[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 113-54]
ENSURING NAVY SURFACE FORCE
EFFECTIVENESS WITH LIMITED
MAINTENANCE RESOURCES
__________
JOINT HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS
MEETING JOINTLY WITH THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
AUGUST 1, 2013
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS
ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia, Chairman
ROB BISHOP, Utah MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam
VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut
AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa
KRISTI L. NOEM, South Dakota COLLEEN W. HANABUSA, Hawaii
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia JACKIE SPEIER, California
FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey RON BARBER, Arizona
MIKE ROGERS, Alabama CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire
DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado WILLIAM L. ENYART, Illinois
E. SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia PETE P. GALLEGO, Texas
STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi
Jamie Lynch, Professional Staff Member
Vickie Plunkett, Professional Staff Member
Nicholas Rodman, Clerk
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia, Chairman
K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina
DUNCAN HUNTER, California JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut
E. SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi RICK LARSEN, Washington
ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia HENRY C. ``HANK'' JOHNSON, Jr.,
MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado Georgia
JON RUNYAN, New Jersey COLLEEN W. HANABUSA, Hawaii
KRISTI L. NOEM, South Dakota DEREK KILMER, Washington
PAUL COOK, California SCOTT H. PETERS, California
Jamie Lynch, Professional Staff Member
Vickie Plunkett, Professional Staff Member
Nicholas Rodman, Clerk
C O N T E N T S
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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2013
Page
Hearing:
Thursday, August 1, 2013, Ensuring Navy Surface Force
Effectiveness with Limited Maintenance Resources............... 1
Appendix:
Thursday, August 1, 2013......................................... 21
----------
THURSDAY, AUGUST 1, 2013
ENSURING NAVY SURFACE FORCE EFFECTIVENESS WITH LIMITED MAINTENANCE
RESOURCES
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Forbes, Hon. J. Randy, a Representative from Virginia, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces................. 1
WITNESSES
Matthews, RDML Timothy S., USN, Director, Fleet Readiness (N43),
Chief of Naval Operations, U.S. Department of Defense.......... 3
Rowden, RADM Thomas S., USN, Director, Surface Warfare (N96),
Chief of Naval Operations, U.S. Department of Defense.......... 2
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Bordallo, Hon. Madeleine Z................................... 27
Forbes, Hon. J. Randy........................................ 28
McIntyre, Hon. Mike.......................................... 29
Rowden, RADM Thomas S., joint with RDML Timothy S. Matthews.. 30
Wittman, Hon. Robert J....................................... 25
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
Mrs. Davis................................................... 43
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Forbes................................................... 47
Mr. Wittman.................................................. 49
ENSURING NAVY SURFACE FORCE EFFECTIVENESS WITH LIMITED MAINTENANCE
RESOURCES
----------
House of Representatives, Committee on Armed
Services, Subcommittee on Readiness, Meeting
Jointly with Subcommittee on Seapower and
Projection Forces, Washington, DC, Thursday,
August 1, 2013.
The subcommittees met, pursuant to call, at 4:22 p.m., in
room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. J. Randy Forbes
(chairman of the Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection
Forces)
presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. J. RANDY FORBES, A REPRESENTATIVE
FROM VIRGINIA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND
PROJECTION FORCES
Mr. Forbes. Gentlemen, first of all, thank you so much for
your patience in being here with us today. We don't get to pick
these votes, as you know, and we are sometimes captive to our
own voting schedules, but we are delighted to have both of you
here today with us. And in the interests of time, we are going
to forego our opening statements and go right to you so we can
hear from you, if that is all right with you.
And I want to just say this, though: Chairman Wittman and
Ranking Member Bordallo and McIntyre are three of the finest
people that I know in Congress. We have a wonderful two
subcommittees, in that we are probably two of the most
bipartisan subcommittees, I think, in Congress and have just a
great respect for each other in this these two committees. So
we are delighted to have you here, and you will share a lot in,
hopefully protecting, the national defense of this country.
We are delighted today to have with us Rear Admiral Thomas
S. Rowden, who is the director of surface warfare, and also
Rear Admiral Timothy S. Matthews.
Gentlemen, thank you for your service to our country and
for being here today.
And with that, Admiral Rowden, I don't know if you are
going to start, or Admiral Matthews. We would like to turn the
floor over to you.
Admiral Rowden. I thank you, sir. Chairman Forbes, Chairman
Wittman, Congressman McIntyre, Congressman----
Mr. Forbes. Admiral, would you mind, if your microphone is
not on, just bring it up close to your mike--your mouth.
Sometimes it is hard to pick up.
STATEMENT OF RADM THOMAS S. ROWDEN, USN, DIRECTOR, SURFACE
WARFARE (N96), CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
Admiral Rowden. All right, sir. Congressman Forbes--or
Chairman Forbes, Chairman Wittman, Congressman McIntyre,
Congresswoman Bordallo, distinguished members of the
subcommittees and other distinguished members, I want to thank
you for the opportunity to discuss the readiness of our surface
forces.
In my career, I have had the privilege to command two
carrier strike groups, a destroyer squadron and a destroyer. In
all these commands and indeed other commands I have served on
throughout my career, no matter what my role was, when it came
time to deploy, I wanted to be sure our ships and sailors were
not only ready for their assigned missions and any
contingencies, but also that our sailors were confident in
their own abilities and in the capabilities of our ships and
its weapons systems.
Our readiness to deploy is something we work on every day;
in the middle of a training cycle; in the middle of a
maintenance period or on the day after we return from
deployment, it doesn't matter. There are always qualifications
to attain, maintenance to accomplish, and tactics to learn.
There are always sailors transferring from our command and new
ones coming in that need assistance, guidance, training, and
leadership. The cycle for every surface ship is always in
motion, and it never ends until the day the ship is
decommissioned and all hands depart the ship for the final
time.
We build our ships, not for peacetime, not for being in
port, but rather for executing prompt and sustained combat
operations at sea. From the shipboard perspective, to achieve
readiness for battle, we must ensure our ships and weapons
systems are 100-percent operational and our sailors are fully
trained to fight the ship. We train our commanding officers
that when they deploy, they must be ready for battle, and if
that battle should occur, it is all hands on deck and all gear
online and operational, maximum redundancy, maximum readiness
to fight the ship.
Thankfully, we have not had to steam our ships directly
into harm's way in the recent past. However, the mandate we
have from the American people dictates that we must always be
ready to go into harm's way and protect American interests.
Whether ``harm's way'' means chasing pirates off the coast of
Somalia or combating a missile threat, our ships are designed
and our sailors are trained to make use of the redundancy
within our vital equipment systems to ensure we can sustain
battle damage and still fight and win.
To do that, all of the equipment must be maintained and all
our sailors must be trained to operate it. Keeping our
equipment properly operating and training sailors takes money
and time. When required funding is limited through
sequestration or for other reasons, we are forced to make hard
decisions about what gets fixed and what training is completed.
Make no mistake, we will deploy ready ships, but our ability to
respond to contingencies and surge additional ships to a crisis
could be reduced.
In the long term, if we do not maintain our ships, the Navy
will be forced to decommission ships before their expected
service life or before they reach their expected service life.
We estimate that if sequestration continues over the long term,
by 2020, we will be reduced from 295 ships down to 257 ships.
Over the same period, we do not anticipate the combatant
commanders' demand for ready forces will decrease.
Without the continued support of Congress and without the
passage of an appropriations bill and reprogramming authority,
the Navy may be forced to cancel or defer important maintenance
and training, reducing the combat readiness and the long-term
viability of our ships. More importantly, this would deprive
our sailors of the proper tools to deter aggression around the
world and, when necessary, to fight and win our Nation's wars.
Thank you, sir.
[The joint prepared statement of Admiral Rowden and Admiral
Matthews can be found in the Appendix on page 30.]
Mr. Forbes. Admiral Matthews.
STATEMENT OF RDML TIMOTHY S. MATTHEWS, USN, DIRECTOR, FLEET
READINESS (N43), CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
Admiral Matthews. Good afternoon.
Chairman Forbes, Chairman Wittman, Congressman McIntyre,
Congresswoman Bordallo, and distinguished members of both
subcommittees, thank you for inviting me here today and for
your continued support of our Navy. I look forward to speaking
with you about the readiness of our surface forces.
I do not have the operational experience of my esteemed
colleague, Admiral Rowden. However, as a career maintenance
officer, I have spent the last 30 years providing combat-ready
ships and aircraft to warfighters like Admiral Rowden. And as I
look at the readiness indicators of our surface ships today and
the likely scenarios that we are forecasting under our
sequestered budget in fiscal year 2014, I am very concerned.
We have made great progress over the past few years
addressing a backlog of surface ship maintenance that has
accumulated over 10 years of high operational tempo. We have
developed rigorous engineering standards and maintenance
assessment processes that will help improve material condition
of our surface ships. And with Congress' help, we have provided
the fleet and the shipyards with the funding necessary to
execute these processes and the associated maintenance.
However, all of this good work is at risk under the deep
funding cuts necessary with the Budget Control Act caps.
In fiscal year 2013, with the budget that Congress enacted
and the reprogramming authority that was recently granted, we
will execute all the scheduled maintenance availabilities.
However, furloughs and overtime restrictions at our regional
maintenance centers are disrupting waterfront services and
technical assistance to our ships, as well as Government
oversight of private-sector work. This will result in
maintenance delays and compressed training cycles that will
make it difficult to meet deployment schedules and which impact
the proficiency of the crews and places more stress on our
sailors and their families.
The ship operations accounts, which fund the replenishment
of spare parts, were also reduced to stay under the mandated
caps. As a result, we have seen an increase in material
deficiencies and the cross-decking of spare parts, which are
early indicators of readiness degradation.
A sequestered budget in fiscal year 2014 will require
significant reductions in maintenance in our surface ship
fleet. Those ships scheduled to deploy in fiscal year 2014 and
fiscal year 2015 will receive the priority for both training
and maintenance dollars. The balance of our surface ships will
not receive their required maintenance. In fact, we project
that over 50 percent of the scheduled surface ship maintenance
availabilities will need to be deferred. If not corrected in
future years, these ships will not stay in service till their
projected service life and our Navy ship count will decline
accordingly.
We are also deeply concerned about the impacts on the
health of our industrial base under sequestration. A skilled
and proficient labor force in our public and private shipyards
is a critical component to Navy readiness, and many of these
jobs will be put at risk with the cancellation or deferral of
maintenance availability scheduled in fiscal year 2014. These
are perishable skills that, once lost, will take a long time to
reconstitute. The readiness of our fleet will certainly suffer
as this lost industrial capacity results in maintenance delays
in the shipyards, a trend we are already witnessing now.
The Navy is committed to improving material condition of
our surface fleet, but we cannot do so without the support of
Congress. We urge you to enact a more balanced approach to
deficit reduction and reverse the detrimental effects that
sequestration will have on Navy readiness.
Thank you for your continued support and the opportunity to
address you this afternoon.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Admiral.
We have been joined by my ranking member, Congressman Mike
McIntyre, from North Carolina, and Mike's statement will also
be made part of the record.
Gentlemen, I just have two quick questions and then I want
to get to our other distinguished members here, but earlier
today in a full committee, we had the opportunity to discuss
our military's future with Secretary Carter and Admiral
Winnefeld. Our conversation was quite startling, I guess, to
say the least, and I am shocked at the dismantling and
devastation that is being proposed by the Administration, the
negative consequences associated with sequestration, as both of
you just pointed out.
For instance, a fleet of only eight aircraft carriers will
significantly and irreparably harm our global strategic
posture.
Now, at this hearing, we will likely have revealed that our
existing fleet's being worn out by this period of sustained
surge as well.
And, Admiral Rowden, it is my understanding that a severe
underfunding has occurred in the ship maintenance accounts over
the last 10 years. Fleet representatives indicated to us on a
recent trip to San Diego that this underfunding has caused an
almost $3 billion shortfall in this account.
When you couple this underfunding with the high operational
tempo of the fleet, we now have a force that is highly
motivated but are driving ships and equipment that is not
properly modernized or maintained to meet their missions. My
fear is that with the continued impact on sequestration, the
continued reliance on OCO [Overseas Contingency Operations]
funding, our ability to adequately support the fleet in terms
of size and capacity might be in jeopardy.
