TRANSITIONING TO AFGHAN SECURITY LEAD: PROTECTING AFGHAN WOMEN?

HEARING

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SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS

OF THE

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THURSDAY, APRIL 25, 2013

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PROTECTING AFGHAN WOMEN?

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS,
Washington, DC, Thursday, April 25, 2013.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:10 p.m., in room
2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Martha Roby (chair-
man of the subcommittee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MARTHA ROBY, A REPRESENT-
ATIVE FROM ALABAMA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON
OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS

Mrs. ROBY. Well, good afternoon. Sorry for the delay. It always
seems that just when we want to get going on a conversation, they
call votes. But it is our constitutional duty. But glad to be here
with you. Good afternoon to each of you.

I am really glad that I had the opportunity to call this hearing
today about how the United States can ensure the safety and polit-
cal freedom of the Afghan women after responsibility for that secu-
ity is ceded to the Afghan Government.

And, you know, it is not lost on anybody in this room that there
are a number of important issues that Congress must consider in
connection with Afghanistan: How and when should the United
States responsibly transfer security responsibilities to the Afghans?
What sort of residual U.S. forces should remain after that time?
And what functions these forces be equipped and prepared to un-
dertake?

But women and girls in Afghanistan have made enormous gains
since the United States and its allies toppled the Taliban govern-
ment. And in Afghanistan today, women and girls I have seen first-
hand attending schools and universities. They hold elected office,
they are present in the military and police forces, and they enjoy
many personal freedoms that were suppressed during the earlier
ruthless rule.

And while there have been many important improvements in
safety, security, and rights of women, much more must be done,
and the hard-won rights and progress Afghan women and girls
have realized during the last 11 years must not disappear once the
U.S. reduces its forces in Afghanistan. Those planning the security
transition and determining residual force structures have got to
keep this in mind, and I would suggest my colleagues here in the
House of Representatives should as well.

The safety and security of women in Afghanistan is not a dis-
crete topic unmoored from the balance of our security consider-
ations. Rather, the condition of Afghan women is an important barometer of the success of our efforts. As I say oftentimes, it is the litmus test as to whether or not we are winning the war in Afghanistan. And a safer Afghanistan with a functioning government responsive to its people and inhospitable to terrorists and extremists is better for all, men and women, boys and girls.

This is a deeply personal topic to me. I have traveled to Afghanistan twice. The ranking member Ms. Tsongas was with me on our first trip, and I am planning on being back there in the near future. And these have been delegations of female Members of Congress, a bipartisan codel, where we saw firsthand the impressiveness of our military’s efforts in Afghanistan. And I witnessed, as well as Ms. Tsongas, the important sacrifices that are being made by our men and women in uniform.

But the unique part about the trip that the women take to Afghanistan is that we actually get to sit down and spend time with Afghan women. We have met with doctors, soldiers, elected officials, and girls who aspire to be in those very positions, and all of these women are pursuing lives that were absolutely unthinkable under the Taliban. We have met with wives and mothers who have a degree of personal freedom and independence previously prohibited by the Taliban and others.

And I can tell you the reason this is so personal to me is because I am a wife and a mother, and I have had the right and the privilege in this country, this free country, to pursue an education, career, and public office. And I don't want Afghan women to face a future where their successes and security is jeopardized, all while keeping in mind what happens to these women and these little girls, again, is the litmus test as to what is really happening in that country, which in turn translates to the effect that it will have on our national security here at home. And I fear that if this is the case, if Afghanistan reverts to the Taliban's control, or a more strict and oppressive government, these women will absolutely suffer, and I believe that it will happen virtually overnight.

As the United States continues to work with the Government of Afghanistan to determine the future size and role of our forces, the continued promotion and protection of the right of Afghan women and girls must not be forgotten or pushed aside.

Again, this is an important issue, one that I know Ms. Tsongas has spent a lot of time on in her time in Congress, one that we share as a really important discussion that we would have in this room together. And before introducing our first panel, I would like to turn to the distinguished ranking member for any remarks that she may wish to make.

[The prepared statement of Mrs. Roby can be found in the Appendix on page 39.]

STATEMENT OF HON. NIKI TSONGAS, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MASSACHUSETTS, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS

Ms. Tsongas. Well, thank you, Chairwoman Roby.

I want to echo our chairwoman’s remarks. And thank you all for being here. But I want to echo her remarks about the importance of this hearing. It is quite timely in a number of ways. Both our
committee and the SASC [Senate Armed Services Committee] recently heard testimony from General Dunford on our evolving strategy to draw down from Afghanistan. I have long supported bringing our troops home from Afghanistan as quickly as possible, and was in favor of an even more expedited timeline than the President, but I also believe we must put in place a plan that does this responsibly and safely, and which does not sacrifice the vital gains which have been made by women. I think it is the one true positive that we can point to.

A 2011 poll found that 86 percent of surveyed Afghan women were concerned that a Taliban-style government could return after the withdrawal of the international community. And while every drawdown requires tradeoffs and tough choices, I completely agree with what Ms. Lockhart, who will be in our second panel, said in her testimony that, "women’s rights are not a tradable good."

Since becoming a Member of Congress, I have had the honor of visiting Afghanistan four times, and my last trip was with Congresswoman Roby. I have been fortunate to visit in particular with some of our military moms who are serving there, female soldiers who have children back home. And we will be going back to Afghanistan soon, and hope to meet again with Afghan women as well as more military moms.

The ever-increasing participation of women in our military demonstrates the important contribution women are making to our efforts in Afghanistan and around the world, but it also stands in stark contrast to the involvement that Afghan women are able to have in their country’s public life. For a safe, stable, and secure Afghanistan to emerge, women must be fully included in Afghan society and government.

Two years ago, we both visited a school where over 1,000 young Afghan girls cycled through each day. It was a remarkable place. When we asked them, the senior members, those who were in the senior classes, what they wanted to be when they grew up, the answers we heard were “doctor, lawyer, teacher,” and, amazingly, working in the press. And we questioned that one. But the reality was brief exposure to education elevated those sight lines so quickly that they wanted exactly what our own daughters would want. These young women felt optimistic about opportunities that were previously unheard of for women in Afghanistan.

Ensuring that these young girls continue to have access to these opportunities is not only good for the future of Afghanistan, it is good for the United States as well so that we can help a more peaceful and just future there, and the way in which we move forward will impact our moral authority around the globe. We cannot be seen as abandoning those gains.

As we reduce our military presence in Afghanistan, the United States must be cognizant of how we will ensure that women continue to have a seat at the table and that the nascent gains are not abdicated. Progress has been made in some areas. For example, 27 percent of the Afghan Parliament is female. However, much more can be done in other areas, such as recruiting women into the Afghan National Army and police force, where they are very poorly represented. And I look forward to hearing your thoughts on that.
In December of last year, just before we considered last year’s defense bill, we were reminded of the tenuous position of women in Afghanistan when the acting head of women’s affairs in an eastern province was assassinated as she traveled to work. I worked with other members of the committee for inclusion in the bill of a provision, section 1233 in that bill, which requires the Department of Defense to produce a plan to promote the security of Afghan women and girls as it withdraws from the country. It would encourage the recruitment of women as members of the security forces, and requires the Department of Defense to report back on its progress towards meeting these goals. I know it is not due quite yet, but I look forward to receiving it from the Department and hearing from you any preliminary observations that you can discuss. I look forward to our discussion.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Tsongas can be found in the Appendix on page 41.]

Mrs. ROBY. Thank you, Representative Tsongas.

I want to recognize that Mrs. Davis is here, and Mr. Lamborn may be joining us. And before I ask for unanimous consent, I didn’t see you come in, but I do want to point out that Mrs. Davis has traveled many more times than either one of us to Afghanistan on this CODEL [Congressional Delegation] with women, and she offers a unique perspective. And although not a member of this subcommittee, I wanted to make sure that you were here to offer your insight because you have worked so hard on this issue, and we spent a lot of hours on a plane talking about it. So I am glad you are here.

So therefore I ask unanimous consent that Mrs. Davis and any other nonsubcommittee members, if any, be allowed to participate in today’s hearing after all the subcommittee members have had an opportunity to ask questions. Is there objection?

Without objection, nonsubcommittee members will be recognized at the appropriate time for 5 minutes.

So today’s hearing includes two panels. Our first panel, we will hear from two representatives of the Department of Defense. And in our second panel we will receive testimony from two outside observers.

For the first panel we have Mr. David Sedney. He is the Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Afghan policy. Thank you for being here. And Major General Michael H. Shields is the Director of the Pakistan/Afghanistan Coordination Cell on the Joint Staff.

I understand, Mr. Sedney, that you have a prepared statement, but both Mr. Sedney and General Shields will take questions from Members. So I thank you both for joining us today, and I look forward to hearing your testimony.

So Mr. Sedney.
Mr. SEDNEY. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman, Ranking Member Tsongas, members of the subcommittee. It is something that I value highly, the opportunity to talk to you today on the issues of security in Afghanistan, security of Afghan women, and the role of the Department of Defense.

First, Madam Chairman, you are exactly right in your focus on the security issues. The progress that has been achieved in Afghanistan over the last 11 years, and it is manifold, and women have been the greatest benefits of that progress, all rest on the basis of security. We are withdrawing our troops. Ranking Member Tsongas, as you know, we have withdrawn 33,000 troops over the last 19 months from Afghanistan, and we continue. And the President said we would withdraw another 34,000 by February of next year. That is possible because the Afghan security forces are stepping to the fore and taking the lead in security.

As General Dunford told you, this coming fighting season will be the opportunity for them to really prove that as they are fully in the lead. If the Afghan security forces fail, then the progress of Afghan women will fail as well. Without security, none of the things that we are talking about will be possible. Building that security, building the Afghan Security Forces remains the core mission of the Department of Defense in Afghanistan, and will continue. And we thank you very much for the continued support and the funding which the Congress has appropriated for that effort, because without that, there would be no progress on Afghan women's issues or other issues in Afghanistan.

As you said, Madam Chairman, progress in Afghanistan has been great, and greatest for women. Since 2001, Afghan women's health, education, political participation have all increased enormously, in many cases from zero, or less than zero. The Afghanistan Constitution has language in it that protects the rights of women, and the Government of Afghanistan, most recently at the Tokyo Conference, has reaffirmed that the human rights of its citizens, and particularly the equality of men and women, will be guaranteed and are guaranteed under the Afghan Constitution and its international human rights—and Afghanistan's human rights obligations.

To reduce discrimination and violence against women, the Afghan Government has enacted laws prohibiting violence against women, ratified the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, and put in place bureaucratic structures to implement that; however, implementation of these laws and ending violence against women is an area of great challenge.

Afghan women still face huge obstacles, huge problems from violence, from discrimination throughout their society. The troubles of poverty, illiteracy, weak security, and poor health continue to afflict women disproportionately, and violence against women and
girls remains a serious problem. As you said, Madam Chairman, many women; I think you will find the same percentage or higher when you go back this time.

I talk to Afghan women when I go to Afghanistan, and they do fear that return of the Taliban; they do believe that they would immediately lose all the progress they have had. And in fact, many of the women who have benefited the most from the progress are the ones who are most at risk. They fear they will be killed as a result of participating in the opportunities that we have helped bring them.

Afghan women have made progress in health and education as well as the political arena. You mentioned the seats in the National Assembly. There are women serving on the High Peace Council. And women take place in many other areas, such as the Tokyo Conference I mentioned, loya jirgas [grand council], and the various conferences about Afghanistan.

In many ways, most importantly at a local level, women are gaining increased presence and visibility through the National Solidarity Program, and they constitute 24 percent of the participants in these local community development councils, which bring real improvements in the lives of everyday average Afghan women.

Ensuring that this increased civic political participation continues and improves is dependent upon an effective rule of law. An effective rule of law is also dependent upon the presence of women in the justice system. Women’s participation in the justice system raises awareness and improves implementation of existing Afghan laws and Afghans’ Constitution.

One area where there has been progress is the recruitment of female judges. There are now approximately 150 female judges, up from 50 in 2003. So a big proportional increase, but still a very small number. This kind of increased participation helps build towards a more effective rule of law.

The main focus of the Department of Defense’s efforts to support women’s security in Afghanistan is through our participation in ISAF’s [International Security Assistance Force] Afghan National Security Forces development. Improving the recruitment of women into the Afghan security forces, improving their status and treatment, and improving the treatment of civilian women by the Afghan security forces across the country are a priority for ISAF, the Afghan security forces, and for us.

Both the ISAF and the Afghan ministries have large numbers of programs aimed at protecting women’s rights and promoting women in the Afghan security forces. Implementation of a gender policy within Afghan armed forces is a long-term project, however. As you mentioned, Madam Chairman, women continue to face discrimination, even when they enter. You have met with the women. I am sure you have heard that not only are they proud to serve, but they still face problems.

Across the Afghan security forces, there are policies and programs in place that attempt to address harassment and violence against women, but they depend upon implementation. Many times that implementation is on the part, almost always on the part, of
men who are not yet fully committed. It remains a big challenge, but we are there and we are working on it.

We have helped to design and execute educational programs and to help build those gender-implementation policies that I mentioned. I would say that support from Afghan leadership is essential to having this happen, and I would say the political will is present among the Afghan leaders in some cases.

Additional things that we have done, Congress has funded the Task Force for Stability Operations in the Department of Defense budget. On May 25, the task force and the American University of Afghanistan will open their International Center for Afghan Women's Economic Development. It will be the first of its kind to lead and coordinate international and Afghan public- and private-sector efforts to advance women's roles in helping to lead Afghanistan's economic stabilization and growth. TFBSO [Task Force for Business and Stability Operations] has used money Congress has appropriated to fund a state-of-the-art facility that has already been built and will open on the 25th, as I mentioned, on the American University's campus.

Additionally, over the last 10 years—or actually 8 years—the Department of Defense has invested approximately $40 million through the Commander's Emergency Response Program to fund more than 900 projects that specifically target the needs of women and girls in Afghanistan. More than a third of these were directly focused on improving the education of women and girls by repairing and building schools and women's centers, supplying education materials, and providing gender-appropriate training programs.

However, as I said, challenges remain. Recruitment of women for the army, air force, and police continue to fall short of goals. The primary obstacle for this is very likely family-related issues, opposition from families. Other impediments, such as a lack of challenging assignments for females upon graduation, sexual harassment and violence in the workplace, and difficulties regarding separate housing, toilet and bathing facilities, continue to be challenges.

We are closely monitoring the security of the Afghan population, including in some cases especially women, Afghan women in transition areas. This transition that is happening in Afghanistan is a dynamic process. Areas are proceeding on different timelines. As I mentioned before, the Afghan security forces are taking the lead. That doesn't mean that we are leaving, but it means we are in an advise and assist. We have much less opportunity to directly intervene in those areas, but we will continue doing that.

I want to stress that our commitment to this remains, our recognition of the challenges is there, and I look forward to your questions.

[The joint prepared statement of Mr. Sedney and General Shields can be found in the Appendix on page 43.]

Mrs. ROBY. Thank you so much for your testimony.

And I would like to remind the members of this committee we have a hard stop time. So if we can all try, and I will try to lead by example, to stay within our 5 minutes. We have a second panel right after this, and I know you all have lots of questions.
I want to start with something that you just said, because it reminded me, and Ms. Tsongas and Ms. Davis will remember this, we were at the Embassy, and we were meeting with some of the women that were both in the Parliament and judges. And one of the comments that was made is, yes, there are positions for women available, but not at the highest level. So from a rule-of-law perspective, you know, these female judges are saying, yeah, it is great, we are there, we can weigh in; however, when the final decision is made at the top, there is no women there. And a lot of what is done at the lower-level courts gets overturned, and we make no progress. So, I mean, do you want to add anything to that?

Mr. SEDNEY. What I would add is that in the case of the Afghan security forces, in the police and the army, there are not only women at the enlisted ranks, but also women at the noncommissioned officer and officer ranks that are beginning to move within the army and police systems. There are no senior officials in the Afghan Ministry of Defense or Ministry of Interior yet—and they are all people who have come up through the uniformed ranks—who are women now. However, they are making progress because they have come in and moved forward.

