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**RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN
AFGHANISTAN**

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HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS

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ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS

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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN AFGHANISTAN

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, April 17, 2013.

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:04 a.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Howard P. "Buck" McKeon (chairman of the committee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD P. "BUCK" MCKEON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, COM- MITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

The CHAIRMAN. Committee will come to order. Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. The House Armed Services Committee meets to receive testimony on the recent developments in Afghanistan.

Today we have with us General Joseph Dunford.

General Dunford, thank you for your leadership. Thank you for the great job you are doing. Will you please convey our best to those men and women that you are serving with there in Afghanistan when you return?

General DUNFORD. I will do that, Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Great.

The NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] mission has entered a period of transition. Although NATO has not fully transitioned security efforts of Afghan lead, President Obama already has announced the withdrawal of half of the U.S. forces in Afghanistan by this time next year.

In my view, the President's approach is fraught with unnecessary risk. Nevertheless, on my recent trip to the region, I was impressed with how far the Afghan security forces have come. Their capabilities and willingness to fight for their country are remarkable.

The fundamental question before us is how the United States will continue to preserve U.S. national security interests after 2014. One of the key components to answering this question, in addition to the President's forthcoming decision on post-2014 troop presence and mission set will be the Bilateral Security Agreement that the Administration is currently negotiating with the government of Afghanistan.

After over 10 years of war, the American people are understandably war-weary. Clearly, the situation in Afghanistan and the region is challenging and complex. But Afghanistan is directly connected to our vital national security interests, so we must get this right. We owe nothing less to the victims on 9/11, the U.S. troops and their families who have served and sacrificed and our sons and daughters who may have to return if we get this wrong.

The simple justice that comes from that principled position cannot be overstated.

General Dunford, again, we are extremely grateful for your service to our country and for the job that you are performing right now in the most critical part of the world. I look forward to your testimony.

Mr. Smith.

[The prepared statement of Chairman McKeon can be found in the Appendix on page 47.]

STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM WASHINGTON, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I share in your comments about the outstanding job General Dunford has done and the job that our troops have done in a very, very difficult environment.

I have been there many times myself and I have seen the progress, and not just in Kabul, not just in the capital, but out in some of the tougher regions, down in Helmand, down south in Kandahar and other places. Our men and women have done an amazing job and they did it by putting their lives on the line and going out there and cleaning up places that needed to be cleaned up and giving the Afghan people the chance in a more stable future.

So we definitely recognize the service, the sacrifice, and the outstanding job that they have done and admire the progress that has been made.

I also want to say that I thank General Dunford, I heard some of his comments yesterday. I think it has been clear for some time what our goals are in Afghanistan. I have always had a great frustration that people say we don't know what we are doing there. We know exactly what we are doing there.

We want to make sure that we have an Afghan government that can stand, that can be stable, that has security and governance without us, because we cannot have a permanent presence there. We want to deny Al Qaeda the ability to return to Afghanistan and use it as a safe haven. And really that second goal is tied directly to the first of having an Afghan government that can stand and survive against the Taliban, against potential AQ [Al Qaeda] elements. I think that has been clear from the start.

Those are modest, realistic goals. We are not going to eliminate the Taliban from the Afghanistan-Pakistan region. The question is can we contain them and what is the best strategy for containing them? And the best strategy for containing them is doing our level best to train the Afghan security forces to be in a position to do that. And I think we have made enormous progress on that front and we are headed in the right direction.

But part of doing that is making it clear that eventually we are going to leave. Eventually they are going to have that responsibility. We cannot be a permanent crutch. We have to transition. And we have seen that.

As we have moved from district to district and province to province, we have turned over slowly and gradually and I think very intelligently greater responsibility to those Afghan national secu-

rity forces. We haven't just said, woop, you are on your own and pulled out. We have been transitioning in a way to build their strength, capability and durability.

Now there are no guarantees, no doubt about that. This is a very, very difficult part of the world. It will be a very, very difficult part of the world 5 years from now, 10 years from and, odds are, 20 years from now. But we have put the Afghan national security forces in the best possible position to be able to, at a minimum, hold, to stop the Taliban from taking back over the government and giving Al Qaeda a safe haven.

And as we go forward, we have to try to envision what our role is going to be. And I will agree with the Chairman, I think the single most important thing right now is to get that Bilateral Security Agreement to eliminate some of that uncertainty as to what exactly our role is going to be post-2014.

I know General Dunford is working hard on that. I know General—sorry, President Karzai is not always the easiest person to work with to get there, but I know that is a huge priority.

But at the end of the day, we cannot stay in Afghanistan forever for a wide variety of reasons, but the only one I will point out here is that if we do, the Afghan government will never truly be sovereign, will never truly be stable and will never truly have the respect of the Afghan people that it needs to be the sustainable government that we need it to be.

So I think the path the President and General Dunford and others have put us on, though not easy, though not full of guarantees, it is the best, smartest path to put us in a direction where we can have the security goals that we strive for in that very, very difficult part of the region.

I thank General Dunford again for his service. I look forward to his testimony and to the questions from the panel. I yield back, thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the Appendix on page 48.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

General Dunford.

STATEMENT OF GEN JOSEPH F. DUNFORD, JR., USMC, COMMANDER, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE FORCE AND UNITED STATES FORCES—AFGHANISTAN

General DUNFORD. Good morning, Chairman McKeon, Ranking Member Smith, distinguished members of the committee. I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you this morning and represent the men and women of the U.S. Forces—Afghanistan.

Thanks to your leadership and support, they are well trained and well equipped. Their extraordinary courage and performance reflects that support. U.S. Forces—Afghanistan remains focused on denying safe haven in Afghanistan to Al Qaeda terrorists who attacked our Nation on 9/11 and denying the Taliban who harbored them the ability to overthrow the Afghan government.

We recognize that our national interests in the region are served by a secure and stable Afghanistan at peace with its neighbors. I appear before you this morning confident in the cardinal direction of the campaign. My confidence is based on the very real progress

we have made since the surge of forces that began in late 2009. And that surge has allowed us to move the campaign forward.

The constant pressure we have exerted on the remnants of Al Qaeda in Afghanistan has disrupted their ability to plan and conduct operations in the West. Our coalition Afghan partner operations have pushed the Taliban away from populated areas and prevented them from meeting their campaign objectives in 2012.

While they remain resilient, they are less of an existential threat to the Afghan government than they were in 2011. Most significantly, our efforts since 2009 have provided the Afghan forces the time and space they need to grow and assume the lead.

Today the Afghan forces have recruited and fielded most of their authorized strength of 352,000. They are leading approximately 80 percent of all combat operations currently being conducted. And they have lead security responsibility for territory where nearly 90 percent of the population lives.

Later this Spring, in line with the plan outlined at the Lisbon and Chicago summits, Afghan forces will be in the lead for combat operations across the nation. Today's hearing truly comes at an inflection point in the Afghan campaign. There are many reasons to be optimistic.

That said, there are significant challenges we must overcome to meet our objectives. Up to this point, it is fair to say we were focused on growing the size of the Afghan national security forces. We are now focused on improving the quality of the forces. In the months ahead, we will focus on a wide range of issues to include leadership development, ministerial capacity, aviation, and the systems to process these and the institutions necessary to support the modern professional army.

In the coming months we will also need to address very real political and psychological factors that will affect the outcome of the campaign. With regard to political factors, we are at a point in the campaign where there is real tension between increasing aspirations of Afghan sovereignty and the reality of operations conducted in accordance with the U.N. [United Nations] Security Mandate, the Law of Armed Conflict, and the Military Technical Agreement. Properly managing that tension is now a campaign imperative.

The psychological aspect of the campaign is equally important right now. Psychology will influence the performance of the Afghan forces this summer and affect the critical elections of 2014. We confront growing uncertainty in Afghanistan and in the region. Many Afghans have told me they no longer fear the Taliban as much as they fear what will happen after 2014.

One Afghan described it to me as the Y2K [year 2000] effect. There is a growing sense that December 2014 is a cliff for the Afghan people. That dynamic must be addressed with a credible, compelling narrative of U.S. commitment. Absent confidence in the hope for a brighter future, Afghan leaders, the Afghan people, and regional actors will continue to hedge and plan for the worst case. The behaviors associated with that mindset have the very real potential to undermine the campaign.

In closing, there is a great deal to be optimistic about at this point. But we are in the decisive phase of transition. The progress we have made to date provides real opportunity but not inevi-

tability. There will continue to be challenges that will test our will and our endurance. But in the end, if we define winning as completing political and security transition, while rendering Al Qaeda operationally ineffective, if we define winning as setting the conditions for the Afghans to exploit the decade of opportunity that will come in 2015, I firmly believe that we can win.

Thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you this morning. And Chairman, I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of General Dunford can be found in the Appendix on page 50.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, General. You know when I was there in theater a few weeks ago, it was the most encouraging trip I have had, the time you spent with us, the briefings that we had, the things that we were able to see as we traveled to different regions. I just felt more positive than I felt in the other visits I have had there. Although each of them seems to, I have seen improvement.

And one of the things I heard there was that when the war started there were about 1 million Afghan children going to school and probably none of them were girls. And now it is over 8 million and a lot of them are girls. When I was there the time before, they opened a school down in Marjah. When I had been there before we couldn't go to Marjah.

And the Marines were firmly in control and the school was open. They had 500 kids that were really excited about the opportunity of going to school. About a third of them were young girls. Not a school like our kids go to here in America, just a humble building out of adobe with a few classrooms and a couple of tents and 10 teachers and 500 kids. But it was great for them. And I just, I was really optimistic when we left.

You know I think if we can continue to have a presence there, if we can get this Bilateral Security Agreement, if we can have enough security that we can go in and teach them how to use new agricultural methods. I looked at each of their little plots, you know, as we were flying around. That could become a prosperous country. It could be a very good story in the future. Probably when none of us are still around.

It would be based though, on what you have done to this point. What you and Admiral Cunningham and the efforts you are making now on that Bilateral Security Agreement. Because I think if we don't get that, if we don't leave a presence, if we end up like we did pulling out of Iraq then none of that, I fear, will be able to come to pass.

In your view General, when would you like to see the BSA [Bilateral Security Agreement] concluded, assuming it wasn't yesterday? If the negotiations drag on, what are your concerns from a military options and planning perspective?

General DUNFORD. Chairman, thank you. As you alluded to, the Bilateral Security Agreement is critical. That will inform our presence post-2014. The U.N. Security Mandate will expire in December 2014, so our presence post-2014, will be based on the agreement that we make with the Afghan government.

There are really two issues with the Bilateral Security Agreement. One is the internal audience and that is to address this idea

of uncertainty and lack of confidence that the Afghan people have about the future. And from my perspective the Bilateral Security Agreement will be the physical manifestation of our commitment post-2014 and really form the foundation of an effective narrative.

I mentioned in my opening comments that we needed a clear, compelling narrative for the future to help overcome the Taliban message which has been one of abandonment and this Y2K effect that I described.

The other reason why the Bilateral Security Agreement is important is because our coalition partners are very much looking to the United States to lead with regard to post-2014. And they are going to need the time to generate the political will in their capitals and do the detailed budget planning, just as we have to do, for a post-2014 presence.

Originally the Agreement was to have that signed not later than November of 2013. When President Obama met with President Karzai in January they agreed to accelerate that timeline. We are now cautiously optimistic that we would get that in May or June. I think it is very important that we get that before the 2013 fighting season.

As the Afghans go into the 2013 fighting season, and they are absolutely going to be in the lead as we go into the 2013 fighting season, the information environment in which they will operate in 2013, will be very much informed by the sense of commitment that we provide about post-2014. And again, I believe that the cornerstone of that commitment is the Bilateral Security Agreement.

I think it is very, very important, both from a psychological perspective inside the country, as well as for our ability to form a coalition post-2014. And I would strongly recommend we do that. I think that the coalition that we have had over the past several years has been very effective and I think we want to continue to incentivize our coalition partners to participate with us as we go into the post-2014 mission.

The CHAIRMAN. Given that NATO has a planning recommendation of 8,000 to 12,000 troops for the post-2014 presence in Afghanistan, at what level can you conduct your train, advise, and assist mission there?

General DUNFORD. Chairman, NATO has given us planning guidance for 8,000 to 12,000 troops that would allow us to be in the four corners of Afghanistan. It would allow us to provide an advise, assist effort at the corps level, and the zone level for police, the corps level for the army, and the zone level for police. It would also allow us to have an advice and assist effort inside of Kabul on the institutions, where they grow officers, where they grow non-commissioned officers, and where some of the sustainment training takes place in Kabul.

So that 8,000 to 12,000 window would allow us to do that. And I would highlight that there are really two missions post-2014. One of which is the train, advise, assist mission. The next big mission is the counterterrorism piece which is not included in those NATO numbers. My assumption is that that will be a U.S. with perhaps a coalition of the willing. But the NATO mission is specifically not for counterterrorism. And then we would also need additional forces to support the U.S. interagency specifically the State Depart-

ment's mission post-2014. So the 8,000 to 12,000 for NATO refers specifically to the train, advise, and assist mission post-2014 and not the other aspects of U.S. presence that may be in position after 2014.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

Mr. Smith.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I think this was mentioned, the Bilateral Security Agreement is the key to that. Not to ask you to play psychologist for the moment, but where do you think President Karzai is at on doing that? He seems, it is kind of up to him. If he wanted to sign it, he could sign it tomorrow. What is our best approach collectively as a country to get President Karzai to where he needs to be on that agreement?

General DUNFORD. Thanks Congressman. Over the last several weeks we have had direct engagement by President Obama, Secretary Kerry and Secretary Hagel on the Bilateral Security Agreement. And Ambassador Cunningham, our U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan and I, also routinely engage, not less than once a week with President Karzai. I think that level of engagement is going to be required. President Obama spoke to President Karzai within the last week and addressed the Bilateral Security Agreement.

I think it is important that President Karzai understand that Afghanistan actually needs the Bilateral Security Agreement more than we do. As important as it is for our national interests, as important as it is that we continue to have a presence post-2014 to ensure a stable and secure Afghanistan for our interests, certainly the presence of coalition forces post-2014 is absolutely and inextricably linked with a future Afghanistan in stability and security. As well as the resources that were pledged in Chicago and Tokyo are certainly associated with our ability to have a presence post-2014.

So I think at this point the negotiation is to ensure that we are entering into a Bilateral Security Agreement as mature partners. We are both recognize that it is in our mutual interest to sign the Bilateral Security Agreement. And I think that is the framework that we are trying to provide right now asto ensure that there is clear recognition that this is something that the coalition needs to have, this is something the United States needs to have, what is most important is, that the future of Afghanistan is linked to the Bilateral Security Agreement.

My sense is, Congressman, that the people in Afghanistan absolutely recognize that. There is uniform support for our presence post-2014, because I think there is a recognition that one, the security environment will still be threatened. But also there is a recognition that the international community needs to be there in some presence post-2014 for political transition and economic development as well.

Mr. SMITH. And can you talk a little bit about the relationship right now between Afghanistan and Pakistan. It is problematic I understand. What might be able to be done to get it to a better point where they can coexist better as we are drawing down?

General DUNFORD. Congressman, at the strategic level, state-to-state, we are at a downpoint in the relationship between Pakistan and Afghanistan.

And that has been exacerbated by some cross-border firing incidents of late in a recent incident where there was a dispute about a border post that Pakistan was providing some—that was enhancing with some construction and Afghanistan took objection to it.

What we have to do and what we are doing is, at the tactical level, establishing an effective military-to-military relationship not only between the coalition in Pakistan and Afghanistan, but, more importantly, one of the objectives we have before the end of 2014 is to have a constructive bilateral security, bilateral military-to-military relationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

As difficult as it is right now at the strategic level, we have made a lot of progress at the tactical level in terms of that military-to-military relationship.

We signed, in November, a tripartite border SOP, standard operating procedure, that allows us to bring the military together to solve these border disputes in a way that will prevent them from being strategic issues.

President Karzai, 10 days ago in one of my meetings, approved my invitation of General Kayani and senior leadership from Pakistan to come to Kabul to meet with the minister of defense and senior leadership from Afghanistan.

So I think these military-to-military exchanges that will develop a relationship of trust and a common understanding of the security issues along the border are the best way to mitigate the security challenges even as the strategic issues are being worked.

But I think that today between Afghanistan and Pakistan, it will take a concerted diplomatic effort on the part of the United States, and I know Secretary Kerry is personally engaged in doing that, to bring those two countries together and ensure that the rhetoric that we have seen over the past several weeks does not become manifest in violence.

Mr. SMITH. Okay, thank you.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Jones.

Mr. JONES. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

And, General, thank you for your leadership and I was sitting here just listening very carefully and I saw where the lady, the diplomat, was killed along with three, I think, soldiers and maybe an Afghan translator delivering books to a school and it kind of brings me to a point.

You used the words that “We are in a decisive phase.” I have sat here for almost 20 years and especially since we went into Afghanistan and remember generals like yourself, who I have great respect for, using words like “fragile,” that “We are making progress.”

But it is always “We are making progress and things are fragile.” Well, the American people are financially broke. Yes, they would like to see an Afghan—Afghanistan, excuse me, that, you know, has got trolleys and everything else going for it.

But when you have a country like ours where we can't even fix the schools in the third district of North Carolina, the home of Camp Lejeune, we can't even fix the roads.

The point is, “We are in a decisive phase”—How long are we going to be “in a decisive phase”? Is that 1 year? Is that 5 years? Or is it something we just don’t know?

General DUNFORD. Thanks, Congressman. When I referred to the decisive phase, I really am talking about the period between now and December 14. What is different I think about today than over the past decade is, one, the performance of the Afghan Security Forces and the progress we have made since 2009 is real.

In 2009—or 2008, I visited the Helmand Province and, at that time, there was one Afghan soldier for every 10 United States marines in Helmand Province. Today, there are three Afghans to every member of the coalition across the country.

In 2008, we were leading 100 percent of the operations with, at best, an Afghan face on a coalition capability. Today, the Afghans are leading 80 percent of those operations and this summer they will be leading 100 percent of the operations across the country.

