    [House Hearing, 113 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                         THE TROUBLING PATH AHEAD FOR
                            U.S.-ZIMBABWE RELATIONS

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   BEFORE THE

                     SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH,
                            GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS, AND
                          INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

                                     OF THE

                          COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                        ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                   __________

                               SEPTEMBER 12, 2013

                                   __________

                               Serial No. 113-101

                                   __________

            Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

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                          COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

                     EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman
    CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey     ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
    ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida         ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
    DANA ROHRABACHER, California             Samoa
    STEVE CHABOT, Ohio                   BRAD SHERMAN, California
    JOE WILSON, South Carolina           GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
    MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas             ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
    TED POE, Texas                       GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
    MATT SALMON, Arizona                 THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
    TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania             BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
    JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina          KAREN BASS, California
    ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois             WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
    MO BROOKS, Alabama                   DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
    TOM COTTON, Arkansas                 ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
    PAUL COOK, California                JUAN VARGAS, California
    GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina       BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois
    RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas            JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III,
    SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania                Massachusetts
    STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas                AMI BERA, California
    RON DeSANTIS, Florida                ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California
    TREY RADEL, Florida                  GRACE MENG, New York
    DOUG COLLINS, Georgia                LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
    MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina         TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
    TED S. YOHO, Florida                 JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
    LUKE MESSER, Indiana

         Amy Porter, Chief of Staff      Thomas Sheehy, Staff Director

                   Jason Steinbaum, Democratic Staff Director
                                     ------

        Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights, and
                          International Organizations

                   CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey, Chairman
    TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania             KAREN BASS, California
    RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas            DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
    STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas                AMI BERA, California
    MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page

                                   WITNESSES

    Shannon Smith, Ph.D., Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of
      African Affairs, U.S. Department of State......................     6
    Mr. Todd Amani, Senior Deputy Assistant Administrator, Bureau for
      Africa, U.S. Agency for International Development..............    15
    Mr. Arthur Gwagwa, international advocacy coordinator, Zimbabwe
      Human Rights NGO Forum.........................................    28
    Ms. Imani Countess, regional program director for Africa, The
      Solidarity Center..............................................    53

              LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING

    Shannon Smith, Ph.D.: Prepared statement.........................     9
    Mr. Todd Amani: Prepared statement...............................    17
    Mr. Arthur Gwagwa: Prepared statement............................    32
    Ms. Imani Countess: Prepared statement...........................    56

                                    APPENDIX

    Hearing notice...................................................    74
    Hearing minutes..................................................    75
    The Honorable Christopher H. Smith, a Representative in Congress
      from the State of New Jersey, and chairman, Subcommittee on
      Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights, and International
      Organizations: Statement from the Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition.    76

                         THE TROUBLING PATH AHEAD FOR
                            U.S.-ZIMBABWE RELATIONS

                                  ----------

                          THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 12, 2013

                           House of Representatives,

                     Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health,

             Global Human Rights, and International Organizations,

                         Committee on Foreign Affairs,

                                Washington, DC.

