[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
PROTECTING THE HOMELAND AGAINST MUMBAI-STYLE ATTACKS AND THE THREAT
FROM LASHKAR-E-TAIBA
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON COUNTERTERRORISM
AND INTELLIGENCE
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JUNE 12, 2013
__________
Serial No. 113-21
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
__________
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85-686 WASHINGTON : 2013
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Michael T. McCaul, Texas, Chairman
Lamar Smith, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Peter T. King, New York Loretta Sanchez, California
Mike Rogers, Alabama Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Paul C. Broun, Georgia Yvette D. Clarke, New York
Candice S. Miller, Michigan, Vice Brian Higgins, New York
Chair Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Patrick Meehan, Pennsylvania William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina Ron Barber, Arizona
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania Dondald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey
Jason Chaffetz, Utah Beto O'Rourke, Texas
Steven M. Palazzo, Mississippi Tulsi Gabbard, Hawaii
Lou Barletta, Pennsylvania Filemon Vela, Texas
Chris Stewart, Utah Steven A. Horsford, Nevada
Richard Hudson, North Carolina Eric Swalwell, California
Steve Daines, Montana
Susan W. Brooks, Indiana
Scott Perry, Pennsylvania
Mark Sanford, South Carolina
Greg Hill, Chief of Staff
Michael Geffroy, Deputy Chief of Staff/Chief Counsel
Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
I. Lanier Avant, Minority Staff Director
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON COUNTERTERRORISM AND INTELLIGENCE
Peter T. King, New York, Chairman
Paul C. Broun, Georgia Brian Higgins, New York
Patrick Meehan, Pennsylvania Loretta Sanchez, California
Jason Chaffetz, Utah William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Chris Stewart, Utah Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Michael T. McCaul, Texas (ex (ex officio)
officio)
Kerry Ann Watkins, Subcommittee Staff Director
Dennis Terry, Subcommittee Clerk
Hope Goins, Minority Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Statements
The Honorable Peter T. King, a Representative in Congress From
the State of New York, and Chairman, Subcommittee on
Counterterrorism and Intelligence.............................. 1
The Honorable Brian Higgins, a Representative in Congress From
the State of New York, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Counterterrorism and Intelligence:
Oral Statement................................................. 4
Prepared Statement............................................. 5
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland Security:
Prepared Statement............................................. 6
Witnesses
Mr. Joseph W. Pfeifer, Chief of Counterterrorism and Emergency
Preparedness, Fire Department of New York:
Oral Statement................................................. 7
Prepared Statement............................................. 10
Ms. C. Christine Fair, Ph.D., Assistant Professor, Georgetown
University:
Oral Statement................................................. 13
Prepared Statement............................................. 17
Mr. Stephen Tankel, Ph.D., Assistant Professor, American
University:
Oral Statement................................................. 25
Prepared Statement............................................. 28
Mr. Jonah Blank, Ph.D., Senior Political Analyst, The Rand
Corporation:
Oral Statement................................................. 38
Prepared Statement............................................. 40
Appendix
Statement of Brian Michael Jenkins, Senior Advisor to the RAND
President, The RAND Corporation................................ 59
PROTECTING THE HOMELAND AGAINST MUMBAI-STYLE ATTACKS AND THE THREAT
FROM LASHKAR-E-TAIBA
----------
Wednesday, June 12, 2013
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:13 a.m., in
Room 311, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Peter T. King
[Chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives King, Higgens, and Keating.
Mr. King. Good morning. The Committee on Homeland Security
Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence will come to
order.
The subcommittee is meeting today to hear testimony
examining a threat to the homeland from Mumbai-style attacks
and LeT, an Islamist terrorist organization.
I now recognize myself for an opening statement.
On the onset, let me express my apologies for being late. I
just came from a debate in the Capitol we had on the whole NSA
issue, which I am sure you have been following in the media,
and that ran over.
But I want to thank all of you being here today. This is an
issue of significant importance.
I want to thank the Ranking Member for changing his
schedule to be here and I truly appreciate that and, also, Mr.
Keating, who comes from Massachusetts, and who personally saw
the terrible impact of the Boston Marathon bombings.
So any hearing we have dealing with threats against the
homeland is extremely significant and the testimony of all of
you, as experts, is very important today.
Today, as I mentioned, we are talking about the Pakistani-
based jihadi group known for its 2008 terror attack in Mumbai,
Lashkar-e-Taiba or LeT.
We will examine their capability and intent to attack our
homeland and what measures, for instance, the FDNY, the New
York City Fire Department, is taking, the other first
responders are taking to prepare for attacks which use fire as
a weapon.
In light of recent news, I will begin by noting that the
man who scouted targets for the Mumbai attack, which killed 166
people including six Americans, and planned a later attack
which sought to behead a Danish journalist, was an American,
David Headley.
The DNI, Director of National Intelligence General Clapper,
has revealed that Headley's terror ties were discovered through
the same National Security Agency programs that have come under
criticism in past days.
I don't want to turn this hearing into a debate on that,
but I would just ask people on both sides--both sides of the
aisle, especially my own side of the aisle in Congress, that
before they rush out and make rash judgments to realize how
essential this program is, how basically it has been used under
both administrations. The very significant court jurisdiction
there is to ensure that they--court oversight there is to
ensure the Constitution is complied with.
Let's not rush to name Edward Snowden as any kind of a
whistle-blower or hero. I think he should be extradited,
indicted, and convicted.
Now, returning to our original subject, LeT is designated
and sanctioned by our Departments of State and Treasury as a
terror organization.
LeT is also a proxy of Pakistani Intelligence. I think it
is important to note that LeT is a terror proxy of Pakistan's
Inter-Services Intelligence, its ISI, which provides LeT with a
safe haven and funding to train and prepare for terrorist
attacks.
While focused on Pakistan's dispute over Kashmir, an issue
over which it regularly kills innocent Indian civilians, LeT's
reach is broad and goes abroad.
In addition to the 2009 plot in Denmark, LeT supported a
planned 2002 attack in Australia by means of a trainer sent
from France. LeT's networks span across South Asia and the
Persian Gulf into Europe, especially Britain, as well as Canada
and New Zealand.
LeT actively recruits Westerners, maintains social media
sites in colloquial American English and has, since the 1990s,
sustained support cells here in the United States.
LeT members were arrested in the homeland as recently as
2011 when Jubair Ahmad was arrested in Woodbridge, Virginia.
Eleven LeT members previously had been arrested in Virginia
back in 2003.
Suspected LeT operatives are reported to have surveilled
several identified potential terror targets in this country.
LeT practices good communication security and is proficient at
surveillance skills making it a difficult target for our
intelligence collection efforts, which should be immediately
increased on this target.
LeT maintains ties with al-Qaeda. They fight together
against us in the Afghan provinces of Ghazni, Kunar, and
Nuristan. LeT terrorists earlier fought our forces in Iraq.
When our special operators raided Osama bin-Laden's
compound in Abbottabad, they reportedly recovered
correspondence between the late al-Qaeda leader and the LeT
leader, Hafez Saeed.
Now, I certainly work with other Members on the
intelligence committee, I believe there is much to be done to
declassify as many of the documents recovered in Pakistan on
May 2, 2011, which could well amplify the relationship with
LeT. That is an on-going process. I think it should be done
sooner rather than later.
Given that LeT has killed American civilians in India,
fights U.S. soldiers in Afghanistan and is operationally active
in this country, we must consider the possibility of a future
LeT strike in the homeland.
I look forward to evaluating that risk with Professors Fair
and Tankel, America's leading academic experts on LeT.
I also think we should make it clear to Pakistan that any
LeT attack upon our homeland, they will bear a responsibility
for that because of their close relationship between ISI and
LeT.
Now, God forbid a Mumbai-style attack were to occur here at
home. Our first responders would face multiple attackers in
different locations.
These terrorists may be exploding bombs, conducting
assassinations, barricading buildings, seizing hostages, and
lighting those occupied buildings on fire concurrently and over
a period of days.
Without prior coordination, planning, practice, and
resourcing, State and local officials will face stark dilemmas.
Governors may have to choose between sending unarmed firemen to
face active shooters or sending police SWAT teams into fully-
burning buildings.
Mumbai is perhaps the most notorious use of fire as a
terror weapon. This tactic was also used in Benghazi on
September 11 of this year. U.S. embassies in Yugoslavia,
Honduras, and Islamabad were also burned in 2008, 1988, and
1979.
Luckily for our country, and I have a bit of a parochial
pride here, I believe the Nation's best service--fire service--
and I am sure Mr. Keating and Mr. Higgins will--may voice some
comment to that, the FDNY is leading the way on preparing such
a situation. The FDNY works with the FBI, U.S. Special
Operations Command, the Department of State and foreign
partners to devise and rehearse best practices to respond to a
Mumbai-style attack.
We are eager to learn about these efforts. I look forward
to Chief Pfeifer's testimony. I encourage the first responders
to learn about and consider copying these techniques and
procedures. I look forward to the testimony of all the
witnesses.
[The information follows:]
Mr. King. Now it is my privilege to recognize the Ranking
Member of the subcommittee, who I emphasized changed his
schedule to be here today, the gentleman from New York, Mr.
Higgins.
Mr. Higgins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to thank Chairman Peter King for holding this
hearing today. I would also like to thank the witnesses for
their testimony.
In November 2008, the terror group LeT conducted a
Fedayeen-style attack in Mumbai. For over 60 hours, terrorists
armed with firearms and explosives attacked multiple targets
across Mumbai killing more than 170 people.
Lashkar-e-Taiba is recognized by the United States
Government as a foreign terrorist organization. Given that
there have been Americans that have cooperated with Lashkar-e-
Taiba, the group's connection with al-Qaeda, I agree that a
threat from that group be examined and evaluated.
I also agree that we should examine and evaluate Fedayeen-
style attacks. We should look into whether or not groups other
than Lashkar-e-Taiba are planning these types of attacks.
There is evidence that al-Qaeda has sought to replicate
this tactic in the West. We know that al-Qaeda seeks to recruit
Americans for their plotting and execution of terrorist
attacks.
We also know that Hezbollah has a presence in North
America. Do these groups have a capability to execute a
Fedayeen-style attack?
When we look at these kinds of attacks, we need to also see
that our first responders in New York City and throughout urban
areas throughout the Nation are able to respond to them in the
event that these attacks occur.
Do they have the resources to respond? Do they have the
access to intelligence that they need to know that a potential
terrorist plot is being planned? Unfortunately, not all
jurisdictions are as prepared as they can be.
In the Buffalo-Niagara region, there are high-impact
targets. Buffalo is home to the Peace Bridge, one of the
busiest Northern Border crossings between the United States and
Canada.
Over $30 billion of annual commerce travels through the
Peace Bridge in the Buffalo-Niagara region. A Fedayeen-style
attack in this area could be catastrophic to critical
infrastructure.
Even though we know this area is home to a high-impact
target--targets, this area is considered--not considered high-
risk enough for State and local officials to receive the
funding they need under the Urban Area Security Initiative
program.
Without this critical funding, local law enforcement
emergency personnel do not have the ability to sustain the
advancements they have made since 9/11.
How can they be expected to protect the area in the event
of a sophisticated attack such as the Fedayeen if they do not
have the proper equipment or capabilities?
Furthermore, local law enforcement--and the Federal
Government still need improvement with information sharing.
Earlier this year, a terrorist plot was thwarted by the
Royal Canadian Mounted Police. Had this plot been successful,
it could have caused grave disaster in Western New York.
Unfortunately, the intelligence about this plot was not
shared with local law enforcement officials in advance of an
arrest of the alleged terrorist.
How can first responders be first preventers if they don't
have the critical information and resources?
We ask a lot of our first responders. They are the ones
that know the area best. They know people and places in their
area better than anyone else. They should have the resources to
keep us protected from terrorist attacks.
I thank the Chairman. I look forward to the testimony of
our witnesses.
[The statement of Ranking Member Higgins follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Brian Higgins
June 12, 2013
In November 2008, the terrorist group Lashkar-e-Taiba conducted a
Fedayeen-style attack in Mumbai. For over 60 hours, terrorists armed
with firearms and explosives attacked multiple targets across Mumbai,
killing more than 170 people. Lashkar-e-Taiba is recognized by the U.S.
Government as a foreign terrorist organization. Given that there have
been Americans that have cooperated with Lashkar-e-Taiba and the
groups' connection with al-Qaeda, I agree that a threat from that group
be examined and evaluated.
I also agree that we should examine and evaluate Fedayeen-style
attacks. We should look in to whether or not groups other than LeT are
planning these types of attacks. There has been evidence that al-Qaeda
has sought to replicate this tactic in the West. We know that al-Qaeda
seeks to recruit Americans for their plotting and execution of
terrorist attacks. We also know that Hezbollah has a presence in North
America. Do these groups have a capability to execute a Fedayeen-style
attack?
When we look at these kind of attacks, we need to also see how our
first responders are able to respond to them in the event that they
occur. Do they have the resources to respond? Do they have access to
the intelligence that they need to know that a potential terrorist is
planning an attack? Unfortunately, not all jurisdictions are prepared
nor can they be.
In the Buffalo/Niagara region there are high-impact targets.
Buffalo is home to the Peace Bridge, one of the busiest crossings at
the Northern Border. Over $30 billion of annual commerce travels
through the Peace Bridge in Buffalo/Niagara region. A Fedayeen-style
attack in this area could be catastrophic to its critical
infrastructure.
Even though we know this area is home to high-impact targets, this
area is not considered ``high-risk'' enough for State and locals in
this area to receive funding under the Urban Area Security Initiative
``UASI'' program. Without UASI funding, the local law enforcement and
emergency personnel do not have the ability to sustain the advancements
they have made since 9/11. How can they be expected to protect the area
in the event of a sophisticated attack such as a Fedayeen, if they
don't have the proper equipment or interoperability capabilities?
Furthermore, the local law enforcement and the Federal Government still
need improvement with information sharing.
Earlier this year, there was a terrorist plot thwarted by the Royal
Canadian Mounted Police. Had this plot been successful, it could have
caused grave disaster to Western New York. Unfortunately, the
intelligence about this plot was not shared with the local sheriff in
advance of the arrest of the alleged terrorists.
How can first responders be first preventers if they do not have
critical resources and information? We ask a lot of our first
responders. They are the ones that know the area the best. They know
the people and the places in their areas better than anyone. We should
trust them and entrust them with the resources they need.
Mr. King. Thank you, Ranking Member Higgins.
I would advise other Members of the committee that opening
statements may be submitted for the record.
[The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson
For more than 60 hours in November 2008, the world watched as
Mumbai--India's entertainment and financial capital--was terrorized by
attacks on hotels, hospitals, the main railway station, and other
public places. By the time the siege was over, 10 terrorists had killed
more than 160 people using automatic weapons and explosives.
This attack was planned and executed by Lashkar-e-Taiba, a
Pakistani terrorist organization. The style of attack, the weapons and
technology used, and the diversity of the targets raised new questions
for how we should approach counterterrorism and security measures here
at home--at all levels of government and in the private sector.
It has become clear that the type of attack carried out in Mumbai--
a ``Fedayeen''-style attack, where small groups engage in combat
operations, as distinguished from suicide bombings--poses a challenge
to our soft targets and our law enforcement community.
As such, it is critical that we study this style of attack,
evaluate how well DHS engages private-sector partners in efforts to
secure against such attacks, and review how the private sector acts on
shared information.
By examining DHS' outreach to the private sector during and in the
aftermath of these attacks, we can determine whether it provided
stakeholders, such as hotels, with actionable information about the
threat situation, the groups involved, and mitigation measures to be
implemented. It is also critical that we examine whether the State and
local jurisdictions are adequately prepared to respond to a Fedayeen-
style attack.
Support from the Homeland Security Grant Program has been critical
to the development core capabilities necessary to help State and local
governments and first responders prepare for and respond to terrorist
attacks and natural disasters. In recent months, communities across
America have seen investments in these important grant programs pay
off. From Hurricane Sandy to the response following the Boston Marathon
bombings, investments in planning and exercises, interoperable
emergency communications capabilities, medical surge capacity, and
other capabilities saved lives and mitigated the damage those disasters
inflicted.
Unfortunately, the funding for the Homeland Security Grant Program
has been reduced significantly under Republican leadership of the
House. Without this important Federal support, State and local
governments, which are already struggling to stretch their budgets, may
not be able to maintain the capabilities, training, planning, and
expertise developed over the past decade.
Finally, we must consider the cost of terrorism. In response to the
events of September 11, Congress enacted the Terrorism Risk Insurance
Act of 2002. That measure increased the availability of terrorism risk
insurance to at-risk American businesses by guaranteeing that the
Government would share some of the losses with private insurers should
a terrorist attack occur. That act is set to sunset in 2014. I have
introduced a bill that would extend these provisions, but would add
some needed improvements. I urge my colleagues on this committee to co-
sponsor this bill.
The 2008 Mumbai attack showed the vulnerability and the economic
devastation a Fedayeen-style attack could have on businesses. We must
recognize that small businesses and others that suffer an economic loss
due to a terrorist act should not have to shoulder that burden alone
and should not have to rely on the kindness of charity.
Mr. King. We are very pleased today to have a distinguished
panel of witnesses before us on what I believe to be a very
vital topic.
We have Chief Joseph Pfeifer who is the chief of
counterterrorism and emergency preparedness for the Fire
Department of New York; Dr. Christine Fair, assistant professor
at Georgetown University; Dr. Stephen Tankel, assistant
professor at American University; and Mr. Jonah Blank, a senior
political analyst for the RAND Corporation.
Our first witness will be Chief Pfeifer, who is the FDNY,
as I said, chief of counterterrorism and emergency
preparedness, as well as the city-wide command chief who is
responsible for commanding responses for major incidents.
Chief Pfeifer was the first chief of the World Trade Center
attack in 2001, and he survived the collapse of the towers.
Unfortunately, his brother did not. Since the attack on the
World Trade Center, Chief Pfeifer has assessed FDNY's response
capabilities, identified policy priorities, helped overhaul
management practices, and developed the FDNY's first strategic
plan, and terrorism preparedness strategy.
Chief Pfeifer founded and directs the FDNY Center for
Terrorism and Disaster Preparedness, and I am proud to call him
a friend. I recognize Chief Pfeifer for 5 minutes. Joe.
STATEMENT OF JOSEPH W. PFEIFER, CHIEF OF COUNTERTERRORISM AND
EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS, FIRE DEPARTMENT OF NEW YORK
Chief Pfeifer. Good morning, Chairman King, Ranking Member
Higgins, and other distinguished Members of the Subcommittee of
Counterterrorism and Intelligence.
My name is Joseph Pfeifer. I am the chief of
counterterrorism and emergency preparedness for the New York
City Fire Department. Thank you for this opportunity to speak
to you today about FDNY's concern and initiatives related to
the use of fire as a weapon by those who are determined to
bring harm to the United States.
The devastating 2008 attack on Mumbai represents a game-
changer. Over 3 days, a city of nearly 14 million people were
held hostage with 166 people that were murdered in multiple
locations, introducing a new model for terrorist attacks.
The salient features of a Mumbai-style attack includes
multiple terrorists, multiple targets, and multiple modes of
attacks deployed over a prolonged period to amplify media
attention. Despite all the violence, the most iconic images
from that day remains those of the Taj Mahal on fire. The
pictures of people at the window of the hotel trying to escape
the flames are reminiscent of 9/11.
Despite the striking images from that major attack, the
interest in using fire as either as strategic or tactical
weapon has not been well understood, and largely ignored to
date. Yet, it is a weapon that could significantly alter the
dynamics of a terrorist attack.
My testimony will focus on two areas: First, understanding
terrorist use of fire as a weapon; and second, explaining the
steps we have taken to respond to a Mumbai-style attack.
Brian Jenkins, a leading expert in terrorism, noted--
notably stated that terrorist attacks are often carefully
choreographed to attract attention of the electronic media and
the international press, ``Terrorism is theater.''
Directing the Mumbai attacks on Pakistan, the mastermind
asked the terrorists, ``Are you setting the fire or not?''
He understood the value of fire as a strategic weapon to
capture the attention of television, and that the world would
watch. He also created a tactical obstacle between the
rescuers, and the terrorists, and the hostages.
The effects of fire, whether intentional or a by-product of
an attack, can slow or even stop the effects of law enforcement
and first responders to rescue those that are injured, to
mitigate the attack, and kill or capture the terrorist.
In Benghazi, it was not the bullets or the explosives that
killed U.S. Ambassador Stevens and Sean Smith. Instead, it was
the fire and smoke from an arson fire deliberately set during
the attacks. As they attempted to escape an untenable
atmosphere, they were overcome with blinding and choking smoke.
Similar to 9/11 in Mumbai, the world was left with another
image of a building ablaze during a terrorist attack. Following
this incident, similar arson attacks took place against the
U.N. Multinational Force in the Sinai Peninsula, as well as the
U.S. embassy in Tunis.
Historically, fire also has been a weapon frequently
mentioned by al-Qaeda as a way to conduct simple attacks in the
West. They have plotted to drive a gasoline truck into the
lobby of a high-rise building, cut and ignite natural gas pipes
in apartment buildings, and set forest fires. One terrorist
publication went so far as to provide a tutorial on setting
wildland fires.
Of particular concern are fires in transportation systems,
as seen in the February 2007 attack on a train in India, which
killed 68 people. What we are learning from these events is
that groups or individuals do not need a great deal of training
to conduct significant terrorist attacks.
This became dramatically clear with the horrific attacks on
the Boston Marathon. Fire presents a qualitatively different
type of weapon when used in conjunction with other means of
attacks. Fire and its associated smoke can prove disorientating
to responders, inhibit police from gaining access to the
target, and create structural dangers, and can greatly increase
the number of casualties.
These factors present complex challenges to
counterterrorism operations. To address these complex
challenges, the FDNY has reaffirmed this relationship with
established partners like NYPD, and has forged new partnerships
to develop effective techniques, tactics, and procedures.
Four unique partnerships are worth mentioning. FDNY is
working with the FBI, New York SWAT Team, to develop procedures
of joint tactical teams, teams that are comprised of fire
personnel, security forces operating together in an environment
with armed terrorists, fire and smoke, and mass casualties.
Discussions, tabletop exercises have led to two full-scale
exercises that validated the concept of joint operations and
tactics. The insights gained with the FBI culminated in the
inter-agency tactical response model released in June 2012.
In May of last year, FDNY began collaborating with the
United States Military Special Operation Forces that
specialized in rapid solutions to current and anticipated
problems on the battlefield.
Not only did this partnership result in a study of tactics
and a likely outcome of a Mumbai-style attack, but it also
provided tactics. It also provided our Nation's leading
counterterrorism forces with the opportunity to confront a
threat not well understood, and to learn from the Nation's
leading fire department.
Following Benghazi, FDNY was asked to advise the Department
of State's Diplomatic Security Services on the most critical
features of fire as a weapon. Agents were put through
firefighting training at the fire academy, introduced how to
extricate people from a fortified vehicle, and to walk through
an exercise of a Mumbai-style scenario.
Here again, the examples where lessons were learned through
the research of FDNY were leveraged to a greater end. FDNY has
also worked closely with the London Fire Brigade on
counterterrorism measures since the 7/7 bombing in 2005.
In preparation for the 2012 Olympics, FDNY discussed with
the London Fire Brigade and the Metropolitan Police Services
possible response scenarios to an active shooter attack
involving fire in multiple locations.
In addition, in May 2012, FDNY collaborated with the
Department of Homeland Security Office of Intelligence Analysis
to release a document on terrorist interest in using fire as a
weapon. This document addresses the advantages of using fire
over other terrorist tactics, potential mass casualty, economic
damage, and the dangers of this type of an attack in a high-
rise building.
This hearing is important. It allows the FDNY to share what
it has learned about this threat posed by a Mumbai-style
attack. By adapting a multi-disciplined approach to fire as a
weapon, we have developed real and workable tactics to mitigate
the attack.
However, more work and training is needed to be done. Fire,
emergency medical, law enforcement, and security services must
continue to work jointly on this threat. The FDNY is committed
to this continuation of this effort. We urge Congress to
continue its support, and funding, and leadership in these
areas.
Finally, the Federal Government can certainly benefit from
leveraging the subject-matter expertise of organizations like
FDNY. The unique partnership we have developed reflects the
value of the Federal grant programs and other investments made
in the FDNY, and how these lessons learned can be shared with
other organizations to keep people safe.
Thank you again for this invitation to discuss this very
important homeland security issue.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Pfeifer follows:]
Prepared Statement of Joseph W. Pfeifer
12 June 2013
introduction
Good morning Chairman McCaul, Chairman King, Ranking Member
Higgins, and distinguished Members of the Subcommittee for
Counterterrorism and Intelligence. My name is Joseph Pfeifer and I am
the chief of counterterrorism for the New York City Fire Department
(FDNY). Thank you for the opportunity to speak with you today about the
FDNY's concerns and initiatives related to the use of fire as a weapon
by those who are determined to bring harm to the United States.
