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HEARING

ON

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2014

AND

OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

FULL COMMITTEE HEARING

ON

THE POSTURE OF THE U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND, U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND, AND U.S. TRANSPORTATION COMMAND

HEARING HELD
MARCH 6, 2013

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THE POSTURE OF THE U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND, U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND, AND U.S. TRANSPORTATION COMMAND

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, March 6, 2013.

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10 a.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Howard P. "Buck" McKeon (chairman of the committee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD P. "BUCK" MCKEON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

The CHAIRMAN. Committee will come to order. Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. The House Armed Services Committee meets to receive testimony on the posture of U.S. Central, Special Ops, and Transportation Commands. Today we have with us General James Mattis, Admiral William McRaven, General William Fraser. Thank you, gentlemen, for joining us here today.

General Mattis, this is your last time. What a wonderful opportunity to say whatever you want.

The CENTCOM [Central Command] area of responsibility remains a critical focus of the U.S. military. Over the next year in Afghanistan, the United States will be withdrawing 34,000 troops, and the ANSF [Afghan National Security Forces] will be fully in the lead across Afghanistan for the first time. These major changes to the security context in Afghanistan, all of which will be occurring during the same time period, could present new forms of risk to U.S. interests in Afghanistan and in the region.

Likewise, the broader challenges within the CENTCOM area of responsibility, including the conflict in Syria, the nuclear ambitions of Iran, and the uncertain political transition in Egypt, continue to pose strategic risks to U.S. interests. However, in my view, among the greatest strategic risks within the Middle East remains the ongoing ambiguity associated with U.S. commitment to our regional allies and the region itself.

Additionally, I remain concerned about the threats posed by transnational terrorism. The threat from Al Qaeda is real; it is global, networked, and clandestine. U.S. Special Operations Command and our Special Operations Forces play a critical role in counterterrorism, unconventional warfare, and countering weapons of mass destruction.

SOCOM [Special Operations Command] has achieved extraordinary integration with each of the Services, the U.S. Interagency, and our international partners. However, an emphasis on direct ac-

tion during the last 11 years of combat may have left our Special Operations Forces out of balance for a future that will increasingly require building partnership capacity and advisory and assistance efforts.

Looking forward, our Special Operations Forces must remain flexible enough to counter the transnational terrorist threat with decisive force when warranted, but at the same time globally postured to prevent transnational terrorism from manifesting into operational and strategic threats, through international partnerships and regional alliances.

Finally, TRANSCOM [Transportation Command] continues to execute the logistical requirements for ongoing U.S. military efforts across the globe. The challenges that TRANSCOM faces continue to grow. As our military prepares to redeploy from Afghanistan, and as we rebalance to the Asia-Pacific, we must remain ready to respond to contingencies elsewhere in the Middle East and Africa. These operational necessities come as the military is being forced to shed force structure, curtail flying hours, and return ships to port, reducing the availability of the very lift capacity upon which TRANSCOM relies. This committee has taken steps to mitigate these shortfalls, but much remains to be done.

In short, CENTCOM, SOCOM, and TRANSCOM are executing vital military missions across the globe. We are extremely grateful for your service to our country, and we look forward to your testimony.

[The prepared statement of Mr. McKeon can be found in the Appendix on page 43.]

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Smith.

STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM WASHINGTON, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I welcome our witnesses as well, General Mattis, Admiral McRaven, General Fraser. We thank you for your service and your great leadership in your three very important commands. It is appropriate that we have the three of you together because you have to work very, very closely together.

As the chairman mentioned, CENTCOM continues to be our most important command facing the greatest challenges, number one, of course, being Afghanistan, where we still have troops in battle. And the transition over the course of the next couple of years is going to be critical. Look forward to hearing more from General Mattis, from all three of you, actually, about how that transition will go.

But there are other threats in the CENTCOM region. Obviously, the instability in the Middle East remains, and the threat from Iran is also something that will continue to be a challenge, and we are curious any thoughts you have on how to contain that and what come out of the Syrian civil war as well.

Admiral McRaven, we greatly appreciate everything the Special Operations Command has done. And, obviously, we are very aware of the work that has been done in Iraq and Afghanistan over the course of the last decade. Less well known is your presence in

many other places trying to contain insurgencies, in many cases before they start.

The relatively small footprint that you offer yields a huge return in a number of places to great success. In the Philippines, helping contain insurgencies there; our work with AMISOM [African Union Mission in Somalia] in the Somalia area, working with partners in Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda, and Burundi, as well, has proven that a small-force, building-partner capacity working with the local population can make an enormous difference for a very small cost. Of course, you also have to include diplomacy and development pieces to make that work, but I think the partnerships that have been formed there have been incredibly valuable.

Now, going forward, certainly, as the chairman mentioned, as we are drawing down in Afghanistan, as we have drawn down in Iraq, how do we reposition SOF [Special Operations Forces] to best meet the threat environment that is out there?

And, General Fraser, the Transportation Command is absolutely critical. It is all about logistics. It is the part of fighting a battle and preparing for battle that most people don't know that much about, but it just doesn't happen if we don't get the troops and the equipment to where they need to go. It is a very complicated process. You do an excellent job; certainly have been, you know, very, very helpful in Afghanistan. And the challenge now as we transition out is you are the guy who has got to get all that stuff out of there in a logical way. So we are anxious to hear about that.

Of course, overall, as the chairman mentioned up front, you all face, you know, budget challenges. You know, we had fairly substantial cuts in what we were expected to spend starting 2011. Now we have sequestration kicking into to roughly double those cuts and to do so in a very unhelpful way, across the board, mindlessly, in a way that makes it very difficult to plan. In addition, we have the challenge of operating under a CR [Continuing Resolution] instead of with an appropriations bill. All of those things are going to make it that much more difficult to get the job done. We are anxious to hear about how you are meeting those challenges and what, hopefully, we can do to reduce them.

So I thank the chairman. Look forward to your testimony. Appreciate your being here, and appreciate your great service for to our country.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the Appendix on page 45.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Gentlemen, your full statements that you have given to us will be included in the record. Without objection, so ordered.

General Mattis.

STATEMENT OF GEN JAMES N. MATTIS, USMC, COMMANDER, U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND

General MATTIS. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Smith, members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify. It is my privilege to appear alongside a stalwart shipmate, a true friend, and a comrade in arms, Admiral Bill McRaven, and our tremendously supportive TRANSCOM Commander, General Will Fra-

ser, whose outstanding team provides 100 percent of our critical strategic mobility and does so superbly.

In the Middle East, we confront what is a significant risk to our interests in the region: a perceived lack of an enduring U.S. commitment. To counter this misperception, we must clearly communicate our intent and demonstrate our support through tangible actions.

In Afghanistan, we are conducting a steady and deliberate transition. U.S. leadership among 50 nations fighting together in the largest wartime coalition in modern history provides continued support of the Afghan Security Forces to set conditions for their long-term success.

Iran remains the single most significant regional threat to stability and prosperity in the region. Reckless behavior and bellicose rhetoric characterize a leadership that cannot win the affection of its own people or the respect of any responsible nation in the region.

Iran's continued support to the murderous Assad regime in Syria, coupled with its maligned activities in Iraq, Afghanistan, Lebanon, Bahrain, Yemen, and Gaza, and globally in Sudan, Turkey, Azerbaijan, Thailand, India, Georgia, Bulgaria, Nigeria, and even here in Washington, D.C., in the attempt to kill the Saudi Ambassador, and elsewhere, as well as in the cyber domain raise the risk of Iranian miscalculation that could spark a disastrous conflict.

As we address the very real challenges we collectively face, I am confident U.S. Central Command will continue working by, with, and through our regional partners to ensure a measure of stability in the region.

Our military-to-military engagements, security cooperation efforts, exercise programs, and information operations will continue to need your support, including innovative and flexible authorities and the necessary funds so we can continue doing what is required to protect U.S. national security interests.

As our Nation confronts a period of fiscal austerity, our ability to adapt our ways and means to continue to meet our operational objectives would be enhanced with three key factors. One is budget certainty; a second is time so we can adapt our changed budget levels, and we can execute them smartly; and third is the flexibility to determine where to shift available funds in a manner that reduces risk and is consistent with the intent of Congress.

With your support, and with the continued devotion to duty of our troops, and the commitment of our military families, we will stand by our friends and maintain a measure of regional stability in defense of our values and our interests.

I look forward to answering your questions, Chairman. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of General Mattis can be found in the Appendix on page 47.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, General.

Admiral.

STATEMENT OF ADM WILLIAM H. MCRAVEN, USN, COMMANDER, U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND

Admiral MCRAVEN. Good morning. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Smith, distinguished members of the committee, I appreciate the opportunity to address the committee today and talk about the magnificent work being accomplished around the globe by the men and women of the U.S. Special Operations Command.

It is always good to be joined by my friend Will Fraser, and I am particularly pleased to be joining Jim Mattis in his last testimony before he retires later this month after 41 years of service to this great Nation.

I have known Jim Mattis for many years, and everyone who has ever served with him by his side feels honored and privileged to have done so, and I count myself in that group. Jim Mattis has been particularly supportive of the men and women of the U.S. Special Operations Command. And, Jim, on behalf of all those great warriors and Americans everywhere, I want to thank you for your incredible leadership, for all your personal sacrifice, and for your unmatched sense of duty, honor, and country. Good luck in retirement, Jim.

Mr. Chairman, this is my second opportunity to address this committee since I took command in the summer of 2011. Since that time I am proud to say that we have continued the great work initiated by my predecessor, Admiral Eric Olson. At the same time we have adapted to the changing strategic and fiscal environment to keep SOF relevant now and in the future. In Afghanistan, we established a new Special Operations command structure, which brought the various NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] and U.S. SOF elements into alignment under a two-star headquarters. This has allowed us to have a common view of the enemy, and has also helped synchronize our Special Operations Forces to achieve a common end state. It has made SOF even more effective than ever before.

Partnered with our Afghan Special Operations Forces, we have continued to attrit the enemy leadership, while at the same time building and training Afghan Security Forces so they can stand on their own against this determined threat.

In addition to our work in Afghanistan, SOF is in approximately 78 countries around the world helping to build partner capacity so that the host nation can deal with their own security problems. In the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance, then-Secretary Panetta wrote, "We are shaping a joint force for the future that will be smaller and leaner, but will be agile, flexible, ready, and technologically advanced. It will be led by the highest-quality battle-tested professionals. It will have a global presence, strengthening alliances and partnerships across the regions."

I firmly believe that the Secretary's words speak to the core capabilities of SOF, and therefore SOCOM is working with the Joint Chiefs and OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense] to ensure we are postured now and into the future to meet the objectives of this strategy.

Finally, I have made caring for our force and families my top priority. In the past year my command sergeant major and I have met with the soldiers and their families from around the SOCOM enter-

prise. We have listened to their concerns and, with the support of the Services, we are aggressively implementing programs and plans to help with the physical, mental, and spiritual well-being of the force. We have a professional and moral obligation to take care of our warriors and their families, and we greatly appreciate the support of your committee and other Members on the Hill in our efforts to take care of these men and women.

Thank you again, sir, for your commitment to the soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and civilians of the Department of Defense, and specifically to those great warriors who make up the Special Operations Command. I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of Admiral McRaven can be found in the Appendix on page 77.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

General Fraser.

STATEMENT OF GEN WILLIAM M. FRASER III, USAF, COMMANDER, U.S. TRANSPORTATION COMMAND

General FRASER. Chairman McKeon, Ranking Member Smith, and distinguished members of this committee, it is indeed an honor and a privilege to be with you here today representing the men and women of United States Transportation Command.

Our total force team of over 150,000 men and women, military and civilian, are dedicated. They are proven to be reliable every single day. They offer seamless logistical support to our warfighters and their families all around the entire globe. I am proud to report to you before you today that I am honored to be with you, but also representing them as they have met the mission every single day.

I would also like to say that I am proud to be here with two of my teammates, Admiral McRaven and General Mattis.

General Mattis, I want to take this opportunity on behalf of all the men and women in the United States Transportation Command to also offer my thanks, our thanks, for the many years of service that you have provided our Nation, for your personal sacrifices. We thank you for your leadership, but I personally want to thank you for your friendship for the many years that I have known you, and I want to wish you all the best in retirement. Thank you very much, sir.

You know, our Active Duty members, National Guard, Reserves, civil servants, merchant mariners, commercial partners have met the challenges of the past year while maintaining a high operations tempo supporting combat operations, sustainment efforts, humanitarian relief, and crisis action responses. These efforts, from supporting folks who were in need after Superstorm Sandy to developing innovative ways to maximize our throughput into and out of Afghanistan, to meeting the directed 68,000 troop reduction level by the 30th of September 2012, were made possible by the United States TRANSCOM team of dedicated professionals committed to ensuring our joint force maintains global logistic superiority.

Our Component and Subordinate Command Team, comprised of Air Mobility Command, led by General Paul Selva; Military Sealift Command, led by Rear Admiral Mark Buzby; Surface Deployment Distribution Command, led by Major General Tom Richardson; the Joint Naval and Capabilities Command, led by Rear Admiral Scott

Stearney; and the Joint Transportation Reserve Unit, led by Major General Dave Post, continued their flawless execution of our command's mission. I have had the opportunity to observe firsthand during my travels throughout Europe, Central Asia, and the Pacific and all around the globe the support these world-class professionals provide and can tell you they are doing the Nation's business magnificently, without fanfare, and often under stressful conditions. I could not be prouder of this total team.

As we continue to sustain our forces abroad, we also are working towards our goal of becoming the Government's transportation and enabling capabilities provider of choice. To meet that goal we embarked on a comprehensive and collaborative 5-year strategic plan, which will tackle the challenges. It will also take advantage of the opportunities for continuing to project national power and influence. This strategic plan positions us to respond effectively and efficiently to our rapidly changing operating environment, while accounting for the dynamic fiscal environment which we now face. We continue to work with our customers and the lift providers to pursue smart transportation solutions to reduce the costs of operations.

Strategic guidance requires a military that is smaller and leaner, while at the same time we must continue to be agile, flexible, and ready. As the global distribution synchronizer and distribution process owner, USTRANSCOM is committed to working with the military services, our component commands, other governmental agencies, allies and commercial partners to synchronize distribution planning and synchronize distribution initiatives. This collaborative effort will ensure we deliver scalable and resilient global distribution network from the point of origin to the point of employment. We will meet the needs of the operating environment.

As we look towards the future, we are also assessing the mission impact of funding reductions for this year and potentially beyond. Since USTRANSCOM requirements are driven by our customer workload and readiness needs, as their demand signals decline, so will our workload. While the impacts of these reductions will not occur immediately, long-term results will likely affect the business base of our commercial partners and, therefore, our ability to support other combatant commands in the same manner as we do today.

In the coming months we will continue to work closely with the military services, our commercial partners to mitigate second- and third-order effects of these reductions on our sealift, on our airlift, and surface capabilities, and we will keep you informed of our progress. Preserving our readiness remains critical to maintaining our capability to project power and provide support to our joint forces around the world.

Chairman, Ranking Member Smith, all the members of this committee, I, too, want to thank you for your continued support of USTRANSCOM and all of our men and women, military and civilian. I look forward to your questions. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of General Fraser can be found in the Appendix on page 94.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.

General Mattis, I said in my opening statement that I remain concerned that the ambiguity associated with our U.S. commitment to CENTCOM region is one the greatest strategic risks to U.S. interests, if not the greatest. You also touched on this issue in your posture statement. Could you provide specific examples in which the changing, ambiguous, or lacking commitments from the United States within the CENTCOM area of responsibility are putting U.S. interests as risk?

General MATTIS. Chairman, the drawdown of our forces can be misinterpreted as a lack of attention, a lack of commitment to the region. Obviously that is a misinterpretation of what we are doing. Those forces were sent there for missions that are going away. But what we have to do through exercises, through our mil-to-mil contacts by having their officers attend our schools is show an unwavering interest in this critical part of the world.

I would also add, sir, that the budget ambiguity right now is probably the single greatest factor. I am asked about it everywhere I go in the region, by the regional leaders to national leaders there. And I think we are at a point that Senator Kaine made yesterday in the hearing in front of the SASC [Senate Armed Services Committee] where he stated that budget ambiguity is now starting to drive our strategy.

And so what we could use most is some degree of budget predictability, like any household or business in America needs to run an operation. We need some time to make those cuts right. And we need a certain amount of flexibility for the Chief of Staff of the Army, Chief of Staff of the Air Force, Commandant of the Marine Corps, Chief of Naval Operations, Commandant of the Coast Guard so that they can take the cuts in a way that has the least risk associated with it. Combined with that and a continuing straight message that we are committed, I think we can weather this current situation, and reassure our friends, and make certain none of our adversaries think this is an opportunity.

The CHAIRMAN. I am hopeful that today we will pass with a good vote the CR, which contains also the appropriations bill for the DOD [Department of Defense].

That would give certainty, at least for the next 6 months, to the Department, which I think is very crucial at this time. So hopefully we can get that done. In fact, I understand we are going to have a vote within an hour on the rule as they try to expedite this process.

General, you are retiring at the end of this month. The Nation owes you a great debt of gratitude for your 41 years of service, and this has been iterated by your colleagues there next to you. We understand that we owe that debt, and thank you. Thank you very much for all you have done to help the Marine Corps, and this Nation, and the people that have served with you and under you during this time.

Reflecting back on your tenure as CENTCOM Commander, if you were giving advice to a future commander, what are the key policy decisions you believe the United States must make in order to ensure our warfighters can conduct robust planning to respond to contingencies in the Middle East?

General MATTIS. Chairman, I think the most important point is that we keep open communications with our regional partners, our allies out there. And they want to carry their share of the burden in many cases, they are eager to do so, and by good intelligence sharing, by good cross-component training with our various components and their components, we can put ourselves in a position where we are not carrying this entire burden ourselves. And I think that is critical right now, and it means we are going to have to look afresh at a region that is going through change, and we are going to have to make certain we are open to the opportunities that are presented to us as well as recognizing the very real challenges that are coming with the turmoil there.

I think, too, the recognition that Iran's role is extremely unhelpful is simply part of dealing with reality. I know there are some very good efforts under way with diplomatic initiatives and economic sanctions, and I completely support those. At the same time we have to recognize that so far they have not backed off on enriching plutonium beyond any plausible peaceful purpose. And that is a reality, too, that I think we see with the P5-plus-1 negotiations, the European Union position. I think there is a broadening international commitment to stopping what is going on there, and we should do everything possible to reinforce the current policies of our President and of the international organizations that are trying to stop this.

Part of this, frankly, we are going to have to recognize Iran's legitimate security interests so we can preclude them going for illegitimate means as a way to protect themselves. So it is going to be a balancing act, and I think we are on the right track right now, but so far we are not having the traction we need to throw the nuclear program into neutral. It is still progressing, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Thanks very much.

Mr. Smith.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to first echo the comments in thanking General Mattis for his service and congratulating him on his impending retirement. I understand you are planning on retiring back to the State of Washington. So we welcome you back, and thank you very much for your great service. And, personally, it has been great to work with you during my time on this committee and your time in command. You have always been very open and very helpful in keeping me informed and doing, you know, a great job for all of us. So I very much appreciate that.

On the spending, I just want to make a quick editorial comment, then I just have one question. Certainly we do need an appropriations bill, but, you know, I realize we have reached the point where the sequestration numbers have simply been accepted, it seems. I don't think that is acceptable, it is not the number we should be at, and I think as a Congress we should not forget that we still have a very strong obligation to address revenue and to address mandatory spending. And our complete inability to address those two issues is placing an enormous amount of pressure on the discretionary budget.

I care about aspects of the discretionary budget that aren't just defense, so certainly they should be noted. But here in the Armed Services Committee, we should take a look and then listen to the

generals that we have all been talking to about the decisions that are having to be made because we cannot address taxes and mandatory spending. It all falls on the discretionary budget and is doing great damage, I think, to this country. So I hope that wherever we are now, however stalemated it appears, there is a commitment at least on this committee to keep looking for ways to get above those sequestration numbers, and the sooner the better.

The only question I have, I have had the opportunity to speak with all three of you gentlemen before the hearing, and there is something I wanted to ask Admiral McRaven about. It is an obscure issue, but the Leahy amendment and how it impacts your job.

This amendment was passed a couple years ago that places restrictions on our ability to do train-and-equip missions with certain nations if they don't meet certain human rights levels. And at first blush, you know, that makes perfect sense. You know, that is where we want to get those countries to. We want to make sure that their security forces are respecting human rights. In fact, I know, Admiral McRaven, you would tell us that is one of the first things you do. I was very impressed, for instance, in the Philippines that that is—you know, since it is an internal issue, training the security forces on how to work with and respect the local populations is a cornerstone of what you do.

The irony of the Leahy amendment is it forces you out at a time when perhaps you are needed most, when there isn't respect for human rights amongst the security forces. Certainly this was a difficulty in Mali, when you weren't allowed to, you know, train as much as you would have liked because of those continuing concerns.

I support the human rights concerns. I just think that SOCOM being able to go in and do train-and-equip missions is a way to improve human rights, and I am wondering if you could just talk a little bit more about that.

Admiral MCRAVEN. Sir, thank you. And I think you hit the nail on the head here. We absolutely want to ensure that the forces we are working with understand and appreciate their requirement to maintain appropriate human rights. We go in and we try to teach them what we think "right" looks like in terms of everything militarily, from good order and discipline, to civilian rule in the military, to human rights.

So when we have a circumstance where you have an individual, for example, that is in the unit, we have now what is called a policy of "poison person, poison unit." So if the individual has committed a human rights violation, then by default we have to go back and relook the entire unit, potentially step away from that unit at a time when, frankly, as you said, we are kind of getting forced out at a time when we probably need to engage them more than ever before.

And I want to make absolutely clear, Congressman, we are all about making sure that there are appropriate human rights vetting, and that we are doing this according to the law and the policy. Unfortunately it has restricted us in a number of countries across the globe in our ability to train units that we think need to be trained, that the U.S. Ambassador in many cases thinks need

to be trained, that the host nation thinks needs to be trained, and yet because of some of the restrictions of the Leahy amendment, we are prohibited from doing that.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. That is something I think this committee should look at during the authorization process.

That is all I have. I yield back. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Thornberry.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I, too, would prefer that we not have military funded at the lower sequestration level. On the other hand I know that we have an opportunity before us in just an hour or two to alleviate some of the damage that comes from having a CR and a sequestration together. And I hope that, like the chairman, we can have a strong vote to make sure that happens, because I am afraid we have a narrow window to get a defense appropriation bill done, and then we will end up with the worst of both.

Thank you all for being here. I appreciate very much your service. And if I may make a brief editorial comment, it seems to me essential to our country's security to have those who serve us in the Armed Forces to be able to and to be encouraged to offer their best professional military advice on the key issues we face even if it makes political leaders uncomfortable. I think that is a form of courage that is just as valuable to the country and just as admirable as the physical sort of courage that we all admire in those who serve.

And I just say, General Mattis, in addition to your intellect and other qualities, that courage that you have displayed throughout your career and integrity is one of the reasons you are so admired on this side of the table as well as with your colleagues there.

Moving to the weeds for just a second, General Mattis, we had a hearing a week or two ago on building partnership capacity; looking at the different authorities and whether there are improvements, adjustments, modifications, updates that can or should be made to the range of authorities we have to help other security forces.

Given your experience and area of responsibility, I would be interested in any comments you have on that topic, suggestions you may have, especially looking forward. And then I would appreciate it if Admiral McRaven could make a comment on that as well.

General MATTIS. Thank you, sir.

I won't reiterate what Admiral McRaven already said about Leahy, but that is at times stopping us perhaps more broadly than was the congressional intent, where one person does something, and now we have a large unit that is tainted and we are unable to work with.

The other point I would make is, sir, that many of the organizations that conduct border security or paramilitary activities against terrorists in particular are in the Ministry of Interior Forces. And if we could get some flexibility that if an ambassador says, this organization in the Ministry of Interior is working in a de facto military realm and could use U.S. military guidance, support, training, we need the authority, I think, to also work with them.

Sometimes we have this arbitrary line drawn originally for a very good purpose, but probably because other organizations do not organize the same way, other nations don't organize the same way we do, we get somewhat circumscribed in what we can do. That would be the one that leaps out at me.

I actually have the authority to do training both here at home, if they want to come to Nellis Air Force base or to Fort Irwin. I have got the authority to do training with them overseas. I am in pretty good shape on the authorities right now, sir, absent those two points.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Admiral.

Admiral MCRAVEN. Yes, sir. Thank you.

In terms of Special Operations Forces and how we train and build partner capacity, as was mentioned in the opening comments by the chairman and the ranking member, our direction here as we push towards a vision for SOF 2020 really is a lot about building partner capacity. We have a number of authorities out there that enable us to do that. We have 1206 authorities, 1208. We have our Joint Capabilities NECC [Navy Expeditionary Combat Command] Sizes and Training program, our JSET [Joint Systems Engineering Team] program.

Unfortunately, all of those have their limitations. Most of them are 1-year money authorities. So as you begin to build a partner's capacity, you really want to be able to come in and say, look, we have got a 5-year plan or a 10-year plan, because it takes time to build capacity if you want to do it right.

It was mentioned earlier about Colombia. We have had tremendous success in Colombia as we began really around 2002 in helping the Colombians deal with the FARC [Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia]. Same thing in the Philippines, where we have great success in working with our Filipino counterparts. But in both of those cases, which have had dramatic effects on the end of it, it has taken us almost 10 years to get there.

So we are looking for an authority that is not just 1 year, so that we can sit down and actually develop a plan that allows us to have multiyear funding, that allows us in the Special Operations community to be able to deal not only with the Minister of Defense, but in many cases with the Minister of the Interior, because many of their counterterrorism forces rest in the Interior vice Defense. We are looking for some minor MILCON [military construction] so that we can build small shoot houses and maybe a small barracks complex, things like that that we think will give us some ability to again build the capacity with a longer-range plane rather than how we are having to do it now, which is year by year.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Larsen.

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Well, General Mattis, congratulations on your career. And like Mr. Smith said, I look forward to having you back in Washington State.

First question as well is for you and has to do with Afghanistan itself and the idea of the commitment the U.S. has to Afghanistan. But it just seems that short of a long-term, very heavy presence in

Afghanistan, folks in the region believe the U.S. won't have a commitment to Afghanistan. And I disagree with that.

But you mentioned a few things. But can you give, you know, what are three specific steps the U.S. can take to show that, yes, this is a long-term—we have a long-term commitment to Afghanistan that is different than the one we had, but is still a commitment to Afghanistan?

General MATTIS. Yes, sir. The first point I would make is that the way we are drawing down right now with the President's plan allows us to keep our troop strength in the field for the next year. That sends a message in itself. And we will then draw down after this fighting season.

Further, we are going to maintain about half the troops we have there now through the election. That shows a commitment to an election that will get the country on the right path, I think, in terms of showing a sustained commitment to democracy and solving their problems through the democratic process rather than picking up AK–47s.

The third point is there will be an enduring force there. I am confident there will be. The President has not made up his mind on what it will be, but both the President of the United States and the Secretary General of NATO, both at Lisbon and at Chicago, have said there will be a continued presence, enough to buttress the Afghan Security Forces and keep them strong and on the right track as they continue to mature.

Further, I believe the Tokyo Donors Conference shows an international commitment, it is not all coming out of the pocketbooks of the American taxpayer, for a longer-term economic support as this country tries to get its agricultural sector back aligned, get their mining sector started up, that sort of thing. So I think it is a combination of international donors and a strong support for the Afghan Security Forces. So there is a positive future that the countries in the region can see there.

Mr. LARSEN. Can you remind us of the date of the election, presidential election?

General MATTIS. I don't think the specific date has been set. It is April or May of 2014.

Mr. LARSEN. Thanks. Thanks.

General Fraser, I don't want you to feel left out, so I have some questions for you on logistics.

In the NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act] 2013, we put some specific authorities related to sealift readiness, you mentioned page 15 of your testimony. Can you help us understand how you plan to use them?

General FRASER. Thank you, sir. I appreciate it.

The fact that as we look forward to the future, one of the things that we are, one, first most appreciative this last year is the recommitment to the Maritime Security Program. This Maritime Security Program is critical for us as we look forward to the future in maintaining U.S. flagships, U.S. mariners. And that fleet of 60 ships is very important for us. It gives us a capability, gives us a capacity which we can draw upon as we move forward in the future.

It is also important as we look at the entire reserve fleet that we make sure that we maintain that in a state in which we could call upon should there be a need for it. But also, we are going to have to work together with our maritime partners to make sure we maintain the right balance. As we continue to see a drawdown of forces out of Afghanistan, as we saw in Iraq, we have seen the business come down. So our business partners are seeing less business in the maritime industry as well as the aviation industry. And so as we go forward in the future, how do we maintain that right balance?

And so we are working with our partners through executive working groups in both the ground, the air, and the sea lanes there to make sure that we have that right balance, and they adjust their business plans for the future. So it is a collaborative effort, working with industry really across all the various modes of transportation right now. And so that is where that is.

Mr. LARSEN. Does that relate as well to your comments on page 17 about railcar capacity?

General FRASER. Yes, sir, it does. As we look at the capacity that is needed for the Army, and to get to the ports, we are in need of flat railcars; in fact, the requirement is over 5,000 flat railcars are needed. The Army owns——

Mr. LARSEN. Just for the Army?

General FRASER. Yes, sir.

Mr. LARSEN. Not TRANSCOM as a whole, but just the Army.

General FRASER. This is TRANSCOM as a whole, what we need to get to the ports, from the forts to the ports. So we partner with the commercial industry, with the rail industry to utilize their flat railcars. And so we are working with industry on different ways in which either we could purchase more railcars, or we could service-life-extend railcars, maintain that capacity.

Mr. LARSEN. Thanks. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Forbes.

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, in these posture hearings we never want to miss an opportunity to, one, thank you for your service, but also thank you for the professionalism you have brought to each of your roles in this very unstable time.

We also don't want to miss an opportunity in thanking the chairman for trying to bring some stability to a very unstable military funding situation. Mr. Chairman, thank you for continuing to do that.

We learn so much from you. Yesterday Admiral Locklear was here, and he told us something that we could extrapolate to our jobs. He said when it comes to the Pacific area, we can't always make China and some other countries do the right things, the things we would like for them to do. So we have three roles. One is to deter them from bad acts; secondly, to assure our allies and our friends that we haven't abandoned our principles; and, third, to try to prevent them when they do bad acts from having more harm than otherwise it would.

Well, our roles are pretty much the same way. We try to deter bad acts from Congress and from the Administration, and sometimes we fail. We knew, many of us in here, when we passed a very expensive trillion-dollar healthcare bill that it would come off the back of defense and out of our budget. We tried to deter that; we failed. We knew when we passed the stimulus bill, those $825 billion and $347 billion of interest, exactly the amount we have cut out of defense, we knew where it was coming, we tried to stop it and deter it; we failed. We knew when the Administration took $800 billion of cuts over the last 4 years—by the way, 19 times the amount of cuts that are going to come from sequestration this year—it was a bad policy. We tried to deter it, and we failed. And many of us believed when sequestration was proposed by the Administration, it was a bad policy. We tried to stop it, and we failed.

