[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
THE IRAN-SYRIA NEXUS AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR THE REGION
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JULY 31, 2013
__________
Serial No. 113-51
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
DANA ROHRABACHER, California Samoa
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio BRAD SHERMAN, California
JOE WILSON, South Carolina GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
TED POE, Texas GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
MATT SALMON, Arizona THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina KAREN BASS, California
ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
MO BROOKS, Alabama DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
TOM COTTON, Arkansas ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
PAUL COOK, California JUAN VARGAS, California
GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois
RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III,
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania Massachusetts
STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas AMI BERA, California
RON DeSANTIS, Florida ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California
TREY RADEL, Florida GRACE MENG, New York
DOUG COLLINS, Georgia LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
TED S. YOHO, Florida JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
LUKE MESSER, Indiana
Amy Porter, Chief of Staff Thomas Sheehy, Staff Director
Jason Steinbaum, Democratic Staff Director
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Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
JOE WILSON, South Carolina GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
TOM COTTON, Arkansas DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
RON DeSANTIS, Florida JUAN VARGAS, California
TREY RADEL, Florida BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois
DOUG COLLINS, Georgia JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III,
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina Massachusetts
TED S. YOHO, Florida GRACE MENG, New York
LUKE MESSER, Indiana LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
C O N T E N T S
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Page
WITNESSES
The Honorable John Bolton, senior fellow, American Enterprise
Institute (former United States Permanent Representative to the
United Nations)................................................ 6
Mr. Mark Dubowitz, executive director, Foundation for Defense of
Democracies.................................................... 14
Daniel Brumberg, Ph.D., senior program officer, Center for
Conflict Management, United States Institute of Peace.......... 36
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
The Honorable John Bolton: Prepared statement.................... 8
Mr. Mark Dubowitz: Prepared statement............................ 16
Daniel Brumberg, Ph.D.: Prepared statement....................... 38
APPENDIX
Hearing notice................................................... 70
Hearing minutes.................................................. 71
THE IRAN-SYRIA NEXUS AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR THE REGION
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WEDNESDAY, JULY 31, 2013
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:30 p.m., in
room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ileana Ros-
Lehtinen (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. The subcommittee will come to order.
After recognizing myself and Ranking Member Deutch for 5
minutes each for our opening statements, I will then recognize
other members seeking recognition for 1 minute and I hope that
you do give a statement. We will then hear from our witnesses.
Thank you, gentlemen, for being here. And without
objection, your prepared statements will be made a part of the
record, and members may have 5 days to insert statements and
questions for the record subject to the length limitations and
the rules.
The chair now recognizes herself for 5 minutes.
As the conflict in Syria continues, the numbers become even
more staggering every day: Over 100,000 killed, 1.85 million
refugees have fled the country with over \1/2\ million going to
our friend and ally Jordan, placing an extreme burden on our
ally as it struggles to cope with the pressure of this mass
influx and as the conflict threatens to cross its borders, and
an additional 4.5 million Syrians have been internally
displaced. Assad remains defiant and in fact his intransigence
has become further entrenched thanks to the support from his
allies such as Iran and Russia.
Iran along with North Korea has been cooperating with Syria
and the Assad families for decades now, aiding Syria with its
nuclear and chemicals weapons program, as well as its ballistic
missile program. Damascus is Iran's linchpin in the Middle
East. Tehran reportedly helped finance Syria's secret nuclear
plant, designed and built by North Korea and destroyed,
thankfully, by the Israelis in 2007, and has also been linked
with helping Assad expand his chemical weapons stockpile.
According to assessments by the U.S. intelligence community, it
judged with high confidence that chemical weapons were used by
Assad on numerous occasions against the opposition, further
amplifying the threat to the region and our national security
interests.
Tehran has provided Assad billions of dollars in direct
funds and recently extended an additional $4 billion line of
credit to help fund his brutal campaign against the opposition.
Iran has sent military advisers and personnel to help Assad.
Members of Iran's elite Revolutionary Guard have been sent to
advise and fight along side Assad's forces as well as to help
recruit external forces to come to the aid of the regime,
including a large number of Iraqi Shiite militants and of
course its proxy Hezbollah.
The Obama administration continues to take the misguided
approach that negotiating with Tehran will bear fruit, but the
actions of the regime say otherwise. Due to the lack of urgency
on this administration's part to prevent Iran from becoming
nuclear capable, I am also concerned that it is not giving the
Iranian threat the priority and the immediate attention it
requires.
Last Congress I authored and the President signed into law
the toughest sanctions yet on record against the regime in
Iran. Later this afternoon the House will vote on and we hope
to pass today or tomorrow Chairman Royce's and Mr. Engel's
Nuclear Iran Prevention Act, which will further strengthen
sanctions against Iran and sends the Supreme Leader the message
that a nuclear Iran is not an option.
So it is perhaps fitting that we are here today discussing
this subject, especially with our distinguished panel of
experts. But as we all know, Iran along with Russia has been a
key arms supplier for Assad's forces. There are daily flights
from Iran to Syria filled with arms and supplies for the
regime. These flights continue to fly over Iraq with mere
impunity and the United States must do more to urge al-Maliki
and the Iraqis to interdict and prevent these arms deliveries
from reaching Syria.
The Iran-Syria nexus has very serious consequences for our
friend and ally, the Democratic Jewish state of Israel. The
conflict is threatening to spread to Israel's borders and the
fear of Assad's chemical weapons being moved and falling into
the wrong hands is very real. Yet the Obama administration,
prodded by some in Congress, has decided to send small arms and
ammunition into the war zone.
I have always been and continue to be opposed to arming any
rebels in Syria. I remain opposed to doing so. Instead of
sending more arms, we should be looking at ways to stop the
arms flowing into Syria from Iran, from Russia and we should be
looking at breaking the Iran-Syria nexus. We must keep the
pressure and increase sanctions on Iran and Syria.
In the wake of last month's election in Iran I must
continue to caution the administration on offering more
concessions to a State Sponsor of Terrorism that continues to
undermine the stability in the region. No concessions and no
waivers should be issued by the Obama administration until we
see concrete and verifiable proof that Iran has begun to
dismantle its nuclear program.
I must reiterate that this new leader is not the moderate
that many have been so eager to believe in Iran. It is the
Supreme Leader who still calls the shots and his nefarious
ambitions have not been altered.
And with that, I am pleased to yield to the ranking member
of our subcommittee, my colleague Mr. Deutch.
Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Madam Chairman, for holding this
hearing. Thanks to the witnesses for being here. Iran's
destabilizing influence in the region, particularly in Syria,
threatens to reshape the future of the Middle East by
strengthening extremists by undermining moderate states and by
fueling a dangerous arms race.
In its current state Syria is slowly on its way to a worst
case scenario. With the help of Iran and Hezbollah, Assad
appears to have stabilized his grip on western portions of the
country, ensuring continued Iranian influence at least for the
foreseeable future. Factor in the use of chemical weapons and
the spillover of violence in the neighboring states, and we are
dealing with a staggering political and humanitarian crisis.
The stats speak for themselves: In a country of 21 million
inhabitants, nearly 8 million need humanitarian assistance, at
least 100,000 have been killed, 4\1/2\ million internally
displaced and 1.8 million sought refuge in Lebanon, Jordan,
Turkey, Iraq and Egypt. A shocking average of 8,000 people flee
Syria every day, a rate of refugee outflow unseen since the
1994 Rwanda genocide.
Amid all the human suffering, it is difficult to remember
that the Syrian conflict was once a mass civic movement
advocating for greater political freedom. Now it has morphed
into a civil war between an externally armed insurgency and a
brutal regime backed by Iran. Essentially, Syria has become a
proxy war for competing regional forces like Iran. From the
beginning Iran has provided arms, military advisers, and
enormous financial assistance to bolster Assad. The opposition
estimates that Iran is providing Assad with more than $500
million a month, and is flying in about 5 tons of military
cargo per day.
Earlier this spring my colleagues and I sent a letter to
Prime Minister Maliki asking him to inspect Iranian planes
using Iraqi air space. This coupled with Secretary Kerry's
efforts have led the Iraqi Government to inspect about a third
of the Iranian flights. It is a good step by the Maliki
government but we know this isn't good enough as Iran is able
to manipulate their flight schedules to ensure that their
weapons go to Syria unabated. Therefore, we must therefore
continue to press the Iraqis to search all flights, to actively
prevent weapons from flowing to Assad's forces.
The removal of Assad would deal a devastating blow to the
Iranian regime's ability to get heavy weaponry into Lebanon.
From terror attacks in Europe and Latin America, Hezbollah has
long done Iran's bidding around the world. In Syria, Hezbollah
has openly intervened on Assad's side with more than 5,000
fighters and is largely responsible for Assad's reclaimed
territory in the areas around Damascus and the City of Homs.
Simply put, Hezbollah's operations in Syria have become a game
changer. Iranian Hezbollah intervention has spurred greater
sectarian tension with almost daily calls from regional Sunni
leaders for a jihad against Iran and Assad. However, we have
seen the Gulf Coast countries react constructively with planned
sanctions against Hezbollah. It is likely that these sanctions
will be more potent than those imposed by the EU.
Europe has taken an important step, but they and we can go
further in sanctioning Hezbollah. Unfortunately, the secondary
outcomes of this conflict are far more negative than positive.
Lebanon and Iraq, two states with tenuous power sharing
agreements, are seriously threatened by a spillover of
sectarian violence. The economic burden of hosting refugees is
threatening to destabilize Jordan. And Hezbollah's involvement
has only furthered a frightening arms race among the region's
extremists. For example, last month a group of hardline
Islamists in Kuwait auctioned off cars to raise cash to arm
12,000 Syrian rebels with guided missiles, heat seeking
missiles, and tandem warheads. My colleagues and I are right to
worry about how arms might end up in extremists' hands. We have
got to face the facts, the extremists already have them, so
what is next? We know that if the Syrian regime survives
Hezbollah will be strengthened and Iran's interventionist
policy will only result in more aggressive behavior. Yet
numerous questions remain. How do we safely support any
moderates in Syria? What, if any, change will a new President
have on Iranian decision making in Syria? And finally, in an
economy that is being struggled by sanctions, how do we put
more pressure on the Iranian regime to end their support for
Assad? What more can we do to pressure the Iranians?
