[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                         [H.A.S.C. No. 113-19]




                          FOR FISCAL YEAR 2014



                               BEFORE THE

                      COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES


                             FIRST SESSION


                         FULL COMMITTEE HEARING




                              HEARING HELD

                             MARCH 15, 2013


80-189                    WASHINGTON : 2013
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                      COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                    One Hundred Thirteenth Congress

            HOWARD P. ``BUCK'' McKEON, California, Chairman

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas                ADAM SMITH, Washington
WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina      LORETTA SANCHEZ, California
J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia            MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina
JEFF MILLER, Florida                 ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania
JOE WILSON, South Carolina           ROBERT E. ANDREWS, New Jersey
FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey        SUSAN A. DAVIS, California
ROB BISHOP, Utah                     JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio              RICK LARSEN, Washington
JOHN KLINE, Minnesota                JIM COOPER, Tennessee
MIKE ROGERS, Alabama                 MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam
TRENT FRANKS, Arizona                JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut
BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania           DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa
K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas            NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts
DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado               JOHN GARAMENDI, California
ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia          HENRY C. ``HANK'' JOHNSON, Jr., 
DUNCAN HUNTER, California                Georgia
JOHN FLEMING, Louisiana              COLLEEN W. HANABUSA, Hawaii
MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado               JACKIE SPEIER, California
E. SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia            RON BARBER, Arizona
VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri             CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire
JOSEPH J. HECK, Nevada               DANIEL B. MAFFEI, New York
JON RUNYAN, New Jersey               DEREK KILMER, Washington
AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia                JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi       TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois
MARTHA ROBY, Alabama                 SCOTT H. PETERS, California
MO BROOKS, Alabama                   WILLIAM L. ENYART, Illinois
RICHARD B. NUGENT, Florida           PETE P. GALLEGO, Texas
KRISTI L. NOEM, South Dakota         MARC A. VEASEY, Texas
PAUL COOK, California

                  Robert L. Simmons II, Staff Director
                 Alex Gallo, Professional Staff Member
                Kimberly Shaw, Professional Staff Member
                Michael Casey, Professional Staff Member
                 Mark Lewis, Professional Staff Member
                           Aaron Falk, Clerk

                            C O N T E N T S





Friday, March 15, 2013, The Posture of the U.S. European Command 
  and U.S. Africa Command........................................     1


Friday, March 15, 2013...........................................    27

                         FRIDAY, MARCH 15, 2013

McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ``Buck,'' a Representative from 
  California, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services..............     1


Ham, GEN Carter F., USA, Commander, U.S. Africa Command..........     2
Stavridis, ADM James G., USN, Commander, U.S. European Command, 
  NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe...........................     1


Prepared Statements:

    Ham, GEN Carter F............................................    99
    McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ``Buck''..............................    31
    Stavridis, ADM James G.......................................    33

Documents Submitted for the Record:

    [There were no Documents submitted.]

Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:

    Mr. Conaway..................................................   123
    Mr. Turner...................................................   123

Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:

    Mr. Coffman..................................................   132
    Mr. Langevin.................................................   130
    Mr. McKeon...................................................   127
    Mr. Veasey...................................................   135
    Mr. Wittman..................................................   131


                          House of Representatives,
                               Committee on Armed Services,
                            Washington, DC, Friday, March 15, 2013.
    The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:05 a.m., in room 
2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Howard P. ``Buck'' 
McKeon (chairman of the committee) presiding.


    The Chairman. Committee will come to order. I would like to 
welcome everyone to today's hearing on the posture of the U.S. 
European Command and the U.S. Africa Command. We have two men 
that have devoted their lives to the service of this country, 
and this will be their last hearing.
    Gentlemen, thank you for many years of service that we can 
never repay you for, but your country is in your debt.
    You know, we are going to have votes about 11:15, so I am 
going to just put my statement in the record. It was wonderful. 
And anybody interested can read it. Mr. Smith is not with us 
here today. And in his place that seat is looking up a lot 
prettier, Ms. Sanchez.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. McKeon can be found in the 
Appendix on page 31.]
    Ms. Sanchez. Smarter, Mr. Chairman, smarter.
    With respect to time, of course, gentlemen, thank you for 
your service. I think it is the last time you are before us. 
With respect to that, I will submit the opening statement for 
Mr. Smith into the record and go straight to the hearing. Thank 
    The Chairman. Very good. And with that, Admiral Stavridis.


    Admiral Stavridis. Sir, I will follow your lead, as I 
always do, and simply say three things. One is thank you to the 
members of the committee, the chairman, to Congresswoman 
Sanchez for sitting in and being part of this today. Secondly, 
I think Europe continues to matter greatly for the United 
States, and I hope in our discussion today I can illustrate why 
that is a bit. And then thirdly, on behalf of the men and women 
of U.S. European Command and the NATO [North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization] alliance, again I say thank you to the committee 
for the terrific support we receive. With that I will, with 
your permission, enter a statement in the record also, 
Chairman, and I will turn to Carter Ham, my very good friend.
    [The prepared statement of Admiral Stavridis can be found 
in the Appendix on page 33.]
    The Chairman. General.


