    [House Hearing, 113 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                           CHINA'S MARITIME AND OTHER
                               GEOGRAPHIC THREATS

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   BEFORE THE

             SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE, EURASIA, AND EMERGING THREATS

                                     OF THE

                          COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                        ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                   __________

                                OCTOBER 30, 2013

                                   __________

                               Serial No. 113-103

                                   __________

            Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

    Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/
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                          COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

                     EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman
    CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey     ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
    ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida         ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
    DANA ROHRABACHER, California             Samoa
    STEVE CHABOT, Ohio                   BRAD SHERMAN, California
    JOE WILSON, South Carolina           GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
    MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas             ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
    TED POE, Texas                       GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
    MATT SALMON, Arizona                 THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
    TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania             BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
    JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina          KAREN BASS, California
    ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois             WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
    MO BROOKS, Alabama                   DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
    TOM COTTON, Arkansas                 ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
    PAUL COOK, California                JUAN VARGAS, California
    GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina       BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois
    RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas            JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III,
    SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania                Massachusetts
    STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas                AMI BERA, California
    RON DeSANTIS, Florida                ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California
    TREY RADEL, Florida                  GRACE MENG, New York
    DOUG COLLINS, Georgia                LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
    MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina         TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
    TED S. YOHO, Florida                 JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
    LUKE MESSER, Indiana

         Amy Porter, Chief of Staff      Thomas Sheehy, Staff Director

                   Jason Steinbaum, Democratic Staff Director
                                     ------

             Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, and Emerging Threats

                     DANA ROHRABACHER, California, Chairman
    TED POE, Texas                       WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
    TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania             GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
    JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina          ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
    PAUL COOK, California                BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
    GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina       ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California
    STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page

                                   WITNESSES

    Perry Pickert, Ph.D., retired career intelligence officer........     7
    Peter Sandby-Thomas, Ph.D., visiting lecturer of political
      science, University of Massachusetts Dartmouth.................    14
    Mr. Rick Fisher, senior fellow, Asian Military Affairs,
      International Assessment and Strategy Center...................    19
    Mr. Steven Mosher, director, Population Research Institute.......    31

              LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING

    The Honorable Dana Rohrabacher, a Representative in Congress from
      the State of California, and chairman, Subcommittee on Europe,
      Eurasia, and Emerging Threats: Prepared statement..............     4
    Perry Pickert, Ph.D.: Prepared statement.........................    11
    Peter Sandby-Thomas, Ph.D.: Prepared statement...................    16
    Mr. Rick Fisher: Prepared statement..............................    21
    Mr. Steven Mosher: Prepared statement............................    34

                                    APPENDIX

    Hearing notice...................................................    48
    Hearing minutes..................................................    49
    The Honorable Ted Poe, a Representative in Congress from the
      State of Texas:
      Prepared statement.............................................    50
      Questions submitted for the record and written responses from:.
          Peter Sandby-Thomas, Ph.D..................................    51
          Perry Pickert, Ph.D........................................    53
          Mr. Rick Fisher............................................    54

                 CHINA'S MARITIME AND OTHER GEOGRAPHIC THREATS

                                  ----------

                          WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 30, 2013

                           House of Representatives,

             Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, and Emerging Threats,

                         Committee on Foreign Affairs,

                                Washington, DC.

        The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 o'clock
    a.m., in room 2255 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Dana
    Rohrabacher (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
        Mr. Rohrabacher. Good morning. The hearing is convened. And
    I recognize myself for an opening statement. Red China--and I
    don't hesitate to call it Red China--is the threat of the 21st
    Century. Since its birth as a Communist country 64 years ago
    this month, untold misery has befallen the world's most
    populous nation. Millions were killed in establishing their
    Marxist-Leninist dictatorship. And millions have been killed
    since then, millions killed, for example, in the Cultural
    Revolution of 50 years ago, and in the regular repression
    since. Today its extravagant claims do not allow for autonomy
    of belief or systems unless those systems are within their own
    control of the dictators in Beijing. It has established a
    concerted effort against any religion that does not worship at
    the altar of Mao, be it any flavor of Buddhism, Christianity,
    or other faiths. The Falun Gong and the Uighurs have been
    singled out for special persecution.
        Some perhaps believe that Mao is a harmless print on a
    poster or a t-shirt. In reality, Mao joins the ranks of Hitler
    and Stalin as the 20th Century's worst characters in butchering
    millions of his fellow citizens.
        One of our witnesses, Steve Mosher, in his book, ``Hegemon:
    China's Plan to Dominate Asia and the World'' quotes Mao
    telling a stunned Khrushchev, ``So what if we lose 300 million
    people? Our women will make up for it in a generation.''
        Lest one think Mao a dusty old historical anachronism,
    foreign policy columnist Fareed Zakaria, if I got that right,
    in the Washington Post October 24th, ``It appears that the
    party is choosing older Mao methods of crackdown, public
    confessions, and purification campaigns.'' What exactly does
    that mean?
        There are millions of prisoners of conscience today in
    labor camps in China according to a new report by the Center
    for International Media Assistance, where the National
    Endowment for Democracy, ``China's media environment remains
    one of the world's most restrictive in 2012.''
        Crimes such as rumor mongering on the internet can land one
    in indefinite detention. Authorities censor and harass
    international reporters or deny their visa applications or
    renewals. Physical attacks on foreign media members are a
    disturbing and a growing trend. And their long reach extends
    overseas. One of our witnesses today, Steve Mosher, had his
    promising academic career in the United States as the first
    American social scientist allowed to carry out field work in
    Mao's China. It was derailed over some outspoken criticism of
    China some years ago.
        Today we look at China's external posture toward its
    bordering states. That is the purpose of this hearing. But
    China has menaced, threatened, and even attempted to absorb its
    neighbors, notably Tibet and Taiwan, and has clashes with
    virtually every bordering state. The subcommittee will examine
    China's threatening maritime and territorial claims.
        For those who attempted to dismiss the thought of a threat
    as being an overstatement, let's not forget that China expanded
    its land mass by 50 percent when it invaded and occupied Tibet
    in the 1950s. Notice the disturbing pattern.
        If China borders you or borders water that is anywhere near
    you, let's say the Pacific Ocean, it will assert every
    conceivable claim to wrest your sovereignty or territory from
    you, including threats, provocations, stunts, protests, and
    gunboat diplomacy, all while whining in the international
    forums that are available to it about its treatment, about how
    they're being treated. This is to say nothing of its routine
    conduct in international affairs: Industrial espionage; piracy;
    forced organ transplants by religious practitioners that it has
    murdered; IP violations; currency manipulation; and even bad
    and deadly dog food, I might add.
        In the New York Times magazine's Sunday, October 27th, in
    an article entitled, ``A Game of Shark and Minnow,'' the author
    writes,

            ``China's currently in disputes with several of its
            neighbors. And the Chinese, having become decidedly
            more willing to wield a heavy stick, there is a growing
            sense that they have been waiting for a long time to
            flex their muscles. And that time has finally
            arrived.''

