    [House Hearing, 113 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                  THE GROWING CRISIS IN AFRICA'S SAHEL REGION

    =======================================================================

                                 JOINT HEARING

                                   BEFORE THE

                     SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA, GLOBAL HEALTH,
                            GLOBAL HUMAN RIGHTS, AND
                          INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

                                    AND THE

                                SUBCOMMITTEE ON
                        THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

                                    AND THE

             SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE

                                     OF THE

                          COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                        ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                   __________

                                  MAY 21, 2013

                                   __________

                               Serial No. 113-72

                                   __________

            Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

    Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/
                                      or
                           http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

                                   ----------
                             U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

    81-167 PDF                       WASHINGTON : 2013
    -----------------------------------------------------------------------
      For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing
       Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (800) 512-1800;
              DC area (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-214 Mail: Stop IDCC,
                          Washington, DC 20402-0001

                          COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

                     EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman
    CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey     ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
    ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida         ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
    DANA ROHRABACHER, California             Samoa
    STEVE CHABOT, Ohio                   BRAD SHERMAN, California
    JOE WILSON, South Carolina           GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
    MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas             ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
    TED POE, Texas                       GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
    MATT SALMON, Arizona                 THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
    TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania             BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
    JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina          KAREN BASS, California
    ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois             WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
    MO BROOKS, Alabama                   DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
    TOM COTTON, Arkansas                 ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
    PAUL COOK, California                JUAN VARGAS, California
    GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina       BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois
    RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas            JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III,
    SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania                Massachusetts
    STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas                AMI BERA, California
    RON DeSANTIS, Florida                ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California
    TREY RADEL, Florida                  GRACE MENG, New York
    DOUG COLLINS, Georgia                LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
    MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina         TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
    TED S. YOHO, Florida                 JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
    LUKE MESSER, Indiana

         Amy Porter, Chief of Staff      Thomas Sheehy, Staff Director

                   Jason Steinbaum, Democratic Staff Director
                                     ------

        Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights, and
                          International Organizations

                   CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey, Chairman
    TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania             KAREN BASS, California
    RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas            DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
    STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas                AMI BERA, California
    MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina
                Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa

                     ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman
    STEVE CHABOT, Ohio                   THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
    JOE WILSON, South Carolina           GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
    ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois             BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
    TOM COTTON, Arkansas                 DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
    RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas            ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
    RON DeSANTIS, Florida                JUAN VARGAS, California
    TREY RADEL, Florida                  BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois
    DOUG COLLINS, Georgia                JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III,
    MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina             Massachusetts
    TED S. YOHO, Florida                 GRACE MENG, New York
    LUKE MESSER, Indiana                 LOIS FRANKEL, Florida

                                     ------

             Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade

                            TED POE, Texas, Chairman
    JOE WILSON, South Carolina           BRAD SHERMAN, California
    ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois             ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California
    MO BROOKS, Alabama                   JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
    TOM COTTON, Arkansas                 JUAN VARGAS, California
    PAUL COOK, California                BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois
    SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania            JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III,
    TED S. YOHO, Florida                     Massachusetts

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page

                                   WITNESSES

    The Honorable Donald Y. Yamamoto, Acting Assistant Secretary of
      State, Bureau of African Affairs, U.S. Department of State.....     9
    The Honorable Nancy E. Lindborg, Assistant Administrator, Bureau
      for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance, U.S.
      Agency for International Development...........................    19
    Mr. Rudolph Atallah, senior fellow, Michael S. Ansari Africa
      Center, Atlantic Council.......................................    37
    Mima S. Nedelcovych, Ph.D., partner, Schaffer Global Group.......    57
    Mr. Nii Akuetteh (former Georgetown University professor of
      African
      affairs).......................................................    65

              LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING

    The Honorable Donald Y. Yamamoto: Prepared statement.............    11
    The Honorable Nancy E. Lindborg: Prepared statement..............    21
    Mr. Rudolph Atallah: Prepared statement..........................    40
    Mima S. Nedelcovych, Ph.D.: Prepared statement...................    59
    Mr. Nii Akuetteh: Prepared statement.............................    67

                                    APPENDIX

    Hearing notice...................................................    90
    Hearing minutes..................................................    91
    The Honorable Christopher H. Smith, a Representative in Congress
      from the State of New Jersey, and chairman, Subcommittee on
      Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights, and International
      Organizations:
      Question for the record to the Honorable Nancy E. Lindborg.....    92
      Summary of recommendations from the Corporate Council on Africa    93
      Statement from Shari Berenbach of the U.S. African Development
        Foundation...................................................   101

                  THE GROWING CRISIS IN AFRICA'S SAHEL REGION

                                  ----------

                             TUESDAY, MAY 21, 2013

                           House of Representatives,

                     Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health,

           Global Human Rights, and International Organizations, and

             Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa, and

            Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade,

                         Committee on Foreign Affairs,

                                Washington, DC.