The use of fire for criminal, gang, and terrorist activities, as
well as targeting first responders, is not new. Over the past 4 decades
the FDNY has faced hundreds of intentionally set fires that would often
target firefighters. However, on March 25, 1990 the unthinkable
happened. An arsonist with a plastic container of gasoline spread fuel
on the exit stairs of the ``Happy Land Night Club'' in the Bronx,
intentionally killing 87 people, foreshadowing even larger events to
come. The attacks of September 11, 2001 are remembered as the first to
employ airplanes as weapons of mass destruction, resulting in the loss
of almost 3,000 people. However, it was the resultant fires, which
brought down Towers 1 and 2 of the World Trade Center in the deadliest
attack on American soil. Seven years later, in what is described as a
``paradigm shift,'' 10 terrorist operatives from Lashkar-e-Taiba
carried out attacks over 3 days in Mumbai, India in November 2008,
using a mix of automatic weapons, explosives, and fire.\1\ Each of
these attacks is remembered for something other than fire yet, in each,
it was the fire that complicated rescue operations and drastically
increased the lethality of the attacks.
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\1\ New York City Fire Department, Counterterrorism and Risk
Management Strategy, 2011.
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A full understanding of fire as a weapon and implications for
response are essential for homeland security, as it requires new
policies and partnerships to address the emerging threat. Fire is an
attractive weapon for terrorists for several reasons. Igniting a fire
requires little to no training. Fire and associated smoke can penetrate
defenses with alarming lethality. Fire makes tactical response more
difficult. And, the images of fire increases media coverage, capturing
world attention.\2\ FDNY has been studying this terrorist trend closely
and, as a result of those efforts, the Department is leading the
National fire service on this issue.
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\2\ The images of buildings on fire with people trapped at the
windows captured the world's attention and provided a dramatic backdrop
to the terrorist actions.
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Security personnel and emergency responders must rethink the way
that they prepare and respond to incidents and anticipate the use of
fire as a weapon, especially when combined with other attack methods.
My testimony will focus on three areas: (i) Understanding the terrorist
use of fire as a weapon; (ii) the complexities of responding to multi-
modality attacks involving fire; and (iii) the role the FDNY can play
in National homeland security efforts.
understanding fire as a weapon
The devastating 2008 attacks in Mumbai, India represent a game-
changer. Over 3 days, a city of nearly 14 million was held hostage
while 200 people were murdered in multiple locations across the city,
introducing a new model for terrorist attacks. The nature of the Mumbai
attack confused those providing tactical response, rescue operations,
fire extinguishment, and mass casualty care. The attackers employed
multiple means of attack including: Improvised explosive devices,
targeted killings (assassination), hostage barricade, building
takeover, active shooter, kidnapping, and fire. Despite all of the
violence, the most iconic images from that event remain the fire at Taj
Mahal Hotel. The pictures of people hanging out the windows of the
hotel to escape the fire are reminiscent of 9/11.
Brian Jenkins notably stated in 1974 that ``Terrorist attacks are
often carefully choreographed to attract the attention of the
electronic media and the international press . . . Terrorism is
theater.'' Directing the attack from Pakistan, the mastermind asked the
terrorists, ``Are you setting the fire or not?'' He understood that the
fire would capture the attention of the television cameras outside the
hotel and would create an image the world would watch. In this case
fire was used as a strategic weapon. Yet it also created a condition
that complicated the rescue planning and challenged the first
responders to deal with not only an active-shooter threat inside a
hostage barricade situation but also one where fire and smoke created a
second layer of obstacles to the rescue force--one for which they were
not prepared.
On September 11, 2012, the first murder of an American ambassador
since 1988 took place in in Benghazi, Libya. Though firearms, IEDs, and
military ordinance were used, it was not bullets or explosives that
killed the U.S. ambassador. It was smoke from an arson fire. During
that attack of the U.S. mission in Benghazi, which killed two
Americans, terrorists reportedly linked to Ansar al-Sharia and al-Qaeda
in the Islamic Maghreb, used fuel from jerry cans to start a fire in
the main villa, where Ambassador Christopher Stevens was sheltering in
the designated location with two members of his diplomatic security
detail. As the three men attempted to escape the untenable atmosphere,
filled with choking, blinding smoke, the ambassador was separated from
the one member of the detail who was able to escape through a window.
Unfortunately, Ambassador Stevens and the other agent did not follow.
Similar to 9/11 and Mumbai, the world was left with another image of a
building ablaze during a terrorist attack. Following this incident,
similar arson attacks took place days after Benghazi against the U.N.
Multinational Force in the Sinai Peninsula as well as at the U.S.
Embassy in Tunis, Tunisia.
While successful attacks are instructive, it is equally important
to study unrealized terrorist plots that reveal a great deal about
intentions, motivations, target selection, and desired tactics of our
adversaries.
Arriving in the United States from the United Kingdom, al-
Qaeda operative Dhiren Barot carried out reconnaissance for
terrorist attacks in New York City and Washington, DC. Part of
his research focused on exploiting building vulnerabilities,
including gaps in fire protection. He determined that he could
cause significant damage to the Prudential Building in Newark,
New Jersey and the Citi Corp Building in New York by ramming a
loaded gas tanker truck into the lobby and then igniting the
fuel.
Another al-Qaeda operative, Brooklyn-born Jose Padilla,
determined that a ``dirty bomb'' attack might be too difficult
to execute, so instead he planned to set wildfires, as well as
ignite high-rise buildings by damaging the gas lines in
apartments.
An al-Qaeda cell in the United Kingdom researched means to
disable fire suppression systems to increase the impact of a
plot that was ultimately disrupted by authorities.
These failed plots point to a strong interest in the use of fire as
a weapon by al-Qaeda and those it influences. In its widely
disseminated English-language Inspire magazine, al-Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula has repeatedly urged aspiring home-grown violent extremists
to carry out low-tech, high-impact attacks in the United States or
other Western countries. In one issue of Inspire, self-radicalized
readers are introduced to various methods of performing an attack,
including the use of simple ``ember bombs'' to ignite forest fires.
Equally important, the images from attacks like Mumbai serve as a model
for others to follow.
What we are seeing from these events is that a group does not need
a great deal of training to conduct a dramatic terrorist attack.
Recently, we witnessed two men at the Boston Marathon kill three
people, injure 275 others and paralyze the city. The Boston attacks
serve as an important reminder that attacks need not be sophisticated
to be deadly. Indeed, a survey of al-Qaeda-inspired attack plots in the
United States over the past decade reveals a trend remarkable for the
simplicity of attack plans. Fire as a weapon, by itself or along with
other tactics, presents significant challenges that first responders
and security forces must contend with in planning, preparation, and
drills.
complexities in responding to multi-modality attacks involving fire
FDNY research and preparedness efforts on fire as a weapon have
centered on what is now known as the ``Mumbai-style attack method.'' In
early 2009, shortly after the Mumbai attack, New York City fire and
police began tabletop exercises focused on the use of fire in terrorist
attacks. The salient features of a Mumbai-style attack include:
Multiple attackers, targets, and weapon types (guns, explosives, and
fire) deployed over a prolonged operational period leveraging media
attention to amplify the effects of the attack.\3\ These factors create
unique challenges for first responders beginning with the ability to
quickly and accurately gain situational awareness of the nature and
extent of the attack, the need for multiple command posts to address
multiple attack sites, and tactics, techniques, and procedures to deal
with attacks deploying both fire and other attack modalities, e.g.,
active shooter.
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\3\ Fire Department in the city of New York, ``Defining a Mumbai-
style Attack,'' Fireguard, April, 2011.
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Fire presents a qualitatively different type of attack when used in
conjunction with other attack means. Fire, and its associated smoke,
can prove disorienting to a responding force, inhibit ingress to the
target, create structural dangers and potentially increase the number
of casualties that the security forces will encounter while trying to
resolve the situation. These factors present significant challenges to
counterterrorism operations.
To address these complex challenges, the FDNY has reaffirmed its
relationships with established partners like the NYPD, and forged new
partnerships that add essential expertise to develop effective
techniques, tactics, and procedures. The results of these initiatives
are jointly published intelligence bulletins, forward-looking joint
exercises, and information exchanges that are pushing response models
forward.
Several partnerships are worthy of mention: FDNY began meetings
with FBI's New York SWAT team to explore the idea of joint tactical
teams simultaneously facing armed terrorists, fire and smoke, victims
and mass casualties. Discussions and tabletop exercises led to two
full-scale exercises that tested this concept. The insights gained from
this 1-year collaboration with the FBI culminated in the Interagency
Tactical Response Model released in June 2012.
In May of last year, FDNY began collaboration with the U.S.
military's Special Operations Forces that specialize in rapid solutions
to current and anticipated problems on the battlefield. As with the
FBI, a series of meetings, training modules, and tabletop exercises led
to the group's February 2013 ``Red Team'' paper on Fire and Smoke as a
Weapon, envisioning a Mumbai-style attack in a hypothetical Manhattan
office building in an attempt to gauge emergency responder preparedness
related to this novel attack method.
After the Benghazi attacks, FDNY was leveraged to advise the
Department of State's Diplomatic Security Service, specifically its
high-threat response team called the Mobile Security Deployment.
Diplomatic Service agents were briefed on the most critical features of
fire as a weapon. Agents were then were put through firefighting
training at the FDNY training academy, including extrication of
fortified vehicles and a walk-through exercise of a Mumbai-style
scenario.
Finally, the FDNY has worked closely with the London Fire Brigade
on counterterrorism measures since the 7/7 bombings in 2005. In
preparation for the 2012 Olympics, FDNY discussed with the London's
fire service and the Metropolitan Police Service possible response
scenarios to active-shooter attacks involving fire in multiple
locations.
leading role of fdny in national homeland security efforts
As consumers of intelligence, and the first line of defense when
terrorist attacks occur, emergency responders require the best
intelligence to carry out their duties across all mission areas. The
understanding of the threat environment drives training initiatives,
general awareness, safety protocols, operating procedures, and risk
management.
However, the fire service is more than a consumer of intelligence.
It is also a producer, as well as a non-traditional intelligence
partner. Firefighters and emergency medical personnel offer unique
perspectives to more established intelligence partners and law
enforcement, adding richness and insights in the understanding of the
vulnerabilities and consequences related to varying threat streams. For
more than 5 years, FDNY has produced a weekly intelligence product
called the Watchline, balancing a strategic focus with operational
relevance to its primary readership: Emergency responders. Fire service
intelligence serves not only the response community but its
intelligence partners with the delivery of tailored intelligence on the
latest threats, trends, events, and innovations that affect these
groups, including the use of fire as a weapon on the world stage.
FDNY has also sent one of its officers to the National
Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) on a 1-year detail where he not only
receives the latest intelligence and threat data but he also provides
the intelligence community with fire service subject matter expertise
on a broad range of issues related to emergency responders. NCTC has
committed to provide first responders with the best threat intelligence
so they can operate safely in performing their life-saving mission, and
recognizes the intrinsic value of this non-traditional partnership.
In addition, the FDNY collaborates with other partners throughout
the intelligence community on the production of intelligence products.
In May 2012, the Department of Homeland Security Office of Intelligence
and Analysis released Terrorist Interest in Using Fire as a Weapon,
written in close consultation with FDNY.\4\ Key findings centered on
the advantages of using fire over other terrorist tactics, potential
for mass casualties, economic damage, and emergency resource depletion.
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\4\ See attachment for a copy of: Terrorist Interest in Using Fire
as a Weapon, 2012. [The information has been retained in committee
files.]
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Working with the Department of Defense's Combating Terrorism
Technical Support Office and New Mexico Tech's Energetic Materials
Research and Testing Center, the FDNY wants to examine the
vulnerability of high-rise building fire suppression systems. This
interagency group hopes to construct a fire protection system and
building mock-up for the purpose of testing blast effects on standpipes
and sprinklers. Test results could then be used to inform first
responders, Homeland Security, and the State Department of the level of
vulnerability of a combination attack of IEDs and fire.
conclusion
This type of interagency and international collaboration by the
FDNY demonstrates the importance of multi-agency solutions to these
complex problems. In an era of ever-constraining resources, it is
critical that organizations such as the FDNY leverage their expertise
to support broader audiences as we continue to face a dynamic and
resilient enemy. The recognition of terrorists' interest in the use of
fire as a weapon and the resulting complexities are important
considerations for all first responders and security forces.
Mr. King. Thank you, Chief Pfeifer. With the other
witnesses, even though technically it is a 5-minute limit, in
view of the importance of this, and it is a subcommittee
hearing, if any of you feel you have to go over for a few
minutes, there is no problem with that at all. Assume Ranking
Member's agreement.
Our next witness is Dr. Christine Fair, an assistant
professor at the Center for Peace and Security Studies within
Georgetown University's Edmond A. Walsh School of Foreign
Service. Previously, Dr. Fair served as a senior political
scientist with the RAND Corporation, a political officer to the
U.N. Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, and a senior research
associate, the Center for Conflict Analysis and Prevention.
Dr. Fair's research focuses on political and military
affairs in South Asia, and covers a range of security issues in
Afghanistan, Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. She is
a member of the International Institute of Strategic Studies,
Council on Foreign Relations, and serves on the Editorial Board
of Studies in Conflict in Terrorism.
Dr. Fair, welcome you today. Look forward to your
testimony. Thank you.
STATEMENT OF C. CHRISTINE FAIR, PH.D., ASSISTANT PROFESSOR,
GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY
Ms. Fair. Thank you for the privilege to be here again to
talk about Lashkar-e-Taiba. I have submitted a written
testimony. I will also draw your attention to the testimony I
wrote for this committee 2 years ago, and also one in 2009 for
the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee, looking at al-Qaeda and
the Taliban.
I also want to say, Mr. Chairman, I was incredibly grateful
for the very lucid comments you offered in your opening
remarks. I wish that more U.S. Government officials would be as
candid and perspicacious in identifying the threat that
Pakistan, the myriad Islamist groups that it supports for its
internal and external goals, but also would add to that list
the ISI. So I thank you for your clarity on this issue.
So I want to pick up upon an issue that you yourself began
with. Lashkar-e-Taiba now, which generally operates under the
name Jamaat-ud-Dawa, is the most coherent terrorist
organization operating in and from Pakistan. It enjoys the
complete unfettered support, not only of Pakistan's
intelligence agency, but has even enjoyed at certain periods in
time, financial support from the Punjab government, which is
the relevant province in which Jamaat-ud-Dawa is situated, as
most of its infrastructure is actually there.
Whereas other terrorist organizations have mobilized to
target the Pakistani state, LeT/Jamaat-ud-Dawa has never done
so. It has never conducted any operation as an organization
within Pakistan. Not only that, it is an important domestic
tool the Pakistani state uses to counter those terrorist
organizations that have been operating against Pakistan
citizens and state targets.
Many times, American analysts will focus on the external
utility of this organization. I also look at the domestic
politics of the organization. It is when you look at the
domestic politics of the organization that you understand how
important it is to the state, both as a bulwark against these
other groups, but it is interesting to the extent to which the
ISI actually props up Jamaat-ud-Dawa domestically.
If you look at media coverage of recent humanitarian
disasters, you will always find coverage of Lashkar-e-Taiba's
so-called humanitarian work. I have done research on this
issue. They never do what the media actually says they do.
The reason why they are given this media campaign is
because the ISI directly points journalists and so forth to
cover the very small number of camps. So what we find
consistently is the ISI is trying to prop up the image of this
organization.
The reason why it does this is that it wants to cultivate
support amongst Pakistanis, then uses that support domestically
to resist American pressure to do something about the
organization. Pakistan will consistently say that it is doing
everything that it can to deal with the terrorist problem. That
is absolute nonsense.
I want to draw your attention to a report that I co-
authored under the auspices of the Combating Terrorism Center.
We analyzed 900 biographies of these LeT operatives.
Many of them have military backgrounds. We see very close
linkages between them and the Pakistan army, particularly in
the areas from which they recruit. The vast majority of the LeT
operatives are coming from the Punjab, which is where the vast
majority of the Pakistan army infrastructure is located.
In my testimony, I actually provide a photograph. I was
recently an election observer in Pakistan. I was missioned to
go observe in Murree. As our vehicle was going down the road, I
happened to see a Jamaat-ud-Dawa sign, and it happened to be
right across the street from the military police station.
So that photograph is in the testimony. I also provide a
link to a video that I took of the same. So this idea that
there is anything but not only tolerance, but complete
facilitation of the organization is just--it is untenable from
any point of view.
You have also, I am sure, have seen the LeT rallies, Hafiz
Saeed regularly gives interviews to domestic and foreign media.
When the Pakistanis say that Jamaat-ud-Dawa's not a terrorist
organization, again, I point to some of the evidence I provided
in my testimony.
I provided photographs of their publications; one, ``We
Mother of the Lashkar-e-Taiba,'' published by the Jamaat-ud-
Dawa publishing outfit.
Also, I call your attention to their minimum opus, ``Why
are We Waging Jihad?'' It is a 35-page document that talks
about, well, frankly, killing people, so putting to rest many
of the claims that the Pakistanis make.
I want to think a little bit about what are the extended
goals of the organization, given that historically it has
operated largely within South Asia; although, as the Chairman
noted, also against Americans and our allies in Afghanistan.
The biographies that we analyze as a part of the Combating
Terrorism Center effort, shows that Hafiz Saeed and other LeT
leadership are deeply involved in selecting people for
training, for selecting them for additional training, and
ultimately for missioning them.
This is very definitely a case of leader-led Jihad. You see
the militants describing how they have had to lobby to the
leadership organization to get selected for a training, and to
ultimately be deployed. So this is a very hands-on tactical
organization.
But this also raises interesting questions for the threat
that they pose to the American homeland. Given that they are so
tightly allied to the ISI, perhaps the most important asset
that they enjoy is unfettered access to Pakistan itself, right,
being able to recruit amongst Pakistanis, being able to raise
money, being able to train wherever they would like to train in
Pakistan, without any sort of limitation.
So this does, for me, raise a question: What would it take
for LeT to actually conduct an attack here as an organization?
Now, this is very distinct from individuals who have had ties
with LeT coming back to conduct violence.
But for LeT to attack the United States on the homeland,
this would, in my view, require ISI acquiescence. Now, Pakistan
likes to cultivate plausible deniability.
I am a fan of doing everything we can to shut down that
plausible deniability by explaining to the ISI, and quite
frankly to other Pakistani organizations and the citizenry,
that if there is an LeT attack here, we will treat it as an act
of war.
I don't understand why we indulge the space that Pakistan
uses for plausible deniability. It does this deliberately.
So for example--I am sure Dr. Tankel can speak to this as
well--the Indian Mujahedeen is a proxy organization for
Lashkar-e-Taiba, so that when the Indian Mujahedeen conduct
attacks, as those described by Mr. Pfeifer, the Pakistani state
can put an additional layer of buffer between it and those
attacks.
I think we need to do whatever we can, using our tools of
foreign policy, to really restrict that scope for plausible
deniability.
I also am not convinced that LeT can recruit a Pakistani
with the necessary skills to come here and conduct that sort of
attack, and getting a visa, for example. However, the Diaspora,
this is the place where I think we are really most at risk,
this is also, I think, where the American Government has a lot
farther to go in terms of the different agency databases that
allow us to identify and apprehend a potential perpetrator once
they are here.
We know the story, the 9/11 bombers either should never
have gotten a visa, or once they were here, they should have
been picked up. But the different databases don't talk to each
other.
Unfortunately, I fear this is still very much the case. In
2006 when I was conducting fieldwork in Pakistan on madrassas,
I came across two Americans, American-Pakistanis from Atlanta,
that were there held against their will.
Now obviously, they are a prime target for any sort of
organization wishing to conduct violence on the United States,
because they are American citizens. When I came back and
discussed this matter, I learned that CIA, FBI, the State
Department, there was no organization that owned responsibility
for understanding that these people were in Pakistan.
So if they had been recruited, the only chance of our being
able to preempt any sort of nefarious designs, would have been
is if when they were coming through the airport, Border
Security Police would have detected something. So I do remain
very fearful that the Diaspora is a source of really important
human capital that this organization may leverage to harm us.
I would also like to put out there on the table that we
kind of consider a larger aperture. Pakistan hosts so many
militant organizations. Because LeT conducted the Mumbai
attack, it is very easy to really isolate our attention to that
particular organization.
The militant landscape in Pakistan is rapidly evolving. One
of the consequences of the last 11 years in the war in
Afghanistan is that groups that were once very parochial have
become much more globalized. In the same way that the LeT could
allure or lure in someone from the Diaspora--by the way, I
don't simply mean American Diaspora. I also mean the European
Diaspora--or really any country that can have ready access to
the United States, so can these other groups.
So I think it is important that while we talk about LeT
because it is so closely allied to the state, that we also
remember that it is not the only organization that Pakistan
deliberately patronizes. So consequently, all of these groups
in one way or another do pose some potential, particularly when
interlaced with the Diaspora.
I would also like to say--I say this somewhat cautiously--
it is not just the militant groups that harm us. The ISI
operates here. I have detailed some of my own experiences with
being harassed by the ISI in my testimony.
I am happy to discuss this. It is, as an American citizen,
is absolutely outrageous that the ISI intimidates and harasses
individuals here. I elaborated several situations in my written
testimony.
I would also like to put on the table the other concern. We
are here because we are talking about Lashkar-e-Taiba. But
times are also changing. There are myriad other kinds of
organizations of different ideologies that also seek to
threaten us.
I have been very dismayed at the inability to have any
sensible discussion about gun control. I tell my students in my
class it is actually quite miraculous that these terrorists are
so obsessed with things like suicide bombing, when they could
actually be more destructive by availing themselves of the
munitions available at most Walmarts.
Yet, we are completely unable to have a discussion about
gun control in this country. So in some sense, we have just
been lucky that terrorist organizations haven't decided to
avail themselves of that particular hole in our domestic
security.
So in conclusion, I would like to sort of wrap up by going
back to Pakistan. I was quite shocked to hear that Secretary
Kerry again issued a waiver so that all of the various kinds of
defense cooperation sales could continue to Pakistan
unfettered.
I was also surprised that no American news outlet covered
this. I understand why we need to continue acquiescing to
Pakistan's coercive demands. But after 2014 when we are no
longer, you know, basically dependent upon Pakistan, I really
hope that this chamber, as well as other elements of the U.S.
Government, will take up a very invigorated, honest, data-
driven assessment of what Pakistan has been.
It has taken billions of dollars. It has killed our troops.
It continues to use jihadists under its expanding nuclear
umbrella as its primary tool of foreign policy. Clearly, this
policy of financial allurement in conventional weapons, has not
made Pakistan in any way, shape, or form, more compliant with
the sorts of things that advance American interests.
So I encourage you, after 2014, when our dependence upon
Pakistan diminishes as we withdraw from Afghanistan, that we
really take another look at this country, and really view it I
think more in the light of what it is. It has been more of an
enemy than it has been a friend. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Fair follows:]
Prepared Statement of C. Christine Fair
June 12, 2013
introduction
Thank you for the privilege of sharing my assessment of the risks
that groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba pose to the American homeland. In
doing so, I will present a brief update on the organization and its
likely evolving intentions and capabilities. However, I will also
encourage you to consider other Pakistan-based terrorist organizations
as well as the activities of Pakistan's intelligence agency, the ISI,
here in the United States.
While Islamist groups continue to pose an undeniable threat, it is
also important to acknowledge the reality that groups of other
ideologies and religious commitments also seek to commit violence in
this country and have done so.\1\ Unfortunately, any terrorist
organization can easily avail of the permissive environment to obtain
any range of guns and munitions. In fact, it is surprising that
terrorist organizations have not perpetrated a Mumbai-like attack given
that the United States routinely experiences mass killings by lone
shooters.
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\1\ Peter Bergan and Jennifer Rowland, ``Right Wing Extremist
Terrorism As Deadly a Threat as Al Qaeda?'' CNN.com, August 8, 2012.
http://www.cnn.com/2012/08/07/opinion/bergen-terrorism-wisconsin.
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Returning to Pakistan, as 2014 nears and as the United States
becomes less dependent upon Pakistan for operations in Afghanistan, I
hope that that the U.S. Government will seriously consider its options
with respect to Pakistan. The policy of appeasement through financial
allurements and conventional military sales has not made Pakistan more
likely to give up its reliance upon Islamist militants under its ever-
expanding nuclear umbrella. It is difficult to escape the conclusion
that Pakistan's intelligence agency is responsible for many deaths of
Americans and our allies in Afghanistan, despite the massive assistance
the Pakistanis have received ostensibly to support the U.S.-led war on
terrorism in Afghanistan and beyond. The realities of the past decade
should be a wake-up call that a new policy is required to contend with
the threats that Pakistan poses and will pose.
lashkar-e-taiba: a brief update
Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), which generally now operates under the name
Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD), is the most organized and coherent terrorist
organization operating from Pakistan. (For an extensive background on
the organization and its history of high-profile attacks, see author's
previous prepared testimony.)\2\ LeT has never attacked any targets
within the state of Pakistan and has consistently been an ideological
weapon of Pakistan's government against the largely Deobandi groups (a
rival Islamist interpretive tradition to that of LeT) that have been
terrorizing the state and its citizens.\3\ Pakistan's media has
recently reported that LeT, along with another pro-state militant group
``Ansarul Islam,'' is about to begin confronting the Pakistani Taliban
(Tehreek-e-Taliban-Pakistan, or TTP) with violence, The LeT disputes
this claim, however.\4\ What is not in dispute is that the LeT
denounces violence committed against the Pakistani state or its
citizens and criticizes the Deobandi organizations for doing just
that.\5\
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\2\ Please see previous author testimony for a detailed description
of the organization and the Mumbai 2008 attack. C. Christine Fair,
``Lashkar-e-Taiba beyond Bin Laden: Enduring Challenges for the Region
and the International Community.'' Testimony prepared for the U.S.