Now, considering the long-term underfunding of the ship
maintenance accounts and the debilitating impact associated
with sequestration, can you give us your opinion as to how this
will impact the size and capacity of our surface forces? And
what would be the long-term impact of these decisions on the
30-year shipbuilding plan?
Admiral Rowden. Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you very much for the question. One of the things
that we have worked very hard on over the past 3 years is to
understand exactly where the current maintenance conditions of
the surface fleet is. And I am very proud of the fact that we
have worked very hard to understand exactly where we are. And
as you pointed out, it is about $3 billion of what we call
reset in order to be able to bring the material----
Mr. Forbes. $3 million or $3 billion?
Admiral Rowden. Billion, sir. In order to bring our--that
is--I am sorry. About $2 billion. We estimate approximately
$346 million in fiscal year 2014 and about $2 billion in the
future in order to reset our force. And that is from--that
occurs from--because we have had to defer maintenance because
of high operational tempo, because we have had a high
operational tempo, and because we have had to work--we have had
a poor definition of the engineered requirements of what was
required to maintain our ships. We now have a good engineered
requirement, and I am confident that the money that we say we
need to reset the force is--is what it is we need.
The trick will be to continue to keep that on track. One of
the problems that I foresee is if for whatever reason we delay
the fund--the execution of that maintenance, as time goes on,
the price to accomplish that maintenance increases in a greater
than linear fashion, and so we really have to get after that
reset maintenance on our ships so that we can preserve those
ships to their expected service life and maintain the fleet. If
we don't get after that, then we may have to look at, because
of the increasing costs, having to decommission ships early,
and that will--that will reduce our fleet as we move ahead.
Mr. Forbes. And just two more quick questions, and I am
asking you to kind of reach back with all of your professional
judgment and instincts and kind of give us a little forecast
with a crystal ball. And I know it is tough, but it is what we
are trying to sell to other members of Congress, but as you
look at all of these figures and you see where sequestration is
if we don't change it and we are locked in to where it is,
where do you think it is going to take us in our overall number
of ships that we are going to end up with? If you could, either
one of you, address that.
But the second thing is this: In 2007, the Navy was able to
meet about 90 percent of our combatant commanders'
requirements. The last 2 years, we are meeting about 51 percent
of those. If we stay on course with sequestration the way it is
and the cuts that have been made, what is your best guess of
where we will be in terms of percentages of meeting those
requirements, especially if we look at reducing our carrier
groups the way we heard today in our
testimony?
Admiral Rowden. Yes, sir. Thank you for the question. I--
there is no doubt, I think, that given where we are proposing
to go with sequestration, that it will reduce the number of
ships that we have in the Navy. And I think probably by 2020,
we are looking at about 257 ships.
Certainly we have to be able to maintain those ships.
Certainly the price tag to maintain those ships goes up as we
defer that maintenance. And so I think that in order to be able
to deploy the ready ships--and we are deploying ready ships--
but I think the surge capacity that we have to be able to
respond to any contingency is definitely not where it needs to
be now, and it could go down further as we move forward.
Mr. Forbes. And I know it is tough, but give me your best
guess of percentage of COCOM [Combatant Command] requirements
we can meet. If we only met 50, 51, I think to be exact, the
last 2 years, what is your best guess if we stay on this curve
line dropping the way it is?
Admiral Matthews. Yes, sir. That is a difficult question to
answer, and I would have to answer it in--with two views, one
is the short term and one is the long term. So looking ahead to
fiscal year 2014, we are going to prioritize the COCOM
requirements. The high-priority deployments are the ones that
we will keep in the highest priority, but we expect to have to
cancel some lower-priority deployments. And if I had to give
you a figure, it would be somewhere around the 90-percent range
that we would satisfy what we call the global force management
plan. So we are pretty confident we will get the highest
priority deployments, and by that, I mean the couple of
carriers that we will have out there, they won't meet what we
have traditionally done when you compare to historical norms,
but we will be able to provide what we have out there today.
Now, what Admiral Rowden said is very pertinent, in that
sequestration is going to affect the surge capacity that we
have in our nondeployed forces. So, as the CNO [Chief of Naval
Operations] has said recently, that will be brought down to
about one carrier strike group and one amphibious ready group
that is available for surge, and that is about it.
Long-term, however, as the force structure would start to
come down, I would expect that we are not going to be able to
meet as many of these requirements with fewer carriers and
fewer surface ships, but a percentage will be difficult for me
to figure at this point.
Mr. Forbes. Well, thank you both.
I would like to now recognize the distinguished chairman of
the readiness subcommittee, Mr. Wittman, from Virginia.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Chairman Forbes.
Admiral Rowden and Admiral Matthews, thank you so much for
joining us today. I want to pick up on what you stated as far
as the efforts going into the service maintenance
availabilities. There is a report out by GAO [Government
Accountability Office] in September 2012 that reiterates that
as these maintenance times are pushed forward, it increases the
cost when the ships eventually do get to port. If you postpone
too many of them, ultimately, it may become too expensive to
even keep the ship in service. So, as you talked about, that
ultimately results in ships retiring early. And then if you
look at our two--our shipbuilding plan, that ultimately, at the
end of the day, reduces the number of ships that we have
available in the future, because we can't build them fast
enough to replace the ones that we are retiring out of the
fleet early. And we already see some of that impact with what
we have gone through this past period of time with the nine
ships potentially being retired early, the cruisers and the
amphibs.
That being said, I wanted to get your perspective on the
status of the eight deferred maintenance availabilities that
remain in fiscal year 2013 and what that cascade effect has
into fiscal year 2014. If you can't get those done, those eight
deferred maintenance availabilities in 2013, and the CNO said
the other day that there are 30 maintenance availabilities
awaiting in fiscal year 2014, you can see the cascading effect
that that has. What--what do you see as the cumulative effect
if those dollars there, and you spoke of the $1.9 billion
needed in that reset effort to get those ships maintained to
make sure that they are going to be available for our sailors
to make sure they are deployed; tell me what happens if those
eight deferred availabilities in 2013 and what happens with the
30 that are on hold and potentially could be deferred in 2014,
what does that mean for the number of ships that we have
available and for readiness for our fleet?
Admiral Rowden. Thank you for that question, sir.
Obviously, if those eight availabilities are deferred or
pushed into the next fiscal year, we start to then have a
domino effect. There is industrial capacity to execute these
availabilities as long as funding is available, but if the
funding is not available, you start to pile them up. And
eventually, you get to the point where you--if the money does
become available--there is no way to get them pushed through,
and so you start to ``bow-wave'' these into the future, and
that then results in a delay in the execution of the
maintenance. And what we have seen is as we delay that
maintenance, there is a rise in the cost of that, and that
cost, that rising cost is bow-waved as well into the future.
So you end up ultimately with having a much tougher time
putting together a ready force. We will always deploy ready
forces, but you have a tougher time putting it together, and
you have to put more money together in order to get those ready
forces there. So I see a bow wave as we move into the future
associated with that.
Mr. Wittman. So those maintenance availabilities are
deferred. Ultimately, you could end up with ships sitting in
port because they are not able to go to sea because they don't
have systems that may be up to speed or that are capable of
doing the job that they are supposed to be doing?
Admiral Rowden. That is correct, sir. That is how I would
characterize it.
Mr. Wittman. And that to me also then leads right into, you
talked about the readiness of our forces and you talked about
those different levels. You talked about deployed units, those
that are currently at sea, the next to deploy, and the
nondeployed units. Tell me, what effect does it have in also
that rotation of what you have in ships and units and sailors?
How do those deferred maintenance availabilities affect that
readiness as you rotate sailors through their duties at sea?
Admiral Matthews. Well, let me take that one on. As we
experience delays in our shipyards and the ships get out late,
that will typically mean that whoever is on deployment gets
extended and depending on what class of ship it is. But if we
were counting on that ship that is in the yard to get out and
go on deployment, then that could actually mean a delay in the
subsequent deployment of that ship.
And if that occurs, then we will have sailors that are left
out there on the pointy end, experiencing a longer deployment,
and eventually, that could have an impact on retention, and
that would be one fear. That is one impact.
The reliability of these ships as they get their
maintenance deferred is going to go down accordingly, and so we
will have ships that may be out there on deployment that don't
have all of the systems in operating condition. We would, of
course, prioritize parts for those ships, but as you reduce the
amount of maintenance, there is life-cycle maintenance, repair
maintenance. We would be doing only the repair maintenance and
not that life-cycle maintenance. And that life-cycle
maintenance is what gets you to expected service life. So you
would have decreased reliability and a decrease in the expected
service life.
Admiral Rowden. And I would say, just to piggyback onto
that, sir, the other issue that if--with reduced maintenance
dollars and reduced ability to keep our equipment operating,
you can't train sailors on equipment that is not properly
repaired and maintained, and so that reduces our ability to
train at home and prepare ready forces to deploy, and so that,
again, has an effect.
Mr. Wittman. Let me close with one question. I just need a
yes or no answer on this. In this scenario, with these deferred
maintenance elements and with sailors being at sea longer and
potentially on ships that don't have all of their systems
operating the way they need to be, does that result in
increased risk for our sailors? And if they are in a wartime
situation, does that also mean that potentially in that
situation, more sailors may die on the high seas?
Admiral Rowden. Yes, sir. I would say that is a correct
characterization.
Mr. Wittman. Okay.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you, Chairman Wittman.
The Chair now recognizes the distinguished gentleman from
North Carolina for any questions he may have.
Mr. McIntyre. Thank you.
You have referred to going down to 257 ships by the year
2030, and I would like you to explain to us other than that
general statement, when we ask what is the impact of the 30-
year shipbuilding plan and the overarching force structure of
the Navy if it doesn't receive the necessary funds to reset the
force, can you tell us what you are looking at in terms of
timetable about how this would affect the Navy's force
structure?
Admiral Rowden. Yes, sir. Again, it goes back to the
deferral of maintenance and the bow-waving of maintenance into
successive years. If we have to defer X number this year and
that pushes into the following fiscal year and we have to defer
Y, eventually, we get to the point where the cost to maintain
those ships grows to the point where it is just not cost-
effective to maintain those ships, and therefore, you start to
remove them out of service early.
Based on what we have seen, there is a potential that we
could go down to as many as 257. I haven't estimated it beyond
that. I don't know whether Admiral Matthews has anything beyond
the 2020 timeframe, but looking at where we think we may have
to go in the next 7 years, we think we are looking at about 257
ships by the time we get to 2020.
Mr. McIntyre. When you talk about the cost of maintaining
the Navy's force structure, can you explain to--what you are
doing with that along with what the cost is in terms of what it
takes to deploy the ships, because I know you are talking about
maintenance costs versus if we have to do a deployment and how
those costs are interacting in the decisions you are making?
Admiral Matthews. Well, generally, we find that the costs
to own, as we call it, which is to maintain the ships and get
them trained to the point where they are proficient in basic
mobility, is between 75 and 80 percent of the total cost of
operating and maintaining and deploying a ship. So to deploy
the ship is a lesser percentage of the overall costs to own
that unit, but it has got to be in balance. So we can't simply
elect not to do the maintenance, we can't simply elect not to
do the training. So both the steaming days required to get
trained and to get out on deployment and the maintenance
required to make sure that it is going to meet its expected
service life but also be a reliable asset once it gets on
deployment are two critical things that we--if we were going to
take down, we would have a difficult time balancing that.
But under a constrained budget, what we are projecting to
do in 2014, for example, is to bring down the nondeployed
training to the minimum levels that we think is safe to get out
there and do the mission. And they will deploy in a combat-
ready stature once they go on deployment, but while they are
back here in CONUS [Continental United States] and in what we
call the sustainment phase, they would--their readiness would
decline accordingly, so we would take the training dollars down
in that regard.
On the maintenance side, which I said is the bulk of the
operation and maintenance accounts related to surface ships, we
have little flexibility, other than to defer the life-cycle-
type maintenance to a future time, future availability, but
that puts the service life of the ships at risk, so we don't
like to do that.
Mr. McIntyre. Okay. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Forbes. The Chair recognizes the gentlelady from Guam
for any questions she may have.
