[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS TO COMBAT A CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL,
RADIOLOGICAL, AND NUCLEAR (CBRN) ATTACK ON THE HOMELAND
SUBCOMMITTEE ON COUNTERTERRORISM
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
APRIL 25, 2013
Serial No. 113-12
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Michael T. McCaul, Texas, Chairman
Lamar Smith, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Peter T. King, New York Loretta Sanchez, California
Mike Rogers, Alabama Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Paul C. Broun, Georgia Yvette D. Clarke, New York
Candice S. Miller, Michigan, Vice Brian Higgins, New York
Chair Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Patrick Meehan, Pennsylvania William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina Ron Barber, Arizona
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania Dondald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey
Jason Chaffetz, Utah Beto O'Rourke, Texas
Steven M. Palazzo, Mississippi Tulsi Gabbard, Hawaii
Lou Barletta, Pennsylvania Filemon Vela, Texas
Chris Stewart, Utah Steven A. Horsford, Nevada
Richard Hudson, North Carolina Eric Swalwell, California
Steve Daines, Montana
Susan W. Brooks, Indiana
Scott Perry, Pennsylvania
Greg Hill, Chief of Staff
Michael Geffroy, Deputy Chief of Staff/Chief Counsel
Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
I. Lanier Avant, Minority Staff Director
SUBCOMMITTEE ON COUNTERTERRORISM AND INTELLIGENCE
Peter T. King, New York, Chairman
Paul C. Broun, Georgia Brian Higgins, New York
Patrick Meehan, Pennsylvania Loretta Sanchez, California
Jason Chaffetz, Utah William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Chris Stewart, Utah Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Michael T. McCaul, Texas (ex (ex officio)
Kerry Ann Watkins, Subcommittee Staff Director
Dennis Terry, Subcommittee Clerk
Hope Goins, Minority Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
The Honorable Peter T. King, a Representative in Congress From
the State of New York, and Chairman, Subcommittee on
Counterterrorism and Intelligence.............................. 1
The Honorable Brian Higgins, a Representative in Congress From
the State of New York, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Counterterrorism and Intelligence:
Oral Statement................................................. 4
Prepared Statement............................................. 6
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Prepared Statement............................................. 7
Mr. Richard Daddario, Deputy Commissioner for Counterterrorism,
New York City Police Department:
Oral Statement................................................. 9
Prepared Statement............................................. 12
Dr. Huban Gowadia, Acting Director, Domestic Nuclear Detection
Office, U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 13
Joint Prepared Statement....................................... 15
Mr. Scott McAllister, Deputy Under Secretary, State and Local
Program Officer, Office of Intelligence and Analysis, U.S.
Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 20
Joint Prepared Statement....................................... 15
Dr. Leonard A. Cole, Director, Program on Terror Medicine and
Security, University of Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey:
Oral Statement................................................. 22
Prepared Statement............................................. 24
COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS TO COMBAT A CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL,
RADIOLOGICAL, AND NUCLEAR (CBRN) ATTACK ON THE HOMELAND
Thursday, April 25, 2013
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence,
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:08 a.m., in
Room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Peter T. King
[Chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives King, Higgins, and Keating.
Also present: Representative Green.
Mr. King. Good morning. The Committee on Homeland Security
Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence will come to
order. The subcommittee is meeting today to hear testimony
examining a threat of weapons of mass destruction attacks on
the homeland and to review Federal, State, and local
governments' capabilities to detect and respond to such
I now recognize myself for an opening statement.
Let me just say at the outset that this hearing was
scheduled a while back. It has been postponed at least once,
and I thank the witnesses today for their forbearance and being
willing to work with us on scheduling a new date.
Obviously at the time this was originally scheduled we did
not know that the attack in Boston was going to occur, and to
me, it makes today's hearing all the more meaningful even
though it is not focused on that in particular. I am sure that
the Chairman of the committee is going to schedule inquiries
into the Boston matter. But I think today certainly can relate
to Boston and it shows the various elements and the scope of
the type of attacks that we have to constantly be on our guard
against when we are dealing with international jihad.
So with that, I want to welcome our distinguished witnesses
for this hearing.
It really is an appropriate hearing to kick off the
subcommittee's activity for the 113th Congress. I am looking
forward to working with Members of the subcommittee, especially
the Ranking Member, Mr. Higgins, who is a colleague from New
York and a friend, to examine current and emerging threats,
ensure that all necessary efforts are made to detect and
respond to a terrorist attack, and conduct oversight over
intelligence and information sharing at all levels of
I can speak for myself, and I am certain for the Ranking
Member as well, this subcommittee will be run in a bipartisan
way with, again, working to the extent we possibly can to
address this issue, which--the issue of terrorism, which
affects us whether we are Democrat or Republican, north or
south, but particularly in New York, where we had a situation
last week with the announcement of the plot by the Royal
Canadian Mounted Police, which would have affected residents
from New York going through Buffalo, of course, the Canadian
border, where Mr. Higgins represents, and a terrible loss of
So we are all in this together, and that, I think, is going
to be the premise that guides our subcommittee as we go
Now, last week the attacks in Boston, which killed three
people and wounded more than 80, were, as I said, a tragic
reminder of the continued terrorist threat facing the homeland.
Hopefully this will be a wake-up call to all Americans,
particularly to Members of Congress, who somehow feel that the
war on terrorism is over and that homeland security funding is
a target to be cut when, in fact, to me, the threat is as great
as it ever was; a different dimension to the threat, but in
many ways even more dangerous than before September 11.
The unfortunate reality is that by using on-line
instructions from Inspire magazine terrorists were able to
construct lethal improvised explosive devices, and that, also,
does not even reference any training they may have had
While this hearing is not focused on the Boston attack
specifically, we have to ask what the possibility is for
terrorists to acquire chemical, biological, radiological, or
nuclear materials and then use those combined with an
improvised explosive device, an IED. We have to ask what our
intelligence and response capabilities look like in that event.
When you think of the carnage that was caused and how in many
ways a country, and certainly a city, came to a halt for 4 days
just with two devices--two IEDs left behind--we can just
imagine the consequences if that had been a radiological or
nuclear or dirty bomb attack.
Now, we don't have to look far to see that the WMD threat
is real. We saw that Korea has certainly made threats against
the United States; we had Kim Jong-un posing with a chart
entitled ``U.S. Mainland Strike Targeting Major American
Iran's Ahmadinejad threatens that a world without America
is both desirable and achievable. While their missiles cannot
yet reach our shores, and while Tehran works vigorously to
produce nuclear arms, it still hasn't succeeded. But we have to
assume the day will come when they will.
Ten years ago al-Qaeda sought and received an Islamic
religious ruling authorizing the use of weapons of mass
destruction against infidels. Al-Qaeda has sought nuclear
weapons for 20 years. In the past 6 years terrorists have
launched several attacks on facilities housing Pakistan's
several dozen nuclear weapons.
A nuclear event in any U.S. city would be a catastrophe.
For instance, it is estimated that a ground burst of a 150-
kiloton device at the base of the Empire State Building in an
unevacuated Manhattan at noon on a workday in good weather
would ultimately kill or wound more than 1.5 million innocent
That is why President Obama stated that the single biggest
threat to U.S. security, both short-term, medium-term, and
long-term, would be the possibility of a terrorist organization
obtaining a nuclear weapon. Al-Qaeda is ``trying to secure a
nuclear weapon--a weapon of mass destruction that they have no
compunction at using,'' and that is a quote from President
An attack using a less sophisticated radiological
dispersion device, often called a dirty bomb, would be less
deadly than a nuclear blast but it still would involve the loss
of human life and would have incalculable economic,
environmental, and psychological impacts on our Nation.
Our first line of defense against rogue states' or terror
groups' weapons of mass destruction are the
counterproliferation and counterterrorism efforts of our
intelligence community and Federal law enforcement. Our next
line of defense is our Nation's military defense forces and
Our last line of defense is with us here today--the front
line defenders responsible for intercepting a nuclear bomb.
They are the Department of Homeland Security's Domestic Nuclear
Detection Office and State and local police, represented, I am
proud to say, today by Commissioner Daddario of the New York
City Police Department, which has 1,000 police officers working
day in and day out on counterterrorism.
The NYPD participates in the DHS's vital Securing the
Cities program, which has provided 8,500 radiological
detectors, trained 13,000 police officers, and conducted 100
drills. Last year DHS wisely expanded Security the Cities to
another at-risk city, Los Angeles.
Commissioner Daddario, I should say, the program has come a
long way, though. I remember the first time, when it was first
being rolled out and they had it--they were testing it on the
border between Nassau County and Queens County on Sunrise
Highway, and the first guy that was stopped was some poor guy
coming back from a stress test and he got pulled over and he
said--I see you nodding--he said, ``The doctor said my heart is
in good shape but I am going to have a heart attack right
now.'' So many lights were going off, helicopters were moving,
it was--we thought we had our first nuclear terrorist but
instead it was just some poor guy who was filled with
But in any event, it has come a long way since then and is
really, I think, absolutely essential to the security of the
city because, similar to what happened in London and Madrid, it
is believed that the next threat against a major city will be
launched from the suburbs. As bad as that would be, if we have
a dirty bomb it would be that much worse. That is why I think
Secure the Cities program, which has worked so well in New
York, but I think it is transferable to virtually any other
urban area in the country.
At today's hearing we will examine the threat of a
chemical, biological, nuclear, or radiological attack on the
homeland; review Federal, State, and local governments detect
and respond to such attacks; and identify opportunities for
information-sharing--again, always with the backdrop of Boston,
which again, if anything positive comes from it it is a
reminder of how real the threat is and how whatever we discuss,
again, thinking how bad that was, how much worse it could have
been if it had been any of these nuclear or radiological
In closing, I want to commend the Obama administration for
its firm line against North Korea. Republican or Democrat, we
all stand shoulder to shoulder with our South Korean and
Japanese allies against any aggression. I also commend the
administration for its continuation and expansion of Securing
the Cities program.
I now look forward to the testimony of the witnesses, and--
but first I want to recognize, again, a good friend, an
outstanding Member of Congress from upstate New York, which
sometimes we refer to as Southern Canada, gentleman from New
York and Ranking Member, Mr. Higgins.
Mr. Higgins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this
hearing, and look forward to working with you toward our mutual
objectives of protecting the homeland and strengthening
America's influence abroad.
I would also like to thank the witnesses for their
Let me also publicly thank the FBI, Joint Terrorism Task
Force, the Department of Homeland Security, and State and local
officials for their efforts in apprehending a suspect in the
Boston marathon bombing. Their efforts exemplify the type of
collaboration that we envision when State, local, and Federal
agencies work effectively together.
On Monday, as the Chairman has mentioned, the Royal
Canadian Mounted Police announced that they, along with the FBI
and Department of Homeland Security, disrupted a terrorist plot
to attack a commuter train that runs from Toronto through the
Northern Border at Niagara Falls into New York City. The
individuals charged allegedly received support from al-Qaeda in
Now, some were surprised that al-Qaeda had a presence in
Iran. Al-Qaeda is a Sunni organization in a Shia-majority
country, but we should remember that when the Taliban was
defeated in 2001 in Afghanistan, many of bin Laden's family
members and top lieutenants had self-exiled to Iran.
I commend the work of the Canadian and the United States
intelligence and law enforcement agencies for successfully
thwarting this attack on our Nation. I believe it is the duty
of this subcommittee to examine threats from al-Qaeda in Iran,
and I have talked to the Chairman about the possibility of
holding a hearing on the al-Qaeda presence in Iran and any
threat it poses to the United States.
According to Secretary of State Kerry, Iran is moving
closer and closer to processing a nuclear weapon. Nuclear
proliferation in Iran, Syria, and North Korea should encourage
us that we need to be prepared for an attack here in the United
We have been fortunate that a chemical, biological, or
radiological, or nuclear attack has never come to fruition here
in our country. In 2008 the Commission on the Prevention of
Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism
produced a report entitled ``World at Risk.'' According to that
report, the commission told us that they believed a terrorist
attack would occur somewhere in the world by 2013 and that it
is more likely to be an act of biological terrorism.
It is now 2013 and we recognize the possibility of a
chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear attack from both
foreign and domestic actors. However, recognizing an attack
does not equal being prepared for one. The Weapons of Mass
Destruction Commission concluded that the best strategy for
biodefense was improving the ability to respond.
