[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
FULFILLING A KEY 9/11 COMMISSION
RECOMMENDATION: IMPLEMENTING BIOMETRIC EXIT
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON BORDER
AND MARITIME SECURITY
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 26, 2013
__________
Serial No. 113-37
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
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Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Michael T. McCaul, Texas, Chairman
Lamar Smith, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Peter T. King, New York Loretta Sanchez, California
Mike Rogers, Alabama Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Paul C. Broun, Georgia Yvette D. Clarke, New York
Candice S. Miller, Michigan, Vice Brian Higgins, New York
Chair Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Patrick Meehan, Pennsylvania William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina Ron Barber, Arizona
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania Dondald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey
Jason Chaffetz, Utah Beto O'Rourke, Texas
Steven M. Palazzo, Mississippi Tulsi Gabbard, Hawaii
Lou Barletta, Pennsylvania Filemon Vela, Texas
Chris Stewart, Utah Steven A. Horsford, Nevada
Richard Hudson, North Carolina Eric Swalwell, California
Steve Daines, Montana
Susan W. Brooks, Indiana
Scott Perry, Pennsylvania
Mark Sanford, South Carolina
Greg Hill, Chief of Staff
Michael Geffroy, Deputy Chief of Staff/Chief Counsel
Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
I. Lanier Avant, Minority Staff Director
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON BORDER AND MARITIME SECURITY
Candice S. Miller, Michigan, Chairwoman
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania Loretta Sanchez, California
Steven M. Palazzo, Mississippi Beto O'Rourke, Texas
Lou Barletta, Pennsylvania Tulsi Gabbard, Hawaii
Chris Stewart, Utah, Vice Chair Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Michael T. McCaul, Texas (Ex (Ex Officio)
Officio)
Paul L. Anstine, Subcommittee Staff Director
Deborah Jordan, Subcommittee Clerk
Alison Northrop, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Statements
The Honorable Candice S. Miller, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Michigan, and Chairwoman, Subcommittee on
Border and Maritime Security................................... 1
The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Texas, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Border and Maritime Security................................... 3
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland Security:
Prepared Statement............................................. 6
Witnesses
Mr. John Wagner, Acting Deputy Assistant Commissioner, Office of
Field Operations, Customs and Border Protection, U.S.
Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 7
Joint Prepared Statement of David F. Heyman, John P. Wagner,
and John P. Woods............................................ 9
Mr. John Woods, Assistant Director, Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 16
Joint Prepared Statement of David F. Heyman, John P. Wagner,
and John P. Woods............................................ 9
Ms. Rebecca Gambler, Director, Homeland Security and Justice
Issues, U.S. Government Accountability Office:
Oral Statement................................................. 18
Prepared Statement............................................. 20
FULFILLING A KEY 9/11 COMMISSION
RECOMMENDATION: IMPLEMENTING BIOMETRIC EXIT
----------
Thursday, September 26, 2013
U.S. House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:31 a.m., in
Room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Candice S. Miller
[Chairwoman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Miller, Duncan, Palazzo, Stewart,
Jackson Lee, and O'Rourke.
Also present: Representative Smith.
Mrs. Miller. We are going to start on time here this
morning. So the Committee on Homeland Security, the
Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security will come to
order. The subcommittee is meeting today to examine the proper
path forward in establishing a viable biometric exit system.
We are so pleased to be joined by a very distinguished
panel of witnesses today: John Wagner is the acting deputy
assistant commissioner of the Office of Field Operations, U.S.
Customs and Border Protection; John Woods, who is the assistant
director of Immigration and Customs Enforcement; and Rebecca
Gambler, director of homeland security and justice issues with
the Governmental Accountability Office, the GAO.
Thank you all so much for coming. I will give a more formal
introduction in just a moment.
Twelve years ago this month 19 terrorists successfully
penetrated our border and visa security defenses. They hijacked
four airplanes and conducted a terrible, terrible attack that
took the lives of almost 3,000 innocent Americans.
That act of terrorism is the very reason the Department of
Homeland Security exists, and really why this committee was
created as well, subsequently, to prevent another terrorist
attack on the homeland. Along the walls we see photographs of
the aftermath of those attacks to remind us each and every day
of why we are here and, most importantly, what the cost of
failure is.
We should never forget what happened on that Tuesday in
September to so many of our fellow Americans or fail to
remember the victims and the heroes of the first responders
during that tragedy. I think one of the ways that we can honor
those who lost their lives is to harden our defenses and to act
on the lessons learned from that horrible day.
Congress established the 9/11 Commission to identify ways
that we could do that, and the report issued by that commission
identified the vulnerabilities that we need to address, and
Congress has taken substantive actions on the majority of their
recommendations. However, the recommendation to establish a
biometric entry-exit system stands out as one of the largest
unfinished border security challenges that DHS has yet to
tackle in a really meaningful way.
This is a challenge that falls squarely within the
jurisdiction of this committee. It is a challenge that this
subcommittee will confront through proper oversight as well as
legislation.
According to the 9/11 Commission Report, a biometric exit
capability could have assisted law enforcement and intelligence
office officials in August and September of 2001 in conducting
a search for two of the 9/11 hijackers that were in the United
States on expired visas. We will not be able to fully close the
holes exploited by the 9/11 hijackers or curtail the ability of
terrorists to travel to the United States without the ability
to know with some degree of certainty if visa holders leave, if
they leave our country in accordance with the terms of their
visa.
We have pushed our border out by conducting more checks
overseas before passengers obtain a visa, before they board an
airplane or present themselves to a CBP officer at a port of
entry, a layered approach that increases our chances of
preventing terrorists from every coming to America. Today we
collect more information on foreign travelers than ever before.
This allows CBP, through the National Targeting Center, to use
complex targeting rules which examine travel patterns, allowing
agents to discern problems with travel documents that might
raise red flags.
That, however, is only one side of the issue. Without a
viable biometric exit system, visa holders can overstay their
visa and disappear into the United States, just as four of the
9/11 hijackers were able to do.
In this committee we have worked very hard to come up with
a common-sense solution to secure the Southwest Border, but
that is only part of the problem. If as high as 40 percent of
all illegal aliens come in through the proverbial front door
then securing the border means having a biometric system that
gives the Nation the ability to identify overstays. Once we
identify overstays we must dedicate the resources necessary to
promptly remove those in the country illegally; otherwise we
could put our citizens at risk.
Last week we introduced H.R. 3141, the Biometric Exit
Improvement Act. I introduced that along with Ms. Sanchez of
California; and our Ranking Member Jackson Lee; former Chairman
Peter King; our Chairman of our full committee, Mr. McCaul, of
Texas; and Ranking Member Thompson, as well. So we had a very
bipartisan introduction of this bill, which we hope to address
the challenge of visa overstays. Under this bill, biometric
exit would be required for all pedestrians who cross a border
within 3 years and at all air and sea ports of entry within 5
years.
I want to be very clear up front that the goal of this
legislation is to make sure that we can identify foreigners who
overstay their visas, and this legislation does not allow the
Government to collect biometrics on any United States citizens.
Now I guess I am going to repeat that because we are using this
legislation to make sure we can identify foreigners who
overstay their visas. This legislation does not allow the
Government to collect biometrics on any U.S. citizens.
So I am very confident that this bipartisan bill will put
the Nation on the right path to establishing a viable biometric
exit system that is certainly long overdue by establishing
tight but achievable time lines. The 9/11 Commission understood
that the establishment of an exit system was an ambitious task,
but they also called it an essential investment in our National
security.
The Biometric Exit Improvement Act leaves no doubt that
Congress expects the investment to be made which will increase
the Department's ability to promptly identify those who
overstay their visa, strengthening our border security efforts
in the process. Unlike several of this subcommittee's previous
hearings on this topic, this hearing is focused on how we as a
Nation can best establish a viable biometric exit system, one
that serves our National security interests as a tool to
strengthen our border security efforts, enhance our
transportation security interests, fight terrorism, and toughen
our immigration control efforts.
So I will certainly commend the work that the DHS has done
over the last few years to focus their efforts on preventing
terrorists from coming into the country in the first place.
Pushing our borders out is a very smart policy. Adding a
reliable biometric exit system reduces the chance that visitors
can stay in the country beyond their period of admission and
reduces the terrorist threat in the process.
While I certainly understand that this effort is not going
to be easy, today we would like to explore how this Nation can
fulfill the recommendation of the 9/11 Commission and establish
a biometric exit system. So I certainly look forward to hearing
from our very excellent panel of witnesses for their testimony
today.
I would like to recognize the Ranking Member for her
opening statement, as well.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me thank Chairwoman Miller for holding
this hearing and reminding us of the tragedy and the journey
that we have taken since 9/11. As one of the Members who was
here and here in the United States Capitol, one of the first
Members to travel to ground zero in the midst of the recovery
stage, there is nothing more compelling, potent to be able to
see that most unbelievable and devastating, mind-boggling,
mind-changing, and the ending of the naivete of the United
States than to be standing on that very ground.
I remain humbled and respectful of the lives lost, the
lives sacrificed, and those first responders, which makes this
hearing and legislation even more vital. As we look currently
in the backdrop of first to recall Mumbai, which did not have a
border instance because people just literally came out of the
water, but Kenya reminds us that terrorism is both franchised
and surprising. Anything we can do to ensure that individuals
in this country leave timely, but also to know the individuals,
hopefully, that may be overstays on purpose of doing harm I
think is a vital effort for this committee.
So holding this hearing today to examine the issue of
deploying a biometric exit system in our Nation's ports of
entry I believe is vital.
We had a very active bipartisan discussion about this issue
during the subcommittee markup of H.R. 1417, the Border
Security Results Act of 2013, earlier this year. That bill,
having passed out of the full committee in a bipartisan manner,
is now being viewed as a major, major component to any aspect
of comprehensive immigration reform. Homeland Security has
often been at the leadership helm of bringing together
Republicans and Democrats around important issues of securing
the homeland.
I was pleased at that time to support an amendment at the
full committee mark-up to require the Department of Homeland
Security to develop an implementation plan for a biometric exit
capability. Most recently I joined the gentlelady from
Michigan, Mrs. Miller, as an original cosponsor of H.R. 3141, a
bill to require DHS to deploy a biometric exit system to record
foreign travelers' departure from the United States.
I applaud Mrs. Miller, No. 1, for capturing the discussion
during our mark-up of H.R. 1417, but more importantly, as a
senior Member on the House Judiciary Committee, working closely
with, looking at various reform measures for the National
Security Agency and assessing the overreach of addressing
surveillance of Americans. I am very glad that she pointedly
made the point that this would not be an oversight or a
collecting of data on American citizens.
I want to say that again, as she did: This would not be a
collection of data on American citizens. The bill points
specifically and pointedly to foreign travelers.
I remain committed to working with my colleagues on a
bipartisan basis on this very important issue. While this
subcommittee frequently focuses on the need to better secure
our land borders, addressing visa overstays, in part by
employing biometric exit, is equally important. Indeed, the
importance of this issue is underscored by the fact that
several of the border security immigration reform bills
introduced this Congress require progress on a biometric exit
system.
There is a strong bipartisan support in Congress for
biometric exit, although the approaches and time lines for
deployment differ. Achieving this mandate is already long
overdue.
While DHS has made significant progress by implementing a
biometric entry system, a solution for biometric exit has been
far more difficult to come by. According to the Government
Accountability Office, DHS currently has over a million
unmatched records representing potential overstays in this
country. Many of these individuals have overstayed but others
have likely departed the country, and we are left with no
information, no ability to track, and no way of providing
assurance that our homeland is secured.
We need to know with certainty who has overstayed in the
United States so that DHS is not wasting scarce resource
attempting to locate visitors who have, in fact, returned home.
I want to hear from our witnesses today about how DHS can
finally make progress on implementing a biometric exit.
At the same time, as a Member from a border State I am well
aware of the importance of maintaining the flow of legitimate
trade and travel as DHS implements this mandate. I notice that
the legislation proceeds with our border ports, and then goes
on to airports and then goes on to pedestrian and land and
vehicle lanes, as well. Having been to the Southern Border and
watched that effort, I know how important it is to get a system
that works; that works to secure us but does not impede trade
and traffic, particularly legitimate trade and traffic here to
do good in the United States.
I am confident that with the right approach and appropriate
support from Congress DHS can do just that. I look forward to a
productive discussion and hearing today on this important
issue, and I also look forward to working with my colleagues on
both sides of the aisle on H.R. 3141 as it moves through the
committee process, subjects itself to, or is subjected to the
amendment process, which I know will be done, as well, in a
bipartisan manner.
I remain committed to advocating for common-sense
enforcement measures as part of a broader immigration reform
package that will not only secure our borders but also uphold
our values as a Nation of immigrants.
Madam Chairwoman, I say it often and will say it again: We
are long overdue for a comprehensive approach to immigration
reform, and I challenge this committee that has already done
its work, I challenge this House and our speaker that we put on
the floor of the House a comprehensive immigration reform bill
post-haste, immediately, as we make and do our work here on
Homeland Security.
I thank the witnesses for being here today, and I yield
back the balance of my time.
I do want to acknowledge Beto O'Rourke, a Member of the
subcommittee.
Mrs. Miller. I thank the gentlelady for her comments and I
thank her for her comments in regards to the Border Security
Act. In regards to comprehensive immigration reform, I think
many of us think that Federal Government perhaps does not do
comprehensive particularly well, particularly when we look at
health care issues and other kinds of things.
But certainly border security first and foremost is a
renumerated responsibility of the Federal Government, and I
think certainly our Border Security Act, as it came out of this
subcommittee and the full committee in a bipartisan way, is
evidence that both parties are very focused on border security,
and a big component of that is interior enforcement, and so
that is the purpose of the hearing today.
I will remind other Members that their opening statements
could be submitted for the record if they would like to do so.
