[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
BENGHAZI: EXPOSING FAILURE AND RECOGNIZING COURAGE
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HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT
AND GOVERNMENT REFORM
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MAY 8, 2013
__________
Serial No. 113-30
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform
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COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM
DARRELL E. ISSA, California, Chairman
JOHN L. MICA, Florida ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland,
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio Ranking Minority Member
JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
PATRICK T. McHENRY, North Carolina ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of
JIM JORDAN, Ohio Columbia
JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts
TIM WALBERG, Michigan WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri
JAMES LANKFORD, Oklahoma STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
JUSTIN AMASH, Michigan JIM COOPER, Tennessee
PAUL A. GOSAR, Arizona GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
PATRICK MEEHAN, Pennsylvania JACKIE SPEIER, California
SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee MATTHEW A. CARTWRIGHT,
TREY GOWDY, South Carolina Pennsylvania
BLAKE FARENTHOLD, Texas MARK POCAN, Wisconsin
DOC HASTINGS, Washington TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
CYNTHIA M. LUMMIS, Wyoming ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois
ROB WOODALL, Georgia DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois
THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky PETER WELCH, Vermont
DOUG COLLINS, Georgia TONY CARDENAS, California
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina STEVEN A. HORSFORD, Nevada
KERRY L. BENTIVOLIO, Michigan MICHELLE LUJAN GRISHAM, New Mexico
RON DeSANTIS, Florida
Lawrence J. Brady, Staff Director
John D. Cuaderes, Deputy Staff Director
Stephen Castor, General Counsel
Linda A. Good, Chief Clerk
David Rapallo, Minority Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Hearing held on May 8, 2013...................................... 1
WITNESSES
Mr. Mark Thompson, Deputy Coordinator for Operations, Bureau of
Counterterrorism and Leader, Foreign Emergency Support Team,
U.S. Department of State
Oral Statement............................................... 7
Written Statement............................................ 9
Mr. Gregory Hicks,Foreign Service Officer and Former Deputy Chief
of Mission/Charge D'Affairs in Libya, U.S. Department of State
Oral Statement............................................... 10
Written Statement............................................ 11
Mr. Eric Nordstrom, Diplomatic Security Officer and Former
Regional Security Officer in Libya, U.S. Department of State
Oral Statement............................................... 15
Written Statement............................................ 16
APPENDIX
Article from the Washington Post Submitted by Mrs. Carolyn B.
Maloney a Member of Congress from the State of New York........ 114
Department of Defense Press Release Dated May 8, 2013, Submitted
by Robin L. Kelly a Member of Congress from the State of
Illinois....................................................... 119
New York Times Article September 12, 2012, Submitted by Gerald E.
Connolly a Member of Congress from the State of Virginia....... 120
Statement for the Record Submitted by Matthew A. Cartwright a
Member of Congress from the State of Pennsylvania.............. 125
BENGHAZI: EXPOSING FAILURE AND RECOGNIZING COURAGE
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Wednesday, May 8, 2013
House of Representatives,
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform,
Washington, D.C.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 11:30 a.m., in Room
2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Darrell E. Issa
[chairman of the committee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Issa, Mica, Turner, Duncan,
McHenry, Jordan, Chaffetz, Walberg, Lankford, Amash, Gosar,
Meehan, DesJarlais, Gowdy, Farenthold, Hastings, Lummis,
Woodall, Massie, Collins, Meadows, Bentivolio, DeSantis,
Cummings, Maloney, Norton, Tierney, Clay, Lynch, Cooper,
Connolly, Speier, Cartwright, Pocan, Duckworth, Kelly, Davis,
Welch, Cardenas, Horsford, and Lujan Grisham.
Also Present: Representatives Rohrabacher and Jackson Lee.
Staff Present: Ali Ahmad, Communications Adviser; Alexia
Ardolina, Assistant Clerk; Jen Barblan, Counsel; Kurt Bardella,
Senior Policy Adviser; Brien A. Beattie, Professional Staff
Member; Richard A. Beutel, Senior Counsel; Will L. Boyington,
Press Assistant; Molly Boyl, Parliamentarian; Lawrence J.
Brady, Staff Director; Joseph A. Brazauskas, Executive
Assistant; Ashley H. Callen, Senior Counsel; Caitlin Carroll,
Deputy Press Secretary; Sharon Casey, Senior Assistant Clerk;
Steve Castor, General Counsel; John Cuaderes, Deputy Staff
Director; Brian Daner, Counsel; Carlton Davis, Senior Counsel;
Jessica L. Donlon, Senior Counsel; Kate Dunbar, Professional
Staff Member; Adam P. Fromm, Director of Member Services and
Committee Operations; Linda Good, Chief Clerk; Tyler Grimm,
Senior Professional Staff Member; Ryan M. Hambleton, Senior
Professional Staff Member; Frederick Hill, Director of
Communications and Senior Policy Advisor; Christopher Hixon,
Deputy Chief Counsel, Oversight; Mitchell S. Kominsky, Counsel;
Jim Lewis, Senior Policy Advisor; Justin LoFranco, Digital
Director; Mark D. Marin, Director of Oversight; Kristin L.
Nelson, Senior Counsel; John Ohly, Senior Professional Staff
Member; Ashok M. Pinto, Chief Counsel, Investigations; Laura L.
Rush, Deputy Chief Clerk; Scott Schmidt, Deputy Director of
Digital Strategy; Jonathan J. Skladany, Deputy Chief Counsel,
Investigations; Rebecca Watkins, Deputy Director of
Communications; Kevin Corbin, Minority Professional Staff
Member; Susanne Sachsman Grooms, Minority Chief Counsel; Devon
Hill, Minority Research Assistant; Jennifer Hoffman, Minority
Press Secretary; Carla Hultberg, Minority Chief Clerk; Peter
Kenny, Minority Counsel; Chris Knauer, Minority Senior
Investigator; Lucina Lessley, Minority Policy Director; Leah
Perry, Minority Chief Oversight Counsel; Dave Rapallo, Minority
Staff Director; Rory Sheehan, Minority New Media Press
Secretary; and Carlos Uriarte, Minority Counsel.
Chairman Issa. The hearing will come to order. The
Oversight Committee exists to secure two fundamental
principles: First, Americans have a right to know that the
money Washington takes from them is well spent; and, second,
Americans deserve an efficient, effective government that works
for them. Our duty on the Oversight and Government Reform
Committee is to protect these rights. Our solemn responsibility
is to hold government accountable to taxpayers because
taxpayers have a right to know what they get from their
government. Our obligation is to work tirelessly with citizen
watchdogs and whistleblowers to deliver the facts to the
American people and bring genuine reform to the Federal
bureaucracy.
On September 11, 2012, four Americans were murdered by
terrorists. It was the 11th anniversary of the 9/11 terrorist
attacks on New York and Washington. Recognizing that the
witnesses before us are actual experts on what really happened
before, during, and after the Benghazi attacks, I'm not going
to recount those events or decisions. These witnesses deserve
to be heard on the Benghazi attacks, the flaws in the
Accountability Review Board's methodology, process, and
conclusion.
Before I introduce these witnesses and explain some of our
efforts to learn more about what happened in Benghazi, I want
to take a moment to reflect on and to recognize the brave
Americans who lost their lives in that attack that day. I also
want to note that there are friends and immediate family of
those killed or injured that are with us here today. J.
Christopher Stevens, U.S. Ambassador to Libya; Sean Patrick
Smith, Information Management Specialist; Tyrone Woods,
Security Specialist and former Navy SEAL; Glen Doherty,
Security Specialist and former Navy SEAL.
Our goal in this investigation is to get answers because
their families deserve answers. They were promised answers at
the highest level when their bodies came home. The President
was there, the Vice President was there, the Secretary of
Defense was there, the Secretary of State was there. We want to
make certain those promises are kept on behalf of those
individuals. We also want to make certain that our government
learns the proper lessons from this tragedy so it never happens
again and so that the right people are held accountable.
I want those watching this proceeding to know that we've
made extensive efforts to engage the administration and to see
and hear their facts. The administration, however, has not been
cooperative, and unfortunately our minority has mostly sat
silent as we've made these requests. Some examples: On February
22nd this committee wrote to Ambassador Pickering and Admiral
Mullen who, as required by law, were appointed by Secretary
Clinton and cochaired the Accountability Review Board
investigation. We asked them to testify about their
investigations and findings. They refused, and our minority
said nothing. When we asked Ambassador Pickering and Admiral
Mullen to speak with us and our committee informally, they
again refused, and again there was silence by the minority.
When five House committee chairmen wrote the White House and
requested relevant documents about the Benghazi attacks, we
were refused. The committee's minority did not join in a
similar call for transparency, and I wish they had. On April
29th this committee asked the State Department to make nine
current and former officials with relevant information
available for this hearing or a separate transcribed interview.
The State Department did not even respond, and to date the
minority has not made a similar request.
Mr. Cummings, I would like nothing more than to have you
work with me on this investigation. Because we've worked on
other areas together, I still hold out hope that one day you
will stand with me as this administration doesn't cooperate,
when they ignore our inquiries, and when that day comes,
together we will be far more effective.
And now for our witnesses. Or should I say our
whistleblowers. Mr. Mark Thompson is the Acting Deputy
Assistant Secretary in the State Department--State's Department
of Bureau of Counterterrorism. Welcome. Mr. Gregory Hicks is a
22-year veteran Foreign Service officer and the former Deputy
Chief of Mission for the U. S. Embassy in Libya. After
Ambassador Stevens was murdered, Mr. Hicks became the Acting
Chief of Mission or, as they say, the charge d'affaires. He
was, in fact, in Libya its highest ranking officer, if you
will, America's representative in Libya. Mr. Eric Nordstrom is
a former--is the former Regional Security Officer in Libya and
perhaps the foremost and most knowledgeable person about
security requests that were made and denied to the U.S.
diplomatic mission in Libya and in Benghazi, ultimately in
Benghazi.
Mr. Cummings, we will have from time to time our
disagreements, but I know that for all the members of this
committee, we understand that these disagreements must be kept
on this side of the dais. These brave witnesses deserve this
committee's call to testify, these brave whistleblowers are, in
fact, what makes this committee's work work. We are the
committee that oversees and that led for new whistleblower
protections signed by this President. The public has a right to
hear their accounts, and we, more than any other committee in
the Congress, must respect whistleblowers and work on a
bipartisan basis always to protect them, and with that I
recognize the ranking member for his opening statement.
Mr. Cummings. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for calling
this hearing, and I want to be clear, and I've said it over and
over again, there's no Member of this Congress, be they
Republican or Democrat, who fails to uphold the right of
whistleblowers to come forward, and I think it's sad when that
accusation is made against any Member of this Congress. And so
to the hearing.
I, too, and all of our members, both Republicans and
Democrats, were tremendously saddened by the deaths of J.
Christopher Stevens, Sean Patrick Smith, Tyrone Woods, and Glen
Doherty. They were servants of the public. They, like our
whistleblowers, were people who dedicated their lives to making
a difference, and they saw the world as bigger than just them.
They were the ones that were often unseen, unnoticed,
unappreciated, and unapplauded. We've actually seen some of
that with regard to public employees in this Congress. But yet
and still day after day they went out there and they did their
jobs, and on behalf of this Congress and a grateful Nation, I
say thank you.
I am glad the whistleblowers are here, and I will do every
single thing in my power to protect the whistleblowers. As a
matter of fact, just on May 7, 2013, I sent a letter to John
Kerry, and I said in that letter that despite the highly
partisan nature of the committee's actions, it nevertheless
remains very important, and this is a quote, to me personally
to make clear to all government agencies and employees who
choose to come forward to Congress that their interests will be
protected. For these reasons, I request that the Department
remind its employees of their rights with respect to providing
information to Congress as well as their responsibilities not
to retaliate against individuals who exercise those rights. The
Department may already do this as a matter of course, in which
case I ask that you provide an update on the status of those
efforts.
Whistleblowers are important. They are very important. One
of the things that I've said in this meeting room over and over
again is that we must be effective and efficient, and one of
the major roles of this committee is to make sure that
government works properly, and so to all of our witnesses,
thank you.
Mr. Hicks, I would like to start by expressing my gratitude
for your service and my condolences for your loss. I can only
imagine what you went through on the night of the attacks. If I
had been in your place, hearing Ambassador Stevens' voice on
the phone, and wanting to do everything possible to help him, I
would have had the same questions you had: Where's the
military? Where are the Special Forces? Where are the fighter
jets to rescue my colleagues? These are legitimate questions,
and I wanted to know the answers myself.
For example, last week there was a widely publicized news
report that a team in Europe called the Commander's In-Extremis
Force could have gotten to Benghazi before the second attack.
When I heard this claim, I wrote to the Secretary of Defense
immediately. Yesterday I received an official response. It says
this press report was wrong. The team was too far away, and the
logistical requirements were too great. Others have suggested
that F-16s stationed at Aviano Air Force Base in Italy could
have gotten there in time, but according to General Martin
Dempsey, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who
testified before the Senate in February, he said they could
not, and this is our highest ranking military member. The fact
is that our Nation's top military commanders have already
testified repeatedly that they did everything in their power to
mobilize and deploy assets as soon as possible, and every
independent and bipartisan review has confirmed this fact. We
have the best military in the world, but even with all of their
technological advances, they could not get there in time.
Mr. Hicks, I know these answers provide no comfort to you
or the families of the victims, but this is the testimony
Congress has received, and I have seen nothing to make me
question the truthfulness of our Nation's military commanders.
Our committee has a fundamental obligation to conduct
responsible oversight, and that includes carefully examining
the information that you and others provide, but we also have a
duty to thoroughly investigate these claims before we make
public accusations.
In contrast, what we have seen over the past 2 weeks is a
full-scale media campaign that is not designed to investigate
what happened in a responsible and bipartisan way but, rather,
a launch unfounded--of unfounded accusations to smear public
officials.
Let me be clear, I am not questioning the motives of our
witnesses. I am questioning the motives of those who want to
use their statements for political purposes. Chairman Issa has
accused the administration of intentionally withholding
military assets which could have helped save lives on the night
of the attacks. I say for political reasons, of all the
irresponsible allegations leveled over the past 2 weeks, this
is the most troubling, and based on what our military
commanders have told us, this allegation is simply untrue.
Chairman Issa suggested that four military personnel were told
to stay in Tripoli rather than board a plane in Benghazi at 6
a.m. the morning after the attacks, supposedly because of the
administration's political desire not to have a presence in
Benghazi. There is no evidence to support this. As Mr. Hicks
told the committee, one plane had already left for Benghazi at
1:15 a.m. that night, and it included a seven-person security
team with two military personnel. The decision the next morning
to keep four military personnel in place in Tripoli was not
made by the White House or the State Department, but by the
military chain of command.
There are other allegations. Chairman Issa went on national
TV and accused Secretary Clinton of lying to Congress. He said
she personally signed a State Department cable authorizing
security reductions. We have now seen this cable, and she did
not sign it. Her name is printed at the bottom just like tens
of thousands of cables sent every year from the Department.
As I close, The Washington Post fact checker called this
accusation a whopper--that's their word--and gave it four
Pinocchios. Chairman Issa attacked Ambassador Susan Rice for
statements she made on Sunday talk shows, claiming the
administration, ``deliberately misled the American people.''
The claim has been directly contradicted by our Nation's top
intelligence official, General James Clapper. He testified, he
has already testified before the Senate that these attacks
against Ms. Rice were, ``unfair,'' because, ``she was going on
what we had given her, and that was our collective best
judgment at the time.'' There have also been allegations that
the Accountability Review Board, led by Ambassador Thomas
Pickering and Admiral Mike Mullen, failed to examine the role
of Ambassador Patrick Kennedy. This accusation is, again,
inaccurate according to the board.
And so, Mr. Chairman, if this committee is going to suggest
that General Dempsey, General Clapper are all involved in a
conspiracy of withholding military assets and then covering it
up and if this committee is going to accuse Ambassador
Pickering and Admiral Mullen of failing to fully investigate
these attacks, the least we can do is have them invited to this
hearing today or in a future hearing, and according to our
conversation yesterday with regard to Admiral Pickering and
Mullen, you have said that you plan to bring them in the
future, and I respect--I appreciate that.
Last but not least, let's make it--I want to make it very
clear to our witnesses, I respect the witnesses who are here
today to offer their testimony. As a lawyer and an officer of
the court, I have tremendous respect for evidence, but today's
hearing is not the full story. I hope we will eventually hear
our military, our intelligence, and our diplomatic officials.
Then I hope we can turn to the real work, as the chairman said,
of this committee, which is ensuring that the Department
implements the recommendations to improve the security of our
diplomatic officials serving overseas, those who are so often
unseen, unnoticed, unappreciated, and unapplauded.
With that, I yield back.
Chairman Issa. I thank the gentleman. Fortunately today I'm
not the witness. I would now like to invite our witnesses.
First, Mr. Mark Thompson, a 20-year career United States
Marine, who 2 years before his retirement from the Marine Corps
was assigned to the State Department, where he brought his
experience in serving in all four Marine divisions and in
numerous amphibious forces to the State Department. For 17
years he has used that military experience and his accumulated
knowledge of counterterrorism well. He has served and led teams
in Baghdad, Iraq, in Latin America, in Southeast Asia, and in
Africa. When in 1996 he joined the State Department as a U.S.
Marine, he was brought there because of what he knew and what
they needed to know. In 1998, when as he retired from the
Marine Corps, he was transitioned at their request into civil
service and was then assigned to what was then the Office of
the Coordinator of Counterterrorism, its successor he serves
and runs today. In 2004 he served with the Coalition
Provisional Authority; in other words, with our forces in
Baghdad. In 2006 he assumed his current position where he
advises senior leadership on operational counterterrorism
matters and ensures the United States can rapidly respond to
global terrorism crises. That is his job. In addition to his
responsibilities, he has led the NSC's direct Foreign Emergency
Support Team, or FES Team, in support of U.S. chiefs of mission
in response to terrorism events, including his expertise was
used in that capacity when he was deployed in response to the
1998 East African bombings of our two embassies, the 2000
bombing of the USS Cole, and hostage and recovery efforts in
Latin America, Southeast Asia, Africa, and the Middle East.
Welcome.
Mr. Gregory Hicks. In more than 22 years in the Foreign
Service, Mr. Hicks has served notably in Libya, but also in
Afghanistan, in Bahrain, where we first met, in Yemen, in
Syria, where we met again, and in The Gambia. Prior to his
assignment in Libya, handpicked to be the Deputy Chief of
Mission by the now deceased Ambassador Chris Stevens, he also
served four tours here in Washington. He was the Deputy
Director of the Office of Investment Affairs, Special Assistant
to the Under Secretary for Economic Energy and Agricultural
Affairs, Trade Policy Negotiator for the Office of the United
States Trade Representative, and Country Officer for Vietnam,
Oman, and Yemen.
Mr. Hicks played key roles in a number of important
historic events with this country and the State Department.
Vietnam's accession to the World Trade Organization, the U.S.-
Bahrain Free Trade Agreement, the U.S.-Vietnam Bilateral Trade
Agreement, and the renegotiation of U.S. forces based in Oman.
Mr. Hicks is the recipient of five meritorious service
increases, three individual superior honor awards, three
individual meritorious honor awards, and numerous group awards
for his service. Thank you.
Mr. Nordstrom. In his 15 years at the State Department, he
has served in Washington, D.C., in Honduras, in Ethiopia, in
India, and most recently he was the Regional Security Officer
for the U.S. Mission to Libya based out of Tripoli. In that
capacity, as RSO in Tripoli from September 2011 to July of
2012, he was the principal security officer advising both
Ambassador Cretz and Ambassador Stevens on security and law
enforcement matters. Prior to joining the Department of State,
Mr. Nordstrom also served in Federal law enforcement at the
Department of Treasury.
Welcome to all three of you. Would you please rise, as is
pursuant to our rules, and take the oath.
Do you solemnly swear--please raise your right hands. Do
you solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give
will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth?
Please have a seat. Let the record reflect all witnesses
answered in the affirmative.
Now I'm going to note that I've read your opening
statements, and they're unusually short, so I'm not worried
about the 5 minutes, but we are here to hear from you. So take
the time you need to tell your story. We will listen, and the
ordinary time is 5 minutes. You take a little less, you take a
little more. This hearing is about hearing from you on your
experience.
Mr. Thompson.
WITNESS STATEMENTS
STATEMENT OF MARK THOMPSON
Mr. Thompson. Mr. Chairman, ranking member, members of the
committee.
Chairman Issa. And please pull your microphone a little
closer. Thank you.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you for this opportunity to tell a
story. As the chairman indicated, I came to the Department 16
1/2 years ago as a Marine, transitioned, and have been on the
activities that he has already described.
The night that I was involved in this incident I was at my
desk at the end of the day when the first reports came in that
indicated that we had an attack going on at our diplomatic
facility in Benghazi. In that facility we knew we had our
ambassador and we had his security personnel. Later when I
heard that the situation had evolved to them going to a safe
haven and then the fact that we could not find the Ambassador,
I alerted my leadership, indicating that we needed to go
forward and consider the deployment of the Foreign Emergency
Support Team. That particular team is an interagency team. It's
been represented as something that the State Department
deploys. It does not. The Deputies Committee of the National
Security Council deploys that organization. But I wanted that
considered. I notified the White House of my idea. They
indicated that meetings had already taken place that evening,
that had taken FEST out of the menu of options. I called the
office within the State Department that had been represented
there, asking them why it had been taken off the table, and was
told that it was not the right time and it was not the team
that needed to go right then.
Let me explain the team a little more. It is comprised of
the leadership from my office, it is comprised of professionals
from Special Operations Command, from Diplomatic Security, from
the Intelligence Community, from FBI. It is a holistic
comprehensive organization that is designed to go forward to
embassies, just as we did, as indicated in 1998 in East Africa,
as we've done in the other places indicated, the USS Cole and
other hostage situations. It is designed to be the glue and the
connective tissue that gets all the options on the table for
the decision-makers. The decision-makers in my line of work are
the Chief of Mission and the authorities back here in
Washington that make the decisions of where we send people into
harm's way. It doesn't mean it has an irreversibility to it.
The other thing that I pointed out was that with the tyranny of
distance, at least 8 or 9 hours to get to the middle of the
Mediterranean, we needed to act now and not wait. There is
sometimes the hesitancy to not deploy because we don't know
what's going on. One definition of a crisis is you don't know
what's going to happen in 2 hours, so you need to help develop
that situation early. We have a robust com suite on the
airplane that we are transported on. It is ably flown by my
SOCOM colleagues, it is on alert to do just this mission, and
it's designed to carry a comprehensive team to a conflict or a
crisis and to help the Ambassador and work for the Ambassador
and/or the Chief of Mission to handle that crisis and to make
sure he or she has the best information possible to make
decisions and to make recommendations back to Washington, and
those same representatives make their views known back to their
parent organizations so that when we do have deputies
committees and principals committee meetings at the White
House, we have a situation in which everyone is using the most
up-to-date information, and so that we can figure out what we
have to do security wise, what we have to do intelligence wise,
what we have to do with the military, what we have to do
diplomatic wise, what we have to do on the public affairs
front.
That works for the Chief of Mission, and I can't emphasize
that enough. We are not there to subsume any activities. The
experts on the team know that the real experts are in the
embassy, and they work for the Chief of Mission to do that.
My time is drawing to a close. I'll end there and await
your questions.
Chairman Issa. Thank you.
[Prepared statement of Mr. Thompson follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Issa. Mr. Hicks.
STATEMENT OF GREGORY HICKS
Mr. Hicks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Issa. We really will have to--you're pretty soft
spoken--get that a little closer.
Mr. Hicks. Try to get this up here. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman, thank you ranking member, thank you members of the
committee.
I am a career public servant. Until the aftermath of
Benghazi I loved every day of my job. In my 21 years of
government service prior to Tripoli, I earned a reputation for
being an innovative policymaker who got the job done. I was
promoted quickly and received numerous awards. People who
worked for me rated my leadership and management skills highly.
I have two master's degrees from the University of Michigan in
applied economics and modern Near Eastern and North African
studies. I have served my country extensively in the Mideast.
Besides Libya, I served in Afghanistan, Bahrain, Yemen, Syria,
and The Gambia. I speak fluent Arabic. In Bahrain my Shi'a
opposition contact gave me advanced warning of impending
attacks on our embassy and antigovernment, anti-American
demonstrations, allowing us to prepare and avoid injuries to
staff. I learned that knowledge of local conditions and strong
connections with the local population are as important as the
strength and height of walls. One reason I am here is because I
have pledged to the Foreign Service as part of my campaign to
be State Vice President of the American Foreign Service
Association that none of us should ever again experience what
we went through in Tripoli and Benghazi on 9/11/2012.
After I arrived in Tripoli as Deputy Chief of Mission on
July 31, 2012, I fast became known as the Ambassador's bulldog
because of my decisive management style. In the days
immediately after the Benghazi attack, the President and
Secretary of State praised my performance over the telephone.
President Obama wrote Libyan President Magariaf expressing
confidence in my abilities. Deputy Secretary Burns and General
Ham told me how much they appreciated how I handled the night
of the assault and its aftermath. I received written notes of
commendation from Under Secretary Wendy Sherman and from
Executive Secretary Stephen Mull. Incoming Charge Larry Pope
told me personally that my performance was near heroic.
In February 1991 I swore an oath to uphold and defend the
Constitution of the United States. I'm here today to honor that
oath. I look forward to answering your questions fully and
truthfully. Thank you very much.
Chairman Issa. Thank you. And I understand that some of
those commendations and letters are in your opening statement,
and for all the witnesses, all extraneous material or other
insertions will be placed in the record on your behalf.
[Prepared statement of Mr. Hicks follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Issa. Mr. Nordstrom.
STATEMENT OF ERIC NORDSTROM
Mr. Nordstrom. Good morning, Chairman Issa, Ranking Member
Cummings, and other distinguished members of the committee. For
the benefit of the new committee members, my name is Eric
Nordstrom, and I currently serve as the Supervisory Special
Agent with the U.S. Department of State's Bureau of Diplomatic
Security. Since September 2012 I have been enrolled in long-
term language training in preparation for my next assignment.
As Chairman Issa noted, I served in Federal law enforcement
since January 1996, first as a Customs Inspector before joining
the U.S. Department of State. I've served in domestic and
overseas postings, including Washington, D.C., Honduras,
Ethiopia, India, and most recently the Regional Security
Officer at the U.S. Embassy in Tripoli. All of those
assignments have been assignments in which I've faced the
threat of criminal or terrorist attacks. I held the last
position as RSO from September 21, 2011, until July 26, 2012.
As the Regional Security Officer, or RSO, at the U. S. Embassy
in Tripoli, I served as the principal security adviser to U.S.
Ambassadors Eugene Cretz and Chris Stevens on security and law
enforcement matters.
I want to thank the committee again for the opportunity to
appear to provide further testimony in support of your inquiry
into the tragic events of September 11, 2012. I would also like
to thank the committee for your continued efforts in
investigating all the details and all the decisions related to
the attack on our diplomatic facility. Specifically, the
committee's labors to uncover what happened prior, during, and
after the attack matter. It matters to me personally, and it
matters to my colleagues--to my colleagues at Department of
State. It matters to the American public for whom we serve, and
most importantly it matters to the friends and family of
Ambassador Stevens, Sean Smith, Glen Doherty, and Tyrone Woods,
who were murdered on September 11, 2012.
In addition to my testimony before this committee in
October of 2012 I also met with the FBI, Senate Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, the Department's
Accountability Review Board, and I've discussed my experiences
with all of them. I'm proud of the work that our team
accomplished in Libya under extraordinarily difficult
circumstances. The protection of our Nation's diplomats, our
embassies and consulates, and the work produced there is
deserving of the time that this committee, other congressional
committees, and the Accountability Review Board and no doubt
future review efforts will invest in making sure we get this
process right.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee for
the opportunity to appear before you today. I stand ready to
answer any questions that you might have.
Chairman Issa. Thank you.
[Prepared statement of Mr. Nordstrom follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Issa. I'll now recognize myself for a quick round
of questioning.
Mr. Thompson, you went through a process of things that you
observed and how you tried to activate your team. Did you do so
because you had an initial view of whether this was a terrorist
attack or something else? And please be brief. I want to use my
time.
Mr. Thompson. Yes.
Chairman Issa. Okay, thank you. Mr. Hicks, as the principal
officer and, you know, once the Ambassador had been murdered,
the highest ranking officer on September 11th from the moment
that you unexpectedly became the Charge, America has heard many
accounts of what happened. We've never heard accounts from a
single person who was in Libya that night. You will be the
first person who observed it. In your own words, take as much
time as you want, please take us through the day of September
11th from whatever time you want to begin through when you
first heard from Ambassador Stevens and through the hours and
days immediately following that, if you would, so we can have
an understanding for the first time from somebody who was
there.
Mr. Hicks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As I remember September
11, 2012, it was a routine day at our embassy, and until we saw
the news about Cairo, and I remember sending a text message to
Ambassador Stevens saying, Chris, are you aware of what's going
on in Cairo? And he said, No. So I told him that the embassy,
in another text, that the embassy had been stormed and they
were trying to tear down our flag. And he said, Thanks very
much. And, you know, then I went on with business.
Closed the day, and I went back to my villa and was
relaxing watching a television show that I particularly like,
and at 9:45 p.m.--and all times will be Libyan times, there is
a 6-hour time difference--the RSO John Martinec ran into my
villa yelling Greg, Greg, the consulate's under attack, and I
stood up and reached for my phone because I had an inkling or a
thought that perhaps the Ambassador had tried to call me to
relay the same message, and I found two missed calls on the
phone, one from the Ambassador's phone and one from a phone
number I didn't recognize, and I punched the phone number I
didn't recognize, and I got the Ambassador on the other end,
and he said, Greg, we're under attack. And I was walking out of
the villa on my way to the tactical operations center because I
knew we would all have to gather there to mobilize or try to
mobilize a response, and it was also a bad cell phone night in
Tripoli, connections were weak, and I said, Okay, and the line
cut.
As I walked to the tactical operations center, I tried to
reach back on both of the numbers, the unknown number and the
Ambassador's personal number, and got no response. When I got
to the tactical operations center, I told people that the
Ambassador, that I had just talked to the Ambassador and what
he said. At the time John Martinec was on the phone with Alec
Henderson in Benghazi, the RSO there, and I asked one of our DS
agents who, what number did I reach Ambassador Stevens on, and
he said, oh, that's Scott Wickland's telephone. Scott Wickland
was Ambassador Stevens' agent in charge, his personal escort
for that night, and was with him in the villa during the
attack.