        Again, Farad Zakaria writes that, ``Diplomats have worried
    that China has been circulating new maps of the region in which
    a previously dotted demarcation line that China claims in the
    South China Sea,'' instead of a dotted line, it now is a solid
    line. This is far from a new problem. Yet, the situation has
    not reserved the scrutiny that it does seriously deserve.
        After a trip to the region, I reported to the House in late
    1998, ``The pattern of Chinese naval bases in the Spratly,''
    meaning the Spratly Islands, ``shows an encircling strategy of
    energy-rich islands and intimidating military presence along
    the vital sea route.'' I argued then ``The U.S. Government must
    end its silence about the Chinese military buildup in the
    Spratly.'' Multiple administrations and Secretaries of State
    have, unfortunately, thought since then that we cannot disturb
    our second largest trading partner or that the situation they
    would hope will improve on its own.
        Worse yet, the New York Times magazine piece reports, ``The
    Americans pointedly refused to take sides in the sovereignty
    disputes.'' The magazine correctly notes, ``China's behavior as
    it becomes more powerful along with the freedom of navigation
    and control over the South China sea lanes, which are being
    threatened, will be among the major global political issues of
    the 21st Century.''
        I would argue that to believe China's apparent expansionism
    is accidental or inevitable sells our adversary short. And we
    helped create this monster, this threat, by granting a
    permanent normal trade relations with what was then and still
    is the world's worse human rights abuser. This is something we
    never did with the Soviet Union. We never granted most favored
    nation status with the Soviet Union. And that is why Soviet
    communism went down and why dictatorship in China has emerged
    as a great threat to all of us, not just its own people.
        There is a longstanding deliberate strategy in China to
    expand, provoke, challenge, and ultimately dominate the region
    and then the world. Stephanie Kleine-Ahlbrandt, the director of
    the Asia-Pacific programs at the United States Institute of
    Peace, said, ``Nothing in China happens overnight. Any move you
    see was planned and prepared for years, if not more. So,
    obviously, this maritime issue is very important to China.''
        Our witnesses today paint a bleak and compelling picture.
    Steve Mosher has written prolifically on our topic today. Perry
    Pickert describes China playing a far more sophisticated game
    of statecraft than what we are playing. And Rick Fisher states
    succinctly, ``We are in a cold war with China.'' Far from
    minding its own business, as a good neighbor, China--and that
    is what they would do if they were minding their own business.
    China, instead, is an international menace with grand designs.
    Marxism may be on its last ash heap of a history, but Marxist-
    oriented one-party rule tragically has characterized China for
    more than 60 years.
        Our Pentagon's announced strategy of a strategic pivot to
    Asia will be hollow if we are not clear about the main threat
    in this theater. Its maritime claims are dubious. Its grand
    designs must be opposed by the free world if peace is to be
    preserved.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Rohrabacher follows:]

                                  ----------

        Mr. Rohrabacher. And, with that, I would ask my ranking
    member for his opening statement.
        Mr. Keating. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding
    this hearing. I would like to thank you and thank all of our
    witnesses for appearing today.
        I will make note that one of the witnesses is Dr. Peter
    Sandby-Thomas, a visiting professor from University of
    Massachusetts in my own district. And I appreciate your being
    here today, as I appreciate all of the witnesses for being here
    today and look forward to your testimony.
        We are joined by Representative Lowenthal. Welcome.
        The United States has a clear national interest in
    promoting the peaceful resolution of maritime and other
    territorial disputes in Asia. Since World War II, the United
    States has played the leading role in maintaining peace and
    stability in the Pacific. It is, therefore, appropriate that
    the United States have an active and direct role in resolving
    the disputes in the South and East China Seas. Yet, we must be
    sure that our policies and actions do not inadvertently
    heighten regional tensions.
        China's maritime and territorial disputes with its
    neighbors date back to conflicts of the Nineteenth and 20th
    Centuries. Most were seriously exacerbated by the tensions of
    the Cold War. In addition, most of these disputes have deep
    historical roots and are fought with bitter emotion. Achieving
    their peaceful resolution will not be easy. It is, therefore,
    essential that the United States continue to support a
    collaborative process free of aggression, coercion, or the
    threat of force amongst all parties involved. This will require
    patience, perseverance, and deft diplomacy on our part, even as
    tensions in the region continue to escalate.
        The United States has made clear it will uphold our
    security commitments and treaty allies and partners in the
    region. And we will make sure that we are strong in stating
    that. Now is not the right time to change that tact. In that
    regard, continued U.S. support for the development of a
    multilateral code of conduct between China and the association
    in southeast Asian nations is essential. A binding code of
    conduct would considerably reduce tensions in this region.
        I applaud the administration's effort to ensure freedom of
    the navigational rights in this region as well as new
    initiatives to help allies and partners strengthen their
    capacity to patrol and administer their territorial waters. I
    am, however, concerned over the impact that across-the-board
    budget cuts and related uncertainty will have on these
    important programs and U.S. projection in the region. I look
    forward to hearing our panelists' views on the immediacy of the
    threat posed by maritime disputes and the effectiveness of the
    U.S. policies in the region along with your own thoughts on how
    the United States might more effectively press claimants to
    peacefully resolve their differences.
        With that, I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Rohrabacher. We are joined by Mr. Lowenthal, but, Mr.
    Stockman, do you have an opening statement?
        Mr. Stockman. Just briefly. To our detriment, in the 1940s,
    we ignored Asia and didn't pay attention to it. And I think
    that was obvious when Pearl Harbor happened. Well,
    theoretically it caught us by surprise. And now again we seem
    to be putting the Asia problems on the back burner.
        When we visited with the Prime Minister from Japan, he
    expressed concern that America is losing its interest in Asia
    and its will to defend Asia and our allies, such as Japan. I
    also remember in 2008, the Olympics. One young man got up and
    screamed out,--this was in Tiananmen Square--``We are a nation
    of slaves. Where is America?'' And he was hauled off.
        And the reporter glibly said, ``Well, we don't know
    whatever happened to that young man.'' I think it is high time
    that we take more of a look at what is going on in Asia and be
    more sensitive and be more alert. I think down the road, by not
    following that path, we are going to end up in big trouble. And
    it will be very much like 9/11, where we wonder what happened,
    where were we. It will catch us off guard. Why didn't we
    connect the dots? Well, the dots are all there. We need to
    connect them.
        And I appreciate these gentlemen coming forward today and
    actually connecting the dots. And this is going to be part of
    the record that we are going to have. So when we look back on
    it, we can look at this record. And a lot of you will probably
    say, ``We told you so.'' So I appreciate you coming out today
    and giving your testimony. And I yield back the balance.
        Mr. Pickert. No. I am just pleased to be here.
        Mr. Lowenthal. I am pleased he is here, too.
        Mr. Rohrabacher. All right. Thank you, Mr. Lowenthal.
        Our witnesses, we have some very significant witnesses
    today. And what I am going to do is ask, with permission of the
    panel, that we place their very lengthy backgrounds and their
    credentials into the record. And so if we could just put their
    bios in the record? I am just going to announce them. And then
    we will proceed. And I would ask that you would be giving us
    about 5 minutes and then the rest of your testimony for the
    record. And then we will have some questions and answers.
        So first we have Mr. Perry Pickert. He is a Ph.D. and a
    retired intelligence officer and I guess a very continuing
    intelligent person. So, Doctor, would you please proceed? And
    then we will introduce the other witnesses. And your lengthy
    bio will be made a part of the record.
        Mr. Pickert. Thank you very much for inviting me.