Having done all that and failed, we want you to know and assure you that we haven't abandoned our principles, and we are not going to accept the substitution of budget analysis for strategic analysis.

The other thing we are going do is what the chairman said. Having had those bad acts, we are going to try to prevent them from having more harm than necessary. And the way we are going to do that is with that CR today, which starts us down the path to give you more predictability. But we are not going to stop there. We are going to work very, very hard in the budget process to get the dollars bumped back up to where they need to be in national defense.

And my question to you today is this: We are looking today, we talked a lot about Afghanistan, we talk a lot about other areas, but one of the things we are hearing a lot about is Iran. And I would appreciate you describing your impression of Iran's A2/AD [Anti-Access/Area-Denial] capabilities and specifically to the U.S. Navy's role in keeping open vital waterways like the Straits of Hormuz. Do you feel CENTCOM has sufficient Navy resources to adequately counter Iran's A2/AD challenges? And if not, what does this committee need to do to try to help you?

General MATTIS. Mr. Forbes, the area access denial effort of Iran is pronounced. It is improving in both numbers and accuracy, capability.

There are basically five threats out of Iran. One is the latent nuclear. One is the MOIS [Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security] Quds Force, the people and their surrogates like Lebanese Hezbollah. One is the ballistic missile force. Another is their cyber efforts. And then you have—let me think. There is a fifth one there. Well, that is all five, right there.

The anti-access is best addressed by a joint force. It is not just the U.S. Navy's capability. I do have what I need. I have requested the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine, and Coast Guard assets. I have them, or I have them on alert in your State, sir. And we are in a position that should Iran try to take advantage of this current situation, we could make it their longest day and their worst day with what I have there.

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, gentlemen.

With that, I yield back, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Ms. Duckworth.

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Fraser, it is good to see you again. We had a great conversation yesterday, and I very much enjoyed what we spoke about. One of the things I learned was we spent a lot of time talking about merchant marines, and it was interesting to be talking to an Air Force general about surface fleets.

Could you speak a little bit here what you said to me in my offices about what would happen to the surge capacity should we have to lay off the merchant marine fleet and we have to move those ships from the readiness level they are at to the point where we actually have to lay off those crews, and what that would do to your ability to surge as needed by DOD.

General FRASER. Thank you, ma'am, very much. I, too, appreciated the time yesterday.

And if I might, just briefly, is the fact that we rely on commercial partners to meet our requirements as far as a surge capability goes. This is also not only in that area, but it is also through other maritime assets. And what I am talking about there is because we have to work with other agencies, speaking specifically now about the Maritime Administration, we coordinate work with the Maritime Administration as they work with the National Defense Sealift Fund.

As we look at the CRs, we look at the sequestration, everybody is going to get hit by this, and the unintended consequence and second- and third-order effect of this may result—and the reason I say "may result," because decisions have not been made—that they have to move some ships that are in the Ready Reserve Fleet to a less-ready operating status. So those ships that are in a reduced operating status of, say, 5 or 10 days right now actually come with crews, and they are able to surge when there is a requirement. And so those crews, those merchant mariners are ready to go, and they are going to be able to move forward. If they have to find the necessary savings, and if a decision is made to move them from the Ready Reserve Fleet to the National Defense Reserve Fleet, that moves them to a further reduced operating status of upwards of 30 to maybe 120 days. Those ships then are really not readily available.

The other thing, unintended consequence, that comes with that, they lose the crews. They lose the merchant mariners that are then assigned to them. So we could upwards see loss of jobs and merchant mariners if they move to further reduced operating status. And that is what we spoke about.

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Thank you, General.

One of the other things we chatted about was some of the cost-saving measures you have already implemented in your command. For example, you talked about lessons learned from commercial aviation with how you choose to carry or not carry fuel in your aircraft and the cost savings that come from that.

General FRASER. Thank you.

The command has been looking forward. We have gone through a strategic review this last year. We are also doing a cost-conscious look at everything that we do. We are developing some tools which will allow us to make better decisions from a cost perspective.

The one that you briefly spoke about there has to do with tankering fuel. We have worked with Air Mobility Command, because in the past, as aviators, and we discussed we always thought you wanted to carry the minimum amount of fuel on an aircraft so as to accomplish the mission, and then refuel once you arrive at a location.

Through a best-business practice in industry, what we have actually learned, and we have now developed a matrix, is where can we buy fuel at a less price. And it actually shows us that when we fill up in other locations or do tech stops and fill up there and carrier heavier into, say, Afghanistan and not have to refuel in Afghanistan, we actually wind up and save millions of dollars. So using that best practice on our organic aircraft is resulting in some significant savings.

There are other areas that we have looked to better load out our aircraft. That is a pilot bill that has gone into a training program. We are assembling individuals at common locations so that we can fill up our aircraft that are carrying passengers through TransViz, a new tool that we have or have had out there for some time period, to fill up the aircraft.

The other thing that we are doing is with our containers is mandating in our contracts they be filled to a minimum of 80 percent full, which reduces the number of containers that we have to move.

So there are a number of other initiatives that we are instituting in the command that are resulting in significant savings.

Ms. DUCKWORTH. Thank you.

And I would like to close by saying, General Mattis, on behalf of my father, who was a marine who landed on Iwo Jima, thank you for your many, many decades of service and devotion to this Nation. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Turner.

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Mattis, I am going to ask you a question about the drug trade in Afghanistan. As we look to the trends on the production of poppy, it appears that it is on the way up while we are on our way out. But I am going to submit that question for the record, and I am going to yield my time to Brad Wenstrup, who, being down in front, usually has to wait a long time to ask a question. So I yield the remainder of my time to Brad.

The CHAIRMAN. Gentleman is recognized.

Dr. WENSTRUP. I thank you, Mr. Turner, for yielding your time.

And thank you, Mr. Chair.

Gentlemen, I want to express my gratitude and admiration for your lifetime of service to our country.

We all have a concern, always, about our personnel and readiness and deterrence, and our abilities in those areas, both short-term and long-term. And certainly those burdens weigh upon your shoulders, and what comes with that is our budget concerns. And, hopefully, we will be relieving some of those for you on behalf of defending our Nation.

But you know your needs very well, and putting budget aside, what would you say are your top one or two priorities or needs as

we go about completing our missions over the course of the next year?

Admiral MCRAVEN. Sir, I will start, if you don't mind.

We have done an extensive study. My predecessor, Admiral Eric Olson, took a look at the Special Operations community, of which there are about 66,000 men and women in the community and their spouses, to take a look at the health of the force, and he conducted this about 2 years ago. The report landed on my desk after I took command in the summer of 2011. And he determined at the time that the force was fraying. And as I have said before, in the 18 months that I have been in command, frankly, the force has continued to fray at a fairly rapid pace.

But one area where I think we need to focus our attention, we do pretty well by our service members, but it is in terms of some of the family support programs and the resiliency programs. This is where I am working with the Services, and I am working with Capitol Hill, and I am working with OSD to figure out can we continue to support our families, because I have made the families a readiness issue.

The Services do a magnificent job of taking care of our families in terms of health care and support to the families, but in these trying times, if you are not going above and beyond to take care of the spouses and the kids, then that directly affects the readiness of the service members. So we are trying to find out what is the right balance between taking care of the member himself, which, again, I think we do a pretty good job of, and then supporting the family members.

General MATTIS. Dr. Wenstrup, right now probably my biggest needs are ballistic missile defense because of the growing ballistic missile threat in the region. That would help reassure our allies as well, who are also improving their defenses.

The second one, I would say, is naval forces. It is going to be a more naval theater in the future than it has been in the past. And so by having embarked troops, by having ballistic missile defense at sea, mine-sweep capability, strike capability, cruisers and destroyers for escort, we send a stabilizing message throughout the region.

For example, you remember you used to hear a lot about mining the waters, mining the Straits of Hormuz by one nation out there. We ran an international mine-sweeping exercise back last September, and you haven't heard anything since. I hoped to get 12 nations out there; we ended up with 35 nations from 5 continents. I was even looking for a penguin from Antarctica so I could get them all.

But my point is after that point of 35 nations coming out, including nations like Canada, Estonia, Japan, Singapore, Djibouti, all across the world it just quieted things down.

So right now, thanks to the Army, Navy, Air Force, Coast Guard, Marine Corps, I have what I need at this point. But those would be my top needs.

General FRASER. Thank you, sir.

First and foremost for me is taking care of our people. They are the ones that are making the decisions in the defense transportation system and assuring that they have the right tools, they

have the right education to be able to make those cost-conscious decisions. So ensuring that we are taking care of them and building that capability and capacity as we move into the future, because we have already seen some of the great things they can do with—you term them loose with innovation.

The second thing I would say is budget certainty. And the lack of budget certainty right now is going to have an unintended consequence on our command. Our command is comprised, as I have said before, of organic and commercial capabilities, and without budget certainty, and without the ability to build a plan for the future, then it makes it very difficult upon the Services to build a solid plan.

And that has that unintended consequence to our commercial partners. Those businesses that are out there making those decisions whether they are going to be with us or not as a part of the CRAF [Civil Reserve Air Fleet] program, or if they are going to be a part of the VISA program, the Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement. These types of things create that uncertainty.

The lack of budget certainty also affects me in a working capital fund. I think this is an unintended consequence a lot of people don't realize with a working capital fund. And so when I don't have my 7 to 10 days of working capital cash, and I draw down on that because I am not generating revenue, then what happens is that creates an uncertainty, is going to draw down my readiness my ability to respond. And so the drawdown on that and the lack of budget certainty is one of the things that is going to, I think, increase our risk in the future to respond in a very timely matter.

Dr. WENSTRUP. Thank you, General.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Barber.

Mr. BARBER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thanks to the witnesses for their excellent testimony and for their leadership and patriotism.

And to you, General Mattis, I join with my colleagues and a very grateful Nation to thank you for your many years of service. Your leadership will be missed, and we wish you well in retirement.

I do have a couple of questions for you, General, specifically with regard to a couple of options we have for continuing to support our mission even as we withdraw particularly from Afghanistan, and that has to do with the need for counterintelligence and human intelligence as a bedrock for our future military posture in the region.

I am very fortunate. In my district we have Fort Huachuca, where a lot of the training in human intelligence takes place, an outstanding facility and training. As we transition, General, from Afghanistan, where do you see the need for American human intelligence capacities in the region, and how can we build our partners' capabilities on human intelligence in the region after the planned drawdown from Afghanistan?

General MATTIS. First of all, sir, I would just reinforce your judgment on this. The kind of enemies we fight today, sir, you can't just count their tanks from outer space with a satellite; you need human intelligence, you need people who understand the culture of

those areas and can really get into what is driving people to certain decisions, certain actions.

We have found, for example, in Afghanistan, under the threat of the insider attack, that this was the way to address it, and we have stood up and built up the Afghans' internal capability. It is too early to say why the attacks have dropped so dramatically, but I am fairly confident that it was the emphasis here that has helped drive that number down significantly.

I would say, too, that working with the other nations—and this is where we need the authorities to be able to work not just with their ministries of defense, because sometimes the people that they organize to carry out the counterintelligence mission are not in their ministry of defense—I need the authority to work with them, bring them to Fort Huachuca, in many cases, and give them the kind of training that we use, which allows us to adapt to the changing character of the threat in the area.

But I think it is mostly a matter of training, because this is something you cannot mass produce. You have got to turn out skillful people on this and people who are imbued with an ethical approach to how they do this duty.

So that is the direction I would take on it, sir, is working through the training effort, both at home and away, to help them on this.

Mr. BARBER. Totally on the same page, General.

Second question for you has to do with yet another way in which we are seeking out the enemy and taking the enemy out, and that has to do with our unmanned aerial systems.

Again, I am pleased to say that two installations in my district are instrumental in this, Fort Huachuca and Davis-Monthan Air Force Base. They have been critical in the counterterrorism efforts in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. But I am concerned about our ability and our allies' ability to target terrorists such as the Haqqani network along the Afghanistan and Pakistani border.

Is there a long-term plan for American unmanned reconnaissance after the planned drawdown of our forces, and what capacity does the Afghan National Security Force have for unmanned aerial platforms to target terrorist networks?

General MATTIS. Sir, the Afghans do not have that capability yet. It is one of the enablers that we are trying to build into them before we leave. I can only speak to the use of these unmanned assets inside Afghanistan where my forces use them.

The long-term view is that we will continue this so long as we are there. We will transition this capability, standing it up inside the Afghan forces so when they leave, they have the ability to keep an eye on that border area. I have operated many years around the world, and I have never had more difficult military terrain to operate in than along that border.

So what you are pointing out is critical. We will have to see what level the President decides to leave as far as our forces there, and what level of coaching, of mentoring we can give to the Afghans. But there is a number of ways that we can get this capability stood up with the Afghans from a more rudimentary level to the more sophisticated level, and we will just have to work on it, sir.

Mr. BARBER. General, just a final point. There is no plan at this stage to continue our use of those unmanned vehicles to take out targets after we leave?

The CHAIRMAN. Sir, the gentleman's time has expired.

General MATTIS. That decision has not been made yet by the President, sir.

Mr. BARBER. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Conaway.

Mr. CONAWAY. Let me share with the gentlemen, thank you for being here this morning, and, General Mattis, a heartfelt, sincere thank you for your dedicated service, and Godspeed on whatever new chapters you open in the days ahead of you.

Yesterday in talking to the Senate committee, you talked about a potential collapse of the Assad regime in Syria, and that you were working with regional partners to try to see what the responses might be.

You also mentioned the idea of arming the opposition or the rebels, that you have not been tasked with knowing who to arm and who not to arm. Can you fill in the blanks, kind of the gaps there, as to how you would deal with a collapsed Assad regime, but not know who those folks are yet that are still in place to fight?

General MATTIS. Yes, sir. Well, we are not operating inside Syria, of course, right now, and so the organizations that are, which are a pretty wide range of organizations, as you know, I don't have that kind of fidelity on them right now.

We are working with regional powers, so we are getting a pretty good idea of what is going on inside the country, and there are, of course, some regional states that are supplying weapons, and we believe that their weapons by and large are getting to the right people, and they are not—in other words, they are not going to the wrong people.

The planning that I am doing has to do with countries that are concerned about what is going to be there the day after Assad is gone, and what we can do working with them and other regional powers that would come in to help as we deal with the day after; in other words, the sectarian and the ethnic divisions that are probably going to be rife at that point. But right now I have not been tasked with providing weapons or other resupply to opposition forces, so I have not moved those kind of forces into the region there to get that situational awareness. Does that answer your question?

Mr. CONAWAY. It does. There are no easy, good answers in Syria. No one is obviously doing that. But knowing that some planning is in place to try to know who, because that is going to be the big deal, and also, you said yesterday that you think that the Iranians will be particularly mischievous and opposed to Assad regime as well with respect to the militias, and those are the same people that we are thinking about helping.

Admiral McRaven, in your statement you talk about—and I will have to read some of this—a joint urgent operational needs statement that you use to source an ISR [Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance] platform or ISR something. And kind of a multipart question with respect to that. SOCOM has its own quick

response kind of ways to buy things. Can you walk us through why you use the DOD version, how did it get paid for, why is that—you also sound like you relied more on the DOD-level joint operational statements versus your own authorities.

Can you walk the committee through, and what was the overwhelming requirement behind the—or that we need for the requirement that you took this tack on?

Admiral MCRAVEN. Yes, sir. The Joint Urgent Operational Needs Statement, or JUONS, as we refer to it, is normally initiated from somebody in the operational unit, so if there is a demand signal that comes from an operational unit in the Special Operations meeting around the world, that gets to us. We actually have a very short time frame, a couple of days, where we have to take a look at that JUONS. We got to validate that to determine whether or not that operational need is, in fact, an urgent operational need, and we have a couple of avenues by which we can begin to put money against a particular operational need.

We can go through the joint service system, as you pointed out, or internal with SOCOM within some acquisition parameters if it is a small purchase, and we can rapidly field it and get it into the battlefield quickly. We have the capability to do that. If it is a larger requirement that, in fact, requires an acquisition program, then, sir, we have to go through the standard acquisition process.

But SOCOM does have an accelerated means of taking an operational need from a soldier, sailor, airman, marine in the field and turning that pretty quickly, producing an object, and getting it back; the capability of getting it back to that soldier's hands as quickly as possible.

Mr. CONAWAY. In that regard are there things about that dual-approach system that we need to fine-tune? In other words, are there flexibilities that you need to decide which way you go? And how does the funding work on the particular way you pick to source it?

Admiral MCRAVEN. Sir, I will tell you, I think the process works pretty well for us right now, having the option to do it internally or to go through the Services, and sometimes if it is a larger acquisition program, or the demand, we think, might be a broader Service requirement after it is a SOCOM requirement or a SOF requirement, then, frankly, we will work through the Service systems.

So, I am pretty happy with the flexibility we have right now in dealing with the urgent operational requirements coming from the field.

Mr. CONAWAY. All right.

Sorry, General Fraser, I ran out of time.

Yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Mr. Veasey.

Mr. Johnson.

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, thank you all for your service to the Nation, and we are very proud of the distinguished careers that you all have led. Thank you very much.

I would like to know, General Mattis, what are America's core enduring interests in Afghanistan, and how would you prioritize those?

General MATTIS. Sir, if we go back to 9/11 and we look at the situation we confronted, our enduring interests are that Afghanistan be able to govern its own country, and the kind of people that set up shop there to attack our country are not allowed to again in the future. That is the core enduring interest.

It means that we have got to help Afghanistan get on its feet as a country. We are going that right now both in a security realm and, more broadly, through the State Department programs.

I think that the priority would be initially, as it has been, the security effort so that we can protect the Afghan people from this enemy and allow them to set up a country again after the trauma they have been through for decades now. But I think once we get to a point where Afghanistan is under Afghans who are responsible, who do not have the medieval view of the world that some of the Taliban and people they allowed to come in, Al Qaeda, then I think that we have got it on the right track, sir. But the priority, I would say, is the security and then the economic and social and governance things that can follow.

Mr. JOHNSON. All right. Thank you.

The Afghan security forces, of course, are key to ensuring the kind of stability that you just indicated. By what metrics are we measuring the effectiveness of the ANSF?

General MATTIS. First of all, we have training metrics, recruiting and training. So we organize them, we equip them, we train them, and then we put them out, we graduate them. That is one set of metrics.

We try to bring them up with an ethical understanding of the use of force, but also that the tactical skills be better than what they are going to confront against the enemy.

Once in the field we rate them operationally, and there we evaluate their ability to operate on their own. Of course, it takes a little while to stand up an army in the middle of a war. We remember that from our Revolutionary War days when the French were the regulars, and we were the irregulars, and they had their advisors helping us stand up. Not much has changed, frankly, sir. It is still how do you mentor them, coach them, build their capability, but more importantly their confidence.

Let me just give you a quick statistic that will show you a measure. Since the first of January, I have lost four of our wonderful troops killed in action there; 2 months, going into a third, four troops.

The Afghan security forces have lost 198 killed. Nothing can more graphically and perhaps grimly show that the Afghan boys are taking the bulk of the fighting now, and I would just point out that this is a continuing trend; this is not just a snapshot. We have seen this coming for some time as they step up to do the fighting, sir.

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, that is indeed encouraging news, and I think it is just human nature that when folks are assisted as they stand up, they end up standing up strong and doing—they make do with

what they have. But I know they have been asking us for things like F–16s, armor, and other forms of advanced weaponry.

Do you see that they are ready for that at this time or will be ready for that at some point in the near future before we cease our combat operations?

General MATTIS. Well, sir, as you know, we are shifting from combat operations to advise-and-assist operations literally right now, and you see that in the statistics.

We would have to look at what the threat is to them, what they need to defend their country. The initial threat right now is really an insurgent enemy, and we are building up some air transport capability so they can move troops around the country. That is under way. We are building up some turboprop aircraft that will allow them to use air support against an insurgent enemy, and we would have to evaluate the requirement before we went to that next level that you are pointing out. I have not gone to that level yet, but I am aware that there is interest, sir.

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, General, and enjoy your retirement as well.

Mr. THORNBERRY. [Presiding.] Mr. Nugent.

Mr. NUGENT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And I want to first thank General Mattis for your leadership. I have had sons over in Iraq and Afghanistan, so I truly do appreciate your leadership as relates to CENTCOM.

And to our other distinguished panelists, Admiral McRaven and General Fraser, I really want to thank you for your service to this country.

But to General McRaven—I am sorry, Admiral McRaven. My apologies. Underseas mobility programs have had a troubled history, but I believe the capability to insert a SEAL [Sea, Air, Land] team undetected anywhere connected to an ocean is absolutely worth overcoming any issues that we may have had. Overcoming the engineering and political challenges, you know, SOCOM, I know, needs to replace the Mark 8 SEAL Delivery Vehicle, the wet, and with a new wet submersible, but also supplement that capacity with a dry submersible variant that can deploy underwater.

I would like to know, if you would, talk about some of the obstacles impeding those various undersea mobility programs and what has caused the delay of initial operational activity or capability of the wet submersible; and then also, if you would, then go to the dry submersible vehicles, both of which I would think would give you added options in regards to inserting our SOF guys where they need to be without being noticed.

Admiral MCRAVEN. Sir, thank you very much.

As you point out, really over the last decade or so as we have—we, the naval special warfare community—has folks on the fight in Iraq and Afghanistan, and we put a lot more of our emphasis in there, we had to kind of deemphasize our support and our look in the undersea mobility. That is now changing.

Again, my predecessor, Admiral Eric Olson, put a fair amount of emphasis into this, and I am following on in that regard. And we have two programs, as you mentioned. The wet submersible that will replace the Mark 8, my understanding is we now have a prototype under contract, so that is good for us to take a hard look at

whether or not the prototype will, in fact, meet the requirements of the SEALs and the SEAL Delivery Vehicle teams. And we have two prototypes that we are working with some foreign countries to take a look at our dry submersible.

We will essentially take a look at both of those, make a good business case, a business analysis as well as an operational analysis of the requirements of one or both of those, and then figure out where we go from there.

So actually I am pretty comfortable with the track that we are on now in terms of both our wet and dry submersible capability.

Mr. NUGENT. What support do you need from this committee or Congress to make sure that those two capabilities happen?

Admiral MCRAVEN. Sir, I think, as always, having the congressional oversight is important to us. Frankly, it makes sure that we stay focused on meeting our timeline for bringing a product to the fleet and making sure that, frankly, our business partners also are doing their bit to ensure that happens. So having congressional oversight and making sure that we are kept on task, I think, is important.

Right now I have the funding I need, for the most part, to do both of those programs, and certainly if we are short of that, we will come back and talk to the folks on the Hill. But right now, sir, I am, again, comfortable with where we are in regards to both those programs.

Mr. NUGENT. And I certainly understand the position that we had to do, I mean, where we had to be and shifting focus, but I am glad to see the focus is coming back on a well-rounded capability for us to insert troops.

And lastly, for General Fraser. The Mobility Command is so important to us now and in the future. Having had sons fly back and forth to Afghanistan and Iraq, I certainly appreciate it, but more importantly, providing the support and supplies that they need to have. I want to make sure that you have the proper resources to make sure that—we don't know where we are going to be next, and that we have the proper resources to meet that challenge.

General FRASER. Thank you, sir. And I, too, am confident that we have what we need right now.

But, however, I am not sure, as I look forward into the future, with the uncertainty and with some of the lack of flexibility with the budget process, that we will be able to maintain that same level of readiness as we move into the future. So we are going to have to continue to work together with all the Services and with other agencies to make sure that we maintain that capability and capacity at the right readiness level, because we don't know when that next call is going to come, whether it is in response to a crisis somewhere or actually to a humanitarian aid requirement. But we will continue to work with you, but we are okay right this minute.

Mr. NUGENT. Mr. Chairman, I just want to thank all of you again for your service, and particularly our neighbors down to the south in Tampa, where I am just north of, so we want to appreciate your service. Thank you.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Mr. Langevin.

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, I want to thank you all for your testimony today and, as always, your extraordinary service to our Nation, and particularly to General Mattis. You have a long and distinguished career and a lot to be proud of, General, and I wish you all the best as you enter this new chapter in your life

Admiral McRaven, if I can start with you. In terms of resourcing and training and equipping a global-style capability, can you talk about the impact that our commitments in Afghanistan have and your ability to provide forces to other geographic combatant commanders?

Admiral MCRAVEN. Sir, thank you.

As General Mattis is wont to say frequently, most of the Department of Defense resources over the last 12 years have headed to CENTCOM. That is true of my Special Operations Forces as well.

About 85 percent of my deployed Special Operations Forces are currently in the Central Command AO [Area of Operations]. As we begin to draw down in Afghanistan, and depending upon what those numbers look like—and that is a kind of a constant dialogue between myself, General Mattis, General Dunford, and obviously the Joint Chiefs, and the OSD and the President in terms of what that requirement might be—but my expectation is in either case, or however it unfolds, we will have additional capacity in terms of Special Operations capability.

Right now, as I look at building the SOCOM strategy to support the Defense Strategic Guidance that was signed out by Secretary Panetta in 2012, it is about building partner capacity globally, and this is about strengthening our alliances, building a network, and therefore, my expectation is I will be able take some of that capacity coming out of Afghanistan and be able to push that capacity to other combatant commanders.

Sir, as you know, I am a support team commander. My job really is to provide the resources to the geographic combatant commanders. They are the ones who actually have the operational control of the forces once they are in theater.

Mr. LANGEVIN. Admiral, can you talk more specifically, too, about your planned commitment of U.S. SOF's mission in Afghanistan through 2014 and beyond. You just touched on it broadly but——

Admiral MCRAVEN. Sir, last year we brought the three components of U.S. Special—or Special Operations in Afghanistan together under two-star headquarters, and this is really a watershed event for us. So we took the what we call the CFSOCC–A [Combined Forces Special Operations Component Command in Afghanistan], the Green Berets, if you will, that were building the Afghan SOF Security Forces, we took our direct action element, and then with the support of our NATO SOF brothers, we pulled all those together under what is called the Special Operations Joint Task Force, or SOJTF. That SOJTF is in place, as I mentioned in my opening remarks. It has been incredibly effective in taking a look at the common threat and then making sure that we have a SOF response to that threat in Afghanistan

As we move forward, we clearly think that we will be focused on the counterterrorism threat, and as General Mattis mentioned earlier, we will continue to do the training of our Afghan local police, of our Afghan commandos, and of our Afghan Special Forces. So

the counterterrorism piece and training piece will remain enduring for us through 2014, sir

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Admiral.

General Mattis, if I could turn to you. I continue to be concerned about the capabilities of our bases to withstand a cyber attack directed against outside supporting infrastructure, such as the electric grid, which you are dependent on, but don't have the responsibility to or the capability really to protect.

Last year you testified that you assessed both the more modern enduring bases as well as the tactical ones to ensure that they could continue to operate, and that you were satisfied that the proper mitigation networks and generators were available if needed. But can you update us on the progress that has been made in evaluating the ability of our bases to withstand—of our bases within USCENTCOM to operate and recover in the event of such an attack based on the increased advanced persistent threat environment, and also specifically focused on the linkages and integration of USCYBERCOM [U.S. Cyber Command] to support your cyber efforts under your command.

General MATTIS. Yes, sir. It is a great question. Over the last year we have got a much tighter bond with CYBERCOM. They have matured capabilities and embedded some of them inside my command. We are constantly reviewing the vulnerability.

I would like to take part of your question for the record and answer you with some of the classified information that shows the resilience that we have put into the various networks and the workarounds we have. We anticipate that it is a worsening and increasing threat, frankly, and where you cannot get complacent about it.

I would even go so far as to say that where last year I told you I thought we were in pretty good shape, I think we have to do more work now, and we are doing that. We have got some very capable help from Cyber Command. And I will give you a more complete answer, including the classified details that will give you a better picture of what we are doing so, sir.

Mr. LANGEVIN. I would appreciate that.

Again, General, thank you for your service, and, gentlemen, thank you for your testimony and your service as well.

Thank you. Yield back.

Mr. THORNBERRY. I think we are just about to have three votes, and the chairman's plan is to recess during those votes and reconvene as soon as possible when the last vote starts. It could be two, it could be three votes, but just to give Members a heads up, I think the chairman wants to begin as soon as possible when the last vote starts.

But in the meantime I recognize Mr. Scott for 5 minutes.

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Mattis, thank you for your service, and I will tell you, you mentioned the issue in Syria, and one of my concerns is how we stop—when Assad is gone, how we stop the attacks on people from his particular sect, if that is the proper way to put it.

And, Admiral, thank you for your service.

I want to focus, General Fraser, if I can, because I represent Georgia Robins Air Force Base, and I have Moody Air Force Base

as well. And my questions revolve around lift capacity. I know that one of the last questions you answered, you said that you were confident that you had the lift capacity that you need right now. Did I understand that correctly?

General FRASER. Yes, sir

Mr. SCOTT. Do we currently lease lift capacity from other countries?

General FRASER. Sir, with respect to our strategic CRAF partners, we contract directly with them. There are some foreign companies that they subcontract to. We also maintain and retain the ability to do some foreign contracts. When the U.S. does not present the capacity or the capability in certain areas, such as short takeoff and landing, we have done with foreign carriers. We have also done some with some helicopter capacity where the U.S. didn't have it within the CRAF piece. But we do retain that ability to do it.

Mr. SCOTT. Which countries do we lease that capacity from?

General FRASER. Sir, I would like to take that one for the record, and we will get you a more thorough list.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 123.]

Mr. SCOTT. That is fine. Can I ask it in this way: Do we lease any lift capacity from Russia at this stage?

General FRASER. Sir, we have, through some of these subcontractors. They have utilized the Antonov, the 124s, for some oversized/outsized, and that was the—as I recall looking at one of the last contracts that we had, it was directly with one of our CRAF carriers, who then subcontracted for that capacity and that capability.

Mr. SCOTT. Okay. I will appreciate that response and more detail on that. I guess one of my concerns is that when we do the analysis, if we are counting on the ability to lease capacity from somebody who might very well be on the other side of the conflict next time, obviously that ability goes away. I don't think they would lease it to us if we were fighting them.

General FRASER. We do the analysis. It is organic, and those who are our CRAF partners is who we build the analysis around and the million-ton miles per day that are needed.

Mr. SCOTT. I know a lot of your equipment will be coming back into the Savannah port when it comes in from overseas, and if there is anything that we can do, as somebody who represents that area, to help you out, I hope you will stay in touch with our office.

And my men and women at Robins Air Force Base do a great job of rebuilding the C–5s [Galaxy strategic airlifter] and the C–17s [Globemaster III strategic airlifter]. I respect all of you. I think it was a mistake to stop the C–17 buy. I think that is one of the best aircrafts we have ever had, and it didn't cost a whole lot of money to keep buying just a few of them and have that line up and running if we needed more of them.

My concern is that when we do things like that, we end up with a situation like we are in with the F–22 [Raptor fighter jet] and the F–35 [Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter], where we cancel one before the other one is ready to go, and who knows when we will be manufacturing an F–35 and putting them into use in this country.

So, thank you for your service. I look forward to the answer on the other.

General FRASER. Yes, sir.

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Chairman, thank you.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank the gentleman.

