    [House Hearing, 113 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

    AFTER THE WITHDRAWAL: THE WAY FORWARD IN AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN (PART I)

    =======================================================================

                                 JOINT HEARING

                                   BEFORE THE

                                SUBCOMMITTEE ON
                        THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

                                    AND THE

                      SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

                                     OF THE

                          COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                        ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                   __________

                                 MARCH 19, 2013

                                   __________

                               Serial No. 113-21

                                   __________

            Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

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                          COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

                     EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman
    CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey     ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
    ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida         ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
    DANA ROHRABACHER, California             Samoa
    STEVE CHABOT, Ohio                   BRAD SHERMAN, California
    JOE WILSON, South Carolina           GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
    MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas             ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
    TED POE, Texas                       GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
    MATT SALMON, Arizona                 THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
    TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania             BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
    JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina          KAREN BASS, California
    ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois             WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
    MO BROOKS, Alabama                   DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
    TOM COTTON, Arkansas                 ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
    PAUL COOK, California                JUAN VARGAS, California
    GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina       BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois
    RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas            JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III,
    SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania                Massachusetts
    STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas                AMI BERA, California
    RON DeSANTIS, Florida                ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California
    TREY RADEL, Florida                  GRACE MENG, New York
    DOUG COLLINS, Georgia                LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
    MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina         TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
    TED S. YOHO, Florida                 JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
    LUKE MESSER, Indiana

         Amy Porter, Chief of Staff      Thomas Sheehy, Staff Director

                   Jason Steinbaum, Democratic Staff Director
                Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa

                     ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman
    STEVE CHABOT, Ohio                   THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
    JOE WILSON, South Carolina           GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
    ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois             BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
    TOM COTTON, Arkansas                 DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
    RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas            ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
    RON DeSANTIS, Florida                JUAN VARGAS, California
    TREY RADEL, Florida                  BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois
    DOUG COLLINS, Georgia                JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III,
    MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina             Massachusetts
    TED S. YOHO, Florida                 GRACE MENG, New York
    LUKE MESSER, Indiana                 LOIS FRANKEL, Florida

                                     ------

                      Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific

                          STEVE CHABOT, Ohio, Chairman
    DANA ROHRABACHER, California         ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
    MATT SALMON, Arizona                     Samoa
    MO BROOKS, Alabama                   AMI BERA, California
    GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina       TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
    SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania            BRAD SHERMAN, California
    DOUG COLLINS, Georgia                GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
    LUKE MESSER, Indiana                 WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page

                                   WITNESSES

    Seth G. Jones, Ph.D., associate director, International Security
      and Defense Policy Center, RAND Corporation....................     8
    Kimberly Kagan, Ph.D., president, Institute for the Study of War.    22
    Mr. Peter Bergen, director, National Security Studies Program,
      The New America Foundation.....................................    26
    Daniel S. Markey, Ph.D., senior fellow for India, Pakistan, and
      South Asia, Council on Foreign Relations.......................    52

              LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING

    Seth G. Jones, Ph.D.: Prepared statement.........................    10
    Kimberly Kagan, Ph.D.: Prepared statement........................    24
    Mr. Peter Bergen: Prepared statement.............................    28
    Daniel S. Markey, Ph.D.: Prepared statement......................    54

                                    APPENDIX

    Hearing notice...................................................    82
    Hearing minutes..................................................    83
    Questions submitted for the record by the Honorable Scott Perry,
      a Representative in Congress from the Commonwealth of
      Pennsylvania...................................................    84

                         AFTER THE WITHDRAWAL: THE WAY
                           FORWARD IN AFGHANISTAN AND
                               PAKISTAN (PART I)

                                  ----------

                            TUESDAY, MARCH 19, 2013

                         House of Representatives,

              Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa and

                     Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific,

                         Committee on Foreign Affairs,

                                Washington, DC.