        The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 12 o'clock
    p.m., in room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon.
    Christopher H. Smith (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
        Mr. Smith of New Jersey. The subcommittee will come to
    order.
        We are joined by the distinguished chairman of the full
    committee, Ed Royce, and I would like to yield to him such time
    as he may consume.
        Mr. Royce. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate very much
    you holding this hearing, and of course we have another
    Zimbabwe election, another Mugabe victory through cheating and
    strong-arming and harassment, and we have seen this before. I
    have been in Zimbabwe and seen the ads run by ZANU-PF after
    they were running cars off the road and killing opposition
    candidates. And the ad shows a truck smashing into the back of
    a car saying--I think the gist of it was, ``Driving can be
    hazardous to your health, but so can voting against ZANU-PF.''
        If it hadn't been mixed with the violence on the ground,
    you wouldn't know the meaning of that ad. But after enough
    opposition candidates or people were killed--now, this is an
    election in the past, not the one we are talking about. But
    what is happening now is more consequential in this election,
    because the unity government has collapsed, the opposition
    party has been sidelined indefinitely, and ZANU hardliners are
    in control. And I mean the hardliners. I have talked to those
    who had had second thoughts, that were trying to make some
    change, but they have no input at this point.
        Mugabe now has unfettered access to all government posts
    and all state resources, and I think you can expect the graft
    and the corruption to continue if it is possible to get any
    more graft and corruption, if it can get worse.
        Unfortunately, the regional bodies aren't any help, and I
    have noticed this in the past, too, in my discussions, the
    reluctance to say anything critical under any circumstances.
    The performance of SADC, the Southern African Development
    Community, has really been a disappointment here, heralded by
    the administration at the start of the summer as a force for
    positive change in Zimbabwe.
        SADC, in my opinion, is still adding to the problem, as
    they have failed in the past to speak out and this time the
    parliamentary group assessment of the July elections, I think,
    terribly missed the mark. Miraculously, they concluded that the
    elections were--and I am going to quote from them--``a credible
    reflection of the will of the people, free and fair,'' is what
    they said, while civil society organizations that were on the
    ground that actually saw the elections, and other domestic
    observers, found rampant voter roll tampering, political
    harassment, political intimidation.
        And for those who have ever seen the results, because I was
    there on another occasion in a neighboring state, speaking with
    some of those who had been beaten, had been intimidated, poll
    watchers, election--you know, party members who were in the
    opposition, I have seen the consequences of what they have gone
    through.
        And this is so disturbing when you consider that SADC
    financially backed the group's election observer mission. So
    you would expect, you know, I mean, given SADC's past in this,
    I just really wonder, the U.S. funded basically a flawed
    assessment that Mugabe has used to legitimate his continued
    despotic rule.
        And I wrote a letter recently to Administrator Shah
    expressing my deep concern of USAID's decision to put the money
    into SADC, given their temerity in the past to speak out in any
    significant way and with regard to human rights or anything
    else in Zimbabwe.
        So adding insult to injury, SADC just elected Mugabe as the
    deputy chair of the regional body for this year and chair for
    next year. The public statements coming out of the State
    Department and our Embassy in Harare conveyed that our
    engagement and sanctions policy will depend on the actions
    taken by a new Mugabe regime, and, in particular, his cabinet
    appointments.
        Well, that is becoming clear because yesterday Mugabe swore
    in his 62-member cabinet, a recycling of old ZANU hardliners,
    the old guard, some of the most militant of the old guard, and
    the new Information Minister who was the architect of the
    sweeping law to clamp down on the media, to clamp down on press
    freedom. The new Finance Minister was formerly Justice Minister
    and responsible for the judicial crackdowns. And, frankly, he
    is already on our sanctions list.
        So in May the administration extended an olive branch and
    eased sanctions on two Zimbabwean banks and delisted three
    individuals from the sanctions list. I will be interested to
    find if the July election will cause the administration to
    reevaluate that decision, and I look forward to hearing from
    our witnesses, and look forward to hearing about what the
    administration's policy is going to be going forward.
        And as I said, as being someone who was on the ground in
    Zimbabwe in the past, and has talked to those who were
    tortured, talked to those who spent their life's work,
    Africans, who have spent their life's work trying to get
    democratic governance, only to be beaten and have their friends
    killed, it is truly distressing to me the way--the situation we
    are at right now.
        Thank you.
        Mr. Smith of New Jersey. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Let me say to Dr. Smith and to Mr. Amani, I apologize for
    being a little bit late. Both Ranking Member Bass and I were
    meeting with a group of Nigerian lawmakers who are in town, led
    by the chairwoman of the Foreign Relations Committee in the
    House of Representatives. So, again, I apologize for that
    lateness in kicking off this hearing.
        I want to wish a good afternoon to everyone. And despite
    more than a decade of targeted sanctions, Zimbabwe has
    continued to be a major U.S. trading partner through the
    Generalized System of Preferences, even though it has been
    excluded from the African Growth and Opportunity Act.
        Chromium, platinum, and diamonds have enriched Zimbabwe's
    leaders but not its people. Zimbabwe had been one of Africa's
    leading industrial powers and agricultural producers until its
    government diminished the ability of the country to sustain its
    industrial or agricultural production.
        Illegal and disruptive land seizures resulted in political
    cronies gaining control of productive agricultural land rather
    than the Black farm workers as promised. Agricultural
    production suffered, dragging down manufacturing of
    agricultural equipment, the base of the country's industry.
        The reduction in tax revenues led to a desperate search of
    foreign funding to stabilize an economy whose inflation rate
    reached globally historic levels. Nevertheless, Zimbabwe is a
    major player in Southern Africa, even more so now that newly-
    elected President Mugabe has been chosen as Vice President of
    the Southern African Development Community, or SADC, as
    Chairman Royce pointed out, and the organization's anticipated
    chairman next year.
        Facing international appeals for an end to sanctions on
    Zimbabwe, and threats from the Mugabe government of economic
    retaliation, U.S. must devise a policy that safeguards American
    interests while maintaining our support for democracy, human
    rights, good governance, and economic development.
        Today's hearing will examine how the process of policy
    formation is going now and discuss what that policy should look
    like at the conclusion of the process. The United States has
    experienced, as we all know, a troubled relationship with
    Zimbabwe, since the Southern African nation achieved majority
    rule in 1980.
        Robert Mugabe, the liberation leader who had led his
    country since 1980, has always resented that our Government did
    not support his war against the previous white minority
    government. Despite our efforts to establish a mutually
    beneficial relationship with Mugabe's government over the past
    couple of decades, his regime has spurned our hand of
    friendship and flouted international law and convention.
        Using colonial era laws as models, Mugabe's government has
    eliminated the possibility that the political opposition can
    credibly challenge his rule. It has limited the ability of the
    media to effectively report on the news of the day. It has
    restricted civil society advocates from advocating and
    verifying the many human rights violations that have taken
    place in Mugabe's Zimbabwe.
        When Congress passed the Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic
    Recovery Act of 2001, it sent out a range of aid restrictions
    requiring U.S. representatives on the boards of international
    financial institutions to vote against loans or debt
    cancellations befitting the Zimbabwean Government, pending
    fulfillment of a range of conditions based on repeal of the
    limitations on the freedoms of the people of Zimbabwe.
        Recent annual appropriations laws have also barred U.S.
    support for international loans or grants to the government,
    except to meet basic human needs or to promote democracy.
    Generally, bilateral aid is prohibited, except that pertaining
    to health, humanitarian needs, education, or macroeconomic
    growth.
        Such prohibitions are maintained unless the Secretary of
    State certifies that the rule of law has been restored,
    including respect for ownership, entitlement to property,
    freedom of speech, and association.
        However, Mugabe's August 22, 2013, inauguration marked the
    end of a 5-year period of often uneasy political power-sharing
    with the opposition and partially fulfilled reforms pursued by
    the government of national unity under the global political
    agreement. The end of the unity government means that unless a
    deal is struck with the ruling ZANU-PF party, its former
    partner in government, the opposition MDC-T party, will likely
    no longer play a role in executive branch policy-making.
        Past patterns of ZANU-PF governments, along with recent
    actions by the party officials, and the MDC-T's new
    marginalization, indicate that Zimbabwe may be entering a
    period characterized by a pattern of unilateral exercise of
    state power, potentially accompanied by a manipulation of the
    rule of law in its favor, a lack of national political
    consensus, and the absence of vehicles for alternatives to
    ZANU-PF policies, continued restrictions on the activities of
    civil society and opposition activists, including legal,
    extralegal harassment, and violence by both the police and the
    ZANU-PF supporters, and weak economic growth due to the party's
    pursuit of a nationalistic economic agenda focusing on state
    intervention in the economy.
        The Mugabe government has long blamed the United States and
    Britain for hampering its economic growth due to sanctions. But
    aside from direct aid limitations, most sanctions are targeted
    toward Mugabe and his government leadership. SADC is now
    calling for the removal of sanctions against Zimbabwe and is
    being joined by a growing international chorus that includes a
    few voices from within the Congress in the United States.
        Meanwhile, President Mugabe has threatened to punish
    Western firms operating in Zimbabwe unless sanctions are
    lifted. But questions remain about the willingness of the
    Mugabe government to take the steps necessary to rescind the
    U.S. sanctions. If Zimbabwe takes a defined stand, where does
    that leave the U.S.-Zimbabwe relationship? The administration
    has tried limited relaxation of sanctions only to be met with
    continued refusal to accept reform. Where does this leave U.S.
    policy?
        We have with us today U.S. Government officials involved in
    developing and implementing our Nation's policy toward an
    important nation in Southern Africa. We also have with us civil
    society observers who will speak to the issues before us as
    well.
        And, again, I would like to thank all of our witnesses for
    being here, taking the time to give us the benefit of their
    counsel and wisdom, and I do now yield to my friend and
    colleague Ms. Bass.
        Ms. Bass. Mr. Chair, as usual, I want to thank you for
    holding today's hearing. As a member of the Southern African
    Development Community, Zimbabwe is an important player in
    Southern Africa, politically, economically, and socially.
        I want to recognize and thank today's witnesses for their
    willingness to come before this committee and assist all of us
    in better understanding the policy opportunities and challenges
    toward engaging the Zimbabwean Government. This includes the
    opposition party, the MDC.
        For today's hearing, I want to focus my comments on two
    primary areas, good governance and economic growth. We all know
    that President Mugabe has led Zimbabwe for more than three
    decades. And recently we witnessed the power-sharing government
    between ZANU and the MDC, but the uneasy 5-year power-sharing
    government of national unity has now ended and it is unclear as
    to how the MDC will continue to play a governing role.
        There is no question that MDC's role within the larger
    government apparatus showed to the world that perhaps an
    alternative to one-party dominance was possible. As many will
    recall, the elections of '08 cast a dark shadow in Southern
    Africa, with government intimidation at many levels including
    that of journalists and opposition leaders. There was deep
    concern over whether Zimbabwe would uphold democratic
    principles in the rule of law.
        Questions remain with respect to the most recent election
    in July, as well as those in '08. The Congressional Research
    Service reports that Zimbabwe may be entering a new time, and I
    am wondering if today's witnesses can comment about that and
    tell us whether they agree. And that new time would be
    characterized by unilateral state power, which accompanies the
    manipulation of the rule of law, where is a lack of political
    consensus and the absence of pluralist institution, where
    activities of civil society organizations and opposition
    activists are restricted, and where there is weak economic
    growth.
        I recently returned from the AGOA Forum in Addis where I
    sat with African leaders eager to tell the U.S. that the
    development agenda of yesterday must be replaced by a new
    vision of trade and investment, but we all know that this can't
    be achieved if governments don't take the necessary steps to
    create investment climates that attract business capital and
    that spur trade, both regionally and globally. This can and
    must be done by strengthening institutions, but it must also be
    done by creating political space.
        Zimbabwe needs strong institutions if it is to join other
    African nations that have proven year after year that strong
    economic growth is not only possible but sustainable. Between
    '09 and 2011, Zimbabwe saw an expansion of its economy with
    strong in sectors that included mining, services, and
    agriculture, yet those trends stagnated.
        The World Bank attributes this economic slowing to poor
    agricultural seasons, binding credit constraint, fiscal revenue
    underperformance, and the slow pace of economic reforms. The
    Bank also acknowledged that slow growth was due to continued
    political uncertainty around the road map to elections
    resulting in low business confidence and other government-led
    policies.
        We know that Africa has the tools and the know-how to solve
    its own problems, and overwhelmingly I am positive about the
    continent's future, but I am also sensitive to the fact that in
    Zimbabwe, despite fairly peaceful elections, still has deep and
    persistent problems that remain unresolved. A focus on good
    governance, government accountability, creating legitimate
    space for opposition parties, and observance of human rights,
    will only strengthen Zimbabwe and its people.
        I am confident that with the support of the African Union
    and the African economic community, such as SADC, Zimbabwe's
    economic, political, and social future can be bright for all
    its people, and I look forward to today's discussion and the
    testimony from the witnesses.
        Thank you very much.
        Mr. Smith of New Jersey. I would like to now introduce our
    two distinguished witnesses from the administration, beginning
    with Dr. Shannon Smith, who was appointed Deputy Assistant
    Secretary for State in the Bureau of African Affairs in May
    2013. Prior to joining the State Department, she served as a
    Senior Policy Advisor for Africa and Global Health for the
    Senate Foreign Relations Committee from 2007 to 2013.
        As a senior staffer for Africa, she traveled widely on the
    continent leading staff delegations and accompanying the
    chairman on the Senate side on numerous trips to Sudan and
    South Sudan during the process leading up to the 2011
    referendum on independence. Prior to her work in the policy
    area, Dr. Smith was a history professor.
        We will then go to Mr. Todd Amani, who is the Senior Deputy
    Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International
    Development's Bureau for Africa. He oversees operations in the
    Bureau's Office of Development Planning, which provides
    leadership and policy outreach strategy, program analysis, and
    budget; the Office of Administrative Management staff, which
    handles personnel assignments, organizational management, and
    administrative support; and the Office of Southern Africa
    Affairs.
        Mr. Amani has been with USAID since 1987 and has served in
    Egypt, Nicaragua, Honduras, Guatemala, and most recently
    Mozambique. Before joining USAID, he was a Peace Corps
    volunteer, worked in Congress, and was a political science
    professor.
        Dr. Smith, if you could proceed.

    STATEMENT OF SHANNON SMITH, PH.D., DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY,
          BUREAU OF AFRICAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