    STATEMENT OF PERRY PICKERT, PH.D., RETIRED CAREER INTELLIGENCE
                                OFFICER

        Mr. Pickert. But I wonder how we can wake up my PowerPoint,
    which has been put to sleep. I will start. They should be able
    to push a button and turn on the computer, but I don't know
    what happened.
        Mr. Rohrabacher. Has someone hacked into our system?
        Mr. Pickert. Yes. The Chinese are here already and shutting
    me out. But I will begin anyway without the PowerPoint. I can
    run through it fairly quickly.
        Mr. Rohrabacher. It has showing up on a television set.
        Mr. Pickert. The term ``Great Game'' was coined in the
    early 18th Century to describe the strategy and tactics to
    protect India, the jewel of the crown of the British Empire,
    from a rising Russia. Beginning with Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen
    Points, the United States has advocated substituting universal
    international organizations and the rule of law for the great
    power competition and war.
        President Obama at the U.N. General Assembly this fall,
    stepping into the stage of one of the Great Games of this
    century, said, ``There is no Great Game to be won.''
        In this century, the United Nations system provides the
    normative and institutional structure for relations as well as
    the language of diplomacy. While Russia, China, and the United
    States have never fought a war against each other, the United
    Nations have provided the legal rationale and cover for actions
    of their military and clandestine services.
        This morning, I will survey the strategic landscape in Asia
    focused on a rising China's territorial claims and the
    implications for the United States. China and Russia view the
    world from a long-term perspective of the Russians as a
    chessboard, and the Chinese play Go.
        Mr. Rohrabacher. There you got it [referring to PowerPoint
    presentation].
        Mr. Pickert. I got it up but not connected to this yet.
    There we go. Now we have got it. Now it should work.
        I will use the traditional Chinese game of Go, which is
    played by placing stones on a board, black and white stones.
    They are not like chess pieces, which can go anywhere, but they
    essentially capture territory. Territory in this game is really
    the space between points, and the Go pieces are placed on the
    intersection of the squares.
        Traditional China is at the center of its own universe and
    over the centuries has grown from a very small tribe in central
    China to the outside. Its international relations were handled
    as family relations. And the outlying princes were ruled as if
    in a family, with the closer relatives closer and the further
    relatives further away. But on the outside, we're the
    barbarians who were ruled liked dogs, being rewarded and
    punished with bones, rewards; and sticks. The Ming dynasty
    extended throughout the whole of East Asia and established a
    system of tribute whereby the rituals of kowtowing and coming
    to the center with presents. Today the center is a U.N. General
    Assembly in New York, every year from October until December.
        Now, if you look at this map, we will go to look at the
    Senkaku Islands, which are the first territorial dispute. You
    will notice they can hardly be seen on this map. That
    exaggerates their size drastically. This is what the Senkakus
    look like in the picture. There are three small little islands.
        In Go terms, this would be played as a three-sided game of
    Go with a space. This game is almost completely finished. The
    contesting space out there now is the blank spaces between the
    lines. And those are called points. So that there is no real
    territory as ground. It is territorial space.
        This is what Taiwan looks at from this perspective. You can
    hardly find Quemoy and Matsu on a map, but you can see Taiwan
    off of the islands, a distance of the straits away. As a Go
    problem, this is the Goggle map of Quemoy and Matsu. It is on
    Google because it is Taiwanese territory and, therefore, is
    open to the word--but it is, you will see, completely
    surrounded on three sides, leaving only one open. In Go terms,
    this is called atari. When you bring someone into position
    where they are about to be surrounded, you are supposed to
    inform your opponent that they are in atari. Generally it is
    not necessary to put another stone there because you don't need
    to finish that off. You have got that territory able to be
    captured by one stone.
        These are fuel air explosives shot from artillery rounds in
    Syria today. The reason I say, ``Welcome to Grozny'' is that
    with this method, after Putin got tired of having an
    inconclusive battle in Chechnya, he used fuel air explosives to
    essentially level the town in 2000. Fuel air explosives are
    like napalm, which is blown by artillery shells. It spreads out
    and then is ignited after the cloud is lighted. That not only
    makes a big explosion, but it also sucks out the oxygen from
    the area. And, of course, they could use fewer explosives to
    blow Quemoy off the face of the Earth in 2 seconds.
        These are China's maritime claims in the South China Sea.
    In this case, the empty spaces usually are the specks out in
    the middle of the lake, which are the essentially disputed
    islands. The far red line shows where the disputes are. Viewed
    it as a Go game, you will see that these are the six parties
    about to contest over a little spot in there. The Chinese way
    of handling this will be to do it bilaterally, waiting for
    weakness on the part of one side, then taking the space.
        This is the Chinese latest surface-to-sir intermediate-
    range ballistic missile. It has a fuel air explosive warhead
    and is called the aircraft carrier killer because, in fact, if
    it hit right on the aircraft carrier, it would be able to kill
    everyone on it and surround, and that would be the end of it.
    Of course, it is really just a big SCUD. And the Russians and
    the Chinese do not use single missile tactics. They use mass
    tactics. So they would fire eight to ten of these. This is the
    range of the missile, the intermediate ones. And that shows the
    range of all of the other. In the game of Go, this would
    essentially put the entire area that we were talking about
    under the range of non-nuclear ballistic missiles that can be
    fired. And they are mobile. So we have no clue where they are.
    And a response is preempted by the longer range potential of
    nuclear missiles which as you can see can hit the United States
    easily.
        This is the Tibetan Plateau. And you can see on this map
    that the center, the one little corner, of Tibet is the source
    of all of the rivers of Southwest Asia: India, China, Vietnam,
    Burma. The Chinese tactic with respect to this is to dam part
    of these rivers up in China. So at any time, they can simply
    turn off the water for Southeast Asia or let it out, causing
    floods. They have a series of dams in China. And there are
    quite a few dams that are built in cooperation with the other
    countries, which they are sponsoring.
        The India-China border is the furthest west. This is an
    area where the Go strategy is to ``seize the high ground.''
    It's not really necessary for them to have forces on the area
    and if they were at Aksai Chin, they would be up at about
    14,000 feet needing oxygen equipment. So nobody ever actually
    sits up there, but they have skirmishes all of the time.
        Now we will turn to the U.N. system as a place for the
    competition of the Chinese world view. First you can see that
    the Russians also have a view of the U.N. That is the U.N. flag
    with a hammer and a sickle and the territory that they used to
    think they controlled. This is the way the Chinese view the
    U.N. system as they expand their influence over it.
        Now I will go through the specific organs of the U.N., but
    I am going to drop the Go analogy because it is a little
    complicated. The General Assembly is what I would call ``liars'
    poker.'' If you look on there, you will see Khrushchev with his
    boot on the table. He, of course, actually had two very fine
    Italian shoes on at the time and brought that along only as a
    prop. He didn't take off his shoe and pound it on the table.
    And Deng Xiaoping announced his strategy for the next 20 years.
    I will be through in 2 seconds here.
        The Security Council is strip poker. You go in, think one
    thing. And by the time that the Russians and Chinese get
    finished with the resolution, you get another.
        The Shanghai Cooperative Organization was created by the
    Chinese and the Russians for central Asia. You can see its logo
    is essentially the trace of Mongol Empire. I call this the KGB
    officers' and agents' traveling crap game.
        The Law of the Sea Convention has been signed by China and
    Russia. And the U.S. is not a member. So we don't participate.
    This will show you how the U.N. system allows you to stretch to
    the Pacific where you can see the Law of the Sea pioneer
    investors, the Chinese, the Russians, and the French, having
    staked out territory at the bottom of the ocean. The competing
    claim is the Clipperton Island claim, which the U.S. has based
    on the economic zone.
        Finally, my conclusion is how do you capture Kim's gun,
    which is in Lahore, Pakistan? And the answer is to recruit the
    Lama--as you see, he was sitting there--because you control the
    space by having the person who was controlling the person on
    the space.
        And this was Kipling's statement about the Great Game, the
    final bottom line, ``When everyone is dead, the Great Game is
    finished,'' not as we have seen the American view that it has
    been subsumed into the U.N. system.
        Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Pickert follows:]

                                  ----------

        Mr. Rohrabacher. We are going to now go to the last witness
    because he happens to be the witness who was invited by the
    ranking member, and I would like Ranking Member Gideon to
    introduce his witness today.
        Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I won't go into great detail because time is precious
    today, but I do thank Dr. Sandby-Thomas for joining us today
    and to testify on these issues. I do think his own expertise
    will be self-evident. And, rather than delay with an
    introduction, I will just introduce Dr. Sandby-Thomas. Thank
    you.