Last Congress this committee held a hearing on the threat
from chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons.
During those hearings our witness, Dr. Leonard Cole, who is
with us today, stated that the response plans and exercises
fall short of optimal levels, and planning that realistically
incorporates Federal, State, local, and private-sector
resources into a unified WMD response is largely absent.
In order to successfully prepare for this kind of attack we
must alter policy and ensure that first responders have the
resources that are necessary to be effective. The First
Responder Grant programs are important to preparedness and
should be provided at adequate levels.
As we saw in Boston, the actions of first responders were
critical. Their actions were necessary in preventing a
catastrophic loss of life in the wake of a chemical,
biological, radiological, or nuclear attack.
I understand that today's testimony will highlight a
Department of Homeland Security program that is designed to
prevent these kinds of attacks in two cities that are facing
the highest risks. Those cities are New York City and Los
I know that these cities are vulnerable and depend on first
responders. I particularly know that New York City does because
first responders from the Buffalo and Niagara region have
assisted them in the wake of the horrific 9/11 attacks and the
devastation from Hurricane Sandy.
We know that these attacks could happen anywhere, and
knowing this, there should be an incentive to properly fund
first responders consistently answering the call when our
Nation is in need.
Along with readiness, information sharing among Federal,
State, and local officials must be strong when it comes to
intelligence involving potential chemical, biological,
radiological, or nuclear attacks. In this Congress I am an
original co-sponsor of H.R. 1542, which strengthens
intelligence and information sharing about weapons of mass
destruction. It is my hope that this bipartisan legislation
will be voted on favorably by this committee.
This legislation is a step in the right direction, but
there is still much work to be done. First responders in all
areas of risk need to be fully capable and equipped to handle
This means that full funding of State and local grant
programs by the Federal Government, and this includes the Urban
Area Security Initiative. I will be introducing--or
reintroducing--legislation to once again provide funding
opportunities for communities like Buffalo and Niagara Falls
under this program, which were senselessly cut from funding.
Additionally, coordination needs to be improved among all
officials at the Federal, State, and local level to have a
response that is expedient, efficient, and effective.
I look forward to the witness testimony today, and I thank
you for being here, again.
[The statement of Ranking Member Higgins follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Brian Higgins
April 25, 2013
I would like to thank the Chairman for holding the first
subcommittee hearing this Congress. I look forward to working with him
in a bipartisan manner. Let me also publically thank the FBI, Joint
Terrorism Task Force, Department of Homeland Security, and State and
local officials for their efforts in apprehending a suspect in the
Boston Marathon bombing. Their efforts exemplified the type of
collaboration that we envision when State, local, and Federal agencies
On Monday, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police announced that they,
along with the FBI and DHS, disrupted a terrorist plot to attack a
commuter train that runs from Toronto through the Northern Border at
Niagara Falls into New York City. The individuals charged allegedly
received support from al-Qaeda in Iran. I commend the work of Canadian
and United States intelligence and law enforcement agencies for
successful efforts to thwart an attack on our nations.
I believe it is the duty of this subcommittee to examine threats
from al-Qaeda in Iran, and I hope the Chairman will hold a hearing on
al-Qaeda in Iran and any threats it poses to the United States.
According to Secretary of State Kerry, Iran is moving closer and closer
to possessing a nuclear weapon. Nuclear proliferation in Iran, Syria,
and North Korea should encourage us that we need to be prepared for an
attack here in the United States.
We have been fortunate that a chemical, biological, radiological,
or nuclear attack has never come to fruition in the United States. In
2008, the Commission on the Prevention of WMD Proliferation and
Terrorism produced a report entitled World at Risk. According to that
report, the Commission told us that they believed a terrorist attack
would occur somewhere in the world by 2013, and that it was more than
likely to be an act of biological terrorism.
It is now 2013, and we recognize the possibility of a chemical,
biological, radiological, or nuclear attack from both foreign and
domestic actors. However, recognizing an attack does not equal being
prepared for one. The WMD Commission concluded that the best strategy
for biodefense was improving the ability to respond. Last Congress,
this committee held hearings on the threat from chemical, biological,
radiological, and nuclear weapons.
During those hearings, our witness, Dr. Leonard Cole, who will also
testify today, stated that response plans and exercises fall short of
optimal levels. And planning that realistically incorporates Federal,
State, local, and private-sector resources into a unified WMD response
is largely absent.
In order to successfully be prepared for a chemical, biological,
radiological, or nuclear attack we must alter policy and ensure that
first responders have the resources that are necessary to be effective.
The first responder grant programs are important to preparedness and
should be provided at adequate levels.
As we saw in Boston, the actions of first responders are critical.
The actions of first responders are necessary in preventing a
catastrophic loss in the wake of a chemical, biological, radiological,
or nuclear attack.
I understand that today's testimony will highlight a Department of
Homeland Security program that is designed to prevent radiological and
nuclear attacks in two cities that are facing the highest risk. This
program is in New York City and Los Angeles. I know that these cities
are vulnerable and depend on first responders. I particularly know that
New York City does because first responders from the Buffalo/Niagara
region have assisted them in the wake of the horrific 9/11 attacks and
the devastation from Hurricane Sandy.
We know that chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear attacks
could happen anywhere. Knowing this, there should be an incentive to
properly fund first responders who consistently answer the call in the
time of anyone's need. Along with readiness, information sharing among
Federal, State, and local agencies must be strong when it comes to
intelligence involving potential chemical, biological, radiological, or
This Congress, I am an original co-sponsor of H.R. 1542, which
strengthens intelligence and information sharing about weapons of mass
destruction. It is my hope that this bi-partisan legislation will be
voted favorably by this committee. This legislation is a step in the
right direction, but there still is work left to be done. First
responders, in all areas of risk, need to be fully capable and equipped
to handle an attack--this means full funding of State and local grant
programs by the Federal Government.
This includes the Urban Area Security Initiative, or UASI. I will
shortly be re-introducing legislation to once again provide a funding
opportunity to communities like Buffalo and Niagara Falls for UASI,
which were senselessly cut off from funding. Additionally, coordination
needs to be improved among Federal, State, and local officials to have
a response that is expedient and efficient. I look forward to witness
testimony today and to hearing how we can work more to close the gaps
that exist and provide resources needed to ensure we are resilient.
Mr. Higgins. Mr. Chairman, I also ask for unanimous consent
to allow Congressman Al Green, from Texas to participate in
Mr. King. No objection. Glad to welcome the interloper back
one more time.
Also, said the Ranking Member, you proposed a hearing on
al-Qaeda in Iran. I think it is a very good recommendation. I
will certainly discuss it with the Chairman of the full
committee. But I think this is certainly a very appropriate
topic for this committee, because especially since now the
homeland security element has been brought in where, based on
what the RCMP said, that this was going to be an attack against
the American homeland.
So it is not just an overseas issue; it is something which
directly affects us. I think it definitely comes within the
jurisdiction of our committee and subcommittee, and so you and
I can discuss with the Chairman and the Ranking Member, but I
certainly think it is an excellent idea and a very good
Mr. Higgins. Thank you.
Mr. King. Thank you.
Other Members of the committee, if they arrived, are
reminded that opening statements may be submitted for the
[The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson
April 25, 2013
I would also like to thank the witnesses for appearing to testify
on our efforts to counter the threat from a chemical, biological,
radiological, or nuclear attack. Let me begin by publically thanking
the FBI, Joint Terrorism Task Force, Department of Homeland Security,
and the State and local officials for their efforts in apprehending a
suspect in the Boston Marathon bombing. Their efforts were a great
example of State, local, and Federal agencies working together.
State and local officials also need to work with Federal agencies
to be prepared and ready in the event of an attack from chemical,
biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons. In 2008, The Commission
on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and
Terrorism produced a report called ``World at Risk''. In that report,
they told us that they believed that a terrorist attack would occur
somewhere in the world by 2013, and that it was more likely to be an
act of biological terrorism.
Well, 2013 is here and there are examples of how we need to be
ready. During the week of April 15, we learned that poisoned letters
were sent to a United States Senator and the President. While the
poison contained in the letters, ricin, did not reach the Senate office
nor the White House, the incident sparked terrible memories of the 2001
anthrax attack which killed 5 people and infected 17 others.
Not only can CBRN threats come from within our borders, but there
are also CBRN threats from abroad. On Tuesday, Secretary of State Kerry
told NATO that there needs to be a plan to guard against the threat of
chemical weapons. We have also been paying close attention to North
Korea, who has vowed to bolster its nuclear program. North Korea
repeatedly violates United Nations Security Council resolutions that
forbid the ``building and testing'' of long-range ballistic missiles.
In testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Admiral Samuel
Locklear, commander of the U.S. Pacific Command, testified that North
Korea's pursuit of nuclear weapons and long-range missiles represents a
clear threat to the United States and its allies in the region. Admiral
Locklear stated, in the event of an attack by North Korea, that he
believes the United States has the ability to defend Guam, Hawaii, and
U.S. allies. The Admiral rightfully has faith in the U.S. military as
most Americans do. However, he is living in the reality of the
continuing budget cuts that the Department of Defense, including
Pacific Command, faces. According to the Admiral, the impacts of
sequestration have created budget uncertainties, limiting our
flexibility to manage risk and could potentially undermine our long-
term strategic rebalance momentum.
Mr. Chairman, we have applauded not only the resilience of
Americans throughout our tenure on this committee, but also those first
responders and troops who protect and defend our country in the wake of
both man-made and natural disasters. For instance, we are still
applauding the people of Boston who are coming together singing ``Sweet
Caroline'' in the wake of the horrific attack on one of their most
cherished holidays. We rightfully and continuously salute the New
Yorkers who have persevered in the wake of 9/11 as we have those who
had to rebuild the Mississippi Gulf Coast after hurricanes and oil
But now, is Congress saying that it knows that we are living with a
nuclear threat, but cannot adequately fund the military and the
Americans who may be in harm's way? Can we not guarantee that in the
event of an attack, we will provide our military with the resources
that it needs to be as resolute as New Yorkers were in the wake of 9/
Since 9/11, there has been particular focus to not just the
military, but first responders who must be ready for any type of
catastrophic event, including an attack from a chemical, biological,
radiological, or nuclear weapon. We saw and commended the efforts of
first responders last Monday during the Boston Marathon attack. These
first responders did not know whether the bomb was an IED or a ``dirty
bomb''. They knew people were hurt and they needed to step in and save
Congress authorized funding for several cities and regions to make
investments in emergency communications, planning, and response
equipment. But during the 112th Congress, much to their surprise, 31
cities and urban areas found that they became ineligible for grant
funding that they rely upon to maintain their preparedness--through no
fault of their own. This left several first responders without the
ability to maintain the equipment they purchased to provide protection
and assistance in the wake of a CBRN and other attacks. However, there
are two areas of the country for which the Department of Homeland
Security has created specific funding through its Securing the Cities
I do not doubt that these areas need the money. I do not dare to
say that these areas do not have vulnerabilities; however, it has been
stated in previous hearings throughout several Congresses that a CBRN
attack can happen almost anywhere in this Nation. As I stated
previously, there are areas of the United States that are under a
stated threat from the Supreme Leader of North Korea, and there are
areas of the United States that are vulnerable to a CBRN attack from a
lone wolf or terrorist cell. I hope our conversation today provides an
opportunity to understand the role and needs of first responders
related to CBRN threats. For this conversation to be productive, its
content should not be concentrated to just one area of the country.
Mr. King. Now, I am very pleased to introduce the
distinguished panel of witnesses we have before us on this
On the panel first is Commissioner Richard Daddario, who is
the deputy commissioner for counterterrorism with the New York
City Police Department. Prior to assuming this position,
Commissioner Daddario served as the U.S. Department of
Justice's attache in Moscow, which is particularly interesting
in view of all of the--I am not going to ask you about it
today, but the discussion in the last week with the FBI and
Russian intelligence and security services; I am sure you have
some thoughts on that--and as an assistant U.S. attorney for
the Southern District of New York.
In his current position Commissioner Daddario is
responsible for the NYPD's large complement of detectives
assigned to the JTTF and the department's counterterrorism
training and programs, including the Lower Manhattan Security
Initiative and the Department of Homeland Security-funded, as
you mentioned, Securing the Cities Initiative.