        The committees met, pursuant to notice, at 2 o'clock p.m.,
    in room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Christopher H.
    Smith (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
        Mr. Smith. This meeting will come to order. And good
    afternoon to everyone. Today's hearing is intended to examine
    the challenges faced by the nations of Africa's Sahel region,
    especially the spread of both terrorism and trafficking in the
    entire area. These problems alone impose a danger to the
    security of both the Sahel and developed countries, not only
    because of air traffic to West Africa that transits northern
    Mali but also because of the use of the region as a base of
    attacks by Islamic extremists on Western targets. Moreover, the
    preexisting humanitarian crisis is now worsened and as are
    human rights concerns. The underlying political instability is
    becoming equally serious.
        We are holding this hearing jointly because the threat that
    we face goes beyond the jurisdiction of any one of our
    subcommittees. It involves not only Africa's Sahel region but
    also countries in north Africa, especially Algeria and Libya.
    It also involves terrorist groups originating from and based in
    nations outside of the Sahel. It is a sign of how seriously the
    Committee on Foreign Affairs considers this matter that our
    three subcommittees have come together to consider this today.
        There are various definitions of the Sahel, but for the
    purposes of this hearing, we mean the nations of Senegal,
    Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Chad.
        In early 2012, the Government of Mali was overthrown, as we
    all know, in a military coup and subsequently lost control of
    the northern area of the country, which constitutes more than
    half of its land area. Mali had long been considered a stable
    example of African democracy, but, as we learned in our
    subcommittee's hearing in June 2012, the coup and resulting
    loss of so much territory revealed the hollowness and rot
    within the Mali democratic system.
        The influx of well-armed terrorist groups, broken promises
    to neglected ethic groups, lack of adherence to democratic
    principles, and rampant drug smuggling all made the Malian
    Government vulnerable to breakdown.
        We must ask now whether other countries in Africa's Sahel
    region are also more vulnerable than we think. Mali provided a
    staging ground for al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, or AQIM,
    which is daily becoming an ever-greater threat in the region
    and perhaps globally. AQIM is considered the best funded of all
    al-Qaeda affiliates and, through its ties to other terrorist
    groups, may be funding their activities as well.
        In a July subcommittee hearing last year, we learned that
    Boko Haram, in Nigeria, is not a unified organization but,
    rather, various factions, some of which are focused on
    embarrassing the Nigerian Government but others that have a
    more global jihadist view. It is the latter that we have had
    present in northern Mali and impose a threat to Western
    interests, not to mention the interests of the Mali people.
        Boko Haram attacks lead Nigerian President Goodluck
    Jonathan, last week, to declare a state of emergency in three
    northern states in his country. A radical Boko Haram splinter
    group, known as Ansaru, may have attacked Nigerian troops en
    route to a peacekeeping operation in Mali.
        In Mali, three terrorist groups dominate the rebellion that
    split off the north: MUJAO, a splinter group of AQIM; Ansar al-
    Dine, an Islamic Tuareg rebel group; and the MNLA, a more
    secular Tuareg group. These groups have different aims and
    sometimes clash with one another. Nevertheless, they
    collectively pose and continue to pose a threat to the peace of
    Mali and the region.
        As a result of the rebel actions in northern Mali, there
    are currently more than 300,000 internally displaced persons in
    Mali, more than 74,000 refugees in Mauritania, 50,000 refugees
    in Niger, and nearly 50,000 refugees in Burkina Faso. The
    displacement of nearly \1/2\ million Malians strains already
    scare resources in the Sahel, with recipients often in remote
    areas.
        French forces, as we know, were able to forestall a rebel
    advance in southern Mali earlier this year. And an African
    military contingent is in the process of being deployed to Mali
    even now. However, chasing rebels out of Mali's major northern
    towns will be easier than ending ongoing terrorist attacks or
    reconciling ethnic groups whose enmity has grown over the last
    year.
        We look forward to today's witnesses. To our two witnesses
    from the administration, thank you for being here. And I will
    properly introduce you in a moment, but thank you for your
    leadership. It is making a huge difference.
        I would like to now yield to my good friend and colleague
    Ms. Bass for an opening statement.
        Ms. Bass. As always, thank you, Chairman Smith, for holding
    this hearing today.
        I was pleased yesterday to see the formal announcement of
    President Obama's upcoming visit to the continent next month.
        I know we are here today to discuss the Sahel, a vast
    region that stretches from the Atlantic Ocean to the Red Sea.
    Each of the nations in the region experience a unique set of
    challenges, which, as we know, make developing effective and
    far-reaching programs extraordinarily difficult. While the
    crisis in Mali was spiraling out of control, a humanitarian
    crisis was underway that affected tens of millions of people
    throughout the region.
        The U.N.'s 2013 Sahel regional strategy amply illustrates
    the immense challenge experienced by those living in the Sahel
    and nations like our own, who have the resources and desire to
    make a difference.
        The report notes that some of the key drivers to the
    humanitarian crisis include food and security, epidemic
    disease, floods, locust infestation, and the continued crisis
    in Mali and the displacement of populations, both internally
    and those who continue to seek refuge in Mali's neighboring
    countries.
        With an estimated need of nearly $2 billion, CRS reports
    that the U.N. consolidated appeals process will bring aid
    organizations together to coordinate a response to major
    humanitarian crises and disasters and appeal for funds through
    a collaborative and coordinated plan.
        I am pleased that Nancy Lindborg from USAID will be here to
    discuss the administration's new resilience strategy, which was
    launched late last year and is a promising program that I
    believe will fundamentally change the way we think about
    development, particularly in regions and in countries that
    endure repeated cycles of shock. The resilience strategy makes
    sense when you consider these key drivers to these humanitarian
    crises.
        While the challenges are great, there is a window of
    opportunity that can be seized upon. If we work within nations
    and collaborate effectively with donors, the resources
    available can be used to save lives and prevent decline in the
    living conditions of millions of infants, expectant mothers,
    and those that require assistance of some sort.
        Mr. Chairman, today and tomorrow, a delegation from Mali, a
    country that has been the focus of this committee's attention,
    will visit the Congress. I believe you have already had a
    chance to meet with them. This delegation, led by the Speaker
    of Mali's National Assembly, is here to discuss their upcoming
    Presidential election, now slated for July 28th, the security
    challenges that remain in the north of the country and
    opportunities toward economic development, including a focus on
    expanding the country's fragile infrastructure.
        As members of the committee are likely aware, yesterday the
    U.N. announced the appointment of a special envoy who will
    assist in helping Mali regain political stability and security
    in its vast north. And last week, the country was able to
    secure over $4 billion in pledges from donor nations to assist
    in peace and stability efforts and reconstruction of failing
    infrastructure. With these important announcements and the
    transition of the African-led international support mission to
    a U.N. peacekeeping force, I believe these are positive steps
    that will ensure a Malian future that is both peaceful and
    prosperous.
        I want to close by retelling a story. In late February, I
    traveled to Mali to see firsthand the many efforts underway
    that would return Mali to a model democracy for the region and
    the continent. The CODEL that I was on included Senators Coons
    and Isakson as well as Representative Sewell. We had a chance
    to meet with displaced families from Timbuktu who spoke of
    their desire to return to their homes. They sought to return
    home, not merely because that was where they were from but
    because they wanted to return home to vote. They wanted to cast
    their ballots to show the world that the people from Mali
    themselves seek peace, stability, and a return to normalcy. Our
    nation is helping to make this a reality. And we should
    continue to do so throughout the Sahel, a region that greatly
    requires our attention and support.
        Thank you.
        Mr. Smith. Thank you very much, Ranking Member.
        I would like to, before I go to Chairwoman Ros-Lehtinen,
    just introduce to all assembled, Younoussi Toure, who is the
    Speaker of the Malian Assembly. Thank you. You and your
    delegation are very welcome to this hearing. And I appreciated
    the time earlier that we had together. Thank you, Mr. Speaker.
        I would like to now yield to my good friend and colleague,
    the former chair of the full committee, now chair of the
    Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa, Ileana Ros-
    Lehtinen.
        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. And
    thank you for your steadfast leadership for many decades on
    this important topic.
        We have been following the developments in this region
    closely, but the growing crisis in north Africa and the Sahel
    has been a largely underemphasized threat to U.S. national
    security interests. For far too long, U.S. foreign policy has
    been focused on fighting terrorist groups like al-Qaeda and
    Afghanistan in the Middle East. Yet, we have looked away from
    the serious and growing threats coming from north Africa and
    the Sahel. These areas have become breeding grounds of
    extremist activity as these nations face many internal
    struggles, political instability from dangerous droughts that
    are wiping out entire villages to food shortages, human rights
    concerns, and domestic conflicts. This leaves large swaths of
    land ungoverned. And their borders are porous and easy to cross
    undetected.
        This fragility gives these extremist groups, like al-Qaeda
    in the Islamic Maghreb, AQIM, Boko Haram, Ansar al-Dine, and
    others, the ability to roam freely in the most lawless region,
    setting up safe havens for terrorist activities, and doing
    their dirty work, kidnapping, drug trafficking, arms
    trafficking. And this became evident in the fallout of the Arab
    Spring as Ghadafi fell and arms and fighters from Libya spread
    throughout the region.
        As Secretary Clinton said when she testified before us in
    January, there is no doubt that the Algerian terrorists had
    weapons from Libya. There is no doubt that the remnants of AQIM
    in Mali had weapons from Libya. The weak governments in north
    Africa and the Sahel don't have the will nor the capacity to
    confront these extremist groups. And that leaves the United
    States and our interests extremely vulnerable.
        The administration has yet to develop a plan or even
    recognize the severity of the threat. In his push to end the
    war in Afghanistan, the President justifies a withdrawal
    because he believes that, as he has repeatedly stated, that we
    are close to our goal of defeating al-Qaeda, that we have
    decimated al-Qaeda. Yet, al-Qaeda is still as great a threat as
    ever and is expanding. We see them in north Africa. We see them
    in the Sahel. They are fighting in Syria. I guess they didn't
    get the same memo the President received.
        We have seen a disturbing alliance between drug traffickers
    and these terrorist groups in the region, allowing the
    terrorists to develop new resources to finance their illicit
    activities while at the same time undermining those governments
    and our U.S. national security interests.
        Just last month, we saw a direct narcoterrorism link
    between African nations and the FARC, a U.S.-designated foreign
    terrorist organization. Several top figures from Guinea-
    Bissau's military, including the head of its armed forces and
    former head of the Navy, were arrested on cocaine and weapons
    trafficking charges. Both were accused of agreeing to store
    tons of cocaine and buying weapons for the FARC. These criminal
    activities undermine our security in our hemisphere and provide
    the financing capabilities to terrorists.
        The administration needs to come to the realization that we
    are a long way still from defeating al-Qaeda and its influence.
    To confront these threats, we need a strategy, a strategy that
    disrupts the operations of extremist networks, that denies them
    safe havens, and prevents an escalation of emerging threats by
    also targeting precursor conditions that foment instability.
        I look forward, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Bass, to
    our witnesses today. Thank you so much for convening this
    timely hearing.
        Mr. Smith. Thank you very much, Chairwoman Ros-Lehtinen.
    The chair now recognizes the ranking member of the Middle East
    and North Africa Subcommittee, Mr. Deutch.
        Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this
    hearing on an issue that, while it may not make the top
    headlines on a regular basis, certainly has significant
    implications on the security of the African continent and
    implications for stability throughout the Middle East.
        Now, the current environment in the Sahel is precarious and
    worrisome. The proliferation of militant groups in the region,
    many of which have ties to al-Qaeda in the Maghreb, pose
    debilitating threats to a region with a history of instability.
    The partnership and coordination of these radical groups can
    and has turned smaller domestic disputes into full-blown
    regional crises.
        With service on commercial networks traversing over state
    lines, the porous borders between countries allow for easy and
    unregulated movement of militant groups, arms, drugs, and other
    contraband that weaken nations and put populations at risk. The
    conflict in Mali exemplifies the trouble that these non-state
    armed groups can cause, not only to a country's security and
    safety of their civilians but to the greater Sahel region as
    well.
        We are seeing how quickly a previously stable democratic
    government can deteriorate, heading toward the likes of
    Somalia. Thus far in Mali, our approach has been one of limited
    engagement, bolstering French and U.N. forces with intelligence
    and other forms of assistance. In the short term, intervention
    was needed and the United States, supported, through the
    Security Council, authorization of an international
    peacekeeping force in Mali.
        We have taken other steps to strengthen the security
    infrastructures in the region, including through bilateral
    agreement with Niger in the presence of UAV base in that
    country, but this should only be one step in our development of
    what I hope is a broader, more comprehensive approach to
    dealing with the instability and violent extremism in the
    region.
        To combat these and other armed groups and to reduce
    further threats to regional and international security, we must
    join with our partners in Maghreb to enhance cooperation and
    prevent the spread of extremism and the flow of arms to the
    Sahel. We must create and implement the comprehensive and a
    multifaceted plan. We must consider what preemptory and
    preventative steps we can take to address the structural issues
    found across the region. Strengthening a country's essential
    institutions can help prevent any need for future military use.
    There are a number of regional challenges that are widespread
    and interlinked, from severe institutional underdevelopment,
    punishing socioeconomic conditions, high levels of poverty, and
    other troubling indicators that I am sure will be the focus of
    today's testimony.
        The problems we are witnessing are long-term challenges to
    the region. I am concerned that they may only be setting the
    scene for additional crises in the future. There must be
    greater international attention placed on the Sahel. That is
    what we are doing today.
        I appreciate your holding this hearing, Mr. Chairman. I
    look forward to hearing from the witnesses. I yield back.
        Mr. Smith. Thank you very much, Mr. Deutch.
        I now recognize the chairman of the Terrorism,
    Nonproliferation, and Trade Subcommittee, Ted Poe of Texas.
        Mr. Poe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Since 2012, a coup in Mali, and the 2011 overthrow of
    Ghadafi in Libya, the security in the Sahel has gotten worse,
    not better. At a time when the United States, as it is said by
    the administration, pivots to the East, we cannot leave behind
    our obligation to the continent of Africa.
        Some might think that this is not a problem for the United
    States, but they are wrong. Most Americans, many Americans,
    shall I say, never heard of Mali until this crisis. They
    thought it was an island in the south Pacific. But what happens
    in the Sahel is directly related to our regional interests and
    security here at home. The prevention of an attack on our
    homeland and on our Western allies by radical Islamic
    extremists is a challenge and will be for the foreseeable
    future.
        In the Sahel, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, or AQIM,
    appears to be taking advantage of the chaos. That is what
    terrorist groups do. In January, thousands of French troops,
    along with local allied fighters, had to launch a military
    offensive because terrorists had taken over part of Mali, which
    is about the size of Texas. I want to commend the French for
    their efficiency and their quick response.
        Recently the French announced that they will keep 1,000
    troops in Mali for the foreseeable future to consolidate the
    gains and keep al-Qaeda on its back foot.
        Recognizing the scope of this challenge, the United States
    has begun training African forces in neighboring Niger to fight
    in Mali. The United States only has about 1,800 troops in all
    of Africa, but 4,000 more are on the way to train African
    forces.
        Due north in Algeria, al-Qaeda has brigades of radical
    killers aided by their brothers in Tunisia. Fortunately, the
    Algerian National Popular Army is doing its best to fight al-
    Qaeda.
        The seriousness of the situation in Algeria hit home with
    us after the extremists attacked a gas plant on the border of
    Algeria and Libya. AQIM-linked terrorists wanted to seize the
    plant in the hopes of creating a massive explosion and killing
    everyone in the area. Fortunately, they were unsuccessful but
    not before gunfights and the follow-up rescue mission resulted
    in the death of plant workers from nine different countries.
    Three of those killed were Americans, two of them being Texans.
    And one of them was my constituent, Victor Lovelady from
    Atascocita, Texas. He was an energy worker, and he was killed,
    not just because of what he did but because of who he was. He
    was killed because he was an American.
        A radical Islamic al-Qaeda group by the name of the
    Signatories in Blood--what a lovely name that is--claimed
    responsibility for this terrorist attack. They are a spinoff of
    AQIM. And they seek to destroy us and kill us indiscriminately.
    This is the real world. This is not a fiction story.
        We have asked the Algerian Government for Victor Lovelady's
    personal effects, but we haven't gotten them back yet.
        We have learned from the past couple of years that we are
    not good at predicting threats. I hope we can better understand
    today the nature of the terrorist threat in the Sahel and
    policy options available to us.
        I look forward to the testimony of our witnesses.
        Mr. Smith. Thank you, Chairman Poe.
        I now yield to the ranking member, Brad Sherman, from
    California.
        Mr. Sherman. Thank you.
        Several groups have rebelled against the central Malian
    Government for independence in northern Mali just in the last
    1\1/2\ years. The Tuareg tribes in northern Mali have had major
    socioeconomic and political grievances against the Bamako
    government and have rebelled in the past.
        Ghadafi supported this movement. And many Tuaregs fought
    for Colonel Ghadafi as he struggled to stay in power. Before
    returning to Mali, Tuaregs took a large amount of sophisticated
    weapons with them, including a huge number of surface-to-air
    missiles looted from Libyan weapons depots. The Libyan weapons
    reinvigorated a longstanding rebellion and expanded it into a
    major conflict.
        We should learn from this lesson as we look at Syria. The
    outcome in Syria is important to us. The outflow of weapons
    from Syria may turn out to be even more important.
        Returning to looking at Mali in the Sahel, we should note
    that the MNLA, the National Movement for Liberation of Azawad,
    is fighting to create an independent country that would have
    less than 1 million people as far as we can tell and would
    include only half Tuaregs in the Sahel region. This seems to be
    an unrealistic objective from so many standpoints, including
    the world's general consensus that the borders in Africa are
    inviolate and that messing around with those borders could only
    lead to huge numbers of conflicts.
        The MNLA was initially backed by Ansar al-Dine, the
    extremist Islamic group. Then that group and smaller Islamic
    groups began imposing a harsh version of Sharia law in some
    areas. Many of these extremist Islamists are foreign jihadist
    fighters. By July of last year, the MNLA had a falling out with
    the Islamic groups over their vision for the future of northern
    Mali. Ansar al-Dine and the other Islamic groups seemed to have
    the upper hand. And then France intervened, as we all know, in
    July 2012 to beat back the advance on Mali's central
    government. And France has deployed thousands of troops with
    the aid of the United States, both in terms of aerial refueling
    missions, drones, other logistical support.
        Among the questions raised there, is the Malian Government
    capable of defending itself and its territorial integrity? And
    for how long will it need French assistance to do that?
        We are still haunted by Colonel Ghadafi's legacy. We are
    facing the consequences of the arms leaving Libya. What can be
    done to both continue to contain weapons in Libya, which is
    still not a stable country, as recent events or relatively
    recent events in Benghazi illustrated? What can we do to make
    sure that we don't have more outflows of weapons from Libya?
        We need to examine the role of Saudi and Gulf states and
    well-connected, wealthy individuals operating with the tacit
    support of their governments in funding Islamic extremists in
    the Sahel and elsewhere. We need to ask what can be done to
    stop drug smuggling in the Sahel. And how big a problem is
    that? And who is earning the profits? And what are those
    profits funding?
        And we need to ask whether the Tuareg have legitimate
    concerns and what can be done to meet those legitimate concerns
    without profiting the bad actors that have been operating in
    northern Mali.
        We have a lot to learn. We have some excellent witnesses.
    And I yield back.
        Mr. Smith. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        We welcome back Ambassador Yamamoto, Donald Yamamoto, who
    is no stranger to the Africa Subcommittee having testified
    several times before. He is Acting Assistant Secretary of State
    for African Affairs, having served since 2009 as the Principal
    Deputy Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of African Affairs at
    the U.S. Department of State. His distinguished career has
    included serving as U.S. Ambassador to Ethiopia from November
    2006 to July 2009 and as a Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
    in the Bureau of African Affairs from 2003 to 2006.
        We will then hear from Nancy Lindborg, who has testified
    before our subcommittee on the Eastern African famine. She is
    the Assistant Administrator for the Bureau for Democracy,
    Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance at USAID. She previously
    spent 14 years as President of Mercy Corps, where she focused
    on international development.
        During her time with Mercy Corps, she also served in a
    number of positions where she worked on issues relating to
    foreign relations and foreign assistance and, again, like
    Ambassador Yamamoto, has a very distinguished background.
        Ambassador Yamamoto?

    STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DONALD Y. YAMAMOTO, ACTING ASSISTANT
    SECRETARY OF STATE, BUREAU OF AFRICAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT
                                OF STATE

        Ambassador Yamamoto. Thank you very much for your
    graciousness.
        And I submit a longer version for the record.
        Mr. Smith. Without objection, it will be a part of the
    record.
        Ambassador Yamamoto. Thank you, Chairman Smith, Ros-
    Lehtinen, and Poe, and Ranking Members Bass, Deutch, Sherman,
    and the other members of this committee, for the opportunity to
    testify to you today.
        The countries of the Sahel face a complex series of
    interconnected and ever-evolving challenges. The 80 million
    people of the Sahel, representing roughly 10 percent of the
    sub-Saharan Africa's total population live in some of the
    world's poorest countries, which consistently rank at the
    bottom of any human development scale.
        The security vacuum following the Libyan revolution and the
    crisis in Mali exacerbated the Sahel's longstanding political,
    economic security and humanitarian vulnerabilities. Instability
    in Mali and increased arms flow from Libya into the region also
    collided with a humanitarian crisis brought on by drought, poor
    harvests in the region already burdened by chronic poverty and
    food insecurity.
        Addressing the Sahel's many challenges demands a
    comprehensive approach. We are working closely with regional
    countries and organizations to improve their capacity to secure
    porous borders and challenge terrorists and transnational
    criminal networks.
        The Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership, TSCTP, is
    the United States' primary vehicle to assist countries in the
    region to improve the counterterrorism capacity capability and
    capacity to control border areas. Algeria, Burkina Faso,
    Mauritania, and Chad are currently using training and equipment
    provided under TSCTP to contain the threat of AQIM and other
    extremist groups.
        Sahel countries have played an active role in supporting
    the French and African-led military intervention that has
    pushed extremists back into the isolated areas in northern
    Mali. Chad's role in Mali has been significant. Burkina Faso
    and Niger have also each contributed around 670 soldiers to the
    African-led International Support Mission in Mali, AFISMA.
        The United States is in the process of providing up to $96
    million to support AFISMA troop and police-contributing
    countries, including Niger and Burkina Faso. Improving security
    in the Sahel, however, requires more than counterterrorism
    responses. The acute security and humanitarian challenges
    facing the Sahel today demand a robust international response.
        Our short-term successes may be fleeting if we fail to
    address the longstanding political and economic fragility and
    render the Sahel susceptible to crisis and conflict. Poor
    governance, weak democratic institutions, and a lack of
    development and economic opportunities cultivate fertile ground
    for instability. Improving governance, strengthening democratic
    institutions, and increasing economic opportunities,
    particularly for the young, therefore, are central to improving
    Sahel's prospects for long-term stability and security. This is
    recited in the U.N. Security Council resolution 2100, which
    articulates a comprehensive approach to addressing the
    multifaceted problems facing Mali. And this is also to a
    conference that my colleague and I attended in Brussels to
    address this issue.
        While Mali and the Sahel remain extremely vulnerable, there
    are signs of progress. Niger, for instance, has achieved
    remarkable political and economic reforms since returning to
    democracy after the 2010 coup.
        Mali is also moving forward. The United States cosponsored
    resolution 2100 and joins the international community in
    supporting Mali's plan to hold Presidential elections in July.
    The creation of a Malian Peace and Reconciliation Commission
    signifies another important step forward. Elections and
    national reconciliations are crucial in setting Mali back on
    the path toward peace and security.
        And so, with this, I welcome your questions.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Yamamoto follows:]

        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                  ----------

        Mr. Smith. Ambassador Yamamoto, thank you very much.
        Ms. Lindborg?
        Ms. Lindborg. Thank you.

        STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE NANCY E. LINDBORG, ASSISTANT
    ADMINISTRATOR, BUREAU FOR DEMOCRACY, CONFLICT AND HUMANITARIAN
         ASSISTANCE, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

        Ms. Lindborg. Good afternoon. Thank you, Chairman Smith,
    Ranking Member Bass, and members of the other subcommittee
    leadership: Ros-Lehtinen, Poe, Deutch, and Sherman. Thank you
    for assembling us today for this important topic.
        As Acting Assistant Secretary Yamamoto noted, he and I were
    at a conference in Brussels last week, where 80 nations came
    together to support Mali, which is an important development.
    During that event, President Traore of Mali noted how grateful
    he was for the international support and the fact that terror
    had abated. And he commended us to address the root causes of
    this crisis, with good governance as the priority. And his
    comments, as many of you understood, really addressed the
    complex challenges that fact the Sahel, where we have
    insecurity, weak governance, chronic underdevelopment that
    combine to result in great vulnerabilities to drought, to
    conflict, to terrorism. And these vulnerabilities have kept
    millions in the Sahel in a state of poverty and perpetual
    humanitarian crisis.
        I have visited four countries in the Sahel since the Fall
    of 2011. Without question, there are bright spots. In Senegal,
    with the peaceful transfer of power in their last elections,
    women attained 43 percent of the parliamentary seats. A
    civilian energetic government in Niger that has withstood the
    recent pressures, remarkable farmer-led regreening efforts in
    Niger and Burkina Faso. However, the challenges in this highly
    complicated region have humanitarian and security implications
    that, as you have noticed, we absolutely must stay focused on.
        So four ways that USAID is tackling these challenges:
    First, continued humanitarian assistance, life-saving for a
    region that is buffeted by continual shock. In 2012, the third
    drought hit the Sahel in less than a decade. It affected 18.7
    million people, 8 million people were in need of emergency food
    assistance.
        Thanks to the early warning systems that we have invested
    in for the past several decades, we saw signs of this drought
    as early as the Fall of 2011. We were able to move in
    prepositioned assistance and I believe forestall a much worse
    crisis.
        However, as that drought was coming forward, the conflict
    worsened in northern Mali. Malians fled to the south and across
    borders to communities that were already stretched by drought.
        In 2012 and 2013, we have provided over $550 million in
    humanitarian assistance to the drought-affected and conflict-
    affected families. And this brings me to our second area of
    focus, which is building resilience.
        Even in the best of times, the Sahel has high malnutrition.
    And shock after shock keeps millions in perpetual crisis. We
    know that these will continue to happen. And what used to be
    10-year cycles of drought are now every other year. Galvanized
    by the Horn drought, followed by the Sahel drought, we have
    launched a resilience agenda, with the goal of reducing chronic
    crisis because of chronic poverty. We are working with
    international development partners to get ahead of the crisis
    and enable families and communities to weather these shocks
    more effectively. We have increased our team in the Sahel. And
    we have our development and humanitarian teams working together
    to design joint programs.
        Our third area of focus is governance. This is fundamental
    to stability, to sustaining our resilience and our development
    gains, and to withstanding the inevitable shocks. The March
    2012 coup in Mali vividly illustrates this.
        Going forward, legitimacy will be essential for the
    sustainability of any democratic transition. We are working in
    Mali to support this return to democracy, as we are working to
    support and consolidate democracies in Niger and Nigeria and
    elsewhere in the region.
        Assistant Secretary Yamamoto has spoken about our efforts
    to counter violent extremism. And we continue to work as part
    of the interagency on the interagency Trans-Sahara
    Counterterrorism Partnership to complement our relief,
    resilience, and development efforts.
        None of these shocks will be defeated overnight. And the
    heart of progress will be legitimate accountable democratic
    governance. This is vital to ensuring that we have an
    alternative to extremism and to protecting precious development
    gains in the face of inevitable shocks for our own national and
    economic security and for the people of the Sahel who have
    already endured so much.
        Thank you very much.
        [The prepared statement of Ms. Lindborg follows:]

        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                  ----------