[The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson
September 26, 2013
I am pleased the subcommittee is meeting today to examine the
Department of Homeland Security's efforts to deploy a biometric exit
system to record the departure of visitors to this country.
As Chairman of this committee, I held hearings and conducted
oversight of DHS's activities on this important matter, and have long
believed that we must do more to address the issue of immigration
overstays.
Deploying a biometric exit system--as recommended by the 9/11
Commission and mandated repeatedly on a bi-partisan basis by Congress--
is an important part of that effort.
Much of the focus in the immigration reform and border security
debate is on our Nation's Southwest Border, but an estimated 40 percent
of individuals unlawfully present in the United States entered this
country legally and overstayed.
Yet a dozen years after September 11, 2001, DHS is still without a
biometric entry-exit system to positively identify those who failed to
depart this country as they were required to do.
That is why I am an original cosponsor of H.R. 3141, a bill
authored by Rep. Candice Miller, to again require DHS to deploy a
biometric exit data system at ports of entry.
I believe the bill takes a very reasonable, phased approach to
deploying the system.
DHS should have sufficient time to put in place the necessary
technology, infrastructure, and personnel without causing undue delays
to legitimate travel and commerce.
Indeed, Congress first mandated an entry-exit system for visitors
to this country in 1996, and required that the system be biometric as
early as 2001, so this requirement does not come as a surprise to DHS.
I look forward to hearing from our Customs and Border Protection
(CBP) witness today about what substantive steps the agency is taking
to deploy biometric exit at ports of entry.
I specifically want to hear what CBP's schedule and benchmarks are
for achieving this mandate.
I also hope to hear from our GAO witness about whether DHS is on
track to make timely progress on exit, based on the work GAO conducted
for its July report on overstays.
I recognize that deploying a biometric exit system will not be an
easy task, but continue to believe it is essential for our homeland
security.
The time has long since passed for excuses about why it cannot or
should not be done.
Instead, DHS--with support and resources from Congress--needs to
find a way to make it happen.
I thank the witnesses for being here today, and I yield back the
balance of my time.
Mrs. Miller. We are pleased today to have three very
distinguished witnesses before us on this important topic.
First of all, Mr. John Wagner is the acting deputy
assistant commissioner from the U.S. Customs and Border
Protection. Mr. Wagner formerly served as the executive
director of admissibility and passenger programs with
responsibility for all traveler admissibility-related policies
and programs.
Mr. John Woods is an assistant director at the United
States Immigration and Customs Enforcement, ICE, where he
oversees the National security investigations division within
homeland security investigations. He oversees programs
targeting transnational security threats arising from illicit
travel, trade, and financial enterprises.
Ms. Rebecca Gambler, a return visit again to our
subcommittee; we appreciate that, is an acting director in the
U.S. Government Accountability Offices for homeland security
and justice team. Ms. Gambler leads GAO's work on border
security and immigration issues.
Certainly the witnesses' full statements will appear in the
record.
The Chairwoman now recognizes Mr. Wagner.
STATEMENT OF JOHN WAGNER, ACTING DEPUTY ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER,
OFFICE OF FIELD OPERATIONS, CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Wagner. Thank you.
Chairwoman Miller and Ranking Member Jackson Lee,
distinguished Members of the committee, thank you for the
opportunity to appear today to discuss the role of U.S. Customs
and Border Protection in entry-exit operations. We appreciate
the opportunity to speak on this very important issue which
supports the core mission functions of our organization.
The 2013 DHS appropriations law signed this past spring
transferred the responsibility for entry-exit policy to CBP. We
embrace this new direction and this new challenge. We have
already established an entry-exit transformation office within
the Office of Field Operations who is actively moving forward
on several initiatives that we will discuss today.
I would like to begin today by discussing how we collect
arrival information from foreign nationals seeking to enter the
United States. CBP receives passenger manifests from air and
sea carriers in advance of departure to the United States.
These manifests indicate who is on-board the aircraft or
vessel. This information is vetted against a number of law
enforcement databases and automated targeting systems prior to
departure from the foreign location and it enables CBP to
address potential risk factors and admissibility issues prior
to boarding the aircraft.
Upon arrival in the United States, the CBP officers
interview every traveler to determine the purpose and intent of
travel. CBP officers also confirm the accuracy of the
biographic manifest data that has been provided by the
carriers, who are subject to fines for any missing or
inaccurate data. For foreign nationals the person's fingerprint
biometrics and digital photograph are collected and additional
database checks are done to ensure there are no previous
violations or any other risk factors that would warrant further
inspection.
Once determining a visitor is admissible to the United
States and there are no risk factors to indicate the person
does not intend to comply with the terms of their admission,
CBP will stamp the passport and indicate the duration of the
allowable visit on the passport page. At the land border CBP
officers also interview every traveler arriving in the United
States for purpose and intent of travel. Fingerprint biometrics
and digital photographs are collected from all visitors except
for those exempt, which are most Canadians and Mexican citizens
only traveling within the border economic zone.
CBP has reduced the number of acceptable identity documents
from more than 8,000 a few years ago to a core set of six,
allowing CBP to increase the percentage of documents verified
and queried through criminal and National security bases from 5
percent in 2005 to over 97 percent today.
Now that I have described our arrival processing I will
outline the process for departing passengers and how we match
the entry and exit information together. Air and sea carriers
provide biographic manifest data for all departing travelers
prior to leaving the United States. The carriers are required
to provide specific sets of data, which include the name and
passport number, and they are subject, again, to fines for
missing or inaccurate data.
As you will remember, it is through this process that CBP
apprehended the Times Square bomber, Faisal Shahzad, who was
attempting to depart JFK Airport in 2010.
The biographic departure data is then able to be matched
against arrival data to determine who has overstayed their
period of admission. DHS maintains a separate system
specifically for this purpose.
It is important to point out that determining lawful status
is more complicated than simply matching entry and exit data.
For example, a person may receive a 6-month admission period at
a time at a port of entry but then apply to receive an
extension of that 6 months, which is relevant to determining if
that person truly overstayed or not.
The land borders environment is considerably different than
that of air and sea. First, the traveler volume is
significantly higher and includes various modes of
transportation. There is also major infrastructure obstacles to
the collection of an individual's data upon departure at the
land border. There are a limited number of vehicle and
pedestrian lanes upon departure and vehicles can depart the
United States traveling at 50 miles an hour in some locations.
In order to begin to address these challenges CBP has
developed innovative ways to collect exit information in the
land environment on the Northern Border. CBP and the Canada
Border Services Agencies have partnered to create a biographic
entry-exit system on the shared land border by exchanging entry
information so that information collected on an entry in one
country is automatically recorded as an exit from another. This
began on June 30, 2013, and CBP has collected over 1 million
records from Canada and receive about 10,000 to 15,000 per day
at a matching rate of over 98 percent. We are currently
exchanging data on all third-country nationals but we will
expand to include all citizens in June of next year.
Unfortunately, it is not feasible to simply replicate this
on the Southern Border. Mexico does not have fixed physical
structures at ports of entry to process travelers entering
Mexico for immigration purposes, nor does it have data
collection procedures similar to the United States and Canada.
But we will continue to work with Mexico to explore ways to do
this.
As CBP is advancing aggressively to enhance our existing
capabilities and progressing our thoughtful and responsible
path to deploy a biometric exit system, we are working in
partnership with Science and Technology, part of DHS, to
determine operational and technical concepts for a biometric
air exit program. We are focusing on technology currently
available that can seamlessly and transparently fit into the
existing traveler process upon departure and eliminate major
disruptions to travel and keep costs low.
We are building a facility to test biometrics with S&T by
February 2014 and we do plan on testing the various biometric
technologies throughout the course of the next calendar year.
We do plan to implement a biometric exit test in a live airport
in mid-2015.
But it is really important to point out that it is not so
much the technology itself but it is where you place it in that
process. If you place it too far in advance of departure what
you are going to end up doing is really defaulting back to
relying on a biographic system where we are just using the APIS
closeout manifest to determine whether a person really or not
traveled.
We want to be careful we don't create a system where we put
biometrics into the process and we collect the biometrics and
then the person leaves the airport and never boards the
aircraft. So we want some assurances that that person actually
got on-board that aircraft and really not just put biometrics
into place just to say we did so but to do it in a thoughtful,
deliberate, and meaningful way.
So thank you.
[The joint prepared statement of Mr. Heyman, Mr. Wagner,
and Mr. Woods follows:]
Joint Prepared Statement of David F. Heyman, John P. Wagner, and John
P. Woods
September 25, 2013
introduction
Chairman Miller, Ranking Member Jackson Lee, and other
distinguished Members, thank you for the opportunity to appear before
the committee to highlight the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS)
critical work on implementing a biometric entry/exit system. Today, DHS
manages a fully-functioning entry/exit system in the air and sea
environments using biometric and biographic components. To illustrate
the progress the Department has made, 10 years ago, screening of
passengers coming to the United States was limited to the Department of
State's (DOS) visa process, if applicable, for those individuals
requiring a visa; passenger information provided voluntarily by air
carriers; and the inspection of a person by an immigration officer upon
their arrival at a United States port of entry. There was no biometric
collection for visa applicants beyond photographs, nor for individuals
seeking admission to the United States. There was very limited pre-
departure screening of passengers seeking to fly to the United States
and there was virtually no screening of any kind for domestic flights
beyond passing through metal detectors at airport checkpoints. There
was no advance screening of passengers seeking admission under the Visa
Waiver Program (VWP), and interagency sharing of information on
terrorist threats was minimal.
In the last decade, with the support of Congress, and by working
with our international partners, DHS has significantly adapted and
enhanced its ability to detect and interdict threats at the earliest
opportunity. Individuals intending to travel to the United States under
the VWP must now obtain authorization through the Electronic System for
Travel Authorization (ESTA) program before boarding an air or sea
carrier for travel to the United States. ESTA screens passengers
against various Government databases and has virtually digitized the
Form I-94W (Arrival/Departure Record) for authorized travelers from
participating VWP countries. Additionally, all passengers seeking to
fly to, from, or within the United States are similarly screened prior
to boarding an aircraft under the Secure Flight program. For non-
citizens, passengers' biometrics are collected and checked against
terrorist watch lists prior to being issued a visa or being permitted
to enter the United States, and agencies share information on known or
suspected terrorists with each other. Further, we have developed new
capabilities and systems (such as our Advanced Targeting System and
Behavioral Detection program) to help identify possible terrorists and
others who seek to travel to or within the United States to do harm.
It has long been a goal of the Federal Government to obtain
accurate and timely data on those who overstay \1\ their period of
admission to the United States. Congress enacted legislation on
implementing an entry/exit system to help achieve that goal. As part of
a 2004 section of the legislation, such a system would require some
form of biometric (i.e., fingerprints) to be collected when a foreign
national enters and leaves the United States. The purpose would be to
match entry and exit records and determine who is complying with their
period of admission to the United States and sanction those who have
not.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ An individual is deemed an overstay if he or she fails to leave
the country within the authorized period of admission.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As you know, many countries use biographic data, which is
essentially text data that is commonly included on a data page of a
traveler's passport, such as name, date of birth, document information,
and country of citizenship. A biographic system is an entry/exit system
that matches the information on an individual's passport or other
travel document when he or she arrives to and departs the country. By
contrast, a biometric system matches data of a biometric or physical
component from a person that is unique to an individual (i.e.,
fingerprints, a facial image, or iris scan) collected when a foreign
national enters and leaves the United States.
While the United States did not build its border, aviation, or
immigration infrastructure with exit processing in mind, the Department
of Homeland Security piloted various biometric exit programs in 15
ports of entry to try to find a way to achieve such a system.\2\
Through these pilots, we found that the limitations of existing
technology plus the lack of infrastructure for departing passengers
would require more than $3 billion in investments as well as
significant disruptions to passengers and airlines for a biometric exit
program in the air environment alone.\3\ The Department has since
worked to bring the existing biographic system to a level of fidelity
equal to, or nearly equal to, a biometric system while continuing to
pursue a more cost-effective biometric solution.\4\
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\2\ There are emerging biometric technologies now available in the
market that were unavailable at the time of the pilots. Accordingly,
there will be additional opportunities to pursue research and
development into a future biometric air exit system, on which Customs
and Border Protection (CBP) and the DHS Science and Technology (S&T)
Directorate are currently working together.
\3\ U.S. airports do not have designated and assured exit areas for
out-going passengers to wait prior to departure, nor do they have
specific checkpoints through which an out-going passenger's departure
is recorded by an immigration officer. Air carriers also have raised
objections to this requirement, and in 2008, Congress directed DHS to
conduct biometric pilots prior to establishing any new system. In the
land environment, there are often geographical features that prevent
expansion of exit lanes to accommodate additional lanes or the addition
of CBP-manned booths.
\4\ Typically, most countries use biographic information, which is
essentially text data that is commonly included on a data page of a
traveler's passport, such as name, date of birth, and country of
citizenship. Text data can be electronically read through passport
features based on international standards, such as a machine-readable
zone or an e-Passport chip. A biographic system is an entry/exit system
based on matching the information on an individual's travel document
when he or she arrives to and departs the United States.
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Today, the Department manages a fully-functioning entry/exit system
that tracks and identifies overstays. Specifically, the Department is
now able, on a daily basis, to identify and target for enforcement
action those who have overstayed their period of admission and who
represent a public safety and/or National security threat. Moreover, we
continue to move forward in building a biometric air exit system that
can be integrated in the current architecture once it is cost-effective
and feasible to do so.
a comprehensive entry/exit system
Collecting entry and exit data is one part of a comprehensive
entry/exit system. If we look at the totality of an entry/exit system,
it extends beyond our physical borders to include a number of steps
that may occur well before a visitor enters the United States and up to
the point at which that same visitor departs the United States through
a land, air, or sea port of entry/port of departure.