        Ms. Smith. Thank you. Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Bass,
    thank you for holding this hearing on Zimbabwe and for inviting
    me to testify before you.
        We appreciate the deep interest of this committee, and we
    are pleased to work with Congress in support of our national
    interests in Zimbabwe and the region. The seriously flawed
    Presidential and parliamentary elections of July 31 were a
    missed opportunity for Zimbabwe.
        The United States and other members of the international
    community had clearly communicated, both publicly and
    privately, a willingness to consider rolling back sanctions and
    other restrictions and charting a path toward full
    normalization of relations, if Zimbabwe demonstrated that it
    was ready to allow its deserving people to freely choose their
    next government through a fair, peaceful, and credible
    election.
        The fundamental challenge the United States faces now that
    President Mugabe has been sworn in for another 5-year term, the
    new Parliament has been seated, and a new cabinet has been
    named, is how best to put into action our long-standing
    commitment to the Zimbabwean people while maintaining a firm
    stance against those who continue to undermine democracy and
    hinder Zimbabwe's progress.
        The recent elections were a particularly acute
    disappointment because they followed some encouraging
    developments earlier this year when the parties of the former
    government of national unity agreed on a draft constitution,
    and the Zimbabwean people overwhelmingly approved it in a
    peaceful referendum.
        However, in the days and weeks leading up to the election,
    that promise faded as the electoral process was systematically
    manipulated. There were serious irregularities in the
    provision, composition, and distribution of the voters roll.
    Political parties had unequal access to state media, and the
    security sector did not safeguard the electoral process
    equitably.
        These problems were highlighted by credible domestic and
    regional observers. We were disappointed that the Southern
    African Development Community, SADC, and the African Union
    chose not to adhere to their own standards or address the
    irregularities highlighted by their observers in making their
    determination that elections were free and fair.
        Secretary Kerry and leaders from other governments noted
    the deep flaws in the process leading up to the elections and
    concluded that although generally peaceful, the elections could
    not be seen as a credible reflection of the will of the
    Zimbabwean people. Elections are a process. They are not a
    single-day event, and that process was simply too flawed to be
    credible.
        While we are all grateful that polling was not marked by
    violence this year, the absence of overt violence is not
    sufficient for the outcome to be considered legitimate. True
    democracy will come to Zimbabwe only when the Zimbabwean people
    are free to exercise the rights afforded them in their new
    constitution, free of fear and manipulation.
        President Mugabe and certain elements of his party
    conducted a sustained campaign of intimidation against civil
    society organizations, political party members, and ordinary
    citizens. They allowed partisan conduct by the Zimbabwean media
    and security sectors, and they made sure the election
    preparations tilted the playing field heavily in their favor.
        In doing so, they sent a clear signal to the people of
    Zimbabwe and the international community that they were more
    interested in retaining power at all costs than in rejoining
    the community of democratic nations.
        U.S. policy reflects the recognition that a select few in
    Zimbabwe remain committed to maintaining power and wealth at
    the expense of their people and their nation. We, therefore,
    continue to maintain targeted sanctions aimed at those who are
    actively undermining democracy in Zimbabwe, and, thus,
    depriving all its citizens of a more democratic, prosperous
    future.
        Currently, the list of specially designated nationals
    includes 113 individuals and 70 entities. In the future, we may
    add new names to the list or move others as conditions warrant.
    We want all Zimbabweans to know that the United States remains
    a friend of the Zimbabwean people and that we make a strong
    distinction between Zimbabwe's 13 million people as a whole and
    those few powerful, self-interested individuals who are
    degrading the country's future.
        There are those who argue that we should revisit our
    sanctions policy because President Mugabe has sought to use
    U.S. policy as a propaganda tool. We will not be swayed by
    attempts of President Mugabe and his party to blame Zimbabwe's
    economic misfortunes and disastrous economic mismanagement on
    the United States and other governments that maintain targeted
    sanctions on a select group of individuals and entities.
        We do, however, want to communicate our message clearly,
    and those who benefit most from the status quo--influential
    officials within the Zimbabwean Government and the defense and
    security sectors--will no doubt remain the most vocal critics
    of U.S. and other Western countries, and they will continue to
    rely on state domination of the media to perpetuate
    misperceptions about our policy.
        With the end of the unity government and the relative
    stability it had brought to Zimbabwe's economy, their looms the
    real possibility of substantial economic decline, which
    President Mugabe and his ZANU-PF party may seek to blame on
    sanctions.
        We and Zimbabwe's neighbors alike need to be prepared for
    the possible humanitarian cost of ZANU-PF's proposed policies.
    We also need to examine, while maintaining our targeted
    sanctions, opportunities for engagement with the private sector
    that are consistent with our values, policies, and interests.
        In addition to helping to stave off economic hardship for
    the people of Zimbabwe, such engagement will also provide a
    powerful counterargument to the false sanctions narrative that
    ZANU-PF seeks to waive. We must also remain supportive of civil
    society groups that advocate for strong democratic
    institutions, the rule of law, and human rights. And we will
    look for opportunities to work with elements of Parliament and
    local government as a means of strengthening democratic
    governance going forward.
        As my USAID colleague will discuss, we also need to
    continue our assistance at a humanitarian-plus level. We can
    and we should be proud of our ongoing support for Zimbabwe's
    progress in the treatment and prevention of HIV/AIDS, in
    improving the lives of small holder farmers, and creating
    opportunities for sustainable livelihoods.
        Zimbabwe's human and economic potential is enormous, and
    that makes the events of recent years and the lost
    opportunities of this election all the more tragic. U.S. policy
    remains dedicated to helping the people of Zimbabwe achieve the
    democratic, peaceful, and prosperous future that they deserve.
        Thank you for the opportunity to speak with your committee,
    and I welcome any questions you may have.
        [The prepared statement of Ms. Smith follows:]

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                  ----------

        Mr. Smith of New Jersey. Thank you very much, Dr. Smith.
        Mr. Amani.

         STATEMENT OF MR. TODD AMANI, SENIOR DEPUTY ASSISTANT
    ADMINISTRATOR, BUREAU FOR AFRICA, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL
                              DEVELOPMENT

        Mr. Amani. Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Bass, and members
    of the subcommittee, I would like to thank you for the
    opportunity to speak with you today. I appreciate your
    continued commitment to helping the people of Zimbabwe build a
    peaceful, stable, and prosperous democracy. And I would also
    like to thank my colleagues at the State Department for their
    active leadership on these issues as well.
        Since the political and economic crisis of 2008, Zimbabwe
    has been in the process of a protracted and difficult
    transition toward economic normalcy and greater democracy. But
    the nation's intermittent progress has often been matched by
    setbacks which you have noted.
        While the economy has stabilized, the recent deeply flawed
    elections represent a disturbing political and democratic
    departure from the cautious optimism we had after the last
    elections which resulted in the formation of the government of
    national unity, and the overwhelming endorsement by the
    Zimbabwean people of a new constitution.
        I would note in response to Chairman Royce's comments about
    our support for SADC that we ended up not financing SADC
    observation effort; another donor supported that. We focused
    our attention on domestic observation and mobilizing voters.
    And it is that domestic observation that made it clear that
    this year's elections were neither credible nor free nor fair.
    And they raise concerns about how the United States should
    continue to support democratic and economic development in
    Zimbabwe.
        However, our commitment to the well-being of the Zimbabwean
    people has not changed. Even if opportunities to pursue broad
    economic and political reform recede, it is in the interest of
    the United States to maintain our commitment to helping the
    Zimbabwean people avert crises and live healthier lives.
        As a new government is formed, the United States is
    strategically looking to build on the strong platform of the
    new constitution and identify opportunities to enhance
    transparency, to open democratic spaces, and to support
    Zimbabweans with goodwill, both inside and outside of its
    institutions, including the nation's next generation of
    democratic leaders.
        At the same time, USAID will watch for signs of economic
    and political backsliding, political repression, and policies
    that could lead to the types of interrelated shocks and crises
    that have engulfed Zimbabwe in the past and could pose a threat
    to regional stability.
        Going forward, our assistance will focus primarily on
    humanitarian-plus approaches that address key concerns such as
    food security, nutrition, economic resilience, and health,
    while helping to promote good governance and economic growth.
    Through these same channels, USAID will seek out and act upon
    opportunities to influence policy formation and help develop
    regulatory systems to support Zimbabweans in their quest for
    economic prosperity and democratic governance.
        As Zimbabwe transitions to a new administration in the
    aftermath of the flawed elections, USAID will closely monitor
    how its leaders address the challenges facing Zimbabwe, and
    whether they turn their campaign pledges into concrete
    policies, and which priorities will be addressed first.
        We will follow how the market responds to political
    developments, signs of political repression, and indication of
    the politicization of humanitarian assistance. These are all
    factors that could influence our approach to assistance. They
    will not, however, affect our commitment to stand by the
    Zimbabwean people, and through our assistance programs offer
    support to those Zimbabweans who are committed to a more
    democratic and prosperous Zimbabwe.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Ranking Member Bass, and other
    members of the subcommittee for your continued commitment that
    you have shown to the people of Zimbabwe, and your support for
    reform within their government.
        I welcome any questions you may have.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Amani follows:]

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                  ----------