So I asked--when John Martinec got off the telephone, I
asked him what was going on, and he said that the consulate had
been breached and there were at least 20 hostile individuals
armed in the compound at the time. So I next called the annex
chief to ask him if he was in touch with the Benghazi annex to
activate our emergency response plan.
Chairman Issa. Please explain the annex chief so that
people that don't know as much would understand that. No, go
ahead, please.
Mr. Hicks. Okay, thank you. And he said that he had been in
touch with the annex in Benghazi, and they said they were
mobilizing a response team there to go to the--to our facility
and provide reinforcements and to repel the attack.
With that knowledge, I called the operations center at the
State Department at approximately 10 p.m. to report the attack
and what we were doing to respond to it. The next thing I did
was to begin calling the senior officials in the government of
Libya that I knew at the time, and so I dialed first President
Magarief's chief of staff and reported the attack and asked for
immediate assistance from the government of Libya to assist our
folks in Benghazi. I followed that up with a call to the Prime
Minister's chief of staff to make the same request, and then to
the MFA Americas director. MFA is Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
The defense attache was at the same time calling the
leadership of Libya's military with the same purpose, to ask
them for assistance. Once that was done, I called again to
Washington to report that these actions had been commenced.
Over the night we, over that night that is basically how our
team operated. I was talking to the government of Libya,
reporting to the State Department through the operations
center, and also staying in touch with the annex chief about
what was going on.
Let me step back one minute if I could and say that I also
discussed with the annex chief about mobilizing a Tripoli
response team, and we agreed that we would move forward with a,
chartering a plane from Tripoli to fly a response team to
Benghazi to provide additional reinforcements.
The defense attache was also reporting through his chain of
command back to AFRICOM and to the Joint Staff here in
Washington about what was going on in the country. David
McFarland, our Political Section Chief, had just returned from
Benghazi where he had been our principal officer for the
previous 10 days, and so he jumped into this picture by
reaching out to his contacts in Benghazi and trying to get them
at the local level there to respond to the attack, and he also
was in touch with our local employee there as well.
Excuse me if I check my notes here, it's so long. The
attack unfolded in four phases or the night unfolded in four
phases. The first phase was the attack on our consulate. This
story is well known, I think. The Benghazi response--the
consulate was invaded, the Villa C where the Ambassador and
Sean Smith and Scott Wickland were hiding in the safe area, was
set on fire. The attackers also went into another, went into
another building. They were unable to enter the tactical
operations center in Benghazi because of improvements to that
facility that had been made. They--Scott attempted to lead the
Ambassador and Sean Smith out of the burning building. He
managed to make it out. He tried repeatedly to go back in to
try to rescue Sean and the Ambassador but had to stop due to
exposure to smoke.
The response team from the annex in Benghazi, six
individuals, drove the attackers out of our compound and
secured it temporarily. There have been estimates as high as 60
attackers were in the compound at one particular time. There
were repeated attempts by all of the RSOs and by the response
team from the annex to go into the burning building and recover
or try to save Sean and the Ambassador. They found Sean's body
and pulled it out, but he was no longer responsive. They did
not find the Ambassador.
I spoke with a medical officer, one of our medical officers
after the attack, and the heroism of these individuals in
repeatedly going into a petroleum-based fire cannot be
understated. Petroleum, according to our regional medical
officer, petroleum-based fires emit enormous amounts of cyanide
gas. He told me that one full breath of that would incapacitate
and kill a person if exposed to it.
The second--it was noticed that a second wave of attackers
was coming to attack the facility, and our teams evacuated five
RSOs and Sean Smith in one vehicle which suffered heavy fire,
but they managed to break through and get to the annex, and
then the annex team also withdrew from the facility, and the
second wave of attackers took it over.
After the second phase of the evening occurs, the timing is
about 11:30 or so, the second phase commences after the teams
have returned to the annex, and they suffer for about an hour
and a half probing attacks from terrorists. They are able to
repulse them, and then they desist at about 1:30 in the
morning. The Tripoli response team departs at about midnight
and arrives at about 1:15 in Benghazi.
If I may step back again to Tripoli and what's going on
there at this point. At about 10:45 or 11:00 we confer, and I
asked the defense attache who had been talking with AFRICOM and
with the Joint Staff, is anything coming? Will they be sending
us any help? Is there something out there? And he answered that
the nearest help was in Aviano, and the nearest--where there
were fighter planes, and he said that it would take 2 to 3
hours for them to get on site, but that there also were no
tankers available for them to refuel. And I said Thank you very
much, and we went on with our work.
Phase 3 began with news that the Ambassador's body has been
recovered, and David McFarland, if I recall correctly, is the
individual who began to receive that news from his contacts in
Benghazi, and we began to hear also that the Ambassador has
been taken to a hospital. We don't know initially which
hospital it is, but we, through David's reports, we learn that
it is in a hospital which is controlled by Ansar al-Sharia, the
group that Twitter feeds had identified as leading the attack
on the consulate. We're getting this information as the Tripoli
response team arrives in Benghazi at the airport. Both our
annex chief and the annex chief in Benghazi and our defense
attache are on the phone during this period trying to get the
Libyan Government to send vehicles and military and/or security
assets to the airport to assist our response team. At this
point this response team looks like it may be a hostage rescue
team, that they are going to--we are going to need to send them
to try to save the Ambassador, who was in a hospital that is,
as far as we know, under enemy control. Our contacts with the
government in Tripoli are telling us that the Ambassador is in
a safe place, but they imply that he is with us in the annex in
Benghazi, and we keep telling them, No, he is not with us, we
do not have his--we do not have him.
At about 12:30, at the same time that we see the Twitter
feeds that are asserting that Ansar al-Sharia is responsible
for the attack, we also see a call for an attack on the embassy
in Tripoli, and so we begin to--we had always thought that we
were under threat, but we now have to take care of ourselves,
and we begin planning to evacuate our facility. When I say our
facility, I mean the State Department residential compound in
Tripoli and to consolidate all of our personnel in--at the
annex in Tripoli. We have about 55 diplomatic personnel in the
two annexes.
On that night, if I may go back, I would just like to point
out that with Ambassador Stevens and Sean Smith in Benghazi
there are five diplomatic security agents, assistant regional
security officers. With us in, at our residential compound in
Tripoli we have the RSO John Martinec, three assistant regional
security officers protecting 28 diplomatic personnel. In
addition, we also have four Special Forces personnel who are
part of the training mission.
During the night I'm in touch with Washington, keeping them
posted of what's happening in Tripoli and to the best of my
knowledge what I'm being told in Benghazi. I think at about 2
p.m.--2 a.m., sorry, the Secretary, Secretary of State Clinton
called me, along with her senior staff, we're all on the phone,
and she asked me what was going on, and I briefed her on
developments. Most of the conversation was about the search for
Ambassador Stevens. It was also about what we were going to do
with our personnel in Benghazi, and I told her that we would
need to evacuate, and that was--she said that was the right
thing to do.
At about 3 a.m. I received a call from the Prime Minister
of Libya. I think it's the saddest phone call I've ever had in
my life. He told me that Ambassador Stevens had passed away.
Mr. Hicks. I immediately telephoned Washington that news
afterwards and began accelerating our efforts to withdraw from
the villas compound and move to the annex.
Excuse me. I will take a glass of water.
Our team responded with amazing discipline and courage in
Tripoli in organizing our withdrawal. I have vivid memories of
that. I think the most telling, though, was of our
communications staff dismantling our communications equipment
to take with us to the annex and destroying the classified
communications capability.
Our office manager, Amber Pickens, was everywhere that
night, just throwing herself into some task that had to be
done. First, she was taking a log of what we were doing. Then
she was loading magazines, carrying ammunition to the--carrying
our ammunition supply to our vehicles. Then she was smashing
hard drives with an axe.
Allen Greenfield, our management officer, was a whirlwind
of activity, organizing the vehicles, to lining them up,
finding the drivers, making sure everybody was getting the
things that they would need for the coming days.
John Martinec was a mountain of moral support, particularly
to the guys who were in Benghazi. He was on the phone talking
them through the whole ordeal. David McFarland on the phone
constantly, all the time, talking to his contacts in Benghazi,
urging them to help.
Lieutenant Colonel Phillips and Lieutenant Colonel Arndt,
Lieutenant Colonel Gibson, mountains of strength. I am awed. I
am still in awe of them.
They asked me in one of the phone calls, when were you
going to move to the annex? And I said, ``We will move at
dawn,'' because none of our people had great experience driving
the armored Suburbans that we were going to have to use. Our
local staff drove for us as part of our security procedures.
They, of course, were not there that night. And we would have
to go through checkpoints, militia checkpoints, on the way to
the annex to get there. And I didn't want our people to be
going through those checkpoints because I didn't know what to
expect from the militias.
And so we moved at dawn. And we arrived at the annex, at
least my group, I think at about 4:45 perhaps, maybe 5:00 a.m.
And a few minutes later came the word of the mortar attack.
If I could return to Benghazi a little bit--I talked
through Tripoli--I am sorry if I bounce back and forth. The
Tripoli team basically had to stay at the Benghazi airport
because they had no transport and no escort from the Libyans.
After the announcement of Chris's passing, military escort and
vehicles arrived at the airport. So the decision was made for
them to go to the annex.
Before I got the call from the Prime Minister, we had
received several phone calls on the phone that had been with
the Ambassador saying that we know where the Ambassador is,
please, you can come get him. And our local staff engaged on
those phone calls admirably, asking very, very good,
outstanding even, open-ended questions about where was he,
trying to discern whether he was alive, whether they even had
the Ambassador, whether that person was with the Ambassador.
Send a picture. Could we talk to the Ambassador?
Because we knew separately from David that the Ambassador
was in a hospital that we believed was under Ansar al-Sharia's
call, we suspected that we were being baited into a trap, and
so we did not want to go send our people into an ambush. And we
didn't. We sent them to the annex.
Shortly after they arrived at the annex, the mortars came
in. First mortar round was long. It landed, actually, among the
Libyans who escorted our people. They took casualties for us
that night. And the next was short. The next three landed on
the roof, killing Glen and Tyrone, severely wounding David.
They didn't know whether any more mortars were going to
come in. The accuracy was terribly precise. The call was the
next one is coming through the roof, maybe, if it hit. Two of
the guys from Team Tripoli, they climbed up on the roof, and
they carried Glen's body and Tyrone's body down. One guy about
Mark's size, full of combat gear, climbed up there, strapped
David Ubben, who is a large man, to his back and carried him
down the ladder, saved him.
In Tripoli, we had a defense attache that persuaded the
Libyans to fly their C-130 to Benghazi. We wanted to airlift--
since we had consolidated at the annex and the Libyan
Government had now provided us with external security around
our facilities, we wanted to send further reinforcements to
Benghazi. We determined that Lieutenant Colonel Gibson and his
team of Special Forces troops should go. The people in Benghazi
had been fighting all night. They were tired, they were
exhausted. We wanted to make sure the airport was secure for
their withdrawal.
As Colonel Gibson and his three personnel were getting in
the cars, he stopped and he called them off and said--told me
that he had not been authorized to go. The vehicles had to go
because the flight needed to go to Tripoli--I mean, to
Benghazi. Lieutenant Colonel Gibson was furious. I had told him
to go bring our people home. That's what he wanted to do. He
paid me a very nice compliment, and I won't repeat it here. So
the plane went. I think it landed in Benghazi around 7:30.
The other thing that we did was--and I want to mention
Jackie Levesque's name in this hearing. She was our nurse. We
had initially thought that she should go to Benghazi. One of
the Special Forces with Lieutenant Colonel Gibson's team was
our last military-trained medic available. He had a broken foot
in a cast. I still remember him walking to go and get in the
car with his machine gun, carrying a machine gun on his
shoulder.
But Jackie, I refused to allow her to go to Benghazi
because I knew we had wounded coming back. I knew David was
severely wounded, and I knew others were wounded, as well. And
Jackie had just made terrific contacts with a hospital in town.
And so we sent her, I sent her to that hospital to start
mobilizing their ER teams and their doctors to receive our
wounded so that when the charter flight arrived in Tripoli we
had ambulances at the airport waiting.
Their doctors were ready and waiting for our wounded to
come in, to be brought into the operating room. And they
certainly saved David Ubben's leg, and they may very well have
saved his life. And they treated our other wounded, as well, as
if they were their own.
Chairman Issa. Mr. Hicks, I know you have the days that
followed, but I think we all need to digest a little of what
you just told us. So if we could pause there.
And Mr. Cummings is recognized.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much.
Again, to all of you, we appreciate your being here.
To you, Mr. Hicks, as you described what happened that
night, it just reminded me of the high cost--the high cost that
is paid by so many of our folk in the diplomatic corps. It also
reminded me of their bravery and the fact that you all go
around the world in foreign places trying to make a difference.
And as I listened to your testimony, I could not help but
think about something that I said very recently, well, 2 years
ago now, in a eulogy for a relative. I said that death is a
part of life, but so often we have to find a way to make life a
part of death.
And I guess the reason why I am saying that, I want to go
back to something Mr. Nordstrom said when he said that he
wanted to make sure that--and all of you said it, pretty much--
he wanted to make sure we learned from this so that your
comrades and our four members of the diplomatic corps who sadly
passed away--so that this never happens again. And I appreciate
it. I know this is difficult. I know it is. We all feel your
pain.
And so I just want to, going back to what Mr. Nordstrom
said, trying to make sure we have a complete picture. Because
there is another piece to this, too, and that is that we have
some balancing here to do today. We have to listen to you all.
And this is really, really difficult because we have some
statements that have been made, not necessarily by you, but
interpreted. While we have to protect you, we also have to
protect your fellow employees. ``Protect'' is maybe not the
right word, but make sure that they are treated fairly. So, you
understand what I am saying? That balance. And I am just trying
to make sure I get, in your words, Mr. Nordstrom, a complete
picture. That's all.
Mr. Hicks, in the interview with the committee staff, you
stated, ``In my personal opinion, a fast-mover flying over
Benghazi at some point, you know, as soon as possible might
very well have prevented some of the bad things that happened
that night.'' Is that right? Did you say that?
Mr. Hicks. Yes, sir, I did.
Mr. Cummings. And you further stated, ``I believe if we had
been able to scramble a fighter or aircraft or two over
Benghazi as quickly as possible after the attack commenced, I
believe there would not have been a mortar attack on the annex
in the morning because I believe the Libyans would have
split.'' Is that right?
Mr. Hicks. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cummings. At a hearing in February before the Senate
Armed Services Committee, General Dempsey, Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, was asked whether we could have deployed
F-16s from Aviano Air Base in Italy, and he explained why we
could not. And these are his words. And we are just trying to
make sure we get the complete picture here.
``For a couple reasons.'' this is a quote. ``For a couple
reasons. One is that in order to deploy them it requires the--
this is the middle of the night now--these are not aircraft on
strict alert. They are there as a part of our commitment to
NATO and Europe. And so, as we looked at the timeline, it was
pretty clear that it would take up to 20 hours or so to get
them there.''
Mr. Hicks, I understand that you wanted planes to get to
Benghazi faster. If I were in your shoes, I would have wanted
them to get there yesterday. And that is completely
understandable. But the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
said they simply could not get there quickly. Mr. Hicks, do you
have any reason to question General Dempsey's testimony before
the Senate?
Mr. Hicks. Again, I was speaking from my perspective----
Mr. Cummings. I understand.
Mr. Hicks. --on the ground in Tripoli based on what the
defense attache told me. And he said 2 to 3 hours.
Mr. Cummings. Okay.
Mr. Hicks. But there were no tankers.
Mr. Cummings. All right.
Mr. Hicks. And I also was speaking with reference to
conversations I had had with veteran Libyan revolutionaries and
other personnel who had experienced the Libyan revolution and
who had told me that the Libyan people were very well aware
of--sorry--that American and NATO airpower had been decisive in
their victory. And I was also speaking to their view, again,
that Libyans would not stand if they were aware that American
aircraft were in the vicinity.
Mr. Cummings. I understand.
So former Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta also testified
in February, and he said this, He said, ``Soon after the
initial reports about the attack, the President ordered all
available DOD assets to respond to the attack in Libya and to
protect U.S. personnel and interests in the region. Some have
asked why other types of armed aircraft were not dispatched to
Benghazi. The reason is because armed UAVs, AC-130 gunships, or
fixed-wing fighters with associated tanking, armaments,
targeting, and support capabilities were not in the vicinity of
Libya and because of the distance. It would have taken at least
9 to 12 hours, if not more, to deploy. This was, pure and
simple, a problem of distance and time,'' end of quote.
Do you question his testimony?
Mr. Hicks. Sir, again, the defense attache said to me that
fighter aircraft in Aviano might be able to--would not be able
to be over Benghazi for 2 to 3 hours.
Chairman Issa. Mr. Cummings----
Mr. Hicks. That is what I am going on, what the defense
attache told me.
Chairman Issa. Thank you.
And I assure you that in regards to your earlier statement,
we will bring in people where we can have that discussion,
hopefully with knowledgeable people chosen on both sides of
could they or couldn't they. I think it is a good line of
questioning, perhaps not for the Ambassador.
Mr. Cummings. Mr. Chairman----
Chairman Issa. You certainly can have another minute.
Mr. Cummings. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
But it is extremely important that I ask these questions
because a lot has been put out there in the air. And all these
folks aren't here for no reason. And I know we will get those
questions answered, but all we have is you today. And I am glad
to have you.
But, in other words, I am just trying--again, remember what
I said to you all earlier. And everybody on this committee
should know this. I try to do everything in my power to protect
witnesses, I don't care if they are called by Republicans or
Democrats, because your integrity and your reputation is all
you got. But I also have some other people whose reputations
are being questioned. So I have to, you know, take what you
say, but then I also have to consider them, too, because I have
a duty to both of them. Do you follow me?
I just have one last thing, Mr. Chairman, and then I will
finish up. And I will just close by noting that even the
partisan report issued by our five Republican chairmen in
April, including our good Chairman Issa, cleared the Defense
Department and said this. It says, ``No evidence has been
provided to suggest that these officials refused to deploy
resources because they thought the situation had been
sufficiently resolved.''
I will end there out of courtesy to all our colleagues.
And, again, I don't know whether we will get to a second round,
but, again, I promise you, I promise every one of you, I will
do every single thing in my power to make sure--I don't--I hope
there is no retaliation--but to protect you, because you are so
very, very important. And it is your bravery that has brought
you here today, and we really appreciate it.
Thank you.
Chairman Issa. Thank you.
We now go to the gentleman from South Carolina, Mr. Gowdy.
Mr. Gowdy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
To the families of the victims, it has been 8 months. And I
know that there are those who have said that's a long time ago.
But the good news is there is no statute of limitations when it
comes to finding out the truth, particularly for those who have
served and sacrificed and died under our flags.
So, Mr. Hicks, let's find out the truth. The President of
Libya responded to the attack and labeled it an attack by
Islamic extremists possibly with terror links, correct?
Mr. Hicks. Yes, sir.
Mr. Gowdy. So hours after our Ambassador and three others
are killed in Benghazi, the President of Libya says it was an
attack with possible terror links, correct?
Mr. Hicks. Yes, sir, that's what I recall.
Mr. Gowdy. Did the President of Libya ever mention a
spontaneous protest related to a video?
Mr. Hicks. No, sir.
Mr. Gowdy. When Ambassador Stevens talked to you perhaps
minutes before he died, as a dying declaration, what precisely
did he say to you?
Mr. Hicks. He said, ``Greg, we're under attack.''
Mr. Gowdy. Would a highly decorated career diplomat have
told you or Washington had there been a demonstration outside
his facility that day?
Mr. Hicks. Yes, sir, he would have.
Mr. Gowdy. Did he mention one word about a protest or a
demonstration?
Mr. Hicks. No, sir, he did not.
Mr. Gowdy. So fast-forward, Mr. Hicks, to the Sunday talk
shows and Ambassador Susan Rice. She blamed this attack on a
video. In fact, she did it five different times. What was your
reaction to that?
Mr. Hicks. I was stunned. My jaw dropped. And I was
embarrassed.
Mr. Gowdy. Did she talk to you before she went on the five
Sunday talk shows?
Mr. Hicks. No, sir.
Mr. Gowdy. You were the highest-ranking official in Libya
at the time, correct?
Mr. Hicks. Yes, sir.
Mr. Gowdy. And she did not bother to have a conversation
with you before she went on national television.
Mr. Hicks. No, sir.
Mr. Gowdy. So Ambassador Rice directly contradicts the
evidence on the ground in Libya, she directly contradicts the
President of Libya, she directly contradicts the last statement
uttered by Ambassador Stevens.
Mr. Hicks, who is Beth Jones?
Mr. Hicks. Beth Jones is the Acting Assistant Secretary for
Near Eastern Affairs at the State Department.
Mr. Gowdy. I want to read an excerpt from an email she
sent. And you were copied on it.
And, by the way, Mr. Chairman, for our colleagues who like
to trumpet bipartisanship, this would be a wonderful
opportunity to demonstrate it. Some of these emails, even
though they are not classified, have not been released, Mr.
Chairman, including the one that I am going to read from. So
for my colleagues who trumpet bipartisanship, this would be a
wonderful time to prove it.
This is from Ms. Jones to you, to counsel for Hillary
Clinton, to Victoria Nuland, to Mr. Kennedy, near as I can tell
to almost everyone in the State Department. And I am going to
read from it. ``I spoke to the Libyan Ambassador and emphasized
the importance of Libyan leaders continuing to make strong
statements.''
By the way, Mr. Hicks, this email was sent on September the
12th, the day after Benghazi and several days before Ambassador
Rice's television appearance.
And I will continue. ``When he said his government
suspected that former Qadhafi regime elements carried out the
attacks, I told him that the group that conducted the attacks,
Ansar al-Sharia, is affiliated with Islamic terrorists.''
Let me say that again, Mr. Hicks. She told him, the State
Department, on September the 12th, days before our Ambassador
went on national television, is telling the Ambassador to Libya
the group that conducted the attacks, Ansar al-Sharia, is
affiliated with Islamic terrorists.
Mr. Hicks, I want to know two things. Number one, why in
the world would Susan Rice go on five Sunday talk shows and
perpetuate a demonstrably false narrative? And, secondarily,
what impact did it have on the ground in Benghazi, the fact
that she contradicted the President of Libya?
Mr. Hicks. As to the first question, I cannot provide an
answer, but perhaps you should ask Ambassador Rice.
Mr. Gowdy. I would love the opportunity to do just that.
Mr. Hicks. As to the second question, at the time, we were
trying to get the FBI to Benghazi to begin its investigation,
and that talk show actually provided an opportunity to make
that happen.
Afterwards, we encountered bureaucratic resistance for a
long period from the Libyans. The Libyan Government at this
time is not very deep: president, prime minister, deputy prime
ministers, ministers--all capable people--some vice ministers,
as well. And it took us an additional--let's see, my math is
not very fast these days--maybe 18 days to get the FBI team to
Benghazi.
Mr. Gowdy. So the crime scene was unsecured for 18 days.
Mr. Hicks. Yes, sir.
Mr. Gowdy. Witnesses were not interviewed.
Chairman Issa. If the gentleman would please finish up, we
are going to try and move along.
Mr. Gowdy. Yes, I will move on.
We will finish this if there is a second round. Thank you,
Mr. Hicks.
Chairman Issa. Thank you.
For all individuals, to the extent that our witnesses can
stay on, we will try to have a second round. But the ranking
member and I both realize that we are a little behind schedule,
and I take blame for it. But we are going to try to move within
5 minutes of questioning whenever possible.
The gentlelady from New York, Ms. Maloney.
Mrs. Maloney. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank all the witnesses, and thank you for your
public service. And my condolences to the families for your
great loss.
And I want to thank the American military. My father served
in World War II, my brother in Vietnam, my husband in the Navy.
And I can say after close observation, there is no place or no
time that the American military wouldn't be there to protect
American lives if they possibly could get there.
And I find it truly disturbing and very unfortunate that
when Americans come under attack, the first thing some did in
this country was attack Americans--attack the military, attack
the President, attack the State Department, attack the former
Senator from the great State of New York, former Secretary of
State Hillary Clinton. And I would like to ask some questions
about these attacks to get at the real facts.
Last month, Chairman Issa went on national television and
accused former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, accused her
of lying under oath when she testified before Congress that she
did not personally approve of security reductions in Libya. As
proof, he claimed that she personally signed a cable denying
requests for additional security. And he stated, ``The
Secretary of State was just wrong. She said she did not
participate in this, and yet only a few months before the
attack she outright denied security and her signature in a
cable in April 2012.'' The fact is that the Secretary did not
sign this cable in 2012. Her name was typed at the bottom of
the page, which is just the general procedure for thousands of
cables that come out of the State Department every single year.
So I would like to ask the panelists and our witnesses just
one question, and it concerns the State Department
correspondence manual, which is posted on the Department's Web
site. And this manual says, ``The communications center will
place the name of the Secretary on all telegrams to posts.''
Now, I would like to ask the panelists in a yes-or-no
question, do you agree that this is the proper procedure or the
procedure that's followed by the State Department, that
thousands and thousands of cables leave the Department
headquarters every single year with the Secretary's name at the
bottom of the page or on the page?
And I would like to know, Mr. Nordstrom, yes or no, do you
agree with the manual? Is that the procedure of the State
Department?
Mr. Nordstrom. That is my understanding of the prevailing
practice.
Mrs. Maloney. Mr. Hicks, yes or no?
Mr. Hicks. Yes, ma'am.
Mrs. Maloney. Mr. Thompson, yes or no, is that the
procedure?
Mr. Thompson. Yes.
Mrs. Maloney. Well, 2 days after Chairman Issa made these
accusations, The Washington Post ran a Fact Checker article
called ``The Whopper.'' And I would like to ask unanimous
consent to place this in the record.
Chairman Issa. Without objection, so ordered.
Mrs. Maloney. Thank you.
Mrs. Maloney. Well, what The Fact Checker said was this:
``There was no basis or evidence to show that Clinton had
anything to do with this cable any more than she personally
approved a cable on proper email etiquette. The odds are
extremely long that Secretary Clinton ever saw or approved this
memo, giving us confidence that this inflammatory and reckless
language qualifies as a whopper and four Pinocchios.''
So anyone who actually knows how the State Department
operates knows that she was speaking the truth. She was talking
about the procedure that was in the manual. There is no way in
the world that she could sign every cable coming out. And when
she said she didn't sign it, she did not sign it. So----
Chairman Issa. The gentlelady's time has expired, but if
anyone wants to respond, they may.
Hearing none, we will go to the gentleman from Utah, Mr.
Chaffetz.
Mr. Chaffetz. Thank you, Chairman.
And thank you, all three, for you being here. And thank you
to the families whose loved ones passed away.
Mr. Hicks, I want to go back to that first plane from
Tripoli. It went from Tripoli, as noted in the ARB report,
included seven rescue team members, including two U.S. military
personnel. That plane then returns to Tripoli. And the first
rescue team that is there is now really engaged in the attack.
You have no idea, is my understanding, as to when the attack is
going to end, so the second rescue team is preparing to go.
And you mentioned it in your opening statement, but if you
could please go back to what the second team--now, the second
team included four U.S. military. These are highly trained
Special Forces personnel, one of which is a medic. And yet
these military personnel do not operate under your authority,
and your permission is not enough for them to go. Explain to me
again exactly what happened.
Mr. Hicks. Again, we determined that we needed to send a
second team from Tripoli to secure the airport for the
withdrawal of our personnel from Benghazi after the mortar
attack.
Mr. Chaffetz. But were any of these U.S. military personnel
not permitted to travel on a rescue mission or relief mission
to Benghazi?
Mr. Hicks. They were not authorized to travel.
Mr. Chaffetz. What happened with those personnel?
Mr. Hicks. They remained in Tripoli with us. The medic went
with the nurse to the hospital to lend his skills to the
treatment and care of our wounded.
Mr. Chaffetz. How did the personnel react to being told to
stand down?
Mr. Hicks. They were furious. I can only say--well, I will
quote Lieutenant Colonel Gibson. He said, ``This is the first
time in my career that a diplomat has more balls than somebody
in the military.''
Mr. Chaffetz. So the military is told to stand down, not
engage in the fight. These are the kind of people willing to
engage. Where did that message come down, where did the stand-
down order come from?
Mr. Hicks. I believe it came from either AFRICOM or
SOCAFRICA.
Mr. Chaffetz. Now, my understanding is that General Ham was
actually not in Stuttgart, where AFRICOM is headquartered, but
he was in Washington, D.C. Is that correct?
Mr. Hicks. I don't know the whereabouts of General Ham on
that night.
Mr. Chaffetz. Mr. Chairman, this is something that we are
going to have to continue to explore.
I need to move quickly now to Mr. Thompson, if I could.
You were the leader there at the what is called the
F.E.S.T. within the State Department. According to the State
Department Web site, the F.E.S.T. is the Foreign Emergency
Support Team, the U.S. Government's only interagency, on-call,
short-notice team poised to respond to terrorist attacks
worldwide.
I want to read to you an excerpt of an email sent by you to
Kathleen Austin-Ferguson on Tuesday, September 11th, 2012, at
9:58 p.m. Could you help me understand, who is Kathleen Austin-
Ferguson?
Mr. Thompson. She is Under Secretary Kennedy's deputy.
Mr. Chaffetz. You wrote, ``I am told that Pat Kennedy
participated in a very senior conference call with the White
House and discouraged the F.E.S.T option. To remind, F.E.S.T.
has dedicated aircraft able to respond in 4 hours, is
Department of State-led, and provides the below skills. When
FBI was contacted, they responded that this situation would be
better addressed via a F.E.S.T. response. Thus, there are
others who are thinking the same way. Ready to discuss further
as needed. Mark.''
Two questions----
Chairman Issa. Can the gentleman suspend for a moment?
Earlier, there was one document that had not been placed in
the record because it hadn't been provided through official
channels. And I would ask that we get that. I think it came
from Mr. Gowdy.
And then, Mr. Chaffetz, if you could make your document
available so we could make copies.
And then for any other Members on either side of the dais,
if you plan to use a document that is not currently committee
record--and I realize, since we have gotten very little, there
is very little committee records--please do us the favor of
having copies so they can be distributed at or prior to the
beginning of the questioning.
I am sorry to interrupt.
Mr. Cummings. Mr. Chairman?
Chairman Issa. Yes.
Mr. Cummings. One thing. Mr. Chairman, as you will recall,
yesterday I reminded you that we had never--with regard to Mr.