        The committees met, pursuant to notice, at 1 o'clock p.m.,
    in room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ileana Ros-
    Lehtinen (chairman of the Subcommittee on the Middle East and
    North Africa) presiding.
        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. This joint subcommittee meeting will come
    to order. After recognizing myself, Chairman Chabot, Ranking
    Member Deutch, and Ranking Member Faleomavaega for 5 minutes
    each for our opening statements, we will then hear from our
    witnesses and without objection, the witnesses' prepared
    statements will be made a part of the record. Members may have
    5 days to insert statements and questions for the record,
    subject to the length limitation in the rules.
        Before I begin my remarks, I would like to convey my
    deepest condolences to the family and friends of U.S. Army
    Captain Andrew Michael Pederson-Keel of South Florida who was
    killed in action on March 11, 2013 while serving our country in
    Afghanistan. Our thoughts and prayers are with his family.
        The Chair now recognizes herself for 5 minutes. Last month
    in a State of the Union address to the nation, President Obama
    announced that the United States will be drawing down our
    forces in Afghanistan by 34,000 troops over the coming year and
    projecting that our military presence in Afghanistan will be
    over before the start of 2015. The President also announced
    that our forces will transition into a support role, handing
    the reins over to the Afghanistan National Security Forces,
    ANSF, while our focus will be mainly on training and equipping
    these forces.
        Reports indicate a remaining residual force of 3,000 to
    9,000 troops, while many military commanders continue to push
    for a more robust role, including the Commander of U.S. Central
    Command, who recommended that nearly 14,000 troops be left
    behind post-2014. The way forward may be debatable, but we
    should agree that the decision must not be made for political
    reasons. Leaving before stability is assured would not only
    unravel all that we have worked so hard to accomplish in
    Afghanistan, but it would undermine the efforts of our men and
    women who have served so bravely and have sacrificed so much in
    Afghanistan, like the aforementioned Captain Andrew Pederson-
    Keel.
        Without the proper infrastructure, training, and support
    from U.S. and international forces, Afghanistan runs the risk
    of plunging into chaos. The national security interests of the
    United States, and indeed of our allies, are at stake because
    of the real threat that the Taliban could retake power and al-
    Qaeda could reestablish a safe haven from which to conduct
    operations.
        Many allies are worried that the drawdown could lead to a
    significant increase in violence and terrorist-related
    activities that can further destabilize the conflict. Most see
    Karzai as an unpredictable leader, yet they are concerned about
    his possible successor. The U.S. must hold Karzai accountable
    for the lack of transparency, for the corruption problems that
    need to be corrected, to ensure a successful transition to a
    viable successor. Afghan's elections are within a year and
    electoral reforms are needed to ensure a free, fair, and
    transparent election that protects human rights and respects
    minority groups.
        Karzai's recent actions reveal that he is attempting to
    play a dangerous, but calculated game, aimed at appeasing
    certain Afghan factions by vilifying the United States. Karzai
    accused us of working hand in hand with the Taliban to spread
    violence in Afghanistan. These inflammatory comments put the
    lives of our servicemen and -women in danger.
        The Commander of the International Security Assistance
    Forces and U.S. Forces Afghanistan warned our troops that
    ``Karzai's remarks could be a catalyst for some to lash out
    against our forces. He may also issue orders that put our
    forces at risk.''
        Karzai yearns to be known as the one who kicked out the
    foreign invaders and he fears that he will suffer the same fate
    as previous Afghan leaders before him who were overrun or
    executed by the Taliban. This would open the floodgates from
    Pakistan, a country which has long been an insurgency sanctuary
    for the Taliban, al-Qaeda, the Haqqani Network and other
    extremist elements. Pakistan must do more to prevent extremists
    from using this area as a staging point for attacks against the
    United States and our allies in Afghanistan.
        We must make an honest assessment of our relationship with
    Pakistan and judge its willingness and capacity to work with us
    in order to ensure that Afghanistan does not succumb to the
    Islamist and extremist threats. Pakistan must also do its part
    by eliminating its ties to foreign terrorist organizations. We
    must evaluate our relationship with Islamabad if we are to
    continue to provide billions of dollars of taxpayer money to
    Pakistan. Pakistan's stability remains a vital U.S. national
    security interest and our relationship is paramount in order to
    fight regional and global terrorism, to stabilize Afghanistan
    and to protect long-term national security interests. Thank
    you.
        I will now turn to my ranking member, my friend, my Florida
    colleague, Congressman Ted Deutch.
        Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Madam Chairman, and thanks to our
    witnesses for testifying today. And before I begin my remarks I
    would like to associate myself with the chairman expressing my
    deepest sympathy to the friends and family of South Florida
    native and U.S. Army Captain Andrew Pederson-Keel. Our thoughts
    and prayers are with his family.
        After almost 12 years of war in Afghanistan and 2,177
    American casualties, there is strong opposition among the
    American public to continue U.S. engagement there. Separately,
    there continues to be deep frustration regarding the state of
    our relationship with Pakistan. But we are working in an area
    where there are many daunting challenges and there are no easy
    answers.
        In Afghanistan, the economy is dependent on foreign aid,
    yet corruption is rampant and too often aid is misused. In
    Pakistan, there are numerous insurgent safe havens that are
    being used to train and rearm the Taliban. And when you factor
    in sectarian tensions and regional anti-Americanism, you
    understand why so many Americans want to end U.S. involvement
    in Afghanistan and cut off billions in aid to Pakistan. But is
    now the time to fundamentally alter our strategy of a
    responsible troop drawdown in Afghanistan?
        Over the next year, the President will be withdrawing
    another 34,000 troops. That is now nearly 2.5 million American
    men and women who served our country in Iraq and Afghanistan
    and have returned to their families and our communities. We
    have an obligation to these men and women to work in a
    bipartisan manner to get our Veterans' benefits and care in a
    timely manner, to find employment, and to address the mental
    health issues necessary to stop the rising suicide rate. The
    sacrifices of those who have served and are returning from
    Afghanistan have helped contribute to numerous sustainable
    goals there. There are positive stories to tell.
        Under President Obama's leadership, we refocused our
    efforts and have now largely accomplished his goal of
    dismantling the core of al-Qaeda and ensuring that it can no
    longer use Afghanistan and the border areas of Pakistan to plan
    or conduct terrorist attacks against the United States
    homeland. Although the Taliban remains an active presence in
    Afghanistan, al-Qaeda in Afghanistan has been decimated which
    is crucial to our national security. And it is important to
    distinguish that although the Taliban has a reprehensible
    history in Afghanistan, it was al-Qaeda that provided a direct
    threat to our homeland.
        In addition, largely due to U.S. international aid in
    Afghanistan, since 9/11, the maternal mortality rate has
    declined by 80 percent. Access to basic health services is
    available to more than 60 percent of Afghans, up from 9 percent
    in 2001. And life expectancy has increased from 44 years to 60
    in the past decade. There have also been tremendous gains in
    gender equality. Today, one third of Afghanistan's 8 million
    students are female. Women now hold more than a quarter of the
    seats in the Parliament. By the end of this year, at least 30
    percent of government workforce will be women. In spite of all
    of the challenges Afghanistan is facing, an Asia Foundation
    poll found that the majority of Afghans think that their
    country is on the right track.
        Now if we are going to commit U.S. personnel and resources
    to Afghanistan under the enduring Strategic Partnership
    Agreement, the Afghan Government must take the necessary steps
    to become a viable and stable democracy. Significantly improved
    cooperation with the Pakistani Government is critical to the
    successful drawdown of troops and long-term stability in
    Afghanistan. Despite years of frustration and mistrust,
    recently exemplified by Pakistan's decision to move forward
    with a natural gas pipeline with Iran, we do share some core
    interests with Pakistan. We want national reconciliation in
    Afghanistan and we do not want Afghanistan to be embroiled in
    another civil war. These are areas of agreement to work
    together on. But Pakistan must do more to ensure that safe
    havens along the border are rooted out.
        If any American troops are going to remain in Afghanistan,
    President Karzai must create an environment that enables U.S.
    forces to assist and advise Afghan National Security Forces in
    securing their country. This means negotiating a bilateral
    security agreement that provides U.S. troops with necessary
    protections. President Karzai must also recognize that his
    recent inflammatory anti-American rhetoric seriously harms our
    efforts to create and ensure stability and security in
    Afghanistan.
        The most important indicator for future stability in
    Afghanistan is the peaceful transfer of political power that
    will occur after the Presidential elections scheduled in April
    2014. As we all know, the 2009 elections were marred by serious
    allegations of widespread fraud, resulting in the nullification
    of nearly 20 percent of the votes cast. If Afghanistan is going
    to progress as a sustainable democracy, it must start with free
    and fair elections in April 2014.
        As I said at the outset, these are difficult challenges and
    there are no easy answers. After 12 years of war and over
    200,000 American casualties, we owe it to the Americans and
    those Afghans who have sacrificed so much to get this right. We
    went into Afghanistan to protect our own national security and
    going forward, this must continue to be about U.S. national
    security. I look forward to discussing with the witnesses the
    best ways for the United States to secure our long-term
    security interests by helping Afghanistan move forward with its
    pursuit of a stable democracy and I yield back.
        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much, Mr. Deutch. We will
    now hear from the subcommittee chair and ranking member of Asia
    and the Pacific Subcommittee, starting with Chairman Chabot.
        Mr. Chabot. Thank you, Madam Chair, and thank you for
    calling this important joint hearing with the Subcommittee on
    Asia and the Pacific. I am pleased to join your efforts to
    discuss the implications of the U.S. withdrawal from
    Afghanistan and the critical role Pakistan plays in
    successfully achieving a stable, peaceful, and independent
    Afghanistan.
        The Obama administration's decision to expedite the U.S.
    withdrawal from Afghanistan poses a strategic risk to the
    stability and security interests of South Asia. The President's
    announcement in January that an additional 34,000 U.S. troops
    will leave Afghanistan by February 2014 threatens to plunge the
    region into a state in which terrorists will once again thrive.
    There is no clarity on the exact withdrawal plan or what a
    post-2014 Afghanistan might look like. With so many outstanding
    variables in play, I think a hasty retreat is unwise.
        In November 2011, the Middle East and South Asia
    Subcommittee, which I then chaired, held a hearing on U.S.
    policies in Afghanistan and Pakistan in which it was discussed
    how, at that time, it was unclear what the plan entailed, when
    it would occur, how it was expected to play out, and what the
    administration hoped to accomplish beyond the 2014 withdrawal
    date. Now, a year and a half later, we know that Afghan forces
    will start taking the lead this spring and U.S. forces will
    transition to a supporting role.
        We are also told now that U.S. troops will remain in
    Afghanistan after 2014 and focus on training and
    counterterrorism, but we do not know how many troops. A
    continuing U.S. presence in Afghanistan, however, rests on the
    finalization of the Status of Forces Agreement which President
    Obama says he hopes is completed by the end of the year.
        Following Defense Secretary Hagel's visit to Afghanistan
    earlier this month, that may or may not happen.
        Former Ambassador Ryan Crocker emphasized nearly 2 years
    ago that the U.S. needed to focus on ``strategic patience.''
    President Obama has chosen to ignore that advice. Withdrawing
    another 34,000 troops from Afghanistan by the end of the year
    jeopardizes the gains we have made in the south against the
    Taliban and in the east where Afghan and coalition forces are
    fighting the Haqqani Network. The odds that al-Qaeda will
    reestablish itself once the U.S. presence has significantly
    diminished is only increasing. This possibility becomes more
    likely once we take into account Afghanistan's corrupt and weak
    governance, and the insurgents' safe havens allowed to thrive
    in Pakistan.
        Time and again, the administration has insisted that
    Pakistan must cease its tolerance of insurgents' safe havens,
    but Pakistan's leadership has ignored its requests. As a
    result, our relationship with Pakistan has dramatically
    deteriorated, and there are lingering doubts about whether its
    leadership is committed to pursuing peace and stability in
    Afghanistan or in the region for that matter.
        This need of cooperation raises concerns about the
    administration's lack of a coherent assistance and development
    strategy with Pakistan. Pakistan has been one of the leading
    recipients of U.S. foreign aid in the post-9/11 period, yet its
    clear lack of support for our regional security goals fails to
    reflect that investment by the American taxpayer.
        We know any successful withdrawal from Afghanistan,
    however, rests on the ability of the United States to foster
    relatively good relationships with Islamabad. We could even
    settle for lukewarm--but even that is easier said than done.
    This particular challenge is further strained because of the
    administration's failure to put in place an effective regional
    strategy that involves Afghanistan's neighbors, Pakistan and
    India.
        Two thousand thirteen will be a critical year for Pakistan.
    It will hold parliamentarian elections this spring which could
    result in a new prime minister. Add to that the turnover of its
    top military position, and we could see huge implications for
    U.S. security interests. Because of Pakistan's growing nuclear
    arsenal, embedded terrorist networks, turbulent relationship
    with India, and extensive influence in Afghanistan, its
    internal stability needs to be a priority, otherwise it could
    become a huge liability for broader objectives in Asia.
        Pakistan is hedging its bets. It continues to support
    extremist groups so that it can maintain an indispensable
    position in Afghan peace talks and deny India, our strategic
    partner, any significant influence. With the severe trust
    deficiency between our two countries, Afghanistan's decision to
    grant Pakistan a central role in selecting Taliban figures for
    governance positions is very concerning. With so many
    unresolved issues, a premature withdrawal from Afghanistan will
    leave behind a war between competing factions all with vying
    interests.
        Lastly, there has been much discussion recently regarding
    notions that Pakistan is having a strategic change of heart.
    While Islamabad claims U.S. and Pakistani interests can be
    brought into alignment, I believe we must remain skeptical of
    the internal divergent interest that risk undermining U.S.
    objectives. I hope today's witnesses will touch on the
    likelihood that Islamabad's recent gestures are indeed a
    legitimate effort to cooperate with the U.S. and its neighbors.
        I want to again thank Chairwoman Ros-Lehtinen for calling
    this hearing.
        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, Chairman Chabot. So
    pleased to recognize now the ranking member, Mr. Faleomavaega.
        Mr. Faleomavaega. Thank you, Madam Chair and Chairman
    Chabot. I would like to join my colleagues in welcoming the
    distinguished panel of regional and security experts who will
    address the way forward toward Afghanistan and Pakistan.
        I have a particular vantage point as a Veteran of the
    Vietnam War. We all remember President Nixon's plan for
    Vietnamization of that war. I can clearly state that the future
    destiny of any nation is primarily determined, in my opinion,
    by the people of that nation itself.
        After more than 12 years of the war in Afghanistan, a war
    that began on October 7, 2001, in the aftermath of the
    September 11 attacks, the American people are experiencing what
    I consider, Madam Chair, a profound sense of battle fatigue.
    This is a war that has lasted longer than our nation's 8-year
    struggle for independence against the mighty British Empire and
    longer than the 4 years of civil war that cost some 600,000
    soldiers their lives. But unlike those mammoth struggles that
    we fought on American soil involving issues that clearly had a
    direct impact on all Americans, the war in Afghanistan has been
    fought in a distant place and only directly impacts those
    service members who answer the call and the tens of thousands
    of our military families that had to be part of that sacrifice.
    And they continue to do this today.
        There are a number in our own country, particularly here in
    Washington, who call for a continued open-ended commitment in
    Afghanistan. They remind one of the American patriot, Tom
    Payne, who wrote and I quote, ``The summer soldier and the
    sunshine patriot will in this crisis shrink from the service of
    their country. For them the battle is joined, but it is for the
    others to do the fighting.'' In my opinion, Madam Chair, the
    American people never sought an open-ended commitment in
    Afghanistan, nor do they see the goal as nation building. They
    are well aware that Afghanistan has been called the graveyard
    of empires. Not even Alexander the Great was able to conquer
    Afghanistan, nor the mighty British Empire or even the Soviet
    Union. Now what makes us think we can do differently?
        I believe, Madam Chair, the goal of the American people was
    to retaliate by going against Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaeda
    who attacked us on September 11. Osama bin Laden is now dead
    and his son-in-law, the so-called mouthpiece for al-Qaeda, was
    recently captured and brought to the United States. The
    American people believe it is high time to declare victory in
    the war in Afghanistan and to bring our young men and women
    home.
        Madam Chair, the Iraq War cost us $2.2 trillion, cost some
    4,400 American soldiers' lives, and some 137,000 Iraqi men,
    women, and children their lives. What has it produced for us
    today? I cannot say enough of the sacrifices that our
    soldiers--we cannot even take care of our Veterans right now as
    a result of them having to fight in that war in Iraq as we are
    doing in Afghanistan.
        I would like to note, Madam Chair, that after 60 years, we
    still have 29,000 soldiers in South Korea. There is supposed to
    be an armistice. What are we, the policemen of the world? That
    is the opinion of some of our colleagues here in Congress, I
    believe. Madam Chair, thank you so much.
        Mr. Rohrabacher. Will the gentleman yield for a question?
        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you. We are so proud of our
    patriots who are wearing our nation's uniform and in that I
    include my daughter-in-law, Lindsey, who has served admirably
    in Iraq and Afghanistan and continues to serve today. And so
    many who are battling it every day. Thank you so much. I wanted
    to point that out.
        The Chair is so pleased to welcome our witnesses. First,
    Seth Jones. Dr. Jones is the associate director of the
    International Security and Defense Policy Center at the RAND
    Corporation as well as an adjunct professor at Johns Hopkins
    University School for Advanced International Studies. Thank
    you, Dr. Jones.
        And next our committee welcomes Kimberly Kagan, founder and
    president of the Institute for the Study of War. Dr. Kagan
    served in Kabul for 15 months and as Chairman of the Joint
    Chiefs of Staff, Mike Mullen recognized Dr. Kagan with the
    Distinguished Public Service Award, the highest honor that a
    Chairman can present to civilians who do not work for the
    Department of Defense. Congratulations to the entire Kagan
    family.
        Third, Peter Bergen, welcome, sir. The director of the
    National Security Studies Program at the New America Foundation
    here in Washington, DC, and a fellow at Fordham University
    Center on National Security. He is also a print and television
    journalist, documentary producer, author of four books, three
    of which were New York Times best sellers and three of which
    were named books of the year by the Washington Post. Do you
    also cook? No, okay.
        And finally, we welcome Daniel Markey. Thank you, Daniel.
    Dr. Markey is senior fellow for India, Pakistan and South Asia
    at the Council on Foreign Relations where he specializes in
    security and governance issues in South Asia. From 2003 to
    2007, Dr. Markey held the South Asia Portfolio on the
    Secretary's Policy Planning Staff at the U.S. Department of
    State.
        I would like to kindly remind our witnesses that your
    testimony in full form has been made a part of the record. If
    you could summarize it to no more than 5 minutes that would be
    great. So without objection, they will be inserted into the
    record and we will start with you, Dr. Jones.