I was with Secretary Hagel last month when he visited Afghanistan, visited the noncommissioned officer training center, and visited a training class for noncommissioned officers for senior sergeants. In that there were, I believe, seven Afghan women NCOs [noncommissioned officers] who were completing the elite-level training course for sergeants. So they are moving forward through the military.

Mrs. ROBY. We are just not there yet. And the problem is the withdrawal is happening very quickly, and, I mean, I think that is, you know, my concern. We have had the opportunity to participate in a shura [consultative council] with women. We hear from our commanders on the ground. And, General Shields, you may want to address this. We hear in our last briefing a year ago we were told, you know, we are ready to turn over some of these operations to the Afghan security forces to be able to handle them, but we go into a room with all women, and we are told exactly the opposite—and some of these women, their husbands are former Taliban members—please don’t leave us, we are not ready. Can you address that?

General SHIELDS. Madam Chairman, thank you.

I would say right now that ANSF [Afghan National Security Forces] are in the lead for probably about approximately 80 percent of operations now. We are approaching this period between now and the summer where we anticipate President Karzai will announce Milestone 2013, which will coincide with the tranche 5 piece, and David mentioned the importance of security. ISAF recognizes that as well, and it is part of the OPLAN [Operations Plan], the focus on that piece.

From a tactical perspective within ISAF, you may be familiar with the family support platoon, the cultural support teams, the female engagement teams. Those are focused outwardly really at the tactical level, regional command, brigade, and down.

There is also unofficially an Afghan Hands program, which—for example, I returned end of October from Afghanistan. I was re-
sponsible for reintegration and had females, males working the re-
integration aspect of the APRP [Afghan Peace and Reintegration 
Program] piece. And we had females that were out at the edge on 
developing programs. But it is largely tactical, and it is very slow, 
as you mentioned.

Mrs. ROBY. Right.

General SHIELDS. As we transition from combat to support, we 
will see us lifting up, if you will, from kandak [battalion] eventu-
ally to brigade. And our ability to reach out to the outliers, if you 
will, will reduce. And so you have a valid concern.

Mrs. ROBY. And the Family Response Unit, that is the Afghan 
National Police organization that deals with these investigation of 
domestic abuse cases, it is my understanding that this is possibly 
going to be canceled? Or can either one of you respond to that? I 
mean, this seems to be a very successful—an opportunity for 
women to receive what they need in those circumstances.

General SHIELDS. I don’t know about its long-term viability. So 
I can get back to you with that, though. I don’t have the answer. 
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 
page 71.]

Mrs. ROBY. Okay. If you can, that would be great.

And, you know, there is evidence, the U.N. [United Nations] has 
just come out with the fact that there is increasing violence against 
women and girls. And so I hope throughout the other Members’ 
questioning we can maybe address why that is happening.

But my time has expired, and I am going to be a good example, 
and I will represent the ranking member.

Ms. TSONGAS. Thank you.

Can you talk about the recruitment process for bringing women 
into the Afghan National Security Forces? Who is in charge of it? 
Is it the Afghan Government? Is it a partnership? Who is in charge 
of it? How do you recruit, identify potential recruits into it? And 
then talk a little bit about, for example, do women receive equal 
pay, or is there discrimination sort of across the security forces in 
terms of pay?

You have talked about some of the other issues, but I am basi-
cally curious as to who is in charge and how they go about bringing 
recruits, female recruits, into the security forces. When we visited 
a couple of years ago, we actually visited and met some pilots, 
young women pilots, who had been recruited and were being 
trained to fly helicopters, and were very excited to be doing so. But 
I am just curious as to who is in charge and how much control we 
have over that process.

Mr. SEDNEY. In terms of who is in charge, the Afghan security 
forces, both the army and the police, have stood up recruitment 
commands over the last 3 years. They didn’t have those before. 
They are in charge. So the Afghans are in charge of recruitment. 
We have provided training, advice, and assistance, and so we have 
advisers within those recruitment commands.

The targets and goals that have been set for recruitment of 
women at the enlisted and officer levels are set at the ministerial 
level, and the recruitment command’s task is to implement those. 
So they do go out and have efforts to affirmatively recruit women; 
however, those recruits, as I said in my statement, those goals are
not being met right now. It is very hard right now to recruit women into the Afghan forces, and our advisers who work with the Afghans who are doing that say that the biggest obstacle is family pressures.

That said, there are a number of efforts under way to try and increase the pool that is considered among Afghan women. And what I understand anecdotally—and we will certainly ask when you are on your trip of people who are really fully up to date on this can do that—younger Afghan women are showing a greater and greater interest in joining both the army and the police as they have come up through the educational system over the last 12 years.

I hope that is a good enough answer. If it is not, we can get some more information for you. You asked about the Afghans who are in charge.

Ms. Tsongas. Equality of pay.

Mr. Sedney. Equality of pay. Yes, pay in the Afghan military is based upon your rank and position. There are not separate pay scales for men and women in the Afghan Army.

Ms. Tsongas. And the turnover rate. Do you have any sense of——

Mr. Sedney. I do not. We will get back to you on the attrition rate of females versus males.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 71.]

Ms. Tsongas. Well, you would think if that many women have had access, greater numbers of women have had access to education, and we have been there long enough actually to see people from the earliest of years into graduating, that you are right, it reinforces the notion that there would be a bigger pool of potential candidates who have an interest.

I am also curious, as we have drawn down our end strength, and we have transitioned portions of the country to control of the Afghan National Security Forces, how we are monitoring the impact on women and girls so that we are able to compare before and after and maybe get engaged when we see alarming things taking place.

Mr. Sedney. Well, both our continuing advice and assist force and on the intelligence side, we monitor the full range of goals that we have for Afghan security forces, including both the performance of women in the security forces and their treatment of women. However, it should not come as any surprise as we have fewer forces, our ability to do that monitoring is degraded. So we are working with our colleagues in the Intelligence Community to try and come up with ways so that we can maintain a higher level of awareness as we have fewer people and fewer organizations to do that monitoring.

So that is a challenge, one that we will identify in the next iteration of our 1230 report to the Congress. We are not giving up on it, though. We have a program to try and address it, but we don't have all the answers on that monitoring issue yet.

Ms. Tsongas. I think it would be important to make sure that there is not a big drop in the numbers of young girls going to school, that access to health care facilities is not dramatically changed, the access to employment opportunities. We have met
with women who, across a broad range of opportunities, become engaged in bringing income into their households. So it would not simply be about what is happening within the security forces, but for us to have a strong sense of really how well the security forces are working, it is really about how women continue to be integrated into a broad range of—of the broad range of society in Afghanistan. And are there such metrics in place, such—are we monitoring that at all?

Mr. Sedney. Yes, we are monitoring what is happening with respect to women and the Afghan population as a whole in terms of issues of education, health, and access to employment. We will continue to be reporting on that in the 1230 report, which Congress has mandated we do. But again, the adequacy of our collection efforts as we withdraw our forces and have less resources is a challenge.

Ms. Tsongas. Is there a way we can ask the Afghan National Security Forces to monitor this so that they can respond?

Mr. Sedney. We do. That is a big part of how we are doing that. But we have to then validate what they are collecting actually is accurate. And that is a big part of the challenge: How do you monitor what they report is accurate?

Ms. Tsongas. Thank you.

Mrs. Roby. Mr. Scott.

Mr. Scott. Thank you, Madam Chairman.

And as you know, this is a cultural issue that has been existing in that part of the world for a long time. I can tell you when I came home from Afghanistan on a CODEL that we took and I showed my wife the pictures, the first thing she noticed was that there were no little girls in the picture. There were little boys and other young men from 5 all the way up to midteens in the pictures, but no little girls. And so that is a cultural issue that I know we have to work through, and we are trying to work through there, that starts at birth and has gone on for generations, centuries, really.

I guess my question, as we transition out of there, the mechanisms that are in place now for us to, if you will, track the progress that is being made with regard to women's rights and the ability of women to succeed in that country from childhood on through military service and into political careers, when we transition out, is that going to become an ISAF responsibility and priority that they are going to continue to track? Or is that something that we are going to be subject to the Afghanistan Government to reporting on?

Mr. Sedney. I would say that, first of all, it will be the Afghan Government that has the primary responsibility for this. And the standards are actually set not on the military side, they are set on the civilian side. And in the Tokyo meeting I mentioned in my testimony, where donor countries and Afghanistan agreed on what is called the Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework, it set out standards across the board, from education, health, effective use of donor money, and just about every conceivable range of development areas they set out standards and they set out requirements based on which Afghanistan would receive future development funding.
Now, the responsibility in the U.S. Government for following that is our colleagues at the Department of State and USAID [U.S. Agency for International Development]. We contribute to that, we contribute to the monitoring, but the lead in the U.S. Government on that is those agencies. And the responsibility is with the Afghan Government, but, because of the commitments, the billions of dollars of aid that were committed by the international community to Afghanistan, is conditioned on their meeting the goals that were set forward in that Mutual Accountability Framework.

Mr. SCOTT. Somebody has got to collect the data, and that may be a better question. Who is going to collect the data necessary for those reports?

And, General, I didn’t mean to interrupt you. I saw that——

Mr. SEDNEY. The data will be collected by the Afghans, but that will be facilitated by the existing programs throughout the Afghan Government.

But going back to the point that I mentioned to Ranking Member Tsongas, validating what the Afghans collect is a challenge, but it is one that we and the international colleagues are very much aware of, and that the ability to do that will be reduced as we withdraw our military forces and our international colleagues reduce their military forces. And that is a challenge we are still looking at how we are going to do.

Mr. SCOTT. You got to my point. That was the auditing of the data. And you used the word “validating,” same thing.

General.

General SHIELDS. Thank you. As we draw down to 34K in February of 2014 and we continue on the glide slope, ISAF will engaged at the ministerial level as well as institutional. So that level of engagement will continue.

One point I wanted to make to the Ranking Member Tsongas, and David mentioned it, it is not only a data quality issue, it is a lack of data issue, right, because we know that the reporting, it is not the same in every area. Certainly there is considerations in the east that might not be present, let’s say, in Herat or in “MeS” [Mazar-e-Sharif]. It makes it more challenging. And you mentioned the cultural challenge that is prevalent.

So it isn’t just the data quality and the reporting quality, it is a potential lack of reporting at all from the cultural challenges that are presented.

Mr. SCOTT. Madam Chair, I will yield the remainder of my time.

Mrs. ROBY. Thank you.

Mr. ANDREWS.

Mr. ANDREWS. Thank you, Madam Chair.

This is really an important subject. Thank you for the attentions that you are paying to it.

I think one of the best ways to assure the fair and good treatment of women and girls in Afghanistan is to try to increase the power and influence that Afghan women have over various institutions within that country. They are ultimately going to be the guardians of this principle. And the numbers from the Afghan military and police are paltry and discouraging: 379 women in the Armed Forces and 1,455 in the national police according to our research.
But I would caution us not to be unduly pessimistic about that. Another army waited 172 years before commissioning its first women officers and 194 years before a woman became a general officer. That is the United States Army. Now, since then women have certainly increased their standing and importance and status in the United States Army, for which we are very grateful, and for which our country has been very well served.

Here is the question I am asking: Do we have a program where our women in the Armed Forces are given a special responsibility to help train Afghan women? The premise of my question is a woman who has risen to lofty positions in the U.S. military has to have something pretty special about her, because she has come through an institution that, frankly, over the years has not been all that hospitable to traditional women leadership. So a woman who makes it in the U.S. military by definition, I think, is a strong and capable woman.

Do we have an institutionalized program where some of those women are employed to work with Afghan women not just in the military, but in other aspects of Afghan society?

Mr. Andrews. They are still pretty paltry.

Mr. Sedney. They are very paltry. But we will get you the figures we have.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 71.]

Mr. Sedney. I don’t want to get into a dispute about small numbers. But your point is correct. I don’t have any information on what role the factors you talk to may play in assignments in the U.S. Army. I will have to defer that either to my colleague or to a later answer.

General Shields. We will get you an answer. In my time in IJC [ISAF Joint Command], I wasn’t aware of an institutionalized program to do that, but we had women who were doing it. So we can get back with you, sir.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 71.]

Mr. Andrews. I offer this as a hypothesis. I don’t know whether it would work, but I think it is worth some thought. And I think we certainly ought to talk to women leaders in our Armed Forces. We should talk to people in Afghanistan. We should talk about the cultural differences.

But it just strikes me that we have in our midst a really invaluable resource that might help Afghan women learn the ropes in a very tough environment. And it is U.S. military women who have learned the ropes in a very tough environment. So I guess, with the chairwoman’s permission, if we could ask if the witnesses could get back to us about their thoughts about this issue, you know, as to whether this would be a viable proposal, and, if so, how it might be implemented, and how we as members of the subcommittee and full committee might make that happen.

Did you want to add something or——
General SHIELDS. I was just reinforcing. I think the issue of institutional we need to get back with you on. But, for instance, MTMA has about a seven-member team that does do that. We do have the female engagement team program as well. But as far as institutionalized perhaps at the ministerial or institutional level, I am not aware of it, and we will get back to you, sir.

Mr. ANDREWS. Madam Chair, I was just saying before I yield back that with your permission, maybe the committee could ask the witnesses to evaluate this idea of women in our Armed Forces being given some special institutional role to help the Afghan women.

Mrs. ROBY. Absolutely. And I was going to tell you—I mean, this is your time, so if you have another question——

Mr. ANDREWS. No, I am going to yield back to you when we are done.

Mrs. ROBY. Okay. So on our last trip—and I am going to get Jamie on the Committee staff to provide you with the specific information—and it may not be an institutional program, but it was certainly something that was being applied in certain provinces, particularly when we met with these women and had the shura, there were—because the women cannot be in a room alone with men, there were female officers that were assigned to working with this specific group of women in this province. And I know Mrs. Davis has actually met with some of these women on multiple occasions, the Afghan women. But our military personnel, the women that have been working with them, had been working with them for an extended amount of time, working through some of the issues that we are talking about here today. So I don’t know if it has a name or if it is a specific program, but I know that it is happening because we saw it firsthand.

But absolutely, I would like to continue to work with DOD [Department of Defense] and this Committee in particular as we return to Afghanistan to see if any of these things are being put in place, because I think that, Mr. Andrews, you make a very good point that we have the resources in place already, why not use them?

Mr. ANDREWS. And the hearing itself is evidence that good leadership from women can be a successful event. So thank you very much, Madam Chair.

Mrs. ROBY. Ms. Speier.

Ms. SPEIER. Thank you, Madam Chair.

I want to start by reading from the Small Wars Journal an article by Vanita Datta that has been provided to all the Members.

“July 2012 on a hillside in Afghanistan's Parwan Province—the sentence of death for adultery is read out. A bearded man aims a rifle and fires nine bullets—claiming the life of a still, squatting figure in a blue burqa. This, accompanied by cheers of men, ringing the hill side, brings home a stark reality of the defenselessness and the oppression of women in Afghanistan. We learn later that Najiba was the woman in the blue burqa.”

The U.N. records for 2012 show that there were 300 women killed in Afghanistan in 2012, and 560 injured, a 20-percent increase over 2011. So, we are there, and this is happening. What is
going to happen when we are not there? And I guess my overriding question is that, without stealing the thunder of one of our witnesses on our second panel, Ms. Sanok, her comment is, “Most incidents are not linked to insurgent violence in this nation. Rather, attacks are linked to domestic violence, tradition, culture of the country. Because this is a problem within Afghan society, it will be difficult, if not impossible, for U.S. or other international forces to address it adequately.”