Senate, Foreign Relations Committee Hearing on ``Al-Qaeda, the Taliban,
and Other Extremist Groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan,'' May 24, 2011.
http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Fair_Testimony.pdf; C.
Christine Fair, ``Antecedents and Implications of the November 2008
Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) Attack Upon Several Targets in the Indian Mega-
City of Mumbai,'' Testimony prepred for the U.S. House of
Representatives, Homeland Security Committee, Subcommittee on
Transportation Security and Infrastructure Protection on Mar 11, 2009.
http://home.comcast.net/christine_fair/pubs/CT-320_Christine_Fair.pdf.
\3\ C. Christine Fair, ``Lashkar-e-Tayiba and the Pakistani
State,'' Survival, Vol. 53, No. 4 (August 2011), pp. 1-23.
\4\ Tahir Khan, ``Cracks appear: TTP braces against militant
offensive in Mohmand ,'' Pakistan Express Tribune, June 8, 2013.
tribune.com.pk/story/560674/cracks-appear-ttp-braces-against-militant-
offensive-in-mohmand/.
\5\ Fair, ``Lashkar-e-Tayiba and the Pakistani State.''
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To facilitate LeT's pro-state message countering that of the
various Deobandi organizations operating in Pakistan and against
Pakistanis (e.g. Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and the Pakistani Taliban),
Pakistan's Ministry of Information and the armed force's Interservices
Public Relations appear to direct Pakistani and international media to
cover the ostensible relief efforts of JuD and its other alias, Falah
Insaniat Foundation (e.g. during Pakistan's 2005 earthquake and the
2010 monsoon-related flood). The media coverage of this humanitarian
work seemed far in excess of the actual relief activities conducted.
Subsequent research has shown that the organization did not provide the
relief that the various media proclaimed.\6\ In essence, this media
coverage handed the organization a public relations boon they did not
deserve.
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\6\ C. Christine Fair, ``Not at the Forefront of Flood Relief,''
ForeignPolicy.com, September 20, 2010. http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/
posts/2010/09/20/not_at_the_forefront_of_flood_- relief.
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In survey work that my colleagues and I have conducted in Pakistan,
we have found that the various state and non-state efforts to rebrand
LeT as JuD in Pakistan have been successful. During survey pretesting
in Pakistan in 2011, we found that Pakistani respondents viewed the two
organizations as being quite distinct and engaging in different
activities with the latter being seen more often as providing public
services.
As I argued in 2011, this strategy is important. By fostering
public support for the organization at home, the Pakistani state can
resist pressure from the United States and others to work against the
organization.\7\ Under these varied guises, LeT/JuD can continue to
recruit, raise funds, and support its message of jihad against the
``external kuffar'' such as the Indians, Americans, Israelis, and so
forth.\8\ The continued official investment in the organization and
expanding public presence suggests that the Pakistani state is ever
more dependent upon this proxy for both domestic and foreign policy
requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ Fair, ``Lashkar-e-Tayiba and the Pakistani State.''
\8\ Fair, ``Lashkar-e-Tayiba and the Pakistani State.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
It is important to understand that whereas in some countries
terrorist organizations arise for a myriad of largely exogenous
reasons, in Pakistan militant organizations have long been organized
with the active assistance of the state. In fact, this phenomenon began
in the earliest days of Pakistan's independence when various parts of
the provincial and federal governments supported tribal militias in
their invasion of India in order to seize Kashmir with support from the
Pakistan army.\9\ Pakistan continues to rely upon Islamist terrorism
under the security of expanding nuclear umbrella to prosecute its
foreign policies with increasing impunity. Equally disconcerting for
U.S. interests, Pakistan is busily expanding its nuclear arsenal with a
renewed focused upon tactical--battlefield--nuclear weapons.\10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ See Shuja Nawaz, ``Crossed Swords: Pakistan, Its Army, and the
Wars Within'' (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), especially 42-
92; Shuja Nawaz, ``The First Kashmir War Revisited,'' India Review 7,
no. 2 (April 2008): 115-54; Praveen Swami, India, Pakistan and the
Secret Jihad: The Covert War in Kashmir, 1947-2004 (London: Routledge,
2007), 49-75.
\10\ David O. Smith, ``The US Experience with Tactical Nuclear
Weapons: Lessons for South Asia,'' The Stimson Center, March 2013.
http://www.stimson.org/summaries/smith-on-tactical-nuclear-weapons-in-
south-asia-/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While media accounts characterize LeT activists as being poor and
poorly educated, the data do not support this claim. In an April 2013
report which I co-authored under the auspices of the Combatting
Terrorism Center (CTC) at West Point, my colleagues and I found that
LeT activists tend to be very well-educated relative to Pakistani males
in general.\11\ Most of the LeT terrorists in our database came from
Pakistan's Punjab province with about ten districts accounting for most
of the recruitment. As shown in Figure 1 below, not only do most of the
LeT activists come from the Punjab, many of the highest-producing
districts for militants are also the highest-producing districts for
the Pakistan army. This likely reflects that the two organizations have
similar human capital requirements and thus have similar ``target
markets'' for recruitment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ Don Rassler, Christine Fair, Anirban Ghosh, Arif Jamal, Nadia
Shoeb, ``The Fighters of Lashkar-e-Taiba: Recruitment, Training,
Deployment and Death,'' Combatting Terrorism Center at West Point,
Occasional Paper Series, Apr 04, 2013. http://www.ctc.usma.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2013/04/Fighters-of-LeT_Final.pdf
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
That LeT militants and the army officers come from similar
districts is an important point. Whereas Pakistan routinely claims that
it cannot manage the various terrorist problems it confronts, it should
be noted that much of the LeT is based in the Punjab which is also
where the vast majority of the Pakistan army's infrastructure is
located: I Corps is in Mangla; II Corps is in Multan; IV Corps is in
Lahore; XXX Corps is in Gujranwala; XXXI Corps is in Bahawalpur; and X
Corps is in Rawalpindi. Only three Corps are located outside of the
Punjab: V Corps in Karachi; XI Corps in Peshawar and XII Corps in
Quetta. Equally, it should be noted that in the past, the Punjab
government provided financial support to the organization.\12\ Taken
together, Pakistan's claims that it is doing all that it can to counter
these myriad threats are risible at best if not outright deception.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ Human Imtiaz, ``Illusions in Punjabi,'' ForeignPolicy.com Af-
Pak Channel, June 19, 2010. http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/
06/19/illusions_in_punjab.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition, LeT/JuD organization operates overtly: It holds
rallies and anti-U.S. demonstrations, collects funds, and its leader
(Hafez Saeed) frequently gives interviews to local and international
media outlets. To give some sense of how openly it operates, in Figure
2, I provide photographs that I took in the hill station town of
Murree, about 1.5 hours from Islamabad by road, in May of 2013. I
happened to be in Murree as a part of an election observation mission
and noticed this while driving by. You will note that this
advertisement for JuD is festooned across a set of buildings
immediately in front of a military police station.
The Pakistan government insists that JuD is a philanthropic
organization and thus U.S. claims that it is a terrorist organization
are false. However, this claim is patently absurd. The afore-noted CTC
report is based upon a collection and subsequent analysis of over 900
biographies of slain terrorists. We obtained these biographies from
magazines and books published by Jamaat-ud-Dawa's publishing arm, Dara-
ul-Andalus at the LeT's headquarters in Lahore, Char Burji (Figure 3).
In addition, in Figure 4, I provide a scanned image of JuD's volume Hum
Kyon Jihad Kar Rahen Hain (Why We Wage Jihad?). A perusal of the volume
will demonstrate that this is indeed about waging militarized jihad and
dedicates no space whatsoever to ``philanthropic activities.''\13\
These publications are readily available throughout Pakistan.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ See exposition in Fair, ``Lashkar-e-Tayiba and the Pakistani
State.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition, the organization has signage on public spaces (walls,
bridges, rickshaws, etc.) advertising for events and campaigns.
lashkar-e-taiba: expanded goals?
So far, we find continuing evidence that LeT's leadership exercises
considerable control over the organization's operations and operatives.
Our CTC effort revealed that LeT's leadership has often been intimately
involved in selecting persons for training and for actual missions.\14\
What does this tell us, if anything, about LeT's desire to attack the
homeland and if so, how could it do so?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ Rassler, Fair, Ghosh, Jamal, and Shoeb, ``The Fighters of
Lashkar-e-Taiba.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As I argued in 2011, the LeT's primary utility to the Pakistani
state is that it services its external goals in India and Afghanistan
while remaining restrained and pro-state at home. This does not mean
that all LeT activists have towed the party line: Indeed, it seems as
if there is personnel movement between various militant groups. Thus
some LeT personnel may defect and join other groups but this does not
mean that the group is no longer loyal to the state. But it does raise
definitional problems about who is a LeT member and what degree of
sanction from the organization is necessary to define any given strike
as a ``LeT attack.'' This raises further questions about how tightly
Pakistan's military and intelligence agencies control all or even most
of the organization's operations. Indeed, the Pakistani state has long
benefited from plausible deniability and seems to even actively
cultivate this. For example, Indian and American analysts alike believe
that the Pakistani intelligence agencies have cultivated the Indian
Mujahideen for years to add an additional layer of plausible
deniability about the degree to which the Pakistani state is involved
in any given attack in India.
However, though the organization serves the state's domestic goals
by mobilizing against groups that perpetrate anti-Pakistan violence,
and serves the external goals of the state abroad, LeT walks a fine
line between being a loyal agent of the state and being able to project
itself as an organization with global jihadist goals against a presumed
threat beyond South Asia. It--like other jihad organizations--has come
under increasing pressure from its constituents to take the jihad to
other infidels (kuffar in their language) beyond the confines of South
Asia. How can the organization continue to satisfy its Pakistani state
backers while also continue to compete for personnel, resources, and
popular support without satisfying some demand to operate beyond South
Asia?
As a rational organization, I do not believe that the LeT would
undertake a catastrophic attack outside of India or Afghanistan without
ISI acquiescence. After all, the most important asset that the LeT
enjoys is unfettered access to Pakistan's geography and people. This
does suggest that some theatres of action for the LeT may be more
palatable than others for international jihad. Both the United States
and United Kingdom are of high value for the Pakistani state. An LeT
attack in the United States could be devastating for Pakistan and thus
the organization. However, other theatres such as European countries,
may satisfy the organization's need to strike outside of the region
while not being so provocative as to jeopardize the perquisites it
enjoys in Pakistan. This does not preclude individuals with some degree
of training from LeT from attempting such an attack however without
explicit top-level organizational approval much less that of the ISI.
thinking beyond let: threats to the homeland
Irrespective of whether the threat comes from LeT or other
organizations, there are a number of important risks that require
political courage and preparedness to manage. We should recognize what
made the Mumbai attack of 2008 as devastating as it was. As I have
argued previously in Congressional testimony, there was little in that
attack that was new. In addition, the U.S. Government provided India as
much advanced warning as possible.\15\ While the Indian government
responded as best as it could, the overwhelming evidence suggests that
their state and federal efforts fell far short of what was needed.\16\
The National Security Guards took 9 hours to reach Mumbai and then had
to travel by bus to the sites of the conflict.\17\ The security forces
had antiquated weapons and personal protective equipment and the law
enforcement personnel abjectly failed to secure the perimeter of the
crime scene, among numerous other catastrophic failures detailed
elsewhere.\18\ It is unlikely that American first responders would be
so hindered and shambolic in their response, based upon recent
management of disasters and terrorist attacks, most recently in Boston.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ Fair, ``Lashkar-e-Taiba beyond Bin Laden;'' Fair,
``Antecedents and Implications of the November 2008 Lashkar-e-Taiba
(LeT) Attack.''
\16\ C. Christine Fair, ``Prospects for Effective Internal Security
Reforms in India,'' Commonwealth & Comparative Politics, Vol. 50, No. 2
(April 2012), pp. 145-170; Pradhan Committee. Report of the High Level
Enquiry Committee (HLEC) on 26/11, 2009. http://www.scribd.com/doc/
23474630/Pradhan-Committee-Reportabout-26-11 (accessed 19 January
2012).
\17\ ``Why did NSG take 9 hrs to get there?'' Times of India,
November 30, 2008. http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/
Why_did_NSG_take_9_hrs_to_get_there/articleshow/3775003.cms.
\18\ C. Christine Fair, ``Prospects for Effective Internal Security
Reforms in India,'' Commonwealth & Comparative Politics, Vol. 50, No. 2
(April 2012), pp. 145-170; Pradhan Committee. Report of the High Level
Enquiry Committee (HLEC) on 26/11, 2009. http://www.scribd.com/doc/
23474630/Pradhan-Committee-Report-about-26-11 (accessed 19 January
2012).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
However, other challenges to American security no doubt persist. It
is a sad fact that most of the 9/11 hijackers either should never have
been granted a U.S. visa or should have been picked up by an array of
U.S. authorities for various other reasons once here. But, as is well
known, they all fell through inter-agency data sieves that allowed them
to enter and remain in the United States despite being identified as
threats for various reasons. (Questions still linger about the degree
of information provided to the United States by the Russians about
Tamerlan Tsarnaev, the older of the two Boston bombers who was killed
in a police shootout.) While the United States has made progress in
this regard, there are still important loopholes that concern me.
It is unlikely that LeT can recruit, train, and dispatch a
terrorist directly to the United States; it is more likely that
individuals from various diasporas in the United States, United
Kingdom, Europe, and elsewhere may radicalize and seek training from
the LeT or other numerous militant groups operating in Pakistan.
American citizens or permanent residents are a particular risk. During
fieldwork in 2006, I met two American children at a Karachi madrassah
being held against their will. When I returned to the United States I
was dismayed to learn that no U.S. agency had any responsibility for
such Americans in such predicaments. Had those individuals been
recruited by a militant organization, the only point at which they
could have been intercepted was at the point of entry when they
returned to the United States. (After the media broke their story,
these two Atlanta-based Pakistani-Americans finally returned home.)
Needless to say, persons from countries that can obtain American visas
easily pose a similar concern.
In the context of an Islamist militant attack, the communities of
concern are diaspora Muslim communities who radicalize at home and seek
training in places like Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, or elsewhere. It is
important that U.S. authorities be able to recognize that certain
communities pose more risk than others but it also important that they
do so in ways that do not alienate the most important allies in this
struggle: Those members of the same community who outnumber those who
seek to do violence and who remain important sources of warning about
potential terrorist activity. The diverse American Muslim community is
replete with such examples of patriotic Muslim Americans who have
cooperated with law enforcement to undermine terrorist plots.
Local sources of information have been found to be critical in
preventing terrorist events in the United States. Erik J. Dahl studied
176 failed terrorist plots in the United States. He concluded that
``precise intelligence needed to prevent attacks is not usually
developed through the use of strategic-level tactics that get much of
the public's attention . . . More typically, plots are disrupted as a
result of tips from the public, informants inside home-grown cells, and
long-term surveillance of suspects.''\19\ This suggests that the most
important thing that U.S. agencies can do is ``focus on local and
domestic intelligence, and to figure out how to gather the necessary
intelligence while still maintaining the proper balance between civil
liberties and national security.''\20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ Erik J. Dahl, ``The Plots that Failed: Intelligence Lessons
Learned from Unsuccessful Terrorist Attacks Against the United
States,'' Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 34, No. 8 (2011): p.
635.
\20\ Erik J. Dahl, ``The Plots that Failed: Intelligence Lessons
Learned from Unsuccessful Terrorist Attacks Against the United
States,'' Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 34, No. 8 (2011): p.
635.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While much concern has been given to the threat that Pakistan's
militant training infrastructure poses, research has shown that simply
being trained by a terrorist organization in places like Pakistan does
not necessarily confirm competence to the actors. A recent study of
Islamist terrorists in the United Kingdom and Spain found that they
lacked tradecraft and that the training they received did not translate
well to the target countries. While terrorists in Pakistan can practice
their craft, once in these environs (e.g. Britain, Spain, etc.) they
were unable to continue ``learning by doing.'' Often their ideological
zeal motivated them to focus upon more sophisticated attacks (e.g.
suicide attacks) and thus fail to seize the opportunity for lower-
sophistication/higher-impact attacks.\21\ This again underscores the
importance of cultivating local information while not alienating much
less criminalizing the entire communities in which these terrorists may
insert themselves.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\21\ Michael Kenney, `` `Dumb' Yet Deadly: Local Knowledge and Poor
Tradecraft Among Islamist Militants in Britain and Spain,'' Studies in
Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 33, No. 10 (2010): pp. 911-932.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
It should be stated forthrightly that Pakistan-based militants are
not the only organizations that pose harm to Americans at home and
abroad. Pakistan's intelligence, the ISI, has the ability to influence
events here in the United States. My colleagues, peers, and journalist
acquaintances suggest that this takes place through various means.
First, the ISI wields influence by supporting individuals and
organizations directly and indirectly in taking positions that are
supportive of that of the Pakistan government.\22\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\22\ For example, see the case of accused ISI operative Gulab Nabi
Fai. U.S. Department of Justice, ``Virginia Man Pleads Guilty in Scheme
to Conceal Pakistan Government Funding for His U.S. Lobbying Efforts,''
December 07, 2011. http://www.fbi.gov/washingtondc/press-releases/2011/
virginia-man-pleads-guilty-in-scheme-to-conceal-pakistan-government-
funding-for-his-u.s.-lobbying-efforts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Second, the ISI wields influence by threatening U.S. citizens here
in the United States. In fact, in May 2011, after I testified on LeT
before a Senate subcommittee, I received an email that likely was sent
at the behest of a Pakistani intelligence agency. After receiving this
note, I reached out to Ambassador Husain Haqqani because I had planned
to avail of a grant I had received to work on my book in Pakistan
during the summer of 2011. When at last he could contact me about this,
he told me forthrightly that I should cancel my trip because ``the crew
cuts are after'' me. In addition, I learned that the then-defense
attache and ISI liaison (Brigadier Butt) sent a letter about me to
personnel at the Pakistan embassy barring them from meeting with me.
This gives some sense of the punitive approaches that this organization
takes when it does not approve of one's scholarship on it and/or its
proxies.
I have heard disconcerting reports among expatriate Pakistanis that
they or Pakistani-Americans have been intimidated. A few weeks back I
heard a harrowing story about a New York journalist who was reportedly
approached by such a man while on the subway platform. Reportedly, he
told her in Urdu that he could easily push her. Obviously, I have no
way to confirm or disconfirm this episode. However, I want to bring to
your attention that very real possibility that individuals are being
threatened and coerced here on American soil.
This is in addition to the intrusive role that the ISI plays in
granting U.S. citizens visas to Pakistan. U.S. scholars receiving
Fulbright awards cannot get visas, reportedly due to ISI intrusions. (I
also experienced this ISI interference before and even during my recent
trip to Pakistan in May 2013. The previous Ambassador communicated to
me that ``they have an objection'' due my co-authored report for the
CTC and because of my public commentary about drones.) Of course, it is
not unusual to oust foreign journalists from Pakistan--not because they
have conducted themselves illegally--but because they report the truth,
which is often unflattering and contributes to evolving public
perception in the United States and elsewhere that Pakistan is at best
a perfidious ally if not outright foe.\23\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\23\ Expelled by Pakistan, The New York Times, May 10, 2013. http:/
/www.nytimes.com/2013/05/11/opinion/times-reporter-expelled-by-
pakistan.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While these threats from Islamist terrorist and perfidious allies
like Pakistan warrant your focus, it is critically important that the
U.S. Government recognize the changing times our country's polity
confronts. There a range of other religious and ideological movements
which harbor a desire to inflict harm upon the United States and its
citizens. It is important to balance what appears to be the perceived
current threat with evolving near-term threats. Indeed, white
supremacist, anti-Muslim, those who oppose even the most commonsensical
of gun control and other bigoted organizations also threaten our
society and have engaged in violence in recent years. The focus upon
Islamist terrorist should not be at the expense of these other threats.
In fact, given that individuals frequently perpetrate mass killings
with easily-obtained guns and ammunition, it is a surprising fact that
terrorist organizations of any ideological and religious moorings have
not exploited this weakness in our domestic security. Just as it is
important that the U.S. Government forthrightly name the groups that
threaten us, it must also work to limit the harm that these groups can
do. It is only a matter of time before a terrorist organization--of any
ideological or religious background--understands that it can easily
terrorize Americans by perpetrating mass killings at soft targets using
munitions that are easily and readily available. It is unfortunate that
various gun lobbies have worked assiduously to undermine common-sense
approaches to circumscribing this threat and have successfully
frustrated any Congressional activity to limit certain types of weapons
and munitions in the service of protecting our collective security.
conclusions
In short, while you consider the specific threat that LeT poses to
the United States and its interests, I encourage you to expand the
aperture of your query to look not only at this group but other
Islamist militant groups based in Pakistan. While they may not be well-
situated to recruit and train a Pakistani to operate here, the diaspora
seems a ready source of potential persons who are so situated. I also
encourage you to look pro-actively at the activities of the ISI and its
henchpersons here in the United States to intimidate Americans and
others to acquiesce to their insidious demands and to cultivate
information that is favorable to the Pakistani state.
While most persons recognize that working with Pakistan is
necessary due to its importance in wrapping up military operations in
Afghanistan, I sincerely hope that after 2014 the United States will
look very closely at Pakistan and evaluate that state's contribution to
the degradation of U.S. security interests in South Asia and beyond. I
hope that there will be a serious inquiry about the numbers of
Americans and American allies in Afghanistan whose deaths and injuries
can be attributed to the ISI's on-going support to the Taliban and
their allies, despite continuing to benefit from U.S. financial
assistance and military sales. In this regard, I was dismayed to learn
that the State Department quietly issued a range of waivers that
permitted all forms of security cooperation and military sales to
proceed as if Pakistan has been a faithful, cooperative ally deserving
of such emoluments.\24\ Oddly no American news outlet covered this
quiet relaxation of U.S. laws and requirements for a country that so
brazenly undermines U.S. interests.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\24\ ``US issues fresh waiver for sale of major defence equipment
to Pakistan,'' Times of India, April 5, 2013. http://
articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2013-04-05/us/38306243_1_defence-
equipment-foreign-military-financing-pakistan.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Finally, while considering the threat that specific religious,
ideological, and expatriate communities pose to Americans' safety, I
strongly urge you to examine the structural features of our society
that makes violence relatively easy to perpetrate on a large scale,
including the ready availability of weaponry as well as continued
problems in the inter-agency data puzzle that allow some persons with
ill-intent to slip into the country without detection until they do
something deadly.
figure 1. district-wise production of let militants and pakistan army
officers
figure 2. jamaat-ud-dawa advertisement across from murree military
police station
figure 3. jud/let's ``we the mothers of the lashkar-e-taiba vol. 3''
figure 4. jamaat-ud-dawa's ``why are we waging jihad''
Mr. King. Thank you, Doctor. Appreciate your testimony. I
am aware of some of the circumstances you talk about. I commend
you for that.
Dr. Stephen Tankel is an assistant professor at American
University, and a non-resident scholar in the South Asia
program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. His
research focuses on terrorism, insurgency, and evolution of
violent non-state actors, also as political and military
affairs in South Asia.
Dr. Tankel is also an adjunct staff member at the RAND
Corporation where he has contributed to research assessing
jihadist ideology and decision making. His latest book,
``Storming the World Stage: The Story of LeT'' was recently
published and examines that group's ideological, strategic, and
operational evolution since the 1980's within the context of
developments in Pakistan, India, and Afghanistan.
Doctor, I appreciate you being here today and you are
recognized for your testimony.
STATEMENT OF STEPHEN TANKEL, PH.D., ASSISTANT PROFESSOR,
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY
Mr. Tankel. Thank you very much for having me here today.
It is an honor to have an opportunity to testify about Lashkar-
e-Taiba, one of Pakistan's oldest and most powerful militant
groups. I too would draw your attention to my submitted written
testimony, as well as to testimony that I submitted several
years ago about LeT. I would also like, Mr. Chairman, to join
Dr. Fair in commending you for very lucid comments about some
of the group's capabilities, which are robust.
Now as Dr. Fair said, and you yourself have said as well,
Mr. Chairman, Lashkar-e-Taiba is Pakistan's most reliable
proxy, and it considers India to be its main enemy.
It is not an al-Qaeda affiliate, but since 9/11 the group's
anti-American rhetoric has turned into action. The primary
threat to U.S. citizens from LeT terrorist attacks, I would
argue, remains in South Asia, such as occurred with the 2008
Mumbai attacks. Those were unilateral. Also working with groups
like the Indian Mujaheddin to target foreign targets as
occurred in Pune in 2010 where they combined to target the
German bakery there. LeT can also act as part of a consortium,
meaning it need not take a lead role in order for its
capabilities to be used against the United States, as Dr. Fair
has already said, there are myriad groups in Pakistan whose
goals are expanding.
