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**THE READINESS POSTURE
OF THE U.S. ARMY**

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

HEARING HELD

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THE READINESS POSTURE OF THE U.S. ARMY

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS,
Washington, DC, Tuesday, April 16, 2013.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:26 p.m., in room 2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Robert J. Wittman (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT J. WITTMAN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM VIRGINIA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS

Mr. WITTMAN. I call to order the Subcommittee on Readiness of the House Armed Services Committee.

I want to welcome this afternoon this panel to our hearing and I would like to thank all of you for taking the time to address us today concerning the readiness posture for the United States Army.

And as you know over the past 12 years, the Army—Active, the Guard, and Reserve—has deployed more than 1.1 million soldiers to combat with more than 4,500 giving the last full measure of devotion to this country.

More than 32,000 soldiers have been wounded, 9,000 requiring long-term care. In that time, soldiers have earned more than 14,000 awards for valor to include 7 Medals of Honor and 22 Distinguished Service Crosses.

The Army's contribution to our Nation's security have been numerous and continue around the world today. This hearing comes at a time of strategic inflection for the Army.

After more than a decade, the protracted counterinsurgency operations and cyclic combat operations in the Middle East, the Army must find a way to return to full spectrum operations, reset and reconstitute the force, responsibly draw out an operation in Afghanistan, and fully develop its role under the new defense strategic guidance.

The Army must also find a way to do all of this under a tightening budget and the compounding talent challenges of sequestration, continuing fiscal challenges in Afghanistan, and to do so with a smaller force.

To discuss how the Army plans to meet the challenges of tomorrow in this austere budgetary environment, we have with us this afternoon Lieutenant General James L. Huggins, Jr., the Army's Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations; Lieutenant General Raymond V. Mason, the Army's Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics; Major General Luis Visot, the Deputy Commanding General for Operations of the U.S. Army Reserve; and Brigadier General Walter E.

Fountain, the Acting Deputy Director of the U.S. Army National Guard.

Gentlemen, thank you all very much for being here with us today and I appreciate your thoughtful statements as we head forward in your insights on today's Army and the challenges that we have ahead. So with that, I am going to go to my Ranking Member, Ms. Bordallo, for her opening statement.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Wittman can be found in the Appendix on page 37.]

STATEMENT OF HON. MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, A DELEGATE FROM GUAM, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS

Ms. BORDALLO. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

General Huggins, Mason, Visot, and Fountain, I thank you all for your testimony and your service to our Nation, and I look forward to our dialogue this afternoon.

This is the first in the series of hearings that will dive into some level of detail about the readiness issues for each of the Services. Moreover, this is also our first hearing subsequent to the President's budget release as well as passage of the fiscal year 2013 Consolidated Appropriations Act, so we can hopefully have a more thorough and data-driven discussion.

The 2011 strategic guidance, the effects of sequestration and the planned withdrawal of the U.S. forces from Afghanistan place a significant pressure on all our military components, but particularly the Army.

The Army has planned on reducing its end strength to 490,000 soldiers over the next several years. Yet, still must equip and train each soldier according to its force generation model.

The Army has been at the forefront of the wars over the last decade, but now has an opportunity to reset the force in a time of great financial strain. It is under this context that we must evaluate the readiness of our army for current missions in Afghanistan and potential contingencies in the coming years.

So, I hope that our witnesses will be able to touch on the strategic risk and the lack of strategic depth because of the inability to train nondeploying forces as a result of sequestration and general budget constraints.

I am particularly concerned about this risk and its impact on the National Guard and their ability to meet Title 32 or Homeland Defense requirements. We must all understand that all deploying forces to Afghanistan or elsewhere will be fully trained and equipped but subcommittee members have to understand the level of risk that we are embarking on with nondeployed forces.

So in this vein, I hope our witnesses can also comment on the potential impact of shifting the current force generation model for Active Duty soldiers from a 36-month cycle to a 24-month cycle. What will be the impact on their quality of life and ability to train soldiers?

And I am also curious to understand what further changes there might be to the force generation model as a result of the refocus on the Asia-Pacific region. The current force generation model fo-

cuses primarily on meeting the requirements of the COIN [Counterinsurgency] strategy.

So given the unique environments and wide-ranging environments that exist in the Asia-Pacific region, what is the Army doing to incorporate that into any force generation model as well as their trading scenarios?

I am also concerned about the current budget situation's potential impact on maintenance of Army equipment. As we retrograde from Afghanistan, we will need significant funds to get our equipment back to CONUS [Continental United States] and then reset. Given the immediate nature of the cuts imposed by sequestration, what is the short and medium term impact of sequestration to maintaining our current equipment?

So I hope that our witnesses can touch on the cost growth over the next several years to maintaining and resetting our equipment as a result of this significant cut in the budget caused by sequestration. What gaps in maintenance will we have as a result of some of the immediate deferrals and does this have an impact on the training of soldiers?

And finally, gentlemen, I hope our witnesses will comment on the current BCT [Brigade Combat Team], restationing and composition changes that are ongoing. I am particularly focused on how this assessment may impact the missions and requirements of the Army National Guard.

The Army National Guard has a mixture of infantry and combat support elements. Do our witnesses see this changing substantial as a result of this BCT composition review or as a result of the 2011 strategic guidance?

So again, I look forward to the witnesses' testimony, and Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Ms. Bordallo. Thank you so much for your opening comments and for your leadership as our Ranking Member. I would like to—again gentlemen, thank you very much for being here and I look forward to your thoughtful statements and your insights into our Nation's army.

General Huggins, General Fountain, and General Visot, I understand that for each of you, this is your first time testifying before the subcommittee, and I want to welcome you, and General Mason I understand that this is a time again, back before us, so welcome back.

As you know, last year, this subcommittee spent a great deal of time exploring our current state of readiness in discussing how we remain prepared to meet the challenges we are likely to face in the future.

Time and time again, we heard of a force being described as being on the ragged edge. Today we again explore readiness, this time in the context of how the Army is reshaping itself to be ready for the future challenges and conflicts of the 21st century.

The administration continues to argue that we can afford a smaller force with a smaller army—an army with less capacity so long as we have a more capable one. To enable a skilled superior army, one that can meet the Nation's needs and respond to a wide range of threats, will require timely, thoughtful and targeted investments.

The Army must spend every dollar wisely as it seeks to remain ready, anything less will result in a far-reaching and long-lasting implication for the Army and for this Nation. Congress has a responsibility and a constitutional duty to train and equip our soldiers to ensure they are ready for the job we have asked them to do.

I look forward to learning about what investments and readiness you are making and how the Army plans to meet its mission in these challenging times. And gentlemen, with that, we will go to your opening testimony.

I want you to know that your full prepared remarks will be entered in for the record, so I know we have those. I would urge you to keep your opening comments to 3 minutes and that gives us the advantage of time here for members to ask questions.

So if you will do that, I will assure you that the full text of your comments will be entered into the record and if you can abide by that then that helps us get right to questions which is where I think the members would like to focus their time.

So, with that, General Huggins, we will begin with you.

**STATEMENT OF LTG JAMES L. HUGGINS, JR., USA, DEPUTY
CHIEF OF STAFF FOR OPERATIONS, U.S. ARMY**

General HUGGINS. Chairman Wittman, Ranking Member Bordallo and distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today along with my colleagues to discuss the readiness of the United States Army and the way ahead.

On behalf of Secretary of the Army, the Honorable John McHugh, and Chief of Staff of the Army, General Odierno, thank you for your service and your support and your commitment to our soldiers, civilians and their families.

Today we are here and honored to represent the nearly 1.2 million talented, experienced, well-led, and professional soldiers, and testify on the critical issues of readiness for our total army force, Army Active, National Guard, and the United States Army Reserve.

Upfront, the Army is facing severe fiscal challenges. It has serious implications on our ability to provide trained and ready forces for the Nation. Sequestration and shortfalls in overseas contingency operating funds pose substantial impacts to the readiness throughout the remainder of fiscal year 2014, but also even more grave is the outlook for fiscal year 2014 readiness given the cost we have deferred and pushed into fiscal year 2014 to make it through fiscal year 2013.

This in effect compounds the risk in 2014. And after more than a decade of conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Nation and our army are in a period of transition—a turning point characterized by a fiscally constrained environment and a global and security environment that is more complex and uncertain than any time since the end of World War II, and as the tragic events yesterday in Boston unfolded, it might also indicate that the future is even more unstable.

And I would like to take just a moment and recognize the great work of our Army National Guard brothers there in that moment of great tragedy for our American brothers in Boston.

This discussion on readiness is perfectly timed and the magnitude of the challenges ahead have serious implications on our ability to provide trained and ready forces for the Nation. If sequestration is implemented without significant changes from fiscal year 2014 to fiscal year 2021, the readiness of our total force will be gravely impacted.

The Army simply will not be able to meet—will not have the resources to meet the defense strategic guidance and we risk becoming a hollow force. Now, we have talked about ragged edge before, but the hollow force really is indicative of three critical areas there that must be balanced—end strength, readiness, and modernization. By staying balanced in those three areas is the only way we can make sure we have a force capable of completing a wide array of missions.

As each of you know, the Army's primary purpose is to fight and win our Nation's wars and we are fully committed to that nonnegotiable obligation. As a total force, again Army Active, National Guard, and Army Reserve, we have led this effort performing missions again in Iraq and Afghanistan with great proficiency and professionalism.

Our Army's readiness is also a key deterrent as well as a hedge against strategic risk during unpredictable times. Your support has been critical to the successes we have had in the past but will be more so in the future.

Continued investment in our readiness is a strategic necessity. However, to meet our sequestered targets, the Army will curtail approximately 80 percent of our ground forces for the rest—training for the rest of the fiscal year. This will create secondary shortfalls in critical specialty areas such as aviation, intelligence, and engineering. The latter will impact approximately 2,300 soldiers in their initial entry training.

And then operating under numerous continuing resolutions has only compounded the effects of sequestration and is affecting the training for fiscal year 2014 as we look ahead and beyond.

And finally, we will also be forced to look at cancelling all but two of the remaining decisive action brigade level training events at our combat maneuver centers unless additional funds can be made available.

The Army understands the seriousness of our Nation's fiscal situations, however we need legislative solution that averts sequestration and gives our leaders the flexibility to work with the resources you provide to shape the soldiers for the future.

The magnitude of today's fiscal constraints and uncertainty is not lost on the Army—senior military and civilian leaders understand Army must be good stewards of our resources and tax dollars that are provided to us.

However, sequestration, fiscal constraints, shortfalls and overseas contingency operating funds have caused us to do what matters with less as opposed to doing more with less. However, doing what matters with less cannot come at the price of the overall readiness of our total army.

Our current readiness, the Army is committed to balancing the current global demands for security with a realistic strategy that maintains American land power, America's dominance in land power remains unchallenged, and it is imperative that the Army's total force remain ready and relevant in this persistent engagement era.

Our priorities as we work through the challenges today are our Homeland Defense, Operation Enduring Freedom, and that is to the approximately 60,000 soldiers that are there as well as the next to deploy soldiers, and those others that are deployed in other contingency response missions around the world.

We are also focusing on maintaining them in training as well as properly equipping them and having them prepare to execute other on-call missions. We must also provide for the readiness—high levels of readiness for our forces that are in Korea as well as our global response force which is our hedge to respond to no notice contingencies or crises.

As the G-3/5/7 [Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Plans, and Training], you have my commitment that I will ensure the leaders and soldiers are properly trained and ready for a full range of these missions. However, it will take a reprioritization of resources.

At the end of the day, the Army must remain well-trained, equipped and ready. The Nation's strategic land power maintains its credible advantage over the adversaries because of our capacity, our capabilities and modernization efforts, and our readiness.

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, I want to conclude my statement by telling you all that it is an honor to serve this great Nation as I have for the past 32 years, and it is a privilege to be here today with my colleagues, and thank you again for the opportunity to appear before the committee, and I look forward to your questions.

[The joint prepared statement of General Huggins, General Mason, and General Visot can be found in the Appendix on page 39.]

Mr. WITTMAN. Very good. General Huggins, thank you.
General Mason.

**STATEMENT OF LTG RAYMOND V. MASON, USA, DEPUTY CHIEF
OF STAFF FOR LOGISTICS, U.S. ARMY**

General MASON. Well, good afternoon, Chairman Wittman, Ranking Member Bordello and distinguished members of the subcommittee.

Thank you for holding this hearing. I want to just touch on a few areas of readiness that are on the top of my list and I imagine are on the top of your list as well and that would be equipment retrograde from Afghanistan, reset of that equipment, and the Army's organic industrial base.

Like my fellow witnesses, my top priority is to ensure our soldiers in harm's way have what they need to succeed and those next to deploy are trained, equipped, and ready because they continue to have a challenging and dangerous mission ahead of them.

In the next 20 months, our focus will be on closing bases and bringing out \$20 billion worth of army equipment from Afghani-

stan. The logisticians did a terrific job in retrograding the equipment from Iraq.

But bringing home the equipment from Afghanistan is orders of magnitude harder. Moving equipment out through the northern distribution network and the Pakistan ground lines of communication, while improving, is still a slow and fragile process. So our primary method continues to be the more costly, multimodal air alternative.

After a dozen years of war, it is important that we complete our mission right. Over the years, our citizens and the Congress have entrusted us with billions of dollars worth of modern equipment.

We need to ensure, especially during these times of fiscal constraints, that the equipment we need for whatever the Nation asks for us next is reset and ready and back in the hands of our soldiers. To make sure that that equipment is ready, we need a fully funded reset program that continues for 3 years after the last piece of equipment comes back from Afghanistan.

The reset program you have funded to date has enabled this army to maintain operational readiness rates in theater for our ground fleet at 90 percent or better, and for our aviation fleet at 75 percent or better. However, that equipment has experienced significant wear and tear from operating from over a decade in the extreme temperatures and rugged mountains of Afghanistan.

In fiscal year 2013, we expect to reset approximately 100,000 items at our industrial facilities and 60,000 pieces of equipment on site where our units are stationed or what we call "field maintenance." That includes over 400 aircraft.

However, sequestration will cause us to defer some of these requirements to future fiscal years which I call compounding risk and it is going to have a negative impact on our combat readiness both in the near-, mid-, and long term.

As I believe the members of the subcommittee are aware, this year we published our Organic Industrial Base Strategic Plan to help us transition our depots to rationalize those and our arsenals from war to peace time operations.

This plan gives us a framework to make informed, optimized decisions so that our army and the Nation will continue to have a modern, reliable, cost-effective, and highly responsive industrial base enterprise for years to come.

Sequestration cuts, and I would add annual continuing resolutions, fall heavily on the Army's operations and maintenance accounts. Deferring maintenance will cost production gaps in the industrial base and create breaks in the supply chain recovering—causing—requiring years to recover.

These gaps greatly impact equipment readiness, industrial partnerships and sub-vendors supporting the supply chain, those second-, third-, and fourth-tier suppliers, and many of those are small businesses. It also takes a heavy toll on our highly skilled civilian workforce.

So in closing, I very much appreciate working with you and your staffs as we continue to sustain a high-quality, all-volunteer army that remains the most decisive land force in the world, and I am also very honored to be here after 34 years in the service to be in

front of this committee. So thank you very much. I look forward to your questions.

Mr. WITTMAN. Very good.

Thank you, General Mason.
General Visot.

STATEMENT OF MG LUIS R. VISOT, USAR, DEPUTY COMMANDING GENERAL FOR OPERATIONS, U.S. ARMY RESERVE

General VISOT. Chairman Wittman, Ranking Member Bordallo, distinguished members of the subcommittee, good afternoon and thank you for the opportunity to testify today.

On behalf of the more than 200,000 Army Reserve soldiers and 12,000 civilians and military technicians and their families, I want to thank the subcommittee for its continued outstanding support of the Army Reserve.

I am proud to report that America's Army Reserve is a ready, trained, and accessible operational force. The days of Strategic Army Reserve are simply gone.

We provide a great return on investment for the American taxpayer as we comprise almost 20 percent of the total army for just 6 percent of the budget. As part of that total army, we provide life-saving and life-sustaining capabilities to all Services and all components for both combat and contingency missions.

The Operational Army Reserve currently has more than 12,000 soldiers mobilized and deployed, serving in more than 28 countries with almost 5,000 soldiers today in Afghanistan, and we are deeply committed to the health and welfare of our dedicated men and women.

We continue to promote Army Reserve soldier and family resiliency by ensuring all members of the Army Reserve family have awareness of and access to the training and resources available to support their personal and professional well-being and wellness.

Never in our Nation's history has the Army Reserve been more enduring and indispensable to America. The steady demand for the Army Reserve capabilities has introduced a new paradigm of reliance on the Army Reserve as a positive investment for America and an essential part of our national security architecture.

While we are poised to continue to provide soldiers for planned and contingency missions, we are concerned with the additive impact of sequestration this year and in the future on training and readiness that may certainly have a negative effect on our capacity and ability to support missions abroad and respond to domestic disaster.

In closing, we have the best Army Reserve in the U.S. history. Now is the time to build an investment that our Nation and this country has made in our Army Reserve. We understand the fiscal uncertainty we currently face as a nation, but that is exactly why it is critical to continue—invest in our Operational Reserve force. Keeping us ready, trained, and accessible is more critical in light of the budget impacts that will hit our army in the coming decades.

Thank you for the opportunity to testify today and I look forward to your questions. Twice the Citizen, Army Strong. Thank you.