        Mr. Smith of New Jersey. Thank you very much, Mr. Amani.
        Let me begin, Dr. Smith, with you, if I could. The
    administration decided to loosen the sanctions on the two
    Zimbabwean financial institutions as a means of encouraging
    government reforms, and sadly that has not happened. Do you
    propose to reinstate and reinstitute those sanctions against
    those institutions?
        Ms. Smith. We are certainly in the midst of a review of our
    sanctions policy.
        Mr. Smith of New Jersey. Okay.
        Ms. Smith. In light of the licenses that were granted to
    the two institutions, including the agricultural bank, the goal
    there was to try and promote access of Zimbabwean small farmers
    and others to credit and other issues, other forms of support.
    We don't think that--at the moment we are not planning to
    impose or remove those licenses, thinking that the objectives
    there are still constant, that we still want to support rural
    livelihoods and other factors.
        But I would note that the biggest inhibitor to raising
    capital and to economic progress in general are much more sort
    of the policies and pronouncements of ZANU-PF than any of our
    sanctions.
        Mr. Smith of New Jersey. You described or suggested that
    you clearly communicated international warnings of continued or
    even expanded sanctions if the July 31 elections were not
    deemed free and fair. How did those admonitions get conveyed,
    and how did Mugabe react at the time? And, obviously, I think
    we know how he reacted since.
        Ms. Smith. Earlier this summer, former Ambassador Andrew
    Young had traveled to Zimbabwe. He had met with President
    Mugabe, and he had conveyed to him the idea that the
    opportunity was before them for a new relationship if they
    chose to seize it by having a free and fair election. That
    message was conveyed very consistently.
        We conveyed the same message publicly and privately to
    members of SADC, to other countries with interest in Zimbabwe,
    and to the government itself through our Embassy and through
    other officials.
        Mr. Smith of New Jersey. Thank you.
        Mr. Amani, you did partly I think answer the chairman's
    question, Chairman Royce. But has there been any reassessment
    given to SADC funding in other areas based on their performance
    here? What is our sense of that organization now as a result of
    this?
        Mr. Amani. Shannon can probably help answer some of that in
    terms of our relationship with SADC in a broader sense.
        Mr. Smith of New Jersey. Okay.
        Mr. Amani. As I mentioned, we ended up not using U.S.
    taxpayer money to fund the SADC observation effort. I think we
    feel that SADC, in the future, is an important institution for
    many reasons, including economic reasons and their efforts at
    economic integration. It looks like we have some work to do in
    terms of their observation efforts, and we'd be happy to work
    with them to improve that.
        Mr. Smith of New Jersey. Okay.
        Ms. Smith. I would just echo Todd's comments. I don't think
    we pulled any punches in expressing our disappointment about
    either the elections themselves or the evaluation of them. At
    the same time, SADC is an important institution, and we all
    have a very strong vested interest in economic stability and
    political freedom in Zimbabwe, and we hope that we all engage
    in that.
        Mr. Smith of New Jersey. Mr. Amani, you state that the
    USAID intends to continue to ensure access to basic health
    care. This is the same government that in '05 shut down HIV/
    AIDS clinics in so-called squatter communities, turning
    patients into refugees in other countries with HIV/AIDS that
    could no longer be treated with the usual drug therapy. And I
    am wondering, are there any signs that the government will
    allow that kind of intervention by USAID?
        Mr. Amani. We are going to be watching for signs of those
    kinds of things. We have been working----
        Mr. Smith of New Jersey. But nothing so far, right?
        Mr. Amani. Nothing that we have seen so far. We have been
    working with technically competent people within the Ministry
    of Health for many years across the administrations. We expect
    that we will be able to continue working with those technocrats
    who are well educated and very competent in the future.
        Mr. Smith of New Jersey. Let me ask you just a question--
    one of our witnesses later on will be Imani Countess from the
    Solidarity Center on behalf of the AFL-CIO. And in that
    testimony, it is pointed out that the ZCTU is comprised of 30
    affiliates, over 150 workers. Are any modest union rights that
    have been achieved in Zimbabwe at risk with Mugabe now getting
    a fresh--what he will perceive to be--mandate?
        Mr. Amani. I will have to get back to you on more
    information about unions. This is the kind of thing that we
    will be monitoring as we move forward in our programming to see
    what happens. At this point, it is very early in the
    administration.
        Mr. Smith of New Jersey. Do you have any idea when the
    reassessment of the--and, Dr. Smith, I guess this would be to
    you--when that policy may be forthcoming?
        Ms. Smith. It is an ongoing conversation, and I would also
    note that the list of specially designated nationals--it is a
    living document. It is intended to reflect the realities on the
    ground and to be aimed at those who are undermining democracy
    in Zimbabwe. So it is a living organism, if you will.
        Mr. Smith of New Jersey. What is the reaction, and what is
    the status now of the faith community, the churches, the
    believes, the clerics? Are they at risk? Are they critical of
    Mugabe? Or are they trying to find some way to preserve what
    human rights they currently possess, for them and for the
    people?
        Ms. Smith. I think both the faith-based community and civil
    society more broadly certainly have expressed concerns. At the
    same time, you know, these are people of remarkable courage and
    fortitude that they have demonstrated over the years.
        From the perspective of the U.S. Government, I know these
    are people with whom our Embassy and our representatives here
    in Washington want to engage with very closely, and we will
    rely on, you know, sort of them but also this is a measure of
    accountability for the government. What happens with political
    space, what happens with freedom of religion, what happens with
    members of the faith-based community, that is the measure of
    the government as it moves forward.
        Mr. Smith of New Jersey. Are there any bills or pieces of
    legislation that you see or decrees that you know of that might
    be a further restriction of religious freedom?
        Ms. Smith. Not that I am aware of.
        Mr. Smith of New Jersey. Okay. Let me just ask one final
    question. I remember Andy Natsios once telling me how appalling
    it was that Mugabe could take what is a bread basket country
    that was exporting to its neighbors, and turn it into a food-
    deprived country in need of imports of foreign aid that happens
    to be food.
        Are there any indications that you see, any early warning
    signs--Mr. Amani, this might be to you--that might suggest, you
    know, there is any crisis on the horizon, food-wise?
        Mr. Amani. There has been a recent vulnerability assessment
    that has been undertaken in Zimbabwe that indicates that the
    number of people who will be in need of humanitarian assistance
    over the next year, over the next--the hunger period, which
    runs from about now through March, is going to be significantly
    higher than it was a year ago.
        About a year ago we thought that 1.6 million people were
    going to be in need of humanitarian assistance. It looks like
    2.2 million will now be in need of humanitarian assistance.
    Some of that is due to climatic conditions in drought, some of
    it is due to poor performance of the agricultural sector, and
    some of it has to do with the fact that Zimbabwe has used up
    many of its reserves in responding to previous problems. So it
    does look like it is getting worse in the short term.
        Mr. Smith of New Jersey. Sure. How will that be met? Will
    the international community rally, including ourselves, to meet
    that humanitarian need? And is there anything specific,
    tangible, that you can convey to us, so that we have a sense of
    what our responsibility should be in the Congress?
        Mr. Amani. Right. We are prepared--we are providing
    assistance through our Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance--
    --
        Mr. Smith of New Jersey. Right.
        Mr. Amani [continuing]. And through our Food for Peace
    programming. So we have already offered $15 million in
    assistance. We have ongoing programs in the areas affected by
    the drought to improve economic resilience, and we will be
    looking at further assistance down the line.
        Mr. Smith of New Jersey. Okay. How much do we provide--food
    aid?
        Mr. Amani. We have a $20 million Food for Peace Program. We
    have offered $15 million in more immediate humanitarian
    assistance. And we have our ongoing agricultural promotion Feed
    the Future kinds of activities.
        Mr. Smith of New Jersey. Now, the 1.6 million to 2.2
    million, when will they get the 2.2 million people at risk or--
    --
        Mr. Amani. This is the hunger period when the stocks are
    low for families and they are waiting for the new harvest. So
    this is a period, as I said, starting about now, that runs
    through March.
        Mr. Smith of New Jersey. March.
        Mr. Amani. And this is the period that we need to be
    active. We are working very closely with other entities,
    including the World Food Program, and other international
    organizations, NGOs, and with other donors to respond to it.
        Mr. Smith of New Jersey. Does the World Food Program have a
    specific appeal out on behalf of the----
        Mr. Amani. Yes.
        Mr. Smith of New Jersey.--600,000?
        Mr. Amani. Yes.
        Mr. Smith of New Jersey. When did that go out?
        Mr. Amani. I am not sure.
        Mr. Smith of New Jersey. Okay. I appreciate that. Thank you
    very much.
        I would like to yield to Ms. Bass.
        Ms. Bass. Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
        This is a general question for both of you. Given our
    relationship with Zimbabwe, I just wonder how you function
    there, you know, and specifically for you, Dr. Smith, I am
    wondering if the President's initiative around young leaders,
    if there are leaders that we are engaging with in Zimbabwe,
    and, if so, how?
        And then, you know what I mean? In other words, the
    conditions in which they must function? And then in terms of
    USAID, the same question in terms of, how are you able to
    function in what I imagine would be a rather hostile
    environment?
        Ms. Smith. I will leave the operational side more to Todd,
    but, I mean, Zimbabwe, as you know, like much of Southern
    Africa, has an enormous youth population. It is a very vibrant
    society. It is an increasingly technologically wired up
    society.
        And Ambassador Wharton there is doing a terrific job of
    reaching out to youth and to Zimbabweans in general through a
    variety of communications.
        Ms. Bass. He hasn't blocked the Internet?
        Ms. Smith. No. We still have communications there, and it
    is--you know, as I believe Todd said in his opening statement,
    it is the next generation of democratic leaders, too, that we
    very much want to nurture. It is not an easy political
    environment, but it is--that makes the work even more
    important.
        Ms. Bass. Why do you think he allows that? I mean, why do
    you think he allows the Internet and hasn't taken steps?
        Ms. Smith. I don't think I could speculate on the motives
    there.
        Ms. Bass. Okay.
        Mr. Amani. I will note that when I visited Zimbabwe in
    March I sat in on what we call a listening session with young
    leaders in Zimbabwe, and I must say it was one of the most
    moving experiences I have had was to hear from them, all of
    whom had faced at some point some sort of an issue, whether
    they were dealing with HIV/AIDS or had experienced repression
    based on their political activism, or for whatever reason.
        But they had responded to that by joining or forming an
    organization that addressed those issues, and joining with
    other young Zimbabweans to speak out and be clear about what
    they were facing and what they--their vision for Zimbabwe in
    the future. So we owe them our support over time, and we are
    hopeful that through President Obama's Young African Leaders
    Initiative we can provide support to youth.
        As Shannon mentioned, it is not an easy place to work when
    it is difficult to work with some institutions or we don't--we
    see--don't see the responsiveness to important information.
        One of the things we have been trying to do on the
    macroeconomic side, for example, is provide very solid data on
    what is happening in the economy, so that it can serve as a
    solid basis for decision-making by economic policymakers. And
    we are hopeful that that kind of good data can be used by the
    current government as well.
        Ms. Bass. Do you know if those young leaders that we are
    working with, are they at risk? Do they experience harassment,
    or does it fly under the radar?
        Mr. Amani. Some of them have received--have been victims of
    harassment. Most of them have had some difficulty in operating
    like you would like to. But as I said, they seem to have been
    able to rise above that and continue their work and engage more
    broadly with other youth in trying to improve the conditions in
    Zimbabwe.
        Ms. Bass. And do you see him, from his point of view,
    having a group of younger leaders that he is grooming? I mean,
    he is 89. He is, you know, at some point----
        Mr. Amani. I couldn't comment on that. I don't know.
        Ms. Bass. What did you say?
        Mr. Amani. I couldn't comment on that. I don't know.
        Ms. Bass. You don't know?
        Mr. Amani. No.
        Ms. Smith. I would note that cabinet appointments did not
    necessarily reflect a youth movement, but----
        Ms. Bass. He appointed his peers? Okay. Thank you.
        You mentioned the food program, Mr. Amani, and I was
    wondering if you could describe a little more about that. Is
    this food that we export? Is it from the United States? Do we
    buy locally and provide it in Zimbabwe? Or what are the
    specifics?
        Mr. Amani. I am not sure exactly how we do it in Zimbabwe.
    I believe that some of the support was for local purchase
    rather than U.S. food that was shipped there. We can do either
    in our programs.
        Much of our program is also focused on building resiliency
    in families and helping to make sure that the food they have is
    used so that they get the maximum nutritional benefit from it.
    So we have found that even though sometimes families have
    access to food they don't get the full nutrition out of it that
    they could. So there is a lot of effort to focus on helping
    families use the food that is available in the most nutritious
    ways, and also to just help them build their own stocks, build
    their own capacity to withstand these kinds of shocks that can
    happen cyclically at times.
        Ms. Bass. Is that part of Feed the Future? Or does Feed the
    Future function programmatically in Zimbabwe?
        Mr. Amani. Feed the Future does function programmatically.
    What I was describing is more related to our Food for Peace
    programs that focus on really the poorest and most at need
    populations in the country. Feed the Future is focused more on
    sort of the policy environment for future growth in the
    agricultural sector.
        It is focused on some key value chains that have the
    potential to increase in a significant way the availability of
    food and to help Zimbabwe be, as Chairman Smith mentioned, the
    bread basket--future bread basket--of Southern Africa.
        Ms. Bass. Thank you.
        Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Mr. Smith of New Jersey. Just two very quick questions. It
    is my understanding that some $700,000 was put into SADC for an
    election observation. What did they do with it? Did they give
    it back? Did it get used in some other way?
        Mr. Amani. We sent up----
        Mr. Smith of New Jersey. Is it in escrow?
        Mr. Amani. We sent up a congressional notification for
    that, but ultimately, as I said, we didn't provide that money
    to SADC.
        Mr. Smith of New Jersey. It never went.
        Mr. Amani. Yes.
        Mr. Smith of New Jersey. Okay. That is good. And, secondly,
    we are going to be hearing from Arthur Gwagwa from the Zimbabwe
    Human Rights NGO Forum, which I know you are very familiar
    with. How treacherous is it for human rights organizations and
    researchers and advocates to operate in Zimbabwe today, as of
    right now?
        Mr. Amani. It has been a difficult situation for them to
    work in, and we could provide more information in a separate
    opportunity. But this is--it is a difficult situation.
        Mr. Smith of New Jersey. Could you provide that for the
    record at least? And is that a fear of being arrested,
    harassed, beaten? You know, I know of what has happened, and I
    just want to know right now, snapshot today, if I am a human
    rights researcher, what are my risks in Zimbabwe?
        Ms. Smith. The snapshot today is uncertain, and I suspect
    your next witness can probably give you the best read out of
    all in answer to that question. But it is certainly something
    we would be happy to follow up with you and your staff on.
        Mr. Smith of New Jersey. I appreciate that very much. And
    thank you for your patience in the lateness in starting, and
    thank you for your insights today.
        I would like to now ask our--unless you have anything you
    would like to add----
        Ms. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman----
        Mr. Amani. Thank you.
        Ms. Smith [continuing]. Ranking Member Bass.
        Mr. Smith of New Jersey. I would like to now invite to the
    witness table our next two panelists, beginning first with Mr.
    Arthur Gwagwa, who works as an international advocacy
    coordinator with the Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, a human
    rights coalition of 19 members and the first organization in
    Zimbabwe to also have presence in the global north.
        He conducts research and advocates on the human rights
    situation in Zimbabwe in that role. He works closely with EU
    structures, the UNHRC, and of course our own Government. He is
    a lawyer by background, dually admitted to practice in both
    Zimbabwe and in England. Mr. Gwagwa is based in London, but
    frequently travels to Zimbabwe.
        Welcome, and thank you for making the trip here.
        We will then hear from Ms. Imani Countess, who is the
    Africa region program director for the American Center for
    International Labor Solidarity for the AFL-CIO. She is
    responsible for the overall programmatic and financial
    management of the program, which includes activities in 15
    African countries.
        Prior to this position, she served as the Zimbabwe country
    director for the National Democratic Institute for
    International Affairs with responsibility for program
    development, oversight, implementation of democracy
    strengthening programs, donor relations, and representation.
        Ms. Countess has previously held positions with the
    TransAfrica Forum, the American Friends Service Committee,
    Shared Interest, the Africa Policy Information Center, and the
    U.S. African Development Foundation.
        Thank you, both. Mr. Gwagwa.