How DHS Collects Arrival Information
In instances where the individual needs a visa to enter the United
States, information is captured at the time his or her visa application
is filed with DOS along with additional information developed upon an
interview with a consular officer. It is important to note that if the
individual is from a Visa Waiver Program country and does not require a
visa, he or she may be required to apply through ESTA. Information is
then collected through the ESTA application.
For travelers in the air and sea environment, DHS also receives
passenger manifests submitted by air and sea carriers, which indicates
every individual who actually boarded the plane or ship. This
information is collected in DHS's Advance Passenger Information System
(APIS) and then sent to the Arrival and Departure Information System
(ADIS), where it will be held for matching against departure records.
When a nonimmigrant arrives at a U.S. port of entry and applies for
admission to the United States by air or sea, the traveler is
interviewed by a CBP officer regarding the purpose and intent of
travel. His or her document is reviewed, law enforcement checks are
run, and biometrics (fingerprints and photo) are screened against and
stored in the DHS systems. If admission is granted, the CBP officer
will stamp the traveler's passport with a date indicating his or her
authorized period of admission. Based on electronic information already
in DHS's systems, a Form I-94, Arrival/Departure Record, is
electronically generated for that person and can be printed remotely by
the individual if the individual needs it to provide evidence of legal
entry or status in the United States. The form also indicates how long
the person is authorized to stay in the United States.
When an individual bearing a nonimmigrant visa arrives at a land
port of entry, the individual is sent to secondary inspection where
biometrics are collected (if appropriate) and CBP may issue that person
a Form I-94A, Departure Record, which records their authorized period
of admission.
How DHS Collects Departure Information
Similar to the way DHS gathers passenger manifests prior to entry
through the air and sea environments, DHS also collects through APIS
passenger manifests submitted by commercial air and sea carriers
departing the United States. Since 2008, collection of this information
has been mandatory and compliance is near 100 percent resulting in a
fully-functioning exit system in the air and sea environments using
biographic data. Carriers are required to report biographic and travel
document information to DHS for those individuals who are physically on
the airplane or sea vessel at the time of departure from the United
States and not simply on those who have made a reservation or scheduled
to be on-board. DHS monitors APIS transmissions to ensure compliance
and issues fines for noncompliance on a monthly basis. CBP transfers
this data (excluding data for U.S. Citizens) to ADIS, which matches
arrivals and departures to and from the United States.\5\
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\5\ DHS uses this information for a variety of immigration and law
enforcement reasons, including to determine which travelers have
potentially stayed past their authorized period of admission (i.e.,
overstayed) in the United States.
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How DHS Addresses Overstays of Authorized Period of Admission
When information reveals that an individual is a confirmed
overstay, the Department takes action, including working with DOS to
revoke visas and apprehending individuals. Since fiscal year 2011, DHS
has made substantial improvements to maximize our ability to identify,
prioritize, and sanction confirmed overstays.
As of April 9, 2013, DHS has implemented the following system
updates:
Automation of the flow of information between ADIS and the
Automated Targeting System for Passengers ATS-P.--CBP has
updated the flow of information between ADIS and ATS-P to
reduce manual processes for moving data between the two
systems. This update saves time, improves processing quality,
increases efficiency, and better protects privacy, as the
transfer of information occurs through secure electronic means
instead of manually saving information on portable devices.
Use of ATS-P to enhance name matching for overstay
vetting.--CBP has leveraged existing ATS-P matching algorithms,
previously not available to ADIS, for the purposes of better
matching names in entry and exit records, thereby improving the
accuracy of the overstay list. Additional matching algorithms
have helped identify matches that the original ADIS system may
have missed.
Development of Basic Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(ICE) Overstay ``Hot List''.--CBP created an operational
dashboard for ICE agents that automatically lists and
prioritizes validated records of individuals who may have
overstayed and who are likely still in the United States,
pursuant to National security and public safety criteria. This
reduces the previous manual process in the exchange of data
between NPPD/OBIM and ICE and allows ICE to allocate resources
to those cases of highest priority, on a near-real-time basis.
Implementation of an ADIS to IDENT interface.--This effort
created an interface between IDENT (the biometric database for
DHS) and ADIS, the two systems currently housed at the Office
of Biometric Identity Management (OBIM).\6\ This helps reduce
the number of records on the overstay list by providing
additional and better-quality data to ADIS, closing information
gaps between the two systems.
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\6\ OBIM supports DHS components by providing matching services
against its databases (IDENT and ADIS collectively) and returning any
linked information when a match is made as they vet individuals already
encountered by DHS to identify known or suspected terrorists, National
security threats, criminals, and those who have previously violated
U.S. immigration laws.
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Improved ability of ADIS to match United States Citizenship
and Immigration Services' (USCIS) Computer Linked Adjudication
Information Management System (CLAIMS 3) data.--The Department
has worked to improve the quality, timeliness, and relevance of
data sent from CLAIMS 3 to ADIS, improving the ability of ADIS
to match the data accurately with other records. Many aliens
enter the United States and then extend or change their status
lawfully, and therefore have not overstayed even though their
initial period of authorized admission has expired.
By mid-fiscal year 2014, DHS plans to develop and deploy:
Unified Overstay Case Management process.--Through a data
exchange interface between ADIS and ICE's LeadTrac system,\7\
overstay case management work is being migrated to one analyst
platform, LeadTrac, for DHS. Additionally, ADIS will receive
enhanced overstay case management updates from ICE.
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\7\ LeadTrac is an ICE system designed to receive overstay leads to
compare against other DHS systems and classified datasets to uncover
potential National security or public safety concerns for referral to
ICE field offices for investigation. The system employs a case
management tracking mechanism to assist with analysis, quality control
reviews, lead status, and field tracking.
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Enhanced ADIS and Transportation Security Administration
(TSA) Alien Flight Student Program (AFSP) data exchange.--TSA
relies on ADIS to identify overstays who are enrolled in the
AFSP and provide them to ICE for action. ADIS will utilize
existing overstay vetting operations to increase efficiency and
prioritization of TSA AFSP overstays within the ADIS overstay
population.
Enhanced Overstay Hot List.--The Enhanced Overstay Hot List
will consolidate immigration data from multiple systems to
enable ICE employees to more quickly and easily identify
current and relevant information related to the overstay
subject. DHS will expand capability, including the use of
additional law enforcement and counterterrorism data in the Hot
List for ICE, which will return the results from multiple
database queries in a consolidated dossier, from which analysts
can more easily retrieve the relevant information.
User-Defined Rules.--DHS will develop a capability for ICE
agents to create new or update existing rule sets within ATS-P
as threats evolve, so that overstays are prioritized for review
and action based on the most up-to-date threat criteria.
The measures already in place have proven to be valuable in
identifying, removing, and sanctioning overstays. The above DHS
implementations have strengthened data requirements through computer
enhancements, identified National security overstays through increased
collaboration with the intelligence community, and automated manual
efforts through additional data exchange interfaces. DHS looks forward
to continuing this progress in fiscal year 2014.
The ICE Overstay Analysis Unit (OAU)
To support DHS's commitment to enhance its vetting initiatives
across the full mission space of homeland security. The OAU vets the
system identified overstay records to confirm status and prepare the
records to be sent to the ICE Counterterrorism and Criminal
Exploitation Unit (CTCEU) for possible law enforcement action.
Specifically, the OAU analyzes biographical entry and exit records
stored in OBIM's ADIS to further support DHS's ability to identify
international travelers who have remained in the United States beyond
their authorized periods of admission.
The OAU analyzes and validates two types of nonimmigrant overstay
records: Out-of-country overstays (OCO) and in-country overstays (ICO).
OCO records pertain to visitors who stayed beyond their authorized
admission period and subsequently departed the country. The OAU
validates these violations based on their reported departure dates and
creates biometric and biographic lookouts for these subjects, in case
the subjects attempt to enter the United States in the future. The out-
of-country overstay violator look-outs are posted in two separate
databases: The IDENT Secondary Inspection Tool and CBP's TECS \8\ to
alert and notify Department of State consular officers and CBP officers
of a subject's violation before he or she is granted a visa or re-entry
to the United States. In-country-overstay records pertain to visitors
who remain in the United States with no evidence of departure or
adjustment of status upon expiration of the terms of their admission.
The OAU reviews and validates these ADIS system-identified violations
based upon ICE identified categories of interest.
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\8\ TECS (not an acronym) is the updated and modified version of
the former Treasury Enforcement Communications System. It is owned and
operated by CBP.
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Typical overstay violators are addressed by nonimmigrant overstay
leads, which are used to generate field investigations by identifying
foreign visitors who violate the terms of their admission by remaining
in the United States past the date of their required departure and who
meet the Department's enforcement priorities.
VWP violators are addressed by CTCEU's Visa Waiver Enforcement
Program (VWEP). Visa-free travel to the United States builds upon our
close bilateral relationships and fosters commercial and personal ties
among tourist and business travelers in the United States and abroad.
Today, ICE regularly scrutinizes a refined list of individuals who have
been identified as potential overstays who entered the United States
under the VWP. One of the primary goals of this program is to identify
those subjects who attempt to circumvent the U.S. immigration system by
obtaining travel documents from VWP countries.
The ICE CTCEU
In 2003, DHS created CTCEU, which is the first National program
dedicated to the enforcement of nonimmigrant visa violations. Each
year, the CTCEU analyzes records of hundreds of thousands of potential
status violators after preliminary analysis of data from the Student
and Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS) \9\ and the OAU \10\
along with other information. After this analysis, CTCEU determines
potential violations that warrant field investigations, (based on
National security or public safety concerns) and/or establishes
compliance or departure dates from the United States. Between 15,000
and 20,000 of these records are analyzed each month and over 2 million
such records have been analyzed using automated and manual review
techniques.
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\9\ SEVIS is the database used for monitoring certified schools, F,
M, and J non-immigrant students, and their dependents.
\10\ OAU is in ICE's National Security Division and is a ``sister''
unit to the CTCEU. The CTCEU and OAU work collaboratively to identify
and enforce overstays.
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Today, through the CTCEU, ICE proactively develops cases for
investigation in cooperation with the Student and Exchange Visitor
Program (SEVP) \11\ and the OAU. These programs enable ICE agents to
access information about the millions of students, tourists, and
temporary workers present in the United States at any given time, and
to identify those who have overstayed or otherwise violated the terms
and conditions of their admission and identified as National security
or public safety concerns. To ensure that the potential violators who
pose the greatest threats to National security are given priority, ICE
uses intelligence-based criteria, developed in close consultation with
the intelligence and law enforcement communities.
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\11\ SEVP is the program that facilitates and manages SEVIS.
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ICE special agents and analysts monitor the latest threat reports
and proactively address emergent issues. This practice, which is
designed to detect and identify individuals exhibiting specific risk
factors based on intelligence reporting, including travel patterns, and
in-depth criminal research and analysis, has supported high-priority
National security initiatives based on specific intelligence.
enhancing the department's exit system
In 2003, DHS began development of a biometric entry/exit system
and, in 2004, fully implemented a biometric air entry solution into
existing inspection booths that is currently in operation. Biometric
land entry was deployed between 2004-2005. By contrast, implementing a
biometric exit capability has been a significant challenge. The air
environment afforded a single point where travelers were processed for
admission to the United States and biometrics could be incorporated,
whereas our airports were never architected for an exit control. DHS
remains committed to maximizing the efficiency and effectiveness of the
current entry/exit system, and has made progress in the last few years.
In May 2012, DHS provided a report \12\ to the House and Senate
Appropriations Committees that described the Department's plan for
enhancing its existing biographic exit program. As part of this plan,
various DHS components have been and are currently strengthening
systems and processes in order to improve the accuracy of data provided
to ADIS. This will enable ADIS to more accurately match entry and exit
records and determine who may constitute an overstay, and whether that
person presents a National security or public safety concern. Data that
is entered into ADIS comes from a variety of sources in the Department
including USCIS, CBP, and ICE. In addition, DHS has also identified
mechanisms to improve the ``output'' of ADIS, to ensure ICE
investigators receive priority high-risk overstay cases for resolution
in a timely fashion, and to ensure other ADIS stakeholders (such as
CBP, USCIS, and DOS) receive the best possible information with which
to make immigration decisions.
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\12\ Comprehensive Exit Plan, Fiscal Year 2012 Report to Congress.
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To continue to explore the feasibility of a cost-effective and
efficient biometric exit solution, in March 2013, CBP and S&T initiated
a joint Air Entry/Exit Re-Engineering (AEER) Apex project \13\ to
determine how and when a biometric air exit concept would be feasible.
The purpose of the AEER Project is to analyze, develop, test, pilot,
and evaluate integrated approaches to biometrically confirm the
departure of non-U.S. citizens at U.S. airports, as well as to
introduce more efficient traveler facilitation processes and effective
biometric technologies to screen travelers entering the United States.
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\13\ Apex Programs are S&T initiatives that focus on cross-cutting
or multi-disciplinary efforts, which are initially requested by DHS
components and are of a high-priority, high-value, and urgent nature.
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Land Entry/Exit Program
Today, as part of the Beyond the Border Action Plan,\14\ the United
States has a fully functioning land border exit system on its Northern
Border for non-U.S. and non-Canadian citizens in addition to the
existing air and sea entry/exit system. In fiscal year 2012,
approximately 72 million travelers entered the United States through
the border with Canada. Canada and the United States agreed to exchange
land entry records at ports of entry along the U.S.-Canadian border in
such a manner that land entries into one country will serve as exit
records from the other. Canada and the United States began with a pilot
program that exchanged data on third-country nationals at several land
ports during a 4-month period that ended in January 2013.\15\ During
the pilot, the United States was able to match 97.4 percent of records
received from Canada to existing entry records.
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\14\ United States-Canada Beyond the Border: A Shared Vision for
Perimeter Security and Economic Competitiveness, December 2011 Action
Plan.