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, General Visot. We appreciate that.
General Fountain.

**STATEMENT OF BG WALTER E. FOUNTAIN, USARNG, ACTING
DEPUTY DIRECTOR, U.S. ARMY NATIONAL GUARD**

General FOUNTAIN. Chairman Wittman, Ranking Member Bordallo, distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for this opportunity to speak with you today.

It is my honor to represent the more than 356,000 citizen soldiers in the Army National Guard.

The Army National Guard is the best-manned, best-led, best-trained, and best-equipped and most experienced in its 376-year history. This is do in no small part to the support of this committee, the daily support of our Guard families and employers, and the magnificent performance of our soldiers.

This historic and essential level of readiness as an operational force is at risk due to budgetary uncertainty. If continued, it will erode current levels of readiness and potentially return the Army Guard to the Strategic Reserve.

As we speak, there are more than 24,000 Guard soldiers mobilized across the world. Since September 11th, 2001, there have been more than 517,000 soldiers mobilized for Federal missions. The past year alone, Guard soldiers have provided over 447,000 duty days in service to State and Nation, saving lives and property in the face of disasters and emergencies.

Over the last 12 years of conflict, the Army National Guard has shown that it is accessible to the Nation and States, capable of performing any mission assigned to it and ready for service.

The Army Guard has answered the call time and again without fail. As an operational force, continued employment in contingencies, exercise and training opportunities at home and aboard is vital to maintaining the Army Guard's hard-won readiness and experience.

Additional mobilization authorities enacted in the 2012 NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act] provides the Department of Defense with an important option to employ Reserve forces overseas outside of current contingencies. Through preplanned and prebudgeted requirements, Reserve forces can bring their expertise and experience to support the combatant commander.

The Army Guard has demonstrated that its units are capable of performing every mission they have been given. Simultaneously, it responded with no notice to some of the worst natural disasters in our Nation's history.

This readiness for missions both at home and abroad is a function of resourcing. However, field and depot level maintenance in equipment is now being deferred, rotations to the Army's premier Combat Training Centers have been cancelled, and technicians who do most of the maintenance are in danger of being furloughed.

All these measures began to undermine the Guard's ability to respond rapidly to contingencies overseas and our no notice emergencies here at home.

The Army Guard has recruited and retained a magnificent core of veteran soldiers who have demonstrated their eagerness to serve. All of them have either joined since September 2011 or have made a conscious decision to continue service since.

They expect to be employed in conducting the Army and Nation's business. Reductions in OPTEMPO [Operational Tempo] funding

less money for military schools and fewer opportunities to perform training overseas deployments have occurred.

If there is one mission I could—message I could leave you with today, it is now is not a time to put the Army National Guard back on the shelf and allow us to return to the Strategic Reserve. The current budget situation, if continued over time, presents challenges to the ability to maintain our operational Army National Guard.

Today's Army National Guard is a low-cost, high-impact option for our Nation's defense. With continued modest investment, the Army Guard, as part of the total army solution, the Nation can continue to benefit from a cost-effective force of over 350,000 well-trained, ready soldiers who are eager to take on any mission at home or abroad.

I appreciate the opportunity to speak today and look forward to your questions. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of General Fountain can be found in the Appendix on page 54.]

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, General Fountain.

We appreciate your opening comments and that gives us a good baseline by which to go forward and I will begin the questioning.

I want to start off with the issue of sequester and you all had alluded to that as how it affects the different elements of what is going on with the Army. It is a \$5.3 billion reduction in operation and maintenance funding through fiscal year 2013, \$1 billion of that is in the Reserve Component for both operation maintenance accounts.

And to absorb this, the Army has had to do some things that I think in the—both in the short term and long term prove to be pretty challenging. With a reduction in training for over 78 percent of our nondeployed BCTs, deferment of post combat maintenance on equipment, that is concerning, and also furlough of 251,000 Army civilian personnel, all of those I think collectively get us on the track that creates some problems.

But I want to—I want to look at the training component, and General Huggins, I want to go to you and ask, to what level of readiness are the units training right now, both the deploying and non-deploying units? And are they able to accomplish collective training? In other words, at what level are they able to train—at the brigade level, at the battalion level, at the company level? How are we trying to overcome as best you can the training deficiencies, not just for the deploying units?

I understand the deploying units are going to be kept up at their readiness training levels, but the nondeploying units to me, we will see quickly a decay of readiness as that training component decays.

So if you could give me a little bit of overview about how training is going forward there and then at what level, at what magnitude, can training be pursued? And are there opportunities to try to overcome that by strategically looking at the training component?

General HUGGINS. Chairman Wittman, thank you very much.

First and foremost, as you stated, the forces that we have deploying will maintain a high level of collective, and by that I mean I—I mean brigade level since that is typically what we deploy train-

ing. Likewise, if it is a smaller element, a battalion or company or troop, we would work it at its highest level.

That said, there is still a little bit of a difference than we would have done perhaps in the past. What we have done is we have tailored those units for their specific missions. As many of you have visited Afghanistan and Iraq, you know the strategy there has changed somewhat to security force assistance.

So, what we have done with those, let's say "standard brigade combat teams," is that they are deploying for their security force assistance mission, we have tailored their readiness standards to meet that. We have focused our collective training to meet that.

But that is not the measure of readiness that we use in the standards updates we provide quarterly to the members. I mean, that is the—that readiness standard is as the unit was designed.

So if it was a brigade combat team infantry, it is designed to conduct basically decisive action, either combined arms maneuver or wide area security now, and to the most lethal end of the spectrum of combat.

So, even those units we are sending in harm's way but are not trained to that full level but they are trained to meet all of their combat requirements. I can absolutely guarantee you that portion. That is the easy part of the answer and that is our obligation as each of you has pointed out.

For our non-deploying forces, they are tiered in the measure I spoke to. We are maintaining a high level of readiness for those in Korea, but even that is still somewhat less than our full measure of readiness. In our terms, C-1 [Readiness level] would be the highest; this one would drop back down again to an assigned level.

But for the vast majority, almost 80 percent—78 percent, as you stated, Mr. Chairman, is we have curtailed their training. If you are not deploying or going to either Kuwait for some of those stability operations we are conducting in operation Spartan Shield there, you will train only at the squad level.

What forces command has—our component has relayed is that it is what we define as A-4. That is the bare minimum. But we are struggling to reach anything above that and as I said, we have cancelled Combat Training Center rotations and the real impact on this is the ramp to regain readiness is long and not very steep because it takes time.

And you can lose readiness very, very quickly.

It is—and what we are trying to do to mitigate that is also focus on our professional and leader development portions. But even that, that is just a mitigation measure. So, that is why I said I believe that is the case for 2013 and our outlook is it will extend into 2014.

The real risk comes into global environment and that is those formations that could be allocated to respond to certain contingency plans around the world for the combatant commanders.

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, General Huggins.

I will not go to our Ranking Member, Representative Madeleine Bordallo.

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And I guess this question would be to any one of the witnesses here and it is a takeoff, I guess, further on what the Chairman has been discussing.

How will you know that your forces are not ready? And if you could limit your answer since we are timed up here and I would like to get in as many questions as I could. Whoever would like to, the question is how will you know that your forces are not ready? What will be the triggers that will tell you your forces are not ready and how far away, in your opinion, are we in terms of degraded readiness?

General HUGGINS. Madam Chair—Madam Congressperson, I will tell you—I will go quickly because I think it is important to each of us here on the panel to give you a quick answer on this one.

We have established standards, obviously, for avoiding—I can tell you that we are all committed to maintain our readiness at those squad levels we talked about. Our brothers in the Army Reserve and National Guard are funded to a little bit more than that but I will let them explain that.

But the real measure is because we have given guidance to limit that readiness because we can't afford to buy more readiness other than at the squad level in about 80 percent of our formation, and that is so we can ensure we send the other forces in harm's way, fully trained and properly equipped, ma'am.

Ms. BORDALLO. Next.

General MASON. Madam Congresswoman, you know, I focus on my job on equipment readiness, and so each month we do the unit status reporting, the strategic readiness updates. So I am watching those very carefully, and we are beginning to see a downtick in the home station, nondeployed forces.

My concern is that we have got to watch that very closely because it is one—readiness is one of those things that all of a sudden drops off the—off the cliff. It happened to us in the 1990s, so we are watching that very closely. That is unit readiness and that is happening down at our camps, posts and stations.

And then there is a deeper strategic depot readiness that we are also watching very closely. And you won't feel that today or even next month or perhaps 6 months from now. You will feel that in a year or 2 years.

And so there is this balance between looking at near-term readiness of units through our USR [Unit Status Report] reporting and we are watching that very closely. I look at it almost every day and brief it to the Chief several times a week. So we are focused on that and watching that.

But the deeper one is the one that concerns me perhaps a little bit more because that is the one you can't get back. It will take you a long time to do that. So it is this balance between that. And so, that is where the sequestration, I think, will have the deeper, longer effect.

Ms. BORDALLO. Yes. Next.

General VISOT. Ranking Member Bordallo, as far as the Army Reserve, we are continuing to be a provider of sustainment and support capabilities that we have within the Army Reserve. We provide at a readiness level for training—at a training too, and utilized the Army Force Generation model, and we don't anticipate at

this point, as we speak today a significant reduction for us because we are in that 60-month period of time for us to provide that readiness.

At the T-2 level, that is as we go into the available year, our focus is primarily that we provide company level proficiency, and at the same time, battalion level or staff, you know, battle proficiency.

So we don't anticipate at this point in time any significant impact upon our readiness in being able to provide the forces that our army requires and our army nation requires.

Ms. BORDALLO. Well, thank you, General.

General Fountain.

General FOUNTAIN. [Off mike.] —Ranking Member Bordallo, from an Army National Guard—Army Force Generation model—readiness model which has allowed us and at the individual level and we continue to increase the level of readiness as we progress to the 60-month model to a collective level or unit level. For our combat formations, our objective is to reach platoon level for our combat's support—support in combat service, support company level as our brothers from the USAR [U.S. Army Reserve] do.

To answer your question on how will we know when we reach degraded readiness levels, as I stated in my opening comments, we have already reached that point in the collective level with the cancellation of brigade combat team, CT—Combat Training Center rotations.

The equipment levels will impact our readiness as well in regard to the availability of that equipment that is moving through depot and reset level maintenance.

Finally, it should be known that for us to execute our domestic or home mission, that is based on our level of readiness to conduct our wartime mission as well so that we will have—be impacted—we will always respond domestically, the response could be slowed.

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you. Thank you very much.

Mr. Chairman, I know there are other members and I hope they have an opportunity to ask some questions, but I think I would like to come back for—

Mr. WITTMAN. We will.

Ms. BORDALLO [continuing]. More.

Mr. WITTMAN. We will—

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you.

Mr. WITTMAN [continuing]. Have a second round of questions.

Ms. BORDALLO. And I yield back.

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Ms. Bordallo.

We will go now to Mr. Rogers.

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I thank all of you for being here and your service to our country.

General Mason, I want to direct my question to you. As you may or may not know, I have the Anniston Army Depot in my congressional district and they have been a great asset as we prosecuted these two wars and many of them have gone over in the theater and just done everything that has been asked of them and more.

But I have been bothered lately by the fact that this furlough talk has many of them concerned that they may be hit with furloughs and my understanding is that the defense working capital

fund is fully funded that pays for the projects that are at the depot through this fiscal year and well into next year—toward the end of next year.

Do you believe that the depot workers at Anniston would be subject to a furlough if in fact it were issued by the DOD [Department of Defense] given that working capital fund is fully funded?

General MASON. Yes, Mr. Congressman. I agree with you 100 percent. What our organic industrial base has done in Anniston, specifically with combat vehicles, has been amazing.

The investment in that has taken the health of our combat fleet and our wheel fleet significant high and we have reduced the age of our fleet. So our fleets are in really pretty good shape right now thanks to the great workers in Anniston and the other Red River and the other depots that are there.

The answer to your question is, right now, a furlough decision has not been made. It is still being worked through with the leadership of the Department of Defense and—but if it does, if we do have a furlough right now, the workers at Anniston would be part of that furlough. And we will have to work our way through, what the numbers will be there. But yes, sir, that is the plan right—even though it is an army working capital fund—

Mr. ROGERS. And why is that since it is already fully funded?

General MASON. It—the structure for the furloughs and working capital fund are a separate piece and while the working capital fund, as you know, is that revolving fund in there, the workers still fall in like all the other workers do and it is not separated by either structure or by policy or law.

So, it is something to look at in the future discussions and I personally would like to have some discussions with—inside the Army and then with OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense] as to whether there is a possibility in the future, could we separate the working capital fund or reimbursable type work from the other type of work that is there. That would be a policy issue that we would have to go back to OSD on but I think it is something worth looking at.

Mr. ROGERS. At present, it is not separated.

So the working capital—you are saying at present it is not separated—

General MASON. The dollars are but not the workers.

Mr. ROGERS. Right. And the dollars are subject to the cash flow problems that they are having?

General MASON. They are. That is correct.

And as workload comes down, you order less parts, the working capital fund then becomes at risk but there is cash in the working capital fund right now, that is correct.

Mr. ROGERS. I have heard in recent press reports over the last few days that there is a discussion within your Department about the furlough potential exposure being closer to 7 days than 14 days. I know it came down from 21 to 14. Is—are those press reports accurate?

General MASON. I think all of those options are being looked at. You know, it was 21 days, potentially 14 and 7 is—what I understand in the meetings I am in is that that is an option. Seven days is a potential option. I don't know where it will end up at.

Mr. ROGERS. Okay. Let me ask you, ultimately, how you feel this—if there are furloughs, would affect the readiness equipment that is already scheduled for maintenance.

General MASON. It will end up pushing those works into 2014, and so we will compound the risk that we have got in 2013 and we will go into 2014 because we won't have the work there—the workers to do all the work we need to do, and sequestration compounds that with the dollars that are going to be available to execute the work in the depots.

So, as you know, we looked at cancelling. We have already began to cancel some third- and fourth-quarter work.

Mr. ROGERS. You know, my understanding is those cancelations are not applicable to Anniston as an Army depot, is that accurate?

General MASON. Sir, I will take that for record.

Mr. ROGERS. Fine.

General MASON. I think that there are—is work that will be cancelled, but I will take that for the record and come back to you.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 77.]

Mr. ROGERS. I would appreciate that.

And I would just say as a side note, burdening the structure even more, I just came back from Afghanistan a week before last, and as they are positioning that equipment to come back, that is also going to be piling up at these depots whether it is small arms, wheeled track vehicles, whatever.

We got a very important industrial base that we got to maintain and I appreciate the work that you do in that effort and we need to be doing a better job on our side of the table to make sure you have what you need. So, thank you for your service. And I yield back, Mr. Chairman.

General MASON. Thank you, sir.

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Rogers.

Ms. Hanabusa.

Ms. HANABUSA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think my question is either going to be answered by General Huggins or General Mason.

One of the things that we know from sequestration is its impact on the civilian workforce, and civilian workforce, just so we are not confused, we have of course those that—what I would call the “outsourced workforce.” And in—for example, I am from Hawaii, so Schofield Barracks depot is actually BAE so it is more of an outsourced kind of situation than people who are civilian—military civilian employees.

Now having said that, it is also my understanding that the civilian, the military workforce, is under the operations and maintenance budget and that is why we are hearing all of these issues regarding furloughs.

I also understand that all the Services are not “created equal” in terms of how those funds work. So, it is said that, for example, Navy and Marine Corps, probably have enough in their operations and maintenance budget or the amounts that they have to have zero furloughs.

And I am wondering where you are because it is also said that you are not in the same position as Navy and there is a movement

to treat everyone equally which then may result with the 7 days or the 14 days from the 22 days, whichever it is. So would one of you like to take a stab at that first?

General HUGGINS. We tag team pretty well, ma'am. So, we will—

Ms. HANABUSA. It is okay.

General HUGGINS [continuing]. We will probably go back at it. I will try and frame the higher problem first. I understand the comments in terms of our Navy and our Marine brothers. Our challenge, it is an OMA [Operations and Maintenance, Army], operations maintenance fund issue, but it really stems for us from an overseas contingency operating fund shortfall to which we started out the year in and to which we continue to see increasing demands for everyday.

So then that now has bled into our OMA account which then creates the shortfall in terms of our civilian pay. And obviously, that is a large percentage of it. So, that is the higher portion of the impact.

Ms. HANABUSA. Before you tag off, let me ask you this, when we looked at the impacts of sequestration, and when the continued resolution and everything was identified, the sequestration component for OCO [Overseas Contingency Operations] was I believe about 6 billion. But what you are—are you speaking to something other than that immediate sequestration impact that was assessed to the OCO budget?

General HUGGINS. No, what I am saying is that initially we had a \$10 billion shortfall in what we had requested in overseas—

Ms. HANABUSA. I see.

General HUGGINS [continuing]. Contingency funding.

Ms. HANABUSA. Okay. I understand.

General HUGGINS. That is right.

Ms. HANABUSA. Okay.

General MASON. Yes. Yes, ma'am. I think to add to that, we have got those—as I have mentioned earlier, we have got the near-term readiness of OPTEMPO which deals with repair parts and also fuel. And it deals also with the contractors who are supporting that equipment, and you don't want to take a lot of risk there right now because we are focused on deployers and next deployers. Where we are taking some risk frankly in the deeper readiness which is in the depot maintenance, both in the base account, which we are taking ready—we are taking risk in there, and now some risk in the OCO reset account because we want to make sure that the down—the soldiers and equipment that is down range in Afghanistan is fully ready to conduct combat operations.