I am really concerned about these women. I think everyone on this panel is very concerned about these women. I would love to see our Afghan forces be more representative of the women in the country. I don’t know that it is going to happen. I don’t know what you are going to do in the next 9 months is going to change that number of 1,500 to 3,000. But I think there is something we can do, and that is to create a refugee status for any Afghan woman who wants to leave the country and is seeking asylum in our country, and that we should put in place now a procedure whereby they can be informed of that opportunity and be granted that opportunity so that we can at least save the lives of those who are not so embedded in the culture and want to find a way to free themselves of what I believe will become, without a question, more oppressive than what is going on right now under our noses with us there present.

Your comments.

Mr. SEDNEY. Thank you, Representative Speier. I share your concerns, we at the Department of Defense do, and I know that our men and women in uniform who have served in Afghanistan share them as well.

A couple of comments. I am familiar with the U.N. report that you mentioned; however, in discussing that with people who are familiar with the statistics, yes, there is an increase in reported violence against women, but that increase in reports came about primarily because of greater emphasis on getting the reporting.

I would agree that the number of unreported incidents of violence against women is much greater than those that are reported. The reason that there was a greater number in particular areas, including Herat, there were strong efforts to get more women to report violence, and efforts by the police to accept those reports, because there is a problem both in getting reports and having the authorities being willing to accept them.

So therefore, I do not agree that there was an increase—with the statistics, because there are no reliable statistics on overall violence against women that it increased while we were there. In fact, repeatedly anecdotally talking to Afghan women over the 11 years that I have been working on Afghanistan, they say that violence has been a problem, as you said, continues to be a problem, comes out of a host of social, cultural, historical factors, but they universally say that things were worse before.

Ms. SPEIER. I don’t dispute that.

Mr. SEDNEY. And they say it is getting better. So preserving those gains and keeping in place the prospect of increasing those, I think, is very important.

Ms. SPEIER. I guess that is my problem. I think we are whistling in the wind if we think that once we recede from that country, that
we are going to be able to have as much of an impact or more of an impact than we have right now. And while I think there has been less violence, it has not done away with it. And, you know, we can dispute the numbers, but whether it is, you know, an increase of 20 percent or 10 percent or not an increase, 300 deaths and 560 injured is a very painful statistic, I think.

Mr. Sedney. It is a painful statistic, and unfortunately the reality—

Ms. Speier. My time is already almost up. I want to get to this asylum issue and whether we are doing anything to try and create that opportunity for women.

Mr. Sedney. Again, that is a question I will raise with my colleagues at the Department of State, which is charged with asylum policy issues. I apologize for not being able to comment on it. But I will definitely talk to my colleagues at the Department of State this afternoon and mention this, as I am sure they will hear about it in the news as well.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 71.]

Ms. Speier. Thank you.

Mrs. Roby. Thank you.

Ms. Duckworth.

Ms. Duckworth. Thank you, Madam Chair.

I share my colleague Ms. Speier's fears, and I am sure the fears of every Member of this committee, that once we leave, with the potential resurgence of the Taliban, that the Afghan women have the most to lose.

So my question is what are we doing to make sure that we have enough Afghan women trained in the national police and the national army to protect the women who are playing such an important role in stabilizing insecure areas, and that these women do have someone that they can go report instances of abuse and violence to?

And specifically what I would like to know is, you know, one of the things about putting women in these roles is that they have to have real roles, and they have to be in real leadership positions. That means they have to have some rank on them. If you put in an Afghan policewoman or a security force woman, and she has got to report to a man who is abusing her, or she is experiencing sexual harassment in her own workplace, she is not going to be effective. So what are we doing to make sure that the real women leaders of the Afghan women's security forces and police actually have the power behind their positions and, perhaps more importantly, the funding that is dedicated specifically to them that will not be taken away?

Mr. Sedney. What we have been doing is to preserve those gains from the women's—first of all, building the Afghan security forces overall, because without overall security in the country, there won't be security for women either.

Secondly, on the specific issues relating to women, we have put in place programs first to build into the Afghan Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior recruiting plans, personnel plans, goals for women at every level, from the entry level up through the NCO and officer level. And we have worked with them in their recruiting
efforts to help them, because this really has to be an Afghan task, to recruit women, train women, and put them into positions where they can do that.

As I mentioned earlier in the statement, those efforts are not where we would like them to be. They are not where many of our Afghan colleagues, male and female, would like them to be. They are about in some cases 30, 40, 50 percent short of the goals that the Afghans themselves set for them.

The obstacles to Afghan women both joining the military and the police and remaining in the military and police are myriad both in their own families and in the institutions they are in, just as you described. There has been progress. It has been very paltry progress, as Representative Andrews pointed out, but it is significant percentagewise, but still too small numerically.

You asked about guarantees. I am sorry, Representative Duckworth, there is no guarantee here. There are, I think, prospects for it, and that prospects are going to depend upon our continued commitment, our continued funding, as you mentioned, but most of all on the success of the Afghan security forces themselves to provide a basis for that.

Ms. Duckworth, I am not sure that I am asking for a guarantee. I just want to know what strong mechanisms are in place other than general improvement of the Afghan National Security Forces.

Let’s talk about the funding issue. What would prevent you from actually—in the funding that we provide to help them as they are developing and growing, that we have funds that are specifically set aside specifically to be used for the recruiting, retention, and the support of Afghan women in the security forces and the police forces, and that we put a woman in charge of those funds at the very highest levels of their military and police leadership?

Mr. Sedney. In my experience in dealing with this for a number of years, the issue of funds, availability of funds, has not been a problem. The issues are the cultural, political practices and beliefs of the people, and that is something that changes as they change.

The effort to have goals set by the Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior set for the number of women in the forces, number of women officers, and getting that to be a priority in recruiting, that was something that was an effort by us and by our international colleagues, because I will say that our international colleagues, other countries, have similar strong policies in this area. It took a lot of work. It has been successful.

I think in the area of policies and priorities and in funding, that is—and other countries are actually providing funding in this area as well—that is not the problem. The problem is the overall situation in society.

Again, the progress is there in percentagewise basis, but it is just really hard. Our ability to help does depend on the number of people that we have who are there to help, the number of overall forces we have, the ability of our forces to assist at different levels in the Afghan military, and that, of course, is declining.

Ms. Duckworth. Madam Chair, I am over time, but I would like to request that the witness answer my question on the putting fe-
males at the very highest levels of the Afghan security forces and having them control the dollars in writing.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 72.]

Mrs. ROBY. No objection to that. And please provide that.

And Mrs. Davis.

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Madam Chair.

And thank you for being here. I am sorry I am going to have to leave for a little bit, but I am really looking forward to the second panel as well.

To Congresswoman Duckworth’s point, I believe we were trying to fence off somewhere in the neighborhood of about $85 million to dedicate towards the development of women within the police and within the Afghan National Army. And I recognize, as you all do, that it is one thing to have the money dedicated; it is another to have people coming forward.

I think there is a recognition that the best recruiters are going to be those women who have established themselves within the services, and I certainly would be hopeful that they would also be willing to do that and interested in doing that.

And the other piece, and I think that my colleague mentioned this, Mr. Andrews, that not just our women who are in the military and the police department, but also in neighbors who have faced some similar obstacles from the women in Afghanistan. And perhaps that is an area that we haven’t developed as well as we should. So I think working with ISAF and some of our partners, that is something that we certainly can ask from them, I would think, as we move on out and they have the commitment as well.

I wonder if you could just very quickly, you know, we have really grappled with this, because we know that there are cultural issues, imposing our own values, all those things. But the reality is that we are talking about human needs here, and I don’t think that anyone believes that children should be abused and killed, and women throughout the country for that matter, without people speaking out. And one of the things that I have found that is a little difficult is that when we have traveled, we know that talking about women even with our own military—and there have been a number of people that have been so committed to this, and I really appreciate that—but as if this is sort of the nice thing to do, but not the important thing to do in terms of governance for Afghanistan. And I just would like to see that as we move forward, reports are important, and I think we need to have data, even though sometimes getting that data is difficult, but the other issue is the visibility.

If we can continue as we are asked publicly about what is happening and how things—whether we are maintaining the progress that has been made, we can really move to these issues and talk about them very publicly and encourage our colleagues as well. What do you think? I mean, there are certain things—we don’t have a lot of leverage here, right, in changing some of the actions on the ground, but where is it that we might have some?

Mr. SEDNEY. I will ask my colleague General Shields to comment, as well, Representative Davis.
First of all, on the issue of funding and fencing off funding, I am firstly going to be very cautious about that when we are also facing major cuts to our overall budget, specifically cuts to the Afghan security forces. So in the end you can fence off all you want, but if there is no money, there is no money.

So I am very concerned about the funding for the Afghan security forces, appreciate what Congress has done, but the recent actions to cut funding do put this overall enterprise, including the issue of women, at risk. And if you don’t have overall security, it won’t matter how much money you set aside for women, because if the whole country falls apart because the security forces don’t work, as Madam Chairman said, then those things won’t make any difference.

On your second part about leverage, I think we have a huge amount of leverage actually. And a big part of it actually is what a number of your colleagues mentioned earlier about the interaction of our forces, both men and women, with the Afghan military; the training that people come here for and receive; their exposure to a military, which, regardless what the past was, is today a really a model for not just Afghanistan, but many other militaries in terms of the integration of men and women.

Mrs. DAVIS. May I ask, are we seeing that also in the police?

Mr. SEDNEY. We see it less in the police because we have less training. Our military doesn’t do policing. So we can bring Afghan military into our military schooling; we don’t have a national police force. I think our international colleagues that do have national police forces, Germany, France and others, the training they have given to the police provides some of that modeling and leverage.

Mrs. DAVIS. All right. I am glad to hear you say that. We just need to work with it more.

Ms. ROBY. Thank you so much.

And, gentlemen, thank you so much for your testimony today and your willingness to answer our questions. And I should have said this at the outset, on behalf of my family, I want to tell you thank you for your service to our country, and thank you for the many sacrifices that you have made in your career, but also as it relates to our military personnel and our men and women in uniform in Afghanistan. So thank you for that. Thank you for being here today.

And I will excuse our first panel, and I will invite our second panel to come to the witness table. And as they are getting seated, I will introduce the witnesses.

Mrs. Clare Lockhart is cofounder and director of the Institute for State Effectiveness. Among other related activities, the institute is a nongovernment organization that advises on the political development of nascent countries. The institute has been involved in helping to devise and implement many policies in Afghanistan following the expulsion of the Taliban. Then and previously when working when United Nations and the World Bank, Mrs. Lockhart lived in Afghanistan. So thank you for being here.

Mrs. Stephanie Sanok—I want to make sure I said that correctly—is the deputy director of the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Her research interests include U.S. Government stabilization and reconstruction
efforts and transitions of postconflict responsibilities. From 2005 to 2008, Ms. Sanok was a professional staff member on this committee. So thank you for being here as well.

So, Ms. Lockhart, I will begin with you.

STATEMENT OF CLARE LOCKHART, DIRECTOR, INSTITUTE FOR STATE EFFECTIVENESS, AND FORMER ADVISOR, U.N. AND GOVERNMENT OF AFGHANISTAN

Ms. Lockhart. Thank you for the opportunity to testify today. The factors and conditions that will protect Afghan women are to large degree the same as those which will protect any Afghan citizen, man, woman, or child, in the post-2014 era, and line the resilience of the state across the security and nonsecurity institutions that can protect its citizens from threats. And the goal here is emphatically not Switzerland—Afghanistan will be a developing country for a very long time to come—but the provision of basic protections and services that citizens anywhere in the world can and should reasonably expect.

It emerges again and again in interviews with Afghan women that their top concern is their uncertainty as to what will happen post-2014. The more that they can understand the world in general and the U.S. in particular will not abandon Afghanistan again to a civil war and a vacuum, likely to be filled by warlordism and extremism, but will keep to its commitments, including in a partnership agreement to Afghanistan’s fundamental security, the more confidence citizens will have, and the more that they will work in their own ways to secure that future.

The media has exhibited something of a bias towards reporting the negative trends rather than the opportunities in Afghanistan, and it goes without saying that the challenges have been enormous and the lost opportunities to get things right at dramatically lower costs in blood and treasure tragic. Afghanistan in its early recovery was going in the right direction after 2001, but some inexpensive measures were ignored, leading to unwinding of the fragile gains.

However, real gains, as you have recognized, have been made over the last decade, and the society has changed beyond recognition. Figures about children in school, improvements in health, self-run coverage are well known. Less obvious are the attitudinal shifts as a new generation who have grown up in relative peace and freedom have come of age, large numbers of whom are passionately engaged in creating a future Afghanistan marked by tolerance, accountability in governance, and opportunity for men and women in this generation.

And contrary to popular perception outside of Afghanistan, equal rights for women does enjoy considerable support within Afghanistan. Asia Foundation, surveying Afghan people in 2012, documented that 83 percent of respondents, men and women, believed equal rights under the law regardless of gender to be important, and 87 percent of respondents agreed that women should have equal opportunities to men in education. So I think there is perhaps more progress than we think.

Looking forward, security for Afghan women to exercise their fundamental rights and protect these hard-won gains will rest first and foremost on the fundamental pillar of security. Can the Afghan
State defend its citizens from the threat to state survival and to its citizens, and those threats being the insurgency, criminality, and forms of terrorism and extremism, as well as external threats from neighbors and political instability.

The capability of the Afghan forces is fundamental to meeting these threats. The Afghan forces are moving in the right direction in encouraging roles, encouraging ways, continuing a commitment to support these forces, and perhaps considering the option of further resources held in reserve for use if certain contingencies arise will be really the critical security to a bridge—a bridge to a time when Afghanistan can secure itself.

Security for women is also important to be considered in the sense of human security, and here I would highlight two things: First, the professionalization of security forces. So, attention to the ethos, spirit, and standards of ethics and integrity so that the men serving respect women; and second, continued attention to the decriminalization of the state. The last decade has coincided with the increase in power, wealth, and autonomy of moneylords, warlords, or strongmen, and continuing to focus on decriminalization of the state and society will be essential for the protection of women.

As is widely acknowledged, security itself is determined to a considerable degree by the political process, and a political process can be well designed or counterproductive to peace and stability. I think there is a risk that a rush to cut a deal could represent several steps backwards for peace and stability. And this is where, as I wrote in testimony, that women's rights may be considered—there's a risk that they may be considered a tradable good.

A very wise Afghan leader from the South once said that Afghanistan is like any other society: We have 4 percent thugs, 1 percent extremists, and 95 percent ordinary people. And the problem comes when the foreigners try to cut a deal between the 4 percent and the 1 percent over the heads of the 95 percent. And he said, the sooner you realize that it is actually the 95 percent who are your best allies and the best chance of realizing peace and security for you and for us, the more stable and secure we all will be.

And I think with that very much in mind, I think we are at something of a crossroads, and the type of political process to be pursued as transition, as withdrawal takes place is of fundamental importance. And here I think three pillars of a political process are important: First, attention to the succession. What type of regime will come after President Karzai's regime in 2014 is critical, and, therefore, attention both to the process and the outcomes of election is the first priority. The second is a dialogue within, between Afghan citizens, something of a national dialogue, on how they agree to be governed within the same political entity. And then the third component is attention to Pakistan, and really an ask of Pakistan that they cease interference in the internal affairs of their neighbor.

Lastly, and finally, and also important, programs in the social and economic area can play an enormous role. As you have recognized, women have made enormous strides in their role and status: more than 25 percent of seats in Parliament; 140,000 women have been elected and have served on community development councils through the National Solidarity Program, which Congress was
itself instrumental in ensuring the commitments from the administration to support.

Continuing to support these types of programs that will underpin these opportunities will be essential for preserving the gains. The how-to of implementation matters. We know, it is widely acknowledged, that much aid expenditure has been badly designed and delivered. Lessons must be learned.

But there are programs that work at scale and can work for considerably less resources than those that have been expended, and I will mention just briefly three of these. First, the National Solidarity Program that operates now over more than 30,000 villages and provides in the rural areas opportunities for women to participate, to make decisions, and have seen remarkable improvements across health, education, and other indicators.