Thank you, and I look forward to hearing from the witnesses
on these and many other questions.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, Mr. Deutch, for your
opening statement.
The following members have requested 1 minute statements.
If you are not on the list, please let us know. Mr. Chabot and
then Mr. Schneider and Mr. Kinzinger. We will start with Mr.
Chabot of Ohio.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you, Madam Chair. I have a markup in
Judiciary so I will be leaving, being back and forth. So I
apologize for that in advance.
The terror imposed by the Syrian people by the Assad regime
with the help of the Iranian mullahs is horrifying. Since last
spring estimates suggest nearly 90,000 people have been killed
and the mass exodus of refugees to neighboring nations
continues unabated. The humanitarian crisis is getting worse by
the day. In previous hearings over the last year or so some of
us have expressed skepticism about the steps that the Obama
administration was taking or not taking in Syria and concerns
that U.S. efforts would not ultimately result in Assad's
removal from power.
Here we are today and the Assad regime is still thriving
because of the supply of weapons, fighters and cash from Iran
creating an even more dangerous environment which is
destabilizing the entire region and threatening the security of
nations like Israel, Jordan and Lebanon. Iran wants Assad to
win this fight because his removal would be a decisive setback
for its own nefarious plans in the region. Consequently the
mullahs in Iran are doing whatever they can to ensure it
preserves its influence no matter what happens in Syria. And I
yield back.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much, Mr. Chabot.
Mr. Schneider.
Mr. Schneider. Thank, you and thank you to the witnesses
for joining us today.
The insertion of foreign fighters, weapons and financial
support from the Iranian Government into Syria in support of
the Assad regime has been well documented. We know definitively
that Iran has also worked through its proxy Hezbollah to
further assert its influence over the current conflict in Syria
has seen some success in swinging the momentum that once
appeared to favor the opposition forces.
I look forward to hearing from the panel on several related
topics, including how prolonged Iranian influence could
contribute to the breakup of the current Syrian state, and the
implications for long-term U.S. interest and interests of our
regional allies.
I am increasingly concerned that the fighting between
Kurdish, al Qaeda, Jabhat al-Nusra, opposition forces and other
militias in Syria will only provide greater space for Iran to
exert its influence over the future state of Syria, to the
detriment of our interests and that of our allies.
I look forward to hearing from the panel on these issues,
and I yield back.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much, sir.
Mr. Kinzinger.
Mr. Kinzinger. Thank you, Madam Chair. I have been very
vocal about my concern about the lack of policy and the lack of
focus of this administration when it comes to the Middle East.
The situation in Syria is one that many of us were
discussing 2 years ago, 100,000 lives ago. And I believe that
then was the time for action to be taken at a point when you
had a moderate opposition and we had the ability to get in
there and ensure that Assad didn't survive.
When I was in Iraq as a military guy, one of the worst kept
secrets in Iraq was the role that Iran was playing in that war
and the lives that Iran has personally cost American soldiers.
I have been concerned at the lack of a clear red line for this
administration when it comes to Iran's nuclear weapons, when it
comes to Iran's support for bad people all around the globe.
And I think it is important that this administration be very
clear that Iran will not get nuclear weapons. And now that we
see the joining of forces between Iran and Syria and Assad, I
think this administration needs to be deadly clear that
continued relationships like that will have long-term
devastating results for the Iranian regime.
With that, I yield back.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much.
Any other members seek recognition? If not, I am so pleased
to welcome our witnesses. First, we welcome back to our
subcommittee Ambassador John Bolton, a Foreign Policy Senior
Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. Ambassador Bolton
was appointed as the Permanent Representative to the U.N. in
2005 where he was a leading voice for--I would say the only
leading voice, but maybe there are others, for institutional
reform at the U.N. and also against international proliferation
and terrorism and a strong advocate for human rights. Prior to
this the Ambassador served as Under Secretary of State for Arms
Control and International Security from 2001 to 2005.
Thank you for your service and welcome back, sir.
Next we are so pleased to welcome Mr. Mark Dubowitz, the
Executive Director of the Foundation for Defense of
Democracies, where he leads projects on sanctions,
nonproliferation and countering electronic repression. Mr.
Dubowitz is the coauthor of eight studies on economic sanctions
against Iran and he is also the cochair of the Project on U.S.
Middle East Nonproliferation Strategy.
We welcome you, Mr. Dubowitz.
Third, we welcome Dr. Daniel Brumberg, a Senior Program
Officer with the Center for Conflict Management at the U.S.
Institute of Peace, where he focuses on issues of democracy and
political reform in the Middle East and the wider Islamic
world. Dr. Brumberg is also an associate professor at
Georgetown University, a member of the editorial board of the
Journal of Democracy, and the chairman of the Foundation on
Democratization and Political Change in the Middle East.
Welcome gentlemen, and as I said, your statements have been
made a part of the record. If you could keep your remarks to 5
minutes, that would be good.
Ambassador Bolton.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JOHN BOLTON, SENIOR FELLOW, AMERICAN
ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE (FORMER UNITED STATES PERMANENT
REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS)
Ambassador Bolton. Madam Chairman, members of the
subcommittee, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you
today. I thought perhaps it might be useful to look at the
Syria-Iran nexus from the strategic perspective of the entire
region in the Middle East because so much is going wrong,
almost all of it adverse to American interests, from the
disintegration of Libya after the over throw of Khadafi to the
turmoil in Egypt, the civil war in Syria, the disintegration of
Yemen, the political turmoil in Bahrain and other countries,
the effective loss of representative government in Iraq, and
obviously the ominous presence of Iran. Events in the region I
think are closer to slipping out of control and becoming more
adverse to the United States than in any historical period I
can think of since the 1956 Suez Canal crisis, that period up
until the Six-Day War in 1967.
And yet we have at the moment in Washington and in Europe a
return to the notion that if only you could solve or at least
make progress in the Israel-Palestinian issue, that somehow
everything else would be easier to resolve. And yet if you look
at each and every one of the crises gripping the region that I
mention, all of them taken together have almost nothing
whatever to do with the Israel-Palestinian issue. And if
tomorrow we learn that the negotiators had resolved the Israel-
Palestinian issue, that would have almost no consequence
whatever for the ongoing threats to stability in the region and
American interests.
So given that there are only 24 hours a day and given that
everybody has to prioritize, I think from the perspective of
protecting American national interests we have to ask ourselves
what are the key priorities, what are the main threats to our
interest in strategic stability in the region? And while they
are not responsible for everything that is going wrong, it
seems to me that all of the major problems we face stem from
Iran, from its pursuit of geographic and political hegemony,
the arc of influence it has created from Iran itself through
the al-Maliki regime in Iraq, the Assad regime in Syria and
terrorist Hezbollah in Lebanon. One element is Iran's
continuing support for terrorism, Hezbollah now, as before
Hamas in the Gaza Strip, Iran for decades has been the world
central banker of terrorism supplying arms and other assistance
as well. And then the third major threat obviously is Iran's
nuclear weapons program, 20 years in the search for deliverable
nuclear weapons capability.
Virtually all of Iran's objectives are being pursued
without an effective response from the United States. The
sanctions that we have pursued have in the words of the
Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency,
Yukiya Amano, just a month ago, effectively had no consequence
on the Iranian program. Personally I think the sanctions are a
good idea because they put pressure on the regime and our
ultimate objective should be bringing the regime in Tehran
down. But nobody should be under any illusions that Iran is
determined enough to have nuclear weapons and the sanctions
won't deter it.
It is also no surprise that Iranian Revolutionary Guard
officers and others and now Hezbollah have come into the
conflict in Syria. Iran was always prepared to shed a lot of
Syrian blood to keep the Assad regime in power, and it will
continue to do that because the influence it has over Syria
fits all three of its objectives, including, I believe, more
that we will find out in the area of nuclear, biological and
chemical warfare. The Al-Khobar reactor destroyed by the
Israeli Air Force in September 2007 didn't get there
accidentally and there may well be other aspects of Iranian
influence.
And I think it is critical for Iran to maintain the
viability of Hezbollah as a threat to Israel. Indeed, if Israel
makes the critical decision that it is now facing whether to
take preemptive military action against the Iranian nuclear
weapons program, the third time in its history that Israel will
have done so in its own self defense, I think the most likely
Iranian response will be to unleash Hezbollah and Hamas to
rocket targets inside Israel, which simply makes this question
that much more difficult for Israel.
And yet in response to all this, the American policy is not
just ineffective, it is very sadly lacking. I think we are in
for much greater danger in the coming years.
Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Bolton follows:]
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Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Mr. Dubowitz.
STATEMENT OF MR. MARK DUBOWITZ, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, FOUNDATION
FOR DEFENSE OF DEMOCRACIES
Mr. Dubowitz. Chairman Ros-Lehtinen, Ranking Member Deutch,
distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for
inviting me to testify and for having this hearing on the Iran-
Syria nexus.
The more we talk about Iran's machinations in Syria as a
window into the soul of the Iranian regime the better. The
Iranian regime does not want the world to talk about its
involvement in the massacre of tens of thousands of Syrians. As
we are only 4 days away from the inauguration of Iranian
President-elect Hassan Rouhani, I will focus on the
consequences of his election for Iran's role in Syria and the
appropriate U.S. policy response.
Election victory of Mr. Rouhani has revived a myth as old
as that of the revolutionary theocracy itself, the myth of
moderation. Were Mr. Rouhani a truly different kind of Iranian
leader, he would insist that Iran and its terrorist subsidiary
Hezbollah stop assisting the Assad regime to murder Syrians, he
would end the repression of Iranians and fully comply with
Iran's nuclear obligations under international law. This
optimism, however, may not be warranted. And indeed if his
moderation is only aspirational on our part, Washington could
easily allow Iran to solidify its grip on Syria and develop an
irreversible nuclear capability. I would argue that it would be
naive to expect a significant shift in the foreign and security
policies of the Islamic republic.