So that is that balance we have got right now. And so that is as—we don't then have the ability to move around that OMA dollars back here in the base and so that is impacting the furlough issue.

Ms. HANABUSA. I know that has always been an issue of the flexibility that you may or may not need, but if you don't have dollars in there, you can't really be flexible.

Now, one of the things that we will hear is that as we anticipate the—call them the “drawdown” from Afghanistan and everyone is

sort of saying, “Well, by then—by the year 2014 or 2015 fiscal year, we should be down to zero on OCO.”

But what I am hearing you are saying you really can’t do that unless an additional account is boosted up because you can’t do the retrograde and the reset at that time. Am I—am I hearing you correctly?

General MASON. Yes, ma’am, you are correct. Just because the last combat soldiers or that part of the mission might end in 2014, of course we are looking at an enduring force and that is—

Ms. HANABUSA. Right.

General MASON [continuing]. Going to be determined what that number will be and of course that is going to require reset. But even as that equipment comes out in 2014, you got to transport it back, get it into the depot, a helicopter—a reset of a helicopter takes over a year.

So even if that helicopter was to come back at the end of 2014, you at least need dollars to 2015 and you have got other helicopters that are sitting there. So, this equipment takes some time to get it back, get it through the depot, work the repair parts against it.

So, we have said is we need to reset OCO funding for 3 years after the last equipment comes back that allows us to work through all the depots, get it out the other end and then impact the readiness.

And just to let you know what that will end up doing is, that \$20 billion worth of equipment that is sitting in Afghanistan right now, we have estimated it will cost us about \$8 billion to reset it and that will improve our readiness equipment on-hand and our units from about 88 percent up to about 92 percent for all three composts. A significant, positive impact to readiness.

Ms. HANABUSA. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Ms. Hanabusa.

Mr. Scott.

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Mason, I appreciate you talking about the need in future years and the impact on future budgets. I think one of the things that we are struggling with right now is to meet the 12-month number with quite honestly a lifetime’s worth of responsibilities to form basic duty of protecting the United States citizens and their property.

I have a 13-year-old son, so I want to talk with you briefly as a father who thinks that our world is more dangerous today than it was yesterday and thinks that it will probably be more dangerous in the year 2020 than it is today. And that is an important year to me because that will be my son’s freshman year of college. And I don’t know if any of you have children in that age range but certainly that is—if you do, I think you will understand where I am coming from with this.

And I want to ask you, when you get a chance, to look at page 189 of the President’s budget. And I want to just give you a couple of numbers from that and I am going to read directly from them.

“With regard to total federal spending between this year and 2020, we will increase total federal spending by \$1.2 trillion,” according to the President’s budget in this country. Non-defense dis-

cretionary spending will go up. Social Security will go up. Medicaid will go up. Every other mandatory program will go up. Net interest on the national debt—net interest on the national debt, assuming that we are able to manipulate interest rates the same way they are currently being manipulated, will exceed, according to the President's budget, what we spend on national security in 2020—the year that my child is a freshman in college.

Total defense spending in that budget in 2020 is scheduled for \$601 billion—\$601 billion, well below where it is today. And so, when I hear the talk about the lack of training, well when our men and women aren't training, then we are putting them at risk, more so than they already are when we send them into action.

When I hear that a minimum of the cuts that we are going to have, it is a delayed response. We can't wait. The minute when they put on the uniform, they go—when the bell sounds and we are going to continue to do that as Americans, and I guess, you know, when I look at all of this, and I look at the vision of the President for the country and there are a lot of us up here who really want to help you put some of these things right, and get our military back to the place it needs to be, and I am pretty frustrated with the DOD, and I feel like that some of the leadership at the DOD comes over here and they say, you know, "Yes, sir. Thank you, sir. May we have another cut."

And so the question I have or that my request from you before I get into specific question is, when you are not on the cameras, please, please, look at that sheet, because if we can't help you, if the DOD is going to come over here and say, "Yes, we are going to take these cuts," if the—if the executives are there to—so, with that said, one of the questions that is on everybody's mind is BRAC [Base Realignment and Closure].

And General Mason, I will offer this to you because I am down to a minute and a half and I know I don't have time for everybody to speak to this. But it cost \$2.4 billion, is the request for the BRAC in this year's budget. Given the uncertainty, given the lack of training, given the need to reset, couldn't that money be used to offset some of the reductions in those areas that we all agree are so necessary for us to do our fundamental duty to protect the American citizens?

General MASON. The—I know that the Secretary of Defense talked about BRAC during his testimony and discussed whether that would be something to put on the table or not. So, I will obviously defer to the Secretary of Defense.

It is a base realignment and closure type environment. Do we need to do some realignment potentially in the outyears? Is there closure out there that may need to be done? I think it is—I think as the military officer, we look at options, so I think it is one thing that it needs to be discussed and let the facts take us to where it make sense.

Do we have the dollars to spend on that or should we spend those dollars somewhere else? I think the analysis needs to be done and we need to let the facts drive us to what the right decision is.

Mr. SCOTT. General, in their force reductions in Europe that we have had, how much are the—we are reducing them by about 45 percent. Are we see a corresponding amount of infrastructure re-

duction and are these reductions in your—likely to save that much money?

General MASON. I am not sure. I will take it for record on how much money it is because I am not familiar with that specific dollar figures.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 77.]

General MASON. I would say that, you know, I have served in Europe, sir. We have come down significantly as you know and there is a study ongoing right now for a European restructuring. Do we have it right from an Army standpoint and all the other Services so that I have members on that team that are looking at right now, we have a responsibility to go back to the Secretary.

Mr. SCOTT. General, my time for this round is expired. Thank you very much and I—again, page 189—

General MASON. Yes, sir.

Mr. SCOTT [continuing]. I hope that you will take a serious look at that and where this country is headed.

General MASON. Sir, I will.

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Scott. Excuse me. Mr. Enyart.

Mr. ENYART. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Visot, congratulations on becoming the Deputy Commanding General of Operations of USAR.

General VISOT. Thank you, sir.

Mr. ENYART. You are welcome. Good to see you again, Luis.

General Mason, the fiscal year 2014 budget shows a request for \$2.4 billion for MILCON [Military Construction], and could you estimate for me what percentage of that is going to go to active installations and what percentage is going to go to Army National Guard installations?

And what particularly concerns me is the fact that more than 46 percent of Army Guard Readiness Centers are over 50 years old and at the current level of funding, it looks like it will take 154 years. So let's see, that is roughly from the Civil War to today to modernize those facilities. So, I appreciate if you could tell me what that looks like.

General MASON. Yes, Mr. Congressman.

First off, military construction is not in my area of responsibility or do I have a lot of depth in it. I mean, obviously, as an Army officer of 34 years, I have touched military construction. But currently, that is managed by our Installation Management Command Commander Mike Ferriter and also the Corps of Engineers. So I will certainly take part of your question for the record.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 77.]

General MASON. I will tell you that my experience over the last 10 years of what the Congress has given us to improve our installations I think is pretty dramatic, and I think if you travel—and I am sure you have—to our installations across the compost, I think the investment that the Nation has put in our facilities is really amazing and we appreciate it.

So, I can't speak to the specifics but I will take that for the record and make sure that the appropriate folks answer that and come back to you sir. I don't know if you have any questions, com-

ments about the Reserve Component infrastructure, but I will have to take that for the record.

Mr. ENYART. Thank you, General, I was just picking on you because you are four; four gets everything.

General MASON. [Off mike.]

Mr. ENYART. If it is log-related, I am going to pick on you.

General Huggins, with the pivot to the Pacific, can you tell me, without going into any kind of classified level, what the Army's plans are to support AFRICOM [United States Africa Command]?

General HUGGINS. The biggest concept is our regionally aligned forces concept which will be supported by the Army Force Generation model. Currently, we are working our first proof of principle for AFRICOM with the designation of a brigade combat team which will provide forces for the combatant commander. Some of those will go into Djibouti, others will become crisis reaction forces that we have been called to establish since the Benghazi incident.

Mr. ENYART. So, you are talking about one BCT?

General HUGGINS. Sir, due theater security cooperation, that is correct. We will also go further and regionally align divisions and corps, but those forces will obviously not be forward-positioned.

But we will work the home station training with—as the term we used which even confuses us—some of us in uniform, is now distributed, so we used to have allocated and apportioned and our forces command has—whose proponent of running the regionally aligned forces model that is talked about a distribution of forces to where we assign corps and divisions and then brigade combat teams to align for the combatant commanders. Sir.

Mr. ENYART. Thank you, General.

General Huggins, I will pose this to you but if you want to pass part of this off, I will certainly understand. You know, the—of course, the Army War College teaches us its ends, ways, and means.

And with what we see happening with sequestration, with the budget problems that we have and with the cutbacks, and the size of the military and proposed further cutbacks, do you believe or do you foresee a mismatch—a significant mismatch between the ends that we proposed to accomplish with our military force and the means with which we will be attempted to accomplish those ends?

General HUGGINS. Sir, I personally see the potential for a mismatch. As Chairman Wittman stated at the beginning, I mean, the strategy must drive where we need to go, what the Army must accomplish and then the force structure designed to accomplish that task.

And we are in significant discussions with the Office of the Secretary of Defense through our strategic choices management review process which has all the Services a part of that to look at the defense strategic guidance and other governing documents to determine the way ahead.

But we also know that it is an exceptionally, fiscally constrained environment, and what we hope not to go to is an environment that tells us what to build in force structure based upon resources as opposed to strategy.

Mr. ENYART. Thank you, General.

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Enyart.

Mr. Palazzo.

Mr. PALAZZO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And I would like to thank our witnesses for their service to our country and also for being here today for your testimony. There is absolutely no secret that our Nation faces some very serious financial challenges.

You know, I think many of us in Congress, we advocate for cutting spending but there is a responsible way of cutting spending and there is a—I guess a dumb way of cutting spending, and sequestration I think falls on—in the latter, mindless cuts to defense. Yes, I think 50 percent of all the cuts to date are coming from defense when we only make that almost less than 20 percent of the budget.

So having said that, my kind of—my heart lies with the Reserve and the Guard. I love our Active Duty men and women in uniform, but being a reservist and a guardsman—my citizen soldier life.

I want to—real quick—because I do have three questions. I want to ask you, do you foresee us going from an operational—the Guard and Reserve—going from an operational force back to a Strategic Reserve because—and there are other discussions going on of that nature, Major General, then we could go to Brigadier General Fountain, so?

General VISOT. Congressman Palazzo, first, thank you very much for your service to our Nation as a guardsman in the State of Mississippi. I appreciate that very much.

Mr. PALAZZO. Pales in comparison to you all's.

General VISOT. No. So, from my perspective, you know, in terms of—we cannot afford, you know, to lose what we have gained as a result of 11 years of experience in the battlefield with—you know, from an Army Reserve perspective, with the National Guardsman an Active Component.

I don't think the Nation can afford, you know, to give away on that investment because that is what it is. You know, the Army Reserve is a positive investment for the United States and for our Nation. And to give away what we have earned, we feel very strongly, it is not a thing that we can afford to do in our Nation. And we hope that, you know, throughout the years with the support from the Congress that we will continue to do that and not go back to a Strategic Reserve.

General FOUNTAIN. Congressman, the Army has no intent, in my professional opinion is, in to returning us to a Strategic Reserve.

The reality and what I hope to have captured during my opening statement is that the readiness has already been discussed that was developed over the last 12 years is perishable, that it was a significant investment for us to make the transition from a Strategic Reserve to a full partner in an operational force that is a function of resourcing, and the resourcing is where we will depend on your assistance to see that we do not return to that point.

The—I think the three components together are stronger together than we are at different levels of readiness. That is what has brought us to this point. So, there is no intent for us to return to that point. It is just a reality of resourcing.

If we cannot continue to do those things to train as we have in the last 12 years, if we do not maintain our equipment, all those second-, third-order effects to resourcing or a lack thereof.

Mr. PALAZZO. Well, General, I agree with you both. I have served in both the Strategic Reserve Component and also the operational force structure. And I would much rather—I don't—I would hate to see us waste that investment and some hard-earned lessons.

Real quick, I know last year, the 11th annual QRMC [Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation] actually proposed the possibility of cutting Guard and Reserve pay by 50 percent. Now, personally, I think that would be devastating to readiness recruitment and retention especially as the Active forces are downsizing. We would like our Active Duty men and women to look to the Guard and Reserves because we would like to see that become a repository of their hard-earned skill and knowledge and training.

Real quick and I know I am kind of running short, are you all hearing this and are you all squashing it as that possibility may come up and in you all's conversations?

General VISOT. Congressman, we have heard about that. As you all know, the critical part of this is not just the pay, you know, to attend a battle assembly. It is all the cost that is also associated with that, so just travel cost, hotel cost, you know, lodging cost, that are just not, you know, within that enough, especially when you look at a, you know, a sergeant, you know, in an Army that has to travel distances.

So all those things come into play, so I think the way that we currently are, you know, paid for our service to our Nation is a very small investment for the return that we get.

Mr. PALAZZO. Okay. General Fountain.

General FOUNTAIN. Yes, Congressman, the Army National Guard's position is very similar in that we feel the current compensation system meets the requirement, is fair, and clearly added value to the resource you get from the Army National Guard.

While there could be merits in reviewing any compensation plan, we think that a full review would have to be done as to whether or not you actually get cost savings if you start considering different benefits that would come with a day's order or something of that scenario.

So, a full review and all potential second-, third-order effects for readiness I think would be due before you can make a decision such as that.

Mr. PALAZZO. All right. Thank you, gentlemen.

General FOUNTAIN. Sir.

Mr. PALAZZO. I yield back.

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Palazzo.

Mrs. Hartzler.

Mrs. HARTZLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for your service and I am going to echo some of my colleagues' comments but I certainly did not support these cuts to our national defense and I was glad to be part of the Budget Committee to help restore the defense spending in the 2014 budget that was passed out of the House. We are going to continue to try to do that.

But in the meanwhile, I want to follow up on some of the President's proposal regarding the BRAC. I know my colleague asked

some questions here earlier. But has there been an assessment done within the Department of Army on excess infrastructure on army installations?

General HUGGINS. Ma'am, one was done for the last BRAC. We are currently not doing a continuing assessment other than what General Mason mentioned for Europe which is a specific look for those forward-deployed.

But to the—really the—to set the context, I mean, we currently—we are looking at—as the Active force goes to 490,000, we are looking in going through our programmatic environmental assessment process.

And we are currently in our listening, we have gone out to communities and are conducting our listening sessions to hear first-hand what the impacts are from them.

And then we will make a decision after that is done in terms of what kind of a recommendation as to where we think future stationing will be. And then, that may potentially drive us to look at places for—where excess capacity or excess equipment exists. But, we are a little bit away from that at this point in time.

Mrs. HARTZLER. I just don't quite understand the move to try to push a BRAC when—it is my understanding you had 490,000 before 9/11, isn't that correct? It is about the same force structure we had pre-9/11. And we had a BRAC in 2005 which took some excess infrastructure out.

So basically, you are having the same number of soldiers on our bases with less infrastructure right now. So, why is there a move to push for more infrastructure to be taken out?

General HUGGINS. Well, we are at a high of 569,000—

Mrs. HARTZLER. Yes.

General HUGGINS [continuing]. Now from—so we have grown and we have put structure in places as we look for the best places to build divisions, build enablers that would support those divisions on installations. Going down to 490,000, we have got to take a holistic review of everything to make sure we have it. And efficiencies will play in that obviously, but—

Mrs. HARTZLER. Yes.

General HUGGINS [continuing]. I think it is prudent that we do that. But right now, we are—again, as we are still trying to gain the rest of the information from the community.

Mrs. HARTZLER. Okay. And I understand that you are moving to move down to force structure but I still think with the excess cost that we see haven't even broke even yet from the 2005 BRAC. It cost \$37 billion, now you are supposed to break even to 2018 and then we have all these other cuts and less resources and then \$2.4 billion cost to do any more. I am reticent to support that.

But I wanted to shift and follow up on my friend from Mississippi's comments to the Guard and Reserve. I certainly appreciate the role that you play. My dad was in the U.S. Army Reserves, and so I grew up appreciating that very, very, much.

And I know in the defense strategy that came out last October, there was a move and a shift to continue to place more and more of the responsibilities of our National Defense on an Active operational force of the Guard and Reserve.

And I guess my question is, with sequestration and the current budgetary environment, do you feel like, that you are going to have what you need to be able to continue at that level of proficiency?

General VISOT. Congresswoman, thank you very much for the question. As far as the Army Reserve, as I stated earlier, we just cannot afford, you know, to lose that tremendous investment on our capability to remain an Operational Army Reserve.

The impact of sequestration we will have is one for example, of civilian pay and furlough. It will have an impact upon depot maintenance, you know, as my—as General Mason mentioned specifically in reset. It will have also an impact upon OPTEMPO in terms of the training, you know, that we have going on. The, and lastly, the impact will be in sustainment restoration and modernization.

All those four items combined, you know, will have a significant impact in us in order for us to be able to sustain our ability to remain an Operational Army Reserve which I don't think at this point in time in our history we can afford to do that as a nation.