        STATEMENT OF SETH G. JONES, PH.D., ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR,
        INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY CENTER, RAND
                              CORPORATION

        Mr. Jones. Thank you, Madam Chair. Thank you other members
    of both committees.
        What I would like to do here in summarizing my remarks is
    note that I am pulling them both from my time as a researcher,
    spending time in Afghanistan for RAND, as well as at least one
    major tour as a senior civilian within U.S. Special Operations.
    Had several colleagues that were killed in country, so felt
    personally the loss of the U.S. soldiers in Afghanistan.
        My bottom line, as I will outline it this afternoon is that
    I think it would be detrimental to U.S. national security to
    withdraw all forces from Afghanistan as the U.S. has done in
    Iraq. I think the United States should continue to conduct
    counterterrorism operations in the country and assist Afghans
    in conducting counterinsurgency operations after 2014, although
    perhaps with a presence and strategy that is more akin to U.S.
    efforts in other regions such as the Philippines and Colombia
    based on conditions in Afghanistan and the United States today.
        I am going to make that argument based on three points. The
    first one, my assessment, including coming back from areas like
    Kunar, Nuristan, and Nangarhar along the Afghanistan-Pakistan
    border several months ago, I assessed that both Afghanistan and
    Pakistan and the extremely porous border that they share
    continues to be a hot bed of extremist, radical Islamist
    militancy. There are a range of groups in that region that
    continue to threaten U.S. security and its interests overseas
    including al-Qaeda which as several panelists here have noted
    has been weakened, but I would say, still retains a core
    leadership and still has a presence up in Kunar, where I was,
    with foreigners including British citizens training in camps
    under individuals like Farook al-Qahtani; Lashkar-e-Taiba which
    has conducted attacks in the region and has had operatives
    arrested in the United States for terrorist activity; Tehreek-
    e-Taliban Pakistan which was involved in the 2010 Times Square
    plot in New York City; the Haqqani Network and a range of
    others.
        Based on my assessment of this region, I would say it would
    be detrimental to pull out all U.S. forces. We can talk about
    the specifics in the Q&A period. I would just point to the
    situation in Iraq after we left. As I look at the numbers
    there, al-Qaeda in Iraq has been involved in an average of 30
    suicide and car bomb attacks per month this year which is a 50
    percent increase from 2011 levels. Al-Qaeda has also been
    involved in Syria. Its main affiliate, Jabhat al-Nusra, is
    probably al-Qaeda's best armed affiliate group in the world
    now, especially after the raids of several military bases in
    Syria. I think as we have seen in Iraq, U.S. leaving does not
    mean militancy goes away.
        Second, I would argue that as the ranking member noted
    earlier, Afghanistan society is improving in many ways. The
    data is very clear. Just to supplement his data, if you look at
    GDP data, GDP per capita rose from $92 in 2001 per capita to
    $543 in 2011. That is a massive increase. Foreign direct
    investment has massively increased. Infant mortality rates
    declined from 95 per 1,000 live births in 2000 to 73 in 2001.
    Primary school and secondary school enrollment have
    significantly increased. If you look at the secondary school
    numbers from 362,000 in 2001, the last year of the Taliban
    reign, to over 2 million today. So what we see is it is a more
    vibrant economy. It is a healthier economy. And it is a better
    educated economy than when we started.
        Based on a range of other data, I would say including if
    you look at some of the improvements in the Afghan National
    Army, the Asia Foundation data is probably best. Afghans
    believe it has a better force today and it needs less support
    from foreign troops. We have made progress on multiple fronts.
    I think we lose that if we leave. Not to put a fine point on
    it. I would be happy to go into more details in the question
    and answer session.
        Let me just say finally to conclude, I think it is helpful
    to have a discussion about the criteria for an exit. My view is
    the U.S. should exit this region when we have no serious
    national security threats to the U.S. We are not there yet.
        Let me conclude briefly with a quote from the Lawrence of
    Arabia which I think will be helpful as we think about how to
    proceed. And I am going to substitute the word Arabia--
    Afghanistan for Arabia. Lawrence said, ``Do not try to do too
    much with your own hands. Better the Afghans do it tolerably
    than that you do it perfectly. It is their war and you are
    there to help them, not to win it for them. Actually, also,
    under the very conditions of Afghanistan your practical work
    will not be as good as perhaps you think it is.''
        So with that, I will end.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Jones follows:]

                                  ----------

        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Excellent way to end. Thank you, Dr.
    Jones.
        Dr. Kagan.

     STATEMENT OF KIMBERLY KAGAN, PH.D., PRESIDENT, INSTITUTE FOR
                            THE STUDY OF WAR

        Ms. Kagan. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman, and the
    distinguished members of both committees. It is a great
    pleasure to be here with you today to discuss this vital issue.
        I, too, like Dr. Jones, believe that a successful outcome
    in Afghanistan is essential to America's national security here
    at home, as well as throughout the region of Southwest Asia.
    And I, too, believe and indeed assess that the dismantling of
    al-Qaeda core, although it is something that has been
    undertaken over the last decade is far from complete and far
    from sufficient to achieve our national security objectives in
    Southwest Asia, in Pakistan and Afghanistan.
        Unfortunately, al-Qaeda is both an ideology and an
    agglomeration of organizations that rely on one another to
    perpetuate militancy not only in Afghanistan and Pakistan, but
    also elsewhere on the globe. And unfortunately, that means that
    dismantling al-Qaeda core does not actually suffice to complete
    the reduction of the threat of that radical militancy and
    terrorism against the United States or its allies in the West
    or within the region.
        As Dr. Jones said, there are numerous groups thriving in
    the border lands between Afghanistan and Pakistan, whether it
    be al-Qaeda itself, TTP, LET, the Haqqani Network. And what we
    risk in withdrawing from Afghanistan too soon or in leaving
    smaller number of bases than necessary, is undermining the very
    counterterrorism strategy that we actually as a nation hoped to
    pursue and have continued to pursue through engagement along
    the Afghanistan-Pakistan border in an effort to ensure that
    other militant groups do not get the capabilities or develop
    the intention that they can execute to cause trouble in
    Pakistan, Afghanistan, or the region as a whole.
        This is one of the issues on which I differ from the
    opinion of many senior administration officials because what we
    are talking about here is not simply whether al-Qaeda's
    affiliates have the will to attack the United States or its
    Western allies, we are talking about groups whose intentions,
    wills, and capabilities will change over time as our force
    presence changes, as Pakistani politics changes, and as
    Afghans' politics change.
        Therefore, we actually have a requirement to continue to
    defend America's national security that goes above and beyond
    al-Qaeda senior leadership and actually requires a long-term
    presence, though not an indefinite presence, within the region.
    What does that long-term presence mean? What should it look
    like? Well, it needs to be based on the bilateral security
    agreement that we are working through with difficulty with
    President Karzai to achieve. It requires basing for its
    counterterrorism operations. It requires training the Afghan
    National Security Forces. But most of all, it requires being in
    Afghanistan for two reasons. One is to help preserve the
    essential stability of Afghanistan. Essential because when
    Afghanistan is stable, so too is the region. It is a centrally-
    located place and peace and stability inside of Afghanistan
    tend to emanate outward toward its neighbors and have a
    stabilizing effect on them. Whereas, conflict and civil war
    inside of Afghanistan tend to invite proxy participation by
    foreign states and competition that results in violence, terror
    and militancy in a greater number of ungoverned spaces.
        We have to remain in Afghanistan to prevent Afghanistan
    from once again becoming an ungoverned space wrapped in civil
    war. The Afghans right now are looking to us to commit to them
    and they are hedging against two possibilities. One is the
    possibility of radical success. That, in fact, the policies
    that they and we are pursuing now will lead them to a peaceful
    and stable Afghanistan in which their political lives and the
    kinds of changes will continue. The other is a civil war which
    will result not only in their loss of power, but in the
    destabilization of an entire region where this militancy will
    continue to exist. Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Ms. Kagan follows:]

                                  ----------

        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, Dr. Kagan.
        Mr. Bergen.

      STATEMENT OF MR. PETER BERGEN, DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY
              STUDIES PROGRAM, THE NEW AMERICA FOUNDATION