Dr. Huban Gowadia is the acting director of the Domestic
Nuclear Detection Office, DNDO, at the Department of Homeland
Security. In this capacity Dr. Gowadia oversees integration of
interagency efforts for technical nuclear detection and
forensics and directs research, development, and evaluation,
and acquisition activities for the Department's radiological
and nuclear detection technologies.
Dr. Gowadia served most recently at DNDO as the deputy
director and previously served as assistant director of its
Mission Management Directorate, where she was responsible for
ensuring an effective link between user requirements,
operational support, and technology development across the
nuclear detection architecture.
Scott McAllister is the deputy under secretary for State
and local programs for the Office of Intelligence and Analysis
at the Department of Homeland Security. In this role he manages
the office responsible for Department and interagency support
to the National Network of Fusion Centers.
Before coming to the Department he was chief of
investigators of the Fort Myers Regional Operation Center for
the Florida Developments--Florida Department of Law
Enforcement. He brings more than 36 years of State and local
law enforcement experience, including roles as a major crimes
detective, SWAT operator, and joint terrorism force agents. The
kind of guy to stay away from, I should say.
Dr. Leonard Cole is testifying today as a private citizen.
Dr. Cole is the director of the Program on Terror Medicine and
Security at the University of Medicine and Dentistry of New
Jersey Center for Biodefense. He is also an adjunct professor
in the school's department of emergency medicine and in the
department of political science at Rutgers University Newark.
Dr. Cole is a noted bioterrorism expert and has written
numerous books and articles on this topic throughout his
career. I found out today that he had one of his students go
out and interview me several years ago. I hope I did okay in
the interview; I don't know what she said.
Okay. With that, I would now recognize the witnesses.
I want to especially thank the Department, by the way, for
agreeing to participate on one panel to include Government and
non-Government witnesses. I realize this is a unique
circumstances and I want to thank you for doing that.
All the witnesses are reminded their written testimony will
be submitted for the record, and I now recognize Commissioner
Daddario for his testimony.
STATEMENT OF RICHARD DADDARIO, DEPUTY COMMISSIONER FOR
COUNTERTERRORISM, NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT
Mr. Daddario. Chairman King, Members of the committee--
Congressman Higgins, Congressman Keating, and Congressman
Green--thank you for the invitation to speak at today's
hearing. The subject of the hearing, ``Counterterrorism Efforts
to Combat a CBRN Attack on the Homeland,'' is especially timely
in light of international developments, which I am sure concern
everyone in this room. Some of those have been mentioned by
Chairman King in his opening, and I am going to touch on some
of those points in my statement.
Very briefly, al-Qaeda has exploited the Arab Spring to its
great advantage. Thousands of men who support its ideology have
taken up arms to train and fight in Syria, Mali, Yemen, and
other places in the Middle East and North Africa.
Not so long ago we heard that al-Qaeda was close to defeat.
Now we see it has an expansive space in which to operate,
recruit, train, and plan in areas with weak governments and
states where its ideology has significant public and political
support. That ideology advocates attacks against the United
States in the homeland.
Iran appears to be intent on creating all the components it
needs to assemble and deliver nuclear bombs. If it goes ahead
and does that--and there is no reason to think it will not have
that capability soon--it will be very difficult to prevent the
proliferation of nuclear weapon technology in the Middle East.
North Korea's intentions are unknown, at least to the
police department and to me. However, its hostility to the
United States is obvious. The danger, at minimum, that it could
export its technical bomb-making expertise and its missile-
making expertise is, therefore, real.
Now, the New York City Police Department pays close
attention to these events because our city too often is the
face of America to al-Qaeda and other enemies of the United
States. I don't need to go over the history of attacks and
plots against our city. Almost all the plots and attacks that
you mentioned recently, including the Canada case that
Congressman Higgins referred to, have in some way involved New
New York City is in the crosshairs--it has been for a long
time--and therefore, the police department and the city commit
enormous resources to keep the city safe not only from
conventional means of attack, but also by an attack using a
radiological or improvised nuclear weapon. The possibility of
such an attack is real.
President Obama has said--and again, I am touching on some
points that Congressman King raised--``the gravest danger to
the American people is the threat of a terrorist attack with a
nuclear weapon and the spread of nuclear weapons to dangerous
enemies.'' He has also stated that ``the threat of global
nuclear war has gone down, but the risk of nuclear attack has
gone up,'' and, ``We must ensure that terrorists never acquire
a nuclear weapon. This is the most immediate and extreme threat
to global security.''
The problem, as I have noted, is that the proliferation of
nuclear technology, both to make bombs, to deliver bombs, is
We could not address the radiological and nuclear threat
effectively without the Securing the Cities program. If
Congress had not had the vision to fund Securing the Cities,
New York City would now be completely vulnerable to a form of
attack which might well overwhelm our capacity to recover.
Needless to say, the use of a dirty bomb or improvised
nuclear device against our city would cause immeasurable
personal, economic, political, and psychological harm not only
to the city but to the United States. The police department in
the city of New York does not run the Securing the Cities
program alone. It has 12 principal partners in New York, New
Jersey, and Connecticut, so this is a regional program; it is
not simply based in the city of New York. These 12 principal
partners represent 150 local law enforcement and public safety
agencies within a 40-mile radius of New York City.
The NYPD and its regional partners have achieved several
important accomplishments. Among them, we have distributed and
put to daily use enough personal radiation detectors, PackEye
backpack detectors, radiological isotope identification
devices, and mobile detection systems to afford us a measure of
We are close to achieving complete wireless connectivity of
detection devices by the NYPD at its Lower Manhattan Security
Coordination Center. Data from these devices is thereby
viewable in real time and stored for analysis.
We have developed one concept of operations for detection
and interdiction of illicit radioactive materials. This concept
of operations will enable the regional partners to lock down
and secure the region based on 400 predetermined chokepoints in
the face of an imminent threat.
We have conducted land-based, maritime, and transportation-
based exercises involving surreptitiously transported
radiological substance with great success. We did one in April
2011 with all our partners over a 5-day period and had great
success finding each of the radiological sources that were
deployed during that exercise.
Although we have made great progress, much work needs to be
done. We need to put in place a permanent radiological
defensive ring through the installation of fixed radiological
detection equipment to monitor traffic at all bridges and
tunnels that lead into the city. Now, I am not talking here
about a portal over a lane; we are talking about using readily
commercially available devices arrayed in ways using software
so the we can detect a radiation source moving through traffic.
We also need to procure more advanced equipment to enhance
land, air, and sea detection capabilities and enforce
procedures and programs for inventory control, standardization,
maintenance, and calibration of equipment. All these things are
essential to the operation of Security the Cities program not
only in New York but also if it is going to be deployed in
There are great lessons to be learned from what we are
doing in New York that can be transported and applied to other
cities where DNDO and the Congress may want to set up this
program. So it is essential that the work in the city continue
so that this program can be successful if there is an attempt
to use it--transplant it to other cities.
In closing, the Securing the Cities program has been an
extraordinary example of interagency and intergovernmental
collaboration that would not exist and could not exist without
Federal funding. We thank you for your support and look forward
to your support going ahead.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Daddario follows:]
Prepared Statement of Richard Daddario
April 25, 2013
Thank you for the invitation to speak at today's hearing.
The subject of the hearing--Counterterrorism Efforts to Combat a
CBRN Attack on the Homeland--is especially timely in light of
international developments which I am sure concern everyone in this
Very briefly--al-Qaeda has exploited the Arab Spring to its great
advantage. Thousands of men who support its ideology have taken up arms
to train and fight in Syria, Mali, Yemen, and other places in the
Middle East and North Africa. No so long ago, we heard that al-Qaeda
was close to defeat. Now we see it has an expansive space in which to
operate, recruit, train, and plan in areas with weak governments and
states where its ideology has significant public and political support.
That ideology advocates attacks against the United States.
Iran appears to be intent on creating all the components it needs
to assemble and deliver nuclear bombs. If it goes ahead and does that,
and there is no reason to think it will not have that capability soon,
it will be very difficult to prevent the proliferation of nuclear
weapon technology in the Middle East.
North Korea's intentions are unknown. However, its hostility to the
United States is obvious. The danger, at minimum, that it could export
its technical bomb-making expertise, is therefore real.
The New York City Police Department pays attention to these events
because our city too often is the face of America to al-Qaeda and other
enemies of the United States. I don't need to go over the history of
attacks and plots against our city. We are in the crosshairs and
therefore commit enormous resources to keep the city safe not only from
conventional means of attack, but also by an attack using a
radiological or improvised nuclear weapon.
The possibility of such an attack is real.
President Obama has said:
``The gravest danger to the American people is the threat of
a terrorist attack with a nuclear weapon and the spread of
nuclear weapons to dangerous regimes.''
``The threat of global nuclear war has gone down, but the
risk of nuclear attack has gone up.''
``We must ensure that terrorists never acquire a nuclear
weapon. This is the most immediate and extreme threat to global
We could not address the radiological and nuclear threat
effectively without the Securing the Cities Program. If Congress had
not had the vision to fund Securing the Cities, New York City would now
be completely vulnerable to a form of attack, which might well
overwhelm our capacity to recover. Needless to say, the use of a dirty
bomb or improvised nuclear device against our city would cause
immeasurable personal, economic, political, and psychological harm to
the United States.
The NYPD does not run the Securing the Cities Program alone. It has
12 principle partners in New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut. These
12 principle partners represent 150 local law enforcement and public
safety agencies within a 40-mile radius of New York City.
The NYPD and its regional partners have achieved several important
accomplishments, among them:
We have distributed and put to daily use enough personal
radiation detectors (PRDs), PackEye backpacks, radiological
isotope identification devices, and mobile detection systems to
afford us a measure of protection.
We are close to achieving complete wireless connectivity of
detection devices used by the NYPD to the Lower Manhattan
Security Coordination Center. Data from these devices is
thereby viewable in real time and stored for analysis.
We have developed one concept of operations for detection
and interdiction of illicit radioactive materials; this concept
of operations will enable the regional partners to lock down
and secure the region based on 400 pre-determined chokepoints
in the face of an imminent threat.
We have conducted land-based, maritime, and transportation-
based exercises involving surreptitiously transported
radiological substances. In April 2011, the NYPD and its STC
partners conducted a full-scale, regional exercise designed to
evaluate our ability to detect and interdict illicit
radiological materials. The 5-day exercise involved chokepoints
and other activity in New York, Connecticut, and New Jersey
both on land, including rail and highways, and in the waterways
of the region.
Although we have made great progress, much work needs to be done.
We need to put in place a permanent radiological defensive ring through
the installation of fixed radiological detection equipment to monitor
traffic at all bridges and tunnels that lead into New York City. We are
working with Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) to accomplish
this goal using existing, commercially available detection equipment.
We also need to procure more advanced equipment to enhance land,
air, and sea detection capabilities; and enforce procedures and
programs for inventory control, standardization, maintenance, and
calibration of equipment purchased with STC program funds across the
region; continue work to network all the mobile radiation detection
equipment purchased with STC program funds, not only that used by the
NYPD; continue equipment training and exercises with the regional
partners; and conduct advanced radiation detection and interdiction
deployments on a regional scale to assure our operations are effective.
The STC program has been an extraordinary example of interagency
and intergovernmental collaboration that would not, and going forward,
could not exist without Federal funding. We thank you for your support.
Mr. King. Thank you, Commissioner Daddario.
Now I recognize Dr. Gowadia for her testimony.
Dr. Gowadia, you are recognized.
STATEMENT OF HUBAN GOWADIA, ACTING DIRECTOR, DOMESTIC NUCLEAR
DETECTION OFFICE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Ms. Gowadia. Good morning, Chairman King, Ranking Member
Higgins, and distinguished Members of the subcommittee. Before
I go into my prepared remarks I would like to echo the
Secretary's sentiments regarding the recent Boston incident.
Congressman Keating, my entire DNDO team joins me in
expressing our significant concern for the victims of the
incident. Our thoughts and prayers are with you.
But getting back to the oral remarks here, sir, thank you
for this opportunity to be here today with Deputy Commissioner
Daddario, Under Secretary McAllister, and Dr. Cole to discuss
the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, or DNDO's, progress in
coordinating the United States Government strategy to detect
illicit radiological and nuclear materials.
With your support and working with our Federal, State, and
local partners, we have made significant progress in counter-
nuclear terrorism. It is a pleasure to be here today with the
deputy commissioner and the deputy under secretary. Their
support and assistance are fundamental to the mission you have
given my office.