We are now transitioning to the Afghan Security Forces providing security. The other thing that I would offer that is different about today is that 80 percent of the violence that occurs in Afghanistan today is where 20 percent of the population lives.

We have successfully pushed the Taliban away from the populated area and inhibited their influence which had been there in some great amount just some short years ago.

So, from my perspective, Congressman, if we are able to complete our transition to the Afghan Security Forces, then with a fairly limited investment post-2014 sustain the gains that we have made over the past few years, we will be in good shape.

If we are able to provide oversight now and support as the Afghans conduct political transition in the spring of 2014 with inclusive, free and fair elections, we will be in a good position to transition politically at the end of 2014.

And by staying engaged then diplomatically in the future, we will also be able to sustain the progress that we have made politically.

So, Congressman, I think this is a significantly different period than it has been at any other point in the campaign. I absolutely, as I mentioned in my opening comments, can see our way through completion of our objectives.

We came here originally to preclude Al Qaeda from operating out of Afghanistan and attacking the West. We can do that with our campaign plan as it currently stands.

We came here to leave behind a stable, secure Afghanistan where Taliban could not return and we are at the point now, as a result of Afghan Security Forces growth, and the political transition that is ongoing, from meeting that objective.

But I think more broadly as we think about what we should do in Afghanistan, we also need to look at Afghanistan’s position in the region.

And, from my perspective, what would really be dangerous is for us not to finish the job in Afghanistan and to leave a sanctuary in Afghanistan from which Pakistan could be stabilized.

And I think, as you know, Congressman, because you were, in a very helpful way, working on our challenges with Pakistan, the

nexus of extremism in that region with nuclear weapons is absolutely the area where we have vital national interest.

Mr. JONES. General, really quickly because I have 36 seconds, at what point will you and the others in the leadership make a decision as to the number of troops that we need to have after 2014?

General DUNFORD. This spring, I will recommend to the President a range of numbers, Congressman. My recommendation will be that we refine that range after the Afghans assume the lead this summer.

So in the fall of 2013, they will have been in the lead for the first time. We are not, in our last fighting season in Afghanistan, we are in our first fighting season in support. The Afghans are in the lead.

And I think in the fall we will both have a feel for the Afghan Security Forces after their first summer. And we will also see what conditions are set for political transition and more specifically the elections that will take place in April.

Mr. JONES. Thank you, General.

Thank you, Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. McIntyre.

Mr. MCINTYRE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you so much, General, for your service to our country. I have two questions I would like to get in during my allotted time.

One is following up on my good friend and colleague, also from North Carolina, Congressman Jones' question. Page 15 of your testimony, you talk about the Afghan Infrastructure Fund for critical infrastructure projects you say in the power, water and transportation and rule of law sectors.

And then you talk about that these are, "Carefully selected, assessed and coordinated" and then you name several government agencies. What are examples of infrastructure projects that still need to be done?

Because being from the poorest county of all 100 counties in North Carolina, I, too, share the concerns of Congressman Jones with regard to these further infrastructure projects when we have water, sewer, transportation problems and school problems right in North Carolina.

General DUNFORD. Congressman, thank you. The major projects that we have in the Afghan Infrastructure Fund are related to power and transportation. From my perspective, one of the goals that we have set is we need to make sure that the gains that we have made are enduring, that they are sustainable.

And so the basic fundamental transportation and power investments that we are making really are critical to economic development that will actually allow the Afghans to stand on their own and then alleviate the need for us to continue to support Afghanistan in the future.

Mr. MCINTYRE. So these are projects you anticipate are near completion or are there any new projects that will be starting from scratch during the remaining time that we are there?

General DUNFORD. No, Congressman, we have identified the projects that will take place between now and 2014 and we are in the process of completing those. And any projects that would take

place after that would obviously take place in conjunction with the Afghan government.

Mr. MCINTYRE. All right. Thank you, sir. On another note, I wanted to ask you the Afghan Army's Special Operations Command numbers more than 10,000. Do we anticipate this force being able to further U.S. counterterrorism objectives against Al Qaeda in Afghanistan as the U.S. minimizes its presence beyond 2014? Are you comfortable with what their special operations command can do with regard to counterterrorism efforts?

General DUNFORD. Congressman, I am and a key assumption we make about the post-2014 environment is that we will work very closely with the Afghan National Security Forces to ensure that our gains are sustainable.

The investment that we have made in the Afghan Security Forces is for exactly the reason that you highlight is so they then can provide security post-2014 with minimal support from the United States to include dealing with the terrorist threat that originally emanated from Afghanistan.

Mr. MCINTYRE. All right. Thank you, sir.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Wilson.

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And, General, thank you very much for your service. The people of South Carolina have a special appreciation of your service, of the military significance of Afghanistan.

We have had a presence of the South Carolina Army National Guard, the largest deployment since World War II, nearly 1,600 troops, led by our Adjutant General Bob Livingston.

It really developed into an extraordinary situation of personnel at forward-operating bases all over the country where there was a relationship established with Afghan brothers where they felt like they were making such a positive difference.

I have been there 11 times and, indeed, I have seen the substantial progress. I just hope it can be sustained.

At the same time, I am concerned though about the green-on-blue attacks, the insider attacks, that have created mistrust between our forces. What is being done to avoid and reduce these attacks?

General DUNFORD. Congressman, first thanks for your many visits to Afghanistan. And with regard to the insider threat, for me that is first and foremost a force protection issue. It is one of the most important things to me as a commander and it certainly proved to be insidious in 2012.

As a result of the insider threat attacks that took place in 2012, my predecessor ordered a detailed study into the causes of the insider threat and potential mitigation measures. Since the fall, we have significantly increased the counterintelligence capability both inside the Afghan forces as well as the U.S. forces.

We have changed our tactics, techniques and procedures. Every time now there is a coalition meeting, engagement with Afghan counterparts, we have what we call a guardian angel, an overwatch to ensure that someone who is not actually participating in the event is there to provide security for our members.

We have a team in Afghanistan today going around training on behavioral change so that our sailors, soldiers, airmen, and marines have situational awareness and can recognize when a threat is starting to build as they are conducting a meeting or some other engagement in Afghanistan.

Our predeployment training has been tooled to address this threat and, as importantly, the Afghan leadership has taken this seriously, as well. They recognize that this could be a threat to the coalition. This could shatter the will back—back in the capitals, to include back here in the United States, and they have taken measures to also improve it.

I am cautiously optimistic that we have made a—we have made significant progress with the insider threat. Last year at this time, we had 20 attacks. This year we have had three during that same period of time, but it is not something that we can be complacent about. And I can assure it, it is something that—it is—I am engaged with on a routine basis.

Mr. WILSON. Well, thank you, and that is really reassuring. As a member of a military family, what you say has just great meaning to all of us.

Thank you.

I am also concerned about the Afghan National Security Forces not having the capability to sustain transitional facilities and equipment. This goes beyond operations and maintenance, and includes administrative and financial shortcomings.

Are there plans for ISAF [International Security Assistance Force] to work with Afghans to develop a plan to extend U.S. support contracts to assist and mentor the security forces in building critical sustainment capabilities that will enable the continued tactical success?

General DUNFORD. Congressman, it is really two pieces to that issue. You know, I think it is fair to say to date that we have focused on growing the quantity of the Afghan forces, and I refer to shifting to quality improvement.

Part of that is building at the ministerial level the capacity to budget, to plan, to program, and to provide oversight for infrastructure in—in all levels of command.

So, we have a concerted effort right now to do that. With regard to funding, the money that was pledged in Chicago at the Chicago Conference by the international community for Afghan National Security Forces post-2014 includes funds for the contracts to sustain the infrastructure that you highlighted, Congressman.

Mr. WILSON. And that is reassuring.

And, finally, we have enduring core interests in Afghanistan. Could you identify what you believe they are? And by a level of priority.

General DUNFORD. Congressman, I think the reasons that we went to Afghanistan still remain.

Number one is, we don't want it to be a sanctuary from which Al Qaeda can threaten our interests, as they did on 9/11. And we don't want the Taliban to return with their form of oppression that they exhibited in the 1990s to Afghanistan because they provided safe haven to the Al Qaeda on 9/11.

The other interest that we have is a regional interest. Afghanistan's stability and security is critical to our interests across the region.

As I mentioned, we have a nuclear state next door that has its own extremist threat inside of its borders. And I think it is very important that we provide stability and security in Afghanistan to preclude Afghanistan from being used as an area from which attacks can be conducted in a destabilizing way in Pakistan in the future.

Mr. WILSON. Thank you very much.

Mr. THORBERRY. [Presiding.] Mr. Maffei.

Mr. MAFFEI. Thank you. Thank you to the chairman.

General, thank you for your service. And I—of course, I think every member of this committee wants to thank the men and women under your command.

I am—I guess I want to associate myself to the comments of Mr. Jones. And my concern is, the ranking member referred to the need for the stable government in Afghanistan, and the fact that if we stay forever, we won't have that. But there is a bit of a chicken-or-egg problem. How can you—we have to stabilize the government, and at the same time, be leaving and looking like that—making sure that government has as much credibility as possible.

So, one question I want to ask. When I was there in 2009, admittedly a while ago, there was a lot of concern about corruption within the government of Afghanistan.

Are—is there a military role to play there? And are you working, and have you seen a reduction in corruption within the Afghan government?

General DUNFORD. Congressman, there is absolutely a role for us to play. We have two areas that we focus on.

Number one is, I think I have an obligation to ensure that any money that is provided to the Afghan National Security Forces is—achieves the intended effect. And so, we work very hard inside the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of the Interior to ensure that we have transparent, accountable processes for any money that is spent on the Afghans.

That is U.S. taxpayer dollars. I recognize the need to be good stewards of that funds, and so we focus on that.

The other area that we focus on is contracting. And any contracts that we let with people to provide support for the United States to U.S. forces, as well as the coalition, are areas that we need to pay particular attention to.

And then more broadly, we support the framework—the mutual accountability framework that came out of Tokyo, which provides the standards and the metrics that Afghanistan must meet in order for international assistance to continue to flow past 2014.

Mr. MAFFEI. Excellent. Thank you for that answer.

I am extremely confident in your ability and the ability of your men and women to execute this so-called decisive phase until the end of 2014. My concerns are more in whether it can be sustained, and whether it can be sustained without a major U.S. presence.

You have identified one of the goals as a stable and secure Afghanistan where the Taliban cannot return.

Just to clarify, you mean could not return as the government? Not that there would be no Taliban at all, but could not return as the government?

General DUNFORD. Congressman, thanks for the opportunity to clarify that.

That is absolutely what I mean, is that the Taliban could not return as a government. My assumption is that at some point, this conflict has to be resolved with a political process that would include all Afghans being part of that political process.

Mr. MAFFEI. And you really think that is possible within that current timeframe?

General DUNFORD. No, I do not, Congressman, believe that that is possible within—between now and 2014. What is possible is that the government of Afghanistan can be stable and secure enough and more importantly, the Afghan security forces can be capable enough to preclude the Taliban coming back in a way that they were there in the 1990s.

Mr. MAFFEI. So, if my understanding of you is correct, that although we may draw down and we may not be the leader of the combat missions, there will be a necessary U.S. military presence in Afghanistan of some size until that occurs? Until we get to that point?

General DUNFORD. Our—to be clear, Congressman, our presence post-2014 will not be to fight the enemy, it will be to provide advice and advice assisted training to the Afghans as they provide security in Afghanistan post-2014.

And I believe, based on the trajectory that they have been on over the last few years, that they will be able to do that post-2014.

Mr. MAFFEI. Looking at some of the stuff we are working on—as the chairman mentioned, schools, certainly a worthy project—and other members have mentioned the infrastructure. But of course, we do have those needs here.

Are we nation-building in Afghanistan? Is that a term you are comfortable with? Or—and if you are not comfortable with it, why aren't you comfortable with it?

General DUNFORD. Congressman, we do not have a comprehensive nation-building plan in Afghanistan. It is far more limited than nation-building.

What we are doing is supporting a counterinsurgency effort with projects that will assist in economic development and political transition.

Mr. MAFFEI. And will those projects continue, and can they continue without a direct military presence? In other words, can USAID [United States Agency for International Development] and others take over where the military leaves off, as we, at some point, start drawing down in Afghanistan?

General DUNFORD. Congressman, absolutely. Our plan now is, over time—and we are in the process—well into the process right now—of transitioning security of those projects to Afghan National Security Forces.

Mr. MAFFEI. And you have confidence that that can occur by the end of 2014?

General DUNFORD. It is occurring today, Congressman.

Mr. MAFFEI. Okay. Thank you very much, General.

I yield back.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you.

Mr. Conaway.

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you.

General, good morning.

What—can you give us some insight into what the current analysis is on the size of the Afghan security that will need to be put in place, or left in place whenever all of these things do occur? And what is the anticipation of when Afghanistan can actually pay for that security force themselves versus needing international help?

General DUNFORD. Congressman, the current plan is—we have 352,000 authorized Afghan security forces today. And added to that is the local police, which are authorized at a number of 30,000.

The international community has pledged support for those forces through 2016. We also have requested—

Mr. CONAWAY. At those levels?

General DUNFORD [continuing]. At those levels. And we have requested to do that through 2018 at 352,000, at which point the assumption is that the Afghans would then be responsible.

The funds are, in part, from the United States. These were funds that were pledged in Chicago at the Chicago Conference. At that time, \$4.1 billion was pledged; \$1.3 billion from our international partners, \$500 million from the Afghans themselves, and the United States pledged to provide the balance of those funds.

Mr. CONAWAY. And as your team monitors the ability of those countries to fulfill those promises, are there—do you anticipate that that money will, in fact, be in place?

General DUNFORD. Congressman, my assumption is that the elections in 2014 and the performance of the Afghan security forces over the next year are actually—

Mr. CONAWAY. [Off mike.]

General DUNFORD [continuing]. Are going to be—the money that is going to come from Chicago and Tokyo pledges is conditional based on progress, would be my assumption. And so, I don't understate the importance of the elections in 2014—in effect, a political transition—in ensuring that those—the money that was pledged, both in Chicago and Tokyo, Tokyo being development funds, Chicago being security funds; but I think they are all conditional based on progress over the next 18 months.

Mr. CONAWAY. All right. I appreciate that.

On the Bilateral Security Agreement, can you tell us where the choke points are between us and Karzai on that issue?

General DUNFORD. Congressman, there are a couple—I would prefer to—if we could discuss that in private or in a classified form—

Mr. CONAWAY. Okay.

General DUNFORD. We are at a pretty sensitive point in the negotiations right now, led by the State Department.

There are a couple of issues. One, I can talk about, which is jurisdiction. And that is obviously a red line jurisdiction of U.S. personnel post-2014.

Some of the other issues are more sensitive and may be more suited—

Mr. CONAWAY. Well, I think I was mainly concerned with the issue of how we—how American troops fall under Afghan law, or don't fall under Afghan law post—that was obviously a big deal in Iraq, and moved into different directions, so—but you are dealing with that one specifically? You think you could—you think—anticipate we will be able to get that one done, probably?

General DUNFORD. Congressman, from a best military advice perspective, I wouldn't recognize—I wouldn't recommend at all that we be there post-2014. Absent a Bilateral Security Agreement that addresses—

Mr. CONAWAY. Okay.

General DUNFORD [continuing]. Properly addresses the issue of jurisdiction.

Mr. CONAWAY. Can you speak to us a little bit about the economic development with respect to the huge mineral reserves and other hard—and other resources that Afghanistan has? Is there any progress being made at contracts with other private sector entities or other countries in order to develop those resources?

General DUNFORD. Congressman, there are some basic contracts right now to begin exploration and assessment of how to exploit those minerals. But I would offer to you that the progress has been very slow.

One of the aspects has been the security environment over the last several years, and is not much of an incentive right now for companies to come in and invest in Afghanistan.

I believe we have an opportunity to turn that right now. Certainly the Afghan government is working that pretty hard. And our State Department is also working that pretty hard to make sure that people understand, and are able to make a much more realistic risk assessment about the prospects of investment, and successful investment in Afghanistan.

Mr. CONAWAY. General, I want to make sure I thank you and your team, as well, and all those thousands and thousands of Americans who have served.

It is instructive that your predecessors testifying like this, this room would have been packed. And I think it is instructive that the American people are, as the ranking member said, weary. But we cannot allow that weariness to drive bad decisions in us and to do things that are—here at the end game, cause us not to do what we need to do.

So thank you for your team's willingness and strength of purpose to stick with this deal and see this through to the right conclusion. So, thank you.

General DUNFORD. Thank—thank you, Congressman.

Mr. CONAWAY. Yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mrs. Davis.

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And General Dunford, it is good to see you and thank you so much for your leadership.

Having been to Afghanistan on a number of occasions, and focused largely on the role of women in building a civil society there, I wonder if you could talk a little bit about the role that ISAF plays in helping the Afghans to integrate women into their national forces, both the Army and the Navy.

The fact that I can even ask you this question means that there has been progress. I certainly recognize that. However, we also know that in terms of numbers, there are about 1,700 women serving in the Afghan national police, 430 in the Afghan national army.

We have had an opportunity to speak to a number of those women who have made what is an incredibly difficult decision to serve in that fashion. And I don't know whether we have what I might call some leverage, obviously, with the Bilateral Security Agreement. There may be some opportunities we have there to push harder on that issue, along with the coalition.

What role do you think they can play in—that the women can play really in being integrated into the force and how important is that?

General DUNFORD. Congresswoman, first, you do have the numbers right. That is the current state, both in the Afghan army and the Afghan police. I know that you know from your visits that we have folks specifically addressing the gender issue, both in our NATO training mission Afghanistan as well as at the ministerial levels in Afghanistan.

To be honest with you, the progress is slow and I project it will remain slow over the next couple of years as we have some very real and fundamental cultural issues associated with women participating in the Afghan police and the Afghan national army. There are family reasons why they are discouraged from doing that and then there are cultural accommodation issues that cause them to be discouraged from doing that. Some of the latter pieces, the accommodation issues, are the ones that I think we can make the most progress on, in other words, facilities that would be suitable to have both males and females in the police and in the army. Education and training that can facilitate a command climate where women in the army and the police could be more welcome.