I think we have time for Mr. Garamendi to ask questions?

No? You prefer to wait and come back. Okay.

We will recess and reconvene as soon as possible after the last vote in the next series starts.

[Recess.]

Mr. THORNBERRY. We will reconvene the House Committee on Armed Services, and our next Member to pursue questioning is Mr. Garamendi.

Mr. GARAMENDI. Thank you. I hope you were able to get a cup of coffee or at least take a break, repast from all of this.

Thank you for your service. There are many, many questions. Most of them revolve around the budget issues. I suspect you know that we are presumably going to vote on a sequestration and CR bill here in the next couple of hours. Apparently it deals with the military, but I am not sure it goes in every piece of it. And this question deals with the Transportation Command.

Assuming the appropriation level that was agreed to between the House and the Senate but never passed in November of 2012 goes into place, how will that affect the maritime portions of your command, General?

General FRASER. Sir, thank you very much. And not knowing the specifics of what is in the bill, of course we are responsive to the Services' requirements to transport items. And so I would imagine this would help them with respect to their budgets, and hopefully that that would allow them to then communicate with us what level of funding they have, and give us then more predictability as we do planning with both organic and commercial capabilities, and that would be both across whether it is land, air, or maritime.

And so the other piece tied to that, though, is what it does to other agencies and the unintended consequences of other agencies that take cuts. As we look and work with the Maritime Administration, as we work with Military Sealift Command, it is necessary that we maintain the right balance, and so I will have to take a holistic look and work with the Services as to what that impact would be.

Mr. GARAMENDI. If you could report back, I am on the maritime committee and the transportation/infrastructure committee, and so we cross over there. So if you could do that, that would be good.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 123.]

Mr. GARAMENDI. We will probably know this afternoon at least what the House is going to do. As to what the Senate ultimately does remains to be seen.

General Mattis, in response to Representative—a question about Afghanistan, you indicated that there was a drawdown that will occur this year and then more next year. You did not give specific numbers to that or even a range of numbers. Could you do so?

General MATTIS. Yes, sir, I can. It will be approximately a 34,000-person drawdown between now and February of 2014. So

that will keep the bulk of our troops there through the fighting season this year. Then there will be another drawdown that will probably commence after the election in April or May to help them get through their election in April/May of 2014, and they would draw it down to whatever the President and Secretary General determine is the enduring or post-2014 force, sir.

Mr. GARAMENDI. So, in looking at the force structure, then you would have 65,000 in place until next February.

General MATTIS. About that number. We may draw it down slightly if we find forces we don't need during this fighting season, sir. That is basically correct.

Mr. GARAMENDI. Okay. So there was some, I guess, discussion that there would be a steady drawdown throughout 2013. That is not likely to be the case.

General MATTIS. Well, I think there will be some drawdown. I don't think it will be commensurate each month having the same percentage going down, but we will probably start shortly as fighting season closes out to start drawing down. So it would start out probably in the October timeframe, not waiting until January. They would be out by February, however.

Mr. GARAMENDI. Okay. Now, the CR that we are taking up here in another hour or two would provide about $87 billion for the Overseas Contingency Fund. Do you need that much, considering the drawdown of troops?

General MATTIS. We anticipate we do need that much right now. We will look at it every month. We are not going to spend any more than we need to, but right now that is our best estimate that we need.

Mr. GARAMENDI. I thank you.

I yield back my time. Thank you very much.

Mr. WITTMAN. [Presiding.] Thank you, Mr. Garamendi.

On the schedule, I am next for questioning, so I will pursue that prerogative, and, General Mattis, Admiral McRaven, and General Fraser, thank you so much for joining us today, and thank all of you for your service to our Nation. We deeply appreciate that.

General Mattis, thank you for your stellar career and service to our Nation, and we wish you all the best in your months and years to come. So I know it will be a time when you can look in the past with a smile on your face, and so will we.

Admiral McRaven, I wanted to go to you and ask you specifically about our special operators, and obviously they are there pursuing some pretty challenging missions there with village stabilization operations in Afghanistan. In light of the drawdown and in light of the sequester, will our special operators have what they need both in direct resources, but also in combat support as they pursue these missions there in theater?

My concern has always been is that as we begin that drawdown, if it is not done strategically, it could place our special operators, who are going to continue to pursue these very difficult in missions, it could affect them. So two questions: How will it affect them, and will the mission change because of that?

Admiral MCRAVEN. Sir, right now, in working with General Mattis and General Dunford downrange, we have got a good plan. As the larger conventional forces draw down, the SOF forces will

draw down at a commensurate level, making sure that we are still focused on our primary missions, which are counterterrorism and then training the Afghan National Security Forces.

I am very comfortable with the current plan we have, recognizing what our mission set will be in 2013 and 2014. So, to your first question, sir, we do have the resources we need. I am very comfortable with the plan.

Tactically, as General Dunford looks at how he is going to kind of collapse the conventional forces as we begin to draw down, we will, again, have a kind of a commensurate drawdown of the Special Operations Forces so that we are always in a position to take advantage of the enablers that are out there.

As you know, sir, our biggest concern is always the availability of MEDEVAC [medical evacuation] or CASEVAC [casualty evacuation]. We like to make sure we are within, as we refer to, the golden hour, being able to get the helicopter support in to evacuate a wounded soldier and get him back to a combat hospital. And so each and every time we look at our combat outpost and our forward operating bases, we make sure we are within that golden hour.

The other enablers that are out there, ISR, route clearance packages, all of that are part and parcel to the ISAC [Information Sharing Analysis Center] plan for drawdown to make sure that not only are we taking care of our conventional forces, but certainly our Special Operations Forces are well taken care of as well.

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Admiral.

To General Mattis and General Fraser, I want to get your perspective on where you see the challenges of the difficulties in getting both equipment and personnel out of Afghanistan through the drawdown in face of the sequester and the pending CR that hopefully gets taken up today. So I wanted to get your perspective on where you see the challenges and what you are going to be facing with that in the months to come.

General MATTIS. Chairman, I would defer to General Fraser on the Working Capital Fund and whether or not that is going to be impacted here, but from our perspective, as the operational force in the field, it is a matter of concentrating the gear, getting it cleaned up to the right amount of cleanliness, and then getting it out either using air-to-sea ports, or using the northern distribution network, or going over the Pakistan ground lines of communication.

We have just completed the proofs of principle on the latter through Pakistan, and I think we will see the velocity pick up there. We do have a plan to get the gear out. There is the possibility, I don't forecast it yet, there is the possibility we will get the troops out by the end of 2014. There could still be some equipment there still being in the process of being shipped, and I would defer the rest to General Fraser.

Mr. WITTMAN. General Fraser.

General FRASER. Thank you very much.

And as we look at sequestration and the potential hit that that has to the OCO [Overseas Contingency Operations] budget, it is certainly a concern. However, there has been direction by the Department to ensure that the resources are there which should cover the retrograde that we are talking about.

I further expand on what General Mattis has said is that we have built a very robust network that gives us a number of different lanes by which we can retrograde cargo, so we can go out in many different directions. I am encouraged, based on my visit to Pakistan last month, in the opening of the Pakistan border. We have run proofs of principle that have been very productive, and through my discussions and working with the theater, we are going to continue to ramp up that velocity in moving more through.

The other thing is that we have given booking notice to our commercial partners, because there is foreign military sales that we need to move some equipment in, and this is going to help the Afghan Security Forces because they are in need of this equipment as they further their capacity and capability, and so we are looking forward to that. But everything seems to be moving in the right direction with lots of different lanes, so the capacity is there, and it appears right now that we do have the resources.

Mr. WITTMAN. Very good.

Gentlemen, thank you.

We go now to Mr. Runyan.

Mr. RUNYAN. Thank you, Chairman and gentlemen. Again, thank you all for your service. And, General Mattis, I am sure you are going to—knowing how most of us are wired, you are going to continue to serve either your community or this country in your own special way. So good luck with that.

General Fraser, I think you know where I am probably going to talk about some CRAF stuff and, you know, dealing with our C–5s and C–17s. As you know, you responded to me in a 4 January letter saying that the C–5s were overflown their program or record by 29 percent, and the 17s by 21 percent. And I know in the letter and where we are in kind of the operations, some of that cargo doesn't quite fit this back in to where the area of conflict. You can't get those aircraft in there.

But the point was raised also that in your letter you said there was some people unwilling or unable to execute the request for admissions. Do you have any specific examples of that?

General FRASER. Sir, the request for the flying hour program, as we understand and have worked with the Services, is certainly built upon maintaining readiness. So when there are other calls for response in other areas, and understanding the threat situation, the types of loads that we are lifting, the CRAF partners are not able to either accept that threat area or be able to carry that type of load. Maybe it is outsized/oversized-type cargo. And so, therefore, if the flying hour program is built upon readiness levels, doesn't take into account other crisis or other types of response, we are going to overfly those hours. So that is where we see some of that increase, but every opportunity that we can, we are ensuring that we make sure that we partner with our strategic CRAF partners and give them the contracts.

Mr. RUNYAN. Because we keep pushing that, because I can say since 2001, we have had 13 of those partners fall off the face of actually executing that stuff, whether bankruptcy or just quit doing business. I mean, and whether you are talking about the merchant mariners and/or the CRAF program, that is a strategic asset that if we don't utilize it, it is not going to be there when we need it,

and, again, costing us even more money to fly the gray tails and maintain them even longer down the road.

That being said, if the type of aircraft that our CRAF partners have is a limiting factor, are there commercial aircraft out there that maybe we can have a discussion to kind of try to solve a little bit of this in the future, or is it just not in the commercial stockpile?

General FRASER. Sir, based on a review of the threat areas in particular, they do not have defensive systems on them, and I would not be willing to put them at risk based on the threat. We do a thorough analysis, and in coordination with the theater in various locations that we are flying in, we have continued to expand bases. As the threat decreased, we opened up other airfields where we are now actually flying in commercial aircraft because of the security situation changing. It is in a positive direction, and therefore we have opened it up.

We have not opened up passenger aircraft into Afghanistan, into the airfields, but cargo aircraft we are, and we continue to watch that very closely and in coordination with our CRAF partners.

With respect to the business and it coming down, I would comment that we are working with the Executive Working Group and the CRAF partners. We have an ongoing study called CRAF II. There was a meeting last Friday with them as we laid out looking forward to the future what the business is looking like as we have come out of Iraq. We have seen changes. As we now come out of Afghanistan, we have seen that change. And so how do we posture ourselves to have the right balance of organic and commercial capabilities in the future? We will work that in partnership with them.

Mr. RUNYAN. So in kind of in summary, it is more of a security issue than it is a cargo capacity issue?

General FRASER. It has been a combination of security and oversized/outsized, sir. They don't have that capacity in the commercial fleet for oversized/outsized. That is where we have to use the C–5s and the C–17s.

Mr. RUNYAN. Thank you very much.

Yield back, Chairman.

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Runyan.

We will go to Mr. Hunter.

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First, General Fraser, if you wouldn't mind copying me on the correspondence between you and Mr. Scott and Mr. Runyan on the CRAF stuff, I am interested in that, too. I think DOD spent about $244 million lately in foreign carriers as opposed to U.S. carriers.

So, with that being said, just please keep me in the loop if you don't mind. CC me.

General FRASER. Yes, sir.

Mr. HUNTER. Please. Thank you.

General Mattis, it is an honor to be on this side of the table from you. You will always be my general. You were there in Fallujah. I remember sitting outside of the city with 2nd Battalion, 1st Marines, and we saw this lone LAV [Light Armored Vehicle], and we were like, who the hell is that guy? That is "Chaos." That was his call sign in Iraq. It was "Chaos." And even sitting over here, if you told me to, I would go do bad things to bad people.

So I just want to say thank you for your service. It is an honor to even be sitting here talking with you, and you will always have a special place in Marine Corps lore and Marine Corps history, and a true representative of what it means to be a Marine warfighting general. And we all thank you. And you saved a lot of lives, and you killed a lot of bad people, and we thank you for that.

So, with that being said, I understand in the next few days we are going to release our high-value detainees from our Afghan jails to the Afghan justice system, and I just wanted to hear your thoughts on that, and if that is a wise move, if you recommended that, and what you think that means for the warfighter that is still there, still fighting every day.

General MATTIS. Thank you, Congressman.

In this case I fully support it. Two reasons. First, Ashraf Ghani, who is in charge of that portfolio for the Afghan Government, very trusted, very knowledgeable, has identified clearly the legal authority they have to hold people in what you and I would call admin detention. They have a different term for it. Bottom line is they don't get released.

There is also a process, dual key I would call it, where if they decide to release someone, and we think it is an enduring threat, then obviously we can go in and stop that. In other words, we work together, and it takes both eventually at the highest level, both sides, in this effort to hold on to them or to release them.

So, I know they will not become a force protection threat because we will be able to keep them in, and they have got the legal authority to do so. So based on those two premises, I do support this. And that is a change from if I had been up here even as short as 2 months ago, where we were not certain we had the legal authority, and we had to work out the process to make certain that there was a reclama if they were going to release someone that we did not want released.

That said, we released a number of these people back to their village elders. They signed for them, it is a ceremony, and so far we are doing very, very well, surprisingly well. But it is different category you are referring to, and I recognize that.

Mr. HUNTER. Okay. Thank you. That is reassuring.

Lastly, let's just talk IEDs [improvised explosive device] for the next minute and 40 seconds. It is still an enduring threat. It is still the number one threat. We simply haven't been able to get our hands around how to fight, you know, fertilizer turned explosive. And I guess that is just how it is. We spend billions of dollars, have Ph.D.s working on this day and night. Our marines and soldiers and sailors are trained to go fight this, and yet it is still the number one threat.

What do you think? What are the mistakes that we have made, what are we doing right, and what do we need to keep doing?

General MATTIS. It is a multifaceted campaign, as you know so well, of training, of technology, of scientists. I have talked to as many scientists as I can find. The electromagnetic spectrum is a big part of the problem, and it is so enormous, as you know, for ways to trigger one of these.

We have ongoing efforts, improving efforts, I might add, with the Pakistanis here recently over the last 2 months. But ultimately I

will tell you, sir, what we are going to have to do is find a way to prematurely detonate these so the time and place of detonation is no longer determined by the enemy. That is ultimately going to be our way that we turn this weapon against the enemy. It will not win the war for us, but you know what the casualty rate has been, and as much as it has declined, it is still the number one casualty inducer on us.

So I think that getting the premature detonation is where we have to go, and we have got DARPA [Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency], we have got the Navy folks down at Dahlgren, again, every lab we can insight to get involved with this. We are working with it.

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you very much, Admiral, Generals. Thank you for your service

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Hunter.

Mr. Coffman.

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General Mattis, it seems a real concern I have on Afghanistan is the level of corruption and how I think it compromises, you know, not only the ability for the Afghan Government to have any type of capacity in terms of, you know, establishing governance over the country, but the military as well. I mean, all the institutions, it seems that corruption is so pervasive. In your view, are we making any gains on this problem?

General MATTIS. Sir, I know we are making gains. Whether those are transient, and whether those are sufficient, I don't know.

It is a reciprocity-type society, and that is okay. We can deal with that. It is, as you pointed out, when it interrupts or prevents the provision of government services, when bribery is such a way of life that the poor people basically see that these chips are stacked against them.

I would just say that it is really the strategic, biggest Achilles' heel we have. So we are working it. We have got a task force working it. We have got active measures under way. The officers are told, if you suspect someone is corrupt, you do not have to work with them. There is no requirement to work with someone that you find corrupt in the field. Get the word back up the chain of command. At one time, something as simple as that, they didn't realize they could just break off from that person.

But you are dealing with a society, sir, that for decades has had no belief in tomorrow. And when you don't believe in tomorrow, you do whatever you can today to get your family ahead. And until we create more of an environment where there is hope for tomorrow, where there are jobs and government services are provided in a manner that you don't have to go the corrupt route, it is going to be a generational change, I think, sir.

Mr. COFFMAN. The green-on-blue violence, Afghan soldiers killing U.S. military personnel and the coalition partners, ISAF [International Security Assistance Force] personnel, are those incidents—well, I assume they are down now because we have pulled back, it seems, in our interaction with the Afghan Security Forces. But it is critical for us to have that interaction in order to be able to move them forward. Can you comment on where we are on the green-on-blue violence?

General MATTIS. I can, sir. Thank you for that question. It goes to the very heart of trust.

So far this year, one attack. Now, I did not get complacent. I think I know why it has gone down. It has to do with training, has to do with counterintelligence training we have given to the Afghans so they have ferreted out some of these people inside the ranks and caught them. And we have very good techniques for doing that.

But I would tell you, if you went over there today and contrast it to when you were over there 2 years ago, you would probably find very little difference in what you saw as far as our troops interacting with their troops. We are very much involved with them, integrated with them. We are obviously taking what you would consider prudent measures in the field to protect ourselves. But at the same time they have lost more of their boys in green-on-green than we have lost on green-on-blue. So we have had wholehearted support from the Afghan leadership in addressing this problem, and it appears to be paying off.

Mr. COFFMAN. In terms of our drawdown—and maybe, General Fraser, this may be to you too. In terms of our drawdown as to the equipment, what equipment are we leaving behind? And out of the equipment that we are leaving behind, what will go to the Afghan military? And are we, in fact, categorically looking at equipment that will, in fact, be destroyed, weapons or equipment? General Mattis?

General MATTIS. Sir, if we have excess equipment, we will certainly look at leaving that behind. But if the Army or the Marines, the two Services with most of the gear over there, if they need it brought back, it is coming back. So it has got to be really excess if we leave it.

But we are also, as you know, standing up the Afghan forces with equipment that is bought specifically for them. For example, the Light Armored Vehicle is one that is low-maintenance-intensive; it is easy to maintain. So we are not going to leave them a complex system that becomes more of a burden.

So we will outfit them. We will leave behind some gear. We will bring most of it home. And we would probably destroy or demilitarize those things just not worth bringing home.

Will?

General FRASER. Sir, just briefly, we are working very closely with the materiel recovery element that is on the ground. They have a deliberate process that General Mattis is talking about where they actually categorize that equipment. Once we have disposition orders, then we will either turn it over to the DLA [Defense Logistics Agency] to be destroyed, or it will be transferred, as General Mattis said, to the Afghans. It could be declared as excess defense articles. There is a separate process by which that would go through in coordination with State and countries who are looking for excess defense articles. And then there is the rest of that that we will be bringing home.

So the processes, the procedures are in place, and we are confident that we have all the guidance we need.

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Coffman.

General Mattis, Admiral McRaven, General Fraser, thank you again so much for joining us today. General Mattis, we wish you Godspeed.

And with no further business before the committee, the House Committee on Armed Services stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:33 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

A P P E N D I X

March 6, 2013

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

MARCH 6, 2013

Statement of Hon. Howard P. "Buck" McKeon

Chairman, House Committee on Armed Services

Hearing on

The Posture of the U.S. Central Command, U.S. Special Operations Command, and U.S. Transportation Command

March 6, 2013

The House Armed Services Committee meets to receive testimony on the posture of U.S. Central, Special Operations, and Transportation Commands. Today, we have with us General James Mattis, Admiral William McRaven, and General William Fraser. Thank you for joining us today.

The CENTCOM area of responsibility remains a critical focus of the U.S. military. Over the next year in Afghanistan, the United States will be withdrawing 34,000 troops, and the ANSF will be fully in the lead across Afghanistan for the first time. These major changes to the security context in Afghanistan—all of which will be occurring during the same time period—could present new forms of risk to U.S. interests in Afghanistan and the region. Likewise, the broader challenges within the CENTCOM area of responsibility—including the conflict in Syria, the nuclear ambitions of Iran, and the uncertain political transition in Egypt—continue to pose strategic risk to U.S. interests. However, in my view, among the greatest strategic risks within the Middle East remains the ongoing ambiguity associated with U.S. commitment to our regional allies—and the region itself.

Additionally, I remain concerned about the threats posed by transnational terrorism. The threat from Al Qaeda is real. It is global, networked, and clandestine. U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) and our Special Operations Forces play a critical role in counterterrorism, unconventional warfare, and countering weapons of mass destruction. SOCOM has achieved extraordinary integration with each of the Services, the U.S. interagency, and our international partners. However, an emphasis on direct action during the last 11 years of combat may have left our Special Operations Forces out of balance for a future that will increasingly require building partnership capacity and advisory and assistance efforts. Looking forward, our Special Operations Forces must remain flexible enough to counter the transnational terrorist threat with decisive force when warranted—but, at the same time, globally postured to prevent transnational terrorism from manifesting into operational and strategic threats—through international partnerships and regional alliances.

Finally, TRANSCOM continues to execute the logistical requirements for ongoing U.S. military efforts across the globe. The challenges TRANSCOM faces continue to grow. As our military prepares to redeploy from Afghanistan and as we rebalance to the Asia-Pacific, we must remain ready to respond to contingencies elsewhere in the Middle East—and Africa. These operational necessities come as themilitary is being forced to shed force structure, curtail flying hours, and return ships to port—reducing the availability of the very lift capacity upon which TRANSCOM relies. This Committee has taken steps to mitigate these shortfalls, but much remains to be done.

In short, CENTCOM, SOCOM, and TRANSCOM are executing vital military missions across the globe. We are extremely grateful for your service to our country. I look forward to your testimony.

Statement of Hon. Adam Smith

Ranking Member, House Committee on Armed Services

Hearing on

The Posture of the U.S. Central Command, U.S. Special Operations Command, and U.S. Transportation Command

March 6, 2013

I welcome our witnesses, General Mattis, Admiral McRaven, General Fraser. We thank you for your service and your great leadership in your three very important commands. It is appropriate that we have the three of you together because you have to work very, very closely together.

As the chairman mentioned, CENTCOM continues to be our most important command facing the greatest challenges, number one, of course, being Afghanistan, where we still have troops in battle. And the transition over the course of the next couple of years is going to be critical. Look forward to hearing more from General Mattis, from all three of you, actually, about how that transition will go.

But there are other threats in the CENTCOM region. Obviously, the instability in the Middle East remains, and the threat from Iran is also something that will continue to be a challenge, and we are curious any thoughts you have on how to contain that and what come out of the Syrian civil war as well.

Admiral McRaven, we greatly appreciate everything the Special Operations Command has done. And, obviously, we are very aware of the work that has been done in Iraq and Afghanistan over the course of the last decade. Less well known is your presence in many other places trying to contain insurgencies, in many cases before they start.

The relatively small footprint that you offer yields a huge return in a number of places to great success. In the Philippines, helping contain insurgencies there; our work with AMISOM in the Somalia area, working with partners in Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda, and Burundi, as well, has proven that a small-force, building-partner capacity working with the local population can make an enormous difference for a very small cost. Of course, you also have to include diplomacy and development pieces to make that work, but I think the partnerships that have been formed there have been incredibly valuable.

Now, going forward, certainly, as the chairman mentioned, as we are drawing down in Afghanistan, as we have drawn down in Iraq, how do we reposition SOF to best meet the threat environment that is out there?

And, General Fraser, the Transportation Command is absolutely critical. It is all about logistics. It is the part of fighting a battle and preparing for battle that most people don't know that much about, but it just doesn't happen if we don't get the troops and the equipment to where they need to go. It is a very complicated process. You do an excellent job; certainly have been, you know, very,

very helpful in Afghanistan. And the challenge now as we transition out is you are the guy who has got to get all that stuff out of there in a logical way. So we are anxious to hear about that.

Of course, overall, as the chairman mentioned up front, you all face, you know, budget challenges. You know, we had fairly substantial cuts in what we were expected to spend starting 2011. Now we have sequestration kicking into to roughly double those cuts and to do so in a very unhelpful way, across the board, mindlessly, in a way that makes it very difficult to plan. In addition, we have the challenge of operating under a CR instead of with an appropriations bill. All of those things are going to make it that much more difficult to get the job done. We are anxious to hear about how you are meeting those challenges and what, hopefully, we can do to reduce them.

STATEMENT OF

GENERAL JAMES N. MATTIS, U.S. MARINE CORPS

COMMANDER

U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND

BEFORE THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

ON

THE POSTURE OF U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND

6 MAR 2013

Introduction: We are in the midst of a transition in the Central Command Area of Responsibility (AOR). With volatility a defining feature of the region, United States Central Command remains a command postured to respond to military crises while at the same time working in tandem with regional partners and American diplomats to carry out U.S. strategy in the region. In Afghanistan, U.S. forces continue to support the largest coalition campaign in modern history to ensure it will not again become a haven from which violent extremist organizations can plan, rehearse and execute terrorist attacks. We also work with international partners, and across U.S. government and Combatant Command lines, to share information and posture our forces to inhibit the spread of these radical and violent organizations and rapidly respond to protect U.S. interests. USCENTCOM works closely with our fellow Combatant Commands to mitigate risk collaboratively across COCOM boundaries.

As we transition to Afghan-lead in accordance with NATO's Lisbon and Chicago agreements, each of the other 19 countries that comprise U.S. Central Command's Area of Responsibility across the Middle East and Central Asian States present both challenges and opportunities for our military-to-military relationships. The ongoing events of the Arab Awakening, blatant brutality by the Iranian-backed Syrian regime and the spillover effects of refugees and violence into neighboring countries, coupled with Iran's flagrant violation of United Nations security council resolutions, bellicose rhetoric and pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability, and the persistent threat from both Shia (Iranian supported) and Sunni (Al Qaeda and its affiliates) violent extremists demand international attention.

These factors, compounded by the lack of forward progress on Middle East Peace and the movement toward a sustainable two-state solution and the serious economic challenges many nations in the region confront, require us to remain vigilant and be ready for turmoil in the months ahead. In fact, we are now at a point where a re-energized Middle East Peace effort could pay significant dividends in terms of regional security since the status quo benefits no one and violent extremists use the issue for their own purposes. It is essential that we maintain the viability of the Palestinian Authority as a partner for peace and security, and preserve the two-state solution.

As we look to the future direction of American foreign policy, three enduring factors will keep U.S. attention anchored in this region: the U.S. relationship with Israel and our other partner nations; oil and energy resources that fuel the global economy; and the persistent threat from violent extremist organizations. U.S. Central Command's approach – working in tandem with the State Department and other agencies through a whole of government approach – is to protect our interests using fewer military resources in an era of fiscal restraint and political change.

Operating Environment: Significant factors are currently shaping and changing the region. The Arab Awakening will bring years of political and social changes as the demographic challenges of a burgeoning youth bulge collide with struggling economies. There will be additional pressure on governments to respond to popular interests. We recognize the Awakening is what it is and not necessarily what we hope it will be: it is first a flight from repression and may or may not result in an embrace of democratic principles. The future is not

foreseeable, but one thing is clear: America must remain deeply engaged in the region and fully utilize all tools of national power as a force for stability and prosperity.

Traditional regimes that held power for decades have been swept aside or are under siege, adding to the region's uncertain future. Modern communications and social media have the potential to both empower and endanger people. While they can enable users to better understand their social circumstances and provide ways to organize to improve them, they can also make people more vulnerable to manipulation by malevolent actors. The increasing role of our adversaries in cyberspace necessitates additional emphasis and urgency on a targeted expansion of our presence, influence, capabilities and the authorities necessary to maintain an advantage in cyberspace. Threat networks including those maintained by Iran are adjusting opportunistically, and are emboldened by regional developments – to include the Arab Spring and events such as those in Benghazi and Syria. These networks pursue a range of destabilizing activities that include but are not limited to the transfer of illicit arms, as well as the provision of financial, lethal, and material aid support to a range of malign actors seeking to undermine regional security. In our efforts to counter destabilizing extremists, our international and regional partnerships remain one of our greatest strengths, and most potent tools. Addressing these activities will require our continued engagement, reassurance and commitment to work with other nations against extremists' violent activities.

U.S. Central Command's operating environment is also influenced by the major and emerging powers bordering our region, by the increasing Sunni-Shia polarization, and by Iran's malign influence. U.S. government efforts led by State Department to develop more militarily capable

and confident partners in the region are advancing, and contributing significantly to enhancing our robust regional security architecture. There is also widespread attention on how the U.S. and NATO will remain involved in Afghanistan post-2014 to prevent its regression, and whether the U.S. will continue to remain resolute in the face of a growing Iranian threat. Finally, the threat of weapons of mass destruction is prevalent in the region, with both Syria and Iran possessing chemical weapons or the capability to produce them and Iran advancing its nuclear program. Pakistan has a fast growing nuclear arsenal and violent extremists continue to profess a desire to obtain and use weapons of mass destruction. This danger has our full attention.

Each country in my assigned region has its own unique history, culture, religions and ethnicities and we treat each country on its own merits. The value of American military-to-military relationships is evident when you compare the transition in Egypt with events in Libya and the ongoing brutality in Syria. Under immense pressure both internally and externally, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces in Egypt oversaw the transition and transferred power to an elected government. Egyptian military leaders did not attempt to protect the old regime from its accountability to the people or seize power for themselves. Moreover, they demonstrated restraint and steady performance through difficult transition milestones including the appointment of new military leadership and the political upheaval following President Morsi's December constitutional decree. First and foremost, the military sees itself as the upholder of Egypt's sovereignty and national security. It has maintained its professionalism and validated our longstanding investment in strong military ties, sustaining the trust of the Egyptian people through a most tumultuous period. As this critically important country experiences significant

political change and confronts a dire economic situation, USCENTCOM will remain actively engaged with Egypt's military leadership.

Strategic Risks to U.S. Interests: The most serious strategic risks to U.S. national security interests in the Central region are:

Malign Iranian influence: Despite significant economic sanctions and increased diplomatic isolation within the global community, Iran continues to export instability and violence across the region and beyond. There are five main threats Iran continues to develop: the potential nuclear threat; counter maritime threat; theater ballistic missile threat; the Iranian Threat Network to include the Qods Force and its regional surrogates and proxies; and cyber-attack capabilities.

- **Potential nuclear threat**. Iran continues to expand its nuclear enrichment capabilities, which enable Iran to quickly produce weapons-grade nuclear material, should Tehran make that decision.
- **Counter Maritime threat**. Iran is improving its counter maritime capabilities (mines, small boats, cruise missiles, submarines) to threaten sea-lanes vital to the global economy. The occasionally provocative behavior of the Revolutionary Guard Navy is an issue with which we deal and we refine our operational approaches in sustaining our stabilizing maritime presence in the Persian Gulf.
- **Theater Ballistic Missiles.** Iran has the largest and most diverse ballistic missile arsenal in the Middle East and is increasing medium and short range ballistic missile inventories and capability with ranges up to about 2,000 kilometers, sufficient to strike targets with

increasing precision throughout the region. While Iran has previously exaggerated its capabilities, there is consensus that Tehran has creatively adapted foreign technology to increase the quality and quantity of its arsenal.

- **Iranian Threat Network.** Malign influence and activities (illicit weapons, financial aid, trained personnel and training) in Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, Sudan, Gaza, Lebanon and Yemen along with the 2011 attempt here in Washington to assassinate the ambassador of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, indicate a long-term trend that has clear potential for murderous miscalculation that could spark a disastrous regional conflict. Iran continues to seek to establish nodes throughout the region through which to advance its destabilizing agenda.
- **Cyber.** Given Iran's growing capabilities in this sensitive domain, the U.S. must recognize and adapt now to defend against malicious cyber activity.