Indeed, to maximize our ability to detect and interdict
nuclear threats, it is imperative that we apply advanced
technologies in operations that are driven by intelligence
indicators and place them in the hands of well-trained law
enforcement and public safety personnel. To this end, we have
steadily increased our collaboration with the intelligence
community and we continue to work with our stakeholders to
build the domestic nuclear detection architecture.
A stellar example of our collaborative effort is the
Securing the Cities program. In its first implementation DNDO
partnered with New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut. Over the
past 6 years more than 13,000 personnel have been trained in
nuclear detection operations and over 8,500 pieces of nuclear
detection equipment have been procured and deployed in the
In addition to frequent exercises, Securing the Cities
partners conduct daily operations and routinely search to
enhance operational postures based on information cues received
in fusion centers.
I am pleased to report that based on much success in the
New York City region, last year we were able to expand the
program to the Los Angeles-Long Beach area, as you mentioned,
In addition to efforts under Securing the Cities, we have
established relationships with over 35 States and territories.
To guide their efforts, DNDO created a program management
handbook with modules for specific operational detection
environments. Once their capabilities are established, we
support their operations by facilitating alarm adjudication
from detection events in the field.
We also partner with other stakeholders to develop and
conduct exercises, annually supporting up to 12. To date, we
have exercised nuclear detection operations with 20 States
across the country.
In partnership with our stakeholders, we have developed and
implemented training standards. Since 2005, over 24,000 law
enforcement and public safety personnel from across the country
have participated in DNDO-supported training.
As I mentioned earlier, timely and accurate information-
sharing is critical to the success of our mission. To this end,
we work with our stakeholders--especially our I&A colleagues,
to publish information bulletins summarizing relevant news
articles, reports of lost and stolen sources, and other useful
facts about radioactive materials.
We consider the need to surge detection assets we use
during special events, or we recognize the need to surge
detection assets for special events or times of increased
threat, and so we maintain trailer-based units with an
extensive suite of nuclear detection equipment and
communications capabilities that can be deployed across the
country to augment the detection capabilities of our
operational partners. Since 2009 we have deployed these units
at more than 60 special security events and exercises.
Finally, DNDO's red team partners with operational agencies
to evaluate the nuclear detection systems and associated
techniques, tactics, and procedures. This allows law
enforcement and public safety officials to gain critical
experience with uncommon nuclear sources, providing valuable
feedback and leading to improved readiness and performance. In
the last year DNDO conducted 30 red team assessments, both
overt and covert.
We have come a long way since our creation in 2005. We have
maintained our legislatively-mandated singular focus and have
developed enduring partnerships with the intelligence community
and with law enforcement to strengthen the Nation's
capabilities to detect and interdict nuclear threats. Indeed,
it is our goal to make nuclear terrorism a prohibitively
difficult undertaking for our adversaries.
Thank you again for this opportunity to discuss DNDO's
efforts to protect our Nation. I look forward to your
[The joint prepared statement of Ms. Gowadia and Mr.
Joint Prepared Statement of Huban A. Gowadia and Scott McAllister
April 25, 2013
Good morning Chairman King, Ranking Member Higgins, and
distinguished Members of the subcommittee. We are pleased to testify
today about the efforts of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) and the Domestic
Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) to enhance information-sharing efforts
with our State and local partners and protect against radiological and
nuclear threats to the homeland.
Our testimony today focuses on DHS' work and the ways we have
sought to strengthen our collaboration with our State and local
partners who are on the front lines protecting our communities. In the
10 years since DHS was created, we have significantly improved our
information sharing and operational collaboration as we work together
to confront an evolving range of threats.
dhs capacity building with state and local partners
DHS I&A and DNDO, along with our Federal interagency partners at
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the National
Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), all ensure that State and local
partners have the information and tools necessary to address evolving
threats. To accomplish this mission, DHS has focused on four key
priorities in working with our State and local partners:
Improve production and dissemination of classified and
unclassified information regarding threats to the homeland;
Continue to improve grassroots analytic capabilities through
the development of a National network of State and major urban
area fusion centers so that National intelligence can be
incorporated into a local context;
Standardize how we train State, local, Tribal, and
territorial (SLTT) law enforcement to recognize indicators of
terrorism-related criminal activity and report these suspicious
activities to Joint Terrorism Task Forces for investigation and
to fusion centers for analysis; and
Increase community awareness and encourage the public to
report suspicious activity to local authorities.
Fusion centers represent the cornerstone of the distributed
homeland security and counterterrorism architecture through their
presence as a grassroots analytic and information-sharing capability at
the local or State level. As part of the Implementing Recommendations
of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (Pub. L. 110-53), DHS was charged
with leading the effort to coordinate with and support a network of
State or local-led information sharing and analytic centers in States
and major cities throughout the country.
Through I&A's State and Local Program Office, DHS has included
these fusion centers in the intelligence cycle by assisting fusion
centers to build their capabilities to receive, analyze, and
disseminate and gather information at the local level. I&A facilitates
coordinated Federal support to fusion centers that results in a dynamic
flow of information between Federal, State, and local partners, as well
as the development of joint intelligence products and the rapid
reporting of information with intelligence value.
DHS has made considerable progress in assisting fusion centers to
build necessary information-sharing capabilities by:
Deploying over 90 I&A intelligence personnel to fusion
centers throughout the country to coordinate with DHS component
intelligence and law enforcement personnel;
Deploying 70 Homeland Secure Data Network systems across the
country to provide access to Secret information and
intelligence at the local level;
Training State and local analysts at fusion centers to
ensure they have the necessary skills and expertise to analyze
and fuse intelligence and information from the intelligence
community with local/regional context and produce relevant and
timely products for their stakeholders; and
Developing tailored product lines to meet the needs of State
and local partners, and expanding the distribution of products
to ensure all relevant and appropriate information is shared
with State and local partners.
For example, I&A partnered with DNDO to ensure threat
products are available to fusion center analysts via the
Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN). These
resources include radiological and nuclear awareness
reports, as well as open-source information, detection
tips, and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) lost and
stolen source reporting (as appropriate).
While America is stronger and more resilient as a result of these
efforts to strengthen the Homeland Security Enterprise, threats from
terrorism persist and continue to evolve. The Federal Government
realizes that SLTT law enforcement, as well as citizens, businesses,
and communities, are on the front line of detection and prevention
efforts. Protecting the Nation is a shared responsibility in which the
Federal Government benefits from a robust information-sharing
infrastructure with State and local partners. These partners similarly
benefit from the collaborative environment established within the
fusion centers through their analysis of the National threat picture
and the provision of products that are developed and tailored using
local context to support the implementation of information-driven
community-based solutions by local officials.
threat alert/notification process
In the event of a credible threat to the homeland, I&A, as part of
a broader, coordinated Department effort including DNDO and other
subject matter experts depending on the type of threat, utilizes its
previously-tested threat notification process to assist our customers.
In order to effectively reach our stakeholders, the threat notification
process is accomplished in several ways.
Depending on the classification and nature of the threat,
I&A may work with DNDO, National Protection Programs
Directorate (NPPD), the FBI, as well as other intelligence
community partners to produce a ``tearline,'' which is a lower
classification version of the report describing the threat.
The jointly prepared tearline would be used to notify the
Department's stakeholders of the threat through a Joint
Intelligence Bulletin, produced in conjunction with the FBI, to
describe the threat or incident.
Additional outreach would take place following the initial
notification of the threat via Secure Video Teleconference
(SVTC) or classified and unclassified teleconference, depending
on the nature of the threat. As the threat evolves or as we
receive more information, additional communication would be
DHS may also use the National Terrorism Advisory System
(NTAS) to message the threat to a wider external audience. NTAS
Alerts are designed to appropriately notify the public and/or
institutions of specific and credible terrorist threats of a
limited duration. The alerts describe either ``Elevated'' or
``Imminent'' threats, and may recommend certain protective
measures or suggest looking for specific suspicious behavior. A
specific and credible threat is based on intelligence reporting
from a reliable source or multiple sources, including enough
detail with respect to the attacker, target, method,
capability, or timing to permit countermeasures or pre-emptive
Elevated Alerts warn of a credible terrorist threat
against the United States and its territories that is
general in both timing and target, or details significant
trends and developments in terrorism such that it is
reasonable to recommend implementation of protective
measures to thwart or mitigate against an attack.
Imminent Alerts warn of a credible, specific, and
impending terrorist threat or on-going attack against the
United States and its territories that is sufficiently
specific and credible to recommend implementation of
protective measures to thwart or mitigate against an
dndo's efforts to prevent radiological and nuclear terrorism
Among the many threats we face as a Nation, nuclear terrorism poses
one of the greatest threats to not only our security, but global
security. Ensuring a coordinated response to credible intelligence of a
nuclear threat is a whole-of-Government challenge. DNDO works with
Federal, SLTT, international, and private-sector partners to develop
radiological and nuclear detection capability in support of this
mission. Working with partners from across the U.S. Government (USG),
including the Departments of Energy (DOE), State, Defense, Justice, the
intelligence community, and the NRC, DNDO develops the Global Nuclear
Domestic Architecture (GNDA) and implements its domestic component.
Specifically, DNDO coordinates with interagency partners and leads
programs to develop technical nuclear detection capabilities, measure
detector system performance, ensure effective response to detection
alarms, and conduct transformational research and development for
advanced detection technologies. Additionally, DNDO coordinates and
improves nuclear forensics capabilities across the USG.
SLTT contributions are vital to the GNDA and we continue to work
with these critical partners to build a flexible, multi-layered,
domestic nuclear detection architecture based on capabilities that can
be utilized by the Radiological Nuclear Strategic Group, led by the
FBI, to integrate all assets and capabilities into a unified response
when intelligence or information indicates a credible nuclear threat.
While DHS focuses on threats of all types, DNDO's singular focus is
the prevention of a nuclear terrorism threat. The United States'
ability to counter the nuclear threat is based on the critical triad of
intelligence, law enforcement, and technology. To maximize our ability
to detect and interdict nuclear threats, we apply detection
technologies in operations driven by intelligence indicators and place
them in the hands of well-trained law enforcement and public safety
personnel. In the event of a radiological or nuclear event, the FBI
would lead the CT/WMD Operational Response.
DNDO programs specific to the development of radiological and
nuclear detection capability by SLTT entities include:
DNDO provides planning guidance to GNDA partners on developing,
managing, evaluating and sustaining their radiological and nuclear
detection programs. Through Program Assistance, DNDO helps multi-
jurisdictional policy makers, program managers, and operational
administrators work together to design and implement radiological and
nuclear detection programs that build and enhance detection
capabilities in support of the GNDA. Generally, detection programs are
integrated into and leverage existing operational assets which
decreases overall costs and increases operational impact.
DNDO has established formal working relationships with over 30
States and territories and works with SLTT partners to mature and
advance radiological and nuclear detection and reporting capabilities.
DNDO has developed a framework of scalable processes and products
including concepts of operation, standard operating procedures, lessons
learned, and best practices that can be tailored to the needs of the
SLTT partner. Specific products include:
The Preventive Radiological and Nuclear Detection (PRND)
Program Management Handbook, with modules for specific
operational environments such as Commercial Vehicle Inspection,
Small Maritime Vessel Operations and Special Events, provides
guidance for the administration of a domestic radiological and
nuclear detection program at both the senior policy making and
The National Incident Management System (NIMS) PRND Resource
Type Definitions categorize equipment, teams, and personnel
consistent with other NIMS resource types to facilitate
identification, inventory, and tracking. With direct State and
local participation, DNDO developed the NIMS PRND Resource
Types in 2011 to assist SLTT stakeholders with defining and
building radiological and nuclear detection capability and to
enable jurisdictions to categorize and deploy resources through
Emergency Management Assistance Compacts or other interstate
mutual aid agreements.
The West Coast Maritime Pilot was implemented in the Puget
Sound and San Diego to facilitate development of radiological
and nuclear detection capabilities in maritime regions
throughout the United States. Based on lessons learned, DNDO
works with regional Area Maritime Security Committees to
provide assistance in developing operational procedures,
training, and exercises to develop radiological and nuclear
detection capabilities that support the region's Area Maritime
DNDO provides training products and support to develop, enhance,
and expand radiological and nuclear detection capabilities in support
of the GNDA. In partnership with the Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA), DOE, and the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center,
DNDO develops and implements protocols and training standards for the
effective use of radiation detection equipment and associated alarm
reporting and resolution processes. DNDO also develops training
curricula in support of emerging detection technologies and operational
profiles. Since inception, over 24,000 law enforcement and public
safety personnel from 35 States have participated in DNDO-supported
radiological and nuclear detection training.