        Mr. Smith. Ms. Lindborg, thank you very much for your
    testimony. And, without objection, your full statement will
    also be made a part of the record.
        We do have three votes on the floor. I thought I would ask
    some questions and then we would go into a brief recess. Then
    we will come right back and go to the other members for their
    questions if that is okay.
        Let me just ask first, earlier today, as I mentioned, I had
    a very good meeting with Malian Speaker Toure, who is obviously
    the former Prime Minister as well. And we spoke about a number
    of issues, including the challenges of the July election. And I
    wonder if you might just speak to whether or not that election
    can occur in a way that would be free, fair, and inclusive.
        We also talked about malaria. I chaired a hearing just a
    few days ago with Admiral Ziemer. We had Mark Dybul, who now is
    Executive Director of the Global Fund, who told us that we are
    at a tipping point. There is a lack of bed nets, despite the
    best efforts of the international community, including the
    United States, and that the nets do not last forever. You know,
    once they are 2 to 3 years old, they have to be replaced. When
    there is a crisis like we have seen in Mali, infectious
    diseases and parasites are also opportunistic and could gain a
    foothold.
        I wonder, Ms. Lindborg especially, if you could speak to
    that? You spoke eloquently to the hunger issue. Maybe you could
    elaborate a bit on what the issues are, the challenges of
    malaria and other infectious diseases.
        We also had just a few days before that with Dr. Frieden,
    who talked about multi-drug resistance and resistance in
    general. You talked about the resiliency efforts. Well,
    resistance is something we are all concerned about when
    antibiotics fail to do their magic. So if you could speak to
    those issues, I would appreciate it.
        Ms. Lindborg. Sure. First of all, for the July elections,
    we are working very closely with international partners and
    certainly with the Malians to do two things. First is support a
    reconciliation approach. One of the issues is addressing the
    fact that so many Malians felt disenfranchised and not a part
    of the overall conversation.
        We are supporting both that national reconciliation
    approach as well as support for the mechanics of the election.
    Clearly one of the important issues is ensuring that the many
    refugees and IDPs, internally displaced people, have an
    opportunity to vote. And UNDP along with UNHCR are very much
    focused on ensuring that there are those kinds of more
    inclusive registration approaches.
        There are two parts to the election. One is the
    Presidential, which is scheduled for July 28th. And it is
    unclear whether the legislative elections will be able to be
    held then or scheduled for later in the fall. It is critical
    that Mali have the elections as a means of returning to its
    democratic roots and taking a pathway forward.
        On your second question about malaria, this is critical.
    You are absolutely right in that, even as we look at very high
    malnutrition rates, at the height of the drought, the largest
    killer of children under five in Burkina Faso was malaria. For
    that reason, as part of the resilience agenda--and it is a
    little bit like your three subcommittees coming together--we
    have brought together across sectors our teams in USAID to put
    together a more comprehensive, focused approach that includes
    our efforts to combat malaria and our family-planning
    approaches and our food insecurity approaches together so that
    we are able to address some of the root causes across the
    sectors and have a more potent and effective approach to, even
    as we save lives, setting the pathway to development.
        Infectious diseases are always of concern when you are
    moving into emergency. And a lot of our efforts, in addition to
    our health programming, are also in water sanitation.
        And the final piece is that, in addition to the bed nets,
    it is the behavioral change that is so important, which is why
    you want to package these together.
        Mr. Smith. Was the Brussels conference a success?
        Ms. Lindborg. It was----
        Mr. Smith. Go ahead. Please. I am sorry.
        Ms. Lindborg. It was very successful in that it both raised
    a lot of money, it kept the attention of the issue with the top
    of international attention. And there was a combined agreement
    among most of the nations there that it was imperative for Mali
    to return to its democratic roots and to have national
    reconciliation as key to moving forward.
        Mr. Smith. We are almost out of time, but just if you could
    spend a moment on the State Department-led, pan-Sahel
    initiative charged with detecting and responding to suspicious
    movement? Has it worked? Are we happy with the coordination?
        And the other point, just like these committees coming
    across lines, I know that the State Department is looking to do
    so because there is a split in terms of jurisdiction. Is the
    coordination much improved in your opinion? And what might we
    expect in terms of new initiatives?
        Ambassador Yamamoto. Yes. As far as the coordination
    between not only the interagencies but also with the
    governments involved in the Sahel, it has been very cooperative
    and focused on really clear common agendas and themes.
        And then one last step, going back to the elections in
    Mali, I think the elections in Mali would be critical to
    establishing and moving forward on the whole wide range of
    issues because by going into democracy issues, we can address
    the other issues; in other words, release our funding and
    assistance which have been held up by the sanctions of 7008.
        But more important is that it is part of the linchpin of
    the other crises that we must address, which is the
    humanitarian crisis, the reconciliation in the north, and also
    the conflict with the extremists.
        Mr. Smith. Ms. Bass?
        Ms. Bass. Yes. I know we are getting ready to break to go
    to votes, but I just wanted to begin my questioning. And I can
    finish it when we come back.
        I wanted to know if you could briefly discuss the role that
    AFRICOM may be planning to secure the areas. And if you don't
    have time to finish, we can finish when I get back.
        Ambassador Yamamoto. You know, I defer to the DoD
    colleagues on AFRICOM, but, just shortly, in the Mali context,
    what AFRICOM and DoD are not only the refueling for French
    aircraft but also intelligence sharing, which we are doing
    multi-agency.
        And the other issue is providing strategic lift within the
    region to help some of the 15 African countries who are
    participating in AFISMA go into Mali to provide security
    assistance.
        Mr. Smith. The subcommittee stands in brief recess, subject
    to the call of the chair. I do apologize to our witnesses for
    the delay.
        [Brief recess.]
        Ms. Bass. Thank you very much. And sorry you had to wait,
    but we are through with votes now. We won't be interrupted
    again.
        I know as I was running back and forth to my other hearing,
    that you mentioned the conference in Brussels. I wanted to know
    if you could describe the character of the conference and what
    new information may assist our committees.
        And then I know it was reported that over $4 billion was
    pledged at the conference. I wanted to know how much was the
    U.S.'s contribution and what stipulations were made to ensure
    that Mali takes appropriate steps to hold elections.
        Ms. Lindborg. Hi. Thank you.
        You know, it was very important that 80 nations came
    together at that moment to signal support for Mali. The funding
    that was raised is not all new money, I think, as the French
    noted. It includes money that is already in play. It also
    includes money that will be forthcoming from a variety of
    countries based on benchmarks achieved by Mali. But what is
    essential is that it provide that immediate assistance right
    now, especially as Mali moves forward to address national
    reconciliation in elections.
        We announced $32 million of new money that is primarily for
    humanitarian assistance and for specifically the refugees. But
    we also noted the funds that we have already put toward Mali,
    which includes the $550 million of humanitarian assistance
    regionally and of that $7 million of democracy rights and
    governance support specifically for Mali and our funding for
    health programs and, specific to Mali, humanitarian.
        So I think that it was a very positive conference. We
    commended the French and the Europeans for hosting it. And we
    look forward to working with the international community on
    what is a very important, and it won't be easy, road to bring
    Mali back to democracy.
        Ms. Bass. Well, you know, I wondered when we were there in
    February and had met with the President and asked him how he
    was going to be able to hold elections with a couple of hundred
    thousand people displaced. And maybe you could respond to that,
    you know, whether there is the capacity to do that, how it will
    be done, who will be monitoring.
        Ambassador Yamamoto. Thank you.
        Let me just start with a couple of points and turn to my
    colleague. The issue is that registration in the north, as you
    know, in the last election was about 36-37 percent of the
    people voting in 2007. And for credible elections to take
    place, you really need to have the registration of the minority
    groups, ethnic groups up in the north: The Tuaregs, the
    Songhais, and the Arab groups.
        Nancy Lindborg and I talked to President Issoufou of Niger.
    And we said that we would like to work for it and registering
    the refugees. There were about 400,000 who are internally
    displaced or in refugee camps. And so registering them, we
    figured that we can probably get to those magical numbers and
    to make it a reasonably credible election.
        The French are also working in Kidal. So, therefore, you
    can have registration of groups in that area.
        It is not the cleanest. It is messy. But at least we need
    to work for it. The elections are critical. The elections would
    be critical in holding because from there, we can do the other
    things that we need to do.
        Ms. Bass. And you referred to the internally displaced.
        Ambassador Yamamoto. That is right.
        Ms. Bass. The externally displaced?
        Ambassador Yamamoto. Like Tunisia, Mauritania, Chad, to
    register them as well in the refugee camps.
        Do you want to add?
        Ms. Lindborg. I would just simply add that USAID with our
    efforts to provide election support is very focused on ways to
    include the internally displaced populations. There are a
    number of measures underway, including outreach, information
    campaigns. There will be a need, as you probably heard when you
    were there, to continue to augment the capacities of the
    Elections Commission.
        There is a proposal to introduce biometric identification.
    And all of these measures we strongly believe must be
    accompanied by a reconciliation campaign, that there is that
    opportunity for dialogue so that people trust the elections and
    enable them to feel compelled. So there is both the mechanics
    of it and then the communications campaign and ways to make it
    a more inclusive, legitimate process.
        Ms. Bass. And could you speak some about USAID's
    humanitarian efforts in the greater Sahel?
        Ms. Lindborg. Sure. You know, as I noted in my comments, we
    started in 2011, in the fall, with efforts to provide
    humanitarian assistance to the drought and doing so in a way
    that lay the foundation for greater resilience, even as we
    saved lives, overlay by all this displacement. So we have both
    the ongoing efforts to address the drought.
        And one thing we kept in mind is that in the north, there
    was only ever 10 percent of the population that was in need.
    And in Mali, the greater need always was in the south with the
    food insecurity just in terms of proportion.
        So the resilience agenda is giving us a way to address
    that, even as we look at ensuring we reach those populations in
    the north that are coming out of, really, a reign of terror
    over the last year.
        Mr. Smith. Mr. Weber, the gentleman from Texas?
        Mr. Weber. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        I guess this question is for Ms. Lindborg. Am I saying that
    right? Are we able to identify a lot of the countries in the
    Sahel that are going to be U.S.-friendly, for example? And if
    they are coming out of a background, terror, for example, how
    do we identify them and get the word out that we want to help
    them become stable economies, stable governments? Are we able
    to identify a list and then prioritize that list so that we can
    begin to work in the ones that need the most priority firstest?
    Is that a word?
        Ms. Lindborg. Let me start. And I may ask my colleague if
    he wants to jump in on that.
        Mr. Weber. Okay.
        Ms. Lindborg. But our humanitarian assistance is provided
    on the basis of need. And we work directly with communities in
    need, not through the governments. Our development assistance
    is very much about working in ways that create more
    accountable, more transparent, and more inclusive democracies,
    even as we invest also in health and agricultural programs.
        In the Sahel, there are a range of governments. And there
    is a range of ways in which we are providing support to
    strengthen both our democracies but also investments in their
    economic and social indicators.
        Mr. Weber. Without going through the list and counting the
    countries, is it seven, ten, twelve?
        Ms. Lindborg. We have development programs and development
    missions primarily in Senegal. And of that spine of countries,
    we did in Mali. As Assistant Secretary Yamamoto said, the
    development activities are suspended until the return to the
    democratic roots of Mali.
        We are increasing our programming in Burkina Faso and in
    Niger. And in Chad, we have primarily just humanitarian
    assistance, as is the case in Mauritania.
        Mr. Weber. Is there another country that you will identify
    that is probably going to need our help next; in other words,
    developing events, where you could say, ``On a timeline basis,
    we are going to be here next''?
        Ms. Lindborg. You know, one of the problems with the Sahel
    is that it is chronically underdeveloped. And you could argue
    that it could absorb significant new development investments
    across the whole region. That is one of the reasons that we
    have partnered very closely with the European Union in an
    organization called AGIR, the Alliance for Global Investments
    in Resilience because we know that we need to partner to
    leverage the investments that everybody brings to the table,
    both to build resilience and improve more inclusive governance
    at all levels, local level, national, and regional.
        Mr. Weber. Okay. Did you want to weigh in, Mr. Yamamoto?
        Ambassador Yamamoto. I guess just a general comment is that
    not only coordinating with the other organizations because this
    is not only a U.S. issue. It involves the regional states but
    also the diaspora. You know, you were mentioning how many
    countries are like the United States. You know, we did a survey
    about, you know, 70 percent of Africans like the United States.
    And why is that? Because we didn't have the colonial baggage,
    but more importantly is you have a large----
        Mr. Weber. You said 70 percent?
        Ambassador Yamamoto. 70 percent.
        Mr. Weber. Okay.
        Ambassador Yamamoto. You have a large diaspora in the
    United States who provide assistance and support. And that is
    also another group that we can rely on to help engage and try
    to resolve problems in Africa.
        Mr. Weber. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
        Mr. Smith. Thank you very much.
        Mr. Cotton?
        Mr. Cotton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Yamamoto, I would like to ask a couple of questions
    about Mali and its implications. I am new to Congress, but when
    I saw the news in 2012 the Mali Government was struggling, that
    it might fall and France had to intervene, I found that to be
    somewhat surprising. I thought Mali was one of the more stable
    examples of a Sahel country. So I would like to know, one--do
    you share that assessment, first? Second, if so, what do you
    think we got wrong in our assessment? What did we miss in
    thinking that it was one of the better examples of stability in
    the region? And, third, how does that assessment bear on what
    other countries might face similar instability?
        Ambassador Yamamoto. Let me take a first crack and then
    turn to my colleague. I think the issue is, you know, you look
    at these democratic countries or democratic-leaning countries.
    This year it is fragility of institutions within these
    countries. Mali is a very democratic country, where the
    institutions were very fragile. And so when you say, ``Where
    did we fail?'' I think the issue is not so much the failure. I
    think what you look at is there is a lot of number of issue. In
    other words, you had the influx of extremists coming into the
    area. You have the rise of the Tuareg rebellion. You have
    missed cues and missed plays by the government in making a
    military operation in the north, rather than dialogue as some
    of their main input into trying to reach out to these ethnic
    groups.
        And so there is a combination of problems within these
    countries. What we are trying to do right now is stabilize it
    to first return democratic values and good governance to make
    the governments accountable to the people. And second is to
    address the terrible humanitarian crisis of 400,000 displaced.
    The other issue is to promote a dialogue with the government
    with all of the ethnic groups and tribal groups. And the final
    point is to address the issue of extremism. So that is the kind
    of thing.
        Do you have anything you want to add?
        Ms. Lindborg. I would just underscore that any time you
    have marginalized populations, even if you have successful
    democratic elections, if you do not address those grievances,
    you are setting the stage for longer-term problems and the
    possibility of the kind of conflict that broke out. And we see
    this country after country. And it speaks to the importance of
    having an inclusive and very legitimate democracy, not just
    elections.
        Mr. Cotton. I believe that other countries in the region
    are expected to contribute peacekeeping forces for Mali. I know
    that Mali right now is the center of counterterrorist
    operations in the region. Is there a concern on your part that
    the peacekeeping forces from those other countries could weaken
    their defenses and encourage Islamic jihadists to move out of
    Mali and into neighboring countries?
        Ambassador Yamamoto. That is a very good point. They right
    now are speaking with the commander for the AFISMA, the African
    troops. In AFRICOM, you know, we have 15 countries, which speak
    3 different foreign languages. And the capacity and capability
    is very different from each troop but because these countries
    are committed to stability in Mali, because it is not only for
    Mali but for the stability of the region.
        So are these countries also facing problems? Of course,
    they are, not only from extremist operations but also
    internally from weak institutions, fragility. And so by them
    coordinating and developing and providing assistance in troops
    to the Mali operation, that speaks volumes of their commitment,
    not only to Mali but also to their own defense as well.
        I think it is going to take time. It is going to take a lot
    of effort. But we wanted to emphasize that this has to really
    be an African-led, African-managed operation because ultimately
    they bear the full responsibility for what happens in that
    area.
        Mr. Cotton. When France intervened, they took the lead, but
    the United States very promptly had to provide assets like
    strategic airlifts, refueling, intelligence surveillance,
    reconnaissance. I am aware of those things as an ex-soldier.
        Are there other kinds of critical assistance that the
    United States Government provided to either the French or to
    the Mali Government that we should have in mind as we look at
    the possibility of having to intervene to support
    counterterrorist operations elsewhere in the region?
        Ambassador Yamamoto. I defer to my DoD colleagues, but on
    the French side, of course, we did the presidential draw-down
    authority. So, in other words, we had the $19 million total for
    the fuel, for the aircraft, and then intelligence we collected.
    And the other thing is to provide lift for the equipment into
    the area but also for helping for lift of some of the African
    troops into Mali.
        As far as doing military operations or other things for the
    Malian Government, you would have to go to the DoD side, but
    what we are trying to do is make sure that AFISMA and the
    troops there have the equipment they need and the support,
    logistical support, and also we are going to continue to
    contribute so they can develop a command and control center,
    coordinate and integrate all of these troops and have good
    interoperability. I think that would be critical.
        Mr. Cotton. Thank you.
        Mr. Smith. Mr. Cotton, thank you very much.
        I just want to observe that Speaker Toure is still here,
    the Speaker of the Malian Parliament, the former Prime
    Minister. And I would just say, Mr. Speaker, Tom Cotton, who
    just asked the questions, one of the greatest things about our
    committee and, really, our Congress is the diversity of
    backgrounds. Tom spent 5 years on active duty. He is a graduate
    of Harvard Law School. So he combines those disciplines. And he
    was deployed twice to Afghanistan and to Iraq. So he asks
    questions that are relative to military issues, as do other
    members, all of whom have come here with a great deal of
    background sometimes.
        Thank you.
        Mr. Cotton. And I did join the Army after having gone to
    law school and practiced law, which may affect the depth of my
    legal skill and knowledge.
        Mr. Smith. That is great. Thank you, Tom.
        Mr. Cook?
        Mr. Cook. Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
        I have to apologize for my voice. I have laryngitis. I
    haven't been giving a lot of speeches, obviously.
        But I just wanted to go back to your comment about the
    popularity of Americans, which I think obviously was a shock to
    a lot of people here. And I appreciate you explaining why. Now,
    how we could take advantage of that--and I think you already
    answered the question in terms of, you know, support those
    activities, just the geography of the region there with so many
    different countries and the different languages and ethnic
    groups and how some type of--whether it is the African Union or
    some type of loose federation of African states, what is the
    glue, the common denominator? Because I agree with you. I think
    that is the only way. You know, Africa governed and the chances
    made by Africa's outside interlopers are not going to do it,
    but I think we have the opportunity to help something like
    that.
        I think what I am looking for is some kind of common
    denominator to enable something like that, where it is just
    very hard for me when I look at a map and you look at the
    different countries and just remember some of the countries,
    Ouagadougou, the capitals. And what was it? Nouakchott that was
    the capital of Mauritania and very, very difficult. Most
    Americans don't understand it and particularly looking at a
    map.
        And then I wonder if you might have any--if you could
    elaborate on what kind of denominators that we think are most
    successful for the Americans to have an impact in that area.
        Ambassador Yamamoto. I think each and every day, the United
    States has a tremendous impact, not only from the agencies but
    from American industry. I mean, here today, we have NGO groups,
    faith-based groups doing a lot of work in Africa and doing good
    work.
        I think one of the things that you raise as a very
    important issue is, how do you bring all of these countries
    together? The African Union is one forum. You know, we assigned
    an American Ambassador to the African Union several years ago.
    Other countries have followed suit. We are trying to build
    capacity and capability. And then we are looking at the
    subregional groups, such as ECOWAS in the West, CEEAC in the
    central, SADC in the South. You have got all of these different
    organizations and regional groups.
        And I think to build capacity, to build the ability to
    coordinate, and to face challenges on their own, that really is
    kind of the golden objective we are trying to do.
        And I think the careful coordination between these
    organizations and the good will that we have with these groups,
    I think we are looking at I think successes now. And they can
    multiply in the future.
        And so I think the--not only American foreign assistance
    but mainly American good will. Look what the United States does
    today. We brought in justices recently to look at the American
    system. That really helped influence how they view, how justice
    and law and the ability to talk with you, sir, and the chairman
    on how the Parliaments and the Congresses should work and
    operate. That also helps to promote good governance.
        But I will turn to my colleague from USAID.
        Ms. Lindborg. You know, when I was in Senegal shortly after
    their Parliamentary elections, I met with a group of women who
    were ecstatic because 43 percent of the new Parliamentarians
    were women. And I was congratulating them. And one woman looked
    at me and said, ``You know, this didn't happen overnight. We
    have been working on this for 25 years. And it has been with
    extraordinary help from the American public.''
        I say that to illustrate two things: 1) that progress is
    possible; and, 2) that it is going to take a while. But it is
    about helping countries, communities, civil society, private
    sector feel an ownership stake in the future of their country,
    and supporting their pathway forward. And we are seeing, as I
    noted, bright spots. Niger has an extraordinary program called
    the Nigerieus Nourish Nigeriens that is a very energetic
    comprehensive look at how to create greater economic
    opportunities for their people. And it is when people feel
    included in that future and understand the support that the
    United States is providing for that that you work on both of
    those fronts.
        And the U.S. has been a tremendous partner for support for
    Africa that I think is borne out by these public opinion polls.
        Mr. Smith. Two very brief questions. One, when it comes to
    inclusion in partners, are we including the faith-based groups?
    And to what extent? If you could maybe say a word or two and
    then provide a breakout, if you will, a spreadsheet?
        And, secondly, we have 300,000 IDPs and, of course, what,
    150,000-plus refugees. I know we are working hand in glove with
    the UNHCR and other friends, but what is the unmet need when it
    comes to those IDPs and refugees? Is there a dollar amount that
    could be affixed to what that need is and maybe a breakout as
    to what the commodities are and other kinds of items that are
    now missing?
        Ms. Lindborg. Well, first of all, we have wonderful faith-
    based partners throughout the region. And the importance of
    those groups is that they have been there through thick and
    thin working at the community level. And we are honored to have
    them as partners and be delighted to provide you a breakout of
    who is doing what where. It is an impressive list. And we are
    through that able to leverage the generosity of the American
    public, which provides private support through these groups as
    well so that we are able to greatly increase the overall
    assistance that we provide. It is part of the American
    generosity.
        On the needs of the IDPs and the refugees, there is a new
    U.N. appeal for 2013 of $410 million. And I am delighted to
    provide the committee a breakout of what that goes to, what has
    come in, both from the U.S. and from other donors.
        Mr. Smith. What is our contribution to that $410 million
    appeal?
        Ms. Lindborg. Our contribution to date just for Mali,
    refugees and IDPs, is $181 million, just over. And so there are
    both ongoing needs for just essential----
        Mr. Smith. Is that the same thing? The $410 million appeal
    is also the Mali aid or is that different?
        Ms. Lindborg. Right. That is just Mali.
        Mr. Smith. That is just Mali.
        Ms. Lindborg. That is just Mali. And so it is both ongoing
    needs.
        Mr. Smith. Okay.
        Ms. Lindborg. It is also we have been very focused on
    ensuring that the impact on drought-affected communities is
    addressed as well because many of them have gone to stay with
    communities that are already deeply stressed from the drought.
        Mr. Smith. Now, in terms of the assistance, I was part of a
    launch with seven African first ladies 2 years ago. You might
    recall it very well, the First 1,000 Days Initiative, from
    conception to the second birthday. How well are we doing in the
    Sahel region with regards to backing up that unbelievably
    important first 1,000 days of life? Because if you get that
    right, of course, you are more apt to get the rest of it right
    too.
        Ms. Lindborg. Yes. You are absolutely right. That is
    critical. And we have increased our focus on nutrition during
    those first 1,000 days. And one of the most important things we
    have done from the emergency side is increased the development
    of the highly digestible therapeutic foods that are so critical
    for those first 1,000 days and refocus some of our assistance
    programs to work both on the behavioral changes as well as the
    more nutritional products that can address malnutrition,
    without which you have impacts for the rest of an individual's
    life.
        Mr. Smith. Can I ask you, in terms of probiotics, has USAID
    integrated a probiotic mindset? Obviously, antibiotics have
    greatly increased the ability of people in their gut to carry
    the good flora. Where are we in terms of promoting good
    probiotic efforts, the good organisms?
        Ms. Lindborg. Yes. There are some interesting new studies
    out that show that clean water can be even more important than
    antibiotic treatments for addressing some of the
    gastrointestinal diseases that affect children and create
    malnutrition. So part of that is investment in greater clean
    water and sanitation approaches.
        Mr. Smith. Well, my point is--and maybe you can take it
    back--is, you know, the whole idea of immunity. And there is a
    growing body of knowledge that immunity is almost exponentially
    enhanced by having the right probiotic mix in a person's gut,
    gut flora.
        Ms. Lindborg. Yes. We can give you more details on that.
        Mr. Smith. Thank you for your testimony. I think we are
    finished with members. And thank you for your very honorable
    and effective service. Thank you.
        Mr. Smith. I would like to now welcome our second panel to
    the witness table, beginning with Mr. Rudolph Atallah, a 21-
    year veteran of the U.S. Air Force who retired as a lieutenant
    colonel. He served in the Office of the Secretary of Defense
    and as Africa counterterrorism director, where his
    responsibilities included advising the Secretary of Defense and
    other senior officials on counterterrorism policy, strategy,
    and serving as an adviser to the State Department numerous
    Embassies across Africa.
        He has been a featured guest on programs on NPR, CSPAN, and
    the National Geographic Channel, where he has discussed African
    piracy and successful resolution of the 2009 Maersk Alabama
    incident.
        We will then hear from Dr. Mima Nedelcovych, who is a
    partner in the Schaffer Global Group, a Louisiana-based project
    development, finance, and implementation company focused on
    agro-industrial and renewable energy projects in the emerging
    markets in Africa and Latin America. For the Schaffer Group, he
    is the lead partner in a sugar project in Mali. He recently
    established an independent consulting practice on trade
    facilitation, project development, project finance, and public-
    private partnerships in Africa.
        And then we will hear from Nii Akuetteh, who is an
    independent policy researcher analyst who specializes in U.S.
    foreign policy, African development, and international
    relations. He often publishes in American and African journals
    and appears in Aljazeera, Voice of America, the BBC, and other
    TV and radio outlets analyzing African issues. He has been a
    Georgetown University professor, journal editor, and leader of
    advocacy organizations working on three continents. He created
    and led two organizations focusing on democracy and conflict in
    Mali.
        Colonel, if you could begin?
        Mr. Atallah. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, distinguished members
    of the subcommittee.
        I submitted a written statement for the record.
        Mr. Smith. Without objection, yours and all of the others'
    full statements will be made a part of the record.