Violent Extremist Organizations (VEOs): The focus of our military efforts over the past decade has largely been on Al Qaeda, its adherents and affiliates (AQAA), and we have achieved measurable successes in combating them. The AQAA "franchise" remains a threat however. An equally concerning long-term threat continues to emanate from the Iran-sponsored Shia brand of extremism wielded by groups such as Lebanese Hezbollah. In addition to the threat from these terrorists with which we are already familiar, a clash brought on by these two brands of extremism could pour fuel on the simmering Sunni-Shia tensions we observe from Baluchistan to Syria and incite a worsening cycle of violence.

State Security and Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD): WMD proliferation and the potential loss of control of WMD by regional governments, for example the potential loss of

control of Syrian chemical weapons, pose a significant risk to the region and our most vital national security interests. The potential for WMD in the hands of non-state actors and extremist organizations cannot be addressed by traditional Cold War deterrence methods and presents a clear threat to our regional partners, innocent populations, and our forces and bases.

Afghanistan Stability and Security: While progress in Afghanistan is undeniable, progress and violence coexist. In accordance with NATO/ISAF's campaign plan, our sustained training, advising and assistance have led to a counterinsurgency-focused Afghan National Security Force (ANSF) that has now achieved full strength in numbers. Keeping our campaign on track requires close collaboration and reassurance to our Allies and Afghan partners to maintain the confidence of the largest wartime alliance in modern history and the Afghan people. That message of commitment will also reassure the Central Asian States, which are understandably sharply focused on 2014 and beyond. The present drawdown rate leaves the campaign on a sound footing for the Afghan forces to assume the lead with our advisory support and training.

Regional Instability: As savagery increases in Syria's civil war, the number of refugees fleeing the fighting continues to grow. The impacts on Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon are severe, with media reports of over 4 million internally displaced persons and the U.N. estimating over 900 thousand refugees in neighboring countries. Refugees into Jordan alone continue to increase by more than 50,000 monthly since the New Year. The potential destabilizing impact is clear and there is a growing likelihood of unpredictable longer-term effects on regional stability. Refugee camps are not a permanent solution, they have not proven to be economically viable, nor do they give hope to younger generations.

Perceived Lack of U.S. Commitment: Perhaps the greatest risk to U.S. interests in the region is a perceived lack of an enduring U.S. commitment to collective interests and the security of our regional partners. This impression, if not actively and often countered, and any lack of clarity regarding U.S. intentions in the region, particularly with respect to Afghanistan's future, Middle East Peace, and shaping an acceptable outcome in Syria, could reduce our partners' commitment to stand with us and leave space for other actors to assume less benign leadership roles. If we seek to influence events, we must listen to partner concerns and continue to demonstrate our support through tangible actions. Our regional partners want to share the security burden with us, and we should actively enable them to do so, especially as we face our own fiscal realities.

USCENTCOM's Approach: All of U.S. Central Command's military activities are firmly nested in four main drivers of U.S. foreign policy. First is security, and in particular, meeting the urgent challenges posed by Iran's reckless behavior across a wide front and being prepared to respond to a range of regional contingencies, as well as the related imperative of accelerating a transition to the new leadership which the Syrian people so deeply deserve. The second driver is our continued support for political openness, democratic reforms and successful post-revolutionary transitions. Third, no political transition or democratic reform process can succeed without a sense of economic opportunity. Fourth and finally, a re-energized effort is needed to resolve persistent regional conflicts, and especially for renewing hope for a two-state solution between Israelis and Palestinians. Within this framework, USCENTCOM stands firmly alongside our friends and supports regional security, territorial integrity of sovereign nations, and the free flow of commerce.

CENTCOM's approach to protect the nation's interests in the Middle East is to work BY, WITH and THROUGH key regional partners to bolster regional security and promote stability, while minimizing a permanent U.S. military footprint. In so doing, we can build our partners' capacity to enable them to share in the security costs for the region.

USCENTCOM uses four principal levers as we engage in the region:

- **Military to Military Engagements:** These lay the foundation for and bolster our broader diplomatic relationships. Much of this work is ongoing, but as resources decrease and American forward presence in the region declines, mil-to-mil engagements and working by, with, and through our partners will become increasingly important. This type of *forward engagement* is often the bedrock of our most important relationships and builds the trust necessary to work closely together.
- **Plans and Operations:** USCENTCOM develops and executes plans and operations in close collaboration with our fellow Combatant Commands, interagency organizations and international partners as necessary to address developing contingencies and crises. While providing military options for the Commander-in-Chief, these plans are designed from the outset to be inclusive of regional and traditional partners.
- **Security Cooperation Programs:** Building partner capacity is the responsible way to reduce U.S. military presence and maintain the health of our force by partnering with regional nations to distribute more of the security burden. In order to build partner effectiveness, we must be more responsive to their capability needs while strategically aligning acquisition and training plans with regional collective security requirements. Combined training, multilateral exercises (resourced by OSD's Combatant Commanders'

Exercise Engagement and Training Transformation program), defense reviews and expanded professional military education exchanges are cost-effective means to enhance trust and interoperability while encouraging progress on rule of law and human rights issues. Once fully implemented, the Global Security Contingency Fund will offer us opportunities to respond to emerging security cooperation, assistance and requirements.

- **Posture and Presence:** A tailored, lighter footprint supported by access to infrastructure that enables rapid reinforcement is the foundational concept for future military posture in the region. The USCENTCOM military presence will continue to become more maritime in character, supported by expeditionary land forces and have strong air enablers. I anticipate the need to sustain maritime defense, anti-fast attack craft capabilities, amphibious ships and mine-countermeasure capability and Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance capabilities. I see the need for growth in our Counter Intelligence and Human Intelligence (HUMINT) capacities across the region. In summary, we will need strong strategic relationships with our partners to enable the presence required to deter adversaries and reassure our friends.

Around the Region: The Department of Defense carefully shapes military presence (U.S. and partners) in the Middle East to protect the global free flow of critical natural resources and to provide a counterbalance to Iran – a balanced force presence ready to respond to a variety of contingencies, and to deter Iranian aggression. To maintain a right-sized American security footprint in the Gulf, the U.S. promotes close teamwork with the **Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)** states. By deepening strategic ties with the Gulf and improving the capability of the GCC states through multilateral exercises, security assistance and training, regional stability is

appropriately shown to be an international responsibility. The U.S. will continue to promote the capabilities of GCC partners in such missions as missile defense, maritime security, critical infrastructure protection and development of a common operating picture that allows us to work smoothly together when necessary.

During the past year, we have seen significant progress in our military relationship with countries of the GCC. In support of the efforts of the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense and the U.S.-GCC Strategic Cooperation Forum, we have worked to enhance and deepen Ballistic Missile Defense cooperation in response to the proliferation of these weapons. We continue to emphasize U.S.-GCC multilateral exercises, such as our successful International Mine Countermeasure Exercise, which included participants from over 30 countries from five continents in 2012, and our Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) exercise LEADING EDGE 2013 ably hosted by UAE. The Gulf States have demonstrated the willingness to work with one another and with international partners to counter malign influence in the region and ensure freedom of commerce – a critical international issue in terms of the global economy. Interoperability in this framework improves U.S. defense-in-depth and our own capabilities become more robust by supporting partner capacity and working by, with and through the GCC.

For decades, security cooperation has been a cornerstone of our relationship with the **Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.** As we face ever more sophisticated regional challenges in the Middle East, helping to enable the upgrade of Saudi Arabia's defense capabilities sustains our strong military-to-military relations, improves operational interoperability, helps the Kingdom prepare to meet regional threats and safeguards the world's largest oil reserves. In difficult times, the Kingdom

has demonstrated its willingness and capability to use its military forces to fight as part of a coalition against regional threats. Sustaining the Saudi military capability deters hostile actors, increases U.S.-Saudi military interoperability and positively impacts the stability of the global economy. Working with Department of State, USCENTCOM helped establish the first interagency security assistance program to build the capabilities of the Ministry of Interior Security Forces that protect Saudi Arabia's critical infrastructure. This is a long-term $1 billion FMS Interagency Technical Cooperation Agreement, which has shown remarkable progress.

A long term and strong ally in the region, **Kuwait** continues to build upon a long bi-lateral military relationship with its critical support for U.S. troops and equipment. Kuwait remains a valued partner and is steadily reconciling its long-standing issues with Iraq and supporting the region's stability. We enjoy excellent relations with the Kuwaiti military built on many years of trust between us since the liberation in 1991.

The **United Arab Emirates (UAE)** has been a valued partner through Operations Desert Shield/Desert Storm, Bosnia, Kosovo, Somalia, Afghanistan and Libya. The Emirates participated in Operation Unified Protector in Libya, flying as part of NATO's effort and the Emiratis have increased the number of their troops and aircraft deployed to Afghanistan even as other nations are drawing down. The UAE is also a leader in the Gulf for air and missile defense capabilities. Their Foreign Military Sales purchases total $18.1 billion and include the Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system, valued at approximately $3.5 billion, a highly capable and wholly defensive system that will contribute to regional stability and our interoperability. The UAE was the first foreign government to purchase this system. Their

many contributions to collective defense and their close military ties over decades mark UAE as one of our strongest friends within the region, deserving of our continued close engagement and tangible FMS support.

Qatar is taking an increasingly active role within the region, supporting operations in Libya with both military and humanitarian aid. Qatar continues to demonstrate leadership in its foreign policy, including spearheading an Arab League resolution suspending Syria's membership. Qatar has placed wide-ranging sanctions on Syria in response to the Assad regime's violence against its own citizens and has played a leading role in helping the Syrian opposition to improve its organization and capabilities. We enjoy excellent military relations with this country that has generously hosted several of our forward headquarters and facilities.

Home to our sole main naval operating base in the Middle East, **Bahrain** has been an important friend and partner for many decades, and provides key support for U.S. interests by hosting U.S. Navy's Fifth Fleet and providing facilities for other U.S. Forces engaged in regional security. The strong U.S.-Bahrain relationship is particularly critical in the face of the threat Iran poses to regional stability. Over the past several years, Bahrain has faced internal challenges. USCENTCOM works closely with others in the U.S. government to advance a message of support for dialogue and reform in Bahrain, which will be key to ensuring the country's stability and security. The United States supports Bahrain's National Dialogue and the government's ongoing efforts to implement recommendations from the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry (BICI) report. We will continue to be a strong partner of Bahrain and the Bahraini people in the years ahead.

Oman is strategically located along the Strait of Hormuz and the Indian Ocean and has played a steadying role and been a voice of moderation in the region for many years. We have a shared appreciation of the situation in the Gulf and Oman provides valued perspective for maintaining regional stability. We enjoy trusted military relations with the professional Omani Armed Forces and we are enhancing interoperability through exercises and Foreign Military Sales.

In the face of intense regional pressure and internal economic crisis, **Jordan** endures as one of our most dependable allies in the region. Political reform is clearly occurring even as the spillover of Syrian refugees severely impacts a challenging economic situation. Always a leader in the region, King Abdullah II continues to press forward with many political changes to strengthen Jordan's democratic processes. On the international front, he advocates for re-energizing the Middle East Peace. The Jordanian Armed Forces (JAF) continue to provide strong leadership and perform admirably and professionally while stretched thin, and while continuing to deploy troops in support of ISAF in Afghanistan. The JAF provides protection and humanitarian relief to the tens of thousands of Syrian refugees who have fled to Jordan over the last two years. Our continued support for Jordan, including building the capacity of the JAF, has never been more critical. A stable and secure Jordan is a needed bulwark now more than ever.

Iraq remains at the geo-strategic center of the Middle East. Iraq is also the fourth largest Foreign Military Sales (FMS) partner in the region, and ninth in the world. As we work to develop a new strategic relationship with the Iraqi government, our desired end state is a sustained U.S.-Iraqi partnership in which Iraq becomes a proactive security partner with their neighbors in the region. A shared border with Iran is a reality as is the spillover of Syria's civil war that can

reignite sectarian violence in Iraq. Our military-to-military relationship forged in recent years is the foundation for developing the desired strategic partnership. U.S. security assistance and FMS are key tools for building and shaping Iraq's defense capabilities and integrating Iraqi security forces into the region, anchored by U.S. materiel and training. Recently convened Defense and Security Joint Coordination Committees have helped in this regard and USCENTCOM continues expanding security cooperation activities that deepen our military-to-military ties with Iraq, to include opening doors for Iraqis to participate in our regional exercises. Internally today, the security environment in Iraq continues to present significant challenges, and the United States is supporting the Government of Iraq's efforts to confront these threats. The imperfect political processes still keep most of the tensions from creating havoc. However, persistent Arab-Kurd tensions and increasing Sunni discontent – exacerbated by events in Syria and a sustained violent AQI threat – diminish their regional leadership potential as well as their internal stability. Now the world's third largest producer of oil and desirous of the needed stability for exporting its oil, Iraq's long term interests align more closely with its Arab neighbors in the GCC than with Iran. With our persistent efforts over time, Iraq could become a partner that is both a consumer and provider of security in the region.

Egypt remains one of the most important partners in the pursuit of regional peace and stability in USCENTCOM's theater of operations. They continue to support our over-flight permissions and Suez Canal transit courtesies and maintain a field hospital in Afghanistan in support of the NATO campaign. The Egyptian military is also deploying peacekeeping troops in Darfur, Sudan. The ceasefire agreement with Israel is holding and Israeli military leaders have noted that Gaza is quieter today than it has been in years. In the Sinai, the Egyptians are taking steps to

improve security by relocating border detection equipment to counter smuggling activities and establishing a National Agency for Development and Reconstruction. Further, their military has created quick response forces to improve security for the Multinational Force and Observers Force stationed in the Sinai, which includes around 600 U.S. troops. The political situation remains fluid thus heightening the potential for further changes, and this dynamic could place strains on the network of relations between Egypt and its neighbors that have historically been critical to the anticipation and mitigation of emergent crises. Additionally, the dire state of the Egyptian economy remains a cause of concern and a driver of internal dissent. Our relationship with the Egyptian senior military leadership remains on a firm footing characterized by candid and professional discussions. Our military assistance plays a major role in protecting our interests and is crucial to the modernization and interoperability of the Egyptian Armed Forces and USCENTCOM endorses its continued support without conditionality.

As the sole multi-confessional security institution in **Lebanon**, the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) is a unifying force and the principal governmental organization viewed positively by the Lebanese from all sectarian groups. In light of the ongoing situation in Syria, our various forms of aid to the LAF are vital to maintaining Lebanon's internal stability and helping to guard against the spillover violence from across the Syrian border. Our program providing military training and material support to the LAF has enabled them to be a more effective counter-balance to violent extremists within Lebanon. Our shared goal is to support the Lebanese government to be responsive to the peoples' needs while allowing the LAF to build into the principal security force in a country long abused by extremists and externally supported militias.

In **Yemen**, President Hadi has made important progress implementing the GCC-sponsored political transition agreement. He continues to exhibit sound leadership and a strong commitment to reform. To support the Yemeni government's implementation of the agreement, we are working closely with the Ministry of Defense to restructure and professionalize the military and security apparatus to effectively deal with critical national security threats. The economic situation, already degraded by a long period of unrest, remains vulnerable and poses a significant threat to stability. The security situation remains fragile due to the threats posed by Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and Iran's destabilizing activities. We continue our support to the national unity government to reduce the opportunity for violent extremists to hold terrain, challenge the elected government, or conduct operations against U.S. interests in the region or the homeland.

As the crisis in **Syria** enters its third year, there is little evidence to suggest the conflict's end is imminent. Russia and China's regrettable vetoes in the U.N. and Iran and Hezbollah's full support have helped the Asad regime to remain defiant in the face of international condemnation. The regime has shown a growing willingness to escalate violence in pursuit of its goal to retain power at all costs. The regime's use of ballistic missiles since December 2012 perhaps best illustrates this point: Over 80 of these largely inaccurate but highly destructive weapons have been launched thus far, with little regard for collateral civilian population casualties. The regime has used almost every conventional weapon in its arsenal and we maintain a constant watch for any employment of its chemical and biological weapons (CBW). As the conflict spreads, potentially threatening the security of the regime's CBW stockpile, it will be increasingly difficult to track the vulnerability and status of these weapons.

The conflict has already resulted in an unprecedented level of violence, with the United Nations assessing more than 70,000 dead and nearly one million refugees fleeing the bloodshed (as of mid-Feb 2013). Despite tangible gains by the opposition, the Syrian military maintains its core capabilities – including ground forces, special operations forces, air forces, integrated air defense systems (IADS), and theater ballistic missiles (TBMs). Moreover, while the opposition has inflicted significant losses on Syria's military and eroded Asad's control over many parts of the country, the regime has responded with paramilitary operations assisted by sustained Iranian financial and lethal support. Hezbollah is now heavily committed as a critical partner of the Syrian regime, providing training and oversight to the Shabiha militia in conjunction with Iranian support. This cooperation between Syria, Iran and Hezbollah stands in contrast to the relative disunity of the Syrian Opposition – which is further encumbered by the malign influence of Al Nusrah/AQ-related groups.

In **Pakistan** we face a confluence of issues that challenge the Pakistan government and our ability to provide assistance. The political and security environment in Pakistan is impacted by terrorist attacks and ethno-sectarianism and a civilian government with tenuous control in parts of the country, radicalization of segments of the population, overstretched military, strained relationships with neighbors, and dealing with frequent natural disasters. The United States has a vested interest in Pakistan's sustainability as a nation and despite challenges in the U.S.-Pakistan relationship, they are an important regional partner that has sacrificed greatly in the war on terror. They must play a constructive role if Afghanistan is to achieve long-term stability.

The U.S.-Pakistan relationship in 2012 began at a low point as Pakistan maintained the closure of the U.S./ISAF ground lines of communication (GLOC) to Afghanistan in response to the tragic November 2011 incident at Salala. The relationship has steadily improved since the GLOC reopened in July 2012 when we resumed security cooperation with Pakistan's Army and concluded an agreement that permits two-way flow on the GLOC. We also concluded a tripartite U.S.-Pakistan-Afghanistan agreement to facilitate better coordination and complementary operations on both sides of the border that disrupt the enemies' freedom of movement and help prevent another fratricide incident. In December, we held our first high-level bilateral Defense Consultative Group in more than 18 months. We resumed strategic-level talks and committed to implement a framework for defense cooperation that promotes peace and stability within the region, based on areas of converging interests and principles of mutual respect and transparency. Subsequently, we have held operational level talks, including through the recent Defense Resourcing Conference and Military Consultative Committee, which focused on synchronization of our efforts to build Pakistan's capabilities to achieve our common objectives. Continued support for Foreign Military Financing, International Military Education and Training, and the Coalition Support Fund will provide the necessary tools to keep our military-to-military relationship on a solid footing.

In **Afghanistan**, ISAF operations and an increasingly capable ANSF have degraded the enemy's capability. The counterinsurgency campaign has made gains and created space for the Afghan government to continue to make progress toward long-term stability after thirty-plus years of war. Transition of security responsibilities from ISAF to the ANSF continues. Tranche 4 has been announced and will soon move into the Transition Phase, after which 87% of the population

will be in areas secured by the ANSF. To that end, ANSF units are demonstrating increasing confidence and capability. As the ANSF assumes full security lead, the Coalition will continue its transition to a security force assistance (SFA) role. These SFA Teams (SFATs) will focus not only on the Afghan National Army (ANA) maneuver units and the Afghan Uniformed Police (AUP), but will also work to develop a greater level of autonomy for key higher headquarters, district and provincial level components within the ANSF. With sustained U.S. and international support, in accordance with NATO's Lisbon and Chicago decisions, the ANSF will have the capability to prevent the return of terrorist safe havens and prevent a Taliban re-emergence as a dominant force.

However, our mission is not yet complete and our hard-fought gains must be strengthened. As the final tranches of security transition are implemented, Afghanistan will undergo three critical transitions: the assumption of full security lead by the ANSF, elections in the spring of 2014 with the transfer of authority to a new Afghan administration, and the redeployment of the majority of ISAF forces. The success of these transitions relies on continued financial support from the international community, particularly for training, advising and equipping the ANSF. In the current context of global fiscal austerity, demonstrated U.S. leadership through continued support of Afghanistan will be critical to maintaining Coalition cohesion. I greatly appreciate your support for the Afghan Security Forces Fund, which will continue to be a necessity through 2018. Not supporting the ANSF will greatly limit our ability to prevent the return of terrorist safe havens and a Taliban resurgence that threatens the Afghan Government. Our enemies are hedging and contemplating whether the opportunity will arise for them to pursue their agendas. Specific tools such as the Commander's Emergency Response Program, Lift and Sustain,

Coalition Support Funds, Coalition Readiness Support Program and the Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund need your support if we are to achieve a successful transition.

The **Central Asian States** remain key supporting partners for our Afghanistan Strategic Partnership and are concerned about U.S. long-term engagement with the region. They share our priority to maintain security in the region after the transition in Afghanistan. As we transition, maintaining access to the Northern Distribution Network (NDN) for logistical resupply of the Afghan campaign and retrograde operations is of particular importance as we seek to promote stability and assure our partners of our continued commitment to the region. The development of the NDN has been a critical investment to that end and cooperation with our Central Asian partners will continue post-2014. Solidifying international support for the New Silk Road initiative, now and after the drawdown in Afghanistan, will increase economic development, contribute to stability across Central Asia, and may help mitigate the impact of a potential economic vacuum that illicit industries might otherwise fill. Coupled with our NDN efforts, USCENTCOM will continue to provide military assistance focused on building partner capacity and capabilities to combat terrorists and counter illegal trafficking in all its forms. In addition, we will work closely with several of our willing partners who are committed to developing deployable peacekeeping units. Programs and authorities such as Section 1206 (Global Train and Equip Fund) and the new Global Security Contingency Fund, together with the National Guard's State Partnership Program (SPP) represent cost-effective means for the United States to respond to emerging opportunities for building partner capacity.

Our relationship with **Kazakhstan** continues to mature from one of security assistance to a security partnership. In November 2012, we signed a Five-Year Military Cooperation Plan (2013-2017) and a Three-Year Plan of Cooperation in support of Kazakhstan's Partnership for Peace Training Center. Both agreements will assist Kazakhstan in realizing its objective to deploy a company-sized unit in support of a United Nations peacekeeping operation by 2015. Towards this end, Kazakhstan will undergo a NATO peacekeeping evaluation and certification process at STEPPE EAGLE, a peacekeeping exercise co-sponsored by Kazakhstan and the U.S. scheduled for August 2013. Kazakhstan remains a force for stability within the region and supports our efforts in Afghanistan through facilitation of the NDN.

Kyrgyzstan continues to be a key partner for U.S. efforts in Afghanistan and the region. Our military relationship continues to improve, particularly in the areas of regional security and military security cooperation. Kyrgyzstan aims to deploy a U.S.-trained peacekeeping mission within the next two years. The Kyrgyz provision of general access and over flight and use of the Manas Transit Center remain key factors for successful operations in Afghanistan.

For **Tajikistan**, building and maintaining counter-terrorism, border security and counter-narcotics capability to protect our mutual interests from the threat of VEOs are important for regional stability. In concert with our counter-terrorism efforts, we are working with Tajikistan to improve disaster response capabilities. Tajikistan is committed to deploying their U.S.-trained peacekeeping battalion on a United Nations peacekeeping mission in 2014. We continue to use the transit routes along the Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan (KKT) route of the NDN and explore options to facilitate the transit of goods and access in the event of a crisis.

Turkmenistan's policy of positive neutrality governs the shape and pace of our security assistance relationship. This is illustrated in their preference for non-military, non-alliance exchanges, such as those hosted by the George C. Marshall Center and Near East Asia Center for Strategic Studies on broad, multilateral topics. Our bi-lateral security assistance relationship has seen modest growth focused on building their Caspian Sea and border security capacity.

Our relationship with **Uzbekistan** continues to improve in a deliberate, balanced way driven by our common regional security concerns and expansion of the NDN. Security cooperation provides increased opportunity for engagement. The bilateral agreements signed in 2012 are now being implemented and are beginning to produce important capabilities that support our campaign in Afghanistan. In November 2012, we conducted our first Bilateral Defense Consultations, serving to focus and strengthen our military cooperation toward security threats of mutual concern. We expect cooperation with Uzbekistan to continue to progress.

Required Capabilities: America faces hard fiscal realities and the Defense Department is undergoing a period of transition adapting to decreased budgets. U.S. Central Command, along with the rest of DoD and the interagency, will do less with less, but we will not do it less well. CENTCOM will remain tenacious stewards of taxpayer resources as we seek to develop and employ innovative ways and means to achieve our ends.

It is vitally important to invest in relationship development and expand the capacity and capability of our regional partners. To accomplish this, we must adapt USCENTCOM's presence and Regional Security Cooperation through strategic reposturing of our forces and by

providing these forces with the necessary support. We also work to maintain access and presence that provide both crisis response and pre-positioning of critical combat assets and equipment should the need for reinforcements arise. Finally, we need to maintain robust international training opportunities in U.S. schools for their officers as well as multinational exercises as we work to promote regional security and stability by, with and through our partners.

As the war in Afghanistan draws down and our presence reduces, it becomes increasingly important to cultivate strategic partnerships that enable sustained stability. We will need to continue to leverage combined training with our partners and build coalition integration for long-term security in the region. USCENTCOM's exercise and engagement program will enable critical mission rehearsals with partners across the entire military spectrum of operations – reducing the risk of denied access while enhancing interoperability with our partners and creating mutual awareness. This approach will build confidence and enable lower cost mil-to-mil engagement and training activities.

Reposturing for the future, our enduring locations and projects support both a steady state and surge basing capacity, air-refueling, air operations, command and control, and special operations missions to preserve freedom of movement and strategic reach. Our presence also serves to demonstrate U.S. commitment to our allies, partners and foes. Our partners, in turn, provide locations that support critical access for current and future contingency operations while improving their forces and building interoperability with USCENTCOM.

The Iranian Threat Network and Ballistic Missile capability continue to pose a great threat in the region. These threats are expanding in quantity and quality and our focus on the nuclear threat will not divert our attention from the larger issues related to Iran's malign influence, as demonstrated through Lebanese Hezbollah and others of their ilk who are working with Iran's support to destabilize the region. Given Iran's intent to drive us out of the region, to undercut our partners, and its stated threats to disrupt international oil trade, our commitment and reassurance to our regional partners and allies have become the lynchpins to regional security and stability. Our efforts to advance regional integrated air and missile defense help foster U.S. and GCC coordination and advances GCC capabilities in this area. This also reduces risk to U.S. and partner deterrence and response capabilities and preserves freedom of movement. Iran's bombastic threats against the Strait of Hormuz, support for violent proxies and demonstrated military capabilities make the goal of enhancing GCC-wide missile defense capabilities and strengthening collaboration with our forces all the more important.

Improvised explosive devices (IEDs) continue to be the most persistent and lethal weapon confronting our forces, those of our partner nations, and local populaces throughout the Area of Responsibility with an average of 172 incidents per month over the past two years, principally but not solely in Afghanistan. We continue to execute a comprehensive program with the keenly focused Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) to deter and defeat the IED threat in the region and we appreciate Congress' counter-homemade explosives legislation provision.

Our strategic communications and information operations programs provide non-lethal tools to disrupt terrorist recruitment and propaganda within the region. In terms of both outcomes and cost, these programs are highly-effective complementary activities vital to our strategy in the region: they allow us to exert presence, even while our combat forces in the region are reducing. They provide the human socio-cultural data, media analysis, internet video products, and multi-media campaign that include attributable social media and the Regional Web Interaction program (RWIP) to counter current and future threats. They also enable the dissemination of regionally focused information that counters violent extremist ideology and propaganda, amplifies moderate voices within the region, and degrades adversary dominance of the information domain.

These relatively inexpensive activities support interagency efforts to counter violent extremist ideology and diminish the drivers of violence that Al Qaeda and other terrorists exploit. To make this supportable across the Defense enterprise requires an enduring funding mechanism that DOD and our partners can rely on. Episodic engagement is inefficient and has the potential to create animosity due to unmet expectations by the governments and populations we are trying to support. Over the long-run, these proactive activities reduce strategic risk, protect American lives, and reduce the need for expensive responses to terrorist attacks. We seek your support to sustain and expand these efforts.

As I travel throughout the AOR and see the promise of new initiatives and the risk posed by numerous challenges, I receive requests from military leaders across the region to increase intelligence sharing between our militaries. Many show determination to make tough decisions

and prioritize limited resources to oppose antagonists seeking to destabilize their countries or use them to plan and stage attacks against the U.S. homeland. With this in mind, and in order to demonstrate our commitment, I requested the Intelligence Community to begin drafting releasable products for our most trusted partners in the Levant, on the Arabian Peninsula, in the Central Asian States, and in South Asia as a standard practice rather than the exception.

I am encouraged by the personal attention the Office of the Director of National Intelligence is giving these matters. Director Clapper's strong emphasis and encouragement for the intelligence community to produce intelligence in a manner that eases our ability to responsibly share information with our military counterparts creates a stronger, more focused front against our common enemies and builds our partner nations' confidence. We are grateful for the nimble manner in which our intelligence community has strengthened our efforts to checkmate more of our enemy's designs.

Conclusion: Thank you for your continued support to U.S. Central Command and to our troops engaged across the region. I recognize the difficult choices you must make as we confront fiscal realities. We continue to prioritize our needs based on our most critical requirements as we rebalance our approach to work by, with and through our partners while continuing to build partner capacity and reduce our expenditures.

As a Geographic Combatant Commander, the negative impact of a yearlong continuing resolution and/or sequestration would severely undercut the coherence of our efforts. As conveyed in recent testimony by DepSecDef Carter before this committee, "The consequences of

sequestration and lowering of discretionary caps are serious and far-reaching. In the near-term, reductions would create [are creating] an immediate crisis in military readiness, especially if coupled with an extension of the Continuing Resolution under which we currently operate. In the long-term, failure to replace large arbitrary budget cuts with sensible and balanced deficit reduction require this nation to change its defense strategy." The Department continues to protect operations and priority activities in high threat areas, which will result in less initial impact on my current operations. However, impacts on readiness, investments and the civilian workforce are certain as well as other areas that are necessary to support our national security strategy and maintain options for the President. USCENTCOM will weather the challenges we face in the short term. We absorbed reductions in FY12 and will do our part to reduce spending this year as well. We prioritize our needs based on our most critical requirements as we balance our approach to work by, with and through our partners. Looking ahead, USCENTCOM will do its best to do what is required to protect U.S. national security interests in a region undergoing social and political change and in the face of declining resources for our own defense.

General James N. Mattis, Commander

Gen. James N. Mattis serves as commander, U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM), located in Tampa, FL.

Gen. Mattis has commanded at multiple levels. As a lieutenant, he served as a rifle and weapons platoon commander in the 3rd Marine Division. As a captain, he commanded a rifle company and a weapons company in the 1st Marine Brigade.

As a major, he commanded Recruiting Station Portland. As a lieutenant colonel, he commanded 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, one of Task Force Ripper's assault battalions in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. As a colonel, he commanded 7th Marines (Reinforced).