To summarize the conclusions of my written testimony:
Number one, maintaining significant Iranian influence in Syria
and expanding its nuclear weapons program are both strategic
priorities for Tehran. In both cases Iran is successfully
testing the red lines of the United States and the
international community.
Number two, Iran's Supreme Leader handles Syria policy with
operational control in the hands of Major General Qassem
Suleimani, the Revolutionary Guard's Quds Force commander. Most
Iranian Presidents, including Rouhani, have little say over
Tehran's foreign and national security policies. The exception
was former President Rafsanjani during his first term when Ali
Khameni was still consolidating his position as the Supreme
Leader.
During the duration of the Syrian war, Mr. Rouhani has been
the personal representative of the Supreme Leader to the
Supreme National Security Council. In this role, if Mr. Rouhani
has had any influence on the regime's Syria policy then he has
been complicit in the slaughter of tens of thousands of
Syrians.
Even if he has influence, Mr. Rouhani's public statements
reveal that his conspiratorial anti-American and anti-Israel
positions on Syria are closely aligned with Iran's Supreme
Leader and the IRGC. His few statements against so-called
extremism, terrorism and foreign interference reflect Assad's
position, which is to label the entire uprising against his
rule as terrorism and not a genuine popular uprising.
Unlike on the issue of Syria, Mr. Rouhani has been publicly
critical of how his predecessors have conducted nuclear
negotiations. His record, however, reveals that he has been a
practitioner of nuclear deceit and suggests that he cannot be
trusted on the Syria file either.
Finally, if Mr. Rouhani wants to prove himself an
influential and reliable interlocutor, he must end Iran's
nefarious military and financial activities in Syria. But let's
be clear, stopping the massacre of Syrian, Muslim and Christian
women and children should not be rewarded with concessions, it
should be the definition of moderation.
U.S. policy should be designed to treat Iran-Syria nuclear
policies in the same way that Tehran views them, as two sides
of the same coin, and essential strategic elements of Iran's
dry for regional hegemony. Washington must respond to tangible
action, not political rhetoric, and be cautious of
opportunities for Rouhani to engage in strategic deceit at the
proposed Geneva II conference on Syria and at the next round of
diplomatic talks of the P5+1.
U.S. policy should be designed to accomplish the following
five objectives: Number one, resist diplomatic linkage between
Iran's nuclear program in Syria. Linkage will only give Tehran
more concessions with which to trade and undercut our
negotiating leverage over Iran's nuclear program.
Number two, massively intensify sanctions pressure on Iran.
Right now is exactly the wrong time to be offering meaningful
sanctions relief.
Number three, enhance the credibility of military force.
Targeted U.S. strikes against Iranian backed assets in Syria
similar to what Israel has reportedly undertaken or through
carefully vetted U.S. proxies will enhance Washington's
negotiating leverage on both the Syrian and nuclear tracks.
Number four, avoid a negotiated settlement that allows Iran
to retain a critical capability, either in the form of an
Iranian backed Alawistan when industrial sized nuclear capacity
of undetectable breakout.
And finally, number five, resist the political pressure to
sweeten the deal on the assumption that this will strengthen
Mr. Rouhani's moderate position in the Iranian political
structure.
We should not be negotiating with ourselves. Put the onus
on Mr. Rouhani to demonstrate his influence in moderation. Only
when Washington has reversed Iranian strategic gains on Syria
and its nuclear program can there be any negotiated settlement
that protects the security interest of the United States and
its Middle Eastern allies.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much, sir.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Dubowitz follows:]
----------
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Dr. Brumberg.
STATEMENT OF DANIEL BRUMBERG, PH.D., SENIOR PROGRAM OFFICER,
CENTER FOR CONFLICT MANAGEMENT, UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF
PEACE
Mr. Brumberg. Thank you very much. Good afternoon, Ranking
Member Deutch and other members.
Mr. Deutch. Turn on your mic.
Mr. Brumberg. So sorry, I am going to start again. Good
afternoon, Chairman Ros-Lehtinen, Ranking Member Deutch and
other members of this subcommittee. I am honored to have this
opportunity to testify today before the House Foreign Affairs
Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa.
Today I would like to place the question of Iran's
relations with Syria and Lebanon's Hezbollah in a wider
framework. Indeed, the question I will address is how the June
14th election of Hassan Rouhani to the presidency might shape
Iranian foreign policy or aspects of it. I should emphasize
that the views expressed in this testimony represent my own
assessment and do not reflect the positions of the United
States Institute of Peace, which does not take policy
positions.
Both before and after his election Rouhani stated that he
and his new government would strive to regain the trust of
citizens at home and to rebuild Iran's frayed relations abroad.
By ``reform'' Rouhani seems to mean opening space for the
return of those political leaders and groups that were
previously excluded from politics and ensuring that these
groups and the wider populace of some basic civil rights. But
he also argues that pursuing these domestic goals requires
diminishing international conflicts that former President
Ahmadinejad and his hard line allies used to justify repressing
the reformists. Rouhani and his allies appear to believe that
reducing international tensions will facilitate a reopening of
the domestic political arena.
The chances of Rouhani achieving limited success in the
domestic front are not bad. If only because a wide spectrum of
groups, including some in the so-called principalist camp that
had supported the former President, now argue that reviving the
economy and regaining the people's trust are vital to reviving
the Islamic Republic's battered legitimacy.
But on the international front, moving from confrontation
with the West to real cooperation will face significant
obstacles. Those obstacles include ultra hard liners who are
loath to see the reformists use success on the international
stage to strengthen their popularity at home.
Given the influence of these hard liners, Rouhani and his
allies are unlikely to depart from the national consensus
regarding national security issues. Thus he will not risk
provoking retaliation from hard liners and certainly the
Supreme Leader by advocating a fundamental change in Iran's
approach to Syria or Hezbollah. But even as he pays close
attention to these red lines, Rouhani will probably continue
looking for opportunities to promote a more flexible foreign
policy, one that might ease the political situation at home.
My bottom line is this: While the U.S. should be cautious
we should not dismiss such efforts out of hand or take actions
that inadvertently reinforce opponents of the political
opening. We should instead test Rouhani and his government,
pushing I believe for a Palestinian-Israeli deal I still think
is important and pursuing negotiations on comprehensive nuclear
agreement might offer two tests. How Rouhani and his new
government might respond to such tests is unclear. The fact
that he has nominated former Iranian U.N. Ambassador Javad
Zarif to be Foreign Minister and he has nominated impressive
technocrats to take charge of economic policy are both fairly
encouraging signs.
Now these developments reflect long-term social and
political dynamics. Indeed reformists and moderate leaders from
the principalist camp itself have been trying to seek an
alliance as far back as 1999. Among other reasons they sought
this alliance in a bid to repair the economic damage to Iran
that resulted from the previous policies of Ahmadinejad.
Rouhani and his allies have stated that advancing these
economic reform agendas will require a new engagement with the
West and quite possibly with the U.S.
One key objective in pursuing engagement will be to remove
international sanctions, but division in an agenda that Rouhani
favors is larger than that. To reiterate, Rouhani and his
allies see success at the home front as depending partly on
success abroad. Rouhani's previous role as chief negotiator on
the nuclear issue gives him some credibility, certainly at
home. Moreover, the fact that Rouhani and his allies hold that
moving or mitigating international sanctions is crucial to
advancing their domestic agenda suggests an opening for U.S.
diplomacy.
The U.S. wants to make progress on crucial security issues,
particularly the nuclear question, but it also is important to
encourage realistic changes for a reopening of Iran's political
arena. After years of repression Iran's reformist leaders and
the wider electorate which elected Rouhani gave praise to such
domestic change. But they also know that the struggle for
change will take years and will only come through making
accommodations at home.
It is in the interest of the U.S. to find ways to make the
task of long-term political change possible in Iran while
addressing our fundamental security interests.
Thank you.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much, Dr. Brumberg.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Brumberg follows:]
----------
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. I will ask questions about seeing Rouhani
as a moderate, Russia's role in Syria and what will Iraq do.
Ambassador Bolton, you said that those who had been
labeling Rouhani as a moderate are naive in their assessment.
And Mr. Dubowitz, you agree that Rouhani isn't the moderate
that the world is so eager to say he is, yet the administration
has been willing to accept a narrative of him as a moderate and
has even begun to offer concessions on sanctions against the
regime ahead of its next failed round of P5+1 negotiations. And
just this morning the Institute on Science and International
Security assessed that Iran is expected to achieve the critical
capability needed to produce weapons grade uranium by mid-2014
without being detected.
So as Iran continues to support Assad by reportedly
agreeing to supply Assad with $3.6 billion in oil in exchange
for the regime to have the right to investments of various
kinds in Syria, I think it is wise to be reminded that in the
past this so-called moderate has boasted of his ability to
deceive, as you pointed out, and mislead the international
community on Iran's nuclear program when he served as the chief
negotiator, and he continues to support the brutality of Assad.
Given what we know about Rouhani and these latest reports,
why would the United States risk our national security and the
security of the region by offering concessions to the regime
when it is clear that there will be no change in Iran's nuclear
position and its role on Syria? And will the administration--do
you believe--now allow Iran to use Syria as a bargaining chip
for its nuclear program? That is what I see in the horizon.
Now Russia, along with Iran and China, has been flooding
Syria with arms for the Assad regime, has had a key strategic
interest in selling arms to Assad, having access to all of that
region through the Syrian naval base. Moscow has moved to
stonewall U.S. efforts in calling for Assad to step down, and
continues to obstruct our sanctions against Syria and Iran. It
has got this veto power at the Security Council. So it is clear
the administration's reset policy with Russia has not resulted
in any progress whatsoever; it has actually weakened our
position relative to Moscow. So given this, in light of this
and Russia's continued cooperation with Assad and with Iran,
what steps should the United States take regarding our policy
toward Russia?