     STATEMENT OF PETER SANDBY-THOMAS, PH.D., VISITING LECTURER OF
        POLITICAL SCIENCE, UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS DARTMOUTH

        Mr. Sandby-Thomas. All right. Thank you.
        Chairman Rohrabacher, Ranking Member Keating, members of
    the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify before
    the Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia, and Emerging Threats on
    this topic of vital national and geopolitical significance.
        Sort of to frame the discussion, I think it is important to
    consider the question of whether China's recent behavior, both
    maritime and beyond, should be construed as a threat. In sort
    of making that point, the purpose is to draw attention to the
    fact that China is emerging as a reasonable and possibly global
    power. And so in such a context, it is necessary to determine
    what types of behavior and conduct are justifiable and
    commensurate with this increasing power when you clarify this
    and do not provide the benefit in terms of assessing China's
    behavior in terms of what's threatening and what is, say,
    permissible.
        If we turn to China's military capabilities, it is clear
    that they have expanded rapidly in recent years. And that is
    aided in large part through a concerted effort to allocate
    increasing budget spending toward their military. And if we
    looked sort of within this, you can see that the People's
    Liberation Army has navy capabilities. They have been notably
    expanded. You have seen sort of significant milestones in terms
    of China's first aircraft carrier, plans for a second one, sort
    of details indicating that they have other sort of high-tech
    equipment, sort of guided missile destroyers, et cetera, et
    cetera. One of the aspects of this is that it is not always
    entirely clear how to determine the veracity of such reports,
    which in and of itself can be perceived as an issue in terms of
    transparency. And sometimes that leaves a void that gets filled
    by increased speculation.
        But, regardless of that, I think it seems clear that the
    navy is rapidly developing and is on course to be the dominant
    maritime power in east Asia. The time frame is not exactly
    clear, but it seems within the next 10 to 20 years. There
    doesn't appear to be another rival that is capable of sort of
    challenging it. The only sort of reasonable one would be Japan,
    but it is obviously sort of hobbled by constitutional
    restrictions.
        At this point, I think, though, the focus is often sort of
    solely on the hardware. And that is, of course, important, but
    it is also important to consider sort of how seaworthy China's
    vessels are. That is not exactly clear. These things aren't
    obviously battle-tested. They also have a limited schedule of
    sea operations. And I think another aspect to consider is, say,
    the sort of quality of the mariners that China has. Again, that
    is something that can be put down to a lack of practice,
    certainly when you compare it to, say, the U.S. naval
    capabilities.
        Nevertheless, the expansion of naval capabilities has
    raised concerns, particularly over China's intentions. And this
    has led to, you know, a different--I was drawing different
    conclusions. Some make the point that this expansion
    definitively reflects an intention to exert regional dominance.
    And I think that this--it is not obviously something that can
    necessarily be ruled out.
        Certainly, you know, why does China invest all of this
    money and certainly equipment if it doesn't intend to use it?
    That is certainly the prevailing logic. But I think the more
    lightly explanation is that China's strategy, certainly in the
    near to medium term, is primarily defensive in nature, rather
    than offensive.
        If we look at the region that it is located in, it is
    corrupted by, say, a number of conflicting and competing
    challenges. It is a region that is filled with historical
    grievances. You have competing powers, such as Australia also
    has a naval fleet. And Japan has impressive capabilities, even
    if, to a degree, limited. You also have, say, unpredictable
    actors that are in the region. And so the conclusion that I
    would draw is that China's naval expansion would appear to be
    more geared toward ensuring their own territorial security as
    well as ensuring that sea lanes of communication remain open
    for commercial interests.
        And while this assessment does run counter to prevailing
    orthodoxy and it is clear that in the past few years, a label
    of ``assertive'' has been attached to China, particularly with
    regards to the East China and South China Seas and while the
    nature of this claim I think is, say, ambiguous, sort of
    elastic, if you will, isn't clearly grounded, I think you can
    look that China's behavior in these situations has not
    significantly deviated from past practices. You can argue that
    there has been provocation on the part of others. So other
    actors need to be taken into account.
        And I think you can make the point that, you know, China
    has been, say, more forthright in pressing its own claims, but
    whether--I don't think that you can argue in both cases that
    the claims are significantly new. Generally China uses a
    designation of core national interest to determine if it
    regards a particular territory as non-negotiable. And that has
    not been the case on both the Senkaku/Diaoyu Island dispute or
    the dispute in the South China Seas.
        So, because of time, I will sort of wrap up and just say in
    terms of implications for the U.S. in these regional
    developments, the particular concern seems to be, say, a
    security point of view. I think that you can make sort of
    arguments about sort of the assertiveness of China's behavior,
    but, regardless of that, I think the dispute between China and
    Japan appears to be the more serious. I don't think that the
    intention is to engage in conflict, but it is clear that there
    are increased Chinese incursions, increased Japanese responses.
    And so that increases the likelihood or the potentiality for
    some sort of conflict. And obviously that, then, brings in the
    U.S. and its security obligations. In terms of the South China
    Sea, it seems that negotiated compromise is more likely and
    possible and something that the U.S. should certainly press
    for.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Sandby-Thomas follows:]

                                  ----------

        Mr. Rohrabacher. Well, thank you very much. And we will
    have questions for the panel as we finish our testimony. Next
    we have Rick Fisher, who is a senior fellow, Asian Military
    Affairs at the International Assessment and Strategy Center, as
    well as a lengthy bio as well, which will be submitted for the
    record.
        Mr. Fisher, you may proceed with your testimony.

      STATEMENT OF MR. RICK FISHER, SENIOR FELLOW, ASIAN MILITARY
         AFFAIRS, INTERNATIONAL ASSESSMENT AND STRATEGY CENTER