        Mr. Bergen. Madam Chair, members, thank you for this
    invitation. It is really a privilege to be speaking here today.
    I make my comments based on traveling to Afghanistan starting
    in '93 during the civil wars there under the Taliban, so I have
    a sense, personal sense, of what has changed over time. Many of
    these changes, of course, are very good. I have been traveling
    to Pakistan since 1983. Pakistan just celebrated an enormous
    milestone on Saturday which is the first civilian government to
    complete its term in Pakistani history. As you know, there have
    been three successful coups in Pakistan, many other coup
    attempts. So the fact that civilian government has completed
    its term and the Pakistanis will go to the polls to elect
    another civilian government, we are looking at a period when we
    might have a decade of uninterrupted civilian rule which is
    enormously important as we look to the future of the region.
    The Pakistani military has no interest at this point in
    mounting a coup and also probably doesn't have the capability
    to do so. And so we are a kind of different space. This is an
    optimistic moment I think for Pakistan, despite all the
    problems that we know exist in that country.
        Another great opportunity is the election which we referred
    to in Afghanistan is both a moment of opportunity and of great
    peril. If this election is as flawed as the 2009 election, this
    could precipitate a return to a new civil conflict. If, on the
    other hand, this is reasonably fair, reasonably free, and
    reasonably uncontested, this will set Afghanistan down the path
    to basic ally some sort of political agreement that will
    prevent the renewal of some civil war there.
        On the matter of troop numbers, we can have a debate about
    whether 8,000 is the correct number of 15,000. I think much
    more important is the issue of what we say when we actually
    announce the figure. We have negotiated a great U.S. investment
    in this Strategic Partnership Agreement and a partnership
    agreement that goes on until 2024. We should make it clear that
    our commitment is until 2024, whether it is 6,000 soldiers or
    9,000 or 10,000, whatever the final number is, because Afghans
    have received a lot of conflicting signals in the past about
    our intentions. For instance, when the surge was announced of
    30,000 troops it was also announced that July 2011 withdrawal
    date. And that became more important in certain Afghans' minds
    than the fact that President Obama in his first term actually
    tripled the number of troops in Afghanistan from 30,000 to
    90,000. But there was real concern about this withdrawal date.
    So we shouldn't make the same mistake twice.
        On the question of is a civil war likely, I associate
    myself with the comments of Mr. Deutch and also Dr. Jones. I
    mean there has been so much change in Afghanistan, positive
    change, that there is a great deal of investment. There is
    nothing like going through a civil war to prevent the idea--it
    seems like a good idea. And so many people have seen positive
    changes in their lives. I just wanted to add some to the data
    that Dr. Jones and Mr. Deutch mentioned. Five million refugees
    have returned home to Afghanistan. There is nothing like a
    refugee returning home as a signal of faith in the future of
    the country. Relatively few of the millions of Iraqi refugees
    have returned home to Iraq. Iraq is still regarded as too
    unstable.
        There are proportionately, as you probably know, Madam
    Chair, more women in the Afghan Parliament than there are in
    the halls of U.S. Congress. And you can list a whole set of
    data like this. And surprisingly, there has been a lot of
    discussion about the economy Afghanistan once the ACAP goes
    out. But if you look at a World Bank recent study which was
    very rigorous and comprehensive, they espoused that the growth
    rate in Afghanistan will drop from about 9 percent to about 5
    percent. So the economy may do pretty well.
        On the issue of the army, of course, this is a flawed force
    in many senses. The big problem here is the desertion rate. The
    retention rate now in the Afghan army is 27 percent leaving
    every year. So on the other hand, you are seeing a lot more
    Afghan soldiers and policemen dying. Now about 300 Afghan
    soldiers and policemen dying a month. In January, we saw three
    American soldiers die which was the lowest number in 4 years.
    So you are beginning to see a real change in the actual--
    willingness of the Afghan army and police who take casualties
    in after all, what is their own war.
        On the issue of the Haqqani Network, I think it is going to
    be--Pakistan is going to continue its basic acquiescence and/or
    sort of lukewarm support for the Haqqanis. That is not going to
    change. When it is in their interest to attack the Taliban as
    they did in South Waziristan and Swat, they will do it and
    conduct serious military operations. Interestingly, we have
    seen absolutely no evidence. It is hard to prove negatives that
    Osama bin Laden was getting any kind of official support from
    the Pakistani Government. That is the assessment of the
    intelligence community. It is also--we have recovered a number
    of documents from the Abbottabad compound and there is nothing
    in there to show that bin Laden was being supported by the
    Pakistani Government.
        One final note, in terms of improving the Pakistani
    relationship, 2011 was sort of a nadir. I think it is getting
    better. Pakistan has never threatened to close down the air
    corridor which is absolutely vital to our supply effort in
    Afghanistan. Kandahar Airport is the busiest airport in the
    world, 700 flights a day. Pakistan has never even threatened to
    close that air corridor. And so I think there are things that
    we can build on. What about a U.S.-Pakistani free trade
    agreement? What about something that has often been mentioned
    in the past which is lowering the very high rate of tariff on
    Pakistani textiles? Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Bergen follows:]

                                  ----------

        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much.
        Dr. Markey.

    STATEMENT OF DANIEL S. MARKEY, PH.D., SENIOR FELLOW FOR INDIA,
         PAKISTAN, AND SOUTH ASIA, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

        Mr. Markey. Thank you, Madam Chair, and all of the members
    of the subcommittees. It is a real honor to be here today.
        Now as you have heard so far from the other panelists, I
    think here in Washington we tend to focus on Pakistan and the
    U.S.-Pakistan relationship primarily within the context of the
    war in Afghanistan. And what I would like to do is try to shift
    the emphasis a little bit to really focus on the U.S.-Pakistan
    relationship, Pakistan in and of itself because I think that
    the consequences of a rupture in that relationship would be
    dire not just for what they say about Afghanistan, but for
    other reasons as well. And why do I say this?
        As has been mentioned already a little bit, but I think I
    can expand, Pakistan is very important both for the
    counterterror reasons that have been mentioned, the regional
    militancy issues, but also because it is a nuclear armed state
    and to put this in context, imagine a Pakistan or a U.S.-
    Pakistan relationship that was similar to the U.S.-North Korea
    relationship, keeping in mind that North Korea has about 24, 25
    million people; Pakistan about 200 million, keeping in mind
    that Pakistan has about 100 nuclear weapons and North Korea
    probably has a handful of them.
        Cooperation with Pakistan is significant and important. It
    is also frustrating and inadequate and that we must appreciate.
    But things could get much, much worse in this relationship. We
    should seek to avoid that. Beyond the bilateral issues, there
    is also the regional question. Look at the map. Look where
    Pakistan is. Look at the location next to India, next to China,
    along the Arabian Sea, bordering Central Asia. This is a
    strategically-relevant place that will continue to be so well
    into the future, well after the war in Afghanistan ends one way
    or another.
        Now fortunately, although 2011 and 2012 were very rocky in
    the U.S.-Pakistan relationship, we have seen a shift in tone.
    Pakistan reopened the ground lines of communication, restarted
    dialogues with the U.S. Presented itself as being more eager to
    be involved in the reconciliation process with the Afghan
    Taliban. Now this is driven primarily, I believe, by Pakistan's
    anxiety about the future, anxiety about the war in Afghanistan.
    Now that anxiety is not especially new, but the tone has
    shifted and that we should appreciate.
        And it has shifted primarily because of our actions. If
    there has been a change in Pakistan's strategic calculations,
    which I don't think the change is all that significant, it has
    been driven by a more significant shift on our part. And this
    has already been alluded to. That shift is on our part, has to
    do with the decisions that we have made, the U.S. Government
    has made to withdraw forces from Afghanistan faster and at
    greater numbers than I think the region would have anticipated
    just a matter of a year or two ago.
        And I think this has also been coupled with a far more
    energetic effort on our part, on the U.S. Government's part, to
    reach out to Afghan insurgents through this process of
    reconciliation.
        So if there is a change, it has been the change of the
    United States. And what will this mean? What will these changes
    mean for post-2014? I would sketch out two scenarios and we
    have heard a bit of this so far. But if everything works as we
    hope, that is, if we can build the Afghan National Security
    Forces and transition to them over time or on time and bear
    some of the burden for that with our allies; if we can see
    Afghanistan through the next political transition, that is,
    their Presidential elections; if we can bring the bulk of the
    insurgents on board through some sort of a reconciliation
    dialogue; and if we can maintain a cooperative relationship
    with whatever new Afghanistan emerges to keep up a fight
    against remaining terrorist cells, that would be great. Then I
    think the United States' core interests will be met. Pakistan's
    interests will be met. The region's interests will be met.
    Afghans will be pleased. But if we can't do this, if we can't
    succeed in this process and it breaks down along one or more
    fronts, then what is likely to happen is the situation in
    Afghanistan will deteriorate.
        And I am more concerned that perhaps--than at least some of
    my colleagues here, who I am more concerned that we could see a
    spiraling of the insurgency and a downward deterioration into
    worst civil conflict. At that point, the consequence for
    Afghanistan will be dire, but I would also point to the
    consequence for the U.S.-Pakistan relationship. There will be
    mutual recriminations. We will blame each other. We already do
    so. The consequences then could be for greater rupture between
    the United States and Pakistan. So the end game of the war in
    Afghanistan could set us up for a break in the U.S.-Pakistan
    relationship.
        What should we do from this? First, don't confuse what we
    are seeing with Pakistan as more of a strategic shift. See it
    as a tactical response to our behavior. Secondly, look for
    narrow points of cooperation where we can with the Pakistanis.
    We will not agree on many important things. We will agree on
    some. And finally, we should use the time that remains in our
    drawdown in Afghanistan where we still are focused with arms,
    personnel, resources, senior level attention, to strike hard at
    our adversaries and enemies along the border with Afghanistan
    and Pakistan, both because they will be a threat to us if they
    persist as others have made out, but also because they will be
    a threat to Pakistan, the U.S.-Pakistan relationship and the
    region moving ahead. So we have a limited amount of time to
    really make a military difference on that score as well. Thank
    you.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Markey follows:]