\15\ The four locations were Peace Arch, Pacific Highway, Rainbow
Bridge, and Queenstown/Lewiston.
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The second phase of the project was deployed on time on June 30,
2013.\16\ During this phase, Canada and the United States are
exchanging the entry data for third-country nationals, permanent
residents of Canada, and U.S. lawful permanent residents in the United
States, who enter through all automated common land ports. Over 1
million records have been received from the Canada Border Services
Agency since Phase 2 was initiated and the match rate of exit records
received from Canada against existing U.S. entry records are over 98
percent.
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\16\ http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/newsroom/news_releases/national/
07032013.xml.
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By June 30, 2014, Canada and the United States will implement the
third phase of the project, expanding the program to include the
exchange of entry data for all travelers (including U.S. and Canadian
citizens) who enter through any automated common land ports on the
Northern Border. Overall, this initiative is expected to enhance the
ability to identify departures and successfully match entry and exit
records at the land border for the first time.
Entry/Exit Going Forward
A comprehensive entry/exit system is key to supporting DHS's
mission. However, the Department's continuing efforts to improve the
entry/exit system a system should not be construed to mean that DHS
does not already have a functioning exit/entry system in place. The
Department continues to close the entry/exit gap by matching
information obtained through air and sea manifests and exchanges with
Canada. This year, through the fiscal year 2013 DHS appropriation, CBP
was tasked with the entry/exit mission, including research and
development into biometric exit programs. CBP has also established an
Entry/Exit Transformation Office dedicated to managing and coordinating
the entire spectrum of entry/exit efforts, including expansion of the
entry/exit effort with Canada at the land border. This office is
pursuing every opportunity to leverage DHS's investments in the
Southwest Border and those that can be obtained in partnership with
Mexico. Other projects to enhance exit management include an audit of
airline manifest departure data in September and October to establish a
biographic baseline to measure the success of future biographic and
biometric exit solutions and improvements. In addition, the audit will
allow CBP to ensure the credibility of APIS data used to calculate the
overstay rates.
Working with S&T, the office is establishing a physical facility
that mimics real-life port scenarios. This facility, which will be
operational in early 2014, will be used to test the latest in
technological advancements in biometrics that may be candidates for use
in matching departure information to arrivals. Only through this
testing can CBP and S&T identify and qualify potential solutions, as
well as assess the economic impacts of such solutions. As the test
facility is being built this fall, CBP will develop strategies, goals,
and objectives for the biometric air exit system that will be used to
inform the testing process that will begin in 2014.
DHS anticipates that these initiatives will enhance the existing
entry/exit system in a myriad of ways that support our mission. The
comprehensive entry/exit system will:
Take full advantage of, and enhance the existing automated
entry/exit capability that produces information on individual
overstays;
Incorporate and use biometric information as technologies
mature and become more affordable;
Improve DHS's ability to take administrative action against
confirmed overstays, enhancing the Department's ability to take
administrative action as quickly as possible--including visa
revocation, prohibiting re-entry into the United States, and
placing individuals on look-out lists, as necessary;
Support further the administration and enforcement of our
country's immigration laws--by improving DHS's ability to
identify who exits the United States, thus deterring
individuals from remaining in the country illegally; and
Enable DHS to better maintain a focus on individuals who may
wish to do us harm and facilitate the legitimate travel of
those who do not, while protecting the privacy of U.S. citizens
and legal permanent residents.
DHS will continue to consider the traveler, stakeholders, and the
Department when architecting a system that is easily adapted to current
physical and infrastructure limitations, minimizes disruptions to
travel, proves to be cost-effective, and is flexible enough to address
not only current requirements but also to anticipate future ways of
conducting business.
conclusion
Despite significant challenges, over the past several years, DHS
has implemented and now manages a fully-functioning entry/exit system
in the air and sea environments, and is continuing to enhance
capability for land. While the United States did not build its border,
aviation, or immigration infrastructure with exit processing in mind,
the Department of Homeland Security has worked to bring the existing
biographic system to a level of fidelity equal to, or nearly equal to,
a biometric system while continuing to pursue a more cost-effective
biometric solution.
Specifically, the Department is now able, on a daily basis, to
identify and target for enforcement action those who have overstayed
their period of admission and who represent a public safety and/or
National security threat. Moreover, we continue to move forward in
building a biometric air exit system that can be integrated in the
current architecture once it is cost-effective and feasible to do so.
While implementation of a robust and efficient biometric solution
will take time, DHS has and will continue to take appropriate steps to
evaluate emerging biometric technologies and work with appropriate
public and private-sector stakeholders, such as the airlines and
airports and other Federal agencies.
The Department's continuing efforts to improve the entry/exit
system should not be construed to mean that DHS does not already have a
functioning exit/entry system in place. Rather than wait for a time
when funding or capabilities are sufficient to implement a fully
biometric system, the Department has built and is improving on a system
that is effective today--and one which we will continue to enhance in
the future.
Thank you.
Mrs. Miller. Thank you.
The Chairwoman now recognizes Mr. Woods for his testimony.
STATEMENT OF JOHN WOODS, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, IMMIGRATION AND
CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Woods. Chairwoman Miller, Ranking Member Jackson Lee,
and distinguished Members of the subcommittee, it is a pleasure
to be back before this subcommittee and have the opportunity to
discuss ICE's Homeland Security Investigation's on-going
efforts to identify and target for enforcement action those who
have overstayed their period of admission and who represent a
public safety or National security threat to this country.
The HSI overstay analysis unit utilizes entry and exit
records stored in the Arrival and Departure Information System,
or ADIS, to better identify international travelers who have
remained in the United States beyond their authorized period of
admission. In this process HSI analysts vet the ADIS potential
violators against a multitude of other DHS data sets to enhance
the accuracy of the ADIS data and determine the prioritization
of the potential leads. This analysis supports the Department's
commitment to enhance its vetting initiatives across the full
mission spectrum of Homeland Security.
HSI analysts validate two types of nonimmigrant overstay
records: Out-of-country overstays and in-country overstays. The
out-of-country overstay records pertain to visitors who have
stayed beyond their authorized period of admission and
subsequently depart the United States. The overstay analysis
unit validates these violations based on the reported departure
dates and creates a biometric and biographic look-out for these
subjects.
These look-outs of the out-of-country overstay violators
are posted in two separate databases: The IDENT Secondary
Inspection Tool and CBP's TECS. The look-out records alert and
notify the State Department consular offices and CBP offices of
the violation before that individual is either: (A), granted a
new visa, or (B), tries to reenter the United States.
The in-country overstay records pertain to visitors who
remain in the United States without no evidence of departure
nor change or adjustment of their immigration status upon
expiration of their term of admission. The overstay analysis
unit reviews and validates these ADIS-system-identified
violations based on ICE-determined, ICE-identified categories
of interest.
The overstay analysis unit makes the overstay and status
violation referrals to HSI's counterterrorism and criminal
exploitation unit, who in turn attempt to identify and locate
leads within the United States where the overstay status
violator may be located by special agents in the field for
their investigation of the person's status and/or ability to
remain lawfully in the United States.
The CTCEU prioritizes cases for investigations from several
potential violator categories. The first, of course, is the
ADIS leads that we have discussed from the overstay analysis
unit that provide those non-immigrant overstay leads and
potential visa waiver program overstay leads.
Another source is the admitted watch-list leads. This
includes the records of individuals who, at the time of
admission to the United States, were subject to a watch-listed
record containing derogatory information that did not render
the individual inadmissible to the United States but did
warrant monitoring of their visit.
Additionally, CTCEU monitors individuals who, after the
entry, have had their visas revoked by the Department of State.
Although these individuals may still be within their lawful
period of admission, an investigation is warranted to determine
whether a violation of the terms of their admission have
occurred.
Then finally, due to the duration of status admission
period provided to foreign students in the F, J, and M visa
categories, the CTCEU conducts recurrent vetting of the Student
Exchange Visitor Information System to actively monitor whether
new derogatory information is developed or obtained on an
active student and which may warrant further investigation by a
field special agent.
The HSI CTCEU is the only National program dedicated to
enforcement of the non-immigrant visa violations and is
responsible for identifying and targeting those non-immigrant
visa-holders who could pose a threat to National security or
public safety. Each year the unit analyzes records of hundreds
of thousands of potential non-immigrant violators. The CTCEU
uses an intelligence-based criteria developed in close
consultation with the intelligence and law enforcement
communities to ensure that the latest information is
incorporated into our targeting process.
When potential threats are identified the unit refers a
case for investigation to HSI field agents located throughout
the United States. In all, this unit has the support of
dedicated special agents in 200-plus field offices throughout
the United States to accomplish this important mission.
Again, we continue to make great progress in our ability to
identify and target for enforcement action those who have
overstayed their period of admission and who represent a public
safety or National security threat to the country. Recent
technological advances have created an unprecedented
opportunity for HSI to identify and mitigate National security
and public safety threats in a more efficient and expeditious
manner than ever before.
I want to thank the Chairwoman for inviting me here today
to discuss this important topic, and I look forward to
answering any questions that you may have.
Mrs. Miller. Thank you very much, Mr. Woods.
The Chairwoman now recognizes Ms. Gambler for her
testimony.
STATEMENT OF REBECCA GAMBLER, DIRECTOR, HOMELAND SECURITY AND
JUSTICE ISSUES, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
Ms. Gambler. Good morning, Chairwoman Miller, Ranking
Member Jackson Lee, and Members of the subcommittee. I
appreciate the opportunity to testify at today's hearing to
discuss GAO's work reviewing Department of Homeland Security
efforts to plan for and implement a system to collect biometric
data from foreign nationals at U.S. ports of entry. Such a
system is intended to help the Department in its efforts to
identify potential overstays, among other goals.
Beginning in 1996, Federal law has required the
implementation of an entry and exit system, and in 2004 DHS was
mandated to develop a plan to accelerate full implementation of
a biometric entry-exit system. Currently DHS collects
biographic information from foreign nationals entering and
departing the country through airports and, on a more limited
basis, at land ports.
Since 2004 DHS has collected biometric information, namely
fingerprints, from foreign nationals entering the United
States. However, the Department has not yet developed and
implemented a biometric exit capability, as required by
statute.
We have issued a number of reports on DHS's efforts to
implement a biometric exit system, identifying weaknesses in
the Department's planning and management. My remarks today will
focus on actions DHS has taken to strengthen its biographic
exit data and DHS's current planning efforts for a biometric
air exit capability, which we reported on this past July.
With regard to collecting biographic exit data, we found
that DHS has taken action to improve both its collection and
use of such data. For example, DHS is working to address
weaknesses in collecting exit data at land borders by
implementing the Beyond the Border Initiative, through which
the United States and Canada exchange data on travelers
crossing the Northern Border. Because an entry into Canada
constitutes a departure from the United States, DHS will be
able to use Canadian exit-entry data as proxies for U.S.
departure records.
DHS has also taken steps to strengthen its use of
biographic data to identify potential overstays by, for
example, enhancing the connections among components' databases
to reduce the need for manual exchanges of data.
While these are positive steps, DHS has faced significant
challenges in developing and implementing a biometric exit
capability. Some of these challenges include determining
efficient mechanisms for collecting biometric data that do not
disrupt passenger flows through airports and capturing
biometric data at the point of departure.
In May 2012 DHS reported internally on the results of its
analysis, researching long-term options for a biometric air
exit capability. In that report DHS concluded that the building
blocks for implementing an effective system were available but
that significant questions remained regarding, for example, the
additional value biometric air exit would provide over the
current biographic air exit process and the overall value and
cost of a biometric capability.
That report made recommendations to support the planning
and development of a biometric air exit capability, such as for
DHS to develop goals and objectives for its efforts and an
evaluation framework to assess whether biometric air exit is
economically justified. DHS initially planned to address those
recommendations by May 2014 but now it does not plan to meet
that date. Rather, DHS plans to develop options for biometric
air exit and report to Congress regarding benefits and costs in
time for the fiscal year 2016 budget cycle.
DHS has also developed a high-level plan for its biometric
air exit efforts but this plan does not identify the tasks
needed to be completed for an evaluation framework. Further,
the time frames in the plan are outdated.
We recommended that the Department set time frames and
milestones for developing and implementing an evaluation
framework for assessing biometric air exit options. DHS
concurred with this recommendation and stated that it plans to
finalize goals and objectives by January 2014 and an evaluation
framework by June 2014.
We will continue to monitor DHS's efforts in response to
our recommendation.
In closing, DHS has faced long-standing challenges in
making progress toward meeting the statutory requirement for
biometric exit capabilities. While DHS has planning efforts
underway to assess options for a biometric air exit system, any
delays on the part of DHS in providing the planned assessment
to the Congress could further affect implementation of a
biometric air exit system.
This concludes my oral statement, and I would be pleased to
answer any questions that Members may have.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Gambler follows:]
Prepared Statement of Rebecca Gambler
September 26, 2013
border security.--additional actions needed to improve planning for a
biometric air exit system
gao-13-853t
Chairwoman Miller, Ranking Member Jackson Lee, and Members of the
subcommittee: I am pleased to be here today to discuss the status of
the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) efforts to implement a
biometric exit system. Beginning in 1996, Federal law has required the
implementation of an entry and exit data system to track foreign
nationals entering and leaving the United States.\1\ The Intelligence
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 required the Secretary of
Homeland Security to develop a plan to accelerate implementation of a
biometric entry and exit data system that matches available information
provided by foreign nationals upon their arrival in and departure from
the United States.\2\ In 2003, DHS initiated the U.S. Visitor and
Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT) program to develop a
system to collect biographic data (such as name and date of birth) and
biometric data (such as fingerprints) from foreign nationals at U.S.
ports of entry.\3\ Since 2004, DHS has tracked foreign nationals'
entries into the United States as part of an effort to comply with
legislative requirements, and since December 2006, a biometric entry
capability has been fully operational at all air, sea, and land ports
of entry.