Thompson, this is the first time we have gotten a syllable from
him.
Chairman Issa. And we have no transcript either.
Mr. Cummings. Right, but let me go on. One of the things I
said in our conversation is that if there were any documents
that were going to be used, we would like to have had them
yesterday.
But with regard to this document, and it sounds like it is
a very crucial document, and in fairness to everybody, to all
of us, and to Mr. Nordstrom, who said he wanted a complete
hearing, we would just like to have that document, even if we
have to suspend. We would like to see the document that he is
talking about.
Chairman Issa. Okay. In the case of this particular
document Mr. Chaffetz is--my understanding is you do have the
document. So I will let staff work on that and provide
additional time if needed if that turns out not to be true.
For our witnesses, if you have any documents you are going
to refer to that we don't have, if you would have your counsels
allow copies to be made. Again, I want to make sure everyone
has it as soon as possible.
Obviously, if the State Department had made the documents
they show us so-called in camera, if they had allowed us to
have copies, we would all have a lot more documents. But----
Mr. Cummings. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Issa. --that is for a different argument.
Mr. Chaffetz, I am sorry. We will give you back a couple of
seconds. And the gentleman may continue.
Mr. Chaffetz. Mr. Thompson, do you recall that email?
Mr. Thompson. I do.
Mr. Chaffetz. Two questions. Were you ever given a detailed
explanation as to why the F.E.S.T. was not considered for
deployment? And, number two, did you attend or attempt to
attend any senior meetings to plead your case for a F.E.S.T.
deployment? And if so, what happened?
Mr. Thompson. The reason I was given was that this was not
the time for the F.E.S.T. It might be too unsafe for the
F.E.S.T. And I got that through Ms. Austin-Ferguson.
I readdressed that with her. I readdressed it with her
staff 2 days later.
Mr. Chaffetz. Did you attempt to attend any meetings?
Mr. Thompson. The next morning, there were VTCs. I presumed
I would be part of that. I was told not to attend those.
Although CT was represented there, the F.E.S.T. portion and the
response portion of the Counterterrorism Bureau was not
represented there.
Mr. Chaffetz. So why were you not called into action? This
is what you trained for, it is what tabletops are for, it is
what you are prepared to do. Why was F.E.S.T. not called into
action?
Mr. Thompson. I do not know.
Mr. Chaffetz. Mr. Chairman, this is one of the great
mysteries. Here we have this expertise. We have invested
heavily in it. They tabletop it, they understand it. This is
exactly what they train for. And they were never asked to go
into action. We had no idea how long or when this was going to
end.
I yield back.
Chairman Issa. I thank the gentleman. The gentleman is
correct.
We now recognize the gentlelady from the District of
Columbia, Ms. Norton, for 5 minutes.
Ms. Norton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First, I want to say to the families that we continue to
feel deeply about your loss.
I have some questions for Mr. Thompson concerning the role
of the Counterterrorism Bureau.
Now, Mr. Thompson, your lawyer said you were unwilling to
talk with any Democratic member of this committee, so I have
had to rely on statements that were made to the press. Your own
statement is mostly biographical, about the work you have done
in Yemen and Latin America and the rest.
Now, one report I found indicated that you believed that
Secretary Clinton and Ambassador Patrick Kennedy, and here I am
quoting from this report, ``tried to cut the Counterterrorism
Bureau out of the loop as they and other Obama administration
officials weighed how to respond to and characterize the
Benghazi attack.'' Now, that's the end of that quote.
Mr. Thompson, I am asking you, is that quote accurate, that
you believe that the Counterterrorism Bureau was intentionally
kept out of the loop for political reasons?
Mr. Thompson. It is not. I indicated that the portion of
the Counterterrorism Bureau that responds to crises, i.e. my
part of the office, was pushed out of that discussion. The
Counterterrorism Bureau was represented in subsequent meetings
after the night of 9/11.
Ms. Norton. But do you believe you were kept out for
political reasons? This quote----
Mr. Thompson. I do not politicize my job, Madam. I have
served under three Presidents, starting with President Clinton
up to the present. I have served six Secretaries of State----
Ms. Norton. I have to continue. Mr. Thompson, I was just
quoting the quote. So the quote isn't entirely accurate, then?
Mr. Thompson. Correct.
Ms. Norton. All right.
That is very important for the record, that Mr. Thompson is
not saying that they were kept out of the loop for political
reasons.
This week, this quote apparently caused your former boss in
the Counterterrorism Bureau at the State Department--I am
speaking now of Ambassador Daniel Benjamin--to issue a public
statement disagreeing with this allegation in particular, which
was in quotes. And he said, and I am now quoting him, ``It has
been alleged that the State Department's Counterterrorism
Bureau was cut out of the discussion and decision-making in the
aftermath of the Benghazi attack. I ran the bureau then, and I
can say with certainty as the former coordinator for
counterterrorism that this charge is simply untrue.''
Do you agree with Ambassador Benjamin?
Mr. Thompson. I agree that the Counterterrorism Bureau was
included. But there is a distinction with a difference with
respect to the portion of the Counterterrorism Bureau that
would be most effective in the aftermath of an attack on a
diplomatic compound.
Ms. Norton. Now, all of this was under Ambassador Benjamin.
He didn't say one portion or the other. You are yourself
saying, although the bureau was represented, somehow some
portions of the bureau were not represented? And how is that?
Mr. Thompson. That's what happened, ma'am.
Ms. Norton. It says ``the bureau.'' ``The bureau,'' he
says, going on, ``was a central participant in the interagency
discussion about the longer-term response to Benghazi. At no
time was the bureau sidelined or otherwise kept from carrying
out its tasks.''
Now, this seems to me to directly contradict your testimony
here today. He says----
Mr. Thompson. Well, I respectfully disagree.
Ms. Norton. --we were all in. You say, well, yeah, you were
in, but somehow or the other, some part of it was not in.
Mr. Thompson. No other part of the Counterterrorism Bureau
is responsible for responding to a crisis. This was a crisis.
My office was not involved in those subsequent meetings. Other
members of the office were, very professional people, and I am
sure they did their best at those meetings.
Ms. Norton. Well, we certainly don't want to get involved
in, you know, who down the chain of line gets consulted. But
the Ambassador says, ``After the attack, the first question to
arise that involved the Counterterrorism Bureau was whether or
not the Foreign Emergency Support Team should be deployed. The
question of deployment was posed early, and the Department
decided against such a deployment. In my view, it was
appropriate to pose the question, and the decision was a
correct one.''
Now, were you aware that your superiors were consulted
about the decision not to employ the Foreign Emergency Support
Team?
Mr. Thompson. As earlier----
Chairman Issa. You can go ahead and answer that, although
the gentlelady's time has expired.
Mr. Thompson. As earlier indicated, ma'am, I was told that
by the Under Secretary of Management's office. The normal
process for deploying the team is that at the assistant-
secretary level at a Counterterrorism Security Group at the
White House, those options are discussed. At that convening of
that CSG, that decision is recommended or not recommended to
the deputies committee. It is not solely a State Department
function or authority to launch the Foreign Emergency Support
Team, even though we are one part of it.
Chairman Issa. I thank the gentleman.
We now go to the gentleman from Oklahoma, Mr. Lankford.
Mr. Lankford. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Hicks, when you arrived in July, did the facilities in
Benghazi meet the minimum OSPB security standards set by the
State Department?
Mr. Hicks. According to the Regional Security Officer at
the time in Tripoli, John Martinec, they did not.
Mr. Lankford. What about the facilities in Tripoli? The
Benghazi facilities did not meet the minimum standards. Did the
facilities in Tripoli?
Mr. Hicks. Again, according to the Regional Security
Officer in Tripoli, John Martinec, they were very weak, yes.
They did not meet.
Mr. Lankford. They did not meet. Do you think they were
close to meeting the standards?
Mr. Hicks. No, sir.
Mr. Lankford. Mr. Nordstrom, before you left as the RSO,
did the facilities have the number of security personnel that
you had requested?
Mr. Nordstrom. No, they did not.
Mr. Lankford. Mr. Nordstrom, there are a very, very small
number of facilities worldwide that are considered by GAO
critical or high-threat level for personnel serving in our
different embassies and consulates. Tripoli and Benghazi, were
they listed as critical or high-threat level?
Mr. Nordstrom. They were. That was something that I had put
in my written testimony, as well.
Mr. Lankford. By statute, Mr. Nordstrom, who has the
authority to place personnel in a facility that does not meet
the minimum OSPB standards?
Mr. Nordstrom. As I had noted in there, the OSPB standards
go in tandem with SECCA, which is Secure Embassy Construction,
both of which derived out of the East Africa bombings or were
strengthened after that. It is my understanding that since we
were the sole occupants of both of those facilities, Benghazi
and Tripoli, the only person who could grant waivers or
exceptions to those was the Secretary of State.
Mr. Lankford. Mr. Hicks, why was Ambassador Stevens headed
to Benghazi? There were a lot of concerns about him. There were
a lot of security issues that Mr. Nordstrom had listed in
numerous reports leading up to his trip there. Why was the
Ambassador headed there?
Mr. Hicks. According to Chris, Secretary Clinton wanted
Benghazi converted into a permanent constituent post. Timing
for this decision was important. Chris needed to report before
September 30th, the end of the fiscal year, on the physical and
the political and security environment in Benghazi to support
an action memo to convert Benghazi from a temporary facility to
a permanent facility.
In addition, Chris wanted to make a symbolic gesture to the
people of Benghazi that the United States stood behind their
dream of establishing a new democracy.
Mr. Lankford. Why was this timing important? Was it
significant that he went right now? Was there some hesitation
about him going at that moment for that length of time? Could
he have waited a couple more months to be able to go?
Mr. Hicks. He had originally planned to go to Benghazi in
October, but we had a 2-week gap in the principal officer
position. Eric Gaudiosi was departed on August 31st, and his
replacement was not due in the country until September 15th. We
covered the initial 10-day period with David McFarland, and
then the Ambassador chose to go. And, again, he chose to go for
those reasons.
Mr. Lankford. What was the timeline on trying to make this
a permanent facility? Or was there anything pending that had to
be accomplished by a certain deadline?
Mr. Hicks. We had funds available that could be transferred
from an account set aside for Iraq and could be dedicated to
this purpose. They had to be obligated by September 30th.
Mr. Lankford. Okay. And where did those instructions come
from?
Mr. Hicks. This came from the executive office of the
Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs.
Mr. Lankford. So they were told to go ahead and check
everything out, get the process going in Benghazi because we
had do it and we had do it right now. He had planned to go in
October but said, we have to get there earlier and get this
started. And, plus, there was an opening, as well, the
principal officer.
Mr. Hicks. That's right.
Mr. Lankford. Mr. Nordstrom, on March the 28th, there is a
cable that you sent to Washington requesting to keep the
Diplomatic Security that you already had on the ground, that
level of security, and not have that level of security
decreased. Did you draft that cable?
Mr. Nordstrom. I did.
Mr. Lankford. Who was the intended recipient of that cable?
Mr. Nordstrom. Generally, those types of requests would go
to our Diplomatic Security personnel, certainly DAS Charlene
Lamb, who was with me before in October, testified, and,
certainly, to the Under Secretary of Management and Near
Eastern Affairs would typically be the distribution for that.
Mr. Lankford. Okay. Thank you.
My time has expired.
Mr. Mica. [presiding.] I thank the gentleman.
The gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Tierney, you are
recognized.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Hicks, let me start by acknowledging how riveting your
testimony was of the events of that day and evening and
thanking you for your service and your activity, for sharing
with us all the brave acts that occurred that night. I don't
think we have heard enough of that. And I think it is important
for the American people to know how many individuals, both in
Tripoli and in Libya, responded so very well and bravely on
that. So thank you for sharing that and for your service, as
well.
You know, we have an important responsibility here, and
that is to ensure that whatever happened that night and
whatever we learn from what could have been done better
actually gets fixed. And I think that's a legitimate process
for this committee to do. I hope we move on on that basis.
I know that, you know, we had an Accountability Review
Board set up immediately in the wake of all of this, and they
were rather harsh in their determination on that. And, in fact,
they made some 29 different recommendations on that. And we
should be finding out whether or not the Secretary of State and
the Department are implementing those recommendations and how
expeditiously. And I hope that at some point we can get to
that, which I think would be the appropriate role for the
government.
And I know that two of the three witnesses here this
morning actually spoke with the Accountability Review Board,
and the third certainly knew of his right to speak and chose
not to contact them for whatever reason on that.
But earlier this week, I think disturbingly, you know, the
chairman went on to national television and actually accused
the administration of deliberately misleading the American
people about the attacks in Benghazi. For, you know, somebody
that's earned the term of being a whopper, making a statement
of a whopper and four Pinocchios, it is a little bit shocking
to think that that kind of a statement would be made without
any apparent backup.
The basis for the extreme charge were apparently statements
made by Ambassador Rice on news shows the Sunday after the
attacks. And the comments were allegedly that the talking
points that were provided by the intelligence community were
supposedly manipulated for political purposes.
What was quoted by the chairman at that TV show was,
``Clearly, the American public was deliberately misled,'' said
the whopper, ``and it was a political decision.''
Mr. Hicks, you told our investigators that you weren't
involved with the drafting of those talking points. Is that
right?
Mr. Hicks. Yes, sir.
Mr. Tierney. And, Mr. Nordstrom, you weren't involved
either. Is that correct?
Mr. Nordstrom. No, I was not.
Mr. Tierney. And, Mr. Thompson, you also were not involved.
Is that right?
Mr. Thompson. Yes, Congressman. But, however, I offered my
services to the ARB, and I did not try to keep myself out of
that process, just for the record.
Mr. Tierney. Thank you.
And we know that there were conflicting reports about what
happened, including a statement by a Libyan official that there
had been a demonstration and some eyewitness accounts of that
protest.
But, Mr. Hicks, we know that you didn't believe that there
was a protest. You believed that it was otherwise. And we know
that the President of Libya also contradicted with that
statement on that.
But the intelligence community insisted it received initial
reporting suggesting there was a demonstration. We know that
the reporting was wrong; now we know that. But the mention of a
demonstration was put into talking points by the intelligence
community, not the White House or the State Department.
So I want to play a little video here, if we can, of
General Clapper, where he specifically addresses the attacks on
Ambassador Rice. We have that cued up.
[Video shown.]
Mr. Tierney. So General Clapper says that he thinks the
attacks on Ambassador Rice were unfair. She was using exactly
what the intelligence community gave her.
Mr. Hicks, do you have an argument with his veracity when
he made those statements?
Mr. Hicks. There was no report from the U.S. mission in
Libya of a demonstration on----
Mr. Tierney. The difficult question I have for you because
you were good enough to come forward is, do you contest General
Clapper's veracity? Is he lying or is he telling the truth of
what information he gave to Ambassador Rice?
Mr. Hicks. I don't know anything about the development of
those talking points.
Mr. Tierney. So, look, we haven't investigated this issue
yet. You know, it would be interesting to know. But the House
Intelligence Committee has. They got all of the draft talking
points. They got the briefings and testimony from CIA
officials. According to Adam Schiff, one of the Representatives
that is on and part of that investigation, he said, ``General
Petraeus, the former head of the CIA, made it clear that the
change was made to protect classified sources of information,
not to spin it, not to politicize it. And it wasn't done at the
direction of the White House.''
And, as an aside, we might be interested in protecting
classified information, because we have had situations where
people in the majority have gone to Libya and come back and had
a real flare-up about what they disclosed concerning classified
information.
But, in addition, there was a bipartisan report issued by
Senator Lieberman and Senator Collins that similarly stated,
``No changes were made for political reasons, and there was no
attempt to mislead the American people about what happened in
Benghazi.''
So people who have actually seen the documents, who have
actually conducted a real investigation completely reject the
allegation that they were made for political purposes or to
deliberately mislead the American people.
With that, I yield back.
Mr. Mica. Thank you, Mr. Tierney.
Let me yield now to the gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Jordan.
Mr. Jordan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Hicks, in your 22 years of service to our country, you
have always received good reviews, strong evaluations. Is that
accurate?
Mr. Hicks. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jordan. And as I look, I mean, I am just a country boy
from Ohio, but as I look at your resume and bio, other than the
degrees from Michigan, it is impressive. It is amazing, the
things you have done.
In fact, immediately after the attacks, everybody said you
did a great job, right? I mean, you look at the addendum here,
Wendy Sherman said you did an outstanding job. Bill Burns,
Deputy Secretary of State, ``great work, heroic efforts.''
Isn't it true, Mr. Hicks--I think you cited this in your
opening statement--that Secretary Clinton gave you a call
immediately after the attacks and said you did an outstanding
job under extreme circumstances?
Mr. Hicks. Yes, sir. We had the first call at 2:00 a.m. and
then again a video conference with our staff.
Mr. Jordan. And isn't it also true the President of the
United States called you up and said, you know what, Mr. Hicks,
did you an outstanding job, again, under severe circumstances?
Mr. Hicks. He did call me, sir.
Mr. Jordan. And all that seems to change. You are getting
all this praise and support, but all that seems to change. And
it seems to change in the phone call you were on that Mr. Gowdy
referenced in his questioning, the phone call you got from Beth
Jones. Is that accurate?
Mr. Hicks. Yes, in a phone call after the interview, I
asked----
Mr. Jordan. This is after Secretary Rice went on television
and misled the American people. You are on a phone call with
Beth Jones. And it all seems to change then because you asked
Beth Jones what?
Mr. Hicks. I asked her why the Ambassador had said there
was a demonstration when the embassy had reported only an
attack.
Mr. Jordan. And, again, what kind of response did you get
from Beth Jones when you asked that question?
Mr. Hicks. She said, ``I don't know.''
Mr. Jordan. Was it like you shouldn't be asking that
question, you should be quiet, we don't want to talk about
that? What was the sense you got?
Mr. Hicks. The sense I got was that I needed to stop the
line of questioning.
Mr. Jordan. And did things continue to deteriorate between
you and your superiors? After they have given you all this
praise, you have had this outstanding service record, 22 years
serving our country, things began to deteriorate even more.
And as I read the transcript, it seems to me that it came
to a head in phone calls you were on with lawyers from the
Department of State prior to Congressman Chaffetz coming to
visit in Libya. Is that accurate?
Mr. Hicks. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jordan. And tell me about those conversations, what
those lawyers instructed you to do on Mr. Chaffetz' visit to
Libya.
Mr. Hicks. I was instructed not to allow the RSO, the
Acting Deputy Chief of Mission and myself to be personally
interviewed by Congressman Chaffetz.
Mr. Jordan. So the people at State told you, don't talk to
the guy who is coming to investigate?
Mr. Hicks. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jordan. So don't talk to the Congressman?
Now you have had several congressional delegations come to
various places you have been around the world. Has that ever
happened, where lawyers get on the phone to you prior to a
congressional delegation coming to investigate a time where we
have had four Americans lose their lives, have you ever had
anyone tell you, don't talk with the people from Congress
coming to find out what took place?
Mr. Hicks. Never.
Mr. Jordan. Never. And you have had dozens and dozens of
congressional delegations that you've been a part of?
Mr. Hicks. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jordan. First time it's ever happened?
Mr. Hicks. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jordan. And isn't it true that one of those lawyers on
the phone call accompanied the folks from the delegation and
tried to be in every single meeting you had with Mr. Chaffetz
and that delegation from this committee?
Mr. Hicks. Yes, sir. That's true.
Mr. Jordan. Tell me what happened when you got a classified
briefing with Mr. Chaffetz, what happened in the phone call
that happened after that?
Mr. Hicks. The lawyer was excluded from the meeting because
his clearance was not high enough. And the delegation has
insisted that the briefing not be limited by any----
Mr. Jordan. Did the lawyer try to get in that briefing?
Mr. Hicks. He tried, yes. But the annex chief would not
allow it because the briefing needed to be at the appropriate
level of clearance.
Mr. Jordan. You had a subsequent conversation after this
classified briefing that the lawyer was not allowed to be in,
you and Mr. Chaffetz and others on that delegation, you had
another conversation on the phone with Cheryl Mills. Tell me
who is Cheryl Mills?
Mr. Hicks. She is a Counselor for the Department of State
and the Chief of Staff to Secretary Clinton.
Mr. Jordan. That's a pretty important position?
Mr. Hicks. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jordan. When she calls, you take the phone call?
Mr. Hicks. Immediately.
Mr. Jordan. Yes. She is the fixture for the Secretary of
State. She is as close as you can get to Secretary Clinton; is
that accurate?
Mr. Hicks. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jordan. And tell me about that phone call you had with
Cheryl Mills.
Mr. Hicks. A phone call from that senior person is
generally speaking not considered to be good news.
Mr. Jordan. And what did she have to say to you?
Mr. Hicks. She demanded a report on the visit.
Mr. Jordan. Was she upset by the fact that this lawyer
was----
Mr. Hicks. She was upset.
Mr. Jordan. This baby sitter, this spy, whatever you want
to call them, was not allowed to be in that. The first time
it's ever happened. All the congressional delegations you've
ever entertained was not allowed to be in that classified
briefing. Was she upset about that fact?
Mr. Hicks. She was very upset.
Mr. Jordan. So this goes right to the person next to
Secretary Clinton; is that accurate?
Mr. Hicks. Yes, sir.
Mr. Jordan. Mr. Chairman, here is a guy with 22 years of
outstanding service to our country, 22 years, outstanding
service, praised by everybody who counts--the President, the
Secretary, everyone above him. And yet now they're
obstructing--because he won't help them cover this up. He is an
honorable man here telling the truth. Now he's getting this
kind of treatment from the very people who praised him before.
This is why this hearing is so important.
I yield back.
Mr. Mica. I thank the gentleman. I am pleased to yield now
to the gentleman from Missouri, Mr. Clay.
Mr. Clay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for yielding. I want to
thank the witnesses for being here today.
You know the Accountability Review Board made a number of
recommendations to better strengthen overseas embassies and
missions like the one in Benghazi.
Mr. Nordstrom, you told our staff that you read the ARB's
unclassified report and recommendations. Do you think that
implementing these recommendations is important to ensure the
safety and security of our foreign service?
Mr. Nordstrom. Absolutely. I had an opportunity to review
that along with the other two committee reports. I think taken
altogether, they are fairly comprehensive and reasonable.
Mr. Clay. And I guess a diplomat like you probably feels
very disheartened when you read in the paper--let's say you are
overseas and Congress has cut this budget for embassy security
and Congress has been on the cheap of providing protection to
our personnel. You know, in order to make security possible at
our missions and our embassies throughout the world, it's one
recommendation in this report that attempts to grapple with
these issues and err on the side of increased attention to
prioritization and the fullest support for people and
facilities engaged in working in high-risk, high-threat area.
The solution requires a more serious and sustained commitment
from Congress to support State Department needs which, in
total, constitute a small percentage both of the full national
budget and that spent for national security. But it's exactly
what we in Congress have failed to do in the past.
Let's look at our record. House Republicans voted to cut
the administration's request for embassy security funding by
$128 million. And that was in fiscal year 2011. In fiscal year
2012, they cut the request by even more, providing $331 million
less than requested. You know, our Republican counterparts have
just said that these cuts are based on their priorities and
choices. And when asked whether he voted to cut diplomatic
security by over $300 million on CNN, Representative Chaffetz
responded, ``Absolutely. Look, we have to make priorities and
choices in this country.'' But these cuts have serious impacts.
I want to you know that my priorities, including funding these
recommendations, which will save lives.
You know, the ARB--Mr. Nordstrom, just to be clear, you
provided information to the ARB; is that correct?
Mr. Nordstrom. That's correct. Yes.
Mr. Clay. And Mr. Hicks, is it true that you also provided
information to the ARB?
Mr. Hicks. Yes, sir.
Mr. Clay. You know it was led by Ambassador Pickering and
Admiral Mullen, who happens to be the former Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff. In its investigation, the review board
interviewed more than 100 people, reviewed thousands of pages
of documents, and viewed hours of videotapes. The board made 29
recommendations to improve security systems and proceeded to
prevent future deadly attacks. And a key finding made by the
board related to availability of funding. It is specifically
for temporary facilities in high-risk, high-threat
environments. And the board stated, ``The Department should
develop minimum security standards for occupancy of temporary
facilities in high-risk, high-threat environments and seek
greater flexibility for the use of Bureau of Overseas Buildings
and Operations sources of funding so that they can be rapidly
made available for security upgrades at such facility. And it
is important to note that the facility in Benghazi was
designated as a temporary facility.''
Mr. Nordstrom, do you agree with the board's review?
Mr. Nordstrom. That was actually one of the specific things
that I talked with the board. My concern is there is no such
thing when we look at the FAM or the OSPB standards for a
temporary facility. So by its very nature----
Mr. Clay. So they developed a recommendation?
Mr. Nordstrom. After the fact, yes.
Mr. Clay. How about you, Mr. Hicks? Do you agree with the
recommendation?
Mr. Hicks. I am not a security expert. I am a diplomat. I
am an economic officer. But I support every improvement that
can possibly be made to improve our security overseas,
including increasing the training of our personnel.
Mr. Clay. Thank you.
Chairman Issa. [Presiding.] I thank the gentleman. I would
also thank the gentleman from Missouri but would ask, were you
here on October 10 when the person who had those requests for
additional security said money was not a factor; Charlene Lamb.
Do you remember her?
Mr. Clay. I can't remember if I was at that----
Chairman Issa. Mr. Nordstrom, you were on that panel. Do
you remember what she said.
Mr. Nordstrom. Yes. She said that resources was not an
issue. And I think I would also point to the ARB report if I'm
not mistaken that they talked to our chief financial officer
with DS who also said that resources were not an issue.
Mr. Clay. But Mr. Chairman, the ARB says resources were an
issue.
Mr. Nordstrom. Well, I guess the question that I have about
the ARB--and again, it's not what the ARB has. It's what it
doesn't have and that it stops short of the very people that
need to be asked those questions. And that's the Under
Secretary of Management and above. Those are perfect questions
that he needs to answer.
Mr. Clay. I'm sure that if we implement some of the
recommendations, it will help us prevent a future attack.
Chairman Issa. And I appreciate that. And what I would say
is that in the earlier hearing on October 10, the one thing we
did discover is, yes, this facility was not able to take the
blows even of a small bomb that had gone off earlier--Mr.
Nordstrom testified to the fact that this consulate, temporary
consulate had been attacked twice and they breached the wall.
So there was an awful lot of recognition that it was an
insufficient facility. And I think that is--ARB no ARB, that is
something that is well in the committee's record. But I thank
you for bringing it up. Mr. Clay. T
We now go to the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Mica.
Mr. Mica. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First of all, I have to
again tell the families that we will continue to pursue this.
And all the facts need to be known about what took place and
hold people accountable. And then next, to the witnesses, thank
you for your service. Thank you for your bravery and actually
coming forward, and again, some of the commendable acts of the
State Department employees you described.
As everybody may know, and I follow, really, my colleague
Mr. Clay's question about the report there, the Accountability
Review Board report. And I've got--this is the unclassified
version. There's a classified version also. This is available
online.
And we have a responsibility under law to review these
situations and to go to people who actually had firsthand
knowledge. Now Mr. Thompson, you have a very important
position. The title is Bureau of Counterterrorism Leader,
Foreign Emergency Support Team, U.S. Department of State;
right?
Mr. Thompson. Correct.
Mr. Mica. Okay. And did you participate? Were you
interviewed by the ARB?
Mr. Thompson. I was not.
Mr. Mica. You were not interviewed, okay. You were on the
job during this period?
Mr. Thompson. I was at my desk that night until 2:00 in the
morning.
Mr. Mica. And you were not allowed to convey information to
the board?
Mr. Thompson. On the 17th, I conveyed my request to be
interviewed before the board.
Mr. Mica. So they did interview you after that?
Mr. Thompson. No.
Mr. Mica. Have you ever been interviewed?
Mr. Thompson. I have not.
Mr. Mica. You have not. So you are one of the primary
players, but yet the board failed to interview you. Would you
say that's correct?
Mr. Thompson. That is a correct statement.
Mr. Mica. Mr. Hicks, is Mr. Thompson an important player in
this? Mr. Nordstrom?
Mr. Nordstrom. I would say yes. Certainly in the aftermath
of the attack.
Mr. Mica. Okay. Let me go to Charge Hicks. Were you
interviewed by the board?
Mr. Hicks. I was interviewed by the board.
Mr. Mica. Were you able to convey all the information that
you felt was necessary regarding this to the board?
Mr. Hicks. The interview took about 2 hours. And it was in
my mind incomplete and a few days later I had a separate
meeting briefly with the executive secretary.
Mr. Mica. So you did have a follow-up meeting and it was--
--
Mr. Hicks. With the board's executive secretary to amplify
on some issues that had been discussed at the meeting, at the
initial interview.
Mr. Mica. And Mr. Nordstrom, did you participate?
Mr. Nordstrom. I did on two occasions. I also shared with
them a voluminous amount of----
Mr. Mica. Did you share how the process worked that we
heard from Mr. Hicks?
Mr. Nordstrom. Sure.
Mr. Mica. Was it thorough?
Mr. Nordstrom. I felt it was thorough and professional. As
I said, their report--and as I have held, the report is fairly
thorough and comprehensive. My issue is that they stopped short
of interviewing people that I personally know were involved in
key decisions that led to how those events unfolded,
specifically how those buildings were staffed and constructed
and in variance with existing standards. Those were all
critical to the----
Mr. Mica. They fell short. Well, in the unclassified
version, they said that security in Benghazi was now recognized
and implemented as a shared responsibility by the bureaus in
Washington charged with supporting the post, resulting in
stovepipe decisions on policy and security.
Now the next part is interesting. That being said, Embassy
Tripoli did not demonstrate strong and sustained advocacy with
Washington for increased security for Special Mission Benghazi.
Would you both agree with that?
Mr. Nordstrom. If I could speak to that, I would disagree
that it was a collaborative process. I'm not sure exactly the
term they used. On a number of occasions--I testified in
October as well--I raised issues; others raised issues; the
Ambassador raised issues; the DCM raised issues to the point
where reports and decisions on both the Tripoli compound and
the Benghazi compound were decided in Washington. And those
decisions were not either cleared with us or shared with us. So
that doesn't seem as a collaborative process.
Mr. Mica. I want to have time for Mr. Hicks to tell us
about his----
Mr. Hicks. Yes, sir. I monitored the discussions that Eric
has testified about from my Arabic language student status.
When I arrived in Tripoli, I had the understanding that these
decisions had been settled and that we were not to relitigate
them in terms of the number of personnel, security personnel at
post. I began a process to attempt to relitigate them in mid-
August and we held an EAC meeting to discuss the matter. And we
were unfortunately unable to return to that issue before 9/11
occurred.