But I very much think this is a heavy lift and one that will take some years. I can tell you that it is not only part of the U.S. mission and a task for the U.S. piece, but it is very heavily emphasized when I wear my NATO hat, that is part of the specific guidance we receive from NATO for the International Security Assistance Force mission.

So we have made progress, as you pointed out, and we, in fact, even have general officers both in the police and in the army, but my projection is this—the pace of change for the police and the army may lead the rest of society, but it will certainly take place in the context of the pace of change culturally in the rest of society. And I think we are at a point where we are talking about a decade's long process.

One of the things that the Chairman mentioned in his opening remarks, though, was the difference between young people who go to school today and young people who went to school 10 years ago. And he is exactly right. We have 8 million in school today where we had less than a million in school 10 years ago.

The other statistic I think that is important in this conversation is that 60 percent of the Afghan people are 25 years or less at this particular time. And so the percentage of them that are educated, the percentage that have a more open view, I think, is increasing, and that bodes well for making improvements in these areas.

But Congresswoman, I wouldn't be, I think, honest with you if I told you I thought that change would be immediate.

Mrs. DAVIS. Yes, I certainly appreciate that, General.

But I also wonder, given all the constraints, and we understand that, is there a role though within the agreement, and even within the funding of OCO [Overseas Contingency Operations], which we really have not received that funding yet, that we can dedicate some of that funding in a way to make sure that some of the goals that even the Afghan national forces have identified for the country are realized or at least that there is a timetable for that?

General DUNFORD. Congresswoman, we have currently both resources and structure dedicated towards this mission and we can go back and take a look and see if increased resources and/or emphasis in our structure would make an improvement.

I do believe, right now, that both the police and the army are serious about addressing this. You asked why is it important? It is obviously important to tap into the full resources of the Afghan people as they provide security for the nation in the future. And I also think, as we have seen in this country, often the military by accommodating these kinds of issues, actually creates positive change in society as a whole.

But I am not sure right now whether additional resources or structure would actually affect the pace.

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you. And also to the female engagement teams that have played such a significant role in hoping to bring those changes about in Afghanistan.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentlelady's time has expired.

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Coffman.

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And General Dunford, thanks so much for your service in the United States Marine Corps and certainly now in Afghanistan.

Could you describe to us where we are right now in this draw down in terms of total numbers, and how the mission has changed from the direct combat role to advise and assist and where we are in that transition?

General DUNFORD. Congressman, I can.

We have just under 60,000 U.S. forces on the ground in Afghanistan today. We will have 34,000 in February of 2014. We are now at the point where the vast majority of U.S. forces, with the exception of one combat brigade that really is providing some fore protection across the country, are all in a train, advise and assist mode.

So when you come to visit us next, what you will see in an Afghan unit of about 600 or 700 are 15 or 16 members of the coalition in an advise and assist level. If you went to a single province in Afghanistan, there will be thousands of individuals in Afghan security forces providing security inside of that province. There will be hundreds of coalition forces providing advise and assist in training to that unit.

As we move forward to what we call Milestone 2013, which will be in May or June of this year, at that point, the Afghans will be completely in the lead. We will provide by exception combat support in the form of aviation support, logistics support, intelligence

and command and control. But we will not be conducting combat operations except in under extraordinary conditions.

And frankly, that is for two reasons. One is because we are at the point where we have transitioned security to the Afghans and the other reason, that we have already reorganized U.S. forces on the ground in a security force assistance construct. So the numbers of combat forces that we actually have on the ground are very, very limited.

Mr. COFFMAN. How are we doing in terms of mitigating green-on-blue violence?

General DUNFORD. Congressman, we have increased our counter-intelligence capability both inside of U.S. forces in the coalition as well as Afghan forces. We have changed our tactics, techniques and procedures. We have changed our pre-deployment training. In effect, we currently have on the ground a mobile training team that is addressing behavioral change so that our forces are better able to detect a threat.

Mr. COFFMAN. Tell me what—how—what your recommendation is going to be for our footprint after 2014 and how would that mission change from even advise and assist?

General DUNFORD. Congressman, there are really three pieces of the mission post-2014. There is the advise and assist for the Afghan security forces. There is the counterterrorism mission. And then there is the support that we will provide to the U.S. Government interagency, specifically to State Department post-2014.

I believe we should be in the four corners of the country and providing advise and assist at no lower than the core level to the Afghan army and no lower than the zone level for the Afghan police.

I think we should also be in Kabul at the institutional level, providing ministerial capacity-building efforts, as well as some of the institutions necessary to sustain an army post-2014.

I, at this point, am an advocate of a range in numbers because I believe that our post-2014 presence should be informed by a number of interdependent variables. The performance of the Afghan forces this summer is one of those variables. The effectiveness of our political transition in 2014 is one of those variables.

And what we project to be the security environment, the strategic landscape, if you will, post-2014, the strength of the Taliban, where we are with regard to reconciliation and the strength of Al Qaeda all should inform our post-2014.

And then, finally, where we are with regard to regional actors and specifically where we are with regard to our relationship with Pakistan and where Afghanistan is with its relationship with Pakistan should inform our post-2014 presence.

Mr. COFFMAN. Can you tell me about the village stabilization—your assessment right now. The village stabilization program has had mixed results from the analysis that I have come in contact with. Can you tell me about your assessment of that?

General DUNFORD. Congressman, over the past year, the VSO program, Village Stability Operations, and the Afghan local police, which is a part of Village Stability Operations, have actually not had mixed reviews. In fact, they are extraordinary successful.

And I think my perspective on their success is less important than the Taliban's perspective on the success of the Afghan local

police. It is clearly, as we read the intelligence, the most feared aspect of the security architecture because the Afghan local police now are very carefully vetted. They are inextricably linked with local leadership at the district level—at the village level.

And they are part of the overall infrastructure of the Ministry of the Interior. The Afghan local police work directly for the district police chief.

These are all changes, Congressman, that I think we have made in the past 18 months as a result of the things that we have learned from a decade of war. But I am actually very, very high on the Village Stability Operations and the Afghan local police program and I think it is a key part of our ability to help the Afghans as they provide what we call layered security. And that is merely the integration of all elements of the Afghan national security forces to achieve the desired effect province to province.

Mr. COFFMAN. Mr. Chairman, my time is up. I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Garamendi.

Mr. GARAMENDI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I was busily reading one of the documents and I missed it.

General, thank you so much for your service and for your men and women that are in the field and all that they are doing in a difficult situation.

You answered one of my questions just a moment ago, but I would like to go back over it. And that is the criteria on the judgment that you will be making. You went through five or four, maybe five specific things, one of which I think I had not heard before and that is the relationship between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

I think you said in response to Mr. Wilson that one of the issues was whether we needed to protect Afghanistan—protect Pakistan from Afghanistan. And I found that to be new and if that is one of the reasons, it seems to me to be a new one, and could you expound on that?

General DUNFORD. Congressman, I can. I don't think it is new. It may be a point of emphasis for me. I think we have always looked at regional stability and security in a broader context from Afghanistan. We have always considered that we have critical national interests both in Pakistan and in the region. And what I was suggesting, because this is certainly my perspective as I look at it now, is that we, a few years ago took a look and realized that security in Afghanistan was inextricably linked to security in Pakistan.

And all I am saying is as we make a transition, we need to think about the future of Afghanistan in the context of regional stability and specifically security and stability inside of Pakistan.

Mr. GARAMENDI. So that, we should stay in Afghanistan if we perceive Afghanistan to somehow become a threat to Pakistan. Previously we thought that certain regions of Pakistan were a threat to Afghanistan. And this is the flip side. Is that correct?

General DUNFORD. I am not saying we should stay in Afghanistan because of Pakistan. What I am saying is the issue is inextricably linked. So I think it is fair to say if there is a threat today from Pakistan, it affects security and stability in Afghanistan. And in the future, were we not to see this through and provide stability

and security to Afghanistan, I believe it is reasonable to expect, that based on what we see today, that there will be sanctuary for extremist elements inside of Afghanistan that could adversely affect Pakistan.

Mr. GARAMENDI. Okay. There have been a couple of questions on infrastructure and I would like pursue that a little more. There basically it appears to me to be two different types of infrastructure. One is the military infrastructure and the other is the humanitarian economic infrastructure. Could you go into that a little bit more? Specifically in your testimony you said we expect to save \$1.3 billion by downsizing the military. How much are we actually going to be spending in the, in the present year and I guess into the next year on military construction?

General DUNFORD. Congressman I would like to take that for the record, the exact amount that we will be spending on military construction, if I could please.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 69.]

Mr. GARAMENDI. And similarly on the economic infrastructure?

General DUNFORD. The Afghan Infrastructure Fund is the request is for \$359 million for this fiscal year coming.

Mr. GARAMENDI. Very good. Thank you very much, that will, I will yield back my time.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr. Hunter.

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you Mr. Chairman. General first, thanks for your service and for your team and what you are doing. I think it is a lot easier to go in on the beginning of a long war like we have in Afghanistan, or the middle of that war, it is tough to bring it home and to make it end and to do it the right way and actually win. So thanks for what you are doing. And I think people didn't understand what you are up against.

I think you were unfairly criticized by some of our colleagues, if you can call them that, in the Senate yesterday, for not giving the number of troops that you are going to recommend in the future. I think you have to take in the political, all the different machinations and ramifications of the entire environment there. And things that you say here do reverberate and have an impact back in, in-country. I think you have to keep that in mind.

That being said, if you could just break down, let's say there is no United States in Afghanistan post-2014. Let's say we come back and say all right, General, we will give you 3,000 troops and you say, thanks but no thanks. What does Afghanistan and Pakistan look like in 2014? And if you wouldn't mind taking that to 100,000-foot level, what does it look like for the entire area? For transnational terrorism, for nuclear terrorism, for that entire region and the impact on Iran and the United States going forward.

General DUNFORD. Congressman, we have two missions. One is to address the terrorist threat in Afghanistan, the other is to provide security and stability in Afghanistan to preclude the Taliban from coming back. If we had no U.S. forces post-2014, both of those objectives would be at risk.

As I was alluding to earlier with regard to Pakistan, I am increasingly concerned and I think so is the leadership in Pakistan, increasingly concerned with the extremist threat to Pakistan's sta-

bility and security. Pakistan is obviously a nuclear nation and the nexus of extremism and nuclear weapons in Pakistan would absolutely affect our vital national interests in the region.

So from my perspective, stability and security in Afghanistan and Pakistan is inextricably linked and our vital national interest, we do have vital national interests in that part of the world. We do have threats that could emanate from that part of the world that could affect our security back here at home. And no presence post-2014, not insuring that we have stability and security in Afghanistan, not insuring that the stability and the security is linked to a plan for security and stability in Pakistan, would adversely effect, from my perspective, our vital national interests.

Mr. HUNTER. Thanks, General. Let's just loop to one thing that you mentioned in your testimony yesterday, too. Senator Ayotte talked about Section 841 authorities. In 2012, the NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act], do you know what Section 841 does? Anybody who does not? It prohibits DOD from contracting with anybody that we think is an enemy, enemy combatant or just an enemy. It allows us to terminate and nullify those contracts.

So the question is, you support the effort, what do you think about having that exact same rule apply to other agencies within the U.S. Government in contracting with Afghan enemies or any other enemies?

General DUNFORD. Congressman thanks. And thanks for your support of that legislation from NDAA 2012, that did provide, that brought us with the ability to immediately stop contracting with anyone that we identified was providing resources to the enemy. And I think expanding that to all other government organizations, USAID, the State Department, as well as the Department of Defense makes absolute sense. And I would support anything that would prevent resources from going to the enemy.

Mr. HUNTER. General, that is all I got. Thanks for your service. Hope you get time to grab a beer back here before you head back. I yield back Mr. Chairman.

General DUNFORD. Thank you.

Mrs. HARTZLER. [Presiding.] Ms. Hanabusa.

Ms. HANABUSA. Thank you, Madame Chair. General, statements made by the, Chair McKeon as well as the, my colleague the gentlewomen from San Diego, spoke about the progress that we have assisted in terms of Afghan women and girls. And as you know the NDAA last year required a plan for promoting the security of Afghan women and girls, and I think that is something that everyone has really bought into including President Karzai.

I have recently been informed that your command plans to eliminate one of the programs that is directly supportive of this goal and that is the Family Response Unit. It is an Afghan Police Unit designed to investigate cases of domestic abuse. And you know you have Afghan female investigators to look into these cases. And I think that is one of the critical points that we are making especially in terms of the NDAA.

And I think the elimination of programs such as this would run contrary to the NDAA and would weaken the protection of the women. Do you know anything about this? Can you comment about

it? Or can you commit to at least reviewing the status of this program and to get back to me?

General DUNFORD. Congresswoman, I would like to commit to reviewing the status of the program and getting back to you.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 69.]

Ms. HANABUSA. Thank you very much. Also sort of in the same vein. One of the things that I noticed in your written statement, you are talking about the contractor drawdown that we will be seeing in Afghanistan. And I think you are saying approximately a reduction of 25,000 by the end of the calendar year 2013. And if I am reading that correctly, it is about 25 percent. So are you anticipating that by the end of calendar year 2013, the reverse will be that we will have 75,000 contractors still remaining in Afghanistan?

General DUNFORD. Congresswoman, I will go back, first of all on the first part of it, I am confident about the percentage of drawdown and some specific decisions that we made in the last few weeks will allow us to experience that drawdown in contracting. I will go back and check the exact numbers, but at or about 75,000 sounds right. And I will confirm here later today, the exact number.

Ms. HANABUSA. Can you tell me, that of the contractors, the 75,000 that would remain, what the plans are for their security? As far as on your troops or the ISAF is concerned?

General DUNFORD. There is a wide range of contractors. If you are referring to the contractors that work specifically for U.S. Forces Afghanistan, we will provide security to them in the same way that we provide for our own forces.

Ms. HANABUSA. And do you know how many of the 75, or the approximately 75,000 would be those which would be reporting directly to you or to the United States, and therefore, one that we would provide security for?

General DUNFORD. That general number sounds about right for those that are involved, either supporting international security force assistance, the ISAF, or United States Forces—Afghanistan.

Ms. HANABUSA. Is there any anticipated time for the actual drawdown of those contractors? Or is this a number that we expect to remain in Afghanistan for a while?

General DUNFORD. Congresswoman, we would drawdown those contractors commensurate with the drawdown of forces. Although I would expect that as long as we have U.S. forces in Afghanistan, we are going to have some contracting support. What that contracting support would be on a pro share basis relative to the overall force structure.

Ms. HANABUSA. So we, when we are say at the end of 2014, do we have an anticipated number that will be there in terms of our forces as well as the contractors that we have there?

General DUNFORD. Congresswoman, we don't have a specific number for post-14 right now. The President is still deliberating on that decision. I haven't yet provided my best military advice to the President. I expect to do that via the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs here in the coming weeks.

But I don't expect that number to be available in the immediate future.

Ms. HANABUSA. And General could you respond in writing as to the types of services that you would expect that the contractors who may remain in Afghanistan post-2014, what types of services that they would be performing?

General DUNFORD. I will do that Congresswoman.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 69.]

Ms. HANABUSA. Thank you, I yield back, Madame Chair.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr. Scott.

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you Mr. Chairman. General, most of the questions that I have been answered. But I just want to, I know you know this, and remind Americans, that we still have a young man that was fighting for our country that is a POW [prisoner of war] over there and just as we transition out of Afghanistan, making sure that all of the leadership of that country understand that the safe return of all Americans in uniform and contractors is necessary for us as a country.

And just briefly, we talk a lot about the nuclear threat in the area. Could you speak briefly to the biological threat? Other weapons of mass destruction other than nuclear? Is that something that we are seeing any proliferation of?

General DUNFORD. Congressman I don't have visibility on the latter threat and I will take that for the record and provide you with a response. With regard to PFC Bergdahl, I can tell you that we won't forget PFC Bergdahl and we pay very close attention to any information that might lead to his location and eventual return back home.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 69.]

Mr. SCOTT. [Off mike.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr. Enyart.

Mr. ENYART. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General, I am familiar with all of the contributions that have been made by our international allies in Afghanistan, particularly the Polish battle group serving in Ghazni Province.

And my question for you is that, as I understand, other nations are providing about one-third of the forces in Afghanistan. And so, what do you believe are the lessons that we have learned from those multilateral relationships?

And how do you expect those relationships to be exported to other areas of the globe that we would like to influence, particularly those areas where we have little or no physical presence, for example, Africa?

General DUNFORD. Congressman, thank you. First of all, in terms of integrating coalition, we have learned a tremendous amount over the last 10 years that it is applicable to the future.

First of all, I think we are learning to take capabilities and limitations from each one of the countries and properly integrate them to achieve the effect that we need to have in performing a certain mission.

There are strengths and weaknesses for each one of our coalition partners that we can complement by providing enabling support,

for example, and sometimes it is a small thing like providing medical evacuation capability to a country could actually cause that country, then, to provide a significant role in advising and assisting Afghans or, in some cases, combat capability.

I think another important lesson that I—that we should learn is the value of enduring military to military relationships over time. And I will just give you one brief example I think that highlights the most important lesson learned.

In 1996, as a Battalion commander, I had a Georgian platoon serving with me at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina. And it was part of a Partnership for Peace program. We had 19 former Soviet Bloc nations that came to the United States to begin to learn not only our tactics, techniques and procedures, but more importantly, some of the cultural issues about a modern, professional army.

Today I am proud to tell you that there are 1,500 Georgians in the Helmand Province. They are battle space owners. They have been conducting complex counterinsurgency operations and where they are today versus where they were in 1996 is nothing short of profound. And I think it came from that investment in coalition partners over time.

Mr. ENYART. I am very glad to hear you say that, General, because the Partnership for Peace program has been a tremendous success, in my view, and I think the fact that 1,500 Georgians are owning battle space in Afghanistan is saving the United States Government 4,500 soldiers, 1,500 on the ground, 1,500 getting ready to go and 1,500 in reset.