Ms. Bordallo. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
As I have stated in the past, I am disappointed that we
haven't had a more robust discussion on how we can solve
sequestration. Sequestration, in my opinion, is extremely
detrimental for a full economic recovery in our country. And
the challenges are clear: It is the action by Congress that is
necessary to restore readiness and end sequestration.
And with that said, Admiral Rowden, I have a question for
you. Given the DOD's [Department of Defense] strategic
rebalance to the Pacific and increased need for naval forces in
a maritime environment, what is your level of comfort with the
number of battle force ships currently employed and available
for use? How is the Navy balancing the need for modernizing our
fleet with sustaining the current fleet?
Admiral Rowden. Yes, ma'am. Thank you for the question.
Currently the forces that we have forward-deployed in the
Seventh Fleet are ready to accomplish a mission out there. And
I am comfortable that Admiral Thomas, who just relieved Admiral
Swift, has the forces that he needs to accomplish the mission
today.
I think the trick is understanding how to balance the
modernization that we must execute with the fleet with the
maintenance that we must execute with the fleet with the
dollars that we have available. We obviously have to maintain a
modernized fleet. We have to maintain a--or we have to put to
sea on a ship that is--on a fleet that is properly maintained.
And the trick that we have on the resources side and N96 in
surface warfare, working with Admiral Matthews and working with
the fleets, is to try to maintain that balance of modernized
ships and maintained ships so that when we deliver those
capabilities to the combatant commanders, we give them all the
capacity that we have and we give them the maximum capability
that they must have in order to accomplish the mission.
Ms. Bordallo. I have a question for you, Admiral Matthews.
Can you comment on how reductions in the operation and
maintenance accounts will impact our rebalance of forces to the
Pacific area? And what impact will these reductions have on our
ability to have equipment that is available for training with
our partners in the region?
Admiral Matthews. Yes, ma'am. The Navy is still committed
to the strategy of rebalancing the Pacific, and the things that
we have in motion today will continue, even under
sequestration. However, the pace of those developments I would
expect to slow as a result of that.
So, as you know, we are planning to forward-deploy more of
our ships, and our rotational forces will be more frequently
deployed to the Pacific theater under that strategy. And I
don't see that changing, other than the pace of some of those
developments.
We are committed to participating in all the exercises,
like RIMPAC [Rim of the Pacific Exercise] and other exercises
that we engage in overseas, in particular in the Pacific
theater. However, the number of units that are engaged in those
exercises may have to be reduced somewhat under sequestration.
But as these deferrals occur in our availabilities, that is
going to have an impact Navy-wide on our ability to get ships
to sea and the reliability of those forces.
Ms. Bordallo. And a followup question, Admiral. What is the
impact of the planned drawdown in military force levels on the
required capability and capacity of the sustainment industrial
base, and what is the general impact of these actions on the
workforce?
Admiral Matthews. Well, as I stated in my opening
statement, we are very concerned about the impact on the
industrial base. And there will be an impact on the industrial
base. Both in the public yards and in the private shipyards, we
will see an impact as we defer or cancel maintenance
availabilities.
We have had an impact with the furloughs, for example. Even
though the shipyards were exempted from the furloughs, the
supporting activities that order the parts and that do the
engineering were not exempted from the furloughs, so we are
having some delays in the public shipyards. And even on the
private side, at our regional maintenance centers, they are not
exempted from the furloughs, so there have been some delays in
our private sector availabilities as a result of that as well.
That sort of thing will continue.
And it is difficult for a private contractor to maintain
that workforce and meet payroll if they don't have a contract
in hand. And so as we are cancelling and deferring some of
these, I would expect some job losses in the areas of the
country where we have our shipyards. And you heard the
Secretary at least on one occasion mention RIFs [Reduction in
Force]----
Ms. Bordallo. Yes.
Admiral Matthews [continuing]. Which could also be a
possibility. So we are concerned about the health of our
industrial base.
Ms. Bordallo. Admiral, do you have any comments?
Admiral Rowden. No, ma'am. Not at this time.
Ms. Bordallo. All right. I thank you gentlemen very much
for answering the questions.
And, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Forbes. Thank you.
And the Chair now recognizes Mr. Courtney for 5 minutes.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for
holding this hearing, which, again, is just another powerful
argument for why we need to turn off sequester. What is amazing
to me is that when we passed the fiscal cliff on New Year's
Day, the projections that CBO [Congressional Budget Office]
scored in terms of revenue have actually been surpassed by
almost exactly the same amount as the Budget Control Act target
for the sequester cuts to achieve.
So, you know, aside from this being a self-inflicted wound
to our military readiness, it is also completely unnecessary.
And hopefully people are going to start focusing on what the
actual intent of the Budget Control Act was in terms of deficit
reduction and the fact that we actually are making great
strides without having to have this chainsaw go through
essential and important accounts.
Admiral Rowden, you mentioned--but, I mean, we are still
not there yet, so we still have to sort of ask a few other
questions.
Admiral Rowden, in your opening comments, again, you
pleaded with us to make sure that we pass a full defense
appropriations bill minus--without the sequester reduction, and
also asked for reprogramming authority as well. And I was
wondering if you could elaborate a little bit on the second
part of that statement, I think I heard you right when you said
that and in terms of whether or not that can provide you with
some relief in terms of trying to meet, again, essential tasks
that you are responsible for.
Admiral Rowden. Yes, sir. That is exactly correct. The
reprogramming authority gives us the flexibility in order to be
able to move the money appropriately to address the issues as
they occur. We like to think that we have a good understanding
of exactly where we need to go with respect to the execution of
the maintenance of our ships.
Unfortunately, when we get ships into dock, when we get
them in to start taking a look at them and there is growth work
associated with them because we haven't had the opportunity to
look at them in the past, we have the situation where we might
have to put additional funds toward that, and those additional
funds would be much--or the work that needed to be done would
be much easier to fund with the reprogramming authority in
order to be able to go address those.
Mr. Courtney. So Secretary Hale was here last week, and
this issue, you know, came up as well in terms of his
challenges with furloughs and the fact that it appears that the
Pentagon has sort of reached their maximum sort of allowable
reprogramming discretion. And, I mean, is it--are--is your
point the same, that if the Department was given a higher
number to be able to reprogram, that, again, we might be able
to manage these challenges better?
Admiral Rowden. Yes, sir. I would say that is a correct
characterization.
Mr. Courtney. All right. Okay.
And, again, in your testimony, I think one of you, I
apologize, I read it pretty fast, there was, again, mention of
the fact that you are still somewhat reliant on OCO accounts
to, again, get the work done. Again, if you could sort of
elaborate a little bit on that issue and just sort of where are
we headed, because obviously, that is something that falls
outside of sequestration in terms of the tapering down of OCO
funding.
Admiral Matthews. Yes, sir.
In our operations and maintenance accounts, we are heavily
reliant on OCO funding, as you point out, and that will
continue into fiscal year 2014, but the area that we are the
most leveraged is in our ships' maintenance accounts, and that
is what gives me great concern. Twenty percent of the funding
that we get for the ships' maintenance account is OCO funding.
And the way that we fund the public and private shipyards, it
means that the surface ship Navy takes the brunt of the effect
of the OCO decreases. We fund almost all of the availabilities
in our budget for the surface ship Navy with OCO funding, to
the tune of about $1.3 billion in 2014, for example.
So it is a big concern, particularly as we face
sequestration. The demise of OCO is another area where we are
very concerned. And the backlog of surface ship maintenance
that we have been attacking lately through reset funds is also
obviously OCO money, and our ability to catch up on all this
backlog of surface ship maintenance would be negatively
impacted if we lost the OCO money.
Mr. Courtney. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Yield back.
Mr. Forbes. Mr. Runyan is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Runyan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And Admiral Matthews, you kind of answered my question a
little bit earlier, but I just want to really talk about the
defense industrial base. I think a lot of people miss what,
say, workers in the private sector, to lay them off, to
actually retrain them, what the long-term cost of that is. Do
you have any guidance on that?
Admiral Matthews. Well, it would be difficult to estimate
the long-term costs, but these are skilled artisans that we are
talking about here. These are pipefitters and welders and
electricians that take years to develop those skills. If they
are laid off, I would expect them to go find employment
elsewhere. So if we are talking about reconstituting that
capacity, we are talking about taking in apprentices, and years
in the making for those kind of skill sets that are required to
work independently in a shipyard. So while it would be
difficult for me to project a cost, we can certainly project a
reduction in capacity as a result of that.
Mr. Runyan. And I raise that question, because I don't
think anybody can put a cost estimate on it. I raise it to say
that something has to be done, because once you lose that skill
set, it is almost invaluable. You can't put a price tag on it.
And I warn people of that all the time as we move through this
process. And when that process starts, as you just said, your
capacity to actually retool slows down, and that wave hits the
next tier and the next tier and everybody's supplying
everything down. I just wanted to make that point. I know many
people make it, but I just wanted to reiterate it. And I thank
you both to your service.
And I will yield back, Chairman.
Mr. Forbes. Thank the gentleman. Mr. Langevin is recognized
for 5 minutes.
Mr. Langevin. And thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, I want to thank you for your service to our
country and your testimony here today. I especially appreciate
having your insight as we attempt to navigate these very, very
obviously challenging fiscal times right now.
Since the DOD has released the conclusions of the Strategic
Choices and Management Review, I find it troubling that, as
many of my colleagues do, the DOD is having to make, in my
opinion, very unacceptable cuts in areas, such as modernization
and force structure, that will no doubt affect this Nation's
security for years to come. As you may be aware, I am
particularly concerned about the impacts on our shipbuilding
multiyear procurements that Congress has authorized. And as you
alluded to, there is a complex interplay between maintenance,
which ensures the long-term viability of our ships, and 30-year
shipbuilding plan.
A lot of the questions I had prepared have already been
addressed, so let me get to a couple that we haven't touched on
yet. Can we talk about the--what unfunded costs are we looking
at for the total surface ship reset over--and over what
timeframe, and how does shipyard capacity play into that
calculus?
Admiral Rowden. So I think I can address the costs, and I
will turn it over to Tim for the shipyard piece. But by our
estimations, the reset requested is a little over $346 million
in the fiscal year 2014 timeframe, and we estimate that it is
going to be about $2 billion into you the future in order to be
able to complete the reset of our surface ships.
Tim.
Admiral Matthews. And that reset obviously requires
industrial capacity. And the reset is really getting done in
docking availabilities and drydock, because it is very heavy,
labor-intensive maintenance that we do. So that requires us to
have the drydocking capacity, so the facilities as well as the
skilled labor in order to execute the maintenance.
So our concern would be that as funding erodes and the OCO
funding goes away, availabilities are cancelled, the industrial
base capacity is reduced accordingly, and then it is more
difficult to get that reset maintenance done in the future.
Mr. Langevin. That--I would share your concern, and the
point you raise, then, is well taken.
To help improve the material condition of the fleet, the
Navy has reorganized OPNAV [Office of the Chief of Naval
Operations] offices, stood up new maintenance organizations,
and partnered with the American Bureau of Shipping. What, if
any, measurable results or cost savings has resulted from these
efforts?
Admiral Rowden. Sir, I have--I was on the CNO's transition
team when this was initially discussed a little under 2 years
ago. I then reported to the OPNAV staff and was there for the
realignment of the staff and the standing-up of the maintenance
organization without my organization, OPNAV N96, in order to be
able to get at the maintenance piece. And so I had the ability
to then build an organization within OPNAV and 96, drawing from
various expertise from various areas in order to be able to
pull that in. And I am happy to say that--and, again, working
very closely with Naval Sea Systems Command and understanding
what we have done really over the last 3 years to understand, I
think, very, very well the material condition of the ships that
we have and what we have left to do in order to be able to
reset the force.
We have--and in addition to my time on surface ships, I
have also spent a significant amount of time in nuclear power,
so what we did is we pulled the processes that the nuclear
power portion of our Navy does in order to determine their real
requirement, and we instituted that in the surface Navy. And
when we instituted that in the surface Navy, that allowed us to
very succinctly get at exactly what the costs were.