                                  ----------

        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much. Excellent testimony
    and I will speed through the questions so we can get as many
    members as possible. Our exit strategy, the bilateral security
    agreement, and certainly our exit from Iraq was not optimal, as
    President Obama would say about other things. Is the same
    mistake going to be repeated in Afghanistan, along with legal
    immunity for our U.S. forces in Afghanistan?
        Another controversial point between Karzai and the United
    States has been the issue of prison transfers from U.S.-run
    detention center near Bagram to Afghan custody. There have been
    several delays with the last one coming while Secretary Hagel
    was just in Afghanistan. Why is Karzai so adamant that these
    transfers happen immediately? Why has this been such a
    difficult issue to resolve? With all of the corruption problems
    surrounding the Afghan Government, can the U.S. trust that
    government to properly secure those prisoners in a manner
    consistent with our standards? And why is Karzai willing to
    undo all of the good will that had occurred between the U.S.
    and his government over this issue? What is the symbolism or
    the significance of Bagram for Karzai?
        We will just start down the line. Thank you, Dr. Jones.
        Mr. Jones. Madam Chair, this is a very important issue. In
    working with several Afghan ministers along these lines, I
    would note that the Afghan Government more broadly has been
    more amenable to working through these issues than some of the
    public statements from the President would indicate. On issues
    like prison transfers, I would add other things like night
    raids and the use of Special Operations in villages. Public
    statements have ended up being slightly different from the
    negotiating strategy of the government in private.
        I think, in part, what we have got to be able to see
    through is that some of these statements, in my view, by the
    Afghan President are done, in part, for domestic political
    purposes, to try to demonstrate to his constituency, his
    population, that he is not a puppet of the United States. So I
    think we have to take some of his comments into domestic
    politics, into a domestic politics context. So what does that
    mean? I think most of these issues, including the Bagram prison
    transfers, we will be able to negotiate. I think we do have to
    be careful that we do not hand over prisoners, as we have seen
    with individuals like Mullah Zakir, who is the second or third
    in command--the leading military commander of the Taliban that
    they released. So I think we can hold fast on several issues.
    But I found them in practice more amenable.
        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much. Dr. Kagan.
        Ms. Kagan. Thank you. To expand on Dr. Jones' point,
    President Karzai is facing an Afghan electorate even if he
    himself is not running for President in 2014. Certainly, he
    wants to ensure a smooth succession between him and someone who
    also represents the same ideas of Afghan Pashtun unity that he
    would like to represent and symbolize.
        To do so, he is going to play to some of his Afghan
    audiences by reinforcing his commitment to his own sovereignty,
    something frankly that he has emphasized quite a lot in public
    rhetoric and also in private rhetoric over a number of years
    when it comes to legal immunities of detainee transfers,
    Special Operations forces privileges, and so on and so forth.
        I think what is essential here is first to recognize that
    we, the United States, are never going to have a total
    conversion of interests with President Karzai. He is the
    President of a sovereign nation and he has different interests
    from ours. But just because he speaks actively in public to
    posture to his electorate does not mean that that forms the
    basis of his policy or the basis of his expectations of the
    United States going forward.
        It is also vital that the United States does not actually
    lose authorities over the next year to conduct the kinds of
    operations that we will need to conduct in order to maintain a
    counterterrorism mission. And insofar as President Karzai is
    bargaining to take away some of these authorities, it is okay
    for us to push back and to push back hard in order to make sure
    that we secure our national interests.
        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you. And in the interest of time, I
    am going to cut you gentlemen off and give time to Mr. Deutch.
    We are in recess, but we expect that we will have votes in just
    a little while.
        Mr. Deutch.
        Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Madam Chairman. As we look forward
    to 2014, a key factor to stabilizing Afghanistan for the future
    and really to ensure our own national security interest is to
    improve Afghan governance. And as several of our witnesses have
    said today, corruption has been rampant in Afghanistan for many
    years. In order to have long-term legitimacy, the central
    government has to root out corruption at the highest levels and
    it seems that a good opportunity to show that will be in the
    Presidential elections in 2014.
        Mr. Bergen, you had said in your testimony that the
    elections represent both a great opportunity and a potential
    peril for the country. I agree with you. What are the chances
    of a peaceful transition of power? Is Afghanistan capable of
    running free and fair elections? And what should the United
    States do, what can we do to help the Afghans prepare for the
    2014 elections? And are there lessons to learn from the 2009
    elections to help ensure that 2014 is not a repeat of those? I
    will start with you, Mr. Bergen.
        Mr. Bergen. Thank you, sir. In 2005, Afghanistan had a
    Presidential election in which the turnout was 70 percent and
    there hasn't been a Presidential election in this country since
    1900 where there was 70 percent turnout. So there is nothing
    inherently Afghan about not being able to conduct their
    reasonably good election. Two thousand nine was flawed. We
    played a little bit of a role, the United States, in the sense
    that we privately told a number of different Afghan leaders
    that we are backing you which had the unintended effect of
    splitting the opposition to Karzai. We shouldn't make that same
    mistake again.
        The election is something that we can provide security
    assistance to and technical assistance to. At the end of the
    day, it is a U.N. mission more than a United States kind of
    government mission. And we should be cognizant of all of the
    issues we have just discussed, that something that is
    reasonably free and fair enough in which we don't sort of back,
    seem to be backing anybody in particular, that will be very,
    very useful for Afghanistan's future.
        Mr. Deutch. Dr. Kagan, do you have thoughts on what would
    constitute free and fair enough?
        Ms. Kagan. Afghans tend to settle their political
    differences through compromise and negotiation. And since they
    have a Presidential, rather than a parliamentary system, what
    we should expect to see is a negotiation among the political
    leads of Afghanistan in advance of the election to make
    different power sharing agreements that will fall into place
    depending on the outcome of the election.
        What is free enough and fair enough I think is a very
    important question. But what is more important is what is
    actually going to convey a degree of legitimacy on the
    government and a capability to govern the country which is
    absolutely necessary to prevent the kinds of security vacuums
    that will give rise to al-Qaeda.
        Mr. Deutch. But isn't legitimacy going to be based
    ultimately on whether the election is perceived to be free and
    fair, Dr. Jones?
        Mr. Jones. Yes, they are. Frankly, I think that the
    challenge with this election as opposed to previous ones is
    assuming President Karzai does not run, you are going to have a
    range of individuals with questionable national legitimacy that
    may have greater incentives to stuff ballot boxes, pay
    individuals to vote, intimidate. So this is partly an
    information issue. I mean one thing the U.S. has to do with
    several of its allies is to continue to collect information on
    anything about voter fraud, payment of information,
    intimidation, and to get involved both privately and publicly
    in calling this out. I think if that is made very clear very
    early on, that may deter some of the voter fraud that may be
    likely in next year's elections.
        Mr. Deutch. Dr. Markey, can we deter that voter fraud? Can
    we prevent it from happening?
        Mr. Markey. I am pretty skeptical about the prospects for
    the upcoming election. I mean, look, the last one was deeply
    flawed and we were heavily present. The next one we will be
    much lighter footprint, fewer people around the country. Our
    capacity to police it, our capacity to have leverage over the
    process, I think, are just going to be much, much more limited.
    I think we will see the kinds of abuses that you are talking
    about. I would broaden the conversation a bit though. I would
    say first of all, the elections will be important and they will
    to some--possibly, if they happen at all given the kind of
    instability that may emerge, they may ratify the kind of
    process that Kim is talking about, a kind of internal dialogue.
    But that dialogue is probably also going to have to include
    questions about the constitutional system and the
    constitutional order there, if in fact, it is going to bring on
    board some part of the insurgent movement. I mean if that is
    the plan, if part of the plan is reconciliation, you are going
    to have to bring in people who are now outside the political
    process.
        So the elections may be kind of a capstone to that. Will
    still be ugly and messy, but will have to be more of a
    ratification of a broader dialogue than a simple, neat process.
        Mr. Chabot [presiding]. The gentleman's time has expired.
    The gentleman from California, Mr. Rohrabacher, who is chairman
    of the Eurasia and Emerging Threats is recognized for 5
    minutes.
        Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And to
    my friend, Mr. Faleomavaega, I would like to suggest that his
    analysis of the war weariness of the American people is right
    on target. And what I wanted to remind him of earlier and just
    remind us is that Mr. Faleomavaega is a combat Veteran and also
    the Samoan people have contributed a great deal to our military
    over these last 10 years of conflict. I just wanted to put that
    in the record.
        I find it a little bit disturbing that we are talking
    about--from what I just said, that we need to make sure America
    remains there and has military forces there after 2014. There
    is a contradiction there. And the fact is, the American people
    don't want to stay in that part of the world. Let me just note
    that the optimism of this panel, especially the last two
    members here about Pakistan, let us just note, things have
    changed in the last 20 and 30 years. I mean you can see it,
    even before the testimony today, people were describing
    Pakistan in a different way than what we would have 20, 30
    years ago.
        Pakistan is no longer our ally and India is no longer the
    ally of the Soviet Union. What we have now is an ally in India
    and an enemy in Pakistan, not because we are declaring they are
    our enemy, but because Pakistan has declared itself an enemy of
    the United States. Nobody but an enemy would take the murderer,
    the terrorist who slaughtered 3,000 Americans and given him
    safe haven and then arrest the man who helped us bring justice
    to that murderer and arrest him and call him a traitor.
        Pakistan has declared themselves--it is about time we
    realize that Pakistan is the source of many of the problems
    that we have there, rather than being optimistic that Pakistan
    is going to change.
        Let me get on to this about Afghanistan. We have imposed
    Karzai onto the Pakistanis. Karzai had no popular base of
    support and instead of letting the king, King Zahir Shah, play
    his rightful role in bringing about a new type of government, a
    new government in Afghanistan, we superimposed Karzai on them
    and in fact, our Ambassador Zal wrote their constitution which
    is totally contrary to their own national patterns of life. It
    is the most centralized constitution government in the world
    today. The President appoints the Governors. What would happen
    to the President appointing the Governors in our country? There
    would be a lot of conflict there over who was going to hold
    power, because once you establish absolute power people fight
    over it.
        Let me just suggest I think that we have done in
    Afghanistan since driving out the Taliban and let us note it
    wasn't the United States that drove the Taliban out. It was the
    Northern Alliance with the support of the United States. Then
    we created an unsustainable government, an unsustainable
    governmental sector of that society. It is unsustainable
    because it is contrary to their decentralism and we put people
    in power that didn't have any popular base of support or ethnic
    base of support.
        Well, if it is unsustainable, how can anyone suggest that
    we remain in Afghanistan and just have more of our people
    killed like this poor captain down in Florida who the chairman
    is lamenting and who represents all of the people killed in all
    of our--throughout all of our districts as well? So why should
    we stay knowing that the government is an unsustainable
    government that we created in the first place. You have 21
    seconds to answer that.
        Mr. Chabot. Is it directed at anyone in particular?
        Mr. Rohrabacher. Whoever. I made comments. Go ahead. Mr.
    Markey, do you want to take me on about Pakistan?
        Mr. Markey. Sure, just on that. I think you are right in a