Second, education of both girls and boys, the foundation for creating equality of opportunity. We see millions of children in primary school, but secondary, tertiary, vocational sectors have been woefully neglected. And there is still no map that I know of that can show us how many health workers, accountants, engineers the country has or are needed, and there is still time to produce that.

And then, finally, economic opportunity. Women have traditionally gained empowerment in many traditional societies in the economic space through opportunities to work in, to own their own businesses, and to participate in the economy.

In closing, Afghanistan has made considerable progress despite many wrong turnings and setbacks. The institutions are taking root. The next generation is preparing to lead and manage the country. Providing the commitments and confidence to make transition work is the course of action most likely to meet the security interests of citizens of both countries.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Lockhart can be found in the Appendix on page 51.]

Ms. ROBY. Thank you.

Ms. Sanok.

STATEMENT OF STEPHANIE SANOK, DEPUTY DIRECTOR AND SENIOR FELLOW, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY PROGRAM

Ms. Sanok. Madam Chairman, Ranking Member Tsongas, other members of the subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to discuss the protection of Afghan women and girls. It is a little disconcerting to be on this side of the table, but I thank you for the opportunity to be here. I would ask that my written statement be entered into the record, and, in the interest of time, just offer a few brief opening remarks based on my research into gender-based violence in Afghanistan.

So this issue is not a new one. For more than a decade, many Afghan Government officials and local community leaders have worked alongside U.S. and international partners on key reforms to help safeguard women’s rights, opportunities, and security, and it is certainly true that circumstances for women in Afghanistan—education, employment, voting rights, political participation—have improved since 2001. But I would like to focus my testimony on the
physical security of Afghan women and girls as a necessary condition for allowing them to pursue those other opportunities.

Over the course of the last few years, I have made several trips to Afghanistan, and I have spoken to many women who own or run businesses in that country. To a one, they have all indicated their desire to leave before December 2014. They cite implications, what they see coming across in terms of losing educational and employment opportunities, but their top reason they cite for leaving is physical security.

So let us take a look at what physical security has looked like in Afghanistan. We may talk about 20-percent increases, 10-per-cent increases in violence, but if we can just stick to the numbers of reported incidents. Late last year, the United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan released an updated critique of Afghan efforts to protect Afghan women and girls using data from 22 provinces from October 2011 to September 2012. In that yearlong timeframe, battery and laceration was the most prevalent type of case reported with some 896 complaints; 95 “honor killings” were registered; almost 200 incidents of rape were registered or filed; forced self-immolation and forced underage bought or exchange marriages were also prevalent. These types of incidents are, of course, are underreported, mostly due to cultural and social norms, customary and religious beliefs, and threats to life.

What is abundantly clear is that there is a problem. Victims don’t trust the police, prosecutors, or departments of women’s affairs in the provinces. There is a lack of shelters, civil society organizations, and women’s rights organizations. And there is a lack of knowledge about their legal protections and their mechanisms.

On the other side of the equation, there is also evidence that police, prosecutors, and courts lack transparency and accountability. They purposely delay processing cases, they misplace evidence on purpose, and fail to conduct adequate investigations.

Finally, part of the underlying problem is the cumbersome, non-standardized process for submitting a complaint. This process, which can refer victims to offices that simply don’t have jurisdiction, may result in referral after referral, bouncing victims around to multiple offices over a protracted and certainly disheartening period of time.

Regarding security and access to justice, the most promising U.S. Government programs address the systemic rule-of-law issues, and we heard Secretary Sedney refer to these. These programs aim to increase involvement of women as police officers, prosecutors, defense attorneys, judges, other positions along the spectrum of justice. But to reinforce the positive steps that have been made, the U.S. Government, international community, and Afghan leaders may want to focus increased attention on capability- and capacity-building to help mitigate discrimination against women, address bureaucratic hindrances, and persuade victims to access the justice system.

In my opinion, programs should emphasize outreach, working with civil society and local leaders to raise awareness of options available to victims and of the potential consequences for perpetrators. As my colleague Ms. Lockhart has mentioned, outreach efforts should include work with Afghan men and boys. In my opinion, we
need to use terms that resonate with them to develop greater sensitivity as to why this is a real and preventable problem that will hurt all elements of Afghan society going forward and prevent a peaceful, stable Afghanistan. I think a lot of our programs to date have really focused on educating women. I think we are really in a good opportunity to educate the men and boys about why this is an issue as well.

In addition, and this I know sounds incredibly sexy and something you all want to do, but the programs need to reform bureaucratic processes. Whether you clarify jurisdiction, streamline documentation, improve custody of evidence, it is these day-to-day bureaucratic problems that are forcing women to abandon their complaints because they are getting bounced around from office to office.

As Representative Speier noted, I believe this is a problem within the Afghan society that is difficult, if not impossible, for U.S. or international military forces to address. For example, there is a field manual for counterinsurgency under which we are operating in Afghanistan right now, and that field manual emphasizes cultural sensitivity whereas our soldiers need to be sensitive to their culture. And I agree with that, but there needs to be a balance between—there is an inherent tension between observing their culture and excusing some awful practices that are occurring within that culture. How do you balance that tension? Is that the right field manual under which to operate going forward? And I would be happy to discuss the implications of the situation on a “residual U.S. force” going forward after 2014.

But with that, I would like to conclude my remarks and open myself up to questions.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Sanok can be found in the Appendix on page 58.]

Ms. ROBY. Thank you so much. And, again, thank you to both of you for being here.

And there is so much that I want to say and ask. And I am going to try to, again, be a good example because we have to end at 3:45. So I want every Member that is here to have an opportunity to ask their questions.

We have had some extraordinary experiences ourselves, some of the members of the subcommittee, in Afghanistan, including the rule-of-law issues, going to a prison where the women who were the very victims themselves of the things that you have talked about are actually the ones locked up with their children because their husband, in turn, accused them of a crime, and they didn’t have an opportunity in that courtroom to defend themselves through the processes of law that exist in Afghanistan. And we saw that firsthand.

But I wanted to ask Ms. Lockhart first, how great are these risks? I mean, let us try to quantify it. How great is the risk that these Afghan women are going to lose their rights once we—that they have gotten since we have been there, but once we leave?

Ms. LOCKHART. Thank you for the question. I think the risks are grave. And to put them in an order, I think the risk to the stability, which could then result in some form of collapse or anarchy, is actually that the succession, the 2014 political transition, is not han-
ded appropriately. And therefore my recommendation that the elections process is a moment of the greatest risk to the country, and, therefore, the stability is very severe.

Many of my Afghan friends, both men and women, think that actually the risk of return of an extreme form of government is perhaps less than many might think just because the society has changed so fundamentally. But I do think the risk is still there. I also think the opportunities are there, and many of you have cited these. I think that the media has tended to report much more in the negative and to ignore the real opportunities, that the country is ready to govern itself and to secure itself with continued commitment.

Ms. ROBY. I mean, I think that is great to hear. I have been much more pessimistic in my experiences in what I have heard, and looking forward to returning and gaining more experience. But as you know, when we go, we don’t get to stay very long, and so that is why we are drawing from your experiences.

What do you think the warning signs are that we need to look for, and once we see them, how does the United States respond based on our drawdown? Ms. Lockhart, you can go, and then, Ms. Sanok, I have a question for you as well.

Ms. LOCKHART. I think, as your colleagues have also recognized, many of the warning signals are already there. And I think we are seeing this in increased numbers of applications for asylum at the moment, and it is to do with the lack of confidence in the future because of the extent of the uncertainty as to what 2014 means.

So, I think we can see it through applications—those trying to leave the country, we can see an incidence of violence in particular parts of the country. But I think the real test will come as transition takes place, as the election takes place, so we won’t know until 2014, which, again, is why I would recommend some kind of contingencies to be put in place through that very critical time, through 2014 and 2015. And if some reserve capabilities or commitments can be made, this could make a critical difference to that continued confidence.

Mrs. ROBY. Absolutely, and I hear what you are saying, and I am hopeful that others will hear it as well, because I think it is vital to the success in protecting these women, but also, as I have indicated on several occasions, is a litmus test to our success there as well, protecting our own national security. But I am deeply troubled by what might lay ahead, and, you know, we have a—I mean, I feel that we have a responsibility to continue to monitor this very, very closely and be on top of it.

Ms. Sanok, what do you think, based on your experience, what the critical elements of any future transition plan should be so that we can ensure that these women’s rights are sustained as we leave?

Ms. SANOK. I think it has been covered today quite a bit, the importance of integrating women at every level of the justice system and the rule of law system so whether they are Afghan National Security Police, if they are in the legal system both as prosecutors and defense attorneys, as judges, because when you do appeal cases, or you do have someone who has been accused counteraccusing and then not having the resources to defend your-
self, as a woman it really is a problem in referring the cases to higher courts where there are no women present.

I think from a transition plan from the Department of Defense perspective, they do have to do a lot better at recruitment and retention of women throughout the ranks. And I say that because they are not even at 50 percent of what their goal was, and their goal was about 3,000 women in the Afghan National Security Forces, I believe—I would have to check my number—and they are at less than half of that.

Mrs. ROBY. We are not even close, right?

Ms. SANOK. And when you look at the roles that the women in Afghan National Security Forces are playing, and they are cooks, they are administrative support. They are not on the front line. They are not like the female engagement teams that are predominantly U.S. and coalition forces out there talking to the people. They are behind the scenes, and I think that is a real problem. So from a transition plan perspective, I think doing a much better job of recruiting, placing, and retaining people along the spectrum of the justice system is——

Mrs. ROBY. It is very important. Thank you.

And I have gone over, so I will now turn to the ranking member.

Ms. TSONGAS. Thank you. And before we come to the end, I just want to thank you for creating the opportunity for this hearing, because I think it has been—it is so important, and we appreciate it very much, your testimony.

I sort of have a sort of laundry list of issues. You know, one is I do think the recruitment and retention issue is very important. And as Congresswoman Davis said, there was a fund set aside to help encourage that. I am sorry that Mr. Sedney has left us, because he suggested that it is an “either/or.” In reality, I think it is a “both/and.” And you can’t cut out the funding to recruit women and expect that you are going to have better luck at the long-term security of the country. It is not an “either/or.” That is just a comment.

And I appreciate also Congresswoman Speier’s—all of our concerns, really, as to what is going to happen, and that at the very least we should look for broader asylum opportunities for women, Afghan women. But the great reality is that there are many, many women in the country who will never know, never have the opportunity, never have the resources, never be able to take advantage of it. So we have to remain, I think, very mindful of that, as I know we all do.

I have always been struck when we have been there, you know, that there is a very engaged community of women, very polished, very educated, taking great advantage of the opportunities that have developed. But then that is not the great bulk of women in Afghanistan. And yet we have met some remarkable women, very impoverished, who have taken great—taken advantage of the microlending, for example, to have modest, modest businesses. And I did happen to see a program on PBS [Public Broadcasting System] talking about in Pakistan similar efforts, where you have microlending that women take advantage of; they have these small businesses that bring resources into the family. It cuts down on domestic violence because the pressures on the family unit are re-
lieved by women being able to be part of supporting a family. So I think we have seen some of the positive outcomes through our investments there.

I wanted to ask you a question, though, and that is as we proceed to drawing down and seek through a peace process, perhaps, that I echoed your comments about women’s rights are not a tradable good, and I want to know what you would see as the alarm bells, where you would see—if women are not at the table as part of the process, if you don’t see people standing up strongly enough for some of the gains, what would you see as real alarm bells? And what should we in Congress and the international community do to push back on that? I ask that of both of you.

Ms. SANOK. I will take a first crack at it.

The real alarm bells for me, it goes down back to the number of incidents being reported. Now, a dip in reported incidents doesn’t mean that it is not happening, it just means that there are fewer reports. And so peeling that back a little bit, making sure that cases that are coming forward are being prosecuted, and if all of a sudden a great percentage of the cases or the complaints are being dropped, whether through coercion or incompetence or actual malice on behalf of the court system or the prosecution, I think it is worth watching.

The number of women on the streets walking around, feeling safe enough to walk around outside of their home, it is not significant now, but if it goes down, I think that is a good indicator of a greater loss of freedom.

I think another key indicator for me would be I am not hearing the women’s voices; when CODELs stop, what happens? There will be vastly fewer CODELs after 2014. And so who are those women going to talk to? Who will they get support from? So I think there need to be a couple of forums that are more enduring and aren’t necessarily tied to, you know, Mrs. Davis is visiting, or Representative Roby is visiting, or Representative Tsongas is visiting to make sure that something is a little bit more enduring, because I think not hearing the voices is the number one indicator for me.

Ms. LOCKHART. I agree with others who say that increasingly I think it is going to be harder to have the data across the country to know what is going on, and therefore the warnings are going to be harder to detect.

Having said that, I think there are organizations, National Solidarity Program is one, Human Rights Commission is another, which are collecting data. So we can continue to pay attention to them and watch the trends very, very closely.

And in terms of what kind of responses that Congress might take to protect them, especially as some of these warning bells appear, I think actually continued support to some of these program that will continue to be able to operate across the country will be important.

I think second, thinking in terms of scenarios ahead of time, I think we could imagine three or four very different outcomes post-2014, and be prepared to think through what kind of responses we might be prepared to put into place.

I think perhaps reframing our language so it is not talk of leaving, but it is talk of a different type of commitment to the country
as reflected in the Strategic Partnership Agreement that has already been signed, because there will continue to be some form of commitment, and I think if Afghans hear the language of leaving, it heightens concerns even more than might be warranted. And then I think it is continuing. I mean, in South Korea, in Germany, troops have been kept for many decades. Is there a case for continued commitment, including some form of troop presence, not in a combat role and not in a way that is vulnerable to the loss of life in the future, but some form of commitment?

Mrs. ROBY. Thank you. And I was just going to make one comment before I got to Mr. Scott.

I remember early on, in our first trip 2 years ago—my first trip 2 years ago, hearing Mrs. Davis and Ms. Edwards, who went very early on, about not seeing one female on their first trip, and the stark differences of where we are now. So I find it interesting that you use that as a warning sign.

Mr. Scott.

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Madam Chair. And I will be very brief with this so that the other Members have time to speak as well.

And I, again, will go back to the one trip that I have had to Afghanistan so far. And I remember through the whole trip there was only one little girl that we saw. And obviously over there one of the things that you give the children is a pen to reinstill the value of education and other things, and I remember quite well that we gave her a pen, and it was promptly taken from her. And so we gave her another one, and it was promptly taken from her. We gave her another one, and I don’t think that one was taken until probably after we left.

But there is a cultural issue there. I was glad to hear Ms. Sanok talk about the fact that it is not just the women, it is the boys and especially the younger ones that we have got to work with to change that culture.

So thank you for being here today. And I will yield the remainder of my time so that other Members can ask their questions.

Mrs. ROBY. Thank you, Mr. Scott.

Ms. SPEIER. Thank you to both of you for your participation this afternoon.

I am concerned about to whom our foreign aid, to whom our support should go once we do leave when we want to make sure that money gets to women’s programs, women and children’s programs, health programs in Afghanistan, a country that you certainly know has been plagued with a great deal of fraud and abuse.

Ms. LOCKHART. I think it is necessary to pay close attention, as you are, to parsing between those programs that work and those programs that don’t. There are many programs that do work. Some of them have been managed by USAID. Others of them, and some of the greatest successes, have actually been had through the World Bank.

The World Bank moved early on, in early 2002, to set up the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund and a set of national programs, which are countrywide programs that reach across the country. One of these USAID joined with. It is the National Health Program that has shown remarkable successes. It has held up actu-
ally regionally, or even globally, as one of the great successes. And I think this one, in terms of basic healthcare access, is one of those that is well managed and deserves continued support. The second is the National Solidarity Program, and the third is the Education Program. And these three are managed through the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund. It has policy engagements of the ministries, but it is NGOs [non-governmental organization] that do the implementation.

Ms. SANOK. I can briefly answer this question. I was looking through the USAID Web site earlier today and noticed that there are four gender and participant training programs, 23 education programs, and 32 health programs. I was looking specifically for things dealing with everyday life involving women and girls. And I think you have to be careful with USAID programs because they do send out large grants, and then you are not quite sure who the subcontractors or who the subgrantees are.