        Mr. Fisher. Chairman Rohrabacher, Ranking Member Keating,
    and distinguished members of this subcommittee, I would also
    like to thank you for this privilege to offer testimony to aid
    your deliberations. I would also like to offer my compliment to
    your leadership in looking beyond Europe and Eurasia to examine
    concerns with China.
        Just 2 weeks ago, I was called to address a NATO
    parliamentary committee on Chinese military modernization. And
    my experience at this meeting was that, indeed, there is great
    concern, especially when considering how China is pursuing its
    territorial claims in a way that is increasing the chances for
    conflict, either accidental or by design. I will just offer
    that just this past weekend, the Japanese Air Force had to
    scramble three times 3 days in a row to intercept threatening
    Chinese bombers that were conducting coordinated ship,
    submarine, and aircraft anti-ship exercises south of the
    Sakashima Islands, which if the Chinese ever succeed in
    grabbing the Senkaku Islands will be the next meal on the menu.
        In my testimony, I try to describe how China is building a
    force to achieve regional dominance. I estimate that absent a
    countervailing effort by the United States and its allies, that
    China could have its regional dominance by early in the next
    decade. This dominance is going to be expressed not just in
    hardware, expansive space control, missiles, expanded regional
    nuclear forces, fourth and fifth generation aircraft, naval
    forces with multiple aircraft carriers, a large amphibious
    projection capability, but China will practice and will have
    the skills to use this hardware to achieve its aims.
        Japan, of course, as I mentioned, is the target of the
    moment. Since the Japanese Government moved to purchase the
    Senkaku Islands in the Summer of 2012, a move which we have
    just found out was designed to try to ameliorate conflict with
    Beijing, the Chinese have put on an expanded paramilitary
    campaign to try to intimidate Japan into making concessions. It
    is not going to work. And my prediction is that the Japanese
    are going to rearm significantly because of this pressure and
    we will have a much more dangerous and more well-armed East
    China Sea by the end of this decade.
        But China probably believes that it can have more success
    in the South China Sea. It is succeeding in the last year in
    pushing the Philippines away from areas near its economic
    exclusion zone. Mr. Chairman, as you pointed out, in a recent
    New York Times article, Chinese Coast Guard ships are trying to
    dissuade the Philippines from supplying men on a beached LST on
    the Second Thomas Shoal.
        In the future, China is going to be building the means for
    global power projection. And it is going to be able to weigh in
    on other people's, other countries' territorial disputes. I
    would just offer that this year, I was able to find out by
    visiting arm shows that Argentina and China are considering the
    co-production of a Chinese fighter, a fighter that could be
    armed with a new Chinese hypersonic missile at a speed at which
    you can't shoot it down. China fully supports Argentina's claim
    to the Falklands. By the next decade, by the end of the next
    decade, will China be able to send aircraft carriers or
    amphibious groups to respond to a British attempt to defend the
    Falklands again?
        I conclude by noting that while the Obama administration's
    recent pivot to Asia over the last 2 to 3 years has been
    welcomed in the region, the momentum that the administration
    has built up is being undermined significantly by uncertainty
    surrounding our ability to pay for new programs to make good on
    our pledges and continue to ensure pledges that we have made to
    our allies, our military allies. We are not able to afford
    aerial exercises that we have planned. We are threatening to
    cut back our number of carrier battle groups and eliminate
    whole types of combat aircraft. This is very disturbing. And it
    will only encourage the Chinese to press harder.
        I believe we can deter China. I think we have it within our
    capability to encourage our allies to join a regional
    information-sharing network: Radar, space assets and the such,
    and then eventually tie this network to new ballistic missile
    capabilities: Short-range and medium-range systems that perhaps
    we share with our allies, intermediate-range systems that we
    deploy ourselves. If we can prove to China that, like on Dr.
    Pickert's Go board, that if they use their Navy, they can lose
    their Navy, then we can sustain deterrence and suggest to our
    Chinese friends that violence will not pay.
        Thank you very much.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Fisher follows:]

                                  ----------

        Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much for that testimony. We
    now have Steven Mosher, director of the Population Research
    Institute. And, again, all of our witnesses have lengthy
    resumes that will be included in the record.
        Go right ahead, Mr. Mosher.

     STATEMENT OF MR. STEVEN MOSHER, DIRECTOR, POPULATION RESEARCH
                               INSTITUTE

        Mr. Mosher. Well, I commend the chairman, Chairman
    Rohrabacher and Ranking Member Keating, for holding this timely
    hearing. As Rick just mentioned, there have recently been
    renewed incursions by Chinese assets into Japanese territorial
    waters around the Senkakus and the Ryukyus in general, and I
    would note that a top Chinese general has actually questioned
    the legitimacy of Japanese claims, not just to the tiny
    Senkakus but to the entire Ryukyu Island chain, including
    Okinawa with its U.S. military bases. And knowing the situation
    in China, knowing that people rarely speak out of turn without
    being punished, I take such warnings, such suggestions by
    Chinese generals as tantamount to diplomatic announcements.
        Seemingly, everywhere we look, we see evidence of China's
    increasing aggressiveness. And I think it is past time to ask.
    I think, as the former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld did
    many years ago, why this ongoing military buildup when China
    faces no external threat? Why these provocative acts? What,
    after all, does China want? I think to suggest that Australia
    somehow poses a military threat to China is vastly overstating
    rather underpopulated Australia's desire to defend its own
    territorial waters from a country which now is in the process
    of trying to annex the entire South China Sea, which is a
    territorial claim roughly equivalent to as if Nazi Germany had
    declared before the outset of the conflict in World War II that
    it owned the entire Mediterranean. I mean, it is an
    extraordinary territorial claim.
        In May this year, Chinese troops intruded nearly 12 miles
    into Indian territory. It withdrew only after India agreed to
    withdraw its own troops from the area. And so this high-
    altitude border dispute continues to simmer. The Indian Prime
    Minister is going to China, to Beijing, in a couple of days,
    apparently to sign a border cooperation agreement on Chinese
    terms, which I believe is what one Indian analyst called an
    exercise in course of military diplomacy, or bullying in short.
        China is sowing new seeds of conflict by continuing to
    expand its military presence in the South China Sea, where I
    know, Mr. Chairman, you have been personally. Last year, it
    seized the Scarborough Shoal, which lies off the coast of the
    Philippines, by force. When the Philippines protested, the PRC
    reacted by saying that the Philippines' claims were illegal and
    that it would never agree to international arbitrary over the
    shoal or any other claims. Now, that is important because the
    Philippines is now seeking U.N. assistance against China. And
    we, at least the current administration, seem to be extremely
    reluctant to back U.S. allies in the face of Chinese
    aggression. We have only said in the person of U.S. Secretary
    of State John Kerry that all countries have a right to seek
    arbitration to resolve competing territorial claims. We have
    not vigorously backed the obvious claim of the Philippines to
    territory which lies very close to its own homeland.
        I see China's behavior as reflecting something fundamental
    about the Chinese Party state. A government that rules its own
    people by brute force--we all remember Tiananmen--is naturally
    inclined to treat its smaller, weaker neighbors the same way,
    especially if they were, as in the past, tributary states of
    China. I think this accounts, in part, for the palpable disdain
    with which it treats the other claimants in the South China Sea
    dispute, including Vietnam and the Philippines, both of which
    have stronger claims for the Spratlies and Paracels than does
    China itself.
        I would also add to the death toll that you, Mr. Chairman,
    mentioned at the outset of this hearing in your remarks, to the
    death toll caused by the one-party dictatorship that rules
    China, we must add the 400 million eliminated by China's
    infamous one-child policy. I was an eyewitness to women being
    arrested and forced to be aborted at 7, 8, and 9 months of
    pregnancy in China in 1980. And those atrocities, those kinds
    of atrocities still continue today.
        Only the continued presence of U.S. assets, the U.S.
    Seventh Fleet in the Far East, stays China's hand. China has
    actually suggested that we withdraw to Hawaii and cede
    everything west of Hawaii to China. There is little doubt if
    that happened that China would then occupy the remaining
    islands in the South China Sea by force, ejecting the garrisons
    of other nations, and begin to demand the ships transiting its
    ``interior waters'' would first seek permission to do so or run
    the risk of being boarded and quarantined. This is actually now
    the official policy of the Chinese Government as of last
    November. Beijing announced last November that Chinese
    authorities will board and seize control of foreign ships that
    ``illegally enter'' the area that he claims is part of the
    Province of Henan. That is the entire area inside the 9-line.
        Now, seizing ships in international waters is an act of war
    under international law. I believe that China has been clear
    about its intentions in this regard.
        We could talk about continued double digit increases in the
    PLA's budget. We could talk about other new capabilities. But I
    am really less worried about China's capabilities than its
    intentions. I am concerned that China, which lacks transparency
    in terms of its military budget and in stating its intentions,
    is only emboldened by our careful and measured and nuanced and
    oftentimes too quiet response to acts of aggression. I think
    that emboldens the Chinese leadership and open society relies
    on comprehensive and accurate information to inform both its
    citizens and its allies of the common threats that they face.
        I believe we need another commission. And I realize there
    are a couple of commissions that serve to alert us to
    happenings in China now. But I believe we need another
    commission that focuses specifically on China's intentions.
    There is a precedent for that. I served on the U.S. Commission
    on Broadcasting for the PRC back in the '90s, which
    specifically looked at the question of whether or not we needed
    a radio-free broadcast system broadcasting into China news and
    information that was denied the Chinese people themselves by
    their state-censored media. The answer that we on the
    commission reached was yes, we did need such a broadcasting
    service. And it does yeoman work today.
        I believe we need another commission to look specifically
    at China's intentions. It would review; evaluate; and, if
    necessary, correct any understatements that are reached by
    other intelligence agencies. Such a check on the current
    administration consensus on China would be invaluable. Such
    reviews proved to be such during the Soviet era when a number
    of independent commissions reviewed Soviet military
    capabilities and intentions. This way we can get a timely,
    independent assessment of China's military intentions because
    in a few years, it will have the hardware it needs to undertake
    aggression, both in Asia and in different parts of the world.
    It is vital that we understand now before it gets that hardware
    how they intend to use it.
        Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Mosher follows:]