    General Ham. Thanks, Mr. Chairman and Congresswoman 
Sanchez. I had about a 20-minute opening statement, but I think 
I will follow the lead of all, which makes a lot of good sense. 
But it is great to have the opportunity to talk about what the 
women and men of AFRICOM [Africa Command] have done. We are the 
newest of the combatant commands. This year is our fifth year 
in existence and we have changed a lot over those 5 years, and 
I look forward to have the opportunity to talk with you a bit 
about that. We are in the midst, obviously, all of us, of some 
serious resourcing challenges as we move forward. That is going 
to take all of our best efforts to address those to ensure that 
all of us collectively can meet the national security needs of 
our country.
    I would join with my great friend and colleague, former 
boss, Admiral Stavridis. We are closely joined between Africa 
Command and European Command. In just about every endeavor in 
Africa I rely on European Command for support. That support has 
been unwavering and enduring. And similarly, the support from 
this committee for our troops, for their families, for our 
civilian employees has been similarly unwavering, and for that, 
we are deeply appreciative.
    I will depart the command in about a month and be replaced 
most ably by General David Rodriguez, again an old friend and 
exemplary leader who will take Africa Command and its women and 
men to even greater heights, and I look forward to that. And 
again thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ms. Sanchez, for your great 
    [The prepared statement of General Ham can be found in the 
Appendix on page 99.]
    The Chairman. Thank you very much. Both your records, 
without objection, will be submitted to the record. So ordered.
    Admiral, you are our senior combatant commander. You will 
be leaving your command shortly. And one of the things that we 
are hearing a lot around the Hill here is maybe we don't need 
forces in Europe anymore. You know, we are so far advanced 
there, maybe we could pull all those troops home, and it would 
be a big money savings, and the way things are going right now 
financially that would probably be a great thing. That is what 
we are hearing. I would like you to, from your experience on 
the ground, tell us why it is important to have troops in 
Europe. And with four combat brigade teams you have supported, 
and now that has changed, if you could tell what you think we 
do need there, why, and address that in light of the fiscal 
constraints that we have.
    Admiral Stavridis. Chairman, I will be glad to. To put the 
discussion in context, I think it is worth looking back to the 
Cold War, when we had 450,000 troops in Europe and we had 1,200 
bases in Europe. That is the height of the Cold War. We have 
reduced that by 80 percent. So we have come down very 
significantly in the forces in Europe. I would argue that our 
current level is roughly right, and I will give you four or 
five reasons why I think it is important to continue to be 
forward in Europe.
    The first is really the most basic, it is values. We share 
with democracies in Europe freedom of speech, freedom of 
religion, freedom of assembly, freedom of education. Nowhere 
else in the world will we find a pool of allies who share our 
    Secondly, it is the economy. There is a $4 trillion trade 
route across that Atlantic Ocean. And that binding of our 
economic interests will continue to make Europe our most 
important trading partner collectively.
    Thirdly, it is geography. You know, Robert Kaplan just 
wrote this terrific book, ``The Revenge of Geography.'' 
Geography matters. Europe, in that regard, is critically 
important. People sometimes say, you know, those bases in 
Europe, they are kind of the bastions of the Cold War. They are 
really not. They are the forward operating bases for 21st 
century security. They allow us to support Carter Ham in 
Africa. They allow us to support Jim Mattis in the Levant, in 
the near Middle East, and indeed in Central Asia. So geography 
matters as well.
    Fourthly, it is the alliance, it is the NATO alliance. 
Fifty-one percent of the world's GDP [gross domestic product], 
28 nations, 24,000 combat aircraft, 800 oceangoing ships, 50 
AWACs [Airborne Warning and Control] aircraft. This is a 
powerful, capable alliance that has stood with us, most 
obviously at the moment in Afghanistan, where today we see 90 
percent of the non-U.S. troops are indeed from Europe. So the 
alliance matters.
    And then, fifth and finally, I would say nowhere else in 
the world will we find so many trained, capable soldiers, 
sailors, airmen, and marines who will stand with us on missions 
from the Balkans, to Libya, to the Levant, to Afghanistan, and 
indeed around the world.
    In terms of posture, we are about right now. We have 
reduced the numbers of brigade combat teams. But, Mr. Chairman, 
we are going to rotate forces in to make up that shortfall. And 
I think we are about in balance. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Thank you very much.
    General Ham, your special ops force unit was established on 
the 1st of October of last year. The committee has learned that 
this force doesn't have the necessary enablers to operate in 
certain environments. Obviously, if this is correct, this is 
extremely concerning, as it would appear that we are not 
postured for the next crisis in the region, like the attack in 
Benghazi, Libya, on September 11 of last year. What is the 
projected timeline to get your special ops forces outfitted 
with the appropriate enablers?
    General Ham. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. You are correct in that 
the Commander's In-extremis Force was formally established on 
the 1st of October of 2012. It had been about a year or more in 
building that capability. Prior to the 1st of October, Admiral 
Stavridis and I shared a Commander's In-extremis Force. It was 
assigned to European Command, but available to AFRICOM should 
that be necessary.
    Today, that force is home-based in Colorado, but always 
with an element forward stationed in Europe. We have also 
deployed elements of it already to Africa on occasion. It has 
most of the enablers that are required, but not all. The 
principal shortfalls are in dedicated special operations 
aviation. Again, I rely on Admiral Stavridis on a sharing 
arrangement with special operations aviation forces that are 
forward stationed in Europe. It is my preference to have those 
elements dedicated.
    Then there are some other enabling capabilities, such as 
special operations surgical teams and some others, that I would 
prefer to have dedicated exclusively for that force, and at 
present we borrow those forces from other organizations. So we 
have a better capability, and a quite good capability now, but 
not the full capability that I think is necessary in the long 
term. Ongoing dialogue with Admiral McRaven at Special 
Operations Command as to when we might be able to build those 
capabilities and station those capabilities. I think for the 
next year, we will probably be in a sharing arrangement.
    The Chairman. Thank you. I think as the Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs, General Dempsey, pointed out, that if we have any 
further cuts in defense it will have to change our strategy, we 
won't be able to carry out the strategy that they devised when 
we were hit with the $487 billion in cuts. And then with the 
sequestration on top of that, we are going to have to revise 
that strategy, and we will not be able to respond quickly in 
all parts of the world at all times. So I think that it is a 
reality that we are going to have to decide if that is what the 
American people want. Thank you.
    Ms. Sanchez.
    Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Thank you again, Admiral and General, for being before us.
    You know, I am from California, so I have always thought 
that the United States was pivoted towards the Pacific, you 
know, but there seems to be a lot of consternation, especially 
among our allies out in the European theaters, that somehow we 
are going to slip away from this very critical alliance that is 
not only NATO, but all our European allies there. And, you 
know, it has really gone from having our troops there in order 
to defend Europe and now really being pretty integrated and 
having their own troops doing their thing.
    One of those things that is important is, you know, the 
interoperability and the training and the mission readiness for 
a decision that is made to go and intervene in places that are 
important for stability around the world, like Libya, for 
example, or other places. So my question to you, Admiral, is 
how are the Europeans feeling? Where are they with respect to 
their defense spending given that they are watching us lower 
our defense and most of them have not met the 2 percent 
threshold over the last few years? And how is that affecting 
our interoperability and our readiness for missions should new 
fires erupt out in an area that we would think together we 
should handle the situation?
    Admiral Stavridis. Thank you, Congresswoman. And as you 
know from our discussions in Munich at the Security Conference 
there, the Europeans are indeed watching the United States, 
both in regard to our rebalancing to Asia and in our potential 
significant reductions in defense spending. To kind of put it 
in perspective, the United States spends $600 billion, roughly, 
on defense base budget. Europeans actually spend about $300 
billion per year collectively. So it is a very significant 
expenditure on their part. It is more than China and Russia 
spend combined. So they spend a fairly significant amount.
    The bad news is, in my view, and we have discussed this, 
and as you alluded to, they are not meeting their own targeted 
2 percent of GDP, which I think is a minimum in order to 
continue to maintain the appropriate level, as you said, of 
interoperability with the United States. So on the one hand we 
want to have full advantage of their spending and their 
integration with us. On the other hand, we need to encourage 
them to step up and to spend appropriately so that we are in 
balance with them. We continue to do that. I work that very 
hard within both NATO, in my hat as the Supreme Allied 
Commander, but also in the U.S. European Command context.
    Lastly, as to the rebalancing to Asia, again, as you and I 
have both seen in Munich, the Europeans themselves are kind of 
rebalancing toward Asia. And I think the key is that we 
maintain both military integration and interoperability as well 
as the diplomatic, cultural connections that we have.
    So on balance, I continue to be pushing of the Europeans to 
get their spending levels up. But we should recognize they 
already spend a fairly significant amount, and they have, as 
you said, stood with us, Afghanistan, Libya, the Balkans. Today 
the forces in Mali, in Carter Ham's region, are essentially all 
European. So it is a balance. We need to continue to encourage 
    Ms. Sanchez. And with respect to Bosnia and Kosovo and some 
of what I call the unfinished business there, can you give us 
an update of where are our allies there and where Europe seems 
to be going, and if the current economic conditions that we are 
experiencing and others, and how that is affecting that? What 
do you think we need to do to really make that, the Balkans 
work? I know that is a big question in 2 minutes.
    Admiral Stavridis. It is, and I will do it quickly. 
Whenever we think about the Balkans, it is instructive to look 
back 10 to 15 years when the Balkans of 15 years ago looked a 
lot like Syria today. Fifteen years ago in the Balkans we saw 
100,000 killed, we saw 2 million pushed across borders, we saw 
open combat across Bosnia-Herzegovina, we saw a definite 
follow-up in Kosovo, which continues today to have a lot of 
tension. So we have come a long way in 10 to 15 years. At one 
time collectively there were about 50,000 Allied troops in and 
around the Balkans.
    Here is the good news. Today we are down to only about 
6,000 troops total, and of those only about 700 are from the 
United States. So this is now about an 85, almost 90 percent 
European mission. There are about 2,000 to 3,000 European Union 
troops that are in Bosnia-Herzegovina, where there are no U.S. 
troops. So the good news is the Europeans have stepped up and 
are doing this. What we need to do is continue the dialogue, 
notably between Kosovo and Serbia, as well as between Croatia 
and Serbia, so that in the Balkans, instead of reaching for a 
gun to solve their disputes, as they did 10 years ago, they 
reach for the telephone for a negotiation. I think it is moving 
in that direction.
    Ms. Sanchez. Mr. Chairman, I am very pleased that there are 
so many of our members here today for this hearing. And for 
that reason, even though I have many, many more questions, I 
will end. And thank you so much for the time.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Mr. Thornberry.
    Mr. Thornberry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    And thank you both for being here, for your service to the 
country, and for your families' service to the country over 
many years.
    Let me start with just something brief that has come to my 
attention. I understand we have an airfield in the Azores that 
we are going to mothball by the end of 2014. Some people are 
concerned about that because of its proximity to North Africa, 
and especially not having to have overflight rights and so 
    General Ham, are you comfortable with where we are headed 
with this? Or is it on your radar screen at all?
    General Ham. It is, sir. One of the things that we are 
always concerned about is access. I think losing access to one 
place won't be a show-stopper. But we have got to look at this 
more holistically, and I know Admiral Stavridis does that and 
spends a lot of time on making sure that we have enough points 
of entry and enough redundancy so that we can have the access 
that is needed when it is needed. So I am not overly worried 
about one particular case, but I do think it is important that 
we look more broadly.
    Mr. Thornberry. Okay. I just raise the point because I 
think there are some people concerned.
    If I can ask you one other question right quick. We had a 
hearing earlier this year about the various authorities to 
build partnership capacity. Nowhere is that more important than 
your region. If you had to give us two or three improvements in 
current law, whether they be tweaks or major reforms, what 
would you suggest we at least consider to make our existing 
authorities more effective in building partnership capacity 
across the region that you are responsible for?
    General Ham. First, I would thank the committee and all for 
providing the authorities that you have. That is a significant 
improvement over past years.
    I think as we look to the future, though, we probably need 
to look at something that is akin to today's overseas 
contingency operations, authorities and fundings that are not 
specifically tied to Afghanistan and to Al Qaeda, but rather 
give us some broader authorities to address a growing number of 
violent extremist organizations that don't necessarily fit 
neatly under the Al Qaeda umbrella. So I think that would be 
the first one.
    And secondly, probably some increased authorities for some 
of the geographic regions. So the Global Security Contingency 
Fund I think is a good step in that direction, and authorities 
to apply some of DOD's [Department of Defense] capabilities, in 
partnership with State, in new partners. Libya, I think, is a 
great example of that. So I think there are some minor tweaks, 
but I think we are moving in the right direction.
    Lastly, I happen to be a fan of the so-called dual key 
authorities, where both the Secretary of Defense and the 
Secretary of State have vested interests. I think that ensures 
a closer alignment of Defense and State as we move forward.
    Mr. Thornberry. Thank you.
    Admiral Stavridis, you have been not only combatant 
commander in Europe, but in the southern region as well. This 
is an unfair question with such limited time, but if you were 
to give us on this committee the top three things you think we 
ought to be focused on in the years ahead from our standpoint, 
not just for Europe but for our total responsibilities, what 
would they be?
    Admiral Stavridis. Very quickly, I would actually put cyber 
at the top of the list. I think in cyber we find the greatest 
mismatch between our level of preparation and the level of 
danger. I think that, in other words, we prepare an awful lot 
for counterterrorism, for spread of weapons of mass 
destruction, for many conventional scenarios we are very well 
prepared for. But I think cyber we have a lot of work to do. I 
mean the big we, not just DOD, obviously. This is something 
that cuts across all parts of government and all parts of 
society. So I put cyber at the top.
    Secondly, may or may not surprise you, I think trafficking 
is an enormous problem. The movement of narcotics, weapons, 
humans as in slaves, humans as in terrorists, cash, and God 
forbid, the weapons of mass destruction. So countertrafficking, 
which means ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance], intelligence, understanding what is moving in 
the seas and the ways around you, both land, sea, and air, I 
think is critically important.
    And then I would say my third thing would be special 
operations. I believe that as we move forward, that is going to 
be the comparative advantage for the United States. And I think 
we should continue to focus on how we can use, improve, and 
interoperably work with our allies in the special operations 
zone. Thanks.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Mr. Langevin.
    Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Gentlemen, thank you for your service to our country and 
for appearing here this morning.
    General Ham, if I could just start with you. East Africa 
remains, obviously, a key operating and training area for Al 
Qaeda and associates, and specifically the Somali-based 
terrorist group Al Shabaab. How concerned is the Department 
about Al Shabaab's ability to attract and train foreign 
fighters, including recruits from the United States, who may 
project violence outward from East Africa? And what exactly is 
the Department doing to counter this threat?
    General Ham. Al Shabaab is, in my assessment, significantly 
weakened from where they were a year ago, and that is because 
of the concerted effort of African forces, certainly supported 
and enabled by the United States and others. But there has been 
good progress. We are seeing Al Shabaab continuing to have 
strong linkages with Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, in 
Yemen, specifically, and we have seen continued effort by Al 
Shabaab to recruit foreigners from other parts of Africa, from 
the Mideast, to a lesser degree in Europe and the United 
States. But there are certainly those efforts.
    We think we are most effective in countering that approach 
by supporting the African-led approach to countering Shabaab by 
the restoration of a legitimate government, which the United 
States now recognizes, focusing on development, countering the 
underlying causes that has allowed Shabaab to gain traction. 
There are some specific efforts in the information domain that 
we work in partnership with other nations and with the 
Government of Somalia, again, to help convey the legitimacy of 
the African-led effort in Somalia, and we hope that that is 