And so I am confident, given the fact that we have now been
executing this process for about 3 years, that we do know the
condition of our ships and we have a good understanding of how
to then go determine what funding must be applied, and that is
wholly with OPNAV N96. And I am able to advise my boss as we
build the budgets for the Navy in order to be able to
understand and defend exactly what it is we need.
Mr. Langevin. But in terms of any hard dollar savings, can
you point to any numbers, or is that still a work in progress?
Admiral Rowden. That is, I think, a work in progress. I do
not have hard numbers for you, sir, but I can tell you that I
think that the processes that we have will allow us to drive
much more efficiency into the execution of the maintenance of
our surface ships.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you. I thank you both for your service.
And I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Forbes. The gentlelady from Missouri, Ms. Hartzler, is
recognized for 5 minutes.
Mrs. Hartzler. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, gentlemen, for all that you do for our
country.
I was--I am very concerned, obviously, about all of this as
well, and I was wondering with the decreasing fleet size and
expanding requirements, particularly with a pivot to the
Pacific, what share of COCOM requirements is the Navy unable to
fulfill?
Admiral Matthews. Well, ma'am, looking off into the future,
it depends on the time horizon that we are looking at, but in
the short term, we are going to prioritize all of the
deployments in the Pacific area and in the central command
area, and we will be able to meet all the high-priority
deployments in fiscal year 2014. There will be a handful of
deployments that we will probably have to cancel, but those are
lower-priority deployments, and they would be most likely in
the Southern Command, SOUTHCOM [U.S. Southern Command] area, as
we did this year. We cancelled a number of deployments this
year, as you may know, in the SOUTHCOM area.
But looking forward, as the force structure comes down
under sequestration, which has been proposed, and as the money
for maintenance and operations declines, I would expect that we
would be forced to decline more, a higher percentage of the
COCOM
requests.
Mrs. Hartzler. And I apologize for not being able to get--
be here earlier to hear your statements, you may have touched
on this, but my husband and I sell farm equipment, and we know
how service is very important to the life of a tractor and I
know it is important to the life of all machines. And I was
wondering, with the deferred maintenance that you are seeing
among the ships, how does that correlate to the ship's ability
to reach the expected service life? Are you expecting so--to
shorten the amount of service life for the various fleet?
Admiral Rowden. Yes, ma'am, I think that certainly the
delayed maintenance or the deferred maintenance causes, when
you eventually are able to get to that maintenance, a
significant cost increase in the execution of that maintenance,
and so then the decision has to be made, can we afford to keep
that ship, or do we have to take it out of service as a result
of that?
Mrs. Hartzler. Uh-huh.
Admiral Rowden. And so I think as we push--as we defer
maintenance availabilities and we are looking at up to 30
maintenance availabilities having to be either deferred,
delayed or canceled next year, that will just continue to bow-
wave the readiness issues into the future. And as a consequence
and as a result of the increasing costs of the execution of
maintenance, we may have to look to remove those ships out of
the inventory earlier just because they would become too
expensive to maintain.
Mrs. Hartzler. Yeah. That is very concerning. I was
wondering overall, back to the Pacific, is demand increasing in
that area and how are you being able to mitigate any shortfalls
that you see? Like you say, in SOUTHCOM, you had to stop some
deployments. So they have just done without, or do you try to
change the
mission?
Admiral Matthews. Well, to a large degree, they have been
doing without, and we have been doing what we can to supplement
with other forces as possible.
A strategy that we have is to intentionally focus more on
the Pacific theater, so we will be rotating more forces to the
Pacific, and we will also be forward-stationing more forces in
the Pacific, according to our strategy, to the point where we
will have about 60 percent of our forces focused on the Pacific
and the 40 percent on the Atlantic side. And that is going to
proceed apace, even under sequestration, but at probably a
reduced rate.
Mrs. Hartzler. Could you expound just a little bit on the
SOUTHCOM deployments that have been cancelled? Some of them
have to do with drug interdiction. Is that right?
Admiral Matthews. I need to be careful that I don't get
into a classified area, but we did, for instance, cancel the
Comfort, which was the hospital ship that was going down there,
and we cancelled, I believe it is three frigate deployments
that were going to occur, and they typically do that sort of
work.
Mrs. Hartzler. Okay.
Admiral Matthews. Yes, ma'am.
Mrs. Hartzler. Well, thank you for what you do.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Forbes. Thank the gentlelady.
Mr. Peters is recognized for 5 minutes.
I ask unanimous consent that nonsubcommittee members, if
any, be allowed to participate in today's hearing after all
subcommittees have had an opportunity to ask questions.
Is there any objection?
Without objection, nonsubcommittee members will be
recognized at the appropriate time for 5 minutes, and this is
the appropriate time to recognize Ms. Davis, and she is
recognized for 5 minutes.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you both for being here.
I appreciate this opportunity both to be with you, Admiral
Rowden and Admiral Matthews.
I want to talk for a second about San Diego--I bet you were
expecting that--and the concerns about the future of our naval
surface fleet. And I hope you could explain to me, in April, it
was announced a plan to increase end strength by about 4,000
personnel by the end of this fiscal year, and yet today, the
Navy--it was suggested in the paper that the Navy might have to
sideline up to three carriers.
And while I suspect you understand my desire to protect all
of our Navy personnel, I want to ensure that we are spending
our money wisely and wonder if we are not going to have a much
harder time suspending these three carriers from service when
we are ready to put them back into service.
How much would it cost to bring them up to par when you
decide to put them back into service? What maintenance will be
needed to keep them in a condition that would not take away
from their full service life? And how would these additional
4,000 personnel be utilized when you are planning to eliminate
the jobs of up to 18,000 other sailors? Are you familiar enough
with this situation and can you--how do we deal with this?
Admiral Matthews. Well, ma'am, the proposal to bring down
the number of aircraft carriers is really still being
evaluated. Obviously, one of the cost savings would be in
personnel, because there are, you know, roughly 5,000 folks
that are assigned to the air wing and the aircraft carrier, so
that is a large cost that we would be looking to reduce. But
you can't just park an aircraft carrier, because it has got a
nuclear reactor on it, so you would have to maintain some sort
of a minimum crew or decommission the ship entirely, but those
things are being evaluated at this point. And if you are
interested in more information, I would have to take it for the
record.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 43.]
Mrs. Davis. Do you want to--you don't want to weigh in on
this, Admiral. I can tell. That is okay.
When we face these kind of issues, though, and just the
cost-benefit analysis of how we do this, what--are the savings
that real? I mean, obviously, if you have 4-5,000 personnel,
but don't you have to find a place for them anyway?
Admiral Matthews. Well, I think the point would be that we
would reduce the personnel commensurate with the force
structure reductions. So we would reduce the number----
Mrs. Davis. You would reduce----
Admiral Matthews [continuing]. Of personnel assigned, along
with the maintenance requirement would go away, and all the
things that support the aircraft carrier would be reduced as
well.
Mrs. Davis. But the costs of bringing it back obviously is
an issue as well.
So right now we have only two carriers, we have the Ronald
Reagan and we have the U.S.S. Carl Vincent. With the
understanding that a third, and I think most likely people
talked about it being the Gerald Ford, would come to San Diego
after its completion. And I certainly had hoped that we would
see those three carriers call San Diego home in 2016, but the
delay of the Ford in recent news articles on the results of the
SCMR [Strategic Choices and Management Review] calling for the
possible sidelining of these three carriers have brought some
uncertainty, as you can imagine.
So how will these proposed drawdowns to the surface fleet
affect the home port and our carriers in the future? How does
that really change the whole configuration of the expectation
that we have in San Diego? And I understand this is still under
discussion, but even so, what should we know?
Admiral Rowden. Yes, ma'am. I believe I am going to have to
take that question for the record, because I think that as Tim
pointed out, I think we are still--this was talked about
yesterday, and I think that the movement associated with--or
how we would deal with that, there is a lot of work that still
is required on that.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 43.]
Mrs. Davis. Okay. All right.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Forbes. I thank the gentlelady for her service and for
her questions.
And I would like to ask unanimous consent for all of the
chairmen and ranking member statements to be submitted for the
record.
[The prepared statements of Mr. Wittman, Ms. Bordallo, Mr.
Forbes, and Mr. McIntyre can be found in the Appendix on pages
25, 27, 28, and 29, respectively.]
Mr. Forbes. Without objection, it is so ordered.
And I want to also thank Admiral Rowden for--I know he is
on leave today. Thank you for suiting up and coming in here and
helping us. That is truly service beyond the call of duty, but
we thank you both.
And we just have a couple more questions, but earlier, you
described that your current surge capacity consists of only one
carrier strike group and one amphibious ready group. We know
from Admiral Greenert's recent press conference, that last year
your surge capacity was three strike--carrier strike groups and
three amphibious groups.
The fleet response plan provides the Nation the ability to
surge assets in time of pending conflict, and we don't always
know when that conflict is going to come. Kind of tough to get
carriers out of mothballs, rehire 5-6,000 sailors and train
them. Can you provide us some examples for the subcommittees on
how the Navy has leveraged that surge capacity in recent years?
And what is the impact and risk associated with fewer surge
assets? It is kind of a follow up on Ms. Davis' question.
Admiral Rowden. Certainly, without straying too far into
classified----
Mr. Forbes. I understand.
Admiral Rowden [continuing]. Conversation, we have been
able to meet requests for forces from the COCOMs for specific
items. I can tell you, sir, that, for example, when I was the
commander of DESRON 60 [Destroyer Squadron Sixty], in the 2006
timeframe, I was in Gaeta, Italy, and it was the July
timeframe, and that is when there was a significant action
between Hezbollah and Israelis. And the decision was made to
conduct a noncombatant evacuation of Beirut, about 15,000
folks.
And I essentially went at a moment's notice from working in
Gaeta, turning the ship around that was headed to Augusta Bay
to get gas, gassed them up in Souda Bay, pulled another ship
out of the Black Sea. We turned around an amphibious readiness
group that was in Aqaba, brought them through the Suez Canal,
and we were able to execute that noncombatant evacuation
because we had ready forces and we had ready forces there.
Pulled those 15,000 folks out, and I remember General Jensen
saying to me, the sum total of my assignment was to evacuate
Beirut--evacuate the Americans from Beirut and don't get
anybody killed. And I had the ready forces available to go do
that.
Likewise, when Reagan Strike Group was on deployment in the
2011 timeframe and she was steaming over to execute an exercise
in the Western Pacific and the disaster in Japan occurred, we
had ready forces there both in the form of Essex and in the
form of the Reagan Strike Group to go up there and lend a hand
for that significant disaster that occurred.
Those weren't necessarily times when we surged forces.
However, if they had become protracted, we may have had to move
forces out in order to backfill them. But those forces were
there. They were ready. And they were on station. And I think
that those types of responses could possibly be in jeopardy.
And those are just two examples, but I think that they
certainly are examples of where we were able to roll in and do
what needed to done and do it in a very effective and efficient
manner because we had ready forces available to execute.
Mr. Forbes. So, just for clarification, surge really
doesn't mean extra. It means needed forces as well. It is just
our ability to put them where we need them when we need them.
Is that a fair
statement?
Admiral Rowden. Yes, sir. But I would say that certainly in
any larger conflict that were executed, certainly we start to
look to the forces that are stateside, and I mean, clearly, a
transit across the Pacific Ocean is not something that occurs
in days. It is really weeks.
Mr. Forbes. And as a follow up to Ms. Davis' question about
cost-benefit analysis, it may be useful for both our committees
to have a classified briefing on some of that, too, because
that is kind of a cost we have to weigh in, too, when we are
doing that.
The Chair recognizes Mr. Wittman for a followup question.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to follow up from Chairman Forbes' question.
When he talked about surge capacity, let me ask it in a little
bit different way. As we talked about, you have deployed units,
the next to deployed units, and nondeployed units, so you have
different levels of readiness there. If readiness decays, the
question is, is how are you able to reconstitute it? Do you
have a capability to reconstitute it? And that is both on the
sailor side with training but also on the maintenance of those
ships to make sure that they are operationally available. If
so, if you can reconstitute that, is there a time element in
reconstituting it? Is that time element important in being able
to reconstitute it? And then what is the cost of being able to
reconstitute?
Admiral Rowden. Sir, I think you hit the nail on the head.