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\1\ Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. C, 110, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-
558 to 59. Additionally, the Immigration and Naturalization Service
Data Management Improvement Act of 2000 required the implementation of
an integrated entry and exit data system for foreign nationals that
would provide access to and integrate foreign national arrival and
departure data that are authorized or required to be created or
collected under law and are in an electronic format in certain
databases, such as those used at ports of entry and consular offices.
See 8 U.S.C. 1365a(b)(1).
\2\ See 8 U.S.C. 1365b.
\3\ A port of entry is any officially-designated location (seaport,
airport, or land border location) where DHS officers or employees are
assigned to clear passengers and merchandise, collect duties, and
enforce customs laws.
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However, we have identified a range of management challenges that
DHS has faced in its effort to fully deploy a corresponding biometric
exit capability to track foreign nationals when they depart the
country.\4\ For example, in November 2009, we found that DHS had not
adopted an integrated approach to scheduling, executing, and tracking
the work that needed to be accomplished to deliver a biometric exit
system.\5\ In these reports, we made recommendations intended to help
ensure that a biometric exit capability was planned, designed,
developed, and implemented in an effective and efficient manner. DHS
generally agreed with our recommendations and has taken action to
implement a number of them. Most recently, in July 2013, we reported on
DHS's progress in developing and implementing a biometric exit system,
as well as DHS's efforts to identify and address potential overstays--
individuals who were admitted into the country legally on a temporary
basis but then overstayed their authorized period of admission.\6\
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\4\ See GAO, Overstay Enforcement: Additional Actions Needed to
Assess DHS's Data and Improve Planning for a Biometric Air Exit
Program, GAO-13-683 (Washington, DC: July 30, 2013); Homeland Security:
US-VISIT Pilot Evaluations Offer Limited Understanding of Air Exit
Options, GAO-10-860 (Washington, DC: Aug. 10, 2010); Homeland Security:
Key US-VISIT Components at Varying Stages of Completion, but Integrated
and Reliable Schedule Needed, GAO-10-13 (Washington, DC: Nov. 19,
2009); Visa Waiver Program: Actions Are Needed to Improve Management of
the Expansion Process, and to Assess and Mitigate Program Risks, GAO-
08-967 (Washington, DC: Sept. 15, 2008); Homeland Security: U.S.
Visitor and Immigrant Status Program's Long-standing Lack of Strategic
Direction and Management Controls Needs to Be Addressed, GAO-07-1065
(Washington, DC: Aug. 31, 2007); Homeland Security: Planned
Expenditures for U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Program Need to Be
Adequately Defined and Justified, GAO-07-278 (Washington, DC: Feb. 14,
2007); and Homeland Security: Some Progress Made, but Many Challenges
Remain on U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology
Program, GAO-05-202 (Washington, DC: Feb. 23, 2005).
\5\ GAO-10-13.
\6\ GAO-13-683.
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Within DHS, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) is tasked
with, among other duties, inspecting all people applying for entry to
the United States to determine their admissibility to the country. CBP
collects biographic and biometric information to document
nonimmigrants' entry into the country and biographic information to
document their exit. CBP is also responsible for implementing a
biometric exit program. Within DHS's National Protection and Programs
Directorate, the Office of Biometric Identity Management (OBIM) manages
the Automated Biometric Identification System, which maintains
biometric information that DHS collects from nonimmigrants upon their
entry into the United States.\7\ OBIM also manages the Arrival and
Departure Information System, which tracks and matches arrival and
departure records for the purpose of identifying potential overstays.
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\7\ Pursuant to the fiscal year 2013 DHS appropriations act and its
accompanying explanatory statement, DHS created OBIM effective March
27, 2013, to manage the Arrival and Departure Information System and
the Automated Biometric Identification System and realigned US-VISIT's
responsibility for analyzing overstay data into U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement. See Consolidated and Further Continuing
Appropriations Act, 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-6, div. D, 127 Stat. 198,
342, 346-47, 356 (2013); Explanatory Statement, Consolidated and
Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2013, 159 Cong. Rec. S1287,
S1551, S1557-58 (daily ed. Mar. 11, 2013).
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My statement today is based on our July 2013 report and, like that
report, discusses the extent to which DHS has made progress in
developing and implementing a biometric exit system at air ports of
entry, which is DHS's priority for a biometric exit capability.\8\ For
our report, we reviewed statutory requirements for a biometric exit
system and analyzed DHS documents, including a May 2012 report on the
status of efforts to implement a biometric exit capability at airports
that was based on analysis that DHS's Science and Technology
Directorate (S&T) conducted. We compared the status of DHS's efforts
against statutory requirements and standard practices for project
management. We interviewed DHS Office of Policy and S&T officials
regarding DHS's plans for addressing recommendations in the
Department's May 2012 report and other on-going efforts to develop a
biometric exit system. We also analyzed information about the Beyond
the Border initiative, which is a joint effort between the United
States and Canada to exchange entry and exit data through which entry
into one country is treated as exit from the other. We conducted this
work in accordance with generally accepted Government auditing
standards. Our July 2013 report provides further details on our scope
and methodology.
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\8\ GAO-13-683.
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dhs faces long-standing challenges and uncertain time frames in
planning for a biometric exit system at airports
As we reported in July 2013, DHS has not yet fulfilled the 2004
statutory requirement to implement a biometric exit capability, but has
planning efforts under way to report to Congress in time for the fiscal
year 2016 budget cycle on the costs and benefits of such a capability
at airports and seaports. Development and implementation of a biometric
exit capability has been a long-standing challenge for DHS. Since 2004,
we have issued a number of reports on DHS's efforts to implement a
biometric entry and exit system. For example, in February and August
2007, we found that DHS had not adequately defined and justified its
proposed expenditures for exit pilots and demonstration projects and
that it had not developed a complete schedule for biometric exit
implementation.\9\ Further, in September 2008, we reported that DHS was
unlikely to meet its time line for implementing an air exit system with
biometric indicators, such as fingerprints, by July 1, 2009, because of
several unresolved issues, such as opposition to the Department's
published plan by the airline industry.\10\ In 2009, DHS conducted
pilot programs for biometric air exit capabilities in airport
scenarios, and in August 2010 we found that there were limitations with
the pilot programs--for example, the pilot programs did not
operationally test about 30 percent of the air exit requirements
identified in the evaluation plan for the pilot programs--that hindered
DHS's ability to inform decision making for a long-term air exit
solution and pointed to the need for additional sources of information
on air exit's operational impacts.\11\
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\9\ GAO-07-1065 and GAO-07-278.
\10\ GAO-08-967.
\11\ GAO-10-860.
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In an October 2010 memo, DHS identified three primary reasons why
it has been unable to determine how and when to implement a biometric
exit capability at airports: (1) The methods of collecting biometric
data could disrupt the flow of travelers through airport terminals; (2)
air carriers and airport authorities had not allowed DHS to examine
mechanisms through which DHS could incorporate biometric data
collection into passenger processing at the departure gate; and (3)
challenges existed in capturing biometric data at the point of
departure, including determining what personnel should be responsible
for the capture of biometric information at airports. In July 2013, we
reported that, according to DHS officials, the challenges DHS
identified in October 2010 continue to affect the Department's ability
to implement a biometric air exit system. With regard to an exit
capability at land ports of entry, in 2006, we reported that according
to DHS officials, for various reasons, a biometric exit capability
could not be implemented without incurring a major impact on land
facilities.\12\ For example, at the time of our 2006 report, DHS
officials stated that implementing a biometric exit system at land
ports of entry would require new infrastructure and would produce major
traffic congestion because travelers would have to stop their vehicles
upon exit to be processed. As a result, as of April 2013, according to
DHS officials, the Department's planning efforts focus on developing a
biometric exit capability for airports, with the potential for a
similar solution to be implemented at seaports, and DHS's planning
documents, as of June 2013, do not address plans for a biometric exit
capability at land ports of entry.
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\12\ GAO, Border Security: US--VISIT Program Faces, Strategic,
Operational, and Technological Challenges at Land Ports of Entry, GAO-
07-248 (Washington, DC: Dec. 6, 2006).
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Our July 2013 report found that since April 2011, DHS has taken
various actions to improve its collection and use of biographic data to
identify potential overstays. For example, DHS is working to address
weaknesses in collecting exit data at land borders by implementing the
Beyond the Border initiative, through which DHS and the Canada Border
Services Agency exchange data on travelers crossing the border between
the United States and Canada.\13\ Because an entry into Canada
constitutes a departure from the United States, DHS will be able to use
Canadian entry data as proxies for U.S. departure records. As a result,
the Beyond the Border initiative will help address those challenges by
providing a new source of biographic data on travelers departing the
United States at land ports on the Northern Border. Our July 2013
report provides more information on DHS's actions to improve its
collection and use of biographic entry and exit data.\14\
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\13\ We found in April 2011 that DHS faced challenges in its
ability to identify overstays because of unreliable collection of
departure data at land ports of entry. See GAO, Overstay Enforcement:
Additional Mechanisms for Collecting, Assessing, and Sharing Data Could
Strengthen DHS's Efforts but Would Have Costs, GAO-11-411 (Washington,
DC: Apr. 15, 2011).
\14\ GAO-13-683.
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In 2011, DHS directed S&T, in coordination with other DHS component
agencies, to research long-term options for biometric air exit.\15\ In
May 2012, DHS reported internally on the results of S&T's analysis of
previous air exit pilot programs and assessment of available
technologies, and the report made recommendations to support the
planning and development of a biometric air exit capability.\16\ In
that report, DHS concluded that the building blocks to implement an
effective biometric air exit system were available. In addition, DHS's
report stated that new traveler facilitation tools and technologies--
for example, on-line check-in, self-service, and paperless technology--
could support more cost-effective ways to screen travelers, and that
these improvements should be leveraged when developing plans for
biometric air exit. However, DHS officials stated that there may be
challenges to leveraging new technologies to the extent that U.S.
airports and airlines rely on older, proprietary systems that may be
difficult to update to incorporate new technologies. Furthermore, DHS
reported in May 2012 that significant questions remained regarding: (1)
The effectiveness of current biographic air exit processes and the
error rates in collecting or matching data, (2) methods of cost-
effectively integrating biometrics into the air departure processes
(e.g., collecting biometric scans as passengers enter the jetway to
board a plane), (3) the additional value biometric air exit would
provide compared with the current biographic air exit process, and (4)
the overall value and cost of a biometric air exit capability. The
report included nine recommendations to help inform DHS's planning for
biometric air exit, such as directing DHS to develop explicit goals and
objectives for biometric air exit and an evaluation framework that
would, among other things, assess the value of collecting biometric
data in addition to biographic data and determine whether biometric air
exit is economically justified.\17\
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\15\ In our previous reviews of DHS's efforts to pursue a biometric
exit capability, DHS's plans have approached development of a biometric
exit system through a phased approach that involved conducting pilots
to inform eventual planning for long-term solutions. Different pilots
were created to inform solutions at air, sea, and land ports. See GAO-
10-13. As of April 2013, the Department's planning efforts are focused
on developing a biometric exit system for airports, with the potential
for a similar solution to be rolled out at seaports, according to DHS
officials.
\16\ DHS, DHS Biometric Air Exit: Analysis, Recommendations and
Next Steps, (Washington, DC: May 2012).
\17\ The report recommended that DHS take the following actions:
(1) Develop explicit goals and objectives for biometric air exit, (2)
leverage improvements in passenger facilitation and biometric
technology to support a concept of operations, (3) use developmental
scenario testing instead of pilot programs to validate a concept of
operations, (4) establish collaborative relationships with airports and
airlines, (5) use operational tests to validate performance and cost
estimates, (6) develop an evaluation framework for biometric air exit,
(7) employ a holistic approach to assess the costs and benefits of
comprehensive biometric entry and exit processes, (8) determine whether
biometric air exit is economically justified, and (9) incrementally
deploy biometric air exit to airports where it is cost-effective to do
so.
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DHS reported in May 2012 that it planned to take steps to address
these recommendations by May 2014; however, as we reported in July
2013, according to DHS Office of Policy and S&T officials, the
Department does not expect to fully address these recommendations by
then. In particular, DHS officials stated that it has been difficult
coordinating with airlines and airports, which have expressed
reluctance about biometric air exit because of concerns over its effect
on operations and potential costs. To address these concerns, DHS is
conducting outreach and soliciting information from airlines and
airports regarding their operations. In addition, DHS officials stated
that the Department's efforts to date have been hindered by
insufficient funding. In its fiscal year 2014 budget request for S&T,
DHS requested funding for a joint S&T-CBP Air Entry/Exit Re-Engineering
Apex project. Apex projects are cross-cutting, multi-disciplinary
efforts requested by DHS components that are high-priority projects
intended to solve problems of strategic operational importance.
According to DHS's fiscal year 2014 budget justification, the Air
Entry/Exit Re-Engineering Apex project will develop tools to model and
simulate air entry and exit operational processes. Using these tools,
DHS intends to develop, test, pilot, and evaluate candidate solutions.
As of April 2013, DHS Policy and S&T officials stated that they expect
to finalize goals and objectives for a biometric air exit system in the
near future and are making plans for future scenario-based testing.
Although DHS's May 2012 report stated that DHS would take steps to
address the report's recommendations by May 2014, DHS officials told us
that the Department's current goal is to develop information about
options for biometric air exit and to report to Congress in time for
the fiscal year 2016 budget cycle regarding: (1) The additional
benefits that a biometric air exit system provides beyond an enhanced
biographic exit system and (2) costs associated with biometric air
exit. However, as we reported in July 2013, DHS has not yet developed
an evaluation framework, as recommended in its May 2012 report, to
determine how the Department will evaluate the benefits and costs of a
biometric air exit system and compare it with a biographic exit system.