Mr. Mica. Thank you.
Chairman Issa. We now recognize the gentleman from
Massachusetts, Mr. Lynch, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Lynch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I also want to thank
the witnesses for their courageous service and their
willingness to come before the committee here today. I also
want to offer my condolence again to Ambassador Stevens and his
family, Tyrone Woods and his family, Glen Doherty of
Massachusetts and his family, and Sean Smith. These were
American heroes and they were our very best. I don't want that
part to be overlooked. These individuals were regarded as our
very best, including Ambassador Stevens. Without question, I
think his opinion and the respect that his experience and
authority in all matters in Libya and not only in Tripoli but
also in Benghazi was unquestioned I think. And it showed in the
deference that others gave him to those decisions.
I thought the ARB report especially did single out some
areas where I thought they were trying to identify where the
decisions that were made may have been deficient. And they do
identify on page 30, they talk about the Bureau of Diplomatic
Security and NEA, the Near Eastern Affairs, and at post, there
appeared to be a very real confusion over who ultimately was
responsible and in power to make decisions based on policy and
security considerations. They go on further to say the DS
bureau showed a lack of proactive leadership with respect to
Benghazi, failing to ensure that the priority security needs of
a high-risk, high-threat post were met. And at the same time,
with attention in late 2011 shifting to a growing crisis in
Egypt and Syria, the NEA's bureau's front office showed a lack
of ownership of Benghazi security issues and intended to rely
totally on diplomatic security for the latter. The board also
found that Embassy Tripoli leadership, saddled with their own
staffing and security challenges, did not single out a special
need for increased security of Benghazi.
Now what they point to in the next couple of paragraphs is,
they thought that the Special Mission Benghazi extension--that
this was a temporary residential facility not officially
notified to the host government even though it was also a full-
time office facility resulted in a special mission compound
being accepted from office facility standards and
accountability under the Secure Embassy Construction and
Counterterrorism Act of 1999. Mr. Nordstrom, your point
exactly. And the Overseas Security Policy Board, OSPB. So what
they are saying is because there was an extension made that
there was a lowering in expectation there, that the resources
for physical security and also the personnel assignments needed
at that was not given an adequate priority and that it was left
to Diplomatic Security in some cases to make those repairs.
Is that something that you see as being a weak point in
this whole process that allowed Benghazi to be ill-prepared for
the attacks on September 11?
Mr. Nordstrom. I do. As I said, I think that what still
remains unseen is who made that decision to go ahead and assume
that this is going to be a temporary facility. At one point, in
fact, I was told by the colleagues in OBO and DS that the
recommendations that we wanted to make, the upgrades both in
Tripoli and Benghazi would not be made. They forwarded up the
way forward documents that we discussed in October. And they
said, and I quote, ``it's my understanding that M, Under
Secretary for Management, agreed to the current compounds being
set up and occupied condition as is.'' The ARB in particular
found it interesting at my reply, which was in February of
2013. I requested, is anything in writing? If so, I'd like a
copy for post so we have it handy for the ARB. That's 8 months
before the attack. I got no confirmation as to who made those
decisions, nor did I get a copy of that.
Mr. Lynch. Wow. And so the status was still in limbo at
that point? I know there were some discussions with Mr.
Lankford earlier, the gentleman from Oklahoma, that----
Mr. Nordstrom. My understanding was the facility again--the
types of facilities are whether or not you are sole occupancy
of the building or are you a partial occupancy of, say, a
commercial building or if you are in a building which is owned
by the host nation. Well, clearly we were the sole occupant.
And that's the standard. It's very clear. And it's based on our
threat and those standards. We did not meet any of those
standards with the exception of perhaps the height of the wall.
Mr. Lynch. Thank you. My time has expired.
Chairman Issa. Thank you. Just one thing. You used the term
``M'' for the Under Secretary of Management. Who was that?
Mr. Nordstrom. At the time and throughout all of this was
Patrick Kennedy, who was up here in October as well.
Chairman Issa. That's who would have been the person who
said, No, or, This is good enough, presumably.
Mr. Nordstrom. Presumably. Again I don't know what the
decisions--the factors were in his decision. I am sure he had
reason for those decisions. I am not going to criticize those.
My only concern is that nobody has looked at those, whether it
be ARB or anybody else.
Chairman Issa. Thank you.
Mr. Turner.
Mr. Turner. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
Gentlemen, I want to thank you for being here today.
Without your statements, there is a tremendous amount of
information that we just wouldn't know. And certainly it's
important that you are giving us this information, as we all
have deep condolences for the families.
As we look at the information we have gotten today, we
basically have two stand-down decisions that we've been able to
discuss. One, the foreign emergency support team that Mr.
Thompson has told us about. And Mr. Hicks you told us of
Colonel Gibson. Mr. Hicks, I am a member of the House Armed
Services Committee and I am very fascinated with this stand-
down order to Colonel Gibson. As we pursue that, we want to
know who gave Colonel Gibson the order and why. And so I would
like to review that stand-down order with you and what you
experienced that night since you were with him as he was
receiving that stand-down order. You told us that there was a
C-130 Libyan transport that had been provided and that you had
indicated to Colonel Gibson that he should go to reinforce
Benghazi and help to withdraw personnel. Colonel Gibson was
told to stand down and that plane left without him, landing at
about 7:30 in Benghazi without Colonel Gibson's team.
Let's start first with the review of what is Colonel
Gibson's team. Who were those personnel on Colonel Gibson's
team? What were they doing in Libya?
Mr. Hicks. They are the remaining members of the special
security team, group of 14 Special Forces personnel assigned to
protect Embassy Tripoli after the return and re-establishment
of the embassy in September of 2011. And on the 1st of August,
the Secretary of Defense signed an order changing their status
from being a security team to a training team and transferring
the authority--their authority from the Chief of Mission, the
Ambassador, to General Ham. And on August 6, two members of
that team were in a carjacking incident as they were driving
early in the morning outside the compound, and they had to use
their weapons in order to escape that armed attack on their
vehicle. In light of that incident, General Ham decided to draw
down the team from 14 personnel to four personnel. And
Lieutenant Colonel Wood and nine others--Lieutenant Colonel
Wood testified before this committee last October--left Tripoli
in the middle of the month. So Lieutenant Colonel Gibson and
the other three members of that team are the remainder of that
group.
Mr. Turner. So their chain of command had been changed and
they had been reduced. But as you were just describing, these
are highly trained individuals with specialized skills that
would have been useful in the certain situation in Benghazi.
Mr. Hicks. Yes. Absolutely. And particularly given the
fact--again, that the personnel in Benghazi were exhausted from
a night of fighting against very capable opponents.
Mr. Turner. Now do you know why they were told to stand
down? Did Colonel Gibson give you any information or
understanding?
Mr. Hicks. I actually don't know why.
Mr. Turner. Is there any reason to believe that the
situation in Benghazi was over? I mean, there were a number of
serious attacks as you've described it to us. Is there any
reason to believe that there was no longer any danger in
Benghazi?
Mr. Hicks. No. There was every reason to continue to
believe that our personnel were in danger.
Mr. Turner. Mr. Hicks, Mr. Chaffetz has given me an article
that appeared in USA Today just this week. And just as early as
last Monday, Major Robert Furman, a Pentagon spokesman, said
that the military's account that was just first issued weeks
after the attack hasn't changed. There was never any kind of
stand-down order to anybody. And that's a pretty broad
statement, anybody. What's your reaction to the quote by Mr.
Furman?
Mr. Hicks. I can only, again, repeat that Lieutenant
Colonel Gibson said, he was not to proceed to board the
airplane.
Mr. Turner. So your firsthand experience being on the site,
standing next to Colonel Gibson who was on his way on that C-
130 transport and being told not to go contradicts what Mr.
Furman is saying on behalf of the Pentagon?
Mr. Hicks. Yes, sir.
Mr. Turner. Mr. Hicks, did the embassy have a defense
attache on staff whose role it was to interface with the
Defense Department? And did you ask him that evening, were
there any resources coming from the U.S. military? And what was
your reaction to his responses as the evening unfolded?
Mr. Hicks. My reaction was that, okay, we're on our own.
We're going to have to try to pull this off with the resources
that we have available.
Mr. Turner. Were the Libyans surprised?
Mr. Hicks. I don't know but I think they were.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Issa. Thank you. Before we go to Mr. Connolly,
just because most people in the audience, including on the
dais, don't understand ``chief of mission authority,'' would
you, as Chief of Mission, run us through who was under your
chief of mission authority and who wasn't? In other words, who
did you have command and control of? And we are talking about
military assets. Because I think a lot of folks up here are
hearing two chains of command. And it would be helpful for you
to explain it as a career State Department person quickly.
Mr. Hicks. All civilian personnel in civilian USG personnel
in Libya were under chief of mission authority which was Chris
Stevens----
Chairman Issa. Which was yours.
Mr. Hicks. --until we knew that he was dead and then that
passed to me. The four members of the Special Forces team were
under General Ham's authority. We had two other military
Special Forces personnel in country. And I was at that time
unclear as to whether they were under my authority or not.
Chairman Issa. So anyone you had under your authority, you
gave orders to; they responded; they went downrange if you
asked them to. The others were not allowed to?
Mr. Hicks. Yes, sir.
Chairman Issa. Thank you.
Mr. Connolly, thank you very much. You will have your full
time.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. By the way, there
have been some statements that Under Secretary Kennedy was not
interviewed by the ARB, by Ambassador Pickering and Admiral
Mullen. That is a mistaken fact. He most certainly was. You can
look it up. It is documented. He was interviewed and he
provided evidence and that evidence was evaluated. So it is
simply not true that Under Secretary Kennedy was not part of
that process. He most certainly was. And I would ask, Mr.
Chairman, that the record so reflect.
Chairman Issa. Who said that he wasn't? I'm not sure.
Mr. Connolly. I think we've heard it from the table.
Mr. Thompson, statements have been attributed to you that
your bureau, the Counterterrorism Bureau, was actually
deliberately kept out of post-Benghazi developments, decision
making, and so forth. Are those statements attributed to you
accurately?
Mr. Thompson. It's true that my portion of the office was
not participatory----
Mr. Connolly. Your portion. To whom do you report?
Mr. Thompson. I reported to Dan Benjamin at the time.
Mr. Connolly. And did Mr. Benjamin, was he included?
Mr. Thompson. He was overseas at the time.
Mr. Connolly. He was overseas. But was he kept informed and
involved?
Mr. Thompson. I kept him informed in the early stages.
Mr. Connolly. Was he kept informed and involved by the
Secretary's Office?
Mr. Thompson. I have no idea.
Mr. Connolly. Would it surprise you to learn that he has
stated emphatically that he most certainly was?
Mr. Thompson. It wouldn't be a surprise. I have read it.
Mr. Connolly. And would it surprise you that he contradicts
your statements or statements attributed to you? And I read to
you: This charge that we were kept out of the loop in the
aftermath is simply untrue. ``Though I was out of the country
on official travel at the time of the attack, I was in frequent
contact with the Department. At no time did I feel the bureau
was in any way being left out of deliberations that it should
have been part of.''
Mr. Thompson. I would disagree. He is true factually. His
view of how much of----
Mr. Connolly. Okay.
Mr. Thompson. So for the record, if I may, sir, if he
thinks that he was adequately informed and given counsel on
that, then that is his professional opinion.
Mr. Connolly. Well, he is the head of the bureau and he is
or was your supervisor. And that's his testimony. So it
contradicts yours.
Mr. Thompson. I don't think it's his testimony, sir.
Mr. Connolly. Well, I am entering it into the record. So it
is now in the evidentiary record.
Chairman Issa. Would the gentleman yield? I will hold the
time.
Mr. Connolly. Certainly.
Chairman Issa. Mr. Cummings--perhaps you were here, perhaps
not--has said among the lot of people we want to bring before
this committee, he is now an anticipated future witness so he
can give testimony.
Mr. Connolly. But the chairman anticipated exactly the
point I was going to make. So we can clear that up by having
Mr. Benjamin here. Thank you.
Mr. Hicks, I don't think anyone who could have listened to
your account, the minute-by-minute account of what happened,
could be anything but moved. The trauma of what you and your
colleagues must have gone through, especially being in Tripoli,
not being able physically to sort of reach out and do something
about Benghazi, I think all of us can relate to that. Terrible.
I was in Libya, in Tripoli in May of last year before the
tragedy. And I don't remember whether we had a chance to meet
or not. But David Dreier led our CODEL. We were not allowed to
stay in Libya overnight.
What struck me when I arrived in Tripoli was that the
airport security was provided by a militia. And I have traveled
a lot over my years in foreign policy and what goes through the
mind is, what could go wrong with this? It is a volatile,
violent, unstable--or was--situation.
Do you want to talk just a little bit about the domestic
situation in Libya as we found it because I think sometimes we
have forgotten in the telling that we are facing instability in
Libya still in a post-Qadhafi revolutionary situation and
likewise in Benghazi. Could you just share with us some
insights into what you found in terms of that inherent
instability?
Mr. Hicks. Thank you, Mr. Connolly. And thank you for being
my Representative.
First of all, I just want to say that I don't recall saying
that anyone other than myself testified to the ARB or was a
witness before the ARB. So I wanted to be clear about that.
The second thing is, the political and security climate in
Libya at the time, it was highly unstable although after the
elections, we thought that political trajectory--the elections
in July was the political trajectory was heading in the right
direction. President Magariaf had been selected. They were
trying to appoint the new Prime Minister and move towards a
democratic government. The security scene, however, was very
unstable and has been I think well documented. We had
assassinations and car bombings in Benghazi but the assessment
was that this was Libyan-on-Libyan and not necessarily a threat
directed at foreigners. At the same time that we are in the
process of building towards making our post in Benghazi a
permanent post, the British are contemplating returning there
to Benghazi. They left after their ambassador survived an
assassination attempt in June. In Tripoli we also have
instability. We have car bombings, carjackings, we have Islamic
extremist militias who began to attack Sufi shrines and a
government that is struggling to maintain security and improve
security in the country.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you. And Mr. Chairman, if I could just
say to my constituent, we're proud of you. And I would add my
voice to that of Mr. Cummings I am a member of not only this
committee but the House Foreign Affairs Committee and you have
my personal pledge that were there ever to be any hint
retaliation or retribution for your willingness to come forth
and tell your version of what happened, this Member of Congress
will intervene on your behalf forcefully.
Chairman Issa. I thank the gentleman.
The gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Duncan.
Mr. Duncan. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. First of
all, thank you for calling this hearing. There is obviously
great interest in and concern about what happened with that
tragic incident. Mr. Nordstrom, we've already heard Mr.
Thompson say that he was never interviewed even though he
requested to be interviewed. Did I understand you correctly to
say a few minutes ago that you know of other witnesses that had
firsthand knowledge who were not interviewed by the board?
Mr. Nordstrom. No. I don't believe I said that.
Mr. Duncan. I guess I misunderstood about that. I will tell
you though I was a criminal court judge for 7 \1/2\ years
trying felony criminal cases, and I can tell you that it's
surprising that anybody with firsthand knowledge wouldn't be
interviewed about this unless somebody did not want to have a
complete report.
Mr. Thompson, what were you told was the reason you were
not interviewed?
Mr. Thompson. I was not given a reason, sir.
Mr. Duncan. You were not given a reason.
Mr. Hicks, do you feel the report lets any individual or
bureaucracy off the hook?
Mr. Hicks. Yes, sir. I think that in our system of
government the decision-making authority is at the level of
presidentially appointed, Senate confirmed individuals. It's at
the level of Assistant Secretary or higher. Now the reporting
coming out of Embassy Tripoli on conditions there, particularly
the fact that we had to provide a daily report of who was in
country to Under Secretary Kennedy and the fact that he made
the decision as to who came to Tripoli and Benghazi or who
didn't, that budgets came to his table and that security threat
environment reports also came to his table would suggest that
there was some responsibility there.
Mr. Duncan. Mr. Thompson, let me ask you this. Another
thing I find surprising is that--do the security people not
consider that the date of 9/11--I have already heard somebody
say that this mission was considered to be a high threat or a
high risk mission. Do they not realize that 9/11 is a high
security type date and we should be prepared for terrorist
activities on that date in particular?
Mr. Thompson. Certainly. When I hear ``security'' I think
of Greg Nordstrom. So I won't go down the security trail too
far here. But certainly on the anniversary of 9/11, since 9/11/
2001 we have all had our antenna up so to speak and been
forward leaning if not physically, mentally on that particular
day, yes.
Mr. Duncan. The report basically puts the primary blame for
this situation on the Bureau of Diplomatic Security. I would
like to ask if any of you have a comment about that. Do you
think that's fair?
Mr. Nordstrom. If I could, Congressman, I think this might
also address Congressman Connolly's question. My concern with
the report is not that Under Secretary Kennedy was or was not
interviewed. I don't know who was interviewed. Again that's
part of the confidentiality of it, but there's been a lot of
discussion of how many people were supposed to be there or not
supposed to be there. Those things are not driven by
regulations in law. That's a subjective opinion. Obviously that
was quite a bit of my testimony in October. I go back to who
authorized embassy employees, U.S. Government employees to go
into facilities that did not meet legal requirements. I don't
know who made that decision. And the reason why is because, as
Ambassador Pickering said, he has decided to fix responsibility
on the Assistant Secretary level and below. How I see that is,
that's fine. It's an accountability of mid-level officer review
board and the message to my colleagues is that if you are above
a certain level, no matter what your decision is, no one is
going to question it. And that is my concern with the ARB.
Mr. Duncan. Mr. Hicks, did you find other shortcomings in
the report?
Mr. Hicks. Well, I find shortcomings in the process.
Although I was interviewed for 2 hours, I was never allowed to
review the recording of my testimony to the board. I was never
given an opportunity to read the unclassified report before it
was published to see if my testimony had been incorporated at
all or properly. And I have never been given an opportunity to
read the classified report.
Mr. Duncan. All right. Thank you very much.
Chairman Issa. I thank you. I must admit, one of the rules
of this committee is that interviews and depositions, the
witness actually gets a copy of and is allowed to make
corrections in most cases to make sure that they didn't
misstate something. So that is a little surprising to me.
The gentlelady from California, Ms. Speier.
Ms. Speier. Mr. Chairman, you know it's ironic that you say
that, Mr. Chairman, since Mr. Thompson was not even engaged
with the Democratic side of the aisle in terms of answering any
series of questions.
But let me first of all say to the family members, we lost
extraordinary servants to this country. You lost loved ones.
And there's nothing that we can say that will ever heal your
huge loss but know that we will do everything in our power to
make sure that other families do not go through what you are
going through.
To you, Mr. Hicks, thank you for your extraordinary
service. You know, as you were retelling the events--and they
were harrowing--it reminded me of an experience that I had
similar in a foreign country, ambushed, and a sense that we
were woefully under protected. And I think as part of what
we're going to glean from this today is that we have got to do
a much better job of providing protection in high risk, high
threat embassies and counsel offices around the world. It was
inadequate and I am troubled by the fact that General Ham
withdrew additional support because they had been engaged in a
carjacking. If anything, that would heighten our concern and we
would create more support.
Let me, though, ask you a question. You said earlier today
that the lawyers at State told you not to talk to Mr. Chaffetz
when he came. That's what I wrote down. Would you just verify
that that's what you said?
Mr. Hicks. We were not to be personally interviewed by
Congressman Chaffetz.
Ms. Speier. Now in your interview with the committee, you
were asked the question, did you receive any direction about
information that Congressman Chaffetz shouldn't be given from
Washington? And your answer was, no, I did not. Is that still
your testimony today?
Mr. Hicks. I don't recall that phrase. I thought that I
said--and I'd have to review again--that I did receive
instructions exactly as I said them but I did not know who gave
them to me because I did not at that time have access to my
email from my time as the DCM in Tripoli.
Chairman Issa. If the gentlelady could just tell us what
page of the transcript that's on.
Ms. Speier. Maybe the staff can get it for me. I am reading
from a separate document.
You did say that you were told to make sure other State
Department officials were present for meetings with
Representative Chaffetz. As you stated, they told me not to be
isolated with Congressman Chaffetz. Is that correct?
Mr. Hicks. Yes. That's what I mean by not to have a
personal interview with Congressman Chaffetz.
Ms. Speier. Okay, so it was more about not being in a
situation where you did not have other people with you. Is that
correct? As opposed to not being interviewed.
Mr. Hicks. Again, that's what I said, not to be personally
interviewed by Congressman Chaffetz.
Ms. Speier. Well, you said they told me not to be isolated
with Congressman Chaffetz.
Mr. Hicks. That's the meaning of isolated, not to be
personally interviewed.
Ms. Speier. There was a classified briefing for Mr.
Chaffetz that no other State Department official was able to
attend and you testified earlier. So as a result no other State
Department officials can confirm what was said, if there was a
mischaracterization after the fact. So when Representative
Chaffetz returned to Washington and attended this committee's
hearing in October there was a great deal of controversy about
his description of that classified briefing.
Did you by chance watch the hearing?
Mr. Hicks. Actually I didn't but I don't think I said that
no State Department official was allowed in that annex
briefing. In fact, I was in that briefing. David McFarland was
in that briefing, and John Martinec was.
Ms. Speier. The attorney was not.
Mr. Hicks. The attorney was excluded by the annex chief for
clearance purposes.
Ms. Speier. You received a call from Cheryl Mills--actually
let me ask a different question.
Chairman Issa. The gentlelady's time has expired but go
ahead and ask your last question quickly.
Ms. Speier. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think you deserve to
have a post in a location that you desire. So I would like to
ask you, where would you like to be posted?
Chairman Issa. The court of King James is out of the
question.
Mr. Hicks. The country I would most like to go to, is that
the question, and be assigned to?
Ms. Speier. Yes.
Mr. Hicks. You know, I would really want to talk to my
chief decision maker, my family who is sitting right over here,
my wife because I think her opinion is more important than mine
on that point.
Ms. Speier. Just to conclude, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Issa. He really is a diplomat.
Ms. Speier. Well, most of you should be diplomats on issues
like that.
Ms. Ziba had said to you that she would help you get a good
onward assignment. And I think this committee will help you get
a good onward assignment. So we await for the responsible
person for that decision informing us.
Chairman Issa. I thank the gentlelady and I am actually
shocked that Mr. Connolly didn't make that promise to a
constituent who could vote.
With that we go to the representative from North Carolina,
Mr. McHenry.
Mr. McHenry. Not to bring this subject matter of this
hearing back to the subject matter of this hearing, but I'm
sorry, Mr. Hicks, the Senate is in charge of those types of
movements of our ambassadors in the confirmation process. But I
hear you know there's a wide variety of islands just to the
south of Florida that are lovely.
But the subject matter of today's hearing is to get at the
root cause and the root facts of an awful tragedy that
occurred. The mismanagement and the political coverup that
resulted from that mismanagement and a rush to judgment by some
very ambitious political operatives within Washington. At least
that's near as what I can tell, having gotten into the facts as
we have today and knowing what we know today. So I want to
thank all three of you gentlemen for your service to the
American people and to our government. And I want to say to you
that the tough treatment you have gotten as a result not only
on that day in September but since then is a horrible tragedy.
I want to go back to Mr. Gowdy's line of questions here.
Mr. Hicks was there a protocol within the consulate in the
event of a protest?
Mr. Hicks. Yes, there was.
Mr. McHenry. Was there any evidence when you were there in
Libya on that day that this was a protest?
Mr. Hicks. No, there was none. And I am confident that
Ambassador Stevens would have reported a protest immediately if
one appeared on his door. The protocol of course was for us to
evacuate immediately from the consulate and move to the annex.
Mr. McHenry. Okay. Was there anything in connection to a
YouTube video, was there any awareness that the events occurred
because of a YouTube video?
Mr. Hicks. The YouTube video was a non-event in Libya.
Mr. McHenry. Okay. And did you know about that within a
couple of days or the day of?
Mr. Hicks. Yes.
Mr. McHenry. Okay. And so did you report to anyone in
Washington within the first couple of days that there was
anything in connection--a protest in connection to a YouTube
video?
Mr. Hicks. No. The only report that our mission made
through every channel was that there had been an attack on a
consulate.
Mr. McHenry. Not a protest?
Mr. Hicks. No protest.
Mr. McHenry. You can leave your microphone off. I'm going
to come back to you a few times.
Mr. Gowdy mentioned this earlier, but on September 16th
Ambassador Susan Rice went on the Sunday shows, recited a whole
group of talking points. Were you a part of those talking
points.
Mr. Hicks. No, I had no role in that preparation.
Mr. McHenry. Okay. So one month later we had an Under
Secretary Kennedy. Let's play his statement:
``Always made clear from the very beginning that we are
giving out the best information we have at the time we are
giving it out. That information has evolved over time. For
example, if any administration official, including any career
official, had been on television on Sunday, September 16, they
would have said the same thing that Ambassador Rice said. She
had information at that point from the intelligence community,
and that is the same information I had and I would have made
exactly the same point. Clearly we know more today, but we knew
what we knew when we knew it.''
By September 16th, did you know what you know what you
know, which is apparently what Susan Rice said? Let me rephrase
that actually. Let me actually make that a question, if you
will.
Ambassador Rice recited a set of facts. A month later they
defended--the State Department defends that. You are a career
State Department official. Would you have said the things that
Ambassador Rice said?
Mr. Hicks. Not after hearing what President Magariaf said,
especially considering the fact that he had gone to Benghazi
himself at great personal and political risk and for him to
appear on world television and say, this was a planned attack
by terrorists is phenomenal. I was jumping up and down when he
said that. It was a gift for us from a policy perspective, from
my perspective sitting in Tripoli.
Mr. McHenry. And did that occur before September 16th?
Mr. Hicks. He said that on the same talks shows with
Ambassador Rice.
Mr. McHenry. And did you report that--was there knowledge
that he was going to say that?
Mr. Hicks. No, there was not.
Mr. McHenry. Mr. Chairman, I know we have a lot more
questions about this, including what that did in country,
Ambassador Rice's rhetoric, what that did and the impact it had
in country for the work that you were doing and the delay that
resulted because of that of the FBI investigation on the
ground. If you could speak to that. And Mr. Chairman, if you
will indulge me and let him answer, please.
Chairman Issa. Briefly.
Mr. Hicks. Yes, sorry. Again, it took 17, 18 days for us
from that interview to get the FBI to Benghazi and we dealt
with people at the low level and we got them to Benghazi by
stringing together a series of basically low level commitments
to help us get them to Benghazi.
Chairman Issa. Thank you. The gentleman from Wisconsin.
Mr. Pocan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And to the families,
again to those who lost their lives in Benghazi, you have our
condolences and I think the best tribute we can give to those
who lost their lives is to make sure this doesn't happen again
and I think that's really the goal of the committee.
Gentlemen, thank you for being here today. Mr. Hicks,
especially thank you for your extensive conversation about what
happened during the confusion of those first hours, whether the
Ambassador was at the hospital or the annex and all that
happened. I can tell you about 16 years ago I was backpacking
through the Darien Gap in Colombia and woke up to machine gun
fire and hand grenades. At the time we didn't know what
happened. We had paramilitaries on the river, we had guerrillas
behind us, and we were caught in between. So I can fully
understand the full confusion that happened at the time you
were recanting that and I think we saw that in the report.
What I can tell you though, Mr. Chairman, is I don't think
there's a smoking gun today. I don't even think there is a
lukewarm slingshot. What we have is some strong opinions from
people who--all at least I know Mr. Nordstrom Mr. Hicks both
participated in the study and Mr. Thompson while he didn't, no
one stopped him--no one said he shouldn't be in the study--but
we've had a chance to take a look at this. I think what is
really imperative is that we make sure that these
recommendations are done, that something concrete comes out of
this so that no one else is in that situation. And I think one
of the real things that we can do as a committee, as
individuals on this committee, is to make sure that we provide
adequate funding for security and training to all of our
embassies. And I think you know I am one of the new folks
around here, so when I look at some of the past budgets where
we've been asked for literally hundreds of millions of dollars
that haven't been approved in a post-9/11 world, I look at that
as rather risky. And both Mr. Nordstrom Mr. Hicks, you both had
extensive experience around the world in various places you
have been. So looking at this proactively, I think this is
probably the ninth or so hearing that the House has had on this
issue so maybe it's time we start looking at how we make sure
we protect our embassies the very best way we can rather then
going through and rehashing the same old stories.
My questions specifically, both Mr. Hicks and Mr.
Nordstrom, are when it comes to extra training or extra
security do you feel that we need more in some of the embassies
across the world so that we make sure those who are working in
there indeed have the very best protections because we have
that responsibility to them as they serve the country?
Mr. Hicks.
Mr. Hicks. Thank you. There are two things. And I
appreciate the question. We in the State Department need more
training for our people who are going to these critical type
places not only for our diplomatic security agents but also for
our everyday security agents. We need to be able--in my opening
statement I talked about my experience in Bahrain of developing
contacts who helped us get through some very difficult times in
2002 when our embassy was attacked twice and we were
experiencing very severe anti-American demonstrations. We have
to be able to engage. Our diplomats have to be out on the
street. One of the reasons why we were perhaps caught off guard
in Benghazi is because for security purposes, because we had so
few personnel there, the consulate was basically on lockdown.
And so it was very difficult for our principal officer to get
out and mingle with the people and learn what was going on.
This was magnified when I talked with a correspondent after the
event who had been in Benghazi after 9/11 and the correspondent
told me that the people of Benghazi were terrified by these
Islamic extremist militias. We didn't have that sense prior to
9/11. And the only way we could have that sense is if we're out
on the street. I think Under Secretary of State for Public
Diplomacy Sonenshine said it beautifully at the tribute for
Anne Smedinghoff last week when she quoted Correspondent Edward
R. Murrow about going the last three feet. That's what we as
diplomats do. So if we are going to be going outside the
embassies to meet with people and learn what's going on, we
have to have the training to be able to respond rapidly and
effectively to that desperate situation.
So that's one thing. The other thing I believe that we need
to do--and I put this forth as part of my platform for--in
running for office in my speech to the Foreign Service, we need
to develop a robust paradigm for analyzing and mitigating risk,
and one that is comprehensible to every member of the emergency
action committee. And this would be a powerful tool for our
regional security officers to be able to develop the kinds of
programs and the kinds of activities that we need to mitigate
risks that they identify through the use of this paradigm.
Chairman Issa. Thank you.
We now go to the gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Walberg.
Mr. Walberg. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for
holding this hearing. And I, too, agree with both sides of the
aisle that this ought to continue with other hearings.