So I appreciate those remarks. The Marines, I think, pride themselves on being our Nation's quick reaction force, or what I would term a quick reaction force. That may not be your doctrinal word, but that is the word—the term I will use.

Can you tell me, particularly from your experience as the past Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps, what has been the impact on Marine Corps readiness to serve as our Nation's quick reaction force with the deployments to Afghanistan, which may not have necessarily been in conformance with your doctrine?

General DUNFORD. Congressman, thanks for that question. And I can tell you from my recent experience as Assistant Commandant what the impact of our contingency operations over the last few years has been.

We pride ourselves on being a force of readiness, the Marines, the term we use is not a doctrinal term but it is a 911 force, we have used that for some decades.

But the significant challenge has been that our home station readiness has been adversely affected as we have correctly provided all the equipment, all the people and all the training focused on those forces that deployed to Iraq and subsequently to Afghanistan.

What that did was degrade home station readiness to the point where, typically, two-thirds of the forces that are at home station, Camp Lejeune, Camp Smith, Camp Pendleton in California, Cherry Point and so forth, two-thirds of those forces are at a degraded state of readiness, typically in C3, C4.

And as you know, one being the best, four being the lowest, typically two-thirds of the force has been at C3, C4, largely because of

personnel or equipment shortfalls associated with our contingency operations forward.

Mr. ENYART. General, one last quick question. In response to a previous question, you indicated that the United States, of course, has vital interest in that part of the world. And the obvious interests, to me, are preventing terrorism, preventing a base for terrorism, as well as controlling nuclear weapons in that part of the world.

What other, if any, vital interests do you see that we have in that part of the world?

General DUNFORD. When it comes to vital interests, Congressman, defined as the security of our Nation, it is that nexus of extremism and nuclear weapons that is our vital national interest in the region.

Mr. ENYART. So you don't see any other particular—

General DUNFORD. I see other national interests, economically, diplomatically, politically, but in terms of vital national interests where there could be a physical threat to the well-being of our Nation, that being the definition, it is the nexus of terrorism and nuclear weapons.

And either one of those individually, but certainly where there is a nexus, that would be a threat to our vital national interests.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman's time has expired.

Mr. Nugent.

Mr. NUGENT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And General, thank you so much for your service and particularly as it relates to Afghanistan.

Recently, an Afghan army outpost was overrun by the Taliban. And that Afghan unit was rated as one of the strongest and most capable units the U.S. transferred authority over to. And I guess I am concerned about the fact that that is one of the most capable units and they were overrun and that compound was destroyed.

Are we getting a real accurate assessment coming to you, that is, are you getting an accurate assessment with regards to the reliability of the Afghan National Army, in particular in the ability to defend itself? And obviously, as we look forward to leaving Afghanistan, I want to make sure that we are leaving it in a way that they can defend itself. Can you answer that?

General DUNFORD. Congressman, first of all, from my personal experience, bad things happen in good units on occasion. In this particular case, it was a basic failure of leadership, nothing more, nothing less. There were fewer people at that observation post than there should have been.

The Minister of Defense and the senior leadership in Afghanistan have taken corrective action. That individual that was the Battalion Commander was relieved of his duties following this particular incident because it did not reflect the capabilities and capacities of the Afghan National Security Forces, it reflected the commander's decision and the failure to properly provide resources based on the mission that they were assigned.

Mr. NUGENT. Well, it is good to hear that it was identified as to what the initial problem was. And that the Afghan National Army has taken the proper steps to reinforce the issue in regards to not

happening again. And you are right, bad things do happen to good units.

My concern as we move forward is Afghan army and police forces, are they sustainable in the long haul? Meaning, we have trained them to be self-sufficient organizations, take care of themselves once we leave, but do they have the close air support, the maintenance, logistics, and the casualty evacuation that we would expect them to have to be successful?

General DUNFORD. Congressman, that absolutely is our focus now as we approach 2015, is to ensure that what we are doing is sustainable over the long-term.

Of the functional areas you mentioned, the one that won't be addressed by the end of 2014 is aviation. It will take until 2015 or until 2016 before the aviation piece is there in a sustainable way. And so there are some gaps that will exist post-2014.

But by and away, the majority of what we call enablers, the things that you referred to, we will have those fielded and we will be well along the way towards integration by 2014.

But again, I would emphasize that in order for our gains that we have made over the last couple of years to be sustainable, some post-2014 advise, assist mission is going to be necessary. That is where we are at this point.

We have, as you correctly identified, we have grown the quantity of the force, they are in the fight, all the statistics that I outlined earlier are real with regard to what they are doing on a day-to-day basis, both with regard to conducting operations and securing the people.

But today they are not sustainable. And there are some things that we need to do over the next couple of years to make sure that they are sustainable. Part of it is this ministerial capacity building that I spoke about.

They don't have, today, the ability to plan, program and budget in a way that will sustain the army into the future. Part of it is their logistics infrastructure and making sure that we have distribution all the way down to the lowest tactical level from Kabul. And those areas are areas that are still weak.

Intelligence is another area that we still continue to have to make progress and command and control is another area that will need to be addressed over the next couple of years.

But we have clearly inside of U.S. Forces—Afghanistan, in the ISAF, we have clearly shifted our focus now on addressing those things from a quality perspective that will ensure that the Afghan capability is sustainable over time.

Mr. NUGENT. Well, and it is—as you know, obviously, particularly those outposts that are—Afghanistan does not necessarily have roads in most of those areas, so they are going to be dependent, obviously, upon transportation by helicopter to get the supplies they need to make sure that they can stay supplied, resupplied, but also have those assets to support them in a combat mission.

So I would suggest or I guess we are going to wind up keeping assets there in that particular enabling area of aviation to be able to supply and resupply them?

General DUNFORD. Congressman, I don't anticipate post-2014 providing that kind of support. The aviation support that I would

expect to provide post-2014 would be close air support in some geographical areas where there would be some difficulties.

They currently have 26 helicopters that will grow to 50 helicopters for the conventional forces by the end of 2014. We also have a special mission wing that will be 30 additional helicopters.

We have some Cessna aircraft out there right now to help them move people and supplies around a battlefield and there have been four C-130s [Hercules tactical airlifters] approved to be delivered to the Afghans as excess defense articles over the course of the next 2 years. Deputy Secretary of Defense made that decision.

So with regard to what we would probably describe as assault support, I would expect the Afghans to be providing their own assault support and also using ground transportation where appropriate. They certainly have already, for example, retooled their casual evacuation system to rely primarily on ground transportation and local hospitals.

So it doesn't look like ours does, but it is effective in an Afghan context. So I don't expect that we would provide much in that category that you described post-2014.

Mr. NUGENT. Well, once again, I thank you and please pass on our thanks to all the troops that are currently serving over there. Having had a son in Afghanistan, those are really tough conditions to operate under, so I really do appreciate it. Thank you.

General DUNFORD. Thank you.

Mr. COOK. [Presiding.] Thank you, Mr. Nugent.

Mr. Johnson.

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. On the 23rd of March, the U.S. Government transferred the Parwan Detention Facility over to Afghan control, General, along with its detainees. How many were turned over? How many detainees turned over at Parwan?

General DUNFORD. Congressman at the, on the occasion of the transfer on 23 March, we had 390 detainees that were at that time under U.S. custody and control. And they were subsequently transferred to Afghan custody and control.

Mr. JOHNSON. And how about at the Bagram facility that was transferred over on the 25th of March I believe it was?

General DUNFORD. Congressman it is probably, maybe some confusion in the reports. The Parwan facility is at Bagram, so when we talk about the Detention Facility at Parwan it is synonymous with Bagram.

Mr. JOHNSON. Okay.

General DUNFORD. And that number that I provided to you was the number of detainees that we held on that date.

Mr. JOHNSON. All right, thank you. It was referred to as Parwan and also as Bagram, that was a little, that was a little confusing to me. Thank you. How many of those detainees, if any, have been released from Afghan custody?

General DUNFORD. Of the 390 that we turned over the 23rd of March, none have been released to my knowledge at this point. They were entered into the Afghan legal process at that time, which will take some time.

Mr. JOHNSON. Was that the Afghan civilian process or the military process?

General DUNFORD. They are using evidence-based legal framework for their processing detainees which is consistent with the Afghan law that applies to all Afghan citizens, whether it be military or civilian.

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you. The U.S. is negotiating a Bilateral Security Agreement with the government of Afghanistan. And we want to do so, want to have that in place by June or July of 2013 as I understand it. Is that correct?

General DUNFORD. Congressman, I would like to see that Bilateral Security Agreement signed in the very near future.

Mr. JOHNSON. How are things going with it? Does it appear that we are on track to meet that deadline?

General DUNFORD. I think both, and I would base my assessment on the support that I see within Afghanistan as well as the conversations I have had with members of the team that are doing negotiations. I think we are very close to addressing all the technical aspects of the agreement in a way that satisfies both Afghanistan and the United States.

What I can't predict is the political environment that may affect the timing of the signing of the BSA, specifically what the political calculus might be in Kabul about the timing of the BSA.

Mr. JOHNSON. Back in 2012 the U.S. signed a Strategic Partnership Agreement with Afghanistan which recognized the government or the country of Afghanistan as a non-NATO ally. And then in the negotiations for the Bilateral Security Agreement, the government of Afghanistan has raised the issue of mutual defense. Can you enlighten us a bit about how the Strategic Partnership Agreement and that designation of being a major non-NATO ally, can you explain to us, how those two agreements on that particular issue, would be consistent with each other?

General DUNFORD. Congressman, you know, with regard to the Bilateral Security Agreement and mutual defense that obviously is still being worked. But I would offer to you, and I think you know this, that in order to have a mutual defense treaty, we would have to have something that was ratified by the Senate. In the Bilateral Security Agreement is not intended to be a treaty ratified by the Senate that incurs a security obligation to the United States. So that is, the details of that are still being worked.

Non-NATO ally status provides a category that facilitates the exchange of foreign military sales or excess defense articles and those kinds of things. If you are a non-NATO ally you have special status legally, where it can facilitate some of the military-to-military programs that we have. I can get you the exact details on that. But that, generally speaking, is the significance of being a non-NATO ally.

Mr. JOHNSON. All right, thank you. Last but not least, does the, would the U.S. jurisdiction or control over our forces post-2014, include also jurisdiction and exclusive control over the 75,000 contractors?

General DUNFORD. Congressman it would not automatically do that. And that aspect of the BSA negotiation is ongoing. But the Status of Forces Agreement would not relate specifically to contractors unless it was negotiated separately.

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you.

Mr. COOK. Thank you, Mr. Johnson. Dr. Wenstrup.

Dr. WENSTRUP. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General, thank you one for being here today. I was curious, what is your sense of loyalty of the national militaries of Pakistan, Afghanistan, towards their leaders?

General DUNFORD. I can probably better speak to the loyalty of the Afghan forces as opposed to the Pakistani forces. Certainly at the counterpart level, the Minister of Defense, Chief of the General Staff and the senior leadership that I deal with on a routine basis, are very much committed to the future of Afghanistan. They believe in Afghanistan. There is a lot of discussion about factionalism in Afghanistan amongst the senior leadership. Were that to occur, it wouldn't occur because they want it to occur. They absolutely would like to see a cohesive, National Army, for the people of Afghanistan, for the nation of Afghanistan. Their vision for Afghanistan is very much consistent with what our vision for Afghanistan would be.

Dr. WENSTRUP. And the other question I have, I know we have significant medical assets at Bagram. And I am curious what will become of that facility and what type of care will the people of Afghanistan get or the military of Afghanistan get, particularly once we leave?

General DUNFORD. One of the areas that we are working on very hard, and we talk about enablers in general, is the medical capability of the Afghan forces. And so in terms of developing their capability to provide services that are consistent, not similar, not exactly the same, but consistent with what we provide to our forces, they have made a lot of progress.

In fact they recently identified someone to serve as in effect their Surgeon General, a uniformed General Officer, as their Surgeon General who now sits on the general staff to work these kind of issues. So with regard to field hospitals, medical training for personnel at the lowest active level, as well as a National Military Hospital which has been constructed for more serious injuries, I would describe their medical capability at this point, as maturing. But it is one of the areas that we are working on as we talk about a sustainable Afghan solution.

Dr. WENSTRUP. General will we have a need or obligation to stay longer with medical assets do you think?

General DUNFORD. Not for the Afghans specifically Congressman. The medical support that we would provide post-2014 would be largely for U.S. and coalition forces and certainly on a humanitarian case-by-case basis, we would do what we always do, in terms of providing support for Afghans. But we wouldn't plan, and train, organize and equip specifically to provide care for Afghans. That will be something that they will sustain themselves after 2014.

Dr. WENSTRUP. Thank you, General. I yield back my time.

Mr. COOK. Ms. Tsongas.

Ms. TSONGAS. Thank you, and thank you, General, for appearing before us today. This is an issue that we have all monitored very closely. And I for one, are grateful to see us drawing down in a serious way. I would support a more aggressive effort but appreciate very much the planning that is going into this.

I wanted to go in a slightly different direction. As I am sure you know we are currently running into an issue that we also confronted in Iraq. That insurgent murders of allied indigenous translators who were on the payroll of coalition armed forces. My hometown of Lowell, Massachusetts has a small community of Iraqis who sought refuge in our country after helping us in our effort in Iraq and whose lives and the lives of their families were very much at risk as we drew down.

So this is an issue which was brought to my attention very shortly after I first took office. Senator Kennedy, the then-dean of our delegation, also played a key role in expediting visa approvals for Iraqi translators in 2008. Today however, according to an article this week in the *New York Times*, thousands of Afghan applicants are caught in an approval process that lasts for more than 2 years. As many as 5,000 were waiting to begin the process as of last fall, and a number of these translators work with Special Operations Command putting their lives in even greater danger by participating in dozens if not hundreds of high-risk missions.

I recognize that this is an issue really that the State Department, is within the State Department's purview and not ISAF, but to the extent you can, can you please outline some of the measures that ISAF takes in collaboration with the Afghan National Security Forces, to protect Afghan translators, both during and after their service with ISAF?

General DUNFORD. Congresswomen, when they are serving with us, we provide them the same standard of protection we provide to our own forces. And I would just echo your comments, they have been absolutely critical to our success over the past 10 years. And some incredibly committed and brave young Afghans and some not so young Afghans have provided us with extraordinary support to allow us to accomplish the mission.

And so I am very supportive of them, and in the cases of those that have applied for visas to be able to get to the United States, we have, in some cases, on a case-by-case basis, insured that their paperwork was properly completed and forwarded from the Embassy in Kabul so at least they were back here and competing for the visa applications back here. Once they are no longer in our service, we do not provide them with security. And in many cases they are at great risk, which I think highlights the importance of the visa program in insuring that we try to do that as expeditiously as possible. Because these are individuals that we owe a debt of gratitude to.

Ms. TSONGAS. Well I appreciate that. And I know I have seen some of the families that are in Lowell, Massachusetts who helped our effort in Iraq, making their way to this country is not an easy one. They need a lot of support once here, but I encourage you, just in recognition of sort of maintaining the integrity of our effort, that we do everything we can to help the Afghans who have helped us, especially those translators.

I also want to associate myself with the comments that have been made about supporting, helping support the gains that have been made for women and girls in Afghanistan. I have been part of several trips that have really focused on those gains. You spoke about the numbers of young people now going to school.

We visited a school in Northern Afghanistan in which hundreds of girls were coming through on any given day, obviously with the support of their families, putting their families at risk, as they were their young people.

But tremendous gains that have been made. And I, for one, would hate to see us walk away—or be seen as waking away from those gains. They have been so important—have elevated the sight lines of young girls.

We asked, “What do you want to do?” They want to do exactly what our young daughters want to do, and that is just the result of exposure to education. So I encourage you, in your capacity, to do everything you can as we begin to draw down our effort.

Thank you, and I yield back.

General DUNFORD. Thank you, Congresswoman.

Mr. COOK. Thank you.

Mrs. Walorski.

Mrs. WALORSKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Dunford, as you know, the President’s budget request was submitted to Congress last week without a final request for OCO operations in fiscal year 2014.

Secretary Hagel was also here last week. Testified he was delayed to provide you enough time to fully assess requirements for force levels.

Of course, we are interested in getting the details as soon as possible on the NDAA over here for early June. The President’s budget was submitted 2 months late. Do you believe you will have—you will be able to make those recommendations to the White House in time for the budget request to be finalized in the next few weeks?

General DUNFORD. Congresswoman, the decision really is—once the President makes his decision about the drawdown, we will then be able to provide the right budget fidelity.

Mrs. WALORSKI. And let me ask you this. We had General Madison here a couple weeks ago, and he made the comment about his concern overall in the military—as he was retiring—about budget austerity leading the mission in our military, and no longer strategic types of outlooks.

And does the fiscal uncertainty affect your planning in 2014 and post-2014?

General DUNFORD. Congresswoman, the biggest thing that I am concerned about in terms of the fiscal environment is not so much the money that we spend in Afghanistan. I have been assured by the Congress and by senior leadership in the Department that as long as we have men and women in harm’s way in Afghanistan, they will be properly resourced.

Where I see the greatest risk is on—at home station training, in the preparations that our young men and women have before they deploy. And I think the impact on readiness is real. It is occurring right now, and is something we all ought to be concerned about.

Mrs. WALORSKI. Thank you.

I yield back my time.

Mr. COOK. Thank you very much.

Mr. Gallego.

Mr. GALLEGO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General, as we transition the role of the Afghan National Security Forces, they, I think, move to a more regular role, shall we say, in terms of military police, everyday stuff, that is going to be significantly different from what they are doing now.

And yet, we have seen that many of the challenges that we have had are—to use the vernacular of my neighborhood—they are “inside jobs.” They are people who have infiltrated and seek to do harm, and in such a fashion, destabilize not only the local situation, but frankly, they undermine the credibility of the security forces there and the perception of the American public with respect to Afghanistan’s ability to sustain itself and to take care of itself.

What are you doing differently that hasn’t been done in order to minimize those risks? What have we learned from that situation? And what are we doing differently to ensure that that doesn’t happen in the future?