DNDO provides assistance in developing, designing, and conducting
exercises that are compliant with the Homeland Security Exercise and
Evaluation Program methodology. The exercises provide valuable hands-on
experience for personnel performing radiological and nuclear detection
operations and assist decision makers in integrating the detection
mission into their daily operations. To date, DNDO has conducted
exercises with 20 States and annually supports up to 12 exercises. DNDO
continues to develop and apply standardized and tailorable exercise
templates and guidelines evaluating the implementation and performance
of Federal and SLTT radiological and nuclear detection programs.
DNDO sponsors strategic engagements with State and local leaders
via an Executive Steering Council (ESC) and a State and Local
Stakeholder Working Group (SLSWG). The ESC and the SLSWG forums are
part of DNDO's on-going outreach to and collaboration with SLTT
agencies involved in radiological and nuclear detection. They are
specifically designed to obtain feedback on DNDO's initiatives, learn
about advances in SLTT, and facilitate communication, coordination, and
collaboration within the radiological and nuclear detection community.
joint analysis center
DNDO's Joint Analysis Center (JAC), which is supported by detailees
from DOE, USCG, and the FBI, provides awareness of the GNDA as well as
technical support and informational products to Federal, State, and
local entities. I&A and the JAC regularly collaborate on the
development of these products.
Utilizing the Joint Analysis Center Collaborative Information
System (JACCIS), the JAC facilitates nuclear and radiological alarm
adjudication and consolidates and shares information and databases.
JACCIS provides a process for Federal and SLTT agencies to share
radiological and nuclear detection information. The JACCIS Dashboard
provides a secure web interface to collaborate with mission partners
and uses a geographic information system to show detection information,
detectors, situational awareness reports, and other overlays in a
geospatial viewer. Web service interfaces to other mission partners'
systems and content routers provide linkages to detection assets in
real time. This same technology is employed to connect JACCIS to the
TRIAGE system, maintained by the Department of Energy, National Nuclear
Security Administration, to adjudicate alarms. This connection allows a
seamless transition of alarm adjudication in JACCIS to be elevated to
TRIAGE for National-level adjudication assistance.
test and evaluation assistance
Federal, State, local, and Tribal partners require reliable
information on the technical performance, operational effectiveness,
and suitability and limitations of currently available radiological and
nuclear detection equipment to develop effective detection programs.
DNDO has established a robust test and evaluation capability to
rigorously test commercially available radiological and nuclear
detection systems against National and international standards and in
operational scenarios faced by Federal and SLTT end-users. DNDO
involves operational partners in the planning and execution of test
events ensuring equipment is tested in the manner in which it is used
and provides operators with valuable hands-on experience with detection
equipment and special nuclear material sources. Such tests
independently assess systems to confirm vendor performance claims and
provide operational data to develop effective concepts of operation.
Since inception, DNDO has conducted over 80 tests and evaluations that
involve all classes of radiological and nuclear detection systems,
including personal radiation detectors, handheld, backpack and mobile
detection systems, radiation portal monitors, and radiation detection
systems suitable for maritime environments and aerial platforms. The
results of these efforts are shared with operational partners.
DNDO fields a unique Red Team to objectively assess the operational
effectiveness and performance of DNDO programs and deployed
radiological and nuclear detection capabilities at the Federal and SLTT
levels. This capability evaluates deployed systems and operations and
their associated tactics, techniques, and procedures, in as-close-to-
realistic environments as possible. As covert and overt assessments are
generally the only opportunity for operators of radiological and
nuclear detection systems to gain experience detecting uncommon nuclear
sources, these operations provide them with valuable feedback on the
performance of their tactics, techniques, and procedures. This feedback
enables operators to improve their concepts of operation and readiness.
In the past year, DNDO conducted 30 overt and covert assessments.
new technologies for nuclear detection
DNDO continues to develop breakthrough technologies with
significant operational impacts on our National capability to detect
radiological and nuclear threats. For example, DNDO led the development
of next-generation Radioisotope Identification Devices which are used
by law enforcement officers and technical experts during routine
operations. DNDO worked closely with U.S. Customs and Border Protection
(CBP), U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA), and State and local operators to identify key
operational requirements that drove the design of the new system. Based
on an enhanced detection material, lanthanum bromide, and improved
algorithms, this new handheld technology is easy-to-use, lightweight,
and more reliable, and because it has built-in calibration and
diagnostics, has a much lower annual maintenance cost. DNDO proactively
engages industry to procure commercial off-the-shelf devices to field
other new technologies for nuclear detection. DNDO procures these
devices to be used by CBP, USCG, and TSA.
Additionally, DNDO has funded the development of radiation sensing
materials such as Strontium Iodide (SrI2) and CLYC
(Cs2LiYCl6). In October 2012 a major milestone
was reached as SrI2 and CLYC became commercially available
for use in radiation detection equipment. This new generation of
detectors will greatly benefit Federal, State, and local law
enforcement and public safety personnel, because the devices are
relatively inexpensive and provide significantly improved performance.
securing the cities program
Since 2007, DNDO has supported the Securing the Cities (STC)
Program to develop State and local capabilities to detect and prevent
illicitly-trafficked nuclear materials that may be used as a weapon
within high-threat/high-density urban or metropolitan areas. The
program assists regions, selected through a competitive application
process, to enhance regional capabilities to detect, identify, and
prevent nuclear materials that are out of regulatory control; guide the
coordination of Federal and SLTT entities in their roles defined by the
GNDA; and encourage participants to sustain the nuclear detection
program over time.
There are three phases to the program. In Phase I, DNDO assists
State and local partners to develop a region-wide initial operating
capability that is mutually supported through cooperative agreements,
regional concepts of operations, interoperable equipment, collective
training, and progressive exercise planning. In Phase II, DNDO provides
additional resources to build upon the initial capabilities to enhance
detection, analysis, communication, and coordination to better
integrate State and local assets into Federal operations. In Phase III,
STC works with regional partners to maintain connectivity with the
established local architecture through alarm adjudication and subject
matter expertise and provides advice on long-term training, exercise,
and program support.
In the first STC implementation, DNDO partnered with State and
local agencies in the New York City, Jersey City, and Newark areas.
Over the past 6 years, more than 13,000 personnel have been trained in
radiological and nuclear detection operations in the region and over
8,500 pieces of radiological and nuclear detection equipment have been
procured and deployed. In addition to frequent exercises, STC partners
conduct daily operations and routinely surge to enhanced operational
postures based on information cues received in fusion centers.
Seeking to leverage the lessons learned from the first STC
implementation and improve the radiological and nuclear detection
capability of additional high-threat/high-density urban areas, in 2012,
DNDO selected the Los Angeles/Long Beach area as the next metropolitan
area for STC implementation.
The ability to surge resources for use during special events, times
of increased threat, or in response to information or events that
indicate the need for enhanced detection capabilities, is critical.
DNDO's Mobile Detection Deployment Program maintains trailer-based
units outfitted with an extensive suite of radiological and nuclear
detection equipment and communications capabilities. These Mobile
Detection Deployment Units (MDDUs) are deployed regionally across the
United States and offer a National radiological and nuclear detection
surge package that can be deployed as needed to assist stakeholders to
augment their capabilities. Each MDDU is configured to outfit numerous
personnel and contains a number of mobile units, backpacks, high-
resolution handheld devices, personal radiation detection devices,
communications and tracking equipment. When deployed, the MDDU is
accompanied by technical support staff to train personnel on the use of
equipment and to help integrate these surge capabilities into other
protective operations. Since 2009, DNDO has deployed MDDUs for
radiological and nuclear detection surge operations in support of
Federal and SLTT law enforcement and public safety personnel during
more than 60 special security events and exercises.
national rad/nuc challenge
To share best practices within the operational community, stimulate
interest, and facilitate improvements in detection equipment so as to
strengthen National radiological and nuclear detection capabilities,
DNDO initiated the National Rad/Nuc Challenge. Through head-to-head
competition, the Challenge will highlight excellence in detection
efforts and encourage participants to enhance skills.
responding to the national crisis for helium-3
Helium-3 (\3\He) is an important element used in many National
security, homeland defense, and medical applications. For decades,
\3\He has been used as a neutron detection component for radiation
detection devices. In 2008, a critical \3\He shortage was identified as
demand outpaced the supply. Fortunately, DNDO was already exploring
options for better, more cost-effective, alternatives for neutron
detection. Once the shortage was identified, DNDO accelerated the
process and led an interagency working group to address the development
and use of alternative neutron detection technologies. DNDO also
created a competitive application process through which SLTT agencies
developing or enhancing radiation and nuclear detection capabilities
would be eligible to receive an allotment of \3\He. This effort has
resulted in the distribution of over 500 liters of \3\He to SLTT
agencies since 2010.
In just a few short years, we have transformed how we work
together--to share information, build our capabilities, combat threats
in our communities, and address our shared challenges. As a result,
today we are better at understanding risks, leveraging intelligence and
information, and making sure that information is incorporated into law
enforcement efforts across the United States. Through robust
partnerships with State and locally-owned and -operated fusion centers,
as well as an integrated approach to implementing programs such as the
GNDA, we continue to strengthen the Nation's capabilities to detect all
types of threats, including nuclear terrorism. Our efforts are not only
advancing the capabilities and operational readiness of our partners,
but are also enhancing National deterrence against a serious threat to
We appreciate your continued support as we work with our partners
to develop, evaluate, deploy, and support the necessary systems and
resources to effectively share threat information and implement a
nuclear detection architecture that can effectively protect the
homeland, in response to credible, timely intelligence about
radiological and nuclear threats.
Chairman King, Ranking Member Higgins, we thank you for the
opportunity to discuss the on-going efforts of I&A and DNDO to prevent
and protect against this threat.
We are happy to answer any questions the subcommittee may have.
Mr. King. Thank you, Dr. Gowadia.
Now I recognize Mr. McAllister.
STATEMENT OF SCOTT MC ALLISTER, DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY, STATE
AND LOCAL PROGRAM OFFICER, OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE AND ANALYSIS,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. McAllister. Good morning, Chairman King, Ranking Member
Higgins, and distinguished Members of the committee. Our
condolences are also echoed, as the Secretary and Dr. Gowadia
has expressed, to the victims and their families from the
tragic event that had occurred in Boston.
Thank you for the opportunity to discuss the role of DHS
Office of Intelligence and Analysis in addressing the
radiological and nuclear threat in the United States.
I&A agrees with the 2012 assessment from the director of
national intelligence that a mass attack by a foreign terrorist
group involving chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear
weapons in the United States is unlikely. However, the DNI also
highlighted that the intelligence community remains concerned
about limited attacks that could occur with little or no
warning because terrorist organizations and other non-state
actors remain interested in conducting this type of attack.
In light of the current global threat environment and as
highlighted by the recent tragic events in Boston, the
relationships and processes we have built to share information
with our State and local partners are more important than ever.
As a former Governor, Secretary Napolitano understands the
critical role State and local governments play in protecting
their communities. As she has oftentimes said, homeland
security begins with hometown security.
It is essential that State and local partners have the
necessary tools and capabilities not only to support National
security efforts, but at the same time, can be leveraged to
enhance local priorities. Strengthening these capabilities are
critical to counter today's evolving threat, particularly when
individuals responsible for the threats increasingly operate
within the United States and do not travel or communicate with
In support of this, DHS is committed to pursue a layered
approach, working with our State and local partners to build a
domestic counterterrorism capability. This approach includes
training front-line officers to recognize and report behaviors
that maybe indicate criminal activity associated with terrorism
through the Nation-wide Suspicious Activity Reporting
Initiative. It involves engaging our public through public
awareness campaigns, such as, ``If you see something, say
something,'' by emphasizing the importance of reporting
suspicious activity to the proper law enforcement authorities.
Finally, support to the National network of State and
locally-owned and -operated fusion centers, furthering their
role as the central information-sharing conduit between and
among multiple disciplines and multiple levels of Government.