In keeping with the subject of this hearing, I would like
to focus my testimony on an LeT-led operation against the
homeland, which could, but would not necessarily look like the
Mumbai attacks. It certainly has the capabilities to launch
such an attack, and I will focus the first part of my testimony
just expanding on those briefly. Its intent to do so is hotly
debated. I will focus the second part of my testimony on the
group's intent. Then finally I would like to highlight just
several courses of possible U.S. action.
LeT's training camps remain open and the group boasts a
stable of men who can provide instruction in small unit
commando tactics, reconnaissance, which is critical, the
construction and use of explosive devices, as well as a bevy of
other specialized skills. While it continues to enjoy reach-
back capability into the Pakistani military and ISI, it has
leveraged financial resources and the operational freedom it
enjoys to develop an educated product that amplifies technical
training and planning capabilities, especially in the areas of
communications and information technology.
Mr. Chairman as you mentioned, the group has trans-national
network sections across South Asia, the Persian Gulf, and
Europe and that reach into the United States and Canada.
Historically Lashkar-e-Taiba has used its operative base in
western countries to support its operations in South Asia.
However, these networks can be redirected to execute or support
terrorist attacks in the west. There are several examples of
foreign LeT operatives doing so. It is unclear whether all of
these activities were sanctioned by the Pakistan-based LeT
leadership. Which gets to the importance of tensions within the
group, and the ability for its capabilities to be used by
various LeT factions.
Finally, as was already mentioned, LeT has a long history
of training people from Western countries including Americans,
several of whom have conducted surveillance not far from here.
Lashkar-e-Taiba has killed American citizens in Mumbai. It
deploys fighters to Afghanistan where they continue to confront
U.S. forces, and it previously sent members to Iraq as well.
There is no evidence that it has ever attempted an attack
against the U.S. homeland. The question is, what is stopping
them?
LeT's restraint has more to do, I would argue, with
strategic calculation than ideological inclination.
Ideologically it would be more than prepared to attack the
United States. But it does not want to risk its position in
Pakistan. As one of its members admitted to me, it remains
tamed by the ISI. Why might that change? Put simply, key LeT
leaders, not just Hafiz Saeed but also, and it is important to
mention them by name, Zakiur Rehman Lakhvi who is the group's
operational commander, and Sajid Mir, who oversees its foreign
assets, might pursue an attack against the United States if
they believed the group could avoid retribution, or that it
could withstand the costs, and that these were outweighed by
the benefits.
Here it is important to remember the group is a patient
organization. So when considering these calculations, I would
like to note three variables. First, ISI's situational
awareness of, and influence over, core LeT remains strong. If
that relationship weakened, or LeT believed it could claim
plausible deniability for an attack against the United States,
then this could change the equation. Notably, unlike al-Qaeda,
Lashkar-e-Taiba likely would do everything possible to hide its
hand in an attack against the United States. Here it is
important to note, its use of front groups such as the Indian
Mujaheddin, and also during the 2008 Mumbai attacks when it
created another front group out of whole cloth, the Deccan
Mujaheddin, and claimed credit for the attacks through them
initially.
Second, if Pakistan were to crack down for real on LeT,
then the group's cost/benefit calculus could change. That is
not a reason why Pakistan shouldn't crack down, it is simply to
say that it is something that we should be aware of.
Alternatively though, if LeT leaders surmised that Pakistan was
too weak to punish the group, and that the United States would
be unable, or unwilling to do so, then they might also consider
moving forward with an attack. Third, as I have mentioned
already, one must consider the threat from factions within
Lashkar-e-Taiba. It remains more coherent than most Jihadist
groups, but internal tensions exist, over whether to sacrifice
military adventurism, to protect its social welfare
infrastructure, over how close to remain to the state, and over
whether to stay locally-focused, or to go global. That is just
to name a few.
Where does that leave the United States? Any attempt to
disarm and demobilize LeT without Pakistani support is destined
to fail. Pakistan shows no sign of breaking with the group in
the near term. However, there are steps that the United States
can continue to take to degrade LeT, and areas where it could
increase its efforts.
First, barring a resurgent al-Qaeda central, the drawdown
of U.S. forces from Afghanistan could create space for
Washington to focus more on Lashkar-e-Taiba when allocating
resources such as intelligence collection and analysts. This is
critical. We must understand better the nature of the group,
especially as it evolves, and the threats it poses. Second, the
United States should continue to pursue actions necessary to
degrade LeT's international networks. Counterterrorism
cooperation with India has leveled off since a spike after
Mumbai, and regenerating this engagement is in both country's
interests.
The arrest and deportation last summer by Saudi Arabia of
two Indian LeT operatives suggests a greater focus has been
given to monitoring and infiltrating Gulf networks used for
recruitment and logistical support. This is to be applauded,
but there is more to be done. Third, because Washington is
unlikely to have success attempting to force strategic steps
Pakistan is not yet ready or able to take, it should remain
focused on containing LeT in the short term, while encouraging,
assisting, and compelling Pakistan to create conditions for
sustained and measurable action against militancy over the
longer term.
Containment does not equal inaction, or inattention.
Although LeT should not drive U.S. policy towards Pakistan, the
2014 drawdown in Afghanistan and success degrading al-Qaeda
central create an opportunity to elevate the priority given to
LeT. This includes continuing to make clear to the ISI that the
United States will hold it responsible in the event that LeT is
then involved in an attack on the homeland. It also means
pressuring Pakistan to identify, arrest, and extradite any
Westerners training, or attempting to train, with LeT.
The United States should also be mindful of opportunities
to weaken LeT, or separate the group from its support base. It
must revise its counterterrorism architecture in South Asia in
line with the decreasing threat from al-Qaeda central, and the
evolving threats from regional actors like LeT against which
unilateral direct action may have less utility. Finally, to
echo what Dr. Fair said, we need new and better metrics when
determining whether and how to engage with regard to giving
military aid.
Finally, the United States should prepare for the
unexpected. It should develop a response plan in the event of
an LeT-led attack against the homeland that includes a mix of
inducements, rewards, retributive measures, and unilateral
actions vis-a-vis Pakistan. It should also prepare for the
possibility, albeit incredibly remote at this point, that
Pakistan attempts to mainstream LeT or elements of it at some
point. This includes exploring how the United States might
assist overtly, or covertly in such an enterprise, the cost and
benefits of doing so, and the possible outcomes that might
eventuate.
Let me conclude by saying that Lashkar-e-Taiba is clearly
capable of threatening the homeland, but that threat must be
kept in perspective. The United States must remain attentive to
the evolving nature of the group and vigilant in taking steps
to degrade it.
Thank you again for inviting me to testify here today. I
look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Tankel follows:]
Prepared Statement of Stephen Tankel
June 12, 2013
Lashkar-e-Taiba (the Army of the Pure or LeT) is one of Pakistan's
oldest and most powerful militant groups. India has been its primary
enemy since the early 1990s and the group has never considered itself
to be an al-Qaeda affiliate, but the United States is clearly on its
enemies list. Since 9/11, the group's anti-American rhetoric has turned
into action. LeT has been actively attacking U.S. and Coalition forces
in Afghanistan since 2004-2005, its presence there increased in the
last several years and it deployed a small number of fighters to Iraq
following the U.S. invasion of that country. LeT has also killed
Americans and other Westerners in terrorist attacks in India and
contributed to other plots targeting them as well. The group has the
capabilities to launch terrorist attacks outside of South Asia,
including against the United States, and is likely working to augment
those capabilities. However, the question of LeT's intent to engage in
a unilateral attack against the U.S. homeland remains hotly debated.
Before turning to LeT's capabilities and intent, it is important to
recognize why Pakistan is unlikely to attempt dismantling the group in
the near term. First, the Pakistani military and its Inter-Services
Intelligence Directorate (ISI) have long considered LeT to be the
country's most reliable proxy against India and the group still
provides utility in this regard. Second, Pakistan is facing a serious
jihadist insurgency. LeT remains one of the few militant outfits whose
policy is to refrain from launching attacks against the Pakistani
state. Fearing LeT's capability to execute or assist with terrorist
attacks in Pakistan's heartland, the security establishment does not
want to take any action to change this calculus. LeT has built a robust
social welfare apparatus via its above-ground wing, Jamaat-ud-Dawa
(JuD), and assorted other legitimate relief organizations. As a result,
concerns also exist regarding its capability to provoke social unrest
in strongholds such as Lahore. Moreover, LeT actually provides
assistance at times against some of the groups involved in anti-state
violence. This assistance includes challenging the ideological
underpinnings of waging jihad against a Muslim government, providing
intelligence regarding anti-state militants' activities, and in some
instances even targeting anti-state militants directly.\1\ LeT has
provided similar intelligence and direct action assistance against
separatists in Balochistan as well. In short, the group has utility
both externally and internally. Third, some of LeT's members enjoy
strong personal relationships with members of Pakistan's armed
forces.\2\
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\1\ Regarding LeT's ideological utility see, for example, Sermon by
LeT cleric Mubashir Ahmad Rabbani entitled ``The Schism of
Excommunication,'' undated. Al-Qaeda refuted points from ``The Schism
of Excommunication,'' in a book entitled, Knowledgeable Judgment on the
Mujrites of the (Present) Age. C. Christine Fair, ``Lashkar-e-Tayiba
and the Pakistani State,'' Survival 53, no. 4, 2011. Information
regarding LeT's intelligence gathering is based on field interviews in
Pakistan. Regarding LeT direct action against anti-state actors see,
for example, Stephen Tankel, Storming the World Stage: The Story of
Lashkar-e-Taiba (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), pp. 196,
200-201. Tahir Khan, ``Mohmand Agency: TTP accuses rival groups of
plotting attacks on its bases,'' The Express Tribune, June 9, 2013.
\2\ For a detailed analysis of LeT recruiting patterns and overlaps
with those of Pakistan's military see, Anirban Ghosh et al, The
Fighters of Lashkar-e-Taiba: Recruitment, Training, Deployment and
Death (West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center, 2013).
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The safe haven LeT enjoys within Pakistan has provided it the
freedom of movement necessary to develop capabilities and capacity that
enable it to threaten the United States. At the same time, its
integration with the Pakistani state raises questions as to whether LeT
leaders would risk their group's position to execute such an attack.
The following focuses on a LeT-lead operation against the U.S.
homeland. It is important to note, however, that the primary threat to
U.S. citizens from LeT terrorist attacks remains in South Asia, either
unilaterally as was the case with the 2008 Mumbai attacks or via
operations executed in concert with the Indian Mujahideen.\3\ Further,
LeT could act as part of a consortium, meaning it need not take the
lead role in an attack in order for its capabilities to be used against
the U.S. homeland.
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\3\ Networks associated with LeT were suspected of supplying the
military-grade RDX used in the 2010 bombing of the German Bakery in
Pune and an LeT commander (Mirza Himayat Baig) cooperated with the
Indian Mujahideen to execute the attack. Praveen Swami, ``Lashkar-
linked terror charity raises fears,'' The Hindu, September 2, 2011.
Chandan Haygunde, ``Aspiring teacher to terror accused,'' Indian
Express, April 19, 2013.
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capabilities to launch an let-lead attack against the united states
LeT's training camps in Pakistan remain open and the group boasts a
stable of men who can provide instruction in small-unit commando
tactics, reconnaissance, counter-intelligence and the construction and
use of explosive devices. The group has transnational networks
stretching across South Asia, the Persian Gulf, and Europe, with a
particularly strong connection to the United Kingdom, and reach into
the United States and Canada. LeT operates a robust above-ground
infrastructure that, combined with investments in legitimate
enterprises in Pakistan and fundraising networks abroad, has enabled it
to operate independent of direct ISI financial support. While it
continues to enjoy reach-back capability into the Pakistani military
and ISI, LeT also has leveraged its financial resources and operational
freedom to develop an educated cadre among its membership.
Collectively, these individuals amplify technical, training, and
planning capabilities.
Training Apparatus
Soldiers on secondment from the military trained many of LeT's
trainers, and some of them took early retirement to join the group. As
a result, LeT militants and trainers are considered to be among the
most tactically adept and its bomb-makers to be among the best in the
region.\4\ Its own camps continue to operate in Pakistan-administered
Kashmir, Mansehra, and elsewhere in Pakistan. As LeT has deepened its
collaboration with other outfits, cross-pollination among trainers and
trainees has occurred. At the same time, LeT does not enjoy
historically strong ties with other groups in the region and actually
suffers from a deficit of trust with some of them. This should not
discount the possibility that LeT trainers or camps might be used to
prepare militants from another group for attacks against the United
States. However, the focus here is on the group's capabilities to plan,
prepare, and execute a unilateral terrorist attack.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ The latter are reportedly responsible for building some of the
improvised explosive devices used in Afghanistan as well as instructing
others on how to do so. Tankel, Storming the World Stage, pp. 198-199.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
LeT's own training traditionally begins with the Daura-e-Suffa,
which focuses on imbuing religious principles, including the obligatory
nature of jihad, as well as proselytizing. It lasts approximately 3
weeks, is often conducted at the group's compound in Muridke and
includes lectures by senior leaders. This is followed by the Daura-e-
Aama, which consists of lectures, additional religious indoctrination
and prayer, physical training, and some introductory weapons drills. It
also lasts about 3 weeks and is typically conducted in Pakistan-
administered Kashmir. A small number of those who go through the Daura-
e-Suffa and Daura-e-Aama advance to the Daura-e-Khasa, which takes
place at a higher elevation in Mansehra. This lasts approximately 2 to
3 months and includes physical training, guerrilla warfare tactics,
survival techniques, firing different types of light weapons, and
instruction on the use of hand grenades, rocket launchers, and mortars.
These time frames are not fixed and militants may train for
considerably longer as well as skipping the initial Daura-e-Suffa and
Daura-e-Amma in some instances.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ For a detailed assessment of LeT's training infrastructure and
programs see, Ibid, pp. 74-79.
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LeT also runs a bevy of specialized programs providing instruction
on a range of skills. In addition to maritime training for those who
operate at sea and commando training for individuals who will undertake
fidayeen attacks, these include instruction on counter-intelligence,
IED construction, sabotage and surveillance, conducting reconnaissance,
communicating in code, and the use of sophisticated communication
technologies.\6\ The focus on support activities such as reconnaissance
and communication is crucial to LeT's capability to execute complex
operations abroad, as evidenced by the 2008 Mumbai attacks.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ ``Testimony of David Coleman Headley to the Indian National
Investigative Agency,'' 3-9 June 2010.
\7\ The Mumbai attacks were several years in the making and
benefited from extensive surveillance by David Headley.
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Attack Planning Capabilities
LeT is a patient organization, known to perform surveillance of
targets for the purpose of creating target packages that it could use
in the future. For example, the 2008 Mumbai attacks began with
surveillance of the Taj Mahal Hotel conducted 2 years prior and with no
immediate attack in mind. David Headley, the Pakistani-American who
undertook reconnaissance for the attacks, made multiple trips to
Mumbai, conducting extensive surveillance of multiple targets. This
included taking photographs and making video recordings. He was taught
how to use a GPS and plotted out the future terrorists' movements
around Mumbai, bringing that GPS with the coordinates back to Pakistan
so the attackers could practice. LeT's close relationship with the
Pakistani military enabled it to pull in a member of the navy to help
plan the maritime insertion.\8\ The final operation also revealed
several smart tactical decisions. Splitting the attackers into small
teams made it more difficult to intercept all of them and also created
the sense of a larger attack force. Exploding IED's away from the
attack sites contributed to the confusion.
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\8\ At one meeting, the men examined nautical charts and discussed
various landing options. The naval frogman directed Headley to explore
the position of Indian naval vessels in order to avoid a gunfight
before entering Indian waters, which Headley did upon his trip to
Mumbai. Ibid.
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LeT used Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) during the Mumbai
attacks and this made it more difficult (though clearly not impossible)
to intercept its communications.\9\ According to Indian officials, LeT
operatives based there now communicate almost exclusively with their
handlers in Pakistan via VoIP or other technological means that are
difficult to monitor. Notably, the group historically has focused
significant resources on building up its technological capabilities,
including sending members for graduate work in the field of Information
Technology. This raises questions about LeT's capability to engage in
clandestine communications with transnational operatives. Its
significant financial assets likely enable the group to invest in
sophisticated programs and to experiment with various technologies.\10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ Transnational operatives were used to set up the VoIP, which
also was intended to make it more difficult to trace.
\10\ The group reportedly purchased para-gliders and commissioned
an expert in their use to train a small cadre of members. ``Chinese
training LeT men in paragliding: Abu Jundal,'' DNA India, July 3, 2012.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Transnational Networks
LeT's transnational networks stretch across South Asia, the Gulf,
and into Europe and North America. These are used primarily for
fundraising and to support its regional operations, including attacks
against India. However, LeT operatives have been known to operate in a
number of European countries that participate in the Visa Waiver
Program.\11\ Thus, it is believed to be capable of talent-spotting,
recruiting, and vetting radicalized Westerners. LeT's use of social
media geared toward English-speaking audiences suggest the group also
is attempting to position itself as a destination of choice for
Westerners, especially members of the Pakistani diaspora in the United
States and Europe, interested in associating with jihadist groups.\12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ Tankel, Storming the World Stage, pp. 96-102, 164-167.
\12\ The group is active through its above-ground organization,
JuD, on Twitter and Facebook. JuD previously had a youtube page that
featured various LeT attacks in India and Pakistan.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
It must be noted that LeT historically has used Western operatives
to support its own operations in South Asia. Nevertheless, networks or
operatives used for support purposes can be re-directed to support
terrorist attacks. There are several notable examples of LeT foreign
operatives suspected of supporting al-Qaeda-led attacks, though it is
unclear whether the Pakistan-based LeT leadership sanctioned these
activities.\13\ The one example of the group using one of its
operatives to launch an attack against a Western country occurred in
2002-2003. Sajid Mir, who is responsible for managing LeT's overseas
operatives and oversaw the planning and execution of the 2008 Mumbai
attacks, directed a French convert to Islam based in Paris to travel to
Australia, where he was to assist an LeT-trained local to execute a
terrorist attack.\14\ It is unclear from the open source whether the
LeT-trained local in Australia was directed to execute the attack by
LeT leaders or if he germinated the idea and reached out to the
organization for assistance. If the latter, it is also not clear if the
entire LeT leadership sanctioned deploying the Paris-based operative to
assist or if Sajid Mir was acting independently or on behalf of a
faction within the group. Thus, the operation illustrates not only
LeT's capacity to project power far beyond South Asia, but also the
difficulty of determining the dynamics behind the decision to do so.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ For example, activists in Paris associated with the group are
suspected of providing some logistical support to the ``shoebomber''
Richard Reid. LeT operatives in the United Kingdom are also suspected
of providing money to those involved in the 2006 attempt to bomb
transatlantic flights from the United Kingdom using liquid explosives.
Regarding assistance to Richard Reid see, Judgment in Republic of
France vs. Rama et. al., Magistrates' Court of Paris, June 16, 2005.
Regarding the 2006 bomb plot see, Dexter Filkins and Souad Mekhennet,
``Pakistani Charity Under Scrutiny In Financing of Airline Bomb Plot,''
New York Times, Aug. 13, 2006. Joshua Partlow and Kamran Khan,
``Charity Funds Said to Provide Clues to Alleged Terrorist Plot,''
Washington Post, Aug. 15, 2006. Henry Chu and Sebastian Rotella,
``Three Britons convicted of plot to blow up planes,'' Los Angeles
Times, Sept. 8, 2009. John Burns, ``3 Sentenced in London for Airline
Plot,'' New York Times, July 12, 2010.
\14\ Sajid Mir arranged for members of the group's network in Paris
to provide money for the trip. Australian security officials said the
men intended to select a suitable target and purchase the chemicals
necessary to build a large bomb, though it remains unclear whether they
intended to assemble it or LeT was planning to deploy another foreign
explosives expert for that purpose. Regarding the role of LeT's French
networks see, Jean-Louise Bruguiere, Ce que je n'ai pas pu dire (Paris:
Robert Laffont, 2009), pp. 469-472. ``Committal Hearing of Faheem
Khalid Lodhi,'' Downing Centre Local Court, Sydney, Australia, Dec. 17,
2004. Natasha Wallace, ``Court Battle Over Secret Evidence,'' Sydney
Morning Herald, Dec. 18, 2004. Judgment in ``Republic of France vs.
Rama, et. al.'' Appeal Judgment in ``Fahim Khalid Lodhi vs. Regina,''
New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal, Dec. 20, 2007. ``Frenchman
Played `Major' Role in Australia Terror Plot, Court Hears,'' Agence
France-Presse, Feb. 8, 2007. Information regarding activities in
Australia from Australian security officials said the two men intended
to select a suitable target and purchase the chemicals necessary to
build a large bomb, though it remains unclear whether they intended to
assemble it or LeT was planning to deploy another foreign explosives
expert for that purpose. Interview with former member of the Australian
security services. Appeal Judgment in ``Fahim Khalid Lodhi vs.
Regina.'' Martin Chulov, Australian Jihad: The Battle Against Terrorism
from Within and Without, (Sydney: Pan Macmillan, 2006), p. 143. Liz
Jackson, ``Program Transcript: Willie Brigitte,'' ABC, Feb. 9, 2004.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Training Westerners
Pakistanis constitute the majority of those trained in LeT camps,
but the group has a history of training foreigners too.\15\ After the
U.S. counterattack against Afghanistan destroyed the training
infrastructure there, LeT stepped in to train local militants as well
as foreigners who pre-9/11 would have trained in al-Qaeda camps, but
now were looking for other avenues of instruction.\16\ Since the mid-
1990s, LeT has provided training to Indian Muslims for attacks against
their own country, a practice that continues today. Some of these men
have executed attacks on LeT's behalf, providing the group with
plausible deniability, while others have proffered logistical support
to Pakistani members of LeT who infiltrated India to carry out
operations. Still others are associated with various indigenous
jihadist networks, most notably the Indian Mujahideen, or have settled
into life in India, essentially becoming sleeper agents the authorities
fear could be activated at another time.\17\
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\15\ It claims to have trained recruits during the 1990s for combat
in Afghanistan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Chechnya, Kosovo, the southern
Philippines, and, of course, Indian-administered Kashmir. MDI website,
``A Brief Introduction to the Markaz and the Group X,'' undated.
\16\ Chulov, Australian Jihad, p. 151. Mariam Abou Zahab,
``Salafism in Pakistan: The Ahl-e Hadith Movement,'' in Global
Salafism: Islam's New Religious Movement, ed. Roel Meijer (London:
Hurst, 2009),p. 140. Amir Mir, The True Face of Jehadists (Lahore:
Mashal Press, 2004), p. 70. Josh Meyer, ``Extremist group works in the
open in Pakistan,'' LA Times 18 Dec. 2007.
\17\ Regarding the Indian jihadist movement see, Stephen Tankel,
The Indian Jihadist Movement: Evolution and Dynamics, Washington, DC:
National Defense University, forthcoming (provisional title).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
LeT has long had a policy of training Westerners. The majority of
them are members of the Pakistani and Kashmir diasporas in the United
Kingdom, but the group has been training Americans since 2000.\18\ The
first Americans known to have trained with LeT were from Virginia and
were part of a coterie of would-be jihadists that ultimately became
known as the Virginia Jihad Network. Sajid Mir, the commander in charge
of overseas operatives, arranged for several of them to provide
assistance to a British LeT operative who traveled to the United States
on multiple occasions from 2002-2003 to procure military gear for the
group. Although the men clearly were used in a support capacity, one
concern about such networks is that their purpose can change over time.
Indeed, Sajid Mir also asked two of the trainees to undertake missions
involving information gathering as well as the dissemination of
propaganda.\19\ One of them told the FBI in 2004 that he was asked
specifically to perform surveillance on a chemical plant in
Maryland.\20\ Precisely what LeT or elements within it planned to do
with this information is unknown, though they clearly were interested
in both surveillance and expanding the group's networks in the United
States.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\18\ Indictment in ``United States vs. Randall Todd Royer,'' The
United States District Court for the Eastern-District of Virginia,
Alexandria Division June 2003.
\19\ Memorandum Opinion in ``United States vs. Masoud Khan et
al.,'' The United States District Court for the Eastern-District of
Virginia, Alexandria Division 4 March 2004.
\20\ United States Attorney's Office Eastern District of Virginia,
``Virginia Jihad Member Convicted of Perjury, Obstruction, '' Feb. 5,
2007.
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In 2005, two men from Atlanta Georgia with ties to the ``Toronto
18'' as well as to a British Pakistani who acted as a talent spotter
for LeT identified possible targets for a terrorist attack in the
United States.\21\ A month later the duo traveled to Washington, DC,
where they shot video recordings of possible targets, including the
U.S. Capitol; the headquarters building of the World Bank; the Masonic
Temple in Alexandria, Virginia; and a group of large fuel storage tanks
near a highway in northern Virginia.\22\ One of the men traveled to
Pakistan later that year intending to study in a madrasa and then train
with LeT.\23\ He arrived the week after the London Underground bombings
that occurred on July 7 and was unable to realize his ambitions,
possibly owing to the heightened security environment in Pakistan where
two of the London bombers had trained. Notably, at least one of them is
believed to have spent a night at Muridke, though there is no open-
source evidence suggesting LeT had any direct involvement in the 7/7
attacks.\24\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\21\ United States Attorney's Office Northern District of Georgia,
``Terrorism Defendants Sentenced: Ehsanul Islam Sadequee Receives 17
Years in Prison; Co-defendant Syed Haris Ahmed Receives 13 Years,''
Dec. 14, 2009.