                                  ----------

        Mr. Rohrabacher. I would like to thank all of my witnesses,
    all of our witnesses, today. And what we will have now is just
    some questions and answers. All right. And that is good. All
    right. As my staff recommends, I would suggest that I would
    like--well, first of all, let me just note this for the record.
    Our subcommittee focuses on Europe and Asia, central Asia, but
    it also in its definition talks about emerging threats.
        That is why we are here today. This is part of a discussion
    on what some of us believe is an emerging threat to the peace
    of the world and the security of the United States of America.
    And from the witnesses today, I would say we do have one voice
    of disagreement. And we will get into that discussion. And we
    are very happy to have you with us to promote that type of
    discussion because, of course, in countries like China, they
    don't have people on the other side of issues where they are
    being discussed, the other side of issues that the state has
    taken a stand on.
        I would like to ask the panel very quickly if you might
    mention any specific weapons systems that China is building
    that threatens America's naval or air or space assets. And
    maybe just go down the line just very quickly. Dr. Pickert, can
    you think of a weapons system that they are developing that you
    might warn us against?
        Mr. Pickert. I think specifically the sea power aspect is
    under the envelope of strategic conventional weapons. And the
    East Wind system of--these are essentially huge SCUD missiles
    that can operate from the bases in China to essentially any of
    these things which are being disputed can be blown off the face
    of the Earth without even leaving China.
        Mr. Rohrabacher. Are they accurate enough to be----
        Mr. Pickert. They don't have to be accurate. You just shoot
    20 of them, and they will knock off a whole corner of the
    universe. I don't know if you have ever seen an arc-light
    strike by B-52s, they take out a whole grid square of
    territory. This is a SCUD tactic. It is using mass attack on a
    particular place. And you have 20 missiles, all shooting at the
    same thing. And these islands are in specific areas where you
    have naval forces are simply deterred from using that space if
    it escalates to anything beyond local conflict. And the trouble
    with each of these areas is they cannot be held as territory
    because they can be obliterated.
        Mr. Rohrabacher. Mr. Fisher?
        Mr. Fisher. Mr. Chairman, I would call to your attention
    the system of weapons that the Chinese are developing and
    beginning to deploy, starting with a dual-use space program,
    both manned and unmanned, that provides targeting and
    communications and data links for missiles, like the anti-ship
    ballistic missile, new supersonic anti-ship missiles that are
    being carried today by Chinese bombers, future hypersonic anti-
    ship missiles, not to mention what they will be putting on
    their aircraft carrier. As soon as that starts service in about
    2 to 3 years, it will have a fighter that is about as good as
    our F-18 Super Hornet. And submarines are being built like
    dumplings. And they are good, and they have air-independent
    propulsion so that they can stay underwater for a long time.
        And this is just what is going to be hitting us in Asia. In
    the next decade, China will have the wherewithal to project
    force around the world, both mechanized airborne and mechanized
    amphibious infantry supported by aircraft carriers and an even
    more robust space architecture.
        Mr. Rohrabacher. Mr. Mosher?
        Mr. Mosher. Well, I believe Mr. Fisher has hit on the key
    points here. And I would just say that China has rapidly
    upgraded the capabilities of its navy. And it has now a navy
    the largest force of major combatant submarines and amphibious
    warfare ships in Asia. And many of them are first-rate. China
    is constructing its own GPS satellite network. It has a ground-
    launched anti-satellite capability capable of taking out our
    communications satellites and is developing a space plane, the
    Shunlong, which may have military capabilities.
        Mr. Rohrabacher. Here is your chance.
        Mr. Sandby-Thomas. Sure.
        Mr. Rohrabacher. Are these not a threat, Dr. Thomas?
        Mr. Sandby-Thomas. Well, I think they are fairly
    comprehensive. I think the big concern is, sort of as I noted,
    the guided missile destroyers in terms of how that impacts U.S.
    Navy operations, particularly for providing support, whether
    they could take out aircraft carriers. But some of it seems to
    be developing or being developed, probably close to production.
    I am not entirely clear.
        Mr. Rohrabacher. Let me just note that one of the sad
    aspects of the answers that we just got is that the source of
    research and development for many of the weapons systems that
    you are talking about are the American taxpayers. I mean, many
    of the weapons systems that China is developing are based on
    information that they have stolen and hacked and gotten from
    American industry. And sometimes they have actually stolen from
    our own Government operations. Is there any doubt about that?
    Can we comment on that? Yes, sir?
        Mr. Fisher. Acquisition of foreign technology is essential
    to the Chinese military research and development process. From
    the opening of our relations with China, Mr. Chairman, China
    has deployed tens of thousands of engineering students to the
    United States to study at our best schools and largely for the
    purpose of taking that information and experience back to China
    to apply to weapons programs. I can offer numerous citations of
    experts that work for NASA, went back to China, and are now
    helping to develop space planes, which will be used for
    military purposes.
        When China was developing its current fourth generation
    fighter, the J-10, it had to develop new composite materials
    for the air frame. It actually came to California and had those
    composites validated by an American company. It went back to
    China and put them into production. They work very fine. Thank
    you very much.
        Mr. Rohrabacher. I think that says it all. Thank you very
    much.
        Mr. Keating?
        Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Given our focus as a
    committee on Europe--and Mr. Fisher referenced NATO--I would
    just like to know how our European partners are responding to
    the recent developments in Asia. And should we be asking them
    to do more? And if so, what do you think the contributions they
    could bring might be?
        Mr. Fisher. Mr. Keating, it is a very important question.
    For 20 years, the United States Government has been engaged
    with our European allies over the issue of arms sales to China.
    The European Union established an embargo, as did the United
    States, after the Tiananmen massacre. The Europeans have,
    unfortunately, defined and redefined their embargo to allow
    more and more dual-use technology to go to China. And this is
    going directly in the People's Liberation Army.
        Eurocopter, for example, has a new full-up helicopter co-
    development program, to include the engine with the Chinese
    helicopter industry. This will be a new modern, state-of-the-
    art 6- to 7-ton helicopter. The Europeans tell me when I see
    them at numerous arms shows that no, this helicopter will never
    go into the PLA. But every other European helicopter that the
    Chinese have co-produced--and there are about four or five of
    them--they have all gone into the military. And naval engines,
    all Chinese non-nuclear submarines and new combatant ships use
    European-designed naval engines, large German-designed engines.
        I just found a citation a few weeks ago that the Chinese
    ship-building industry has purchased a state-of-the-art Spanish
    ship design three-dimensional software. And this is already
    helping the Chinese to develop better combat ships.
        When we find these examples, we should be quite insistent
    with our allies that this is not helpful, that this is actually
    creating problems for them because the sooner that China has
    the ability to wage war against Taiwan, which it is still
    building tremendously to conquer Taiwan, perhaps early in the
    next decade, attack Japan over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, or
    enforce its outrageous and expansive claims in the South China
    Sea. Those could all possibly engage American forces in support
    of allies and detract, either in the short term or very likely
    also in the long term, to assist our European allies from
    threats that are growing against them as well.
        Mr. Keating. So you mentioned that there might be
    compromise because of their sales. When you gave your address,
    was there any concern from any of those countries about what
    was occurring through China's actions?