    sense. Pakistan has been incredibly frustrating and at times
    would be better characterized as an adversary or enemy,
    particularly with respect to our differences in Afghanistan.
    But let us be careful what we wish for because they could be an
    even worse enemy than they currently are.
        Mr. Rohrabacher. They are friends with China.
        Mr. Chabot. The gentleman's time has expired. The gentleman
    from Samoa, who actually is the ranking member of the Asia and
    the Pacific Subcommittee, Mr. Faleomavaega, you are recognized
    for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Faleomavaega. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I generally
    don't like to oversimplify a given issue, but as a matter of
    historical perspective, I want to share my view with our
    panelists. We were in Korea for 3 years, and 30,000 of our
    soldiers lost their lives. We were in Vietnam for 10 years, and
    60,000 of our soldiers lost their lives with some 200,000 of
    our men and women wounded and maimed for life. And some 2
    million Vietnamese women and children killed in that terrible
    war. Then we were in Iraq for some 8 years; and 4,400 soldiers
    lost their lives. There seems to be a consistency of the
    pattern and look at how long we tend to stay once we start a
    war. It seems like it is always easy to start a war, but to end
    itqu seems to be really, really difficult as my good friend
    from California is expressing the very same concern that I
    have.
        I understand Dr. Jones and Dr. Kagan both are of the view
    that we should continue to stay in Afghanistan. I think we need
    to go back to the very beginning, why we ended up in
    Afghanistan. It was due to the attack on the American people on
    September 11th. Guess what? Nineteen terrorists attacked our
    country. Fifteen were savvy Arabs, one Egyptian, one Jordanian.
    Not one Iraqi among the 19 terrorists who attacked us. I think
    the whole world, even our country, was in favor of pursuing
    Osama bin Laden. He was the instigator. He is the one that
    organized al-Qaeda. We need to go after them. Where? Because he
    was in Afghanistan. But what happened? We shifted gears and
    said, ``No, not just Osama bin Laden. We need to go after
    Saddam Hussein.'' And for other reasons we missed the whole
    purpose of why we were in Afghanistan, which was to go after
    al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden.
        And then of course, we added the idea that we need to do a
    little regime change. Added to the problem with the Taliban at
    one time controlled Afghanistan and an entirely different set
    of situation where the Taliban, they didn't attack us. The
    Taliban has no intention of attacking our country. In fact,
    they want us out of Afghanistan. Let them do their little
    thing.
        The fact of the matter is that 12 million Pashtuns live in
    Afghanistan and this is where the Taliban has its base, with
    some 27,000 Taliban, as I understand it. But on the borderline
    with Pakistan, there are 27 million additional Pashtuns that
    live there. So is it any surprise that Osama bin Laden was able
    to stay in Pakistan for nearly 5 years until we were finally
    able to locate his whereabouts?
        My concern is that it is very easy for us here to say,
    ``Oh, we need to leave our soldiers there.'' I believe that
    this should be the very last act the Congress, the
    administration, or our Government makes when we put our men and
    women on the line in harm's way, it better be for the final
    security of our national interest. Some have said the war in
    Iraq was a war of choice, the same way that the war in
    Afghanistan is a war of choice. Where do we really come into
    sensing this balance where we have to be there and the fact
    that we send our soldiers in harm's way to do this to protect
    our national interest?
        I know your position and I respect that, but I just cannot
    believe that we are going to be there another 10 years or the
    suggestion that it is vitally critical to our national interest
    that we stay in Afghanistan. Could you elaborate a little more
    on that, Dr. Jones?
        Mr. Jones. Yes, sure. And I sympathize with the range of
    your comments on other theaters including Iraq to some degree.
    But let me just say this, two things. One is that the American
    presence in the strategy can vary quite a bit. The U.S. has
    played a very useful role in undermining and countering
    terrorist and insurgent groups with a limited presence in the
    Philippines and Colombia and a range of other places that does
    not require large amounts of money, large numbers of boots on
    the ground, and large numbers of Americans dying. So I do think
    there is some variation in how we proceed that may look like
    other cases.
        The last thing I will note is my concern right now in
    Afghanistan is that we look up in Kunar province where we have
    current al-Qaeda training camps, small, they are there because
    they have a local Taliban ally in that case. It is a district-
    level commander. That is the situation I want to make sure if
    we leave too quickly that that stuff doesn't spread.
        Mr. Faleomavaega. I am sorry, my time is up. Thank you, Mr.
    Chairman.
        Mr. Chabot. Thank you. The gentleman's time is expired.
        Mr. Bergen, let me ask you a question. You mentioned in
    your statement that you felt it was a mistake that the
    administration had announced the surge in Afghanistan and
    basically, at the same time, announced that we are pulling out
    by this date. What do you think were the consequences of
    announcing that when they did? What could have or should have
    happened differently? What do you think were actually the
    results of that?
        Mr. Bergen. Yes, I mean this is all in the context of
    trickling the number of troops in Afghanistan from 30,000 to
    90,000 which happened under President Obama. But unfortunately,
    people and the media of which I am part of, sort of seized on
    the part of the speech where it said the drawdown was going to
    start in July 2011. I think the problem with that is that
    Afghans do actually want us to stay, generally speaking. They
    are not happy about some of the things that have happened, but
    they see us as a guarantor that the Taliban won't come back and
    a guarantor that neighboring countries, whether it is Iran or
    Pakistan, don't take too much of a role in the future of their
    country.
        And so I think in retrospect July 2011 was a mistake. So
    let us learn from our mistakes when we announce the new level
    of troop numbers and we have already negotiated the Strategic
    Partnership Agreement. Let us point out that the Strategic
    Partnership Agreement is still 2024 and these are not combat
    troops. These are advisory troops, some people doing
    counterterrorism. So the concern about large numbers of
    American soldiers dying in post-2014 we have already seen the
    numbers are in single digits right now every month as opposed
    to much larger numbers we were seeing before. So I think just
    learn from this error, if possible.
        Mr. Chabot. Thank you. Let me shift gears. Recently, the
    Iran-Pakistan pipeline, also called the peace pipeline, gained
    some momentum. The pipeline was inaugurated this month in the
    southern Iranian port city of Chah Bahar by President
    Ahmadinejad and President Zadari. Iran offered Pakistan a loan
    of $250 million to $\1/2\ billion to work on the 781-kilometer
    portion of the pipeline inside Pakistani territory. Russia and
    China have also indicated their willingness to help Pakistan to
    construct the pipeline. In January, U.S. Consul General Michael
    Dodman said the State Department would impose sanctions against
    Pakistan if it finalized the deal with Iran.
        Taking into consideration that once a country is dependent
    on a particular source for their natural gas supply, it is
    extremely difficult to change course, how do we assist Pakistan
    to diversify its energy sources in order to reduce its desire
    to partner with Iran? And would you recommend that the U.S.
    impose sanctions on the foreign companies that are involved in
    this pipeline project and should U.S. assistance to Pakistan be
    conditioned on its continued support for the pipeline?
        Dr. Kagan, do you want to take that or Mr. Markey?
        Mr. Markey. Thanks. First of all, I would say, to me, the
    pipeline is deeply problematic and there are all kinds of
    reasons to oppose it. It also appears to be a political stunt
    and I believe it s a stunt by the Pakistani outgoing government
    to attempt to portray itself as more anti-American and more
    independent than many Pakistanis have believed up until this
    point. And it is also a stunt to try to show that they are
    doing something to meet Pakistan's energy needs that is
    tangible when they haven't met those energy needs over the past
    several years.
        And so in that category, and recognizing that this is a
    pipeline that is proposed to go across some of Pakistan's most
    difficult territory through Baluchestan Province which is going
    to be very difficult to build and I believe almost impossible
    to build and certainly impossible to build on the timeline that
    they have in mind, I would suggest that while we should do
    everything to oppose the pipeline, including threatening
    sanctions should they turn it on, and including suggesting an
    alternative, a pipeline from Turkmenistan, TAPI pipeline that
    would probably meet their energy needs as well or better and
    would pose none of the problems that this Iran pipeline does
    pose, that that should be the package that we go ahead with.
    That doesn't mean imposing sanctions now, but it does mean
    leveling threats and making it clear that those sanctions would
    be imposed should they open such a pipeline down the line. But
    as I say, it is years away if it ever happens.
        Mr. Chabot. Thank you very much. My time is about ready to
    expire so I will now turn to Mr. Wilson, the gentleman from
    South Carolina. Five minutes.
        Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you all for
    being here. I am particularly concerned about insider attacks.
    Over the weekend, I had a very sad opportunity to participate
    in a visitation for a very dedicated young American who has
    done so much for our country. She is retired Sergeant 1st Class
    Inez Renee Odom-Baker of Cayce, South Carolina. She was
    murdered during an insider attack this month as she was serving
    with dedication to help the people of Afghanistan as a civilian
    contractor. My sympathy to her two sons, Andrew Odom and Larry
    Mitchell, Jr. and family.
        Dr. Kagan, for you and your colleagues, what assurances can
    you provide to the families of personnel serving in Afghanistan
    that improved security is in place to reduce the number of
    insider attacks?
        Ms. Kagan. I cannot possibly myself give guarantees to the
    families of those who are in Afghanistan. And the issue on
    green on blue attacks is something that is meant to be of
    concern to all of us because it is a strategic opportunity that
    the Taliban is taking that disaffected individuals within the
    Afghan army who are not affiliated with the Taliban. The Afghan
    Government is unfortunately not able to deal with it entirely
    because, frankly, our proximity to, partnership with, and
    continued interaction with the Afghan National Security Forces
    is so essential to the long-term outcome and stability in
    Afghanistan. Despite these attacks and despite the threat that
    they pose to the men and women who serve in military and
    civilian capacities we actually need to persist with that close
    partnership in order to achieve our strategic objectives over
    the long term, namely a degree of stability in Afghanistan and
    an ability for that army to have the capability to defend its
    own country's borders so that ultimately we can reduce our
    forces and come home.
        Mr. Wilson. Thank you. If any other would like to comment?
    Yes, Dr. Jones.
        Mr. Jones. Yes, just a couple of things. One is the levels
    of insider attacks were at a historical peak last year. Both
    ISAF and the various components made a concrete effort to
    improve and I was out there looking at some of this, the
    vetting process for the Afghan local police and the Afghan
    national police and the Afghan national army which seems to
    have reduced by the end of the year in some cases, the number
    of green on blue attacks, including the collection of
    information, monitoring of cell phones conversations and some
    cases with active Taliban or Taliban sympathizers to make sure
    if there are any problems with current Afghan national or local
    security officials that those are dealt with.
        I think there has been a greater recognition, some vetting
    has been improved. But I would say the other thing I would just
    comment on is this is one area where I do think we have to push
    back on the President of Afghanistan. Comments like the United
    States is collaborating or has common interests with the
    Taliban has the potential to cause an increase in insider
    attacks if that is the message that the President of that
    country is sending out to his forces. So I think a very strong
    pushback to him that those statements actually are
    counterproductive because they threaten the security of U.S.
    forces operating in there would be helpful.
        Mr. Wilson. If Mr. Bergen or Dr. Markey, do you have--and
    indeed, I appreciate the efforts of vetting and I was happy to
    hear even to the point of monitoring cell phone conversations,
    it is particularly important to me. I am very grateful. Thanks
    to my wife, Roxanne, we have four sons serving in the military
    today. They are Veterans of Iraq serving with Bright Star in
    Egypt and Afghanistan. And so our family truly is appreciative
    of any effort to make sure that insider attacks are eliminated,
    reduced, and so again, I want to thank all of you for being
    here today and I yield back the balance of my time.