According to DHS officials, the Department needs to finalize goals and
objectives for biometric air exit before it can develop such a
framework, and in April 2013 these officials told us that the
Department plans to finalize these elements in the near future.
However, DHS does not have time frames for when it will subsequently be
able to develop and implement an evaluation framework to support the
assessment it plans to provide to Congress.
According to A Guide to the Project Management Body of Knowledge,
which provides standards for project managers, specific goals and
objectives should be conceptualized, defined, and documented in the
planning process, along with the appropriate steps, time frames, and
milestones needed to achieve those results.\18\ In fall 2012, DHS
developed a high-level plan for its biometric air exit efforts, which
it updated in May 2013, but this plan does not clearly identify the
tasks needed to develop and implement an evaluation framework. For
example, the plan does not include a step for developing the
methodology for comparing the costs and benefits of biometric data
against those for collecting biographic data, as recommended in DHS's
May 2012 report. Furthermore, the time frames in this plan are not
accurate as of June 2013 because DHS is behind schedule on some of the
tasks and has not updated the time frames in the plan accordingly. For
example, DHS had planned to begin scenario-based testing for biometric
air exit options in August 2013; however, according to DHS officials,
the Department now plans to begin such testing in early 2014. A senior
official from DHS's Office of Policy told us that DHS has not kept the
plan up to date because of the transition of responsibilities within
DHS; specifically, in March 2013, pursuant to the explanatory statement
for DHS's 2013 appropriation, DHS established an office within CBP that
is responsible for coordinating DHS's entry and exit policies and
operations.\19\ This transition was in process as of June 2013, and CBP
told us that it planned to establish an integrated project team in July
2013 that will be responsible for more detailed planning for the
Department's biometric air exit efforts. DHS Policy and S&T officials
agreed that setting time frames and milestones is important to ensure
timely development and implementation of the evaluation framework in
accordance with DHS's May 2012 recommendations. According to DHS
officials, implementation of a biometric air exit system will depend on
the results of discussions between the Department and Congress after
the Department provides this assessment of options for biometric air
exit.
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\18\ Project Management Institute, A Guide to the Project
Management Body of Knowledge (PMBOK Guide), Fifth Edition, (Newton
Square, Pennsylvania: 2013). We have used A Guide to the Project
Management Body of Knowledge to provide criteria in previous reports,
including GAO, Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund: State Should
Better Assure the Effective Use of Program Authorities, GAO-13-83
(Washington, DC: Nov. 30, 2012).
\19\ See Explanatory Statement, Consolidated and Further Continuing
Appropriations Act, 2013, 159 Cong. Rec. S1287, S1550 (daily ed. Mar.
11, 2013).
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In summary, we concluded in our July 2013 report that without
robust planning that includes time frames and milestones to develop and
implement an evaluation framework for this assessment, DHS lacks
reasonable assurance that it will be able to provide this assessment to
Congress for the fiscal year 2016 budget cycle as planned. Furthermore,
any delays in providing this information to Congress could further
affect possible implementation of a biometric exit system to address
statutory requirements. Therefore, we recommended that the Secretary of
Homeland Security establish time frames and milestones for developing
and implementing an evaluation framework to be used in conducting the
Department's assessment of biometric exit options. DHS concurred with
this recommendation and indicated that its component agencies plan to
finalize the goals and objectives for biometric air exit by January 31,
2014, and that these goals and objectives will be used in the
development of an evaluation framework that DHS expects to have
completed by June 30, 2014.
Chairwoman Miller, Ranking Member Jackson Lee, and Members of the
subcommittee, this completes my prepared statement. I would be happy to
respond to any questions you may have at this time.
Mrs. Miller. Thank you very much, Ms. Gambler.
I would ask unanimous consent that the gentleman from
Texas, Mr. Smith, is permitted to sit on the dais and
participate in the hearing.
Without objection, so ordered.
You know, we always hear, just, I guess for my own
clarification--we are always hearing about how many folks are
here illegally in the country. I just would ask the question, I
guess, any of you: How many people actually are here, your best
guess, how many people are actually in the country illegally as
a result of visa overstays?
Mr. Wagner, what is your--if somebody asked you that, what
would you say?
Mr. Wagner. I am really not sure of what that number would
be. I would be hesitant to even guess. I think, you know, we
have committed to publishing the overstay rates by the end of
the calendar year and, you know, we look forward to being able
to do that. But can't give you a number today on what that
would be.
About a million people a day arrive in the United States.
You know, roughly 40 percent of them are U.S. citizens so
figure about 60 percent are visitors, but it is, you know, it
is a high volume of people coming in every day at the different
ports of entry.
Mrs. Miller. Yes.
Either of the other two have any number that they want to
put forward as their best guess?
Mr. Woods. Chairwoman, I think it would be premature to
state a number at this time. I think, like Mr. Wagner said, the
Office of Immigration Statistics is supposed to publish numbers
by the end of this calendar year. That comes out of DHS Office
of Policy.
We report those numbers that we get out of the ADIS system
to them. Historically, those numbers could not be validated
correctly.
Through the last 3 years we have made major investments
into enhancing our technological capability to cross systems
and cross data through the DHS spectrum. In doing that we feel
we are getting better numbers and being able to validate those
numbers, and I think once the statistics come out they will
speak for themselves.
Mrs. Miller. Ms. Gambler.
Ms. Gambler. I would just add to that that since 1994 DHS
or its predecessor has had a statutory requirement to report
annual overstay estimates. The Department has not done that
historically because of concerns about the reliability of the
data they have on potential overstays.
As the two gentlemen to my right mentioned, DHS is planning
to report overstay estimates by the end of the year. I think it
will be important for us to look at what those estimates are. I
think it will also be important, as we reported, for DHS to
disclose what any of the limitations are of that data and the
methodology and methodologies they used to calculate that data
so that we can assess what the estimates are and what they
show.
Mrs. Miller. I appreciate you making that--and very
important to note that.
So just sort of a follow-on question. I guess I am going to
get the same answers. Could you give us your best guess of how
many actually leave annually and are noted by our current
systems and then how many we think are sort of lost into the
system? You have any comment on that or are you going to wait
till the end of the year again?
Mr. Wagner. I think that is going to tie into the overstay
rates that, you know, we will be publishing by the end of the
year.
Mrs. Miller. Mr. Woods, same answer?
Mr. Woods. I would agree with him, yes.
Mrs. Miller. Yes.
Ms. Gambler, you have anything about that?
Ms. Gambler. Again, I would just add that in our July 2013
report we did identify that there were over 1 million unmatched
arrival records in DHS's system. Those are records for which
DHS has data on entry but not a corresponding record that the
person either departed the country or applied for a change in
status. Some number of those are potentially overstays or are
overstays and some number may have departed or changed status
without a record. So there is at least a million for which we
have an entry record but don't have a corresponding record of
departure or change in status.
Mrs. Miller. Well, I appreciate all the answers, and we are
all very well aware of the situation and are looking forward to
the report at the end of the year.
I just asked that basic question because I think it points
out how vulnerable the United States of America is. We can't
even figure out how many are here, how many are lost in the
system. Evidence of why we need to do something much more
structurally about pushing to make sure that we have a very
robust exit system. This is not a good security posture for the
United States to be in, in my opinion.
I was just taking some notes, Mr. Wagner, as you were
speaking about--and maybe I got my numbers here wrong--you were
saying there were 10,000 to 15,000 per day leaving through the
Northern Border, some of them going, as you mentioned 50 miles
an hour, so they are just passing through without anyone being
able to check of who they are, what they are leaving, et
cetera, et cetera.
But I think it is of note that what is happening with the
Beyond the Border agreement between the United States and
Canada is such an important document, really, a historic
document, and the relationship that we have with Canada, who is
our closest ally, our best friend, our biggest trading partner,
as well. I always remind people, particularly when we are doing
free trade agreements, Canada is--I mean, I come from Michigan;
that is our biggest trading partner--but Canada is the United
States' biggest trading partner, as well.
So when you think about the ability to be able to exchange
information between our two nations but then you subsequently
said we had nothing really similar with the Mexican government,
could you expand on that a little bit? Did I get my numbers
right? We are getting 10,000 to 15,000 people per day going
into that?
Just as a follow-up, you have any idea, again, of
percentages; how many people are leaving on the visas that are
going through the Northern Border as opposed to the Southern
Border?
Mr. Wagner. We developed a very practical and cost-
efficient process with our partners in Canada, the Canada
Border Services Agency. You know, we are exchanging that
biographic information so the entry into Canada serves as the
exit from the United States.
Right now we are just doing a third-country national, so
non-U.S., non-Canadian travelers, and it is about 10,000 to
15,000 records per day. We are matching that at about a 98
percent rate to their entry record into the United States.
Next year we will be expanding that to include all
travelers going back and forth from the border. So it is a very
cost-effective and practical way to do it.
Canada, unlike the comparison to Mexico, Canada does do,
you know, almost 100 percent of recording and querying of
travelers entering Canada at the land border, much like we do.
Mexico, not so much. They just don't have the infrastructure or
the procedures or policy in place to query every single
traveler going into Mexico, much like we did 10 years ago. We
were only querying about 5 percent of land border travelers
through our databases and our watch lists and our National
security files and recording that entry.
Thanks to a lot of the actions of Congress to be able to
fund us to implement the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative,
you know, that number is over 98, 97 percent now of travel held
to query at the land border. So Canada implemented a similar
process to query travelers so we can exchange that information.
So the path forward with Mexico, we need to sit down and
discuss with them and the choices are, do we build an exit
infrastructure on our side of the border or do we work with
Mexico to help them build their capacity entry into the land
border? You know, I think there is--it is going to be huge cost
either way we do it. You know, we will have to look at the pros
and cons and the discussions with Mexico on, you know, what the
feasibility is for them to be able to do it to replicate what
we have done with Canada.
Absent that, we would have to build a similar, you know,
process as we have inbound on the U.S.-Mexico border to
replicate south-bounds, but, you know, you are talking just if
you just put technology in at the existing footprint I believe
it is over a $500 million price tag to replicate that.
The land border footprint for exit would nowhere near have
the capacity to mimic an in-bound process. You are looking at
tremendous amounts of capital improvement, expansion of the
exit lanes, and when we talk about the 50 miles an hour, you
know, cars will just take on the highway across the border.
They will stop in Mexico but they are not stopping in the
United States and then stopping again at a lot of the places.
So there are some very, very significant challenges I think
we need to address with Mexico to draw the same comparison to
what we have got with Canada.
Mrs. Miller. I appreciate that.
Chairwoman now recognizes our Ranking Member, Ms. Jackson
Lee.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me thank the Chairwoman.
Let me also thank all of the panelists, witnesses, for your
service. It is much appreciated.
This is a time that Members raise questions but also engage
in our reason for being and doing this work, and I value my
Chairperson's comments and input because we work so well
together. I agree that our responsibility and why we are
joining in on this bipartisan bill that we have just introduced
this week is the idea of securing the border. That means to
keep the persons in the United States safe and to know who is
in the United States. I take that as a given.
As I listen to the numbers of returning persons, some 60
percent would be foreign individuals or noncitizens. Maybe in
those noncitizens would be returning U.S. military personnel,
many of whom are not yet citizens but are willing to sacrifice
their lives for this Nation.
So my earlier point stands: We are long overdue with a
comprehensive approach to immigration reform, which means that
we would have such elements as a strong border security effort.
I think what we passed in Homeland Security makes that
statement, and so I hope that we will see comprehensive
immigration reform moving forward because people are concerned,
lives are concerned, and this Congress has fiddled around too
long with comprehensive immigration reform. Piecemeal approach
may not be the most effective approach because it does not
answer some of the concerns that have been expressed by the
very groups that we and people that we represent.
So I am just hoping that as we move this legislation, very
forward-thinking legislation, along that I make it very clear
that I am not stepping away from the responsibility of this
body to have comprehensive immigration reform now, now, and
now.
Mr. Wagner, let me ask you, you have been given this
mandate or your other entities have now moved into your agency
in the Department of Homeland Security--it was somewhere else
before in the Citizens Services--this issue of a biometric
effort. What is your honest opinion as to how long it will take
for CBP to identify a cost-effective biometric and how long it
would take you to get it in process?
As the Chairwoman said, we are about 12 years or I know
2004, it is about 8 years--12 years away from 2001 but 8 years
away from the mandate in 2004. Help us understand whether any
legislation that we pass here in the Congress is going to move
CBP, now handed this responsibility, any faster along.
Mr. Wagner. Thank you for the question. You know, we are
working with the Science and Technology branch, a part of DHS.
We are building a test facility in January or February 2014
that we will spend calendar year 2014 evaluating different
biometric approaches to doing this and, more importantly, also
where is the right part in the process to put those biometrics.
You know, we want----
Ms. Jackson Lee. Can I stop you for a moment?
Mr. Wagner. Yes.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Wagner, you know I appreciate your
service very much. Didn't you already have a pilot process
previously?
Mr. Wagner. We have piloted, along with DHS, some different
approaches to doing this. We had officers with hand-held
devices collecting fingerprints. You know, that is about a $3
billion solution to be able to do that. That is something, yes,
we could do, you know, provided we had the funds and the
staffing to do that.
But we really want to make sure we have got a process in
place that gives us the assurances the person got on-board the
plane and left the country. When we looked at the old pilots we
had done years ago with just the kiosk, you know, a traveler
can go up there, register their fingerprints, and then leave
the airport. Then you are defaulting back to the biographic
system of relying on the APIS manifest from the airline to
determine whether or not the person actually got on-board the
plane and didn't swap boarding passes with someone else, which
is a real risk.