\22\ Indictment in ``United States of America vs. Syed Haris Ahmed
and Ehsanul Islam Sadequee,'' United States District Court for the
Northern District of Georgia, July 19, 2006.
\23\ Ibid.
\24\ Tankel, Storming the World Stage, p. 163.
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LeT has trained others living in America since then, none more
famous than Daood Gilani, who took the name David Coleman Headley in
2006 to help facilitate his reconnaissance trips in Mumbai and
elsewhere for the group. He joined LeT in February 2002, participating
in the Daura-e-Suffa that month. In August 2002 he went through the
Daura-e-Aama and then in April 2003 the Daura-e-Khasa, LeT's 3-month
guerrilla warfare training program. More specialized trainings
followed, and in 2006 he began conducting reconnaissance in India that
ultimately led to the 2008 Mumbai attacks. Headley was trained and
handled jointly by LeT and Pakistani intelligence, and used in a
support capacity. However, without his contributions in terms of
reconnaissance, it is unlikely the 2008 Mumbai attacks would have been
as operationally successful. Notably, despite his access to America and
Americans, LeT used Headley overwhelming for operations against India.
(Headley's involvement in an aborted plot against Denmark is discussed
below.)
Given the benefits Headley provided to the group, it is reasonable
to assume LeT may have increased its efforts to recruit and train other
Westerners or to find ways for Pakistani members to acquire citizenship
or residency in Western countries. For example, in September 2011, the
Federal Bureau of Investigation arrested Jubair Ahmad, a 24-year-old
Pakistani immigrant living in Woodbridge, Virginia. Ahmed received
religious training from LeT as a teenager, and later attended its basic
training camp while living in Pakistan, before entering the United
States in 2007 with other members of his family. After moving to the
United States he provided material support to LeT, producing and
distributing propaganda.\25\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\25\ Stephen Tankel, ``Lashkar-e-Taiba's American Connections,''
Foreign Policy, Sept. 6, 2011.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As should be clear, LeT has all of the tools necessary to strike
the homeland. The group's instructors are very proficient for a non-
state actor, it has developed an array of sophisticated training
programs and it enjoys significantly more freedom to conduct those
programs than other groups in the region. LeT's transnational networks
enable it to identify and vet possible Western recruits, including
Americans or citizens from visa waiver countries in Europe. The group
also has the operational space as well as the organizational
wherewithal to build relationships in the Pakistani diaspora community.
A cautious and calculating organization, LeT primarily has used its
overseas operatives to support operations in South Asia. The danger of
LeT's training apparatus and transnational networks, however, is that
they can be redirected toward international attacks. As the 2008 Mumbai
attacks demonstrated, given enough time and space to plan, LeT is
capable of inflicting significant and spectacular damage once it
decides to do so.
intent to launch an let-lead attack against the united states
LeT is a pan-Islamist group committed to defending the umma and
avenging what it perceives to be the oppression of or violence against
Muslims. The U.S. invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq as well as the use
of unmanned aerial vehicles (drones) to launch missile strikes in
Pakistan and elsewhere make it an obvious ideological target. India
remains the group's main enemy and if the group could only attack one
country then that likely would remain its target, but LeT is a robust-
enough organization to launch attacks against multiple countries. And
it added America to its enemies list long ago. LeT has killed U.S.
citizens in Mumbai in 2008, though they were not the main targets of
the attack. The group has also deployed fighters to Afghanistan, where
they directly confront U.S. forces, and previously to Iraq. Yet there
is no evidence LeT has ever attempted an attack against the U.S.
homeland, despite access to some of its citizens and residents. So
what's stopping it?
LeT's leadership retains an element of nationalism that is
distinctly at odds with al-Qaeda and still finds common ground, as it
has since the 1990s, with elements in the Pakistani military and ISI.
LeT and its backers remain co-dependent: Each afraid of the
repercussions that might stem from splitting with the other.
Furthermore, unlike al-Qaeda Central, which confronts a challenging
security environment, LeT controls a robust social welfare
infrastructure and its leaders value the influence that comes with it.
In the 1990s the group needed the state to build up its infrastructure,
whereas now it is reliant on the state not to tear it down. It is worth
highlighting the leadership's devotion to dawa through the delivering
of social services and the fact that protecting its domestic
infrastructure has at times limited its military adventurism. This
leadership operates openly in Pakistan's settled areas, not from a
hidden redoubt.
This freedom of movement carries with it a number of benefits, but
also serves as another leverage point that can be used to constrain
LeT's activity. As a result, significant elements within the group are
still ``tamed by the ISI'' as one former member observed.\26\
Pakistan's security services are believed to use this and other means
of leverage to put pressure on LeT to refrain from striking Western
interests abroad. Unless the Pakistani security establishment wants a
showdown with the United States, this is unlikely to change. At the
same time, cracking down on LeT is not the top U.S. demand made on
Pakistan. The group does not want that to change, nor does it wish to
invite greater unilateral American action against it.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\26\ Author interview with former Lashkar-e-Taiba member, Jan. 2009
in Pakistan.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In short, LeT's restraint has more to do with strategic calculation
than ideological inclination. If Pakistan were to crack down sincerely
on LeT, then the group's cost-benefit calculus could change. However,
key LeT leaders also might authorize a strike against the United States
if they believed the group could avoid retribution or that it could
withstand the costs and that these were outweighed by the benefits. It
is also important to note LeT's history of using false names to claim
its attacks and, in some instances, of training radicalized actors
indigenous to their target country to carry them out. In other words,
unlike al-Qaeda, the group is likely to do everything possible to hide
its hand in any attack on the American homeland. It is impossible to
predict with certainty whether the day will come when LeT changes its
calculus or, if so, what the tipping point might be. A number of
variables could inform such a shift. Two of the most important are
inter-related: ISI situational awareness of and influence on LeT; and
organizational dynamics within LeT.
ISI Situational Awareness and Influence
The level of Pakistani control over LeT is hotly debated and it is
arguably more useful to think in terms of situational awareness and
influence. The ISI reportedly retains a liaison relationship with LeT,
meaning that there are designated go-betweens, with senior leaders also
having specific handlers.\27\ Local interlocutors in Pakistan,
including one former and one current LeT member both of mid-rank,
assert that the security services have informants within the
organization and also engage in other forms of intelligence collection
regarding its activities.\28\ This provides a significant level of
situational awareness. However, given the uncertainties associated with
most principal-agent relationships of this nature, it is also
reasonable to assume that LeT has taken countermeasures to enable some
clandestine activities. In terms of influence and guidance, the ISI
leadership generally provides descriptive rather than detailed
instruction. This means it sets broad guidelines and leaves
implementation up to line-level ISI officers and, in some cases, LeT
militants themselves.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\27\ ``Testimony of David Coleman Headley to the Indian National
Investigative Agency.''
\28\ David Headley's testimony supports this contention. See, Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
According to David Headley, his handler, known to him as Major
Iqbal, was aware of all the targets chosen for the 2008 Mumbai attacks.
Moreover, Major Iqbal reportedly was the person who recommended LeT
target the Chabbad House, believing (wrongly) that it was a front for
the Israeli Mossad.\29\ Given the nature of relationships between LeT
leaders and the ISI, it is reasonable to assume others were also aware
of the operational details. This is reinforced by the fact that at
times Headley met with Iqbal to brief him on information, which the
latter already had.\30\ It is unclear whether the ISI leadership was
aware of the scope and scale of the attacks. If not, this may have
resulted from LeT's handlers not passing information all the way up the
chain of command or from the turnover that was taking place in the ISI
at the time.\31\ In October 2008, 1 month before the Mumbai attacks,
LeT began plotting a terrorist attack in Denmark. Major Iqbal was
present for the initial discussions that took place between Sajid Mir
and David Headley.\32\ Several months later, in the wake of the fallout
from the 2008 Mumbai attacks, Sajid postponed the operation
indefinitely as a result of what he told Headley was ISI pressure to do
so.\33\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\29\ Sebastian Rotella, ``Witness: Pakistani Intel Officer Ordered
Hit on Mumbai Jews,'' ProPublica, May 24, 2011.
\30\ Superceding Indictment in ``United States of America vs. Ilyas
Kashmiri, Abdur Rehman Hashim Syed [a/k/a `Major Abdur Rehman,' a/k/a
`Pasha'], David Coleman Headley [a/k/a `Daood Gilani'], Tahawwur
Hussain Rana.'' ``Testimony of David Coleman Headley to the Indian
National Investigative Agency.''
\31\ Ahmad Shuja Pasha became Director General of the ISI in
October 2008, a month after the Mumbai attacks were originally
scheduled to take place. He reportedly visited LeT's Operational
Commander, Zaki-ur Rehman Lakhvi, in jail following the latter's
detention in the wake of the attacks in order to ``understand the
Mumbai attack conspiracy.'' ``Testimony of David Coleman Headley to the
Indian National Investigative Agency.''
\32\ Ibid.
\33\ Plea Agreement in ``United States vs. David Coleman Headley
[a/k/a `Daood Gilani'],'' The United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, Mar. 18, 2010.
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In summation, regardless of what the ISI leadership may or may not
have known about Mumbai, from LeT's perspective it was a sanctioned
operation. And when the group allegedly was told to put an attack
against a Western country on hold, its leaders apparently submitted.
This suggests a reasonably high level of ISI situational awareness and
influence. Yet with the 2014 drawdown of U.S. and Coalition forces from
Afghanistan, there is cause for concern about how this might impact the
LeT-ISI relationship.
First, LeT is likely to attempt to keep a small presence in
Northeast Afghanistan, where its members have worked to carve out
territory. If it succeeds, then access to safe haven in Afghanistan for
LeT conceivably could reduce ISI situational awareness of what its
members there are doing. At the very least, it could increase plausible
deniability for LeT and, thus, for the Pakistani state itself. Each
could conceivably claim they did not sanction plots orchestrated from
across the border, even if planned in Pakistan, with the result being
to heighten the likelihood such attacks might occur.
Second, LeT is likely to agitate for regenerating the jihad
directly against India, both in the form of terrorist attacks against
the mainland and increased activity in India-administered Kashmir. The
latter has been torpid since the late 2000s. Several LeT-lead attacks
there this year suggest attempts to regenerate the conflict, but it is
highly unlikely to succeed in spurring violence on the order of
magnitude of that which existed before the conflict began to ebb. If
the Pakistani security establishment is not deemed supportive enough of
these efforts and they fail to bear fruit, this could heighten the
chance that LeT or factions within it undertake unsanctioned attacks
either against India or Western targets.
Third, if the situation in Pakistan continues to deteriorate, key
LeT leaders could make the determination that the security
establishment is in no position to severely punish the group or those
individuals in it who are considered essential to keeping the rank-and-
file in line. They may also assume--rightly or wrongly--that as the
American presence in the region shrinks, Washington will have less
leverage over Pakistan and thus fewer options for responding to an
attack against the U.S. homeland.
Hence, these leaders could surmise that they, as individuals, and
the group collectively were well-enough positioned to withstand the
consequences of an attack against the United States. At the same time,
a deterioration of the situation in Pakistan could mean that those
anti-state jihadist groups with which LeT competes were going from
strength to strength. Thus, attacking the U.S. homeland could bring
significant prestige within the jihadist universe at a time when some
LeT leaders felt the group needed a win. Such a decision would be
inextricably linked to dynamics within the organization, discussed
below.
Organizational Dynamics
LeT remains more coherent than most groups in Pakistan, but
internal tensions exist regarding where the group should focus its
energies and how close it should remain to the state. The most obvious
point of tension concerns whether to remain regionally focused (i.e.
primarily fighting against India and in Afghanistan) or to expand the
group's involvement in the global jihad. David Headley's account
suggests there was debate over the decision to include targets such as
the Chabbad House for the Mumbai attacks.\34\ Zaki-ur Rehman Lakhvi,
the Operational Commander of LeT, and Sajid Mir, the man responsible
for overseeing transnational operatives, were in favor and clearly won
the day. In short, two of the group's most important militant leaders
promoted expanding LeT's target set.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\34\ ``Testimony of David Coleman Headley to the Indian National
Investigative Agency.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Even those LeT leaders who favor a growing involvement in the
global jihad against America do not believe this should come at the
expense of war against India. However, this policy of attempting to
have it both ways opens the group up to additional factionalism, which
could be exacerbated if LeT is unable to regenerate its jihad against
India post-2014 or it were to lose one or several of its founding
members. LeT's involvement in Afghanistan has been a formative
experience for some of those who comprise the next generation and
possibly a transformative experience for some of the current crop of
leaders. Just as more than 2 decades spent waging war against India
hallowed that cause, almost 10 years spent fighting against U.S. forces
in Afghanistan may have influenced the preference structure for some of
the group's members. The rise of new leaders who cut their teeth in the
post-9/11 world could have important implications in terms of LeT's
future behavior.
Another important point of tension concerns the degree to which LeT
should sublimate its jihadist impulses in order to pursue a reformist
agenda via its above-ground infrastructure. LeT and JuD are two sides
of the same coin, but they also represent different sets of priorities.
Hafiz Saeed may lead a militant organization, but he does so from his
position as a cleric who lives comfortably in Lahore and values
spreading his interpretation of the Ahl-e-Hadith faith and promoting
reformism in Pakistan. Zaki-ur Rehman Lakhvi is a militant's militant.
He has fought in Afghanistan and Indian-administered Kashmir, lost a
son to jihad, and is currently on trial for his role in the 2008 Mumbai
attacks. It is reasonable to assess that he is more committed to
militancy than missionary outreach. Notably, these debates are about
more than just ideological preferences. They are also about power
within the organization.
Additional variables could inform whether these tensions inflame or
abate, as well as how that process impacts LeT's behavior. First,
fighting in Afghanistan has not only provided an opportunity to
confront U.S. forces directly, but also necessitated collaboration with
an array of other militant actors including al-Qaeda. This has the
potential to create conditions in which other actors with more extreme
agendas can influence LeT members. It also means the group is competing
with those other actors for credibility.\35\ Second, and related, LeT's
close ties to the Pakistani state open up its leaders to criticism from
the rank-and-file as well as other militant groups seeking to poach
some of its members. Although organizationally opposed to attacks in
Pakistan, it is a myth that no LeT member has ever been involved in
violence there. Some occasionally get out of line.\36\ Others have left
to join other militant groups engaged in violence against the
state.\37\ The desire to reset the narrative that the group is fighting
the ISI's jihad and not Allah's jihad, which striking the United States
would help to do, is unlikely to change LeT's calculus on its own. Nor
should one expect the group to cross the strategic Rubicon and launch a
unilateral attack against the U.S. homeland out of concern that some
members, no matter how valuable, are breaking away. However, these
could be among a number of factors that influence LeT leaders or
factions within the group when they are considering whether or not to
expand the group's operational footprint.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\35\ For example, after LeT acceded to ISI demands to delay the
Danish plot, David Headley began working with al-Qaeda to execute the
operation.
\36\ See for example, Amir Mir, ``Lahore episode further blemishes
Punjab govt's record,'' The News, Mar. 11, 2013. Tankel, Storming the
World Stage, p. 202.
\37\ See, for example, Tankel, Storming the World Stage, pp. 130-
131.
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recommendations
Any attempt made to disarm and demobilize LeT without Pakistani
support, specifically from the military and ISI, is destined to fail.
Without host country support, the United States would have to employ
direct military action to target LeT's infrastructure, which is based
in the settled areas of Pakistan near to population centers. Similarly,
U.S. efforts to convince the Pakistani security establishment to break
with its historical policy of supporting irregular outfits in general
or LeT specifically are also unlikely to succeed in the short term.
Nevertheless, there are steps the United States can continue to take to
degrade LeT and areas where it could increase its efforts.
First, barring a resurgent al-Qaeda, the draw-down of U.S. forces
from Afghanistan could create space for Washington to focus more on
LeT. Resource allocation should be realigned away from al-Qaeda Central
and Afghan-centric militants, especially intelligence officers and
analysts whose expertise will be essential for identifying emerging and
evolving jihadist threats from LeT and other regional actors. This does
not mean flooding Pakistan with clandestine officers focused on LeT.
The Raymond Davis episode highlighted the dangers inherent in such
activities. Rather, the United States could augment collection efforts
in LeT's near abroad as well as increase analytical capacity further
for intelligence collected. This might include commissioning a
reassessment of LeT's historical involvement in international attacks
in light of new information that has surely been gathered since the
intelligence community enhanced its focus on the group post-Mumbai.
Even this seemingly minor effort, could reveal important lessons about
LeT's calculus at critical times in its evolution. Additionally, LeT
has had the same leaders since the group was founded and these men are
not getting any younger. It would be worthwhile to explore the
scenarios that might eventuate were a battle for succession to occur.
Finally, the United States should develop a response plan in the event
of a LeT-lead attack against the homeland that includes a mix of
inducements, rewards, retributive measures, and unilateral actions vis-
a-vis Pakistan. The United States should be prepared for a phased
escalation in the event of Pakistani reticence and should develop
oversight mechanisms to ensure Pakistan keeps any commitments it makes.
Second, the United States should continue to pursue actions
necessary to degrade LeT's international networks and contain its
operations outside Pakistan. The U.S.-India Joint Working Group on
Counterterrorism is more than a decade old, but counterterrorism
cooperation between the two countries really accelerated immediately
after the 2008 Mumbai attacks.\38\ However, engagement on
counterterrorism has since leveled off. Regenerating this engagement
and enhancing counter-terrorism cooperation is in both countries'
interest, and efforts to do so should be supported. In the last several
years, the United States, India, and the United Kingdom all took steps
to facilitate counterterrorism efforts in Bangladesh. As a result, the
LeT presence is reduced, and maintaining vigilance on that front
remains important. The Persian Gulf is still fertile soil in terms of a
support base for South Asian militancy. U.S. counterterrorism efforts
vis-a-vis the Gulf historically focused primarily on terrorist threat
financing. The arrest and deportation by Saudi Arabia of two Indian LeT
operatives suggests a greater focus has been given to monitoring and
infiltrating Gulf-based networks that could be used to recruit
operatives or provide logistical support for terrorist attacks.\39\ The
Gulf has not suddenly become a no-go area for LeT militants, but
reducing their confidence that it is a guaranteed safe space for
operations could have an impact on how militants conduct activities
there. The United States should continue to press Gulf allies,
especially Saudi Arabia, on these issues and to encourage their
cooperation on counterterrorism efforts with India. Finally, the United
States is already engaging in counterterrorism cooperation and
intelligence sharing vis-a-vis LeT with allies in Europe. Some Western
allies place a higher premium on these efforts than others, suggesting
there is room for improvement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\38\ The two countries also launched a Homeland Security Dialogue
Ministerial in May 2011.
\39\ U.S. intelligence is believed to have played an important role
in the capture and hand-over of at least one of the men. Stephen
Tankel, ``Sharing is Caring: Containing terrorism in South Asia,''
Foreign Policy, June 20, 2012.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Third, the LeT threat must be taken seriously, but should not drive
U.S. policy toward Pakistan. At the same time, Washington's objectives
vis-a-vis Pakistan need to expand. When tough choices have had to be
made, Washington's priority has been killing al-Qaeda and countering
Pakistan-based insurgents fighting in Afghanistan. The 2014 draw-down
in Afghanistan and success degrading al-Qaeda Central create an
opportunity to elevate the priority given to LeT. They also demand
revising the U.S. counterterrorism architecture in South Asia in line
with the decreasing threat from al-Qaeda and evolving threats from
regional actors like LeT against which unilateral direct action has
less utility.\40\ Any policies regarding LeT or counterterrorism more
broadly must nest within a wider approach geared toward encouraging,
enabling, and compelling Pakistan to address its myriad infirmities.
Such an approach includes, but is not limited to, redressing the
current civil-military imbalance and creating conditions for action
against militancy that could bear fruit down the road. In the short
term, this means gearing an overall approach toward maintaining a level
of engagement and influence that allows Washington to execute
transactions on narrow security issues, exploit opportunities to
reinforce positive structural change within Pakistan when possible, and
remain prepared to engage in crisis management should the need arise.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\40\ While the United States should not abandon the option of drone
strikes, it should use them in coordination with U.S. diplomats attuned
to their impact on the broader political and security environment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Laying the groundwork for future action against LeT is complicated
and does not promise satisfaction. However, Washington is unlikely to
have success attempting to force strategic steps Pakistan is not yet
ready or able to take. Given the ground reality, the United States
should remain focused on containing LeT in the short term, but also
mindful of opportunities that can be exploited to weaken it or separate
the group from its support base. This means continuing to signal to the
Pakistani security establishment the severe repercussions that would
result were LeT, or elements within it, to attack the homeland.
Additionally, Washington should increase pressure on Pakistan to
identify, arrest, and extradite any Westerners training or attempting
to train with LeT. While being mindful of the need to protect sources
and methods of intelligence collection, U.S. officials should seize
opportunities to enlighten their counterparts in Pakistan about the
involvement of any current or former LeT militants in anti-state
violence as well as about activities the group attempts to keep hidden
from the ISI. The United States should also explore the viability and
potential consequences of efforts to exploit aforementioned fissures
within the group. Finally, the United States should prepare for the
possibility, albeit unlikely in the near-term, that Pakistan attempts
to mainstream LeT or elements of it. This includes exploring how the
United States might assist, overtly or covertly in such an enterprise,
the costs and benefits of doing so, and the possible outcomes that
might eventuate.
LeT is clearly capable of posing a threat to the United States, but
one that must be kept in perspective. The group is not the proverbial
shark in the water that must keep moving in order not to die. It has
practiced a significant degree of strategic restraint given its
capabilities, suggesting it can be deterred. This is not cause for
indifference. LeT is also patient organization and one for which the
current strategic calculus is not fixed indefinitely. The United States
must remain attentive to the evolving threat and vigilant in taking
steps to degrade the group.
Mr. King. Thank you. Dr. Tankel.
Our next witness, Dr. Jonah Blank is a senior political
scientist at the RAND Corporation, and by the way Dr. Tankel
and Dr. Blank are affiliated with RAND. If you would say hello
to Brian Jenkins and thank him for the work that he has done
and the assistance he has given us over the years. Prior to
joining the RAND Corporation, Dr. Blank served as policy
director for the South and Southeast Asia on the staff of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee from 1999 to 2011. So he
understands Capitol Hill, for better or worse.
[Laughter.]
Mr. King. Before entering Government service, he served as
senior editor and foreign correspondent for U.S. News and World
Report where he reported from Indonesia, India, Nepal, and
Pakistan. Dr. Blank began his career in Japan as a finance
editor for Tokyo's Ashai Evening News and has been a reporter
for Fortune Magazine. He has written for multiple publications
including Foreign Affairs, The New Yorker, and The Washington
Post.
Dr. Blank, you are recognized for 5 minutes. Or for as long
as you take.
STATEMENT OF JONAH BLANK, PH.D., SENIOR POLITICAL ANALYST, THE
RAND CORPORATION
Mr. Blank. Thank you very much Mr. Chairman. Should note
that the part of my background that might be most relevant here
today is my background as an anthropologist as well as a, sort
of a student of, not only India but of wider South Asia.
Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member, Members of the committee,
it is an honor to appear before you here today. This hearing
addresses two significant threats; Lashkar-e-Taiba and the
potential for a Mumbai-style attack here in the United States.
Both threats deserve very serious attention, but their linkage
is indirect.
Lashkar is primarily a threat abroad in my judgment, while
there is a very real threat of a Mumbai-type attack here. The
connection rests more in Lashkar's training and recruitment,
than its direct action. So to be clear, I consider Lashkar-e-
Taiba a very serious threat to the United States, but the
threat to the homeland I think rests primarily in its training
and its recruitment.
The Mumbai attack struck very close to home for me
personally. During much of my ethnographic field work in India,
I lived just a few blocks from the attack sites. One of the
victims was a good friend of mine, a man without whom I could
not have conducted my doctoral research.
He was an elderly Muslim cleric, easily identifiable as
such by his white beard and skull cap, but the gunman shot him
down at close range. My friend survived the attack, but 166
others, including 6 Americans, were not as lucky.
I wish I could say this cannot happen here, but I am afraid
it can. Lashkar-e-Taiba was responsible for the Mumbai attacks,
but the next Mumbai, that is, an attack dramatic enough to
install widespread terror even without weapons of mass
destruction or a death toll in the thousands, that might be
thought of as Boston squared. It wouldn't require the resources
of Lashkar-e-Taiba or of al-Qaeda in order to achieve its aims,
as Chief Pfeifer has so ably noted.
Where does the Lashkar threat to the United States lie?
First, it is one of the most capable and experienced terrorist
groups in the world, and a de facto affiliate of al-Qaeda.
Moreover, as the Chairman has rightly noted, Lashkar has long
enjoyed support from elements of the Pakistani military and its
spy service, ISI.
Second, Lashkar has killed American citizens before, both
in India and Afghanistan, and is likely to do so in the future.
Third, Lashkar has a unique potential to precipitate a major
war, possibly a nuclear exchange between India and Pakistan.
Fourth and perhaps most dangerous from a homeland
perspective, Lashkar remains a factory churning out violent
extremists. Even if the group's central command refrains from
launching attacks in the United States, its alumni network and
splinter cells may not show such restraint.