        Mr. Chabot. The gentleman yields back and we would like to
    thank you for also serving this country, as well. I want to
    apologize to my Democratic colleagues. I went over here twice
    in a row. The gentleman from California is also the ranking
    member of the Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade
    Subcommittee. Mr. Sherman is recognized for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Sherman. I doubt very much whether we are going to see
    a peaceful, unified, progressive state in Afghanistan, but I
    have no doubt that there will be those advocating for unlimited
    American resources, treasure, and blood to try to achieve that
    objective.
        Dr. Jones, I want to thank you for your pointing out that
    we can have antiterrorist presence in Afghanistan involving
    tiny fraction of the cost and casualties than we have
    experienced over the last several years, especially since the
    surge.
        And I believe it was Dr. Markey who suggested a U.S.-
    Pakistani free trade agreement. Again, there is no--you did
    not? Excuse me. Mr. Bergen. I would point out that the cost of
    that to American workers has to be calculated among the other
    costs that those focused on this area would have the taxpayers
    and people of America pay.
        Now the Taliban would not be in business in Afghanistan if
    it was hunted down by the Pakistani national security
    enterprise as if it was a true enemy of Pakistan. So the
    question I have and I will ask you to accept the premise
    whoever volunteers to answer this, that indeed we installed
    Karzai. There are few who doubt that. Why did we choose to
    install someone who was so distrusted by Pakistan or at least
    elements of the ISI that they have chosen to keep the Afghan
    Taliban as a potentially useful asset for future involvements
    in Afghanistan? Why did we not install somebody in Kabul that
    the Pakistanis could unite behind and view those who waged war
    against Kabul as enemies of Pakistan? Do I have someone?
        Yes, Dr. Jones.
        Mr. Jones. My understanding is the record is fairly
    straightforward on this and that is the U.S. envoy to the Bonn
    negotiations, Ambassador Jim Dobbins at the time actually ran.
    He said this in his book that came out several years ago that
    he ran President Karzai's name by the ISI directly and--or
    actually gave them the opportunity to provide their top choice
    as he did with the Indians, the Chinese, and others and
    President Karzai was their--was the ISI's choice as their most
    palatable option in Afghanistan. That view clearly changed over
    the next several years, but I think for the record, that point
    anyway appears to be fairly straightforward.
        Mr. Sherman. Thank you. Dr. Markey, do you have a view on
    that?
        Mr. Markey. I think it is important to just take us back to
    that early period and to appreciate the extent to which we, the
    United States, believed that the Taliban were truly a spent
    force. And I think that most of the countries in the region
    also believed that they had been thoroughly beaten and that
    this was a very winnable prospect and that Karzai, if it is
    true that the ISI were willing to accept him as sort of a best
    of bad alternatives candidate, they were willing to do so
    because they believed at the time that the war had been won by
    us, that it was over.
        Mr. Sherman. Another view is they just view whoever we
    installed in Kabul is somebody who would only be there for a
    year or two and they would sweep him aside and put in whoever
    else they wanted which is the other story I have heard.
        Mr. Markey. Possibly, but there was a pretty dramatic and
    convincing route of the Taliban at that time. And their ability
    to reconstitute themselves took a matter of years.
        Mr. Sherman. Whether it was the Taliban or someone else,
    the idea that the government we installed would survive against
    whatever group the ISI put together. Anyway, I want to shift to
    a completely different subject and that is Pakistan which I
    believe is far more important to us long term than government.
        We are not doing too well in attracting friends among the
    Pakistani public, even with our public diplomacy. Pakistan
    speaks a variety of different languages. What should we do to
    reach out to the different communities that make up Pakistan?
    Should we be doing more, for instance, the Sindhi language with
    our broadcasting through Voice of America and through public
    diplomacy? Or should we adhere to the view of some in Islamabad
    that we should treat Pakistan as a purely Urdu-speaking
    country?
        Who wants to answer this one? Dr. Bergen.
        Mr. Bergen. To some extent it is not what we say, it is
    what we do. Right? The thing that really angers the Pakistanis
    the most right now is our drone program. And the Afghan
    Parliament is basically an April----
        Mr. Sherman. I am asking about broadcasting in the Sindhi
    language and you are talking about our drone program?
        Mr. Bergen. Well, I am going to say it doesn't matter what
    we say in Sindhi, Urdu, or Punjabi or Pashtu or any language if
    we have things that anger them at a very basic level.
        Mr. Sherman. Okay. Do I have another response? I agree that
    the drone program has angered many in Pakistan and as the
    apprehension and death of bin Laden on their territory, but
    sometimes you have to do what you have to do. It doesn't mean
    we shouldn't do the best job of public diplomacy that we can
    do. And I yield back.
        Mr. Chabot. Thank you. The gentleman yields back. The bells
    that you heard here mean we have votes on the floor. Several
    members have already headed over, so we are going to head over
    now, so we are in recess. We will be back in probably a half
    hour, maybe less. Thank you very much. We are in recess.
        [Off the record.]
        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen [presiding]. The subcommittee is now back
    in session and I am going to recognize Mr. Kinzinger to take a
    slow 5 minutes.
        Mr. Kinzinger. I will take a slow 5 minutes. Thank you,
    Madam Chair, and thank you all for waiting through the votes
    and being here. It has actually been a pleasure to listen to
    you.
        Ms. Kagan, it is great to see you. Thank you for all your
    hard work and I point you out just because I know of your work
    well and I appreciate things that you have done. Actually, I
    have to admit I was very bothered earlier when I heard America
    basically in essence, in a round about way, referred to as an
    empire when somebody had mentioned that Afghanistan is the
    deathbed of empires like for some reason America has somehow
    been chasing the vast natural resources in Afghanistan or the
    huge copious amounts of oil. I will tell you that Afghanistan
    in my mind, although U.S. interests are at stake, was a war
    that was fought out of frankly, I think, moral justification;
    an entire culture that believes that women couldn't even be in
    the same room as men. You hear about people that would have
    their nose and ears cut off because somebody in the family
    committed a crime and they would be used as payment. Frankly, I
    think what America has done and what the Western world has done
    in Afghanistan has been frankly pretty amazing.
        I also want to briefly explore the issue of the surge and
    the surge in Iraq. When President Bush added troops to Iraq it
    wasn't the addition of the troops that really made the
    difference. It was that in that time the enemy believed that
    America could not stand the heat of the improvised explosive
    attacks of the attacks that were going on, the massive
    casualties, and thought that President Bush would eventually
    say we are done. We can't take it any more.
        And not only did the President not say that we are not
    done, he said we are going to send more troops in and we are
    going to win this war. And what you saw when that happened was
    on a dime the war in Iraq turned. And the war in Iraq went from
    a bloody 100 American troops lost a month to a massive shift
    and a victory, frankly, for the United States that I feel and I
    am afraid that we squandered away a year ago.
        In Afghanistan, and this is my first question, we talked
    about the 2014 timeline. I think it was Mr. Bergen that had
    mentioned the second you say we are surging troops, but they
    are leaving, so basically the last troop going in is actually
    going to cross paths with the first troop leaving from the
    initial entrance, you send a message to the enemy and the
    Taliban have saying. They say America has the watches, but we
    have the time. So you send a message to the Taliban and you say
    hey look, we are sending more troops, but just wait your turn.
    I know you have been fighting this war for decades, just fight
    it a few more years because we are out. It sends the wrong
    message.
        So the question I have for the four of you and please
    answer very briefly, what is up with the year 2014? Is there a
    reason that 2014 was actually picked? Is there a reason on the
    ground? Or was 2014 used because of a political concern back
    here at home? It is palatable to the American people. Because I
    think, as I heard my colleagues on the other side mention, when
    you use American troops you have to do so very judiciously. I
    agree. When you use American troops though, you should never
    make a decision that involves American troops based on politics
    at home or it is time to leave.
        So let me just ask. I will start with you, Dr. Jones. What
    is special about the year 2014 or is it politics?
        Mr. Jones. I think the answer, it is a political decision.
    Period.
        Mr. Kinzinger. Dr. Kagan.
        Ms. Kagan. I concur. Two thousand fourteen does not make
    sense from the perspective of what we are trying to accomplish
    in Afghanistan. The choice of 2014 was a political decision.
        Mr. Kinzinger. Mr. Bergen?
        Mr. Bergen. I think it is a little more complicated than
    that. This was a decision that was arrived at with the Afghan
    Government and also with our NATO allies which number, I think,
    21 in Afghanistan right now. And we have negotiated a Strategic
    Partnership Agreement until 2024. So it is not like we are
    turning the lights off in 2014.
        Mr. Kinzinger. Dr. Markey?
        Mr. Markey. No doubt that it has a political component, but
    the original 2014 suggestion, I believe, actually came from
    President Karzai and then was latched on to by the
    administration. Just one quick point, it did send a wrong
    message to the Taliban. It sent the wrong message to the entire
    region, so it was beyond just the adversaries. It was our
    allies, as well as the regional players.
        Mr. Kinzinger. I agree with you and I appreciate you
    bringing that up because in the Middle East it seems that we
    like this idea of if you smile really well, and the West if two
    people get in a fight one person says I am sorry and you have
    an agreement then. In the Middle East, it is frankly strength.
    And the second you say we are eager to get out of here, you
    have just shown the enemy they can outlast us.
        My last point, and it is not a question. It is a point.
    Vietnam, we can look back at the Vietnam lessons and say we
    should or shouldn't have been there. I will argue that a
    different day. But at the end of Vietnam, we left people that
    have stood up and fought for a southern government that fought
    for freedom. We ended up leaving them high and tight, high and
    dry, and a lot of people died as a result.
        Now the next major war we get involved in, Iraq and
    Afghanistan. The implications of the United States leaving--and
    the Western allies--I don't mean of everybody--leaving
    Afghanistan at a time when frankly a lot of people have stood
    up and said I will put my life on the line to defend a new
    Afghan Government and to defend freedom and to defend the
    women's ability to go to school and to be human, frankly. If we
    leave, I think that sends a message to the rest of the world
    that if we ever have to do something like this again and it is
    ignorant of us to think we never will, it would be very hard to
    get locals on our side when we ask them to support the United
    States or the Western world again.
        With that, Madam Chairman, thank you. I yield back.
        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much. And so pleased to
    yield to another combat veteran, Congresswoman Gabbard. Thank
    you.
        Ms. Gabbard. Thank you very much, Madam Chairwoman. I
    appreciate the insight that each of you have shared today, as
    well as the variety of opinions that have been voiced by our
    colleagues on the committee. Really my question is centered
    around more specifics. Each of you has touched on at one point
    or another, using different words, about the necessity to
    remain in Afghanistan specifically, but what does that actually
    look like? What does that actually mean when you are talking
    about numbers of troops on the ground? I think Dr. Jones
    mentioned during one of his responses to the questions saying
    that it doesn't necessarily mean that you have tens of
    thousands or over hundreds of thousands of troops that remain
    there.
        I would like to know your thoughts on specifically what
    going forward that looks like and how long that will be
    required in order to achieve the goal that you have stated that
    you feel are important to our national security?
        Mr. Jones. Very briefly, the way I envision this right now,
    one option any way because I think there are a range on the
    table is on the military side, we can talk about civilian
    presence later. The goal I think has got to be to focus on
    training, equipping and advising Afghan national army, Afghan
    national police, and Afghan local police forces, conducting
    direct action operations against high-value targets. And then
    providing some limited enablers such as intelligence, civil
    affairs, military information, support operations.