Upon becoming a brigadier general, he commanded first the 1st Marine Expeditionary Brigade and then Task Force 58, during Operation Enduring Freedom in southern Afghanistan. As a major general, he commanded the 1st Marine Division during the initial attack and subsequent stability operations in Iraq during Operation Iraqi Freedom.

In his first tour as a lieutenant general, he commanded the Marine Corps Combat Development Command and served as the deputy commandant for combat development. He also commanded the I Marine Expeditionary Force and served as the commander of U.S. Marine Forces Central Command. Previous to this assignment, he served as both NATO's Supreme Allied Commander Transformation from 2007-2009 and as commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command from 2007-2010.

Gen. Mattis, a native of the Pacific Northwest, graduated from Central Washington State University in 1972. He is also a graduate of the Amphibious Warfare School, Marine Corps Command and Staff College, and the National War College.

POSTURE STATEMENT OF
ADMIRAL WILLIAM H. McRAVEN, USN
COMMANDER, UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND
BEFORE THE 113th CONGRESS
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
March 6, 2013

Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the Committee, thank you for this opportunity to address this committee, the second in my tenure as the 9th commander of United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM).

USSOCOM is one of nine Unified Combatant Commands, yet it is distinct in that it exercises numerous Service, military department, and defense agency-like responsibilities. Under Title 10 U.S. Code Sections 164 and 167, it is my legal responsibility to organize, train and equip my force; to build a strategy that supports the goals and objectives of the Defense Strategic Guidance; and to provide combat ready forces to the President and the Secretary of Defense to meet the challenges of today's security environment.

USSOCCOM Strategy - SOF 2020

In January 2012, the Secretary of Defense issued his Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG) and the Chairman followed with his Capstone Concept for Joint Operations (CCJO). The DSG describes the Joint Force of the future as "agile, flexible, ready" and possessing global reach, thereby directing "the joint force to

capitalize on networks and inter-dependency to maximize effectiveness in deterrence and evolving war." Building on this imperative, the CCJO envisions a "globally postured Joint Force… that quickly combine[s] capabilities with itself and mission partners across domains, echelons, geographic boundaries, and organizational affiliations." Special Operations Forces are uniquely suited to implement the guidance outlined in these documents. Specifically, SOF are "rapidly deployable…have operational reach… [are] persistent…and do not constitute an irreversible policy commitment." General Dempsey concluded his Capstone Document with the statement that military success in today's environment is "about building a stronger network to defeat the networks that confront us."

We live in a world in which the threats have become increasingly networked and pose complex and dynamic risks to U.S. interests around the world. These networks are diversifying their activities, resulting in the convergence of threats that were once linear. In today's environment, this convergence can have explosive and destabilizing effects — there is no such thing as a local problem. In the words of former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, "Extremist networks squeezed in one country migrate to others. Terrorist propaganda from a cell in Yemen can incite attacks as far away as Detroit or Delhi. A flu virus in Macao can become an epidemic in Miami. Technology and

globalization have made our countries and our communities interdependent and interconnected. And today's threats have become so complex, fast-moving, and cross-cutting that no one nation could ever hope to solve them alone."

To address these problems, we must adopt a global perspective. With SOF deployed in over 75 countries on a daily basis, I can provide a global view of the problem and help link and synchronize global effects across geographic boundaries. However, as the SOCOM Commander, with some unique exceptions, I do not command and control any forces in combat or crisis. I am a "supporting commander" to the Geographic Combatant Commanders and the Chiefs of Mission (COMs). It is my job to provide them the best Special Operations Force in the world. It is their job, to employ those forces in support of U.S. policy. Special Operations Forces do nothing, absolutely nothing, without the approval of the President, the Secretary of Defense, the Geographic Combatant Commanders and the Chiefs of Mission – nothing. To best serve the interest of the GCCs and the Chiefs of Mission, SOCOM is developing a plan to enhance its already global force by networking with our U.S. interagency counterparts, and our foreign allies and partners around the globe. We aim to provide GCCs and Chiefs of Mission with improved special operations capacity and are aligning structures, processes, and authorities that enable the network.

The Global SOF Network

Given strategic guidance, increasing fiscal constraints, and the networked and dispersed nature of conflict, SOF will play an increasingly critical role in the Joint Force of the future. And although SOF usually only garner attention for high-stakes raids and rescues, direct action missions are only a small part of what we do, albeit a very important part. USSOCOM will continue to ensure our nation has the best precision strike force in the world. We will not let up on that front. However, I'd like to emphasize that, in fact, on any given day USSOF are working with our allies around the world, helping build indigenous special operations capacity so that our partners can effectively deal with the threat of violent extremist groups, insurgents, and narco-terrorists — themselves. Indeed, SOF focuses intently on building partner capacity and security force assistance so that local and regional threats do not become global and thus more costly - both in blood and treasure.

Accordingly, with the support of the GCCs and Chiefs of Mission, USSOCOM is enhancing its global network of SOF to support our interagency and international partners in order to gain expanded situational awareness of emerging threats and opportunities. The network enables small, persistent presence in critical locations, and facilitates engagement where necessary or appropriate — all under the authority of the GCC and COM.

Through civil-military support elements and support to public diplomacy, SOF directly support interagency efforts to counter violent extremist ideology and diminish the drivers of violence that al-Qa'ida and other terrorists exploit. These efforts to prevent terrorist radicalization, recruitment, and mobilization are critical to defeating this dangerous ideology in the future; neither we nor our partners can kill our way to victory in this fight. These efforts require continuity and perseverance. Episodic engagement is inefficient and has the potential to create animosity due to unmet expectations by the governments and populations we are trying to support. Over the long-run, these proactive activities reduce strategic risk, protect American lives, and reduce the need for expensive response to terrorist attacks.

To this end, using already programmed force structure, USSOCOM is methodically enhancing the capabilities of the Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOCs) based on a multi-year deliberate process supported by detailed analysis and war gaming. The goal is to increase the capacity and capabilities of the TSOC and their assigned forces to the GCCs to conduct full spectrum special operations — ranging from building partner capacity (particularly in austere, high-risk or sensitive

environments) to irregular warfare and counterterrorism.

In partnership with the GCCs, COM, TSOCs, other U.S. Government agencies and partner nations, USSOCOM is working to develop opportunities to improve our partnership with regional Special Operations Forces. This approach was very successful in NATO, with the establishment of the NATO SOF Headquarters which allowed U.S. and partner nations to share information, improve interoperability and, when necessary, work together abroad. While the NATO construct is unique in the world, we believe there are other low-key opportunities that may present themselves in other regions of the world.

In addition to the SOF capacity inherent in all GCCs through the TSOCs, USSOCOM also employs Special Operations Liaison Officers (SOLOs) in key U.S. embassies around the world. SOLOs are in-country SOF advisors to the U.S. Country Team. They advise and assist partner nation SOF and help to synchronize activities with the host nation. Currently, there are SOLOs in Australia, Canada, United Kingdom, Jordan, Poland, Colombia, France, Turkey, Kenya, and Italy.

Similarly, as part of the global SOF network here at home, one-to-three person Special Operations Support Teams (SOSTs) work with our interagency partners in the National Capital Region (NCR). They comprise the SOF liaison network that assists in synchronizing DoD planning for training, exercises and

operations. Currently, we have SOSTs working within 19 U.S. Government departments and agencies.

Given the importance of interagency collaboration, USSOCOM is placing greater emphasis on its presence in the National Capital Region (NCR) to better support coordination and decision making with interagency partners. Thus, USSOCOM began to consolidate its presence in the NCR in early 2012. This is not a duplication of effort. We are focused instead on consolidating USSOCOM elements in the Washington D.C. region under the leadership of the USSOCOM Vice-Commander — who resides in Washington. Specifically, USSOCOM-NCR ensures that the perspectives and capabilities of interagency and international mission partners are incorporated into all phases of SOF planning efforts. The SOCOM NCR also conducts outreach to academia, non-governmental organizations, industry and other private sector organizations to get their perspective on complex issues affecting SOF.

At the USSOCOM headquarters in Tampa, the staff will serve as the focal point for coordinating information that supports USSOCOM warfighters. It is here that USSOCOM will maintain the global perspective on all SOF activities in support of the GCCs and U.S. Chiefs of Mission. As such, SOCOM will support operations, intelligence, logistics, planning, communications, and provide critical information to enable forward deployed SOF

to meet mission requirements. SOCOM will monitor SOF supporting campaigns, ensure that the Command is satisfying GCC theater requirements, maintain the global common operating picture for the SOF network, and monitor the readiness and availability of all U.S. SOF capabilities. The entire network will be enabled by the existing communications infrastructure. However, communication and information sharing must facilitate interconnectedness beyond the U.S.-only realm, and improve partner-nation capacity, interagency coordination, and stakeholder situational awareness by providing information technology infrastructure and communications services to unite U.S. and partner-nation SOF, plus other mission partners. This communications infrastructure will leverage existing networks and systems to avoid duplication of effort.

As a whole, the SOF network represents a way to improve the support to the GCCs and Chiefs of Mission and to empower a global effort with capable allies and partners. Recognizing that we have much to learn from each other, working with partner SOF will build mutual trust, foster enduring relationships, and provide new opportunities to affect shared challenges.

To this end, the SECDEF's authority to support foreign forces, irregular forces, and groups or individuals who support or facilitate ongoing military operations to combat terrorism – namely Section 1208 of the FY2005 NDAA – remains critical to

Special Operations. The drawdown of forces in Afghanistan will not diminish the need for 1208 authority. In fact, GCCs' demand for 1208 authority has increased, and the authority's utility is recognized as mission essential in winning their current fight.

Preserve the Force and Families

A SOF Universal Truth is that "people are more important than hardware." We recognize that none of the efforts described in preceding paragraphs are possible without having the dedicated, professional SOF warriors to bring them to fruition. Hence, it is imperative that we do all that we can to preserve the force and care for their families. Therefore, to lessen the strain, we are seeking improvements in the predictability of SOF schedules – training, education, deployment, and rest.

USSOCOM must ensure our SOF warriors and their families are properly cared for and that we work to help them reduce the stress they face related to high operational tempos. Difficulty also occurs as forces reconnect and reintegrate into garrison and family activities. DOD provides preventive and responsive counseling, medical, psychological, and rehabilitative care to institutionalize the resiliency of our SOF warriors and their families.

Everyone in the fight has been significantly changed by their experiences. Providing the treatment our troops need and reducing the stigma associated with asking for help is a top

priority for all USSOCOM leaders. For our service members and their families, we are implementing programs identified as best practices and aggressively institutionalizing education for our Chaplains and Mental Health professionals to emphasize prevention-oriented care. Through human performance improvement, readiness, and spiritual growth, we hope to preserve our forces for the duration of their careers. Recognizing that the readiness of many of our service members is inextricably tied to the well-being and happiness of their families, we have sought to bolster the care afforded to them. Additionally, to increase the predictability of service members' time, USSOCOM will redouble our efforts to reach out to families by opening up communication channels at all levels of the command through innovative use of varied media. We are committed to sustaining our force and families and will not break faith with our SOF family.

Maximizing SOF readiness also requires an enhanced capacity to anticipate and proactively preserve and manage the future force. I am implementing an enterprise-wide PERSTEMPO capability that will provide commanders increased visibility, fidelity, and ability to manage SOF readiness down to the individual service-member level. Once fully implemented throughout the command by FY14, SOF commanders from the O-5 level and above will have a near real-time common operating picture of SOF readiness. This

new capability further enhances commanders' force management decision making, improves the quality of life for the SOF force, and offers promise for maximizing force readiness through improved recruitment, retention, and protection of investments in SOF personnel and the resources that enable them.

Acquisition Excellence

Mobility, lethality, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance and survivability remain critical SOF enablers for the full spectrum of SOF operations. USSOCOM's unique acquisition authorities remain critical to meeting the rapid, information sensitive and operationally peculiar demands of Special Operations. Specifically, USSOCOM employs rapid and tailored acquisition strategies to modify Service-common equipment, enhance commercial items, or – when required – develop, procure and field SOF-peculiar equipment and services to respond to global requirements.

USSOCOM will continue its emphasis on equipping SOF operators as a system. Development, procurement and fielding of the SOF individual equipment system (i.e. individual protection, visual augmentation systems, weapons and sights) needs to suit the wide variety of SOF tasks and environments. The Tactical Combat Casualty Care (TCCC) system and use of Freeze Dried Plasma (FDP) will combine to help care for wounded operators in remote and

challenging environments, often at great distance from primary care facilities.

To meet the wide range of SOF missions, USSOCOM employs platforms that are both versatile and agile. For example, current acquisition efforts focus on equipping both manned and unmanned fixed wing assets with intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities suitable for diverse global requirements. The Non-Standard Aviation fleet of aircraft supports SOF intra-theater mobility, Aviation Foreign Internal Defense (AvFID), and manned ISR. The SOF fleet of Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) – ranging from the man-portable RQ-20A Puma to the medium altitude MQ-9 Reaper – provides essential ISR capabilities and cutting edge sensor and communication technologies. USSOCOM's ability to efficiently modify service common ISR assets with capabilities such as high definition (HD) full motion video (FMV) provides game-changing, operational effects at relatively small investment.

USSOCOM is continuing to execute programs to modernize its rotary wing and maritime mobility fleets, replacing legacy equipment such as the MH-60 K/L, Mark V Naval Special Warfare Rigid Hull Inflatable boat (RHIB), and SEAL Delivery Vehicle in the coming years. On the ground, USSOCOM will maintain a family of special operations tactical combat vehicles with customizable, mission-specific payloads. A Non-Standard

Commercial Vehicle (NSCV) capability enables SOF operators to maintain a low profile among indigenous populations while providing necessary mobility and protection.

Global SOF rely on the SOF Information Environment (SIE) to achieve full operational potential. Within the SIE, USSOCOM will continue to incorporate a SOF Deployable Node (SDN), a family of Wide Band SATCOM systems, and increased access to SIE voice, data and video services to deployed headquarters and operational elements. Simultaneously, USSOCOM will continue its efforts to downsize system profiles and footprint through engineering efficiencies of common and scalable components amongst SDN variants, provide SIE access to tactical wireless users through SDN, and focus current efforts on providing SIE access to maritime and ground mobility platforms.

USSOCOM's Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate continues to pursue technology innovation, and utilizes a Special Operations Advanced Technology collaborative process for SOF-centric, S&T development. This process allows better synchronization of SOF-related technology initiatives with the Department of Defense and other government agencies to leverage external capital opportunities that address SOF capability gaps. S&T's near-term technology development efforts are focused on providing SOF operators with all-digital, multi-spectral visual augmentation systems and advanced novel materials to improve

protection and survivability for personnel and platforms.

Responsible Resourcing and Service Support

Despite an increase in operational commitments over the last decade, we have been able to sustain our obligation to appropriately organize, train, and equip the warriors from whom we ask so much. We are aware of current budget uncertainties, and are therefore committed to only prudent use of resources provided to us by the taxpayers. I am committed to exercising common-sense steps to cost-cutting and cost-avoidance. The Command has begun to restructure and realign resources to support the SOF 2020 vision which reflects the nation's strategic priorities. Currently, we are able to execute the vision I have outlined in this document without any increase in either civilian or military manpower outside of current programmed growth or additional funding. I will continue to manage cost-growth in acquisition programs, and implement requirements of the Combatant Commanders, Executive Order mandates, and DoD auditability guidance.

USSOCOM has successfully used the Rapid Acquisition Authority to source a validated Joint Urgent Operational Needs (JUON) Statement for Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance activities. USSOCOM will rely more heavily on this authority

within the future fiscal environment.

The Command's ability to execute rapid acquisition of its materiel and service programs is essential to deliver and field critical requirements and new technologies. USSOCOM's capacity to maintain a competitive advantage on the battlefield depends on out-thinking and outpacing the enemy in speed, technology, equipment, and maneuverability. SOF capabilities are directly related to investments we make through our procurement budget.

USSOCOM, like the Services, has seen an extraordinary increase in operational tempo. Through advanced technologies, the battlefield has become smaller, highlighting a need for continued interoperability among the Services and SOF. SOF's reliance on the Services for institutional training, installation services and support – particularly in forward deployed locations where SOF can only sustain itself for short periods of time – remains critical. The Services' support for SOF's global persistent presence and annual deployments to over 100 countries is both vital and very much appreciated.

Conclusion

Budget uncertainties which face the Department of Defense and USSOCOM are of great concern in Fiscal Year 2013. The SOF network, as a vital tool to support the President and SECDEF's national defense strategy, seeks a strong and flexible global network of SOF, United States government partners, and partner

nations. We are working tirelessly to provide SOF capabilities and capacity to GCCs and Chiefs of Mission; capabilities and capacities that are supported by the required structures, processes, and authorities necessary for success. In the immediate future, and as stated by Chairman Dempsey, the "Joint Force 2020 must protect…against threats that routinely span regional boundaries." Notably, as presented by former Secretary Clinton at the International Special Operations Forces Week in May of last year, "Special Operations Forces exemplify the ethic of smart power – fast and flexible, constantly adapting, learning new languages and cultures, dedicated to forming partnerships where we can work together." Your support will ensure USSOCOM's continued ability to successfully address the most challenging security demands of our nation.



Admiral William H. McRaven
Commander, United States Special Operations Command
United States Navy

Adm. McRaven is the ninth commander of United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), headquartered at MacDill Air Force Base, Fla. USSOCOM ensures the readiness of joint special operations forces and, as directed, conducts operations worldwide.

McRaven served from June 2008 to June 2011 as the 11th commander of Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) headquartered at Fort Bragg, N.C. JSOC is charged to study special operations requirements and techniques, ensure interoperability and equipment standardization, plan and conduct special operations exercises and training, and develop joint special operations tactics.

McRaven served from June 2006 to March 2008 as commander, Special Operations Command Europe (SOCEUR). In addition to his duties as commander, SOCEUR, he was designated as the first director of the NATO Special Operations Forces Coordination Centre where he was charged with enhancing the capabilities and interoperability of all NATO Special Operations Forces.

McRaven has commanded at every level within the special operations community, including assignments as deputy commanding general for Operations at JSOC; commodore of Naval Special Warfare Group One; commander of SEAL Team Three; task group commander in the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility; task unit commander during *Desert Storm* and *Desert Shield*; squadron commander at Naval Special Warfare Development Group; and, SEAL platoon commander at Underwater Demolition Team 21/SEAL Team Four.

McRaven's diverse staff and interagency experience includes assignments as the director for Strategic Planning in the Office of Combating Terrorism on the National Security Council Staff; assessment director at USSOCOM, on the staff of the Chief of Naval Operations, and the chief of staff at Naval Special Warfare Group One.

McRaven's professional education includes assignment to the Naval Postgraduate School, where he helped establish, and was the first graduate from, the Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict curriculum.

Updated: 24 January 2012

Statement of

General William M. Fraser III, United States Air Force

Commander, United States Transportation Command

Before the House Armed Services Committee

On the State of the Command

March 6, 2013

INTRODUCING THE UNITED STATES TRANSPORTATION COMMAND

Mission/Organization

It is an honor to represent the men and women of the United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM). Our Total Force team of Active Duty, Guard, Reserve, civilian, commercial partners, and contractors leads a world-class Joint Deployment and Distribution Enterprise (JDDE) providing reliable and seamless logistical support to our warfighters and their families around the globe. Our service component commands the Army's Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command (SDDC), the Navy's Military Sealift Command (MSC), the Air Force's Air Mobility Command (AMC); our functional component command the Joint Transportation Reserve Unit (JTRU); and our subordinate command the Joint Enabling Capabilities Command (JECC) provide tremendous capabilities that we merge into transportation solutions to deliver effective support to the combatant commanders at the best value to the Nation. Together, we deliver global transportation services and enabling capabilities to our warfighters that no other nation can match.

Preserving our readiness remains critical to maintaining the Nation's capability to project power and influence anywhere, anytime. As the Distribution Process Owner (DPO), USTRANSCOM focuses on end-to-end performance and on providing the most value by targeting process improvements and enterprise performance measurements. Our mission as Global Distribution Synchronizer (GDS) complements the DPO role by integrating transportation solutions into theater posture plans in the earliest planning phase possible. We are working with all combatant commands (COCOMs), interagency, Non-Governmental Organizations, supporting nations, and industry partners to develop regional distribution campaign plans, with an eye toward process, global touch-points, and measureable delivery. Additionally, we are hard at work on a series of measures to reduce the cost of operations and

maintain effectiveness to those who depend on us–while encouraging continued and expanded use of the Defense Transportation System (DTS).

Planning for the Future

Our goal is to be the U.S. Government's transportation and enabling capabilities provider of choice. To meet the numerous challenges and take advantage of the enormous opportunities for continuing to rapidly project national power and influence well into the future, USTRANSCOM has proactively embarked on a comprehensive and collaborative 5-year strategic plan. This strategic plan is positioning us to effectively and efficiently respond to our rapidly changing operating environment while accounting for the dynamic fiscal landscape we now face.

First, we will preserve enterprise readiness by ensuring unfettered access to organic and commercial transportation resources. Our Readiness Roadmap will better leverage our organic assets, as well as the unique strengths and contributions of our commercial partners, and identifies the steps we must take to wisely transition from a decade of conflict to become a leaner, more efficient and more collaborative manager of the defense transportation enterprise.

Second, we will achieve excellence in information technology (IT) management, by promoting increased knowledge-sharing and transparency across the enterprise. In our unique roles as Distribution Process Owner and Global Distribution Synchronizer, we recognize we must develop and sustain a secure information environment that ensures effective knowledge-sharing and decision-making even while operating in a contested cyber domain. We have already begun building a functionally-managed IT framework to identify and align resources to our most critical needs.

Third, we are re-baselining our internal roles, functions and responsibilities in order to match human and capital resources for projected future mission activities. This realignment enhances

collaboration, matches skills to processes and creates a more disciplined, transparent resourcing process in order to achieve sound resource stewardship while remaining responsive to those who depend on us to effectively execute in an increasingly dynamic operational environment.

Finally, but most importantly, we are better equipping our people with the knowledge, skills, and training to maintain our world-class, customer-focused professionals. The enhancements we are achieving in our diverse workforce of Active, Guard and Reserve military components, civilian employees, and contractors will further enhance support for global mobility across the transportation enterprise.

Supporting Global Operations

Current fiscal realities have resulted in funding reductions for all Services. USTRANSCOM requirements are driven by our customer workload and readiness requirements. If COCOM demands are reduced, our workload will also be reduced. While these impacts will not occur immediately, the long-term results may directly impact our ability to execute critical missions of our supported COCOMs.

The capacity to project national power, presence, and influence worldwide is unique to the United States. To support this vital national capability, we lead a team of dedicated professionals in providing global mobility and strategic enablers. USTRANSCOM provides the ideal blend of operational expertise and distribution know-how to move and sustain the force worldwide. Together, we deliver unparalleled service to multiple COCOMs in support of their theater campaign plans and contingency operations. Our team has an unrelenting passion to meet a vision of coordinated, synchronized, and responsive end-to-end logistics which ensures that our soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines, Coast Guardsmen, and U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) civilians always have the support they require.

USTRANSCOM oversees the global mobility enterprise; our component commands execute the mission. In 2012, AMC and its Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard partners maintained a high operations tempo supporting requirements around the world. AMC deployed, to multiple locations, a rotational force of over 30 C-130 Hercules tactical airlift aircraft and 60 KC-135 Stratotanker and KC-10 Extender aerial refueling aircraft. The strategic airlift fleet flew over 1,400 C-5 missions and 13,000 C-17 missions supporting the full range of national interests. In total, AMC moved 584,000 tons of cargo, offloaded 194 million gallons of fuel, and moved 1.7 million passengers while flying 127,000 sorties. On the surface, MSC and SDDC transported over 7.4 million tons of cargo worldwide. In addition, MSC's point-to-point tankers delivered 1.4 billion gallons of fuel in support of global DOD requirements.

During 2012, more than 900 JECC personnel performed 27 operational deployments and participated in 39 joint exercises in support of COCOM requirements. JECC's highly skilled Active and Reserve Component personnel rapidly deployed as mission-tailored planning teams to assist combatant commanders in establishing, organizing, and operating joint force headquarters during numerous operations, and provided unmatched deployable joint communications and public affairs expertise, whenever and wherever needed.

Our functional command, the Joint Transportation Reserve Unit, provided necessary augmenting capability to a wide array of functions across the Command. This augmentation has been particularly important during numerous surge and contingency operations when our most critical operational and planning functions required the highest level of activity.

Support to Geographic Combatant Commands (GCCs)

The President directed the reduction of Afghanistan's Force Management Level to 68,000 troops by 30 September 2012. Achieving this force reduction on schedule was possible through close coordination between headquarters, USTRANSCOM, our component commands, and our commercial partners. Innovative ways to maximize throughput included expanding options for transiting forces into and out of the USCENTCOM Theater. Mihail Kogalniceanu Airfield, Romania, provided an additional transit location for deploying and redeploying forces in support of OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM, resulting in the movement of approximately 10,000 troops during the height of the surge recovery of forces from Afghanistan.

Working with our regional and commercial partners, we executed multiple proofs of principle to validate processes and capabilities. As we develop more efficient transportation routes around the globe, we continue witnessing the great effects of maturing routes. We continue to seek new air, ground, and multi-modal routes, adding flexibility and responsiveness to the DTS.

In addition to validating two-way passenger flow through Romania, we are reaping the benefits of last year's initiative to flow air-direct traffic over an Arctic route. This Arctic routing, allowing both commercial and military aircraft to support Afghanistan from the West Coast, resulted in 2 million gallons of jet fuel saved last year. This is a savings of $26million.

Our ground lines of communication continue to mature as well. The success of the distribution network's flexibility was demonstrated by the lack of operational impact resulting from the closure of the Pakistan Ground Lines of Communication (PAKGLOC). The Northern Distribution Network (NDN) absorbed a 46 percent increase in containers, moving over 30,000 containers in total. That capability, coupled with our multi-modal capacity, allowed us to continue uninterrupted support to our warfighters. Additionally, we have successfully reversed our Kazakhstan – Kyrgyzstan – Tajikistan and

Uzbekistan routes, allowing the movement of retrograde cargo over the NDN. We are also executing a reverse Trans-Siberia route, which establishes another option for the movement of retrograde cargo. Despite the enterprise's ability to weather the unexpected, the PAKGLOC, when fully operational, remains the quickest and most cost-effective route for supporting operations in theater.

Multi-modal operations continue to provide a middle-ground option between the speed of air direct and the lower cost of surface movement. USTRANSCOM, working with industry and partner nations, continues to expand the capabilities of existing locations and add new sites where necessary. For example, following the recent success of air direct shipments through Baku, Azerbaijan, we developed processes and procedures for multi-modal operations. This effort is expected to increase volume while reducing transit time and costs. Hybrid multi-modal operations, leverage a blend of military and commercial airlift, and provide another opportunity to reduce cost without sacrificing effectiveness.

In the U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) area of operations (AOR), USTRANSCOM continued its support of the National Science Foundation's (NSF's) mission. As part of OPERATION DEEP FREEZE, we coordinated for the delivery of over 4,000 passengers and 2,150 short tons (STONs) of cargo via C-17 and more than 6 million gallons of fuel and 3,400 STONs of cargo via sealift to McMurdo Station, Antarctica. In February 2012, the NSF discovered the ice pier used in previous years to offload cargo was not capable of supporting ship off-loading operations. USTRANSCOM rapidly coordinated the delivery and setup of an Army modular causeway system, which permitted the off-load of nearly 7 million pounds of cargo in 322 containers and the backload of more than 8.7 million pounds of retrograde cargo in 391 containers. This off-load operation, the first of its kind in this environment, spanned eight days, during sub-freezing temperatures and sustained Antarctic winds.

In addition to ODF, USTRANSCOM supported numerous operations that enhanced the security and preparedness of U.S. and allied forces in the PACOM AOR. USTRANSCOM supported multiple

deployments and redeployments in support of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM-PHILLIPINES (OEF-P). We also provided strategic airlift and sealift to military Security Forces and Special Warfare Units to the Republic of Korea, Japan, and Guam in support of USPACOM's Theater Security Cooperation program engagement strategies and objectives. USTRANSCOM supported U.S. Special Operations Forces Joint Command Exercise Training (JCET) throughout the Asia-Pacific region at the invitation of regional governments, with strategic airlift and sealift of PACOM assets. Support for USPACOM's JCS Exercises TERMINAL FURY in Hawaii, COBRA GOLD in the Kingdom of Thailand, COMMANDO SLING in the Republic of Singapore, BALIKATAN in the Republic of the Philippines, and KEY RESOLVE, and ULCHI FREEDOM GUARDIAN in the Republic of Korea entailed the movement of 10,452 passengers, 1,298 STONS moved by strategic airlift, and 406,270 square feet (or 22,114 STONS) via sealift.

Additionally, USTRANSCOM moved 1,574 STONS of food, water, construction materials, and vehicles to support the USPACOM Joint POW/MIA Accounting Command (JPAC) team from Pusan, Republic of Korea, to Nampo, Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

In the U.S. Southern Command's (USSOUTHCOM) AOR, USTRANSCOM continued to support the secure transport of personnel for detainee movement operations. In coordination with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Office of the Secretary of State, Joint Staff, and supported COCOMs, we successfully completed 100 percent of these sensitive missions without incident.

In the U.S. European Command's (USEUCOM) AOR, USTRANSCOM deployed and redeployed more than 2,233 troops and 1,169 STONs of cargo in support of the Kosovo Balkan force. During December 2012, we conducted the movement planning for 326 personnel and 1,022 STONS of cargo in support of the Patriot Missile Battery deployment into Turkey in support of NATO defense. Support to USEUCOM also included numerous strategic lift missions in support of exercises in several countries to

include: Estonia, Georgia, Israel, Latvia, Norway, and Poland. These exercises entailed moving more than 2,732 personnel and over 8,000 STONs of cargo for training events aimed at exercising the ability to deploy, employ, and sustain forces in response to a crisis affecting the USEUCOM AOR.

In the U.S. Africa Command's (USAFRICOM) AOR, USTRANSCOM deployed and redeployed 3,187 troops and 1,297 STONs of cargo in support of Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa. We also coordinated and tracked 40 airlift missions moving nearly 300 personnel and over 490 STONs of cargo while supporting contingency operations in northern Africa.

Finally, in the U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) AOR, the Modular Airborne Fire Fighting System equipped C-130 aircraft, provided by our Component, AMC, flew 922 sorties and released more than 22.2 million pounds of fire-retardant, combating wildfires in direct support of U.S. Forestry Service operations. The WC-130 Hurricane Hunter aircraft flew over 120 sorties into 32 storms collecting valuable hurricane data for the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. In support of relief efforts in the wake of Super Storm Sandy, USTRANSCOM coordinated for nearly 100 C-17 and C-5 missions moving 749 passengers and 3,762 STONs of cargo. Critical supplies delivered included electric utility restoration vehicles, medical personnel, search and rescue teams, blankets, dewatering pumps, and support equipment. Support to USNORTHCOM also included lift for training exercises providing realistic homeland defense and defense support to civil authorities training for joint and interagency partners. This entailed moving more than 3,700 personnel and over 1,363 STONs of cargo in support of EXERCISE VIBRANT RESPONSE 13, a training event exercising the ability to deploy, employ, and sustain specialized military response forces upon the request of civilian authorities following a catastrophic incident.