I, too, am very concerned about who is actually receiving the money and where exactly it is going, and I would encourage you in your congressional oversight role to really peel back the onion a bit on who are the implementing partners—the World Bank is excellent, Asia Development Bank is excellent, the Asia Foundation is also quite good; but to talk to the USAID a little bit about they are going to have an enduring presence in this country. One, I agree with Ms. Lockhart, it does need to be made clear to the Afghans that we are not leaving at the end of the 2014, although the troop presence will be drastically reduced. But really take a look at some of the USAID implementing partners and understand who their partners are, and I think it would be a little bit shocking.

Ms. SPEIER. Well, actually I am all too familiar with how shocking the wastefulness has been in Afghanistan. The SIGAR [Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction] just presented to the Oversight and Government Reform Committee, of which I am a member, and then did a policy briefing to the Watchdog Caucus, and it is abominable, it is abominable what has gone on, and it has gone on under our noses. And we have done nothing to those subcontractors or those contractors that have abused the power and the money. They continue to get contracts, and oftentimes they are U.S. contractors. So you make a very good point.

We just had a celebration last week to give the Congressional Gold Medal to Muhammad Yunus, who, as you know, is recognized for the microfinancing. And I believe, Ms. Lockhart, you might have been—or maybe it was you, Ms. Sanok, who talked about microfinancing for women in Afghanistan. He pointed out that since he undertook his effort, where he gave something like $27 out to 40 women in Bangladesh, that program has expanded to just an astronomical—100 million people across the planet with $40 billion worth of money, something like that. It was amazing.

So in terms of microfinancing, what has your experience been in those efforts in Afghanistan, particularly to women?

Ms. SANOK. In my experience it has been very positive. Micro-lending and microfinance, whether it is a $25 loan, a $50 loan, when I talk to—they call them AWOBs, Afghan women-owned businesses. It has been very successful. To a one, I believe they
have all been repaid, and I think that is a fantastic return, and re-
investing into the system.

Mrs. ROBY. Thank you.

Ms. Duckworth.

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Thank you. Acknowledging that political tran-
sition and the security transition are inextricably linked, I would
like to talk a little bit about the upcoming elections and what each
of you see as some potential dangers, whether it is security, wheth-
er it is women not being able to stand for elections, or perhaps
women not feeling safe enough to come out to vote. I want to make
sure that women are participating in that political process so that
their voices can be heard. Could you speak to those issues?

Ms. LOCKHART. Certainly. And also to reflect very much Rep-
resentative Speier’s concern over contractor oversight. I very much
welcome and admire efforts to continue oversight and account-
ability because it has been a very shocking shortfall.

On the issue of elections, I think two parts to this. One is the
process. And tragically in the 2009 elections, sufficient attention
was not paid to the preparations necessary for a minimally free
and fair election, and, therefore, we saw the massive fraud and
abuse of that process and failure to provide for women’s access.

I think there is enough time, starting now, to make those prep-
arations, and goes across the gamut from civic education arrange-
ments to transportation; in short, minimizing the fraud. And there
are ways to do that. A group of Afghan political parties have come
together to make recommendations. I think those recommendations
are good and can and should be followed.

The other part of this is the outcome part, and I think there is
a possibility that we might see something of a unity team, a group
of actors come together with a reform agenda for the country. And
if that happens, I think then the outlook for the country could im-
prove quite dramatically. If it doesn’t, and we see the kind of splin-
tered field that we saw last time, or a failure of the parties to agree
on a minimum set of rules of the game, then the risks will be much
higher. So continued attention to this process as it moves forward
will be critical.

Ms. SANOK. I agree with Ms. Lockhart that this is a—there is
plenty of time in the lead-up to this election to take some steps
necessary to better ensure that it is a free and fair election. Will
it be completely free and fair? Probably not.

I do think that this is an election period where you will have still
significant U.S. troop presence motivating folks to vote. So I have
fewer concerns about this upcoming election than I will about the
election when we are not there. So I agree wholeheartedly with ev-
erything that Ms. Lockhart has laid out.

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Would either of you be comfortable talking
about women standing for election in Afghanistan and what the
likelihood of them actually being recruited and standing for real
positions? You talked a little bit, Ms. Sanok, about, you know, mak-
ing sure they are involved in the judicial system. What about the
legislative system?

Ms. SANOK. Because there are a certain number of seats set
aside for women, I think there is an interest on everyone’s part to
fill those seats, and so I think there is going to be some recruit-
ment to find women to fill those seats. Now, who is doing the recruiting and who is pushing them is going to be interesting to watch, what kind of women will be filling those seats.

So from a participatory perspective, I think there will be women in the Parliament going forward, at least in this upcoming election. Beyond that, what kind of person and what kind of principled stances will she take is open to real examination.

Ms. LOCKHART. I agree very much. Because the Constitution reserves 25 percent of those seats for women, I think we certainly will see an active number of—well, a considerable number of women very engaged in the political process and its acceptance more in the urban than the rural areas.

I think on the other side, women in senior positions in the armed forces and in government across the administrative positions, in the judiciary, is extremely important, and this is where both Congress and the administration, I think, can do—you already do, but can continue to do a lot to encourage that those positions are kept and expanded.

I had an experience of working closely with a female Director of Treasury for the Afghan Government and the Director of Budget for the entire Afghan Government. They had problems in the first few days establishing authority with the men who worked for them, but once they had, they were extremely effective professionals and had no problem. But it was getting them into position in the first place, and this is where I think the U.S. Government can do an enormous amount to ensure they continue to have access to those roles.

Ms. DUCKWORTH. How do you feel about the safety of these women once they are in these roles? You know, I am worried that those two women that you mentioned, for example, they have established their authorities. After U.S. forces are gone in 2014, I want to be sure that they are safe, because safety and security, these women need to be able to continue to go to work, and I have real fears that they will be subject to attacks.

Ms. SANOK. The State Department has programs in place for judicial security. I think similar programs should be in place for women in positions of influence and power. And so if I were talking to State Department people, I would encourage them to not only take judicial security very seriously, but also the security of women, again, in these particular positions.

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Thank you, Madam Chair.

Mrs. ROBY. Thank you.

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you. Thanks for being here. I am sorry I missed your comments earlier, but I wondered if you could comment. We have had an opportunity to meet with a number of Parliamentarians; in fact, there are certainly have been Parliamentarians who have come here as well. And it is always interesting to me because they are seeking our support to help with the kind of issues that, you know, we—we are—we kind of seek help from one another, networking, how do I influence other people, et cetera.

Whether it is through the State Department or NGOs, how can we best work with existing organizations that are there? Obviously, we are not going to be there on the ground, but in the future, that
might be helpful. Is there a role, and how might we be communicating in some way? What do you think they need?

Ms. Lockhart. I do believe that the kind of Congress-to-Parliament exchanges and other kind of civic-to-civic, people-to-people programs can play an enormous role if we look at the way that cities have been twinned, schools have been twinned, and the work that Spirit of America has been doing. Perhaps to find increased ways to link veterans, U.S. veterans, who have served within Afghanistan to the areas and families that they encountered over the coming years would be, again, an enormous way to keep the commitments and solidarity between the nations enduring.

Ms. Sanok. I would echo that. A Parliamentary exchange, I think, is very appropriate in this particular respect.

I would also say that there are some programs being run through the embassy, small grant programs, to encourage women's voices and gender equality. It is not as institutionalized as I think it probably should be, because, again, as we draw down in forces, and we shift to a more State Department-heavy, USAID-heavy presence, we really need to use the power of those organizations to institutionalize things that are a lot more enduring than anything I have seen on the table right now.

Mrs. Davis. Yeah. Well, thank you. I appreciate that.

We were very aware that meeting only with Parliamentarians was not going to give us a very good picture of women in Afghanistan either, and that is why we went into a more rural area. We spent time in Qalat over a number of years and really saw a lot of progress. So if we sound like we haven't, we have seen great progress, and I think that may be why the level of frustration continues to be high fearing that those gains could be lost.

Can you give a sense, I mean, do you think there is a 50-percent chance that the gains might not be lost and that will continue, and that we might 2 or 3 years down the line see that some of these really exceptional people that we have had a chance to meet are able to carry on, or they have been stymied and stopped or maybe something worse? What chance do you give it?

Ms. Lockhart. I would find it very hard to put a number on it, but I think if the political process is not one that trades away the gains, but is one that seeks to shore up the 95 percent as great allies of this Nation with the right kind of building blocks of the political process; and if this, at much, much, much reduced cost and commitment than the one that we have seen, but if there is some continued commitment sufficient to ensure the confidence of the Afghan nation that it can secure its own people, if those two conditions hold, then I am confident in the future security of women. But those are two “ifs.”

Ms. Sanok. They are two very big “ifs.” I think, again, I go back to the women that I have talked to who have run or been involved in or owned businesses, and, again, to a one, they all indicated their intent to leave, which—talk about a brain drain and kind of a confidence drain in the country.

I disagree with what Secretary Sedney said earlier. I think we are losing leverage. So now is the time to put into place institutions and more enduring exchanges and contracts to be able to keep
track, to monitor, to make sure that you have the relationships moving forward so that all is not lost.

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you very much. Thank you for being here.

Thank you, Madam Chair.

Mrs. ROBY. Well, thank you. And to both of you, I think there are so many takeaways from today's hearing. I look forward to getting back to Afghanistan shortly, and several members of this subcommittee women will be on that CODEL, and I think then we will have some comparative information based on our own experience.

But what you have presented here today, Ms. Lockhart, I appreciate your being positive, much more positive than I have been in some of my words lately. I again remain deeply concerned about this. It is my hope that in having this hearing today and coming back to this issue time and time again that we can draw others' attention to how critical this area is for the success of this country to be able to secure itself, but also for our national security interests at home and all of the service and sacrifice of our military, our men and women in uniform who have been the partners alongside people like you, to ensuring that these women do have—or have all the gains that they have.

And so we really appreciate you taking the time to be here, and look forward to continuing this conversation whether in the committee room or not, outside.

So thank you again, and thank you to all of the Members for being here. With that, we will be adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 3:53 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
APPENDIX

April 25, 2013
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

April 25, 2013
Good Afternoon. I am delighted to convene this hearing on how the United States can ensure the safety and political freedom of Afghan women after responsibility for security is ceded to the Afghan government.

There are many important issues Congress must consider in connection with Afghanistan: How and when should the United States responsibly transfer security responsibilities to the Afghans? What sort of residual U.S. forces should remain after that time? What functions must these forces be equipped and prepared to undertake?

Women and girls in Afghanistan have made enormous gains since the United States and its allies toppled the Taliban government. In Afghanistan today, women and girls attend schools and universities, they hold elected office, they are present in the military and police forces, and they enjoy many personal freedoms that were suppressed during the earlier ruthless rule.

While there have been many important improvements in the safety, security, and rights of women, more must be done. The hard-won rights and progress Afghan women and girls have realized during the last 11 years must not disappear once the U.S. reduces its forces in Afghanistan. Those planning the security transition and determining residual force structures must keep this in mind.

The safety and security of women in Afghanistan is not a discrete topic unmoored from the balance of our security considerations. Rather, the condition of Afghan women is an important barometer of the success of our efforts. A safer Afghanistan with a functioning government responsive to its people and inhospitable to terrorists and extremists is better for all: for men and women, boys and girls.

This is a deeply personal topic. I have travelled to Afghanistan twice. I have been part of two delegations of female Members of Congress who have visited to see firsthand our military's impressive efforts in Afghanistan. I have seen the sacrifices they have made.
I have also met many Afghan women on these trips. They were doctors, soldiers, and elected officials and girls who aspired to these and other positions. All were pursuing lives that were unthinkable under the Taliban. I have also met wives and mothers who have a degree of personal freedom and independence prohibited by the Taliban and others.

I am a wife and mother who has had the right and privilege to pursue an education, career, and elected office. I do not want Afghan women to face a future where their successes and security is jeopardized. I fear this would be the case if Afghanistan reverts to the Taliban’s control, or a more strict and oppressive government otherwise takes root there.

As the United States continues to work with the government of Afghanistan to determine the future size and role of our forces there, the continued promotion and protection of the right of Afghan women and girls must not be forgotten nor pushed aside as a bargaining chip.
Statement of Hon. Niki Tsongas

Ranking Member, House Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations

Hearing on

Transitioning to Afghan Security Lead:

Protecting Afghan Women?

April 25, 2013

Good afternoon, Secretary Sedney, General Shields, Ms. Sanok, and Ms. Lockhart. Thank you for appearing before our Subcommittee today. I look forward to your testimony and appreciate your experience.

I want to echo Chairman Roby’s remarks about the importance of this hearing. It is quite timely in a number of ways. Both our Committee and the SASC recently heard testimony from General Dunford on our evolving strategy to draw down from Afghanistan. I have long supported bringing our troops home from Afghanistan as quickly as possible, and was in favor of an even more expedited timeline than the President. But, I also believe we must put in place a plan that does this responsibly and safely, and which does not sacrifice the vital gains which have been made by women. A 2011 poll found that 86% of surveyed Afghan women were concerned that a Taliban-style government could return after the withdrawal of the international community.

While every drawdown requires tradeoffs and tough choices, I completely agree with what Ms. Lockhart said in her testimony, that “women’s rights are not a tradable good.”

Since becoming a member of Congress, I have had the honor of visiting Afghanistan four times. I have been fortunate to visit, in particular, with some of our “military moms” serving in Afghanistan, female soldiers who have children back home. Congresswoman Roby and I are going back to Afghanistan soon and hope to meet with Afghan women as well as more “military moms.” The ever-increasing participation of women in our military demonstrates the important contributions women are making to our efforts in Afghanistan and around the world. It also stands in stark contrast to the involvement that Afghan women are able to have in their country’s public life. For a safe, stable, and secure Afghanistan to emerge, women must be fully included in Afghan society and government.

Two years ago, I visited a school where over one thousand young Afghan girls cycled through each day. When we asked them what they wanted to be when they grew up, the answers we heard were “doctor, lawyer, teacher.” These young women felt optimistic about opportunities that were previously unheard of for women in Afghanistan. Ensuring that these young girls continue to have access to these opportunities is not only good for the future of Afghanistan, it is good for the United States, as well, so that we can help ensure a more peaceful and just future there, and the way in which we move forward will impact our moral authority around the globe.
As we reduce our military presence in Afghanistan, the U.S. must be cognizant of how we will ensure that women continue to have a seat at the table and that the nascent gains are not abdicated. Progress has been made in some areas. For example, 27% of the Afghan parliament is female. However, much more can be done in other areas, such as recruiting women into the Afghan National Army and police force, where they are very poorly represented. In December of last year, just before we considered last year’s Defense Bill, we were reminded of the tenuous position of women in Afghanistan when the acting head of women’s affairs in an eastern province was assassinated as she traveled to work.

I worked for inclusion in the bill of a provision, Section 1233, in that bill, which requires the Department of Defense to produce a plan to promote the security of Afghan women and girls as it withdraws from the country. It would encourage the recruitment of women as members of the Security Forces and requires the Department of Defense to report back on its progress towards meeting these goals. I know it is not due quite yet, but I look forward to receiving it from the Department and any preliminary observations you can discuss.

I look forward to our discussion.
STATEMENT OF
DAVID SEDNEY
DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
AFGHANISTAN, PAKISTAN AND CENTRAL ASIA
BEFORE THE
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS
April 25th, 2013
Chairman Roby, Ranking Member Tsongas, members of the Subcommittee, thank you for this opportunity to update you on the security of Afghan women as we transition to Afghan security lead.