        STATEMENT OF MR. ARTHUR GWAGWA, INTERNATIONAL ADVOCACY
              COORDINATOR, ZIMBABWE HUMAN RIGHTS NGO FORUM

        Mr. Gwagwa. Thank you, Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Bass,
    and other committee members, for granting me this opportunity
    to testify before this House.
        I would request the committee to admit my written
    testimony, together with all of the annexes, as part of the
    record.
        Mr. Smith of New Jersey. Without objection, all testimony,
    any attachments, will be made a part of the record.
        Mr. Gwagwa. Thank you. I frequently visit Zimbabwe, and I
    was in Zimbabwe last week. I traveled extensively around the
    country. I met all civil society leaders, and I had interviews
    with members of the diplomatic community, including the United
    States, Canada, Norway, and SADC diplomats as well.
        In writing this statement, I adopted an evidence, you know,
    based approach. I did not really express my own opinion, but
    collected evidence from Zimbabweans about what, you know, they
    are thinking about the situation.
        So I have clearly set out the views in support of, you
    know, the current measures by the United States of America on
    Zimbabwe, and I have also clearly set out the views of those
    Zimbabweans who say, you know, that sanctions, you know, should
    be removed. And I have also clearly set out what I call the
    middle ground of, you know, those who are saying, yes, you
    know, the sanctions should go, but not immediately.
        In terms of, you know, our approach, you know, those who
    have instructed me to represent Zimbabwe civil society
    organizations today, we do not really have a very clear
    position to say, ``Well, U.S.A. should take this stance or
    should take that stance.'' It is up to the Government of
    America to make, you know, that decision, based on the evidence
    that we collected from, you know, the Zimbabweans.
        But my own assessment of the situation when I went, you
    know, to Zimbabwe recently in 2012 and 2011 is that currently
    it is a country that is, you know, going through a very
    difficult time where people are whispering their aspirations
    and expectations, and their disappointment with what happened,
    but they do not really have the freedom to talk about such
    issues in public for fear of persecution.
        I should commend, you know, the government, you know, for
    holding a violent-free election. You know, that is a huge
    credit, because not many people were killed, not many people
    were injured, and not many people were maimed in comparison
    with previous elections, particularly the 2008 Presidential
    runoff. That is a positive.
        But the credibility of an election cannot be assessed just
    on the basis of, you know, lack of violence, but other factors
    that are outlined in my statement. And one of the issues is
    outlined on page 3 of my testimony. That is, you know, the
    state of compliance with and breach of obligations under the
    national law, treaties, and conventions, that Zimbabwe is party
    to.
        Although cases of politically motivated matters,
    abductions, disappearances, torture, and intimidation have gone
    down in comparison to 2008, the situation is still worrying.
    The military is looming large. And people were not given a
    chance to express, you know, their democratic right to choose a
    government of their own choice, the widespread violations and
    separation of the right of freedom of association, assembly,
    movement, exercise of profession, including politically
    motivated reprisals.
        I interviewed the barristers, who are called advocates in
    Zimbabwe. And they were actually afraid that maybe the library
    where we are holding the interview was bugged. They could--if
    top lawyers in a country cannot freely express themselves, I
    think it is really worrying, because I am a lawyer myself who
    practiced in Zimbabwe for close to 10 years, and I am a
    barrister in the U.K., and I know how worrying it can be if
    lawyers are being dragged or being referred to the prosecuting
    authority by a judge of the High Court simply because they are
    exercising their right to practice their profession.
        And some of these young lawyers who are now leading the
    chambers, I trained them, you know, before I left Zimbabwe in
    2001. And it is really worrying to see an attack on lawyers
    that is an advocate--Beatrice Mtetwa, and other human rights
    defenders, including Jestina Mukoko, Abel Chikomo, who is
    another--the executive director of the Forum.
        Abel Chikomo next week is going to be in court being
    accused of running an illegal organization when in fact the law
    in Zimbabwe actually allows an organization to run on the basis
    of being a common law entity. It doesn't have to be registered
    under the Private Organizations Act.
        At the moment, there are fears that the government might
    resurrect the NGO bill. That might impair and maim, you know,
    the work that we are doing in trying to promote political
    pluralism. There is widespread violation of freedom of
    expression, access to information, as seen particularly during
    the past election where the MDC requested for--in order for
    them to assess their rights in the electoral court, but that
    right was denied.
        There are violations of property rights, and the government
    continues to make provocative statements that are leading to
    capital flight, and it is my submission before this committee
    that if the Government of Zimbabwe is serious about, you know,
    reengagement, it should stop--and I say categorically, stop
    making provocative statements that are leading the country on a
    downhill path, and they should stop insults, you know,
    targeted, you know, toward the diplomatic community.
        So in terms of the options that are open to the U.S.A., I
    would--there is a dossier of reasons why, you know, the
    sanctions--people are saying the sanctions should be removed.
    But the main reason being that, you know, the sanctions have
    actually given the regime, you know, choose to keep on, you
    know, tormenting its people.
        I spoke to the Embassy leaders. You know, they are holding,
    you know, the same argument. But my view is that when the world
    is retreating in fear, countries like the United States of
    America should not cower but should hold onto its principles
    and ideals that makes, you know, this nation great. It should
    stand as a moral leader to fill that particular vacuum that
    other people of, you know, weak spine are afraid, you know, to
    fill.
        So in terms of, you know, my own take, I would go for
    Secretary Clinton's action for action principle that--action
    for action, because we send a very wrong signal, not only to
    Zimbabwe but to the region and to the world, particularly in
    the current, you know, climate of instability, if were to
    reward intransigence.
        What the United States of America, you know, should do is
    to balance--to do a balancing act in terms of which they
    distinguish the state from the nation, safeguarding the
    economic interests of the nation of Zimbabwe and the people of
    Zimbabwe, but taking measures I think against those who are
    making, you know, their country of Zimbabwe, you know, to
    continue suffering.
        I have outlined, you know, the principles that I believe
    would actually be very, very relevant in elaborating on the
    action and action principle. In terms of the areas that I think
    the United States of America should focus on in terms of, you
    know, supporting Zimbabwe, economic recovery and resilience for
    the small holder farmers, but also ensuring that Zimbabwe
    diamonds are traded openly on the market in terms of, you know,
    the Kimberley Process, political pluralism, healing and
    reconciliation, rule of law and justice, citizenship
    participation, institutional reform, and access to services,
    including access to justice, culture, arts, and information
    technology.
        We have seen across the world how information technology
    can be an impetus in social change, democracy, and advancement
    of human rights. But we have also seen how information
    technology can be used by repressive governments in surveilling
    and oppressing, you know, people's rights. So information
    technology is a very crucial role that I think the United
    States of America can support.
        And, finally, the issue of culture. Ambassador Bruce
    Wharton is doing a fantastic job in that regard. He started,
    you know, the bicycle diplomacy. I actually happen to be an
    expert on cultural diplomacy, spoken a lot at the Institute of
    Culture and Diplomacy in Germany, and I want to see, you know,
    culture-to-culture interaction with the United States of
    America and Zimbabwe. We used to have Loyola University
    students coming to Zimbabwe. I think more of that, so that we
    have got an exchange of ideas and principles, that would make
    for a very strong world.
        Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Gwagwa follows:]