Mrs. HARTZLER. Exactly. General Fountain.

General FOUNTAIN. Yes, Congresswoman. The same impacts of sequestration that the Army suffers and the USAR suffers, so will the Army National Guard. The sequestration from strictly Army National Guard perspective impacts that investment of time, just as my colleague mentioned from the USAR.

It simply is a situation where—and I believe the Chairman of Joint Chiefs General Dempsey made a statement during his discussion in reference the fiscal year 2014 budget when he stated that, "It is less expensive to stay ready than to get ready," and that I am probably messing that quote up but that is the bottom line.

From our perspective, we have through investment from what this great country have transitioned from an Operational Reserve—Strategic Reserve to an operational force at a great cost, and to lose that investment to us would be buying high and selling low.

Mrs. HARTZLER. There we go. Thank you very much.

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mrs. Hartzler. We are going to begin a second round of questions and I want to focus on the DOD's new strategic guidance that was released in January of 2012 and then the accompanying document from the Secretary on Defense budget priorities and choices.

And as you know, there is a significant element in there that relates to readiness in the U.S. Pacific Command and I wanted to get each of your perspective on how does that affect Army readiness?

What are the challenges that that new strategic directive provides to the Army to get your perspective on where things are going?

And again, it goes back to the earlier comments about strategy and making sure that strategy is driving how we determine how resources are allocated, not the other way around looking at resources and then say that that drives a strategy and we have some clear strategy directives now.

So I wanted to get each of your individual perspectives on this new strategy initiative and then the Secretary of Defense's comments and directives on our defense budget priorities and choices. And we begin with you General Huggins.

General HUGGINS. Chairman, thank you. Obviously, the strategy drove us to the Pacific in terms of—as we looked at our national vital interest. The Army has taken in and now is upgunning the three-star headquarters we have in U.S. Army Pacific at Fort Shafter to four-stars, so that is measure one.

And we don't do that to create another four-star position but because the oversight on the responsibility for increased capability there requires such. And that increased capability is, first and foremost, in the form of the 25th Infantry Division which is now forced into the PACOM [United States Pacific Command] area. We have also gone to Fort Lewis—or Joint Base Lewis-McChord and allocated it also.

So, the first corps as the JTF [Joint Task Force] and we are working training exercises with PACOM and USARPAC [U.S. Army Pacific] to certify those headquarters as a combined joint task force level—take resources, but once there are probably good investments for a strategic hedge given especially our current world situation in that area.

There are—the brigades have also been taken off of our—what we have notionally called the “patch chart” that shows the deploying units for our combat operations. So, we have taken the 25th Infantry Division brigades—the brigades in Alaska and two of the Stryker Brigades at Joint Base Lewis-McChord, and basically protected them to work their readiness for response to the Pacific area and those threats.

That said, Sir, we are only training those forces to the squad level.

Now, the exception to that are the forces that are committed to—on the peninsula of Korea already, which again we will maintain a higher level of readiness for. It is an impact, but we have—in this case, we have clear priority so we move to—to those priorities. We just wish we could gain higher level of readiness for each of those divisions, the corps and the BCTs and our soldiers within them.

Mr. WITMAN. Very good.

General Mason.

Thank you, General.

General MASON. Mr. Chairman, I have got four tours in the Pacific, a little over 10 years. Most recently, 3 years ago, I commanded the two-star headquarters there, so I spent a fair amount of time.

To me, it is a region of opportunities and challenges. There are great opportunities there, well, for our Nation economically. And there are opportunities there for us as a military to train with other forces to become interoperable to—and most of those militaries in that part of the world are actually predominantly Army, and so there is—although it is a big ocean out there, there is a land force out there, and so connecting with that land force and staying with them.

And there is great exercise programs both at the joint and the Army level, so it can improve our readiness.

And as General Huggins mentioned, rotating forces in and out of there and getting them used to that part of the world, we can leverage capabilities of these other nations. They bring incredible ca-

pabilities—our particular allies, the Australians, others that are there.

We also preposition stocks out in the Pacific. APS [Army Prepositioned Stocks] sets, both brigade sets, that is—as well as what we call operational project stocks. They—so we have got land out there, we can put on the ground, so our allies in Japan, in Korea and other places. You know, we are discussing it with the Australians potentially. But it has challenges.

Probably the primary challenge is the tyranny of distance. Traveling in the Pacific is expensive. You got to have ships, then you get to a location. You got to have planes to get deeper in locations, and it is very helicopter-intensive, so it has got some challenges for training that does increase your cost. But I think the opportunities in the Pacific both at the strategic operational tactical level are worth those kinds of costs. And I think we are going to be a better Army by staying engaged in the Pacific. I think we are going to be a better nation by staying engaged in that part of the world.

And there is cost-sharing that occurs. We have cost-sharing with the Koreans. They bear some of the cost of our capabilities there. And potentially, there is other cost-sharing relationships.

Some of our strongest alliances and treaties are in the Pacific. So it is a dichotomy of challenges and opportunities, Sir.

Mr. WITTMAN. Very good.

General Visot, if you could do that quickly and General Fountain, then in the interest of time for—so I get to Ms. Bordallo.

General VISOT. Mr. Chairman, we are definitely committed to continuing to support because we presently have about 4,000 soldiers that are located in the Pacific Command area of support, and we continue to provide the sustainment and support, you know, capabilities within that area and align ourselves with the strategy of aligning regional alignment forces through our Army Reserve engagements cells and Army Reserve engagement teams, we will be able to fulfill the Nation's requests.

Mr. WITTMAN. Okay. General Fountain.

General FOUNTAIN. Yes, Mr. Chairman. The Army National Guard also feels that we can make the transition and support the chief staff of the Army's regional alignment forces strategy as well.

Whether it would be security cooperation or building partnership capacity, we feel that that would be a natural evolution of our 65 partnerships across the globe today. And the Army Force Generation Model is adaptable enough to focus mission training and deployment and keep us engaged as an operational force to the strategy.

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you. And that is a great lead-in to Ranking Member Bordallo, who has a great National Guard component there in Guam.

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you. Thank you very much. I was going to mention that, Mr. Chairman.

I wanted—just whoever you think, if the answer is the same between the two Services, then I guess, we will just go to those that may have a different idea on this. What flexibilities or exceptions did you request in terms of furloughing civilian personnel? And also, what is the impact of using borrowed military manpower to backfill the civilian positions?

General HUGGINS. Ranking Member Bordallo, we ask for no exceptions based on the guidance that were given to us. We have looked at the impact in terms of the furlough. And as was stated before, we are, even today, working drilldowns as we go from 14 to 7 and possibly to zero on furloughs because we do think that is going to impact on the way ahead.

I would tell you it will impact, you know, our readiness in the long-term because of exactly what has been stated in terms of what we are going to have to defer.

The minimum amount that—and General Mason can speak more of this—that we are trying to do to keep our depots operating so we don't have to go into a cold status and then have to start them up over again. But I will see if General Mason has anything else to add.

Ms. BORDALLO. General.

General MASON. To the second part of the question about our military manpower, we have taken very—very seriously, Ma'am, and we are looking at them. The G3 holds weekly meetings and we are looking at where can we use soldiers appropriately that aren't too far outside of their military occupational specialty. But based on the constraints we have got now with dollars, we likely are going to have to have some borrowed military manpower.

Now we have done it in the past and it is one of those things that commanders take a hard look at because you want to balance training with all the other requirements on there, and we are working our way through that.

As far as the furlough impact on the depots, it will be significant. And, you know, as a depot operates, you don't want to shut a depot down, you want to keep it on, yes, while you are on two or three shifts as you well know. So our concern is this herky-jerky kind of situation with a furlough. And that will be challenging, and we will see where the numbers come out, but obviously the less furlough the better for us in the depots.

Ms. BORDALLO. Would the others like to comment, General?

General VISOT. Yes, ma'am. From the Army Reserve, our position is we would like not to have to furlough, you know, our civilian military technicians because of the fact those are GS-5s and GS-7 employees. As you know, when you cut 20 percent of their salary for, you know, 14 days or so, that has significant financial impact not only on the soldiers themselves, but also on their families.

Ms. BORDALLO. And General Fountain.

General FOUNTAIN. Ranking Member Bordallo, as the impact goes with the Army National Guard is that our—we have very few civilians. Our full-time manning provides a baseline of readiness for support of the other 83 percent of our force which is part-time or traditional guardsmen. Military dual-status technicians are actually members of those Army National Guard formations and deployable assets whether at home or abroad.

The areas where we did request some exception was at the area of physical security, emergency response services and others. But the primary impact will be for us is readiness that the administration, training, and maintenance that is done by these individuals. And the part utilized and borrowed military manpower really

doesn't apply to Reserve Component in that we are a part-time force.

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you. Thank you, General.

How are any of you using sequestration as an opportunity to do business differently at the headquarters or administrative levels? Are any of you—if you could give me a quick answer because my time is running out.

General HUGGINS. We all can refine and look for that opportunity. Madam Chairperson, it is a matter of really looking at our processes.

For instance, in our modernization processes, we are going through with our acquisition community and finding efficiencies. Some were forced that way because of just absolute need where, in the past, perhaps it was easier to try and do it another way. But there have been multiple opportunities. And it is not a good thing, but we try to find the best we can out of it.

Ms. BORDALLO. So you are going to become businessmen?

General HUGGINS. I would scare most of you if we try that, but I would sure take that for the record, Ma'am.

Ms. BORDALLO. All right. Thank you.

Was there anything else you wanted to add just very quickly?

General MASON. No, ma'am. I think we don't want to become businessmen, but we will use business practices where they are appropriate for sure just as you described.

Ms. BORDALLO. Very good. All right.

In closing, Mr. Chairman, I wish to say that I am extremely proud of the service that has been rendered by the Reserves, the Air Guard, the National Guard.

And currently, as Mr. Chairman said, I just returned from the State of Mississippi where I witnessed the briefing of 600 of the Guam National Guard. That is quite a number for a small United States territory, and we are very proud of them.

And I also want to thank you for your leadership with all the different organizations that you represent here. And I join my colleagues, and I do not agree with the deep cuts to our Armed Services.

And with that, I yield back.

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Ms. Bordallo.

We will now go to Mr. Scott.

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, I want to talk with you briefly about AFRICOM and—and just about Africa, in general, and the challenges that are there. As somebody who just looking at the raw numbers, you are talking about approximately a billion people.

You are talking about 20 percent of the land mass of the world. You are talking about 54 countries plus Somalia and—I am sorry, Somaliland and Morocco, so we got 56 different governments that you would potentially have to deal with. We are talking about downsizing our military both in the terms of manpower and in the terms of our weapon systems and capabilities.

Why is the military convinced or the leadership of the country convinced that we can engage in Africa with the type of challenges that are there while, at the same time, engaging in all of these

massive cuts to our military and the equipment and the training that they need would be my first question.

And the second question I have would be, is China downsizing their military? Is Russia downsizing their military, are any of those countries that could potentially be our foes in the future downsizing their military?

General HUGGINS. Congressman Scott, thank you very much for the question. First to set the stage for the AFRICOM piece, you certainly bring up a great topic because there is an awful lot of human suffering going on in that area.

I have great confidence in General Rodriguez who just took the helm there in terms of defining the requirements to us as the Army service to support his engagements. Currently that demand signal does not exist that much, but I would have to be honest and say that probably is more a function of everything we have committed for years to Afghanistan and Iraq.

Hopefully as we see that situation begin to downsize even further if the situation require. We can support it. We could see a strategy that might allow other forces to go to other places. But I believe first and foremost the Africa piece is probably a whole-of-government approach to work engaging. And then our piece is working with the various militaries to try and build capacity at that level, which we are doing.

Our National Guard brothers engage right now in Partnership for Peace activities, the State Partnership Exchanges. But what we have found in our previous engagements there, our capabilities so outmatch many of the Armies that are in that country. And I am really talking more about Central Africa, West Africa, and the south, not all the way to South Africa, that they want basic levels of instructions. And we are able to help them with that.

The real issue is, is how we are going to address the whole continent writ large as in—and that becomes a multiple COCOM [Combatant Command] requirement or challenge when we look at the partnering space with Central Command, Sir.

General MASON. I would add, Sir, that we need to stay engaged in that part of the world, but the engagement doesn't necessarily to be in large formations, even brigades.

Many times just well drilling, building a bridge, and engagement with USDA or Department of Agriculture, those kinds, that whole-of-government piece, I think, many times pays back greater dividends. You put a small footprint in there.

Now we have a command—

Mr. SCOTT. General, if I may—

General MASON. Yes.

Mr. SCOTT [continuing]. I certainly mean to be as respectful as I can. I am down to about 1 minute. With all due respect, Sir, you are talking about nation-building, and that is not the reason we have the Armed Services of this country. But that is nation-building when we are doing wells and other things along those lines.

And again, I think that we want to do what we can to help people. But my fear is that we are leaving our country vulnerable.

And if you look at where we are today, we don't talk about Iran that much because Syria heated up. We don't talk about Syria that much because North Korea heated up. I mean, we are still in Af-

ghanistan. We spent a fortune in Iraq and Afghanistan. We have been up against a capable enemy, but not an enemy that is capable technologically of taking down insignificant numbers.

Our aircraft, not that any loss is insignificant, but we have not been up against China or Russia, or anybody who has got the aircraft to take us one on one.

And I guess, my concern again is, you know, with due respect, you are talking about nation-building. And as we take these cuts, I really think we got to focus on making sure that we protect America first because if we don't protect America first, we can't do anything to help the men and women in the other countries out there.

General MASON. Sir, I very much appreciate that. My point would be is if you can build stability in a country, the opportunities for terrorists to come in and for other agents to create an environment such as in Afghanistan with the Taliban may be less. So I think it is directly related to national security, but I understand your point.

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Scott.

Ms. Hanabusa.

Ms. HANABUSA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Mason, you used the words "organic industrial base." Just so that we are on the same page, can you tell me what you mean when you say "organic industrial base"?

General MASON. Yes, Ma'am. When I talk about the organic industrial base, I am talking about the industrial base that United States Army and, of course, the other Services have similar. But we have what we call hard-iron depots—Anniston, Red River, depots of that nature.

We also include our arsenals, which have manufacturing capabilities such as Rock Island Arsenal and Watervliet. Watervliet does cannons. Rock Island does a real fine type of metalwork. So those are our arsenals and our hard-iron depots where we do rebuild and reset of trucks, tanks, helicopters.

Ms. HANABUSA. Thank you.

You also mentioned the fact that, you know, we are teaming up with others. And this is because of your experience in the Pacific. I don't think my colleagues are aware of the fact that as far as the U.S. Army Pacific that you really have now an Australian general in a dominant, quite obvious position for us in Hawaii.

So can you explain to us what the position of the Australian general is and what he is anticipated to do and participate? Does he have full range of participation?

General MASON. And all of the three perhaps can answer this, but he is the deputy commander there so he has all the full responsibilities of a—just as a U.S. general was. And, in fact, I did a 2-year exchange in the Australian Army, so I understand it very well. In fact, I commanded Australian forces during my tour, so I had full rights and responsibilities as a—in that military. So that is his role, and I think it is a great partnership.

As you know, we have Canadian down with Fort Hood, so this relationship with some of our greatest allies is very powerful. And I think it is a really good thing here in USARPAC.

Ms. HANABUSA. Do we have any concerns about any kind of confidential information or anything like that, General Huggins?

General HUGGINS. No, ma'am. There are certainly limits. And we typically have an acronym we use for the five eyes for the nations that we have the highest level of clearance rate. But we still protect some information.

But the Australians are great partners. And more importantly, it sends a message to all of our Pacific partners the team that is trying to be built there because it will be, you know, a multicultural, a multinational solution here.

Ms. HANABUSA. Thank you.

General Fountain, one of the things that I have always been curious about is Title 32 and Title 10 interface. And I do understand the amount of investment that we have made as a country both in the Guard as well as in the Reserve, and it would be a travesty to lose that.

Having said that, however, as far as the Guard is concerned, you know, you are the State militia primarily, which means to a certain extent, well, maybe not even to a certain extent, technically the Governor of the State—of respective States are really your co-commander.

So as you come before us and you say that we want to ensure the continuation of the Guard, there still is this other player out there called the Governor, Title 32.

So have you given any consideration or Generals, yourselves as well as to how as you want to maintain, and there is nothing that I am necessarily opposed to, but how are you going to do that if a Governor, for example, does not cooperate and says, "We don't want—whatever minimum amount it may cause the State, we don't want that expense." How do you intend to basically get that in line with what you want to do?

General FOUNTAIN. Yes, Congresswoman. I cannot speak for each Governor or the Governors Association, but I would simply say that it is a challenge and just as running our democracy is a challenge.

However, I do believe each Governor is very aware that that capability and capacity that resides within their Title 32 Army National Guard and Air National Guard, for that matter, is developed through our relationship with our Title 10 services. And those Title 10 services man, train, and equip to fight and win America's wars. But that capability and capacity is leveraged by the Governors and their adjutant generals to support that State, regional, and in some instances, national mission set here in the homeland.

Ms. HANABUSA. So we would be—we will be on—I mean, I would be correct. If I were to say that if, for example, the Army decided that it didn't want the level of participation that you have now that they probably would be very little for them to—for a Governor to leverage under your scenario.

General FOUNTAIN. Yes, Congresswoman.