So why would Lashkar refrain from hitting the homeland? For
the very same reason that it remains such a threat in South
Asia. Its complex relationship with Pakistan's military. ISI
has drawn a red line prohibiting Lashkar from attacks in the
United States. As all mutual fund investors know, past
performance is no guarantee of future results. But so far at
least, that ban has stood.
If Lashkar's threat--if Lashkar abides by its red lines, do
we have to worry about a Mumbai-style attack in America? Yes we
do, just not at least for now from Lashkar. What made Mumbai so
shocking was not its body count or the fact that the attackers
had infiltrated from abroad.
By 2008, Mumbai had suffered at least seven major attacks
in the prior decade-and-a-half, all of them with suspected
links to Pakistan and two with significantly higher levels of
fatality. A key difference between this attack and prior
results was psychological impact.
Two years earlier, serial railway blasts killed 209
victims, but they lasted a total of 11 minutes. The 2008
shootings took 43 fewer lives than these railway blasts, but
they kept the entire population of Mumbai in a state of fear
from Wednesday to Saturday.
For half a week, the terrorists threw India's largest city
into chaos. They humiliated all levels of government, showed
the police and the military unable to maintain control. Mumbai
is sometimes called the New York City of India. Lashkar-e-Taiba
executed the equivalent of attacking the Empire State Building,
the Statue of Liberty, and Grand Central Station all at once.
Could that happen here? Not precisely. Our high-profile
targets aren't as soft as Mumbai's were then. Even Mumbai's
high-profile targets aren't as soft now as they were then. But
in terms of iconic impact, actions not too far short of Mumbai
already have occurred here.
Less than 2 months ago, the Boston Marathon blasts had a
similarly dramatic effect. As Congressman Keating knows better
than most of us, they kept a city and a Nation on eggshells for
4 days.
In 2002, Washington, DC, Maryland, and Virginia were
virtually paralyzed for 3 weeks by the Beltway snipers. These
attacks together, one with pressure cooker bombs, one with
firearms, may provide a glimpse of Mumbai in America.
I would like to conclude with what a Boston squared attack
might look like here. It might, like Mumbai in 2008, rely on
small arms and simple explosives rather than chemical,
biological, or other advanced weapons. It might, like Mumbai in
2006, rely on simple improvised explosive devices requiring no
special training. Like the Boston Marathon bombs and like
Mumbai in 2006, pressure cookers were the device. But before we
ban pressure cookers, let's remember how many different types
of IEDs our troops have faced in Afghanistan and in Iraq.
It might, like both of these Mumbai attacks, as well as
bombings in 1993 and 2003, rely on multiple teams hitting
several soft targets at once, as Chief Pfeifer has noted. Such
an action could be accomplished by a particularly competent set
of independent operators or by a terrorist group far less
capable than Lashkar.
Getting to Ranking Member Higgins's point, is this the only
group we have to worry about? Definitely not. That is why
Lashkar remains such a threat, in my judgment, not as an
operator per se but as a producer of terrorists, terrorists
that sometimes operate for Lashkar, sometimes for al-Qaeda,
sometimes for groups that are spread all throughout the world.
This really is why, in my view, Lashkar is a threat not
only to U.S. interests and citizens abroad but to the American
homeland. I thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Blank follows:]
Prepared Statement of Jonah Blank \1\
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\1\ The opinions and conclusions expressed in this testimony are
the author's alone and should not be interpreted as representing those
of RAND or any of the sponsors of its research. This product is part of
the RAND Corporation testimony series. RAND testimonies record
testimony presented by RAND associates to Federal, State, or local
legislative committees; Government-appointed commissions and panels;
and private review and oversight bodies. The RAND Corporation is a
nonprofit research organization providing objective analysis and
effective solutions that address the challenges facing the public and
private sectors around the world. RAND's publications do not
necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.
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June 12, 2013
lashkar-e-taiba and the threat to the united states of a mumbai-style
attack \2\
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\2\ This testimony is available for free download at http://
www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/CT390.html.
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Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member, Members of the committee, it is
an honor to appear before you today. This hearing addresses two
significant threats to America's security and vital interests: Lashkar-
e-Taiba, and the potential for a Mumbai-style attack here in the United
States. Both threats are timely, and receive far less attention than
they warrant--but they are not necessarily related. Lashkar-e-Taiba
(LeT) poses a grave danger to U.S. interests and citizens in South
Asia, but is less of an immediate risk to the American homeland. A
Mumbai-style attack--that is, an attack dramatic and shocking enough to
inspire widespread terror even without the use of weapons of mass
destruction or a casualty-count in the thousands--remains a realistic
near-term threat to the homeland. Such an attack might be termed,
``Boston Squared''--that is, an attack similar to the Boston Marathon
bombing in April, but much larger in effect--and wouldn't require the
resources of Lashkar-e-Taiba or al-Qaeda in order to achieve its aims.
Before turning to lessons that the Mumbai attack of 2008 might hold
for homeland security here (a topic on which my colleague Brian Jenkins
has provided expert analysis), I'll spend a few minutes outlining why I
regard Lashkar-e-Taiba as a very significant threat to American
interests and citizens abroad--and less of a threat here at home.
Lashkar-e-Taiba is one of the most capable, experienced, resourced,
and politically-protected terrorist groups in the world. For more than
two decades it has carried out acts of terrorism, as well as more
traditional guerrilla warfare, in both India and Afghanistan. LeT
enjoyed virtually open support from the Pakistani state throughout the
1990s, and has received at least tacit protection (in my view, also
active facilitation and guidance) from Pakistan's Inter-Services
Intelligence Directorate (ISI) since the group was officially banned by
Islamabad in 2002.\3\ In addition to whatever support it still receives
from ISI, Lashkar has a global network of fundraising and recruitment
that frees it from complete reliance on its traditional patron.
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\3\ For studies outlining ISI support to Lashkar-e-Taiba, as well
as some of the other basic facts about LeT, see South Asian Terrorism
Portal: http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/jandk/
terrorist_outfits/lashkar_e_toiba.htm; Ashley J. Tellis, ``The Menace
That Is Lashkar-e-Taiba,'' Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
(Washington, DC: March, 2012): http://carnegieendowment.org/files/
LeT_menace.pdf; and Anirban Ghosh, Arif Jamal, Christine Fair, Don
Rassler, Nadia Shoeb, ``The Fighters of Lashkar-e-Taiba: Recruitment,
Training, Deployment and Death'' (West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism
Center at West Point, April 4, 2013): http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/
the-fighters-of-lashkar-e-taiba-recruitment-training-deployment-and-
death.
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The bulk of LeT's terrorist actions have been carried out in India.
Most of these have targeted Kashmir, but at least five major attacks on
civilian targets have been credibly attributed to Lashkar elsewhere in
India: Three in New Delhi, one in Varanasi, and two in Mumbai.\4\ Given
this focus, why does LeT pose a threat to the United States?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ The five highest-profile Indian attacks credibly linked to LeT
outside of Kashmir are: Delhi, Red Fort, 2000 (LeT operative Ashfaq
Arif was convicted and executed; http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-
asia14471793 P); New Delhi, Parliament House, 2001 (LeT is believed to
have cooperated with Jaish-e Muhammad for this attack: http://
www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2010/11/us_treasury_sanction_1.php);
New Delhi, Diwali market bombings, 2005 (60 dead, 527 maimed. LeT
denied responsibility, but is widely assumed to have orchestrated the
attacks: http://www.abc.net.au/news/2005-11-01/diwali-begins-as-delhi-
mourns-bomb-victims/2136636; http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/
4395346.stm); Varanasi, 2006 (more than 20 dead, responsibility claimed
by previously and subsequently unknown group Lashkar-e Qahab, believed
to be LeT front: http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2006-03-
09/india/27822334_1_varanasi-blasts-twin-blasts-outfit); Mumbai, July
11 2006 railway blasts (Sometimes called the ``7/11'' attacks, for the
date on which they occurred; 211 dead, about 400 maimed, over 768
injured less severely; Lashkar-e Qahhar, also believed to be a front
for LeT, claimed responsibility: http://www.idsa.in/
idsastrategiccomments/MumbaiSerialBlastsPortend-
DangerousTrends_AKamboj_190706); Mumbai, November 2008 attacks: LeT
operative David Headley outlined the group's role in U.S. court
testimony (http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2013/January/13-nsd-104.html),
and Pakistan's own investigation implicated LeT (http://
www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/pakistan/9672494/Pakistan-
details-how-Lashkar-e-Taiba-2008-Mumbai-attack-gunmen-were-
trained.html).
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First, Lashkar-e-Taiba is a de facto affiliate of al-Qaeda, and is
believed to have joined Usama bin Laden's International Islamic Front
for Jihad sometime after the umbrella group's famous fatwa in 1998.\5\
When al-Qaeda's Chief Operating Officer Abu Zubaydah was captured in
Faisalabad, Pakistan in 2002, the site where he was located was an LeT
safe-house.\6\ In rhetoric, at least, LeT has openly declared itself to
be a committed threat to America.\7\
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\5\ http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/usa/IIF.htm. Also http://
carnegieendowment.org/files/LeT_menace.pdf.
\6\ http://www.cfr.org/pakistan/lashkar-e-taiba-army-pure-aka-
lashkar-e-tayyiba-lashkar-e-toiba-lashkar-taiba/p17882.
\7\ http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/next-al-qaeda-
lashkar-e-taiba-and-future-terrorism-south-asia.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Second, LeT has killed American citizens in South Asia, and remains
a threat to Americans in that region. In the 2008 attack on Mumbai, for
example, four Americans were killed and two were seriously injured. In
Afghanistan, LeT militants have fought in conventional and
unconventional actions alongside cadres of the Taliban, the Haqqani
Network, and al-Qaeda; for example, in July 2008, LeT fighters are
believed to have been among a 400-strong insurgent force that nearly
overran a Coalition outpost near Wanat in Nuristan, killing 9 U.S.
troops and wounding 15 others.\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2013/04/
isaf_captures_lashka.php.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Third, Lashkar-e-Taiba has always been, and is likely to remain, a
factory churning out violent extremists. Even if the group itself
continues to limit its attacks to South Asia, its alumni network and
splinter cells show no such restraint. Several terrorist plots in
Europe--fortunately, most foiled well before completion--have had LeT
linkages. One such plot was a proposed attack on a Danish newspaper and
other sites in Copenhagen, in which American LeT operative David
Headley conspired in 2009 with the high-level al-Qaeda commander Ilyas
Kashmiri.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ http://news.outlookindia.com/items.aspx?artid=700541. Ilyas
Kashmiri had close ties to ISI during the 1990s, and his intelligence
liaisons are said to have unsuccessfully tried to steer him towards
joining Jaish-e Muhammad, a Pakistan-based terrorist group that has
operated in concert with LeT in the past. He was killed in a drone
strike on June 4, 2011. http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2009/10/
kashmiri_lashkaretai.php.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
LeT has contributed to terrorist recruitment in Europe through what
British counterterrorism authorities refer to as Lashkar's ``jihadi
escalator'': Recruits are drawn to one of the training camps run by
LeT, whether near its headquarters in Muridke (for purely ideological
instruction) or in Pakistan's Azad Kashmir and Federally Administered
Tribal Areas (for instruction involving weaponry and advanced combat
skills). Many recruits get off at lower levels, but the most committed
ride the escalator up to the top floor: Membership in LeT, al-Qaeda, or
any of at least a dozen terrorist groups that draw from Lashkar's
training and enlistment machine.
Fourth, LeT has a unique potential to precipitate a major war
between India and Pakistan. Due to its traditional sponsorship by
Pakistan's military, an attack by LeT is regarded by India as nearly
synonymous with an attack by the state of Pakistan. At least twice in
the recent past--after the 2008 Mumbai attack, and after the 2001
attack on India's Parliament--New Delhi came very close to launching a
military strike across the border in response to an attack attributed
to LeT. As the 1999 Indo-Pakistani combat at Kargil demonstrated, any
serious military engagement between these two rivals runs the risk of
nuclear escalation: During the Kargil episode, the Pakistani military
began mobilizing the nation's nuclear assets without the knowledge of
the civilian prime minister.\10\ Apart from the risk to tens of
thousands of American citizens in India and Pakistan, the threat of a
nuclear exchange anywhere in the world would obviously have a
monumental impact on U.S. strategic and economic interests.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ Bruce Riedel, American Diplomacy and the 1999 Kargil Summit at
Blair House, Policy paper series, Center for Advanced Studies of India,
2002. p .11. The prime minister during that crisis, Nawaz Sharif, was
sworn into office for a third term on June 5, 2013. http://
media.sas.upenn.edu/casi/docs/research/papers/Riedel_2002.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
So why is Lashkar-e-Taiba NOT an immediate threat to the U.S.
homeland? For the very same reason that it is such a uniquely
problematic threat in South Asia: Its sponsorship by Pakistan's
military. According to former Directors of ISI and other retired
Pakistani generals I have interviewed, the nation's military
interlocutors have drawn a red-line prohibiting Lashkar from
undertaking any attacks in the United States or Europe. Thus far, this
ban has been respected by LeT's leadership: Relatively few plots
outside of South Asia have been detected, and all have been the work of
disaffected splinter cells.
Based on interviews I have conducted in Pakistan, in Britain, and
in India, there is wide-spread sentiment among counterterrorism
professionals that LeT's top leadership--including the group's leader
Hafez Saeed and his close associates--is likely to respect whatever
restrictions are laid out by ISI. For Lashkar, the stakes for crossing
ISI are too great to take the risk; for ISI, the risks of crossing the
United States are too great to take the risk.
This line of analysis was challenged by the revelation--on May 2,
2011--that Usama bin Laden had been hiding in a safehouse next door to
the Pakistan Military Academy in Abbotabad.\11\ If Pakistan's top
generals could have sheltered America's most wanted terrorist (the
counterargument goes), why would they hesitate to unleash LeT on
America? The fact remains, however, that Lashkar's commanders have
never authorized an attack in the United States, despite having
operatives here. For example, in 2006 nine Virginia residents (Muhammed
Aatique, Hammad Abdur-Raheem, Ibrahim Ahmed Al-Hamdi, Seifullah
Chapman, Khwaja Hasan, Masoud Khan, Yong Kwon, Randall Todd Royer, and
Donald Surratt) were convicted of conspiring to provide material
support to LeT: The group played paintball and travelled to Pakistan
shortly after 9/11 to attend LeT training camps, but only with the
intention (according to the Department of Justice) of waging war
outside the United States.\12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ There is no direct proof linking implicating General Pervez
Musharraf (who was Chief of Army Staff when bin Laden is believed to
have taken up residence at Abbotabad) or General Ashfaq Kiyani (who was
Director of ISI at the time, and is now Chief of Army Staff). But
former ISI chief Gen. Ziauddin Khwaja is quoted by former National
Security Council Senior Director Bruce Riedel as saying that Musharraf
``knew Bin Laden was in Abbottabad.'' (Bruce Riedel, ``Pakistan's
Musharraf Has Been Accused of Knowing Bin Laden's Hideout,'' The Daily
Beast, Feb. 14, 2012: http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/02/13/
pakistan-smusharraf-has-been-accused-of-knowing-osama-bin-laden-s-
hideout.html). Moreover, it seems hard to imagine that bin Laden would
choose to hide right next to a Pakistani military establishment--
leaving behind the safety and protection of his heavily-armed tribal
hosts in Waziristan--without being convinced that he'd be sheltered by
the very highest levels of the Army's leadership.
\12\ According to the Justice Department's statement, Al Hamdi was
convicted obtaining training ``for the purpose of enhancing his ability
to train for violent jihad in Chechnya, Kashmir, or other places
outside of the United States;'' Three others, ``Yong Kwon, Muhammed
Aatique, and Khwaja Hasan--all of whom pled guilty--stated that they
went to the Lashkar-e-Taiba camp to obtain combat training for the
purpose engaging in violent jihad in Afghanistan'', http://
www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2004/April/04_crm_225.htm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
LeT operations outside of India and Afghanistan have generally been
focused not on attacks, but on fundraising, recruitment, and aid for
operations back in South Asia. For example, in April 2012, an
electrician named Jubair Ahmad, was sentenced in Alexandria, Virginia,
to 12 years in prison after pleading guilty to providing material
support to LeT by producing an internet recruitment video.\13\ This
pattern shows no immediate sign of changing--but I'll offer the same
disclaimer that mutual funds give to investors: Past performance is no
guarantee of future results.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ Ahmad lived in Woodbridge, VA. He reportedly also tried to
recruit LeT operatives, received LeT training himself, and sought
donations for the group. He was born in Sialkot, arrived in the United
States in 2007, and became a permanent resident. http://www.wjla.com/
articles/2012/04/jubair-ahmad-sentenced-to-12-years-behind-bars-
74909.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
If Lashkar-e-Taiba is not an immediate threat to the U.S. homeland,
do we have to worry about a Mumbai-style attack in America? Not much--
if we define ``Mumbai-style attack'' as ``an attack executed much like
that of LeT's 2008 operation in Mumbai.'' My colleague Brian Jenkins
has outlined many of the reasons that such an attack would be unlikely
to succeed in the United States, and witnesses from law enforcement are
likely to reinforce this point. The tactical capabilties of most
American counterterrorism responders is well above that of their Mumbai
counterparts in 2008 (indeed, the capabilities of India's own
responders, in Mumbai and elsewhere, is now well above the 2008 level).
But the next Mumbai-style attack won't necessarily look like the last
one.
If we define ``Mumbai-style attack'' by its impact rather than its
methods, however, such an action becomes far more plausible--and it
wouldn't require a group as capable as Lashkar-e-Taiba to achieve its
aims. What made Mumbai so shocking was not its body count, or even the
fact that the perpetrator was a state-sponsored terrorist group. Mumbai
has suffered at least 7 bombings since March 12, 1993, when 257 people
were killed and 700 were injured in a series of 13 coordinated
explosives; these attacks were attributed to Dawood Ibrahim, a self-
exiled Mumbai crime-lord with longstanding ties to ISI (since 1993, he
is believed to have moved freely between Dubai and the Pakistani city
of Karachi).\14\ Just 2\1/2\ years before the 2008 attack, there was
another coordinated set of bombings, this one targeting Mumbai's
railways: Like the Dawood action, this one killed a lot more people
than the 2008 attacks--209 compared with 166--and injured over twice as
many (more than 700, compared with about 308). The suspected
perpetrator was identified by Mumbai police as affiliated with LeT,
perhaps working in concert with an Indian extremist group.\15\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ http://www.hindustantimes.com/India-news/NewDelhi/Dawood-
Mumbai-blasts-mastermind-eludes-justice/Article1-1030228.aspx.
\15\ http://www.theepochtimes.com/news/6-7-13/43897.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
So why has the 2008 attack become so iconic, both in India and
around the world? A key difference was duration: The seven railway
blasts on July 11, 2006, lasted a total of 11 minutes. The 2008
shootings kept the entire population of Mumbai--at that time, 14
million people, if suburbs are included--in a state of constant fear
from Wednesday night to Saturday morning.
During that period, the terrorists had succeeded in throwing
India's largest city into chaos. They humiliated the municipal, state,
and national governments, and showed that the police and military were
unable to maintain control even over the country's financial and
cultural center. Mumbai is sometimes referred to as the ``New York'' of
India--and Lashkar-e-Taiba executed the equivalent of capturing and
holding the Empire State Building, the Statue of Liberty, and Grand
Central Station all at once.
In terms of iconic impact (that is, impact that is itself so
dramatic as to create a new expression of terrorism--attacks targeting
cultural icons), actions not too far short of Mumbai already have
occurred here. Less than 2 months ago, the Boston Marathon blasts had a
similarly dramatic effect, and kept both a city and a Nation in a state
of uneasy tension until the perpetrators were brought down 4 days
later. In October 2002, Washington, DC and the surrounding areas were
paralyzed for 3 weeks by the Beltway Sniper. Both of these attacks
caused fewer deaths than other post-9/11 mass killings in the U.S.
homeland: The Boston toll was 3 dead, while the Beltway snipers killed
10. By contrast, mass shootings at Sandy Hook Elementary School in
December 2012 and Virginia Tech in November 2007 killed 26 and 32
respectively. The Tech shooting spree alone was more than ten times as
deadly as the Marathon bombing--but the Boston attack spread wider
terror. The shootings in Virginia were part of a long, tragic pattern
of largely apolitical gun violence: Jonesboro, Columbine, Paducah,
Aurora--the list goes on. But bombing a marathon was something new: It
struck not only at Boston, and runners, at amateur athletes, at
everyone who's come out to compete or cheer a loved one across the
finish line.
What might a Mumbai-style attack look like in America? Perhaps like
``Boston Squared'':
It might, like the Mumbai attack of 2008, rely on small-arms
and simple explosives rather than chemical, biological, or
other more advanced weapons. The firearms used in Mumbai were
primarily AK-47s--perhaps the most widely-available firearm in
the world.\16\ Semi-automatic rifles are far more easily
available in America than in India, and can be modified to fire
fully-automatically without advanced training; one YouTube
video demonstrates the conversion technique in just over 2
minutes.\17\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ According to a World Bank report, assault rifles in the
Kalashnikov family (AK-47s, AKM, AK-74, etc.) represent one-fifth of
the 500 million small arms in the world, with AK-47's representing
approximately three-quarters of the Kalashnikov total: Phillip
Killicoat, ``Weaponomics: The Global Market for Assault Rifles.'' World
Bank Policy Research Working Paper 4202 (Post-Conflict Transitions
Working Paper No. 10: April 2007),p. 3. http://www-wds.worldbank.org/
servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2007/04/13/000016406_200704- 13145045/
Rendered/PDF/wps4202.pdf.
\17\ Link is not provided in the interest of public safety, but
this witness was able to find the site with less than half a minute of
internet research.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
It might, like the Mumbai railway attacks of 2006, rely on
simple improvised explosive devices, requiring no special
training to construct. The bombs for these attacks were made
from widely-available pressure cookers--just like the bombs in
Boston. The surviving suspect in the Boston attack, Dzhokhar
Tsarnaev, allegedly told police that he and his brother learned
how to construct their devices from an internet site set up by
al-Qaeda's Yemeni affiliate.\18\ Before banning pressure
cookers, we should remember the exceptional range of materials
used to construct IEDs deployed against our troops in
Afghanistan and Iraq.\19\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\18\ http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2313782/Dzhokhar-
Tsarnaev-Boston-Marathon-bomber-admits-learned-build-bomb-Inspire-
magazine.html.
\19\ http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/intro/ied.htm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
It might, like Mumbai, rely on a small team hitting several
soft targets simultaneously. While LeT engaged in considerable
reconnaissance and logistical effort prior to the Mumbai attack
(much of it by U.S. citizen David Headley), little of this was
strictly necessary. Site-selection required scant on-the-ground
expertise: The Taj Hotel is the city's most identifiable
landmark, the Oberoi is Mumbai's second-most prominent hotel,
and Chhatrapati Shivaji Rail Station has been the city's
transit hub ever since it was constructed in 1887 as Victoria
Terminus.\20\ None required any particular tradecraft or
surveillance to locate or breach. Soft targets abound in
Mumbai--as they do in every American city.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\20\ The other targets were more peripheral: The Leopold Cafe, an
establishment catering to budget-minded foreign tourists and C-list
Bollywood hangers-on, may have been thrown in (like Metro Cinema) at
the behest of local facilitators; the Chabad House was added as a
target after the major sites at the insistence of LeT organizers
seeking the global symbolism of a synagogue or Jewish cultural center;
St. Xavier's College may have served a similar function for its
Christian symbolism; Cama Hospital appears to have been a target of
opportunity, accidentally embroiled when gunmen tried to flee the
nearby rail terminal.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
It might require little sophisticated training. This is a
difference from Mumbai's plan as executed--but didn't have to
be. LeT probably provided its 10 operatives with more
instruction than they needed. They are said to have received
both the group's basic course (Daura Aam) and its advanced
combat course (Daura Khaas), as well as instruction for
maritime operations and specialized commando drills.\21\ This
may well have been necessary to strengthen the operatives'
resolve: The psychological ability to execute mass killings is
not part of most individuals' make-up.\22\ From a purely
technical perspective, however, the basic skill-set necessary
to complete the mission was far more modest: Ability to fire
small arms, toss grenades, and read a map.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\21\ Praveen Swami, ``A Journey Into the Laskar,'' The Hindu,
Chennai, December 2, 2008. http://www.hindu.com/2008/12/02/stories/
2008120259961000.htm.