And it was shocking to just hear a statement about this is
rehashing same old stories. These aren't old stories. These
aren't same old stories. This is a situation that is atrocious
in that it happened. And it's about time we heard the stories
for the first time that we're hearing today. And I thank the
witnesses for being here to do that for us and appreciate your
valor and appreciate the families and their sacrifice.
Mr. Thompson, on several occasions already, it's been
insinuated that not only did you not ask to be interviewed by
ARB but that you refused. You've indicated on a couple of
occasions, no, you asked to be involved.
Let me give you further opportunity and ask you, why were
you concerned about the ARB's failure to interview you? And did
you raise any concerns with the Department about the Review
Board's unwillingness to interview you?
Mr. Thompson. The reason I was concerned about it was that
it was a terrorist event, and we did not respond to a terrorist
event with the team, or we weren't considered to. And there
wasn't a normal process by which that goes through. That
process that I have already stated is not one that is
bureaucratic. It's one that can go from a cold start to wheels-
up, so to speak, within hours.
Mr. Walberg. On-the-ground experience, understanding of
what you were tasked to do.
Mr. Thompson. Yes. With respect to places like Nairobi,
Kenya, on August 7th, 1998, in which we had 12 murdered
Americans, 240 murdered Kenyans, and thousands injured, a very
ambiguous situation and a situation in which we responded to
and collaborated with our DOD and our FBI colleagues. Even OFDA
was there because we had to get--Office of Foreign Disaster
Assistance. We even had to get them in there to help with the
medical resupply because the hospitals were overrun by this
event. We had to set up a new embassy because we had one that
was destroyed. We had to set up all the communications for the
Ambassador. So it was a fairly comprehensive response.
Such was not the case in Tripoli with Mr. Hicks. However,
we did have a need to get people pushed forward early, and even
if they did not end up in Tripoli, they would be closer. Again,
going back to the tyranny of distance, whether we would have
landed in Frankfurt or Sigonella or Crete or somewhere in the
area.
Those are the things I would have brought out to the Board
had I been interviewed.
Mr. Walberg. Any of those findings included in the ARB
report?
Mr. Thompson. Not to my knowledge, but I also have not seen
a classified version. They may be in there.
Mr. Walberg. Mr. Hicks, in a little deference to my
colleague from Ohio, I would say, on top of all of your
distinguished records of achievement and accolades, your two
earned degrees from University of Michigan are your best. And I
appreciate that.
Let me ask you this: Do you know if anyone interviewed by
the ARB was provided an opportunity to read the full classified
report?
Mr. Hicks. I've talked to several witnesses who were
interviewed by the ARB, and none of them have been allowed to
read the classified report.
Mr. Walberg. As far as you know, none that were interviewed
have read the classified report.
Mr. Hicks. So far as I know.
Mr. Walberg. So you mentioned that there was a 2:00 a.m.
phone call with the Secretary of State. During that short phone
call, conversations you rehearsed for us, was there any mention
of a demonstration during that conversation?
Mr. Hicks. No.
Mr. Walberg. It would be interesting to know if that was
included in the report. But you've not read it.
Mr. Hicks. Correct.
Mr. Walberg. In fact, it wasn't.
Do you think the ARB report lets any individual or
bureaucracy off the hook?
Mr. Hicks. Again, as I mentioned earlier, given the
decision-making that Under Secretary Pat Kennedy was making
with respect to Embassy Tripoli and Consulate Benghazi
operations, he has to bear some responsibility.
Mr. Walberg. What, in your view, were the shortcomings of
the ARB process, besides not interviewing some people and
allowing the classified report to be read?
Mr. Hicks. Well, again, there was no stenographer in the
room when we were interviewed.
Mr. Walberg. No stenographer?
Mr. Hicks. No, sir. And----
Mr. Walberg. So we're talking about editorial commentary,
potentially, as opposed to clear truth, accuracy?
Mr. Hicks. That's correct. There were note-takers. I had
counsel in the room with me taking notes. But other witnesses
did not have counsel or may not have had counsel.
Mr. Walberg. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, I don't have that benefit on the campaign
trail, to not have accurate reporting.
Thank you.
Chairman Issa. Well, Congress created the ARB in 1986, so
we have the ability to professionalize it by congressional
action. Perhaps that will be something we will recommend.
We now go to the gentlelady from Illinois, Ms. Duckworth.
Ms. Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, thank you for your bravery in being here today
and for your service to our Nation.
I really believe that the best way to honor the sacrifice
of Ambassador Stevens and the three other Americans who gave
their lives in the line of duty in a final act of devotion to
this Nation, the best thing that we can do is to put aside
politics and take a hard look at the facts of what went wrong
and what we need to do as we move forward to make sure this
never, ever happens again.
And I share the frustration that many of my colleagues have
expressed about the fact that we did not have the opportunity
to properly prepare for your testimony today or to participate
in a bipartisan investigation.
You know, I want to take a look particularly at what we can
do to strengthen our missions, particularly in parts of the
world where we cannot rely on host governments to provide
adequate security, what we need to do to strengthen our ability
to protect our posts. As you've mentioned already, this
includes better security measures and more U.S. security
personnel.
Mr. Hicks, you had said that, regarding the ARB's
recommendations, that you thought it was incomplete, that the
recommendations were unbalanced in favor of, I think you said,
building higher walls, pouring more concrete, and that it was
insufficiently strong in recommending that the State Department
personnel needed to have more and better training, which is
what you started to respond to my colleague from Wisconsin, Mr.
Pocan.
Could you elaborate further on what you believe needs to be
done with improvements in training?
Mr. Hicks. Again, the point I made is that those of us
whose job it is to engage the local population, to represent
America to local populations, we have to be able to go outside.
We have to be able to meet them in their own places, especially
in a part of the world where hospitality is a major part of the
culture and where, also, the demonstration of personal courage
is an important part of the culture.
So that means that we have to, as individuals, those of us
who go outside, have to be able to be cognizant of the
situations that we're going into. We have to be situationally
aware, I think, as Eric would say, in order to recognize in
advance that we may be getting into a difficult situation and
we need to be able to respond appropriately.
And if we are put in a situation of extremis, then we have
to also have the ability to be able to protect ourselves in
that situation.
Ms. Duckworth. Uh-huh. Thank you.
Mr. Nordstrom, I know you did not have a chance to answer
or elaborate on my colleague's question. What is your opinion?
Because I really want to make sure that we get the lessons
learned from this.
You know, is there a balance that could be struck between
focusing on improvements to physical security and also focusing
on improvements to training, as Mr. Hicks suggested, or maybe
dynamic communications? Do you have any specific
recommendations?
Mr. Nordstrom. Your point is actually a good one, is a
perfect one. You know, my concern is that in the wake of an
attack we're going to go through the same cycle that we've gone
through all the time.
Ms. Duckworth. Right.
Mr. Nordstrom. More money is not always the solution. More
is not always the solution. Better is the solution.
During the process, I had somebody ask me as part of the
ARB why had I not requested machine guns, 50-caliber machine
guns, for the consulate in Benghazi. I was awestruck. I said,
if we are to the point where we have to have machine gun nests
at a diplomatic institution, isn't the larger question, what
are we doing? Why do we have staff there?
You know, one of the recommendations that I've looked at
is, again, it's decision-making processes. That doesn't cost
money. One of the things that we saw, again, is, what is the
role of DS? Is DS, Diplomatic Security, elevated high enough
within the Department of State's organizational structure
whereby recommendations that are within that organization are
heard by the Secretary of State? I mean, I think she has a very
reasonable assertion that some of these issues weren't brought
to her attention. Well, how do we fix that so that they are
brought to the attention of the Secretary of State?
It's not lost on me that, as the unheeded messenger this
time around, I look at where those messages seem to stop: the
Under Secretary for Management. I look back, and I see the last
time we had a major attack was East Africa. Mr. Thompson has
talked about it. Who was in that same position when the
unheeded messengers of the Ambassador in Nairobi and the RSO in
Nairobi were raising those concerns? It just so happens it's
the same person. The Under Secretary for Management was in that
same role before. So if anybody should understand this, I would
hope that he would.
That's why I'm going to the point of, there's something
apparently wrong with the process of how those security
recommendations are raised to the Secretary.
Ms. Duckworth. I agree. And I think that you've given us a
great way forward.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Issa. Thank you. I thank the gentlelady.
We now go to the gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Amash.
Mr. Amash. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you for the witnesses for testifying today. Thank
you for your service.
Mr. Hicks, from a Michigan alum, go Blue.
Mr. Hicks, you testified that you haven't read the final
classified ARB report. Is that correct?
Mr. Hicks. That's correct.
Mr. Amash. If you haven't been allowed to read the report,
how do you know whether your testimony was used appropriately?
Mr. Hicks. I have no idea.
Mr. Amash. The Department employees who were singled out
for disciplinary action, were they allowed to read the final
classified ARB report to examine the evidence that was used
against them?
Mr. Hicks. Two of those individuals have told me that they
were not allowed to read the classified report.
Mr. Amash. Do you believe that the ARB report does enough
to ensure that a similar tragedy doesn't take place in the
future?
Mr. Hicks. Again, I haven't read the complete report, so I
can't make a judgment at this point in time.
Mr. Amash. Did you have an opportunity to provide input
with respect to the report?
Mr. Hicks. Yes, I had a 2-hour conversation with the Board.
Mr. Amash. All right.
I'm going to yield some time to the gentleman from Utah,
Mr. Chaffetz.
Mr. Chaffetz. Thank you.
Mr. Hicks, do we typically need permission of a host-nation
government to fly military aircraft over their territory?
Mr. Hicks. Yes, we do.
Mr. Chaffetz. And, to your knowledge, did we ever ask the
Libyans for permission to fly over their country?
Mr. Hicks. Frequently.
Mr. Chaffetz. But did we the night of the attack?
Mr. Hicks. The night of the attack?
Mr. Chaffetz. The night of--once this incident started, did
we seek permission from the Libyan Government to do a flyover?
Mr. Hicks. I think in the record there is--a UAV was flying
over Libya that night, and it had permission to be there.
Mr. Chaffetz. Did we ever ask for permission to fly
anything other than an unarmed drone over Libya during the
attack?
Mr. Hicks. No.
Mr. Chaffetz. Would you have known that?
Mr. Hicks. Yes.
Mr. Chaffetz. Based on your extensive experience as a
diplomat in dealing with the Libyan Government, do you believe
the Libyans would have granted overflight rights if we had
requested it?
Mr. Hicks. I believe they would have.
Mr. Chaffetz. Mr. Nordstrom, do you believe that would also
be true?
Mr. Nordstrom. I think certainly in this situation. They
were fairly--yeah.
Mr. Chaffetz. Mr. Chairman, I think one of the unanswered
questions here is, if it's a possibility, if there's any chance
that we could get military overflight, if we could get a
military flight there, then we would ask permission in advance.
My concern is there was never an intention, there was never an
attempt to actually get these military aircraft over there.
I think one of the hard questions we have to ask is not
only about the tankers, but what was the NATO response? We flew
for months over Libya. For months, we conducted an air
campaign. And we have assets. We have NATO partners. We worked,
for instance, with the Italians. It is stunning that our
government, the power of the United States of America, couldn't
get a tanker in the air.
Mr. Hicks, when did you think that this was actually over,
it was done, we were safe?
Mr. Hicks. Not until our personnel landed in Tripoli on the
C-130.
Mr. Chaffetz. And then, even then, we were--Ansar al-Sharia
had posted that, that we were potentially--I mean, there was a
reason why you had to leave the facility in Tripoli.
Mr. Hicks. That's correct.
Mr. Chaffetz. When did you actually return to the embassy
in Tripoli?
Mr. Hicks. We returned, I believe, on the 14th.
Mr. Chaffetz. When did the FES Team arrive to help secure
the embassy?
Mr. Hicks. They arrived on the night of September 12th at
about 8:30 or so.
Mr. Chaffetz. And there still, there still was a potential
thought. And the government never asked for permission. This is
one of the deep concerns.
In the last minute here, I want to ask Mr. Thompson here--I
want to read to you another excerpt of an email sent by you to
Timothy Walsh and James Webster on Wednesday, September 12th.
This is at 11:10 in the morning. ``Spoke to DB''--who is DB?
Mr. Thompson. Daniel Benjamin.
Mr. Chaffetz. --``Daniel Benjamin on the phone this
morning. He understands my FEST points, concurs, but expressed
his pessimism regarding our deployment and, by extension, does
not intend to lobby for our inclusion,''.
To remind everybody here, didn't Daniel Benjamin recently
state that any claim that key elements of the Counterterrorism
Bureau, such as F.E.S.T., were cut out of the response planning
was simply, ``untrue''? Is that your understanding?
Mr. Thompson. Correct.
Mr. Chaffetz. How do you react to that? He goes out and
publicly says that's not true, but based on the email, it
sounds like you had a discussion with him. What happened in
that discussion?
Mr. Thompson. He was on the phone from Germany. Another
member of our front office had been talking to him. She asked
if he wanted to talk to me. I gave him a quick rundown of what
had happened the night before.
I kept him informed via BlackBerry on the unclass level
about the concerns. And, obviously, when we finally understood
how many people had been murdered that night, he was shocked
and appalled, wanted to know anything he could do. And I told
him about the dismissal and how it was dismissed in terms of
getting our people out, or getting our people out of town.
And I would just add that it's more than process and it's
more than some of the other things that have been stated. My
biography's in the record. We live by a code. That code says
you go after people when they're in peril when they're in the
service of their country. We did not have the benefit of
hindsight in the early hours. And those people who are in peril
in the future need to know that we will go get them and we will
do everything we can to get them out of harm's way.
That night unfolded in ways that no one could have
predicted when it first started. And it is my strong belief
then, as it is now, that we needed to demonstrate that resolve
even if we still had the same outcome.
Chairman Issa. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Connolly. Mr. Chairman?
Chairman Issa. For what purpose does the gentleman seek----
Mr. Connolly. I just wanted to reiterate, Mr. Chairman,
that your point to me, that rather than speculate what Mr.
Benjamin and Mr. Kennedy and others may think or may have said,
we'll have the opportunity----
Mr. Chaffetz. Will the gentleman--will the gentleman yield?
Chairman Issa. We look forward to it.
Mr. Chaffetz. Will the gentleman yield?
Chairman Issa. Actually, all time has expired.
We now go to the gentlelady from Illinois, who has been
patiently waiting, Ms. Kelly.
Ms. Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I, too, would like to thank you for your service and
thank you for your patience and endurance, sitting here almost
3 hours. And my condolences to the family.
Mr. Hicks, I would like to ask you about your testimony
involving the flight from Tripoli to Benghazi. First, in your
interview with the committee, you explained that the first
plane from Tripoli to Benghazi left on the night of the attack
around 1:15 a.m. Is that correct?
Mr. Hicks. No, it arrived in Benghazi about 1:15.
Ms. Kelly. It arrived, okay. The ARB report said that the
first plane had a seven-person security team which included two
military personnel. Is that correct?
Mr. Hicks. Yes, it did.
Ms. Kelly. Now, you also told the committee that a second
flight left Tripoli the next morning, September 12th, between
6:00 and 6:30 a.m. Is that correct?
Mr. Hicks. I think the flight actually left a little later,
but, again, the timelines are still not--have merged, to a
great extent, given time.
Ms. Kelly. Okay. You said that four military personnel were
told not to board that plane and that this call came from
Special Operations Command Africa. Is that right?
Mr. Hicks. That's what I understand.
Ms. Kelly. Okay. During the interview, you were asked if
you knew what was the rationale that you were given that they
couldn't go ultimately, and you explained, I guess they just
didn't have the right authority from the right level. Is that
correct?
Mr. Hicks. I think that's correct.
Ms. Kelly. Okay. So you basically don't know why they were
told not to get on the plane, right?
Mr. Hicks. I have no idea why they were told not to get--
why they were not allowed to go get on that airplane.
Ms. Kelly. Thank you.
Just this morning, the Department of Defense released a
press release, if I can read it.
``The team leader called Special Operations Command Africa
to update them that the movement of U.S. personnel to the
Tripoli annex was complete. He then reported his intention to
move his team to Benghazi aboard the Libyan C-130. As the
mission in Benghazi at that point had shifted to evacuation,
the Special Operations Command Africa operations center
directed him to continue providing support to the embassy in
Tripoli.
``We continue to believe that there was nothing this group
could have done had they arrived in Benghazi, and they
performed superbly in Tripoli. In fact, when the first aircraft
arrived back in Tripoli, these four played a key role in
receiving, treating, and moving the wounded.''
I would like to yield the rest of my time to Mr. Connolly.
Mr. Connolly. I thank my colleague.
Chairman Issa. Does the gentlelady want that in the record?
Ms. Kelly. Yes, please.
Chairman Issa. Without objection, it will be placed in the
record.
Mr. Connolly. Mr. Hicks, you said rather emphatically that
the video had no material impact in Libya?
Mr. Hicks. That's correct.
Mr. Connolly. And you talked several times about
conversations, phone conversations, with the Prime Minister,
who referred to it as a terrorist act, not as a protest. Is
that correct?
Mr. Hicks. That's----
Chairman Issa. The President.
Mr. Connolly. Oh, the President. But we don't want to leave
a misimpression here. I mean, the Libyan Government is somewhat
inchoate at this time.
Mr. Hicks. That's correct.
Mr. Connolly. I mean, it's hardly a unified government.
Mr. Hicks. That's correct.
Mr. Connolly. And, for example, you were busy on the day,
but on September 12th, the New York Times published a story
quoting Libya's Deputy Interior Minister, Wanis al-Sharif, who
said that his initial instinct was to avoid inflaming the
situation by risking a confrontation with people angry about
the video in Libya. He said he also criticized the Americans at
the mission for failing to heed what he said was the Libyan
Government's advice to pull its personnel or beef up its
security, especially in light of recent violence in the city
and the likelihood that the video would provoke protest.
That same article interviewed people engaged in the assault
in Benghazi who cited, according to The New York Times, the 14-
minute video, that this was due to their anger.
Now, my only point is the Libyan Government doesn't speak
with just one voice; there were disparate voices. Some, in
fact, did see the video, apparently, at the time, as an
influence. And it's a little--I don't want to mislead the
public that there was one unified perspective, and that was--
that narrative is entirely false and was at the time.
Would you care to comment?
Mr. Hicks. Sure.
Our assessment in the embassy was that the video was not an
instigator of anything that was going on in Libya.
Now, I understand that these people were quoted. In fact,
on September 20th, Prime Minister El-Keib raised the video in
front of the press when Deputy Secretary Burns was there. But
we saw no demonstrations related to the video anywhere in
Libya. The only event that transpired was the attack on our
consulate on the night of September 11th.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you very much.
I thank my colleague.
And, Mr. Chairman, if there is no objection, I would like
to enter into the record the full New York Times article dated
September 12th, ``Libya Attack Brings Challenges for U.S.''
Chairman Issa. I certainly think, under the circumstances,
it would be appropriate to put into the record something that
says that we were stupid to still have a consulate in Benghazi,
that it was an unreasonable risk and it should have been closed
down in light of the danger, and, in fact, there may have been
a video reaction. I think that's a good balance.
Mr. Connolly. Well, I thank the chairman for that, the
unanimous consent comment.
Chairman Issa. With that, we go to the gentleman from
Arizona, Mr. Gosar.
Mr. Gosar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First, to the families, thank you for the heroism that your
sons exhibited. I would tell you that.
To the three of you at the stand, thank you for your
bravery, particularly in light of how we treated whistleblowers
today and in the past.
Mr. Hicks, did you ever question officials in Washington
about what Secretary Rice said on the Sunday talk shows?
Mr. Hicks. Yes. Again, when Assistant Secretary Jones
called me after the talk show event, I asked her why she had
said there was a demonstration when we had reported that there
was an attack.
Mr. Gosar. Was she the only one that you talked to?
Mr. Hicks. Yes.
Mr. Gosar. Okay. And her reaction was?
Mr. Hicks. Her reaction, again, was, ``I don't know.'' And
it was very clear from the tone that I should not proceed with
any further----
Mr. Gosar. So she was very curt?
Mr. Hicks. Yes.
Mr. Gosar. Okay. Did you receive any negative feedback
based on this conversation?
Mr. Hicks. Over the next month, I began to receive
counseling from Assistant Secretary Jones about my management
style, things that I basically was already doing on the ground.
But, nevertheless, I implemented everything that she asked me
to do.
Mr. Gosar. Something that you were highly recommended and
highly accommodated for, they're questioning it all of a
sudden.
Can I have the video to be played on the screen, please?
[video shown.]
Mr. Gosar. Well, I'm really mad. But, Mr. Hicks, would
you--could I give you the opportunity to respond to that
question, what difference does it make?
Mr. Hicks. I think the question is, what difference did it
make?
Mr. Gosar. Yep.
Mr. Hicks. President Magarief was insulted in front of his
own people, in front of the world. His credibility was reduced.
His ability to lead his own country was damaged. He was angry.
A friend of mine who ate dinner with him in New York during the
U.N. season told me that he was still steamed about the talk
shows two weeks later. And I definitely believe that it
negatively affected our ability to get the FBI team quickly to
Benghazi.
Mr. Gosar. So that definitely impacted getting the FBI to
look at the crime scene, did it not?
Mr. Hicks. Absolutely.
Mr. Gosar. So when you talked to the Libyan Government,
were they responsive when you asked about access for the FBI?
Mr. Hicks. It was a long slog of 17 days to get the FBI
team to Benghazi, working with various ministries to get,
ultimately, agreement to support that visit, to get them to
Benghazi. But we accomplished that mission. But, again, at the
highest levels of the government, there was never really a
positive approval.
Mr. Gosar. So this false--? thing to a spontaneous reaction
to a video was a direct contravention of the explanation
offered by this President, the President of Libya. And the
facts on the ground impact our ability to investigate the crime
scene afterward.
How long was it, as you said, before the FBI was allowed
access into Benghazi to examine that crime scene?
Mr. Hicks. Seventeen days.
Mr. Gosar. Seventeen days. Was the crime scene secure
during that time?
Mr. Hicks. No, it was not. We repeatedly asked the
Government of Libya to secure the crime scene and prevent
interlopers, but they were unable to do so.
Mr. Gosar. So let me get the timeline finalized here. So
the FBI is sitting in Tripoli for weeks, waiting for the
approval of the Libyan Government to travel to Benghazi. Is
that appropriate?
Mr. Hicks. Well, they were attempting to do their job from
Tripoli as best they could.
Mr. Gosar. But they were denied access into Benghazi,
right?
Mr. Hicks. Correct.
Mr. Gosar. So what were they doing with their time?
Mr. Hicks. They were interviewing witnesses that they could
find in Tripoli and could meet with in Tripoli. And they were
also engaging with the government in order to develop a
cooperative investigation with the Libyans, who had sent an
investigative team--an investigator to Benghazi.
Mr. Gosar. Were you interviewed by the FBI?
Mr. Hicks. No, I was never interviewed by the FBI.
Mr. Gosar. Never? Hmm. Nice story.
I yield back my time.
Chairman Issa. I thank the gentleman.
We now go to the gentleman from Nevada, Mr. Horsford.
Mr. Horsford. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you to our witnesses for being here.
And, you know, it's my understanding that we've had nine
oversight hearings on Benghazi since the horrific attacks on
our consulate on September 11th, 2012. And like many of my
colleagues have expressed to the family, I believe that we need
to continue to do everything within our power as Congress to
get to the solutions and the recommendations that will prevent
this from happening again. And I think that, in addition to our
condolences, the things that we need to do most is our job, to
come up with the recommendations to prevent this.
One of the overall conclusions of the Accountability Review
Board was just that, that ``Congress must do its part to meet
this challenge and provide necessary resources to the State
Department to address security risks and meet mission
imperatives.'' That was a direct statement out of the Review
Board recommendation.
And I think each of you agree that Congress must do its
part. Am I correct, yes or no? Real quick.
Mr. Thompson. Yes.
Mr. Horsford. So, you know, Mr. Chairman, I just would hope
that, after this hearing, after nine oversight hearings, that
we will begin to work on some specific recommendations that we
can bring forward and that all of us working together can do
our job to protect our embassies. I think that's what the
public wants. I believe and hope that that's what the families
want in the memory and the legacy of those who lost their
lives.
And I would say that it does cost money. Mr. Nordstrom, I
know you say it's not just about money, but it also is about
properly prioritizing budget considerations. And, you know, in
the past, you know, my colleagues on the other side have not
been willing to make the kinds of serious and sustained
commitment to funding that are necessary for large-scale and
long-term security projects like building facility
improvements, for example.
Chairman Issa. Would the gentleman yield briefly?
Mr. Horsford. May I?
Chairman Issa. Of course.
Mr. Horsford. Thank you.
And so, in both the 2011 and 2012 budget cycles, the
budgets gave the State Department hundreds of millions of
dollars less than what was requested. The fiscal year 2013
budget as proposed by the other side proposed even more cuts.
They want to reduce the international affairs budget by more
than $5 billion less than it was in fiscal year 2012. That is a
9.8 percent cut to Diplomatic Security when extrapolated across
the whole foreign affairs budget.
By the fiscal year 2016, the proposed budget by the other
side further cuts funding to international affairs by another
$5 billion. This represents a 20 percent cut to Diplomatic
Security when extrapolated over the entire foreign affairs
budget.
So these are serious and significant cuts, and we cannot
pretend that they don't have consequences.
And so I know that my colleagues have talked several times
about holding people accountable. Well, I hope that one of
those groups that we will hold accountable are ourselves, as
Members of Congress, to do our job to properly fund the safety
of our embassies so that this never happens again.
I urge my Republican counterparts to work with us in a
bipartisan effort to actually fund these improvements to our
embassy security and to follow through on the 29 ARB
recommendations that have already been made and those that we
believe should also be supported from this hearing.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Issa. We now go to the gentleman from
Pennsylvania, Mr. Meehan.
Mr. Meehan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I note for the record that Charlene Lamb, who testified
before this committee at a previous time, was asked
specifically the question as to whether or not funding issues
impacted the actions that took place, and she said no.
And I'm really intrigued at this point in time by some of
the commentary, because one of the things--I would like to
follow up on the questioning, Mr. Nordstrom, that came to you
from Mr. Lankford with regards to some of the decisions that
were made. Because being in Benghazi, having the Secretary--
because I'm going to tell you, I am struggling to find out how
we had a United States Ambassador in a marginally safe American
compound in an increasingly hostile area on an iconic day like
September 11th with limited security.
And I think that there are some issues that you were
talking about first, decisions that were made about allowing
occupancy in the first place. Could you tell me quickly about
how that was enabled to be approved?
Mr. Nordstrom. That's the same question I still have to
this day.
Mr. Meehan. You do not know. But you do know, according to
the law, it appears that it must be signed off by the Secretary
of State, and there is no delegation.
Mr. Nordstrom. Certainly, for parts of it, yes, for the
second portion of it.
Mr. Meehan. Following up, on July 31st, it's a fact that
there were--I go back on the record--there were 16 SSTs,
Special Forces, in Libya, 14 Department of State security
personnel. On August 31st, just shortly before, that had been
reduced to six regulation individuals in Tripoli, three in
Benghazi.
Why the cutback on security?
Mr. Nordstrom. Again, that's one of the questions that I
had. I've never seen it addressed in the ARB or anything else,
is, why were these decisions that we made turned down?
In fact, there was a proposal that went back all the way to
a month after we had arrived asking for $2.1 million for
staffing to have 19 DS agents maintained throughout that time
period. I still don't have any understanding as to what
happened to that proposal. That went to the Under Secretary of
Management as part of the----
Mr. Meehan. Did you have confidence in the ability of the
locals in the country who were purportedly designed to provide
security for you, did you have confidence in their ability to
provide that?
Mr. Nordstrom. I think, to put it succinctly, it was the
best bad plan. It was the only thing we had.
Mr. Meehan. It was the only thing--but I didn't ask if--I
said, did you have confidence in that?
Mr. Nordstrom. No.
Mr. Meehan. Did you report that at any point in time to
officials in Washington, D.C.?
Mr. Nordstrom. We did. We did note the training
deficiencies, in particular. That was something that was always
there.
Certainly, we had also raised the issue of doing some sort
of counterintelligence vetting of the people that worked for
us. Ultimately, that was turned down, even though we wanted it,
because the Department of State wanted post to pay the funds
for it, which we didn't have. It had always been our
understanding that that was going to be paid for by Washington.
Mr. Meehan. Mr. Thompson, I know that you have background
in counterterrorism. I'm going back on--this is testimony that
was provided by Lieutenant Colonel Wood, who was an SST person
doing service in Tripoli and ultimately wanted to be in
Benghazi. He talked about Facebook threats that were made about
Western influences in Benghazi.
I also note then a series of issues: an RPG attack on the
Red Cross in early May; a Red Cross second attack in June; an
IED attack against the U.N. mission on April 6th; an IED attack
against a U.N. convoy on April 10th; an assassination attempt
on the British Ambassador on June 11th with RPGs; an attempted
carjacking on August 6th of two SST officers of the United
States.
In your mind, in your professional opinion, would this
suggest to you that the facility in Benghazi by a reasonable
person with your experience or a reasonable person in the State
Department would be likely to be considered a possible or even
likely target of a terrorist incident?
Mr. Thompson. It certainly had all the indicators of that,
based on that history, yes, Congressman.
Mr. Meehan. And in light of that and in light of your
experience and Mr. Nordstrom's testimony, would you have been
happy with the idea that it was allowed to be maintained under
less than the staffing that had existed only a month before or
2 months before and under standards which were only two in the
entire country, according to the testimony of Mr. Nordstrom,
that were not meeting the requirements, the minimal
requirements of safety?
Mr. Thompson. No, sir.
Mr. Meehan. Mr. Nordstrom or Mr. Hicks, what is
normalization? And why were we doing this?
Mr. Nordstrom. That's been a question even that the ARB
raised and others have raised. I'm not sure. I mean,
sarcastically, we saw it as ``do more with less.''
But I first saw that term, ``normalization,'' in that
budget proposal, resource proposal, a month after we had
arrived. There was already talk about normalizing our
footprint. It was then picked up again in February when Greg's
predecessor had met with DAS Lamb, same thing.
It struck me as being part of some sort of script, just
like the reason we didn't close the facility in Benghazi
despite the risks. There was already a political decision that
said, we're going to keep that open. That's fine, but no one's
ever come out and said that, that we made that risk and we made
that decision, and then take responsibility for it.
Chairman Issa. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Meehan. My time has expired, but, Mr. Hicks, did you
have a response to that, as well?