The Army Total Force Policy is something that all three components are committed to. And we believe that the Army Total Force Policy is essential to us remaining in the operational force. So provided resources are available to continue to maintain those hard-fought gains, I believe that we will continue to be that equitable

partner, and the Army will continue to leverage us for those areas where we are very skilled in our contribution to the total Army.

Ms. HANABUSA. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Ms. Hanabusa.

And with that, if there are no other questions to come before our witnesses we will adjourn the Subcommittee on Readiness for the House Armed Services Committee.

[Whereupon, at 4:01 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

A P P E N D I X

APRIL 16, 2013

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

APRIL 16, 2013

Statement of Hon. Robert J. Wittman
Chairman, House Subcommittee on Readiness
Hearing on
The Readiness Posture of the U.S. Army
April 16, 2013

Welcome to this afternoon's hearing. I would like to thank our panel of experts for being here today to address the readiness posture of the United States Army.

Over the past 12 years, the Army—Active, Guard, and Reserve—has deployed more than 1.1 million soldiers to combat with more than 4,500 giving the last full measure of devotion for this country. More than 32,000 soldiers have been wounded—9,000 requiring long-term care. In that time, soldiers have earned more than 14,000 awards for valor to include 7 Medals of Honor and 22 Distinguished Service Crosses.

The Army's contributions to our national security have been numerous and continue around the world today. This hearing comes at a time of strategic inflection for the Army.

After more than a decade of protracted counterinsurgency operations and cyclic combat operations in Middle East, the Army must find a way to return to full-spectrum operations, reset and reconstitute the force, responsibly draw down operations in Afghanistan, and fully develop its role under the new Defense Strategic Guidance.

The Army must find a way to do all this under a tightening budget and the compounding challenges of sequestration, continuing fiscal challenges in Afghanistan, and do so with a smaller force.

To discuss how the Army plans to meet the challenges of tomorrow in this austere budgetary environment, we have with us this afternoon:

- Lieutenant General James L. Huggins, Jr., the Army's Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations;
- Lieutenant General Raymond V. Mason, the Army's Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics;
- Major General Luis R. Visot, the Deputy Commanding General for Operations for the U.S. Army Reserve; and
- Brigadier General Walter E. Fountain, the Acting Deputy Director of the U.S. Army National Guard.

Gentlemen, thank you all very much for being here today. I appreciated your thoughtful statements and your insights into our Nation's Army.

General Huggins, General Fountain, and General Visot, I understand that for each of you this is your first time testifying before

the Armed Services Committee, welcome. General Mason, welcome back.

Last year this subcommittee spent a great deal of time exploring our current state of readiness and discussing how we remain prepared to meet the challenges we are likely to face in the future.

Time and time again, we heard of a force that was described as being “on the ragged edge.” Today we again explore readiness, this time, in the context of how the Army is reshaping itself to be ready for the future conflicts of the 21st century.

The Administration continues to argue that we can afford a smaller force with a smaller Army—an Army with less capacity, so long as we have a more capable one.

To enable a skilled, superior Army, one that can meet the Nation’s needs and respond to a wide range of threats, will require timely, thoughtful, and targeted investments.

The Army must spend every dollar wisely as it seeks to remain ready. Anything less would result in far-reaching and long-lasting implications for the Army and for this Nation.

Congress has a responsibility and constitutional duty to train and equip our soldiers—to ensure they are ready for the job we have asked them to do. I look forward to learning about what investments in readiness you are making and how the Army plans to meet its mission in these challenging times.

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STATEMENT OF
LTG JAMES L. HUGGINS, JR
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, G-3/5/7
UNITED STATES ARMY

And

LTG RAYMOND V. MASON
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF, G-4
UNITED STATES ARMY

And

MG LUIS R. VISOT
DEPUTY COMMANDING GENERAL- OPERATIONS
UNITED STATES ARMY RESERVE

BEFORE THE
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS
FIRST SESSION, 113TH CONGRESS
ON
THE READINESS POSTURE OF THE U.S. ARMY
16 APRIL 2013

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNTIL RELEASED BY THE
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

Chairman Wittman, Ranking Member Bordallo, and members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today on total Army readiness with my fellow panel members.

America's Army remains at war and has been in a state of continuous war for the past twelve years, the longest in our nation's history. More than 167,000 Soldiers are deployed or forward stationed in nearly 160 countries worldwide. We serve as a total Army--Active, Army Reserve and National Guard—and deploy as a joint and combined force, serving side by side with Marines, Airmen and Sailors and coalition partners, all working to achieve one goal: to fight and win our nation's wars. After more than a decade of conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan, the nation and our Army are in a period of transition, a turning point characterized by a fiscally constrained environment and a global security environment that is more complex and uncertain than at any time since the end of World War II, pointing to further instability. The Army remains a key guardian of our national security. Our ability to provide a trained, ready and capable force to fulfill global commitments and mission requirements is predicated upon continued investment in readiness.

Current Readiness

The Total Army (Active, Reserve and National Guard) conducts missions worldwide in support of national security objectives, as well as within the United States in support of civil authorities. This force provides the foundation for global security posture by engaging partners and dissuading adversaries. As the demands for Army forces in Afghanistan will continue to decrease, the requirement for strategic landpower capable of worldwide deployment will endure.

The Army's Active, Reserve and National Guard Soldiers are currently committed to operations around the world – in Afghanistan, Kosovo, the Philippines, Horn of Africa, Turkey, Sinai Peninsula and throughout the Middle East. The Army's ability to perform these vital missions is at risk due to sequestration, budget uncertainty and shortfalls in Overseas Contingency Operations funding. We cannot afford to allow the Total Army to fall behind in readiness or modernization; we must place our Soldiers in position for success by giving them the best leaders, training and equipment that the

Nation can afford. We must providing combatant commanders the most capable Soldiers and units possible to execute our national security goals. In other words, investment in our readiness is a strategic necessity. History has proven that we cannot narrowly define the conditions for which our Army must be ready. The nation has paid a heavy price for its historic pattern of unpreparedness at the start of major conflicts; therefore, we must be prepared now and in the future to dominate across the entire spectrum of conflict. Failure to do so can result in a "hollow" Army, dangerously unable to protect the nation's interests, placing our national security at risk and threatening the readiness of our Soldiers. No level of risk is acceptable if it threatens the ability of our Soldiers to fight and survive in combat.

Maintaining an Army capable of performing its vital role of winning the nation's wars in an environment of budgetary uncertainty translates into significant readiness issues over the next several years for our military and civilian populations. The nation cannot afford to give up the readiness achieved since the events of September 11th. The Army faces dramatic cuts to its personnel, force structure and modernization programs. For the past twelve years, we have relied heavily on a combination of Active, Reserve and National Guard capabilities. Every year, an average of 24,000 Army Reserve Soldiers have been mobilized and seamlessly integrated to support the total force. In addition, more than fifty percent of the National Guard Soldiers are veterans of a deployment, many having served multiple tours just as their active counterparts. Total force operational proficiency is inextricably linked to our operational Army Reserve and National Guard readiness. The Army Reserve and Army National Guard each have distinct roles and legal authorities and we believe maintaining these forces ensures the Total Army is well postured to meet both domestic and overseas mission requirements. Again, sequestration will tremendously impact the Total Army's ability to fulfill the goals and objectives outlined in both the National Security Strategy and Defense Strategic Guidance and Priorities.

The Army is committed to balancing the current demands with a realistic strategy that ensures America's dominance in military operations remains unchallenged and that our forces remain ready and relevant. Considering that the Total Army currently supports operations in approximately 160 countries around the world, the importance of

managing and mitigating these impacts and risks to readiness based on our responsibilities to execute current military strategy objectives is critical.

The Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff of the Army remain committed to winning the current fight, sustaining the All-Volunteer Force, preparing trained and ready forces for a full range of operations and increasing future force capabilities based upon lessons learned from 12 years of war. To prepare for operations in a postwar environment based upon the current fiscal constraints, the Secretary of the Army and the CSA outlined steps they must take to reduce expenditures while mitigating risk to readiness.

Ready and Available Forces.

Future Force Generation. Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) puts the Army on a rotational readiness cycle which enabled us to provide cohesive units to combatant commanders for enduring missions in Iraq and Afghanistan. ARFORGEN provides the mechanism to adjust training, equipping and manning of our units to meet the requirements of persistent conflict. Lessons learned from more than 12 years of war demonstrate the need for a force generation cycle built on a demand-based model rather than a supply-based model; we are in the final stages of developing a new Future Force Generation model that will realign our institutional systems to support this goal. However, the efficiency gained by the new model which will prioritize training for decisive action with a focus on combined arms maneuver and wide area security, will not solve all the problems that falling under certain budget levels will create. Future Force Generation will allow the Army to apply scarce resources and project manpower at the correct time and place to minimize risk, ensure readiness, specifically identifying those capabilities critical to meeting the National Military Strategy, allowing us to project steady-state requirements while retaining the capability and flexibility to surge for the most stressing war plan. The Army will focus resources only on those units deployed, deploying or with critical contingency response missions. The gap in readiness will be for those units associated with contingency

response to missions outside of the annual priorities identified by the joint staff with an acceptable level of risk for the nation.

Regionally Aligned Forces. Maintaining an Army capable of winning the nation's wars, even in an environment of budgetary uncertainty and reduced resources, is critical. To be more responsive to all combatant commanders and better enable our joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational partners, the Army is regionally-aligning its forces to provide rapidly deployable, tailored capabilities that are consistently available for all requirements. Regionally Aligned Forces are the Total Army Force. Regional alignment leverages the critical partnership and unique skills of the Army Reserve and National Guard, in combination with the ready capabilities of the Active Component. To assist in planning support for regionally-aligned missions, the Army Reserve is creating Army Reserve Engagement Cells at the Army Service Component Command. These cells will deliver critical planning and support, ensuring the unique combat support and combat service support capabilities of the Army Reserve are maintained and used.

Operational missions, operations support, theater security cooperation activities and bilateral and multilateral exercises are at risk due to the baseline training that focuses on combined arms maneuver and wide-area security which requires developing language skills, regional expertise and cultural training necessary for Soldiers to operate in combatant commanders' areas of responsibility. This training, which includes joint exercises and operations with partners and allies, is paramount to the CSA's vision of the Army's role in protecting American interests at home and abroad. Soldiers who receive regionally-specific training and equipment and participate in regionally-focused missions will contribute to the shaping of their regional security environments with much greater effectiveness. Adequate resources are required to ensure that as missions evolve and new threats emerge, aligned forces are trained, ready and tailored to support the mission as necessary.

Training Readiness. The changed conditions of warfare necessitate that we can no longer accept increased levels of risk in how we train and prepare for war.

Training and leader development are focused on three strategic ends: training units to be versatile and ready to support combatant commanders worldwide; developing leaders to meet the challenges of the 21st Century; and holding commanders responsible for progressive and realistic training, guided by the doctrine of mission command. The Chief of Staff of the Army's immediate priority is to ensure Soldiers in Afghanistan and those next to deploy are trained and ready. Training for operational adaptability will take place at home station, combat training centers, in Army institutions and while deployed. Army leaders must recognize that there are no predetermined solutions to problems, so training and leader development must continue to foster creativity at every level. The Army's Force Generation process is central to future training readiness. The Army Reserve and National Guard will remain on a 60-month process, providing a cost-effective progressive readiness model. The Active Army Force Generation process is changing from a 36-month to a 24-month process leading the Army to change the timelines for conducting training.

The Army is also revitalizing home station training and the training management skills of commanders so they will be more effective and efficient in preparing units and Soldiers for the future. Similar to the pre-9/11 Army, our ability to execute demanding home station training will provide the strategic depth necessary for the Nation to respond to unforeseen contingencies.

This is essential given that non-deploying units will face the most direct impact of reduced resources. The Army will continue to prioritize efforts to maintain readiness across non-deployed forces according to the Secretary of Defense's Strategic Planning Guidance against these known requirements: Homeland Defense (HLD) units; Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) units; Korean forward deployed units; the global response force (GRF); and other combatant command contingency response forces. Immediately and most profoundly, the vast majority of non-deploying Army units will train less often and to a lower level of proficiency. In addition, the Army may curtail the training of critical enablers, skills and functions. Some examples of the current effects of resource reductions on the Army's individual and collective training are:

- Curtailing training for 78% of all non-deploying or non-forward stationed units
- Cancelling five Mission Command Training Program (MCTP) Brigade Warfighter Exercises (WFXs), and one Army Service Component Command (ASCC) Exercise

Our inability to train non-deploying units will degrade our units' readiness posture and reduce the progressive build of unit capability to meet early FY14 missions, emerging requirements and timelines associated with Combatant Commander war plans. These examples illustrate how curtailing training will impact our units' basic warfighting skills and create shortfalls across critical specialties including aviation, intelligence and engineering. Training shortfalls will also impact our ability to recruit new Soldiers into the Army.

Sequestration will have significant short and long term impacts on instructional capability, institutional training and certifications as a result of civilian furloughs. The impact will be felt across all 32 Army Schools organized under eight Centers of Excellence managed by Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), the 18 Non-TRADOC Schools that execute branch specific training (Special Warfare, Medical and Judge Advocate General), component specific training (U.S. Army Reserve and Army National Guard), and specialty schools (Inspector General, Corps of Engineers, School of Music, Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center, etc.). Annually, these centers and schools train approximately 500,000 Soldiers, Civilians and other service members in initial military skill training, professional military education and functional duty specific training, to include Ranger and airborne qualification. The majority of these schools use Department of the Army (DA) Civilians as instructors; their absence one day a week will require training institutions to implement less than optimal alternatives. These alternatives include, but are not limited to, filling the instructional shortfall with part time contractors, extending the program of instruction time period and creating a student throughput delay/backlog, and/or keeping the program of instruction time period as is and accepting risk in training standards.

Moreover, sequestration will be noted in the Army Reserve through degraded training support systems, range operations and airfield operations capabilities, again due to civilian furloughs, requiring the Army to borrow qualified military manpower to

replace DA Civilian shortfalls. Some of these training support capabilities include the expanded use and increased maintenance of simulators (flight and ground vehicle, weapon, tactical), distributed learning facilities, and training aids, devices and simulations. For the Army Reserve, lack of funding will make it difficult to maintain Depot Maintenance initiatives; more than 40% of ARFORGEN-critical equipment, and disaster relief and Homeland Defense missions will be negatively impacted as equipment may not be repaired. Reductions in the Army Reserve Sustainment, Restoration and Modernization (SRM) resources may lead to subsystem failures, further impacting Army Reserve facility readiness in support of Soldier training.

Another negative effect will be degraded administrative support in the areas of resource management, quality assurance and course program management, potentially causing a disruption to student services. Incremental funding of Mission Command Training contracts will reduce workforce available to support units' preparations for future training exercises with furloughs further limiting civilian availability to offset reductions.

Sustaining Readiness.

Ready and Resilient. The Ready and Resilient Campaign is designed to guide the Army's efforts in building and maintaining resilience across the Total Army- Soldiers, Family Members and Army Civilians, improving unit readiness and further reinforcing the Army Profession. Commanders are ultimately responsible for Soldier resilience and unit readiness. Leaders at all levels must understand that high standards of professionalism and discipline represent readiness within their formations. The campaign reinforces leadership at the first line supervisor-level. Leaders are empowered and enabled to enforce standards of professionalism and discipline, and they are held accountable for maintaining and improving resilience and readiness within their formations. Incorporating resilience as a critical component in determining Soldier and unit readiness, emphasizing the importance of physical, psychological, and emotional factors in determining comprehensive fitness, and promoting a deliberate approach to building and sustaining resilience.

Retrograde. We have the policies, authorities, and processes in place to support the retrograde of equipment from Afghanistan and maintain operational flexibility. The operational campaign plan drives the pace of retrograde operations. Up to this point, the Army is successfully retrograding equipment from Afghanistan while concurrently conducting combat operations. Our goal remains to have all non-enduring equipment out of Afghanistan by the end of 2014. Supporting CENTCOM retrograde goals will cause us to take risks in other Army accounts. One cost driver is that multi-modal (air lift out of Afghanistan) is currently the primary means to retrograde equipment from Afghanistan because the Northern Distribution Network (NDN) and the Pakistan Ground Lines of Communication (PAKGLOC) modes continue to progressing slowly. Surface lines of communication (NDN/PAKGLOC) are critical to achieving the retrograde volume necessary to meet timelines and decrease costs. The Army plans to retrograde approximately \$20 billion worth of Army equipment to meet future requirements and improve Equipment on Hand Readiness across the Total Army.

Reset. Reset funding must continue as long as we have forces deployed and for three years after the last piece of equipment leaves Afghanistan to ensure readiness for future missions. A fully-funded Reset program ensures that battle damaged equipment is replaced and equipment worn-out by prolonged use in harsh environments is returned to a fully ready state commensurate with a unit's future mission. In the forecast for FY13, the Army expects to Reset (repair) approximately 100,000 items at its industrial facilities, and more than 600,000 pieces of equipment on site where units are stationed (including more than 400 aircraft). However, sequestration will cause us to defer some of these requirements to future fiscal years, immediately impacting equipment readiness. Equipment Reset is a vital means for maintaining Army equipment readiness in order to sustain a force that can meet our National Military Strategy. Since its inception, the Reset Program has improved the condition and readiness levels of Army ground and air systems. A consistently, fully-funded Reset program enabled the Army to maintain operational readiness of equipment at more than 90% and 75% for ground and aviation, respectively, in theater.