      STATEMENT OF MR. RUDOLPH ATALLAH, SENIOR FELLOW, MICHAEL S.
                 ANSARI AFRICA CENTER, ATLANTIC COUNCIL

        Mr. Atallah. Since my testimony on the situation in Mali
    last June, things have escalated dramatically, causing further
    instability in the Sahara and the Sahel. Many skeptics
    underestimated the Islamist threat and claim that the Saharan
    branch of AQIM was only focused on kidnappings for ransom and
    illicit trade, rather than jihadist activities. A year later,
    Mali is faced with a new threat: Suicide bombers, a phenomenon
    never seen in the Sahel before. In fact, since 9 February, Mali
    has experienced 12 suicide attacks in the cities of Timbuktu,
    Gao, Kidal, Meneka, and now Gossi, which happened on 9 May.
    These are primarily areas that were once under Islamist control
    after the secular MNLA was elbowed out by AQIM and its allies.
    I am concerned that in time, AQIM's influence and tactics will
    grow more sophisticated and violent following a similar
    evolution seen by the Nigerian jihadist group Boko Haram from
    2011 to present.
        The root causes of terrorist escalation in Mali and across
    the region are complex and multi-faceted. Understanding the why
    of this present violence and the logic of its perpetrators
    requires us to look more closely at some of the principal
    regional issues that contributed to this current crisis.
        First, militants linked to al-Qaeda, hardened by years of
    survival under oppressive regimes, have been revived in this
    region since the start of the Arab Spring. Seasoned fighters
    from Afghanistan, Algeria, Iraq, Syria further bolster their
    skills and intent, helping them to expand their networks,
    strengthening their fighting capacities and resolve to recruit
    new militants.
        Terrorist training camps exist in several parts of the
    region, and every state is vulnerable to AQIM, which has been
    massively bolstered by weapons flow, porous borders, and
    security vacuums in the Sahel, in combination with fragile
    regional governments.
        The recruitment narrative of AQIM has also been given new
    life via Western intervention in Mali and renewed, increasingly
    severe focus on Western targets. The recent Amenas in Algeria;
    the hostage crisis; and the September 11, 2012 attack on the
    U.S. consulate just exemplify some of these patterns.
        Another catalyst for violence, violent extremism in Mali
    and the broader region is the confluence of marginalized
    peoples, pushed into harsh border areas, and violent extremist
    organizations. Militant Islamists, like AQIM, Boko Haram,
    MUJAO, Ansar al-Dine, and others prove attractive to some
    within marginalized ethnic groups, coerced into a veritable no-
    man's land, seeking social justice and political recognition.
        Despite the French intervention in 2013, of this year,
    designed to route out AQIM, the former has most certainly not
    concluded its project in Mali. For the better part of a decade,
    proselytization, intermarriage, a variety of inducements, and
    alliances with tribes have left AQIM with many friends in
    northern Mali and the region.
        Moreover, AQIM fighters have opted for tactical withdrawal
    versus the supposed strategic defeat that some claim. Some
    militants clearly remain in the country, evidenced by the
    increased suicide bombings, while others have merely taken
    refuge in Libya, Algeria, Sudan, Niger, Mauritania, and
    elsewhere.
        In sum, the French, Chadian, and Malian efforts in the main
    pushed against AQIM and their allies out of Mali. The network
    remains resilient and has emerged less effective but more
    clandestine in nature.
        In contrast to Mali, Morocco stands out as a model for a
    reform in progress in the region. It continues to fight
    terrorism through the strengthening of the security and justice
    systems and emphasizes a preventive dimension against violent
    extremism and organized crime through reform in the economic,
    political, social, religious, and educational fields. And they
    have actually put this all in the Amazigh, or the Berber,
    language.
        Nevertheless, like other countries in the region, Morocco
    is concerned with the risks of infiltration by terrorists
    fleeing Mali via illegal immigration channels. For example, 2
    weeks ago, Moroccan authorities dismantled two terror cells
    that, according to news agencies, were believed to be in
    contact with jihadists in Mali.
        While there are few proverbial silver bullets to solve this
    complex problem set, there are several approaches that could
    make a difference. And let me provide a few of them.
        The first recommendation is, as we were discussing with the
    previous panel, to bring USAID back into the fight in the key
    territories in northern Mali and the surrounding region. Couple
    that with the support of U.S. and allied special forces
    initiatives. From Tindouf, Algeria to the Aouzou Strip in
    northern Chad, the arc of instability, as the U.N. calls it,
    the populations of this under-governed region receive little
    support and are left exploited by various political actors,
    including AQIM and its allies.
        The second recommendation pertains to addressing border
    insecurity in the region. Borders between countries of the
    Sahara remain porous and open to terrorists and smuggler
    activity, both of which weaken governance and promote
    corruption, not to mention global insecurity. It is time that
    these countries of the region receive assistance to secure and
    monitor a movement along their borders. This applies not only
    to land traffic but also to air.
        Finally to effectively counter the jihadist narrative
    wielded by AQIM, a comprehensive and expertly crafted
    information operations campaign is necessary for the region.
    Violent extremists associated with AQIM experience far too much
    safe haven in social, print, and televised media, and this must
    be rectified. Recently, news agencies flocked to write about
    AQIM's new Twitter account, which gained 5,000 new members in 2
    weeks. And it is noteworthy that the Syrian terror group Jabhat
    al-Nusra, Somalia's al-Shabaab, and Tunisia's Ansar al-Sharia
    are all followed by this new AQIM Twitter account. Countering
    AQIM's media expansion and online havens is crucial to our
    long-term success against violent extremism in the region.
        Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Atallah follows:]

        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                  ----------

        Mr. Smith. Thank you very much for your testimony and
    concrete recommendations for the committee and for the
    administration to consider.
        Mr. Nedelcovych?

      STATEMENT OF MIMA S. NEDELCOVYCH, PH.D., PARTNER, SCHAFFER
                              GLOBAL GROUP

        Mr. Nedelcovych. Thank you, Chairman Smith and honorable
    members of the Foreign Affairs Committee.
        I appreciate the opportunity to speak. I was asked to speak
    from a business perspective in dealing in Africa and especially
    in the Sahel. I like the forum. I am new to this, but there is
    a full statement. So I can just speak off the cuff.
        I have been in Africa pretty much all of my life. You can
    tell from the accent. And thank you for attempting pronouncing
    Nedelcovych. I come out of the Balkans. So we know a little bit
    about tribal warfare. I left Belgrade at 1 year old, grew up in
    Ethiopia, actually my first 10 years, before coming to the U.S.
    and making this a home. So I have spent most of my life, one
    way or another, in Africa. I have been on the public side. I
    have been on the private side. I have been going many moons ago
    when USAID first discovered the private sector, brought in as
    an adviser to see how the private sector could assist, was
    named to be the U.S. executive director of the African
    Development Bank in the late '80s under the first father Bush
    administration.
        So I since then have joined Schaffer. Schaffer is in the
    agro industry. We have been managing developing agro-industrial
    projects throughout the continent. We have also been in very
    difficult places. We did the major sugar state development in
    Kenana, in Sudan, got pulled out of there for various reasons.
    As you know, it happened that we got pulled out on U.S.
    sanctions.
        Most recently and in the last decade, I would say, we have
    been working a major, major project in the Office du Niger in
    Mali. Our attempts are always bringing in these small farmers
    to the investments into the schemes that we develop. It is the
    only way we see in the end--and I like this term
    ``resilience.'' I have to remember that. I always thought of it
    as economic growth, but I guess it is one and the same, the
    flip side of the same coin. The importance in the end is very,
    very simple for me. I went back. I actually have a Ph.D. in
    political risk. I went back and thought what I wrote back in my
    dissertation.
        There was a sociologist, Maslow, and how theory of the five
    critical requirements, the pyramid of needs. And the very basic
    two needs at the bottom of the pyramid are your food, the
    water, the survival; and then shelter and employment. And if
    those needs are not met, you will have always the opportunity
    under whatever guise for extremism to come. You will find
    radical solutions. I would call them momentive solutions.
        But it is very easy. People have nothing to lose, have
    nothing to lose. And that is where we come from the business
    standpoint, Mr. Chairman. Looking at difficult areas, I would
    argue that U.S. business--and we are there in agro industry,
    certainly.
        There is a huge Niger River coming through that area. There
    are many, many opportunities to develop agro-industrial schemes
    that bring in all of the small farmers, but for all of this to
    happen, you have to have security. We put together a program of
    over $600 million for the Office du Niger near Segou and
    Markala that basically went on hold. We were to go into the
    major expansion on April 15th. And something happened in
    February. So we are on hold. Who loses? It is the people there
    in the end because what we have done now? We have concentrated
    on projects elsewhere.
        I could use an example in Nigeria, where we are up in
    Sokoto in a rice program. Things got heated up, became very
    difficult work while we are not developing the program, the
    project down in the middle states. Who loses? The people in the
    north.
        So, in the end, my plea is really, to the extent possible--
    and I think USAID has been moving in this direction with my
    various names, global development alliance or other, to bring
    in the corporates, get people in that are in, especially people
    like us, who are in the agro-industrial area. We operate in
    rural areas. We operate where poverty is.
        And the only way you are going to get out of poverty is to
    create growth, create jobs. Otherwise you are going to have
    desperate people. And desperate people do desperate acts. So,
    for me, Mr. Chairman, that is the one take-away I really wanted
    to pull out of this discussion with further questions.
        Also, I will be remiss to not say I sit on the board of the
    Corporate Council in Africa. I am one of the founding members,
    among the parties to cut hunger and poverty in Africa. So I can
    sit and have the debate on the public policy side or from the
    straight corporate investment standpoint, but I will argue that
    it is always when those two come together. That is the key.
    That is where we can have the long-term development money
    coming in with the commercial money to make growth happen.
        We have--and I have copies--submitted a couple of months
    ago recommendations to the Obama administration from the
    Corporate Council in Africa on doing business in Africa. And I
    would also like to conclude by saying the continent, by and
    large, the trend is very, very positive. The issue is what
    happens in difficult places like the Sahel and how can public
    and private interests come together to actually really continue
    on the basis of resilience, but let's also get on. This is one
    world we must also all grow and people must have some reason to
    not be desperate.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Nedelcovych follows:]

        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                  ----------

        Mr. Smith. Mr. Nedelcovych, thank you so very much for
    that. And your recommendations, I have seen that. I would like
    to at least take some of that and put it into the record. And
    we will follow up on those recommendations as well, I think. I
    thank you for that.
        Remember, you are not just speaking to the Congress. You
    are speaking to the Speaker of the National Assembly of Mali.
    So I hope he heard your message as well.
        I would like to now ask Mr. Akuetteh if he could proceed.