Support for the Warfighter

Global patient movement remains one of our most demanding missions requiring 100-percent accuracy. Last year, in partnership with the medics of AMC, Air Force Reserve Command, and the Air National Guard, we efficiently and effectively provided en route medical care to more than 14,000 patients. Patients requiring critical care support were moved by Critical Care Air Transport Teams, including six patients who were moved by the new Acute Lung Rescue Teams, one from USPACOM and five from USCENTCOM.

Our partnership with the Military Health System is vital to the success of patient movement. In particular, Landstuhl Regional Medical Center is vital to the support of four COCOMs: USEUCOM, USCENTCOM, USAFRICOM, and U.S. Special Operations Command. The planned Military Construction (MILCON) replacement of this outstanding hospital will further aid the en route medical care needs of ill and injured Service members and their families.

We are working to improve the quality of life for Service members and their families by providing convenient and user-friendly online services for scheduling the shipment of household goods. Last year, the Defense Personal Property Program (DP3) through the Defense Personal Property System (DPS) managed approximately 600,000 DOD household goods shipments. DP3 provides the procedures necessary to build the many online resources provided by DPS. These services include Web-enabled counseling, the ability for a DOD customer to score their Transportation Service Provider (TSP) via the customer satisfaction survey, as well as the ability to file an online claim while in direct communication with the TSP.

Finally, the ability to support the warfighter in Afghanistan's mountainous terrain requires reliance on vertical resupply via airdrop operations. Although airdrop cargo amounts decreased from 2011 to 2012, AMC airdropped over 40 million pounds of fuel and combat supplies, significantly reducing

exposure to troops on surface roads. With the High Speed Container Delivery System, we are able to support forward deployed warfighters, increasing delivery tonnage to point of need and providing enhanced threat avoidance and tactical maneuverability to airlift aircraft and crews. Civilian causality concerns led to the development of new capabilities such as an extracted container delivery system to improve aerial delivery accuracy. Additionally, enhancements in existing capabilities, such as the low-cost, low-altitude airdrop system and Joint Precision Airdrop System, enhance our delivery capability to warfighters operating at ever increasing, smaller and more austere locations or in proximity to civilian populations.

Interagency and Other Support

Cyber threats posed to USTRANSCOM, our components, commercial partners, national critical infrastructure, and key resources are a direct challenge to DOD global operations. Among USTRANSCOM's top priorities is ensuring freedom of action and protection of mission data throughout the cyberspace domain to plan and execute our global mission. To that end, we continue to strengthen our partnerships with U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) as well as the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) and other interagency and industry partners. It is critical that we protect our essential command and control systems and information from cyber attack or exploitation. USTRANSCOM continues efforts to improve readiness and strengthen ties with both our commercial and U.S. Government partners through improved information sharing.

Our role as GDS facilitates enhanced opportunities to support the COCOMs and the Department of State by means of engagement events focused on distribution, transportation, and logistics. Fostering critical relationship-building opportunities based on universal logistics interests is our unique and innovative approach to traditional security cooperation activities. Our GDS responsibilities provide the

basis and means for successful strategic engagements as we continue to expand our reach and become more agile. The NDN is a prime example of coordinated and synchronized activities that have maximized strategic distribution flexibility and reduced operational risk. The NDN has minimized reliance on any one nation by offering fair and open competition that facilitates economic development and diplomatic engagement. The strategic impact has improved international relations and expanded commodity resourcing through the development of an integrated and synchronized distribution enterprise.

Mobility Capabilities Assessment-18 (MCA-18)

MCA-18 is an assessment being conducted by USTRANSCOM in conjunction with the Office of the Secretary of Defense and Joint Staff. We are assessing DOD's capability to project and sustain forces in support of the defense strategy, through 2018, by examining a range of strategic and operational mobility challenges that include current operations plans, defense scenarios, seminars presented in Chairman Joint Chief of Staff senior leader seminars, and historical operations. MCA-18 will identify and evaluate our capabilities, the constraints associated with projecting and sustaining forces in support of the strategy, and options to mitigate system constraints. We will leverage this assessment as we move forward to complete the congressionally mandated Mobility Requirements Capabilities Study 2018.

Air Mobility Readiness

With the delivery of the last U.S. Air Force C-17, we will have the planned air mobility force structure to meet the strategic airlift requirements for a single large-scale operation, while maintaining the flexibility and adaptability to support the Joint Force in another region.

Our other strategic airlifter, the C-5, is critical to our oversized and outsized air cargo capability. Management of this fleet focuses on retirement of the C-5A, the oldest and least reliable aircraft while improving reliability for the remaining C-5s. The Reliability Enhancement and Re-Engining Program (RERP) increases the C-5 fleet mission capable rate from 55 to 75 percent while vastly increasing aircraft performance, range, and fuel efficiency.

Together our C-17 and C-5 fleets continue to improve availability through the replacement of aging components, obsolete components and the Air Force's new programmed phase inspection maintenance process. This change from a "failure of major components" process to a preventive replacement process, along with the retirement of maintenance intensive jets and RERP modifications, will significantly improve strategic airlift aircraft availability, velocity, and capacity to the warfighters.

The KC-46A is critical to the entire Joint and coalition team's ability to project combat power around the world, and provides America and our allies with unparalleled rapid response to combat and humanitarian relief operations alike. The KC-46A offers more refueling capacity and increased capacity for cargo and aero-medical evacuation. The KC-46A will provide outstanding aircraft availability, highly adaptable technology, flexible employment options, and superb overall capability.

The legacy air-refueling fleet includes the KC-10 and KC-135 aircraft providing the backbone for Air Mobility support to our warfighters. The KC-10 Communication, Navigation, Surveillance (CNS)/Air Traffic Management (ATM) Program addresses airspace access and near-term critical obsolescence issues for the 59 KC-10 aircraft fleet. CNS/ATM capabilities are necessary to ensure worldwide flight operations in civil and military air space and meet current Federal Aviation Administration and International Civil Aviation Organization standards.

C-130s continue to be the intra-theater workhorse for airlift operations around the globe, providing critical lift and airdrop capability wherever needed. This versatile aircraft will continue to play an integral role for airlift long into the future.

The Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) is a voluntary commercial segment of our mobility force, providing additional capability to rapidly deploy forces and equipment globally. Over the past few years, USTRANSCOM has encouraged program improvements by way of contracting day-to-day business with preference to those commercial carriers who have modernized their fleet. This approach has provided increased reliability and greater fuel efficiency, through economy of scale and continues to be of value as we adjust to changes in global economic situation and anticipated changes in our future force deployments. We continue to examine the CRAF program for viability and cost effectiveness for future mission needs.

Sealift Readiness

During large-scale operations, roll-on/roll-off (RO/RO) vessels are the prime movers of unit equipment for Army and Marine Corps forces. We rely primarily on commercial industry for sealift and complement it with our U.S. Government-owned vessels from the MSC's surge fleet and Maritime Administration's (MARAD) Ready Reserve Force (RRF) when necessary. Our partnership with commercial industry is formalized through agreements such as the Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement (VISA). This agreement and others ensure the availability of a viable U.S. flag maritime industry and the required U.S. citizen mariner pool needed in times of national emergency. We also leverage significant capacity through the Maritime Security Program (MSP). MSP has been an extremely successful program since its inception in the mid 1990's; over 70 percent of the VISA capacity needed for a national emergency would come from our partners in MSP. Additionally, the

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 has ensured the continued presence of the U.S. flag fleet in international commerce while providing DOD critical continued access to militarily useful RO/RO and other cargo vessels. Preserving these programs preserves the U.S. merchant mariner base, a vital national asset that provides the manpower needed for surge operations.

The National Defense Sealift Fund provides funding for 9 Large Medium-Speed Roll-On/Roll-Off vessels, 5 Roll-On/Roll-Off-Container vessels, and the 46 RRF vessels of our U.S. Government-owned surge fleets. All vessels are critical for the DOD's ability to surge to meet future global requirements. USTRANSCOM is working with our commercial and U.S. Government sealift partners to find the most cost effective means to fund these fleets and the critical capacity they provide. Finally, with the average age of the RRF exceeding 36 years, and nearly 1.6 million square feet of RO/RO capacity retiring over the next 10 years, it is important to begin the process of recapitalizing our organic fleets.

Surface Readiness

Successful execution of our mission and the daily support we provide to the warfighter rely on a complex global enterprise of interdependent critical infrastructure. Our Critical Infrastructure Program aligns resources in managing both a COCOM program and a Defense Infrastructure Transportation Sector program, the latter focusing on building relationships and trust among non-DOD critical infrastructure stakeholders, sharing information and collaborating where appropriate. Our critical infrastructure stakeholders range from other Federal agencies to State and local entities, foreign countries, and the private sector.

We continuously monitor the infrastructure network based on threats, hazards, and vulnerabilities. We augment teams who assess risks to infrastructure, advocate initiatives to economically reduce risk, and help develop solutions to preserve our readiness. These efforts are aimed at ensuring that

infrastructure is available when required. Through coordination and cooperation with the commercial sector, the National Port Readiness Network delivers an important link between commercial port operations and military readiness at 17 strategic ports. These ports provide the critical services and intermodal links needed to ensure rapid, secure, and effective military mobilization. Improving the resiliency and modernizing our seaports, air nodes, and critical rail and road networks is a USTRANSCOM focus area that ensures our ability to support all geographic combatant commanders and respond to emergencies within the homeland, now and far into the future.

Infrastructure improvement projects at the U.S. Army Military Ocean Terminal Concord (MOTCO), in Concord, CA, are essential to USTRANSCOM's support of USPACOM's operational plans and DOD's military capability in the Pacific Theater. Due to the nature and size of this military mission, no suitable alternatives to MOTCO exist on the West Coast. We continue to work within DOD to find resources to reduce or eliminate any capability gaps and risk at MOTCO to alleviate throughput issues to the Pacific Theater. DOD's current efforts are centered on preserving existing throughput capability at MOTCO's only operational pier configured for movement of containerized ammunition through comprehensive structural engineering assessments. Although the requisite resourcing processes have not yet run their full course, we are working with the U.S. Army to address the deteriorating infrastructure at MOTCO to allow for sufficient and uninterrupted delivery of supplies to the Pacific Theater.

Recently completed and ongoing infrastructure improvement projects at the U.S. Army Military Ocean Terminal Sunny Point (MOTSU), in Sunny Point, NC, are essential to USTRANSCOM's support of USCENTCOM's operational plans and DOD's military capability in multiple theaters. Specifically, MOTSU's Center Wharf was recently upgraded to support the installation of two new container gantry cranes, which became operational in 2012. These improvements enhance MOTSU's ability to conduct

missions and allow the terminal to meet documented throughput requirements, contributing to a resilient capability.

In addition to improving critical infrastructure, DOD must maintain railcar capacity to meet military transportation requirements. USTRANSCOM through our Army component, SDDC, is executing an Army program established to preserve and assure access to commercial railcars needed to augment U.S. Government-owned capabilities and meet contingency deployment requirements.

Joint Enabling Capabilities

USTRANSCOM ensures the readiness and timely deployment of mission-tailored joint capability packages to assist all COCOMs across seven unique functional areas–joint planning, operations, logistics, knowledge management, intelligence support, communications, and public affairs–within hours of notification. JECC forces provide these enabling capabilities and are designated as part of the Secretary of Defense's Global Response Force. As a result of a changing, complex operational environment, the geographic combatant commanders have relied on and will increasingly depend upon USTRANSCOM's low density-high demand JECC forces to accelerate the formation and the effectiveness of joint force headquarters and assist joint force commanders in the planning and execution of joint operations. We recognize that JECC's ability to effectively assist COCOMs on short notice depends on the development and maintenance of strong, close relationships with our mission partners and stakeholders.

Enhancements to USTRANSCOM Readiness and DOD Supply Chain Management

As the GDS and DPO, USTRANSCOM is committed to working with the military Services, COCOMs, governmental agencies, allied, and commercial partners to synchronize distribution planning

and synergize distribution initiatives. This collaborative effort will ensure we deliver a scalable and resilient Global Distribution Network from point of origin to point of employment, meeting needs dictated by the operating environment.

A robust global infrastructure network is essential to our Nation's ability to project and sustain its power and influence; therefore, a commitment to obtain the access and agreements necessary to maintain this capability and adequately resource it is imperative. Using strategic-level analysis and subsequent modeling, we have identified requirements in the En Route Infrastructure Master Plan (ERIMP) as both current and anticipated capability gaps and requirements. We will continue to utilize the ERIMP process to identify access requirements and construction projects that will improve our ability to support COCOM global routes.

At USTRANSCOM we are constantly focused on reducing costs within the DOD supply chain while simultaneously sustaining or improving service levels to the warfighter. Last year, in collaboration with mission partners from Defense Logistics Agency, General Services Administration, COCOMs, and the Services, we achieved over $500 million in cumulative cost avoidance due to better surface container utilization and better pallet and planeload utilization. This simply better optimized business practices. We have set another target this year to continue finding savings opportunities and will seek to identify an additional $500 million in cost avoidance by the end of fiscal year 2015; to date, we have reached $721 million in cumulative cost avoidance. Our collective efforts earned the prestigious Defense Logistics 2012 Cost Savings and Performance Improvement Award.

To enhance readiness we are identifying new ways to leverage the existing DTS infrastructure and industry resources in support of our global demands, as well as formulating better solutions to improve DTS capabilities. This will not only benefit military aircrew proficiency but will contribute to our organic and commercial viability. In order to accomplish these objectives, the command stood up the

Enterprise Readiness Center (ERC) to help capitalize on opportunities to increase DTS volume. The ERC will also seek to improve transportation services to existing customers and drive responsiveness to improved levels by applying enterprise-proven methods. We understand multiple transportation providers exist in today's global distribution network. To that point and with the ERC in place, USTRANSCOM will endeavor to become the transportation provider of choice.

We continue to partner with USCYBERCOM, DISA, industry, and academia to improve and harden our information technology resources, strengthen cyber defense, and improve our capability to operate effectively in cyberspace. Because of our strong reliance on commercial partners, over 90 percent of DOD deployment and distribution information transactions are handled on unclassified systems, leaving us vulnerable to possible cyber attacks. We are defining standards for processing and handling data that will improve the security of our information through our continued collaboration forums, including our cyber summit, industry day, and an exercise involving the Department of Homeland Security that improved our information sharing processes and relationships.

In order to fully support the needs of the warfighter, we are working with our joint enterprise partners to measure distribution performance. Our focus is to measure the right events at a sufficient level of detail to pursue supply chain optimization opportunities. For example, we are leveraging technology such as electronic data transmitted from commercial partners and system of record database incorporation to capture appropriate time-stamps. This data facilitates performance measurements and root-cause analysis as requisitions flow from suppliers to the warfighter. Through continual collaboration across the DOD, we are developing common and meaningful performance metrics that incorporate best-practices from the commercial and U.S. Government sectors.

Business Transformation--Efficiencies

We continue seeking methods to achieve cost avoidance and improve processes for container management. We have implemented several initiatives to include container detention fee reductions through increased use of U.S. Government owned containers where cost effective, improving contract provisions with carriers through the recently awarded Universal Services Contract (USC)-7 and accomplishing container buyouts earlier when carrier owned containers are required to meet mission objectives. USC-7 is also enabling us to transform other business areas. This multiple award program, with 22 contracted ocean carriers, supports our worldwide surface shipments. Some changes of significance from USC-6 to USC-7 include measuring carrier performance regionally by COCOM versus global basis; this allows for more relevant "best-value" booking decisions and provides leadership visibility on carriers' performance in each COCOM. We added four electronic data interchange codes, assisting in more accurate measurement of carriers' performance, ensures carriers are appropriately compensated for validated and compensable delays by providing more detailed visibility into the status of shipments.

Our operations focus foremost on effective support to the warfighter; we constantly search for the best, most efficient methods to provide seamless and responsive support. Many times, these transparent efficiencies also result in increased effectiveness. Deployment and Distribution Cost Based Decision Support (D2 CBDS) practice ensures USTRANSCOM and COCOM operational decision-making incorporates cost consciousness with mission effectiveness through vetted, standardized, and codified operational cost methodologies. D2 CBDS methodologies encompass end-to-end nodes and transportation legs. To ensure second- and third-order effects are adequately considered, all required stakeholders are engaged throughout the D2 CBDS process. D2 CBDS has already produced significant cost avoidance, included under our DPO Strategic Opportunities umbrella, through a number of

emerging efforts, including the Tankering Decision Matrix, monitored by the AMC Fuel Efficiency Office, that informs the Tanker Airlift Control Center when it is cost effective to carry fuel to downrange locations due to the prohibitively high costs to deliver fuel in theater.

Going forward, the D2 CBDS Working Group composed of USTRANSCOM directorates, COCOMs, and network partners will provide rapid response and subject matter expertise for emerging complex operational costing opportunities.

Training, Education, and Exercises

USTRANSCOM's participation in the Combatant Commanders Exercise Engagement and Training Transformation (CE2T2) Program directly supports U.S. national security interests by ensuring joint force readiness, increasing military capabilities, strengthening alliances and partnerships, and retaining strategic access around the globe. Maintaining freedom of action and global access is as much a requirement for the functioning of our JDDE as it is for the conduct of military operations and requires continuous engagement worldwide. CE2T2 enables this critical engagement; contributes to strategic and logistical access for the U.S. Government; increases readiness across combatant commands; and sustains partnerships with commercial industry and our global core partners in order to provide reliable and seamless logistical support at time of need. As we move forward with a refocus on the Pacific and our forces become more CONUS-based, we will see an even greater reliance on the CE2T2 program to maintain our freedom of action and the readiness to project that force to meet national security objectives. Maintaining the CE2T2 Program is critical to USTRANSCOM's readiness.

Platform Enhancements

Joint Logistics Over the Shore (JLOTS) provides the capability to load and discharge vessels in austere environments into Army and Navy watercraft or lighterage, where ports are damaged, unavailable, or inadequate or access is denied. Among the improvements JLOTS provides is a telescopic crane system that has stabilization technology to permit the selective retrieval of containers to be transferred between vessels or lighterage even under heavy sea states. The second is an interface module that will enhance Army Modular Causeway and the Navy Improved Lighterage Systems, which have differing freeboards.

JLOTS operations are extremely complex and require a detailed working knowledge of requirements, capabilities, and limitations among the Services to successfully plan and execute. As part of our oversight authority for JLOTS, this year we established the JLOTS Working Group with the primary mission to facilitate and streamline the coordination between Services and COCOMs and within the JLOTS community of interest. This group will lead the review of JLOTS initiatives, doctrine, and training as well as advocate for sustained JLOTS capabilities in support of COCOM requirements. JLOTS and Service Logistics Over the Shore capabilities continue to provide a necessary capability to support combatant commanders.

Hybrid airships represent a transformational capability, bridging the longstanding gap between high-speed, lower-capacity airlift, and low-speed, higher-capacity sealift. Across the range of military operations, this capability can be leveraged from strategic to tactical distances. From swift crisis action support to enduring logistical sustainment operations, hybrid airship technology has the potential to fulfill "factory to foxhole" cargo delivery. We encourage development of commercial technologies that may lead to enhanced mobility capabilities in the future.

Final Thoughts

We are entrusted with the authority to lead and transform the Joint Deployment and Distribution Enterprise and the incredible responsibility of serving the geographic combatant commanders as they execute our Nation's most demanding military missions. To ensure that we can repeat our successes of the past as we move into a dynamic, resource-constrained future, we must transform the way that we manage the enterprise and make significant cultural changes in the way that we think, train, and execute our missions. Our strategic plan is guiding us in this transformation so that we are postured to support our forces worldwide with all available resources within the U.S. Government and offered by our commercial partners. We will continue to challenge ourselves to be ready for any contingency, peacetime or during conflict, and to meet the needs of our warfighters across the globe. I am extremely proud of the USTRANSCOM team and our enterprise partners and the fantastic work they do to support our national security objectives. They know, better than anyone, that "Together, we deliver!"

BIOGRAPHY

UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

GENERAL WILLIAM M. FRASER III

Gen. William M. Fraser III is commander, U.S. Transportation Command, Scott Air Force Base, Ill. USTRANSCOM is the single manager for global air, land and sea transportation for the Department of Defense.

General Fraser entered the Air Force in 1974 as a distinguished graduate of the Texas A&M University ROTC program. His operational assignments include duty as a T-37, B-52, B-1, and B-2 instructor pilot and evaluator. General Fraser has commanded an operations group, two bomb wings and a major command. His staff duties include tours on the Air Staff, Joint Staff, and Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff at Offutt Air Force Base, Neb. He has also served as chief of staff for U.S. Strategic Command, as the Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the 34th Vice Chief of Staff, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C.

General Fraser has extensive wartime, contingency, and humanitarian relief operational experience. During Operation Enduring Freedom he led an intelligence fusion organization that provided direct support to the warfighter.

Prior to assuming his current position, General Fraser was the commander, Air Combat Command, Langley Air Force Base, Va., and Air Component Commander for U.S. Joint Forces Command, where he led over 130,000 Total Force Airmen.

EDUCATION

1974 Bachelor of Science degree in engineering technology, Texas A&M University
1977 Squadron Officer School, Maxwell AFB, Ala.
1980 Master of Science degree in management information systems, University of Northern Colorado, Greeley
1983 Marine Corps Command and Staff College, Quantico, Va.
1985 Armed Forces Staff College, Norfolk, Va.
1987 National Security Management Course, Syracuse University, N.Y.
1991 Air War College, Maxwell AFB, Ala.
1995 Executive Development Program, Johnson Graduate School of Management, Cornell University, Ithaca, N.Y.
1999 Combined Force Air Component Commander Course, Maxwell AFB, Ala.
1999 Senior Information Warfare Applications Course, Maxwell AFB, Ala.
2000 National Security Leadership Course, National Security Studies, Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University, N.Y.
2002 Executive Program for Russian and U.S. General Officers, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.
2002 Joint Flag Officer Warfighting Course, Maxwell AFB, Ala.
2002 Senior Intelligence Fellows Program, Wye River, Md.

2003 Program for Senior Executives in National and International Security, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.
2005 Leadership at the Peak, Center for Creative Leadership, Colorado Springs, Colo.

ASSIGNMENTS

1. November 1974 - October 1975, student, undergraduate pilot training, Williams AFB, Ariz.
2. October 1975 - March 1976, student, instructor pilot training, Randolph AFB, Texas
3. March 1976 - February 1978, T-37 instructor pilot and T-37 check pilot, 96th Flying Training Squadron, Williams AFB, Ariz.
4. March 1978 - March 1980, T-37 instructor pilot and flight examiner, 82nd Flying Training Wing, Williams AFB, Ariz.
5. March 1980 - October 1980, Operational Support Aircraft Program Element Monitor, Air Staff Training Program, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C.
6. October 1980 - April 1981, Worldwide Military Command, Control and Communications Program Element Monitor, Air Staff Training Program, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C.
7. May 1981 - October 1981, B-52H student, 4017th Combat Crew Training Squadron, Castle AFB, Calif.
8. October 1981 - March 1983, B-52H aircraft commander, later B-52G aircraft commander and instructor pilot, 46th Bomb Squadron, Grand Forks AFB, N.D.
9. March 1983 - December 1984, Chief, B-52G Standardization and Evaluation Branch, 319th Bomb Wing, Grand Forks AFB, N.D.
10. January 1985 - June 1985, student, Armed Forces Staff College, Norfolk, Va.
11. June 1985 - March 1986, Chief, European Single Integrated Operational Plan Tactics, Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff, Offutt AFB, Neb.
12. April 1986 - October 1987, executive officer to the Strategic Air Command Chief of Staff, Headquarters SAC, Offutt AFB, Neb.
13. October 1987 - July 1990, Chief, Nuclear Requirements Cell, SHAPE, Mons, Belgium
14. July 1990 - July 1991, student, Air War College, Maxwell AFB, Ala.
15. July 1991 - July 1993, Deputy Commander, 384th Operations Group, McConnell AFB, Kan.
16. July 1993 - January 1995, Commander, 509th Operations Group, Whiteman AFB, Mo.
17. January 1995 - August 1995, Vice Commander, 509th Bomb Wing, Whiteman AFB, Mo.
18. August 1995 - January 1997, special assistant to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, SHAPE, Mons, Belgium
19. February 1997 - May 1998, Commander, 28th Bomb Wing, Ellsworth AFB, S.D.
20. May 1998 - May 1999, Chief of Staff, U.S. Strategic Command, Offutt AFB, Neb.
21. May 1999 - December 2000, Commander, 2nd Bomb Wing, Barksdale AFB, La.
22. December 2000 - December 2002, Deputy Director for National Systems Operations, the Joint Staff; Director, Defense Space Reconnaissance Program; and Deputy Director for Military Support, National Reconnaissance Office, Washington, D.C.
23. January 2003 - October 2004, Director of Operations, Headquarters AETC, Randolph AFB, Texas
24. November 2004 - February 2005, special assistant to the Commander, Air Force Command and Control, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Center, Deputy Chief of Staff for Warfighting Integration, Langley AFB, Va.
25. February 2005 - May 2006, Vice Commander, Air Combat Command, Langley AFB, Va.
26. May 2006 - October 2008, Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, D.C.
27. October 2008 - September 2009, Vice Chief of Staff, Headquarters U.S. Air Force, Washington, D.C.
28. September 2009 - September 2011, Commander, Air Combat Command, Langley Air Force Base, Va., and Air Component Commander for U.S. Joint Forces Command
29. October 2011 - present, Commander, U.S. Transportation Command, Scott Air Force Base, Ill.

SUMMARY OF JOINT ASSIGNMENTS

1. June 1985 - March 1986, Chief, European Single Integrated Operational Plan Tactics, Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff, Offutt AFB, Neb., as a major
2. October 1987 - July 1990, Chief, Nuclear Requirements Cell, SHAPE, Mons, Belgium, as a lieutenant colonel
3. August 1995 - January 1997, special assistant to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe, SHAPE, Mons, Belgium, as a colonel
4. May 1998 - May 1999, Chief of Staff, U.S. Strategic Command, Offutt AFB, Neb., as a colonel
5. December 2000 - December 2002, Deputy Director for National Systems Operations, the Joint Staff; Director, Defense Space Reconnaissance Program; and Deputy Director for Military Support, National Reconnaissance Office, Washington, D.C., as a brigadier general

6. May 2006 - October 2008, assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, D.C., as a lieutenant general
7. October 2011 - Present, Commander, U.S. Transportation Command, Scott Air Force Base, Ill., as a general

FLIGHT INFORMATION
Rating: Command pilot
Flight hours: More than 4,200
Aircraft flown: T-37, T-38, T-1, KC-135R, B-1B, B-2, B-52G/H and C-21

MAJOR AWARDS AND DECORATIONS
Defense Distinguished Service Medal
Distinguished Service Medal with two oak leaf clusters
Defense Superior Service Medal with two oak leaf clusters
Legion of Merit with two oak leaf clusters
Defense Meritorious Service Medal with oak leaf cluster
Meritorious Service Medal with oak leaf cluster
Air Force Commendation Medal with oak leaf cluster
Air Force Achievement Medal
National Intelligence Medal of Achievement
Secretary's Distinguished Service Award, Department of State
Combat Readiness Medal
National Defense Service Medal with bronze star
Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal Global War on Terrorism Service Medal Armed Forces Service Medal
Military Outstanding Volunteer Service Medal

OTHER ACHIEVEMENTS
Officer training award, undergraduate pilot training
Top graduate, T-37 pilot instructor training
T-37 Instructor Pilot of the Year
Distinguished graduate, B-52 G/H combat crew training
Air Force Public Affairs Directors Special Achievement Award for commander support
Joseph A. Moller Award, Outstanding Wing Commander, Air Combat Command
Gold Medal, National Reconnaissance Office
Honorary Tuskegee Airman
Order of the Sword, Air Combat Command

EFFECTIVE DATES OF PROMOTION
Second Lieutenant Nov. 8, 1974
First Lieutenant Nov. 8, 1976
Captain Nov. 8, 1978
Major Oct. 1, 1983
Lieutenant Colonel June 1, 1988
Colonel Jan. 1, 1992
Brigadier General Jan. 1, 2000
Major General Oct. 1, 2003
Lieutenant General Feb. 3, 2005
General Oct. 8, 2008

(Current as of November 2011)

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING

MARCH 6, 2013

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. GARAMENDI

General FRASER. The passage of the "Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2013" since the March 06, 2013 hearing has removed a portion of the uncertainties we are facing from continuously working under Continuing Resolutions and pending sequestration cuts. The National Defense Sealift Fund (NDSF) was funded to the FY2013 budget request and until recently was facing a sequestration reduction. We are pleased that Office of Secretary of Defense and the Navy had the flexibility to eliminate the NDSF cut, as it would have caused a reduction in the readiness and responsiveness of our organic fleet.

Additionally, the Maritime Security Program (MSP), which falls under the Department of Transportation Maritime Administration, ensures the Department of Defense has access to militarily useful U.S. flagged merchant vessels to support the transportation of supplies to support our deployed forces. Under the recent budget resolution for FY2013, MSP is funded at the FY2012 appropriated level of $174 million, $12 million less than the authorized level, and will be reduced further by a 7.8% sequestration cut. The Maritime Administration will be unable to fully fund this program.

The impact of the funding reductions to the commercial portion of our fleets could decrease the capability of USTRANSCOM to respond to the requirements of the Geographic Combatant Commanders. [See page 29.]

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. SCOTT

General FRASER. Afghanistan Helicopter (Rotary Wing) Program, contracted directly with the foreign carrier: Canadian Helicopters, Canada. CHC Global Operations, Canada. Vertical De Aviacion, Columbia.

Thule Airlift (Fixed Wing Aircraft), contracted directly with the foreign carrier: Air Greenland, Greenland.

International Airlift Subcontracted through CRAF Carriers: Volga Dnepr, Russia (subcontracted through Atlas Air). Polet, Russia (subcontracted through UPS). Silk Way, Azerbaijan (subcontracted through World Airways Inc.). [See page 28.]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

MARCH 6, 2013

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MCKEON

Mr. MCKEON. During the SASC posture hearing on 5 March 2013, you stated that you want 13,600 troops to remain in Afghanistan following the end of the NATO mission on December 31, 2014. What would you envision should be the associated mission sets for a 13,600 troops presence in Afghanistan?

General MATTIS. During his State of the Union address, President Obama outlined two specific missions for U.S. forces in post-2014 Afghanistan. First, the training and equipping of Afghan forces so that Afghanistan does not again slip into chaos; and secondly, a counterterrorism effort that allows us to pursue the remnants of Al Qaeda and its affiliates. I also consider our support of other U.S. Government agency efforts in Afghanistan an inherent and critical mission.

Mr. MCKEON. What value do you put on area weapons, such as the Sensor-Fused Weapon (SFW), in deterring enemy forces from considering massing military assets to attack our allied forces?

General MATTIS. Area weapons allow us to engage a large number of enemy assets assembled in one area with a limited number of munitions. This should provide some form of deterrent to an enemy planning to mass forces. Therefore, area weapons such as the SFW are valuable in deterring enemy forces from massing military assets.

