to the AOR with embarked
AUF helicopters, exponentially increases opportunities for successful
Interdiction and Apprehension (I&A).
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