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        Mr. Smith of New Jersey. Thank you very much for your
    testimony.
        Ms. Countess.

    STATEMENT OF MS. IMANI COUNTESS, REGIONAL PROGRAM DIRECTOR FOR
                     AFRICA, THE SOLIDARITY CENTER

        Ms. Countess. Good afternoon. Chairman Smith, Ranking
    Member Bass, and members of the subcommittee, on behalf of the
    Solidarity Center Board of Trustees and staff, thank you for
    inviting us to testify today. I will give brief remarks on the
    subject and ask that my written testimony and annexes be
    submitted.
        Mr. Smith of New Jersey. Without objection, so ordered.
        Ms. Countess. Thank you. For over a decade, the Solidarity
    Center has worked with trade unions in Zimbabwe to strengthen
    their capacity to defend worker rights and advocate for
    sustainable economic policies and human rights protections.
        We, along with unions in Southern Africa, the AFL-CIO, and
    its allied organizations here in the U.S., are deeply concerned
    about the situation in Zimbabwe, and we welcome this
    opportunity to provide our perspective as a part of this
    hearing.
        Since the results of the July 31 elections were released,
    criticism, including that of our union partners, the Zimbabwe
    Congress of Trade Unions, the ZCTU, and the Labor and Economic
    Development Research Institute of Zimbabwe, LEDRIZ, has
    centered primarily on the deeply flawed electoral process. Yet
    in the midst of an unclear and highly polarized political
    environment, it is very easy to lose sight of the dramatic
    changes that have occurred in the country over the past 5
    years, including economic stabilization, largely peaceful
    elections, and a new constitution that has been endorsed by
    voters.
        Affairs have significantly improved from 5 or even 10 years
    ago, and building on the current strengths can lead to
    continued improvements in the economy as well as democracy and
    governance. So while the path ahead may seem troubled,
    objectively it is somewhat clear: There is a need for continued
    support for democratic institutions that are independent and
    that have integrity.
        Despite what may be seen as a step backward politically,
    organizations and groups are creating space for independent
    action and dialogue with an eye toward addressing the yawning
    social and economic needs of the country. Any analysis of
    Zimbabwe's way forward has to involve a discussion about how
    the country is to revive its once strong and diverse economy.
    And while there is no clear and obvious way forward, there are
    basic principles and steps that should be beyond dispute.
        First, the country is blessed with a wealth of strategic
    minerals, diamonds, and other commodities. However, the wealth
    generated by them is being utilized in inefficient and corrupt
    ways. The country's once strong manufacturing and agricultural
    sectors have steadily withered, and mining is not realizing its
    job creation potential or helping rebuild the foundation for a
    stable working class in the country.
        Zimbabwe has an opportunity to learn from the resource
    curves from which so many countries have suffered, and to work
    toward an open, transparent government where any citizen can
    see where and how income derived from natural resources is
    spent. Yet today Zimbabwe has no governmental institutions that
    promote transparency around the use of funds generated by
    natural resource mining.
        Zimbabwe clearly needs an economic plan and a trade plan
    that prioritize investments and industrialization and job
    creation. Africa's trade unions have emphasized the need for
    accelerating industrialization in Africa. They recognize that
    the current model, based largely on the export of raw extracted
    minerals, fosters dependency on Western and Asian markets,
    which leaves the continent exposed to numerous economic shocks
    and perpetuates the pattern of jobless growth, leaving Africa
    less stable and less secure.
        Last April, I met with the workers at the RioZim Empress
    Nickel Refinery in Kadoma, a town located about 100 kilometers
    south of Zimbabwe's capital city, Harare. There workers
    emphasized the need to add value to the country's natural
    resources. One said to me, ``If Zimbabwe only exported the raw
    mat'' or material ``from which nickel, copper, and cobalt is
    extracted, the 600 workers at our refinery would be jobless.''
        Those jobs pay between $200 and $1,700 per month and are
    highly coveted, given Zimbabwe's 80 percent unemployment. The
    refinery manager is also a strong proponent of
    industrialization. He is certain that industrialization is the
    only way to increase local employment. In fact, he says of the
    current refining process, ``We should go further. We should
    produce parts. We have nickel, iron ore, all the minerals one
    needs to produce alloys required to make parts. That is what we
    need to do.''
        Today the refinery produces nickel and copper sheets that
    are exported to South Africa and Western Europe. In October,
    the International Labor Organization, ILO, will send a high-
    level technical team to Zimbabwe to implement recommendations
    made by a Commission of Inquiry on respect for freedom of
    association and the right to bargain collectively, because of
    the country's ongoing and systematic failure to respect freedom
    of association.
        Those failures led to the country's inclusion in the June
    2013 hearings at the ILO's Committee on Application of
    Standards as one of the 25 worst countries regarding labor
    rights violations because it has failed to uphold international
    labor standards and even failed to ensure compliance with its
    own national laws.
        In addition to issues of anti-union discrimination by
    companies, including state-controlled enterprises, violations
    include unfair dismissals, non-payment of wages, underpayment
    of wages, as well as worker harassment and intimidation.
        Hopefully, the Government of Zimbabwe will finally act on
    the ILO recommendations and demonstrate a willingness to uphold
    the rule of law, or it can continue to be seen as a major
    violator of worker rights by the international labor community.
    As the newly elected government in Zimbabwe has choices, so,
    too, does the United States, which is of course the reason for
    this hearing.
        In terms of policy, the U.S. Government has a variety of
    tools at its disposal that can be used to support rule of law
    and worker rights in Zimbabwe and to encourage the Government
    of Zimbabwe to do the same. These investments in Zimbabwe
    citizens and their institutions have and can continue to
    produce positive outcomes by leveling the playing field in ways
    that can lead to a more stable economy and one that ultimately
    provides benefits to all.
        Specifically, the U.S. Government should continue to
    actively support civil society institutions that move the
    dialogue in Zimbabwe and proactively focus on democratic
    reform, human rights, and absolutely vital economic reforms.
    Zimbabwe's labor movement and its allies will continue to push
    for the creation of greater political dialogue on economic
    reform and discussions among labor, business, and government,
    to move policy actions.
        It is too early to see if this dialogue will continue in
    the current economic environment. However, what is clear is
    that organizations and institutions that are moving these
    debates in terms of economic reform clearly need continued
    support.
        I thank you and welcome your comments.
        [The prepared statement of Ms. Countess follows:]

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                                  ----------