Mr. MCKEON. Is it anticipated that area weapons would contribute in defending against hostile action by Iranian land and/or maritime forces should deterrence fail?

General MATTIS. Yes. Area weapons are effective against fielded forces including military personnel and armored vehicles. They would be one of the available options to defend against hostile actions. They would be less effective against maritime forces at sea but could be used against maritime forces in port.

Mr. MCKEON. Can you outline the current threats posed by the Haqqani network to our strategy in Afghanistan and Pakistan and the region? How do we expect that threat to morph as we withdraw our forces? How best can we mitigate this threat?

General MATTIS. The Haqqani Network, proportionately, remains the most lethal and cohesive insurgent group operating in Afghanistan. Its areas of operation and influence continue to expand outside of its traditionally defined operating areas, affecting the Transition and Afghan stability.

As our retrograde in Afghanistan proceeds, we anticipate the Haqqani Network will attempt to exploit security vulnerabilities, particularly in Eastern Afghanistan. The Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and other targets perceived as vulnerable could fall victim to attacks; however, Kabul will be the primary operational effort. Absent sustained pressure and international enforcement of United Nations sanctions, the Haqqani Network will remain resilient in its Pakistani sanctuary. The Haqqani Network clearly understands the value of high-profile attacks that garner significant media attention, and will attempt to increase the frequency and lethality of attacks in key population centers as we draw down our forces. This network is directly linked to the majority of high-profile attacks in Kabul and eastern Afghanistan and responsible for numerous U.S casualties. The Haqqani Network has the closest relationship with Al Qaeda of any other militant group operating in Afghanistan or Pakistan.

We are maintaining pressure on the Haqqani Network through the combination of persistent Combined Team operations and interagency and international partnerships, challenging the Haqqani Network's command and control and operational effectiveness. A security environment that is manageable by the Government of Afghanistan and its security forces will limit the ability of terrorists to use Afghan territory to plot, resource, and conduct terrorist attacks against the U.S. homeland, our interests, and the interests of our allies worldwide. Aggressive targeting and international partnerships are essential to limit the travel of senior leaders to the Gulf States for fundraising purposes.

Mr. MCKEON. What is the role of area versus unitary munitions in addressing this threat?

General MATTIS. Unitary munitions give precision deployment capability against a single point target. Area munitions allow the engagement of multiple targets

across a defined area. This can include denying or disrupting the enemy's use of that area or destruction of enemy fielded forces and armored vehicles.

Mr. MCKEON. What capability does the SFW provide that other munitions in the U.S. inventory cannot in this environment? How does the SFW address the humanitarian concerns that have been raised about the use of other munitions?

General MATTIS. The SFW provides the ability to disable multiple armored vehicles with a limited number of aircraft sorties. In comparison, multiple missions with unitary weapons would be required to disable the same number of armored vehicles. Sensor Fuzed Weapons would address concerns regarding collateral damage or unnecessary human suffering by more directly targeting enemy vehicles versus personnel. Because the weapon is designed to disable a vehicle's motor, it is less likely to cause undue suffering to personnel in the open vs. indiscriminant use of cluster munitions or unitary munitions that miss their targets.

Mr. MCKEON. What type of consequences would you foresee if U.S. forces could rely only on unitary systems to defend against an Iranian ground or maritime attack? What costs in terms of protecting friendly forces, materiel, and dollars would be incurred?

General MATTIS. The consequences would be felt in three primary areas by U.S. forces. First, aircraft that attack from high altitude would be required to fly more missions across the target area because they would be unable to target as many enemy forces per mission as they would with cluster munitions. Second, aircraft that work in the low-altitude environment, such as the A–10, which can carry large numbers of unitary munitions, would be exposed to the threat environment for a longer period of time. Finally, it would take longer to prepare the battle space in advance of U.S. backed ground forces taking the field of battle. Additionally, the ability to rapidly repel an advancing enemy ground force would be reduced in a troops-in-contact scenario.

The exact cost would be difficult to pinpoint, but the primary factors involved would be the increased risk to U.S. aircraft, potentially high battlefield losses of U.S. troops, and a loss of popular support for an operation incurring high loss rates. While unitary munitions are extremely useful against a variety of targets, cluster munitions exists as a viable option to reduce battle losses.

Mr. MCKEON. What efforts have been undertaken and are anticipated to remove by 2018 munitions available to the Central Command that are prohibited by the 2008 Policy on Cluster Munitions and Unintended Harm to Civilians?

General MATTIS. We do not anticipate any difficulties meeting the requirements of the 2008 Policy on Cluster Munitions and Unintended Harm to Civilians. Cluster munitions are not identified as primary targeting weapon solutions in any of our plans although we do not rule out their use in a dynamic environment where they might be the most appropriate weapon for the target. A comprehensive search of our munitions database records indicates that only seven types of munitions out of a total of 44 covered by the policy are currently located within the CENTCOM Area of Responsibility (AOR) and our Service components will schedule retrograde of select munitions from theater as their parent military service priorities dictate.

Mr. MCKEON. What efforts have been undertaken and are anticipated to procure capabilities to mitigate shortfalls resulting from implementation of the 2008 policy? What further steps would be required if legislation were enacted requiring implementation of the 2008 policy prior to 2018?

General MATTIS. CENTCOM does not manage munitions acquisition. As capability documents are staffed for review, we follow the 2008 policy in providing input to the comment matrix, however the Service components drive procurement and would be in a better position to answer this question.

Mr. MCKEON. What is the expected impact on the Central Command's theater objectives and operational plans if these shortfalls are not mitigated?

General MATTIS. Failure to mitigate resourcing shortfalls would force us to accept a higher level of risk to the successful accomplishment of our objectives and missions. We will continue to prioritize our needs based on our most critical requirements as we balance our approach to work by, with and through our partners. While the effects of these shortfalls would negatively impact all of the Services and combatant commanders, it will arguably have the greatest operational impact in the CENTCOM Area of Responsibility (AOR) due to geography, the pace of ongoing combat operations and the likelihood of numerous contingencies. Certainly we can expect that those units required to address these emerging challenges will be less ready than in the past or will have less capability due to reduced readiness levels in training and equipping.

Mr. MCKEON. What are CENTCOM's current highest priority intelligence requirements? How well are these requirements being addressed? What is the current divi-

sion of labor between theater-level assets and national-level assets? Please describe for both collection requirements as well as analytical support.

General MATTIS. [The information referred to is classified and is retained in the committee files.]

Mr. MCKEON. What are CENTCOM's key intelligence gaps?

General MATTIS. [The information referred to is classified and is retained in the committee files.]

Mr. MCKEON. How do you assess national intelligence support to CENTCOM? Please specifically discuss support from the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, as well as the rest of the Intelligence Community. Do you have any recommendations to improve support provided by these agencies?

General MATTIS. The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency (NGA), the National Security Agency (NSA), the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) and the rest of the Intelligence Community provide excellent support to CENTCOM. The majority of my Intelligence staff civilians are DIA employees and DIA provides a host of training environments for specialty areas of Intelligence, including Intelligence Collection Management, Intelligence Analysis and tailored courses for utilizing software tools developed by DIA. DIA also provides the Intelligence Collection Manager interface for CENTCOM with the Joint Staff and with elements of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.

NGA and NRO have highly proficient liaison officers embedded within my staff, with in-depth geospatial intelligence knowledge and advanced technical skills. Their ability to reach back to their parent organizations and rapidly support CENTCOM requirements has been a major asset in maintaining situational awareness across our region. Both organizations have proven very agile over the last five years in providing personnel that directly support my staff and forward elements in Iraq and Afghanistan.

NSA support has also been excellent, with embedded liaison officers that rapidly turn our needs and requirements into collection. They are essential in providing exceptionally precise indications of potential hostile intent and Indications and Warning for our toughest problem sets in Iran, Syria and Afghanistan.

Mr. MCKEON. Please describe CENTCOM's current ISR needs and your most recent request for ISR allocation.

General MATTIS. [The information referred to is classified and is retained in the committee files.]

Mr. MCKEON. Please describe the value of HUMINT to CENTCOM

General MATTIS. HUMINT is a critical enabler. It plays a key role in ascertaining information in support of CENTCOM requirements and mission objectives. The ability of HUMINT to penetrate hard targets and access denied areas within the CENTCOM AOR and answer intelligence requirements (particularly those related to plans and intentions) are vital to the CENTCOM mission. HUMINT is uniquely valuable to CENTCOM in validating and complementing intelligence from other disciplines by providing information that is beyond the capabilities of technical sensors, and often incorporates the values and qualitative judgments of the source. HUMINT includes non-tangible information such as insights into adversary plans and intentions, deliberations and decisions, research and development goals and strategies, doctrine and leadership, and morale. HUMINT assets collect information that is not communicated electronically, such as troop movements conducted under radio silence; or equipment and facilities concealed or shielded from overhead or airborne imagery systems. This dedicated capability has been instrumental in the success of numerous CENTCOM operations.

Mr. MCKEON. Have CENTCOM's needs been fully incorporated and integrated into planning for the Defense Clandestine Service?

General MATTIS. Yes. CENTCOM requirements for Defense Clandestine Service (DCS) capabilities are fully captured in tasks to The Defense Intelligence Agency's (DIA) Directorate of Operations within the HUMINT Appendices to CENTCOM approved plans and orders. Defense HUMINT Enterprise councils and boards (of which DCS is a core member) also sufficiently detail combatant command HUMINT requirements.

Mr. MCKEON. What are SOCOM's current highest priority intelligence requirements? How well are these requirements being addressed? What is the current division of labor between theater-level assets and national-level assets? Please describe for both collection requirements as well as analytical support.

Admiral MCRAVEN. USSOCOM has four enduring priority intelligence requirements that directly support the commander's top strategic global security concerns, including 1) countering transnational violent extremist organizations, 2) regional in-

stability and state aggression, 3) threats to sovereignty that may threaten the stability of our interests and/or partner nations, and 4) WMD counterproliferation. In addition, USSOCOM supports the GCC's SOF-specific priority intelligence requirements in their respective theaters of operations, including countering violent extremist organizations, setting conditions for long-term stability, developing regional access, and building security force assistance capacity through partner-nation security initiatives.

USSOCOM collection requirements are submitted at the national-level. Our collection requirements are received from our component commands and from the commander's priority intelligence requirements. We do not task theater-level CCMDs assets. USSOCOM relies heavily on its deployed subcomponents, the other GCCs, and the greater IC to fulfill our collection needs. Therefore, requirements in theaters where greater theater and national collection resources are available are more likely to be addressed. USSOCOM as force provider does not have theater-level collection assets under its control. We provide SOF assets to the GCCs and the GCCs then allocate assets in theater to the TSOCs based on the commander's priorities.

Analysis of collection done by USSOCOM intelligence professionals is focused on providing unique SOF-specific assessments. SOCOM depends heavily on GCC and national level analytic resources for all non SOF-specific analysis.

Mr. MCKEON. What are SOCOM's key intelligence gaps?

Admiral MCRAVEN. USSOCOM intelligence gaps are captured under the DIA intelligence requirements process through multiple mission management boards conducted on a monthly basis. Additionally, SOCOM contributes to the DNI annual intelligence collection gaps discussions to address current and projected intelligence gaps and requirements. To fulfill its Intelligence Requirements, USSOCOM would greatly benefit from greater authorities in applying SOF intelligence assets against specific targets, networks, organizations, and entities; increased priority of USSOCOM requirements within the IC; and expanded/enhanced IC partner capabilities.

Mr. MCKEON. How do you assess national intelligence support to SOCOM? Please specifically discuss support from the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, as well as the rest of the Intelligence Community. Do you have any recommendations to improve support provided by these agencies?

Admiral MCRAVEN. National intelligence support to USSOCOM has been superb, and provides the commander with daily, relevant intelligence that informs the command of ongoing threats, regional instability, counterproliferation, and WMD issues. These assessments help shape the commander's critical decisions pertaining to SOF employment, deployment, and global activities. DIA, NGA, and NSA have full-time embedded analysts in the J2 who provide daily intelligence support to the Joint Intelligence Center (JIC). Additionally, the CIA, NRO, NGA, and NSA have dedicated senior representatives who provide valuable reach back to their parent organizations in support of SOF activities.

Mr. MCKEON. The present authorized funding ceiling for Section 1208 CT authorities is $50 million. In your testimony you say that this authority, "remains critical to Special Operations," and that, "demand for 1208 authority has increased."

a. How much of this authority have you used this year?

b. Is the present amount of $50 million sufficient?

c. Given today's tight fiscal environment, is it too much? How would a reduction in this funding impact your operations?

Admiral MCRAVEN. BLUF: $50 million is adequate to cover anticipated FY2013 requirements. USSOCOM continues to assess the need for an increase beyond the current $50 million authority. Discussion: As of 22 Mar 2013, USSOCOM has $43.5 million committed to support ongoing operations. Additional requirements currently in staffing to support one ongoing operation and two emerging operations will bring the total amount committed to $47.9 million . A separate additional operational requirement is under development, and if approved during FY2013, is anticipated to fully commit the remainder of the $50 million authority. While most or all of the FY2013 $50 million authority is likely to be committed, historical execution trends indicate that USSOCOM will only expend roughly 82% of that amount. Since 1208's inception in 2005, USSOCOM's execution shows a year-over-year upward trend as the program and authority matures. Operational planning that spans up to 14 distinct operations requires some flexibility in authority versus actual execution. USSOCOM, in conjunction with the GCCs, TSOCs and Task Forces is assessing: a) whether or not the ongoing FY2013 operations are expected to continue into FY2014 and beyond at their current level, and b) the potential for additional emerging future requirements. The preliminary assessment is that $50 million is required (not

too much authority), and that an increase (amount TBD) would be prudent to avoid the potential to negatively impact future operations.

Historical Authority, Programs and Execution of 1208 since inception in 2005.

($M)	FY 2005	FY 2006	FY 2007	FY 2008	FY 2009	FY 2010	FY 2011	FY 2012	FY 2013*
Authority	$25.0	$25.0	$25.0	$25.0	$35.0	$40.0	$45.0	$50.0	$50.0
Approved Program	$ 0.4	$19.4	$22.6	$19.6	$24.7	$38.6	$34.6	$43.6	$50.0
Obligations	$ 0.3	$ 7.5	$19.6	$11.5	$15.1	$27.1	$24.6	$33.1	$41.2
Number of Operations	1	8	10	11	11	12	10	10	14

Mr. MCKEON. We understand that SOCOM has been working to have its own Special Operations security force assistance authority—in addition to those SFA authorities that are already available to your forces.

a. Can you provide us with more detail on this requirement? Why are current authorities NOT satisfying your needs? What are the legal limitations that constrain you?

b. What is the State Department's opinion of this initiative?

c. What do the Geographic Combatant Commanders say about this initiative?

d. Do you expect to have OSD and OMB support for this initiative?

Admiral MCRAVEN. [The information was not available at the time of printing.]

Mr. MCKEON. What changes if any would you recommend to Title 10 Section 167—the foundational statutory authority for U.S. Special Operations Command?

a. Are there areas that require our attention more so than others? Perhaps personnel issues, such as the management of Professional Military Education for Special Operations Forces? Do you require modifications to your personnel authorities so that you are more Service-like, as an example, so that you have more of a say in the careers of our Special Operations Forces?

Admiral MCRAVEN. At this time we do not intend to recommend any revisions to 10 USC 167.

Mr. MCKEON. Can you outline the current threats posed by the Haqqani network to our strategy in Afghanistan and Pakistan and the region? How do we expect that threat to morph as we withdraw our forces? How best can we mitigate this threat?

Admiral MCRAVEN. The Haqqani Network's (HQN) goal is to degrade security and the effectiveness of GIRoA through harassing and persistent attacks in Southeastern Afghanistan, and to use these corridors to project violence into Kabul by launching spectacular attacks there. The HQN hopes to translate successful attacks into continued support that draws money, materials and manpower from the Taliban and the international jihadist community. The loss of their operations chief, Baddruddin Haqqani, and increased security in Kabul have diminished the number and frequency of successful spectacular attacks conducted by the network. However, their intent and resources remain intact.

As the U.S. withdraws forces, HQN may benefit from degraded GIRoA/Coalition security in the HQN dominated areas of Paktika, Paktya, and Khowst as well as areas where they have expanded influence such as Logar and Wardak. Continuing to disrupt HQN leadership such as Haji Mali Khan, who could augment the network's capabilities, will help mitigate the threat.

Mr. MCKEON. Your forces just like all of our military forces are beholden to the Leahy Amendment that prohibits U.S. military assistance to foreign military units that violate human rights.

a. What changes to this human rights policy would you propose?

Admiral MCRAVEN. While I certainly appreciate the opportunity to answer this question directly to members of the HASC, I want to emphasize that I am only one of the seven Combatant Commanders who must operate on a regular basis in accordance with the Leahy vetting laws. Within the Department we are looking ways to make human rights vetting more effective and more consistent with the goals of the legislation. The Department has assembled a working group to accomplish this task and all the Global Combatant Commanders and the Special Operations Command support this effort.

With that being said, I want to underscore several important points:

1. I fully concur with the decision that there must be appropriate human rights vetting for our engagement activities and that we are doing this according to the law and the policy.
2. In my opinion, the concept of "poison-person-poison-unit" may unnecessarily restrict U.S. Forces from engaging with units that are beneficial to U.S. interests.
3. In my opinion, Ambassadors ought to have significant input in the decision on whether or not to engage with a particular unit.
4. Allowing limited human rights and rule-of-law training for units and personnel considered trained due to violations of human rights, particularly when there is the political will within the country's leadership to change, could be a positive first step in improving conditions in that country.

Mr. MCKEON. Women have been very active in U.S. Special Operations Command and across the globe—working on the ground in Afghanistan as part of Cultural Engagement Teams, filling critical Civil-Military roles in Africa and the Pacific area, even flying Air Force Special Operations aircraft.

a. Can you outline how the new Department of Defense policy will impact your force? What concerns do you have?

b. How will you ensure that standards are not lowered?

c. Will there be a cultural challenge within your force?

d. Do you expect to seek any waivers or exceptions to the policy?

Admiral MCRAVEN. a) The new Department of Defense policy will enable SOF elements to be more effective in conducting operations worldwide. We regularly augment tactical action units with women in a wide spectrum of operations and I foresee a continuing need to employ women in our missions. In order to properly incorporate women, USSOCOM will conduct an in-depth analysis on the impacts of integrating women to include ensuring all personnel, men and women, are provided the opportunities to succeed while still maintaining the high standards that are bedrock to our success.

b) We will continue to maintain the highest standards by ensuring our occupational standards are related directly to operational requirements. We believe the standards are currently well-linked to requirements and will validate them with a detailed analysis throughout the SOF enterprise. In addition, we are commissioning an un-biased, third party to review to ensure they remain gender-neutral and reflect operational requirements.

c) Women have served and continue to perform a vital role in SOF. USSOCOM will address any lingering cultural challenges as part of the independent study by analyzing the impacts of the psycho-social-behavioral effects of women incorporated into small teams. We have the highest expectations for our Force and I'll ensure they uphold the requirement to treat any women as professional, skilled, co-equal teammates.

d) We will not make any decisions until the completion of the detailed studies. Once we have gathered the data and are certain of the facts, we will develop a course of action and inform the relevant parties.

Mr. MCKEON. As a component of the Northern Distribution Network (NDN), Azerbaijan provides ground and naval transit for roughly 40 percent of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) coalition's supplies bound for Afghanistan. Azerbaijan has extended important over-flight clearance, landing and refueling operations for U.S. and NATO flights to support ISAF. In 2012, more than 150 aeromedical evacuation flights of U.S. Air Mobility Command were flown over Azerbaijan, rushing more than 2,200 patients to a higher level of medical care. How do you assess current U.S.-Azerbaijan military-to-military relations, specifically in terms of supporting our troops in Afghanistan? Given that NDN passing through Azerbaijan and Georgia is more secure and stable route in comparison with Pakistan route do you plan to use it for retrograding U.S. troops and equipment from Afghanistan as we move towards 2014?

General FRASER. The U.S.-Azerbaijan defense relationship is strong—but still has room to grow. USTRANSCOM continues to build on existing cooperation and engage in regular consultations at high levels with Azerbaijani counterparts to identify areas where we can strengthen our cooperation and partnership. Azerbaijan is part of a key transit corridor which TRANSCOM is incorporating into its retrograde operations. Azerbaijan's willingness to build wash racks and make other infrastructure improvements to support multimodal operations in Baku is illustrative of the level of cooperation that Azerbaijan and TRANSCOM enjoy. Since April 2012, approximately 600 short tons of cargo have retrograded through Azerbaijan bound for locations in Europe and 540 short tons of cargo has returned to the U.S.. Azerbaijan

is a stable, reliable partner and TRANSCOM will continue to partner with Azerbaijan until 2014 and beyond. There are no plans to move troops through Azerbaijan.

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. ANDREWS

Mr. ANDREWS. TRANSCOM manages the Transportation Working Capital Fund, which supports airlift services. Each of the Services and agencies bear some of the costs to fly missions and support the Air Mobility Command's budgeted flying hour program. Working Capital Fund policies require the Services to transfer funds about 2 years before the actual missions are flown. When TRANSCOM overflies its flying hour program—which it has for the past several years—what happens to the excess funds paid by the Services and the agencies? Who in TRANSCOM controls the operational tempo of Air Mobility Command aircraft in this instance?

General FRASER. Working Capital Fund rates are set 2 years in advance of actual execution. USTRANSCOM bills Services and Agencies (customers) for missions as they are flown. The Working Capital Fund policy dictates that any operational gains/losses are returned to customers in the form of lower/higher rates two years out. In the case of Air Mobility Command (AMC), these gains/losses are put toward the Airlift Readiness Account.

The Services and Agencies and world events drive the operational tempo at AMC.

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. LOBIONDO

Mr. LOBIONDO. The Civil Reserve Air Fleet augments military aircraft, creating a larger transport network that we can call on as needed. The CRAF program has been activated during two major contingency operations and has provided critical supplemental airlift services to the Department of Defense. Even when CRAF is not activated, its members provide direct support to the U.S. military in day-to-day operations.

In light of a shrinking defense budget and withdrawal from Afghanistan under way, what is TRANSCOM's plan to keep the CRAF program viable?

General FRASER. The Air Mobility Command is in the final phase of a two-phase post Operation ENDURING FREEDOM CRAF study. This expansive body of work will assess the near-term health and future viability of the CRAF program. Upon the study's conclusion, we will have formulated the recommendations for the most effective methodology for restructuring policy, practices, and procedures that most accurately reflect the changing business environment. We have integrated our industry partners throughout this process to fully vet their concerns, ensuring we maintain a collaborative approach. Furthermore, we've been proactive by providing our industry partners requirements and forecasts of the drawdown period via semi-annual Executive Working Groups. Finally, with the creation of the Enterprise Readiness Center, we seek to leverage new business for the future health of the Defense Transportation System.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN

Mr. LANGEVIN. General, I continue to be concerned about the capabilities of our bases to withstand a cyberattack directed against outside supporting infrastructure, such as the electrical grid. Last year you testified that you assessed both the more modern enduring bases as well as the tactical ones to ensure they could continue to operate and that you were satisfied that the proper mitigation networks and generators were available if needed. Can you update us on the progress that has been made in evaluating the ability of our bases within USCENTCOM to operate and recover in the event of such an attack, based on the increased advanced persistent threat environment, and also specifically focus on the linkages and integration of USCYBERCOM to support your cyber efforts under your command?

General MATTIS. [The information referred to is classified and is retained in the committee files.]

Mr. LANGEVIN. General, is operational energy a priority? If so, why? And, can you please describe what actions you are taking in CENTCOM to reduce overall energy consumption in order to extend combat capability?

General MATTIS. Yes. Forces currently operating in the CENTCOM Area of Responsibility (AOR) consume over 3 million gallons of fuel per day with recent consumption as high as 5 million gallons of fuel per day. Satisfying that demand has required immense logistical support, susceptible to attack. It is the CENTCOM pol-

icy to shape its use of operational energy effectively as a strategic advantage, improving our operational capability and effectiveness by increasing operational energy performance and efficiency. To date, we have made great strides ensuring increased efficiencies and improved combat effectiveness by focusing on the development of policies, process improvements, and incorporation of energy efficient technologies in camp facilities, ground vehicles, and ground and aviation operations.

Mr. LANGEVIN. General, does a requirement for persistent surveillance and integrated fire control still persist in the CENTCOM Area of Responsibility (AOR)?

General MATTIS. Yes. CENTCOM forces and coalition partners will have only minimal time to react to missile launches in the Arabian Gulf. Rapid identification, verification, geolocation, and kinetic targeting of such threats are a must.

Mr. LANGEVIN. General, what would the addition of a persistent surveillance and integrated fire control orbit add to CENTCOM's ability to address cruise missile and surface moving threats to the Fifth Fleet and missile defense assets in the region?

General MATTIS. Persistent surveillance systems such as the Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated Netted Sensor (JLENS), specifically designed for missile detection and tracking, would help to counter threats such as those posed to U.S. Forces in the Gulf. However, JLENS is not currently a program of record and is still in testing. If this system does become available for worldwide operational use, JLENS will offer persistent and multi-sensor capabilities optimized for point area defense. The fact that JLENS is tethered will prove a limitation requiring substantial planning and de-confliction to overcome the impact to air navigation, especially in nations who only grant the U.S. limited use of their airspace.

Mr. LANGEVIN. Admiral, you have commented on the need to create a globally networked force of international partners and allies that could rapidly respond to and address regional challenges. Your command is promoting a concept of regional SOF coordination centers designed to promote regional SOF partnering, similar to the NATO SOF Headquarters in Mons, Belgium. Can you comment on this proposal, and HOW you intend to accomplish this? Given such a strong regional emphasis would require engagements and commitments with other countries broader than U.S. Special Operations Command, how has the Department of State reacted to your proposals? How have the Geographic Combatant Commanders reacted? And how would you propose paying for such a commitment?

Admiral MCRAVEN. [The information was not available at the time of printing.]

Mr. LANGEVIN. General, the Pakistan Ground Lines of Communication (PAK GLOC), when open, remains the quickest and most cost-effective route (i.e. cheapest) for surface transportation into Afghanistan. As we are all aware ground transportation through Pakistan was curtailed in November 2011, and then in early July 2012 the PAK GLOC was reopened after extensive negotiations. The reliability of the PAK GLOC to remain open is questionable and linked to any potential future disagreements with the U.S. or NATO. Can you speak to the importance of Northern Distribution Network (NDN) and how USTRANSCOM is posturing to support operations as we bring our forces home after many years of war?

General FRASER. The NDN is an instrumental piece of the Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) Distribution Enterprise. During the closure of the PAKGLOC and subsequent negotiations of its reopening, the NDN was a critical means of getting supplies and equipment into Afghanistan. Because of these routes, as well as multimodal and air-direct options, U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) saw no operational impact resulting from the closure of the PAKGLOC. Maintaining a balance among our various distribution routes continues to be a focus of USTRANSCOM, reducing risk and increasing flexibility in our support of the warfighter.

As the Distribution Process Owner, USTRANSCOM will be a part of all planning efforts in conjunction with USCENTCOM to redeploy personnel and equipment from OEF to ensure transportation feasibility. Maintaining a balanced distribution network ensures continuity of the transportation enterprise and avoids any single point of failure, enabling the redeployment of OEF forces and the retrograde of OEF materiel within the prescribed timelines.

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER

Mr. TURNER. In 2006 General James Jones (then the Supreme Allied Commander of Europe) stated that "the Achilles' heel of Afghanistan is the narcotics problem. The uncontrolled rise of the spread of narcotics, the business that it brings in, the money that it generates is being used to fund the insurgency, the criminal elements, anything to bring chaos and disorder." When discussed in previous hearings, you in-

dicated that "DOD supports capacity building within the Counternarcotics Police-Afghanistan and specialized units such as the DEA-sponsored National Interdiction and Special Investigative Units."

This 2012 UNODC (The United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime) report shows that the past 5 years have produced the largest crops in decades. According to the study, the dropoff in 2010 is largely attributed to plant blight that reduced the annual yield.

Given the fact that narcotics production actually increased during our surge of forces, do you believe that the Afghan Army will be able to effectively conduct counternarcotic operations? What do you expect to happen when we further reduce our forces? Can we truly claim success if we leave the nation in this condition?

General MATTIS. I agree that the illicit narcotics problem remains one of the greatest challenges to our future success in Afghanistan. Secretary Panetta, just prior to leaving as Secretary of Defense, endorsed a Commander ISAF request to identify counternarcotics as a Department of Defense enduring priority for Afghanistan after the 2014 transition.

In response to your concerns, the Afghan Army does not have a counternarcotics mission. Afghan drug laws are enforced by the Counternarcotics Police of Afghanistan, a component of the Ministry of Interior. In the past, the Afghan Army has occasionally provided security for counternarcotics police operations. As we further reduce military forces, our U.S. Government law enforcement partners will lose much of the security umbrella U.S. and Coalition military forces provide and will have less freedom of movement within Afghanistan. This will restrict U.S. law enforcement partnered activities with the Afghan counternarcotics police.

Success in Afghanistan is ultimately an Afghan responsibility. We have trained, equipped, and mentored their forces to a level which we assess can provide the environment for a secure and stable Afghanistan. They must have the resolve to do so.

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. SHUSTER

Mr. SHUSTER. Air Mobility Command maintains a list of about 136 companies that are approved to transport military cargo. However, only about 30 companies on this list are CRAF participants; the rest are freight forwarders and non-CRAF carriers. Despite stated and well-known polices and regulations to use CRAF carriers, TRANSCOM has repeatedly allowed DOD to contract with these other companies

Please explain the list of Approved Air Carriers. Who are these companies? How do they get on this list? How do you use this list?

How can TRANSCOM ignore stated policy—from a Department of Defense Instruction and United States Code—to assign missions that transport military cargo to non-CRAF carriers?

General FRASER. The referenced list, Approved Air Carriers, is comprised of transportation service providers which provide transportation partly or wholly via air. Air tenders and Air Transportation Service Provider Rules (Section F of the Military Freight Traffic Unified Rules Publication-1 (MFTURP–1)) are managed by AMC. Companies apply for "DOD-Approved Status" through a process outlined in the MFTURP–1. As long as companies meet the requirements of the MFTURP–1, air transportation providers may include air freight forwarders and air taxis as well as conventional air freight carriers operating under Federal Aviation Administration rules. Once approved, these domestic air carriers are given access to the Global Freight Management (GFM) system where they can submit tenders (rates) based on their approved service category (air carrier, motor carrier, rail, etc).

The process outlined in the MFTURP–1 is used to determine which transportation service providers are certified and governs the validation process by which transportation service providers become DOD-approved air carriers listed in the GFM system. Transportation officers use the GFM system to choose the transportation service providers for their domestic tender requirements. Business conducted through the GFM system is not subject to the requirements of the Fly America and Fly CRAF acts. Therefore, customers are able to utilize the additional non-CRAF transportation service providers for air delivery services.