General DUNFORD. Congressman, thanks for that question.

I think it is fair to say, as we grew the quantity of the force over the last several years, the vetting process was completely different than it is right now. And that is the critical piece, is properly vetting individuals that come into the police and the army.

We do have a much tighter, and the Afghans specifically, have a much tighter vetting process now, where local leadership vouch for young men and women that serve, or that volunteer to serve in the Afghan police, in the Afghan army. Biometric data is taken on each one of those individuals, and leadership has much more oversight over the individuals as they come back from leave, as an example.

We are paying particular attention to individuals who have gone on leave who may have been influenced when they were on leave when they return.

So, I think the critical piece to address the challenge you talked about is properly vetting individuals before they join, and then ensuring that once they come back from extended leave periods, that they are also then vetted before returning back to the units. And both of those steps have been taken. And I think that has, in large part, been part of the success of mitigating the insider threat that you refer to—the insider threat being on the Afghan side.

Mr. GALLEGO. What have we learned, and what is different now—very recently, we had a situation where a State Department employee—very young—was killed on what I would consider a fairly humanitarian mission in terms of delivering school books. And the situation is tragic, and someone argued that that is not necessarily—it wasn’t necessarily part of the core mission in the security interests of the United States.

What is different about—it is clear that this strategy has two prongs. I mean, at some point, you are worried about the security, but you are also trying to build a relationship on sustainability, long-term.

What have we learned from that, and what happens going forward—

General DUNFORD. Congressman—

Mr. GALLEGO [continuing]. In a situation like that?

General DUNFORD [continuing]. That tragic loss of life was in a mission that was outreach to the Afghan people. They were, I

think, as you know, delivering school books in—trying to participate in a mission to do that.

That is part of our long term plan for the State Department. I would expect that the U.S. State Department will continue those types of outreach programs post-2014. It is what our brave young men and women in the State Department do every day around the world. I think that incident highlights that Afghanistan does remain a dangerous place. There is still violence occurring in Afghanistan, and there will be for the foreseeable future. But it also highlights the need for brave Americans to be out there, and doing the things that we need to do to bring stability and security to Afghanistan. And she was very much a part of that.

Mr. GALLEGO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

Mr. COOK. Mr. Courtney.

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Cook.

I apologize, General, but there was another committee meeting, so some of us just joined late here.

But one question—and I apologize again if you have already gone over it, but in terms of the drawdown—I mean, a part of it, obviously, is logistical in terms of equipment and, you know, transporting—I assume, lots of materiel back to the U.S. or outside of Afghanistan. And I know—you know, in Iraq, there was definitely sort of a—almost like a triage-type decision made in terms of, you know, types of vehicles that would be left behind.

Others, like MRAPs [Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles], that were considered, you know, more valuable and moved out. And I was just wondering if you could sort of give us a quick snapshot.

Mr. Hagel, when he was here the other day, you know, was really adamant that, you know, people should not accept—or expect instant savings from the drawdown, because, frankly, there is a pretty big bill to pay in terms of just executing the drawdown.

And, you know, maybe just sort of help me, you know, in terms of how that is going.

General DUNFORD. Congressman, there are really three parts to the drawdown: there is the retrograde of equipment that actually will come back here to reset, in large part, the United States Army and the Marine Corps, but each of the Services.

There is then the base closure piece that is taking place. And then there is the retrograded materials, and so forth—materiel reduction.

With regard to retrograde, the Services identified to us those items that will be returned back to the Services. In other words, based on either the condition of that particular piece of equipment, or the need for that piece of equipment coming back. They will identify that for us to send home.

I feel confident that those items that have been identified to reset the Services will come home by the end of 2014. But I think what Mr. Hale mentioned is really an important point, because at that point, the reset process begins. And so the OCO money necessary to reset that equipment will be required for some period of time after that equipment leaves Afghanistan.

It will take, in many cases, 90 days for that piece of equipment to return back to the United States, at which point, it will either

return to a home station, or be inducted into depot-level maintenance.

In any case, there will be maintenance required to reset that vehicle to a serviceable condition to ensure that it is ready for soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines to use it before they deploy it for another contingency.

So that is an important part of it, and I think that is why we are going to continue to need services funding for some 2 to 3 years after we draw down all the equipment inside of Afghanistan.

Mr. COURTNEY. And how about the base closures which you mentioned? I mean, is that—I mean, can you give us sort of some general sense of how many of them closed and how many will—how many more will be closed?

General DUNFORD. Again, Congressman, we have closed, I think, on the order of 400, more than 400 bases. And we have a little more than 100 to go. And I will confirm those exact numbers for you, but it is somewhere in the order of four-fifths of the bases that we had at one point have all been closed right now, so we are proceeding a pace in terms of closing those bases.

Some of the larger, more complex bases, the ones that remain—some of those will remain post-2014, so we still have a fair amount of work to do.

But I think we have a very detailed plan. I am comfortable that, again, we will get the equipment out by the end of 2014. But I think some of the base closure and materiel reduction efforts that will take place will probably take place after 2014.

Mr. COURTNEY. I mean, this really must be almost a historic sort of effort in terms of just the amount of materiel that you are going to be moving around. And, obviously, you know, the number of installations that are being closed. And, you know, Iraq was sort of a similar kind of challenge. I mean, did that experience provide some help in terms of doing this maybe a little, you know, more efficiently or smarter?

General DUNFORD. Congressman, absolutely. Our experience in Iraq informed Afghanistan, but we, in Iraq, we had Kuwait. And so we were able to bring all the vehicles down there and stage them and so forth.

I would say that Afghanistan—the degree of difficulty is significantly greater in Afghanistan than it was in Iraq as a result of geography. And so, while we learned many lessons from Iraq, Afghanistan is its own set of unique problems that we are dealing with. But I think it is historic. And frankly, I always tell people, among the things I lay awake at night, despite the complexity of this particular issue, and despite the magnitude of the issue, this is not one of those areas that I lay awake at night, because we have extraordinarily capable young men and women that are working these logistical issues. And although I get routine updates to track our progress, I feel very comfortable that in this, what I describe as the science of war, we are in pretty good shape.

Mr. COOK. Mr. Wittman.

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Dunford, thank you so much for joining us today. Thanks for your service to our Nation.

It is always been my privilege to travel down range to see our great men and women that are serving there—our marines, our sailors, our soldiers, our airmen. They are doing a fantastic job, and I appreciate what you are doing in leading ISAF, especially through these challenging times in transition.

I did want to speak a little bit about that transition as we look at what you are faced with. Obviously, with the drawdown and with the fighting season coming up, and then trying to manage not only that combat effort, but also managing the resources that you have in theater there, trying to get some of those elements back home.

I know that General Allen testified, and his words were, “Throughout history, insurgencies have seldom been defeated by foreign forces. Instead, they have been ultimately beaten by indigenous forces.” And in the long run, our goals can only be achieved and then secured by Afghan forces. Transition then is the linchpin of our strategy, not merely the way out. And I know that you are faced with that as far as that.

Tell me, where we are right now, what are the largest gaps that you believe are there with the Afghan National Security Forces? And how do you believe those gaps will be bridged or what might even be left as we begin to ramp down and have some kind of residual force there as we go forward?

General DUNFORD. Congressman, thanks. And I would echo General Allen’s comments about the defeat mechanism being the indigenous forces and that is exactly our approach in terms of growing the capabilities and capacities of the Afghan National Security Forces.

Where we are right now is that aviation is one of those gaps that you asked about. Logistics is one of those gaps that you asked about. Intelligence, command and control, and then leadership. We have got a significant deficit in leadership. We are short some 10,000 non-commissioned officers in the army, some 6,000 in the police. There is inconsistency in the quality of leadership across the police and the army that will take time, and that is certainly something that the Minister of Defense and the Minister of the Interior are both working on over time. I believe we will be in the right trajectory in most of those areas before the end of 2014. We will still need an advise and assist effort to address some of the ministerial capacity issues that I have spoken about, planning, programming, budgeting, and all the things that really need to be put in place to sustain our progress over time.

The one area where we will still have a significant gap post-2014 is in aviation. We won’t see that gap closed until 2015 or 2016. But in most of those other areas, our effort is to accelerate the pace of fielding what we describe broadly as enablers, which are those functional areas that I spoke about. And I think we will be pretty close to where we need to be by the end of 2014, with certainly some work, particularly in terms of integrating capabilities, some work left to be done after 2014.

Mr. WITTMAN. Let me ask you this, just yes or no, then you don’t believe then that the gaps, as they exist today, or where they will be as we begin to move to a residual force would be fatal to the long-term stability of Afghanistan?

General DUNFORD. I don't, Congressman. I believe that the trajectory that the Afghan security forces will be on post-2014, given the projections that we make about the security environment within which they will be operating, will allow them to be successful in effecting security transition and provide security to the Afghan people post-2014.

I do think, from time to time, aviation support we will continue to provide intelligence support, command and control, but I think that is the nature of advise and assist. So I would caveat my comment by saying that based on the limited support that we will support post-2014, I am confident in the Afghan capability to provide security.

Mr. WITTMAN. Let me ask you this. As far as retrograde, I know it is a challenge trying to get equipment out of there, determining which equipment we keep, which we may send to the ANSF [Afghan National Security Forces].

How is that progressing? I know the packed GLOC [Ground Lines of Communication] as opened up a little bit, but certainly not with enough flow to get to the Port of Karachi to where we could really get equipment out like we need to.

Obviously flying costs and the efforts through the northern routes are also very, very expensive. Where do you see things with our force structure in the retrograde? Have there been discussions about how much we can leave there? I know the different branches want to be able to take some things home because that is critical to their reset.

Give me your vision where we are today, where we need to be to make sure that the retrograde is taking place in good pace along with our drawdown.

General DUNFORD. Congressman, first, with regard to the equipment that we will bring out. I have pledged to the Services that whatever they need to reset, we will retrograde. And that is our plan is based on what the Services identify as important and we will make sure that that happens.

As you know, from my recent experience, I am sensitive to the needs of the Services as well as the requirements that we have forward, and we will balance those over the next 2 years.

We don't have a capacity issue with regard to getting the equipment home. But you correctly identified the real issue, which is the cost. And so we have plenty of capacity. We could move all of our equipment out by air or multimodal, flying it to a port and then bringing it back home by ship. But it is significantly less expensive were we to bring it out across the ground lines of communication.

As an example, I think the total cost for our retrograde is on the order of \$6 billion if we don't have the GLOCs available, and closer to \$4 billion if we do. And I can get those exact figures to you, but it is not insignificant, the amount of money that would cost us if the GLOCs are not available.

We have had 2 months of successful proofs of principle moving equipment both from Afghanistan to Pakistan and through the Port of Karachi and back home. As well as having equipment that had been backlogged inside of Pakistan has now been freed up and brought into Afghanistan.

This next 2 months will be critical. We will start to see the velocity that we will need to have on those ground lines of communication. But we have worked through the technical aspects of getting through the various checkpoints and customs and security pieces of movements across the ground lines of communication, and I think we are in pretty good shape as we look towards the next couple of months.

Mr. WITTMAN. Very good. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

Mr. COOK. Mr. Andrews.

Mr. ANDREWS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Dunford, thank you for your service to our country and please convey to the men and women that you lead how proud we are of them and how much we support them and want them home safely. We appreciate their effort very, very much.

General DUNFORD. Thanks, Congressman.

Mr. ANDREWS. And yours as well. On page 15 of your testimony, you outline one of the definitions of victory as an operationally ineffective Al Qaeda deprived of a safe haven from which to plan and conduct operations outside the area. How do we stand today with respect to achieving that goal?

General DUNFORD. Inside of Afghanistan, Congressman, the operations that we have conducted with our Special Operations Forces have effectively disrupted Al Qaeda.

There is a small presence in the northeast part of the country, a small Al Qaeda presence, but I do not assess them as having the capability to plan or conduct operations outside of Afghanistan at this time. And it is largely as a result of the operational tempo of our Special Operating forces, which virtually, every night, are conducting operations to disrupt those Al Qaeda remnants.

Mr. ANDREWS. I know what is supposed to happen when those Special Ops forces are no longer in the country doing that. What do you think will happen? When the Afghan forces are responsible for achieving that objective, how do you assess their readiness to do that?

General DUNFORD. Congressman, I think there are a couple of variables. One is the capabilities of the Afghan security forces and I am confident in their development over time that they will be able to provide security inside of Afghanistan.

But a critical piece of addressing the enemy situation in Afghanistan is going to be where Pakistan is with regards to supporting the enemy inside of Pakistan, as well as the progress of political transition inside of Afghanistan. So those are all preconditions to our ability to have a sustainable security environment over time.

Mr. ANDREWS. I understand these goals are integrated, they all relate to each other. I notice that the fourth goal is that constructive ANSF-Pakistani military relationship. How does the Taliban fit? If that relationship between the ANSF and Pakistan is optimal, from our point of view, how does that alliance deal with the Taliban and what is their relationship with the Taliban?

General DUNFORD. Congressman, one of the developments that I have seen certainly in the last few months, and I have met with General Kayani in Pakistan twice now since arriving in Afghanistan, is there is a growing recognition inside of Pakistan that the

linkage between Pakistani Taliban and Afghan Taliban has a destabilizing effect, not only inside of Afghanistan but inside of Pakistan, as well.

In fact, it has been described to me by the Pakistanis as their desire to break the nexus between Pakistani Taliban and Afghan Taliban to try to support the turning of the Afghan Taliban politically inwards toward Kabul so they can deal with the very real threat they have inside of Pakistan.

Pakistan has lost over 15,000 killed or wounded since 9/11 dealing with the threat. Just in the past couple of weeks, inside the Khyber Agency, they were involved in a very difficult fight where hundreds have been killed and wounded as they deal with the TTP [Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan] threat.

So from my perspective, the military-to-military relationship that Afghanistan and Pakistan has post-2014 will be helpful in dealing with what is now, I think, commonly understood to be a mutual threat to their security. And I actually have—although there are some concerns about the strategic relationship between those two countries, I actually have a degree of optimism about our ability to affect a constructive military-to-military relationship between Pakistan and Afghanistan because of their common understanding of the threat post-2014.

Mr. ANDREWS. That would be like—best news we could anticipate for the future of the region. I noticed that the attrition rates for the Afghan forces still are about twice what the goal is. What has been the most effective attrition reduction strategy that you have seen in country thus far?

General DUNFORD. Congressman, from my perspective, it is about leadership. And when I came into the United States Marine Corps in the 1970s, both the United States Marine Corps and the Army had significant attrition problems. And we fixed those problems with leadership. We fixed those problems by holding leaders accountable and to standard.

And that is exactly the most effective way to deal with the attrition problem in the Afghan forces. There are really two pieces of it. One is good vetting, as individuals are recruited to come into the service. And then once they are in, ensuring that we have the proper command climate within which those individuals—

Mr. ANDREWS. So is there a range of results that some units that are well-led have very low attrition and others that have very high attrition?

General DUNFORD. Congressman, there is a direct correlation between leadership and attrition.

I will give you an example. The Minister of Defense recently identified 30 general officers to be reassigned or relieved of their duties. He gave us that list of names. When we did a correlation of those names and units, we found that there was a direct correlation between high attrition levels in those units and the failure of those individuals to perform to standard.

So absolutely a relationship between the two. And again, I think today we have an inconsistency in leadership across the Afghan forces that will be addressed over time.

Mr. ANDREWS. General, thank you very much for your service.

Mr. COOK. Mr. Rogers.

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General, good to see you again. Thank you for your service and thank you for your hospitality a few weeks ago when I was in Afghanistan.

I am going to be parochial here. I have the Anniston Army Depot here in my district, several thousand great Americans who have done a real stand-up job in supporting our military in both theaters and been over there side-by-side with them on many occasions trying to make sure that their equipment worked.

And as a result, I am focused a little bit on FMS [foreign military sales] with Afghanis. Are there any foreign military sales planned with the Afghanis to try to help them with the equipment we are going to leave behind or not at present?

General DUNFORD. Congressman, we are still refining the plans for FMS for Afghanistan. I would be happy to stay in contact with you and provide those details over time.

Mr. ROGERS. I would appreciate that. I serve on the Readiness committee with Mr. Wittman who just talked to you about retrograde. And I know part of the tour you gave me over there was looking at retrograde.

One of the things that has come up since I have gotten back is whether or not the costs for bringing the equipment back, transportation, which you were just talking about with Mr. Wittman, has become so onerous that that may be a big factor in whether or not we bring some of the stuff back. Is that going to be the primary factor on whether or not we can use it again?

General DUNFORD. Congressman, the Services are making a case-by-case decision on each piece of equipment. And one of the factors is obviously the requirement back home. Another factor is the condition of the equipment that is in Afghanistan. And then the costs of transporting that equipment home.

But we have a very close dialogue with the services. In fact, I think with regard to the Army we are doing weekly VTCs [video teleconference] with the Army to track the equipment that they need to bring back home.

So cost is one of the variables, but it is just one of the variables. The real issue is achieving the desired end state, which is enhancing the readiness of our home station units. And so it is all being balanced in a way that I think is appropriate.

Mr. ROGERS. Great. Last question I have got—and you may not know the answer to this, because the President's budget just came out—but do you know if that budget request adequately funds the transportation cost that you expect in the retrograde, or is it too early to tell?

General DUNFORD. Congressman, it is too soon to tell. We have not got the details of the actual OCO piece of that budget which would cover the transportation cost you refer to.

Mr. ROGERS. Great. Thank you for your service and I yield back.

Mr. COOK. Well, seeing no—Colonel Kline, you have no questions at all?

General, on behalf of the committee, first of all, I had a couple of questions but you have already answered. You have been extremely patient. I want to thank you very much for our visit that we had over there. It was really an eye-opener. I was very, very impressed with the American military, primarily Army units. Your

leadership, the Afghans, it was—very, very concerned about the politics, but that is something we will discuss outside this room.

But, I wanted to give you a chance if you had any final comments you wanted to make. It has been a long morning. You have answered every question conceivable, I think, and I appreciate your patience.