Modernization. As the Army prepares for another drawdown after more than 12 years of war, budget impacts and reduction in forces will negatively impact continued modernization of combat systems. The majority of our combat systems are legacy platforms tied to the fundamental design and technical constraints from the 1980s. While modernization actions have lengthened service life and added capabilities, the operational utilization rates, such as miles driven and hours flown, have continued to soar due to combat operations, well beyond the anticipated service life of the system. The length of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan significantly degraded equipment and the Army must continue to Reset and modernize vehicles, weapons systems and aircraft for future contingencies. For example, the Army Reserve has 86% of its needed equipment but only 65% has been modernized. The equipment readiness lessons learned from the Vietnam War, a time when the Army's vehicles, weapons systems and aircraft readiness levels were unsatisfactorily low, are informative to our current situation.

Army Organic Industrial Base. The current fiscal uncertainty could drastically impact our strategy and threaten our requirement for an Army Organic Industrial Base that is a modern, reliable, cost effective, and highly responsive to meet both wartime and peacetime requirements, while maintaining the ability to surge during rapidly developing contingency operations. During times of war, the Army requires the Organic Industrial Base to repair and manufacture equipment as quickly and efficiently as possible to ensure it is available to train and support next deployers, as well as those deployed over the past decade. The Army's Organic Industrial Base Depots and Arsenalns surged to double capacity, and in some cases, tripled their pre-war output. As the Army's Organic Industrial Base transitions from wartime production to peacetime requirements, we must ensure it remains effective, efficient, and capable of meeting current and future Army contingency requirements. A reasonable predictable funding program is critical to the health and readiness of our Organic Industrial Base

Closing.

The Total Army must always be capable of providing strategic landpower that can prevent conflict, shape the environment and win the Nation's wars. The security of our nation is the result of the committed, experienced, well-led professional force of men and women who come from every corner of the United States to serve and protect this great country. In their service to the nation, our Soldiers have never failed to meet any demand that the nation has asked and expected. Therefore, the nation and our Army must never accept the risk of unprepared, untrained leaders and Soldiers because that risk will be paid for in the lives of our men and women. Now more than ever, Soldiers who willingly sacrifice for this great Nation, tour after tour, need the steadfast and loyal support of the American people and Congress to sustain our readiness, prepare our force for current and future contingencies, Reset the force and ensure we continue to modernize and transform equipment, and most importantly, fulfill our commitment to Army Families. The Army understands the Nation's fiscal constraints and we assure you that we will be good stewards of the resources given to us to prepare trained and ready forces for the future. Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee: Thank you again for the opportunity to speak here today. It is an honor to serve our great nation.

Lieutenant General Jim Huggins



Lieutenant General James L. Huggins, Jr., was commissioned as a second lieutenant of Infantry through ROTC in 1980. His military education includes the Infantry Officer Basic and Advanced Courses, Combined Arms Staff Service School, United States Army Command and Staff College, Armed Forces Staff College, and the United States Army War College. He holds a Masters Degree from Central Michigan University.

Lieutenant General Huggins has commanded airborne infantry units at the company, battalion, brigade, and division levels. His service as a staff officer includes tours as an S3/G3 Operations officer at battalion, brigade, and division levels. Following brigade command in Operation Enduring Freedom, he served as the Chief of Staff, 82nd Airborne Division in Operation Iraqi Freedom, and Chief of Staff, XVIII Airborne Corps at Fort Bragg and the Multi-National Corps- Iraq, and Deputy Commanding General (Maneuver) 3rd Infantry Division during the Operation Iraqi Freedom surge. LTG Huggins then served as Director, Operations, Readiness and Mobilization, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7, Washington, DC. In August 2010 he assumed command of the 82nd Airborne Division and led CJTF 82 & Regional Command-South in Operation Enduring Freedom until September 2012. LTG Huggins has been afforded many unique professional experiences and opportunities to include tours with the 3rd and 25th Infantry Divisions, PACOM, 82nd Airborne Division, XVIII Airborne Corps, as well as two operational deployments and seven combat tours in OPERATIONS JUST CAUSE, DESERT SHIELD/STORM, ENDURING FREEDOM, and IRAQI FREEDOM tours. On 8 March 2013, LTG Huggins assumed duties as the HQDA G-3/5/7.



United States Army

Lieutenant General
RAYMOND V. MASON

Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff, G-4
United States Army
500 Army Pentagon 1E394
Washington, DC 20310-0500
Since: July 2011



SOURCE OF COMMISSIONED SERVICE ROTC

EDUCATIONAL DEGREES

James Madison University – BA – Commercial Marketing and Merchandising
Florida Institute of Technology – MS – Procurement/Contract Management
National Defense University – MS – National Resource Strategy

MILITARY SCHOOLS ATTENDED

Quartermaster Officer Basic and Advanced Courses
United States Army Command and General Staff College
Industrial College of the Armed Forces

FOREIGN LANGUAGE(S) None recorded

<u>PROMOTIONS</u>	<u>DATE OF APPOINTMENT</u>
2LT	16 Dec 78
1LT	16 Dec 80
CPT	1 Oct 82
MAJ	1 Oct 90
LTC	1 Mar 95
COL	1 Jun 00
BG	1 Jan 05
MG	16 May 08
LTG	1 Sep 11

FROM TO ASSIGNMENT

Jun 79	Sep 80	Supply Platoon Leader, later Executive Officer, Headquarters and A Company, 205th Transportation Battalion (AVIM), 3d Corps Support Command, V Corps, United States Army Europe and Seventh Army, Germany
Sep 80	Jun 81	Supply Platoon Leader, 699th Maintenance Company, 85th Maintenance Battalion, 3d Corps Support Command, V Corps, United States Army Europe and Seventh Army, Germany
Jul 81	Oct 82	Aide-de-Camp to the Commanding General, 3d Corps Support Command, V Corps, United States Army Europe and Seventh Army, Germany
Nov82	Jul 83	Student, Quartermaster Officer Advanced Course, United States Army Quartermaster School, Fort Lee, Virginia

Aug83 Jul 86 Assistant S-3 (Plans and Operations), Division Support Command, later Commander, E Company (Rigger), 407th Supply and Services Battalion, later Plans Officer, G-4 (Logistics), 82d Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, North Carolina and OPERATION URGENT FURY, Grenada

Aug86 Dec 86 Student, United States Army Logistics Management College, Fort Lee, Virginia

Dec 86 Jun 87 Student, Florida Institute of Technology, United States Army Logistics Management Center, Fort Lee, Virginia

Jun 87 Jun 89 Exchange Officer, Australian Army, with duty as Commander, Supply Services Company, 21st Supply Battalion (Australian Army), Canberra, Australia

Jul 89 Jun 90 Student, United States Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

Jun 90 Jun 91 Chief, Officer Branch, Office of the Quartermaster General, United States Army Quartermaster Center and School, Fort Lee, Virginia

Jun 91 May92 Aide-de-Camp to the Commanding General, United States Army Materiel Command, Alexandria, Virginia

Jun 92 Jun 93 Support Operations Officer, 702d Main Support Battalion, 2d Infantry Division, Eighth United States Army, Korea

Jul 93 Jun 95 Speechwriter, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, United States Army, Washington, DC

Jul 95 Jun 96 Executive Officer, Division Support Command, 82d Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, North Carolina

Jul 96 Jun 98 Commander, 407th Forward Support Battalion, 82d Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, North Carolina

Aug 98 Jun 99 Student, Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, DC

Jun 99 Jun 00 Special Assistant to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, United States Army, Washington, DC

Jun 00 Jul 02 Commander, Division Support Command, 25th Infantry Division (Light), Schofield Barracks, Hawaii

Jul 02 Sep 03 Deputy Director, J-4, The Joint Staff, Washington, DC

Sep 03 Sep 05 Commander, Defense Supply Center Philadelphia, Defense Logistics Agency, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

Oct 05 Oct 06 Deputy Commander, United States Army Field Support Command with duty as Commanding General, Army Materiel Command Forward-Southwest Asia/C-4, Coalition Forces Land Component Command, Kuwait

Oct 06 Oct 07 Commanding General, 19th Sustainment Command (Expeditionary), Eighth United States Army, Korea

Oct 07 Aug 09 Commanding General, 8th Theater Sustainment Command, Fort Shafter, Hawaii

Aug 09 Jul 11 Deputy Chief of Staff, G-4, United States Army Forces Command, Fort McPherson, Georgia

Jul 11 Present Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff, G-4, United States Army, Washington, DC

SUMMARY OF JOINT ASSIGNMENTS

	<u>DATE</u>	<u>GRADE</u>
Deputy Director, J-4, The Joint Staff, Washington, DC	Jul 02 - Sep 03	Colonel
Commander, Defense Supply Center Philadelphia, Defense Logistics Agency, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania	Sep 03 - Sep 05	Colonel/Brigadier General

SUMMARY OF OPERATIONS ASSIGNMENTS

	<u>DATE</u>	<u>GRADE</u>
Deputy Commander, United States Army Field Support Command with duty as Commanding General, Army Materiel Command Forward-Southwest Asia/C-4, Coalition Forces Land Component Command, Kuwait	Oct 05 - Oct 06	Brigadier General



MAJOR GENERAL LUIS VISOT

DEPUTY COMMANDING GENERAL - OPERATIONS

Major General Luis R. Visot assumed the responsibilities of Deputy Commanding General (Operations) June 9, 2012. As Deputy Commanding General (Operations), MG Visot provides oversight of the 16 Army Reserve Operational and Functional Commands.

MG Visot, born in Ponce, Puerto Rico, was commissioned as a 2LT in May 1978. He holds a Bachelor of Arts in Spanish from Marquette University in Milwaukee, WI and a Masters in Education from the University of Georgia in Athens, GA. MG Visot received a Masters in Strategic Studies from the United States Army War College. His military education includes: Infantry Airborne Basic Course, Quartermaster Officer Basic Course, NBC Defense Course, Transportation Officer Advanced Course, Command and General Staff College, the Associate Logistics Executive Development Course, the United States Army War College, the Advanced Joint Military Professional Education (AJPME), the Joint Flag Officer Warfighting Course, and CAPSTONE.

MG Visot has held a variety of command and staff positions. MG Visot assumed command of the 377th Theater Sustainment Command, New Orleans, LA, on May 16, 2009. Prior to this assignment, MG Visot served as the Commanding General, 4th Sustainment Command (Expeditionary), San Antonio, TX. MG Visot served as the Deputy Commander, 1st Theater Sustainment Command, Ft. Bragg, NC and deployed in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom (2007-2008). MG Visot has served as Commander, 3rd Transportation Command Element in Anniston, AL; Chief of Staff for the 143rd Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) in Orlando, FL; and Commander, 32nd Transportation Group (Composite) in Tampa, FL. As Commander, 32nd Transportation Group (Composite), MG Visot deployed his unit in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom to Kuwait and Iraq in 2003-2004. MG Visot's previous assignments include Commander, 6th Transportation Battalion (Truck) at Ft. Eustis, VA under the 7th Transportation Group (Composite), as part of the Battalion Command Exchange/Integration Program; Commander, 3-347th Regiment, 2nd Brigade, 87th Division (Training Support); and Commander, 146th Transportation Detachment (Air Terminal Movement Control Team) in Orlando, FL. As Commander, 146th Transportation Detachment (Air Terminal Movement Control Team), MG Visot deployed his unit in support of Operation Joint Endeavor to Taszar, Hungary and Tuzla, Bosnia-Herzegovina. During Desert Shield/Desert Storm (1990-1991), he served as the 32nd Transportation Group Liaison Officer to 22nd Support Command in the Logistical Operations Center and as a Logistical Planning and Analysis Cell Analyst, 22nd Support Command, in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia.

MG Visot's awards/decorations include: Army Distinguished Service Medal, Legion of Merit, Bronze Star Medal with oak leaf cluster, Defense Meritorious Service Medal, Meritorious Service medal with silver and bronze oak leaf clusters, Army Commendation Medal with two oak leaf clusters, Army Achievement Medal with two oak leaf clusters, Army Reserve Components Achievement Medal with silver oak leaf cluster, National Defense Service Medal, Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal with one oak leaf cluster, Southwest Asia Service Medal with three Bronze Service Stars, Global War on Terrorism Expeditionary Medal, Global War on Terrorism Service Medal, Armed Forces Service Medal, Armed Forces Reserve Service Medal with Bronze Hourglass, "M" and "3" devices, Army Service Ribbon, Army Overseas Service Ribbon, Army Reserve Components Overseas Training Ribbon with "4" devices, NATO Medal, Kuwait Liberation Medal (Kingdom of Saudi Arabia), Kuwait Liberation Medal (Government of Kuwait), Meritorious Unit Citation, and Parachutist Badge.

MG Visot is married to Dr. Cindy S. Visot, who is the Chief of Staff and the Director of Board of Trustees Operations at the University of South Florida.

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STATEMENT BY

**BRIGADIER GENERAL WALTER E. FOUNTAIN
ACTING DEPUTY DIRECTOR, ARMY NATIONAL GUARD**

BEFORE THE

**HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS**

FIRST SESSION, 113TH CONGRESS

ON

ARMY READINESS

APRIL 16, 2013

NOT FOR PUBLIC DISSEMINATION
UNTIL RELEASED BY
THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

Opening Remarks

Chairman Wittman, Ranking Member Bordallo, members of the subcommittee; I am honored to appear before you today, representing the over 355,000 Soldiers in the Army National Guard, including 23,000 members currently mobilized at multiple locations around the world defending our national interests. For 376 years Citizen Soldiers have been central to how the nation defends itself at home and abroad. Through resolve and readiness, Army National Guard Soldiers deliver essential value to our nation and its communities.

The Army National Guard of 2013 is the best-manned, best-trained, best-equipped, best-led and most experienced force in its long history. This is a direct result of the resourcing and legal authorities that Congress has dedicated to this purpose over the past decade-plus of conflict. The Army Guard has used those resources wisely, and is today an operational force that provides capabilities and strategic depth to meet U.S. defense and homeland security requirements. On the domestic front, in fiscal year 2012 Army Guard members served over 447,000 duty days under the control of the states responding to domestic emergencies – and that was, historically, a slow year. This current fiscal year (FY), which began with Hurricane Sandy, will likely post far higher numbers.

The bedrock of an operational force – a force that is actively engaged and is postured for employment at home and abroad whenever

called – is ready Soldiers. In order to ensure that Army National Guard Soldiers are ready, they must have effective training, modern equipment and capable facilities. They must also be physically ready for service, and be present in sufficient numbers to support the wide range of missions the Army National Guard is called to perform. Without these key elements, the nation’s substantial investment in an operational Army National Guard, built at great expense in blood, sweat and treasure over a decade of conflict, will surely atrophy.

Personnel Readiness

One persistent false impression is that the Army National Guard is a “tired force” whose Soldiers, families and employers are worn out from the strain of more than a decade of conflict. No doubt, there has been strain. However, the Guard’s Soldiers continue to show a strong appetite for service, and the Guard’s appeal as a winning team that embodies selfless service to both nation and community continues to draw America’s youth to its ranks. The Army National Guard recruitment rate is 102 percent of goal, while the retention rate stands at over 94 percent of goal (as of March 31, 2013). Every member of the Army Guard has made a conscious decision to join or continue to serve since September 11, 2001. This is a key point, as today’s Guard differs from that of the pre-9/11 period in that today’s Soldiers anticipate being deployed home and abroad in service to their country.

Indeed, nearly 50 percent of the Soldiers in the Army Guard today are veterans of a deployment, many having served multiple tours. Retaining this core of experience is critical to maintaining an operational force, and this year and the next present a particular challenge as the large cohort of Soldiers that grew the Army National Guard in 2007-8 becomes eligible for re-enlistment. While bonuses and incentives play an important role in deciding to stay in the Guard, the desire for relevant training and utilization at home and abroad drew many of these men and women to enlist in the first place, and will play a role in their decisions to stay. A key component of the operational Army National Guard is that it is a force that sees regular use, through a progressive readiness model – such as Army Force Generation – that prepares Soldiers and units for deployment every five years. This gives Soldiers, their families and civilian employers the predictability they need to plan their civilian lives and careers, while developing critical military skills exercised through tough, realistic training and operational employment.

The Army National Guard provides a balanced range of essential capabilities through our current end strength of 358,200. We are planning on reducing our end strength to 354,200 by the end of FY 2014. This end strength supports a force structure which consists of 40 percent combat maneuver forces, 24 percent support forces, 25 percent sustainment forces, and 11 percent generating forces. At the current level of manning, this balanced force provides an optimal set of dual-use

capabilities for supporting overseas contingency operations as well as concurrent state/territory requirements for Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA).

It is these comprehensive and complementary capabilities – of combat maneuver, support, sustainment and generating forces that keep the Army National Guard as a viable operational force.

Individual Soldier medical readiness is critical to build and maintain a ready and relevant operational force. The Guard has made great strides in leveraging leadership, best practices, and innovation to build efficiencies in how we use our funding and to improve the accuracy in how we account for each Soldier in order to increase medical readiness and manage the non-deployable force. Only 41 percent of Army National Guard Soldiers were considered fully medically ready in 2007; today 79 percent of the Guard is fully medically ready. That is the highest return on your investment and percentage of individual medical readiness ever recorded by the Army National Guard. Your continued support is essential, as we strive to attain 85 percent or greater medical readiness by December 2014.