helping to diminish the ability of Shabaab to recruit 
    And lastly, sir, we are seeing, because of the increased 
pressure on Shabaab, we are seeing a bit of a split between the 
foreign fighters who are there and those who are native Somalis 
who are part of Shabaab. The foreign fighters are very rapidly 
losing influence inside that organization.
    Mr. Langevin. Thank you, General. I think that is so 
important, that if we can get to some of the root causes of why 
Al Shabaab had been able to adequately recruit fighters we can 
obviously further degrade their ability to be an effective 
fighting force. So I think that is important, especially 
working with local populations.
    Let me ask you this. Do we have a sufficient amount of 
Department resources, including intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance assets working on the problem? And is AFRICOM 
adequately resourced in general? Do you have to beg, borrow, 
and steal too much from the other area commands or do you feel 
you are adequately resourced?
    General Ham. I have significant shortfalls in intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance. So that causes us to apply a 
pretty sharp prioritization. Unsurprisingly, Somalia has been 
near the top of that prioritization because of the effort 
against Al Shabaab. And so we have conducted a lot of 
reconnaissance missions in support of the African-led effort in 
Somalia. That has been pretty effective. But it has left us 
short in other areas across the continent. So that would be at 
the top of my list, sir, is shortfalls in intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance.
    Mr. Langevin. Thank you, General.
    Admiral, let me turn to you, if I could, before my time 
expires. Previously you have shared, you touched on something 
that is very important, something that I spend a lot of time 
on, is the issue of cyber. Can you further summarize for us 
EUCOM's [European Command] evolution in this area over the 
course of your tour and where you believe more work needs to be 
done on cyber from a EUCOM perspective?
    Admiral Stavridis. I can very quickly, Congressman. We have 
worked very closely with my very good friend, General Keith 
Alexander, at U.S. Cyber Command to create a cyber center 
within U.S. European Command, a kind of a nascent version of 
the Special Operations Command that we enjoy. I think having 
such centers in each of the combatant commands is important, 
and we should move forward.
    Secondly, we have worked very closely with NATO to build a 
NATO cyber center in Tallinn, Estonia, a nation which has 
experienced a cyber attack, as you know quite well, being an 
expert in this area.
    And thirdly, we are working operationally across the 
alliance to have an appropriate NATO cyber incident response 
center mirroring what we have here in the United States. So 
those are three quick things, and I would like to add, for the 
record, a few more for you.
    Mr. Langevin. Thank you. I would appreciate that.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Mr. Jones.
    Mr. Jones. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    And, Admiral and General, thank you again, as everyone else 
has said, for your service to our Nation. You all are real 
heroes to America. You really are.
    General Ham, I want to read you a statement, and then I 
will get to my question.
    ``Africa cannot be thought of as a monolith. It is a hugely 
complex landmass with a hugely diverse population. The nature 
of the people, the diversity of cultures and religions, and the 
tribal factions all combine to make Africa far more dangerous 
than Afghanistan. We need to be wary of being drawn into a 
    Would you agree with that statement?
    General Ham. Yeah, I agree with the first part, about the 
complexity and the diversity. I don't think that the threats 
that are present in Africa yet rise to the seriousness that 
existed with Al Qaeda and the Taliban in Pakistan or in--or in 
Afghanistan, pardon me--and in the Federally Administered 
Tribal Area, but the trend is not good.
    Mr. Jones. Okay. Your statement, and thank you, has not at 
this point risen to a situation where maybe we would have to 
start thinking about committing more men and women to Africa. 
As you begin to leave your service and become a citizen outside 
of the military, do I understand you correctly that you would 
not want to see this Nation make such a commitment that we 
begin then to be in a situation, as we have been in Afghanistan 
for 12 years, in a failed policy that will not lead to any 
success at all? History says that, not me, but history.
    I mean I understand the intelligence importance of having a 
presence in Africa. I have no problem with that at all. But to 
see the footprint get larger, where we are committing more than 
300 or 400 troops to be there primarily as advisers and intel 
officers. But to see this thing start to grow and expand, would 
you rather not see that happen?
    General Ham. Congressman, I believe that if the threat that 
is present in Africa is left unaddressed it will over time grow 
to an increasingly dangerous and imminent threat to U.S. 
interests and certainly could develop into a threat that 
threatens us in other places. We have already seen from some 
places in Africa, individuals from Nigeria, for example, 
attempt to enter our country with explosives. I think we have 
an opportunity now to work preventive effort, in concert with 
African forces and with allies and friends globally, to 
suppress the threat, to reverse the trend, which is 
increasingly worrisome to me. And that does not necessitate a 
large commitment of U.S. forces, and I do not believe that a 
large commitment of U.S. forces is either necessary nor 
appropriate under the current circumstance.
    Mr. Jones. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank the admiral and 
the general again. And I appreciate you indicating that you 
would hope that we will not get into a situation where it would 
be Congress funding a larger military presence. As long as we 
can work with other countries, which, you know, the situation 
in Afghanistan of the coalition forces at best was limited. And 
what I am concerned about is that we are here cutting every 
program for the American people and the military is getting hit 
very hard by sequestration. And I would like to believe that as 
time goes forward that we would have leaders like yourself and 
the admiral to say that we need to really limit our commitment 
to these countries, where we can let other countries come in 
and take the lead instead of America. So I thank you very much 
for your question.
    My time is about up. And again, I thank you both for your 
service to our Nation.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Mr. Garamendi.
    Mr. Garamendi. Thank you.
    Admiral and General, thank you for your service. My wife 
and I recently returned from a trip to South Sudan. General 
Ham, could you please give us your assessment of the situation 
there, considering the financial near bankruptcy of the 
country, the presence of Lord's Resistance Army in the 
southwestern part of the country, and the overall outlook as 
you see it for South Sudan?
    General Ham. I had the great pleasure and honor, 
Congressman, of on the 9th of July of 2011, of attending as a 
member of the U.S. delegation the independence celebration for 
South Sudan in Juba, and it was an exuberant moment. But one of 
the lasting memories from that was after the celebration, the 
chief of the Sudanese People's Liberation Army, the South 
Sudan's Army, we were having a discussion, and he rightfully 
said, now the hard work begins. Independence is important, we 
are glad, the U.S., obviously, has been supportive of that for 
a long time. There are many, many challenges that South Sudan 
faces. The army is far too large. It consumes an exorbitantly 
large portion of the national budget, upwards of 40 percent. 
That is obviously not sustainable.
    So one of the key priorities that we and those in the State 
Department are helping with South Sudan is defense structure 
and reform, which is very important. In the same time, we are 
also working with the South Sudanese on some specific leader 
development training. We think that is probably an area where 
we can provide a very positive influence. I am concerned about 
the continuing inability of Sudan and South Sudan to resolve 
their lingering border conflicts. It is promising to see now 
indications that South Sudan will soon begin oil production. 
That will help both countries, frankly, Sudan and South Sudan.
    And to your point, sir, about the Lord's Resistance Army, 
the South Sudanese have been very supportive in terms of 
supporting the African Union-led effort. They have welcomed us, 
our advisers, and the capabilities that the U.S. team brings in 
terms of aviation support, logistics support, and advisers. And 
they have been an active and supportive participant with the 
other nations, Uganda, Central African Republic, and Democratic 
Republic of Congo, in the effort for the Africans to resolve 
the Lord's Resistance Army challenges.
    Mr. Garamendi. I thank you for that. On a different line, 
there are numerous violent extremist organizations in the 
Sahel. It is argued and pointed out by many NGO [non-
governmental organization] groups, wildlife groups and the 
rest, that the organizations are supported through the 
slaughter of elephants and the ivory trade. Do you have 
authority to assist the governments in the Sahel in dealing 
with this issue? And do you need authority if you don't have 
    General Ham. Congressman, we have very limited specific 
authorities to help with the specific challenge of poaching. 
But we do have some, and we work with State Department and with 
the U.S. ambassadors in that regard. But where we can have an 
effect and are having an effect is many African militaries do 
have responsibilities within their own nations for countering 
poaching. And I would cite as one example in Cameroon the Rapid 
Intervention Battalion, a special operations organization which 
we have had a long relationship with. It is an exceedingly 
capable force. They have been designated by their President to 
take on a counter-poaching role. So our support for them 
extends, while not directly to counter-poaching, the equipment, 
the training, the advising that we have provided helps enable 
that force.
    And so I think our best efforts, again, probably will be in 
a more indirect approach. The one exception, sir, would be if 
we see that financing has a direct relationship, financing from 
poaching has a direct relationship, then there are some law 
enforcement authorities that the United States possesses in 
terms of addressing the finance aspect of that which could be 
    Mr. Garamendi. I thank you. In my last 9 seconds, I am told 
by wildlife organizations operating in the region that they do 
in fact have evidence that these violent extreme organizations 
are using ivory and other animal parts as a financing 
    The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired.
    Mr. Miller.
    Mr. Miller. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Admiral, General, thank you very much for being here. I 
apologize for missing some of your opening statements. General 
Ham, I would like to know a little bit about the cooperation of 
Boko Haram and AQIM [Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb], Al 
Shabaab. Talk to me about the level of cooperation between 
those organizations, if you will.
    General Ham. Congressman, it is very worrisome to me. The 
three organizations which you mentioned, Al Shabaab in Somalia, 
Boko Haram in northern Nigeria for the most part, and Al Qaeda 
in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb in Mali and in that region, 
each individually presents a significant challenge. But when 
they collaborate, and we are seeing them increasingly 
collaborate, I am very worried about that, particularly the 
relationship between Boko Haram and Al Qaeda in the Islamic 
Maghreb, as you mentioned. We have seen indications of sharing 
of financing.
    Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb is, we believe, Al Qaeda's 
best-funded, wealthiest affiliate, if you will, mostly from 
kidnappings for ransom, but also through drug trade. And we 
believe they have provided financing directly to Boko Haram. We 
believe that they have shared training, to include explosives 
training. And we believe that fighters from Nigeria, Boko 
Haram-sponsored fighters have found their way over the past 
year to training camps in northern Mali. So the relationship, 
sir, is very worrisome to me.
    Mr. Miller. Do you assess that Boko Haram has it within 
their desires to come to the United States and do something 
here on our continent?
    General Ham. Sir, Boko Haram, like most terrorist 
organizations, is not monolithic. There are a couple of 
different elements within Boko Haram, some of which are 
exclusively focused on domestic Nigerian issues, but there are 
others who more closely align, while not directly part of Al 
Qaeda, but an Al Qaeda-like global ideology. And so I would say 
that in my view there are elements of Boko Haram who aspire to 
a broader regional level of attacks, to include not just in 
Africa, but Europe and aspirationally to the United States. And 
I think that is why it is important for us, in partnership with 
Nigeria and others, to help them counter this before their 
capability matches their intent.
    Mr. Miller. That is all, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Ms. Duckworth.
    Ms. Duckworth. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    General Ham, my question pertains to Mali. My understanding 
is that when the coup happened, the United States, all non-
humanitarian aid had to be pulled out of Mali because 
technically it is a military junta and a coup and not a 
legitimate government because there was an overthrow of the 
government. I am interested to know if there are any future 
training plans or any other types of engagement that we may be 
thinking about into the future with the military in Mali, even 
though it is technically not a legitimate government.
    General Ham. Congresswoman, we do want, we very much would 
like to reengage on a military-to-military basis with Mali, but 
it is premature to do so. But we are starting to think now what 
we would like to do when there is a legitimate government in 
Mali, and we have gotten some indications that the Malians are 
very interested in restoring that normalized military-to-
military relationship. I think our efforts probably will 
initially focus perhaps on helping the Malians develop a 
capable counterterrorist force, but there are other aspects of 
an enduring relationship that I think would be helpful.
    I would just note also, ma'am, that while we are prohibited 
from having a direct relationship, as Admiral Stavridis 
mentioned, the European Union and others are already present 
and are working with the Malians to good effect.
    Admiral Stavridis. If I could, Congresswoman, just to 
amplify quickly, the European Union has 200 soldiers. They are 
going to ramp that up very quickly. And they are stepping up in 
this. And I am encouraged to hear what General Ham says about 
potentially us as well. Thank you.
    Ms. Duckworth. General Ham, I have a slightly different 
follow-up question. This is really with regard to trying to use 
our forces more wisely and with greater cost savings. And 
specifically, I would like to talk about the State Partnership 
Program, which in the admiral's testimony really talks about 
the success of the program being used by the European Command. 
Do you have any plans, looking to the future, to really 
capitalize on this? I see that, for example, California, which 
participated in the State Partnership Program in 1993, later, 
10 years later took on the role of helping work with the 
Nigerians. North Carolina, after 12 years' experience working 
with Moldova, is now working with Botswana since 2008. For a 
program that has demonstrated its successfulness and its cost 
savings by using the National Guard and that institutional 
knowledge and those long-term relationships that can be 
established by the cadre of the National Guard in particular 
States, are you looking to expand this program in AFRICOM?
    General Ham. I would like to think that you probably have 
the co-chairs of the State Partnership Program fan club seated 
here. It is an extraordinarily effective and low-cost effort to 
achieve our national security objectives. We have eight 
partnerships presently in Africa. I think we are close to 
having a few more. Don't have any in East Africa. We have had 
discussions with some East African countries, and I think we 
are close to getting a couple to formally request. The Chief of 
the National Guard Bureau is already, you know, working with 
the state adjutants general to see who might be willing to take 
on some relationships.
    Another aspect, ma'am, that I would highlight, we have a 
couple of instances where States have State partnerships both 
in Europe and in Africa. And I think that is something that we 
can leverage to a further extent in the future.
    Admiral Stavridis. Yeah, if I could, three I would really 
highlight. Illinois-Poland is terrific. Kosovo is married up 
with Iowa. And Georgia, imaginatively enough, is married up 
with Georgia. And they are bang for the buck one of the best 
things going. We had an earlier question about authorities and 
what we could do. Anything that enhances State partnership is 
money in the bank for the regional combatant commanders, ma'am.
    Ms. Duckworth. That is good to hear. I, too, am a fan of 
State Partnership Programs because of two things. One, that 
long-term institutional knowledge. I am, of course, biased 
being from Illinois, but also because of the great cost 
savings. You do not have to have Active Duty troops carry that 
load for the whole time. So thank you for your answers, 
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Mr. Wilson.
    Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    And Admiral, General, thank you for your service.
    General, each year I am always interested in finding out 
what the latest is on potentially relocating AFRICOM command. I 
know that last October there was a determination not to 
relocate because of one-time relocation costs, even though 
there could be a savings from $130 million to $60 million to 
$70 million to relocate back in the United States. I have 
information from the Charleston Metro Chamber of Commerce that 
puts in perspective a benefit of relocating AFRICOM back to the 
United States. It is clear that in Charleston, with the joint 
military complex, there are assets to support the command. The 
Charleston Air Force Base already supports the African air 
cargo channel missions. It is the largest C-17 wing, and the 
only C-17 special operations unit. SPAWAR [Space and Naval 
Warfare Systems Command] at Charleston is already an integrator 
of joint communications for DOD, Department of Homeland 
Security, State Department, and other Federal agencies. The 
Port of Charleston provides approximately 50 percent of import-
export seagoing container traffic between the United States and 
Africa. The Department of Homeland Security's Project SeaHawk 
command and control center in Charleston integrates nearly 50 
Federal, State, and local law enforcement, intelligence 
agencies, technologies, and assets. With two-thirds of Africa's 
nations having sea access, SeaHawk could be a major contributor 
to AFRICOM's training and security missions. The Charleston 