And on Iraq, we have been saying that we have called on
Iraq to act, and stop, and inspect the planes that are
routinely flying militants and militia to fight along Assad,
but in only a few cases has Iraq actually done this inspection.
And in addition, the Iraqi Government continues to ignore our
request to honor its commitment to protect the people of Camp
Liberty through its Memo of Understanding of 2011 and continues
to put their lives in danger. Does the U.S. have any leverage
with Iraq to force it to act on any of these issues?
Ambassador Bolton.
Ambassador Bolton. On the first point, Madam Chairman, on
Rouhani as a moderate. I mean, I think his career demonstrates
he has been a man of the regime for 30-plus years. He wouldn't
have been allowed to run for President unless it was clear he
would hue to the policies, particularly in the nuclear area, of
the Supreme Leader and the Revolutionary Guard.
I have watched him in action very closely during the period
of 2003-2005 when he was Iran's nuclear negotiator. And he was
very smooth, charming, Western European diplomats just loved to
deal with him, and he took them to the cleaners day after day
after day negotiating a supposed suspension of Iran's
enrichment program that was suspended because of the failures
of the program itself, difficulties in the uranium enrichment
process and even more importantly difficulties in the uranium
conversion process that allowed Iran during this period of good
will to fix the problems, then break the suspension and return
to its nuclear weapons program.
So I think he has shown he knows how to do it once before
and have no doubt he would like to do it again. Would he like
to see----
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Let me turn to Mr. Dubowitz for Russia's
role or Iraq's role.
Mr. Dubowitz. Let me talk a little bit about this question
of his record. Let's remember that he was nuclear negotiator
and/or the Secretary of Supreme National Security Council when
Iran did not voluntarily or transparently disclose Natanz,
Fordo, or Isfahan.
On the issue of sanctions, I support massively intensified
sanctions on Iran to bring it to the verge of economic
collapse. I think it is the only way to put the Supreme Leader
to a fundamental choice. But I think the sanctions relief that
I am most concerned about are not the humanitarian sanctions
that Treasury clarified last week. It was a statement of
clarification, they were not new sanctions, but the fact that
there have been sanctions on the books that have not enforced
like the gold sanctions that have given Iran up to $7 billion
in just under a year of vital foreign exchange reserves. And
the unwillingness to entertain new sanctions, it is the non-
enforcement of existing sanctions which is sanctions relief. We
are already giving Iran sanctions relief and we are getting no
nuclear concessions in return.
And finally, on the issue of linkage, I think the issue of
linkage is very important, Madam Chairman. And that is that the
Iranians will try to expand the negotiations to include Syria
and their other interests so that they can trade concessions.
And we have to be very careful not to link the Syria issue with
Iran's nuclear program.
On Russia and Iraq they are both sanctions busters. We are
not enforcing sanctions against either country and they are
both in violation of our financial and energy sanctions.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much. Thank you,
gentlemen. My time is over.
Mr. Deutch.
Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Mark, I just wanted
to follow up with Mr. Dubowitz with where you left off. What is
it, and I throw this up to all three of you, what is it that
needs to happen for sanctions to have the best chance of
working? We are going to pass legislation this afternoon that
will only strengthen the sanctions. We can give you, all of us
sitting here can give you the statistics about the successes
that the sanctions have yielded in terms of really tightening
the economy in Iran. And yet the numbers, the statistics about
what Iran is doing in Syria, the amount of money, the amount of
supplies are staggering. How is that happening, first of all,
given where their economy stands? Is there any issue of public
pressure that may help with Iran's involvement in Syria? We
know the Iranian people are frustrated with the state of their
economy. It was an issue for Rouhani in the election. Are they
aware of the extent of Iranian involvement in Syria and the
cost ultimately to them? So that is the second question. The
first question though is sanctions generally, what more can be
done?
Mr. Dubowitz. So I agree with Ambassador Bolton that
sanctions are not going to be a silver bullet. There is no
evidence that they have slowed Iran's nuclear program. But I
think that we can fundamentally change the calculus of this
regime by massively intensifying the sanctions and increasing
the credibility of the military threat.
With respect to sanctions the only number that I think
matters is the size of Iran's accessible foreign exchange
reserves, because that is their principal hedge against a
balance of payments crisis and economic meltdown. If we don't
know that number then we don't know when they economically drop
dead. And we have no way of comparing that number to David
Albright's number, which is Iran's obtainment of undetectable
nuclear breakout by June 2014. We have to know which comes
first. And I think by going after the foreign exchange
reserves, denying them access to overseas accounts, going after
their oil export revenue, their commercial trade, we have to
get Iran closer and closer to the brink of economic collapse
but we need to know that number. And if we don't know that
number, we don't know where we are at.
Mr. Deutch. Dr. Brumberg.
Mr. Brumberg. Well, I will have to disagree with my
distinguished colleague. I think that the dependence on
sanctions is a flight from reality. The notion that by
increasing sanctions we are going to compel Iran to do
something it doesn't want to do is simply a substitute for a
strategic policy. It is not a policy, it is easy to agree on,
it is easy to get consensus on, but it is not an effective
policy. It hasn't worked so far. I see no evidence that if you
put a gun to the heads of the Iranian leadership they are going
to say we will do what you want us to do. It hasn't been
successful. And when something doesn't work you don't keep
repeating it. That is not a policy.
Now sanctions, there are two ways we can think about
sanctions. Sanctions are always a means for some sort of end.
Sanctions can be a means of a war policy. From the vantage
point of Iran and if the Iranian leaders were listening to the
presentations today, they would say well, clearly the point of
view, and our colleagues have basically said this, the point of
view of sanctions is regime change. Now if that is your
message, then that is your message. Then of course if you want
to make war you make war. But if sanctions is an adjunct for
negotiations and is a bargaining chip, then you have to be
ready at some point or other to conceive of a deal in which you
are going to remove sanctions, because sanctions are there in
order to compel your adversary to make peace, and that means a
dual track approach.
So I am not saying that one or the other is best. I think
we have to decide what we want to do. And ultimately if we want
to go to war, we go to war. Because this is what has been
advocated here today in effect. But if we don't, we have to
recognize that concessions will come down the way. And at some
point or another we will deal with this regime because it is
not collapsing today or tomorrow.
Mr. Deutch. Ambassador Bolton, a lot of us sitting up here
believe that sanctions haven't yet caused the Supreme Leader to
change his commitment to nuclear weapons because they have not
been strong enough, right, isn't that the alternate argument?
Ambassador Bolton. Well, that is the theory. I actually
agree with Dr. Brumberg up until the point when he started
talking about going to war. The sanctions are not working and
they are not going to work. There is a theoretical case that
economic sanctions can work with three conditions, that they
are utterly comprehensive, everything is covered, number one.
Number two, that they are complied with by every major power in
the world, and three, that they are enforced by military force.
None of those three things apply to Iran nor will they ever.
The nuclear weapons program is not expensive enough for the
sanctions to have an effect on and the proof of the pudding is
Korea. North Korea, the most heavily economically sanctioned
country in the world, has detonated three nuclear devices.
Mr. Deutch. Madam Chairman, may I ask for 30 seconds for
Mr. Dubowitz to respond to the suggestion that North Korea is
an example here. You have spoken to the need for strengthening
sanctions. You have spoken to the opportunities that we have to
further tighten the economic noose so that the Supreme Leader
changes his ways.
Can you speak to ultimately the potential effectiveness of
that that your two colleagues on the panel seem to argue
against?
Mr. Dubowitz. Well, there is no doubt that sanctions will
not work on their own. We have all stated that. But I think
that it is actually wrong to say that sanctions can't put
enormous pressure that we can convert into negotiating leverage
at the table. If Iran only has $20 billion of accessible
foreign exchange reserves and those reserves are being depleted
rapidly, Iran is facing economic collapse. Now if economic
collapse cannot break the nuclear will of Mr. Khamenei, nothing
will and there will be no nuclear deal with no concessions that
Mr. Brumberg would at all entertain. On the other hand, we need
to try. And I think that we don't need military force to
enforce sanctions. We need to massively ratchet up the current
sanctions regime, which is putting enormous economic pressure
on the regime and get those FX reserves down to a level where
the Supreme Leader does not have the money to support economy.
Mr. Rouhani was elected because the Iranian people are sick
of the sanctions, they are sick of the economic pressure and
they are sick of the nuclear intransigence that Mr. Khamenei
has shown.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Mr. Deutch.
Mr. Kinzinger.
Mr. Kinzinger. Thank you, Madam Chair, and again to the
witnesses, thank you for being here. I will take just a very
slight issue with what Dr. Brumberg said. I think actually it
is not necessarily that we are advocating for war, I frankly
think Iran has been at war with the United States for a very
long time. I mentioned in my opening statement I am a veteran
of Iraq, I flew planes, and if I could say in this setting,
which I can't, I don't think, but I will say that a lot of
energy was focused on Iran basically being involved in the war
in Iraq and in some cases some have suggested that almost half
the U.S. casualties were the direct result of Iranian
technology and Iranian action.
And I just want to say too at the outset, I am not critical
of this administration because I am a Republican, I am not
critical of this administration because there is any partisan
politics involved. If this were a Republican administration
with the same policy, I would be saying the exact same thing.
But I am a believer that when the leadership around the globe
retreats something has to follow. And if there is no other
leader that is stepping up or able to step up, which in this
case there isn't, when the United States retreats from
engagement from around the world I think chaos follows. And I
think that is what we are seeing in the Middle East as a result
of frankly a lack of American engagement.
I will give you some examples on that. We look at Egypt,
the day--and I want to ask this question, but I want a second--
the day there was this change in Egypt our administration was
not really focused on going out and stressing support for the
Egyptian people, stressing support for their change into a
democracy. I look at the example of Benghazi and what happened
there. I look at the status of forces agreement in Iraq and
basically the ease to give up there and the quickness at which
we walked away from the negotiating table. And today you look
at Iraq and it is basically in chaos again, which to me
personally is very disturbing.