So you have the last word.

General DUNFORD. Thanks, Congressman.

The only comment I have is I actually do appreciate the opportunity to come here today to testify. And one of the reasons is I am concerned that perhaps Afghanistan is in the rearview mirror in some ways to the Afghan people, and I very much appreciate the House Armed Service Committee ensuring that, that is not the case.

We still do have nearly 60,000 young men and women that are in harm's way, and what I want to do is the same that thing you want to do, ensure that they have the wherewithal to accomplish the mission until the very last day that they are in Afghanistan.

And so I appreciate the support of the committee in making sure that we do that, and I appreciate your visit. And we welcome any members of the committee to come over and visit. One, I think it means a lot to our forces forward deployed. They know by your visit that you actually care about what support they have, and I also think it just reaffirms the commitment of the American people to what they are doing, and let's them know that what they are doing is important.

And I would tell you that at the end of the day is really all they ask for, they just ask that the American people recognize and support what they are doing in Afghanistan. And I think with that support they will do whatever it is that we ask them to do.

So thanks very much.

Mr. COOK. Thank you very much, General.

On behalf of the committee, thanks again.

Semper Fi.

This meeting is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:03 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

A P P E N D I X

APRIL 17, 2013

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

APRIL 17, 2013

Statement of Hon. Howard P. “Buck” McKeon
Chairman, House Committee on Armed Services
Hearing on
Recent Developments in Afghanistan

April 17, 2013

Good morning ladies and gentlemen. The House Armed Services Committee meets to receive testimony on the recent developments in Afghanistan. Today, we have with us General Joseph Dunford. General Dunford, thank you for your leadership and service to the Nation, and thank you for joining us today.

The NATO mission has entered a period of “transition.” Although NATO has not fully transitioned security efforts to Afghan lead, President Obama already has announced the withdrawal of half of the U.S. forces in Afghanistan by this time next year. In my view, the President’s approach is fraught with unnecessary risk. Nevertheless, on my recent trip to the region, I was impressed by how far the Afghan security forces have come. Their capabilities and willingness to fight for the future of their country are remarkable.

The fundamental question before us is how the United States will continue to preserve U.S. national security interests after 2014. One of the key components to answering this question—in addition to the President’s forthcoming decision on post-2014 troop presence and mission set—will be the Bilateral Security Agreement that the Administration is currently negotiating with the Government of Afghanistan.

After over 10 years of war, the American people are understandably war-weary. Clearly, the situation in Afghanistan and the region is challenging and complex. But Afghanistan is directly connected to our vital national security interests and we must get this right. We owe nothing less to the victims on 9/11, the U.S. troops and their families who have served and sacrificed, and our sons and daughters who may have to return if we get this wrong. The simple justice that comes from that principled position cannot be overstated.

General Dunford, again, we are extremely grateful for your service to our country. I look forward to your testimony.

Statement of Hon. Adam Smith
Ranking Member, House Committee on Armed Services
Hearing on
Recent Developments in Afghanistan
April 17, 2013

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I share in your comments about the outstanding job General Dunford has done and the job that our troops have done in a very, very difficult environment.

I have been there many times myself and I have seen the progress, and not just in Kabul, not just in the capital, but out in some of the tougher regions, down in Helmand, down south in Kandahar and other places. Our men and women have done an amazing job and they did it by putting their lives on the line and going out there and cleaning up places that needed to be cleaned up and giving the Afghan people the chance in a more stable future.

So we definitely recognize the service, the sacrifice, and the outstanding job that they have done and admire the progress that has been made.

I also want to say that I thank General Dunford, I heard some of his comments yesterday. I think it has been clear for some time what our goals are in Afghanistan. I have always had a great frustration that people say we don't know what we are doing there. We know exactly what we are doing there.

We want to make sure that we have an Afghan government that can stand, that can be stable, that has security and governance without us, because we cannot have a permanent presence there. We want to deny Al Qaeda the ability to return to Afghanistan and use it as a safe haven. And really that second goal is tied directly to the first of having an Afghan government that can stand and survive against the Taliban, against potential AQ elements. I think that has been clear from the start.

Those are modest, realistic goals. We are not going to eliminate the Taliban from the Afghanistan-Pakistan region. The question is can we contain them and what is the best strategy for containing them? And the best strategy for containing them is doing our level best to train the Afghan security forces to be in a position to do that. And I think we have made enormous progress on that front and we are headed in the right direction.

But part of doing that is making it clear that eventually we are going to leave. Eventually they are going to have that responsibility. We cannot be a permanent crutch. We have to transition. And we have seen that.

As we have moved from district to district and province to province, we have turned over slowly and gradually and I think very intelligently greater responsibility to those Afghan National Security Forces. We haven't just said, woop, you are on your own and pulled out. We have been transitioning in a way to build their strength, capability, and durability.

Now there are no guarantees, no doubt about that. This is a very, very difficult part of the world. It will be a very, very difficult part of the world 5 years from now, 10 years from and, odds are, 20 years from now. But we have put the Afghan National Security Forces in the best possible position to be able to, at a minimum, hold, to stop the Taliban from taking back over the government and giving Al Qaeda a safe haven.

And as we go forward, we have to try to envision what our role is going to be. And I will agree with the Chairman, I think the single most important thing right now is to get that Bilateral Security Agreement to eliminate some of that uncertainty as to what exactly our role is going to be post-2014.

I know General Dunford is working hard on that. I know President Karzai is not always the easiest person to work with to get there, but I know that is a huge priority.

But at the end of the day, we cannot stay in Afghanistan forever for a wide variety of reasons, but the only one I will point out here is that if we do, the Afghan government will never truly be sovereign, will never truly be stable, and will never truly have the respect of the Afghan people that it needs to be the sustainable government that we need it to be.

So I think the path the President and General Dunford and others have put us on, though not easy, though not full of guarantees, it is the best, smartest path to put us in a direction where we can have the security goals that we strive for in that very, very difficult part of the region.

I thank General Dunford again for his service. I look forward to his testimony and to the questions from the panel.

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

WRITTEN POSTURE STATEMENT

STATEMENT OF GENERAL
JOSEPH F. DUNFORD
COMMANDER
US FORCES-AFGHANISTAN
BEFORE THE
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
ON
THE SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN
APRIL 17, 2013

HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

*Afghanistan: Progress, Opportunities, and Commitment**Where We Are – State of the Environment*

The conflict in Afghanistan has now shifted into a fundamentally new phase. For the past 11 years, the United States and our Coalition allies have been leading combat operations. Now the Afghans are taking over, and ISAF is stepping back into a supporting role. The progress made by the ISAF-led surge over the past three years has put the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA) in control of all Afghanistan's major cities and 34 provincial capitals, and driven the insurgency away from the population. ISAF's primary focus is now shifting from directly fighting the insurgency to supporting the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) in their efforts to hold and expand these gains.

The progress made by the ANSF enabled President Obama and President Karzai to agree at the January Summit that Milestone 2013 -- Afghan security lead throughout the country -- will be announced later this spring. This announcement will mark ISAF's official transition to its supporting role: fully focused on training, advising, and assisting the ANSF. In fact, this transition has largely taken place. The ANSF are now leading the vast majority of operations countrywide. ISAF casualties are lower than they have been since 2008. The majority of ISAF bases have been transferred to the ANSF or closed, and construction is complete on the majority of ANSF bases. The U.S. will redeploy 34,000 troops by February 2014, and the ANSF have grown to nearly 352,000 personnel. Afghanistan's populated areas are increasingly secure, and the ANSF have successfully maintained security gains in areas that have already been transitioned. Still, the ANSF will continue to need training, advising, and key combat support from ISAF, including close air support, logistics, and intelligence, through the end of the ISAF combat mission in December 2014.

However, security challenges remain. The insurgency's sanctuaries in Pakistan, limited GIROA institutional capacity, and endemic corruption remain the greatest impediments to long-term stability and sustainable security in Afghanistan. ISAF will continue to work with GIROA to address its challenges in order to deliver effective governance to the Afghan people.

Where We Are – State of the ANSF

The ANSF are at the forefront of the fight and are now responsible for maintaining and expanding security in the face of the insurgency. Despite the early recognition that Afghan security would depend on indigenous security forces, building the ANSF lagged in the initial years after we forced the Taliban government from power. In late 2009, a concerted effort to grow the ANSF was initiated with the goal of generating and fielding trained and equipped Afghan combat elements and getting them into the fight. Unit partnering between Afghan and ISAF forces – enabled by the U.S. troop surge ordered by President Obama – provided the ANSF the space to develop combat capabilities and leadership skills from the tactical level on up. GIRoA and ISAF deliberately focused first on ANSF growth (force size), followed by the development of enablers and the professionalization of the ranks. This decision was made with a full understanding that the ANSF, once built to size by 2012, would experience some initial shortfalls in equipment, logistics, personnel, and leadership – foreseeable challenges that would be overcome in the 2012-2014 period as Afghan knowledge, capacity, and experience increased.

Moving into the 2013 fighting season, the insurgency now confronts a combined ANSF and Afghanistan Local Police (ALP) force of over 350,000 personnel who have secured over 87 percent of Afghanistan's population, and are leading 80 percent of all conventional operations. These forces are operating with growing confidence, improved leadership, warfighting capability, and a vision for the future. They are a source of security, confidence, and pride for the Afghan people – factors the insurgents must consider as their influence and effectiveness in Afghanistan wanes.

As of early 2013, most of our Coalition partnerships with the ANSF have evolved into advise and assist relationships; these relationships are designed to provide tailored support and to continue increasing ANSF confidence and capabilities. Those advisory roles are designed to evolve and reduce over time until ANSF units can fully stand on their own in a sustainable manner.

The ANSF continue to improve at a steady pace with marked quality increases seen in units capable of conducting independent operations. Over the last year, only one of the 23 Afghan National Army (ANA) brigade headquarters was conducting independent operations. Today the

ANA has one corps/division headquarters, five brigade headquarters, and 27 battalions (4 of the 27 are garrison support units) capable of operating independently. The growing ANA Special Operations Command (ANASOC) has also made strides towards becoming an independent and effective force – with the vast majority of ANA special operations forces (SOF) missions, to include night operations, being Afghan-led.

Evidence of the ANSF's growing capacity to conduct their own increasingly sophisticated operations can be seen in Laghman, Kabul, and Paktika provinces. Here, the ANSF have implemented the layered security concept that decreases vulnerabilities in any single arm of the force by leveraging the capabilities of the entire ANSF (e.g. ALP, ANASOF, ANA, Afghan National Police (ANP), Afghan Border Police (ABP), National Directorate of Security (NDS), etc.), providing security to the Afghan people with minimal assistance from the Coalition. This "web" of enduring security starts locally, then spreads from the bottom up to the population centers, through the rural areas, and out to the borders.

Layered security consists of all ANSF elements having a defined role within an established network, each one responsible for a specific security operation's focus defined geographically (Border, Village, District, Province), or by other objectives outlined in a security strategy. For example, a layered security operation might consist of the Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP) patrolling a population center and its highways, while the ABP provides an outer security layer by controlling border crossings. Simultaneously, the ANA conduct combat patrols and operations based on NDS intelligence providing a security layer in between the border and population center. Command, control, coordination and intelligence for the entire layered security operation is conducted at the Operational Coordination Center (OCC). The OCCs are designed to manage and disseminate information and intelligence proactively or in response to an incident, and laterally share information that enables rapid joint action at the provincial level and below. This integrated combination of information sharing, decision support, and the ability to direct operations makes it more difficult for criminals or insurgents to succeed. The Afghan ability to implement this layered security environment will increase once the Afghan Air Force (AAF) becomes fully capable. This ANSF collective effort is an example of how Afghans have taken responsibility for their own security and are making marked and sustainable progress on the ground.

In the last year, the Coalition has begun transitioning districts and provinces in the east and south. There have been setbacks during these operations, as we expected in any transition as dramatic as the ones described above. But, the Afghans are learning from their mistakes and are pressing on to become increasingly independent and effective. This is a part of a larger story of resilience and resolution. Throughout last summer and fall, the ANSF fought increasingly on their own, with decreasing enabling support from U.S. and Coalition forces. In Kandahar's Zharey District, for example, we reduced U.S. troops from 3,500 to 300 last October. Afghan soldiers are now patrolling independently and attacks have not increased. We estimate that the number of Taliban fighters have fallen from 900 to 100. In neighboring Panjwai District, local villages have risen up against the Taliban and their harsh tactics. When they did, Afghan police quickly reinforced the villagers, enabling them to survive a Taliban counterattack.

In another branch of the ANSF, the Afghan Air Force's (AAF) emerging capability was recently demonstrated in Regional Command (RC)-East, where winter flight missions were successfully conducted to resupply the ANSF at forward operating bases in Nuristan Province. In another example, the AAF provided direct support to the ABP mission to supply local villages and secure contested territory in RC-South. While many challenges remain, the progress across the ANSF has been genuine and is already creating a significant impact on both the physical and psychological aspects of the fight.

ANSF Challenges and Gaps in 2013

Having realized the initial goal of growing and equipping the ANSF into an organization that will be capable of assuming the lead security role, we have shifted emphasis to building capacity and fielding more complex and technologically advanced capabilities. ANSF progress towards advanced capabilities has been measured. Significant gaps in some ANSF capabilities persist. The ANSF will continue to require ISAF support in areas including battle command, intelligence fusion, logistics, casualty evacuation (CASEVAC), Counter-Improvised Explosive Device (C-IED), surface fires, engineer and explosive ordnance, and aviation. Current ISAF support and the subsequent RESOLUTE SUPPORT mission (the NATO post-2014 mission) force must take a tailored approach to provide train, advise, and assist support focused on very specific capabilities to maintain the current ANSF development trajectory.

The ANSF have made some progress in enablers such as logistics and they are increasingly taking responsibility for distribution, maintenance, ammunition management, fuel, and other classes of supply at the national and regional logistics nodes and institutions. ANSF intelligence capability has seen improvements. ANA Military Intelligence Companies with human intelligence (HUMINT), signals intelligence (SIGINT), and counter-intelligence sections are currently integrated at the Corps level to support several ANSF mission sets. The Afghan Air Force is improving its ability to provide air support to the ANSF. These and other capabilities that need further development have been identified for inclusion in the current ISAF and subsequent RESOLUTE SUPPORT train, advise, and assist effort. Capabilities that will require continued development after 2014 include aviation, explosive ordnance disposal, engineer, and personnel management. While not exhaustive, current capability gaps include:

- The need for continued assistance with planning, coordination, fire support integration, control of CAS, intelligence, medical evacuation, and command and control, as highlighted by the recent 209th Corps Operations in Badakhshan .
- Intelligence sharing exists, but is not a capability that has been cultivated and standardized across the ANSF. Information sharing between the NDS and ANA remains uneven. In an effort to cultivate intelligence sharing, the ANSF Operational Coordination Centers are increasingly focused on facilitating intelligence sharing at the regional and provincial levels, where we see some success. However, despite the progress, ANSF commanders tend to rely on what they are most familiar with, such as tactical-level source operations and intelligence sharing based on personal relationships.
- The AAF will require increased capability and capacity going into 2015 due to late equipment fielding, contracting problems, and personnel shortfalls. ISAF currently predicts that this gap will exist through 2016. Coalition advisors will continue working to build sufficient fixed-wing, rotary-wing, close-combat attack, and intelligence air platform capabilities.
- While route clearance and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) capabilities continue to improve throughout the ANA, significant challenges exist for generating fully manned, trained, and equipped EOD teams. The majority of ANSF casualties come from IEDs. As of

February 2013, the ANA has only 59 validated EOD teams out of an authorized 230, and the ANP has 14 validated teams out of an authorized 88. This gap will likely endure through 2015 and beyond.

- ANSF personnel issues, like that of many militaries, are varied and range from shortages, literacy, retention, attrition, and desertion. The ANSF continue to suffer from non-commissioned officer (NCO) shortages. The ANA requires over 10,000 NCOs, while the ANP requires over 5,000. In the ANA, the core limitations in NCO generation remain the limited number of functionally literate applicants. Just as in many regional armies, the professionalization of the ANSF NCO corps has not yet occurred, with NCOs being underrepresented across the forces and lacking authorities required to effectively lead troops.
- Attrition within the ANA also continues to be a significant challenge, creating a burden on recruiting and training structures. The ANA's sustained high attrition rates remain a significant concern and threaten the growth and development of a professional, competent, and capable force. Vacancies are not always filled quickly or with properly trained personnel, presenting challenges for units at the operational level. Furthermore, attrition creates a burden on recruiting and training assets, increasing the overall cost of the force. The ANA attrition rate continues to exceed the monthly target rate of 1.4 percent; for the last year the monthly average was 2.7 percent per month. This attrition rate equates to the loss of around 5,000 personnel per month or 60,000 per annum. The ANA leadership tracks attrition data and the reasons most often cited for leaving the army are issues of leadership, family separation, leave, and operational tempo. Since many of the underlying issues with attrition pertain to leadership, Minister of Defense Mohammadi formed an Evaluation Commission to assess his commanders, and if need be, replace unsatisfactory leaders from battalion through corps levels.

Mitigation Efforts into 2014

In most battlefield enabler and functional areas, ANSF capabilities will never equal those of the Coalition. But parity between Coalition and Afghan forces is not necessary for the requirements of Afghan security, and is therefore not the right measure of Afghan capabilities. In most areas, the ANSF will do things differently than the Coalition has done them. They will utilize different

tools and techniques to achieve the same net effect. Indirect fires, for example, can be provided by mortars rather than close air support; casualty evacuation can be accomplished by ground rather than air; and planning will be accomplished in an Afghan way. In some cases, too, the ANSF may simply choose not to do some things that they would have undertaken while partnered with us. But it is a mistake to discount organic Afghan capabilities and techniques because they do not meet Western standards – the ANSF have other advantages (local familiarity with the culture and terrain, in-depth understanding of their enemies tactics and techniques, ingenuity, etc.) that they can leverage to defeat the security challenges they face. These organic capabilities and methods will most often be sufficient to preserve their own confidence and that of the Afghan people. Where the ANSF lack sufficient independent capability, we will continue to provide security force assistance to close the gaps until such time as the Afghans are able to provide their own capacity and capabilities for themselves.