        Mr. Smith of New Jersey. Thank you, Ms. Countess. Let me
    ask you, with regards to the ILO team that is going in October,
    who do they expect to meet with? Is there a sense that they
    will be well received, or is this going to be, you know, a very
    difficult uphill battle for them?
        And along those same lines, Mr. Gwagwa, you might recall
    back in 2005 the African Union sent a human rights observer. He
    got to the airport and that's about as far as he got. He was
    sent back. Although a U.N. researcher, rapporteur for want of a
    better word, was sent on the housing issue and that report was
    devastating, and it did have an impact in at least exposing
    what Mugabe was doing when he was just literally leveling whole
    stretches of housing.
        So if you could, the ILO, what are the realistic
    expectations? Do you know who is heading it for the ILO?
        Ms. Countess. Unfortunately, I don't know who is heading
    the delegation. I did speak actually earlier this week with ILO
    representatives who made it very clear that it is their
    intention to travel in October.
        It is unclear at this point in time how they will be
    received. I would speculate, though, I will sort of go out a
    little bit on a limb, and say that the government will receive
    them. The government challenged vigorously earlier this summer
    their inclusion in the current case and made it very clear that
    they would like to see things differently. And so I don't have
    the sense that they would refuse entry to the ILO.
        Mr. Smith of New Jersey. Now, when labor leaders----
        Ms. Countess. Yes.
        Mr. Smith of New Jersey [continuing]. Meet with the ILO in
    country, what risk does that entail? You testified that there
    are some 150 workers that are part of organized----
        Ms. Countess. 150,000.
        Mr. Smith of New Jersey.--150,000, I am sorry, representing
    30 affiliates. Has there been growth in union membership, or
    decline? Is it static? And what happens to those who are
    already part of the union? You mentioned dismissal wages, but
    is that, you know, for people who are aspiring to become
    organized and part of the labor union, or people who are
    currently in a union?
        Ms. Countess. The union membership in Zimbabwe has declined
    significantly. It has declined because of the virtual collapse
    of the economy. There has been incredible loss in terms of
    every sector of the economy--textiles, agricultural production,
    mining, and so forth. And many of the areas that have seen
    growth--for example, mining--those workers for the most part
    are not unionized, and the level of violation of basic worker
    rights is extremely high.
        In terms of the level of risk, trade unionist, particularly
    trade union leaders, do experience a high level of risk,
    without a doubt. They are aware of that risk, and they assume
    the responsibility for representing workers, and they embrace
    that responsibility. So they don't run from the risk. In fact,
    one of our partners said they assume that one in five of their
    staff is a part of the security sector, and there to inform.
        And so there is a level of maturity, a level of awareness,
    but overall a high level of commitment to advancing the cause
    of worker rights in the country.
        Mr. Smith of New Jersey. Can I just ask you, because I know
    the South African trade unions have been a great ally of the
    trade unions in Zimbabwe, has that influenced the South African
    Government to be more robust in its protestations?
        Ms. Countess. There are very clear examples in the past of
    COSATU in particular being able to use its power, its muscle,
    to change or nudge changes in the policy of the South African
    Government. I think that given the current situation that we
    are in with the election in Zimbabwe and the response of the
    South African Government, we clearly are at a point in time
    where there needs to be an intensification of the dialogue
    between the trade unions of South Africa and Zimbabwe.
        One of the things that the trade union regional groupings
    took--was able to organize prior to the elections was its own
    observation mission that included over 20 trade union leaders
    from about 13 countries. They came, they observed, in
    partnership with the ZCTU, and they came out with a report that
    was extremely critical and they applauded the country for the
    peaceful elections but noted that there was no possibility for
    free and fair elections and that the elections were not
    credible.
        So you have got the trade unions in the region who are of
    an opinion that the election was not credible, and they have
    communicated by and large their views to their governments and
    will continue to do so.
        Mr. Smith of New Jersey. Let me ask you, Mr. Gwagwa, in
    your testimony you say, ``Now is not the time for the U.S.A. to
    cower or whisper on Zimbabwe or hide Zimbabwe behind the Syrian
    agenda,'' which I think is a very important point. Very often
    we fail to multi-task the way we should, and next thing you
    know very important abuses and deteriorations in other
    countries don't get the focus that they ought to.
        One of the reasons why we are having this hearing today is
    to keep our focus as a committee and to, you know, dialogue
    with our executive branch but also to ask your input.
        But let me--have we made Zimbabwe a sufficient priority in
    our foreign policy? You did speak very well of our Ambassador,
    and I am sure he will be glad to hear that. But if you could
    elaborate on the overall policy. Is it as robust as you would
    like it to be?
        Secondly, if you could comment, as I mentioned a moment ago
    about, is it time for the AU? You know, in 2005, the human
    rights officer tried to get in, didn't get in, to resend, you
    know, a person to observe human rights. It might have a
    chilling effect even on any deterioration, just like I do
    believe the ILO mission will have nothing but positive impact
    going forward.
        And you did speak of flight post-election. Are those
    properties then confiscated by the government when people
    leave? And how widespread is that? Are people really uprooting
    and leaving out of fear? If you could.
        Mr. Gwagwa. In terms of the U.S. policy, while I think, you
    know, the U.S. has really been doing enough, because there are
    other fishes to fry. And we can't expect--you know, the U.S.
    cannot be putting all of its focus on Zimbabwe when there are
    people dying in Syria, in Egypt, and other nations of the
    world.
        But the overall impression is that, you know, Zimbabwe is a
    slow-burning situation, which is why it is on the back burner
    of, you know, many countries', you know, foreign policies,
    because you can't compare Zimbabwe to Syria. You can't compare
    it to Egypt, because you don't see people dying in the streets,
    you don't see a lot of people being--because, you know, there
    are factors or--the situation--the factors in Syria, Egypt, and
    Zimbabwe are totally different, because Zimbabweans are peace-
    loving people.
        We are long-suffering, and we know that happened between
    1965 and 1980. We are not a fighting country, but it does not
    mean that we are not angry. So because of that, it is a slow-
    burning situation. Sometimes, you know, people say, ``Well,
    there are better countries to be focusing on.''
        But in terms of, you know, regional stability and in terms
    of within the region, I actually think, you know, they should
    be more focused on Zimbabwe because I have seen the reactive
    foreign policies where we--governments want to go and wage wars
    instead of, you know, taking preventative measures so that, you
    know, such atrocities, you know, do not take place in the first
    place. So, yes, the U.S. has been doing, but it could do better
    in terms of engagement.
        And, number two, the issue of, you know, sending another
    representative, Zimbabwe has been notoriously known, even at
    the United Nations Human Rights Council for ignoring requests
    for visits, special rapporteurs.
        In 2010, you know, Manfred Nowak, who was, you know,
    deported at the airport, and we worked with special
    rapporteurs. Most of them have been ignored, and I actually
    think it is high time we had special rapporteur, for example,
    on independence of judges and employers to visit, you know, the
    country.
        And then, third question on the human rights violations,
    there was serious escalation from August 2012 to about, you
    know, June, May/June. But the reason why there was a little or
    sort of like a retreat by the government in terms of their
    attack on human rights defenders was that they switched their
    attention from attacking human rights defenders to electoral
    manipulation.
        We begin to see central intimidation, judicial complicity,
    where if a judge attacks you you can't say anything in public
    because you will be down for contempt of court. So it became
    more central because it is the truth of trade that, you know,
    the government--they employed new tools. But now we see a rise
    in attacks again.
        And I could talk of maybe the MDC's organizing secretary,
    Morgan Komichi, whose crime was simply that he picked a ballot
    paper and he gave it to the Election Commission. He is
    languishing in detention. Jestina Mukoko--the organization is
    facing, you know, delisting. Zimbabwe Human Rights Forum is
    facing attacks. Even Morgan Tsvangirai himself last week at the
    funeral of Enos Nkala in Bulawayo, the leader of the war
    veterans said Tsvangirai should not return to his rural home.
    That's really scary.
        So in terms of the attacks, there is a lot of intimidation.
    And it is likely to increase unless, you know, something is
    done.
        Thank you.
        Mr. Smith of New Jersey. Has any request been made to the
    U.N. to investigate this intimidation of lawyers and judges?
    Because, you know, we could do that here as a committee, and
    certainly join you. That is something we could do--you know,
    collaborate with you.
        Mr. Gwagwa. In the past, because our organization was
    actually responsible for--well, was part of that team that
    lobbied Minister Patrick Chinamasa, you know, now planning to
    visit Zimbabwe in May 2014 as part of the negotiations. But we
    have requested--what we have done is because the government
    rejects the applications, you know, for country visits, so what
    we end up doing is we invite the special rapporteurs to attend
    our annual events, particularly the introduction of human
    rights day on 10 December.
        But the downside to that is that if they are invited for a
    working arrangement because they haven't been invited by the
    government, they cannot comment on the situation in the
    country. They can only make anecdotal, you know, references.
        Mr. Smith of New Jersey. I see.
        Mr. Gwagwa. So I think, you know, there is actually--if the
    government is saying--is committed to reforms, what are they
    afraid of? I actually think, you know, the special rapporteur,
    independent of judges and lawyers, should come into the
    country. And then also, Frank LaRue, the Special Rapporteur on
    the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom at
    Expression and Opinion, which is the mandate that also covers
    elections and access to information.
        Mr. Smith of New Jersey. One last question before yielding
    to Ms. Bass. When is Zimbabwe's periodic review at the Human
    Rights Council? Is that coming up anytime soon?
        Mr. Gwagwa. I actually happen to be part of their civil
    society team, you know, that does that. Zimbabwe was reviewed
    in October 2011, and the report was adopted on the 12th of
    March last year, 2012. So the midterm review is going to be in
    March of next year.
        So the government is preparing for that, and we are
    preparing for that. And thank goodness we have been working