You know, we don't want to just, you know, spend all this
money and create a process that at the end of the day it is
really only marginally better than the biographic system we
have in place today. So we want to take a very deliberate and
structured approach to testing the different technologies and
coming up with the concept of operations on where do you put
this right; what is the right technology and where do you put
it at the right place in the process that give us the
assurances that this is a meaningful and deliberate effort that
we can do it? That is really where the challenge with us lies.
So we will spend next calendar year looking at and
developing these things. We do want to run a pilot. We are
projecting the middle of 2015 to be live at a mid-size airport
and piloting some type of biometric exit.
I would think later on, then, in 2015 we will be able to
come back to you with an implementation plan and schedule and,
most importantly, what are the costs to be able to do----
Ms. Jackson Lee. I don't want you to use what does not
work, but can you state for the record that DHS and your
particular sector in particular, is there a sense of urgency,
and so when you talk about the piloting process and testing, is
there that sense of urgency, No. 1, to get the best product,
which is what you are telling me and we appreciate your
expertise, but that this is really urgent and that Congress
really wants you to engage in this?
Mr. Wagner. There is absolutely a sense of urgency for us
to do this. We want the biometrics. As law enforcement officers
we want these biometrics. We want as many sources of data as we
can run people through to support our law enforcement and
National security mission.
Make no mistake about that. We want to get it. But we want
to do it in a way that we don't shut down or gridlock air
travel and end up risking losing that authority down the road
because we didn't implement it properly.
So we want to be very deliberate about how we do this and
do it in a structured approach. But yes, absolutely. There is a
sense of urgency for----
Ms. Jackson Lee. If Congress added to this initiative,
border security, a comprehensive approach to immigration
reform, would that help you as well?
Mr. Wagner. How so? Not quite sure I understand----
Ms. Jackson Lee. If we passed a comprehensive immigration
approach legislation along with what we are discussing today,
along with border security, would that help as well?
Mr. Wagner. Well, it would certainly help for us to look at
what would the costs be and the structure be to be able to do
this and some clarity on what, you know, a new comprehensive
immigration system would look like, what changes would be. But
it certainly would--it could help us.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Woods, how many people have you--ICE
has deported?
Mr. Woods. Annually we deport about 400,000 individuals.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Is that a higher number than you have had
in the past?
Mr. Woods. Yes.
Ms. Jackson Lee. How would this system improve the ability
to be fair in your system? As you well know, there are
certainly concerns of deportations, but how would this help
your system?
Mr. Woods. The biometric exiting?
Ms. Jackson Lee. Yes.
Mr. Woods. Yes. Biometric exits, like Mr. Wagner said,
would give us more data to look at and determine and identify
those individuals who have overstayed their terms of admission
so we can better find out the individuals we want to look for
and to apprehend and deport from the United States, as opposed
to, as the Chairwoman said in her opening statement, chasing,
using our scarce resources to chase people that are ghosts that
may have already departed, so with a system attaining more data
but not necessarily reduce the number of overstays.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I thank the Chairwoman.
Mrs. Miller. Thank you very much.
Chairwoman now recognizes gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr.
Barletta.
Mr. Barletta. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. I want to thank
you for calling this hearing. This has been something that has
been very important to me since I was a mayor back in 2006,
dealing with the problem in my city, which really shined a
light on the fact that our problem with illegal immigration
isn't just people crossing the Mexican border. We saw that
first-hand.
In 1996, I am going to direct this to Mr. Wagner, in 1996
Congress passed a law calling on Congress to collect biometric
data. DHS now maintains that they have a plan underway by 2016
to report to Congress on the cost and benefits. That is 20
years to come up with a report on the costs and benefits.
Fourteen other nations have already done this. In fact, New
Zealand is on their second generation of technology.
You know, back in 1961 John F. Kennedy challenged America
by saying that we would set a goal to send a man to the moon
safely before the end of the decade. Today it is going to take
us 20 years to report to Congress a plan on the costs and
benefits. I just wonder what John F. Kennedy would say today if
he was sitting on this committee.
Could you tell me why it has taken so long when we know for
a fact that visa overstays is the preferred entry into this
country by terrorists?
Mr. Wagner. Well, thank you for the question. The
responsibility for this was assigned to Customs and Border
Protection this past April, you know, and we are pursuing a
plan to be able to do that. It is a very complicated system.
We have worked and implemented the biometric inbound part
of that. We have supported that with the biographic capability
to know who is leaving via commercial air and sea. We have made
great progress on the Northern Border with the biographic
approach for travelers, you know, leaving the United States
into Canada, which I talked about earlier.
But it is a very complicated system. You know, we have run
pilots in the past, we have looked at, okay, you know--I have
no doubt we can set up a system to collect biometrics and match
them from a previous encounter. We do it every day today.
State Department collects the biometrics when they issue a
visa; couple weeks or months later we see the person arrive in
the United States, we take their fingerprints again and we
match them up. That is the easy part of it.
It is where do you put it into that travel process that,
No. 1, it is meaningful, and No. 2, we just don't shut down air
travel because we backed up, you know, people--the line is so
bad that the departures are delayed. Because really, if we
don't put it at the right place in the process and we don't
know that the person actually boarded the aircraft we have
really only minimally improved the existing process we have
today.
Mr. Barletta. If I could just interrupt you, I understand
that it is complicated. I am sure President Kennedy thought it
was complicated to send somebody to the moon and bring them
back when we didn't have a space program like that.
We are the greatest country on earth. We can shoot missiles
out of the sky. I am hearing that it is going to take us 20
years because it is complicated to come up with a way when 14
other countries have done so.
Center for Immigration Studies said that a system would
cost us $400 million to $600 million in the first year, but DHS
said that it could cost as much as $9 billion over 10 years.
Why the discrepancy in the cost from DHS's old study that is a
5-year estimate to what Center for Immigration Studies
declared?
Mr. Wagner. Not sure what they are relying on but I think a
lot of our costs were the personnel costs to have the officers
out there with a hand-held biometric collection device at all
departure gates to collect those biometrics from people doing.
That is something, we could implement that fairly quickly and
easily, but it has got a pretty tremendous price tag along with
it.
I don't know that the other study you are referring to,
that they have looked at where do you put that technology to
have some assurances the person actually boarded the aircraft?
We could put it at the TSA security point. We could put it at
the airline desk. We could put kiosks out there. But somebody
could register their fingerprints and walk out of the airport.
So what have we really improved in the process at that----
Mr. Barletta. If I could ask a quick question of Ms.
Gambler before my time is up. In 2012 the DHS Office of
Inspector General issued a scathing report identifying
potential fraud involving discrepancies between biographic
information collected when a visa-holder exits and biometric
information collected when they enter the United States. Yet
Secretary Napolitano testified before this committee that she
believed the biographic logging conducting by DHS is not the
same as biometric but it is very close to the same.
Ms. Gambler, do you agree with that assessment?
Ms. Gambler. Congressman, I think at this point DHS doesn't
have the information to be able to say what benefits they are
getting out of biographic and how that compares to the benefits
that could be gotten out of biometric. That is part of the
process that DHS is going to be engaging in going forward with
this assessment that they are planning to provide to Congress
several years from now in terms of what benefits biometric
would provide over biographic and at what cost. But at this
point I am not sure they have the information yet to be able to
say that.
Mr. Barletta. Thank you.
Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
Mrs. Miller. Thank the gentleman.
The Chairwoman now recognizes Mr. O'Rourke, of Texas.
Mr. O'Rourke. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
The comments made by Ms. Gambler really struck home in
terms of looking at the value of a biometric exit system versus
the cost, and I think that cost can be measured in a number of
ways; certainly what it costs to purchase that and maintain it
and operate it, but also what costs communities like ours in El
Paso, States like Texas, for whom Mexico is our largest trading
partner, or our country, which has 6 million jobs tied just to
U.S.-Mexico trade will endure if we increase wait times, if we
waste an opportunity to capitalize on the trade that is already
flowing there.
So I want to ask Mr. Wagner, from our perspective in El
Paso, the country's safest city 3 years in a row despite and
maybe because of the fact that we are the largest binational
community on the U.S.-Mexico border, at a time when we are
spending $18 billion a year to secure that border, at a time
that we are doing $92 billion in trade just through the ports
in El Paso and yet we have wait times at those ports that in
many cases can be measured in hours not minutes, and the
Department of Commerce has estimated for every minute of
additional wait time at a port of entry it costs the U.S.
economy $166 million.
I want to ask you: What is the best value we can expect for
the limited resources that you have now? Do you want to spend
that on a biometric exit system? Do you want to spend it on
additional ports officers? Do you want to spend it on other
technologies, processes, or concepts? How do we answer the
question of value versus cost?
Mr. Wagner. Thank you. Very interesting question. I think,
you know, you are certainly well aware of, you know, what the
administration has put forth in the fiscal year 2014 budget
proposal. We had the workload staffing model, which, you know,
as you mentioned, indicated a need for 3,811 CBP officers just
to handle our existing work today.
We are very cognizant of the wait times. We recognize the
cost to the economy that wait times bring. You know, we also
recognize the costs of a terrorist incident, what that is going
to bring. So, you know, we take both of those issues very
seriously.
You know, as we look at what is the value of adding
biometrics to an entry-exit process, tremendous value on the
in-bound piece. You know, I think we have to look at what value
it brings on the exit piece. We absolutely want the data. We
want to run our queries on that. We want the assurances it is
the same person.
But if you are looking at keeping America safe linking to
terrorist travel, you know, I think your biographical
information is really where a lot of the basis of your National
security checks are going to be. I think you have very few
biometrics associated with the terrorist records that we do
have.
I think it helps us identify it is a person and then the
same person, but if you are looking at the National security
implications of a fingerprint record, your biographicals are
really where the true value is at. It is the basis of all our
National security checks now, both internationally and
domestic; it helps us identify the risks of who is flying
internationally and domestically; it helps us draw the links
between different people.
The biometrics help us confirm who that person is or, if we
have seen them before, it is the same person again. But if you
look at the cost of implementation in a place like El Paso, I
don't know that there is a biometric technology right now that
could allow us to check vehicles leaving the United States in a
way that wouldn't back that traffic, you know, up even more
considerably than it is now. So it would be very, very
difficult for us to do. It is something we are going to look
at, but it really needs careful study and probably, you know, a
lot of improvements in the existing technology to be able to do
it.
Mr. O'Rourke. Thank you.
For Ms. Gambler, one of the memories that I think looms
large for this committee and certainly for me in making any
decision on a biometric exit system was our failure with
SBInet, where we spent hundreds of millions of dollars on a
border security technology boondoggle, which is really a
homeland security contractors gone wild, where they were
defining the scope and running the project, and it didn't make
our country any safer, and it made us hundreds of millions of
dollars poorer as a result.
What is your advice to us? You said that there is going to
be an evaluation framework that is scheduled to be published by
June 2014. Will that framework, do you think, answer the value
versus cost issues and allow us to make sure that we are making
an informed decision and that we are using taxpayer money
wisely, protecting the homeland, and not entering into perhaps
another boondoggle?
Ms. Gambler. Thank you. The evaluation framework should do
a number of different things, but in part, lay out the
methodology that the Department will use to assess the cost and
benefits of the various options that it will be testing and
looking at for a biometric air exit system.
I think going forward, in terms of implementation of a
system, whatever comes out of that testing, it will be
critically important for the Department to implement that
system in an efficient and effective manner and, you know, in
part they could do that by looking at some of the past
recommendations we have made related to the progress they have
made on biometric in the past. Those things include, for
example, having reliable schedules that define what they want
to accomplish in what time frames and then being held
accountable to those schedules, thinking through and evaluating
what the different options are and testing all of the
requirements that you will have for the system.
So those types of things, those types of actions would help
the Department implement any testing in an effective way, but
also the system, as well.
Mr. Duncan [presiding]. Thank you.
Chairwoman Miller had to step out, so I will recognize
myself for 5 minutes.
I appreciate her having this hearing today. I think it is
very important, as the gentleman from Pennsylvania has really
been beating the drum over the last 6, 8 months, even into the
last Congress, about visa overstays. The statistics that I have
seen show that roughly 41 to 49 percent of all illegal aliens
in this country are people that did not walk across our
Southern Border, our Northern Border, or hop off a merchant
ship somewhere; they came into this country with a permission
slip. They came with a visa. So if I use the numbers of there
are 12 million illegal aliens in this country, that tells me
that roughly half, or almost 6 million of those, are visa
overstays.
Mr. Wagner, some of the data I showed may have come from
Ms. Gambler, but ICE made 1,374 arrests in 2012; 1,374 is a far
cry from 6 million. It is a huge problem. I think that is why
it is so important.
When I also see that ICE is expending only 3 percent of its
resources for chasing down visa overstay based on the written
testimony, that raises awareness and concern from me that maybe
we are not putting enough effort toward the visa overstays. So
the question, the first question I have for you is: What is the
process for someone to get a visa to enter this country?
Mr. Wagner. Well, I mean, it is Department of State that
issues that visa, and I would really have to defer to State
Department to explain, you know, the different types of visas
and the different requirements to get them. But, you know, in
general they would have to show that they intend to comply with
the terms of what that visa allows them to do, so if it is a,
say a general tourist visa, you know, they would have to show
that they are coming to visit, that, you know, they have a
residence and employment they don't intend to abandon in their
home country, and really that they are not a security risk, and
there are certain security things that have to be reviewed, you
know, but essentially, are they going to comply with the terms
of what that visa allows them to do?
Mr. Duncan. Do they generally have a interview in a
consulate or an embassy?
Mr. Wagner. They interview them; they collect their
fingerprints. When the person arrives in the United States we
will evaluate, you know, a similar set of circumstances.
We will match the fingerprints to those taken by Department
of State. You know, we will ask people about the purpose and
their intent of travel. We will make sure they have a return
ticket that is within that time frame. You know, it is a risk
assessment, at the end of the day, that the person is going to
comply with the terms of that.