Medical readiness extends beyond the physical well-being of Soldiers – leadership at all levels must ensure that Soldiers under their charge receive the mental healthcare screening and treatment that they need. The Army National Guard takes seriously its responsibility to ensure that Soldiers are given every resource and opportunity to address

mental health issues before they manifest into the tragic outcome of a suicide or other high-risk behavior. Resources have been dedicated to ensuring that each state and territory has a suicide prevention program manager, who provides training and oversight on suicide prevention matters for Army National Guard units within their states. In addition, the Vets4Warriors program has been expanded to ensure that all military personnel have nationwide 24/7 access to comprehensive non-clinical peer counseling and support services. The Army National Guard also works with DoD's Defense Suicide Prevention Office to promote awareness of the Military Crisis Line, a service that provides 24/7, confidential crisis support to those in the military and their families. The professionals at the Military Crisis Line are specially trained and experienced in helping Service members and their families of all ages and circumstances—from those coping with mental health issues that were never addressed to those who are struggling with relationships. They provide immediate access to care for those who may be at risk of suicide, along with additional follow-up and connection with Service members and Veterans to mental health services.

Additionally, the Army National Guard members have access to the expanding Partners in Care program. The program, originally started by the Maryland National Guard, leverages faith-based organizations to provide counseling, education and mentoring, transportation, and many other services to members of the National Guard and their families. It is

based on the belief that local faith communities can bring hope, offer support and continuity of spiritual care, and increase the resilience of rural and other dispersed military populations.

The Army National Guard has also established Master Resilience Training Centers at Fort McCoy, Wisconsin and Ft. Custer, Michigan, training over 2,800 Master Resilience Trainers and over 7,400 Resilience Trainer Assistants, who themselves will provide resilience training at the company and platoon level.

The Army National Guard has uniformed behavioral health officers and specialists that drill on the weekends, attend annual training and deploy to support Soldiers throughout the ARFORGEN cycle. They can provide military-mandated behavioral health screening in support of personnel and medical readiness. Because the Guard does not have full-time behavioral health providers, the Army National Guard has resourced 55 contract Directors of Psychological Health to provide behavioral health assessments, referrals, and track Army National Guard Soldiers as they receive care.

Suicide prevention, regardless of component, is a challenge for leadership. However, due to geographical dispersion and in-person contact between Soldiers and leaders being generally limited to drill weekends and exercises, it is a greater challenge for Army National Guard forces. When Army National Guard Soldiers are not drilling or otherwise on duty, suicide prevention support and services are limited.

Even when Soldiers are participating in inactive duty training, medical providers are only allowed to provide care in order to save life, limb or eyesight. These factors make identifying and treating potential precursors to suicide exceptionally difficult.

Another challenge facing today's military is sexual assault within the ranks. In calendar year 2012, the Army National Guard had 182 reported sexual assault cases – an increase of 39 reported sexual assault cases from the 2011 total. While the exact cause of the increase is unknown, we believe that enhanced education, a better understanding of the reporting process by Army National Guard Soldiers, and the strict confidentiality of the reporting have led to an increase in reporting. It is important to note, however, that according to Department of Defense data, the majority of sexual assaults continue to go unreported in all branches of the armed services.

There is no question that much more must be done to prevent sexual assaults and provide assistance to victims. For this reason, the Army National Guard increased awareness amongst senior leaders in every State and supported Sexual Harassment/Assault Response and Prevention (SHARP) training initiatives. The Army National Guard implemented the SHARP program in all 54 States, Territories, and the District of Columbia. Since 2011, more than 1,500 Army National Guard Soldiers have been trained in the 80-hour SHARP course. Currently, the Army National Guard has 88 of the targeted 108 full time SHARP/Sexual

Assault Response Coordinators and victim advocates at each State Joint Force Headquarters, with the remaining 20 personnel slated to be in place September 30, 2013. In addition, a National Guard Bureau (NGB)-level investigation team comprised of Army Criminal Investigation Division-trained Judge Advocates was established to provide impartial, third party investigative support at the request of State Adjutants General. The NGB investigation team provides investigative capability and reports back to the State leadership, augmenting state-level investigative capabilities.

Underlying the readiness of Army National Guard Soldiers, facilities and equipment is the cadre of full time manning personnel. From training Soldiers, to maintaining equipment, to administering programs and everything in between – the Soldiers and civilians of the Army National Guard full time manning workforce ensures that the Army National Guard continues to meet Army and Department of Defense standards for readiness. With full time manning levels currently at 72% of the 1999 Army-validated requirements, and with temporary full time manning levels drawing down as their war-related funding is decreased, it is more critical than ever to ensure that the level of full time manning remain where it is today. Any further reductions in full time manning will not only ensure that the already-stretched force is taxed even further, but there is a distinct likelihood that critical activities for normal unit operations and continued readiness will be negatively impacted.

Training Readiness

Realistic, regular individual and collective unit training is critical to ensure that Guard Soldiers are ready to serve in the full spectrum of operations, both globally and domestically. Over the last decade, Congress has provided substantial resources for enhanced Army National Guard training, including the use of realistic (and cost-effective) battlefield training simulators, rotations through live individual and collective, unit-based training, and providing Army National Guard units with rotations through large-scale training exercises.

However, despite gains in training quality and availability, due to a combination of sequestration and the Continuing Resolution Act (CRA), units have been significantly challenged to provide adequate funding to support all individual training required to achieve required readiness levels. Low resource availability has caused the Army National Guard to reduce the number of Soldiers that can be sent to schools this fiscal year by over 17 percent. Further, state Regional Training Institutes (RTIs) may be forced to reduce training seat capacity by nearly 7,000 throughout the remainder of FY13.

In addition to the impact on Army National Guard individual Soldier training, budget shortfalls due to sequestration have eroded Army National Guard collective training. For instance, sequestration has caused the cancellation of the 56th Stryker Brigade's Warfighter staff

training exercise in March and the 72nd Infantry Brigade's Warfighter staff training exercise in May 2013. The 40th Infantry Division Warfighter staff training exercise may be cancelled due to lack of resources to execute the event. The 33rd IBCT's Joint Readiness Training Center rotation in June 2013 and the 48th IBCT's National Training Center rotation in September 2013 have been cancelled due to current fiscal constraints. The Army National Guard's Exportable Combat Training Capability (XCTC) is the primary venue for enabling Army National Guard units to meet Platoon level maneuver and live fire training requirements at home station in accordance with the Army Training Strategy; three brigade-level XCTC rotations are currently at risk due to lack of ammunition. While units will still receive a portion of their required training, resource reductions will prevent them from receiving all the training they require in order to meet the training and readiness requirements.

Just as reductions in training resources have negatively impacted readiness, so too has the reduction in the overseas operational use of the Army National Guard. In order to maintain levels of readiness that the nation expects and has invested in over the past decade-plus, Army National Guard Soldiers and units must see regular, predictable use. Now that the war in Iraq is over, and the war in Afghanistan is drawing to a close, there are fewer opportunities for Army National Guard Soldiers to participate in the kinds of missions and exercises that have

enabled their current levels of readiness. And, due to sequestration, the Army has been forced to cancel deployments of Army National Guard units for missions they have traditionally performed.

If the Army National Guard is to maintain the nation's substantial investment in its readiness and continue to be a cost-effective option for national defense, it must be used in a regular, predictable way. A force that is poorly trained and seldom used will be unable to respond with the efficacy the nation expects when called upon for the next war, contingency or disaster. Through the authority granted by Congress in the recent revision of 10 USC 12304(b), the nation's military leaders have full flexibility to use Army National Guard Soldiers for regular, foreseeable mission requirements. Without high-quality training and regular use, today's operational Army National Guard may return to a strategic reserve, unable to effectively support the Army's Total Force policy.

Equipment Readiness

The Army National Guard has received significant investment in its equipment over the last few years, increasing Equipment on Hand (EOH), Critical Dual-Use (CDU) equipment, and the overall modernization levels of equipment.

The Army's goal is to ensure that Army National Guard units are equipped properly with Critical Dual Use (CDU) capabilities to execute

missions both at home and abroad. The Army's goal is to equip the Army National Guard with at least 80 percent of the CDU requirement.

Overall CDU EOH is at 90 percent of goal, an increase from 86 percent two years ago and a significant increase from 65 percent at the time of the Hurricane Katrina response in 2005. Army National Guard EOH for Modified Table of Organization (MTOE) units is currently at 88 percent of goal (an increase from 85 percent two years ago). Of the 88 percent EOH for MTOE units, 83 percent is currently at home station (not mobilized) and considered available for domestic operations. Of the total quantity of EOH, 70 percent is considered modernized, while 18 percent of the on-hand equipment is not modern.

While modernization levels overall are good, and within one percent of active component levels, there are still areas of concern. The Army Guard's UH-60 Blackhawk fleet is the oldest in the Army, and current modernization plans have the Army National Guard falling further behind. Sixty-five percent of the active Army UH-60 fleet will be digital by 2020, at which time the Army National Guard UH-60 fleet will be less than 23 percent digitized. By 2025, the active Army will be completely digitized, while the Army National Guard will not be fully digitized until 2036. This ever-widening gap may eventually render a preponderance of Army National Guard UH-60s non-deployable for overseas contingency operations because of theater-specific restrictions.

The procurement and fielding of the UH-60M has already been delayed. Subsequent delays will result in Army National Guard lagging further behind the active component in modernizing the UH-60 fleet. And, due to sequestration, induction of UH60As into the UH-60A to L remanufacture line will stop in April 2013, further eroding UH-60 readiness.

Equipment reset, including field and depot level maintenance, also has a significant impact on overall equipment readiness. Currently, the Army is developing strategies and plans for the way forward as it copes with cuts in maintenance due to sequestration. As it currently stands, approximately 1,000 pieces of Army Guard equipment from eight brigades and 450 individual units will not enter Automatic Reset Induction during FY13. The brigades impacted hail from Minnesota, Oklahoma, Ohio, Hawaii, New York, Missouri, and two from Texas. The Army's reset priorities are driven by the readiness requirements of units that are next to deploy, the global response force, and forward-deployed units. As fewer Army National Guard units deploy, especially given the sequestration-driven decision to cancel Army National Guard deployments, the equipment reset backlog will certainly increase over time.

Simply stated – equipment procurement, reset and modernization equals readiness. Troops without adequate equipment are unable to deploy. Plus, equipment that is not able to be maintained once in use

puts Soldiers and those they are serving in danger. The public depends on modern, safe Army National Guard equipment to effect rescues and save property during disasters here at home, and Soldiers on the battlefield depend on the same equipment to ensure their missions are accomplished and they return home safely. Today, the Army National Guard has the appropriate mix of CDU EOH to support domestic operations, including disaster response and recovery. Continuing to maintain investments in equipment modernization, maintenance and procurement will be critical to ensuring the Army National Guard is ready to respond to any mission or requirement.

Facilities Readiness

The Army National Guard has facilities in more than 2,600 communities nationwide. In many towns and cities these facilities are the only military presence, with the Guard serving as the most visible link between hometown America and the nation's armed forces. Facilities are critical to readiness and support unit administration, training, equipment maintenance, and storage. They serve as platforms for mobilization during times of war as well as command centers and shelters during domestic emergencies.

While the Army National Guard transformed from a strategic reserve to an operational force during more than a decade of deployments, many facilities have not been updated in several

generations. Currently, more than 46 percent of Army Guard readiness centers are over 50 years old. Many fail to meet the needs of a 21st century operational force, cannot accommodate modern equipment and technology, are poorly situated, and are energy inefficient. In some facilities, modern equipment cannot fit into old storage and maintenance bays.

At current levels of funding, it will take 154 years for all Army National Guard facilities to meet the majority of the wartime/primary missions of the units assigned to those facilities.

Investment in Army National Guard facilities is truly an investment in local communities as well as in the Army National Guard. The majority of Army National Guard military construction is completed with local materials and local construction companies. Military construction funds flow directly into the communities in which the facilities are built, and many facilities serve as civilian facilities when not in active use by the Army National Guard.

Closing Remarks

Resources remain the principal reason why the Army National Guard is now a ready, operational force and will determine whether it stays that way. Resources have allowed the Army Guard to reach its authorized end strength levels and retain valued experience in the ranks. Resources have permitted the Guard to achieve individual and unit proficiency with advanced training devices and simulations, attend Army

schools, and participate in live and constructive exercises at the Army's premier training centers. They have allowed the Guard to surge personnel on active duty in order to better prepare units for scheduled deployments. They have equipped the Guard to a higher level of modernized equipment on hand than at any time in its history.

As the military enters a period of constrained resources and the Services conduct their analysis of the proper mix of active and reserve forces needed to accomplish national strategic goals, the Army National Guard as an operational force stands as a cost-effective and efficient solution to a wide variety of mission sets, and should continue to play an integral role in the fabric of our nation's defense.

Biography



National Guard Bureau

General Officer Management Office, Arlington, VA

BRIGADIER GENERAL WALTER E. FOUNTAIN



Support Special Assistant to Director, Army National Guard

Brigadier General Walter E. Fountain is Support Special Assistant to the Director, Army National Guard. As the Support Special Assistant, he is a liaison between the Director and Headquarters, Department of the Army leaders as well as National Guard Bureau Joint leadership. General Fountain represents the Director at a number of forums including State level, the National Guard Bureau Joint Staff, Office of the Secretary of Defense, public meetings, presentations and conferences. He provides policy recommendations to the Director on high priority programs such as Recruiting and Retention, Personnel, Logistics, Sustainment Restoration and Modernization (SRM), Military Construction, Information Technology Policies, Programs and Plans, Military Construction, Suicide Prevention, Morale, Welfare

and Recreation and Equipping of the National Guard's 350,000 Citizen-Soldiers serving in 54 states and territories.

General Fountain was commissioned in 1981 through the Federal Officer Candidate School. In previous assignments, he has served as the Director, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, Joint Force Headquarters, Oklahoma National Guard; Chief, National Guard Affairs in Iraq; Commander, 90th Troop Command, Oklahoma Army National Guard; and Assistant Adjutant General - Army, Joint Force Headquarters, Oklahoma National Guard. General Fountain has commanded at the company, battalion and brigade level.

EDUCATION:

1996 T. A. Edison State College, Bachelor of Science, Applied Sciences, Trenton, New

Jersey

1998 Oklahoma State University, Master of Science, Natural and Applied Science, Stillwater, Oklahoma

2002 United States Army War College, by correspondence

2002 United States Army War College, Master of Strategic Studies, by correspondence

2003 Joint Air Command and Control Course, Eglin Air Force Base, Florida

2006 Joint Forces Staff College, Joint and Combined Warfighting School, National Defense University, Norfolk, Virginia

2011 Joint Task Force Commanders Course, Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado

2012 Level IV Antiterrorism Executive Seminar, Arlington, Virginia

2012 General Officer/Senior Executive Service Force Integration Course, Fort Belvoir, Virginia

2012 Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, National Security Management Course, Syracuse University, Syracuse, New York

2013 George C. Marshall Center Senior Executive Seminar, Central Asia After ISAF

Transition: Regional Challenges and Cooperative Responses, Garmisch, Germany

ASSIGNMENTS:

1. December 1981 - November 1982, Platoon Leader, Detachment 1, Company A, 1st Battalion 179th Infantry, Fairfax, Oklahoma
2. November 1982 - July 1983, Student, Rotary Wing Aviation Course, Fort Rucker, Alabama
3. July 1983 - March 1986, Pilot, Detachment 2, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 45th Infantry Brigade, Lexington, Oklahoma
4. April 1986 - September 1987, Section Commander, Detachment 1, Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 45th Infantry Brigade, Lexington, Oklahoma
5. September 1987 - February 1989, S-1, Troop Command (Aviation), Lexington, Oklahoma
6. February 1989 - September 1991, Platoon Leader, Company B, 1st Battalion 245th Aviation, Lexington, Oklahoma
7. October 1991 - September 1994, Commander, Company C, 1st Battalion 245th Aviation, Lexington, Oklahoma
8. September 1994 - August 1996, Airfield Commander, Headquarters, State Area Command, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma
9. September 1996 - August 1997, Commander, Army Aviation Support Facility, Headquarters, State Area Command, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma
10. September 1997 - August 2001, S-3 (Air), Headquarters, State Area Command, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma
11. September 2001 - August 2003, Commander, 1st Battalion, 245th Aviation, Tulsa, Oklahoma
12. September 2003 - June 2005, Commander, 90th Troop Command, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma
13. July 2005 - November 2008, Director, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, Joint Force Headquarters, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma
14. November 2008 - June 2009, Chief, National Guard Affairs, Multi-National Corps - Baghdad, Iraq
15. June 2009 - November 2011, Director, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, Joint Force Headquarters, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma
16. November 2011 - July 2012, Assistant Adjutant General - Army, Joint Force Headquarters, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma
17. July 2012 - Present, Special Assistant to Director, Army National Guard, National Guard

Bureau, Arlington, Virginia

AWARDS AND DECORATIONS:

Bronze Star Medal
Meritorious Service Medal (with 2 Bronze Oak Leaf Clusters)
Army Commendation Medal
Army Achievement Medal
Army Reserve Component Achievement Medal (with 1 Silver and 2 Bronze Oak Leaf Clusters)
National Defense Service Medal (with Bronze Service Star)
Iraq Campaign Medal (with Bronze Service Star)
Global War on Terrorism Service Medal
Humanitarian Service Medal
Armed Forces Reserve Medal (with Silver Hourglass Device and 'M' Device)
Joint Meritorious Unit Award
Army Service Ribbon
Army Reserve Component Overseas Training Ribbon (with Bronze Numeral 2)

EFFECTIVE DATES OF PROMOTION:

Second Lieutenant 3 December 1981
First Lieutenant 2 December 1984
Captain 2 April 1987
Major 4 December 1991
Lieutenant Colonel 10 October 1996
Colonel 11 September 2003
Brigadier General 8 November 2011

(Current as of February 2013)

The date of publication indicated on this biography reflects the most recent update. It does not necessarily reflect the date of printing.

**WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING**

APRIL 16, 2013

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. ROGERS

General MASON. No. The current budget uncertainty caused us to shift our efforts from lower priority to higher priority programs, and like all depots and arsenals, Anniston had some program cancellations or deferrals to FY14.

Workload is not evenly distributed across the depot's shops and some workload will be delayed while awaiting parts and materials. Production gaps for some equipment lines began in the April/May timeframe. Many of the remaining lines will operate at substantially reduced quantities, but will remain open and continue to repair assets.

As of 10 April, Anniston has released 449 personnel. Anniston has utilized the Voluntary Early Retirement Authority/Voluntary Separation Incentive Pay (VERANSIP) to minimize non-voluntary permanent employee separations. [See page 15.]

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. SCOTT

General MASON. The Army over the past several years has aggressively moved to reduce costs and shrink its facility footprint in Europe. For example, in 2006 there were 54,000 Soldiers stationed in Europe. The Army projects this number to be 30,000 by 2016. This will represent a 45% reduction in end strength since 2006. Our total facility square footage in Europe is declining from 143 million gross square feet (GSF) to 68 million GSF by 2017. This decline amounts to an infrastructure reduction of 54% which corresponds closely with the reduced end strength and force structure. The Army projects these reductions in end strength and infrastructure to be accompanied by an approximately 57% reduction in the annual operating budget, which will drop from \$2.37 billion in 2006 to \$1 billion by 2017. [See page 19.]

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. ENYART

General MASON. The Army's FY14 Military Construction base budget request is \$1.615 billion, of which \$1.12 billion is for Active Army, \$321 million is for Army National Guard, and \$174 million is for Army Reserve. [See page 19.]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

APRIL 16, 2013

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WITTMAN

Mr. WITTMAN. How will utilization of regionally aligned forces (RAF)s support the new strategic guidance? How will they be funded? Is the RAF construct viable under sequestration? What is the Guard and Reserve's role?

General HUGGINS. The 2010 U.S. National Security Strategy calls for strong security partnerships with allies and partners. In response, the 2012 Department of Defense Strategic Guidance directed the U.S. military services to strengthen allied and partner relationships, and to pursue new partnerships. Knowing that these partnerships are fundamental to regional and global security, and to ensure better and faster Army responsiveness to Combatant Command security cooperation and operational requirements, the Chief of Staff of the Army directed the Army to improve its ability to be globally responsive and regionally engaged. The goal of regional alignment is to provide Combatant Commands (CCMDs) with reliable and responsive capability to meet requirements across the full range of military operations, to include operational missions in response to crisis or contingency, operations support, theater security cooperation activities, and bilateral and multilateral military exercises.

—“Resource requirements for the successful implementation of RAF will be managed within existing Army resource levels” (HQDA EXORD dated 21 December 2012). In other words, the cost to implement the RAF concept will be a zero sum gain with offsets required to cover major structural changes (APS, OCO to Base, Army Language and Culture Enterprise etc).

—In contrast, the demand costs associated with implementing the National Strategy are the responsibility of the CCMDs. Regional Alignment of Forces does not create new, unfunded requirements but, rather, offers an efficient, focused, Army resource to fulfill existing, funded requirements. Rather than creating demand, RAF better focuses Army capabilities against existing demand. It is a better sourcing solution for forces, not the funding.

—While RAF implementation is viable under sequestration, the ability for the concept to reach full potential in supporting CCMD requirements will be significantly delayed across additional budget years. This is mainly due to decreased funding for CCMD programs, exercises, DoS Title 22 programs, as well as the well-documented problems with decisive action training for units in FY13.

—RAF are drawn from the Army Total Force (Active Army, Army National Guard and Army Reserves). Many elements of the Reserve Component are already regionally aligned (civil affairs) and the Army National Guard State Partnership Program is seen as both complementary and supporting the Regional Alignment of Forces concept.

Mr. WITTMAN. To the extent that you can in this setting, can you explain the impact of current anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities on the Army's ability to execute its mission? How is the Army mitigating/compensating for A2/AD in the region?

General HUGGINS. The proliferation of current A2/AD capabilities around the globe results in greater importance and need for Army engagement and shaping activities with partners and allies to build new and strengthen current relationships to assure access necessary to conduct potential operations.

The Army has developed the Regionally Aligned Force concept, which focuses capabilities across the Active Component, Army National Guard, and Army Reserve to support combatant commanders. Regionally aligned forces will improve partnering capabilities: Daily steady-state activities with partner armies are potentially the Army's most significant and durable contribution to mitigating A2/AD challenges. They maintain the foundations for basing and operational access necessary to prevail should a conflict occur. The National Guard State Partnership Program continues to be one of the Army's most valuable investments in ensuring operational access throughout the world.

The Army will habitually align corps and division headquarters, where practical, to geographic combatant commands for planning and mission preparation in accordance with the combatant commander's priorities. These units will also complement

existing capabilities at the theater army level for providing Joint Force Capable Headquarters to those combatant commands.

The Army provides invaluable contributions to overcoming A2/AD capabilities, from the Patriot and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense systems, providing much of the Joint Force's administrative and logistics backbone, as well as combat and support contributions for the Global Response Force.

The Army is continuing to refocus its training institutions back towards developing the skills necessary for successful combined arms maneuver in an A2/AD environment, while retaining the base of knowledge gained in stability operations. In support of U.S. Pacific Command the Army maintains a forward presence with eight Active Component Brigade Combat Teams, twelve batteries of Patriots, and theater enabling units. The combination of regionally aligned forces and those trained in combined arms maneuver deter regional threats while reassuring allies, before a conflict even starts. The foundations laid in regional engagement are essential in enabling the Joint Force to prevail against A2/AD challenges should the need arise.

Mr. WITTMAN. To what level are you able to repair your equipment now? Can you achieve the maintenance standards required in technical manual 10-20, or are you having to settle for less? If less, what is the impact of not achieving 10-20?

General HUGGINS, General MASON, and General VISOT. The Army currently maintains ground equipment for units preparing to deploy or forward deployed at Technical Manual (TM) 10/20 standards. The Army maintains aviation equipment at Fully Mission Capable (FMC). Due to the effects of budget uncertainty and sequestration, for all other ground equipment (including missile systems, communications and electronic systems and watercraft) the TM 10/20 maintenance standard is waived and the equipment is maintained at a Fully Mission Capable Plus Safety standard.

As a result of maintaining ground equipment at FMC Plus Safety, the Army will defer approximately \$392M in Operations & Maintenance, Army funds from FY13 to FY 14. Deferred maintenance will impact future Army readiness if not addressed in subsequent years. Capacity constraint limits Army's ability to address deferred maintenance in a single year and could require 2-3 years to restore selective ground equipment to TM 10/20 standards.

Mr. WITTMAN. Does sequestration call into question our ability to maintain an Operational Reserve? What would be the impacts of reverting to a Strategic Reserve?

General VISOT. Yes, sequestration, by reducing programmed funding in the President's Budget, adversely affects personnel, training and maintenance of our equipment and thereby impedes readiness of our Soldiers and units. As a consequence, sequestration does indeed hinder our ability to maintain an Operational Reserve. Reversion to a Strategic Reserve would clearly increase the risk of our not being able to promptly deploy ready Army Reserve Soldiers in support of various contingencies that we might otherwise be more than able to do.

The sequester has had the biggest impact on the Army Reserve due to the 2d and 3rd order effects of cancelled training for Active Component (AC) units into which Reserve Component units were integrated. Key cancelled AC training includes:

- 6 x Combat Training Center Rotations affecting 1537 Soldiers.
- 2 x Major Functional Exercises affecting 2058 Soldiers.
- Reduced 2013 ODT requirements affecting 429 Soldiers.

It is crucial that the Army Reserve continue to be resourced as an Operational Reserve in order to continue to provide critical life-saving and life-sustaining capability to all Services and all components.

Mr. WITTMAN. Does sequestration call into question our ability to maintain an Operational Reserve? What would be the impacts of reverting to a Strategic Reserve?

General FOUNTAIN. Yes. Sequestration is an important factor in determining whether the Army National Guard (ARNG) remains an operational force. Ongoing loss of readiness due to sequestration may have far-reaching implications for overseas missions as well as no-notice emergencies here at home.

In its first few weeks, sequestration has led the Army to off-ramp the mobilization of ARNG units in the remainder of FY 13 in order to use base program funds to resource Unfunded Requirements and avoid the expense of mobilizing these troops. Subsequently, the Army has announced its intentions to off-ramp ARNG units scheduled for mobilization in FY14. An unintended consequence of off-ramping is the hardships it creates for Citizen Soldiers and their families who have already made major life decisions in preparation for the deployment.

Regular, predictable employment is critical to leader development and maintaining the operational force. Loss of deployment and training opportunities deprives ARNG units and Soldiers of valuable operational experience, which directly impacts future ability to conduct both overseas and domestic missions. It is the readiness to conduct wartime missions that enables the ARNG to execute domestic operations with skill and efficiency. Of course, the ARNG will always respond domestically, but the response may be slowed due to lower levels of readiness in equipment, personnel and training.

As a result of sequestration, the Army has cancelled rotations at its Combat Training Centers for all but deploying units, leading to the cancellation of rotations for several ARNG Brigade Combat Teams and enabling units. CTC rotations occur less frequently for the Guard than for Active Component forces; if missed, Guard leaders may not have another opportunity to gain this training for several years, if ever. In terms of equipping, another key measure of readiness, the Army National Guard's Equipment On Hand (EOH) and modernization rates are expected to decline as sequestration causes the Army to procure less new equipment in coming years. Sequestration has also led to the postponement of Field and Depot level reset of equipment, both, limiting the availability of thousands of items of equipment in the present, and creating a maintenance backlog which will take time and money to address in the future.

The Army's funding of Contract Logistical Support (CLS) has been affected by the sequestration with flying hours for UH-72 helicopters reduced by 30%. The FY 13 programmed funding plan will also curtail new UH-72 fielding and may administratively ground the aircraft due to total loss of contract logistical support this summer. The UH-72 is critical in providing support to Southwest Border and counterdrug operations, flight training courses, medical evacuation and other civil support requirements.

Sequestration is expected to have an impact on the roughly 45% of the ARNG full-time force who are dual-status Military Technicians. While technically civilian employees, the 27,100 dual-status military technicians in the Army Guard are required to be members of the units in which they serve and wear their military uniform to work every day. They perform the vast majority of maintenance on Guard ground and aviation equipment, and perform myriad other tasks that make the 83% of the Guard which serves part-time a capable and ready force. The expected 11-day furlough of Technicians will be another drag on readiness, particularly the readiness of Guard vehicles for short-notice or no-notice domestic response missions.

OPTEMPO funding is another area that will be impacted significantly. As a result, units will have fewer tank miles and flying hours, less money for repair parts, and less time to train to the required level of proficiency. This will lead to an increase in the amount of post-mobilization training required in order to prepare units for operational employment.

The Congress' decade-long investment in the Army National Guard has been substantive and sustained. It can be measured in billions of dollars that have raised equipment on hand levels to historic highs, recruited quality Soldiers, and provided them with superb training. The payoff can be seen in more than 518,000 separate Soldier deployments of Citizen Soldiers, the overwhelming majority in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom. When deployed, numerous experts attest that Guard Soldiers perform on a par with their Active Component counterparts. When not deployed, the Nation retains this superb capability at about a third of the cost of a full-time Soldier. In fact, when factoring in the relative costs of retirement and the lower usage of housing and medical benefits, Guard Soldiers cost less than the Active Component even when deployed. Given this relative value, it would be a terrible waste of resources to allow the Army National Guard, a superb operational force, to revert to its previous status as a Strategic Reserve. It takes only a continued modest investment to maintain an operational force when compared to the Strategic Reserve the Nation had prior to 9/11.

Mr. WITTMAN. To what level are you able to repair your equipment now? Can you achieve the maintenance standards required in technical manual 10-20, or are you having to settle for less? If less, what is the impact of not achieving 10-20?

General FOUNTAIN. The Army National Guard (ARNG) objective is to maintain all equipment at a 10/20 level of readiness. The ARNG is currently maintaining overall fleet readiness rates at levels which are comparable to the last five years.

Due to budget constraints, the Army has authorized commands and organizations to begin maintaining ground systems, including missile systems (less Patriot missile systems), communications and electronic systems and watercraft at "Fully Mission Capable Plus Safety" level.

The ARNG has not adopted this mitigation measure at this time, but may consider such mitigations as the impact of constrained budgets becomes clearer.

It is also important to consider the implications of not achieving 10/20 maintenance standards:

Delayed or deferred maintenance does not go away. It remains required maintenance and builds a backlog which is expensive to correct.

If 10/20 standards are not maintained, the Army National Guard can expect lower equipment readiness and mission capabilities. This could have a particularly serious impact on the Guard's domestic emergency response missions, which—unlike overseas deployments—occur with little or no notice time with which to bring equipment up to standards.

Funding required for delayed maintenance will relationally increase with the length of delay.

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. BARBER

Mr. BARBER. General Huggins, thank you for your service and your testimony today. I understand the Army is in the midst of a precarious balancing act due to budget cuts and general uncertainty. The Army must determine how best to restructure the force as a result of mandatory spending caps while simultaneously maintaining its readiness. Meanwhile, General Odierno has mentioned that the Army might need to reduce the total Army force by an additional 100,000 service members as a result of sequestration. There can be no doubt these cuts will impact the Army's ability to carry out its assigned missions. General as you know, Ft. Huachuca is in my home district, and the fort carries out the important mission of building partner capacity by training foreign military officers. General, my question to you is this, how will another drawdown affect the Army's ability to continue the important mission of building partner capacity, such as the training offered at Ft. Huachuca?

General HUGGINS. The Army is committed to providing the best possible training for foreign military officers, through any end strength reductions, and to continue building international partnerships through this training. Army force structure reductions may influence the size of the institutional training force; however, those decisions have yet to be made.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LOBIONDO

Mr. LOBIONDO. What do you see as the impact of budget cuts to readiness and how industry and the Army can move forward in partnership to sustain the industrial base and provide best value to the Army? Performance Based Logistics programs have demonstrated value and DOD is seeking to increase the effective use of PBLs. How do you see the Army optimizing readiness with PBLs?

General HUGGINS, General MASON, and General VISOT. The budget cuts present a significant challenge to the Army's ability to maintain readiness and will require tough choices for how to best apply limited resources to optimize readiness as the Army navigates through the difficulties of transitioning from an Army at War to an Army preparing/training for the next contingency.

The challenges of this fiscally uncertain environment will require the Army to explore new partnerships and expand existing ones with industry to achieve the best value. The Army has consistently recognized the need to build strong relationships, either with Sister Services, Allies, or the Host Nation populace, and is committed to achieving best value in acquisition programs, through performance based agreements to include sustainment throughout equipment lifecycles.

This commitment to best value is demonstrated through existing Public-Private Partnerships and Performance-Based Logistics product support strategies, as well as support of the Department of the Defense's (DOD) Better Buying Power initiative. Additionally, the Army recognizes the benefits of PBLs such as the AH-64 Apache Helicopter and the Patriot Missile Defense System, which have optimized readiness and life cycle costs. The Army is a key member of a DOD led Integrated Project Team responsible for evolving current PBL product support strategies to the "Next Generation" PBL that will broaden usage of PBLs as the product support strategy of choice across the DOD.

Mr. LOBIONDO. What do you see as the impact of budget cuts to readiness and how industry and the Army can move forward in partnership to sustain the industrial base and provide best value to the Army? Performance Based Logistics programs have demonstrated value and DOD is seeking to increase the effective use of PBLs. How do you see the Army optimizing readiness with PBLs?

General FOUNTAIN. Budget cuts present a significant challenge to the Army's ability to maintain readiness and will require tough choices for how to best apply limited resources as the Army navigates from a wartime to a peacetime—but still actively engaged—standing.

The challenges of this fiscally uncertain environment will require the Army to explore new partnerships and expand existing ones with industry to achieve the most value. The Army has consistently recognized the need to build strong relationships, either with sister Services, allies, or the host nation populace. The commitment to achieving best value in acquisition programs includes sustainment throughout the lifecycles of systems, services, or products. This commitment to best value is also demonstrated through existing Public-Private Partnerships and Performance-Based Logistics (PLB) product support strategies, as well as support of the Department of the Defense's (DOD) Better Buying Power initiative.

Additionally, the Army recognizes the benefits of PBLs through existing PBLs such as the AH-64 Apache Helicopter and the Patriot Missile Defense System, and continues to look for new PBL opportunities. Finally, the Army is a key member of a DOD-led Integrated Project Team responsible for evolving current PBL product support strategies to the "Next Generation" PBL that will broaden usage of PBLs across the DOD.