Although the ANSF are developing solutions to provide needed enabler capabilities, continued support will be required for the foreseeable future. We have developed a tailored plan to accelerate key enablers as a part of transition to help improve the future self-sufficiency of the ANSF to protect the Afghan population, manage violence, and contain the insurgency through sustained layered security operations. We anticipate most of these enablers to be fielded by the end of 2014 with capability development continuing through the RESOLUTE SUPPORT mission.

Where We Are – State of the Insurgency

U.S. and Coalition forces, working side by side with our Afghan partners, have reversed the insurgency's momentum and pushed insurgents out of population centers. By the end of last year's fighting season, the ANSF and ISAF had deprived the insurgents of key safe havens, command and control nodes, and support zones. They are now less capable, less popular, and less of a threat to the Afghan government than a year ago.

Despite this degradation, safe havens in Afghanistan and sanctuaries in Pakistan continue to provide Taliban senior leadership some freedom of movement and freedom of action, facilitating the training of fighters, and the planning of operations. The Afghan Taliban and all its sub-

groups, including the Haqqani Network, remain capable of conducting high profile attacks, though counterterrorism pressure has degraded this ability. However, the Taliban remain firm in their conviction that ISAF's drawdown and perceived ANSF weakness, especially when supplemented with continued external support and with sanctuary in Pakistan that the Taliban exploit, will translate into a restoration of their pre-surge military capabilities and influence.

Sustained counter-terrorism operations have also eliminated dozens of al Qaeda enablers and exerted pressure on al Qaeda personnel, restricting their movement to isolated areas of northeastern Afghanistan. Despite effective counter-terrorism pressure on al Qaeda and its Taliban enablers, and on the small number of al Qaeda fighters in Afghanistan, al Qaeda's relationship with local Afghan Taliban remains intact.

Challenges

Establishing a Constructive ANSF-Pakistan Military Relationship

The security, especially along the border, of Afghanistan and Pakistan is an interdependent issue that requires a cooperative effort between the two countries.

The Afghanistan-Pakistan relationship has ebbed and flowed over time, but both nations acknowledge that stability in Afghanistan impacts Pakistan and vice versa. The unresolved border issues between Afghanistan and Pakistan are a historical source of friction between the two countries. Actions by both sides exacerbated this friction and contributed significantly to the loss of trust necessary for a meaningful relationship between each country's military forces. Last fall, as a step toward improving this relationship, ISAF led the development of a Tripartite Border Standard Operating Procedure. This document is designed to improve cross border coordination between ISAF, the ANSF, and the Pakistan military. ISAF continues to work to improve the cooperation, participation and commitment of the Afghans and Pakistanis.

Recently the ANSF established a more robust Tripartite Joint Operations Center in Kabul, providing general officers on both sides with direct access to their respective Ministries. On-going Border Flag Meetings continue to address border issues and are key to develop and

improve cross-border relations. While we see some initial progress, serious challenges remain. Our goal remains to develop the trust necessary between the two countries so that they will eventually be able to maintain a constructive bilateral military-to-military relationship.

Insider Threat

One tactic the insurgents use to sow distrust and attack our resolve is infiltration in friendly forces for the purposes of attacking from the inside, sometimes described as “Green on Blue” or “Green on Green” attacks. We recognize the insider attacks are a threat to Afghan and Coalition forces and take this issue very seriously. ISAF is a learning, adaptive organization, and we have devoted a tremendous amount of time and energy to better understand this threat. Together, ISAF and the Afghan government have undertaken numerous measures to reduce the risk of insider attacks, including improved vetting and screening, counter-intelligence, and cultural awareness. We are constantly refining our approach.

Our actions are based upon the three pillars: Force Protection, Situational Awareness, and Counter-Intelligence (CI). Our Force Protection (FP) efforts include the assignment of a dedicated FP Officer to provide a daily risk assessment and adjust FPO measures as appropriate. We have also instituted guidance to employ Guardian Angels to prevent insider attacks or reduce the effects of these attacks. We have brought in outside support to provide Insider Threat Situational Awareness Training with mobile training teams. These teams provide a sophisticated understanding of Human Behavior Pattern Recognition Analysis, helping to identify predictive indicators of potential insider attacks. Our final pillar encompasses the expansion of our CI teams for both the Coalition and Afghan National Army; we have accomplished this by employing additional resources from Allied Command Counter-Intelligence, while the Afghans have transferred CI personnel from the Ministry of Interior and National Directorate of Security over to the Afghan National Army.

Civilian Casualties

The protection of the Afghan population remains a top ISAF priority, and avoidance of civilian casualties is one of ISAF’s highest priorities. We have taken significant actions over the past year to minimize these tragic events. As a result, ISAF-caused civilian casualties have been reduced by almost half in comparing 2011 to 2012. These casualties are, rightly, a concern to the

people and the President of Afghanistan. We are working with the GIRoA to further reduce ISAF-caused civilian casualties and maintain the trust and support of the Afghan government and the Afghan people.

ISAF continues to work closely with its Afghan counterparts to ensure accurate and timely reporting of civilian casualties. Supporting security transition is the transfer of responsibility for civilian casualties avoidance and mitigation measures, procedures, and capabilities to the ANSF. In order to support effective protection of the Afghan population, in December the Ministry of Defense hosted its first Population Protection Conference to discuss and address these issues.

Lessons Learned

Detention Facility in Parwan. The transfer of the Detention Facility in Parwan to the Afghan government reaffirmed Afghan sovereignty, while preserving our force protection requirements. Now known as the Afghan National Detention Facility – Parwan (ANDF-P), the facility represents an emerging sense of sovereignty for the Afghan people, allowing them to assume responsibility for the detention and prosecution of detainees under the authority of the Afghan constitution. During the transfer ceremony, GIRoA officials highlighted their responsibilities for detention operations in accordance with the Afghan rule of law, due process, and international standards for the humane treatment of detainees. While the day represented a transfer of authority, there is still work in progress to transition the management functions of the facility. We still have an appropriate presence at the facility in support of Afghan forces. We will continue to train, advise, and assist the Detentions Operations Command, the Afghan Review Board process, and the Justice Center at Parwan as Afghanistan’s capability to operate independently fully develops.

We did not arrive at this juncture overnight; the original Memorandum of Understanding was signed on March 9th, 2012, and it took a year of continued work at the facility to build sufficient Afghan capacity and capabilities to finalize the transfer of authority – that work continues as we mark another milestone in the transition of this mission. The Agreement that determined the final requirements for the transfer reaffirms our mutual commitment to the lawful and humane treatment of detainees, while ensuring proper protection of Afghan, U.S., and Coalition Forces. This transfer improved our strategic partnership with Afghanistan, sets the stage for increased

cooperation in the broader transition framework, and fulfilled the pledges made by President Obama and President Karzai during their Joint Statement in January.

ISSUES

Elections in 2014

A peaceful and successful transition of the Afghan Presidency in 2014 will be a crucial step toward a confident, secure, and stable way ahead in Afghanistan. Elections must be seen to be inclusive, free, and fair to the Afghan people. A successful political transition is also a precondition for the continued flow of resources as described in the Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework. Donor confidence and sustained flow of pledged funding are critical for continued progress in a stable Afghanistan. ISAF will support the ANSF as they provide security for the elections process.

Force Posture

As the Campaign transitions in the coming 20 months to the RESOLUTE SUPPORT train, advise, and assist mission in support of the ANSF, we will also be redeploying U.S. forces to reach our 34K force structure by February 2014 and retrograde equipment. Following that, we will further redeploy forces to a level yet to be determined by the end of 2014. Although challenged by geography, weather, and occasional disruptions in the land routes, we can complete retrograde and redeployment of U.S. Forces from Afghanistan. We have sufficient transportation capacity to meet redeployment and retrograde requirements. The combined capabilities of the Multi-Modal (M/M) network, the Northern Distribution Network (NDN), and the Pakistan Ground Lines of Communication (PAK GLOCs) provide redundant capabilities to meet our requirements.

U.S. Forces – Afghanistan (USFOR-A) redeployment and retrograde operations began in 2012 with the recovery of surge forces. From January 2012 through March 2013, USFOR-A reduced force levels by 28 percent, reduced U.S. bases by 70 percent, reduced rolling stock equipment by 45 percent, and reduced non-rolling stock equipment and supplies by 26 percent. We are

confident in our ability to successfully continue redeployment and retrograde operations through 2014 as we transition to the post-2014 mission.

Contractor Drawdown. In concert with our mission requirements and overall retrograde and base closure/transfer, we are responsibly drawing down the contractor footprint, both in terms of personnel and equipment. In August 2012, we stood up the Operational Contract Support Drawdown Cell, and tasked them with this specific mission, giving particular emphasis to applying lessons learned from Iraq. With this cell in place, we put our primary focus on the largest contracts in theater and are currently executing a plan that will yield a reduction in contractor personnel by approximately 25,000 (~25 percent) by the end of calendar year 2013. A combination of base closure and a further de-scoping of contract requirements will allow us to continue to reduce contractor footprint through calendar year 2014. We are also putting great emphasis on responsible disposition of contractor-managed government-owned equipment in theater. To make this happen, we are collaborating closely with Defense Logistics Agency, Defense Contract Management Agency, and other key stakeholders to ensure we have a fiscally responsible and logistically feasible plan for materiel reduction of this equipment. Over the next 21 months, this approach will result in a responsible contractor reduction that appropriately balances mission risk with our need for retrograde, base closure/transfer, and materiel reduction.

During this transition, commanders will move to more expeditionary standards and balance quality of life, safety, fiscal stewardship, and mission. For example, we will reduce our in-theater food stock by changing the meal cycle to two Meals-Ready-to-Eat and two hot meals, we will reduce the use of non-tactical vehicles on our bases, and we will begin to descope the services provided to our soldiers and civilians such as contract laundry. We will continue to provide wireless internet services as long as possible which is important to the morale of our force and provides a vital link to their families.

Stewardship of Resources Remains a Key Task

Afghan Security Force Funds (ASFF)

A critical tool in our efforts to support the development of the ANSF has been the use of the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF) which provides the resources required to train,

sustain, and equip a force of 352,000 Afghan soldiers and police as well as 30,000 Afghan local police. A combination of ongoing Department of Defense reviews, Department of Defense reprogramming, and Congressional reallocation reduced the original FY 2012 request from \$12.8 billion to \$9.2 billion. ASFF received \$5.1 billion in FY 2013 against a request of \$5.7 billion. This reduction will result in the delay in deploying some needed enabling capabilities. The FY 2013 budget shifted emphasis from building, equipping, and training to professionalizing and sustaining the force. It will include some key enabler builds as well as equipping and infrastructure requirements for the Afghan Air Forces and Special Operations Forces as they continue to build their capabilities.

Commander's Emergency Response Program

The Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) remains important; although it will reduce as our forces reduce. Working collaboratively with the Special Inspector General for Afghan Reconstruction and the Army Audit Agency, we have made significant improvements in policy and execution that provided significant return on investment. In FY12, ISAF was able to reduce CERP projects in both number and scale due to improving security conditions and a decreasing requirement for humanitarian relief and reconstruction. Even so, the right-sizing of this critical enabling program continued to emphasize small-scale, high-impact projects that delivered immediate assistance to the local population with 96 percent of the projects executed in FY12 valued at less than \$100K each and 90 percent under \$10K each. CERP remains a critical tool for our Commanders on the ground.

Military Construction

Despite a dynamic and evolving operational environment, ISAF and USFOR-A remain firmly committed to efficiently managing congressionally appropriated Military Construction (MILCON) funds to support our warfighters. By establishing a deliberate process to review, validate, and adapt this multi-billion dollar investment, the command ensured effective resource stewardship while providing the quality facilities needed by our troops. As a result, since 2011, we have recommended and received approval for the cancellation/de-scope of over 100 MILCON projects with an estimated cost avoidance/savings of nearly \$1.3 billion.

Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund

Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund (AIF) is a Department of Defense funding source that uses two-year funds for the execution of critical infrastructure projects in the power, water, transportation, and rule-of-law sectors. The projects are carefully selected, assessed, and coordinated with GIRA, the U.S. Department of State, and the U.S. Agency for International Development to ensure that they are both sustainable and congruent with Afghanistan's future infrastructure priorities. AIF projects are critical to locking in stability gains and providing a foundation for internal economic growth that is less reliant on external aid. Nearly all AIF funds (99 percent) are spent in the East, South, and Southwest areas of Afghanistan where they provide positive counter-insurgency effects in support of the ANSF and encourage long-term security and stability. In addition, two-year funds enable USFOR-A to execute large, complex projects that were not possible with CERP. Most importantly, the AIF program serves as an effective counter to the insurgent narrative of abandonment.

What Winning Looks Like

Despite the remaining challenges, we can win in Afghanistan. The key elements of our success include:

- The transition of security responsibility to a confident, self-reliant and sustainable ANSF capable of protecting the population and securing a legitimate Afghan government
- An operationally ineffective al Qaeda deprived of a safe haven from which to plan and conduct operations outside the area
- An acceptable political transition, defined by inclusive, free, fair elections and Afghan government adherence to the Mutual Accountability Framework
- A constructive ANSF-Pakistan military relationship

We will have reached the end state of our combat operations when security conditions are set for the Afghan people to exploit a Decade of Opportunity. All of this is achievable -- but it is not inevitable. Winning in Afghanistan will require us to remain focused on why we are there and firmly committed to achieving our objectives.



General Joseph F. Dunford, Jr.
Commander, International Security Assistance
Force/United States Forces - Afghanistan

General Dunford assumed command of the International Security Assistance Force and United States Forces-Afghanistan on 10 February 2013. A native of Boston, Massachusetts, he graduated from St. Michael's College and was commissioned in 1977. He previously served as the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps from October 2010 to December 2012.

General Dunford has served as an infantry officer at all levels. He commanded the 2nd Battalion, 6th Marines. During Operation Iraqi Freedom, he commanded the 5th Marine Regiment.

Joint assignments include service as the Executive Assistant to the Vice Chairman, JCS and Chief, Global and Multilateral Affairs Division (J5).

As a general officer, he has also served as the Assistant Division Commander, 1st Marine Division, Marine Corps Director of Operations, Vice Director for Operations on the Joint Staff, and the Marine Corps Deputy Commandant for Plans, Policies and Operations. He commanded I Marine Expeditionary Force and served as the Commander, Marine Forces U.S. Central Command.

General Dunford is a graduate of the U. S. Army Ranger School, Marine Corps Amphibious Warfare School, and the U. S. Army War College. He holds an M.A. in Government from Georgetown University and an M.A. in International Relations from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy.



**WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING**

APRIL 17, 2013

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. GARAMENDI

General DUNFORD. In Fiscal Year 13 (FY13) United States Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A) spent \$16.5M on construction for U.S. Forces in minor military construction, life/health/safety construction, and repairs. There is an additional \$14.1M remaining. USFOR-A spent \$178M on humanitarian/economic reconstruction, with an additional \$400M remaining. [See page 21.]

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. SCOTT

General DUNFORD. Neither Afghanistan nor any of its regional neighbors carries out chemical or biological weapons programs. Extremist groups have developed and employed limited quantities of crude poisons; however, extremists have not shown the ability to develop or procure highly potent biological or chemical weapons.

Both Pakistan and Iran are capable of producing radiological material, and limited quantities of radiological material may be accessible in the former Soviet Republics north of Afghanistan. The potential exists for this material to be used in conjunction with conventional explosives to form a radiological weapon; however, we have not witnessed such an attack, and we consider the threat of such an attack to be low.

Finally, we are unaware of chemical, biological, or radiological weapons proliferation in the region. [See page 24.]

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. HANABUSA

General DUNFORD. The Family Response Unit (FRU) program is an Afghan Ministry of Interior program and is not being eliminated. Over 300 Afghan personnel remain assigned to the FRU in all 34 provinces and large districts. Currently, 22 contractors provide advisory support to the FRU program. Due to drawdown limitations affecting the contractors' security, logistics resupply, and effective FRU mentor auditing/oversight, International Security Assistance Force's (ISAF's) NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A) decided to de-scope the advisory contract. However, the FRU program will remain an active Ministry of Interior Program. [See page 23.]

General DUNFORD. Our assessment can only be given for contractors supporting the United States portion of the mission. Given United States Forces—Afghanistan's (USFOR-A's) current understanding of the mission, completion of retrograde, troop mix, and base structure, I anticipate requiring less than 13,000 contractors in support of the force. The mission support areas accomplished by contractors will include base support/logistics/maintenance, communications support, construction, training, translation services, intelligence effects services, transportation and Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) operators. Depending on the final Force Management Level (FML) and mission assignments, other areas of support may be required as well. [See page 24.]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

APRIL 17, 2013

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN

Mr. LANGEVIN. General, on April 16th, 2013, at the Senate Armed Services Committee, you highlighted the fact that there is growing fear and uncertainty within Afghanistan. With our focus shifting to a handover of security responsibilities, can you highlight the key areas and milestones that will need to be reached in order to reduce the probability of the Taliban succeeding in their “fear campaign” against the Afghanistan National Security Forces?

General DUNFORD. There are two key areas that will help counter the Taliban’s “fear campaign,” which is based upon the narrative of “abandonment” by the West. The first is the Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA). The BSA is the physical manifestation of our public commitment to Afghanistan after the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission ends in 2014. A BSA between the U.S. and Afghanistan will not only help instill confidence in the Afghan people regarding their future, but will also help provide our coalition partners the political capital necessary to garner support and incentivize commitment to the post-2014 mission. Greater commitment on the part of the international community will further negate the Afghan population’s anxieties and the Taliban’s narrative regarding abandonment.

The second key area to countering the Taliban’s “fear campaign” comes in the form of a successful 2013 fighting season for the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). This summer the ANSF will have the lead for security operations across Afghanistan, with ISAF in support. A confident and successful ANSF after the 2013 fighting season will drive down Afghan fears regarding security and establish a secure environment in 2014 that permits free, fair, and inclusive elections. With confidence in the ANSF to provide security and a successful 2014 election that results in a peaceful transition of presidential power, the people of Afghanistan will have gained a major victory over the Taliban. The people of Afghanistan will have achieved the political stability and confidence to take advantage of a decade of opportunity.