And you look at the administration floating the idea, even
if they don't follow it, floating the idea of a zero troop
option in Afghanistan after 2014, that does nothing but
embolden our enemy. That does nothing but embolden the forces
that would fight against the United States. We have been
fighting these proxy wars against Iran, against terrorists for
a very, very long time. And this is from somebody, by the way,
one of six Republicans that voted to give the President
authority to go into Libya because I believed that was the
right thing to do.
But a couple of big questions. First off, I want to ask
you, Ambassador Bolton, specifically about the--and I know this
is an exactly on topic, but the message sent the day that
change happened in Egypt. What do you think the Egyptian people
saw in the United States' kind of lack of engagement on that
transition?
Ambassador Bolton. Well, I think they see an incoherence in
dealing with events in Egypt that has unfortunately
characterized the response to the entire Arab Spring. If you go
back to Mubarak's fall, I counted in the 31-day period from the
time demonstrations began in Egypt to the time Mubarak stepped
aside that the administration had four distinct positions. And
the net of that, and I think essentially we saw a repetition
when the demonstrators went into the streets in late June and
early July, and the military finally stepped in on July 3rd.
The result is nobody knows where we stand. We don't gain points
with any of the various competing factions or persuasions in
the struggle. And overall we are left impotent as the situation
deteriorates. And I think the debate we are having now over
continued foreign assistance unfortunately helped show that.
And I think the signal that it sounds throughout the region
combined with an absence now of having done anything effective
since September the 11th in Benghazi is that America is
uninterested, that we are declining in our ability to shape
events in the region. And I think that is something that our
adversaries and our friends alike both see and they are
calibrating their policies accordingly, unfortunately, for our
interest.
Mr. Kinzinger. Thank you. I will ask each of you if you can
answer with basically just one quick answer, what is more
important to Iran a healthy economy or nuclear weapons? I'll
start with you, Dr. Brumberg.
Mr. Brumberg. Well to the forces----
Mr. Kinzinger. Just very quickly.
Mr. Brumberg. When you say Iran I am not sure what you
mean, but if you are talking about the forces.
Mr. Kinzinger. The regime.
Mr. Brumberg. Nuclear weapons. I think that Iran is much
more than a regime and I have to say this because this is not
the conversation we are having. There was a force that brought
Iran to power. This is the force of the electorate. They want
economic and political change.
Mr. Kinzinger. Well, that is great and we have been talking
about that for 20 years, the fact the regime is in charge and
the regime is the one chasing nuclear weapons. Dr. Brumberg.
Mr. Brumberg. Well, we may have some disagreement on that.
Mr. Kinzinger. Would you say healthy economy or nukes?
Mr. Dubowitz. Regime survival. And if they think that a
nuclear weapon can guarantee the survival of the regime they
will pursue it. If they think that there is a fundamental
choice between a nuclear weapon and the survival of the regime,
we may have a chance of breaking their nuclear will. But we
need enhanced leverage, we can't be naive, this isn't the
Harvard Negotiation Project.
Mr. Kinzinger. Mr. Ambassador.
Ambassador Bolton. They want nuclear weapons and I would
say please don't believe the official economic statistics.
These are expert smugglers with--the largest Iranian diplomatic
facility in the world is in Caracas, Venezuela. Because of
their close cultural ties? No, because they are laundering
their money through the Venezuelan banks.
Mr. Kinzinger. Thank you. I have a million more questions
but my time is up.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much.
Mr. Schneider.
Mr. Schneider. Thank you, Madam Chair, and thank you to the
witnesses. I would like to pick up essentially where we left
off. But as you talked about, Mr. Dubowitz, the desire of the
Iranian regime is survival and we saw in the recent election
what to them appears to have been a surprise outcome with the
election of Rouhani. How much impact, and this is everyone, do
you believe the economic struggles of the Iranian people having
influence on the outcome of the election if at all?
Mr. Dubowitz. Well, thank you for the question. I think the
Supreme Leader doesn't fear the United States, he doesn't fear
Israel. He fears his own people. He knows what he has done to
his own people. He has brutalized them, he knows the sense of
despair. And I think he was shocked by the election results. I
mean he was shocked that his preferred candidate, Said Jalili,
lost and that Rouhani won, not because it was a pro-Rouhani
vote but it was because it was an anti-Khamenei vote. And the
vote was based on a sense of despair and depression and
frustration with the nuclear intransigence that has led to the
economic demise of a proud nation that otherwise should be
powerful and rich and influential. And so for that reason I do
think these sanctions are working, not in slowing down Iran's
nuclear program, because that is clearly not happening, but in
embittering the Iranian people not against the United States
but against the Supreme Leader, the Revolutionary Guard and a
regime that has held them hostage for 30 years.
Again, these sanctions can give us leverage. That is all
they can give us is leverage, and how we use that leverage
remains to be seen.
Mr. Schneider. Dr. Brumberg, you are nodding your head.
Mr. Brumberg. Well, I agree with that. Sanctions will get
Iranian leadership to the table. What you decide to do at the
table is the question. Whether you want to negotiate on the
kinds of concessions that you ultimately want to provide,
including on the sanctions relief, that is the debate we need
to have. What kind of relationship do we ultimately want with
the Islamic Republic around? Assuming that we are not
advocating regime change. If we want to find some way to live
with this regime, which in many respects has ben a repugnant
regime. That is a conversation I think we often avoid, the
strategic conversation we need to have.
I also want to say on this issue of Rouhani and whether he
is a moderate and we have these debates that go on forever.
Rouhani is not really the story here. The story is the
political social forces that brought him into power that have
been struggling to be heard and they count in the Islamic
Republic system. I have been studying the system for years. It
is not simply the Supreme Leader. And the office of the
President, which everybody predicted would be abolished is not
going to be abolished. There will be parliamentary elections in
2 years. The one thing the reformists desperately want is a
peace process between the U.S. and Iran to create the space
that they need for the long-term struggle for human rights in
that country. Now we have to decide whether we take that
struggle seriously. Do we want to help to foster it, because
short of regime change the change in Iran will happen through
not against us.
Mr. Schneider. In a sense of time, I only have 2 minutes
left. Out of this committee and going to the floor today or
tomorrow is a bill that strengthens the sanctions regime, that
hopefully gives us that leverage to try to force the hand and
change the course away from progress toward a nuclear
capability, and it seems what I am hearing is that those
sanctions have had an effect on the economy, and the effect on
the economy has had an effect on the politics on the Iran. And
so it seems to me that we should be pursuing more sanctions or
stronger sanctions.
Am I missing something?
Mr. Brumberg. I think the sanctions have had an effect on
the politics, there is no doubt about it, but alone the
sanctions will not compel the Iranians to do what we think they
should do. They will not do it by themselves. We have to sit
down and negotiate and decide ultimately whether we are going
to be living with sanctions forever or real incentives in
return for a deal that we and the Iranians can accept. That is
the conversation I don't think we are having.
Mr. Schneider. Sanctions are a means to an end. Sanctions
aren't the goal----
Mr. Brumberg. Yes.
Mr. Schneider. Preventing Iran from having a nuclear weapon
is the goal.
Mr. Dubowitz.
Mr. Dubowitz. Well, there is a lot of talk in Washington
about sweetening the offer and that we are not being generous
enough to the Iranian regime. There is an offer on the table,
it was presented at al-Mahdi. It is a very good offer despite
the fact that administration officials go on background as
describing the sanctions relief as modest. The offer says gold
sanctions and petro sanctions, chemical sanctions relief worth
tens of billions of dollars, 20 percent, and the suspension of
20 percent enrichment. That is increasingly an irrelevant
nuclear concession if you believe David Albright and nuclear
experts who say we are moving to undetectable nuclear breakout.
So there is an offer on the table. Let Rouhani respond to it
before we talk about sweetening that offer or offering generous
sanctions relief. We should be enhancing our negotiating
leverage not diminishing it before we show up for the
negotiations.
Mr. Schneider. And my time is up as well. I have many more
questions. But again, thank you for your time.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much, sir. Mr. Weber of
Texas.
Mr. Weber. Thank you, Madam Chair. I am going to follow up
on that. Winston Churchill, Mr. Dubowitz, said, an appeaser is
someone who feeds the crocodiles his friends one at a time,
hoping it will eat him last. Is that what is going on here? We
are simply trying to appease them in the sanctions process and
they are going to get the nuclear weapons? That is your best
opinion?
Mr. Dubowitz. You know, I don't like to use the word
``appeasement'' because I think that everybody who has engaged
in this has the best of intentions and is trying to figure out
how to deal with a very complicated diplomatic issue. I do
think that we tend to take a very Western approach to this. You
know, we are all trained in sort of negotiating tactics that we
want to have a good relationship, we want to expand the
community of interests, we want to look for different options,
we want to find a deal. The fact of the matter is we are
negotiating against hardened negotiators who employ
brinksmanship.
Mr. Weber. One who has already misled the United States and
boasted about it.
Mr. Dubowitz. They have absolutely done so. So this
Rouhaniphoria that has followed the election of Mr. Rouhani I
think has to be treated with a high degree of skepticism, not
because only of his track record, but the track record of the
Supreme Leader and the fact that these are men who understand
the nuclear file and have forgotten tricks we haven't even
learned.
Mr. Weber. All right. Let me move from that to one of my
colleagues, Mr. Deutch, down on the other side of the podium
here said that they were, I believe, sending Iran $500 million
a month into Syria and 500 tons of cargo a day, if I remember
him correctly. Were you all aware of that? And you think that
is pretty accurate? Based on $500 million a month, now you
talked about their surplus I think, how long can they do that?
Mr. Dubowitz. Well, I think that is the essential question.
I mean, if we know what the size of their accessible foreign
exchange reserves are and we know how much money they have got
in the bank, then we have a pretty good sense of how long they
can do that.
Mr. Weber. So do the math. How long is it?
Mr. Dubowitz. Well, you know, that is the question you need
to ask the administration in a classified setting.
Mr. Weber. Let me move over to Ambassador Bolton.