As we bring forces back from deployment, when I brought Milius
back in the 2001 timeframe, my feeling was we were never more
ready than the day we got back because we had just executed a
6-month deployment, and we had done everything. We had steamed
the Arabian Gulf and North Arabian Sea, and I had a great crew,
and we were ready to go. Shortly thereafter, end of the
availability, people transfer. New people come in, training has
to occur. You dip down in your readiness, and you start to
bring that up. If that maintenance availability--if we hadn't
been able to execute that maintenance availability or, for
whatever reason, we hadn't been able to execute the training,
struggling to get that ship back up, it takes time and it takes
money, and if people transfer without relief, you have got to
get the proper people in there. You have got to form your team
well enough ahead of time to get them trained up and ready to
go. You can't bring the team together at the 11th hour and say,
Go. You have got to bring them together. You have got to
understand the issues associated with where they are, and that
lies on the commanding officer. It lies on the training
commands. It lies on all that.
And so when we reduce the readiness of our forces, for
whatever reason, because the maintenance dollars aren't
available, because the training dollars aren't available, or
because the people aren't available, it takes time, it takes
money, it takes energy, and it takes a concerted effort on the
part of all the leadership from the type commander on down in
order to get those forces where they need to be in order to
deploy those ready forces, and that is really what we owe to
our sailors. We want in their hearts to know that as they
deploy, they are confident for whatever mission gets tossed at
them.
Mr. Wittman. Admiral, just one closing question. And if we
can't do that, does that result in increased risk for our
sailors?
Admiral Rowden. Yes, sir, it think it does.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Forbes. With that, gentlemen, we want to thank you so
much again.
As you heard, both ranking members and the chairmen stated,
we appreciate your service to our country. Thank you so much
for all you do, the men and women under you, and thanks for
taking time to be here with us.
And with that, we should hear bells any time for a vote,
and we have two admirals departing, so thank you all for being
here with us.
Adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 5:25 p.m., the subcommittees were
adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
August 1, 2013
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
August 1, 2013
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Statement of Hon. Robert J. Wittman
Chairman, House Subcommittee on Readiness
Hearing on
Ensuring Navy Surface Force Effectiveness with Limited Maintenance
Resources
August 1, 2013
I would like to extend a warm welcome to our witnesses this morning
and look forward to a robust conversation regarding the reality in the
surface fleet today, and the forecast for the future. Rear Admiral
Rowden, Rear Admiral Matthews, thank you both for being here today;
this is an important conversation not only for us, but also for the
Nation to clearly understand the depth of the crisis that is on the
horizon.
Earlier this year, we reviewed the Navy's O&M base budget request,
but, since that time, we received the OCO request in addition to the
reality and impacts of sequestration. I fear this will put you
gentlemen in a damage control situation to maintain the fleet, leading
to grave concerns for the readiness of the surface force.
The existing force structure took years of investments and
maintenance in order to sustain the level of readiness we have today.
To achieve that, the Navy has refined its processes, to include more
robust maintenance plans providing greater insights into the
requirements, fine-tuning the timing of maintenance availabilities, and
optimizing force generation requirements through the Fleet Response
Plan.
This delicate balance is fragile, and without the needed
maintenance and reset of the force, the Navy will be severely
challenged to meet its training and operational commitments, let alone
retain the ships for their expected service life, which undermines the
ability to achieve the 30-year shipbuilding plan.
In testimony before the Readiness Subcommittee in 2011, Navy
officials indicated that approximately 70% of the existing fleet will
be in service in 2020. Reaching expected service life requires an
integrated engineering approach to plan, fund, and execute the right
maintenance. During that same hearing, the Navy also articulated, and I
quote: ``the cheapest way to afford our Navy with the force structure
that we need is to maintain the ships that we already have.''
The Navy has continually affirmed that it has worn out its ships
over the past decade, both through lack of visibility into the true
requirements, and as a result of the sustained surge. These two factors
result in increased maintenance and unanticipated requirements. That
trend is most apparent in the results from the Board of Inspection and
Survey which have since 2009 consistently documented that only about
80% of those assets inspected have been deemed ``satisfactory.'' These
scores reflect the broader reality of trends associated with increased
casualty reports and cannibalization of parts required just to get the
fleet ``ready.''
These maintenance requirements are not inconsequential. In FY14,
routine Navy maintenance is a $6.9 billion bill, coupled with an
additional ``reset'' cost of $1.9 billion through FY18.
In previous testimony, the Navy highlighted that it needed both
time and money to accomplish the necessary maintenance. Due to current
budget circumstances, we understand the Navy has currently deferred
eight maintenance availabilities in FY13, and hopes to buy them back
with a reprogramming request.
The projection for FY14 is equally as bleak. During Admiral
Greenert's recent press conference on July 19th, he highlighted that
due to sequestration, in FY14 approximately half of the 60
availabilities are expected to be deferred.
We are not strictly talking about maintenance . . . it is much
bigger than that. It is the compounding effect of missed maintenance,
less-than-capable assets for training, continued surge, and operation
of ships, all of which results in abbreviated service life of the
surface fleet. Add to this mix the tenuous progress the Navy has made
to reverse degraded surface fleet readiness trends, and I'm deeply
concerned about losing the momentum we have achieved to preserve the
readiness of the naval force.
I strongly believe that our long-term Naval strategies cannot be
fully articulated until the budgetary pressures get resolved. I am
deeply concerned that decisions are being made today that are
mortgaging future force readiness, and it is imperative for us to work
together to avert that outcome. Our sailors deserve nothing less than
the best, most capable equipment with which to train and deploy with,
and I am committed to making every effort to ensure that happens.
To conclude, I want to make very clear to this committee and to
Congress why we have to get this right and why there is no room for
error. There are members of Congress who believe that when we come home
from Afghanistan our ships in CENTCOM will return to the United States,
moor at their homeport, and wait to be called on again. This is not
true and it is simply not how our Navy operates. The Navy does not have
the luxury and flexibility to ``reset'' in the same manner that the
Army, Marine Corps, and Air Force have. The Navy is always on watch,
always deployed, regardless of whether we are at war or not.
Maintaining and ``resetting'' a ship takes time and money. There is no
other piece of gear like it in our inventory.
On September 10, 2001, our Navy and Marine Corps team was forward-
deployed around the world, operating in every major combatant command
AOR. They have been forward-deployed since the late 1790s after
Congress passed the Naval Act of 1794, authorizing and building our
first six frigates so they could deploy to places like the
Mediterranean Sea to protect American shipping and combat piracy.
Since then Congress has carried out its duty under Article 1
Section 8 of the Constitution ``to provide and maintain a Navy,'' and
our Navy has remained forward-deployed and at sea around the globe
watching over our sea lines of communication, protecting commerce and
our economy, and ensuring maritime security. We have to get this
maintenance and readiness right, it is our constitutional duty.
Statement of Hon. Madeleine Z. Bordallo
Ranking Member, House Subcommittee on Readiness
Hearing on
Ensuring Navy Surface Force Effectiveness with Limited Maintenance
Resources
August 1, 2013
I want to welcome our witnesses to the hearing today. We are
discussing critical topics that will have lasting effects on our Navy
and the ability of our military to support and defend U.S. interests. I
find this a helpful discussion and greatly appreciate your time.
I will state again as I have in the past, that I am disappointed we
are not having a more robust discussion in Congress about how to solve
sequestration. We all agree and understand that sequestration is
extremely detrimental for the prospects of a full economic recovery in
the United States. Cuts to defense and other discretionary programs
will have significant negative impacts on the long-term economic growth
of the country.
I again want to call upon the leadership of both parties to place
everything on the table to find ways to avoid sequestration. I hope
that our discussion today about Limited Maintenance Resources in the
Navy's nonnuclear Surface Force will encourage members of both parties
to get leadership back to the table in a meaningful way and put an end
to this punitive approach to governing.
Our Navy faces significant challenges over the coming years which
the Navy has testified to in previous hearings. Clearly, if we do not
align strategy with the need for sustainment we create a situation
where we are negatively affecting the readiness of our military forces.
I hope that our witnesses can highlight the increase in cost that will
occur when strategy and sustainment are not coordinated. What is the
additional cost that is borne by the Government in the long term with
such a significant cut in the short term? Furthermore, I hope our
witnesses will comment on how the Navy will continue to resource toward
the strategic goal of rebalancing our focus on the Asia-Pacific region.
What challenges will we encounter with sequestration?
I believe much of what is discussed here today is already known by
both DOD and Congress. We are well aware of the maintenance challenges
for the DOD in the near term and that the situation will only get worse
in the outyears. We know that years of war have taken a toll on the
equipment in use today and that these assets are needed in our
inventory for longer than they were ever designed to be used. I hope
our witnesses can comment on the balance between maintaining our
current fleet with the need to modernize our fleet.
I will tell you that the challenges are clear; it's the action
needed by Congress that is necessary to restore operational readiness
and end sequestration. I fully support having a robust military to
defend our Nation and our interests but we must do our part to ensure
they have the resources to meet current and emerging
challenges.
I will just close by encouraging open dialogue today . . . by
recognizing these challenges have solutions . . . and I am committed to
helping resolve this. I am thankful to each of you testifying before us
today, and I know your leadership will help see us through the
challenges on the horizon.
Statement of Hon. J. Randy Forbes
Chairman, House Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces
Hearing on
Ensuring Navy Surface Force Effectiveness with Limited Maintenance
Resources
August 1, 2013
I want to welcome all of our members and distinguished witnesses to
today's joint Seapower and Projection Forces and Readiness hearing that
will focus on ``Ensuring Navy Surface Force Effectiveness with Limited
Maintenance Resources.'' Earlier today, we had the opportunity to
discuss our military's future with Secretary Carter and Admiral
Winnefeld. Our conversation was quite startling. Frankly, I am shocked
at the dismantling and devastation that is being proposed by this
Administration and the negative consequences associated with
sequestration. For instance, a fleet of only eight aircraft carriers
will significantly and irreparably harm our global strategic posture.
As this hearing will likely reveal, our existing fleet is being
worn out by this period of sustained surge. Unfortunately, there is no
indication that demand for our naval forces will abate anytime in the
near future. In fact, quite the opposite. In the decade ahead I believe
we will increasingly lean on these forces to underpin our national
security strategy, protect the world's sea lanes, and operate forward
to deter conflict.
While we are currently meeting the minimum requirements of our
ever-retreating national strategy, it is painfully obvious that our
future readiness is being leveraged to pay for our current requirements
and operational commitments. According to Admiral Greenert a couple of
weeks ago, ``We have today one carrier strike group and one amphibious
ready group ready to deploy with all the capabilities. [but] the rest
of the fleet is not ready to deploy with all the capabilities that are
needed that we would normally have in our fleet response plan.'' So,
when you compare where we are today against a year ago, or even just a
few months ago, the changes become obvious. Since the beginning of the
fiscal year, the Navy cancelled six deployments, and deferred two more.
There is minimal surge capacity, so, while hope is not a strategy, hope
will serve as the limit of our expectations should any additional
contingencies emerge.
I refuse to accept this. Simply stated, the requirements well
exceed the Navy's current capacity to support--due to lack of funds and
sufficiently ``ready'' assets and there is no expectation that demand
will decrease. Therefore, we need to ensure we understand what the Navy
has, what it can afford, and how it can be effective with limited
resources, let alone afford to meet the objective force of the 30-year
shipbuilding plan.
Next, let's take a moment to review the 30-year shipbuilding plan
that was submitted earlier this year. The Administration once again
proposed the early retirement of seven cruisers and two amphibious
ships in fiscal year 2015, well before the end of their service lives.
With 31 ships being retired over just the next 2 years, we are headed
toward a fleet size of 270 battle force ships by FY15. Decline is a
choice, and I believe this new plan willingly chooses to continue the
slow, painful decline of robust American Seapower. Couple the
projection of the shrinking size of our fleet with the reality of the
state of our existing inventory and the picture is quite problematic.
The consequences of such a long-term deferral of ship maintenance will
have a detrimental and long-term impact on the fleet. I intend to
review in greater detail today the potential impact of sequestration on
the fleet, how that affects the expected service life of the assets,
and thereby the ability to meet the Navy's 30-year shipbuilding plan.