\22\ One of the most widely-cited data-points in discussions of the
psychology of combat is S.L.A. Marshall's 1947 classic Men Against Fire
(current edition: University of Oklahoma Press, 2000), which reported
that only one-quarter of U.S. infrantrymen who engaged in active combat
during World War Two actually fired their weapons. Marshall's
methodology and statistical conclusion have been criticized since his
death in 1977 (see http://strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/
parameters/Articles/03autumn/chambers.pdf). The underlying premise,
however--that most untrained individuals do not easily kill, even when
societal norms and the laws of self-preservation give them sanction to
do so--is the basis for much of the basic training in U.S. and other
militaries.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
It might, like Boston, require little sophisticated
infiltration, and no exfiltration. There was no infiltration
requirement for the suspected Boston bombers: One was an
American citizen, the other a legal resident. LeT opted for a
logistically-challenging infiltration method in Mumbai: By sea,
at night, employing GPS navigation, with a landing-point not
far from a major Navy and Army cantonment. But this may not
have been necessary: India has porous borders with Bangladesh
and Nepal (countries in which LeT has been active in the past),
and Lashkar had nearly two decades of experience infiltrating
its operatives by land into Kashmir. Once inside India, the
attack team could have reached Mumbai in the same way that
thousands of migrants, both internal and external, reach the
megalopolis every week: Bus, train, or car. As for
exfiltration: LeT (and possibly the Boston attackers) never
intended their journey to require an exit.
What does this tell us about the possibility of a similar attack in
America?
First, that such an action is not beyond the capabilities of even a
group far more modestly equipped, funded, and politically protected
than Lashkar-e-Taiba: Such an attack does not require a state sponsor,
does not require a major international terrorist organization, and may
not (if one defines ``Mumbai-style'' by impact rather than by method
used) require sophisticated planning, training, or execution. It could
be accomplished by a particularly competent team of ``lone wolves'': If
the Tsarnaev brothers had happened to befriend the Washington Sniper
duo, those four men could have achieved ``Boston Squared.'' Two of
these killers were U.S. citizens, one a legal resident, and the last
was recruited after he'd already reached America; not one of them was
linked to a foreign terrorist group, and the only one with real
training in lethal arts (John Allen Muhammad) received his instruction
in the United States Army.
Second, that the key complicating factors for the terrorist team in
Mumbai were largely of their own making, and may have stemmed from the
planners' unwillingness to trust the operators.\23\ As Brian Jenkins
correctly notes in his testimony, the challenge of assembling a 10-man
team all fully committed to a professionally-run terrorist suicide
operation is quite daunting. But if one defines ``Mumbai-style'' by
impact rather than prior example, it wouldn't require a 10-man
professional team. Even the actual Mumbai operation didn't rely on
complete team compliance: If a few of the two-man teams had deserted at
the last minute, the impact on the overall mission would have been
arithmetic rather than geometric--that is, the attack would have been
somewhat less devastating, but the terrible mission might well have
proceeded largely intact. Mumbai reminded us how easy it is for a small
band of killers to create widespread--but transitory--terror.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\23\ LeT operators stayed in contact with the attack team
throughout the operation, via cell phone and Voice Over Internet
Protocol (VoIP). This does not seem, however, to have been an
operational necessity: The controllers do not appear to have relayed
any vital tactical information, merely to have urged the operators to
maintain their pre-arranged targeting. Likewise, the risky infiltration
method could have been avoided by sending the operatives in by land,
whether in Kashmir or through Bangladesh or Nepal. Why did Lashkar
choose to complicate its mission unnecessarily? One possible answer is
that LeT did not have sufficient confidence in its operatives to permit
them to carry out their mission unsupervised. Had the attack team been
given its mission before a simple land infiltration and left to execute
the orders without further contact, there may never have been proof of
LeT (let alone ISI) involvement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
So what can we do? On the issue of Lashkar-e-Taiba, we could try to
work with the government of Pakistan to construct a glide-path to
decommission the organization. This would have to be done with the full
cooperation of the Pakistani military, because any attempt to do so
without the partnership of Pakistan's army and ISI has no realistic
chance of success. Would the Pakistani military agree to such a plan?
At present, no. But there is a growing sentiment within the ranks of
general officers I have interviewed that Lashkar and similar groups now
represent a real danger to Pakistan's own interests--and, equally
importantly, to the institutional interests of the military itself.\24\
From a U.S. perspective, it's simply unacceptable that for a Major Non-
NATO Ally to shelter and support a terrorist group officially committed
to the killing of Americans.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\24\ I have spoken with several retired top-level Pakistani
generals who expressed these sentiments, and said that their concerns
are shared among a growing minority of their brother-officers. As the
U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan proceeds, and as issues like supply
lines through Torkum Gate and Spin Boldak recede in importance, we may
be able to raise Lashkar-e-Taiba much higher on our priority list.
Three years from now, it is possible that the number of U.S. troops
killed by the Haqqani network will drop permanently to zero--but
Lashkar-e-Taiba will present a serious threat to America for as long as
it remains in operation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On the issue of dealing with a Mumbai-style attack, one thing we
can do is take a lesson from the citizens of both Mumbai and Boston.
The reason the attacks in these cities were so jarring was that they
stripped away the illusion of safety. A few weeks ago, however, the
citizens of Boston confronted an unspeakable evil--not with panic but
with quiet, rock-solid resolve. That's what the citizens of Mumbai did
in 2008--indeed, at least half a dozen times in recent years.
Unfortunately, that is what other citizens, in the United States as
well as elsewhere, will be called on to do in the future.
The Mumbai attack had special meaning for me: I used to live in
Mumbai, just a few blocks from the site of most of the attacks. I used
to buy American newspapers from the Taj bookshop, stop by the Leopold
Cafe for a cold beer, watch a movie at the Metro Cinema, take trains
from the terminal that locals still call by its colonial-era initials
of ``VT.''
One of the victims of the Mumbai attack was a friend of mine. He
was man without whom I wouldn't have been able to conduct my
ethnographic fieldwork. He was an elderly Muslim cleric, easily
identifiable as such by his white beard and skullcap--but the gunmen
still shot him at close range.
My friend survived the attack with relatively minor wounds, but
nearly 200 others weren't as lucky. I wish I could say, ``It can't
happen here,'' but it can.
We can do everything in our power to lessen the likelihood, but we
also have to steel ourselves for the fact that we will not always
succeed. Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
Mr. King. Dr. Blank, thank you very much for your
testimony, and thank all the witnesses for their testimony. My
first question will be to Chief Pfeifer. Does the FDNY have
access to sufficient classified information to stay informed
about current threats to the homeland? Do you feel you are
being kept updated?
Chief Pfeifer. Right now we have two fire marshals that sit
on the JTTF in New York. We have a fire lieutenant in the
National Counterterrorism Center. Myself, along with a number
of other people within the fire department, have top secret
clearances.
It is important that the fire service has intelligence. As
Congressman Higgins mentioned, without intelligence, how are we
going to know how to protect our homeland?
Just recently, where a fully-funded position in NCTC, I was
told was no longer going to be funded through NCTC. So we need
to come up with our own funding source to maintain that
position within the intelligence community. So we are in a
position of looking for funds for that.
But let me say one thing. It is not simply just about the
FDNY. It is important that Buffalo has the information. So not
only do we receive intelligence at the classified and
unclassified level, we provide that to other parts of the city.
So Buffalo right now gets our weekly intelligence paper called
the Watchline, and that is able to be put in every fire house
and police station.
So I think as we look forward and try to define funding, it
is how can we leverage those organizations like FDNY, a big
fire department, how do we leverage that organization to the
rest of the country? It is not simply let's give one city
money. The city that receives the funding has a responsibility
to provide information to the rest of the country.
Mr. King. Thank you, Chief; ask the other three witnesses.
The reality is there is going to be a U.S. withdrawal in
Afghanistan by 2014. In that vacuum, specifically do you think
LeT is going to play a role, is going to enhance their
position? Also, as Dr. Blank saw LeT or some other group that
can carry out a Mumbai attack in this country.
Do you see anything we can be doing, directly referencing
the 2014 withdrawal, to minimize the potential for either LeT
or other groups to fill a vacuum to the extent that they can
attack us? I will start with Dr. Fair and we will just work
across.
Ms. Fair. Now this is a really interesting question. So
here is my take. As I said in my written testimony and
elsewhere, Jamaat-ud-Dawa is very pro-state as an organization.
If you read its publications, it actually takes on very
directly those Deobandi organizations, which is a different and
competitive interpretive tradition of Islam. It takes to task
those groups that target Pakistanis.
What is interesting in their book ``Why Do We Wage
Jihad?'', you get to about page 33 and you get to this
particular set of reasoning. They say that it is not
appropriate to target Pakistanis and they offer a number of
reasons.
They then say that it is for that reason that we have to
continue to fight what they call the external kufar, you know,
basically us, the Indians, anyone who is not in Pakistan. They
say that when we stop waging jihad on the external kufar, we
will then turn our guns on Pakistan and the entire Pakistani
project will basically be disintegrated.
This points to a couple of paradoxes that confront the
organization. On the one hand, they, like other Islamist
terrorist organizations, they are under pressure to take their
jihad outside of the theater of South Asia.
But because they are, as I think all of us have agreed to
one extent or another, are still very much as an organization
under the thumb of the ISI, it seems that they have to
calibrate this demand to operate abroad while continuing to
enjoy access to the amenities that Pakistan itself offers.
So if you were to think about what is the sweet spot for
LeT to operate outside of South Asia but not do so in a way
that is catastrophic that would be an act of war on the United
States, I think European countries are actually perhaps more at
risk than we are.
Some of the Scandinavian countries have done things that
have been very provocative to Islamists. They don't have the
relationship with Pakistan. They are not a source of money in
the way in which we are. So when I think about what are the
other theaters where LeT could operate that would satisfy the
requirement to operate outside of South Asia while retaining
ties to the ISI, those are the theaters I think about.
I think--now going back to this diaspora issue, it is also
a fact that American Muslims, Muslims in other countries,
converts in particular, continue to be radicalized by things
that they see in Afghanistan. I do anticipate that we are going
to see more, not less, of this diaspora involvement. Whether or
not this ties to 2014 per se is really a different issue for a
number of reasons.
What I think we can do in the near term, given that we have
this very real requirement to work with Pakistan, is, I do
think we need to think about signaling to the Pakistanis very
clearly that this stuff is just not acceptable.
The last time an American official said to Pakistanis in
public, ``Your government harbors terrorists,'' was Secretary
Clinton in 2010.
There was never an explanation about the waiver. ``By the
way, we are doing this waiver because--well, we need to deal
with you. But there is going to come a time when this isn't
going to happen.''
So, I think we should be taking advantage of the space
between now and 2014 to really think through how do we handle
Pakistan? Also, while we sort of hold our breath to 2014, think
about what we can do right now.
I have said this in other forum. I have absolutely no moral
qualms with going after ISI individuals who are linked to LeT
attacks using every Department of Treasury tool at our
disposal, denying them and their children visas. I don't even
have a problem with putting LeT in the JASA targeting list.
If we have to basically acquiesce to the reality that we
can't really do much about JUD within Pakistan, they become
dangerous when they leave Pakistan. So maybe we should really
be thinking about our law enforcements and other more
aggressive tools to deal with LeT operatives once they leave
Pakistan, if we have to sort of acquiesce to the political
requirement that we can't do anything within Pakistan.
Thank you.
Mr. King. Dr. Tankel.
Mr. Tankel. Thank you very much.
Let me take the 2014 question and--and draw attention to
two theaters within South Asia first. Here, I would also draw
your attention to an article I wrote not too long ago for
Foreign Policy called ``The Militant Groups Next Door,''
talking about the impact of the draw-down in Afghanistan on
various actors like Lashkar-e-Taiba.
The first is that, as U.S. forces draw down in Afghanistan,
LeT is likely to seek to regenerate the conflict in India-
administered Kashmir. They have had their eyes there for some
time. They see the U.S. draw-down, you know, and in their eyes,
the reduction potentially in pressure leveraged on Pakistan is
an opportunity for them to do so.
That doesn't mean that they will leave Afghanistan. They
are a robust-enough and elastic-enough group, in my opinion,
that they will be able to keep some people in Eastern
Afghanistan, specifically, Kunar and Nuristan provinces, where
they have been working to carve out safe haven, as well as
regenerating their jihad in Indian-administered Kashmir.
Now, what does that mean for the dynamics within the group
and for the threat to us?
First, if they are unable to regenerate the conflict in
Kashmir to a suitable level, and if they don't see the ISI as
forthcoming enough with support, that could create tensions
within the organization, and spur them, and contribute to that
pressure to look further afield.
Second, if they are able to maintain some safe haven in
Afghanistan, that doesn't mean that they will be able to plan
attacks against the United States or in European countries from
that area, but it does provide another layer of plausible
deniability. Which is that LeT can say, ``It wasn't us, it was
X or Y splinter group in Afghanistan that did this to you.''
So, I think those are two areas where we really need to
keep our eyes on it. Again, I come back to the need for greater
collection and greater resource allocation in terms of analysts
to look at some of these issues.
I would finally add, in terms of our relations with
Pakistan and what can we do, it is my sense that for the last
however-many number of years, when we have sat down at the
table, our top asks have been about al-Qaeda, about
Afghanistan, and then, you know, perhaps weapons of mass
destruction.
As U.S. forces draw down, and with al-Qaeda Central
degraded, LeT should elevate in priority. You know, with all of
the different tools that people have outlined, I think we need
to be more prepared to use those tools, and to make that clear
to the Pakistanis post-2014.
Mr. King. Thank you.
Dr. Blank.
Mr. Blank. Thank you.
Let me pick it up from where Dr. Tankel left off, since I
very strongly agree with that, that 2014 can be an opportunity
for us.
Up until now, our ask list for Pakistan has had GLOCs, the
ground lines of communication, perhaps, is No. 1. Al-Qaeda is
No. 2, or No. 1, depending on what day of the week it is.
Haqqani is perhaps No. 3.
Somewhere way down on the list is Lashkar-e-Taiba. Two
years from now, nobody in the United States is going to care
much about the Haqqani network, because as soon as our troops
are no longer in Eastern Afghanistan, the Haqqani network is
not going to be a real--a top priority for us. Likewise, the
ground lines of communication are not going to be a top
priority for us when we no longer need them.
Al-Qaeda, hopefully, will continue to be less of a priority
in the future than it has in the past. That provides us the
opportunity to raise Lashkar-e-Taiba up on the bid list. I see
at least a potential for some good news there. Because right
now, the reason that Lashkar-e-Taiba is so dangerous is its
continuing ties with the Pakistani state.
But there is a growing feeling within the Pakistani
military cadre at the top leadership that this is not
necessarily a good deal for Pakistan, either. I have spoken
with several former D.G. ISIs, commanders of ISI, and other
retired Pakistani generals, who have candidly said, ``Time is
not on our side here.''
This is not an organization that is in a static situation
with us. They are going to turn on us sooner rather than later.
We should be developing a glide path for helping Pakistan turn
the fiction of LeT. The fiction is that LeT is dead, and
Jamaat-ud-Dawa is a social service organization.
We should be looking for a way of turning that fiction into
a reality.
Mr. King. Thank you, Dr. Blank.
Now, the Ranking Member, as much time as you require, sir.
Mr. Higgins. Yes, just--the comment of Dr. Blank on the
issue of Lashkar-e-Taiba as a producer of terrorists is cause
for great concern, particularly in Pakistan.
Pakistan's a large country of about 180 million people, a
lot of Islamic extremists, and they have nuclear weapons. A
major goal of al-Qaeda and other extremist organizations is to
gain access to nuclear weapons.
When you consider that the Taliban is virtually controlling
the Swat Valley some 90 miles from Islamabad, the prospects of
an increasingly influential Lashkar-e-Taiba is a great concern.
So, talk a little bit about the relationship again between
Lashkar-e-Taiba and the Taliban, al-Qaeda, and other groups
that may be emerging.
The other concern I have is, you know, Pakistan views India
as an existential threat to its very existence, real or
perceived. You know, the dynamics of that relationship as it
evolves moving forward, particularly within the context of the
United States withdrawal of Afghanistan in 2014. Anybody who
wants to take that.
Ms. Fair. So, on this relationship issue, it is all too
often that these groups just get lumped into one category.
These organizations spend a lot of time differentiating
themselves from each other, both for recruitment purposes and
fund-raising purposes. So, I take seriously their own efforts
to differentiate themselves from others.
Al-Qaeda--the connection between al-Qaeda and Lashkar-e-
Taiba--I am a skeptic of that evidence. There have been al-
Qaeda personnel found in LeT safe houses, but that is also true
of Jamaat-e-Islami.
In fact, one of the reasons why I think LeT has, even
though ideologically has more affinity to al-Qaeda, has been
more aloof, is that it always had its own training camps in
Afghanistan. So, the reason why it is in Afghanistan in Kunar
and Nuristan is that that is actually where it began.
There is historical reasons. There have always been Ahl-e-
Hadith adherents to these parts of Afghanistan, and so that has
been the home territory for Lashkar-e-Taiba in Afghanistan.
In contrast, most of the organizations that operate in and
from Pakistan are associated with a movement called Deobandi.
It is very different than the Deobandi in India. But they, much
more than LeT, which recruits a very well-educated cadre, as we
demonstrate in the Combating Terrorism Senate Report that I did
with my colleagues, these are--the Deobandi groups--they will
rely much more heavily upon a network of madrassas and mosques.
So, for example, the Deobandi organizations produced the
Afghan Taliban. The Pakistan Taliban--the groups that are
targeting Shia--like you might have heard the expression
Lashkar-e-Jhangvi. These organizations, because of their
association with bin Laden in Afghanistan, have had much more
integral and organic ties.
So, for example, the attack that occurred in the U.S.
consulate in Karachi--that was al-Qaeda in conception, but it
was executed by local Deobandi groups Jaish-e-Mohammed and
Lashkar-e-Jhangvi.
So, it is really important that we understand how these
groups interact. That just because the organizations have
certain affinities, we have to remember that these are--once
they train a militant, they have recruited someone essentially
who has a taste for violence. As Dr. Tankel said, let's say
that you have been recruited by LeT, but you are frustrated
that you can't go to a mission in India, or you haven't been
selected to go to Afghanistan to kill Americans. Because,
again, the leadership is so involved in selecting people for
these missions. There is nothing that stops you from going and
joining the Pakistan Taliban.
But for purposes of our discussion, and for purposes of
holding Pakistan accountable, we do have to be careful. When it
says, ``We, Pakistan, are a victim of terrorism,'' the response
should be, ``Yes, you are a victim of terrorists that you
cultivated,'' right? This doesn't in any way, shape, or form
mitigate the relationship that you have with groups like
Lashkar-e-Taiba.
So, I think these distinctions are really important. They
take themselves seriously.
Mr. Tankel. I would just add to that, you know, I think it
is also important to recognize that Lashkar-e-Taiba,
specifically, is historically dichotomous in some ways. It has
been willing to train many, many, many people who, you know,
were not members of the group.
After 9/11, when the training infrastructure was destroyed
in Afghanistan, LeT picked up a significant amount of the
slack, because it continued to have standing training camps.
That doesn't mean that everybody stayed with the group
afterwards.
At the same time, it is a historically selfish
organization. So, when it has come across people like David
Headley, for example, who are--you know, have a particular set
of specialized skills--in this case, the ability to speak
English and a U.S. passport--they have sought to hold onto
them.
That creates, you know, a degree of competition
specifically with al-Qaeda, which is seeking the same types of
individuals. As a matter of fact, when Lashkar-e-Taiba pulled
back on the plot in Denmark, David Headley went over and began
working with al-Qaeda. He didn't leave LeT. He was working with
both organizations. So that is a danger.
The other point I would make more broadly, is that all of
these groups collaborate and compete, as Dr. Fair said. LeT
competes more than most, because it is--and others are
Deobandi, but also because it is much closer to the state. So
unlike most of the groups, it hasn't turned its guns on the
state.
It has actually been used against some of these actors by
the ISI, while at the same time, collaborating with them. So
Lashkar-e-Taiba militants, some could be providing intelligence
on the Pakistani Taliban, and others could be working with them
at al-Qaeda across the border in Afghanistan.
That creates a very, very dangerous dynamic. Because of
course, the risks from collaboration are obvious. The risks
from competition should be obvious as well, which is to say
that if you are a group that is trying to hold the line on
turning your guns against the Pakistani state, while all the
other people that you are working with are doing that, you look
for other avenues where you can gain credibility.
That doesn't mean on its face that you go and you attack
the homeland. But it is another sort of point that can drive
you in the direction of seeking to expand not necessarily
against the homeland, perhaps in Europe, perhaps by adding
Western targets to your target set in South Asia.
Those are the types of dynamics I think that we need to
keep in mind. I think it is--your question, Congressman, is a
very, very important one, and really goes to the heart of some
of the fast-evolving developments that are taking place within
the militant landscape.
Mr. Blank. I agree with Doctors Fair and Tankel. So rather
than restate what they have said, I will just make a quick
point about Lashkar-e-Taiba recruitment, and how that actually
could be of concern to us here.
Some of the most dangerous recruits that Lashkar is looking
for, they don't look like what a lot of Americans would think a
Lashkar-e-Taiba operative looks like. They look like me.
If you see a picture of David Headley, he looks like a--you
know, he had one eye is green and one eye was gray. He could
have not been out of place on any American street. That is why
he was so highly sought.
Sajid Mir, the Lashkar-e-Taiba operative who is in charge
of finding foreign recruits, went out of his way to find not
just diaspora recruits, but Westerners, people from East Asia,
anybody who could not fit the profile.
So when we are thinking who is the, you know, who is the
guy you should be afraid of, it is not me as I look like when I
was living in Lahore, when I had a long beard and a skullcap
and tried to speak only in--it is me right now. If you are on
an airplane, and someone is ordering the Halal meal, that is
not the guy you should be afraid of.
Mr. Higgins. Yield back.
Mr. King. Ranking Member yields back. I now recognize Mr.
Keating for as much time as he requires.
Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to focus on
comments from Dr. Blank and Chief Pfeifer for a second. You
know--and it is about the areas you dealt with, the Mumbai-type
attacks, fire, and incendiaries as a weapon. I understand
iconic buildings and facilities as a symbol, and as a target.
But one of the areas I am concerned about that you didn't
address directly, is the idea that with this kind of fire as a
weapon, or incendiaries as a weapon-type attack, what about
places that contain hazardous materials? What about places that
have chemicals, or gases, or petroleum-based products? There
could be a tremendous damage done in that respect.
Now, yesterday I was with firefighters throughout our
State, including firefighters in Boston. I was talking to them
about their level of preparedness. One of the things that
concerned me directly--and if you can comment on this, Chief,
that would be helpful--is the fact that--now there is Boston, a
top-tier city in terms of the ranking to terrorist attack.
They are not having utilization of the grant money right
now directly for their own training. I was told that they were
getting help from New York with some training.
But otherwise, they are taking their personnel and going to
places like Alabama to get trained there, which I think you
know, Chief, is impractical to be able to train enough people,
and spend the grant money, to go down to Alabama to get trained
and come back.
So how important is this, you know, for our major cities in
particular, to be able to have this kind of training in HAZMAT?
Because I see this as an enormous threat. If Dr. Blank can
comment on the enormous threat that it might present. If the
chief--if you could, Chief Pfeifer, talk about exactly the
level of preparedness, and the fact that we are, as the
Homeland Security, as a committee, and as a Congress, we are
sending funds for training. But I am worried it is not getting
utilized so that it really is any great help to our cities like
Boston. Either one of you can go first.
Chief Pfeifer. I was just up in Boston a couple weeks ago
talking to Commissioner Fraser, and also to the police
department, and OEM. I understand very much what they went
through with the Boston Marathon.
We have a very good relationship with Boston Fire
Department. You are correct in saying that training is critical
to first responders. Hazardous-material training, particularly
critical when we are talking CBRN-type of attacks.
The interesting thing we must note about training is that
it is a perishable skill. If we don't keep training, if we
don't keep testing ourselves, we lose that.
The other thing with first responders is that the people
rotate in and out. People retire and new folks come on. So
training must continue--be a continuing process. That takes
funding. It takes a lot of funding.
For New York City Fire Department, to train everyone within
the department for 1 hour, it costs $1 million. But without the
training, we can't deal with a hazardous-material event, or we
can't deal with a Mumbai-style attack.
Both types of attacks, CBRN or Mumbai-style, is a high-
consequence, low-frequency. We don't see it a lot. It is not
something we get to practice. Therefore, the training is
important.
The other element is for us to share information, and to
share information particularly on the East Coast. How do we
collaborate together? How do we do that amongst fire
departments? But how we also do it incorporating fire, police,
and emergency medical is certainly a challenge for all of us.
Mr. Keating. Chief, in New York, because of your size and
the fact you are a target, you are able to have your own
training. My concern going forward is these other cities and
these other communities, they don't have their own.
What is happening with Homeland there, my understanding
from the firefighters is, they are centralizing training in
places that, frankly, these cities can't afford to send people
to.
Dr. Blank, what do you think about the dangerousness of
that kind of combined fire attack with hazardous materials? I
just think the danger of that is enormous.
Mr. Blank. Thank you, Congressman. I completely agree. I
think from a tactical perspective, we have chemical plants
around the country that are WMD waiting to be deployed.
You don't have to bring WMD to the United States. All you
have to do is use the WMD that is lying around here.
The same week, right after the Boston Marathon bombings, we
saw an explosion at a chemical plant in Texas, which
fortunately, was not a terrorist action. But that doesn't
matter to the people who died there. If I were a member of
Lashkar-e-Taiba, or another terrorist group, I would be looking
very seriously at that.
I think also, Congressman, your larger point about, we have
got to be looking forward rather than back, is critically
important. The next Mumbai is not going to look like the last
one. The opportunities for iconic attacks, by which I mean not
attacks on icons, but attacks that are themselves icons, that
is immense.