Ambassador Bolton. I don't think we know what Iran's
foreign exchange reserves are. I don't think they have been
honest over the past decade in declaring what their reserves
are and where they are. I don't think they are being honest
today about their oil exports. I don't think they are recording
as official exports the oil they are trucking through Kurdistan
into Turkey. I don't think we are calculating the oil they are
shipping through Iraq as Iraqi oil.
Mr. Weber. In other words, you think they would
purposefully mislead us.
Ambassador Bolton. I know it is shocking.
Mr. Weber. Golly. Let me move on.
Ambassador Bolton. That is the way it goes.
Mr. Weber. Let me move on. So you say if the Israelis have
that air strike, if they issue that strike, that Iran will most
assuredly will retaliate. And I think you said by unleashing
Hezbollah into just an unbelievable rocket barrage. Of course
we have the Iron Dome in place. Any idea of what kind of
sustained barrage and how long that would go on?
Ambassador Bolton. Well, I think the Iranian calculus,
although you can never be sure with a regime of that nature, is
that they can intimidate Israel into not acting by threatening
Israel's civilian population. And I think the supplies and the
personnel that they have put into the Bekaa Valley for
Hezbollah since the end of the Israel-Hezbollah war in 2006 is
very, very frightening. I think their efforts, which are
continuing, to put at least a modest missile capability in
Hamas's hands in the Gaza Strip, all make this an
extraordinarily difficult decision for Israel, which is what it
is calculated to do. And I think that is why we have to look at
this from the perspective that there is not much time for
Israel to make a decision whether it is going to----
Mr. Weber. Well, it is just delayed annihilation, if you
will. I mean, they can either go ahead and stop the process now
or be confronted with it later.
Ambassador Bolton. Or they can risk the very real
possibility that we have all miscalculated, and that Iran has
facilities we don't know about, or that they are working with
North Korea, or many other things that put them much closer,
not just to one or two nuclear weapons, but to scores of
nuclear weapons.
Mr. Weber. No, I would agree with that. Now let me move
back to you Mr., is it Dubowitz or Dubowitz?
Mr. Dubowitz. Dubowitz.
Mr. Weber. Dubowitz. You said earlier that not killing
Christians, women, and children should not be the framework for
concessions in your prepared remarks. Would you reiterate that?
Mr. Dubowitz. Well, what I said is that if Mr. Rouhani and
this regime would actually demonstrate their moderation, they
should stop killing Syrian women and children. But we shouldn't
reward them for that.
Mr. Weber. So you are not saying that we are negotiating
with that right now.
Mr. Dubowitz. No, we are not negotiating with that right
now. What I am suggesting is that we try to view Mr. Rouhani
through the prism of the nuclear file all the time. And I think
what we try to do in this hearing, given the nexus, is to view
him through the prism of Syria, where Mr. Rouhani and this
regime are complicit in the slaughter of tens of thousands of
Syrians, including women and children. And that should give us
pause when we sit down with this man.
Mr. Weber. Oh, absolutely. And that is a great point. I
appreciate you making it. Madam Chair, I yield back.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, sir. My Florida colleague, Ms.
Frankel.
Ms. Frankel. Thank you, Madam Chair. Thank you all for your
service. To me, this is an example of very smart, committed
people with very different opinions on things. And I just
wanted to say as an aside that I am personally happy that our
Secretary of State is trying for peace in the Middle East. And
I hope, and I expect that he will not lose focus on Iran and
Syria and the rest of the chaos.
Mr. Bolton, I think I heard you say that you do not
believe, as to Iran, that sanctions are working. So I want to
just ask you specifically are you suggesting a military
intervention to stop a nuclear power? And let me ask my other
question. And then, I think, Mr. Dubowitz, I think I heard you
say that you think we should have more sanctions. But the
sanctions should just be related to Iran trying to obtain
nuclear power, but should not be related to its action in
Syria. I think you said that. No, you didn't say that. Well,
maybe you could explain that. Let's start with those two
questions, and then we will go from there.
Ambassador Bolton. There is simply no evidence that the
sanctions have had any impact on Iran's nuclear weapons
program. And given that with the amount of uranium they have
enriched to reactor grade already, if they were racing to
create nuclear weapons, they could do it within about 4 months.
So the notion that continuing to ratchet up the sanctions at
some point will prevent them from getting nuclear weapons
simply misses the reality. I think, and I want to say this very
carefully, objectively speaking, focusing on sanctions almost
guarantees that Iran will get nuclear weapons because they are
that close.
I do believe that the only option is a preemptive military
strike against Iran's nuclear program. I have believed that for
quite some number of years. And I know this is a very, very
unattractive option. But it is a far worse option to
contemplate Iran with nuclear weapons, not only because of what
that regime could do with those weapons, but because it doesn't
stop with Iran. As Secretary of State Clinton said over a year
ago, if Iran gets nuclear weapons, so will Saudi Arabia, so
will Egypt, so will Turkey, so will others.
Ms. Frankel. Mr. Bolton, can I just ask the other two
gentlemen to comment on that? And give me your opinion of a
scenario of what would happen if there was a military
intervention?
Mr. Dubowitz. I think there is another scenario, which is
not necessarily to launch a military strike, but actually to
enhance the credibility that we were serious about using the
military option if all other options were exhausted. I mean, I
think one of the fundamental problems of our Iran policy has
been that the Supreme Leader does not believe the United
States, and I don't think even believes Israel that we are
serious about using military force to destroy his nuclear
facilities. I think if he thought so and actually believed
that, we would have a much better chance of finding a peaceful
resolution to this problem at the negotiating table through a
combination of economic pressure and a credible military
threat. We may not actually have to launch those military
strikes in order to get that deal, but we have got to enhance
the credibility of the threat.
Ms. Frankel. How is that done?
Mr. Dubowitz. It is done through the rhetoric of the
President, it is done through the positioning of military
assets, it is done through selective leaks, it is done through
arming our allies, it is done through a variety of ways that
signals to the Iranians that this President is serious about
using military force to stop a critical nuclear capability, not
just a nuclear weapon.
Ms. Frankel. Dr. Brumberg?
Mr. Brumberg. Well, I have to admit I am not an expert on
these strategic matters. I have spent, however, a lot of time
sitting with the experts here in Washington, and, I might add,
in Israel, talking about this very subject. And I have not run
into serious people who do serious work on this question who
would argue that using force is an obvious or inevitably
successful strategy. In fact, quite the contrary. I hear it
over and over again that it will be a boomerang. Why? Because a
serious military strike is not something that you have
overnight and disappear. It takes weeks. You have to make sure
the Iranians cannot retaliate.
So when you talk about a strike, understand what we are
talking about. We are talking about going to war. Now, that is
what I was saying before. I am not advocating going to war. But
I think the discussion just gets around what the real options
are. We have to stand up and say if we want war, then make the
argument. It is no point in threatening war unless you are
ready to go to war. And from what I can tell, again, working
with my Israeli friends, the debate in Israel is rich and
complex. And the military people there are not convinced that
the military strike is the obvious way to go. And moreover,
they don't necessarily believe that it is possible for them to
do it without the U.S.'s involvement in a major sustained set
of strikes lasting weeks, if not longer.
So if this is the solution, and we think at the end of the
day we will resolve this, with all the costs to the region, and
the costs to the hopes of reform in Iran, then let's make that
argument. But if we don't really want that outcome, then let's
talk about the real possibilities. And I think that often the
conversation doesn't get down to the nitty gritty. And while I
obviously disagree with Ambassador Bolton in some respects, I
respect his readiness to at least articulate what he thinks the
ultimate real option is, which is war.
And if that is the way we want to go, then let's make the
argument. But I don't think it is the obvious solution. And I
think that threatening war when you know the consequences are
going to be very bad isn't an especially good idea.
Mr. Dubowitz. Remembering that this is an Iran-Syria nexus
hearing, remember there are Iranian assets in Syria as well. I
mean, the Revolutionary Guard assets could force assets in
Syria. The Israelis have reportedly launched four air strikes
against assets in Syria, Hezbollah assets in Syria. They have
penetrated Syrian air defenses. There has been no blowback, no
consequences. They have lost no planes, no pilots. It does
suggest that the U.S. has other strike options that may not
entail blowing up Iran's nuclear facilities, but, in fact, may
entail going after Iranian assets in Syria selectively to once
again send a message of resolve. I don't think it is an either/
or between, you know, appeasement and a full-scale military
intervention with 150,000 soldiers climbing through the
mountains of Iran. There are other options as we look at this
trajectory.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you. And my other Florida
colleague, Mr. DeSantis.
Mr. DeSantis. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. You know, I
appreciate the testimony. I was reading in the paper when they
had the Iranian election, and Wall Street Journal, Washington
Post, I mean, all of them, moderate wins Iranian election. And
we even have a letter now that is circulating amongst my
colleagues in the House, I think there is over 130 of them, who
have said, hey, this guy's a moderate, this is a chance to get
some negotiations. And I just find that to be incredibly naive.
To describe him as a moderate in a way that we would kind of
think of it here is very misleading.
So Ambassador Bolton, what is your sense on Hasan Rouhani
and this idea that he is some kind of a moderate? Do you agree
with that? And do you think that it is worth negotiating with
this regime?
Ambassador Bolton. No, I don't think it is worth
negotiating. We have negotiated for 10 years. And you know, at
some point you can say how much longer do we have to wait? The
criticism of Ahmadinejad when he was President by the so-called
moderates had nothing to do with his objective to get a
deliverable nuclear weapons capability. It was that he talked
about wiping Israel off the face of the Earth, that he boasted
about the nuclear weapons program, that he went on public
relations tours of the centrifuge facility at Natanz, that he
kept talking about it.