Overall, circumstances for all Afghans have improved significantly since 2001. For Afghan women and girls, proportionally this progress has been even greater. Women’s health, education, and political participation have all increased enormously. The Afghan constitution declares that “The citizens of Afghanistan – whether man or woman – have equal rights and duties before the law.” The government of Afghanistan reaffirmed at the Tokyo Conference that the human rights of its citizens, in particular the equality of men and women, are guaranteed under the Afghan constitution and in international human rights law obligations. To reduce discrimination and violence against women, the Afghan Government has enacted laws prohibiting violence against women and ratified the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women. However, implementation of existing laws promoting equality and prohibiting violence remains mixed. Despite advances, the troubles of poverty, illiteracy, weak security and poor health care continue to affect women disproportionately, and violence against women and girls remains a problem. Many Afghan women fear a return of the Taliban and a re-emergence of a society hostile toward women.

Areas where Afghan women have made progress include health and education, as well as in the political arena. Women hold 27 percent of the seats in the National Assembly, and 25 percent of the seats in provincial councils are reserved for women by law. There are two women serving on the High Peace Council’s 19-person Executive Board. With strong support from the U.S. Government and the international community, Afghan women have taken part in many countrywide political decision-making processes since the end of Taliban rule: the Bonn Conference in 2001; the Loya Jirga in 2002; the 2004 Constitutional Loya Jirga; the Consultative Peace Jirga of 2010; the Kabul Conference in 2010; Bonn Conference 2011; and the Tokyo Conference of 2012. Women have also increased their presence and visibility through the National Solidarity Program and constitute 24 percent of participants in the local Community Development Councils.
Ensuring women’s civic and political participation, as well as enhancing women’s status and equality, is dependent on an effective rule of law. Yet an effective rule of law is also dependent upon the participation of women in the justice system. Women’s participation in the justice system raises awareness and improves implementation of existing Afghan laws protecting women’s constitutional rights. One area of progress has been in the recruitment of female judges: there are now approximately 150 female judges, up from 50 in 2003. Increased participation and a more effective rule of law allow women to rely on the formal sector to provide security and access to justice.

The main focus of the Department of Defense’s efforts to support women’s security in Afghanistan is through ISAF’s Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) development mission. Improving the recruitment of women into the ANSF, their status and treatment within the ANSF, and the ANSF’s treatment of female civilians across the country are a priority for ISAF. ISAF, the Afghan Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Ministry of Interior (MoI) have a large number of programs aimed at protecting women’s rights and promoting women in the ANSF. Implementation of a gender policy within Afghanistan’s armed forces and police is a long-term project. Some of the success Afghanistan has had integrating women into its security forces in the past decade surpasses that of other countries in the region. Across the ANSF, there are policies and programs in place that attempt to address harassment and violence against women. We have also helped design and execute educational projects for women. Formal gender integration policies exist in both MoD and MoI, but need implementation. Support from Afghan leadership is essential and political will is present in some cases.

Many challenges remain, however. Recruitment of women for the Afghan National Army, Afghan Air Force, and Afghan National Police continues to fall short of female recruitment goals. The primary obstacle for this is likely family-related issues. Other impediments have been identified, such as a lack of challenging assignments for females upon graduation, accounts of sexual harassment and violence, and difficulties concerning separate housing and bathing facilities.
ISAF closely monitors the security of the Afghan population, including Afghan women, in transitioning areas. Transition is a dynamic process: areas proceed on different timelines based on demonstrated improvements in security, governance, rule of law, and ANSF capabilities. During the transition process, functions are steadily transferred to the ANSF as their capability increases. Transition does not mean the absolute withdrawal of ISAF’s support. In fact, ISAF continues to provide support at the level required by the ANSF to ensure that they are capable of securing the areas in which they have the lead.

While the Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development administer the majority of women’s initiatives, DoD also oversees several programs focusing on women outside of the ANSF. These programs include: assistance to the Department of Women’s Affairs in Kandahar; assistance to the District Development Assembly for Women’s Affairs in Parwan District; and U.S. Cultural Support Teams that provide an enduring female engagement capability in support of special operations and Afghan Local Police expansion. ISAF also has a number of Gender Advisers, who educate personnel, ensure that women’s rights and security are factored into decisions throughout ISAF, and coordinate the efforts of their subcommands and external international organizations, non-governmental organizations, and governmental organizations.

These efforts are also consistent with our commitment to implement the U.S. National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security (NAP). The NAP details the actions the U.S. Government will take to accelerate, institutionalize, and better coordinate efforts to advance women’s inclusion in peace negotiations, peacebuilding activities, and conflict prevention; to protect women from sexual and gender-based violence; and to ensure equal access to relief and recovery assistance, in areas of conflict and insecurity. The Department recognizes that the goals of the NAP are important to our national security and to ensuring sustainable peace and security in Afghanistan and throughout the world.
As I close, I would like to thank the House Armed Services Committee and this Subcommittee for your continued support for our men and women in uniform. Ensuring the rights and security of women and girls in Afghanistan is a long-term, generational process. However, our progress in this area has been substantial, and I am confident that through the efforts of the DoD, other U.S. departments and agencies, NGOs, and our Allies and partners in Afghanistan, this progress will continue in the future.
David Samuel Sedney is Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Afghanistan, Pakistan and Central Asia in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs.

Mr. Sedney was Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asia from 2007-2009. He served as Deputy Chief of Mission at the U.S. Embassy in Beijing from 2004-2007. Previously Mr. Sedney was Deputy Chief of Mission at the United States Embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan from 2003-2004, where he was Charge d’Affaires from August through November 2003.

Mr. Sedney was also Deputy Chief of Mission in Kabul in 2002, after the re-opening of the Embassy. Mr. Sedney was Director for Afghanistan at the National Security Council (2003), Senior Advisor in the State Department’s Office of e-Diplomacy (2002), Senior Advisor to John Negroponte, United States Ambassador to the United Nations (2001-2002), Deputy Director of the State Department’s Office of Chinese and Mongolian Affairs (1999-2001), and Special Assistant to Stephen Sestanovich, Ambassador-at-Large and Special Representative for the Newly Independent States (1997-1998).

Earlier, Mr. Sedney served as Deputy Chief of Mission at the United States Embassy in Baku, Azerbaijan (1995-1997), Political-Military Officer at the United States Embassy in Beijing, China (1991-1994) and Political Officer, Refugee Officer and Consular Officer at the United States Embassy in Bucharest, Romania (1985-1987). He was a Watch Officer at the State Department’s Operations Center (1987-1988) and Duty Officer and Senior Duty Officer at the White House Situation Room (1988-1989).

Before joining the State Department, Mr. Sedney spent five years as a house-husband in Bern, Switzerland; Baton Rouge, Louisiana; and Williamstown, Massachusetts, raising three daughters. Mr. Sedney also taught courses at North Adams State College and Williams College. Earlier he worked for the United States Department of Labor’s Wage and Hour Division after stints as a factory worker, truck driver and taxicab driver.

Mr. Sedney is a graduate of Princeton University and Suffolk University School of Law. He attended Louisiana State University’s School of Law where he studied Law of the Sea and International Law. Mr. Sedney is a distinguished graduate of the National War College. He speaks Romanian, Mandarin Chinese and Azerbaijani. Mr. Sedney has received the Secretary of Defense Medal for Meritorious Civilian Service, the Department of State’s Superior Honor Award six times, and Department of State’s Meritorious Honor Award twice.
United States Army

Major General Michael H. Shields

Director
Pakistan/Afghanistan Coordination Cell, J-5
The Joint Staff
3000 Joint Staff Pentagon, Room BD945A
Washington, DC 20318-3000
Since: Nov 2012

SOURCE OF COMMISSIONED SERVICE ROTC

EDUCATIONAL DEGREES
Norwich University – BS – Physical Education
Central Michigan University – MS – Administration
United States Army War College – MS – Strategic Studies

MILITARY SCHOOLS ATTENDED
Infantry Officer Basic and Advanced Courses
United States Army Command and General Staff College
United States Army War College

FOREIGN LANGUAGES None recorded

PROMOTIONS

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FROM TO ASSIGNMENT

Nov 12 Present Director, Pakistan/Afghanistan Coordination Cell, J-5, Joint Staff, Washington, DC
Feb 12 Oct 12 Director, Future Operations, International Security Assistance Force Joint Command, OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM, Afghanistan
Sep 10 Jan 12 Deputy Director, Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization, Arlington, Virginia
Mar 09 Sep 10 Director, National Joint Operations Intelligence Center, J-3, Joint Staff, Washington, DC
Nov 08 Mar 09 Deputy Director for Operations, National Military Command Center, J-3, Joint Staff, Washington, DC
Aug 07 Nov 08 Assistant Deputy Director, Europe/North Atlantic Treaty Organization/Russia/Africa Policy, J-5, Joint Staff, Washington, DC
Jan 07 Aug 07 Chief, Eastern Europe and Eurasia Division, Deputy Directorate for Politico-Military Affairs (Eastern Europe/Eurasia), J-5, Joint Staff, Washington, DC
Jul 04 Dec 06 Commander, 172d Brigade Stryker Combat Team, United States Army Alaska, Fort Wainwright, Alaska and OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM, Iraq
Jul 03 Jan 04 Student, United States Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania
May 02 May 03 Assistant Chief of Staff (Operations), C-5, Coalition Task Force-K2, OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM, Afghanistan
May 00 May 02 Commander, 3d Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment, 82d Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, North Carolina
Jun 97 May 00 Battalion S-3 Trainer, later Chief of Plans, G-3, United States Army National Training Center, Fort Irwin, California
Jun 96 Jul 97 Operations Officer, S-3, 1st Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment, 82d Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, North Carolina
SUMMARY OF JOINT ASSIGNMENTS

Director, Pakistan/Afghanistan Coordination Cell, J-5, Joint Staff, Washington, DC
Director, Future Operations, International Security Assistance Force
 Joint Command, OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM, Afghanistan
 Deputy Director, Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization, Arlington, Virginia
 Director, National Joint Operations Intelligence Center, J-3, Joint Staff, Washington, DC
 Deputy Director for Operations, National Military Command Center, J-3, Joint Staff, Washington, DC
 Deputy Director, Europe/North Atlantic Treaty Organization/Russia/Africa Policy, J-5, The Joint Staff, Washington, DC
 Chief, Eastern Europe and Eurasia Division, Deputy Directorate for Politico-Military Affairs (Eastern Europe/Eurasia), J-5, The Joint Staff, Washington, DC
 Assistant Chief of Staff (Operations), C-3, Coalition Task Force-82, OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM, Afghanistan

SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS ASSIGNMENTS

Director, Future Operations, International Security Assistance Force
 Joint Command, OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM, Afghanistan
 Commander, 173rd Brigade Stryker Combat Team, United States Army Alaska, Fort Wainwright, Alaska and OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM, Iraq
 Assistant Chief of Staff (Operations), C-3, Coalition Task Force-82, OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM, Afghanistan

US DECORATIONS AND BADGES

Defense Superior Service Medal
 Legion of Merit
 Bronze Star Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
 Meritorious Service Medal (with 4 Oak Leaf Clusters)
 Army Commendation Medal (with 2 Oak Leaf Clusters)
 Army Achievement Medal (with 4 Oak Leaf Clusters)
 Combat Infantryman Badge
 Expert Infantryman Badge
 Master Parachutist Badge
 Pathfinder Badge
 Air Assault Badge
 Ranger Tab
Transitioning to Afghan Security Lead: Protecting Afghan Women
Testimony to House Armed Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations
April 25 2013
Clare Lockhart

Thank you for the opportunity to testify before this subcommittee.

The factors and conditions that will protect Afghan women are to a large degree the same as those which will protect any Afghan citizen – man, woman or child – in the post 2014 era. The key to the protection of women lies in the establishment of a legitimate state – with functioning and robust institutions across both security and non-security factors – that can secure the trust of and afford protection to its own citizens. I will thus consider the measures that can and should be taken across the spheres of security, the political process, economics, and social/civic development, in full recognition that any attempt at categorization of a complex situation is bound to be problematic, and that the future for Afghan women will lie in the interplay between these factors. It is also in recognition that some of the most critical factors are difficult to specify or measure and lie instead in more intangible concepts such as confidence – confidence of the Afghan people in their own future – and commitment – commitment of the international community in general and US in particular – to the future peace and stability of the South Asia region.

Security for Afghan women to exercise their fundamental rights and protect their hard-won gains will rest first and foremost on the fundamental pillar of security: can the Afghan state defend its citizens from threats to state survival and to its citizens? The risks to the Afghan population and state can be characterized as internal threats from insurgency, criminality, and forms of terrorism and extremism; external threats from neighbors; and political instability related to the upcoming political transition, and to the ability of the body politic to cohere and agree to the rules of the game for governing – as expressed by the Constitution.

The capability of the Afghan forces is fundamental to meeting these threats. Order within any nation state is based on the premise of the monopoly on the legitimate use of force. The Afghan National Security Forces are moving in the direction of this goal in encouraging ways. The ANA has demonstrated its ability to maintain the trust of the Afghan citizenry, consistently polling at the level of 80% trust by citizens. Transition is on track with forces able to secure an increasing proportion of the population and the territory. Continuing a commitment to support these forces with appropriate equipment, training and the right institutional framework will be critical to securing the state and the population, through maintaining this capability and allowing it to take root. While the Afghan forces are moving towards acquiring sufficient capability to meet the internal and external threats, a clear commitment to reinforce or guarantee the fundamental security of the Afghan state and people through resources that can be held in reserve for use in contingencies will be essential for providing the security bridge to a time when Afghanistan can secure itself.
Security for women must be seen not only in the context of state security, but human security. Women as individuals and in the household and community face threats, from a variety of sources, including from security forces, and from criminalized militias, networks and gangs, and the insurgency.

Great attention must be paid to continued professionalization of the security forces, so as to minimize any risk to women. Here focus is needed not only on numbers and capabilities, but ethos, spirit and standards of ethics and integrity.

Perhaps the greatest threat to women and girls comes from the criminalization of state and society. The last decade has coincided with the increase in power, wealth and autonomy of “moneylords” or strong men, many of whom operate as if they live outside the framework of rule of law. Decriminalization of state and society cannot be tackled unless it is recognized as a shared interest and shared burden by both external actors and national actors.

While commitment to the security of Afghanistan is the foundation for security of its women, as is widely acknowledged, security itself will be determined to a considerable degree by the political process. Key risks to the country’s stability are first, whether the succession from the Karzai government to a successor has both a process that is sufficiently trusted and does not catalyze an outbreak of insecurity, and whether the outcome is one that produces a regime capable of governing. Second: the extent to which individuals and groups within the country can overcome their differences and past and current grievances to agree on a formula for co-existing within the same political entity and governing in a way accountable to the expectations of the citizenry. For the first, attention to the election process is imperative. For the second, allowing sufficient space for initiatives along the lines of a national dialogue, whether formal or informal, where political and civic leaders can address the impediments to national unity should be a priority. Lastly, to the extent that compromises are made to achieve peace, it will be vital for the future of women that fundamental rights of women and girls and the hard won gains of the last decade are not whittled away. Women’s rights are not a tradable good.

Security is a necessary platform for the empowerment of women through economic growth, political and civic leadership, and improving social development programs across health, education and creating space for civic engagement. The role and status of women within the economic, civic and political spheres will be vital for the future success and sustainability of Afghanistan as a society.

Women have made enormous strides in their role and status over the last decade. As 25% of the seats in Parliament were reserved for women, and many have emerged in positions of leadership in civic, government and business roles, women’s role in leadership positions is now a part of the social fabric of the country. This applies across the country including in rural areas: over 100,000 women have held positions as elected members of Community Development Councils. Women play a significant role in staffing the education and health service across the countryside, as well as consumers and beneficiaries of these programs.
Continuing to support the type of programs that underpin these opportunities will be essential to preserving gains for women. On the other hand, it is widely acknowledged that much aid expenditure has been badly designed and delivered. The imperative is thus to parse out carefully those programs that work and merit and require ongoing support, from those that do not, as well as identifying lacuna that could be addressed.