        Based on a range of estimates, including the size of Afghan
    National Security Forces and others, one could envision,
    depending on allied commitments of forces anywhere between
    8,000 to about 15,000 American forces.
        The question on timing and a lot would depend not just on
    the numbers because I think we get into a numbers game pretty
    quickly. It also depends on the strategy one uses and other
    factors, how you deal with the sanctuary. The sanctuary is a
    key component, should be a key component of any strategy in
    Afghanistan because the leadership structure has not been
    targeted and sits across the border in Pakistan, especially the
    Taliban's command and control node.
        My one last comment along these lines is I think on the
    timeline and exit, I can't put a year there because I think it
    is a conditions-based one that ties in very closely to the
    threat to the U.S. homeland and its interests overseas coming
    from this area. When that threat goes away, I think it is time
    to go.
        Ms. Kagan. I concur. I don't think that there is anyone
    here on the panel who believes that there should be an
    indefinite number of troops committed to Afghanistan
    indefinitely. We are in a process of drawing down, in part
    because of the changes that the Afghan security forces have
    themselves experienced. During our surge, they, too, have
    surged. But it is absolutely vital that our withdrawal of
    forces remains conditions based, based on conditions of the
    ground, that the commanders in Afghanistan have the flexibility
    to bring in the units that they need to hold the bases that
    they need and conduct the logistical support that they need in
    order to do the missions that Dr. Jones has mentioned.
        Therefore, as we look at the drawdown, it is very
    important, really quite vital, that it not happen faster than
    conditions on the ground permit.
        Ms. Gabbard. Thank you. I think it is just important to
    note the distinction. I know there were some comments made that
    militancy does not go away when the U.S. leaves. Car bombs and
    attacks that are still continuing in Iraq, al-Qaeda's presence
    in Syria, I think it is something we can all agree on that the
    threat from al-Qaeda exists, not only in Afghanistan, but in
    other places. And it is one that is based on an ideology, not
    based on a commitment or allegiance to a specific country which
    is why I think it is most necessary for us to stay focused on
    what is the mission at hand, what is the specific threat that
    is facing our country, and recognize forward looking what will
    be required to address that threat, not just in Afghanistan,
    but across the entire regions, stay focused on those
    counterterrorism activities.
        And so I think when we look at that threat as opposed to a
    noble cause of trying to bring stability to an unstable region,
    and essentially acting as a police force or nation building in
    different countries which we would all love to be able to do,
    but because of limited resources and assets, don't have those
    capabilities. Thank you.
        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much. Mr. Connolly is
    recognized.
        Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Madam Chairman, and thank you for
    holding this hearing. Welcome to our panel.
        I was talking to a nonprofit representative who has been
    doing a lot of work in Afghanistan and one characteristic he
    made was from his point of view once the United States
    withdrawal is met, the deadlines are met, that what is left
    behind is sort of a situation that will muddle along. It is not
    going to collapse. It is not going to look like Saigon in 1975.
    There are some enduring institutional changes that we will have
    helped leave behind that actually will make a positive
    difference and that that is probably the best we are going to
    look for and that is probably what the likely situation is
    going to look like on the ground for some period of time.
        Would you all agree with that characterization?
        Mr. Bergen?
        Mr. Bergen. Basically, yes.
        Mr. Connolly. That is succinct.
        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. We are not used to that.
        Ms. Kagan. I would disagree with that characterization.
        Mr. Connolly. You would disagree.
        Ms. Kagan. I do. I think that we have made some very
    fundamental changes to the situation in Afghanistan, but I do
    not know that Afghanistan will muddle along. I think that, in
    fact, the potential for rekindling a civil war in Afghanistan,
    for state collapse, for state withdrawal, exists. And our path
    out of Afghanistan can accelerate or decelerate that kind of
    collapse and help to ensure that Afghanistan--to ensure that
    Afghanistan continues to muddle along. We need to make sure
    that there is support to the Afghan Government.
        Mr. Connolly. Dr. Jones.
        Mr. Jones. I think part of the answer to your question
    depends on identifying a handful of key variables that could
    push this in a roughly muddling along in a positive way to very
    badly destabilizing. I would just point to at least three off
    the top of my head. One is the activity of neighbors. Increases
    in weapons, money, other resources from the Iranians, the
    Pakistanis, the Russians, the Indians, and other countries in
    the region could lead this to something very different from
    muddling along. The early 1990s, in my view, in Afghanistan
    similar scenario, was not muddling along. It was deeply
    destabilizing.
        Second, are we talking about a U.S. combat presence ending
    or simply the U.S.--and focusing on train and equip, or does
    the U.S. leave period? What the U.S. does on a military
    perspective, if it stays and does some training versus combat,
    that could vary those outcomes.
        The third, frankly, is the quality of Afghan governance.
    The 2014 election, if that goes badly and you get fracturing
    among say Tajiks and Uzbeks up in the north who do not support
    the direction of the government, will tend to rip the fabric
    apart in ways that I think would be worse than muddling along.
    So the elections, the neighbors, U.S. presence, combat or
    otherwise, I think are several variables that will impact that.
        Mr. Connolly. Yes, Dr. Markey.
        Mr. Markey. I think these are all reasonable concerns. I
    think muddling along should actually be seen as pretty good
    success and muddling along will only happen if a degree of
    resources continue to flow both to the Afghan National Security
    Forces and more broadly to the Afghan state. I mean it is not
    self sufficient. So muddling along, I think, should be seen as
    pretty decent and we should be concerned about some of these
    downside risks.
        Mr. Connolly. Yes, given the alternatives. Two-part
    question real quickly about the Taliban. The same person
    observed part of what will help the muddling along positive
    scenario is actually the intense dislike for any return of the
    Taliban in most of the country and that that is pretty clear.
        Secondly, I wonder what your opinion is about can Taliban
    be negotiated with? Count me a skeptic, but there are those
    that say they could be.
        Mr. Bergen. Yes, and no.
        Mr. Connolly. Thank you. I only have 28 seconds. I really
    appreciate that.
        Dr. Jones, can you match that kind of succinctness?
        Mr. Jones. No.
        Mr. Connolly. We have got a bunch of Calvin Coolidges up
    here, Madam Chair.
        Mr. Jones. Very quickly, the intense dislike, yes. But an
    insurgent group that has outside sanctuary and outside support
    can overcome intense dislike in a country.
        Mr. Connolly. Mr. Bergen's answers, Madam Chairman, remind
    of the story I told about Calvin Coolidge. He is at a dinner
    party where a woman sat next to him, President Coolidge, and
    said you have got this reputation for being so laconic and I
    bet somebody $100 I could get you to say three things. He
    looked at her and said you lose.
        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Very good. Thank you, Mr. Connolly.
        Mr. Connolly. Thank you.
        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Mr. DeSantis, this is a tough act to
    follow. We need a historical joke.
        Mr. DeSantis. Well, I do appreciate Calvin Coolidge. He is
    a very underrated President, so I thank my colleague from
    Virginia for invoking him.
        In terms of the footprint that you recommend, Dr. Jones,
    and I agree. In terms of having folks there, I think you
    recommended between 8,000 and 12,000. Sometimes people say oh,
    just throw some Special Operations forces in there. But you
    don't just throw Special Operations forces in there. You have
    got to have at least some conventional forces to support them
    and obviously, intelligence and the CIA component as well.
        Where does that put you in terms of what the administration
    has said in terms of numbers? Do they want a total or have they
    left the door open for this type of strategy?
        Mr. Jones. Well, it is unclear right now. They have opened
    the door for numbers, possibly numbers along these lines by
    2014, but the question is for how long? And I think this goes
    back to Mr. Bergen's point earlier. Without a better sense of
    what this means in 2015 or '16 or '17, I think those numbers
    are partly meaningless because locals will look at the longer-
    term commitment.
        Mr. DeSantis. Now given the fact that obviously there is a
    lot of things going on in Afghanistan, we probably really
    didn't understand when we went in in 2001. Tribal society, they
    have certain customs that are different from ours. What is kind
    of the best case scenario in terms of what we can reasonably
    expect of an Afghan Government because a lot of constituents
    and Americans will say they really believe that we need to
    fight terrorism, but they think that Afghanistan, like those
    people will just never have a decent government. So can you
    guys just give your assessment on that?
        Mr. Jones. I can very briefly comment. If you look at even
    the most stable period of Afghanistan's history, let us say
    1929 to 1978, government that controlled some key urban areas,
    some key lines of communications on roads, but had tribes, sub-
    tribes, and clans involved in adjudicating controlling key
    parts of rural Afghanistan. I think that is your best bet in
    the future, a limited central government and a range of tribal,
    sub-tribe, clan and other actors that continue to influence in
    rural areas.
        Ms. Kagan. I think it is important that the American people
    know that Afghans see Afghanistan as an entity though. And that
    one of our goals in Afghanistan is keeping a united state
    surrounded as it is by unruly neighbors. And that the mythos
    that the Afghans don't want to recognize themselves as a state
    even though they find tribe and clan and locality of prime
    importance is a misconception that Americans impose on Afghans.
        Mr. Bergen. Just to answer that, the first modern Afghan
    state was founded in 1747 so it is an older country than the
    United States and even the Taliban doesn't want to devolve. It
    is a strong nation, but a weak state.
        I think what is realistic is let us look at their
    neighbors. You have Iran which is a theocratic autocracy. You
    have Uzebekistan that boils dissidents alive which is a Soviet-
    style regime. And you have Pakistan which has had four military
    coups. So by those standards, Afghanistan is already looking
    reasonably good. And my prognosis, in the 1970s, Afghanistan
    was a tourist destination, so within living memory there is a
    whole different Afghanistan. So it is not dream-a-vision that
    you have somewhere. It is somewhat functional.
        Mr. Markey. I agree with a number of these points, but I
    would actually also focus on our capacity, the Afghan capacity
    to keep together and build up a more successful National
    Security Force. The army, and our ability to keep it together,
    their ability to keep it together and not to see that fracture
    will be very important to national unity. Above and beyond
    these concerns, I mean there will be all kinds of corruption,
    war lordism. I mean these kinds of things can happen, but it
    really falls apart if the one institution of national security
    also collapses.
        So if I were to put my finger on something, that would be
    the thing I would put it on and that is something that I think
    we are capable of helping them along with over a reasonable
    time frame.
        Mr. DeSantis. And then finally, and anyone can take this.
    There was a comment made by someone earlier in the hearing
    about the Taliban, they don't really want to come attack
    America over here, whatever. I guess in your judgment when they
    allowed al-Qaeda to operate, obviously that was a huge--the
    regime got crushed after 9/11. Would they want to work with al-
    Qaeda again as the U.S. withdraws? Or is that something that
    they view that as a mistake that they had made, that yes, they
    are Islamic fanatics and they do that, but they didn't have the
    desire to export terrorism. Is that accurate?
        Mr. Jones. I think very briefly it is impossible to
    generalize about the Taliban. The inner Shura has expressed
    some concerns about al-Qaeda, but we see local al-Qaeda
    commanders developing a relationship with local Taliban
    commanders, meaning that part of the answer depends on what
    level of the organization you are talking about.
        Mr. DeSantis. Thank you.
        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much, Mr. DeSantis. Thank
    you to all the members and all of our wonderful staffers who
    make this look easy, but most especially to the panelists.
    Thank you for excellent testimony and thank you to the audience
    as well. With that, our joint subcommittee is now adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 3:32 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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