Federal Law Enforcement Training facility can accommodate 
maritime and law enforcement training for African nations, and 
currently operates an international training site at Botswana. 
Charleston and the State of South Carolina already have close 
ties with African nations in the field of medicine, 
agriculture, education, religious institutions, business, as 
well as a shared heritage with a large percentage of the 
Lowcountry Charleston population originating in West Africa.
    In light of the defense cutbacks, particularly 
sequestration, will this be looked at further, to relocate the 
AFRICOM command?
    General Ham. Congressman, I am uncertain. As you are aware, 
Congress did require the Department of Defense to conduct a 
study. They did. That was led by the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense. Obviously, Africa Command had an operational role in 
that. The Department did respond, and it was the Department's 
determination that the command is best retained in its current 
location in Stuttgart, Germany. But clearly, having been part 
of the discussion, the cost factors were a significant aspect 
of this, and I know that Secretary Panetta, as he was in office 
at the time, wrestled hard between many of the attributes that 
you spoke of, the cost savings and the operational impact. But 
the Department's conclusion was that the command is best 
retained in its current location.
    Mr. Wilson. Well, and do understand that we appreciate what 
you have done so much and recognize how important it is. That 
is why we would love for you to relocate to South Carolina. And 
we like to point out we have the right climate. It is 
meteorological, and you would appreciate that. And then the 
people are very warm and would be very supportive.
    Admiral, at the last several posture hearings before this 
committee you strongly advocated for retaining four Army 
brigade combat teams in Europe. How has the decision to 
withdraw two of the brigade combat teams affected your ability 
to meet operational and training requirements?
    Admiral Stavridis. Obviously, it decrements them. What we 
are doing to substitute for them, Congressman, is instituting a 
rotational policy so we can bring a brigade combat team that is 
located back in the United States. As you were just talking 
about, Charleston is a good place to be located, we are 
rotating out of Georgia. They will come to the European 
theater, they will train, operate, interoperate, be part of 
NATO exercises, and be part of assurance, reassurance, and 
deterrence. So we are substituting a rotational structure. And 
so far, so good.
    Mr. Wilson. And would it be rotating out of Fort Stewart 
    Admiral Stavridis. Initially, that is the indications we 
are getting. It will probably bounce around within the United 
States. But we would like to see it centralized in a particular 
unit so we could build the experience base working that piece 
of it.
    Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much.
    Admiral Stavridis. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Mr. Castro.
    Mr. Castro. Thank you, Chairman.
    Thank you, Admiral and General. The question I have is one 
that I asked on my other committee, which is Foreign Affairs, 
and the answer there was that it would be more appropriate for 
you guys at Defense. That is, as we try to understand the 
emerging terrorist groups, in North Africa in particular, how 
do we distinguish between those with legitimate ties to Al 
Qaeda and those that are simply posers trying to take advantage 
of the credibility and the prestige that comes to wrongdoers 
who are attached to Al Qaeda.
    General Ham. It sometimes can be a tough challenge, 
Congressman, because, again, many of these organizations have 
multiple personalities. So some of them are relatively easy. So 
Al Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb, they are very 
clearly an Al Qaeda-associated organization. They have said so, 
Al Qaeda senior leaders have said so. So that makes it pretty 
    But others have not quite so clear views. Some of them 
originate with dissatisfaction with the host government. And 
then sometimes an element of that group may get co-opted by an 
ideologically motivated entity. And so there are a number of 
those types of organizations that operate in North Africa that 
make it very difficult.
    What that necessitates for us is that we cannot paint with 
too broad a brush to say that every VEO [violent extremist 
organization] has an Al Qaeda-like ideology. We really have to 
be very precise in our application. It requires us to work very 
carefully with host nation governments, particularly with their 
intelligence organizations, so that we can more clearly 
understand where are the hard-core, ideologically committed 
extremists that require one approach, and where are those 
others who have perhaps unfulfilled expectations or have been a 
long-disaffected population whose concerns can be addressed 
through nonmilitary means.
    Admiral Stavridis. If I could add a thought on that, it is 
the importance of cyber and the social networks as tools that 
allow us to do the kind of discriminatory analysis. So it is 
another aspect to this. Traditional intelligence has its 
merits, obviously, but here you can learn more about these 
groups by getting inside them because so many of them are using 
the cyber world in articulating their vision, as well as 
actually conducting operations.
    Mr. Castro. Thank you, gentlemen. And I think we all agree 
that our understanding of those relationships affects the 
United States engagement with those different groups and the 
level of resources and energy we attend to those groups. So 
thank you all very much.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Mr. Turner.
    Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Admiral Stavridis, thank you for being here. And I want to 
thank you also not just for the confidence that we here in this 
committee have in you, but also the confidence that you have 
earned with our NATO allies. And it certainly is, I think, very 
important both for the credibility of the United States and for 
our relationships that you have such high regard from our NATO 
    I want to talk about an issue of which I have concern about 
that relationship with our NATO allies. I serve on the 
Strategic Forces Subcommittee and have served as chair, and 
missile defense is one of those areas where you have worked 
very diligently to obtain support from our NATO allies for 
adding missile defense as a NATO mission. As you and I have 
talked previously, I was very concerned with the way the Obama 
administration ended the Bush plan to put ground-based missiles 
in Poland, both because I thought it was going to be essential 
for the protection of our mainland United States, but also 
because of the way in which the Poles were treated in that 
retreat. They had made a political commitment, and I think it 
was done in a way that was detrimental to our relationship.
    Now we are to the Phased Adaptive Approach, which I have 
some concerns about, and the GAO [Government Accountability 
Office] has recently issued a report that the SM-3 IIB 
[Standard Missile-3 Block IIB] missile may have, I believe 
their view is, very little national missile defense 
contribution from land-based sites in Poland and Romania. My 
concern from that report is it begins to signal again that 
perhaps we could disappoint our allies in commitments that we 
have made.
    Secretary Miller recently said in remarks to the Atlantic 
Council that the Pentagon, in view of the internal DOD reports, 
was looking very hard at the future of the SM-3 IIB missile. 
And I am concerned about the DOD commitment to this missile and 
the administration's commitment to this missile. Now, I don't 
see this as an alternative to ground-based sites, because I 
believe that they are complementary and they could be both used 
together, but in looking at the SM-3 IIB, I mean this 
Republican House has always funded the IIB missile. The Senate 
Democrat appropriators have cut funding for that. And when the 
Department of Defense in the conference report issued its 
objections of the appeals with respect to the appropriations, 
defense of the SM-3 IIB was not there. So we have the 
administration saying they are going to the SM-2, the SM-3 IIB 
funding being cut from the Democratic-controlled House, the 
administration not objecting, the Republicans on the House side 
funding it, and now technical issues having been raised. I am 
concerned about the DOD's commitment both to our allies, the 
Romanians and Poles, with respect to this missile, but also the 
protection of the mainland United States.
    What is the Department of Defense's commitment to the SM-3 
IIB? And how do you see its role both with our allies and in 
protecting the homeland?
    Admiral Stavridis. Well, as you know, Congressman, from our 
long conversations about this, let me start with the Poles and 
Romanians. At the moment, in my conversations with my 
interlocutors, military to military, and indeed conversations 
with ministers of defense, ministers of foreign affairs, they 
appear to me to be comfortable with the EPAA [European Phased 
Adaptive Approach] and the upcoming addition of shore-based 
sites, as you know, coming into Romania and then into Poland 
2015 and 2018 and so forth.
    So my sense is the allies have adjusted to EPAA, and they 
are in fact looking for ways to contribute. The Dutch, the 
Spanish, the Italians are all looking at maritime-based 
contributions. The Germans and Italians are looking at point 
defense solutions. Germany is providing command and control. So 
I think the structure under the NATO hat that you know from 
your time as a NATO Parliamentarian, sir, is in fact coming 
    In terms of where we are going through this progress, as 
you know, SM-3 IIB is scheduled to come online in 2020, so that 
is 7 years from now. I suspect there will continue to be 
technical discussions regarding it. What I would like to do is 
take that for the record and come back to you with a defined 
departmental position that includes some technical analysis, 
because I sense that is what you are hungry for, and I will 
obtain that from MDA [Missile Defense Agency] and come back.
    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix 
on page 123.]
    Mr. Turner. Admiral, I would appreciate that. But the other 
aspect of this is that, as we look to the emerging threats we 
are going to need to make certain that we have every 
technological available means to address it. The SM-3 IIB 
certainly has additional capabilities. I am concerned by the 
press reports that seem to indicate that Congress is the one 
that is cutting it because this side of Congress has been 
funding it. The administration, if it really wants it, 
certainly has influence with the Democratic Senate to be able 
to obtain it.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Mr. Johnson.
    Mr. Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Admiral, good to see you again, sir. We were just recently 
in Europe, visited EUCOM headquarters, and I want to thank you 
and your staff for your outstanding support during that trip. 
And I also have a little egg on my face because I think I 
assured you that there is no chance that sequestration would 
kick in. And I have got egg on my face. Really it is more like 
manure on my face, I feel. And so, bam, it is what it is.
    But the chairman asked you during his questioning about the 
need for troops in Europe, and you mentioned that from the 
height of the Cold War we have decreased by 80 percent the 
troop strength in Europe. I have heard questions from those who 
would question why we need those other 20 percent troops in 
Europe: Why can't we just bring them all home and let Europe 
take care of itself? Can you rebut that assertion?
    Admiral Stavridis. Sir, I think I can give you the view 
from U.S. European Command. I mentioned earlier values, the 
economic base we share, the significant geography and access we 
enjoy in Europe, as well as the alliance itself, which is a 
treaty obligation which goes back and forth across the Atlantic 
for mutual defense. And finally this very pragmatic reason: 
that Europe is this largest pool of allies we have in the 
world, trained soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, as well as 
high technology. So I think that basket of reasons is very 
    Mr. Johnson. Well, what threat, though, is posed to our 
allies and ourselves that require us to maintain such a 
presence in Europe?
    Admiral Stavridis. I think as you look around the periphery 
of Europe, particularly, as Carter Ham knows extremely well, 
look to the south, along the Sahel, and the northern rim of the 
Mediterranean, as well as the Levant----
    Mr. Johnson. And the Levant, for those who don't know, is 
    Admiral Stavridis. Near Middle East, Syria and that region, 
sir. So that arc of crisis, if you will, that runs today from 
Syria down through and across the northern part of Africa, I 
think represents threats to the United States, as well as to 
our allies. So I would argue that we continue to have enduring 
presence needs, enduring interoperability needs, and a treaty 
obligation that would require some level of forces in Europe. 
Again, we have come down 80 percent. I think that is probably 
about right for the moment, but we should keep looking at it as 
we go forward.
    General Ham. Mr. Johnson, may I?
    Mr. Johnson. Yes.
    General Ham. Sir, I would make two points to that, hardly 
as a guy who is reliant upon Europe-based forces to a large 
degree. And I would make two points.
    One, in terms of near-term response, when the President, 
when our President made the decision to commit forces initially 
in Libya, that simply would not have been possible on the 
timelines that were required absent Europe-based air and 
maritime forces. Had those forces been in the continental 
United States the timelines would have been significantly 
different and we don't know what might have happened if we had 
not been able to respond on timelines.
    Second is, one of the many missions which combatant 
commanders are given is to assure access for the United States 
and for others in the global trade. And so as we look to 
Europe, the Straits of Gibraltar, a strategic chokepoint, the 
Suez Canal, further down, the Bab el-Mandab, access through the 
Gulf of Guinea, all important economically not just to our 
country but to many others, and the presence of U.S. forces 
nearby helps assure that access that is vital to our economy.
    Mr. Johnson. Thank you. I will yield back the balance of my 
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Mr. Rogers.
    Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    And, gentlemen, thank you both for your service and for 
being here today.
    Admiral, could you give us a rough order of magnitude as to 
the size of our nuclear weapons in Europe, forward deployed.
    Admiral Stavridis. Yes. Sir, if I could, that is 
classified, so I will take that for the record and provide you 
with a precise number.
    [The information referred to is classified and retained in 
the committee files.]
    Mr. Rogers. Let me ask this then. Can you tell us how many 
so-called tactical or nonstrategic weapons that Russia has that 
are forward deployed in Europe?
    Admiral Stavridis. I think you will find press reports that 
Russia possesses some low number of thousands of tactical 
nuclear weapons. They are on Russian territory. The United 
States possesses orders of magnitude, smaller numbers than 
that. Again, I will respond on a classified basis.
    [The information referred to is classified and retained in 
the committee files.]
    Mr. Rogers. And I understand, and I appreciate it. And you 
have painted the picture that I was after.
    Admiral Stavridis. Okay, sir.
    Mr. Rogers. As you know, I have taken over the chairmanship 
of the Strategic Forces Subcommittee.
    Admiral Stavridis. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Rogers. So I am concerned about press reports about the 
administration's intent to pursue reduction talks with the 
Russians and not through a treaty structure, which I find 
disturbing. Is it your professional opinion that if those talks 
were to proceed, that they should include tactical weapons as 
well as strategic weapons parity?
    Admiral Stavridis. I would obviously defer to the State 
Department for negotiations and treaties. I will say from a 
military perspective we have a small number of weapons, as you 
know, that are in Europe, and that any changes to that 
structure would need to be first and foremost negotiated within 
NATO so we had an overall position before we could even move to 
a discussion with Russia.
    Mr. Rogers. Well, it is my observation that as we continue 
to discuss reductions in our strategic weapons, not only with 
Russia but our position in the world, Russia, China, and other 
countries continue to dramatically increase their tactical 
weapons and we don't seem to ever take account for that. And I 
think that is mistaken.
    But the next question, on the subject of tactical weapons, 
are you familiar with the Presidential Nuclear Initiative of 
1991 between President Yeltsin and George H.W. Bush?
    Admiral Stavridis. Yes, sir, in general terms.
    Mr. Rogers. In 2006, then Assistant Secretary Stephen 
Rademaker noted President Yeltsin committed to similar 
reductions in Russian tactical nuclear weapons but considerable 
concern exists that the Russian commitments have not been 
entirely fulfilled. What are your thoughts about that? Do you 
think the Russians are fulfilling their commitments and are we 
able to verify that?
    Admiral Stavridis. Well, you are correct that we are not 
able to verify that. With some treaties, as you know, in a 
treaty structure you have verification regimes, think Nunn-
Lugar. Here we don't have that. So it is difficult to say with 
certainty. I think you are correct in the assumption that there 
is a wide disparity in terms of numbers of such weapons. And at 
the moment there is no mechanism for monitoring, verifying, or 
following up on those discussions.
    Mr. Rogers. I appreciate that. I do want to follow up on a 
couple of things. Mr. Turner talked about the SM-3 IIB. I 
completely concur with his position. I think that it appears 
that the administration and some in the Congress on the other 
side of the Hill have lost their enthusiasm for that program 
and my concern is that the DOD may be in a similar situation. 
When you do respond to him in a follow-up, I would appreciate a 
copy of that.
    Admiral Stavridis. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Rogers. Like to know what your perspective is about the 
DOD's long-term commitment----
    Admiral Stavridis. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Rogers [continuing]. To that weapon system.
    And then lastly, you talked a little bit about Romania and 
Poland. I fear that what happened in Poland is about to happen 
in Romania. I am very concerned about that and our credibility 
going forward to negotiate with our European allies. So I would 
urge you to be sensitive to making sure that we don't leave the 
Romanians feeling like that we left them at the altar, as we 
did the Poles.
    Admiral Stavridis. Yes, sir. Understood.
    Mr. Rogers. With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Mrs. Davis.
    Mrs. Davis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    And thank you to both of you for your extraordinary 
service. I have enjoyed working with you.
    General Ham, I wonder if you could just take a moment and 