        Mr. Fisher. Oh, yes, a great concern, many questions. And
    the information that I was giving, surprisingly, was viewed as
    new. Many of the parliamentarians from our NATO ally countries
    who attended this conference simply did not have an
    understanding that China was at a point where it was
    threatening to start and cause wars.
        Our annual PLA military power report that the Pentagon has
    been issuing since early in the last decade really needs to be
    translated into multiple languages. It needs to be upgraded. It
    needs to be published as a book with pictures and charts. Yes,
    that may look like the old Soviet military power report of the
    1980s, but that is what our friends and our allies are looking
    for from the United States. We have to identify these threats
    in order to ask and encourage our allies to take them seriously
    and then respond appropriately.
        Mr. Keating. And I think all of our panel has addressed
    this in one way or another, but just to have a concise, you
    know, answer to this, if I could just go across our panel and
    just ask, how immediate is the threat for the China's maritime
    and territorial disputes? And could you just, you know, in very
    short language describe it as either short, medium-term risk of
    armed conflict? What is the time frame and how real is it, if
    we could just quickly go? I just want to zero in on that.
        Mr. Pickert. I will start at this end by saying that all of
    these disputes are essentially traps for points of opportunity
    for regional and local conflicts, one on one with small
    countries that cannot respond to them.
        Mr. Keating. So short, medium?
        Mr. Pickert. That is present right now all over the place.
    It is happening every day. And their strategic overview of that
    is to protect, to make sure that we do not interfere in that
    process.
        Mr. Keating. Mr. Fisher?
        Mr. Fisher. In the last 3 weeks, Japan has threatened to
    shoot down Chinese unmanned aircraft that would violate
    Japanese air space. A Chinese unmanned aircraft basically did
    that in early September, and it was intercepted. The Chinese
    have responded just this past weekend that the shoot-down of a
    UAV by Japan would be an act of war. This act of war could
    actually transpire at almost any time, Congressman.
        Mr. Keating. Short-term. Mr. Mosher?
        Mr. Mosher. The threat is immediate and ongoing. That is
    why Japan is building now its own brain expeditionary force to
    protect the Senkaku Islands and also the Ryukyus. It never felt
    the need of doing that before. It does now. So Japan feels an
    immediate threat. It is in the neighborhood. And I think we
    ought to look to Japan's response to calibrate our own.
        Mr. Keating. Mr. Sandby-Thomas?
        Mr. Sandby-Thomas. Yes. I would think the likelihood of
    conflict is higher now than, say, it was a year ago. In terms
    of immediacy, it seems that the potential for provocation on
    both sides is there, but I still don't think that war will
    break out, I guess.
        Mr. Keating. No, but there is consensus among all four of
    you that there could be conflict in the short-term that is
    escalating. And that is an interesting point that we should
    bear in mind and seek out our Europe allies and our partners in
    Europe so that there is better understanding of that. So I
    thank you very much. That was very helpful.
        And for the purpose of the rest of the hearing,
    Representative Lowenthal will be assuming the ranking
    membership. And I thank him for doing that and thank you
    because I think that last series of things put a time frame on
    some of the urgency of what we are facing.
        Thank you.
        Mr. Rohrabacher. And thank you very much.
        And, Mr. Lowenthal, who represents the district next to my
    district in Southern California and he also now represents a
    city that includes the Ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach. And
    these ports, of course, tie us to China. And events in China
    are very significant to Southern Californians. And we welcome
    his participation today.
        Mr. Lowenthal. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I do agree
    that we have figured out ways between you and I to settle our
    disputes peacefully, not that we have that many.
        I just want to follow up on that last question about,
    really, the level of tension in terms of the maritime disputes
    and what really specifically at this moment should be the U.S.
    role. And I would like to start with Mr. Sandby-Thomas and then
    ask all of the panel, what now? Where do we go now for the
    United States in terms of this? If tensions have escalated,
    what specifically should we be doing today besides holding this
    hearing and learning about what is really going on and not
    denying the existence of the problems that are going on?
        Mr. Sandby-Thomas. Well, in terms of the East China Sea
    disputes, it is unclear necessarily an unsafe China strategy,
    but obviously there is this issue of energy around the islands.
    I think the islands in and of themselves don't really hold a
    huge amount of value. They are sure these barren rocks are
    uninhabitable.
        Mr. Lowenthal. Right.
        Mr. Sandby-Thomas. So there is energy, but that seems that
    that could be something of joint negotiation. There have been
    negotiations in the past. We jointly developed these. So that
    could be resumed.
        In terms of the Chinese position, it seems that the
    decision by the Japanese Government to purchase the islands may
    be, on the one hand, sort of changed how the islands are
    administered but, on the other hand, maybe indicated that Japan
    was--it kind of changed the status quo. And so the Chinese
    actions in that context, maybe I think they have a strategic
    value. If the Senkaku Islands weren't part of this first island
    chain, the Chinese incursion seems to be sort of testing
    Japanese resolve on this. I think they are testing both
    Japanese resolve, how far can China get, can it kind of break
    this chain, does it have an opportunity to do so, and how
    strong is the resolve between the U.S. and Japan. So would the
    U.S. defend Japan if there were a sort of conflict with the
    breakout?
        I think on the latter part, the U.S. has reiterated its
    obligations under the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. So that seems
    fairly clear. The difficulty really resides in sort of the
    Japanese and the Chinese. And they have various competing sort
    of interests and aims. They have different audiences that they
    are playing to. Sort of obviously in terms of, say, Chinese
    domestic politics, negotiation with Japan is not so easy. And,
    particularly, I think some of the politicians in their
    statements have linked the Senkaku Island back to sort of
    Japan's sort of wartime actions within China.
        And on the Japanese side, it seemingly is the China threat
    is being sort of amplified to sort of push forward demands for
    increases in naval capability. So I think that is what
    contributes to the volatility.
        In terms of the U.S., I think it has sort of gone as far as
    it can. You know, I am not sure that it--I think, you know, it
    is important to indicate that the U.S. would intervene. And,
    you know, the likelihood of conflict I think is an immediate
    threat, but I wouldn't expect conflict to break other than
    through the sort of accidental issue. I don't think the
    intention of either side is to engage in conflict, but that is
    something that could change, hopefully, going forward.
        Mr. Mosher. Well, I would have to disagree, at least in
    part, with that assessment. I believe that China's leaders
    since Tiananmen massacre have deliberately stoked patriotism.
    They installed in the early '90s a patriotic education program
    in the schools. So that from kindergarten through college, the
    Chinese history textbooks are full of great Chinese Shogunist
    sentiments, talking about how China was once a great nation and
    will be again, how the Japanese, who are called in colloquial
    parlance in China ``dwarf barbarians,'' which is not a happy
    phrase, have periodically invaded and ravaged China. And they
    use this anti-Japanese sentiment in order to reinforce their
    own control over China. The appeal of communism in China has
    long vanished, but the appeal of patriotism still has a strong
    hold on the Chinese people.
        So, in part, these aggressive acts enable the Chinese
    leadership to say to the Chinese people, ``We are in the
    process of building a great and glorious China, equivalent to
    those in the Song, the Tang, the Ming dynasty.'' You see how we
    are asserting Chinese rights overseas in the Senkakus and the
    South China Sea and elsewhere. We are going to bring these
    tributary states to heal.
        I happen to believe that without the calming presence of
    U.S. assets in Asia, that Chinese open aggression would have
    already occurred vis-a-vis the Philippines, for example, last