And the argument by leaders like Rafsanjani and others was
stop talking about it. You are getting the West agitated. They
are paying attention to it. And I think Rouhani is perfectly
positioned to play exactly that kind of strategy to allay the
fears, to have negotiations, to make meaningless concessions,
all the while Iran's nuclear infrastructure grows broader and
deeper. And just one piece that we haven't talked about today,
the IAEA, in its last quarterly report, estimates that the
heavy water production facility and the heavy water reactor at
Iraq will be on line next year. And that is an even more
efficient way to produce plutonium for the plutonium route to
nuclear weapons. There is no power generating capacity in Iraq
to use the output of the heavy water reactor. It can only have
a weapons purpose. And it is going right along.
Mr. DeSantis. With respect to Iran's pursuit of nuclear
weapons and Israel's response, you know, you talked about an
Israeli strike. I think in your testimony you meant a strike on
the actual reactors. One of the gentlemen up here mentioned
some of their other assets in the region. So Ambassador Bolton,
do you think a strike against some of these other assets in the
region, but not necessarily a strike on the Iraqi--or on the
Iranian nuclear facilities itself would be effective or
sufficient?
Ambassador Bolton. No, I don't. I think what any strike has
to do is break Iran's control over the nuclear fuel cycle at
certain key points. You don't have to destroy all their
facilities. But at a minimum, I think you need to prevent their
capacity to enrich uranium and the even more vulnerable link,
their capacity to convert uranium from a solid into a gas. This
is the Isfahan conversion facility. We know where it is. It is
all above ground. We don't think there is an alternative. The
risk of not acting, as every day goes by, is simply that Iran
increases the potential to have redundant facilities that we
don't know about. And for all this discussion that we have had
here today and we have in the general public debate, we ought
to be a little bit more humble about our intelligence about
what is actually going on in Iran.
We have had problems overestimating our accuracy before.
And that is why the notion that we have an essentially
unlimited time to negotiate is very, very dangerous.
Mr. DeSantis. And I know this is about the Syrian-Iran
nexus, but with respect to the Israeli-Palestinian issue I
think it is relevant because it kind of feeds into this idea
that we can get further in negotiations and we may have to. I
know Israel has agreed to give up 100 or so Palestinian
prisoners, terrorists. And it is frustrating to me because I
think that sends the wrong signal to the Palestinians, almost a
reward in some ways. I don't think that that is going to lead
to any type of lasting settlement. But what are your thoughts
on what is going on with that situation?
Ambassador Bolton. No, I think the release of the prisoners
was clearly as a result of the pressure of the United States. I
don't think that will fundamentally change the negotiating
dynamic. And I think the ultimate outcome is that we are going
to be left pretty much in the place that we were before. I do
think to the extent that it reflects an investment of American
prestige in an effort that is almost certainly doomed to
failure, it will leave the United States, when that occurs, in
yet even weaker a position in the region as a whole than we are
already.
Mr. DeSantis. I appreciate that. And thank you, Madam
Chairwoman. I yield back.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, sir. Mr. Connolly of Virginia.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. And you may not
remember that I was once a Senate staffer on the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee. But in 1981, I staffed the nomination
hearing for a young person named John Bolton.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. He was young once?
Mr. Connolly. He was young, he had no gray hair. He still
had the moustache, though.
Ambassador Bolton. Much like you.
Mr. Connolly. That is right. He aged. I don't know what
happened to me. Well, starting with you, Mr. Ambassador, you
sound pretty gloomy. You have no faith in the restart of peace
negotiations undertaken by Secretary Kerry, and you think that
there is really no alternative but to a preemptive strike to
take out the nuclear capability that is being developed in
Iran. Is that correct?
Ambassador Bolton. Yeah. It is a very, very unattractive
alternative. But I think you have to look at it this way. If
the choice were between the world as it is today compared to
the world after an Israeli strike, we would all prefer the
world as it is today, of course. But that is not the choice
that Israel faces or that the United States faces. The choice
is between the world after an Israeli strike compared to a
world where Iran has nuclear weapons. And it is in that
circumstance where that is the decision that the resort to
preemptive military force, as Israel has twice before done
against this program, I think is the only other option.
Mr. Connolly. So the Israelis should, in your view, and we
should encourage them by extension, I assume, undertake this
preemptive action. Any kind of timeline?
Ambassador Bolton. The sooner the better. I mean, look, the
Israelis unambiguously would prefer that the United States do
this because they know our capacity is much greater, our
ability to sustain the operation over a long period of time is
much greater. And it is true that the United States has said,
in both the last administration and this one, that all options
are on the table, but nobody believes that. Nobody believes it
in Israel and nobody believes it in Iran. That is why the
spotlight is on Israel. They don't want it on Israel, but that
is the choice. And I think if they don't act in the very near
future, then the almost certain outcome is that Iran gets
nuclear weapons and very, very soon. And if that happens, as I
said a moment ago, I think at least three other countries in
the region move quickly to get nuclear weapons themselves.
Mr. Connolly. What about trying, before you sort of
undertake a preemptive strike, presumably you have got to do
some calculus about the consequences. Now, some have posited
that this is very different from taking out a capacity in Syria
or the previous taking out of a reactor in Iraq. This is very
different, and that you are talking about potentially region-
wide, you know, reactions that could be deeply and profoundly
injurious to the interests of Israel, and by extension, us. So
how would you address that, Mr. Ambassador, since you have
called for the preemptive strike?
Ambassador Bolton. Yeah. Well, I have written, and I will
try and summarize what I think the Iranian reaction would be.
But let me say, first, in terms of the reaction in the region,
the Arab states of the peninsula on the other side of the Gulf
would welcome the elimination of the Iranian nuclear weapons
program. They may not say that publicly, but in private, they
fear Iran with nuclear weapons almost as much as Israel does. I
think that Iran itself, then, would have some hard decisions
about how to respond. I do not think that they would close the
Strait of Hormuz. I do not think they would attack deployed
American forces in the region or the Arab states on the other
side of the Gulf because that would bring us in.
And as I said before, you can never be certain with this
regime. But I think by process of elimination you conclude the
most likely Iranian retaliation is to have Hezbollah and Hamas
attack Israel, which is why prompt American support, if Israel
does decide to attack, is so important to resupply the planes
they will undoubtedly lose in large numbers over Iran so that
they can gain air supremacy over the Bekaa Valley and the Gaza
Strip to suppress that rocket fire.
Mr. Connolly. Madam Chairwoman, if you would allow Mr.
Dubowitz and Dr. Brumberg to simply have the opportunity to
respond.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Without objection.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you.
Mr. Dubowitz. Congressman, I actually think that there is
another risk, that the Iranians may not dash to a nuclear
weapon quickly, prompting a--or at least before that, prompting
Israel and the United States to have to move quickly. The
Iranian end game actually may have a middle point. And the
middle point is to establish critical nuclear capability where
they are at the point of undetectable nuclear breakout, where
they can break out without the IAEA and Western intelligence
knowing about it. And then in doing so, establish an industrial
size nuclear capacity so they can produce not one weapon, but
multiple weapons, and then stop. And at that critical point
where they have the ability to turn a screw and build a nuclear
weapon, they stop and they say to the international community
we now have an industrial-sized program with undetectable
breakout, and here are our demands: Massive sanctions relief,
recognize our interests in Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq, Bahrain
and elsewhere, and don't force us to build a bomb. You know,
the Supreme Leader has this supposed fatwa against a nuclear
weapon. Well, we don't want a nuclear weapon, so don't force
our hand. And in doing so have all of the leverage and turn the
tables on the international community, get massive sanctions
relief, get the oil flowing, get the economy stabilized, and
then at some point, because I think it is absolutely in the
Supreme Leader's DNA, then dash to a weapon with a strong
economy and without sanctions in place. That may be a potential
end game that I think we should be very conscious and very wary
of.
Mr. Brumberg. Well, if this discussion illustrates
anything, it is the lack of good alternatives. I mean, I think
we all recognize, listening to this discussion as we are trying
to work out a very difficult situation, that many of the
alternatives are worse than the other. The Israelis themselves,
from what I know, speaking to the experts, don't believe that
they have the ordnance to undertake an effective strike by
themselves. And therefore, there is no such thing as successful
or effort to be successful on the military front without a
concerted, extended, protracted bombing campaign supported by
the U.S.
And again, there is no guarantee that it will be
successful. And it may have regional effects that we can't
imagine and maybe disaster. And that is disastrous. That is why
the Israelis are so worried, and are not necessarily adamant
for making the kinds of moves that some are advocating. I might
also just add one more remark here, and that is when you talk
about the Iranians looking for capacity, having the capacity,
what that means. It is a very complex issue. Can we negotiate
under those circumstances an agreement that we can accept?
Perhaps not. Perhaps so. We don't really know. This is a matter
to be addressed through negotiations, unless we simply don't
want to have negotiations. Then the war option is really the
only one, and it is not a good one either.
So I think that all the alternatives are bad. I myself have
made the argument that we should, at the very least, test the
opportunity before us. The situation cannot be reduced to one
man or one position, but is a complex one in which we have a
serious process of change going on in Iran, and let's not blow
that up as well.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Mr. Connolly. I hope your cold
gets better. And Mr. Deutch and I have packed this subcommittee
with Floridians. So very pleased to yield to Dr. Yoho of
Florida.
Mr. Yoho. Thank you, Madam Chair. I appreciate the
opportunity, and I enjoy you guys and your testimony. What I
see as our foreign policy is a circle. It is like a tiger
chasing its tail for the last 25 to 30 years. You know, stop
Iran from developing a nuclear weapon, sanctions, the threat of
war, the IAEA inspectors in the hopes that Iran will not
develop a nuclear war.
Mr. Bolton, or Ambassador Bolton, in your book, Surrender
is Not an Option, for over 20 years we and other nations of the
world have attempted to dissuade Iran from developing a nuclear
weapon, but yet they get closer, decade by decade, year by
year, day by day. And we send the IAEA in there, and they get
hoodwinked, and Iran says we are not doing it, but we know they
are and they have been. I mean, the proof is in the pudding
right now.