talk about our partnership capacity. We have certainly dealt 
with that on this committee, but I am referring particularly to 
our humanitarian assistance missions. And I know that San Diego 
was very proud last evening, or I guess Wednesday evening, they 
honored the USNS [United States Naval Ship] Mercy for its work. 
This was the Center for Conflict Resolution, which usually 
honors individuals, but in this case they honored the Mercy. 
And certainly from my experience in working with them in Papua 
New Guinea, I really appreciate that honor to them.
    But I also know that the USNS Comfort has not been deployed 
to the coast of Africa. And I am wondering, you know, number 
one, where you feel that this humanitarian mission lies in 
terms of the needs that we have to support our friends around 
the world. We have already talked about the importance of 
cyber, trafficking, special operations. I know that those are 
certainly high priorities, but I wondered where humanitarian 
assistance lies in this, but also whether or not we should be 
using the tools that we have better, and particularly the USNS 
Comfort as part of that growing partnership.
    General Ham. Both ships and their crews are extraordinary. 
Comfort and Mercy have been great symbols for the people of the 
United States in a wide variety of contingency operations and 
other engagements globally. And so I think they do offer great 
capability. But it is also a capability that is best applied 
when there is some host nation capability to reciprocate and 
can build upon the capabilities that Comfort or Mercy provide. 
So we do look at that and we look for opportunities to deploy 
those ships. We haven't found, frankly, quite the right 
circumstance just yet where in an engagement purpose it might 
be useful.
    But rather our humanitarian assistance, and I would wrap 
into that umbrella also disaster response, is a high priority 
for us in Africa. There are many circumstances in which African 
military forces are required for humanitarian assistance and 
disaster relief. And a large number, the preponderance of the 
exercises that we do both bilaterally and regionally with 
African forces, are built on a humanitarian assistance or 
disaster relief scenario. We have seen some improvements in 
their regional capabilities and I think that is an area of 
enduring effort for us.
    I think there are ways we can improve that. We have a good 
relationship with USAID [United States Agency for International 
Development]. I have a senior development adviser at my 
headquarters; also folks from the Office of Foreign Disaster 
Assistance. They are hugely beneficial. I have got a planner 
embedded at USAID that helps as well. And we have got to 
tighten the relationship with the many nongovernmental 
organizations that do such good work in humanitarian assistance 
    So I think there is significant room for improvement. And 
for us the trick is how do you bring the African militaries and 
capabilities so that they are increasingly capable of 
responding. I think Admiral Stavridis had a point.
    Admiral Stavridis. In my previous life, when I was 
commander of U.S. Southern Command for 3 years, I was lucky 
enough to have Comfort deploy several times to Latin American 
and the Caribbean. I cannot overstate the impact of that. When 
you see a little 8-year old boy who has hiked through the 
jungle with his mother for 3 days to get to the Comfort put on 
his first set of eyeglasses and say, ``Mama, veo el mundo--Mom, 
I see the world''--multiply that times 400,000 patient 
treatments, that creates security for the United States because 
it portrays us in a very different and positive way.
    Mrs. Davis. As we grapple with budgetary concerns, is this 
a place that you think people would naturally go to and think 
we should just cut out this kind of assistance? And how would 
you respond?
    General Ham. I don't think so, because for us on the 
military side it is pretty low cost. I mean, it is typically 
small teams of medical experts, whether they are preventive 
medicine or veterinarians, or as Admiral Stavridis mentioned, 
deployable eye surgical teams that can go into the heart of 
Africa. I think we will be okay, ma'am.
    Admiral Stavridis. And can I add that on the Comfort about 
a third of the personnel are volunteers from the private 
sector. So this is a good example of private-public partnering.
    Mrs. Davis. Right. Thank you. And the Mercy as well.
    The Chairman. Thank you. Thank you.
    Mr. Franks.
    Mr. Franks. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Thank you, gentlemen. You know, we always want to take the 
opportunity to express appreciation because we know that 
American freedom is anchored in the freedom that is alive in 
your hearts, that you dedicate yourself to that end for your 
whole lives.
    Admiral Stavridis, I know that it is difficult to kind of 
have a dual-hatted challenge of being in the role of SACEUR, 
Supreme Allied Commander of Europe; that is not an easy 
challenge, and I would commend you on that. And I am, like so 
many others on this committee, committed to seeing a robust 
missile defense capability against whatever enemies might 
challenge us. And with that in mind, would you provide us with 
an update on your command's missile defense capacity and force 
structure requirements, specifically highlighting any concerns 
that you might have about our ability to meet the European 
Phased Adaptive Approach policy and its requirements?
    Admiral Stavridis. Yes, sir. As you know, we are in phase 
one, which means we have an Aegis ship deployed, typically to 
the Eastern Mediterranean. We have what is called a TPY-2 
[Transportable Radar Surveillance], it is a phased-array radar. 
That is hosted by Turkey. The command and control that lashes 
it together is in Ramstein, Germany. It is a NATO command and 
control structure. At the moment it is manned by the nations of 
NATO with a very strong U.S. underpinning to it. So that is 
phase one, and it relies on the SM-3 IA missile system, which 
can be launched from the Aegis ship.
    The next phase, phase two, will add a land-based side in 
Romania, which we discussed earlier this morning. It will 
upgrade the missile. That will come in, in about 2015, and it 
will include an enhanced command and control structure, tying 
more exactly to overhead systems.
    The third phase, which will come in, in 2018, will include 
a land-based site in Poland, another upgrade to the missile, a 
further upgrade in the overhead sensor system. And then it gets 
a little less defined as you get into that fourth phase, but 
the current plan, as we have been discussing this morning, is 
to add another upgrade to the missile system. So that is kind 
of the flow of this over the next 7 years, sir.
    Mr. Franks. Well, thank you. Let me, if I could, ask you 
about the Russian missile defense system. Is it true--and I am 
asking these questions sort of like a lawyer does, you know, 
you have some perspective of the answer already, but for the 
sake of the record and the committee--is it true that Russia is 
undertaking a significant modernization of its system? Is it 
true that they use nuclear-armed interceptors? And have we, the 
United States, gotten assurance that Russia's missile defense 
system is not aimed at our nuclear deterrent? You know, I 
suppose that is a pretty relevant question since we witnessed 
Russia's hysteria about our relatively small non-nuclear-armed 
missile defense system when Russia deploys one that seems so 
clearly aimed at deterring ours. So I have given you a lot to 
shoot at there, but I might not get a chance to rephrase the 
    Admiral Stavridis. Well, let me begin by saying I will 
respond for the record in a classified manner to several 
elements of what you say.
    [The information referred to is classified and retained in 
the committee files.]
    Admiral Stavridis. It is very true that Russia is expanding 
generally in their defense spending to include missile systems, 
seagoing systems, as well as advanced air and so forth. So 
Russia is increasing their defense budget by about 12 percent 
this year, for example. I am sure that will include enhanced 
systems. Beyond that we would probably get into a classified 
realm there that I would like to address for the record.
    I want to state for the record that the U.S. missile 
defense system, and therefore the NATO missile defense system, 
poses no threat to Russian strategic systems, and the science 
and the kinematics of that are very clear.
    Mr. Franks. Well, Mr. Chairman, I guess I would just close 
by suggesting that during the Bush and Obama administration 
both of them have spent much time and political capital in 
trying in good faith, in my opinion, to assuage the Russian 
concerns or its stated concerns about our missile defense 
system. At the same time Russia has this extensive missile 
defense system in place that seems clearly aimed at our 
deterrent, and at some point we need to realize that Russia may 
be playing us to some degree. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    The vote has been called. It looks like we are going to be 
45 minutes to an hour. What I am going to try to do is get Mr. 
Enyart and Mr. Conaway, if we can get those questions in, and 
we probably will conclude the hearing at that time.
    Mr. Enyart.
    Mr. Enyart. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    General Ham, it is good to see you again.
    Admiral Stavridis, good to see you again.
    You know, I was certainly glad to hear that you are the co-
chairs of the State Partnership fan club, and I would like to 
think that that may be in large part due to the great 
partnership you saw between the Illinois National Guard and 
    I would like to ask you a couple of questions about the 
State Partnership Program, and I know it is a very small part 
of the budget. You know, at $22 million it is really dust, but 
I think it is a very effective program and I know that you do, 
too. So I would ask that you relay your thoughts on that to 
your incoming commanders when you get replaced eventually.
    Now, the State Partnership Program has been such a great 
success because what we tried to do was take those Eastern 
European nations that were formerly part of the Warsaw Pact and 
bring them close to the West and eventually integrate them into 
NATO, which we have successfully done. And of course we align 
States like Illinois with Poland because of cultural ties. 
Chicago is the second-largest Polish city in the world. And so 
we had some very firm bases there to work with. Do you believe 
that that model would translate also to Africa?
    General Ham. I do, Congressman. And we have some clear 
examples of that with the eight partnerships that we do have. 
And I think you are exactly right, the real benefit in the 
State Partnership Program is the enduring nature of the 
relationship, that sergeants and lieutenants and captains grow 
up together and have multiple engagements. So I think the 
premise is exactly right.
    Admiral Stavridis. If I could, because I have seen State 
Partnership both in Europe and in Latin America and the 
Caribbean, I can tell you it is easily transportable from 
significant and advanced to developing nations. It is a very 
powerful tool, and bang for the buck it is unmatched.
    Mr. Enyart. Has there been any thought given to what is 
called a multilateral partnership, where you would take a long-
established partnership, like Illinois and Poland, which has 
been in existence for 20 years, and pairing that partnership 
then with an African nation? Has there been any thought given 
to that?
    General Ham. There has, and we have one good example of 
that with Michigan and----
    Mr. Enyart. Latvia.
    General Ham. Estonia and Liberia. So that three-part 
relationship I think is a model for what might be possible in 
the future.
    Mr. Enyart. Admiral Stavridis, you indicate that the 
brigade combat teams [BCTs] that are leaving will be replaced 
on a rotational basis. Can you tell me how long a period of 
time you are talking about rotating the BCTs into Europe?
    Admiral Stavridis. Very much still under discussion. We are 
starting with a big exercise later this year called Steadfast 
Jazz. We will bring in headquarters elements and probably 
company level-size formations to do this. Then we will build it 
up to a battalion level phase the following year, and then we 
are hopeful to bring in the first brigade-size unit in about 3 
years. So we are building up to doing this. I am very confident 
of the support from the U.S. Army, they are enthusiastic about 
this, and we will mature the process as it goes along and make 
sure, Congressman, that it plugs into the NATO exercise 
schedule so we are getting the maximum bang for the buck both 
bilaterally, as well as within the alliance.
    Mr. Enyart. Any thought to using National Guard BCTs as 
part of those rotational forces?
    Admiral Stavridis. I think it is a terrific idea. And I am 
sure the Army is looking at a wide variety of different units 
to support this over time.
    Mr. Enyart. It sounds like what we are talking about is 
essentially a 2-week, maybe a 3-week training exercise.
    Admiral Stavridis. Yes.
    Mr. Enyart. Not any kind of permanent rotational.
    Admiral Stavridis. Correct, correct. Probably longer than 2 
to 3 weeks so that would get the efficiencies out of bringing 
them over, but probably a couple of months on the ground type 
of thing.
    Mr. Enyart. The Kosovo and Sinai peacekeeping missions have 
been a National Guard mission for the last 10 years, and I 
think that has been great for the Guard in terms of training. 
It has also saved our country money when you consider the fully 
burdened cost. Do you envision those missions continuing to be 
a Guard presence or are those going to become an Active Duty?
    Admiral Stavridis. I think that is up to the Army to sort 
through that. I noticed the next rotation in Kosovo is going to 
be an Active Duty unit. You are correct that for the previous 
decade it has been National Guard. I think the Army really 
values that flexibility.
    The Chairman. The gentleman's time expired.
    Mr. Conaway.
    Mr. Conaway. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Gentlemen, thank you both for your long, distinguished 
service to our country, and it is a heartfelt thank you.
    General Ham, you have had forces in Congo and Uganda for a 
little better than a year now on the hunt or helping hunt some 
folks. Can you give us a quick couple of sentences on whether 
that is working or not or how you see the value of those 
    General Ham. Congressman, I think the U.S. presence both in 
terms of the 100 or so special forces advisers, some other 
enabling capabilities, aviation, intelligence, logistics, 
medical, I think has provided a valuable service. We have seen 
significant increases in the number of defections from the 
Lord's Resistance Army, we have helped enable the Ugandan 
People's Defense Forces to conduct long-range patrols that have 
resulted in capturing some, to include some senior leaders from 
the Lord's Resistance Army. So positive steps. But Joseph Kony 
remains at large.
    Mr. Conaway. Right. The dustup in Mali, the collapse of the 
Mali armed services, what appeared to be, in the face of 
whatever fight--I don't know who trained them, if we were 
involved in any of the training in that regard. But are there 
lessons learned from what happened with the Mali forces that we 
can extend across Africa, to say, here is how we train, here is 
how we don't train, here is what works and doesn't work?
    General Ham. There are, Congressman. And certainly we 
looked introspectively in the aftermath of the military coup. 
First of all, from an intelligence perspective, did we miss 
indicators? We don't think so. We think this was very much a 
spur of the moment thing. Secondly, did we miss something in 
our training, in our engagement? I am glad to say that the 
units with which we were primarily engaged in Mali did not 
participate in the coup.
    Mr. Conaway. How did they perform in the fight?
    General Ham. They didn't. The units that we were mostly 
engaged with were largely suppressed by those who did 
participate in the coup.
    My greatest disappointment, though, sir is with the senior 
leaders, senior military leaders in Mali, who neither supported 
the coup, but they didn't resist it either. And this goes from 
the former chief of defense and to some other senior leaders. 
It is my belief that because this was not long planned, this 
was a very junior level-led coup, it could have been stopped 
relatively quickly had senior leaders in the Malian armed 
forces taken positive steps to counter the coup. They didn't, 
and that is a failure on their part. We are looking at 
ourselves to say, in our engagements with leaders we have got 
to continually emphasize the military ethos, the 
professionalism, the subordination to legitimate civilian 
control, operating according to the rule of law, and that 
military coups are not anywhere within the realm of possibility 
of a professional military.
    Mr. Conaway. Okay. Let me take one for the record on the 
fight that they had with the Tuaregs and the extremists in the 
    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix 
on page 123.]
    Mr. Conaway. That was really the subfocus of the question. 
Great answer to the other part because that was a big deal as 
    Your forces in extremis, given the tyranny of distance and 
geography that Stavridis mentioned earlier with respect to 
Africa, is it rational for you to have the kind of enablers and 
others available to respond to the next Benghazi-like event in 
    General Ham. Congressman, what we are seeking to do is to 
have forces postured regionally. So one in East Africa, 
Djibouti, one in West Africa, maybe maritime-based, maybe 
something ashore, and then a Southern Europe force that can 
respond to North Africa. In conjunction with the State 
Department, the Department of Defense is looking at what are 
the other capabilities. Do there need to be more Marines in 
more places at U.S. diplomatic facilities?
    Mr. Conaway. Have we dealt with the chain of command issues 
and the ability of whoever has AFRICOM's command, that you will 
be able to use those forces when you need them without having 
to go through other layers?
    General Ham. Yes, sir. The Secretary of Defense is my boss 
and that is who tells me where and when we can use forces. 
There is always a diplomatic aspect in terms of access. But I 
think we are clear. The chain of command has never, in my view, 
never been in question.
    Mr. Conaway. When in the Benghazi issue and the excitement 
about trying to respond there, there was clear lines of 
authorities and clearly operational issues that didn't--or were 
there--that got in the way of the response?
    General Ham. Sir, there was no lack of clarity on my part 
as to chain of command and no impediment.
    Mr. Conaway. All right. Thank you.
    Yield back, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank you. If we hurry, we can make the vote.
    Gentlemen, thank you very much. And if you could leave your 
entire statement it will be taken into the record. But I would 
also like staff to make copies and get them to all of the 
members of the committee, because you were so expeditious.
    I know I had requests from members that they wanted to hear 
that whole testimony, so that we will get it to them so they 
can read it. Thank you again for your great service to this 
    This hearing is adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 11:36 a.m., the committee was adjourned.]