As directed in the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11
Commission Act of 2007, the State and local program office of
Intelligence and Analysis leads in coordination of Federal
support to the National Network of Fusion Centers. Protecting
the Nation is a shared responsibility and the Federal
Government benefits from a robust information-sharing
infrastructure with our State and local partners.
I&A has made considerable progress in assisting fusion
centers to build out this information-sharing capabilities by
deployment of intelligence personnel, the connection of
classified homeland secure data networks, sponsoring secret-
level clearances to our State and local partners, providing
training and technical assistance for our State and local
fusion center analysts, and developing tailored products to
meet the needs of our State and local stakeholders. For
example, I&A partners with DNDO to provide fusion center
analysts with radiological and nuclear awareness reports, open-
source information, detection tips, and relevant Nuclear
Regulatory Commission lost or stolen source reporting.
In the event of a credible threat to the homeland, I&A
leverages the expertise of appropriate subject matter experts,
such as those in DNDO's Joint Analysis Center, to develop
products and information for distribution through our
established information-sharing architecture. In order to
effectively reach our stakeholders, I&A utilizes its existing
threat notification processes to include roll call releases,
terror lines, joint intelligence bulletins that we produce in
partnership with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the
National Counterterrorism Advisory System, secure video
teleconferences, and other means of communication.
Additionally, I&A has remained proactive over the past year
in disseminating information to our State and local partners on
the threat posed by radiological and nuclear attack as well as
providing the information of potential attack indicators and
recommended reporting requirements. Products developed and
distributed through personnel and information systems that I&A
has deployed help ensure that our State and local partners have
access to the necessary information they need to protect their
I thank you for the opportunity to discuss the efforts of
I&A in sharing information and intelligence with our State and
local partners and our pursuit of getting the right information
to the right people in a timely manner, and I am happy to
answer any questions the subcommittee may have.
Mr. King. Thank you, Mr. McAllister.
Now I would recognize Dr. Cole.
STATEMENT OF LEONARD A. COLE, DIRECTOR, PROGRAM ON TERROR
MEDICINE AND SECURITY, UNIVERSITY OF MEDICINE AND DENTISTRY OF
Mr. Cole. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Oops, you heard me.
Thank you very much, and the distinguished Members of the
subcommittee--Representative Keating, Representative Green,
good to see you again. I thank, as well, the full committee's
Chairman McCaul and Ranking Member Thompson for their
leadership on homeland security.
The bombings at the Boston Marathon 10 days ago and the
subsequent letters containing ricin mailed to President Obama
and Senator Wicker continue to consume our Nation's attention.
They underscore the vital importance of addressing the
terrorist threat in general and the CBRN threat in particular.
Last November I was privileged to review with this
subcommittee the paper titled ``WMD Terrorism,'' which I co-
edited with Randall Larson on behalf of the Aspen Institute's
Homeland Security WMD Working Group. WMD, of course, stands for
weapons of mass destruction, which is a term that is generally
equivalent to CBRN.
The Aspen Working Group project, under the direction of
Clark Ervin, provided an update on recommendations made in 2008
by the bipartisan Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of
Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism. Among the Aspen
paper's proposed actions was a call for reauthorization of the
Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act. I am pleased to note
that last month, after passage by both houses of Congress,
President Obama signed the act into law.
The act provides funding for numerous protective measures,
including reinforcing the Nation's--the Strategic National
Stockpile, which contains medicines and equipment appropriate
to CBRN threats. The stated goal is to deliver items from the
stockpile anywhere in the United States within 12 hours. Just
weeks ago, defenses against smallpox were strengthened with the
introduction into the stockpile of a novel antiviral drug
Another of our Aspen paper's proposals was to advance
public-private collaboration toward enhancing medical response
capabilities. Again, last month a consortium of public,
private, and academic institutions announced the establishment
of a major new influenza vaccine development facility at Texas
and A&M University.
The consortium is one of three centers for innovation
introduced by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
in mid-2012. The centers were established to develop and hasten
the availability of medical countermeasures, such as
antibiotics and antidotes, for biological, chemical, and
radiological threat agents.
Welcome as these actions have been, other protective needs
remain inadequately addressed. At last November's hearing
Congressman Pascrell voiced misgivings about the absence of a
special assistant for biodefense who would report directly to
the President. This lapse continues, as do other weaknesses in
our biodefense structure, including the lack of uniform
security requirements for laboratories that work on select
biological threat agents.
CBRN threats have also been heightened by recent
international events. Allegations that chemical weapons were
used in Syria either by its government or by opposition forces
remain unresolved. In any case, worries persist that in the
midst of the civil war there, Syrian chemical agents could fall
into the hands of terrorists.
Nuclear proliferation also remains worrisome, as we have
been discussing here, especially because of Iran's failure to
curb its apparent efforts to acquire nuclear arms. Nuclear
concerns were further escalated just last month when North
Korea threatened to target the United States with nuclear
Every effort should be made to reduce these threats, but
they also signal the need for improved readiness in the event
of a nuclear detonation on American soil. In this regard, the
Aspen paper called attention to a valuable initiative by the
Center for Biosecurity called ``Rad Resilient City.'' I am
holding this up. It is a publication that I think would be
well-distributed to local and regional people in charge of
having to respond in case there were the horribly unfortunate
of having a nuclear detonation of any consequence on American
Other protective measures against high-level radiation
exposure should also be explored. For example, the new field of
terror medicine might include the stockpile in blood banks of
umbilical cord blood. Rich in stem cells, this blood could help
seed production of people's blood cells whose natural
production had been damaged by radiation exposure.
For all these reasons, coupled with the fact that al-Qaeda
and other terrorist groups have sought to acquire weapons of
mass destruction, I am very grateful that this subcommittee is
focused on enhancing America's preparedness and response
capabilities for a possible CBRN attack.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Cole follows:]
Prepared Statement of Leonard A. Cole \1\
\1\ Unless otherwise indicated the views expressed here are my own
and not representative of any institution.
April 25, 2013
Chairman King, Ranking Member Higgins, former Chairman Meehan,
distinguished Members of the subcommittee, thank you for inviting me
again to speak on the CBRN threat to the homeland. I thank as well the
full committee's Chairman McCaul and Ranking Member Thompson for their
leadership on homeland security. The bombings at the Boston Marathon 10
days ago, and the subsequent letters containing ricin mailed to
President Obama and Senator Wicker, have consumed our Nation's
attention. They underscore the vital importance of addressing the
terrorist threat in general and the CBRN threat in particular.
Last November, I was privileged to review with this subcommittee
the paper titled WMD Terrorism, which I co-edited with Randall Larsen
on behalf of the Aspen Institute's Homeland Security WMD Working Group.
(WMD--Weapons of Mass Destruction--is a term equivalent to CBRN.) The
Aspen Working Group, under the direction of Clark Ervin, provided an
update on recommendations made in 2008 by the bipartisan Commission on
the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and
Terrorism (WMD Commission).
Among the Aspen paper's proposed actions was a call for
reauthorization of the Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act
(PAHPO). I am pleased to note that last month, after passage by both
houses of Congress, President Obama signed the act into law. The act
provides funding for numerous protective measures including reinforcing
the Strategic National Stockpile, which contains medicines and
equipment appropriate to CBRN threats. The stated goal is to deliver
items from the stockpile anywhere in the United States within 12 hours.
Just weeks ago, defenses against smallpox were strengthened with the
introduction into the stockpile of a novel antiviral drug, Arestvyr
(though with questions by some about the drug's cost).
Another of our paper's proposals was to advance public-private
collaboration toward enhancing medical response capabilities. Again,
last month, a consortium of public-private-academic institutions
announced the establishment of a major new influenza vaccine
development facility at Texas A&M University. The consortium is one of
three Centers for Innovation introduced by the U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services in mid-2012. The centers were established to
develop and hasten the availability of medical countermeasures such as
antibiotics and antidotes for biological, chemical, and radiological
Welcome as these actions have been, other protective needs remain
inadequately addressed. At last November's hearing, Congressman
Pascrell voiced misgivings about the absence of a special assistant for
biodefense who would report directly to the President. This lapse
continues, as do other weaknesses in our biodefense structure including
the lack of uniform security requirements for laboratories that work on
select biological threat agents.
CBRN threats have also been heightened by recent international
events. Allegations that chemical weapons were used in Syria either by
its government or by opposition forces remain unresolved. In any case,
worries persist that in the midst of the civil war there, Syrian
chemical agents could fall into the hands of terrorists. Nuclear
proliferation also remains worrisome, especially because of Iran's
failure to curb its apparent efforts to acquire nuclear arms. Nuclear
concerns were further escalated last month when North Korea threatened
to target the United States with nuclear weapons.
Every effort should be made to reduce these threats. But they also
signal the need for improved readiness in the event of a nuclear
detonation on American soil. In this regard the Aspen paper called
attention to a valuable initiative by the Center for Biosecurity called
``Rad Resilient City.'' Other protective measures against high-level
radiation exposure should also be explored. For example, the new field
of terror medicine might include the stockpiling in blood banks of
umbilical cord blood. Rich in stem cells, this blood could help seed
production of people's blood cells whose natural production had been
damaged by the radiation exposure. (This storage plan has long been
advocated by the University of Medicine and Dentistry's Dr. Norman Ende
and Dr. Kenneth Swan.)
For all these reasons, coupled with the fact that al-Qaeda and
other terrorist groups have sought to acquire weapons of mass
destruction, I am grateful that this subcommittee is focused on
enhancing America's preparedness and response capabilities for a
possible CBRN attack.
opinion: preparing for the next one
NorthJersey.com.--Leonard A. Cole is Director of the Program on Terror
Medicine and Security at the University of Medicine and Dentistry of
New Jersey. His most recent book, co-edited, is ``Local Planning for
Terror and Disaster: From Bioterrorism to Earthquakes.''
THE BOMBINGS at the Boston marathon Monday were a devastating
reminder that the American homeland remains vulnerable to terrorism.
Three people were killed, 176 injured, and judging from media coverage
millions of Americans feel aggrieved. The country has been deeply
shaken in part because the attack was such a surprise. It was
especially shocking to those who had come to believe that terrorism was
no longer a major concern.
To be sure, law enforcement officials and other emergency
responders have maintained an awareness of the terrorism threat. But
for many in the general population the heightened concern prompted by
the 2001 attack on the World Trade Center had given way to complacency.
This was reflected in Gallup polls during the past decade. After 9/11,
85 percent of Americans worried that another terrorist attack could be
imminent. Ten years later the worriers had declined to 38 percent. The
marathon bombings may reverse the trend.
In fact, about 50 terrorist plots against the United States have
been thwarted since 9/11. At least 15 of them had targeted New York
City, according to the city's Police Commissioner Raymond Kelly.
Several plots, including the 2010 bombing attempt in Times Square,
nearly succeeded. After a street vendor saw smoke coming from a parked
car, he alerted the police. An ignited bomb was found in the vehicle,
but police were able to disarm it before it could explode. Such close
calls evidently had little effect on the public's declining unease
Even the shooting in 2009 at Fort Hood, Texas, by Major Nidal Malik
Hasan, failed to stir a public reaction comparable to that by the
Boston marathon attack. Hasan killed 13 and wounded 29. While firing
his weapon, he repeatedly shouted Allahu Akbar (``God is Great''). In
the previous months he had corresponded by email with Anwar al-Awlaki,
then a senior al-Qaeda operative in Yemen. Still, the Obama
administration considers Hasan's attack not an act of terrorism but
only of ``workplace violence.''
Words that describe an action may frame how others view and react
to it. Thus the Fort Hood shootings like other mass shootings, as at
the Newtown, Conn., elementary school, are attributed to deranged
individuals. Although horrible in their own right, they are not seen as
inspired by any belief system. Conversely, terrorist violence is driven
by ideological, political, or religious motivation. The terrorist's
intended target is not just innocent individuals, but an entire nation
or society. The aim is not just to kill but to demoralize, to demean,
and ultimately to bend the will of the population.
Terrorism remains a threat
The Boston attack has reanimated the pain of 9/11 along with
questions about the country's vulnerability. Many uncertainties remain.
But the attack underscored the danger of holding the illusory notion
that terrorism is not a serious threat. It also demonstrated how, with
proper preparedness, lives could be saved and the national will
The Boston assault was consistent with past efforts by terrorists
to damage prominent American symbols. This annual marathon event has
not only typically been festive, but iconic. It is held on Patriot's
Day, which commemorates the first battles of the Revolutionary War. The
nature of the event also meant that many protective measures were in
place. Both security personnel and medical support were readily
available. This led to a quicker and more effective response than might
be expected in other venues.