Let me be very clear, we cannot and will not stand idly by while
the greatest, most powerful Navy in the world erodes for lack of
funding. We must recognize the consequences, not only now--cancelling
operations and worldwide commitments--but next year, and across the
next decade. Before we realize it--the damage will be irreversible, and
our inability to be able to operate forward and project power will
embolden regional instability. In the end, further defense reductions
will be paid for in the lives of our service members. I refuse to
accept this premise and will work to provide a fleet that has
sufficient funds for maintenance and modernization and is sized to
support our national commitments and ideals.
Joining us today to discuss the Navy's surface force effectiveness
are two distinguished gentlemen: Rear Admiral Thomas S. Rowden,
Director, Surface Warfare, OPNAV N96; and Rear Admiral Timothy S.
Matthews, Director, Fleet Readiness, OPNAV N43. Gentlemen, thank you
for being here.
Statement of Hon. Mike McIntyre
Ranking Member, House Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces
Hearing on
Ensuring Navy Surface Force Effectiveness with Limited Maintenance
Resources
August 1, 2013
Today's joint hearing will focus on the Navy's current and planned
surface vessel maintenance operations. I want to thank Readiness
Subcommittee Chairman Wittman and Ranking Member Bordallo for
cooperating with myself and Chairman Forbes to make this a joint
hearing.
Today's hearing is prompted by some issues that should concern all
Americans. First, after 12 years of war, the Navy's ships have been
``ridden hard'' and in many cases face substantial maintenance work
backlogs. Proper maintenance takes time, so digging out of a backlog
can be a very long and expensive process.
Second, the Department of Defense faces severe funding shortfalls
due to budget reductions and sequestration. Ship maintenance is a very
large, multibillion-dollar industrial enterprise. Over time, cutting
funding for maintenance year after year will clearly damage the fleet.
Taken together, these two factors--high operational demand and
reduced maintenance funding--pose a significant danger to the future of
America's Navy. While maintenance may seem like the ``routine
business'' of the Navy, it is in fact a very large, complex, and
challenging industrial enterprise that requires years of advanced
planning and management--as well as billions of taxpayer dollars.
To be successful, the Navy must constantly adjust its plans to meet
the dual demands of forward presence on the seas and keeping ships in
fighting condition. Leaning too far in either direction can be costly.
If we don't do proper maintenance on our ships, we will wear them out
and impose huge costs on the Nation in the future when ships face very
expensive repairs or have to be retired and replaced earlier than
planned. On the other hand, we maintain a Navy in order to protect sea
lanes, defend American interests abroad, and project power. If we don't
have enough ships at sea due to maintenance backlogs, we can't achieve
those goals.
Also, how we use the fleet has a direct connection to the
shipbuilding budget and the future size of the fleet. If ships must be
retired early, we face an even greater challenge in the future when we
must try to replace them earlier than planned. If ships are not
properly maintained today, we could face a future with a much smaller
fleet that may not meet our national security needs.
Today's hearing seeks to better understand the risks we face and
how to deal with them.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING
August 1, 2013
=======================================================================
RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MRS. DAVIS
Admiral Rowden and Admiral Matthews. The Navy homeporting plan as
briefed to Congressional staffs in May 2013 depicts San Diego as the
homeport for two CVNs through 2016. A third homeported CVN is planned
for San Diego in 2017. A return to six CVNs homeported in the Pacific
is planned prior to 2020, with an ultimate laydown of three CVNs in San
Diego. The full impact of DOD budgetary restrictions on the aircraft
carrier force structure and homeporting plan is currently being
evaluated. [See page 17.]
Admiral Matthews. The plan referenced by Representative Davis was
the Strategic Choices Management Review (SCMR). The SCMR examined
potential force structure reduction options but it did not explicitly
consider reversibility. The SCMR carrier-related efficiencies assumed
carriers and carrier air wings would be decommissioned (i.e., reactors
would be defueled and ships could not be returned to active service),
not placed in a temporary inactive status. From a public and regulatory
policy standpoint, the Navy does not place fueled nuclear-powered
warships in lay-up. While the SCMR did not examine the feasibility of
re-activating nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, the cost to re-
activate a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier would be substantial.
SCMR options assumed Navy end-strength would be reduced based on
the number of carriers and carrier air wings cut. A significant part of
the savings from carrier and air wing reductions is associated with
reducing the number of assigned sailors. Overall Navy end-strength is a
decision based on balancing strategic objectives and financial
constraints. The Navy has processes to carry out such reductions, if
the decision is made to do so. The Navy does not plan to reduce
manpower unless force structure (ships and aircraft) is reduced. [See
page 17.]
?
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
August 1, 2013
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FORBES
Mr. Forbes. The committee would like to congratulate the Navy for
creating the policy in May of this year that directs the integration of
condition based maintenance, a proven technology that will generate
cost savings while simultaneously increasing readiness, on ships, ship
systems, and equipment. Condition based maintenance has been
successfully implemented on aircraft, helicopters, military and
commercial vehicles, and trains, all of which have demonstrated cost
savings and increased readiness. The committee is encouraged that the
Navy has included condition based maintenance on the new Littoral
Combat Ship and is planning to rapidly implement condition based
maintenance on main propulsion diesel engines onboard amphibious ships.
This is important as it will help address a longstanding diesel
readiness problem that has resulted in increased maintenance and repair
costs. Please advise the committee about the actions the Navy is taking
to capture the benefits offered by condition based maintenance and what
the plan is to implement this proven technology on all classes of
ships? Can you please tell me more about the plan to integrate
condition based maintenance on diesel engines and the timeframe for
doing so?
Admiral Rowden and Admiral Matthews. Condition Based Maintenance
(CBM) has been successfully implemented on aircraft, military and
commercial vehicles, and trains resulting in a positive cost savings
and increased readiness. Regarding the Navy's In-Service Fleet, CBM
includes the Integrated Condition Assessment System (ICAS) and the
Diesel Readiness System (DRS). Currently, ICAS is the CBM Program of
Record used to monitor Hull, Mechanical and Electrical systems and is
installed on 65% of the in-service surface fleet. DRS is a diesel
engine specific program installed onboard 100% of in-service Amphibious
platforms. Periodic studies of ICAS and DRS continue to prove that CBM
is a good investment, improving Mean Time to Repair and operational
availability.
The Navy's plan to fully implement CBM is a multipronged approach.
The Navy is continuing to install ICAS on new construction ships and
ICAS and DRS on all new construction amphibious platforms (i.e. LPD 17
Class). Recently, the Navy started a review to determine how best to
combine all collected diesel engine data in an effort to improve and
simplify remote monitoring. This review and implementation is estimated
to take approximately 5 years. The goal is to provide improved diesel
engine health assessment by facilitating near real-time analysis for
shipboard engineering personnel and the shore-based Navy technical
community. Sequestration and budget reductions have impeded the full
surface fleet implementation plan and resulted in less frequent review
of CBM data by shore-based technicians for both ICAS and DRS.
Mr. Forbes. With the decreasing fleet size and expanding
requirements, particularly with the pivot to the Pacific, what share of
COCOM requirements is the Navy unable to fulfill? Is demand increasing?
What is the risk of not meeting these requirements? How is the risk of
these shortfalls being mitigated? How does the Fleet Response Plan
enable the Navy to plan and prioritize to meet these requirements? What
risks is the Navy taking in core requirements in order to fulfill COCOM
requirements?
Admiral Rowden and Admiral Matthews. A fleet of more than 500 ships
would be required to fully meet the demands of the Combatant Commanders
(CCDR), but current and projected fiscal constraints preclude a Navy of
that size. Navy provides the maximum presence and surge capacity
possible, in support of CCDR requirements and within the constraints of
force structure and the budget, through the use of a Fleet Response
Plan (FRP) that provisions appropriately trained and ready forces to
the CCDR in accordance with the Joint Staff-led Global Force Management
Allocation Plan (GFMAP) adjudication process. Navy is simply a force
provider and is not positioned to determine the risk a CCDR assumes if
a unit is not sourced.
In FY13, under sequestration, Navy is taking increased risk in our
core surge capacity by curtailing training for units not scheduled to
deploy and delaying pre-deployment training until ``just-in-time'' to
meet scheduled deployment dates. This approach increases the pressure
on the Fleet Response Plan sustainment phase and creates challenges in
our ability to provide surge ready forces. However, it does permit us
to make funding available to ensure our deployed forces are fully ready
at all times.
As fiscal pressure forces the Navy to get smaller, the need to move
forces forward becomes all the more critical. Forward deploying the
forces we do have permits us to maintain forward presence with a
smaller rotation base--effectively mitigating the impact of the force
reduction. While we try to maximize the utilization of the force, we
must also balance that impact against the personnel and service life
impacts to the ship and crew. However, DoD and CCDRs may need to revise
operational plans to accommodate a significantly reduced force
structure.
Mr. Forbes. In recent weeks, the Navy has expressed a concern
regarding lack of surge capacity as a result of sequestration and
fiscal constraints. Can you please describe exactly what that means,
and how that will impact the Navy's ability to meet the Combatant
Commanders' requirements?
Admiral Rowden and Admiral Matthews. Surge capacity is the number
of operationally ready units Navy is able to provide above and beyond
the baseline forces provided in accordance with the Global Force
Management Allocation Plan (GFMAP). The Navy force generation process
is designed to optimize surge capacity to support contingency
operations, both for national security requirements or humanitarian
assistance, and to support the Combatant Commanders' operational plans.
In today's fiscal environment, Navy is forced to schedule surge
capacity just to meet baseline Combatant Commander demand, therefore
decreasing the ability to surge forces for contingent operations and
emergent requirements. Loss of this surge capacity would be driven by
reductions in the battle force, as there would be fewer units available
and a higher proportion of those remaining units would be forward-
deployed to support GFMAP requirements for naval presence. Surge
capacity would also be affected by reductions in training and
maintenance funding, which would reduce the materiel condition and
operational readiness of nondeployed
vessels.
Ultimately, Navy sources all SecDef adjudicated requirements but at
long-term risk to maintenance, training, and ship service life.
Sequestration and fiscal constraints may require DOD and Combatant
Commander to revise operational requirements and plans to accommodate a
decrease in Navy's surge capacity.
Mr. Forbes. In Chief of Naval Operations' testimony earlier this
year before the full committee, he noted changes to the FY13 GFMAP
based on constrained resources. To date, the Navy has cancelled five
ships due to deploy to SOUTHCOM, one ship to EUCOM, and deferred the
deployment of two additional ships. According to CNO's recent press
briefing, July 19th, all told, the Navy is down about 10 forward-
deployed ships from several months ago. What risk are the COCOMs
assuming as a result of this? What will be the impact on the Navy's
ability to support the full range of GFMAP requirements in FY14?
Admiral Rowden and Admiral Matthews. Combatant Commanders (CCDRs)
are encouraged to ask for any forces they feel would be beneficial to
achieve their theater objectives. This demand signal is not constrained
by force provider inventory, National Defense Strategy, or other CCDR
demands. Navy is simply a force provider and is not positioned to
determine the risk a CCDR assumes if a unit is not sourced.
The ability to support the full range of baseline GFMAP
requirements in FY14 will be affected by lack of capacity and funding.
Navy is deferring and curtailing deployments, maintenance, and training
to meet SecDef adjudicated demands under the current budgetary
shortfalls. Continuing these actions will ultimately affect Navy's
ability to: (1) source future deployers; (2) meet assigned operational
commitments; (3) maintain a contingency surge capacity; and, (4)
control long-term maintenance costs and achieve ship/aircraft expected
service lives.
Mr. Forbes. As the Navy is working toward achieving or exceeding
planned service life of the current fleet, we would expect that you are
looking at ways to maximize efficiency and leverage your private-public
partnerships to help save valuable resources. One of these partnerships
is with the American Bureau of Shipping (ABS), the U.S.-based not-for-
profit marine classification society, who has developed a risk-based
approach to assist the Navy in identifying crucial maintenance needs
through their Achieving Service Life Program (ASLP). In fact, in a
recent interview in the U.S. Naval Institute magazine VADM McCoy
highlighted the success that the Achieving Service Life Program has
achieved through identifying the highest risk areas and allowing NAVSEA
to refocus its maintenance efforts on those areas. Partnerships like
this can help direct the Navy in its maintenance prioritization process
and help vessels achieve and in some cases even extend their intended
service life at a cost-savings to the U.S. taxpayer.