      STATEMENT OF MR. NII AKUETTEH (FORMER GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY
                     PROFESSOR OF AFRICAN AFFAIRS)

        Mr. Akuetteh. Chairman Smith, thank you very much for
    including me in this hearing this afternoon. And I thank you
    and the other committees for placing so much attention on an
    important Africa issue.
        Point of personal privilege. Because I am immigrant from
    Ghana, I am an African, I would like to extend to you the
    appreciation of fellow Africans for the attention that you and
    the committees are placing on this very important issue.
        I also have to say that, as was mentioned by Mr.
    Nedelcovych, there is some good news in Africa. The AU is
    celebrating its 50th anniversary. The President is visiting
    three countries noted for the advanced, you know, progress in
    democracy. There is fast economic growth.
        So I think it is appropriate that this hearing is focusing
    on a troubled spot, a big area that is under stress, but it
    should be noted that there is good news on the continent.
        Now, the region that we are talking about and in the
    invitation letter, about nine countries are covered. So we are
    talking about a very big area. I would also even add that there
    is one area we should include, which is the Western Sahara,
    because some of the issues, some of the problems in the Western
    Sahara are spilling over into Mali in terms of fighters with
    grievances who may be involved in Mali.
        Now, the problems that the Sahel, as defined in this
    hearing, is facing are very serious problems, from terrorism
    all the way to bad governance through lack of democracy. So
    this is a region in stress.
        And always when I look at U.S. policy, it seems to me that
    there is a very big unspoken question by the American people,
    what has this got to do with me? What has this got to do with
    us? And I think it is great to focus on this problem because it
    does affect U.S. interests. Problems in the Sahel which are
    stressing the countries does affect the U.S. Therefore, it
    seems to me the imperative is very clear for the U.S. to help
    these countries cope with their problems that they are facing.
    Otherwise, when the problems get out of hand, they spill over
    into the neighborhood, it will not be just one or two African
    countries if the problems get out of hand. It will affect you
    clearly.
        It might even because--one of the problems that were cited
    has been cited is drug trafficking from Latin America through
    West Africa. I think research has shown that there is a
    reverse. There is drug money going back into Latin America and
    even arms.
        So this can also affect U.S. interests in its own
    hemisphere. It can affect U.S. interests in Europe. So this is
    a very important issue. And any help that the U.S. gives
    African countries to cope with them is really I think a good
    investment in its own interests.
        Now, one of the things that strikes me is that I think in
    the area we are talking about, the U.S. interests really picked
    up after 9/11. It has been 10 years. So a key recommendation,a
    key point in my view is that there needs to be a review of U.S.
    strategy in the region. After 10 years and after the problem in
    Libya, now we have Mali. It seems to me that a thorough review
    needs to be done so that lessons can be learned and a new
    strategy can be crafted.
        Until that thorough review is done, it seems to me there
    are areas where improvements can be made. I think that
    terrorism is a problem, not just for the U.S. but even for
    African countries. And I think the way to deal with it is to
    push hard on democracy because it seems to inclusive democratic
    government goes a long way in preventing, at the very least,
    homegrown terrorism.
        In the region that we are looking at also, Mali is clearly
    the epicenter. So it seems to me that special attention should
    be paid to Mali. And I would like to see the U.S. play a
    leading role, not in the security area, because, you know, we
    have AFISMA and the U.N., but in the reconstruction of Mali,
    what just happened in Brussels.
        I would like for the U.S. to--it is my recommendation that
    the U.S. play a very strong role in that, particularly in two
    areas: The area of the elections. I have to confess, Mr.
    Chairman, that I am one of the people who is nervous about the
    elections because the recent example in a couple of other
    African countries, Cote d'Ivoire, next door, and Kenya, that we
    need to make sure that, as important as the Malian elections
    are, we have to have contingency plans and make sure that they
    happen well.
        And, secondly, I think the Mali's reconstruction plan,
    their reconciliation and dialogue committee, I think the U.S.,
    with its history and its diversity and its democracy, can be a
    special help to the U.S. So it is also my recommendation that
    that should be a big focus in the way that the U.S. can help
    Mali and, therefore, the Saharan region going forward.
        I thank you again for including me.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Akuetteh follows:]

        [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                  ----------