The two bombs exploded seconds apart about 100 yards from the
finish line. After the blasts, race participants and bystanders
immediately began to comfort the injured and move them to safer areas.
Police, emergency medical technicians, physicians, and nurses appeared
almost as quickly. Later, all the responders received high praise for
their courageous and selfless rescue efforts. But scant notice has been
given to the unusual circumstances that permitted this exemplary
In any marathon, the strenuous 26.2-mile run is likely to result
for some in injury and illness. Runners experience falls, abrasions,
sprained ankles, dehydration, exhaustion, and more. The exertion at
times can even be life-threatening: Participants in past marathons have
had heart attacks and died. Thus, stationing medical resources at these
races has become common practice. New York City marathons, for example,
have attracted more than 1,000 medical volunteers to provide emergency
care at a network of tented field hospitals along the route.
Mr. King. Thank you, Dr. Cole.
I now recognize myself for questions.
Dr. Gowadia, you mentioned about special events where there
may be a nuclear detection surge. Would the Boston Marathon or
other marathons be in that category?
Ms. Gowadia. Yes, Mr. King. We actually have these trailer
units which we can deploy upon request.
We do tailgate training out the back; we have technical
support that goes out with the systems. There are
communications elements to it, all kinds of mobile detection
gear. Twenty to 40 personnel can be immediately trained and
integrated into the existing operation.
Mr. King. Now, does that depend on the local event
requesting it, or the local municipality?
Ms. Gowadia. Yes, sir, it does. We are always open to
hearing from and bringing this asset out. It is created
expressly for their use.
Mr. King. Okay. Do you want to say whether or not it was
present at the Boston Marathon, or would you rather not?
Ms. Gowadia. I would prefer not to.
Mr. King. Okay.
Mr. McAllister, if you could just take me through--for
instance, you quoted, and I think rightly so, that hometown
security is homeland security and homeland security is hometown
security, probably more so than ever now that it looks as if
most of the attacks are going to be launched from within the
country rather than a large attack from overseas. I know you
said that information is shared and that people have
clearances, but since so much of that information would be
classified, at what stage do you share it with local partners?
For instance, if you heard that X city--there is a
potential nuclear threat, a dirty bomb against X city, what
would be the procedure you would follow as far as when you
would notify officials in that city? What level would they be
at? Would it be police level? Would it be the mayor, or--and
again, at what stage do you make that decisions?
Mr. McAllister. Certainly, and thank you for asking that,
First of all, what we strive for is getting security
clearances out to our key stakeholders within the State and
local environment. We have over 4,000 Secret-level or above
security clearances distributed to our partners out in the
State and local arena.
If there was an emerging threat what we would do is we
would work to take that classified information and drill it
down to the lowest classification level in order to get it out
to the widest distribution possible. We have installed, through
our National Network of Fusion Centers, the capability to
communicate in a Secret/Classified level as well as, you know,
our Governors, our major city mayors, our fusion center
directors, and other key stakeholders have that level of
So we are able to communicate with them in a Classified
environment, as well as, we would work with the FBI in order to
develop a joint intelligence bulletin that could go out at a
FOUO level or a Classified level, depending upon the nature of
the threat. We would, again, work with them in order to
distribute that through the existing information architecture
to make sure that those State and local key stakeholders have
informed decisions in order to make educated decisions on how
to mitigate that threat in their community.
Mr. King. Who would make that decision in the Department as
to when that tipping point comes where the local officials, you
know, should be notified?
Mr. McAllister. That is ingrained in the way we operate on
a daily basis.
Mr. King. Okay. So there wouldn't be a question of the
obligation being made later on that information was held back
or wasn't sufficiently shared.
Do you feel that the information-sharing process is
adequate right now?
Mr. McAllister. I look at my philosophy as well as my
colleagues' is that we have an obligation to provide rather
than a need-to-know environment. We strive to make sure that we
get information that could impact a community out to the right
folks out in the field.
Mr. King. So, Dr. Gowadia, to change topics a little bit,
but it definitely involves nuclear detection, I know that DNDO
is reviewing a number of technologies for cargo scanning--and
this is an issue that is often brought up at this committee--
including the multimode passive detection system. What is the
status of those R&D projects?
Ms. Gowadia. I believe you are referring to our nuclear,
radiological imaging platform----
Mr. King. Yes.
Ms. Gowadia [continuing]. Technology, sir. The ATD, or the
advanced technology demonstration, kicked off last year and I
do believe we will be seeing characterization results, which is
testing results, in the next fiscal year.
Mr. King. Thank you.
Commissioner Daddario, I know there is, I guess, no
definite way of answering the question, but what would have
been the impact in Boston if that had been a dirty bomb as
opposed to a conventional explosive? Also, how would, whether
it is New York or other cities in--you have the expertise in
New York--how would the city have responded to that?
Mr. Daddario. Just starting with New York, whenever we have
a suspicious package and we have a bomb team that goes out they
always have--they have radiation detection equipment with them
so that when they approach a bomb the assumption is that it
could be a dirty bomb, so that is one of the first things we
Let's say a dirty bomb were to go off in Boston, depending
on the--how much material there was, there would be a large
area that would be contaminated for a substantial period of
time. Depending on where it was, in this case in the center of
an important area of Boston, that would shut down the
economic--all economic activity in that area, chase residents
out of the area for substantial periods of time until there
could be a clean-up.
There would be mass panic. People would be very reluctant
to go anywhere near that area, which would mean that the ripple
effect would extend far beyond the actual contamination zone.
So I think the effect would have been, to a substantial extent,
the shutting down of economic life in the city of Boston.
That is the concern we have, quite frankly, in the city of
New York. If a dirty bomb were to go off in the middle of the
city what would that mean for the future of the city? Could the
city continue to operate?
So that is why these types of investments, we think, are so
important. Obviously, you know, when I talk to you about it my
concern is the city of New York. I can understand communities
around the country--other cities--saying, ``Well, what about
us?'' The reason for that is they understand that if something
like this were to happen it could mean the death knell, really,
for a major urban area.
Mr. King. Without giving out too much information in a
public setting, but all of us were extremely impressed by the
tremendous medical response in Boston--the victims brought to
the hospitals, the treatment they got. I mean, the--no one died
once they were taken to the hospital--emergency care.
But if it was a dirty bomb with nuclear materials, are
hospitals equipped to bring contaminated victims in? What would
that do to other patients in the hospital or other facilities?
Again, I don't want you to give up too much--I mean, that is a
whole new dimension on this.
Mr. Daddario. It would create enormous challenges for the
public--for the hospitals and public health system--how to
treat the victims, whether there are enough types of
medications available that would be effective in the
stockpiles. It is certainly something we don't want to see, Mr.
Mr. King. Thank you, Commissioner.
Now I recognize the Ranking Member.
Mr. Higgins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Just on this issue of the terror plot that was thwarted in
Canada. Seemingly the introduction of an al-Qaeda presence in
Iran to me is, you know, both disturbing and intriguing from
the standpoint that Iran is a majority Shia population and al-
Qaeda is Sunni-based. They also have an intolerance of those
So I am just curious as to the thoughts of our panel about
what seemingly is new information and what that does or doesn't
do relative to a further threat to the United States, North
Mr. Daddario. The subject you are raising is an awful lot
of information that I am not at liberty to talk about, but I
think in the public record it is pretty clear that al-Qaeda--
senior al-Qaeda people have been in Iran for some period of
time. It has been convenient for Iran to have them there and it
is convenient for al-Qaeda to be there.
Iran is a, if nothing else, it is a passage, it is a point
through which people travel to go from the Afghanistan and
Pakistan area into the Middle East. So yes, there is tension
for the reasons you have said, but there are also some common--
they have some common objectives, the United States being a
common enemy in their eyes.
So I think what you are seeing in--with Syria, maybe there
is some more tension that is there. You know the case of Abu
Ghaith, who recently left Iran, so that may be some indication
of those tensions.
But it is not new news that al-Qaeda has had a presence in
Iran. How hospitable that hosting had been and how consistently
hospitable it has been is something which is worth thinking
about but the presence of al-Qaeda in Iran continues to this
I think that is about all I can really say.
Ms. Gowadia. I will focus my comments predominantly on the
nuclear element. Precisely because we worry about the
proliferation, as Chairman King mentioned in his opening
statement, we work very hard, sir, to build a layered
architecture that takes into account all kinds of terrorist
So it is our fundamental responsibility to build robust
nuclear detection systems, and also, DNDO is responsible for
nuclear technical forensics capabilities for the Nation, and we
build them robust enough to deal with a wide variety of
threats. It is agnostic to the country or the terrorist
organization of concern.
Mr. McAllister. From my perch two things come to mind. One
is, right now that is still an active investigation with the
Federal Bureau of Investigation. I know Director Mueller was on
the Hill the other day and asked about that and, you know, in
an open setting couldn't comment on that.
We are working with the FBI on a joint intelligence
bulletin pertaining to the Canadian incident that will be
distributed today. It is a Classified level, but I am sure that
we will make that available to the committee.
Mr. Cole. Well, I would just speak to the general necessity
all the more that we be concerned that Iran not be permitted to
even get close to a final development of a nuclear weapon, with
all of the obvious implications that that would have, including
possibly, then, making such a weapon more accessible or
knowledge about it more accessible to al-Qaeda and other groups
on collaboration with Iran, perhaps.
Mr. Higgins. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. King. Ranking Member yields back.
Now the gentleman from Massachusetts. Again, I join with
the others in expressing our thoughts, prayers, and condolences
to you and our gratitude for the people of Massachusetts who
were the responders.
Gentleman from Massachusetts is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Ranking Member.
Thank you for your remarks, all of you on our panel.
In Boston there is a situation where the operations of the
attack were conducted by two people that were domestic--at
least had lived here--one a citizen, one a noncitizen, but had
lived in the Commonwealth for a period of time, lived in the
United States for a period of time. Some of the planning, at
least, was done by these two individuals, and the procurement
of some of the materials used in that explosive--that was also
at least done by some measure by those two individuals. There
might have been more, but at least some of it.
My question is this: In that instance there was easily
accessible materials and there was enough knowledge to put an
explosive together. What type of biological, chemical,
radiological materials are accessible by average folks to put
together this kind of attack that we are having the testimony
I know Dr. Cole mentioned concerns about security around
certain laboratories, and certainly that is an area, but could
you comment on that, since I think those kind of attacks are
going to become more prevalent, they are harder to detect, and
I just want to see in the instances of biological,
radiological, chemical attacks--nuclear attacks, as well--what
can they get their hands on and what can people be reasonably
expected to do to put together an attack using these materials?
Mr. Cole. Well, I think it is important to differentiate
between the nature and character of each of these weapons, the
CBRN. In the case of biological it is a rather unique weapons
system if natural--naturally occurring pathogens are used for
hostile purposes. Yes, security is important, and there is not
a standardization, as I mentioned, for laboratory work.
There are various countermeasures that we have in place,
including detection systems, which sometimes are not as
effective and accurate as we wish, but nevertheless, we have
moved in this direction in terms of biological materials, if
they are--certainly if they are in the environment, if they
floated and they ought not to be there. If appropriately
engaged in advance, there are defenses against them from
antibiotics and vaccines and other kinds of countermeasures.
Radiological is entirely different. It is not contagious. I
know Chairman King mentioned the possibility of bringing
somebody to a hospital who has been exposed to radiation. That
would not be dangerous to others nearby. However, depending on
the intensity and the level of radiation that a person has been
exposed to, this could be critical to that person's life.
Mr. Keating. Well, if I could interrupt?
Mr. Cole. Sure. Sure.
Mr. Keating. Can they get their hands on our--I will be
very clear: Can they get their hands on these things and use
them in an attack? How accessible is that for people like these
domestic or homegrown terrorists?
Mr. Cole. In the case of biological, which is my particular
expertise, it is not at all difficult to get--for anybody with
a will and a little understanding of how you can get these
materials, including from natural-occurring locations--anthrax,
plague bacteria--these occur in nature. If you get a highly
dangerous strain, and with a little knowledge about laboratory
techniques, it would not be difficult to create a biological
spread that could be harmful to a lot of people.