                            A P P E N D I X

                             March 15, 2013





                             March 15, 2013


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                              THE HEARING

                             March 15, 2013



    Admiral Stavridis. As of 15 MAR 2013, Secretary Hagel announced 
U.S. policy changes with regard to ballistic missile defense (BMD), 
including European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) Phase 4. Phase 4 was 
cancelled and the prime component of Phase 4, the SM-3 Block IIB, was 
put on hold. This hold allows for SM-3 Block IIB engineering 
development to continue, but no acquisition milestones will be met. 
EPAA Phases 1-3, including Polish and Romanian sites, will provide the 
BMD resources to meet U.S. requirements to defend U.S. interests and 
support American commitments to our Allies in the 2018 timeframe. The 
loss of EPAA Phase 4 will have no effect on EUCOM's regional BMD 
requirements. [See page 17.]
    General Ham. The 2012 Tuareg rebellion was the latest of several 
Tuareg rebellions intended to gain economic resources and greater 
political autonomy from Bamako. In mid-January 2012, Tuareg rebels from 
the National Movement of the Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA) and Ansar 
al-Din groups conducted a series of attacks on Malian Armed Forces 
(MAF) outposts in northern Mali in reaction to the MAF's increased 
presence in the region. Weapons and fighters associated with the 2011 
Libya crisis enhanced Tuareg rebel military capabilities against the 
MAF. Rebel forces isolated and overwhelmed the inadequately supplied 
MAF outposts in northern Mali. The 22 March coup d'etat led by Malian 
soldiers in Bamako expedited the MAF's retreat from northern Mali. 
Islamic violent extremist organizations al-Qa'ida in the Lands of the 
Islamic Maghreb and Tahid wal Jihad in West Africa, in alliance with 
Ansar al-Din, took advantage of the Tuareg rebellion, and expanded 
their control throughout northern Mali--largely expelling the MNLA--
until early January 2013. [See page 25.]