Mr. LANGEVIN. General, most accounts portray the Taliban as a unified entity, but is the Taliban monolithic? Are there particular strains within that organization that are more willing to take concrete steps towards reconciliation, and conversely, are there hardline elements that are intractable?

General DUNFORD. There is friction among different groups of Taliban members. This friction is caused by personal grievances, tribal differences and some ideological differences. Senior leaders have internal debates as to how to proceed in terms of talks with the United States. While there is debate, very few Taliban have actually taken steps towards reconciliation, and we assess there are only a handful now who are considering a break from the Taliban, but not enough to fracture the organization. The hardline elements firmly believe the Taliban can achieve their goals through military means and see no reason to engage in “peace” talks with the United States.

Both the moderates and the hardliners may shift their position in the coming months based on factors which include, strength of ANSF, strength of the Afghan government—particularly the success of the 2014 presidential election and the composition of the new government—and the commitment of the international community toward Afghanistan and enduring troop numbers.

Mr. LANGEVIN. General, is Pakistan a positive or negative force in getting the Taliban to the negotiating table?

General DUNFORD. There are indications that the Government of Pakistan is reaching out to the Government of Afghanistan to build a foundation of cooperation. In November, Pakistan played a positive role when it hosted the Afghan High Peace Council, the only entity President Karzai authorizes to negotiate with the Taliban. However, I believe we need to remain fully engaged with Pakistan to continue to play a positive role in determining a long-term political solution between the Taliban and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.

Mr. LANGEVIN. General, as our forces draw down, how do you see the mixture of regular and special forces evolving? As one of the “SOF Truths” is that most operations require non-SOF assistance, are you confident that the remaining assets will

have the support they need? Additionally, can you game out for this Committee potential outcomes of the Afghan Presidential 2014 election?

General DUNFORD. SOF depend on general purpose force (GPF) enablers for continued operations supporting the current ISAF mission as well as the post-2014 mission in Afghanistan. GPF enabler support provides unique capabilities that are either not organic to SOF formations or are not organic in the quantity required to conduct special operations across a country the size of Afghanistan. Enabler support to SOF includes: ISR, force protection, MEDEVAC, forward medical support (e.g. forward surgical teams, Role II and III hospitals), route clearance packages, rotary wing lift and fires, fixed wing fires, and base infrastructure support. Planners from SOF and GPF have been working closely to analyze the impact of the force drawdown and ensure that the reduction of GPF enabler support are properly mitigated or their impacts are minimized.

The International Joint Command (IJC) and NATO Special Operations Component Command-Afghanistan (NSOCC-A) staffs recently completed an analysis of the drawdown with a particular focus on identifying functional and geographic gaps, including the loss of enabler support to SOF. This analysis was briefed to me, and I am confident that our drawdown plan provides an adequate mix of SOF and GPF enablers to meet mission objectives. For the post-2014 mission, we are planning a force structure of SOF and GPF that will provide sufficient enabler support. However, if national leadership directs force levels below what we have recommended, there will be an impact on critical enabler support. With lower force levels and a reduced GPF footprint, there will be less GPF enablers available from which SOF can draw; this will limit SOF's ability to meet all expected objectives within the currently planned timelines for the post-2014 mission.

The 2014 Afghan Presidential election outcome is best left to the Afghan people. Our mission is to ensure that ANSF are in the lead and are capable of providing security for the Afghan people moving forward. I would defer further comment on the Afghan elections to the State Department.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WITTMAN

Mr. WITTMAN. General Dunford, in last year's NDAA, Congress provided expanded authority to donate non-excess equipment to the ANSF. Has ISAF utilized this new authority? If so, to what extent? What types of equipment have been transferred?

General DUNFORD. To date the International Security Forces-Afghanistan (ISAF) and United States Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A) have not exercised this authority. We appreciate the expanded authority granted in last year's National Defense Authorization Act and expect that ISAF and USFOR-A will, over the course of the next 20 months, find these authorities useful as retrograde activities continue. We continue to track ANSF requirements that can be cross-matched against available non-excess material.

Mr. WITTMAN. General Dunford, have you seen any decrease in the overall readiness of the U.S. forces that are being deployed to Afghanistan? Are they getting the training and equipment they need to operate in theater?

General DUNFORD. U.S. Forces in Afghanistan are receiving all the equipment they need to successfully execute their missions of training and advising the Afghan National Security Forces. Moreover, U.S. Forces are properly equipped to protect themselves from insurgent attacks or take the lead in security operations, when necessary.

Units and personnel are receiving the appropriate training prior to arriving in theater. Upon arrival in theater, U.S. Forces pre-deployment training is augmented with in-theater/regional specific training to prepare units and personnel for the diversity of the mission environment. I am concerned that the effects of sequestration may negatively impact future home station pre-deployment training.

Mr. WITTMAN. General Dunford, what are your top concerns and challenges with the reset and redeployment of U.S. Forces from Afghanistan? Furthermore, how do you ensure that we leave a secure footprint for the enduring conventional and Special Operations Forces that will operate in Afghanistan post-2014?

General DUNFORD. The resetting of each Service's equipment represents our biggest challenge as it is essential to future military readiness. Each Service will identify equipment that will be processed, returned, reset and placed back into the fleet. Once the last piece of equipment leaves Afghanistan, it is really at this point that the reset process begins since OCO funding for reset will be needed for 3 years beyond that date. Consequently, Overseas Contingency Operation (OCO) funds will be a necessity for all Services after we drawn down all the deployed equipment to bring

it back to fully mission capable standards. As we reduce our footprint in theater, we are reviewing options for our enduring presence locations that are within range of high-quality medical care; maintaining ground and aerial quick reaction forces to provide support; and ensuring Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) assets are in place to protect the force.

Mr. WITTMAN. General Dunford, in light of Pakistan's repeated and extended closures of cargo transportation routes to the Port of Karachi, what are your concerns about our continued heavy reliance on Pakistan for logistical support for operations in Afghanistan? What other options beyond existing Northern Distribution Networks (NDN) is ISAF exploring?

General DUNFORD. Equipment is currently flowing through the Pakistan Ground Lines of Communication (PAKGLOC) and I believe these routes offer the best option for removing our equipment from Afghanistan. If required, we could move all of our equipment out by air or by a combination of other means, but at a higher cost from a fiscal and time perspective. We plan to maximize our usage of the PAKGLOC as the most cost effective and efficient means. In addition the arrival of a CENTCOM Material Retrograde Elements (CMRE) late in FY 2012 to oversee our retrograde efforts will be helpful in managing the PAKGLOC.

Mr. WITTMAN. General Dunford, with regard to the troop drawdown strategy, what are specific conditions on the ground, relating to both Afghan National Security Force capabilities and the capabilities of the enemy you will be examining to manage the U.S. troop drawdowns? What are the largest gaps in the capabilities of the Afghan National Security Force today that need to be improved by 2014 for the Afghan security forces to maintain a stable Afghanistan?

General DUNFORD. I will be specifically examining the combat effectiveness and confidence of the ANSF to protect the people with minimal support from the coalition. In terms of the enemy, I will examine signs of their increased isolation from the people and leadership conflicts that can create opportunities to divide them. These factors will help me determine my recommendation to the President on future troop drawdowns.

Our long-term goal is to build sustainable processes with the ANSF. The largest gap in capabilities of the ANSF today is close air support and that won't be addressed until after 2014. It will take until 2016 or 2018 before the sustainable air support program will be sustainable. I would emphasize that in order for our gains to be sustainable, we must maintain our train, advise, and assist mission at the Corps level post-2014.

Mr. WITTMAN. General, two years ago General Petraeus testified before this committee saying, "As a bottom line up front, it is ISAF's assessment that the momentum achieved by the Taliban in Afghanistan since 2005 has been arrested in much of the country and reversed in a number of important areas. However, while the security progress achieved over the past year is significant, it is also fragile and reversible. Moreover, it is clear that much difficult work lies ahead with our Afghan partners to solidify and expand our gains in the face of the expected Taliban spring offensive." General with the effort to draw down our forces by the end of 2014, are we still willing to concede that our progress is fragile and reversible? It seems that outside of the Taliban and the terrorist networks operating in and around Afghanistan our biggest enemy is time. Do you have enough time to execute a sound, measured, responsible drawdown while still maintaining a force capable of training the ANSF to take the lead and keep the Taliban and terrorist networks from resecuring a foothold in Afghanistan?

General DUNFORD. Each day the ANSF is growing stronger and more confident. I have no doubt they will perform commendably during this fighting season. Thus, while I would not call our progress to date fragile, I would call it reversible. For that reason, it will be important for the U.S., our coalition partners, and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA) to honor the pledges made at Chicago and Tokyo.

I think we have a measured and reasonable approach for our drawdown while we shift our mission focus to train, advise, and assist in support of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). ISAF is engaged down to the battalion level with the ANSF in the lead for the first time this summer. We are already at the point where the vast majority of U.S. forces are in a train, advise, and assist configuration. I am confident the ANSF, with our support, can keep the Taliban and terrorist networks from resecuring a foothold in Afghanistan during our drawdown.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BARBER

Mr. BARBER. General Dunford, Pakistan's internal stability and economic development during and after the upcoming elections will undoubtedly affect our drawdown of U.S. forces in Afghanistan. In your testimony, you mentioned insurgent sanctuaries in Pakistan. If we continuously have to engage terrorist forces in Pakistan, with increasing chaos in the region, our transition from Afghanistan will be challenging. What sort of relationship would you like to see with the next Pakistani government, that will help to protect our interests in Afghanistan and how should we engage Pakistan in the coming months and after the election?

General DUNFORD. We recognize the historic significance of the upcoming election as a true watershed moment with the first transfer of power from one democratically elected civilian government to another. Regardless of which party wins, we will continue to positively engage with the new Pakistani government as before. From a U.S. Forces—Afghanistan (USFOR—A) perspective, we will continue our positive military-to-military relationship with Pakistan to further our national interests in the region.

Mr. BARBER. General Dunford, thank you for appearing before the Committee for this important update. Sir, you mentioned in your testimony and I completely agree that border security between Afghanistan and Pakistan is interdependent upon both countries' efforts; however, their relationship has ebbed and flowed over time. It seems to me that for decades Pakistan has focused its regional strategy on its borders—whether competing with India for nuclear dominance, or seeking to influence what happens in Afghanistan. We saw this during the eighties with the Soviet invasion, and over the past ten years as we have sought to bring down the Taliban and Al Qaeda. As Pakistan continues to depend on U.S. military and economic support, how can we encourage more Pakistani involvement in border security, our efforts to defeat the Taliban, and end the war in Afghanistan?

General DUNFORD. ISAF strongly encourages Pakistan and Afghanistan to discuss border issues within the Tripartite Commission. In November 2012, the Tripartite Commission approved the Tripartite Standard Operating Procedure (SOP). The framework of the SOP serves as a tangible demonstration of security cooperation and strategic outreach. The SOP defines the Border Coordination Area to ensure common reporting standards, establishes a uniform set of protocols to enhance coordination and communication on both sides of the border, minimizes cross-border incidents, mitigates incidents of fratricide, and establishes information sharing requirements. We need to continue to encourage both parties to abide by the SOP to better manage border tensions and more effectively control the border in denying the Taliban freedom of movement.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. CARSON

Mr. CARSON. Do you believe that President Karzai or any future President of Afghanistan can be a unifying figure that can successfully dissuade the Afghan people from violence? Or do you believe this type of persuasion is going to have to come from local officials and religious figures? How is the United States military addressing the strengths and weaknesses of top Afghan officials to promote a more secure country?

General DUNFORD. President Karzai can be a unifying figure for the Afghan people. For example, he has sought to build consensus by holding a National Consultative Peace Jirga in 2010 declaring that the doors of peace will remain open to all those who renounce violence, cut links with terrorist organizations, return to a peaceful life, and respect the Afghan Constitution. This assembly led to the establishment of the Afghan High Peace Council. These efforts address concerns across a wide, multi-ethnic body.

As with any federal government, the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA) would function more efficiently with the support of local officials. At the local level, ISAF supports GIROA's Afghanistan Peace and Reconciliation Process (APRP) which encourages insurgents to abandon extremism. APRP aims to build trust and confidence among Afghans who have been fighting their government and each other for far too long.

In its advisory mission with the security ministries, U.S. Forces—Afghanistan (USFOR—A) and the International Security Forces—Afghanistan (ISAF) are working to increase institutional capacity, while also supporting the Afghan government's program to combat corruption. Reducing corruption is essential to enhancing the legitimacy of the government and thereby strengthens the abilities of top Afghan officials to promote security. Our partners in the Ministries of Defense and Interior

have demonstrated a willingness to remove corrupt officials and enhance the legitimacy and strength of their institutions in providing security to Afghanistan.

Mr. CARSON. What impact does corruption have on the safety and security of our forces in Afghanistan today? To what degree are corrupted officials, troops and police complicit in attacks on our forces and what steps are being taken between now and 2014 to address this corruption?

General DUNFORD. Corruption has an indirect impact on the safety and security of our forces. There is little direct evidence tying corrupt officials, troops, or police to attacks on our forces. However, corruption does contribute to an environment under which insurgents, criminals, and lethal aid transit Afghanistan's borders and move within the country. Multiple efforts to address corruption, including prudent force protection measures, engagement with Afghan security ministries, fielded forces, working with inter-agency partners and the International Community to improve internal controls and external verification mechanisms have been underway for several years, and will continue through 2014 and beyond. As we transition to a Security Force Assistance role and later to the post-ISAF mission, anti- and counter-corruption efforts will increasingly rest with the Afghans themselves.

Mr. CARSON. While we have had special forces units based in Afghanistan, there have been occasions when specialized units have been brought in for missions targeting high-value targets—like Seal Team Six with Osama bin Laden. How will the change in our force structure and mission impact our pursuit of high-value targets in Afghanistan post-2014?

General DUNFORD. The use of a specialized SOF unit from outside Afghanistan to conduct a mission like the Osama bin Laden raid in Pakistan has been extremely rare. The vast majority of our missions pursuing high value targets (HVT) are done by forces present in Afghanistan. For our post-2014 mission, we have planned a highly capable SOF force structure that can conduct the full range of special operations, to include pursuing HVTs. This planned force will be smaller than our current force which will reduce the number of targets that we can pursue at any given time. Our planners have designed the SOF structure in accordance with specific restrictions from national leadership regarding the types of targets that we are authorized to engage post-2014; this allows us to maintain a smaller force. However, SOF will continue to train, advise, and assist (TAA) Afghan special security forces (a mix of Afghan SOF and special police units) at the ministerial, institutional, operational and tactical levels. This will enable the Afghans, who will be clearly in the lead for their own security, to pursue Afghan-designated HVTs.

In this regard, we view our post-2014 TAA and counter-terrorism (CT) missions as being inextricably linked. Finally, as with the Osama bin Laden raid, United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) retains the capability to bring in specialized units for short-notice missions to pursue HVTs if outside of Afghanistan.

Our biggest concern for this capability will be the availability of bases from which such a force can operate on short notice. While we feel confident that we will retain sufficient bases to support these missions, this is subject to the results of the ongoing Bilateral Security Agreement negotiations between the United States and Afghanistan.

Mr. CARSON. In 2010 there were reports that upwards of \$1 trillion worth of mineral deposits have been found within Afghanistan. These are obviously of significant interest to the international business community, which is seeking inroads for lucrative mining contracts. However, we also know from history that such mineral deposits often become grounds for serious internal and regional conflicts. What risks do you see in this area and do you believe that foreign military or security forces will attempt to set up operations in Afghanistan to protect their national business interests brought in for mining operations? Are issues involving these minerals causing any challenges for you?

General DUNFORD. The greatest challenge at this point is for Afghanistan to have a sustainable legal, physical and security infrastructure that will encourage investment, while allowing the Afghan people to leverage the mineral wealth in developing their economy. It is unlikely a foreign military force will establish a significant presence in order to secure its extractives investment. The cost of the military operation would make Afghanistan a more costly place to do business than a competing mineral rich nation. Most likely, companies will use indigenous Afghan security (e.g. Afghan Public Protection Force) forces for security. The international business community has some reservations about investing in Afghanistan's mineral wealth given the absence of a legal framework that enables predictability, transparency and oversight. Without a more attractive investment climate, the business community will question the risk and profitability of investing in Afghanistan.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ENYART

Mr. ENYART. What are the lessons learned with multilateral relationships in Afghanistan and how can we export what has been learned to other areas where we have little or no physical presence like AFRICOM?

General DUNFORD. Many of our coalition partners bring unique strengths to ISAF. The coalition has become quite proficient at leveraging the strengths of each contributing nation. This synergy strengthens the ISAF mission and it increases the pride, political will, and commitment of our partners. We have learned to provide enabling support to overcome some of our partners' limitations and take advantage of their strengths. For example, providing something as simple as medical evacuation support might permit a country to play a significant role in advising and assisting Afghan forces or a combat mission.

Another important lesson learned is the value of enduring military-to-military relationships. When I was a battalion commander at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina in 1996, I had a Georgian platoon serving with me under the NATO Partnership for Peace program. In all there were 19 former Soviet bloc nations that came to the United States to begin to learn our tactics, techniques and procedures and some of the cultural dynamics that make modern, professional armies. Today I'm proud to tell you that there are 1,500 Georgians in Helmand Province; they are battlespace owners and they are conducting complex counterinsurgency operations. Where they are today versus where they were in 1996 is nothing short of profound. I think it came from our investment in our coalition partners over the decades. These lessons are easily applied anywhere and do not require an actual physical presence. Nearly any willing partner can make a consequential contribution.

Mr. ENYART. What has been the impact on USMC in terms of readiness as QRF?

General DUNFORD. As a former Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps, I believe this question would be best answered by the current Commandant of the Marine Corps or the Joint Staff.