    year in Scarborough Shoal. Were it not for the possibility of
    U.S. intervention, the Chinese might well have sank the
    Philippine patrol boats. Instead, they drove them off a water
    cannon.
        Last year they cut the towed sonar arrays of Vietnamese
    survey vessels. They were trying to survey waters immediately
    off Vietnam's coast, but that is part of the extraordinary
    territorial claim made by China. They cut the survey cables and
    drove the Vietnamese ships back to port. They might have
    behaved even more aggressively were they not worried about the
    possibility of the U.S. intervention. The same thing with
    regard to their last November claim that they had the right to
    intercept, interdict, and board ships in the South China Sea.
    We guarantee freedom of the seas, freedom of navigation. And as
    long as the U.S. remains engaged in Asia and reassures its
    allies that we will be there in the event of conflict, China
    gets that message loud and clear.
        So I think for us to equivocate or not state clearly what
    our position is encourages aggression and that, as in the
    1880s, when we faced a different kind of threat, we can achieve
    peace in Asia through strength but certainly not by
    telegraphing weakness.
        Mr. Fisher. Congressman, I would like to answer your
    question by also saying that if we do nothing today, then we
    risk the danger in the short term of having our allies possibly
    defeated in skirmishes around Senkakus, in the South China Sea,
    but that this is simply unacceptable. If our allies are
    undermined, if they lose confidence in their alliances with the
    United States, they have alternatives. And in my opinion, they
    will develop their own nuclear missiles, Japan perhaps,
    followed by South Korea, followed by Vietnam and Australia. It
    could happen rather quickly. And after that, the prospect of a
    skirmish, being one that escalates to a nuclear exchange that
    we are drawn into, is real.
        So, sir, I would suggest that, as Steven suggests, we have
    to be very clear to the Chinese about what we consider
    unacceptable behavior. And we have to support our friends and
    allies. We have to make clear that we are there to back up our
    alliances, that we are there to support our longstanding
    friendship with Taiwan by selling them the systems that they
    need to deter war because if we fail to do this, we are, as
    Steven, I would agree completely, inviting conflict. And those
    conflicts very well could consume our own.
        Thank you.
        Mr. Pickert. Well, I think the most important thing is to
    maintain relationships over a long period of time with the
    peripheral states, especially ASEAN in this case, because that
    was developed as a counter-alliance to China almost 50 years
    ago and still is. The problem is our relationships bilaterally
    with those countries are not really integrated into a
    comprehensive strategy. They are only one-on-one meetings,
    photo ops at a certain time wearing some kind of ridiculous
    outfit in a photo op. Our relationships have to go beyond that
    into long-range ties with the countries, which, especially in
    the cases where we don't have those ties, like Vietnam, it is
    important to build them. And in places where we have had long
    ones and are essentially neglecting them now, such as with
    Thailand, which is a very big and important country, cutting
    back on our military relations, which I know we are doing, is a
    bad, bad sign. And, therefore, we should spend a little money
    on the relationships as more important than hardware, which is
    essentially really checkmated by the strategic missile systems
    that are being built.
        Mr. Rohrabacher. Well, thank you very much. I thank our
    witnesses today and my colleagues. I will just do a summary.
    And then we will bring this to an end.
        Let me just--we live in a changing world. This is a very
    changing world. My father flew the first DC-3s into Shanghai in
    the final months of the Second World War. And he always told me
    how he was sent there from the Philippines, where they have
    been flying up and down from the Philippines. And when they
    landed, their job was to make sure that that airport was
    available so that we could now have input into Shanghai, which
    had been under Japanese occupation. And things had broken down
    there. And so they were sent in. And when he got to Shanghai
    with a number of DC-3s and filled with Marines and equipment,
    set up communications, et cetera, an American presence in that
    city, the first thing he did was get off the airplane and
    grabbed what appeared to be a Chinese official or someone who
    knew what was going on and said, ``Where is the home of the
    Japanese commanding officer?''
        And he said, ``Oh, it is a big house over there.''
        And then my father lined up his Marines and marched up to
    the house and knocked on the door. An older man, Japanese man,
    answered the door. And my father said, ``This house is now
    being confiscated by the United States Marine Corps. You will
    vacate within \1/2\ hour and not come back.'' My father was 24
    years old, had never been out of North Dakota before World War
    II. It is the kind of influence that we were exercising
    throughout the world.
        And I saw a thing about last night I was up watching a
    documentary on the Battle of the Bulge. And he had all of these
    18- and 19-year-old Americans. They were facing the German
    Army. And America since that time period has spread out from
    the heartland of our country to be this huge force in the
    world. We no longer have that ability. We no longer can afford
    to be the dominant force in the planet militarily. We don't
    have the capability of having our young men go to a foreign
    country and knock on the door and tell the aggressor to get out
    of the building or to send 18- and 19-year-olds as cannon
    fodder to stop an invasion by a totalitarian force in Europe.
        We were mentioning we are not spending as much money. Well,
    if we do, we have to borrow it from China in order to spend it.
    What does that tell you? The world is a changing situation. We
    have to come up with a strategy that works to promote peace in
    the world and also freedom in the world, which I believe peace
    and freedom go together. They are two sides of the same coin.
    And that is why we need to talk about these serious challenges.
    And I believe that as we develop a strategy for the future, we
    have to understand the threat in Asia and the threat that China
    plays to our planet, first to the Pacific and to our planet.
        The testimony we had today on the expansion of Chinese
    missile and space power; the expansion of the submarine fleet,
    Chinese submarine fleet; and the utilization of Chinese air
    power expanding by utilizing Western technology, perhaps
    Argentineans, et cetera, this means that we have a challenge,
    but at the same time, we have our limitations. All of this has
    to be put into given a lot more thought, given a lot more
    discussion, as we have had today.
        Let me just note that when I hear that the Germans are
    working with the Chinese to develop certain weapons systems, I
    can't help but not be so upset that some of our people might be
    listening in to the German Government's conversations. I know
    Mrs. Merkel may not like to hear that, but the fact is that our
    intelligence systems need to keep us informed of the
    development of this type of threat.
        And, finally, let me just say we don't live in a world
    where a 24-year-old young man goes and confronts a Japanese
    general who is engaged in an aggressive act in China. We live
    in a world, instead, that you have an aggressive posturing by
    China and a bullying of its neighbors by a government in
    Beijing that is the world's worst human rights abuser.
        I think the most important statement made in today's
    hearing was that a country, a government that so tortures its
    own people, so represses them and murders them, how can we
    expect them to treat other neighboring weak countries any
    better than they treat their own people? And if that does not
    forbode us or to warn us, what does? The fact is the way they
    treat their own people, they will treat the rest of the world.
        And Japan, we need to make sure Japan, which can be a very
    positive force, that we need to not be afraid of Japan anymore.
    We need to make sure that where we cannot afford to balance off
    this expansion of Chinese power and military power in the
    Pacific, we can't afford that, but we can afford to work with
    Japan, who with their contribution can help balance off that
    shift in power and, thus, help ensure the peace of the world.
    We should be working with the Japanese for that end.
        With that said, this hearing is now adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 11:39 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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