                             March 15, 2013



    The Chairman. General Dempsey has stated that ``recognizing longer-
term uncertainty, I've also begun to reassess what our military 
strategy should be as well as institutional reforms necessary to remain 
an effective fighting force.'' Given the fact that the Department of 
Defense is undertaking a reassessment of military strategy due to 
sequestration, what would be the implications for EUCOM? Through this 
reassessment, what aspects of EUCOM's strategy will you be able to 
execute, and what aspects will you not be able to conduct under 
sequestration? What are the implications for U.S. force posture in 
    Admiral Stavridis. EUCOM is participating in the Secretary's 
Strategic Choices and Management Review, but the implications of this 
reassessment of military strategy are not yet clear. However, the 
fundamental importance of our strategic partnership with Europe to U.S. 
military strategy remains unchanged. This includes the strategic access 
that European Allies and partners provide for crisis response and 
global operations, the military forces that Europeans contribute to 
operations worldwide, and the military operations they lead around the 
globe. Therefore, preserving the U.S. strategic partnership with Europe 
and adapting it to meet the challenges of the 21st century will remain 
central elements of EUCOM's strategy. Being ready to fulfill our 
commitment to Article 5, which underpins the strategic partnership with 
Europe, and execute other contingency plans will also remain an 
enduring EUCOM mission. While these core tenets of EUCOM's strategy 
will persist, a reassessment of that strategy and potential impact of 
sequestration could affect how we execute the strategy and the level of 
risk to achieving our strategic objectives.
    The Chairman. To what extent is EUCOM adjusting the command's size 
and structure in light of the January 2012 strategic guidance? To what 
extent is EUCOM adjusting the command's size and structure in light of 
the current fiscal environment?
    Admiral Stavridis. DOD's strategic guidance, ``Sustaining U.S. 
Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense,'' looked out 
over the next 10 years and identified the plan for strategic 
rebalancing of U.S. defense posture in Europe. The Strategic Guidance 
also recognized that ``Europe is our principal partner in seeking 
global and economic security, and will remain so for the foreseeable 
future.'' In keeping with this evolving strategic landscape, our 
posture must also evolve to ensure we have the right force posture in 
Europe for the next 10-20 years. Our planned reductions include V Corps 
headquarters, two heavy brigades (one is already inactivated), an A-10 
squadron, an Air Control Squadron, and approximately 2,500 Army enabler 
forces. This reduction of general-purpose forces is offset by the 
addition of four ballistic missile defense capable destroyers at Main 
Operating Base (MOB) Rota, Spain; a CV-22 squadron at MOB Mildenhall, 
United Kingdom; a small aviation detachment in Poland which was 
established in late 2012; and potentially, more special operations 
forces in Germany to support contingency requirements. There are also 
plans to enhance rotational force presence to include elements of a 
U.S.-based brigade combat team to support the NATO Response Force 
(NRF). This strategic rebalancing ensures the U.S. has the right 
capabilities needed to accomplish military missions within and from the 
United States European Command Area of Responsiblity (USEUCOM AOR).
    The Chairman. As the second largest geographic combatant command, 
EUCOM appears to have a close to half its authorized staff dedicated to 
providing intelligence support or performing security cooperation 
activities. Given DOD's recent strategic guidance and the shift in 
priorities to the Pacific and Middle East, please explain EUCOM's 
continued requirements for these personnel in further detail.
    Admiral Stavridis. [The information referred to is classified and 
is retained in the committee files.]
    The Chairman. To what extent, if any, has EUCOM been affected by 
sharing Navy and Air Force component commands with U.S. Africa Command 
    Admiral Stavridis. The sharing of Navy and Air Force Component 
Commands between AFRICOM and EUCOM is an imperfect but manageable 
command and control compromise caused by a resource constrained 
environment. Because it violates the principal of ``Unity of Command'' 
it has occasionally created operational, organizational, resource and 
doctrinal friction. The EUCOM staff, AFRICOM staff, and service 
components continue to overcome the associated challenges to provide 
effective oversight, direction, and control of subordinate 
organizations in pursuit of national and theater strategic objectives. 
This sustained success is a testimony to the leadership of the 
component commanders as well as the hard work, can-do attitude, and 
professionalism of the EUCOM, AFRICOM, and component staffs.
    The Chairman. How does the command manage personnel within its 
directorates and the directorates of its subordinate unified commands 
to ensure that resources are being efficiently allocated and that there 
is no unnecessary overlap in functions?
    Admiral Stavridis. USEUCOM is manned via the Joint Table of 
Distribution (JTD) and managed via the Organization and Functions 
Manual. These two documents ensure the exact number of personnel 
required to perform specific duties are allocated to each directorate, 
and the functions of those directorates are outlined in the 
Organization and Functions Manual. The Personnel Strength function 
within the J1 works specifically with each Service Personnel 
headquarters to man the billets outlined in the JTD with qualified 
personnel at the specific service manning rate.
    The Chairman. DOD issued Instruction #1400.25 in July 2012 
establishing procedures and guidelines for civilian employment in 
foreign areas. The instruction also stated it was DOD policy that 
``Civilian employment in the competitive service in foreign areas shall 
be limited to a period of 5 continuous years unless interrupted by at 
least 2 years of physical presence in the United States or nonforeign 
area.'' a. Is this DOD policy part of the calculus for EUCOM staff 
drawdown? If not, why not? Is EUCOM on track to meet its projected 
reduction in staff without following the DOD policy? b. How many EUCOM 
civilians have transitioned back to the U.S. because of the 5-year 
policy? c. How many EUCOM civilians have asked for an extension? d. How 
many EUCOM civilians have been given an exception to the policy and 
allowed to stay beyond the 5-year policy?
    Admiral Stavridis. a. The DOD five-year policy is always part of 
the calculus when planning any staff drawdown or restructuring. EUCOM 
is on track to meet its projected reduction in staff.
    b. From July 2012 to present, 21 individuals have transitioned back 
to the U.S. because of the five year policy.
    c. From July 2012 to present, management requested 62 tour 
    d. 40 of the 62 extension requests were approved; 22 requests are 
pending decision.
    The Chairman. General Dempsey has stated that ``recognizing longer-
term uncertainty, I've also begun to reassess what our military 
strategy should be as well as institutional reforms necessary to remain 
an effective fighting force.'' Given the fact that the Department of 
Defense is undertaking a reassessment of military strategy due to 
sequestration, what would be the implications to AFRICOM's strategy? 
Through this reassessment, what aspects of AFRICOM's strategy will you 
be able to execute, and what aspects will you not be able to conduct 
under sequestration?
    General Ham. Our strategic approach entails the synchronous 
execution of operations, exercises, and security cooperation programs 
which contribute to increased security, stability, and prosperity 
across the expanse of the African continent. U.S. Africa Command, while 
remaining vigilant to threat to U.S. National Security Interests 
emanating from the region, specifically those posed by al-Qa'ida, 
violent extremist organizations, and illicit trafficking, undertakes a 
range of activities focused on strengthening the defense capabilities 
of African states and regional organizations so that over the long run 
African partners are able to address African security challenges.
    We believe that we will be sufficiently resourced and capable of 
planning and executing counterterrorism related activities. However, we 
are concerned about the impact of reduced resources as we see an 
increase in threat activity in Africa. Specifically, we are concerned 
      The availability of intelligence, surveillance and 
reconnaissance (ISR) assets to maintain awareness across a large area 
of threat activity.
      The availability of Personnel Recovery capability as our 
engagement and presence on the African continent increases.
      The availability of Special Operations Forces and 
enablers to rapidly respond to crisis and contingency operations on the 
African continent.
      The impact of resource degradation on our interagency 
partners since we leverage interagency resources to accomplish 
objectives on the continent. Cuts to other agencies could potentially 
impact the execution of our theater strategy. Specifically, budgetary 
reductions associated with the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism 
Partnership (TSCTP), a suite of Global Peacekeeping Operations 
Initiative (GPOI) programs, the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS 
Relief (PEPFAR), and pandemic response.
    Increased--but modest and focused--investments today in 
counterterrorism and in strengthening the defense capabilities of our 
African partners will contribute to the conditions for a stable and 
prosperous Africa and reduce the risk to our National Security 
Interests. U.S. Africa Command's ability to sustain gains already made 
in East Africa, while responding to emergent security challenges in 
North and West Africa, depends upon adequate resources and responsive 
partner building authorities.
    The Chairman. The Committee understands that AFRICOM is in the 
process of conducting an internal review of its size and structure. a. 
What is the status of the study? Do you anticipate any changes in 
military, civilian, or contractor positions? b. Can you provide details 
of any potential areas of concern for the command in terms of staffing? 
Please describe how these staffing needs will fulfill ongoing mission 
    General Ham. AFRICOM is currently conducting our annual internal 
organizational review to ensure manpower and personnel are aligned 
appropriately to support our mission critical needs. This review is the 
Combatant Commander's title 10 responsibility for organizing to meet 
mission requirements. We are currently 75% complete on the study. Once 
the study is complete we will align manpower to ensure mission critical 
needs are being met. We will not make any staffing decisions until the 
study is complete.
    The Chairman. AFRICOM has several temporary task forces that are 
not reflected in its permanent authorized personnel numbers. To what 
extent is AFRICOM considering realignment and staffing of its temporary 
joint task forces (Special Operations Command and Control Element-Horn 
of Africa, Operation Enduring Freedom-Trans Sahara, and Combined Joint 
Task Force-Horn of Africa)? a. To what extent has AFRICOM evaluated 
whether these are enduring missions? b. Given the command's initial 
focus on phase zero/interagency activities, what is the command doing 
to prepare itself to respond to the growing conflicts occurring in 
northern and eastern Africa? Do you see an expansion in the role of any 
of these task forces?
    General Ham. In coordination with the Director of the Joint Staff, 
we are conducting a mission analysis of CJTF-HOA to determine what 
missions are enduring. We do not anticipate an expansion of CJTF-HOA; 
however, we are currently working through the Joint Manpower Validation 
Process to pursue a permanent force structure for CJTF-HOA and SOCCE-
HOA. Given recent events in Northwest Africa, we continue to assess the 
mission requirements and structure of OEF-TS.
    The Chairman. To what extent, if any, has AFRICOM been affected by 
sharing Navy and Air Force component commands with U.S. European 
Command (EUCOM)?
    General Ham. We have shared our Navy component command since the 
inception of the command and our Air Force component command for the 
past two years. There has been no change in support for U.S. Africa 
Command operations, exercises, and theater security cooperation 
engagements attributable to sharing component commands.
    The Chairman. How does the command manage personnel within its 
directorates and the directorates of its subordinate unified commands 
to ensure that resources are being efficiently allocated and that there 
is no unnecessary overlap in functions?
    General Ham. As part of the Command's annual review process we 
strive to ensure appropriate resources are allocated efficiently to 
support our mission critical requirements. During the annual review we 
assess our core and non-core functions to identify overlap and 
duplication of functions. Through this annual review process, we 
determine the best allocation of our resources by assessing priority of 
and risk associated in not resourcing the function. Where sufficient 
manpower is not available, we accept risk in lower priority mission 
areas. The Command also uses a Joint Resources Board (JRB) to 
prioritize and make resourcing determinations to support emerging 
manpower requirements throughout the year.
    The Chairman. DOD issued Instruction #1400.25 in July 2012 
establishing procedures and guidelines for civilian employment in 
foreign areas. The instruction also stated it was DOD policy that 
``Civilian employment in the competitive service in foreign areas shall 
be limited to a period of 5 continuous years unless interrupted by at 
least 2 years of physical presence in the United States or nonforeign 
area.'' a. What is the role of DOD policy as AFRICOM reviews and 
manages its personnel structure? b. How many AFRICOM civilians have 
transitioned back to the U.S. because of the 5-year rule? c. How many 
AFRICOM civilians have asked for an extension? d. How many AFRICOM 
civilians have been given an exception to the policy and allowed to 
stay beyond the 5-year policy?
    General Ham. Response A: The five-year limitation on foreign area 
employment provides headquarters, U.S. Africa Command the necessary 
flexibility to accommodate the ever-changing foreign area workforce 
requirements. It provides developmental and career-enhancing 
opportunities for employees in the U.S. as well as periodically renews 
the knowledge and competencies of the overseas workforce. The DOD-wide 
policy provides consistency of application between the many commands in 
the Stuttgart area.
    Response B: Since July 2012, 46 extension requests have been 
denied. Of those, eight employees transitioned back to the U.S., 10 
employees were denied extension and are currently registered in the DOD 
Priority Placement Program (PPP) for job placement assistance in CONUS, 
and 28 were denied extension, but have yet to register in DOD PPP or 
make plans for departure due to non-extension. This last category is 
primarily due to the delay between when employees are notified about 
whether they will be extended (a year in advance of their scheduled 
departure date) and when they are allowed to register in the PPP 
program (six months in advance of their scheduled departure date).
    Response C: Since July 2012, 66 overseas tour extension requests 
were submitted by either the employee or the management/supervisor. 
Seven requests were approved for compassionate reasons (1-6 months), 13 
requests were approved for mission related reasons, and 46 requests 
were denied.
    Answer D: Since July 2012, 20 overseas tour extensions beyond five 
years were approved based on mission related reasons and compassionate 
reasons (allow dependents to finish the school year).

                  *Snap Shot of Overseas Tour Extension

Approved Overseas Extension beyond 5 years                           13
Extension approved for Compassionate Reasons                          7
Extension requests that were denied                                  46
  (10 on PPP/8 departed HQ USAFRICOM)
Overall Number of Extension Requests                                 66


    Mr. Langevin. Admiral, are the lines of command, control, 
communications, and information sharing adequately defined between 
EUCOM, CYBERCOM, STRATCOM, NATO and the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense 
Center of Excellence, as well as those allies with whom we work on a 
bilateral basis on cyber? What, in your view, can we do to better 
integrate our allies into network operations?
    Admiral Stavridis. The current lines of Command, Control, 
Communications and information sharing between EUCOM and STRATCOM/
CYBERCOM are strong and getting stronger everyday through continual 
exchanges to include EUCOM's daily participation in CYBERCOM's morning 
J3 update and CYBERCOM's participation in EUCOM's weekly Cyber Defense 
Working Group. As to NATO and allies with whom we work on a bilateral 
basis, EUCOM is the Executive Agent for a number of DOD Information 
Assurance agreements with NATO and select countries in the Area of 
Responsibility (AOR). These formal agreements govern both what and how 
cyber-related information is shared and has been sufficient to date. In 
regards to the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of Excellence, 
while numerous informal exchanges have occurred between EUCOM and the 
Center to discuss how we can best support each other's efforts, there 
only exists a Memorandum of Agreement on administrative support to U.S. 
military members embedded in the Center. EUCOM is working on multiple 
lines of effort to achieve greater cyber integration with allies to 
include: participating in a number of bilateral/multinational network 
operations exercises, sponsoring seminars on best cyber defense 
practices, and working with NATO to establish a framework for coalition 
communications operations based on the lessons learned from ISAF's 
Afghan Mission Network.
    Mr. Langevin. Admiral, we understand the Department is considering 
a legislative proposal that would increase the authorized funding 
amount of the NATO Special Operations Headquarters from $50 million per 
year to $75 million per year. Can you tell us why this increase is 
needed in a time of declining budgets and sequestration? When can the 
committee expect to see this legislative proposal and what priority 
would your command assign to this proposal?
    Admiral Stavridis. As you know, section 1272 of the FY 2013 
National Defense Authorization Act (Public Law 112-239) amends section 
1244 of Public Law 111-84 to authorize $50 million per year from the 
Operation and Maintenance, Army account for the NATO Special Operations 
Headquarters for fiscal years 2013 through 2015. At this point, the 
President has not approved a legislative proposal that would increase 
that amount, so that any such proposal would be pre-decisional. I am 
not at liberty to address pre-decisional matters and, respectfully, 
must decline to discuss this matter further at this time.
    The Department is currently working with the White House to begin 
providing the Committee with legislative proposals in the very near 
future, and with as much of the Department's legislative program as 
possible before the Committee begins to mark up the fiscal year 2014 
National Defense Authorization Act in late May.
    Mr. Langevin. General, do you feel that your building partnership 
capacity missions have a proper amount of oversight and control, or 
does this committee need to consider additional authorities?
    General Ham. Under current oversight requirements, I see no risk to 
the development and submission of building partner capacity proposals. 
We are able to develop and submit proposals to meet our highest 
priorities for near-term, emerging partner capacity building.
    In general, I believe oversight is sufficient, but more flexible 
authorities that enhance our ability not only to respond to emerging 
challenges, but to provide stability and consistency in our approach, 
would be of strategic and long-term benefit.
    Mr. Langevin. General, how does your command currently address 
building partnership capacity (BPC) missions in a country where 
counter-terrorism functions may be carried out by forces other than the 
military, such as a gendarmerie or Interior Ministry?
    General Ham. We strive to develop programs in coordination with 
non-Department of Defense (DOD) agencies who can work with the police 
and border security in support of numerous militarized border security 
forces. Department of State led programs such as Trans-Sahara 
Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) and Partnership for Regional East 
Africa Counterterrorism (PREACT) include non-DOD agencies who can work 
with the police and border guards. The Global Security Contingency Fund 
provides for an integrated approach to border security where U.S. 
Africa Command's military requirements can be blended with interagency 
law enforcement initiatives.