Looking ahead, how will the Navy continue to work with
organizations like ABS to maximize the efficiency of the maintenance
process? Is it true that the USS Port Royal was scheduled to have a
survey and engineering assessment completed within the ASLP program in
2010? We know that GAO has been directed to look into the
decommissioning of the USS Port Royal, Is it possible that GAO could
conclude after their assessment that the USS Port Royal would have
benefited from participating in the Achieving Service Life Program and
extended its service life beyond 21 years?
Admiral Rowden and Admiral Matthews. The partnership with ABS has
been beneficial to the Navy and has resulted in several improvements to
Navy onboard assessment requirements and the manner in which we
develop, track, and prioritize maintenance actions resulting from
onboard corrosion assessments performed to Navy standards. Such
improvements include revised Navy assessment standards for tanks,
voids, and critical spaces; enhanced branding of corrosion-related
corrective maintenance actions; and consolidation of Navy assessment
findings and corrective action status into Navy databases such as
Corrosion Control Information Management System (CCIMS).
ASLP inspections and analyses have been conducted to commercial
standards in parallel with mandatory Navy assessments, resulting in
numerous lessons learned and improvements to Navy standards and
processes. After 5 years of ASLP execution, the number of unique ABS
findings is now less than 5% of total findings. In view of the current
fiscal climate, coupled with improvements to Navy processes and
decreasing number of unique ABS findings, the Navy is evaluating the
cost effectiveness of continuing ASLP. Options being considered include
augmenting the Navy's onboard assessment resources with ABS inspectors
trained to Navy standards, and investigating limited use of ABS
engineering expertise in predicting expected service life using Navy
assessment results.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WITTMAN
Mr. Wittman. In cooperation with the American Bureau of Shipping
(ABS), the Navy began the Achieving Service Life Program (ASLP) which
is a tailored program to prioritize maintenance resources resulting
from survey findings combined with structural stress and fatigue
assessments. Does the Navy intend to continue ASLP which was recently
highlighted as a success story by VADM McCoy in the May 2013 U.S. Naval
Institute article ``To Improve the Material Readiness of the Surface
Fleet''? Please provide some examples of ASLP survey, structural and
fatigue analysis findings and recommendations which will help the Navy
attain service life as well as improve the targeted expenditure of
maintenance funds.
Clearly, there was a cost-savings benefit to the Navy in leveraging
the expertise and capability of ABS rather than attempting to acquire
or develop an in-house capability. If the Navy does intend to eliminate
ASLP, does the Navy have a plan to re-create or develop another service
life program and at what cost to the U.S.
taxpayer?
Admiral Rowden and Admiral Matthews. ASLP was initiated in 2009
along with other measures, such as establishment of Surface Maintenance
Engineering Planning Program (SURFMEPP) and increasing resources at the
Naval Regional Maintenance Centers (RMCs), in order to improve
maintenance planning and achieving ships' expected service life (ESL).
The ABS onboard corrosion inspections are performed to commercial
standards and are in parallel with onboard assessments and analyses
conducted in accordance with Navy standards. One of the key objectives
of ASLP has been to study the findings of ABS commercial surveys/
analyses and to develop improvements to Navy standards and processes
executed by Navy entities such as the RMCs. As a result, there have
been many improvements to Navy assessment requirements and the manner
in which we develop, track, and prioritize maintenance actions
resulting from onboard corrosion assessments performed to Navy
standards. Such improvements include revised assessment standards for
tanks, voids, and critical spaces; enhanced branding of corrosion-
related corrective maintenance actions; and consolidation of Navy
assessment findings and corrective action status in Navy databases such
as Corrosion Control Information Management System.
After 5 years of ASLP execution, coupled with continued SURFMEPP
evolution and increased RMC assessment resources, the number of unique
ABS findings are now less than 5% of total findings. In view of the
current fiscal climate, coupled with improvements to Navy processes,
and decreasing number of unique ABS findings, the Navy is evaluating
the cost effectiveness of continuing ASLP in its current construct.
Options being considered include augmenting the Navy's onboard
assessment resources with ABS inspectors trained to Navy standards, and
limited use of ABS engineering expertise in predicting ESL using Navy
assessment results.
Mr. Wittman. In light of the existing shortfalls in the FY13 O&M
accounts, and the impacts of sequestration in FY14, what are your
greatest concerns about the Navy's readiness? And, what is the impact
it will have on the future?
Admiral Rowden and Admiral Matthews. We are concerned that the cuts
imposed by continued sequestration will result in significant
degradation to our surface fleet readiness as inadequate funding for
life-cycle maintenance impacts the material condition of our ships and
their ability to reach expected service life. This will reduce
operational availability of our ships and result in a lower force
structure than projected by our 30-year shipbuilding plan.
Navy's ability to manage the impacts of sequestration in FY13 is
not representative of the expected impact in FY14. The impact of
sequestration in FY14 will be more severe since it is a larger topline
reduction imposed upon a smaller budget, and because the ability to
mitigate readiness impacts by reprogramming prior-year procurement
funding was essentially exhausted in FY13. Without reprogramming
authority, under sequestration, over 50% of the approximately 60
planned CNO availabilities will need to be cancelled or deferred.
Two additional factors are impacting surface ship readiness. One is
the significant backlog of life-cycle maintenance developed after
nearly a decade of high operational tempo and deferred maintenance.
Funding for the ``reset'' of surface ship readiness will be at risk
under continued sequestration. The second is that we continue to rely
on OCO funding for a significant portion of our enduring baseline ship
maintenance requirement. As a result, surface ship maintenance funding
will be increasingly
vulnerable as OCO funding is phased out and baseline budgets become
more
pressurized.
Mr. Wittman. What is the impact of sequestration on surface ship
operations?
Admiral Rowden and Admiral Matthews. Sequestration in FY14,
particularly if combined with a continuing resolution, will compel us
to defer roughly half of FY14 surface ship availabilities. Ships
impacted will experience an increase in the number of equipment
casualties, limiting their ability to operate at full capacity and
capability. In addition, the likelihood that the casualties that do
occur will be more significant and take longer to repair will increase.
Ultimately, the maintenance that was deferred will be more costly and
extensive when we finally have the resources to execute that
maintenance. If the maintenance is not reconstituted, the ships'
ability to achieve expected service life is reduced.
In 2013, steaming days were reduced due to sequestration. It is
likely the Navy will have to further reduce steaming days if sequester
continues in 2014. Reducing steaming days will negatively impact
training and readiness of the Fleet as ships will not be able to get
under way to practice important and vital tasks such as gunnery
exercises, underway replenishment, air operations, and a multitude of
other tasks necessary for safe operations, which will manifest as
reduced surge capacity in the event of conflict or crisis response.
Navy also canceled five ship deployments in fiscal year 2013 as a
result of
sequestration.
Mr. Wittman. How much is the Navy reliant on OCO funding? In what
accounts? Why is the Navy not moving from OCO to baseline?
Admiral Rowden and Admiral Matthews. OCO funding has been essential
to Navy's ability to provide ``ready'' and trained forces during the
conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan over the past 12 years. The
operations and sustainment of our Navy expeditionary combat support
forces most directly involved in the operations have been highly
leveraged with OCO funding. Sustaining this long war has also driven
higher maintenance requirements for our ships and OCO funding has
become a critical component of our ship maintenance program. The Ship
Operations, Ship Depot Maintenance, Aviation Depot Maintenance, and
Flying Hour Programs also receive OCO and cannot sustain their present
level of operations without it. The Navy PB14 budget requests the
following OCO amounts to fund total requirements:
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ship Maintenance $1.3B (20% of the total requirement)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ship Operations $ .5B (18% of the total 51 deployed/24 nondeployed
steaming days requirement)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Flying Hours Program $ .2B (3% of the total requirement)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Aviation Depot Maintenance $ .1B (11% of the total requirement)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Navy Expeditionary $ .4B (43% of the total requirement)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Supplemental funding above the baseline will likely be required for
some time to restore the readiness of our ships. Navy remains concerned
that, although ground combat operations will end in Afghanistan, Navy
operations are likely to continue at their current pace or even
increase in the coming years. As such, the Navy, in conjunction with
the Office of the Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) and the Office of
Management and Budget, continues to identify enduring missions funded
in the OCO that should transition to the baseline.
Mr. Wittman. As the size of the Navy's fleet declines, and staffing
levels at maintenance and training organizations feel added pressure
from sequestration, what specific risks has the Navy identified that
could hinder its ability to execute the Surface Force Readiness Manual
strategy?
Admiral Rowden and Admiral Matthews. The purpose of the SFRM is to
ensure ships are trained, maintained, and certified for success in
combat operations in support of a crisis (surge) or scheduled
deployment. In order to achieve this certification, each ship requires
the budget and the time to complete maintenance and training.
The Navy is attempting to increase the size of
maintenance and training organizations to correct prior deficiencies so
we can execute the SFRM strategy and get our forces maintained, trained
and certified for deployment.
Despite increasing the size of maintenance and training
organizations, specific risks of sequestration include:
Cancelling or delaying maintenance availabilities.
Reducing underway training time (a reduction in steaming
days).
Delaying training until it is absolutely necessary,
thereby reducing ability to surge forces.
Tailoring training to cover only the most likely
missions.
Mr. Wittman. To help improve the material condition of the fleet,
the Navy has reorganized OPNAV offices, stood up new maintenance
organizations, and partnered with the American Bureau of Shipping.
What, if any, measurable results or cost savings have resulted from
these efforts?
Admiral Rowden and Admiral Matthews. Since 2010, Navy has worked
aggressively to reverse a decade-long negative trend in surface force
readiness due to high operational tempo and a progressive maintenance
process that focused on near-term maintenance to get ships under way.
Progress is being made to improve the material condition of the Fleet,
but measurable results and cost savings take time. As we liquidate the
existing backlog of maintenance and continue to improve our maintenance
planning and execution processes, we expect more apparent results.
Recent accomplishments include:
Established the Surface Maintenance Engineering Planning
Program (SURFMEPP) to provide technical oversight of surface ship
maintenance.
Revised depot maintenance requirements for CG-47, DDG-51,
LSD-41/49, LHD-1/8, MCM-1, and LCS-1/2 ship classes to more accurately
capture the necessary life-cycle maintenance.
Updated the tank database which now tracks 12,600 tanks
and contains accurate condition information for about 85% of tanks in
the Fleet.
Implemented formal availability work package development
process, with Baseline Availability Work Packages developed for 100
total availabilities, 21 of which have been completed to date.
Established Commander, Navy Regional Maintenance Center
(CNRMC) and revitalized RMCs.
Increased MPN by 1151 billets in POMs 12-14 to
reconstitute organic intermediate level maintenance capacity and
capability.
Implemented Workforce Development Program to reestablish
Journeyman training at the RMCs, improving the maintenance proficiency
and capability of technicians both at RMCs and on subsequent sea tours.
Improved Integrated Assessment Program, including
implementation of Total Ships Readiness Assessments (TSRA) and
Corrosion Control Assistance Teams, to improve material condition
awareness of ships and assist crews with identifying and correcting
deficiencies.
203 TSRAs conducted in FY11/12, improving knowledge of
ship material condition and maintenance availability planning and
execution.
Patterned after proven CVN and SSN material assessment
programs.
Implemented the Surface Ship Engineering Operating Cycle
to instill discipline in the surface maintenance program by requiring
maintenance executors to track their performance against the
requirements developed by SURFMEPP.
Enables us to identify, document, and track execution-
year impacts to ships' expected service life.
Informs our Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and
Execution cycle to support fiscal decisionmaking.
Mr. Wittman. Navy witnesses have testified in recent years that
they are turning the corner on reversing the negative trends in surface
fleet readiness/maintenance, but needed more time to achieve the
results. In the current fiscally challenged environment, how tenuous is
that progress? And what is the potential for meeting those requirements
coupled with recent trends of sustained surge/high operations tempo of
the assets?