Some programs to require significant funding to be maintained, but many of the most successful programs cost very little to design and sustain, relative to their impact. Going forward, this raises significant questions for the way that development programs are designed, managed and financed, not only in Afghanistan, but across the developing world. Programs that rely on a model of multiple layers of sub-contracting where every contractor takes a cut, or those that build parallel systems that leach capacity away from frontline delivery services in the name of capacity building, do not deliver value to either Afghan or US taxpayers. Conversely, there is now a set of programs in Afghanistan that do work, at relatively little cost, and operate at scale. The National Priority Program system, financed through the World Bank Trust Fund, that include the National Solidarity Program, and national programs directed towards health, education and agriculture, are all programs that are delivering at scale and are financed through a burden sharing model where several nations contribute.

Going forward, the initiatives of this House to question the aid delivery model relied upon by USAID to a large degree over the last decade through a small number of large contractors, and find better ways to support institution building, civic spaces and economic activity, in partnership with a broader spectrum of US universities, companies and NGOs are very welcome.

Over the long term, women have traditionally gained empowerment in the economic space, in businesses, through employment in public and private service, and through opportunities in small scale economic activity. In general, focusing on how Afghanistan is to enhance and grow its legitimate economy so as to provide an increasing proportion of the revenue base to sustain its own costs and opportunities for legitimate livelihoods for its citizens is a strategic question that merits great attention in the coming months. Within this, how women can share in the economic dividends across sectors should not be marginalized.

Finally, in the ordinary course of engagement by US Government representatives, across the spectrum of defense, diplomacy, cultural engagement, economic assistance as well as Congressional delegations there are many opportunities to ensure that we open, rather than inadvertently close the space for women’s voice and representation. Seeing meetings with, and hearing from, women across the spectrum of society rather than relying only on a limited set of interlocutors will be important to ensure that we continue to hear from a range of voices and perspectives.
Clare Lockhart

Clare Lockhart is co-founder and director of ISE, which focuses on development across the institutions of state, market and civil society. She also directs the Market Building Initiative, which works to identify approaches to creating jobs, revenue and economic growth. These programs are currently working with governments and leaders across a range of countries including Afghanistan, Kosovo, Nepal, Pakistan, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Southern Sudan, and studying successful transformations across a number of cases including Singapore, EU Accession countries, Malaysia, Indonesia and Gulf countries.

She is co-author of “Fixing Failed States” (OUP, 2008) and author of several articles on development, institution-building and citizenship. She is a regular contributor to the media, including Al Jazeera, BBC, CNN, the Financial Times, Foreign Policy, New York Times, PBS, Sky News, the Times and Washington Post. She has lived and worked in Asia, Africa, the US and Europe. She has lectured widely at universities, public debates and think tanks on issues of state and market functionality, accountability and development.

She is frequently called upon to serve on advisory panels and task forces on security and economic issues, including the World Bank on its fragile states strategy and the United Nations Peace Building Commission and the UN’s strategy for development post-2015.

In 2001 Ms. Lockhart was a member of the UN negotiation team for the Bonn Agreement on Afghanistan and spent several years living in the country as UN and World Bank Adviser, where she helped steward numerous initiatives including the Afghanistan Development Forum, National Development Framework, National Solidarity Program, and a framework for coordination. Prior to 2001, she managed a program on institutions and strategy at the World Bank.

She is a barrister (member of the Bar of England and Wales) and has degrees from Oxford University (a double first in Modern History) and Harvard University (MPA, Kennedy School, Kennedy Memorial Trust Scholar). Ms Lockhart was named as among the 100 most influential global thinkers of 2009 and 2010 for her work on fragile states. Ms. Lockhart was selected for the 2011 Forum of Young Global Leaders by the World Economic Forum and was selected as Chair of the Global Agenda Council on Fragile States for 2011-2012. She has been appointed to the Board of the Asia Foundation and the Women’s Regional Network.
DISCLOSURE FORM FOR WITNESSES
CONCERNING FEDERAL CONTRACT AND GRANT INFORMATION

INSTRUCTION TO WITNESSES: Rule II, clause 2(g)(5), of the Rules of the U.S. House of Representatives for the 113th Congress requires nongovernmental witnesses appearing before House committees to include in their written statements a curriculum vitae and a disclosure of the amount and source of any federal contracts or grants (including subcontracts and subgrants) received during the current and two previous fiscal years either by the witness or by an entity represented by the witness. This form is intended to assist witnesses appearing before the House Committee on Armed Services in complying with the House rule. Please note that a copy of these statements, with appropriate redactions to protect the witness’s personal privacy (including home address and phone number) will be made publicly available in electronic form not later than one day after the witness’s appearance before the committee.

Witness name: Clare Lockhart

Capacity in which appearing: (check one)

- Individual
- Representative

If appearing in a representative capacity, name of the company, association or other entity being represented:

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**Federal Contract Information:** If you or the entity you represent before the Committee on Armed Services has contracts (including subcontracts) with the federal government, please provide the following information:

**Number of contracts (including subcontracts) with the federal government:**
- Current fiscal year (2013): ____________
- Fiscal year 2012: ________________
- Fiscal year 2011: ________________

**Federal agencies with which federal contracts are held:**
- Current fiscal year (2013): ________________
- Fiscal year 2012: ________________
- Fiscal year 2011: ________________

**List of subjects of federal contract(s) (for example, ship construction, aircraft parts manufacturing, software design, force structure consultant, architecture & engineering services, etc.):**
- Current fiscal year (2013): ________________
- Fiscal year 2012: ________________
- Fiscal year 2011: ________________

**Aggregate dollar value of federal contracts held:**
- Current fiscal year (2013): ________________
- Fiscal year 2012: ________________
- Fiscal year 2011: ________________
Federal Grant Information: If you or the entity you represent before the Committee on Armed Services has grants (including subgrants) with the federal government, please provide the following information:

Number of grants (including subgrants) with the federal government:

- Current fiscal year (2013): __________________________;
- Fiscal year 2012: __________________________;
- Fiscal year 2011: __________________________.

Federal agencies with which federal grants are held:

- Current fiscal year (2013): __________________________;
- Fiscal year 2012: __________________________;
- Fiscal year 2011: __________________________.

List of subjects of federal grants(s) (for example, materials research, sociological study, software design, etc.):

- Current fiscal year (2013): __________________________;
- Fiscal year 2012: __________________________;
- Fiscal year 2011: __________________________.

Aggregate dollar value of federal grants held:

- Current fiscal year (2013): __________________________;
- Fiscal year 2012: __________________________;
- Fiscal year 2011: __________________________.
Statement before the U.S. House of Representatives
Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations

"TRANSITIONING TO AFGHAN SECURITY
LEAD: PROTECTING AFGHAN WOMEN?"

A Statement by

Stephanie Sanok
Deputy Director and Senior Fellow,
International Security Program
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)

April 25, 2013
Rayburn House Office Building
Madam Chairman, Ranking Member Tsongas, and Members of the Subcommittee, on behalf of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and our President and Chief Executive Officer, Dr. John Hamre, thank you for this opportunity to present an independent assessment of the security of Afghan women and girls and to provide recommended areas for enduring progress in this area. It is a great honor and pleasure to appear before you today.

The issue of protecting Afghan women and girls is not a new one. For more than a decade, many Afghan government officials and local community leaders have worked – with the advice and support of U.S. and international partners – to develop and implement key reforms that could better safeguard the rights, opportunities, and security of this vulnerable population. Since 2001, considerable attention and resources have focused on changing Afghanistan’s legal, security, political, and economic constructs toward this end. Major steps toward supporting the protection of Afghan women and girls have included creation of: a 10-year National Action Plan for the Women of Afghanistan (2008); the Law on Elimination of Violence against Women (2009); a High Commission on Elimination of Violence against Women (2010); a Special Prosecution Unit in the Attorney General’s Office (2010); Family Response Units in the Afghan National Police; gender units in a variety of Afghan government ministries and departments; and regulations on shelters and access to legal aid. In light of these developments, it is certainly true that, as stated by the Department of Defense in its most recent Report on Progress toward Stability and Security in Afghanistan, “circumstances for Afghan women and girls have improved significantly since 2001.”

But while these steps and others have changed the circumstances in which Afghan women and girls live, have they translated into actual greater security? Recognizing that security – broadly defined – includes a range of critical areas, from educational and employment opportunities to voting rights and political participation, I would like to...

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focus my testimony on the physical security of Afghan women and girls. In particular, I would like to provide information on the types of incidents which have occurred recently, despite U.S., international, and Afghan efforts to eliminate violence against women and girls, as well as on issues surrounding access to justice. Finally, I will offer my perspective on programs and efforts that may offer the most promise for providing greater physical security for women in girls, both during and after the transition of security responsibilities to the Afghan National Security Forces in late 2014.

Security Incidents

First, it is important to understand the current state of violence against Afghan women and girls. According to the United Nations, more than 300 women and girls were killed and more than 560 injured in 2012, representing a 20 percent increase in such casualties over the previous year. Last month, United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-moon expressed strong concern about these incidents, saying that he remains “deeply disturbed that despite some improvements in prosecuting cases of violence, there is still a pervasive climate of impunity in Afghanistan for abuses of women and girls. They have the inviolable right to live free of fear or attack, and women and girls are key to a better future for Afghanistan. Protecting them is central to peace, prosperity and stability for all people in the country.”

In December 2012, the United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA) released an updated critique of Afghan efforts to protect Afghan women and girls. Due to the general lack of availability, and the general underreporting, of comprehensive official data, there are significant challenges in gathering statistically significant and sufficiently detailed information on reporting, registration, investigation, and prosecution of violence against women and girls. That said, UNAMA’s report – entitled Still a Long Way to Go: Implementation of the Law on Elimination of Violence against Women in Afghanistan – provides a useful synopsis of incidents from October 2011 to September 2012, including but not limited to information on battery and laceration, sexual violence and harmful practices (e.g., early and forced marriages), ba’ad (i.e., use of girls in marriage to settle disputes), and “honor” killings.

In the year addressed by the report, battery and laceration was the most prevalent type of case reported to the Afghan National Police (ANP) and prosecutors with some 896 complaints. Twenty-nine incidents of “honor” killings were registered with the ANP, 39 with prosecution offices, and 27 with the courts in the same timeframe. Incidents of sexual violence, including rape and forced prostitution, were also high: “the ANP and prosecutor’s offices from 22 provinces registered 63 and 93 cases of rape respectively,

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4 It is important to note that while a landmark piece of legislation, the Law on the Elimination of Violence against Women does not cover incidents of “honor” killings or spousal rape.
5 UNAMA, p. 19.
6 UNAMA, p. 20.
while courts from 22 provinces filed 64 rape cases for the reporting period. Additional information is available on forced self-immolation, as well as forced, underage, and ba’ad marriages.

Anecdotal evidence abounds, but it appears that cultural and social norms, customary and religious beliefs, and threats to life prevent women and girls from reporting crimes to formal law enforcement and justice institutions. This is an important – and difficult – area in which change is necessary to counteract widespread violence that is clearly preventing women from participating in public life or helping to determine Afghanistan’s peaceful, stable future to the maximum extent possible. Families and communities play a significant role in addressing violence, and tailored efforts can help to support more effective programs in this process.

Access to Justice

Institutions also have an important role to play. Law enforcement and judicial officials must have not only the capability and capacity to implement existing laws, such as the Law on the Elimination of Violence against Women, but also the political will to do so. It appears that basic rule of law principles – as applied to incidents of violence against women and girls – require considerable attention that is focused on capability, capacity, and political will.

UNAMA identified the following as primary factors that hinder victims’ access to justice: lack of trust in the ANP, prosecutors and Departments of Women’s Affairs; absence of shelters, civil society organizations and women’s rights organizations; and lack of knowledge about the legal protections and mechanisms. There is reportedly evidence that ANP, prosecutors, and courts may exercise a disregard for transparency, delay processing cases, misplace documents and other evidence, fail to conduct adequate investigations, provide varying treatment to suspects and accused in the same cases, and lack accountability. Some of these failings reflect a certain level of incompetence, some reflect a certain level of corruption, some reflect a certain level of discrimination – practiced by police, prosecutors, and courts alike – against women, and some reflect a combination of these elements.

As I am sure you have heard from the Department of Defense, there is a continued effort to recruit and train women as part of the Afghan National Police; similar efforts are underway for qualified prosecutors and judges. This is a critical area as women and girls are much more likely to approach a female official to report a violent incident. However, the ANP is a long way from meeting its goal of 3,000 women members – in fact, they are roughly halfway there. Moreover, those female ANP members are often relegated to supporting roles, working behind the scenes in administrative functions instead of interacting with communities. This is certainly an area for further improvement.

7 UNAMA, p. 21.
8 UNAMA, p. 24.
Finally, aside from these cultural and recruitment hindrances, part of the underlying problem is the cumbersome, non-standardized process for submitting a complaint. This process, which can refer victims to offices that simply do not have jurisdiction on criminal cases of violence against women, may result in referral after referral, sending victims to multiple offices over a protracted, disheartening period of time. Moreover, there is often inadequate follow-up in the cases of referrals.

**Promising Programs and Efforts**

With projects at the national, provincial, and community levels, U.S. Government programs appear to knit together several different elements that can empower, and advocate for, women. The Department of State and the United States Agency for International Development have lead U.S. Government responsibility for many of the women’s initiatives in Afghanistan, many of which focus on increased political, economic, and civic participation, urban development, and capacity-building for the Ministry of Women’s Affairs. The Department of Defense works with Departments of Woman’s Affairs at provincial and district levels, provides mentors to security ministries on gender integration and human rights, and aims to work with Afghan female security forces to create a more enduring engagement capability that could benefit women throughout the country. Regarding security and access to justice, though, the most promising U.S. Government programs aim for “an effective rule of law where women can rely on both the informal and the formal sectors.” These programs aim to increase involvement of women as police officers, prosecutors, defense attorneys, judges, and other positions in the spectrum of the justice system.

To reinforce these positive steps, the U.S. Government, international community, and Afghan leaders may want to focus increased attention on the details of capability- and capacity-building in the hopes of mitigating discrimination against women, addressing bureaucratic hindrances, and persuading victims to access the justice system. Programs in this area should emphasize outreach to communities, working with civil society and local leaders to raise awareness of options available to victims of violence and of the potential consequences for perpetrators; this outreach should include efforts to work with Afghan men and boys, in terms that resonate with them, to develop greater sensitivity to why violence against women and girls is a real and preventable problem. In addition, programs should reform bureaucratic processes – whether in clarifying jurisdictions, streamlining documentation, improving custody of evidence, or other practical steps – that hinder the timely registration, investigation, and prosecution of violence against women and girls. Another important step will be to ensure that Afghan women are in meaningful positions within the justice sector – not simply relegated to administrative tasks.

In short, there needs to be a reliable, trustworthy system through which Afghan officials can implement landmark legislation, such as the Law on the Elimination of Violence.

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10 U.S. Department of Defense, p. 143.
against Women, and other institutional changes that can better protect Afghan women. U.S. Government efforts to enable such a system should focus support in addressing the key deficiencies.

Final Thoughts

Finally, it is important to note that while the security of Afghan women and girls can be a valuable indicator about the overall security throughout the country, United Nations Special Envoy to Afghanistan Jan Kubis recently acknowledged that most incidents are not linked to insurgent violence in that nation. Rather, attacks are “linked to domestic violence, tradition, culture of the country.”11 Because this is a problem within the Afghan society, it will be difficult – if not impossible – for U.S. or other international forces to address adequately. I would be happy to discuss the implications of the current situation for a residual U.S. force in Afghanistan after the 2014 transition of security responsibilities, should any Member of the Subcommittee want to examine that particular issue set.

Again, I appreciate the opportunity to engage in this conversation, and I stand ready to respond to your questions.