        Mr. Smith. Thank you very much for your testimony.
        At least let me ask you on that last point about the
    elections, are you concerned about the July elections? Nothing
    focuses the mind like a deadline. And sometimes when deadlines
    are delayed, it leads to a certain ennui and a belief that
    things can spiral out of control again. So it seems to be
    positive if it is in July, but if you could elaborate on your
    concerns? Are there any other panelists who would want to touch
    on that?
        Mr. Akuetteh. Yes. And I am particularly grateful for that
    question, too, because I do see the need for elections. I mean,
    there is a lot of good that elections can do Mali. Even the
    issue of the MNLA and Tuaregs, you need to know who represents
    whom. Who does the MNLA speak for? Who are other people who
    speak for other communities? And elections will help with that.
        You do the research, and you will see that a lot of people
    say that they want a government environment that the people
    themselves elected. So I am saying, on the one hand, it is
    important and good to have elections. At the same time, because
    elections are so important, we need to make sure that they are
    done right. And that means a lot of preparation from
    registering people. And the fact that you have so many
    displaced people in Mali causes me some nervousness.
        So, thinking about it, I agree with you that there should
    be a deadline to make sure that we move quickly. But I also
    think we need what I will call electoral insurance policy.
    Given the difficulties that Mali has, it seems to me there
    should be contingency plans to say, what do we do if we run
    into this particular circle or that particular circle? So I
    think the election should be done. They should be done as fast
    as possible. But we should also be aware of the off circles and
    the dangers that bad elections can lead to.
        Mr. Smith. Dr. Nedelcovych?
        Mr. Nedelcovych. Chairman, I would agree that it is
    essential to have a deadline. I will draw from an example next
    door in Guinea. We are involved in a rice program. There the
    elections, we are halfway through the administration 2\1/2\
    years later, we haven't had the legislature.
        So I think the most critical thing is you will not have the
    perfect elections, clearly, but one must get on with having as
    good an election as you can. Is July too soon? One could argue
    perhaps, that it is important, that it is perceived as
    legitimate, and that people can, in fact, vote. But I certainly
    if it were to be pushed back would not push back very far
    because what is happening is, in essence, all of us who are on
    hold waiting for this to happen--and it is those very
    investments that will in the end stabilize the country and
    bring back the growth to make it go forward.
        So I would argue better and imperfect elections sooner than
    a perfect one later.
        Mr. Smith. Thank you.
        Mr. Atallah?
        Mr. Atallah. Mr. Chairman, just briefly if I may comment? I
    agree with pushing for elections. However, there are some
    underlying issues in the country that have been festering now
    since the independence of Mali in 1960. And if we don't address
    local grievances in the divide between north and south, I think
    what we return to is a forced election and the continued
    problem sets that remain in the country. Those need to be
    addressed for fair elections going to the future. We have to
    address those, those internal dynamics. And those need to come
    right now, before the elections, in order to bring everybody
    together.
        Thank you.
        Mr. Smith. Dr. Nedelcovych, you mentioned in your written
    testimony the old saying that capital is a coward and that it
    goes into flight, obviously, when there is a crisis. And, yet,
    you cite the examples of China, India, and other nations who
    continue to invest in Africa. Why are American companies so
    reluctant?
        As you might know, I have introduced legislation. It is co-
    sponsored by my friend and colleague Ms. Bass. And we are
    building a co-sponsor base, hopefully a large group that would
    put a very heavy emphasis on exporting to Africa. Obviously, a
    rising tide raises all of the boats.
        We know that AGOA is working, but it is only one initiative
    among what should be many. Why are we so reluctant?
        Mr. Nedelcovych. Thank you for the questions. I have been
    living the last 20-plus years since leaving the ADB.
        You know, Mr. Chairman, when you say capital is a coward,
    it needs certainty. Okay? That certainty can be bad. Certainty
    can be good. I need to know what that certainty is so I can
    mitigate. This was actually the irony to some extent that,
    really, Mali, even we that have been operating all over,
    Angola, Sudan, I mean, you name it, we, are a bit surprised.
        If you dig back far, you would say, ``Well, but, in
    essence, as the colleague said, these were discrepancies from
    the north and the south and the country.'' Maybe why am I
    surprised that it boiled over? It is those uncertainties that
    are difficult for American companies. Now, at the same time--
    and I refer the patchwork--if you look at 60, 70, 80 percent of
    the countries, most of them, the trend is very positive.
        I look at my own reactions here. At some point, I was about
    ready to hang up the boots. You know, I have been doing this
    for many years. And I said, ``You know what? This is crazy.''
    When the continent finally for 30 years--20 years, I have been
    scratching odds and ends sort of deals.
        Now real deals are happening. There are real business deals
    happening, Mr. Chairman. And it is not just oil and gas. It is
    the growing middle class. There is a consuming substantive
    group. When you start speaking of Nigeria, you start speaking
    of Nairobi in Kenya, you start speaking of Tanzania, there are
    so many centers now of growth where investment is interesting.
        What I hope the lesson will go back to both the political
    and society in the unstable areas is, you know what, ladies and
    gentlemen? If you want that capital, that capital needs to have
    some stability. Otherwise, it will very happily go elsewhere.
    So help us come because then we all win. That I think is the
    message that needs to come out.
        Thank you.
        Mr. Smith. Thank you.
        Let me ask you, Mr. Akuetteh. You mentioned that there is a
    great burden and stress being placed on Mali's neighbors
    because of the refugees that are spilling over the border.
    Could you perhaps elaborate on what that burden is? And is
    there an expectation that those individuals will be able to be
    repatriated back to their homes?
        Mr. Akuetteh. Thank you again. I think it is connected to
    my answer to the elections question because, of course, these
    people, one of their fundamental rights, the displaced people,
    both in the southern part of Mali and in the other regions, is
    the right to vote. So if elections are being held, we have to
    think about how do we allow them to cast a vote?
        In terms of the stress placed on the other countries, I am
    very glad that this hearing is about the region, not just about
    Mali. Mali's neighbors are also stressed. It just so happens
    that because of the Tuareg problem and the MNLA coming from
    Libya, Mali imploded. But the other countries are also at risk.
    And, therefore, it is a question of countries that are already
    at risk that now have had to play host to the refugees from
    Mali.
        It seems to me it is clear that they are industrious in
    terms of food, in terms of water, in terms of the impact on
    very fragile agricultural communities.
        Now, I am glad for the discussion in the previous panel. I
    think the one area where the U.S. has been doing a pretty good
    job is the humanitarian assistance, especially in the region.
    But I still think that these are countries that really do need
    help. And it will be good to increase that.
        And, if I might, on the question of U.S. companies and
    their presence in Africa, which is an issue that concerns me, I
    would just add that, you know, Africans are also puzzled. I
    mean, I would echo your questions. We would like to see more
    involvement from the U.S.
        The elephant in the room is the presence of the Chinese.
    And I will actually say that, I mean, I have been in the U.S.
    for quite a while, going into my fourth decade. And what I
    don't understand, I think that the U.S. has far more positive
    assets if you look at the Chinese versus the U.S. There are
    people like me, African-born, but, of course, there is the
    African community, the African-American community, here, which
    is a big asset.
        So, frankly, it puzzles me that with all of those assets,
    with the U.S.'s democracy, as Ambassador Yamamoto said, the
    U.S. is very popular in Africa. So if you look at that, if you
    look at the experience with capitalism, if you look at the
    black community in this country, it seems to me the U.S. should
    have a much bigger presence.
        And I, too, like you, don't understand why U.S. companies
    haven't made bigger progress into the continent.
        Mr. Smith. You know, on that point, our legislation would
    try to encourage the diaspora as part of a strategy to be more
    involved with reconnecting and certainly being part of an
    export strategy. So I thank you for your comment.
        Just two final questions and I yield to my friend and
    colleague Ms. Bass. Mr. Akuetteh, you mentioned that in your
    testimony, the Government of Niger has handled the potential
    Tuareg threat much more effectively than the Government of
    Mali. Could you explain what they are doing differently and why
    it has worked better?
        Mr. Akuetteh. Thank you again.
        A lot of this is from the analysis of experts in the area.
    What I do know for a fact, for instance, is that in the
    immediate aftermath of the Libyan problem and when people moved
    south into the countries bordering the south of Libya, one of
    the things that the Nigerian Government did was they said they
    insisted that everybody coming from Libya who wanted to go into
    Niger had to disarm and if they refused to disarm, they cannot
    get in.
        Now, on the other hand, it is not clear how Mali handled
    that, but all of the experts and, in fact, Nigerian officials
    say, ``This is what we did. We said nobody can come in who had
    arms. Otherwise, we are not letting them in.'' It is not clear
    how that was handled in Mali, but we do know that the MNLA,
    which was heavily armed--and I have seen statistics that say
    that some say there were 800 of them, others like 2,000 of
    them. One way or another, they happened to enter back into Mali
    and the rebellion started.
        Mr. Smith. Mr. Atallah, one final question. You testified
    that there was an underestimation of the jihadist intentions of
    al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. Could you explain as to why
    that was the case? And are we repeating that mistake in your
    opinion anywhere else in the Sahel?
        Mr. Atallah. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Yes, I think the
    issue has been festering for a very long time; in fact, for two
    decades. Specifically, if I look at northern Mali, GSPC, which
    is a precursor to AQIM, established itself in late 2002, early
    2003. In fact, I was in the northern parts of Mali. At the
    time, I was still in uniform running around looking at the
    problem set.
        Since then, they have intermarried within ethnic groups in
    the north. They have done the same thing across the region. And
    this is where AQIM becomes a threat. If you look across the
    region--and I am going to include north Africa in it--currently
    Tunisia, the fledgling government in Tunisia, is fighting
    affiliates of AQIM in the western side of their border.
    Southern Libya has AQIM. AQIM has direct connections with Boko
    Haram. And the current Government of Nigeria is involved in
    trying to push Boko Haram and Ansaru from the north, with a lot
    of refugees pulling across the border. We have AQIM operational
    in northern Niger and Mauritania and, of course, in Mali. So
    they are all across the region.
        The problem is and what I find amongst peers, my colleagues
    is we try to quantify AQIM saying, oh, they are about 3,000
    strong or 2,000 strong or whatnot. That is irrelevant. There
    can be 10 or 15. It doesn't matter. The fact is that every
    single time the Shura council, which exists in the northeastern
    part of Algeria, when one of their members speaks, they are
    able to incite and bring and leverage people into the fold. And
    this is where we have the issue.
        Today there are over 800 Tunisians fighting on the militant
    side in Syria. Sooner or later, these guys are going to come
    back. Many of them have connections to AQIM.
        So the problem set is not only within the African context
    but outside of that as well. And this is where we are literally
    missing the boat. I think we need to do more.
        And those are the three small recommendations I made. There
    are several others. But we need to get involved in this issue
    across that region of the Sahara.
        Mr. Smith. Thank you so very much.
        Ms. Bass?
        Ms. Bass. Yes. Just following up on that when you were
    talking about AQIM--and you might have referenced it when I was
    running back and forth to committee to vote. So excuse me if I
    am asking stuff you already covered. But do you think that
    there is a degree of coordination between the different
    factions or is it similar to al-Qaeda, where there are spinoffs
    but they are not necessarily working in coordination?
        Mr. Atallah. Thank you very much for your question.
        As far as I understand so far, it depends on where, but
    there is definitely coordination. And it depends also loosely
    on how we define coordination. For example, there has been a
    lot of testimony on what happened in Benghazi, but it is
    understood, at least from experts, that the Sahara branch of
    AQIM, one member specifically, Mokhtar Belmokhtar, was getting
    feed of information, what was going on in Benghazi.
        Currently what is going on in Tunisia, there are members
    there that are specifically battling Tunisian authorities that
    have directly links to the Shura council or to the emir of
    AQIM, Droukdel.
        The same thing within Boko Haram. Boko Haram, for example,
    in Nigeria has had connections to AQIM for a very long time. In
    fact, Abubakar Shekau, the emir of Boko Haram, had one of his
    messages pushed on AQIM media back in 2011. It was an audiotape
    that AQIM kind of facilitated. So there are coordinations here
    and there. And that is part of the issue.
        We know so little about the band of the Sahara Sahel. And
    some of these groups are linked to AQIM not out of ideological,
    you know, views but sometimes out of just necessity of survival
    because AQIM has become the wealthiest affiliate out of all the
    AQ affiliates around the world.
        Ms. Bass. Wealthiest from drug trafficking?
        Mr. Atallah. From kidnap for ransom. And I would say a lot
    of Western countries are to blame for that. You know, over the
    years, 2007, 2008, 2009, we see multiple kidnappings and, in
    return, payments that are provided in return for these.
        The last one was more recently, not even a year ago. You
    had aid workers that were kidnapped from the Tindouf area. And,
    in return, two AQIM affiliates were released from a Mauritanian
    jail. And supposedly AQIM received 15 million euros.
        I was in contact with friends in northern Kidal. They said
    that for the longest time, folks were no longer using the West
    African CFA but they were actually using euros to pay for
    things. That is indicative of how much, how deep-rooted this
    problem set is.
        Ms. Bass. So you are saying the Western countries are to
    blame because they are paying the ransom?
        Mr. Atallah. They are enabling. They are enabling.
        Ms. Bass. What should they do?
        Mr. Atallah. Well, again, this is where--and that is a fair
    question. This is where I think we need to stop enabling and we
    need to really focus on the problem sets. Messaging is
    important. You know, the current recruits that AQIM is able to
    leverage, they have built this over time, but 12 suicide
    bombers never seen in the history of Mali, we are not messaging
    in these problem set areas. We are not dealing with the root
    causes of the problem. In fact, we just put, as I--and pardon
    the expression--a Band-Aid on a sucking chest wound. It just
    doesn't work.
        Ms. Bass. Thank you.
        And I am sorry. I am not going to attempt. Would you
    describe a couple of your businesses? Specifically what do you
    do? And where are you working?
        And, actually, let me ask you about Mali because I have a
    big interest, especially as Mr. Akuetteh said, in promoting
    U.S. businesses and, in particular, you know, African-American
    businesses, their involvement on a continent. And so I am
    wondering, how you do work in Mali? What do you do?
        Mr. Nedelcovych. Thank you, Congresswoman.
        We are in agro industry. We are primarily in the process
    side. So being out of Louisiana, it is sugar cane, cane
    processing. It is rice, rice milling. And it is always the co-
    generation of electricity from the agriwaste. So the Mali
    project, in fact, I believe Eric had a chance to speak with the
    people out there when you were in Bamako. It was to be 200,000
    tons of sugar produced, 30 megawatts of electricity, and 10
    million liters of ethanol, actually, for a 10 percent gasohol
    blend in all the gasoline----
        Ms. Bass. And it is in Bamako or around Bamako?
        Mr. Nedelcovych. It is in Segou and Markala in the Office
    du Niger. It is using the strength and the value of water.
    Agriculture is water. And this is why I say oftentimes while
    one looks at the Sahel, its very, very desperate region, from
    an agro-industrial standpoint, I would say quite the opposite.
    You have a major, major river that is coming through that needs
    to be properly harnessed in a sustainable way.
        The key, the key, is absolutely the way you structure it.
    And this comes back to the question of why U.S. investments
    don't go in. Investments that are small are just going to be
    difficult for international investors to come in. So the key
    becomes sizing the investment.
        For agri industry, if you don't scale up, you can't
    compete. Now, that does not mean you dislocate the small
    farmers. What it does mean is literally capture them in the
    scheme as outgrowers. In our case in the 15,000 hectare, 7,000
    were going to be independent small farmers that are being
    brought into modern agriculture, if you will. The same happens
    with our rice schemes now in Nigeria. The key is always
    bringing in the community, bringing in the small farmer.
        And guess what? In the end, that will be what is putting
    the Band-Aid on whatever----
        Ms. Bass. Right.
        Mr. Nedelcovych [continuing]. It that you are placing it
    because then it is those people that will make sure that this
    doesn't get undermined.
        Unfortunately, in Mali, we were about to start up the major
    operation. Had we been there a year or two, I am willing to bet
    the region would act differently. Those would be the people
    protecting our aid workers going in there.
        So I would continue to argue for that combination of larger
    investment, which is interesting foreign national groups, with
    schemes that bring in the smaller. And then there is one very
    important thing, coming back to what Congressman Smith was
    asking. That is, if you take out Nigeria, South Africa, Kenya,
    most of these economies are just simply too small to be
    interesting.
        Ms. Bass. Right, which is why----
        Mr. Nedelcovych. And I hate to say it, but the ECOWASes and
    the economic committees have all spoken very nicely. But, in
    reality, those are not functioning as true common markets. And
    in our case, for example, on the sugar, the state and the Mali
    delegation, the Ambassador knows very well, it is ties to the
    point where now we have taken advantage of being landlocked.
    The advantage is you have got a huge population that grow the
    national markets.
        We don't need to export the sugar. It is not even
    interesting. The price is a lot more interesting for sugar and
    rice in the region. Grow it. But what happens then is if those
    common markets are not functioning,----
        Ms. Bass. Right.
        Mr. Nedelcovych [continuing]. You begin to have to start
    subsidizing the small factories that don't work. The reality of
    the world has to come back in. And that goes also on the
    African side.
        Ms. Bass. Well, I really appreciate what you are saying. I
    mean, one of our challenges here in trying to work with
    businesses to go to the continent is they are afraid to death--
    well, I mean, basically, it is our own ignorance of the
    continent. So when we hear a conflict in Mali, we think that it
    is happening all over the place. And we have no geographic
    understanding as to where one country is, you know.
        So you have been able to do this in Mali, in the middle of
    a conflict. And I think that is a really important perspective
    to bring. Even where there is a conflict, you can still