What other strategies, other than the sanctions we have
talked about and the threat of war, would you recommend? And
this is for all three of you. And what, in your opinion--and I
know this is crazy, but play along with me here, because the
last 30 years have been kind of crazy. And this has happened
before with Pakistan developing a nuclear weapon and then
India. Said it couldn't be done. And then North Korea and
China. What would happen if, as Mr. Dubowitz said, the end
game, if they were allowed--not allowed, but if they developed
that and then we had a different strategy, thinking outside of
the box, and say you know what, if you have that, you just
better be careful how you use it because the rest of the world
is going to respond. I mean, I know that is--I have not heard
anybody talk about that. But yet you said your end game is
getting Iran that close to developing a nuclear weapon. And if
they get that close, they have the negotiation power. And it
sounds to me like they are going to get that anyways. So what
happens if we change the policy and said you know what, if you
get that, you need to be very, very careful? I would like to
hear your comments on that.
Ambassador Bolton. Well, I think the idea that if they get
nuclear weapons they can be contained and deterred is a
strategy that is doomed to leave Israel and our Arab friends in
the region in grave peril forever. And in fact, given Iran's
support for international terrorism over the years, would lead
to the potential of them assisting terrorists in exploding a
nuclear device anywhere on Earth, whether they ever get the
ballistic missile capability to deliver it that way or not.
And as I said a moment ago, once that happens, even if I am
wrong that you cannot contain and deter a nuclear Iran, it
doesn't stop there. You have got the proliferation to the
Saudis, to Egypt, to Turkey, and others that takes an already
very dangerous environment in the Middle East and ratchets it
up to half a dozen nuclear weapon states in a relatively short
period of time. And that too is a prescription for disaster.
So that is why I think it has been so important to focus on
stopping Iran in the first place. And the idea that there is
some level that people would allow them to be comfortable with
but not actually, for example, testing nuclear weapons, I think
is a mistake because I think the proliferation will occur
anyway. If you have trouble sleeping some night just read books
about India's recessed deterrent policy----
Mr. Yoho. I have.
Ambassador Bolton [continuing]. In the decades before they
detonated weapons in 1998. They did have everything but turning
the last screw, and everybody knew it, and that is why Pakistan
got nuclear weapons. And that is proliferation at work. That is
why, as I say, the ultimate conclusion has to be to stop Iran
in the first instance. And we are very nearly out of time do
that.
Mr. Dubowitz. Well, I absolutely agree. I mean, I think
Iran as a threshold nuclear power would be as dangerous as Iran
with nuclear weapons, which is why we must ensure that they
don't get there. And these notions of giving Iran the right to
enrichment, or having it have domestic enrichment I think are
fanciful, because ultimately, this is a regime that has shown
itself willing to rapaciously cheat and deceive. And if it has
domestic enrichment, it will do so.
Just to add to your question, sir, I think that there is
more we can do to show the Supreme Leader that we are serious.
I mean, if you look at it from his perspective, Iranian
provocation in Iraq and Afghanistan, around the world,
including trying to blow up a restaurant in Georgetown,
Washington, has been met with nothing. No response. Court
hearings. Prosecutions. Angry words. And even on the sanctions
front, targeted sanctions, graduated sanctions, focused
sanctions. We haven't responded in a massive way. On the
sanctions side, it needs to be massive sanctions leading to
economic collapse. We should be responding in places like Syria
not with U.N. Council recommendations or Geneva two peace
conferences, but with actually killing Iranian IRGC Quds Force
commanders in Syria. I mean they are there, they are on the
ground. We should be taking them out. That will send a message
that we are serious.
Mr. Yoho. Madam Chair, can the next witness answer that?
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Absolutely, Dr. Yoho.
Mr. Yoho. Thank you, ma'am.
Mr. Brumberg. Well, I think you put your finger on the
question, and that is, is there any level of enrichment that we
can live with in a negotiated settlement? Now, from the
perspective of the United States and our European allies, if
there is no level of enrichment on Iranian soil acceptable,
there is no basis for an agreement and we should simply stop
negotiating and consider the options which we have already
talked about. I am not convinced that this is the basis for a
negotiation. And I don't think whatever administration was
sitting in the White House would necessarily agree to that
premise. Because it only narrows your options and precludes
negotiations.
So once again, this is really about ultimately what is the
end game of a negotiation. What are you prepared to live with?
And that is a discussion that neither the Iranians nor the
Americans are very likely or happy to have. We keep dancing
around it. In some sense, we are making progress here because
at least we are having that discussion. But that is really the
ultimate question. And we can have a useful debate about that.
Mr. Yoho. Thank you.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much. Mr. Messer, you are
our cleanup batter hitter. Come on, out of the ballpark.
Mr. Messer. Well, thank you, Madam Chair. I certainly
appreciate the testimony today, and have learned a lot
listening. I think in the last couple of questioners, you know,
often when we go through these conversations, we assume that it
is a given that Iran cannot, we cannot have a nuclear Iran, and
yet then don't talk about the consequences of what that really
means. I think in the last couple of questioners we managed to
get there. So I will skip through that, the questions I was
going to ask there, and just say, in my view, I think shared by
at least two of the three on the panel, there is no world in
which it is acceptable to have a nuclear Iran. The world would
be forever changed. And we have to do whatever we can, even the
most unsavory of options, to make sure that that doesn't
happen.
This hearing is about the nexus between Syria and Iran. And
obviously in the world we live in today, there is an awful lot
of events happening in Syria. So I would just ask the panelists
to assess where they see events in Syria today, the stability
of the Assad regime, and how does this nexus change in a world
if Assad falls.
Ambassador Bolton. Well, let me just address one aspect we
haven't talked a lot about in connection with Syria. And that
is the effective confluence of interests between Iran and
Russia in keeping Assad in power. I think that is very
important for a lot of reasons. And I think that is why you see
the momentum, the dynamic in the conflict having shifted these
past several months. Certainly not over yet. We have been up
and down and all around in Syria over the past 2 years. I don't
think you can predict at this point even yet what the outcome
will be. But Russia and Iran have worked effectively to keep
the Assad regime propped up when it looked like it was about to
go down. And that is significant I think because of the larger
regional implications. Russia and China cast three double
vetoes in the Security Council of U.S. and European proposed
sanctions. They are going to do whatever they can to keep Assad
in power, as Iran will.
And that is one reason why I worry, in the midst of all
this chaos in the other countries in the region, that the
Russians see an opportunity, maybe not to get back to where
they were in Soviet days before the--before Sadat took office
in Egypt, but they see the potential to expand Russian
influence in the region that they haven't had in a long time.
And so that is why this conflict in Syria is so important
to them. And I think we have missed this in the last 2 years.
We believed for a long time we could negotiate with Russia to
ease Assad out of power. It was never going to happen. And I
think the Obama administration was reluctant to take Iran on in
the early days of Syria because that would tank whatever
prospects there were of negotiating with Iran about the nuclear
weapons program. That is the linkage point right there.
So I think it is a very, very troubling time from that
perspective, and that Russia and Iranian cooperation isn't
ending in Syria. You are going to continue to see it as the
Russians for reasons of their own, and very mistakenly in my
view, but as they continue to fly political cover for Iran on
this issue.
Mr. Messer. Thanks. The other panelists.
Mr. Dubowitz. Well, with respect to Syria, I mean again, I
think the Iranian game there is to establish a different kind
of critical capability, in that case, to establish what my FDD
colleague Tony Badran has called Alawistan. So Assad is
winning. Assad will probably not have control over all of
Syria. But if he can control a land mass that stretches from
Latakia in the north to Tartus on the border of Lebanon in the
south, includes Homs and Damascus, with territorial contiguity
with Lebanon, which provides a land bridge to Hezbollah, then
he has Alawistan, he has a land mass, a launching pad for
Iranian influence in that region. And that is a different kind
of critical capability than we talked about on the nuclear
side, which is threshold critical capability.
I think on the issue of how we deal with this, and this is
a response to my friend over here, I think we make a big
mistake when we negotiate with the Iranians in responding to an
Iranian declaration that something is nonnegotiable by saying,
okay, it is nonnegotiable, then we will take it off the table.
So the right to enrichment, domestic enrichment, nonnegotiable,
we won't have a deal unless we----
Mr. Messer. Particularly when the result is nonnegotiable.
Mr. Dubowitz. Well, that is right. And I think that that is
just a big mistake in negotiating with men who employ
brinksmanship. Everything is negotiable. And in fact, what we
need to be doing is what the Iranians are doing, creating facts
on the ground in the way that they create centrifuges on the
ground, enrichment stockpiling, and critical territory in
Syria. We need to be creating our own facts on the ground to
use as leverage in a negotiation process where we can actually
come to some peaceful determination.
Mr. Messer. Okay. Madam Chair, with your permission Dr.
Brumberg.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Absolutely. Without objection.
Mr. Brumberg. I think we all can agree the situation in
Syria is disastrous on many levels, one of which we have
already mentioned briefly, and that is it has been the basis
for an escalation of a sectarian war between the Sunnis and the
Shiites throughout the region. And that is feeding the jihadist
movements everywhere, including, of course, now in the Sinai,
which has become a huge problem. And what is interesting is
that in Iran, there is a considerable debate about this.
Because they know the blowback of their so-called success in
Syria will come to haunt them. This has implications for Iran's
own security. If Lebanon falls apart, and Hezbollah is
completely dragged into a sectarian war, Iran's own interests
will not be defended, and in fact, will be undermined.
So the Iranians are having an interesting debate about
this. The incoming President and the people around him are
surely aware of it. They have talked about it. And they are
going to have to deal with the unintended consequences of their
so-called victory in Syria.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much. I thank the witnesses
for excellent testimony. And I do agree with Ambassador Bolton,
in an ideal world, peace between Israel and the Palestinians,
is always a wonderful thing. But meanwhile, we can only have so
many hours in the day. You have to focus on what is happening.
We have got Egypt in crisis. We have got Iran close to nuclear
weapons. We have got bloodshed in Syria. And look what this
administration is doing. Anyway, with that, the subcommittee is
adjourned. Thank you gentlemen. Thank you to the audience as
well.
[Whereupon, at 4:05 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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