Stephanie Sanok is deputy director of the CSIS International Security Program, where she focuses on a range of "seam" issues affecting defense, foreign affairs, and development. Her research interests include defense policy and strategy, U.S. government stabilization and reconstruction efforts, the nexus between security and economic development, transitions of post-conflict responsibilities, and U.S. military activities to partner with foreign nations and other organizations. Prior to joining CSIS, Ms. Sanok served at the U.S. embassy in Baghdad, where she developed policy options for the U.S. government's efforts to support a sovereign, stable, and self-reliant Iraq. She collaborated closely with military and civilian colleagues to revise the Joint Campaign Plan—an interagency strategy to strengthen U.S. relations with Iraq along political, economic, energy, rule of law, and security lines of operation and identify strategic risks and transition issues related to the U.S. military withdrawal. From 2005 to 2008, Ms. Sanok was a senior professional staff member on the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Armed Services, where she led a team on overarching defense policy topics, such as military strategy, detention operations, export controls and technology security, troop levels in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the Pentagon's role in foreign assistance and civil aspects of overseas operations. At the Pentagon from 1998 to 2005, she worked in the secretary of defense's counterproliferation, European, and NATO policy offices and, as a Presidential Management Fellow, completed rotations in the secretary of defense's policy, comptroller, and personnel/readiness offices, in the Joint Staff's Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate, and at the U.S. embassy in Sarajevo and the U.S. mission to NATO. Ms. Sanok received a master of public policy degree with concentrations in international security policy and conflict resolution from Harvard University and a degree in communication and international relations from Cornell University.
DISCLOSURE FORM FOR WITNESSES
CONCERNING FEDERAL CONTRACT AND GRANT INFORMATION

INSTRUCTION TO WITNESSES: Rule 11, clause 2(g)(5), of the Rules of the U.S. House of Representatives for the 113th Congress requires nongovernmental witnesses appearing before House committees to include in their written statements a curriculum vitae and a disclosure of the amount and source of any federal contracts or grants (including subcontracts and subgrants) received during the current and two previous fiscal years either by the witness or by an entity represented by the witness. This form is intended to assist witnesses appearing before the House Committee on Armed Services in complying with the House rule. Please note that a copy of these statements, with appropriate redactions to protect the witness’s personal privacy (including home address and phone number) will be made publicly available in electronic form not later than one day after the witness’s appearance before the committee.

Witness name: Stephanie Sanek

Capacity in which appearing: (check one)

☐ Individual
☐ Representative

If appearing in a representative capacity, name of the company, association or other entity being represented:

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Federal Contract Information: If you or the entity you represent before the Committee on Armed Services has contracts (including subcontracts) with the federal government, please provide the following information:

Number of contracts (including subcontracts) with the federal government:

Current fiscal year (2013): see above table;
Fiscal year 2012: ____________________;
Fiscal year 2011: ____________________.

Federal agencies with which federal contracts are held:

Current fiscal year (2013): see above table;
Fiscal year 2012: ____________________;
Fiscal year 2011: ____________________.

List of subjects of federal contract(s) (for example, ship construction, aircraft parts manufacturing, software design, force structure consultant, architecture & engineering services, etc.):

Current fiscal year (2013): see above table;
Fiscal year 2012: ____________________;
Fiscal year 2011: ____________________.

Aggregate dollar value of federal contracts held:

Current fiscal year (2013): see above table;
Fiscal year 2012: ____________________;
Fiscal year 2011: ____________________.
Federal Grant Information: If you or the entity you represent before the Committee on Armed Services has grants (including subgrants) with the federal government, please provide the following information:

Number of grants (including subgrants) with the federal government: **None relevant**

- Current fiscal year (2013):
- Fiscal year 2012:
- Fiscal year 2011:

Federal agencies with which federal grants are held:

- Current fiscal year (2013):
- Fiscal year 2012:
- Fiscal year 2011:

List of subjects of federal grants(s) (for example, materials research, sociological study, software design, etc.):

- Current fiscal year (2013):
- Fiscal year 2012:
- Fiscal year 2011:

Aggregate dollar value of federal grants held:

- Current fiscal year (2013):
- Fiscal year 2012:
- Fiscal year 2011:
WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING

APRIL 25, 2013
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MRS. ROBY

General Shields. The Family Response Unit (FRU) program is an Afghan Ministry of Interior program and is not being eliminated. Over 300 Afghan personnel remain assigned in all 34 provinces and large districts. Currently, 22 contractors provide advisory support to the FRU program. Due to drawdown limitations affecting the contractors' security, logistics re-supply, and effective FRU mentor auditing/oversight, NTM–A decided to de-scope the advisory contract. However, the FRU program will remain an active Ministry of Interior Program. [See page 9.]

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MS. TSONGAS

Mr. Sedney. NTM–A has no data from the MOI or MOD on attrition by gender. The ministries measure attrition as a percentage of the entire force, and do not break this data out according to gender. [See page 10.]

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ANDREWS

Mr. Sedney. The number of Women in the Afghan National Security Forces is as follows:

Afghan National Army: 416 (as of April 18th, 2013).
Afghan National Police: 1521 (as of April 18th, 2013).
Afghan Air Force: 44 (as of April 18th, 2013). [See page 13.]

Mr. Sedney. There is no specific program within our Armed Forces currently that focuses solely on female service members training/mentoring Afghan women. However, there are a number of key and successful partnerships and programs currently ongoing that facilitate direct mentoring of Afghan women at the strategic and tactical level.

Currently at the strategic level there are advisors at the Ministry of Defense, Afghan Defense University, the Female Training Battalion at Kabul Military Training Center, and the Ministry of Interior. These positions are staffed through NATO Training Mission Afghanistan (NTM–A), United Nations Development Program (UNDP), and Non-Governmental Organizations. The DOD APPAK Hands program specifically contributes female program members to serve as advisors/mentors in a number of Afghan Ministries.

Most recently UNDP launched a mentorship pilot program that is functioning in 4 provinces (Jalalabad, Herat, Kabul, and Mazar-e-Sharif). The program is supported by a consortium of members to include, Afghanistan Public Policy Research Organization (APPRO), Afghan Women's Skills Development Center (AWSDC), Justice for All, Medical Afghanistan, and Women for Afghan Women (all Afghan organizations funded by NTM–A). This program was developed to facilitate professional growth and to address issues faced by female members of the Afghan National Police. At the tactical level, Female Engagement Teams (FET) continue to support operations with a secondary effect of providing mentorship and assistance to Afghan women, both within and outside of the Afghan National Security Forces. The relationships developed by this support element and the issues they have identified have helped focus regional efforts in the development of feasible women's assistance programs. Members of the FET are identified by their individual services. [See page 13.]

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MS. SPEIER

Mr. Sedney. We have passed your concerns on the State Department, the U.S. Government lead for asylum-related issues, and asked that the appropriate official take appropriate action on your proposal. [See page 16.]
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MS. DUCKWORTH

Mr. SEDNEY, As discussed earlier in my testimony, and in the previous 1230 Report on Stability and Security in Afghanistan, the United States promotes the recruitment and rights of women in the ANSF through several programs.

U.S. activities in Afghanistan do not, however, include the hiring and firing of ANSF personnel, or authority over the ranks and positions of individuals within the ANSF. Afghanistan is a sovereign country, and the United States does not have the legal authority to interfere directly in their military personnel decisions. ISAF does often advise the ANSF on personnel matters. However, to impose upon the Afghans to “put females at the highest levels” of the ANSF would be an unprecedented level of interference in their internal personnel decisions. This type of interference would likely generate a strong negative reaction from leaders across the ANSF.

Authority in the ANSF is based more upon personal contacts and informal networks than it is in many Western nations. A woman who had been “put” in a position at the highest levels of the ANSF as a result of U.S. pressure would likely be resented and treated poorly, and would have little real authority. This could do significant harm to the cause of promoting women within the ANSF. The current ISAF mission is ending in 2014, and it is unlikely that women who have been “put” into high office within the ANSF would be able to retain their status after this time. [See page 17.]
QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MS. DUCKWORTH

Ms. DUCKWORTH. What are U.S. forces doing to provide necessary support to the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to:

• increase recruitment of women in the ANSF;
• ensure female mentors for women in the ANSF;
• monitor how women are assigned and utilized by their superiors in the districts and provinces; and
• address the institutional barriers to recruitment and retention (such as lack of sex-segregated facilities, pervasive sexual harassment, etc.)?

Acknowledging that the political transition and the security transition are inextricably linked—can you explain how U.S.-led Coalition Forces are working with the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan on security preparations for the upcoming presidential election (currently scheduled for April 2014)? Specifically, what is being done to increase the number of female security personnel capable of staffing women’s voting stations?

Mr. SEDNEY. Improving the recruitment of women into the ANSF, their status and treatment within the ANSF, and the ANSF’s treatment of female civilians across the country is important to the Department of Defense. However, recruitment of women into the ANSF will remain a serious challenge, given Afghanistan’s history, culture, and society. The U.S. has many efforts to increase the number of women in the ANSF, mainly through the NATO Training Mission–Afghanistan’s (NTM–A) Afghan National Security Force (ANSF) training and advising programs. ISAF has Gender Advisors, who educate personnel, ensure that women’s rights and security are factored into decisions, and coordinates the gender-related efforts of their subcommands and external international organizations, NGOs, and governmental organizations.

As a result, gender training is now in place across much of the ANSF, harassment and violence against women in the ANSF are being addressed, educational projects for women are being established, and political will is present in certain areas.

NTM–A promotes female recruitment and gender integration in its interactions with the ANSF. To help increase the recruitment of women into the Afghan National Army (ANA), and safeguard women’s rights, the Afghan Ministry of Defense (MOD), with assistance from NTM–A, has begun to stand up the Directorate of Human Rights and Gender Integration (HR&GI). The MOD assigned a Major General as the director and an Afghan Air Force (AAF) Colonel to the deputy position; both are actively working to improve the rights of women and to increase the Directorate’s manning authorization from five to 36 positions. The number of women taking the test for acceptance into the National Military Academy of Afghanistan (NMMA) increased from 47 to 97 in the last six months. The Afghan Ministry of Interior (MOI) also conducted a recruiting campaign for Special Operations Forces and received 34 female applicants, and accepted seven.

The recruitment and retention of women in the ANA and ANP is also an element of the U.S.-Afghanistan Bilateral Commission’s Democracy and Shared Values Working Group. The Embassy, in coordination with ISAF, also regularly engages the Afghan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, MOI, and MOD on this issue to emphasize the importance of women in the ANSF.

As women graduate from ANA and ANP training courses, NTM–A advisors are helping to find female graduates appropriate assignments. NTM–A Gender Integration Officers conduct site visits of ANA and ANP recruiting and training centers, analyzing assignments for ANSF women. Female ANSF recruits have previously faced problems getting uniforms and boots that fit, but this issue has subsequently been resolved without additional funding. NTM–A advisors worked with the ANA and ANP Chief of Logistics to advise on planning, projecting, and ordering smaller sizes for the female recruits through the same system male uniforms are ordered.

With robust assistance from NTM–A advisors, the MOD is working to establish courses on women’s history, gender-based customs, and gender-based harassment for ANSF personnel. The objective of this effort is to have the Afghans develop these courses based on historical values, Qur’an passages, and cultural context.
ISAF, MOD, and MOI have a large number of personnel and programs aimed at protecting women’s rights and promoting women in the ANSF. Additionally, the MOI signed an order to prevent sexual harassment in the ANSF while continuing human rights and gender training. ISAF sent a mobile training team (MTT) to Herat to train policewomen, and the ABP has conducted similar training, helping to make fielded female ANSF personnel more effective. Several other organizations, including UNAMA and European Police (EUPOL), also provide gender-related training.

NTM–A gender-integration officers coordinated with ISAF Joint Command (IJC)-Female Engagement Teams (FET) to build the gender-integration network by sharing information throughout different organizations and levels. The members of this network have the lead responsibility for gender issues in their organizations. This network has over fifty personnel working in all Regional Commands (RCs), including three in RC–N, two in CFSCOCC–A, 17 in RC–E, 11 in RC–S, three in RC–SW, fourteen in RC–W, four in RC–N, and one in RC–C. NTM–A and IJC collaboration includes highlighting lessons learned, and exchanging current projects and upcoming events to support, such as graduations, training, or International Women’s Day.

Election Security

Helping Afghans achieve a peaceful transfer of authority in 2014 is one of the U.S. Government’s highest priorities in Afghanistan. The U.S. Government encourages government and political opposition leaders to build consensus around candidates broadly representative of Afghanistan’s ethnic and political diversity. The United States provides technical advice and support, consistent with international commitments. U.S. embassy leadership meets with President Karzai and his advisors, the Independent Election Committee (IEC), Parliament, the political opposition, and civil society organization leaders to discuss prioritized actions and decisions to be carried out before election day. The credibility of the elections hinges on the decisions and implementation of electoral reforms that incorporate internationally accepted practices. Decisions and reforms include creating an independent mechanism for resolving electoral disputes, and passing legislation to reinforce Afghanistan’s electoral institutions. The United States urges consultation in these efforts among President Karzai, Parliament, the IEC, the political opposition, and civil society to help ensure that decisions ultimately will have buy-in from the Afghan population.

In conformance with the overall security transition, ISAF will maintain a low profile to avoid perceptions of international influence or interference in Afghan sovereign responsibilities. The ISAF Campaign Plan includes an appendix which outlines actions ISAF will be prepared to take only when and if requested by GIRoA. ISAF support will be confined to logistics, intelligence, route clearance, and in extremis support. ISAF will consider providing quick reaction forces across Afghanistan for international community election observers. As a contingency, ISAF may deploy forces in the event the ANSF are not able to provide for the safety of Coalition personnel or members of the international community involved in the election. The U.S. Force Management Level (FML) of 34,000 forces for the election period is structured to maintain operational security through a potential elections unrest period (February to June 2014). Coalition Forces will, together with their Afghan advised counterparts, be able to provide a rapid in extremis response, in the event the local security deteriorates beyond the ANSF’s ability to control it.

Ms. DUCKWORTH. What are U.S. forces doing to provide necessary support to the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to:

• increase recruitment of women in the ANSF;
• ensure female mentors for women in the ANSF;
• monitor how women are assigned and utilized by their superiors in the districts and provinces; and
• address the institutional barriers to recruitment and retention (such as lack of sex-segregated facilities, pervasive sexual harassment, etc.)?

Acknowledging that the political transition and the security transition are inextricably linked—can you explain how U.S.-led Coalition Forces are working with the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan on security preparations for the upcoming presidential election (currently scheduled for April 2014)? Specifically, what is being done to increase the number of female security personnel capable of staffing women’s voting stations?

General SHIELDS. NATO Training Mission Afghanistan (NTM–A) has provided one Gender Advisor to mentor the Human Rights, Gender and Child Rights Directorate at Ministry of Interior (MOI) who conducts outreach to assist with gender integration across all functional areas to include recruitment. Engagements have been conducted with a number of key Afghan departments in order to emphasize the im-
portance of this subject. The Afghan Ministry of Defense (MOD) has started a working group to review gender integration policy and develop new recruiting policies.

The majority of efforts to provide female mentorship are occurring at the ministerial level and within the higher echelons of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP). These efforts are not nested within one singular female mentoring program.

A mentor has been provided for the ANP Senior Enlisted Non Commissioned Officer (NCO) from the MOI Gender Division. She is working to enhance the quality of life and empowerment for female ANP NCOs. United Nations Development Program (UNDP) currently has a female police mentorship pilot program that is functioning in 4 provinces (Jalalabad, Herat, Kabul, and Mazar-e-Sharif).

Within the ANA placements are based on decisions made within the General Staff at the MOD GSG1. The assignment process is the same for both genders. The process is the same within the MOI. MOI maintains job descriptions, and a tracker identifying the number of female police by location, with associated duty descriptions.

MOD has made the designation of a facility/building a local command decision. MOI is in the process of addressing the issue of female facilities. Currently, 54 Family Response Unit locations (co-located with ANP HQ locations) have received additional structures/construction to facilitate offices/barracks for the FRU. All buildings that were constructed by NTMA have female bathrooms and facilities.

Instead of using female ANP members, MOI plans on temporarily hiring 14–15K women from the private sector to be trained as security screeners for the approximately 7,000 polling centers. Elections security planning efforts continue with MOI serving as the lead security ministry.