    quite well with the government on that, in terms of the UPR,
    because the UPR doesn't threaten, you know, the government. You
    know, Minister Patrick Chinamasa has been doing a fantastic
    job. We will wait to see how Emmerson Mnangagwa is going to
    cooperate with, you know, civil society.
        But I am going to be having a Skype interview with the
    United Nations next week on maybe strategic areas, where we
    think we need support. So I couldn't go to the Human Rights
    Council session, which is undergoing as we speak, because of
    this commitment. But we have a Skype interview to discuss
    strategy in terms of where the country goes from now.
        Ms. Bass. Thank you. I just have a couple of questions. I
    wanted to know your opinion, both of you, about the African
    Union and the African Union's emphasis and discussion about
    governance, supporting, promoting, good governance. And also
    maybe a new tenure in the AU where they in the past had wanted
    to have real hands-off on governance.
        And I am wondering, do you see the role being any different
    in Zimbabwe? I understand that the AU accepted the results of
    the elections, but I mean more in terms of supporting the
    development of better governance in Zimbabwe.
        Ms. Countess. It is a really difficult question, because
    what we all saw in terms of both the AU, in SADC, and South
    Africa's response to the elections, is that these bodies, and
    South Africa as a country, have prioritized peace in terms of
    an absence of violence.
        And it is very difficult moving forward to see to what
    extent these international bodies and countries can be
    encouraged to prioritize accountability. Already, within just a
    matter of weeks, I do know that some civil society
    organizations and trade unions in Southern Africa have
    organized a new network, a network that is designed to pressure
    SADC to be more accountable to the will of the majority of the
    peoples of the region.
        It is called ``The SADC We Want,'' and it is new, and it is
    just rolling out its agenda. And it is unclear what impact it
    will have.
        But what I do believe, and it is echoed in my comments, is
    that the only way in which we can see an increased
    accountability of AU, SADC, South Africa, and other governments
    is through citizen engagement and citizen power, including
    worker power. And until we get more of that----
        Ms. Bass. Right.
        Ms. Countess [continuing]. It is not clear.
        Ms. Bass. Got it.
        Mr. Gwagwa. Just briefly, I support what she is saying,
    because I think particularly the subject places relationships
    above principles. Although there have been changes of--a change
    in government in different countries, but, you know, the issue
    of liberation, war, solidarity still looms large in the region.
        And also, the culture--patriarchy, where you cannot be seen
    to disrespect your elders, even us I think within civil society
    we face the same issue. You meet Zimbabwean diplomats across
    the world. They say, ``Young man, who do you think you are?''
    But the world is changing.
        I am same age as David Cameron, George Osborne, and even
    President Obama. And so the world is changing. I think African
    leaders have to change in terms of their cultural paradigm,
    that you only--you need a white hair in order for you to be a
    leader.
        AU is still problematic as well. Mrs. Dlamini Zuma, when
    she went to Zimbabwe prior to the elections, you know, she was
    partisan. She was clearly pros here, because she is part of
    that liberation movement.
        We see what happened when the foreign affairs advisor to
    Jacob Zuma wanted to be outspoken regarding what is happening
    in Zimbabwe, how she was silenced and how Botswana is being
    sidelined as a result of his unprincipled stance. But I see
    signs of change across Africa through social change which is
    being prompted by ICTs and globalization.
        I see young people driving social change, so I think there
    is need for investment in that regard. And there are also
    structures like the African Commission for Human and People's
    Rights, although some Commissioners maybe believe in their--may
    be--shall I say, I see quite a diversification in terms of
    Commissioners. Commissioners are really committed to human
    rights.
        So I think working with the African Commission, African
    Court on Human and People's Rights, and other structures within
    the African Union can actually help to support the calls for
    good governance and democracy. But above all, we need social
    change. That is investment in social change projects,
    participatory democracy projects that empower citizens and
    reinvigorating our democracy in Africa.
        Thank you.
        Ms. Bass. Thank you. And then, a final question is about
    the impact of U.S. sanctions now, whether or not they--well,
    one, what you think of the impact, and how you have seen the
    impact on the ground; but, two, what do you think needs to be
    changed? Should it be increased? Expanded? Decreased? What?
        Mr. Gwagwa. Well, to be honest, my organization doesn't
    have a view on sanctions. And we also do not usually want to
    talk about it, I think partly because of, you know, the fear
    that it can actually be banned, you know, from Zimbabwe as a
    result of----
        Ms. Bass. Okay.
        Mr. Gwagwa [continuing]. Sanctions. So I won't say--because
    we don't have a stance on the issue of sanctions, but I
    provided a dossier of what Zimbabweans are saying on sanctions,
    from page--it is page 19 to 21.
        There is a strong view that the sanctions should go, but
    not because there have been reforms in Zimbabwe, but the major
    reason is that some people actually think that the sanctions
    have actually helped the government to--because the issue about
    the government is that they are cushioned by diamond revenues,
    and their children continue to go to Western universities and
    to good schools like, you know, St. George's, Prince Edward,
    those top schools within the country.
        So in terms of real impacts on the politicians, it has been
    very minimal. But, and there are other reasons, again, that the
    bureaucrats who preside over institutions like Zimbabwe
    Election Commission, the High Court, and all of that, those
    people were affected by sanctions, maybe not really affected
    but some--sorry, some of them were affected by sanctions.
        Maybe they saw their standard of living maybe going down.
    So they can never forgive the West, I think on the issue of
    sanctions. So the danger is that when we want to work with
    them, they might say, ``Well, we don't want to work with you
    because you guys you push for sanctions.''
        So, in other words, the agenda for institutional reform is
    going to be very difficult in the presence of sanctions,
    because expecting the same people to reform institutions is not
    different from expecting Emanghe to preside over an agenda to
    abolish a forest. It is another way of saying, reform the
    institutions, but, you know, there are sanctions.
        Ms. Bass. Right.
        Mr. Gwagwa. So my personal view is that maybe they should
    go. It is a difficult view, but I think maybe they should go
    not for--to appease the government----
        Ms. Bass. No. You are saying because it is a rallying point
    for the government.
        Mr. Gwagwa. Yes. Because it is a rallying point for the
    government.
        Ms. Bass. I understand.
        Ms. Countess. I would just want to echo what has just been
    said. The sanctions really have very little impact when we are
    talking about travel restrictions on 100 or so people and
    commercial licensing restrictions on a handful of enterprises.
    They don't have a significant impact on the country. They are
    essentially a red herring.
        They are used by the government, by the Government of
    Zimbabwe, to--you know, as a real rallying point, they enable
    the government to use the West as sort of like a whipping post.
        The previous Ambassador used to really challenge the
    Government of Zimbabwe on this question of sanctions, and he
    would remind the government that during the colonial era when
    Rhodesia was sanctioned, the U.S. imposed chrome sanctions and
    other sanctions against the Government of Rhodesia. The
    Rhodesian economy actually grew because they were forced to do
    more with less. And so, again, the previous Ambassador kind of
    threw that back, without much response.
        I don't want to speak on behalf of the trade unions of
    Zimbabwe. But having lived there for several years, what I can
    certainly say, based on my personal experience, is that there
    is very little impact.
        Ms. Bass. Thank you.
        Mr. Smith of New Jersey. Thank you very much.
        And, Ms. Bass, thank you.
        Mr. Gwagwa, thank you, and Ms. Countess, for your very,
    very enlightening, very incisive answers. Your testimony really
    does help this committee, and I hope it helps all listeners,
    including in the administration who, you know, benefit from
    your counsel.
        I won't ask you for an answer because you did give a very
    elaborate answer on sanctions. I have believed for a long time
    in sanctions that are even more microtargeted--I have a bill
    pending right now called Jacob's Law that seeks to hold human
    rights abusers accountable.
        It is even more narrow if they abuse American citizens,
    although the Magnitsky Act was one of those with--vis-a-vis
    Russia that seeks to pick out individuals, and if they are
    complicit in crimes, human rights abuse, they and they alone
    are the ones, not a more blanket sanction. And I think we are
    trending in human rights policy toward more of that, because
    that is a more effective way of doing it.
        And so but I do thank you for your testimonies. They were
    extraordinary. If you have anything you wanted to add before we
    conclude? Yes.
        Mr. Gwagwa. Yes. All I can say is I think the issue of
    sanctions is entirely up to your government to make a decision
    on that. I think, as you have said, I think maybe a new
    approach, we have been working with the EU on that--I think a
    much more responsive approach, you know, which is based on
    compassion I think for the people, because politicians all
    across the world, you know, sometimes they are not--sometimes
    they have got their own, you know, narrow agendas. But it is a
    question of maybe, how do you look beyond politicians and have
    compassion for the people, but it is a difficult balancing act.
        Mr. Smith of New Jersey. Very good.
        Mr. Gwagwa. No one could ever get it right. The EU is
    struggling with the same question.
        Mr. Smith of New Jersey. It is a very tough question. I
    have been here 33 years. I voted to impose sanctions on South
    Africa. As a matter of fact, in this room when we had that
    vote, I was the only Republican who voted for it, but there
    were people, including the Reagan administration, who argued
    that it would hurt the average South African even more. And I
    didn't dismiss that argument. I thought it had some validity,
    but apartheid was such an abomination that it seemed a more
    blanket sanction was warranted. But they are tough calls.
        So I do thank you, again, for your insights on all things
    related today. And without further ado, the hearing is
    adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 1:59 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

                                A P P E N D I X

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         Material Submitted for the Hearing RecordNotice deg.

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       Material submitted for the record by the Honorable Christopher H.
     Smith, a Representative in Congress from the State of New Jersey, and
     chairman, Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights,
                        and International Organizations

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