You know, if we see any indications that make us believe
the person is going to overstay or not request a legal
extension of doing that we will deny them entry into the United
States and----
Mr. Duncan. Well, just in the essence of time, so we have
gotten the correct spelling of their name, we have gotten a
fingerprint, probably taken a photograph, they have had the
interview at the consulate or embassy, we know a lot of data,
we know what they are coming to this country to do, probably
know their destination, whether it is a hotel, a family
members' address, we have got an address of some sort on that
person. We know the date they are entering, and we have given
them terms of a visa, of what they can come to this country
for. So we have given them a permission slip, correct?
Mr. Wagner. Yes. Absolutely.
Mr. Duncan. Okay. This is low-hanging fruit. This is low-
hanging fruit as we talk about immigration reform that we don't
start pursuing some of these visa overstays and dealing with
almost half of the illegals that are in this country because it
is not like we are chasing a footprint in the desert trying to
figure out who that was, what they look like, get a data, a
name, where they were going. No, we know a lot about these
folks. So why not go knock on the doors?
I think you guys have a tremendous number of resources and
maybe that is something we need to look at, but 1,374 arrests
in 2012 out of roughly 6 million visa overstays is abysmal.
Let me ask you this: What are other countries doing? When I
travel, I have been to Japan; I have had to give a thumbprint;
they knew when I left and when I entered; in Europe, as well.
So you mentioned earlier it is a $3 billion program to come up
with this biometric data system. Have we reached out to
countries that are friendly to us in the world that are
actually doing something and doing it successfully?
Mr. Wagner. Sure. A lot of other countries set up their
transportation system to have a discrete departure process, and
they replicate their in-bound process with an exit process, and
you will get interviewed by a border control officer before you
leave that country. Our airports and transportation systems
were not designed or set up that way and we certainly, you
know, we have hundreds of airports in the United States that
would have to be reconfigured at great cost not only to the
physical footprint but to the operations of the airlines.
Yes, the airlines leave from many different departure
gates. We don't control their departure locations like we do
in-bounds.
You know, our system was set up to be an in-bound process
but we do not have the kind of departure controls or even
physical impediments or a physical footprint that would support
us doing that, unlike a lot of other countries, like you
correctly mentioned. They are set up and designed that way and
when you do leave that country you get in line and you wait and
speak to a border control officer, an immigration officer, and
they stamp your passport with a departure stamp.
Some countries keep track of that; some don't. Some of them
are moving towards fingerprints and other biometrics at this
point, you know, so there is--but we certainly talk to a lot of
different countries on different ways to do that.
We certainly, by and large, have the largest amount of
travelers coming and going, and probably the largest amount of
airports. If we were only going to do this at two or three
airports like a lot of countries only have, it be a lot easier
task than doing it at couple----
Mr. Duncan. I agree with you that it is a monumental task
but I also understand that international terminals are actually
segregated or separate or you have to go in a certain area. So
I don't believe the task is quite as immense as you may think.
Mr. Wagner. But that is only for in-bounds. Departures are
not leaving from the international terminals.
Mr. Duncan. Okay. I will give you that one.
Mr. Wagner. They are leaving from domestic gates and you
don't go through a specific process at the airport through the
international terminal to do that. You know, you can----
Mr. Duncan. If your flight is originating from an
international terminal like Atlanta and you are getting on an
international flight it is a little different but I am not
going to speak for the entire country and all airports. If you
are going from one domestic city to the next and then getting
on an international flight in another terminal, I understand
that.
I agree with you, it is an immense task. But I think it is
something that we need to continue talking about, and I think
that has been brought up several times here today.
So my time is expired and I believe I will recognize the
gentleman from Utah, Mr. Stewart, for 5 minutes.
Oh, he is gone?
So, Mr. Smith, Chairman, you are welcome to ask questions
for 5 minutes.
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will thank you and
the other----
Mr. Duncan. I apologize. I am going on Candice Miller's
list and Palazzo was next on the list and she has him marked
off, so I am going to recognize the gentleman from----
Mr. Smith. Be happy to defer to Mr. Palazzo.
Mr. Palazzo. Chairman Duncan, you put me in a precarious
position. He is the Chairman of my other committee, which I
serve as his subcommittee Chairman----
Mr. Duncan. I am going to let you guys work that out. You
have got 5 minutes.
Mr. Palazzo. Sure. Okay. Fantastic.
Ms. Gambler, quick question: In 2012 the DHS inspector
general issued a report which showed that there were
significant discrepancies in the different ICE databases. Would
a fully implemented biometric system, compared to the
biographical exit system we have now, reduce the number of
fraud cases?
Ms. Gambler. A biometric exit system would help confirm the
identity of individuals leaving the country. It would help,
most likely help on ICE's data matching, as well, and could
help reduce the risk of fraud that someone could make it appear
fraudulently that they left the country when they really did
not.
Mr. Palazzo. Twelve years after 9/11 what seems to be the
problem coordinating these databases? Have we gotten to the
point to where we can overcome that? What are the plans to do
that?
Ms. Gambler. ICE has made some changes to some of the
connections and integrations between its different databases in
the spring earlier this year, and while those are positive
steps, what we have reported is that DHS hasn't assessed the
improvements that it has gotten out of those enhanced
connections between the databases in terms of being able to
identify potential overstays and report overstay rates, as
required by statute.
Mr. Palazzo. Thank you.
I was hearing some numbers tossed around and I can't
remember if it came from up here or if it was down there. What
is the estimated cost over the next 10 years if we were to
fully implement an exit biometric system? Did you all provide
that?
Mr. Wagner. I think we were discussing the $3 billion
figure for airports departure based on some of the previous
pilots that we ran. It is not inclusive of land border.
Mr. Palazzo. Okay, so, because Secretary Napolitano said $3
billion would be the low end and like $9 billion would be the
high end.
Mr. Wagner. Right. I believe that was just for air and sea.
I don't believe that included the land border, but I will have
to verify that.
Mr. Palazzo. All right. Because I am curious, does anybody
out here have a statistic--we know--I mean, there are a lot of
numbers when it comes to immigration that are tossed around.
But it is estimated that 11 million to 12 million illegal
immigrants are in the United States at any one time; 40 percent
of those are visa overstays, which the Chairman was pointing
out, I mean, we are basically giving them a permission slip and
we should be able to go find them readily, easily.
So if 4.5 million of those overstay, well I guess my
question is: Do you all have a statistic on how much those 11
million or 12 million illegals cost the United States
Government annually? Surely you all read the papers or you have
internal reports that you could share with us that, you know,
or just what you think.
Okay. Well fortunately we do try to research that. They say
it is $100 billion a year that those 11 million or 12 million
illegal immigrants cost the United States taxpayer a year--$100
billion.
When I saw--when I look at your request for anywhere from
$3 billion to $9 billion and you are looking at 40 percent of
those illegals are actually visa overstays, that means almost
$40 billion to $45 billion a year is the cost to the U.S.
taxpayer. So I do think this is a good investment. Now I know
that we are talking and I think Congressman O'Rourke was
asking, you know, what are your priorities; port security, you
know, land, and all this? We have got to make some choices.
But I do think, 10--you know, anywhere from $3 billion to
$9 billion to fix a $40 billion problem is a good business
decision.
So I would also like to just ask you, you mentioned
something about our relationship with Mexico, Mr. Wagner. Can
you kind of, I am running out of time, but kind of describe it?
Are they cooperating with our efforts on the border, or what
can we do to, you know, try to improve that?
Mr. Wagner. We have an excellent relationship with the
government of Mexico. We have done a lot of great work with
them over the years.
I think it is assessing what their current process is and
what their current infrastructure and footprint is and, you
know, what would be even a reasonable, rational ask for them to
work with us on. But we have an excellent working relationship
with them and exchange of information and cooperation.
Mr. Palazzo. That is good to hear. I also hear that Mexico
is actually increasing border security on their Southern
Border, you know, because they recognize that once drugs or
weapons or human trafficking is actually in Mexico it is going
to find its way to the United States. It is just the element; I
guess the criminal element there is just so well-organized. Are
we doing anything to help Mexico enforce their southern
borders?
Mr. Wagner. We have got a lot of work going on with them.
We got a, you know, similar agreement that was mentioned
earlier with Canada, Beyond the Border. We have got a similar
arrangement with the government of Mexico that we are working
through a lot of different areas, that being, yes, being one of
them.
Mr. Palazzo. Thank you. I yield back.
Mr. Duncan. All right. The Chairman will recognize the
gentleman from Texas, Mr. Smith, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am going to try to
make Mr. Palazzo feel a little bit better on the cost to start
with.
Your pages of the DHS testimony are not numbered but as I
read on Page 3 you mention the $3 billion for the air and sea
ports. Then you say correctly in the footnote, No. 2, there are
emerging biometric technologies now available in the market
that were unavailable at the time of the pilot.
The $3 billion figure is from 5 years ago. There have been
a lot of technological breakthroughs since then and the most
recent estimate I have seen on the cost brings it down from $3
billion to $500 million to $600 million, a considerable
difference. Part of that is because the time spent per person
has been reduced from about 66 seconds to 20 seconds, and that
might account for some of the reduced cost, so it is a lot less
than we might have thought.
A question that DHS has been asked during the course of
this hearing repeatedly is: Why don't we know the number of
visa overstayers? In point of fact, the DHS is supposed to have
been reporting those, as Ms. Gambler reminded us, every year.
During this administration I don't believe they have reported
it one time.
To me, the fact that you all haven't bothered to make the
estimates, haven't tried to make the estimates but we hear they
may get our first estimate in 4 years at the end of this year,
it may be the best reason I have heard so far for implementing
an entry-exit system as soon as possible.
I guess the first question I have, and I am a little
frustrated because it was my 1996 bill that includes the entry-
exit system and that is the reference to a lot of what we are
talking about here today; but what has this administration been
doing in the last 4 years, and Mr. Woods, we will start with
you, to implement an entry-exit system? I know in 2009 the
Appropriations Committee gave you $2.5 billion to implement an
entry-exit system and to my knowledge those funds were not used
fully to do that. So what have you been doing in the last 4
years?
Mr. Woods. Over the last couple years we have been making
many technological enhancements to our integration between DHS
systems. There are varied systems within DHS, you know, but do
not speak to each other for many years, and getting over that
hill was very arduous. But we had to bring together CBP, CIS,
ICE, and the main department and US-VISIT to come to the table
and put out all our money on the table that we got from the
Congress for each individual component to make these systems--
--
Mr. Smith. I understand that, but you have had, not only
have you had 4 years to do that, today I hear you all say, ``We
are going to study it for another 3 years.'' Thank goodness for
Ms. Gambler who said she would like to move up that deadline
from 2016 to 2014, and I totally concur with that.
But 7 years of studies to try to fully implement this
program, I know it is complicated but we have also heard
testimony today about other countries having successfully done
things. I heard today about the problems at the airports, but
now we have hand-held boarding pass, passport readers, mobile
biometric devices, and so forth that have been used in the
European Union, United Kingdom, Ireland, France, and Australia.
I don't know why we can't use those same kind of biometrics.
You have got London's Heathrow incorporates the biometric self-
boarding technologies now.
It seems to me we might actually want to try to catch up
with other countries and perhaps even lead the pack when we
have so much at stake and so many individuals in this country
we can't keep track of and don't know who they are.
I am going to jump ahead to Ms. Gambler.
I just mentioned, I thank you for saying that we could and
that we should expedite the entry-exit system and try to start
implementing it by 2014. I want to go to the difference real
quickly about biometrics and biographics. I know you are not
prepared to issue sort of a final study on that, but as I
understand it with biographics, is it not true, as I see it,
that it is almost an open invitation to fraud because with
biographics alone you don't know if the same person who came in
is actually exiting. Somebody could pass on the paperwork and
someone else could use that paperwork and therefore you end up
with both ID theft and fraud.
Is that not a, without coming to too many conclusions, is
that not a problem with biographics?
Ms. Gambler. It is a vulnerability that someone could make
it look as if they departed the country when they hadn't----
Mr. Smith. Correct.
Ms. Gambler [continuing]. Through fraud. For example,
somebody could pass through screening process at an airport and
be on a passenger manifest and then when they get into the
secure area of the airport, give their boarding pass to someone
else and then they could leave the airport. Now, the magnitude
of that problem is unknown but it has been identified as a
vulnerability certainly by CBP.
Mr. Smith. Okay. Thank you very much.
I know, Mr. Chairman, my time is up, but let me just say
that it doesn't appear to me that the Department of Homeland
Security is really engaging in a serious or sincere effort to
implement the entry-exit system. In one sense, and I am sorry
about this, it is no surprise. The administration has either
not enforced or undermined any number of immigration laws, and
as far as I am concerned, this is just another one.
I yield back.
Mr. Duncan. I thank the Chairman of the Science Committee.
I want to thank the witnesses for their valuable testimony
today and the Members for their questions.
Members of the committee may have some additional questions
for the witnesses and we will ask you----
Ms. Jackson Lee. Chairman?
Mr. Duncan [continuing]. To respond to these in writing.
Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Chairman, let me add my appreciation--
I didn't want you to gavel down before it. I think Mr. Palazzo
asked a very important question. It may not be the topic of
these individuals, but let me reframe his question, and I think
it is appropriate to answer for this committee.
Is the amount of money that would be generated by the
documenting of the perceived number of 11 million which will
come about from comprehensive immigration reform? So I am going
to put that on the record because I think that to balance what
these undocumented may be costing, there are great
documentation as to what the investment would be on the basis
of their work, taxation, and their overall input into the
consumer economy, which would be in the trillions of dollars. I
stand corrected if it is not, but I want them to answer: What
would be the return to the Government if that was to occur?
I yield back to the gentleman.
I thank the witnesses for their testimony.
Mr. Duncan. Pursuant to rule 7(e), the hearing record will
be held open for 10 days. Without objection, the committee will
stand adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:52 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]