Mr. Hicks. Normalization, to us, was moving toward being
like a normal embassy instead of being, in a sense, under siege
or in a hostile environment where we're surrounded by potential
threats. And we wanted to move toward normal life. And it also
meant a withdrawal of extra DS personnel and then a movement
toward our Diplomatic Security personnel managing more of a
program that included the recruitment of Libyans to provide the
security that we needed.
Chairman Issa. Thank you.
Mr. Hicks, you mentioned earlier your wife being such an
important part of your decision process. Were you planning on
bringing her to Libya since it was normalized?
Mr. Hicks. Mr. Chairman, thanks. Just to correct, I was
actually selected to be DCM by Assistant Secretary for Near
Eastern Affairs Jeff Feltman in Tripoli.
Chairman Issa. Jeff and I spent a lot of time in the 2006
war in Lebanon together. He's a good man.
Mr. Hicks. Yeah.
Chairman Issa. But as to family returning to Libya, I mean,
normalization means you bring back dependents and so on.
Mr. Hicks. Right.
Chairman Issa. Was that part of what was going on?
Mr. Hicks. That's what we were pointing toward, in fact.
And Chris and I had a long talk on the night of September 9th
before he left for Benghazi, and we talked about this, that we
felt optimistic about the trajectory. Even though all of these
security problems were going on, we felt that the Libyans were
getting their political act together. They were going to pull
together a government. They were going to get a constitution.
Their economy was going to pick up. They were going to
stabilize.
And my next project was, in fact, to reach out to the board
members of the American school and start working with them
about the possibility of opening the school in September. And
that would, of course, have allowed me to bring my family to
join me in Tripoli. And that was actually a condition that my
wife made for my going to my second unaccompanied assignment.
Chairman Issa. I'm sure she's glad to have you home now,
though.
Mr. Hicks. Yes, she's very glad to have me home.
Chairman Issa. With that, we go to the gentleman from New
Mexico, who has been patiently waiting.
Oh, I'm sorry. Who is next?
Mr. Cardenas next.
Mr. Cardenas. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
My condolences to all the families and everybody who
suffered from this tragedy. And, also, I hope that you pray for
us that we do the right thing as policymakers and not as
politicians.
Mr. Nordstrom, you have stated here that you felt the
security situation in Benghazi was unsafe. As a matter of fact,
you've been very clear on placing blame with a number of
people.
So, given everything that was going on at the time and
everything you have said today and what you said on October
10th, at any point did you suggest to Ambassador Stevens that
he should not travel to Benghazi on September 11th, the
anniversary, and that the situation was volatile and that the
facility, per your own assessment, was not secure?
Mr. Nordstrom. I had departed post on 26th of July, so I
didn't have the opportunity to do that. I would defer that to
the RSO that was there at the time, John Martinec. It's my
understanding that he also had raised some concerns and
discussed that.
Mr. Cardenas. So you have your opinions today, but you did
not have those same opinions back then?
Mr. Nordstrom. I wasn't at post for September 11th. I
departed 6 weeks prior, so----
Chairman Issa. If the gentleman would indulge, I think he's
asking, what was your opinion on the day you left relative to
Benghazi?
Mr. Nordstrom. Oh, okay. I understand.
I had actually met with the Ambassador prior to that as
part of an out briefing, and he and I talked about kind of the
way forward. And the threats in the east were something that we
talked about. I had mentioned that in October, as well. It was
very concerning to us, the increasing in the targeting. It was
something that I had mentioned back to our headquarters in
reporting.
It was something that the Ministry of Interior brought up
when the Ambassador went and met with the Minister in July to
talk about requesting static security. They highlighted, number
one, growing extremism in the east, particularly in Benghazi
and Derna and Sirte.
So, absolutely, that was something that we discussed. And
we were concerned, in particular, that we were not getting the
resources.
Mr. Cardenas. So you stressed that you did stress concerns,
but not to the point where you said, ``I wouldn't go if I were
you,'' or, ``You shouldn't go''?
Mr. Nordstrom. We never had that discussion, in part
because the Ambassador had not indicated any sort of desire to
travel to Benghazi. My hope would have been that they would
have had resources there to augment any such travel.
Mr. Cardenas. And resources require other kinds of
resources. I mean, if you have resources on the ground, they
require actual funding, et cetera. There's a balance to
creating the kind of atmosphere and security that would be
required to meet any concerns, correct?
Mr. Nordstrom. Sure. And what we were looking at is that
you were going to have a downsizing of personnel in Tripoli. So
anytime the Ambassador would have traveled, that would have
impacted security in both locations because you would have been
splitting up resources, which is what I think ultimately
happened.
Mr. Cardenas. Mr. Hicks, can you shed some light on this
discussion that we're having?
Mr. Hicks. In the two planning meetings that we had for
Ambassador Stevens' trip to Benghazi, Regional Security Officer
John Martinec raised serious concerns about his travel. Because
of those concerns, the Ambassador adjusted his plans for that
trip.
First, he agreed that he would go in a low-profile way,
that his trip would not be announced in advance, we would not
do any planning of meetings until right before he went.
And, second, he eventually decided also to shorten his
trip. He initially had planned to go on the 8th. He went on the
10th instead to narrow the time frame that he would be in
Tripoli.
The third step that he took was the one public event that
he planned would take place at the very end of his trip just
before he left.
Mr. Cardenas. So, basically, you're describing what I feel
to be consistent. What I've known of the Ambassador is that he
was very, very committed. He did listen to advice, et cetera,
but he was very determined, and he continued to do his job.
Mr. Hicks. Exactly. He went there to do his job. He felt
that he had a political imperative to go to Benghazi and
represent the United States there in order to move the project
forward to make the Benghazi consulate a permanent constituent
post.
Mr. Cardenas. Okay. I'm so proud of his commitment, and
that is very consistent with everybody who has come across him.
I just hope that we can have that commitment up here as elected
officials to do the right thing so this never happens again.
Thank you so much.
Chairman Issa. Thank you.
We now go to the gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. DesJarlais.
Mr. DesJarlais. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Today's hearing is about one thing, one simple thing: It's
finding the truth. And I know these families here want the
truth, and I know the American people want the truth. But yet I
listen to this questioning today, and there seems to be a real
partisan feel to finding the truth, and I don't understand
that.
I mean, if you listen to the other side, you would think
it's time just to move on from this. They would agree with
Secretary Clinton, right, that they would just say, what
difference does it make? Well, some of the family members I
talked to before this hearing, I guarantee this hearing makes a
difference today. We want to know who made some of these
decisions and why they made some of these decisions.
The only encouraging part that I heard from the other side
is that they feel that you all should be protected, your
ability to testify here and your desire to testify here should
be protected, so that's good.
And I want you to know I really appreciate you all being
here. It does matter. It matters to a lot of people.
Mr. Hicks, after your visit with Congressman Chaffetz--or
Congressman Chaffetz' visit, did you feel any kind of shift in
the way you were treated?
Mr. Hicks. Yes, again, I did. When Assistant Secretary
Jones visited shortly after--prior to the visit, Assistant
Secretary Jones had visited, and she pulled me aside and again
said I needed to improve my management style and indicated that
people were upset. I had had no indication that my staff was
upset at all, other than with the conditions that we were
facing.
Following my return to the United States, I attended Chris'
funeral in San Francisco, and then I came back to Washington.
Assistant Secretary Jones summoned me to her office, and she
delivered a blistering critique of my management style. And she
even said, exclaimed, ``I don't know why Larry Pope would want
you to come back.'' And she said she didn't even understand why
anyone at Tripoli would want me to come back.
Mr. DesJarlais. Okay. But yet, right after the attack and
before the attack, you had all kinds of praise for your
leadership. You got a call from Secretary Clinton, you got a
call from the President praising you for your service and how
you handled things.
Was there a seminal moment in your mind to when all this
praise and appreciation turned into something else?
Mr. Hicks. In hindsight, I think it began after I asked the
question about Ambassador Rice's statement on the TV shows.
Mr. DesJarlais. Uh-huh. And, you know, anyone listening to
this hearing today, if they don't have questions--I think there
was some comment made about, well, there was a few people in
Libya that had a problem with this YouTube video, but the
overwhelming evidence is that this was a terrorist attack.
Everybody knew it, but yet someone higher up decided to run
with this story, this facade, and they kept it for a long time.
And I would think that everyone sitting here wants to know the
answer, why that was done.
So what other impediments have you had, or how have you
felt since deciding to come forward? Do you feel like they've
treated you any differently from that point on?
Mr. Hicks. Well, after--I was angry with the way I had been
criticized. I thought it was unfounded. I felt like I had been
tried and convicted in absentia. But I decided I was going to
try to--I was going to go back and try to redeem myself in
Tripoli.
Mr. DesJarlais. What is your job right now?
Mr. Hicks. What is my job? I am a foreign affairs officer
in the Office of Global Intergovernmental Affairs.
Mr. DesJarlais. Okay. A far cry from where you were in your
level of capabilities?
Mr. Hicks. Yes, sir.
Mr. DesJarlais. Yeah. So when you came back to the United
States, were you planning on going back to Libya?
Mr. Hicks. I was. I fully intended to do so.
Mr. DesJarlais. And what do you think happened?
Mr. Hicks. Based on the criticism that I received, I felt
that if I went back, I would never be comfortable working
there. And, in addition, my family really didn't want me to go
back. We had endured a year of separation when I was in
Afghanistan in 2006 and 2007. And that was the overriding
factor.
So I voluntarily curtailed. I accepted an offer of what's
called a no-fault curtailment. That means that there would be
no criticism of my departure of post, no negative
repercussions. And, in fact, Ambassador Pope, when he made the
offer to everyone in Tripoli when he arrived--I mean Charge
Pope--when he arrived, he indicated that people could expect
that they would get a good onward assignment out of that.
Mr. DesJarlais. All right. Well, thank you.
I would just close with the fact that, you know, we have a
President that's made it his policy since he took office not to
knee-jerk or jump to conclusions when it comes to some tragedy
or event, but yet, why did he do it in this case? Why was he
quick to jump to the conclusion that this was a protest due to
a YouTube video? I think we all know that's not true, and I
think we all need to find the answer to that.
Chairman Issa. Thank you.
Mr. Hicks. Could I----
Chairman Issa. Of course.
Mr. Hicks. Could I just clarify? The job that I have right
now--between my curtailment and my finding of this job that I
have now, I had no meaningful employment. I was in a status
called Near Eastern Affairs overcomplement. And the job now is
a significant--it's a demotion. ``Foreign affairs officer'' is
a designation that is given to our civil service colleagues who
are desk officers. So I've been effectively demoted from deputy
chief of mission to desk officer.
Chairman Issa. Let me just interject one thing at this
time. In your opening statement, I note--and it's already in
the record, but I want to make sure that it's separately placed
in at this moment--you included an unclassified document
purported to be from the President of the United States to the
President of Libya. Is that correct?
Mr. Hicks. Yes.
Chairman Issa. I want to be very careful. It doesn't have a
signature. It looks like it was electronically transmitted.
Mr. Hicks. It's a cable.
Chairman Issa. This cable, was it, as far as you know, from
the President of the United States directly?
Mr. Hicks. Yes.
Chairman Issa. And was it delivered to the President of
Libya directly?
Mr. Hicks. It was.
Chairman Issa. And does it mention ``terrorist attack''
anywhere else? And I would note that this is September 17th,
which would be that Monday afterwards.
Does this, in your opinion, in any way, shape, or form
describe the unfortunate circumstances as terrorism to the
President of Libya?
Mr. Hicks. I believe it does.
Mr. Cummings. Mr. Chairman?
Chairman Issa. Yes?
Mr. Cummings. We--I don't even know----
Chairman Issa. It's in his opening statement. It was
delivered to everybody.
Mr. Cummings. Okay.
Chairman Issa. These are inclusions. But it says, ``Thank
you for responding quickly to the tragic attack'' in Benghazi.
And I'm reading through this thing, you know, and--well, it's
in the record.
But, as far as I can tell, it speaks of it as a tragic
attack. It doesn't speak to it, even after Ambassador Rice
spoke, it doesn't speak to it as a terrorist attack or our war
on terror or fighting terrorism. Is that correct?
Mr. Hicks. Yeah, I don't have it before me at this moment.
Chairman Issa. Okay, we'll deliver it back to you just to
make sure. Someone may want to follow up. Oh, your counsel has
it for you.
Mr. Hicks. Oh, sorry. Yeah, it says ``outrageous attack.''
Chairman Issa. Okay. So it's an outrageous attack, but it
doesn't talk about us working together to fight terrorism, does
it?
Mr. Hicks. No.
Chairman Issa. Okay. Thank you for including that in the
record.
We now go to the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Farenthold.
Mr. Farenthold. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And I
would also like to join my colleagues on both sides of the
aisle in expressing our condolences to the families of
Ambassador Stevens, Sean Smith, Tyrone Woods, and Glen Doherty,
and all of those others injured. I want to quickly clear up
just a couple of loose ends from earlier testimony, and then I
want to ask a couple of questions about the February 17th
Martyrs Brigade.
But first off, Mr. Hicks, you have testified on numerous
occasions that you never got a chance to read the classified
ARB report. You do have a security clearance that you sat in
the meeting with Mr. Chaffetz that your minder couldn't attend.
So you do have a security clearance.
Mr. Hicks. Yes, sir.
Mr. Farenthold. All right. Then Mr. Thompson, you testified
in answer to the question as to why the F.E.S.T. team, your
response team was not deployed, that one of the things you
heard was it might not be to a safe location. Do you guys train
to deploy to Canada or the Caribbean islands or other safe
locations, or are you trained to respond to hot spots?
Mr. Thompson. Hot spots.
Mr. Farenthold. And would there have been any reluctance on
the part of you or any of the men or women in your organization
to go to Libya or anywhere in the world that you were needed to
protect Americans?
Mr. Thompson. I hang out with a very noble and brave crowd.
The answer is no.
Mr. Farenthold. I didn't think so.
And Mr. Hicks, I want to talk a little bit about what was
going on in Libya at the time. There had just been a
revolution. We had a newly-elected President, democratically-
elected. We were involved through our NATO partners in that.
This was probably a win for the United States. We had a
friendly government, relatively friendly government going in.
And then we all but make the new President out--we throw him
under the bus on the Sunday shows. And you testified that that
may have been one of the reasons the FBI was slow getting in.
Do you think it overall damaged our relationship beyond that
with Libya?
Mr. Hicks. It complicated things for that period of time, I
think particularly with respect to the FBI mission. But the
Libyan people, as a poll released by Gallup before 9/11
attests, valued our relationship highly, in fact higher than
almost any other Arab country. It was over 50 percent of the
population.
Mr. Farenthold. And isn't that one of the reasons
Ambassador Stevens went to Benghazi on that fateful day, is to
continue to show our support for what was going on in Libya at
the time?
Mr. Hicks. Absolutely. Especially to the people of
Benghazi.
Mr. Farenthold. All right. Now I want to go on, there have
been some reports floating around. Mr. Nordstrom, can you tell
me what the role of the February 17 Martyrs Brigade was in
protecting the consulate in Benghazi?
Mr. Nordstrom. Certainly. That was the unit, for lack of a
better term, that was provided to us by the Libyan Government.
Mr. Farenthold. Now, were you aware of any ties of that
militia to Islamic extremists?
Mr. Nordstrom. Absolutely. Yeah. We had that discussion on
a number of occasions, the last of which was when there was a
Facebook posting of a threat that named Ambassador Stevens and
Senator McCain, who was coming out for the elections. That was
in the July time frame. I had met with some of my agents and
then also with some annex personnel. We discussed that.
Mr. Farenthold. And Mr. Hicks, you were in Libya on the
night of the attack. Do you believe the February 17th militia
played a role in those attacks, was complacent in those
attacks?
Mr. Hicks. Certainly elements of that militia were
complicit in the attacks. The attackers had to make a long
approach march through multiple checkpoints that were manned by
February 17 militia.
Mr. Farenthold. All right. Okay. Mr. Hicks, Mr. Nordstrom,
I am going to ask you both this question. I am stunned that the
State Department was relying on a militia with extremist ties
to protect American diplomats. That doesn't make any sense. How
does that happen?
Mr. Nordstrom. You mean like in Afghanistan, where Afghanis
that are working with our military that are embedded and turn
on them and shoot them? Or Yemen, where our embassy was
attacked in 2008 by attackers wearing police uniforms? Or in
Saudi Arabia in Jeddah, we had an attack in 2004, the Saudi
National Guard that was protecting our facility reportedly ran
from the scene, and then it took 90 minutes before we could get
help.
Mr. Farenthold. Pretty high unemployment in the United
States. I would imagine there are some people who would be
willing to take--Americans that would be willing to take jobs
overseas.
Mr. Nordstrom. We couldn't agree with you more. But
unfortunately as I said earlier, one of the things that we ran
into, that was the best bad plan. That was the unit that the
Libyan Government had initially designated for VIP protection.
It is very difficult to extract ourselves from that.
Mr. Farenthold. I certainly hope that these hearings will
result in us not having to rely on the best of bad plans, and
we can use folks like Mr. Thompson and his group for what they
were intended and secure our personnel.
I see I am out of time, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Issa. Only by a little. We now go to the
distinguished gentleman from the great State of Washington, the
chairman of the Resources Committee, Mr. Hastings.
Mr. Hastings. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And let me
add my voice to all of my colleagues' that thank you for your
service. I think while we all say it, it probably should go
without saying, but nevertheless we really do appreciate that.
Mr. Hicks, I want to follow up. You may have answered this,
so I just want to get a clarification, because Mr. Jordan was
entering into questions regarding the lawyer that came in and
was not allowed to go to the meeting because he wasn't
qualified to go to that meeting. My question specifically is to
back up. The State Department sent this lawyer. Were you told
why the lawyer was sent?
Mr. Hicks. He was sent to participate in all the meetings
and all events associated with Congressman Chaffetz's visit.
Mr. Hastings. Did you find that unusual?
Mr. Hicks. It never had occurred before in my career.
Mr. Hastings. Okay. But the State Department did say that
this lawyer was going to come and participate in all of the
meetings?
Mr. Hicks. Yes.
Mr. Hastings. You were told that. And then of course he
couldn't because of the protocol. You mentioned that the tone
of the State Department as it related to you changed probably
after the Rice interview.
Mr. Hicks. It began to change, yes.
Mr. Hastings. Yeah. Explain, just give us some examples of
how things changed.
Mr. Hicks. Again, I began to have my management style
counseled by Assistant Secretary Jones. When she visited, she
again counseled me on my management style and said staff was
upset. I had had no indication of staff being upset. And then
again when I returned to Washington, she delivered a very
blistering critique of my style, and again said--exclaimed, ``I
don't know why Larry Pope would want you back.''
Mr. Hastings. That leads to a very obvious question then.
Prior to September 10th, 2012, had you received any negative
feedback from your superiors?
Mr. Hicks. No. Chris and I had developed a very positive
relationship. He trusted me, I trusted him. And we were working
together very, very well. And morale was high.
Mr. Hastings. Well, I suppose in a career as long as yours
you might have some disagreement with your superiors. Was it to
the extent that you have felt that you were treated after this
event last September, compared to prior maybe disagreements you
may have had with your superiors? I guess on a scale of 1 to
10, 10 being the worst, you were----
Mr. Hicks. Ten. Ten.
Mr. Hastings. After. Okay. I guess that's what I would like
to--wanted to follow up on. You mentioned that you feel in the
job you have it is really a demotion from the qualifications
that you have had in your career in the service. Have you
talked to any of your colleagues or any senior leaders within
the State Department regarding this? And if so, what was those
conversations all about?
Mr. Hicks. I spoke with--well, after a couple of friends
who are outside the Department intervened with senior officials
about my situation, the Deputy Secretary Burns and the Director
General said that I would be taken care of. Same thing that
Larry Pope had indicated. And so I met with the Principal
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Human Resources, Hans Klemm, and
I talked to him about what options might be available to me.
And basically, the answer was I would have to go through the
formal normal bidding process for assignments and persuade
someone that I should be hired. And then the conversation with
Deputy Secretary Burns was centered around discussions I had
had with the leadership of our embassy in Mexico City about the
head of the political section job there, which would be a very
good job. And he said that he would support that, but I had to
go through the process. And it is a very long process, since
the position--that position is at a higher grade.
Mr. Hastings. Let me ask you this. Going through the
process, and I understand there is protocols, but would that
strike you as unusual for somebody with your background and the
position that you had in Libya and other areas?
Mr. Hicks. I was surprised that I was having to go through
the process, the normal process. And especially when the
Ambassador in Mexico City had talked to Deputy Secretary Burns
about bringing me on as his political counselor.
Mr. Hastings. Well, I heard my colleagues on the other side
of the aisle say that if there is any retribution--that's my
words, not your words--any retribution on this that you will
have the full support of your colleagues. Let me lend my
support, and I think the support of everybody here. I think a
bipartisan support on somebody that comes forth that has a
difference of agreement on a policy issue, or a decision that
killed four Americans deserve to have whatever we can give to
you. So thank you very much. And I see my time has expired.
Chairman Issa. Well, and the time that we can ask witnesses
to stay seated without a break has also expired. So for those
of us who were able to get up and come back and forth, we are
going to take about 10 minutes. I would ask the witnesses, you
can either go through that door or this door, to use facilities
that are available there without going out into the public. And
then we will reconvene in about 10 minutes. Thank you.
[recess.]
Chairman Issa. The committee will come to order again. I
have been advised that we expect to have votes on the House
floor at approximately 5 o'clock. We can work until about 5
minutes into those votes. After that, we will adjourn. The
expectation is we will not come back. So for our three
witnesses, for the families, and for the attorneys, let me
assure you the end is in sight.
With that, we go to the gentlelady from Wyoming, Mrs.
Lummis.
Mrs. Lummis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I too want to thank
you gentlemen for this long day. And for the families, I offer
my most sincere condolences from my constituents. They think
about you all the time. First question, Mr. Nordstrom. Now, do
I understand you had responsibility for security in Libya while
you were there?
Mr. Nordstrom. That's correct.
Mrs. Lummis. And then you left in July. Is that correct?
Mr. Nordstrom. That's correct.
Mrs. Lummis. Now, before you left did you make security
recommendations to Washington, D.C.?
Mr. Nordstrom. No. Well, we do an out--internal report, but
that's not really a place where we put recommendations. It's
more laying out the situation, the crime, the political
situation. And a lot of that reporting I had done previously
with Washington.
Mrs. Lummis. And so they had recommendations from you? Or
not?
Mr. Nordstrom. It is my understanding, yes, they had wanted
a transition plan specifically on how we were going to
transition from the SST and the DS agents to our local
bodyguards. That was submitted to them February 15th.
Mrs. Lummis. And do you know were those--was that
implementation plan accepted? Was it implemented?
Mr. Nordstrom. I never really got any feedback from
Washington. That was one of the things that surprised me even
when I left post. I was never contacted by DS leadership or
management from the date I left on the 26th to this date. The
only time I had any interaction was preparing before the
October hearings. But they have never contacted me to ask me on
thoughts about Libya, suggestions, anything like that.
Mrs. Lummis. Mr. Hicks, do you know whether security
recommendations were implemented? Were there security
recommendations that were implemented?
Mr. Hicks. John Martinec, our RSO, came on board, and he
was following up on many of the things that Eric was working on
before to strengthen our security posture in Libya. After the
attack--attacks, John and I worked on a list of physical
security improvements that had to be made in Tripoli in order
for us to remain there. And I cabled that in, that list in to
the Department after Congressman Chaffetz's visit. And I
learned later that that cable was not well received by
Washington leadership. To the ARB's credit, when they saw that
cable they sent it to Under Secretary Kennedy and insisted that
every recommendation in that cable be implemented.
Mrs. Lummis. Thank you. I want to switch gears a little
bit. Mr. Hicks, are you aware of any efforts by department
officials to limit department witnesses' access to information
about the attack prior to their testimony before Congress?
Mr. Hicks. I have never seen the classified ARB report. So
the answer is in my respect, yes.
Mrs. Lummis. Mr. Nordstrom, do you know whether the State
Department consciously sought to limit your awareness of
certain information prior to your testimony before this
committee?
Mr. Nordstrom. I am not aware of that.
Mrs. Lummis. Let me ask you this. Mr. Nordstrom, I want to
read you an excerpt from an email Ambassador Stevens sent to
you and a colleague on July 5th, 2012. The email concerned a
draft cable intended to request an extension of security
personnel for the embassy, which was ultimately sent on July
9th. Now, the Ambassador wrote, ``gentlemen I have taken a
close look at the cable and edited it down and rearranged some
paragraphs. My intention was to give more focus to what we are
doing to end our reliance on TDY support and to let the
Department figure out how to staff our needs. If it looks okay,
please run it by DS and see if they want it front channel.''
Then Mr. Nordstrom, can you briefly explain what Ambassador
Stevens meant when he asked you to run it by DS and see if they
wanted it front channel?
Mr. Nordstrom. What he is referring to is the process by
which we would send an official State Department cable. I had
done that for prior requests, and it was my advice to the
Ambassador--I do remember that dialogue--that we do in fact
send that front channel. Within the Department of State, that
is considered to be the official record. If I sent something by
email or informally discussed it by telephone, it is still
valuable, but unless it is on that cable it is not official. My
experience in the past was that as soon as we put those
recommendations, just as Greg just alluded to, as soon as we
put that onto an official cable, somehow we were seen as
embarrassing the Department of State because we are requiring
them to live up to their end of the bargain.
Chairman Issa. I thank the gentlelady. We now go to the
gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Woodall.
Mr. Woodall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will add my thanks
to the gentlemen on the panel. I know you have heard that over
and over and over again from members here, but only because of
folks believe it. And we are grateful to you not just for being
here today, but for your decade upon decade of service. I will
tell you, Mr. Thompson, I am comforted, and I know folks at
U.S. posts across the world are comforted that there are men
and women who do what you do, who live by a code that says if
you are in harm's way we are going to come for you. Just hang
on. And I thank you very much for that commitment.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you.
Mr. Woodall. Mr. Nordstrom, my questions are following up
on my colleague from Wyoming, thinking back to early July,
2012. Do you recall your back and forth with Charlene Lamb
particularly?
Mr. Nordstrom. Vividly.
Mr. Woodall. What did you think of that decision-making
process? Were those decisions that Ms. Lamb was making or were
those decisions being kicked up to a higher level?
Mr. Nordstrom. It was unclear. I think largely DAS Lamb.
But one thing that struck me throughout the entire time that I
was in Libya was a strange decision-making process.
Specifically, again, the Under Secretary for Management in many
ways was dealing directly with DAS Lamb. As her supervisor two
levels ahead, obviously he has that ability to do that. He is
well within his right. But it was strange that there was that
direct relationship. And I never really saw interaction from
Assistant Secretary of DS Eric Boswell or our Director, Scott
Bultrowicz. It was even more clear in October when we were all
sitting up here. There was two levels, if you will, that were
not reflected. And it was quite a jump between DAS Lamb and
Under Secretary Kennedy. So certainly I felt that anything that
DAS Lamb was deciding certainly had been run by Under Secretary
Kennedy.
Mr. Woodall. Given the seriousness of that conversation,
thinking about extending SST and MSD as the security support,
did you receive an explanation for why that request was denied
that satisfied you?
Mr. Nordstrom. I didn't. As I testified before, you know,
what I perceived that it was some sort of--explained to me that
it would be somehow embarrassing or politically difficult for
State Department to continue to rely on DOD, and that there was
an element of that. That was never fully verbalized. But that
was certainly the feeling that I got going away from those
conversations.
Mr. Woodall. Okay. And then following up on moving these
discussions from back channel to front channel, what was the
nature of your conversation with the Ambassador that this was
such a serious issue that rather than leaving it with a no on
back channels he wanted to elevate that?
Mr. Nordstrom. That's exactly what it is. In fact, I recall
all the way back to our first meeting with Congressman Chaffetz
and the chairman, that was the question that I think they posed
to me is if you knew she was going to keep saying no, why did
you keep asking? Well, because it was the right thing to do.
And it was the resources that were needed. And if people also
on the other side felt that that was the right thing to do, to
say no to that, they could at least have the courtesy to put
that in the official record.
Mr. Woodall. And did you receive any feedback back from
Washington, whether a direct response to that cable or a back
channel response to the fact that you elevated it to this front
channel process?
Mr. Nordstrom. By the time that we sent the one in July,
no, I did not receive a response. In fact, that cable, as I
understand, was never responded to, which is something that is
relatively unheard of in the State Department. When you send a
request cable for anything, whether it is copiers or manpower,
they get back to you. Prior discussions, back channel ones,
yes, I had a number of conversations with my regional director
and also DAS Lamb where it was discouraging, to put it mildly.
That why do you keep raising these issues? Why do you keep
putting this forward?
Mr. Woodall. And if you could characterize it then between
a nonresponse or a disagreement when it comes to these issues
of security for American personnel on the ground in Libya, were
you receiving a nonresponse from Washington or was there
disagreement in Washington with your assessment of levels of
need on the ground?
Mr. Nordstrom. I largely got a nonresponse. The responses
that I did get were you don't have specific targeting, you
don't have specific threats against you. The long and short of
it is you are not dealing with suicide bombers, incoming
artillery, and vehicle bombs like they are in Iraq and
Afghanistan, so basically stop complaining.
Chairman Issa. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Woodall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Issa. Anyone else can answer. Okay. Thank you.
We now go to the gentleman from Illinois, Mr. Davis.
Mr. Davis. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I know that
it has been a long day, and lots of questions and answers have
been shared. But let me ask the gentlemen this. Last week an
unidentified individual, who was described as a military
Special Ops member, appeared on national television to give an
interview on the military's response to the attacks in
Benghazi. The man appeared behind a black screen in order to
conceal his identity. He suggested that military assets in
Europe could have prevented the second attack in Benghazi.
Specifically, he said this. ``I know for a fact that C-110, the
EUCOM, European Command, CIF, Commander's In-Extremis Force,
was doing a training exercise not in the region of North
Africa, but in Europe, and they had the ability to react and
respond.'' He further stated, ``We have the ability to load
out, get on birds, that is aircraft, and fly there at a minimum
stage. C-110 had the ability to be there, in my opinion, in
four to six hours.'' He then went on to conclude that they
would have been there before the second attack. Let me ask if
any of you gentlemen are familiar with this claim.
Mr. Nordstrom. Yeah. I have seen it.
Mr. Hicks. I saw it on television.
Mr. Thompson. Yes.