Why was Boston such a blow to all of us, not just those of
us who have lived in Boston, but everybody who is a runner,
everybody who is an athlete, everybody who loves someone who is
a runner or an athlete, or has been to Boston, or just
identifies with people who suffered such terrible things?
It is because people are always coming up with new ideas.
Last summer, I drove from Congressman Keating's district to
Congressman King's district, and of course, I took the Long
Island ferry from New London to Orient Point. I don't want to
give anybody ideas, but that would be a soft target that would
have enormous iconic impact.
We have got to be thinking about these things, not just
about making soft targets harder, but also recognizing that the
future is not going to look like the past.
Mr. Keating. Yes. I just want to thank you. I think if you
turn on a television news station on any given evening, if
there is a fire in that community, they are covering it.
Certainly, the attractiveness of these terrorist groups to
getting media, optimizing the media exposure is very real, too.
So I want to thank all of you. Dr. Fair, thank you for your
comments on information sharing. I think that is--these
things--first responders, information sharing--remain among our
priorities. With that, I yield back.
Mr. King. Thank you, Mr. Keating. I really just have one
question. I want to thank you all for your testimony. But as
far as an affiliate of LeT, or faction of LeT, if there were an
attack against us, American interests overseas, by one of these
factions--of course, LeT would just claim--assume they would
just claim responsibility--would ISI, do you believe, have
control over the factions as well? Or could a faction carry out
an attack against American interests without some sort of
condoning by ISI?
Mr. Tankel. Let me start by saying that as incredibly
troublesome as the ISI-LeT relationship is for a host of
reasons, I think one of the things that we need to be very
concerned about is a reduction of ISI situational awareness and
influence over LeT.
Now, that said, I think it is important. One can divide
this many different ways. I will choose just two. One is that
this is a core LeT attack, but that it is claimed by a front
group, you know, the same way Deccan Mujahideen was created to
claim the 2008 Mumbai attacks.
Arguably, you know, I think it is unlikely in my personal
opinion that ISI would be aware of it. I think that there is--I
would assume that core LeT is working to create compartments
within the organization that are outside of ISI's purview.
That this relationship, as close as it is, as long-lasting
as it is, is still not a relationship where the two people are
working together because they all the time like one another or
always share the precise same goals.
So I would assume that LeT is working to create
compartments within the organization that are outside of ISI's
awareness. My fear would be that the ISI does not recognize
that, that it thinks it has the situation under control, or
that LeT is benefiting as a result of benign neglect.
The second is that this is an actual splinter. There, you
know, I think if it is an actual splinter, you know, that is a
much more complicated response for us in some ways, but it is a
real threat.
There, again, I would look at the ISI-LeT relationship from
the perspective of the degree to which it has the potential to
create some of those splinters.
That the more the group, you know, tries to tow the line or
reign in people, the more there is the potential for it to
throw off viviparous units.
Then, again, that is not to say that we want situational
awareness or influence to cease or that we want the ISI to
continue supporting LeT. We don't. We want it to gradually
dismantle it.
But it is to say that we need to be prepared for the
potential consequences if that were to occur and, certainly,
need to be aware of the dynamics of the relationship as it
exists now.
Mr. King. Dr. Fair.
Ms. Fair. I actually find myself in disagreement with you,
Dr. Tankel. We will have to take this to the bar.
Mr. King. Let's not have a fight here now.
[Laughter.]
Ms. Fair. Right. So I actually do have a very different
opinion about this. It is really important that we understand
that of all of the dozens of terrorists groups operating in
Pakistan against Pakistanis, the reason why Jamaat-ud-Dawa is
so useful to the ISI is that in its literature it actually says
this is a bad thing.
There have been recent reports, in fact, that there might
even be an actual militarized conflict between Jamaat-ud-Dawa
and elements of the Pakistani Taliban.
As 2014 comes into focus, the Pakistanis, in their own way,
think that once we are gone that the Pakistani Taliban will go
back to Afghanistan, that they will go back to their
traditional theaters, that they will no longer be the target of
the TTP because they are not going to be working with us.
I think the Pakistanis are wrong in that calculation. I
think that the TTP has morphed in a way that the Pakistanis
don't understand. Because of that, I think Jamaat-ud-Dawa is
going to become more important to the state than not because it
will be the only organization that has an ideological argument
against the TTP.
Now, this doesn't mean that there won't be individuals
within Jamaat-ud-Dawa/LeT that disagrees with the leadership,
doesn't preclude factions.
But this does go to I think there needs to be a discussion
in the U.S. Government about how we respond. I am of the belief
that anything we can do to shrink the space of plausible
deniability is to our benefit.
The Pakistanis, the ISI, the army, the militant groups
themselves are constantly trying to expand this space for
plausible deniability.
I really don't care whether the organization that attacks
the United States has the sanction of Muridke and LeT's
leadership or for that matter, Rawalpindi or the ISI
headquarters in Opara, we need to hold the Pakistani state
accountable.
They have nurtured these lunatics. They have done
everything they can to help them and to expand their mission
domestically. They have thwarted our every single opportunity
to get the Pakistanis to come to their sense about this
organization.
I don't find any logical, compelling reason to indulge
Pakistan's sense of plausible deniability. We need to tell
them, you know what, this is your problem. You have raised
these guys, this is your problem.
I don't--I can't even understand why we would even give the
Pakistanis even greater plausible deniability than they have
already cultivated.
Mr. Tankel. Can I just?
Mr. King. And, now, rebuttal.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Tankel. Let me be clear----
Mr. King. Yes.
Mr. Tankel. Saying that Lashkar-e-Taiba is attempting to
carry out operations without the ISI knowing does not mean that
the ISI shouldn't be held responsible for that.
Ms. Fair. Okay.
Mr. Tankel. Okay, I mean that is an important distinction.
To your question about whether the ISI would know about it and
sanction it, you know my sense is we should continue to put
enormous pressure on the ISI to put enormous pressure on LeT
not to, you know, carry out an attack against the U.S.
homeland.
We should make clear that we will hold the ISI responsible
for that. That is not to say that LeT won't attempt to
compartmentalize information so that the ISI doesn't know.
That is--I think we need to acknowledge that reality and
that our discussions with the ISI and with Pakistan needs to be
more nuanced. It needs to be: Hey, listen, we are going to hold
you accountable.
Therefore, you know, though publicly you may claim that you
have no control over LeT, privately we all know that you do.
You better have the control over it that privately we are all
assuming because it is going to be problematic if you don't.
Mr. King. Dr. Blank, you want to take a side, too?
Mr. Blank. Yes. Well, actually I don't think there is----
Mr. King. I agree----
Mr. Blank. A huge area of disagreement because, to be
honest, the accountability is already there. Anyone in ISI,
anyone in Pakistani decision circles who thinks that if there
is an attack in the homeland that has a return address in
Pakistan that that is not going to lead to a tremendous
response, well they were obviously asleep during Abbottabad
that is for sure.
I mean--also, we do have--I think I can say this now. We do
have something called a drone program. It is--the idea that we
would not hit back if there were a Lashkar attack in the United
States I think is ridiculous.
We would, and the Pakistanis know it and that is why there
has never been a Lashkar attack in the United States. I don't
think it is because they don't want to hit us. I don't think it
is because they can't hit us.
I think it is because, at least up until now, they have
made a conscious decision to abide by ISI's red line. Will that
happen in the future? So far, I think yes.
But the real danger I think is that as long as Lashkar
continues to be this factory churning out extremists, those
extremists, as both Dr. Fair and Dr. Tankel have testified,
they are going to go somewhere.
Mr. King. Thank you.
I was afraid if an argument did break out, Chief Pfeifer
would think he was back in the firehouse.
[Laughter.]
Mr. King. Let me just thank all of you for your testimony.
I found this particularly illuminating and it is important we
build this record.
Again, the effort that you made, the interest that you put
into this and is--again, extraordinary, Chief Pfeifer, what you
have done with the FDNY, the three of you with your
intellectual pursuits and your academic pursuits and also
willing to come forward.
I know, Dr. Fair, it is particularly stressful at times.
But, again, each of you contributed immeasurably to what our
committee and subcommittee are trying to do.
I know he is not here, but I do want to, again, thank the
Ranking Member, who is not here, who had to make some serious
changes in his schedule to be here.
Again, I regret being late this morning. I was, as I said,
caught in an NSA debate and, of course, my arguments were
coherent and cogent as opposed to the opposition.
[Laughter.]
Mr. King. But, in any event, I want to just thank you for
your testimony and, also, myself and other Members of the
committee may have additional questions for you and if so, we
will submit them to you in writing and ask for a response.
So, without objection, the committee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:44 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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Statement of Brian Michael Jenkins, Senior Advisor to the RAND
President, the RAND Corporation \1\
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\1\ The opinions and conclusions expressed in this testimony are
the author's alone and should not be interpreted as representing those
of RAND or any of the sponsors of its research. This product is part of
the RAND Corporation testimony series. RAND testimonies record
testimony presented by RAND associates to Federal, State, or local
legislative committees; Government-appointed commissions and panels;
and private review and oversight bodies. The RAND Corporation is a
nonprofit research organization providing objective analysis and
effective solutions that address the challenges facing the public and
private sectors around the world. RAND's publications do not
necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors.
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June 12, 2013
the threat of a mumbai-style terrorist attack in the united states \2\
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\2\ This testimony is available for free download at http://
www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/CT391.html.
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I regret that circumstances prevent me from testifying in person at
this hearing. I want thank Chairman King, with whom I have had long
conversations on terrorism issues, Ranking Member Higgins, and Members
of the committee for inviting me to submit this written testimony. The
topic before the committee is the threat of a terrorist attack in the
United States along the lines of the 2008 terrorist assault on the city
of Mumbai, where 10 terrorists, armed with assault rifles, pistols,
grenades, and improvised explosives, carried out coordinated attacks
across the city, killing 162 people and paralyzing a metropolis of 14
million people for 60 hours while mesmerizing the world's media.
To provide background on this inquiry, I invite Members of the
committee to read an early RAND analysis of the Mumbai attack,\3\ as
well as my testimony before the Senate Homeland Security Committee on
the subject.\4\
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\3\ Angel Rabasa et al., The Lessons of Mumbai, Santa Monica, CA:
RAND Corporation, OP-249-RC, 2009.
\4\ Brian Michael Jenkins, Terrorists Can Think Strategically:
Lessons Learned from the Mumbai Attacks, Testimony before the Committee
on Homeland Security and Government Affairs, United States Senate,
January 28, 2009.
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My RAND colleague Jonah Blank has focused his testimony on the
current threat posed by Lashkar-e-Taiba, the organization responsible
for the Mumbai attack. Therefore I will focus my attention on the
attack scenario.
It is ironic that as I am preparing this testimony, neighboring
streets in Santa Monica, California, are blocked off because of a
shooting rampage by a heavily-armed lone gunman who killed five people
and wounded four others before being killed by police. Insofar as we
know now, political motives were not involved in this incident, but the
occurrence of such episodes in the United States demonstrates the
possibilities of similar terrorist assaults and at the same time has
resulted in police being better prepared to respond to what are
referred to as ``active shooter'' situations.
The Mumbai assault was a complex operation involving five teams of
two gunmen each. They arrived together at a seaside village in Mumbai
and then deployed to attack various targets across the city. The
assault required detailed planning and thorough reconnaissance of the
targets, including learning the layouts of the luxury hotels that were
the attackers' final objective. Team members had been carefully
selected and trained for months--their skills showed in their
disciplined fire control. Each man carried an assault rifle with a
large quantity of ammunition, a semi-automatic pistol, and hand
grenades. Their goal was to kill as many people as possible at iconic
sites. In addition, the group had five improvised explosive devices.
The terrorists attacked unguarded targets--the central train station, a
hospital, a Jewish social center, a restaurant, and two hotels. During
the assault itself, they received instructions from controllers in
Pakistan who were watching the episode on television.
ample precedents
Although the Mumbai assault was audacious and unprecedented in its
scale, complexity, and consequences, the annals of terrorism provide
ample precedents for armed assaults, going all the way back to the 1972
terrorist attack at Tel Aviv's airport. The attack, which came to be
known as the Lod Airport massacre, was carried out by the Japanese Red
Army, acting for the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine,
with whom the Japanese group had become allies. Three attackers, armed
with automatic weapons and hand grenades, opened fire on passengers
disembarking from a flight arriving from the United States. Twenty-five
people were killed in the assault, and 80 were wounded. More-recent
terrorist assaults include \5\
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\5\ These are strictly armed assaults. Additional assaults that
also involved vehicle bombs are not included.
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1985.--The Abu Nidal organization carried out simultaneous
armed assaults at the Vienna and Rome airports, killing a total
of 19 and wounding 140.
1997.--Six gunmen attacked tourists in Luxor, Egypt, killing
62.
2001.--Six gunman opened fire on a church in Bahawalpur,
Pakistan, killing 15.
2001.--Five gunmen attacked India's Parliament House,
killing 7.
2002.--Jihadist gunmen attacked the American consulate in
Calcutta, India, killing 5.
2003.--Four gunmen attacked multiple targets in Yanbu, Saudi
Arabia, killing 6.
2003.--Gunmen attacked foreign housing compounds in Khobar,
Saudi Arabia, killing 22.
2004.--Five armed attackers broke through the gates of the
American consulate in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, killing 5.
2004.--A large group of gunmen assaulted a school complex in
Beslan, Russia, killing and barricading themselves with
hostages, most of them children. The episode, the most
spectacular event listed here, lasted nearly 3 days and
resulted in 380 deaths.
terrorist assaults since the mumbai attack
Spectacular armed terrorist assaults have been made subsequent to
the Mumbai attack, although none of them match the scale of that
operation:
2009.--Members of the Pakistan Taliban attacked the
Pakistani Army's General Headquarters in Rawalpindi, killing 6.
2011.--A lone gunman opened fire on the American embassy in
Sarajevo, Bosnia, wounding 1.
2011.--Pakistan Taliban gunmen attacked and waged a 16-hour
gun battle at the naval air base in Karachi, Pakistan, killing
12.
2011.--Motivated by anti-Muslim sentiments, Anders Breivik
detonated a bomb in Oslo, killing 8, and then proceeded to gun
down people at a nearby youth camp, killing 69.
2011.--A jihadist gunman opened fire on a bus carrying U.S.
military personnel at Frankfurt Airport in Germany, killing 2.
2012.--A lone gunman, inspired by jihadist ideology, carried
out a series of shootings in Toulouse and Montauban, France,
killing 7 and wounding 5.
2012.--A heavily-armed group of reportedly as many as 150
men attacked the U.S. consulate in Benghazi, Libya, killing 4,
including the American ambassador, and wounding 10.
2013.--Terrorists claiming allegiance to al-Qaeda carried
out a major assault at Amenas, Algeria, killing 37.
potential mumbai-style attacks in the united states
The Mumbai attackers infiltrated the city from a hijacked fishing
vessel. There are two ways a Mumbai-style attack could be carried out
in the United States. First, terrorist planners could assemble and
train a team of attackers abroad and attempt to infiltrate them into
the United States individually over a period of time or as a single
team. None of the major jihadist groups have attempted (or, insofar as
we know, contemplated) large-scale armed assaults in the West.
In the 9/11 attacks, al-Qaeda managed to infiltrate 19 attackers
into the United States who remained committed to their suicidal mission
even after months of residence here. However, al-Qaeda at that time
operated in a more permissive environment and was able to draw upon a
large reservoir of volunteers at its training camps in Afghanistan
enabling it to select the best candidates. The terrorist organization
also was better able to clandestinely communicate and transfer funds.
Improved intelligence world-wide has since degraded the operational
capabilities of al-Qaeda and has made its operating environment more
hostile, making more likely that authorities would learn of
preparations for a large-scale terrorist operation, but there is no
guarantee that such a feat cannot be repeated, especially if the
terrorists are allowed space to freely plan and prepare attacks.
India's government accused Pakistani authorities of being complicit
in the Mumbai attack, but Pakistan has different rules for dealing with
India than for other nations. Defendants in three of the jihadist cases
in the United States since 9/11 had connections to Lashkar-e-Taiba, but
they were not plotting to carry out attacks in the United States.\6\ A
major terrorist attack on the United States that could be traced back
to Lashkar-e-Taiba or any other Pakistan-based group obviously would
have serious consequences for Pakistan.
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\6\ These include the 2003 Northern Virginia cluster case, the 2005
New York defendants case, and the 2009 David Headley case. For a
detailed chronology of jihadist plots in the United States, see Brian
Michael Jenkins, Stray Dogs and Virtual Armies: Radicalization and
Recruitment to Jihadist Terrorism in the United States since 9/11,
Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, OP-343-RC, 2011.
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The second approach would be for home-grown terrorists to plot a
Mumbai-style attack. Today's al-Qaeda has become far more
decentralized, far more dependent on its affiliates and allies and on
its ability to inspire home-grown terrorists to carry out attacks on
its behalf. Although still dedicated to spectacular, ``strategic''
attacks, al-Qaeda has embraced a do-it-yourself strategy. On-line
jihadist publications have exhorted terrorists to carry out bombings,
shootings, stabbings, even ramming cars into crowds.
In response to these calls, individual jihadist terrorists carried
out shooting attacks, and more recently, stabbing attacks have taken
place in Woolwich, England, and on the outskirts of Paris.
the u.s. experience
The United States is not immune to such attacks. In preparing
Congressional testimony on this topic, one cannot help but recall the
1954 armed assault on Congress itself by four Puerto Rican separatists,
in which five Members of Congress were wounded. Capitol security has
increased since then.
All of the more recent terrorist shootings in the United States
have involved a single shooter:
1994.--A heavily armed Lebanese immigrant opened fire on a
van carrying Jewish students on the Brooklyn Bridge in New
York, killing 1 and wounding 3.
1997.--A Palestinian nationalist opened fire on spectators
on the observation deck of New York's Empire State Building,
killing 1 and wounding 6.
2002.--An Egyptian limousine driver shot and killed 2
persons at the El Al ticket counter in the Los Angeles Airport.
(Although the attacker was labeled a terrorist, his precise
motives, beyond killing Jews, were not apparent.)
2009.--Abdulhakim Mujahid Muhammad (aka Carlos Bledsoe) shot
and killed 1 soldier and wounded another at an Army recruiting
office in Little Rock, Arkansas.
2009.--Motivated by white supremacist beliefs, a man opened
fire at the Holocaust Museum in Washington, killing 1 person.
2009.--Major Nidal Hasan shot and killed 13 of his fellow
soldiers at Fort Hood, Texas; 31 others were wounded in the
attack.
2012.--An army veteran linked to white supremacist groups
opened fire on members of a Sikh temple in Oak Creek,
Wisconsin, killing 6 and wounding 4.
2013.--During their escape, following the Boston Marathon
bombing, the Tsaernev brothers engaged in a running gun battle
with police in which the older brother was killed and 1 officer
was wounded. (The Tsaernevs had earlier killed 1 police
officer.)
Al-Qaeda's efforts to radicalize and recruit home-grown terrorists
have thus far yielded only a meager turnout. Between 9/11 and the end
of 2012, 204 persons were arrested or self-identified for providing
material support to al-Qaeda and allied groups, including Lashkar-e-
Taiba; joining jihadist fronts abroad; or plotting to carry out
terrorist attacks in the United States. Most of the plots involved
improvised explosive devices, but 6 involved planned armed assaults, 2
of which were carried out (Bledsoe and Hasan). These 2 attacks account
for 14 of the 17 fatalities that have resulted from al Qaeda-inspired
violence since 9/11.
Sixty-eight of the jihadist terrorist plots uncovered in the United
States have involved a single individual. The most ambitious plots
involved 3 to 7 attackers. Few of the plotters had any training,
although some were former soldiers. Only two of the plots definitely
anticipated suicide attacks. None came close to the sophistication,
determination, or personal skills demonstrated in the Mumbai attack.
non-terrorist shooting rampages
Mass shootings are not uncommon in the United States, and this
appears to be a growing problem since 2000. The following were some of
the bloodier incidents:
1999.--Two teenagers, armed with shotguns, a rifle, and
handguns, killed 12 classmates and wounded 24 others at a high
school in Colombine, Colorado. They had planned to kill
hundreds. This is a rare case in which there was more than one
shooter.
2007.--A lone gunman at Virginia Tech killed 32.
2009.--A lone gunman in Kinston, Alabama, killed 10.
2009.--A lone gunman killed 13 in Binghamton, New York.
2012.--A lone gunman killed 12 at a theater in Aurora,
Colorado.
2012.--A lone gunman killed 26 at an elementary school in
Newtown, Connecticut.
The perpetrators in almost all of these cases would be described as
at least temporarily mentally disturbed, which speaks to their
determination. Nonetheless, they demonstrate that 1 person, with little
or no training, can acquire and effectively use firearms to achieve
high body counts. In the above cases, 7 armed individuals killed a
total of 105 persons, or an average of 15 per attacker, which is close
to the results achieved in the Mumbai attack.
The challenge of carrying out a Mumbai-style massacre is not
providing individual firepower but, rather, assembling the attacking
force. The 10 terrorists who carried out the Mumbai attack were no
doubt selected from a larger pool and trained for months. The objective
of the training was not simply to instruct them in the operation of
their weapons; equally important was selecting the attackers and
mentally preparing them for a suicide mission--in other words,
duplicating the will displayed in the homicidal rages of crazed
shooters.
Since members of the attacking team at Mumbai were trained
individually, the lone survivor was unable to tell authorities if any
candidates for the operation were deselected because they exhibited
insufficient zeal. That would be a limiting factor in any home-grown
plot where there is no possibility of selecting volunteers from a
larger pool. It is not simply a matter of getting 10 men together; it
is necessary to persuade every single one of them to remain committed.
Faintheartedness would reduce the size of the group and would also risk
exposure of the operation. The Mumbai attack worked because a larger
organization was in charge of it.
The cases listed above are not typical of active-shooter incidents
in the United States. Overall, the average number of deaths per attack
is 3; the more-accurate median number is 2. Typically, the perpetrator
is a male whose motives are retaliation for some perceived personal
wrong or simply unknown. Forty percent of the perpetrators ended the
attack with suicide; 46 percent of the attacks ended with bystanders or
police forcefully subduing the shooter; only 14 percent ended with
voluntary surrender. To end the killing, therefore, requires prompt,
forceful intervention. Eight percent of the shooters were killed by law
enforcement.
american law enforcement is better prepared
Analysis of the Mumbai attack shows that local police were poorly
trained and equipped to handle such an incident, and the National
response also had flaws. In contrast, police in the United States are
better prepared and have gained experience as result of dealing with
domestic shooting incidents, which have been carefully analyzed. The
Mumbai attack itself provided further impetus for preparations. This
does not mean that a Mumbai-style attack could not occur in the United
States or that casualties would be prevented. It does mean that police
would intervene more promptly to rapidly resolve the episode. A
terrorist shooter would be confronted by a heavily-armed response,
already on the scene in many venues. For example, a hypothetical
terrorist shooter that chose a venue like New York's Penn Station would
immediately face armed officers from the NYPD, MTA, PATH, NJRR, and
Amtrak, and at times, TSA VIPR teams and National Guardsmen.
In 1975, fleeing IRA terrorists in London ran into an apartment
building, where they barricaded themselves with hostages, thereby
initiating a lengthy siege. Imagine what would have happened had the
fleeing Tsaernev brothers done the same. In Mumbai, the attackers'
seizure of hostages, or the mere presence of potential hostages or
victims in the hotels, posed a challenge to the counterterrorist
responders. This also constrained authorities dealing with some of the
other terrorist assaults.
Barricade-and-hostage situations were a more common terrorist
tactic in the 1970s than they are now, and they would complicate the
response to a terrorist assault. The United States has experience here.
In 1977, 12 members of an extremist Muslim sect, led by an individual
with a history of mental illness, seized 149 hostages at three separate
locations in Washington, DC, initiating a siege that lasted 39 hours.
The event became known as the Hanafi siege. Two persons were killed
during the initial takeover, but patient negotiations resulted in the
peaceful surrender of the attackers without further bloodshed.
Political extremism has become more violent since then, and a bloodier
version of the Hanafi siege could occur.
conclusions
What conclusions can be drawn from this brief survey of history?
A Mumbai-style attack is conceivable in the United States,
although probably not one at anywhere near the scale of the
2008 assault in India.
In the terrorists' current operating environment, it would
be difficult to export a 10-man assault team from Pakistan or
another location in the Middle East, North Africa, or South
Asia. The jihadist terrorist enterprise has not been able to
launch a significant terrorist operation in the West since
2005.
It is hard to imagine that a terrorist attack on the scale
of the Mumbai attack that was traced back to Pakistan or any
other country would not result in serious consequences for that
country's government.
There is at present no known terrorist group in the United
States that has the organization and human resources to
assemble an operation of the complexity and scale of the Mumbai
attack.
Smaller-scale armed assaults have been contemplated by home-
grown terrorists, although these plans have been immature.
The most likely Mumbai-style scenario would involve one to
several shooters, who could produce significant casualties. The
Oslo attack underscores the killing capacity of one determined
individual.
American law enforcement is much better prepared than local
police in Mumbai to respond to active-shooter scenarios.
An armed assault combined with hostages at multiple
locations would present the greatest challenge.