    successfully od business, let alone all of the nations where
    there isn't a current conflict. So I appreciate that.
        And, Mr. Akuetteh, I wanted to ask you about a few things
    that you were saying. You talked about the U.S. playing a
    stronger role. And I wanted to know what your opinion was, how
    U.S. security activities in the region are perceived by the
    governments and populations in the Sahel. So I always worry
    about the U.S. playing a stronger role, but where is that fine
    line between playing that stronger role and then feeling as
    though we have overplayed our hand?
        Mr. Akuetteh. Thank you very much. I think it is a great
    question. And also, especially because you mentioned
    governments and people, sometimes I think that there is a split
    in how some particular U.S. programs may be looked at.
        But it seems to me that, as I mentioned, the U.S. interests
    in the Sahel, West Africa and North Africa, really picked up,
    for understandable reasons, after 9/11. So the issue is
    terrorism and the potential for terrorism.
        And I think it is important to underline that terrorism is
    a problem for Africans as well. I mean, Boko Haram has been
    killing Nigerians. The Embassy bombings killed a lot of
    Africans. So Africans welcome the U.S.'s help in dealing with
    terrorism. I do think there should be dialogue about what
    particular approaches will work.
        Ms. Bass. Right.
        Mr. Akuetteh. I think if there is that dialogue, then we
    don't overstep and don't do things that may make Africans
    nervous. I particularly think that a stress on democracy will
    be a very good way. Paradoxical as it may sound, it will be a
    very good way of dealing with terrorism and potential terrorism
    across Africa.
        So, yes, I want the U.S. to say, ``Look, this is very
    important to us. We want to be engaged,'' but then have a
    dialogue with the Africans, whether regionally or in particular
    countries, as to exactly what will work.
        If I might mention one particular example; for instance,
    training African militaries. I think this is part of the
    strategy for dealing with terrorism in Africa, but in my mind,
    it has to be in three stages. I think the first thing that
    African soldiers need is respect for civilian authority to know
    that an elected President is really their Commander in Chief
    and it has chosen to turn a gun on him.
        I think the second phase for training for African soldiers
    has to be respect for citizens; that is, citizens pay their
    salaries, pay for their uniforms, and it is not their job to
    abuse them. I think if they pass those two phases of tests,
    then for me, you go to the third level, which is how to make
    them better fighters.
        So I would say again the U.S. needs to be involved with the
    Africans and particularly on the training of the soldiers. Make
    sure that they respect democracy and they respect civilian
    authorities.
        Ms. Bass. So taking Mali for an example, do you think that
    what we did didn't work? I mean, because we trained the
    military there. And that is exactly what the military did. So
    is it that it didn't work? I mean, that is always the fine
    line. How do you determine when you have moved from one stage
    to the other?
        Mr. Akuetteh. I think it is a good question here. Without
    ducking the question, I need to display some humility, which is
    why, in fact, an important point in my testimony, and even last
    year when I was here, is that I think the U.S. needs to do the
    most thorough of reviews of their strategy over the 10 years
    and look at everything. Experts will have to do it. I think
    Congress will have a role. Experts in DoD will have a role so
    they can determine exactly what the training went to and what
    it was meant to achieve, where things may have gone wrong, and
    what lessons can be learned from it.
        So in terms of if you look at just the results, of course,
    I think it is disastrous for Mali, but there was the coup and
    the role of the U.S.-trained soldier in that coup.
        Ms. Bass. Right.
        Mr. Akuetteh. It doesn't make the U.S. look good. Even it
    is disastrous for Mali. My point is we need to do a very
    thorough review to find out exactly what happened. From this
    distance, that is all I can recommend because there are details
    I don't know.
        Ms. Bass. Sure. And, you know, I wanted to know about what
    you thought about the people that are running right now for
    President. We have actually met a number of them. And I know we
    have a whole Malian delegation here that I look forward to
    meeting with as soon as this meeting is over. But how many
    people were running for President? I think I have met two or
    three Presidential candidates who have come through the
    Capitol. And what is your opinion of the capacity?
        Mr. Akuetteh. You know, I think my definitive answer is I
    have heard of 12 running. I know that at least one is a woman,
    which is a good sign. On the other hand, as Chairman Smith had
    asked about the elections, I see the value of the elections. On
    the other hand, I am nervous because between now and July is
    not a lot of time.
        Ms. Bass. Right.
        Mr. Akuetteh. And so the way I am linking this to your
    question is that there doesn't seem to be a lot of time to get
    to know the candidates, at least from people like us from the
    outside.
        Now, the talk inside Mali is that many of the candidates
    are from the old political class. So they may be well-known.
    But from an activist like me, what I know is fairly
    superficial, which is that there are about 12 of them. And they
    are vying. And I wish there was more time to do things right.
        Ms. Bass. Well, and I also think it is going to be
    interesting. And, Mr. Chair, maybe it is something that we
    could look at because after the election takes place, what is
    our role going to be supporting whoever it is that is elected
    to help to strengthen their capacity?
        A final question for you. When I was making one of my runs
    back to another committee, you were talking about drug
    trafficking.
        Mr. Akuetteh. Yes.
        Ms. Bass. And I wanted to know if you could expand on that?
    And I wanted to know your thoughts on how you think countries
    in the region can best counter the drug trafficking.
        Mr. Akuetteh. Oh, if I may take the back end of the
    question first? Because in preparing for this testimony and
    some of the research I was doing, one thing struck me which I
    think is a good sign. And I will underline that.
        Former U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan has actually just
    in January created the West Africa Commission on Drugs. And he
    is bringing a lot of Africans, including former President
    Obasanjo to deal with the drug problem in West Africa.
        Now, what I was saying earlier is that the way I think it
    affects U.S. interests is that these drugs, the experts
    mentioned that you have cocaine, you have meth, and you have
    heroin. The cocaine is coming from Latin America. And, in
    return, what you are getting back into Latin America, of
    course, is drug money, but you are also getting some of the
    weapons that everyone agrees flowed out of Libya. So you are
    getting weapons going to Latin America. Now, I am saying that
    it seems to me that happening in the U.S. hemisphere should be
    of concern to the U.S.
        But, apart from cocaine, the research--and the U.N. Office
    on Drugs has also done a lot of work in West Africa. And they
    are finding out that meth is being produced in some West
    African countries and then exported to east Asia. And the
    heroin is coming from Asia through West Africa into Europe. And
    the big problem this is having on the area, West Africa, is
    three. You have got corruption. You have got democracy being
    contaminated. And then you have got health problems because
    people involved in the drug trade, locals, sometimes they are
    being paid with drugs. And so consumption is also growing. And
    it is a health problem for the Africans. And they are very
    concerned.
        I mean, one thing Kofi Annan said was that we really need
    the help of our friends in Europe and the United States to help
    us deal with the drug problem.
        Ms. Bass. Thank you very much.
        Mr. Smith. Thank you very much.
        You have been very patient with your time. If I could just
    ask a few follow-up questions? And anything you want to add,
    please do. In my walk as a lawmaker--and I have been in
    Congress now 33 years--I often differentiate between criticism
    that mocks, belittles, and takes cheap shots, and criticism
    that is constructive and leads to better outcomes. You did
    listen to the administration witnesses earlier in the first
    panel. You know and you understand the administration's
    policies vis-a-vis the Sahel. I wonder if you could offer this
    panel any constructive criticism that might lead to better
    outcomes.
        Secondly, Mr. Atallah, in your testimony, you heard Nancy
    Lindborg say earlier that while the recent rise of violent
    extremism in West Africa cannot be directly attributed to
    drought, chronic food security, or weak governance, each of
    these factors can indirectly exacerbate instability in the
    region.
        And you made three very specific recommendations at the end
    of your testimony. One is that USAID get back into the fight.
    And you pointed out that there are access restrictions which
    our Embassy imposes and others imposed. If you could elaborate
    on that?
        Thirdly, talk about border security. I wonder if you might
    tell us, to what degree you are talking about. How much? Is it
    technical aid? Is it actual foreign aid that would beef up
    their ability to have a more secure border?
        And, finally, you point out that to effectively counter the
    jihad narrative wielded by AQIM, a comprehensive and expertly
    crafted information operation campaign is necessary for the
    region. And that is, I think, a very profound recommendation,
    but I wonder if you might tell us how that might be done. And
    others might want to speak to that as well.
        The first one would be on constructive criticism and then
    to speak to the three or elaborate on the recommendations that
    you made.
        Mr. Atallah. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Yes. Constructive criticism, I think, sir, you asked the
    question as what is AFRICOM doing. A component of AFRICOM is
    SOCAF. I think SOCAF can be deeply rooted in the fight but with
    restrictions. We are not taking enough steps.
        I know the command is ready. I know the command wants to go
    in. I know they have several plans to go in. However, there are
    some political dynamics that prohibit them from doing so. And
    my first criticism is I think we need to get in there.
        There could be some assistance in targeting key AQIM,
    MUJAO, Ansar al-Dine leaders, Iyad ag Aghali, Mokhtar
    Belmokhtar. I can go on and on. There are several of them that
    are still floating around the region. And we have experience in
    other parts of the world that we can bring to bear in this
    area. That is number one.
        Number two, although USAID is doing some work, a lot more
    can be done. Again, in the band of the Sahara--and when I talk
    about northern Mali, northern Niger, southern Libya, southern
    Algeria, all the way across the northern Chad, the peoples of
    this part of the world are really marginalized by their host
    governments. A call from Kidal, for example. A person was
    telling me that there are very little food resources and
    medical resources. Medecins du Monde, which is an NGO that
    provides some medical aid, has a couple of workers up in Kidal
    but not enough to meet all of the needs. We need to get those
    folks up there. In order to do so, it requires, of course, soft
    elements to provide that security. So that is in a sense a
    criticism of the lack of involvement in the region.
        In answer to the questions you asked specifically to my
    statement, I have flown across the entire band of the Sahara. I
    used to do that for the Defense Intelligence Agency. I have
    landed on every dirt strip in the northern parts of the Sahara
    from Mali, Niger, and Chad. There is no radar. Movements of
    aircraft can go back and forth. People can land, say, in Kidal.
    They can land in Tessalit. They can land in other parts of the
    Sahara, literally without anybody knowing about it.
        Number two, the movements across the Sahara in some of
    these areas is difficult because of the geography. If you take
    the highest peaks of the mountains in, say, southern Algeria,
    the Ahaggar Mountains, into the Adrars in Mali and the Iron
    Mountains in Niger, that band over there has some very
    treacherous terrain. And people move very freely within those
    areas. It is very difficult for the host countries to have any
    visibility or control. So we need to do that, in effect.
        In terms of messaging, AQIM is very apt. Like I said, they
    have a Twitter account. And they have used Facebook
    continuously. There was a Facebook page. And I mentioned that
    in my written statement. That popped up after the attack on the
    gas plant in Algeria. Mokhtar Belmokhtar, the guy who crafted
    the strategy for its face, went on Facebook on a site called
    the Derna Media Center, which stands for Derna, Libya. Within a
    matter of weeks, it was taken down. But the number of people
    that joined that literally in a 2-week span was 4,000
    basically, counting Mokhtar Belmokhtar as a hero of what he did
    in Algeria.
        It doesn't mean all of these people are joining AQIM.
    However, it means that they are getting an audience, whether it
    is through Twitter, it is through Facebook, or whatnot. What we
    need to do is counter that in order to prevent additional
    recruits in the future and to prevent things like we are seeing
    right now in Mali: Suicide bombers.
        Ms. Bass. You mentioned Mokhtar Belmokhtar. I thought he
    was killed.
        Mr. Atallah. Ma'am, he wasn't killed. That was a mention
    from the Chadian side. The Chadian President came out and said
    that he was killed, but Mokhtar Belmokhtar is still alive. In
    fact, jihadi forums came out and did say publicly that he is
    still alive.
        The only person who is confirmed killed--and the French had
    to confirm it publicly--was Abou Zeid. There are several
    others, but Mokhtar Belmokhtar is still around.
        Ms. Bass. Thank you.
        Mr. Atallah. Thank you, ma'am.
        Mr. Nedelcovych. I think we just really have to ask
    ourselves the very basic question. And that is, is it the
    illness we are going after or the symptoms? You know, fighting
    terrorism, fighting the mokhtars by whatever name is a little
    bit like that game you have, the groundhog that comes up. You
    smash its head here, and it pops up here. You smash it here. It
    pops up there. It is never ending. I mean, if one does not get
    in there and treat that hunger and that poverty and that
    desperation, you just simply cannot win the war. You cannot.
        So the question then becomes, why, yes, this has to be
    done. Can we and how do we get to the real root issues so that
    in the end, it is the people living in that area? It is their
    leaderships that have to come back forward and say, ``Okay.
    What are we going to do? We are not going to stabilize. They
    are going to have to stabilize.'' I mean, let's be honest in
    the end. What is the only answer there?
        I was chuckling earlier. I visited my grandmother when I
    was studying political philosophy. And, you know, she was the
    grandmother from the old society. ``This is very brilliant. You
    guys are all very wise, but can I spread this on bread and eat
    it? Can I do that, that wisdom of yours?'' And there is too
    much, at times, focus elections. And there is going to be a
    discussion.
        I mean, I don't even want to count how many national
    dialogues have gone on in various countries on this continent,
    but when do we get on? When does the civil society and the
    people all say, ``What about us? We want to eat. We want to
    grow up like the rest of the world is going forward.''
        But, really, I think that focus has got to come also from
    the people themselves, their own national leadership to pull
    out what is in the end the absolute necessity. And that is
    treat the disease, not the symptom. It is poverty. It is
    hunger. It is desperation. And that is where if there is a
    positive criticism, it is a realization from the development
    agency and others. There are no surprises.
        It is about every so many years. There is instability and
    so many years. We could have predicted everything that has been
    happening. The issue is recognize it and then deal with it with
    the amount of time that is necessary. If it is 20 years, if it
    is these kinds of resources, recognize where it is and do it or
    say, ``You know what? We can't do it.'' That is the reality to
    me.
        Over. Thank you.
        Mr. Akuetteh. Thank you again, Mr. Chairman. In terms of
    constructive, if I might, my colleague's construction
    suggestion, you know, if you look, Mali, Mali was very
    important in terms of U.S. security activities in the region
    prior to the war and the coup. And since then, clearly, the
    French and the Europeans have a heavy presence.
        My suggestion then will be for the U.S. to say, ``Look, we
    weren't in here just to kill our enemies. And if some other
    soldiers are here, then we are not interested.'' It should be,
    actually, I would like the U.S. to send a message to the
    Malians and the regions that ``We want to play a big role in
    your reconstruction and your recovery.'' So that will be that
    the U.S. shall have a bigger presence.
        I did a little calculation of the pledges in Brussels. And
    from what I can tell, based on what the U.S. has already put
    down in their request that they have made to Congress--and I
    could have gotten some things wrong, but it is about a 5-
    percent contribution to what has been pledged for Mali. I wish
    it was more.
        And, secondly, in terms of specific things, again, I think
    Mali because it is the test, what the U.S. does with Mali sends
    a message to the rest of the region--and I will say the
    elections. Again, there are already some signs. I don't think
    the elections can be stopped or rolled back, but I do think
    that there should be a contingency plan for quickly reacting
    and helping the Malians make sure that it goes well.
        And, finally, my big point, which is that we need to do a
    review, to say, ``Over these years and with Libya and Mali
    having happened, what have we learned? How can we reengage the
    region to have security? Because security comes first and good
    governance comes first and other things will follow.''
        Thank you again.
        Mr. Smith. Thank you very much for your testimonies. Thank
    you for your insights and counsel. It is very helpful to the
    committees that have met to receive it. And we will follow up
    on it. So I thank you so very much.
        I would also ask unanimous consent that a written testimony
    from Shari Berenbach, President and CEO of the United States
    African Development Foundation, be made a part of the record.
        I want to thank Speaker Toure for being here for the entire
    day of the hearing. We often have visiting diplomats and even
    Speakers like yourself. This is the first time--and this is
    about my 400th hearing--that we have ever had a Speaker come
    and stay and listen to the entirety of the proceeding. You do
    us a great honor by doing so. I want you to thank you for your
    Ambassador, Maamoun Keita, who has been a great help over the
    years and will continue to be, I am sure. And again I want to
    thank our witnesses. Your testimonies were extraordinary.
        The hearing is adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 4:51 p.m., the committees were adjourned.]

                                A P P E N D I X

                                  ----------

                    Material Submitted for the Hearing Record

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

    Question for the record posed by the Honorable Christopher H. Smith, a
    Representative in Congress from the State of New Jersey, and chairman,
        Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights, and
       International Organizations, to the Honorable Nancy E. Lindborg,
          Assistant Administrator, Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and
       Humanitarian Assistance, U.S. Agency for International Development
    Question:
        Please provide a breakout of the extent that we are partnering with
    faith-based groups in the Sahel.
    Response:
        No response was received prior to printing.

       Material submitted for the record by the Honorable Christopher H.
     Smith, a Representative in Congress from the State of New Jersey, and
     chairman, Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights,
                        and International Organizations

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

       Material submitted for the record by the Honorable Christopher H.
     Smith, a Representative in Congress from the State of New Jersey, and
     chairman, Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global Human Rights,
                        and International Organizations

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]