Mr. Davis. All right. In order to investigate the claim,
last week Ranking Member Cummings wrote a letter to Secretary
Hagel asking for the Defense Department's response. We've now
received that written response from the Department, and I would
like to enter that letter into the record, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Issa. When we have it we will take it under
advisement. I haven't seen it yet.
Mr. Davis. ``In regards to the anonymous allegation that
the CIF could have arrived in Benghazi prior to the initiation
of the second attack on the annex, the time needed from
alerting the CIF to landing at the Benghazi airport is greater
than the approximately 7.5 hours between the initiation of the
first attack and that of the second one.'' The letter also
states this. ``The time requirements for notification, load,
and transit alone prevented the CIF from being at the annex in
time enough to change events.''
Does anyone disagree with that statement?
Mr. Nordstrom. I think the only thing I would add to that,
not being privy to the decisions on the ground on that day,
what's valuable is none of us, including the committee, had
those details but for that person coming forward and making
that allegation. I think that's the point that the majority--
minority, Mr. Cummings made, is that it is important to get
these questions raised in this format. Otherwise we are going
to continue to see those same kinds of allegations. Because
people do not feel that the answers have been provided or that
those answers have been provided in a credible way. So I think
it is much more important to get it done in this manner.
Mr. Davis. Thank you very much. The Defense Department's
letter appears to be consistent with the ARB report, which said
this, and I ``The board found no evidence of any undue delays
in decision-making or denial of support from Washington, or
from the military combatant commanders. Quite the contrary, the
safe evacuation of all U.S. Government personnel from Benghazi
12 hours after the initial attack and subsequently to Ramstein
Air Force Base was the result of exceptional U.S. Government
coordination and military response, and helped save the lives
of two severely wounded Americans.'' So I don't know who that
unidentified individual was on Fox News, but according to the
Defense Department his claim is incorrect. And so Mr. Chairman,
I simply wanted to get that into the record. And I thank you
very much.
Mr. Chaffetz. Will the gentleman yield?
Mr. Davis. Yes.
Mr. Chaffetz. Will the gentleman yield?
Mr. Davis. Yes.
Mr. Chaffetz. Thank you. I believe he yielded to me.
Mr. Davis. I am yielding to Mrs. Maloney.
Mrs. Maloney. Well, thank you. Thank you very much. By all
accounts, Ambassador Stevens was a remarkable man. And I wonder
was he aware how dangerous it was in Benghazi? And Mr. Hicks,
were you aware how dangerous it was, yet he still made the
decision to go there? Is that correct?
Chairman Issa. The gentleman's time has expired, but you
may answer.
Mr. Hicks. Yes, the Ambassador was very well aware of the
security situation in Benghazi. Before he went, we had the
chance to outbrief Eric Gaudiosi, the departing principal
officer.
Chairman Issa. Thank you. We now go to the gentleman from
Kentucky, Mr. Massie.
Mr. Massie. Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding these
hearings. Mr. Chairman, it's been said that all that's
necessary for evil to triumph is for good men to do nothing.
But I submit to you we have three very good men here who are
going beyond the call of duty to come here and testify today.
They have my commitment to protect them from any retribution
that may come from this. And I get the sense that there may be
other people listening to the testimony today that have answers
that we don't have yet. And I would encourage them to come
forward as well. We've got a lot of good answers today thanks
to these witnesses.
I would like to start with Mr. Thompson. I am struck by
your long and distinguished career of hostage rescue missions.
And some of these missions are still classified, but were
successful. Can you remind us where you were when these events
began to unfold?
Mr. Thompson. At my desk in the State Department.
Mr. Massie. So you were at your desk at the State
Department. And you were asked to marshal the resources and the
team to help with the rescue effort, defense effort, did you
not?
Mr. Thompson. Yes. My first call was to the National
Security Council, our CT contacts there.
Mr. Massie. And in your testimony you stated that you were
told this was not the right time. Is that correct?
Mr. Thompson. When I referred that question to the Under
Secretary for Management's office, yes.
Mr. Massie. Okay. If this wasn't the right time, when would
be the right time? Because this is the source of frustration
that the American public has, that I have. We are the greatest
country in the world, and we left people there, Mr. Hicks and
Mr. Stevens, to essentially fend for themselves, and when we
had these resources. When would be the right time if this
weren't the right time?
Mr. Thompson. There is no answer to that, sir.
Mr. Massie. Staying on that topic of time, would it have
been a reasonable thing in an uncertain situation such as this
crisis, where we don't know how it is going to unfold, to go
ahead and assemble that team and put them on a plane? Were
there sufficient communications on the plane that you could
have pulled back a mission that was ready to deploy?
Mr. Thompson. We practice this at least twice a year, as in
a complete deployment to an overseas location to work with our
interagency partners. And the team obviously, again, is staffed
with interagency CT professionals. The answer to your question
is yes, that plane, which is funded by DOD, has a robust
communications suite. The senior communicator on there works
for me. And he is very competent at his job.
Mr. Massie. Are you convinced--I know you haven't been
allowed to review or even contribute to the Accountability
Review Board's report. But are you convinced that the changes
have been made so that this won't happen again for another
embassy?
Mr. Thompson. No.
Mr. Massie. Okay. That's troubling to me. And I appreciate
your candor. Mr. Hicks, you mentioned that at 2 a.m. you had a
phone conversation with Secretary Clinton. Is that correct?
Mr. Hicks. Yes.
Mr. Massie. At any time during that conversation did she
ask what resources you might be able to use or might need?
Mr. Hicks. Yes, she did. I asked for security
reinforcements and transport aircraft to move our medical--our
wounded out of the country to a medical facility.
Mr. Massie. Was there any indication that you would receive
air support?
Mr. Hicks. She indicated that the Marine FAST team was
being deployed to bolster our security posture in Tripoli, and
that a C-17 would be coming from--coming down to take people
back.
Mr. Massie. But no immediate military response?
Mr. Hicks. The Marines were on their way, and they would be
arriving on the--later on the 12th.
Mr. Massie. Okay. Did you tell the Accountability Review
Board about Secretary Clinton's interest in establishing a
permanent presence in Benghazi? Because ostensibly wasn't that
the reason that the Ambassador was going to Benghazi?
Mr. Hicks. Yes, I did tell the Accountability Review Board
that Secretary Clinton wanted the post made permanent.
Ambassador Pickering was surprised. He looked both ways to the
members of the board, saying does the seventh floor know about
this? And another factor in Chris' decision was our
understanding that Secretary Clinton intended to visit Tripoli
in December.
Mr. Massie. Pickering was surprised that this was--his
mission was to establish a permanent facility there?
Mr. Hicks. Yes.
Mr. Massie. That's your impression?
Mr. Hicks. Yes.
Mr. Massie. Okay. I thank you for your time. I thank the
witnesses----
Chairman Issa. Would the gentleman yield?
Mr. Massie. Yes, I yield.
Chairman Issa. I just want you to say it unambiguously, if
that's the correct way to say it without a flaw, one more time,
the reason the Ambassador was in Benghazi, at least one of the
reasons was X?
Mr. Hicks. At least one of the reasons he was in Benghazi
was to further the Secretary's wish that that post become a
permanent constituent post. And also there because we
understood that the Secretary intended to visit Tripoli later
in the year. We hoped that she would be able to announce to the
Libyan people our establishment of a permanent constituent post
in Benghazi at that time.
Chairman Issa. Thank you.
Mrs. Maloney. Will the gentleman yield?
Chairman Issa. I thank the gentleman for yielding. We now
go to the gentleman from Georgia.
Mr. Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it.
Thanks for being here today. And it has been a long day. And I
think there has been some interesting things said and there has
been a lot of questions. One of the things that was said
earlier today that sort of concerns me a little bit, it says
that these hearings have not found a smoking gun, I believe
even a warm slingshot. Well, I for one and the folks of the
Ninth District of Georgia where I represent are not looking for
those things, they are looking for the truth. They are looking
for what happened that night. Because the one thing we have
found, it may not be a smoking gun or a warm slingshot, but we
have four dead Americans. And that's what this is about. That's
about finding what happened in the past so we can move forward
in the future. And I appreciate your willingness to be here,
and these families that are willing to do this, because truth
is important. Even in this town it is important.
I want to ask a follow-up question. Mr. Nordstrom, I want
to follow up on a question from Mr. Lankford earlier about a
March 28th cable asking for more security. He asked you about
your intended recipients of that cable. Now, did you expect
Secretary Clinton to either have read or to be briefed about
that cable?
Mr. Nordstrom. Absolutely. I certainly expected, given the
fact that she had an involvement in the security process. If I
could take a step back, by virtue of having the SST teams
there, because they were a Department of Defense asset, the
process required for that is something called an Exec Sec. That
Exec Sec is literally a request from one Cabinet head to
another, in this case State to DOD. That request must be signed
by the Cabinet head, Secretary Clinton. She would have done the
initial deployment request, plus an extension in the fall, and
a second extension in February. She also came out to post,
toured our facilities, toured the facilities and saw the lack
of security there. That was something that her country team, or
she was briefed by the country team as she visited the site. We
also saw later there was the attacks against the facilities.
Certainly, there is a reasonable expectation that her staff
would have briefed her on those points.
Mr. Collins. I think it was you that said earlier could
this be a concern about a DOD presence and an embarrassment
with State on an embassy? And a real short answer there.
Mr. Nordstrom. That was how I took away from----
Mr. Collins. That's the way you took it.
Mr. Nordstrom. Right. From DAS Lamb.
Mr. Collins. Thank you. Mr. Hicks, I have a question, we
are going back, it has been asked here a little bit before, in
discussions about a permanent presence in Benghazi, give me a
sort of a quick flavor of what were those discussions like? Was
it said you do this? How was it going out?
Mr. Hicks. Chris told me that in his exit interview with
the Secretary after he was sworn in, the Secretary said we need
to make Benghazi a permanent post. And Chris said I will make
it happen.
Mr. Collins. Okay. Was Washington informed of the
Ambassador's plan to travel to Benghazi?
Mr. Hicks. Yes. Washington was fully informed that the
Ambassador was going to Benghazi. And we advised them August
22nd or thereabouts.
Mr. Collins. Were there any concerns raised from that?
Mr. Hicks. No.
Mr. Collins. Given the timing and everything?
Mr. Hicks. None.
Mr. Collins. Mr. Hicks again, based on your experiences in
Libya, do you believe that Foreign Service officers remain in
avoidable danger in such high threat countries as Libya?
Mr. Hicks. Thanks. I believe that Foreign Service officers
are serving their country where they need to be serving their
country. And in some places the risk that they are taking is
very high.
Mr. Collins. But could we, in light of what we are seeing
now, be avoidable in the sense of from our lessons learned, if
you would?
Mr. Hicks. Thanks. From a lessons learned standpoint, the
security--we need to be increasing our security strength and
practices and training. And so, again, I may not be quite
understanding the question.
Mr. Collins. I think what I am asking is if you had that
situation, what needs to be done to prevent something like this
from happening again? Is that being taken advantage of? Or is
there still sort of a denial process going on here?
Mr. Hicks. I think that we have more to do than what has
been put forth by the ARB in its recommendations.
Mr. Collins. Okay. So as we move along, and I want to maybe
ask you this question that I asked earlier, especially from a
security standpoint, because it is something I think that we
can flesh out over time, and maybe, Mr. Thompson, if you want
to jump in on this, is that DOD sort of influence that has been
mentioned by Mr. Nordstrom a couple of times, from wanting to
be permanent in the area, was that an embarrassment for you?
Did you get that sense as well that we are trying to do this on
our own?
And Mr. Hicks, I would like you to answer that as well.
Mr. Hicks. I never got that sense.
Mr. Collins. Okay. That was more Mr. Nordstrom. You did
have that sense, though.
Mr. Nordstrom. Again, that was specifically conveyed by DAS
Lamb to both me and to the prior DCM.
Mr. Collins. Mr. Thompson, anything to add there?
Mr. Thompson. Nothing in the context text of----
Mr. Collins. I do appreciate it. And again, like I said,
this is in the interests of truth. You have been providing
that. I appreciate it. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Chairman Issa. Thank you. Mr. Meadows, as I yield to you,
would you mind giving me about 10 seconds back?
Mr. Meadows. I will yield to the chairman.
Chairman Issa. Thank you. I will be very brief. Mr. Hicks,
Colonel Wood in the previous hearing with Mr. Nordstrom
testified about trips back and forth of these people, these
military people like the four that were told not to get on the
plane, himself included. During your time as Deputy Chief of
Mission, did those four men doing training ever go to Benghazi?
Mr. Hicks. No.
Chairman Issa. Okay. Thank you.
Mr. Hicks. No.
Chairman Issa. Thank you.
Mr. Meadows. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank each of you
for being here all day today. And certainly as Mr. Nordstrom
started out this, you let us know clearly that this is not
about politics, it is about people. And I just say thank you
for that, because that's what it is. And to the families, I
want to let you know that the people back home are standing
with you. We had unbelievable questions that I will submit to
you that we won't cover today in terms of asking them that
we'll submit to you for you to answer. But they're standing
with you to get to the truth of this. And they will not sit
down until those questions have been answered. And I thank the
chairman for this informative hearing.
Mr. Thompson, let me go to you. You had talked earlier
about the deployment of the F.E.S.T. team, and you said that
you thought it was important to do that. Were there any other
agencies that thought, other than you, that thought that that
was important?
Mr. Thompson. Yes, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and
DOD, specifically our SOCOM friends.
Mr. Meadows. So you are saying that it wasn't just you, but
the DOD--so outside the State Department, the DOD and the FBI
both felt like that that was the appropriate response to make
sure that we provide that kind of forces?
Mr. Thompson. People who are a part of the team, a normal
part of that team that deploy with us were shocked and amazed
that they were not being called on their cell phones, beepers,
et cetera, to go. Whether or not that view was shared by very
senior people in those institutions I do not know.
Mr. Meadows. All right. But the DOD and FBI had a
contradictory response to what the State Department's ultimate
decision was to deploy?
Mr. Thompson. Well, again, the State Department doesn't
make that decision. The National Security Council Deputies
Committee authorizes the deployment. So I think what transpired
was a strong enough conversation from our department reps that
they were convinced that was not the thing to do.
Mr. Meadows. All right. Mr. Nordstrom, let me go back to
the ARB, because everybody talks about how wonderful this
process was. What I see it as narrow in scope, incomplete in
its nature. And I don't want to put words in your mouth, but
earlier you talked about the ARB fixed blame I think you said
on mid-level, or those career employees, not those at a senior
level or the political appointments. Is that correct?
Mr. Nordstrom. That's correct.
Mr. Meadows. And did you not say that that's where the
decisions are made, at that senior level?
Mr. Nordstrom. That's correct. Ambassador Pickering
asserted that it was made at the Assistant Secretary level and
below. That's at variance with what I had personally seen.
Mr. Meadows. So you personally believe that the decisions
are made at a much higher level. And I see, Mr. Hicks, you are
nodding your head ``yes.'' Is that correct?
Mr. Hicks. Yes, I believe so.
Mr. Meadows. So the ARB, in looking to place blame on those
career employees, ignored a whole lot of the what you would say
the decision makers in terms of assigning blame?
Mr. Nordstrom. Absolutely.
Mr. Meadows. Is that correct?
Mr. Nordstrom. Absolutely.
Mr. Meadows. So both of you agree with that. All right. Let
me go on a little bit further, Mr. Nordstrom. One last
question, and then I am going to yield to the gentleman from
Utah. As we look at this, is it fair that all the blame got
assigned to the Diplomatic Security component? Aren't they just
one component underneath the management bureau? Is that
correct?
Mr. Nordstrom. That's absolutely correct. I don't believe
it is fair. As I said, I think that certainly those resource
determinations are made by the Under Secretary for Management.
Mr. Meadows. So as we look at that, when we start assigning
blame, the ARB was incomplete in their analysis in terms of who
was to blame for that with regards to an agency. Is that
correct?
Mr. Nordstrom. That's correct. I mean you affix blame for
the three people underneath the Under Secretary for Management,
but nothing to him. So that either means he didn't know what
was going on with his subordinates or he did and didn't care.
Mr. Meadows. All right. And there is some critical
questions.
Mr. Chaffetz. Would the gentleman yield to the gentleman
from South Carolina?
Mr. Meadows. I will be glad to yield to the gentleman from
South Carolina, Mr. Gowdy.
Mr. Gowdy. I thank the gentleman from North Carolina. I
know I don't have much time, but Mr. Hicks, I want to set the
table for the next round. On September the 12th, 2012, did you
receive an email from Beth Jones that also copied Victoria
Nuland, William Burns, Patrick Kennedy, and Cheryl Mills? You
are also on the distribution list. Do you recall receiving that
email?
Mr. Hicks. Sorry, which email? At that time I was receiving
a couple hundred a day.
Mr. Gowdy. And that's fair. And you had other things on
your mind on September the 12th. This one said, ``When he said
his government suspected that former Qadhafi regime elements
carried out the attacks, I told him that the group that
conducted the attacks, Ansar al-Sharia, is affiliated with
Islamic extremists.'' Do you recall that email?
Mr. Hicks. I do believe I recall that email, yes.
Chairman Issa. Okay. We will now go to the gentleman from
Michigan, who may want to yield more time to the gentleman from
South Carolina.
Mr. Bentivolio. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. As a
veteran of Vietnam and Iraq, I understand that the boots on the
ground are the closest to the truth in these situations. You
know more about what happened in Benghazi than any bureaucrat
or politician can. The fog of battle is easily blamed when
mistakes are made at the highest level. Being caught between
the political dictates of superiors and the chain of command
and doing what is necessary to protect our citizens abroad is
difficult. I understand the risks you have taken by showing up
here today as well. Thank you for having the courage to testify
before us. We are counting on you to reveal the truth about the
failures of this government, and to protect the men and women
who served in Libya, and how we can do a better job in the
future.
Mr. Thompson, earlier you mentioned that you hang out with
some brave and honorable group. Are they Navy, Army, Air Force,
Marines, or shallow water sailors?
Mr. Thompson. All the above.
Mr. Bentivolio. All the above. Can you tell me, according
to----
Mr. Thompson. I might add, sir, from other agencies of
government, too, the Federal Bureau of Investigation,
intelligence community, Department of Energy. Diplomatic
Security is on the team.
Mr. Bentivolio. And this is part of your special security
force or team?
Mr. Thompson. No, this is the interagency component of the
Foreign Emergency Support Team.
Mr. Bentivolio. Are they all highly trained?
Mr. Thompson. Very much so.
Mr. Bentivolio. SWAT?
Mr. Thompson. We are not the operators, we are the
facilitators and the people that bring the operation and
coordinate all aspects of a response. So we are not the door
kickers, as the--some term of art these days. We are not door
kickers.
Mr. Bentivolio. Okay. So but you share a common ethos, if I
am not mistaken.
Mr. Thompson. Absolutely.
Mr. Bentivolio. Never leave anyone behind. Always watch
your buddy's 6 o'clock. And lead by example. Would that be a
safe thing to say?
Mr. Thompson. That would be a great summary.
Mr. Bentivolio. Great. So according to recent media
reports, at least 15 special operators and highly skilled State
Department security staff were available in Tripoli but were
not dispatched to aid Americans under attack in Benghazi. Why
were these personnel not deployed to rescue the Americans in
Benghazi?
Mr. Thompson. I cannot answer that. I was not on the
ground.
Mr. Bentivolio. Mr. Hicks?
Mr. Thompson. Yes.
Mr. Hicks. I am not sure that number is accurate. We did
deploy people to Benghazi. The first team went with seven
members at midnight. The second team left at about 6:30 or 7
a.m. that morning. We could not deploy all of our security
personnel because we still had about 55 diplomatic personnel in
Tripoli that were under threat for attack.
Mr. Bentivolio. Thank you very much. And I yield the rest
of my time to the gentleman, Mr. Gowdy.
Mr. Gowdy. I thank the gentleman. Mr. Hicks, all right, we
are going back to that email. You are on the distribution. And
just so it is clear, Mr. Chairman, nothing would thrill me more
than to release this email. And it is certainly not classified.
We all had access to it. All you had to do was go downstairs in
the basement and look through it. So I hope that my colleagues
on the other side of the aisle will be as full throated in
calling for the State Department to release this evidence as
they are when they are unhappy with us.
So against that backdrop, this email was sent on September
the 12th. And I want to read you a little quote from Ambassador
Rice. ``Well, Jake, first of all, it is important to know that
there is an FBI investigation that has begun.'' This is on
September 16th. That has begun. It has not begun in Benghazi,
has it?
Mr. Hicks. No, it has not.
Mr. Gowdy. All right. ``And it will take some time to be
completed.'' I was an average prosecutor, but I did it for a
long time. So let me ask you this. Are you aware of any crime
scene that is improved with time?
Mr. Hicks. I am not a criminal investigator, but----
Mr. Gowdy. All right. Trust me when I tell you crime scenes
do not get better with time. They are unsecured, which means
people have access to them. They can walk through them, they
can compromise the evidence.
Would you agree with me that you would want to talk to
witnesses as close to the event as you possibly can?
Mr. Hicks. That seems reasonable.
Mr. Gowdy. Right. And you would want to search incidents as
close to the time as you possibly can?
Mr. Hicks. Again, seems reasonable.
Mr. Gowdy. Right. So Ambassador Rice is telling the media
that the FBI investigation has begun, when she is also talking
about a video. And the reality is--and this is the point I want
to drive home--the reality is it was a direct result of what
she said that the Bureau did not get to Benghazi in a timely
fashion. Is that true or is that not true?
Mr. Hicks. That is my belief.
Mr. Gowdy. All right. You used the word immeasurable, that
what she said was immeasurable in its damage. I want you to try
to measure immeasurable. Tell me what you meant by that.
Mr. Hicks. The FBI team was delayed. The Libyan Government
could not secure the compound. It was visited by numerous
people. One of the items that was taken from the compound was
Chris's diary, which through the extraordinary efforts of David
McFarland we were able to retrieve and return back to the
Department. There were other documents that were published that
another journalist managed to acquire while visiting the
compound. So it made achieving the objective of getting the FBI
to Benghazi very, very difficult, and the ability of them to
achieve their mission more difficult.
Chairman Issa. I thank the gentleman.
We now go to the gentleman from Florida, Mr. DeSantis.
Mr. DeSantis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think this is an
important hearing. It really does make all the difference to me
to know whether we did all we could to aid our brethren who are
in harm's way. I think it is part of our military ethos. I
think it is part of our national character.
Mr. Hicks, just to go back and get this, you know, even
though you believed help was needed, there was a SOF unit,
Special Operations unit, ordered to stand down. Correct?
Mr. Hicks. Yes.
Mr. DeSantis. And even though you thought air support was
needed, there was no air support sent?
Mr. Hicks. No air support was sent.
Mr. DeSantis. So no AC-130 gunships, no fighter planes,
right?
Mr. Hicks. AC-130 gunships were never mentioned to me, only
fighter planes out of Aviano.
Mr. DeSantis. And in fact there was no request for airspace
other than the UAV request to the Libyan Government, right?
Mr. Hicks. Yes, and that preceded the attack, if I am not
mistaken.
Mr. DeSantis. So when the order to stand down was given,
who issued that order? Were you told? Did Lieutenant Colonel
Gibson tell you who was ultimately responsible for issuing that
order?
Mr. Hicks. He did not identify the person.
Mr. DeSantis. Okay. So you don't know if it was the
combatant commander?
Mr. Hicks. I do not know.
Mr. DeSantis. Or whether it was the Secretary of Defense or
the President, correct?
Mr. Hicks. I have no idea.
Mr. DeSantis. And have you, since this incident has
happened and you have been interviewed, have you been
enlightened as to who was ultimately responsible for issuing
the stand down order?
Mr. Hicks. I think that the right person to pose that
question to is Lieutenant Colonel Gibson.
Mr. DeSantis. When you spoke with Secretary Clinton at 2
a.m., did she express support for giving military assistance to
those folks in Benghazi? I.e., did she say that she would
request such support from either the Secretary of Defense or
the President of the United States?
Mr. Hicks. We actually didn't discuss that issue. At the
time, we were focused on trying to find and hopefully rescue
Ambassador Stevens. That was the primary purpose of our
discussion. The secondary purpose was to talk about what we
were going to do in Tripoli in order to enhance our security
there.
Mr. DeSantis. So as part of that discussion, though, you
informed her that you guys in Benghazi were in fact under
attack. Correct?
Mr. Hicks. The attack in Benghazi--she was aware of the
attacks. But we were in phase three. The attacks had already--
the first two attacks had been completed. And there was a lull
in Benghazi at the time. So--and again, the focus was on
finding Ambassador Stevens and what the second--or the Tripoli
response team was going to do. We had at that time no
expectation that there would be subsequent attacks at our annex
in Benghazi.
Mr. DeSantis. So it was your--you viewed it as secured at
that point?
Mr. Hicks. No, we knew the situation was in flux.
Mr. DeSantis. Okay. When you spoke to the President
following the attack on the phone, did he say anything about
deploying assets, why assets were not deployed?
Mr. Hicks. I believe I spoke to him on September 17th or
September 18th.
Mr. DeSantis. Right, after the attack. I know this was
several days later. Did he say anything, or was it just to
commend you about your service?
Mr. Hicks. It was just a call to thank me for service.
Mr. DeSantis. Okay.
Mr. Hicks. And praise the whole team.
Mr. DeSantis. I appreciate that. I think that this has been
a good hearing. I think that there are still questions
remaining. I think we need to know who actually gave the order
to stand down. I would like to know why you have been demoted,
why the Secretary's Chief of Staff called you and spoke with
you the way she did. And so with that, I will yield----
Chairman Issa. Would the gentleman yield to----
Mr. DeSantis. Yield to the chairman?
Chairman Issa. Thank you.
Mr. DeSantis. Committee chairman.
Chairman Issa. Always the right answer. Thank you. Mr.
Hicks, 2:00 in the morning Secretary of State calls you
personally. Not a common call.
Mr. Hicks. No, sir.
Chairman Issa. Did she ask you about the cause of the
attack? Did she ask about videos? Did she ask about anything at
all that would have allowed you to answer the question of how
Benghazi came to be attacked as far as you knew?
Mr. Hicks. I don't recall that being part of the
conversation.
Chairman Issa. So she wasn't interested in the cause of the
attack. And this was the only time you talked directly to the
Secretary where you could have told her or not told her about
the cause of the attack.
Mr. Hicks. Yes. That was the only time when I could have.
But again, I had already reported that the attack was--had
commenced, and that Twitter feeds were asserting that Ansar al-
Sharia was responsible for the attack.
Chairman Issa. You didn't have that discussion with her
only because it was assumed, since you had already reported,
that the cause of the attack was essentially Islamic
extremists, some of them linked to Al Qaeda.
Mr. Hicks. Yes.
Chairman Issa. Thank you. I thank the gentleman. Okay. Does
the gentleman yield back?
Mr. DeSantis. Yield back the balance of my time.
Chairman Issa. The gentleman yields back. We now proudly go
to a second round, starting with Mr. Jordan.
Mr. Jordan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Hicks, in my first
round I asked you about Cheryl Mills. And you indicated in your
response that this is a call that you always take, but frankly
don't want to get. Cheryl Mills is the counselor to the
Secretary. She is Chief of Staff to Hillary Clinton. And is it
a common--is it common knowledge that of anyone in the State
Department, when the Chief of Staff to the Secretary calls
that--is the perception that she is speaking on behalf of the
Secretary herself?
Mr. Hicks. No. Not necessarily.
Mr. Jordan. Not necessarily? But is the perception that it
is pretty darn important, based upon your response earlier?
Mr. Hicks. Absolutely.
Mr. Jordan. Yes. So when you when you got this call--I want
to go back to the Chaffetz--to Congressman Chaffetz's visit
there. You were instructed that there was going to be an
attorney accompanying Mr. Chaffetz. And this attorney was to be
next to you at all times. I mean here is what I am trying to
get at. The Secretary has said nobody--in front of the Senate--
nobody is more committed to getting this right.
If the intent is to get it right and get to the truth, then
why this concerted effort to shield the interaction of
Congressman Chaffetz from you? That's what I am not figuring
out. If we want to get to the truth, shouldn't you and Mr.
Chaffetz be able to have a dialogue and conversation without
some baby-sitter from the State Department, some lawyer there
monitoring, taking notes, calling back, doing all the things
that this individual did on that congressional visit?
Mr. Hicks. I should be able to have a conversation with the
Congressman if he wants to have one.
Mr. Jordan. Excuse me, Mr. Hicks. Didn't you say, Mr.
Hicks, in my first round that this was the first and only time
this had ever happened where someone from the State Department
accompanied a congressional visit? And you were instructed
specifically by the State Department do not talk to Congressman
Chaffetz or anyone on the committee's delegation who is there
without this lawyer being present.
Mr. Hicks. That's correct.
Mr. Jordan. And shortly after the one time when you did
have a chance to interact with Mr. Chaffetz and the lawyer was
not present, you got a phone call from Cheryl Mills.
Mr. Hicks. That's correct.
Mr. Jordan. And on that phone call, what did she say?
Mr. Hicks. She asked for a report on the visit, which I
provided. The tone of the report--the tone of her voice was
unhappy, as I recall it. But I faithfully reported exactly how
the visit transpired. I described the content of the briefing
that----
Mr. Jordan. Can I interrupt you right there, Mr. Hicks?
Mr. Hicks. Yes.
Mr. Jordan. Were you in a classified briefing at the time
and were pulled out of that briefing to talk to Ms. Mills?
Mr. Hicks. I recall the phone call afterwards.
Mr. Jordan. Okay.
Mr. Hicks. I was pulled out of the briefing, but I don't
recall that that was the time when I talked to Counselor Mills.
Mr. Jordan. What were you pulled out of the briefing for?
Mr. Hicks. I actually can't remember, to be honest with
you.
Mr. Jordan. Okay. But in close proximity to the time you
had the briefing, the one time you were apart from the minder
from State Department, you received a call from Ms. Mills?
Mr. Hicks. Yes.
Mr. Jordan. Okay.
I guess, Mr. Chairman, I just want to stress--I mean, this
is the equivalent of Rahm Emanuel when he was Chief of Staff.
When he calls--for my colleagues on the other side, when he
calls, you take the call. You understand that's important, and
you understand that he is representing the White House. When
Cheryl Mills calls, you understand, everyone at the State
Department understands, this is the person right next to
Secretary Clinton.
And the fact that we had, for the first time in Mr. Hicks'
22-year history of serving this country, someone accompany a
Congressman on a visit after we lost four American lives, and
that individual has to be in every single meeting, there can't
be personal interaction between these two discussing what took
place, is completely unprecedented.