    Mr. Wittman. The Readiness Committee was recently told by a 
Departmental witness that the Secretary of Defense has initiated a 
European Infrastructure Consolidation. We were also told that force 
structure drives infrastructure. Can you provide us the future force 
structure numbers that will be used for this European Infrastructure 
Consolidation and indicate how this diminished force structure will 
provide you sufficient forces to meet your Phase 0, peacetime stability 
operations? I would particularly like to understand the risks 
associated with this diminished force structure.
    Admiral Stavridis. The Secretary of Defense directed the European 
Infrastructure Consolidation analysis to provide a basis for reducing 
long-term expenses through footprint consolidation. The consolidation 
of our footprint in Europe will take into account DOD's strategic 
guidance for a shift in strategic focus to the Pacific, the planned 
inactivation of the two Brigade Combat Teams and associated support 
forces, reductions in Air Force units, and decreasing requirements for 
support to Afghanistan. This rebalancing also includes the addition of 
four ballistic missile defense capable destroyers, a CV-22 squadron, a 
small aviation detachment to Poland, potentially more special 
operations forces in Germany, and anticipated support to USAFRICOM for 
crisis response to meet the new challenges in their AOR. Because the 
European Infrastructure Consolidation analysis is ongoing, we cannot 
anticipate what impact it will have on our future force structure and 
assigned personnel. We also cannot anticipate what impact it will have, 
if any, to our Phase 0 steady state tasks.
    Mr. Wittman. From an Army perspective, what will be the primary 
purpose of U.S. troops based in Europe once the regular deployments to 
Afghanistan are done? What kind of threats will they be responding to? 
Why should the U.S. continue to forward deploy our troops to Europe?
    Admiral Stavridis. Army forces provide a diverse crisis response 
capability for the uncertain security environment to include the Levant 
and NATO contingency plans; they serve as a demonstration of U.S. 
commitment and deterrence, they underpin our NATO Article 5 commitment, 
and are key to sustaining interoperability among Allies and partner 
nations. As I told the Committee, our European bases are the forward 
operating bases for 21st century security.
    Their primary purpose of our forces is to provide immediate 
response to the full spectrum of operations including global 
contingencies, peacekeeping, noncombatant evacuations, humanitarian 
assistance and more. They support seven combatant commanders and NATO 
with strategic reach into three continents, capitalizing on the 
existing European infrastructure.
    The threats these forces may respond to include the continued 
political unrest in the Middle East, European based terrorism, 
ballistic missile threats, and the frozen conflicts in the Caucasus and 
Balkans. Land forces in Europe contribute to maneuver and enabler force 
capabilities to support a full range of military operations, while 
meeting a wide array of engagements to build partner capacity and meet 
interoperability objectives. The return on investment of U.S work with 
our European partners is enormous, with more than 90% of our coalition 
partners in Afghanistan coming from Europe. That equates to 40,000 
personnel actively shouldering a common burden in our global defense. 
All those nations train with and have close long-term relationships 
with European assigned Army units from the strategic to the tactical 
level. They also remain a visible symbol of U.S. commitment to European 
security and the NATO Alliance.
    Mr. Wittman. The Army has announced the reduction of 2,500 
``enablers'' as part of our force structure footprint reduction in 
EUCOM. During my recent visit to EUCOM, several unit commanders 
expressed concerns about the number of enablers being tied to force 
structure reductions rather than COCOM missions or crisis response. Do 
you share those concerns? Why or why not?
    Admiral Stavridis. No. Our posture in Europe, and these attendant 
changes, reflects our recent strategy guidance and budget decisions and 
are sufficient to meet our current assigned missions. Consistent with 
DOD's Strategic Guidance and NATO's Strategic Concept, we continue to 
adapt our posture in Europe to meet new threats while maintaining the 
forces necessary to fulfill our Article 5 commitments and strengthen 
Allied and partner capabilities.
    Mr. Wittman. Earlier this year, the Department provided us notice 
about the intent to expand airbase operations in Djibouti at a nearby 
airfield in Chabelley. Can you explain the current state of aviation 
operations at Djibouti and ensure our committee that additional 
measures are in place to preserve this critical mission?
    General Ham. Currently, civilian and military aviation operations 
continue normally at Djibouti's international commercial airport while 
talks continue to work out technical arrangements for operations at 
Chabelley. We will continue to work with the Department of State as 
they complete necessary agreements with the Government of Djibouti for 
aviation operations at Chabelley.
    We appreciate the reauthorization of the temporary, limited 
authority to use operations and maintenance funding for military 
construction in support of contingency operations in our area of 
responsibility which will permit us to complete necessary construction 
at Chabelley.

    Mr. Coffman. Admiral, I understand we are reducing our military 
footprint in the European theater. What is the current force lay-down 
for the United States military in Europe? Provide details on the 
number, type, and location of all our troops in Europe.
    Admiral Stavridis. There are approximately 64,000 military 
personnel authorized for the support of U.S. European Command and our 
Service component commands. Additionally, there are approximately 
10,000 additional U.S. personnel supporting U.S. Africa Command, U.S. 
Transportation Command, NATO, and other U.S. Government and Department 
of Defense activities in Europe.

                                        2013 Navy/Marines Force Lay Down
             Unit                   Approx. #              Location(s)                      Comments
                   NAVEUR HQ   600                 Naples, Italy               Includes NAVAF and 6th Fleet
          MARFOREUR/MARFORAF   170                 Stuttgart, Germany
                      NSWU-2   60                  Stuttgart, Germany          .................................
                     NSWU-10   25                  Stuttgart, Germany          .................................
           EOD Mobile Unit 8   160                 Rota, Spain                 .................................
        Rota Security Forces   125                 Rota, Spain                 .................................
     Commander Task Force 67   160                 Sigonella, Italy            .................................
    Other Navy/Marine Forces   5,700               Various locations           Includes Navy personnel for
                                                    (primarily Rota, Spain;     EUCOM, AFRICOM, NATO billets,
                                                    Naples and Sigonella,       etc.
                                                    Italy; and Souda Bay,
          Total Navy/Marines   7,000

                                             2013 Air Force Lay Down
             Unit                   Approx. #              Location(s)                      Comments
                    USAFE HQ   1,100               Ramstein, Germany           Includes support to AFRICOM
               3rd Air Force   500                 Ramstein, Germany           .................................
           31st Fighter Wing   3,800               Aviano, Italy               Includes 2 F-16 Sqdns and an Air
                                                                                Control Sqdn which inactivates
                                                                                in FY13
           48th Fighter Wing   4,600               Lakenheath, UK              Includes 3 F-15 Sqdns
           52nd Fighter Wing   3,600               Spangdahlem, Germany        Includes F-16 Sqdn and an A-10
                                                                                Sqdns which inactivates in FY13
          39th Air Base Wing   1,200               Incirlik, Turkey            .................................
                 MUNSS Units   550                 Various Locations           .................................
          65th Air Base Wing   600                 Lajes, Portugal             .................................
           86th Airlift Wing   5,000               Ramstein, Germany           .................................
    100th Air Refueling Wing   1,800               Mildenhall, UK              .................................
   435th Air Ground Ops Wing   1,300               Ramstein, Germany           .................................
     603rd Air and Space Ops   450                 Ramstein, Germany           .................................
                 MUNSS Units   540                 Various locations           .................................
   501st Combat Support Wing   800                 Various locations in UK     .................................
     352nd Special Ops Group   900                 Mildenhall, UK              .................................
 521st Air Mobility Ops Wing   1,000               Ramstein, Germany           .................................
   Other Air Mobility Forces   400                 Various locations           .................................
            Other Air Forces   3,360               Various locations           Includes Air Force personnel for
                                                    throughout Europe           EUCOM, AFRICOM, NATO billets,
             Total Air Force   31,500              ..........................  .................................

                                            2013 Army Force Lay Down
             Unit                   Approx. #              Location(s)                      Comments
                  USAREUR HQ   700                 Heidelberg/Wiesbaden,       .................................
                     V Corps   775                 Wiesbaden, Germany          Inactivates in FY13
                        JMTC   1,500               Grafenwoehr, Germany        .................................
              173rd IBCT (A)   3,500               Bamberg/Schweinfurt,        .................................
                                                    Germany and Vicenza,
                      2nd CR   4,000               Vilseck, Germany            .................................
               172nd Inf Bde   4,000               Schweinfurt/Grafenwoehr,    Currently Inactivating
         12th Combat Avn Bde   2,700               Ansbach, Germany            .................................
             Theater Spt Avn   570                 Mannheim/Stuttgart,         .................................
                                                    Germany and Chievres,
    10th Air Missile Defense   150                 Kaiserslautern, Germany     .................................
          5-7 Air Defense Bn   575                 Kaiserslautern, Germany     .................................
    21st Theater Sustainment   3,000               Various locations           Includes 16th Sustainment Bde
                      Command                       throughout Europe (HQs in
           18th Engineer Bde   1,300               Various locations in        Includes 2 Eng Bns
                                                    Germany (HQs in
                 18th MP Bde   1,800               Various locations           Includes 2 MP Bns
                                                    throughout Europe (HQs in
                                                    Sembach, Germany)
                 66th MI Bde   1,000               Wiesbaden/Hohenfels,        .................................
          5th Signal Command   1,800               Various locations           Includes 2 Signal Bdes
                                                    throughout Europe (HQs in
             Medical Command   2,800               Various locations           Includes Landstuhl Regional Med
                                                    throughout Europe (HQs in   Ctr
                IMCOM-Europe   400                 Various locations           .................................
                                                    throughout Europe (HQs in
      1-10 Special Forces BN   450                 Stuttgart, Germany          .................................
                  Other Army   3,980               Various locations           Includes Army personnel for
                                                    throughout Europe           EUCOM, AFRICOM, NATO billets,
                  Total Army   35,000              ..........................  .................................

    Mr. Coffman. Admiral, how many of our troops in Europe are combat 
element troops?
    Admiral Stavridis. Although there is no doctrinal definition of a 
``combat element'' force, EUCOM does have several assigned units that 
exercise and employ a direct combat mission. Those units are listed 
below. The combined total FY13 military authorizations for these units 
are approximately 27,000 personnel; however, several of these units are 
deactivating as noted.

          Unit                Service       Approx. #           Location(s)                   Comments
  Naval Special Warfare   USN             60             Stuttgart, Germany        .............................
  Naval Special Warfare   USN             25             Stuttgart, Germany        .............................
      31st Fighter Wing   USAF            3,800          Aviano, Italy             Includes 2 F-16 Sqdns and an
                                                                                    Air Control Sqdn which
                                                                                    inactivates in FY13
      48th Fighter Wing   USAF            4,600          Lakenheath, UK            Includes 3 F-15 Sqdns
      52nd Fighter Wing   USAF            3,600          Spangdahlem, Germany      Includes F-16 Sqdn and an A-
                                                                                    10 Sqdns which inactivates
                                                                                    in FY13
352nd Special Ops Group   USAF            900            Mildenhall, UK            .............................
 1-10 Special Forces BN   USA             450            Stuttgart, Germany        .............................
         173rd IBCT (A)   USA             3,500          Bamberg/Schweinfurt,      .............................
                                                          Germany and Vicenza,
   2nd Cavalry Regiment   USA             4,000          Vilseck, Germany          .............................
          172nd Inf Bde   USA             4,000          Schweinfurt/Grafenwoehr,  Currently Inactivating
    12th Combat Avn Bde   USA             2,700          Ansbach, Germany          .............................

    Mr. Coffman. Admiral, how many of our troops in Europe are there to 
support ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan?
    Admiral Stavridis. U.S. troops are stationed in Europe to enable 
ongoing operations in Afghanistan as well as other global missions. 
First, just like CONUS based forces, U.S. forces in Europe deploy 
worldwide. In the case of Afghanistan, U.S. Army Europe deployed on 
average approximately 20% of its forces (roughly 7,400 personnel) to 
ISAF and U.S. Central Command in 2012. This included the 173rd Airborne 
BCT, 12th Combat Aviation Brigade, and V Corps. Currently, we have 
approximately 3,500 personnel deployed in support of operations in 
Afghanistan. Second, U.S. troops in Europe provide critical logistical 
support to global operations. With regard to Afghanistan, this includes 
Ramstein AB airmen conducting airlift operations, the movement of cargo 
along the Northern Distribution Network, and life-saving urgent care 
for wounded warriors at the Landstuhl Regional Medical Center. Third, 
our European assigned forces enable Allies and partner nations to 
deploy forces in support of U.S. operations. For example, U.S. Army 
Europe personnel at the Joint Multinational Training Command in 
Grafenwoehr and Hohenfels, Germany conduct pre-deployment training for 
Ally/partner nation forces deploying to Afghanistan. U.S. forces in 
Europe have provided these same types of support to operations in Iraq 
and Libya, and will be required to do so in future global operations.

    Mr. Veasey. I know you have worked to foster and maintain great 
relationships with our NATO allies. And you have encouraged our 
partners to build their capabilities as we face challenges across the 
globe. Thank you for your efforts. I know that in 2011, you wrote to 
the Senate Appropriations Committee in support of the Medium Extended 
Air Defense System--MEADS--the next generation Air and Missile Defense 
system we are developing in partnership with Germany and Italy. How 
important is it, in your view, that we complete our financial 
commitment and develop missile defense capabilities for the U.S. and 
our partner nations?
    Admiral Stavridis. It is very important, and we are grateful that 
the Congress passed H.R. 933 (now Public Law 113-6), which provides 
that crucial funding. Completion of MEADS development will reassure our 
allies by avoiding a situation where the U.S. could have been viewed as 
an unreliable partner. Further, this comes at an exceptionally crucial 
point in time where EUCOM is working with NATO and multiple nations to 
build missile defense capabilities and capacity to allow European 
nations to bear more of the load for the defense of Europe.