Admiral Rowden and Admiral Matthews. Many of the readiness
initiatives begun in recent years (e.g., Total Ships Readiness
Assessments, Class Maintenance Plans, Surface Maintenance Engineering
Planning Program, etc.) will endure and continue to benefit surface
fleet readiness. However, if sequestration continues without
reprogramming, over half the FY14 surface ship availabilities will be
at risk, including the reset work that would have been accomplished on
those ships. The backlog of life-cycle maintenance will grow even
larger, and for some ships may become cost-prohibitive. FY14
availabilities that are completed will be descoped, reducing the amount
of reset life-cycle maintenance accomplished and potentially affecting
expected service life.
If sequestration in FY14 is averted and the President's baseline
budget and OCO request are enacted, the full maintenance requirement
for the Fleet will be funded, including $346.6M to ``reset'' the
material condition of surface ships undergoing dry-docking
availabilities in FY14. This would put us on a path to reset the
remainder of the surface fleet in future years, even if the trend of
high operations tempo
continues.
Mr. Wittman. How do maintenance and modernization correlate to a
ship's ability to reach expected service life?
Admiral Rowden and Admiral Matthews. Maintenance and modernization
correlate to the ship's ability to reach expected service life by
addressing two issues: deteriorating material condition due to age/
fatigue and the obsolescence of machinery, weapons, sensors, and
networks aboard the ship.
If maintenance is not conducted regularly the ship will eventually
be unable to operate safely. Equipment may be degraded or become
nonoperational, and the ship's structure will become weakened.
Modernizing a ship includes upgrading obsolete equipment so that
its combat system can pace a modern threat and replacing old equipment
that is no longer supported logistically with new technologies that are
in production and available.
Proper maintenance and timely modernization ensure ships are
relevant and able to meet expected service life.
Mr. Wittman. Given the current budget environment and limited
maintenance resources, would you expect the Navy to defer or cancel
additional availabilities in FY14? If the Navy defers routine
maintenance on surface ships, how will the Navy sustain its current
fleet of ships for their expected service life, and fully execute its
30-year shipbuilding plan?
Admiral Rowden and Admiral Matthews. Under continued sequestration,
the current estimate is that funding for more than 50% of the
approximately 60 planned FY14 surface ship availabilities will be at
risk.
Not performing ship maintenance when required will result in
reduced operational availability due to degraded material condition. If
maintenance is continually deferred, the cost and duration of deferred
repairs rise significantly. Ultimately, if life-cycle maintenance is
not completed, ships will be decommissioned before their expected
service life (ESL). Failure of ships to reach ESL impacts our ability
to reach the force structure projected by the 30-year shipbuilding
plan.
Mr. Wittman. Can you please describe the total cost of surface ship
reset, length of time required to accomplish it, the type of
maintenance required, how the Navy is funding those requirements, and
how the bill originated?
Admiral Rowden and Admiral Matthews. Surface ship reset cost is
$346.6 million in FY14, with an additional estimated $2 billion
required in future years. By FY18 all surface ship reset maintenance is
scheduled for completion. When Navy started the reset process, there
were 89 ships requiring significant dry-docking maintenance
availabilities to reset. Today, 53 ships still require reset during
their next dry-docking availability.
The type of maintenance required usually consists of repairs to
Hull, Mechanical and Electrical systems (HM&E), to include structural
repairs to tanks and voids. For FY13 and FY14 availabilities, reset
funding is incorporated into availability planning and execution.
This requirement originated primarily due to high operational tempo
and deferred maintenance during Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation
Enduring Freedom.
Mr. Wittman. What is the impact to the 30-year shipbuilding plan
and overarching force structure if the Navy does not receive the
necessary funds to reset the force?
Admiral Rowden and Admiral Matthews. The exact impact is unknown,
but without ``reset'' funding the Navy will be forced to cancel or
defer important maintenance, reducing the combat readiness and
viability of our ships. In the long term, if we do not maintain our
ships, the Navy will be forced to decommission ships before their
expected service life. The Navy estimates that if sequestration
continues over the long term and there is no maintenance funding, by
2020 we will be reduced from 295 ships down to a Fleet of about 255-260
ships.
Mr. Wittman. What is the impact of layoffs in the private sector
for Navy surface ship maintenance? Have there been any impacts to date?
And, what are your concerns about the possible long-term consequences
on the private sector depots and the fleet?
Admiral Rowden and Admiral Matthews. Navy and industry predicted
FY13 budget uncertainty would result in layoffs at private sector
shipyards. Because all FY13 ship availabilities were restored following
passage of the FY13 appropriations bill and reprogramming
authorization, the anticipated layoffs did not occur. In fact, the
private sector is on track to perform as much or more total maintenance
Man Days (funded) in FY13 as in FY12.
Although layoffs did not occur in the short term, Navy is concerned
about the long-term impacts of sequestration on the private sector
industrial base. If sequestration continues, the impact in FY14 will be
more severe since it is a larger topline reduction imposed upon a
smaller budget, and because the ability to mitigate readiness impacts
by reprogramming prior-year procurement funding was essentially
exhausted in FY13. Without reprogramming authority, under
sequestration, over 50% of the approximately 60 planned CNO
availabilities will be cancelled or deferred, putting up to 8,000
private sector jobs at risk. Many of these would be highly skilled
artisans that take years to train. The resulting loss of talent would
impact the capabilities and capacity in the private sector industrial
base, and would not be able to be quickly reversed when needed.
Ultimately, it would lengthen maintenance periods and increase costs,
resulting in degraded surface fleet readiness.
Even if a source of funding is identified and reprogramming is
authorized during the fiscal year, negative impacts to the industrial
base and fleet readiness are likely. The uncertainty of having
maintenance availabilities deferred, and then funded at the last
minute, is very disruptive to the maintenance planning process and to
workforce management by our private sector partners. A shorter lead
time to finalize the maintenance schedule and procure necessary
equipment and materials often drives up costs and may impact the
maintenance that can be accomplished in the availability. Specific
maintenance that requires extensive planning or long-lead materials may
be deferred, even if the availability itself is funded and executed.
Mr. Wittman. There is currently a maintenance backlog for surface
combatants due, in part, to the high operational tempo. With no
expectation that this tempo will decrease in the near future, how does
the Navy plan to conduct maintenance and/or modernization of these
ships? What specific mitigation strategies has the Navy developed to
address the high operational tempo and staffing shortages that GAO
raised as risks that could hinder implementation of the Surface Force
Readiness Manual strategy that was introduced in 2012? How much forward
presence can the Navy provide the combatant commanders and still have
time to perform the maintenance necessary to keep the fleet
operational?
Admiral Rowden and Admiral Matthews. The current backlog is a
result of maintenance deferred over the last decade as we experienced a
high operational tempo and prioritized efficiency over effectiveness.
Many of the organizational and process changes made to surface fleet
maintenance in the last few years have focused on providing greater
oversight of maintenance actions across the Fleet, capturing the true
material condition of our ships, and quantifying the necessary
maintenance based on engineered requirements. As a result, the right
maintenance is scheduled on time, including any additional maintenance
requirements as a result of high operational tempo. Consistent with the
Surface Force Readiness Manual, deployment and maintenance periods
align with the Fleet Response Training Plan to ensure ships can meet
maintenance and modernization requirements from a scheduling
standpoint, even after completing extended deployments.
We have begun to address staffing shortages by establishing
Commander, Navy Regional Maintenance Center (CNRMC) and revitalizing
the RMCs, including:
Increased MPN by 1151 billets in POMs 12-14 to
reconstitute organic intermediate level maintenance capacity
and capability.
Implemented Workforce Development Program to
reestablish Journeyman training at the RMCs, improving the
maintenance proficiency and capability of technicians both at
RMCs and on subsequent sea tours.
As long as we are identifying, funding, and executing the true
maintenance requirement (including liquidation of the current backlog),
ship material condition will not limit the forward presence available
to combatant commanders. Under continued sequestration however, over
50% of approximately 60 FY14 availabilities will be deferred. This
would result in degraded material condition of those ships which could
limit their operational availability. Ultimately, if the maintenance is
not completed, it could impact their ability to reach expected service
life, resulting in reduced force structure and less ability to provide
forward presence.
Mr. Wittman. How well is the cost of maintaining Navy's force
structure aligned with the cost of being able to deploy it? To what
extent is the Navy concerned that decisions to defer ship maintenance
in 2013 will lead to shortfalls in deployable forces or surge capacity,
particularly carrier strike groups, in 2014 and beyond? What, if any,
adjustments is the Navy making to manage such concerns?
Admiral Rowden and Admiral Matthews. As part of the 2012 OPNAV
realignment, resource sponsorship for the majority of afloat readiness
resources was realigned to the DCNO for Warfare Systems (N9). N9 is now
responsible for the integration of manpower, training, sustainment,
modernization, and procurement of the Navy's surface warfare systems
resourced by the director of Surface Warfare (N96). This has enhanced
our focus on warfighting capability, program wholeness, and total
ownership cost, allowing better alignment of the ``cost to own'' (or
maintain) the surface fleet with the ``cost to operate'' (or deploy)
it.
The original decision to defer 23 ship maintenance availabilities
in FY13 was a result of the continuing resolution and sequestration. We
were able to restore 15 availabilities when the FY13 appropriations
bill was passed, and the final 8 with a reprogramming request. As a
result, there have been no shortfalls in deployable forces or surge
capacity as a result of deferred maintenance in FY13. There has been an
impact on Fleet operations and readiness as a result of the $4.1B
shortfall in our Operations and Maintenance (O&MN) accounts in the FY13
appropriations bill, however. We cancelled several independent ship
deployments, delayed CSG deployments, and limited our surge capacity--
impacts which will carry over to FY14 and beyond.
Navy's ability to manage the impacts of sequestration in FY13 is
not representative of the expected impact in FY14. The impact of
sequestration in FY14 will be more severe since it is a larger topline
reduction imposed upon a smaller budget, and because the ability to
mitigate readiness impacts by reprogramming prior-year procurement
funding was essentially exhausted in FY13. Without reprogramming
authority, under sequestration over 50% of the approximately 60 planned
CNO availabilities will need to be cancelled or deferred.
To adjust to such a significant reduction in OM&N funding,
maintenance and training will have to be prioritized for next-to-deploy
ships. For example, the ships receiving maintenance availabilities in
FY14 will primarily be those deploying in FY15.
Mr. Wittman. In 2010, Vice Admiral Balisle's Navy Fleet Review
Panel concluded that prior decisions to improve efficiency may well
have been an appropriate attempt to meet Navy priorities at the time,
but there was limited evidence to identify any changes that were made
with surface force readiness as the top priority--efficiency--was
sought over effectiveness. How do the Navy's current decisions that are
designed to achieve cost savings differ from the prior efficiency
decisions, which adversely affected surface ship readiness, according
to the Fleet Review Panel report?
Admiral Rowden and Admiral Matthews. The Navy, in order to achieve
the best possible surface ship readiness, has reorganized maintenance
and modernization functions within the Navy staff. As a result, a
revitalized fleet ashore maintenance organization has been funded and
new procedures have been put in place to allow improved accountability
for the use of both modernization and maintenance funds.
There are several initiatives the Navy has put into place in order
to reverse the negative trends identified in the Fleet Review Panel
report. The Navy has established a rigorous and comprehensive
maintenance program based on best practices from the carrier and
submarine fleet. This includes:
Introduction of a Class Maintenance Plan which
dictates the periodicity of large maintenance items, such as
inspecting tanks or drydocking the ship.
Introduction of the Surface Ship Engineered Operating
Cycle Instruction which delineates maintenance responsibilities
for fleet staffs and maintenance organizations.
Increased manning at shore-based maintenance
facilities such as Regional Maintenance Centers.
Instituted Surface Maintenance Engineering Planning
Program to provide centralized surface ship life-cycle
maintenance engineering, class maintenance and modernization
planning, and management of maintenance strategies aligned with
and responsive to National, Fleet, Surface Type Commander
(TYCOM) and NAVSEA needs and priorities.
These initiatives were not put into place as cost-savings measures,
at least in the short term. We do, however, expect the adherence to our
material standard to lower the cost of maintenance in the long term as
the cost of a maintenance problem increases exponentially if it is
allowed to fester.