With that, I would be happy to----
Chairman Issa. Would the gentleman yield?
Mr. Jordan. I would be happy to yield to the chairman.
Chairman Issa. Mr. Hicks, you and I have known each other
throughout the Middle East for a number of years. But in all my
years of traveling in the Middle East, anytime I was head of a
congressional delegation, I had a one-on-one with the
Ambassador, often in an automobile going to see a head of State
or something else.
Over the years that you've watched great Ambassadors, have
you ever failed to see the head of a delegation come and get a
one-on-one? Isn't that part sort of the ceremony of that
relationship and how you treat the head of a congressional
delegation? Not just this is an exception, but isn't it always
a one-on-one meeting at some point during a leadership meeting?
Mr. Hicks. In every CODEL that I have been involved in,
that has been standard.
Chairman Issa. So they were telling you, a non-Senate-
confirmed, a political appointee of the Secretary of State, her
right-hand person was telling you to breach protocol?
Mr. Hicks. Well, the two lawyers did. The conversation with
Counselor Mills occurred after.
Chairman Issa. Okay. So it was, in fact, people sent by the
State Department told to you breach protocol and not to provide
anything, even if requested by my personal emissary, Mr.
Chaffetz, on that CODEL, told you not to talk to him privately
even if he asked?
Mr. Hicks. That's correct.
Chairman Issa. Thank you.
I thank the gentleman for yielding.
We now go to the ranking member, Mr. Cummings.
Mr. Cummings. Mr. Hicks, I was just listening to your
testimony, and I--during your interview with the committee, you
were asked point-blank--and that certainly was closer to the
time that this happened--whether anyone at the Department
instructed you to withhold information from Representative
Chaffetz at any time during that trip. You were asked, and I
quote, ``Did you receive any direction about information that
Congressman Chaffetz shouldn't be given from Washington?'' And
you replied, ``No, I did not.''
Is that still your testimony? This is your sworn testimony.
I am just looking at the testimony. You don't remember that?
Mr. Hicks. I recall saying that I was instructed not to
allow personal interviews with the----
Mr. Cummings. I'm not trying to twist you up. I am just
going on what you----
Mr. Hicks. I understand. But I recall also stating that I
was not to allow personal interviews between Congressman
Chaffetz, the RSO, the Acting DCM, or me.
Mr. Cummings. Okay. So, in other words, you did say that
you were told to make sure that other State Department
officials were present. Is that right? Is that what----
Mr. Hicks. That's correct.
Mr. Cummings. Present for the meetings with Representative
Chaffetz and----
Mr. Hicks. That's correct.
Mr. Cummings. --as you stated, they told me not to be
isolated with Congressman Chaffetz. Is that correct? They
didn't tell you not to say anything, but they said, don't be
isolated.
Mr. Hicks. They said not to have a personal interview with
him.
Mr. Cummings. By yourself. I'm just trying to make--I'm not
trying to----
Mr. Hicks. I understand.
Mr. Cummings. I'm just trying to be clear, that's all.
Mr. Hicks. I understand.
Mr. Cummings. Okay. Now, Mr. Hicks, you said that four
military personnel were told not to board that plane and that
this call--you don't know where it came from. That's what you
said a few minutes ago. And so you did not know that it came
from Special Operations Command Africa?
Mr. Hicks. I knew it came from Special Operations Command
Africa. I do not know who----
Mr. Cummings. You don't know the individual.
Mr. Hicks. I did not know who.
Mr. Cummings. I gotcha. I just wanted to clear that up
because it wasn't clear.
Mr. Hicks. That's okay. Thank you.
Mr. Cummings. On October 1st, 2012, the Secretary of State
convened an Accountability Review Board led by Thomas
Pickering, Ambassador, and Admiral Michael Mullen to
investigate the attacks in Benghazi. After interviewing more
than 100 people, viewing hours of videotape, and reviewing
thousands of pages of documents, the ARB issued a very thorough
report in December of 2012 setting forth the results of its
review.
Mr. Hicks, did you meet with the ARB as part of that
investigation?
Mr. Hicks. I had an interview with them for about 2 hours.
Mr. Cummings. Okay.
And, Mr. Nordstrom, did you meet with the ARB as a part of
the investigation?
Mr. Nordstrom. Yes, on multiple occasions, sir.
Mr. Cummings. It is my understanding that a cable went out
to every employee at the State Department informing them of how
to contact the ARB if they wanted to bring information forward.
Mr. Thompson, did you receive that notice?
Mr. Thompson. I did.
Mr. Cummings. All right. And did you contact the ARB and
request to meet with them?
Mr. Thompson. I did.
Mr. Cummings. And so, did you end up meeting with the ARB
as part of their review?
Mr. Thompson. I did not.
Mr. Cummings. Did anyone try to stop you from meeting with
the ARB?
Mr. Thompson. No.
Mr. Cummings. Earlier this week, Congressman Chaffetz
claimed that the ARB report was incomplete because they never
even interviewed Secretary Clinton. According to Ambassador
Pickering, the ARB met with Secretary Clinton near the end of
their investigation. And, during that time, they had the
opportunity to discuss the report with her and could have asked
her any questions they wanted.
Ambassador Pickering and Admiral Mullen have put out a
joint statement----
Chairman Issa. I was just saying, I think that very clearly
says they didn't interview her. They just talked about the
report and could have but didn't ask her. Is that right?
Mr. Cummings. They----
Chairman Issa. I think it makes his case.
Mr. Cummings. Well, that's why we need to have--no, I'm not
trying to make any case. I am just trying to get all the facts.
But that's even more reason why we need to have Pickering in
here, and I am glad you have agreed to do that.
And I want to finish these questions because I want to stay
within the time limits.
Ambassador Pickering and Admiral Mullen have put out a
joint statement that, based on their thorough independent
investigation, they assigned responsibility based on where they
thought the responsibility lay. And that was not on Secretary
Clinton. And this is what they said, ``From the beginning of
the ARB process, we had unfettered access to everyone and
everything, including all the documentation we needed. Our
marching orders were to get to the bottom of what happened, and
that's what we did.''
I just wanted to--and, again, we will--as you said, Mr.
Nordstrom, we want to get a complete picture. And we'll
hopefully be getting that complete picture very soon so that we
can get to the point that we want to, and that is the reform so
that these kinds of things are prevented from happening again.
Thank you.
Chairman Issa. I thank the gentleman.
We now go to the gentleman from Utah, Mr. Chaffetz.
Mr. Chaffetz. And thank you, Chairman.
I would say to the ranking member, Mr. Cummings, who I have
the utmost respect for in every way, shape, or form, I totally
concur with you. We, too, just like the ARB, should have
unfettered access to all the information, all the witnesses,
and all the documents. We, as a committee, should stand up for
ourselves and demand that all the unclassified documents be
released so we all can look at them the same time.
Mr. Cummings. Would the gentleman yield for 5 seconds?
Mr. Chaffetz. Sure.
Mr. Cummings. I agree.
I yield back.
Mr. Chaffetz. Thank you.
Mr. Nordstrom, it's pretty clear to me from the October
hearing that there were a number of security recommendations
that you wanted to see done on the ground. At any time during
your service there, did you ever get everything that you
wanted? Were the recommendations that you were making forward,
were you actually able to implement those security
recommendations?
Mr. Nordstrom. Very few of them.
Mr. Chaffetz. Very few of them.
Mr. Hicks, is it fair to say that the people on the ground
trying to make the security decisions, that they were not able
to get the resources, they weren't able to fortify the
facility, they didn't have the personnel that they requested?
Is that fair to say?
Mr. Hicks. Yes, it's fair to say.
Mr. Chaffetz. When I saw Secretary Clinton 4-1/2 months
after the attack in Benghazi testify before the United States
Congress that she didn't make the security decisions, you made
the security decisions, Mr. Nordstrom, you are the regional
security officer on the ground, you were the chief security
person, you are the ones that made the security decisions. True
or false?
Mr. Nordstrom. The response I got from the regional
director when I raised the issues that we were short of our
standards for physical security was that my ``tone was not
helpful.''
Mr. Chaffetz. So, true or false, the security decisions on
the ground in Libya were made by you?
Mr. Nordstrom. I would have liked to have thought, but
apparently no.
Mr. Chaffetz. Mr. Hicks, when you heard and saw that, did
you have a reaction to it? What's your personal opinion?
Mr. Hicks. When I was there, I was very frustrated by the
situation, at times even frightened by the threat scenario that
we were looking at relative to the resources we had to try to
mitigate that threat scenario.
Mr. Chaffetz. And to the leadership of this committee on
both sides of the aisle, I find it stunning that 4-1/2 months
after the attack Secretary Clinton still has the gall to say,
``It wasn't us, it was them. I take full responsibility, but
I'm not going to hold anybody accountable. But it was them that
made the decisions.'' That was not the case.
I yield to the gentleman from Ohio.
Mr. Jordan. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Nordstrom, you testified in October there were 200-and-
some security incidents in Libya in the 13 months prior to the
attack. Is that correct?
Mr. Nordstrom. That's correct.
Mr. Jordan. Repeated attempts to breach the facility there.
You have repeatedly asked for additional security personnel,
and it was denied, correct?
Mr. Nordstrom. That's correct.
Mr. Jordan. Not only denied, but it was reduced, correct?
Mr. Nordstrom. That's correct.
Mr. Jordan. And then 4-1/2 months after it all happens, the
Secretary of State says you were responsible for the security
situation in Libya. That's what we have. That is exactly what
we have.
You have repeatedly asked, ``Send us some more of the good
guys.'' They said, ``We can't do it. In fact, we're going to
take some of them away. You guys are on your own.'' They made
that decision in Washington.
In fact, Mr. Nordstrom, the hearing ended in October. The
hearing, the only hearing we had last fall before an election,
ended with you referring to the folks in Washington, your
superiors, who wouldn't give you what you needed, you referring
to them as the Taliban. Is that correct?
Mr. Nordstrom. Yes.
Mr. Jordan. Do you remember that statement you made?
Mr. Nordstrom. Yeah. I have had a lot of questions about
that metaphor.
Mr. Jordan. I understand. But for them to say now you are
responsible for the security situation flies in the face of
fact.
I yield back to the gentleman.
Mr. Chaffetz. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Chairman, one of the things I see in the Accountability
Review Board, page 37, that I just find--first of all, I want
to highlight: ``Embassy Tripoli staff showed absolute
dedication and teamwork in mobilizing to respond to the crisis
with the DCM''--and then it goes on there, naming you
specifically for your heroism and for your work. That's what I
saw. I could see it in your eyes, and I could see it in the
others. God bless you for the great work that you did.
But the next paragraph, Mr. Chairman, I have a real problem
with. It says in the third sentence, ``The Board found no
evidence of any undue delays or decision-making or denial of
support from Washington or from the military combatant
commanders.'' And as we've heard here today, that is not true.
And the next sentence is the most troubling. Quite the
contrary: ``The safe evacuation of all U.S. Government
personnel from Benghazi 12 hours after the initial attack.''
That's not true. There are four people that were not safely
evacuated.
And at the very beginning of the ARB, it says: ``Those who
cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.'' I think
that's true. We always have to remember them. And we can't
allow this ARB to say that everybody was safely evacuated,
because they weren't. But there was an awful lot of heroism.
Chairman Issa. I thank the gentleman. That is so true.
We now go to the gentlelady from New York, Ms. Maloney.
Mrs. Maloney. Thank you.
And I agree with Mr. Chaffetz completely that there should
be equal exchange of information, that we should have access to
all information. But the Democratic minority was denied access
to a witness. The only way we knew anything about what Mr.
Thompson was going to say was what we read in the press. Now,
there should be equal access to witnesses, and there should be
equal access to information.
Chairman Issa. Would the gentlelady yield?
Mrs. Maloney. On your time.
Chairman Issa. Well, hold the clock.
Mrs. Maloney. Okay.
Chairman Issa. Because you made an allegation I don't
understand.
We didn't have a transcribed interview with two out of the
three witnesses. Mr. Thompson was not made available to either.
Mr. Nordstrom was, in fact, a previous witness, and we felt
that there was sufficient information about what he felt. And
Mr. Hicks, I think he went through 5 hours on a bipartisan
basis. We forwarded their statements, not ours, their
statements--we participated not at all in preparation--we
forwarded them to the minority as we got them, period.
So I am a little bit concerned only in that--there's
nothing fair about partisan politics, but I believe we've fully
complied deliberately with the spirit of the rules all along.
So I would hope the gentlelady, when better informed, would
appreciate that, that we tried to be very forthcoming.
Now, remember, these are whistleblowers.
Mrs. Maloney. But, Mr. Chairman, I am all for equality, and
we did get the copies of Mr. Hicks' statements and Mr.
Nordstrom's. But your staff met with Mr. Thompson. Our staff
was not allowed to meet with Mr. Thompson.
Chairman Issa. But he's represented--it's just not true.
Mr. Cummings. You didn't meet with him?
Chairman Issa. It's true that we have had some meetings
with him. But we haven't prohibited in any way--he's not our
witness.
Mr. Cummings. Would the gentlelady yield?
Mrs. Maloney. Absolutely.
Chairman Issa. He is a whistleblower that came forward.
Mr. Cummings. Yeah, let me--I am so glad we are stopping
the clock. We need to clear this up.
Chairman Issa. Well, I don't think there is anything to
clear up. He's just a whistleblower.
Mr. Cummings. And we want to protect whistleblowers. That
is very, very important to us.
The first thing--we have not gotten a syllable from--you
have had conversations with Mr. Thompson. We have never had a
conversation with Mr. Thompson.
I see you looking over here, Mr. Gowdy, and you know that's
not fair.
And so all I'm saying to you is that we have a witness that
came in here today that you had an opportunity to interview----
Chairman Issa. Well, I appreciate that, but----
Mr. Cummings. --and we never had that opportunity.
Chairman Issa. You know what? Stop the clock for 1 second.
One quick question, I am asking the witnesses.
Mr. Thompson, is it your decision who you talk to? And did
any of my people ever tell you not to talk to the Democratic
minority?
Mr. Cummings. And I'm not accusing you of that.
Mr. Thompson. No.
Chairman Issa. Okay.
Mr. Hicks, have we ever suggested that you not talk to the
minority or any of their people?
Mr. Hicks. No.
Chairman Issa. Mr. Nordstrom, has anyone on my staff or any
of my members ever asked you not to speak with them?
Mr. Nordstrom. No. In fact, I spoke with both.
Chairman Issa. Thank you. That is resolved.
The gentlelady may continue.
Mrs. Maloney. Well, we did request to meet with Mr.
Thompson, and through his lawyer, he said no. But he did speak
to the Republican staff.
I would like to go back to Mr. Chaffetz' or other people's
questioning about Cheryl Mills' phone call.
And in reading the transcripts of it, Mr. Hicks, you told
our investigators that she did not seem happy when she heard
that no other State Department official was in the classified
briefing. Is that true?
Mr. Hicks. She was unhappy that her minder, the lawyer that
came with Congressman Chaffetz, was not included in that
meeting.
Mrs. Maloney. Was she unhappy that no other State
Department official was included? Just that State Department
official.
Mr. Hicks. That State Department official.
Mrs. Maloney. Okay. And you also said that she never
criticized you, and, according to your interview transcript,
you said she never gave you any direct criticism. Do you stand
by that statement today?
Mr. Hicks. The statement was clearly no direct criticism,
but the tone of the conversation--and, again, this is part of
the Department of State culture. The fact that she called me
and the tone of her voice--and we're trained to gauge tone and
nuance in language--indicated to me very strongly that she was
unhappy.
And just, if I may----
Mrs. Maloney. My time is limited.
Mr. Hicks. Okay.
Mrs. Maloney. Going to the diplomatic post in Benghazi, as
I understand it, the British Ambassador's convoy was attacked,
a gentleman was killed, and they decided to pull out of
Benghazi. Is that correct?
Mr. Hicks. I don't believe anyone was killed. I believe we
saved the life of one of those people.
Mrs. Maloney. Okay. He was shot.
Mr. Hicks. And I would like to refer to Eric because he was
actually our RSO there.
Mrs. Maloney. No, no, the point--my question is, did the
British Ambassador close the post in Benghazi and leave?
Mr. Hicks. He did.
Mrs. Maloney. He did. Do you think it was wise----
Voice. I would like to clarify that, though. They----
Mrs. Maloney. Excuse me. Reclaiming my time. I will yield
if somebody wants me to yield, but I wanted to ask, when we
continued to stay there, do you think that was a wise decision,
for us to continue to stay in Benghazi after the English had
closed their post and left?
Mr. Hicks. Absolutely.
Mrs. Maloney. Why was it important for us to stay in
Benghazi?
Mr. Hicks. We needed to stay there as a symbolic gesture to
a people that we saved from Qadhafi during the revolution. As
we know, Qadhafi's forces were on the doorstep of Benghazi
right before the NATO bombing commenced. And as a gesture--
again, as I said before, Chris went there as a symbolic gesture
to support the dream of the people of Benghazi to have a
democracy.
Mrs. Maloney. And so he shared your position that staying
there was incredibly important.
Mr. Hicks. And he also understood from the Secretary
herself that Benghazi was important to us and that we needed to
make it to be a permanent constituent post.
Mrs. Maloney. Uh-huh.
Now, I agree with my good friend on the other side of the
aisle, Trey, that it was a long time before the FBI got on the
ground. And as I understand it from a report that they gave us,
they got the visas right away. The day of Ambassador Rice's
appearance on the Sunday shows, September 16th, the Libyan
Government granted the FBI the visas so that the team could
travel to Libya. Their flight clearance was granted the
following day, on September 17th, and the FBI arrived in
Tripoli on September 18th.
And, according to this report, the team could not travel to
Benghazi for some time due to the security situation on the
ground. Is that true? Were all of our people out of Benghazi?
And were we not letting anyone into Benghazi? What exactly was
happening then, Mr. Hicks?
Mr. Hicks. Yes, the Libyan Government did not want any of
our personnel to go to Benghazi because of the security
situation there.
Mrs. Maloney. Uh-huh. So when the FBI went to Benghazi, it
was when the Libyan Government felt that it was secure enough
for them to go there. Is that a fair statement?
Mr. Hicks. We strung together a series of approvals at the
mid to upper levels from the government and organized a
military escort to go with the FBI and Special Forces troops
that escorted them, as well.
Chairman Issa. Thank you. The gentlelady's time has
expired.
We now go to her friend, Mr. Trey Gowdy.
Mr. Gowdy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I am trying to reconcile how Benghazi was not safe enough
for the Federal Bureau of Investigations to go, but it was safe
enough to leave a below-spec facility for our diplomats to stay
in. I am just trying to reconcile those two points. It's too
dangerous for the Bureau, who are trained law enforcement
officials, but it's just fine for diplomats. At some point, I
will reconcile that.
Let me do this, Mr. Hicks. I am going to dust off something
called the best evidence rule. The best evidence of what you
said when you were asked about Mr. Chaffetz' visit is actually
what you said. So here it is: ``Those instructions were to
arrange the visit in such a way that Representative Chaffetz
and his staff would not have the opportunity to interview
myself, John Martinec, and David McFarland alone.'' That's what
you said in the deposition. So there shouldn't be any ambiguity
about who said what when. That's your testimony.
Now, I'd like to try to weave this tapestry together
because this will be the last opportunity I have, certainly
today, to talk to you. If I understand your testimony
correctly, Mr. Hicks--and I want to be fair about it, so if I
am mischaracterizing anything, you need to correct me.
If I understand your testimony, in part, the Ambassador was
interested in going to Benghazi because of interest Secretary
Clinton had in Benghazi. Is that fair?
Mr. Hicks. That's fair.
Mr. Gowdy. All right.
Now, Mr. Nordstrom, the same thing to you. And if I'm
unfair in my characterization, you need to correct me. I
thought I understood your testimony to be that Secretary
Clinton alone was able to approve facilities that were below
specs.
Mr. Nordstrom. That's correct, part of the specs. There's
two categories, second and OSPB. She is the only one that can
authorize waivers for SECCA. In this case, both apply because
we didn't meet either.
Mr. Gowdy. So we are able to show that, in part, he went to
Benghazi because of Secretary Clinton. In part, Benghazi was
still open, despite the fact it was below specs, because of
Secretary Clinton.
And now to my third point, to complete the circle, who is
Cheryl Mills?
Mr. Hicks. Counselor and Chief of Staff to the Secretary.
Mr. Gowdy. And she was copied on that email that I know my
colleagues on the other side of the aisle are going to have a
press conference on as soon as we get out of here, calling on
the State Department to release this email. I know it. Because
I have heard all afternoon about denying access to documents,
and they do not want to deny the public or the media access to
this document. So I know they are going to call on the State
Department to release this nonclassified email which Cheryl
Mills was copied on which demonstrably undercuts Susan Rice's
talking points. And Cheryl Mills was copied on that email.
Mr. Nordstrom. Mr. Gowdy, if I could add, Cheryl Mills was
also the person that led our preparation for our October
testimony. I'd never met her before, but that was explained to
me who she was afterwards.
Mr. Gowdy. And, apparently, she was also less than pleased
with Mr. Chaffetz' visit to Libya, if I understood that
testimony correctly, which I find stunning. He is the
subcommittee chairman on Oversight, one of the more decent
human beings I have ever met. I have never known him to inspire
that strong of emotion in anyone, other than Ms. Mills.
Let me say this to you, Ambassador, in conclusion. You have
made a compelling case today for why it is important to tell
other countries the truth. You made a compelling case that the
decision not to tell the truth on Sunday morning talk shows
adversely impacted our ability to get to Benghazi. You made a
compelling case.
All three of you have made a compelling case today on why
it is important for government to tell the truth to its own
citizens. So you made the case on why we have to tell the truth
to other countries, and you made the case on why you have to
tell the truth to your own citizens.
So if anyone wants to know what difference does it make, if
anyone wants to ask what difference does it make, it always
matters whether or not you can trust your government.
And to the families, we're going to find out what happened
in Benghazi, and I don't give a damn whose career is impacted.
We're going to find out what happened.
And, with that, I'll yield back.
Chairman Issa. Would the gentleman yield?
Mr. Gowdy. I'll be happy to.
Chairman Issa. We are going to be winding down. There is a
vote called. But I want to ask each of you, you are
whistleblowers; you are the kind of people who give us
information we wouldn't otherwise have. Do you believe what you
are doing today is what we need to keep doing? In other words,
do we need other whistleblowers to come forward, other fact
witnesses who know what we don't currently know?
And I'm not asking you if this was a great process or if
you enjoyed it. But was it worthwhile, in your opinion as
people who have now gone through this process?
Mr. Thompson?
Mr. Thompson. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Issa. Mr. Hicks?
Mr. Hicks. Yes, I do.
Chairman Issa. Mr. Nordstrom?
Mr. Nordstrom. Absolutely.
Chairman Issa. Well, since we are going to Mr. Lankford
next, I hope you continue to feel that way.
Mr. Lankford?
Mr. Lankford. Mr. Nordstrom, I just need to follow up on a
conversation we had earlier dealing with the cable that you
said, March 28, 2012. You had mentioned that you drafted that
cable requesting additional personnel for both the embassy in
Tripoli and in Benghazi because you were very much short. And
as time was expiring and the SST team was leaving, you knew you
were not going to have enough people. You mentioned you drafted
the cable. Your intention was and your assumption was the
executive leadership, including the Under Secretary all the way
to Secretary, would see that cable or at least brief on that
cable and the request for that security. There has been a lot
of discussion about the official response that came back on
April 19th.
Who do you think saw or the intention or at least reflected
the opinion of when that cable came back to you? When that
cable response came back to you who was the assumption that was
actually responding to you?
Mr. Nordstrom. Normally someone would tell me exactly who
it is or they would indicate who the point of contact was. If I
recall correctly that's still unknown to me. I assume that it's
coming from DS but as I testified to you before, so many of
these decisions seem to be at Ambassador Kennedy's level or
higher. Clearly that was cleared by some of those other
officials.
Mr. Lankford. So you are assuming this is the Under
Secretary or on up somewhere that had personal knowledge of
that cable that came back.
Mr. Nordstrom. Certainly saw it ahead of time.
Mr. Lankford. It is an established fact that there is video
of the attack, clear video of the attackers. The FBI has done
an extensive investigation. We're now months past that time.
But are any of you aware of anyone who has been held to account
for the murders that happened in Libya? Anyone detained? Anyone
arrested? Anyone captured? Are you aware of anything that has
happened to any of the attackers to hold them to account?
Mr. Nordstrom. Neither the perpetrators nor the persons
that made decisions. Again, the four people that were named in
the ARB were put on administrative leave. I understand one of
them is trying to come back off of that leave and go to be the
RSO in NATO, which is shocking to me.
Mr. Lankford. So at this point no one is aware of anyone
who has been held to account in any way for the murder of four
Americans?
Mr. Nordstrom. Not that I am aware of.
Mr. Lankford. In 1998, as we have discussed frequently,
there was a bombing at the embassy in Kenya and Tanzania. There
was an ARB at the end of that as well. And let me just read you
the three findings at the end of that ARB that was done in
1999. It said this: Number one, State Department Washington did
not assess the threats or take notes of the clear warning signs
and escalating threats. Number two, it noted the facility was
inadequate for even the most modest of attack. And number
three, there was a lack of preparations or warning systems at
the facility.
That could have been written a month ago. We have discussed
often on this the one thing we have to do is learn the lesson.
In 1998, this same thing occurred and we have not learned the
lesson. What we know of today and the realities that have come
out and through all that you have attributed to this
conversation and what you have contributed is invaluable is
that we did not do the most basic minimum security that was
required by the State Department's standards set after the
bombings in Nairobi, Kenya and in Tanzania. We did not do the
basics. We did not provide the level of security. There were in
fact cameras that were in the box still in Benghazi because a
technical person had never been sent to actually install those.
So there could have been additional warning signs but they had
not actually been installed and done. We know that the Tripoli
facility was even at a greater risk than Benghazi. There were
even more vulnerabilities in Tripoli than there were in
Benghazi, both in physical security around the facility and in
actual staffing, the people there, the gun toters, as you
mentioned before, the door kickers and such, people that would
actually be there to be able to provide that security. The
minimum level was not provided. In fact, my understanding, Mr.
Hicks, is that it reached such a point of vulnerability that
you actually approached some of the Diplomatic Security and
asked for the diplomats to be trained in how to handle a gun
because there was such a fear of the people on the ground
because you were so exposed; is that true?
Mr. Hicks. It's true.
Mr. Lankford. We have got to learn the lessons of the past.
This happened in 1998. We allowed it to happen again. The State
Department has to put into practice their own standards and put
into place the things we know to be right. We cannot allow a
place that is listed as critical and high risk to our personnel
to be ignored. It did not have the support they need. If
there's any one gain that we can do in any one way to be able
to honor those that have fallen is that we actually do learn
the lesson and we protect our diplomats with what is required.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Chairman Issa. I thank the gentleman.
We now go to the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Mica. Mr.
Hicks, did you have something you wanted to say?
Mr. Hicks. Yes. I would just like to make a clarification
with a conversation with the ranking member. There's no
inherent contradiction between denying or avoiding a private
interview with someone and making sure that he has information
available. I just want to be clear on that.
Chairman Issa. Mr. Mica.
Mr. Mica. Thank you.
Mr. Nordstrom, I don't think I have ever read so much
testimony. But what you provided last night I thought was
particularly informative. And on page 7 you talk about the
rating level assigned for threat categories for our various
posts. And there are four of them: Critical, high, medium and
low. And we have 264 posts that--where we had security
concerns, overseas diplomatic posts at the time of Benghazi.
There were 14 posts rated as either high or critical. Not a
huge number, but 14. Two of the posts were Benghazi and
Tripoli.
Were you aware of that, Mr. Thompson? Mr. Nordstrom, you
put it in there. So it's not like they had this incredible
array of posts that were on this high alert; is that correct?
Mr. Nordstrom. That's my understanding, a very small amount
were high or critical.
Mr. Mica. And then finally--again, I have not read the
classified. I read the unclassified version. Mr. Chaffetz
pointed out later in the report where it looks like they tried
to cook this--to put blame basically on the lower level--
there's a certain plateau and then everybody below gets the
blame.
Up on page 4 when I had my time before, I said, Embassy
Tripoli--this is from a report--did not demonstrate strong and
sustained advocacy with Washington for increased security for
Special Mission Benghazi. And yet we've heard your predecessor,
Mr. Hicks, pleaded for additional help. You pleaded for it.
It's documented, and you didn't get it. You actually got a
reduction, is that correct, as was pointed out?
Mr. Hicks. Yes. A drastic reduction.
Mr. Mica. So it wasn't like this was all over the place.
Finally, for the ARB, you put in here to ignore the role of
senior department leadership played before, during and after
the September 11th attack sends a clear message to all State
Department employees. It looks like they are whitewashing the
folks at the higher pay grades and levels and you all are
taking the blame; is that a fair assessment?
Mr. Nordstrom. I think the basic message is that whether or
not you are sitting out at the post requesting resources,
preparing for testimony before this committee, or standing on a
building surrounded by an armed mob attacking you, the message
is the same: You are on your own.
Mr. Mica. Mr. Hicks?
Mr. Hicks. I share what Mr. Nordstrom had to say.
Mr. Mica. Mr. Thompson, and I still can't believe that you
were never interviewed and you had one of the most strategic
positions by the ARB. That is true?
Mr. Thompson. I will let you use ``strategic,'' sir. It's a
tool that should remain on the menu of options is probably my
basic point. And it was early taken off the menu.
Mr. Mica. It's a very sad commentary.
I yield back. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Issa. Would the gentleman yield?
Mr. Mica. Well, I have time.
Chairman Issa. I think what we've heard here today clearly
is that in the future, RSOs--Deputy Chief of Missions, Chief of
Missions need to put everything in a cable. In the future when
you know there's a security problem and you're being told your
application would not be helpful, it would not be wanted or
people say just be patient or they say don't put it in cable,
the answer is the next ARB will probably whitewash the same as
this one. On October 10th the ranking member and I and many
others sat through a hearing in which it was made very clear
that message after message after message, including the actual
if you will open source information about the attacks that
occurred on other diplomatic missions and our own, if that's
not saying loudly they blew a hole in our wall, when are you
going to give us the security we need, then I'm afraid the
deafness at least Under Secretary Kennedy's level is not in any
way curable by technology known to amplify sound.
So with that, this hearing is closed, but this
investigation is not over.
[Whereupon, at 5:15 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
APPENDIX
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Material Submitted for the Hearing Record
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