I think that would be much less so for certain other kinds
of agents. I will let others speak to radiological. But you
know, if you talk not about a nuclear blast but scaring a lot
of people with the release of some levels of radiation, there
are radiation capabilities from machines in medical offices,
dental offices, hospitals. That alone, among other commercial
uses for--with radiation, makes those--that concern real.
Mr. Keating. Dr. Gowadia, you wanted to comment.
Ms. Gowadia. Yes. First and foremost, our special nuclear
material in this country is secure. So the nuclear element, I
think, we can rest assured on.
Dr. Cole is right, there are radiological sources in
hospitals, et cetera. But again, New York is a great example
where we actually collaborated with the NRC--Department of
Energy, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to harden these
sources. Blood irradiators do have large radiation sources, but
we are working to secure them, harden them so it gets harder
and harder for them to acquire these materials.
Mr. Keating. So we are at risk, clearly, on that with these
same group of terrorists working within our borders?
Ms. Gowadia. Yes, we are. But we continue to work as hard
as possible to make the radiological materials hard to acquire
and use as the first line of defense.
Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
If anyone else could comment on that if they wanted to? No?
Then I yield back, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. King. Thank you.
Now I recognize former Member of the committee and
permanent visitor to the committee, gentleman from Texas, Mr.
Mr. Green. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You are always very
gracious to allow me to have this opportunity and I especially
thank you and the Ranking Member.
Mr. King. I was hoping that with the change of chairmen
maybe we wouldn't have----
Mr. King. But since the new Chairman is also from Texas I
guess you are here forever, so----
Mr. Green. He and I are great friends. Thank you so much.
Mr. Keating, I do express my sympathies for the victims and
my condolences, as well.
To the members of the panel, thank you for your very
thoughtful testimony. I must tell you that I was somewhat
impressed, to be quite candid with you, with the way the effort
was coordinated around what happened at the marathon. I am
still impressed at how quickly things came together and how we
were able to either capture or kill--and I don't like the
terminology, but it speaks to what we are capable of doing--
within a very short period of time persons who committed a
So I would like for you, if you would, so that we can just
get it in the record, some testimony about how successful that
coordinated effort was. I am willing to start with Mr.--either
person can start, quite candidly, to do this.
Mr. Daddario. I think you are right, there was the initial
response was very quick. A lot of resources came that were
brought to Boston to assist in the investigation from--not just
from the Federal Government but from local police agencies.
There were, for example, from our department detectives
from the Joint Terrorism Task Force who were in Boston. There
were also other officers from other parts of the police
department there. I don't think New York was alone in that
There was a, I think, after a little bit of--you know,
whenever something like this happens it takes a little bit of
time to put--to get everything organized, but I think a good
sharing of information. The briefings were conducted well so
that people were informed of what was going on. I think that
There is always, as you know, confusion when these type of
things happen, and this is the case which is no different than
others. But all in all, I think it was an excellent effort.
It is still on-going, Congressman. This investigation is
not completed. There is still a lot of work to be done.
So the need to organize the way you have said, bring all
the different actors and parties that have an interest in the
case together and work together, continues to be very
Mr. Green. Would anyone else like to comment?
Yes, Mr. McAllister.
Mr. McAllister. Thank you, sir.
In order to adequately address that I would like to go back
about 10 years, and that is the decade leading up to this
tragic event. Since 2002 the Department of Homeland Security,
through State preparedness grants--Boston has received about
$370 million in order to prepare for such a tragic event--in
particular, training, equipment, and resources to detect
improvised explosive device prevention, response, and recovery
training and equipment.
Last year funding was used in order to speed and improve
the efficiency in responding to such an IED threat. Our FEMA
has supported 12 exercises and training opportunities over the
past several years, 8 of which over the past 3 years in areas
such as biological attack, hazardous materials, and other types
of mass attacks. There has been over 5,500 first responders in
the Boston area that have been trained on mass casualty
response training and the like.
I would like to just also talk about the fusion centers.
The Boston Regional Intelligence Center was there for the
preparation of the special event as well as the--dealing with
the incident, and then the post-incident investigation.
They handled everything from video exploitation to look for
the culprits responsible for that, geospatial imagery for--to
assist the first-line commanders in what was going on on the
ground. They handled all kinds of requests for information,
suspicious activity reporting, seamless updates to those
decision-makers not only in the impacted area but also at the
State emergency response center.
They worked seamlessly with the State fusion center, as
well, and provided accurate and timely information on what was
evolving to the National Network of Fusion Centers as well as
our Federal partners. It really is a model of just a well-
performed, although tragic, event in how to share intelligence
Mr. Green. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I know my time is up.
So if others of you, if you would like to respond, if you
would put something in the record, I will be honored to read
it. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Cole.
Mr. King. Thank you.
I just have one follow-up question to Mr. Daddario, and you
may have touched on this. But taking New York, what are the
trip wires as far as you being alerted if somebody is
purchasing suspicious materials, whether radioactive or
Mr. Daddario. New York has an outreach to businesses that
sell materials that could be used for an attack--chemicals, gun
powder, certain types of components for bombs. So we do an
outreach so that if somebody goes and buys these materials we
hope that it will trigger a call in to a law enforcement
There is nothing that requires, under the law, these calls,
but--so we have to do this type of outreach. For example, a
year or so ago we started doing some outreach to companies that
sell pyrotechnic materials on-line, and that apparently may
have been what was used in this case, because we recognize that
you can go on-line and buy fuses and pyrotechnic powder.
If you put that, as you saw, in an enclosed container along
with BBs and metal you can cause enormous harm from what is,
you know, derogatorily called a crude bomb. These are not crude
bombs; these are very effective small bombs.
I think people, you know, shouldn't use the term, you know,
``It is a crude device,'' or something of that nature. The fact
is that you can now go out and acquire unregulated materials
and buy--to make bombs--that are very, very effective.
That is obviously a concern to us--disturbing to us. So you
have to create this--do this type of outreach to the companies,
the businesses that sell this so that if they see something
suspicious--somebody coming in and buying more than they need
or coming back over and over again--that there is a call made
out to law enforcement, and that is what we try to do.
Mr. King. Also, my understanding is that also applies to
seemingly innocuous items, such as beauty products.
Mr. Daddario. Yes. I mean, beauty--those are chemicals, and
those chemicals can be mixed together to, you know, to form--to
make bombs or poisonous gases.
Mr. King. Thank you.
I have no further questions.
Any Members of the panel have any--gentleman from
Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I just was going to touch base with Mr. Daddario. In New
York it is well-known that surveillance cameras are--have the
most highest concentration probably in our country. That might
be correct. But one of the issues that is really taking hold
and being considered going forward is to what extent, in a city
like Boston, where we, you know, had quite a few and that was
really integral to investigators' success in going forward,
what do you really advise, given your experience in New York
City, on the need in other cities for increased surveillance
Mr. Daddario. We have a program within the Counterterrorism
Bureau to deploy cameras. We do it a little differently than
some other cities. Other cities may have put out more cameras
than we have, but our program is based on the following kind of
design: We try to pull in--we use cameras that the police
department installs, other public authorities install, and
private businesses install.
What we do is we bring those into our network--we bring all
the video data into a central core that allows us to store it,
review it for back--we go back 30 days. We can do analytics on
all that information. So that, to us, is a very effective way
of handling video information.
Cameras themselves--the police department believes very
strongly in. One, we think they have a deterrent effect,
provide for security not just for a counterterrorism
perspective but for general law enforcement, and as an
investigative tool after an event takes place they are
invaluable, and you saw that in Boston. If you wouldn't have
had those cameras, you know, you would--right now we would be
in a much different position--situation than we are now.
So I think any city, as part of its security plan, should
really give a close, hard look at how it can best deploy
cameras--what type, where, how to architect them. I think that
is an essential part of any security policy and program.
Mr. Keating. Yes. The digital cameras I saw at the airport
in Boston--Lincoln Laboratories MIT----
Mr. Daddario. I am familiar with----
Mr. Keating. It is extraordinary. They can see the entire
terminal all at once live time, and experts can look at any
activity that is not done, and this computerized side of that,
as well, as I understand, and they can see a blade of grass
with high definition three football fields away. I mean, so the
technological developments are another aspect of this
surveillance, as well.
Mr. Daddario. Congressman, if you ever want to come to New
York and look at our system--it is called the Domain Awareness
System--let us know, be happy to show it to you.
Mr. Keating. Great. Thank you.
Thank you. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. King. Thank you.
I would just follow up on what the commissioner said. I am
not in a position to invite people to the NYPD, but it really
works--especially, you know, if Boston is considering it, it is
very impressive to look at and there is even more than the
commissioner has described.
I mean, it is--Commissioner Kelly would have shown, there
is some guy wearing a green sweater on 11th Street. You can
pick out almost anything on that. It is amazing how it is done,
and very sophisticated, and you have so many partners working
in there from both the police department and the private sector
at this location I have, so.
Gentleman from Texas.
Mr. Green. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I promise to be terse
I would like for you to respond as a follow-up to
Representative Keating's question with reference to the
citizenry, ``See something, say something,'' in terms of
cameras that--in the hands of citizens and the social
networking that took place with this technology--the impact
that that has, please?
Mr. Daddario. Congressman, are you referring to how people
can take pictures on their cell phones now and----
Mr. Green. Yes, sir.
Mr. Daddario [continuing]. And send it in?
This is a very interesting development, and I think police
departments, law enforcement officers are trying to get a
handle on how to deal with that. It is a lot of information now
that can be sent to police departments.
The problem is you don't have a way to communicate with the
person who sends it to you right away, so you are not sure what
it is, you--so lacking that dialogue or that conversation, it
makes it harder to figure out how to respond. But it is
absolutely something which all law enforcement agencies and
public safety agencies have to start to think about, is how can
it encourage this information be brought in and what--how to
handle it effectively once it comes in the door.
I will tell you, we haven't exactly fully come to terms
with that. It is something that the New York City Police
Department, other police departments, have to give real thought
Mr. Green. Mr. Chairman, just as a follow-up, should there
be a pilot program? Would you be interested in some sort of
methodology by which you can pull forward to develop these
Mr. Daddario. Well, we are thinking about it but we are
always interested in getting help.
Mr. King. The gentleman yields back.
I want to thank all the witnesses for their testimony.
Oh, Dr. Cole.
Mr. Cole. If I may?
Mr. King. Surely.
Mr. Cole. I think protection of the citizenry stands on two
major pillars. One has largely been discussed: How you prevent,
how you detect in advance and you protect the public by not
having an event.
The other equally important pillar is, in the unfortunate
occasion that the attack happens, what about the response? On
this I would like to make one very important point. Through
media reports, through general discussion is--there is a full
appreciation and acknowledgement that the medical response and
rescue response was superb at the Boston Marathon, but it is
extremely important to recognize how atypical that situation
was relative to other possibilities in the United States.
For example, at the New York Marathon there are more than
1,000 medical volunteers stationed across the route heavily
concentrated near the finish line. I don't know the number of
medical volunteers at Boston, but there were many, many
available literally within seconds of the time of the blast.
There would have been many more lives lost simply through
the loss of those legs that were blasted away, or arms in some
cases. With nearby, medically-trained people--EMS people,
physicians, nurses--the bleeding was staunched. That is one of
the reasons that there was an unusually successful manner in
terms of saving lives.
Beyond that, as you well know, Congressman Keating, some of
the most outstanding medical institutions in the world were
literally one or one-and-a-half miles away--Harvard's series of
medical schools, Tufts, Boston University. This is not what we
can expect, God forbid, if there were another occasion where
there was a blasting of people where you have medical folks at
hand within moments and just a couple of minutes away getting
to the hospitals.
We need better preparation, preparedness, and public health
capabilities throughout the country at many locations beyond a
marathon that would draw such a focus of intent including, by
the way, not just for medical but the security people. There
were huge numbers of security police, other officials that
would not necessarily be populating locations throughout the
country in equal numbers.
Mr. King. Thank you, Dr. Cole.
I want to thank all the witnesses for their testimony and
Members for their questions. I think all of us are on the same
page coming from different perspectives, but in dealing with
the issue I think there is a real unanimity as to steps that
should be taken and what is being done.
I want to especially thank the Department for their work,
thank Commissioner Daddario, thank Dr. Cole for coming back
again and for his insights.
I would just say, the Members of the committee may have
some additional questions for you and we will ask you to
respond to those in writing if they come in.
So without objection, the committee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:28 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]