Air Mobility Command manages the movement of DOD airlift missions using a combination of organic and commercial airlift. Commercial airlift missions are acquired through Federal Acquisition Regulation based contracts.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SHEA-PORTER

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. It has been said that Al Qaeda's strategy is to draw the United States into an extended global conflict that validates the narrative that the United States is permanently at war with Islam. What are we doing to counter this dangerous narrative against the United States and our allies? Are we making any progress in this area and if so, how are you measuring success? Do you have sufficient tools and authorities to wage this battle of the narrative?

General MATTIS. We are working hard with our interagency and international partners to counter this very dangerous narrative. CENTCOM is conducting groundbreaking, online activities to undermine Al Qaeda's narrative throughout our Area of Responsibility (AOR) in order to reduce recruiting, fund-raising, and the spread of its ideology. The idea that the West is at War with Islam is a complicated milieu of supporting narratives that effectively draw regional audiences to the conclusion that U.S. policy toward the region serves only Western interests. Deconstructing and defeating this multi-faceted narrative requires a multi-faceted approach which the USG must address holistically. CENTCOM and U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) activities designed to counter the Al Qaeda narrative have established a digital footprint in the AORs Internet information environment to provide focused credible information that counters and undermines Al Qaeda's violent jihad ideology and calls to violence. CENTCOM also has programs that find, fix, and degrade the credibility of Al Qaeda operatives that are promoting Al Qaeda in the mainstream Internet environment. Additionally, CENTCOM is working in close collaboration with the Center for Strategic Counterterror Communications, Department of State's Near Eastern Affairs and South and Central Asian Bureau, and Other Governmental Organizations to synchronize and coordinate these messaging activities.

We assess that we are making progress, albeit slowly, to degrade the core tenets of Al-Qaeda's narrative. We assess that we are seeing a steady degradation in popular acceptance of the Al Qaeda brand and violent jihad ideology. Programmatically, we apply industry best practice to measure the effectiveness of each of our programs and then look to larger-scale assessments to determine their holistic effectiveness. On a program-by-program basis, we assess monthly changes in sentiment toward key topics within the Internet information environment in our AOR as well as other metrics such as growth of viewership, audience interaction, viral spread of our online content and qualitative assessments of our online interactions where we have a digital footprint.

We have the tools sufficient for the task but they are underdeveloped and limited in breadth. These types of operations are habitually underfunded, slowing their maturation and growth dramatically. As our military footprint within the AOR continues to shrink, programs like these become more and more important to CENTCOM to meet these and similar tasks. With your support, we can continue to develop and mature our counterterror programs and more effectively fight this battle of the narrative with our partners.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. How do we ensure ANA/ANP forces can counter the Taliban forces without ISAF assistance, when only one in 23 ANA *kandaks* (battalions) can currently operate independently?

General MATTIS. The operational effectiveness of the ANSF continues a general upward trend and they are performing well. They have fought hard and are holding their own. Afghan forces are increasingly partnering and leading offensive operations. The ANSF are now unilaterally conducting over 80% of the total operations and are leading roughly 85% of total operations. Over 87% of the population is now under Afghan security. Sizewise, the ANSF has reached their object level of 352,000. The focus of the training mission now is on the quality of the force, developing the right balance of seniority, skills, and specializations that are vital to their long-term sustainability and success. Although ANSF resources will be challenged once U.S. and Coalition forces have withdrawn, I do believe they will be sufficient to defeat the Taliban.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Is operational energy a priority? If so, why? And, can you please describe what actions you are taking in CENTCOM to reduce overall energy consumption in order to extend combat capability?

How do you incentivize the military to reduce energy consumption? And, what renewable energy technologies have been effectively employed in CENTCOM and what is the return on investment?

What achievements have you made in the CENTCOM AOR to reduce operational energy? What is your biggest energy challenge? And, how do you define energy security in the context of the COCOM?

General MATTIS. Yes. Forces currently operating in the CENTCOM Area of Responsibility (AOR) consume over 3 million gallons of fuel per day (1.4 million gallons of fuel per day in Afghanistan). Our operational energy policy and efforts fully nest with our Theater Campaign Plan by enabling the conduct of operations necessary to achieve our intermediate military objectives, thus establishing the conditions for regional security, stability, and prosperity.

I have challenged commanders at all levels throughout the CENTCOM AOR to develop and implement operational energy programs focused on reducing energy demand while maintaining or increasing operational effectiveness. I have also charged commanders to push for the rapid fielding of emerging technologies that have proven methods to reduce energy demand, to include proven alternative energy technologies. CENTCOM has employed several renewable technologies in the AOR such as solar powered light carts and street lighting along with the Ground Renewable Expeditionary Energy Network System—a portable hybrid photovoltaic/rechargeable battery power system capable of providing up to 300 watts of continuous power.

Current operational energy includes centralizing power plants on bases, insulating tents with energy-saving liners and the replacement of metal halide light fixtures with light emitting diode fixtures in gyms, just to name a few. Our biggest energy challenge remains harnessed to fuel which is our most valued commodity and is the most difficult to move, store, and distribute. In particular, getting energy to our forward operating bases places an incredible demand on our forces. And finally, energy security means a reliable, secure, and affordable supply of energy for CENTCOM's missions, today and in the future.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. How do we encourage Pakistani involvement in efforts to deter Taliban aggression and encourage diplomatic solutions?

General MATTIS. We continue to encourage Pakistan to deter Taliban aggression by providing much needed security assistance to their military forces. This security assistance has played a critical role in enhancing the Pakistan military's ability to develop more effective counterinsurgency and counterterrorism capabilities. Diplomatic solutions are hampered though because the Pakistanis are under extreme pressure by the violent extremist organizations (VEOs) that continue to target government entities and citizens within their borders. They've had devastating losses of life in VEO attacks that occur almost daily. However, Pakistan understands the importance of regional security and thus, the importance of working with the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) and the United States.

Through this tri-lateral relationship, there's been some success in finding diplomatic solutions toward ending the reign of terror that is being prosecuted by the numerous VEOs along the borders of Pakistan and Afghanistan. Pakistani leaders have publicly called on the Taliban to participate in peace negotiations. In addition, Pakistan also participates in the U.S.-Afghanistan-Pakistan Core Group and two sub-working groups to facilitate a reconciliation process. We must continue to encourage Pakistan to engage with us and GIRoA in order to further advance diplomatic solutions.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. How do we ensure ANA/ANP forces can counter the Taliban forces without ISAF assistance, when only one in 23 ANA *kandaks* (battalions) can currently operate independently?

Admiral MCRAVEN. Certainly challenges remain for both the Afghan government and its supporting security architecture. However, building an effective security apparatus requires time and enduring advisory and financial support. GEN Dunford has implemented a sound plan to ensure a smooth security transition in 2014. One supporting aspect of this plan, designed to provide time for the ANA and ANP to evolve leverages Afghan Special Operations Forces and the Afghan Local Police (ALP) Program. This covering force approach maintains pressure on insurgent networks and simultaneously enables local communities to address their unique security concerns.

This covering force approach is working; improving security for an estimated 17% of the Afghan population (5 million). Today ALP are 21,346 strong and projected to continue growing after transition to an Afghan Government goal of 45K. Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) have been successful in defending their communities against insurgent attacks 88% of the time. The layered support of Afghan special operations elements, time and space combined with the efforts of the ANA and ANP will continue to evolve, enabling relative stability in the post-transitional environment.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. It has been said that Al Qaeda's strategy is to draw the United States into an extended global conflict that validates the narrative that the United States is permanently at war with Islam. What are we doing to counter this dangerous narrative against the United States and our allies? Are we making any

progress in this area and if so, how are you measuring success? Do you have sufficient tools and authorities to wage this battle of the narrative?

Admiral MCRAVEN. SOCOM, in conjunction with the Geographic Combatant Commands (GCC) and Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOC) has a variety of influence programs to counter Al Qaeda's narrative. The Trans-Regional MISO Program (TRMP) is one of SOCOM's priority influence programs to counter violent extremist (CVE) ideology around the globe. The TRMP is nested with the objectives in Campaign Plan 7500, DOD's global plan to counter terrorism and violent extremism. The program provides guidance and authorities to GCCs to execute MISO in support of their CT operations in their AORs, as well as support partner nation MISO activities that align with U.S. objectives. Our primary technique in countering this narrative is not to directly address it (and thus give it credibility), but rather to isolate and discredit Al Qaeda in the eyes of their intended audience, thus nullifying their message. At the same time, SOCOM's trans-regional MISO efforts emphasize the host nation/partner nation counter-AQ efforts to divide AQ out as the real enemy. We also highlight host nation/partner nation efforts which address underlying conditions and contributors to extremism.

Additionally, USSOCOM deploys Military Information Support Teams (MIST) in over 20 nations globally. MISTs work with U.S. Embassy Country Teams and Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOC) to counter violent extremist messaging, among other issues, using the full spectrum of inform and influence activities. Additionally, MISTs often address the upstream factors leading to violent extremism through partnership with our allies. Building partner capacity, persistent engagement, and working by, with, and through our allies is crucial in long-term success in countering AQ's narrative that the U.S. is at war with Islam.

Complementary to the MISTs, USSOCOM continues to operate two enterprise capabilities which provide a globally synchronized and mutually supporting network: the Trans-Regional Web Initiative (TRWI) and the Trans-Regional Magazine Initiative (TRMI). These two MISO programs provide the GCC Commanders with the ability to conduct U.S. unilateral MISO supporting CT and GCC Theater Security Cooperation objectives.

TRWI currently operates 10 Web sites across 6 geographic regions, providing a global network of influence Web sites. These Web sites publish factual content 6 days/week, 24 hours per day, in 23 languages. Such content undermines and indirectly counters the Al Qaeda narrative that the U.S. is at war with Islam, while maintaining a focus on the pragmatic aspects of regional and local economic and social improvements. TRWI Web sites also leverage various social media outlets, greatly expanding the reach and influence of the messaging.

SOCOM's Trans-Regional Magazine Initiative (TRMI), is designed to develop, synchronize, and coordinate senior military-to-military information and influence message in support of SOCOM and GCC objectives. The program supports all six GCC contingency operations and theater security cooperation objectives through the publication of influence products that reach more than 90,000 senior military leaders and defense official in 12 languages across 171 countries worldwide. The magazines serve as a tool to not only counter AQ propaganda, but to promote stability and security and build support for U.S. Government activities. Through the use of these magazines, SOCOM achieved an economy of force solution for a small "boot-print," high-yield engagement in the ongoing war of ideas.

We are making progress as indicated by the House Appropriations Committee-Defense decision in FY13 appropriations to move TRWI funding from Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funding to USSOCOMs baseline budget. The MISO community has worked over recent years to better assess the effectiveness of influence operations. Per guidance in DOD Appropriations Acts 2010 and 2012, DOD reports quarterly to Congress of the effectiveness of MISO activities. While measuring behavioral change in humans is a complex effort, SOCOM has been working closely with the Joint Staff, the Joint Information Operations Warfare Center (JIOWC), and Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy to continue to improve our efforts of assessment.

MISO inherently includes an assessment phase as part of the influence process, and MIST teams incorporate polling, surveys and assessments in the execution of their operations to determine program effectiveness. Additionally, SOCOM's Global Assessment Program (GAP) explicitly measures the extent to which Al Qaeda's narrative resonates with populations of interest through the use of large-scale quantitative surveys as well as multiple qualitative focus groups. GAP has completed baseline assessments in Yemen, Algeria, Nigeria, Bangladesh, Kenya, and Maldives as well as follow-up studies in Yemen and Bangladesh. SOCOM uses these baseline assessments with reassessments to gauge the effectiveness of our efforts at a strategic level.

TRWI Web sites have also provided us the ability to gauge our success in changing attitudes and perceptions. Using both quantitative methods (article reads and unique site visitors) along with qualitative methods (reader comments, online surveys and polls), we're able to measure performance and behavioral data on a daily, monthly and quarterly basis to determine messaging effectiveness. The sites content and performance data is shared with Department of State in order to compare behavioral changes with target audiences in each region.

TRMI uses target audience member feedback to assess the level of influence in countering AQ. TRMI receives numerous submissions for publication of reader developed content, as well as requests to use the magazines in numerous training events and conferences. In addition, SOCOM completed a quantitative and qualitative assessment study in 2011 which researchers used to compare the effectiveness of one magazine's impact on a control group across a 2-year exposure. Researchers found significant changes in attitude regarding reader support of their country's cooperation with the UN, EU, NATO, and UN Peacekeeping missions as a direct result of readership. These are all indicators of TRMIs credibility and effectiveness with the target audience.

USSOCOM has sufficient authorities to counter the Al Qaeda and violent extremist narrative. However, compliance requirements are in some cases overly cumbersome and impact the responsiveness and flexibility necessary to gain the advantage and exploit the OPTEMPO of digital discourse.

Reduced funding for MISO is also limiting our ability to counter the enemy's narrative. The recent defense strategy outlining the future move towards low-cost and small-footprint options for global, persistent engagement should include a reliance on MISO to accomplish U.S. DOD objectives. However, SOCOM MISO funding in the FY13 appropriation remains largely in Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) line. This funding strategy places at risk long-term sustainment for enduring MISO programs. Additionally, Resource Management Decision (RMD) 700a eliminated all funding for the Trans Regional Magazine Initiative, and imposed a 20% reduction on funding for the Trans Regional Web Initiative. At little cost, both programs have global reach, targeting large and diverse audiences, and require no U.S. presence on the ground.

Since 2008, SOCOM has refocused the priority to the indirect approach and in the use of non-kinetic operations as critical to achieving long-term objectives. While the need for non-lethal influence operations has risen since this shift, budgets for MISO and influence operations have been decreasing. When compared to other DOD capabilities, MISO is a low-cost, small footprint, persistent Special Operations Forces (SOF) capability that when combined with other capabilities can achieve lasting effects.

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. As it relates to the planned Air Mobility Command airlift force structure, what is your greatest concern in providing airlift capabilities to support the National Military Strategy and contingency operations to other combatant commanders? And, can you please highlight the potential impacts to organic fleet readiness and ability to respond to contingencies in light of a possible yearlong CR and sequestration?

General FRASER. Our greatest concern in providing airlift capabilities remains retaining the ability to support combatant commanders with timely deliveries of their requirements at acceptable levels of risk as we go forward. Organic fleet readiness may be impacted by sequestration reductions in weapon system support accounts designed to ensure availability of those aircraft in the Active, guard, and Reserve force structure.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. RUNYAN

Mr. RUNYAN. General Fraser, listening to your answer to the question from my colleague, Mr. Scott, regarding use of foreign carriers, I have some concerns.

It is my understanding that TRANSCOM has contracted for at least $244M in 2012 for Russian AN–124 aircraft (as listed in the COINS system), albeit as subcontracts to CRAF carriers. Is that accurate?

I also understand you use these aircraft for what is referred to as "outsize/oversize" cargo that may not fit onto a CRAF carrier. However, I'm concerned you may not be maximizing the use of our own C–5 fleet for outsize/oversize and then putting pallets and smaller equipment on CRAF carriers. Does that make sense?

Can you explain what systems you have in place to ensure we're maximizing the use of C–5s for outsize/oversize, then putting pallets on our CRAF carriers?

Further, I understand you may be flying CRAF carriers into Baku, Azerbaijan, instead of flying CRAF all the way into Afghanistan, even though CRAF is cleared

to do so. Isn't it true that uploading CRAF cargo to these IL–76s costs 3x the price of CRAF carrier and supports a foreign carrier? Why would you do that? Do you feel you have the authority to make this decision to not use CRAF? Does that comply with the Fly CRAF Act?

General FRASER. When organic capability is not available and commercial support is required, we utilize Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) carriers to the maximum extent possible. All DOD commercial missions are conducted in compliance with the Fly America and Fly CRAF Acts. For outsized, oversized, or battle-damaged cargo, occasional use of contract AN–124 and IL–76 aircraft is required to augment our C–5 fleet. DOD assigns those missions to foreign carriers only when the missions cannot be performed by a U.S. commercial carrier. As a matter of policy, the contracts for these aircraft are through CRAF carriers who subsequently use foreign carrier subcontractors. Additionally, Section 801 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2010 (Public Law 111–84; 123 Stat. 2399), provides authority to acquire products and services (to include airlift services) produced in countries along a major route of supply to Afghanistan. This authority is used in the case of IL–76 aircraft flying from Baku, Azerbaijan. The business provided through these aircraft contributes to our continued access of Baku and the rest of Azerbaijan.

Mr. RUNYAN. I understand that TRANSCOM can use multimodal contracts to accomplish door-to-door transportation solutions using all commercial assets. For example, cargo imported into Afghanistan is sealifted to the UAE and then transported by air to its final destination. Instead of using multimodal contracts, however, I understand TRANSCOM has been shipping cargo through the Northern Distribution Network which costs 2½ times more than if TRANSCOM shipped cargo through the Pakistani transportation network. Shipping cargo through the NDN also burns more fuel. The Army has said unexpectedly high transportation costs have partly caused its $5–7 billion shortfall in the fiscal year 2013 budget. Since the UAE is the closest multimodal country to Afghanistan, why hasn't TRANSCOM considered shipping more military cargo on commercial carriers through these multimodal contracts? How does TRANSCOM plan its flight routes to most effectively transport cargo into and out of Afghanistan?

In the coming months, which countries does TRANSCOM plan to transport cargo through on C–5s, C–17s, and C–130s? How does TRANSCOM decide whether to fly cargo on military aircraft or use commercial aircraft under existing multimodal contracts? Approximately how many hours does TRANSCOM waste flying military aircraft, when commercial aircraft could more quickly and efficiently fly cargo through the UAE?

General FRASER. As the Distribution Process Owner, USTRANSOM, in concert with the DOD, interagency, and our partner nations, is responsible for setting the global logistics enterprise to ensure reliable and redundant lines of communication (LOCs) for strategic cargo and passenger transport in support of combatant commands worldwide. In our role as the supporting command to U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) for Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF), we have deliberately established multiple routes and modes to deploy, sustain, and redeploy/retrograde U.S. and coalition partners (Lift & Sustain nations) to meet warfighter requirements, while ensuring system efficiencies to the maximum extent possible. Thus, as the transportation provider supporting USCENTCOM and its components, we continually assess and refine our enterprise processes to realize cost avoidances in our commitment to make the best use of taxpayer dollars. Most importantly, this must be accomplished while effectively enabling USCENTCOM operations by providing multiple lanes of transportation, ensuring our mission will not fail due to loss of one or more routes.

Over the past year, approximately 75% of our Defense Transportation System cargo moving to and from Afghanistan in support of OEF has moved via our commercial partners in the Commercial Multimodal system (CMM). The other 25% moved through other routes that we've established over time and continue to modify, including organic/commercial air direct delivery and the Northern Distribution Network (NDN). Due to cost, USCENTCOM prefers ground routing over CMM or air direct. Of the ground LOCs supporting OEF, the Pakistan Ground LOC (PAKGLOC) is the least expensive. Use of the PAKGLOC at its fullest capacity has been interrupted by its recent closure and subsequent reopening. While technically reopened in July 2012, new cargo bookings were held pending intergovernmental negotiations on the specific Memorandum of Understanding and Terms of Reference. These were approved 31 Jul 12 and 1 Nov 12 respectively. In the interim between the reopening in July 2012 and the conclusion of negotiations in November 2012, cargo that had been stranded along the route and in the port was being cleared. We recently completed proofs of principle with new cargo bookings to ensure smooth

cargo flow under the new procedures. Because the rates are preferable to other available routes, we expect the PAKGLOC to reach higher, sustainable volumes and become the primary logistic LOC supporting OEF by the summer of 2013.

While the PAKGLOC was closed we relied heavily on our commercial partners and the CMM system, along with the NDN, to move cargo into theater. While USTRANSCOM is responsible for establishing and monitoring LOC capacity and capability to meet OEF delivery requirements, USCENTCOM, as the supported command, in coordination with force providers (services and other combatant commands), issues guidance to subordinate commands for LOC selection when moving cargo to and from Afghanistan, with the primary goal of effective operational execution. USCENTCOM's guidance to its subordinate commands for strategic movement includes directives on LOC selection and mode selection (i.e. air direct, CMM, NDN, etc.). Once the requirement is given to USTRANSCOM, we source and execute the specified transportation solution to meet these USCENTCOM requirements, while advising them on low-cost options for cargo delivery that will meet their operational needs if applicable.

Organic and commercial air direct delivery to and from Afghanistan is another critical capability utilized by USTRANSCOM to meet OEF warfighter requirements. Validated USCENTCOM strategic airlift requirements are allocated to either organic or commercial airlift by USTRANSCOM's air component, Air Mobility Command (AMC). Our organic strategic airlift aircraft (C–5 & C–17 assets) are national assets, which are low-density platforms in continuous high-demand throughout the globe. These aircraft are typically utilized to fly equipment that USCENTCOM deems critical and/or sensitive, in addition to other critical requirements that cannot be met by our commercial partners (i.e. helicopters, secure communications equipment, etc). Thus, if AMC does not have organic assets available for lift upon receipt of a validated USCENTCOM requirement, our commercial partners are contracted through USTRANSCOM to fulfill the airlift requirement appropriately. C–130s are not utilized for strategic airlift due to capacity, velocity and intratheater demand.

For organic assets, the missions are sourced, planned, and executed by AMC to meet USCENTCOM directed delivery timelines. Utilizing industry-standard flight planning software that accounts for aircraft specifications, fuel burn, winds aloft, etc., AMC plans the mission for the most efficient route possible, while also accounting for aircrew duty-day limitations, diplomatic overflight clearance and international flow-control restrictions. For OEF support, these routes can be accomplished with either air refueling tanker support to fly cargo non-stop to/from continental U.S. (CONUS) and Afghanistan (most expensive option), or the more typical method of stopping at enroute locations in Europe. International routes for these missions change daily based on a number of other factors, but typically involve European overflight followed by a southern arrival (via Turkey, Iraq, Kuwait, and Pakistan) or northern arrival (via Turkey and Central Asian States) into Afghanistan proper. Nations overflown by our organic assets each have their own diplomatic clearance procedures—some have standing agreements with the DOD for overflight in support of OEF, while others require specific clearances for individual missions. On rare occasions, our organic airlift assets will be used to deploy and/or redeploy units from bases in the western U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) theater, which will move direct from the USPACOM region to Afghanistan (i.e. not routed east over the CONUS and Europe). AMC synchronizes and manages these overflight requirements to ensure disciplined global aircraft movement.

With the requirement to use strategic organic airlift assets to move specific, USCENTCOM-validated critical cargo, USTRANSCOM and AMC continually assess aircraft utilization while meeting combatant commanders' requirements. These efforts at efficiency consistently result in over 80% cargo-fill utilization for our aircraft departing Afghanistan (including unit redeployment, retrograde and intratheater missions). This includes missions that depart Afghanistan with suboptimal cargo loads due to operational requirements such as intratheater repositioning, destination cargo handling capabilities, operational retasking, etc. When these missions, as well as those with physical cargo restraints (i.e. helicopters), are factored out of the assessment, we consistently realize over 95% cargo utilization for organic cargo missions moving OEF cargo. As the weight of airlift effort shifts to a primarily redeploy/retrograde mission for OEF drawdown, we anticipate that cargo utilization will decrease on missions entering Afghanistan, but increase to nearly 100% as aircraft are used to bring equipment and troops out of theater. These missions will be used to support movement of critical items that are ineligible for commercial ground or air lift. The vast majority of cargo is eligible for commercial ground or air lift and will therefore be moved via surface or multimodal options.

Our commercial partners and the capabilities they provide via the CMM system are absolutely critical in our efforts to support the OEF warfighter. They have

moved thousands of tons of vital deployment, sustainment, and retrograde/redeploy cargo by providing door to door logistics solutions for the warfighter. Thus, they are and will be critical partners to successfully fulfill continuing USCENTCOM requirements for a successful OEF drawdown. When the PAKGLOC capacity increases to its full utilization, we anticipate a majority of cargo will move via this route as lift costs continue to stress service budgets. However, we also predict that successful OEF drawdown will require utilization of the CMM system at levels the enterprise has not experienced thus far, which will require concerted effort from our commercial partners to meet substantial lift requirements forecasted by USCENTCOM. USTRANSCOM will continue to coordinate with USCENTCOM to ensure global surface, air, and multimodal capacity exists to meet operational requirements, while working with our commercial partners to ensure they remain fully informed on planned global lift requirements for their use in business modeling and commercial enterprise sizing.

Mr. RUNYAN. General Fraser, how do you use this Approved Air Carrier list? How can TRANSCOM ignore stated policy—from a Department of Defense Instruction and United States Code—to assign missions that transport military cargo to non-CRAF carriers?

General FRASER. The process outlined in the Military Freight Traffic Unified Rules Publication-1 (MFTURP–1) is used to determine which transportation service providers are certified. The MFTURP–1 governs the validation process by which transportation service providers become DOD-approved air carriers listed in the Global Freight Management (GFM) system. Transportation officers use the GFM system to choose the transportation service providers for their domestic tender requirements. Business conducted through the GFM system is not subject to the requirements of the Fly America and Fly CRAF acts. Therefore, customers are able to utilize the additional non-CRAF transportation service providers for air delivery services.

Air Mobility Command manages the movement of DOD airlift missions using a combination of organic and commercial airlift. Commercial airlift missions are acquired through Federal Acquisition Regulation based contracts.

Mr. RUNYAN. Air Mobility Command maintains a list of about 136 companies that are approved to transport military cargo. However, only about 30 companies on this list are CRAF participants; the rest are freight forwarders and non-CRAF carriers. Despite stated and well-known policies and regulations to use CRAF carriers, TRANSCOM has repeatedly allowed DOD to contract with these other companies

Please explain the list of Approved Air Carriers. Who specifically are these companies? How do they get on this list?

General FRASER. The referenced list, Approved Air Carriers, is comprised of transportation service providers which provide transportation partly or wholly via air. Air tenders and Air Transportation Service Provider Rules (Section F of the Military Freight Traffic Unified Rules Publication-1 (MFTURP–1)) are managed by AMC. Companies apply for "DOD-Approved Status" through a process outlined in the MFTURP–1. As long as companies meet the requirements of the MFTURP–1, air transportation providers may include air freight forwarders and air taxis as well as conventional air freight carriers operating under Federal Aviation Administration rules. Once approved, these domestic air carriers are given access to the Global Freight Management system where they can submit tenders (rates) based on their approved service category (air carrier, motor carrier, rail, etc).

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. PALAZZO

Mr. PALAZZO. I know there is talk that the (ANP) Afghan National Police and the (ANA) Afghan National Army are going to be capable of maintaining stability in the Area of Operation (AO). How real is this?

General MATTIS. Despite the nature of the resilient insurgency in Afghanistan, the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), with limited support from International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), continues to improve across all levels. The ANSF capability to maintain stability in the area of operations is real. Successful operations like KALAK KHODE, a large-scale ANSF-led series of operations in Regional Command South, are just one example of how the ANSF continues to make demonstrable progress each day at the brigade, corps, and institutional levels. Since July 2012, the ANSF has not only grown in size, but has developed in capabilities and performance as well. Afghan security forces are now leading 80 percent of all conventional and special operations and, with the implementation of Tranche 4 in March 2013, the ANSF will have security lead for approximately 87 percent of the population. I am confident the ANSF is poised to assume the lead for all secu-

rity operations this spring commensurate with Milestone 2013 as ISAF shifts to a supporting role. ISAF expects that Tranche 5 will be announced concurrent with Milestone 2013. With the implementation of this final Tranche this summer, the ANSF will have the lead for security for 100 percent of the Afghan population.

Mr. PALAZZO. The constant has been U.S. support for Afghan force in contact, the variables are what I believe need to be addressed. One has always been the duration that support would last, and the second is the Taliban. In your opinion, is it a likely possibility that the forces will regress once there is a total U.S. withdrawal?

General MATTIS. No. The Afghan National Security Force (ANSF) operational effectiveness continues a general upward trend as they continue to improve and professionalize. The Afghan Army is performing well, they have fought hard and held their own. Currently, over 87% of the Afghan population is under Afghan control and Afghan security. The ANSF remains on track to support transition allowing them to take the lead for security across Afghanistan by the first half of 2013, and have responsibility for all security by the end of December 2014, per the Lisbon Agreement.

Mr. PALAZZO. Syria and Lebanon have always been in the mix, so to speak. There are small factions of Al Qaeda extremists, but for the most part they have been of little concern with respect to the other two larger threats. Is there more concern that one of these two countries will try to follow Iran's current nuclear push?

General MATTIS. With Syria currently embroiled in a full-scale civil war, the regime is focused entirely on its survival and defeating the insurgency. Syria is a signatory to the treaty on Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and has a declared civilian nuclear research program, and there are no indications the regime is pursuing a nuclear program along the lines of the current Iranian "push." As Syrian state infrastructure and regime control continues to erode in the civil war, development of a nuclear program inside Syria becomes increasingly unlikely.

Neither the Government of Lebanon nor any entity within Lebanon (i.e., Lebanese Hizballah) has the capability or willingness to develop a nuclear weapons program. Lebanon struggles with its own internal stability issues, now exacerbated by sectarian spillover from the Syrian civil war, making nuclear development an implausible scenario.

Mr. PALAZZO. What is the U.S. stance with the actions of Israel? I know we have long since been allies with this very powerful military presence in the region. They are aggressively advocating against the Iranian push to nuclear power. If they were to act on the threat on their own, will our stance be to still support such actions? With that being said, and the looking to follow through with the "Shift to the Pacific," will we have enough of a force to redeploy to this area of operations?

General MATTIS. For the first part of this question, "What is the U.S. stance with the actions of Israel" I would defer to the European Combatant Commander and to the State Department. As for CENTCOM's ability to defend our interests and partners in the Arabian Gulf, CENTCOM is working closely with the Joint Staff and the Services to ensure we retain the necessary capabilities to carry out our responsibilities as directed by the President.

Mr. PALAZZO. With the sequester under way, what in your mind is the order of priority as far as cuts go and what drives that decision? Is it current operations or a projection of where the SOF needs to be?

Admiral MCRAVEN. USSOCOM will achieve all FY13 sequester reductions by reducing the period of performance on several contracts. This was the only way to achieve the savings with only 6 months remaining in the fiscal year without impacting current capability. The Department has not issued guidance on the sequester implementation for fiscal year 2014 and beyond so we have not been able to fully assess what capabilities will be impacted. When we do know the impact of sequester we will strike a balance: we must protect readiness for the operators in the fight while we consider our future capabilities.

Lastly, but just as important, USSOCOM receives critical support from the Services and we are already feeling the impact of sequester with the reduction in flying hours, ISR and CJCS exercises. This will negatively impact global operations and SOF efforts to build partnership capacity and current counter terrorism operations.

Mr. PALAZZO. A particular interest to me and my district is the proposed procurement of a piece of real estate in South Mississippi to facilitate the training of our elite Navy SEALs and (SBU) Small Boat Units.

a. Do these efforts come to a standstill?

b. What do you need to ensure that your forces have the best training facilities available to them?

c. How do we expedite this process?

Admiral MCRAVEN. The query about "procurement of a piece of real estate in South Mississippi to facilitate the training of our elite Navy SEALs and (SBU) Small Boat Units" is referring to the planned land acquisition adjacent to NASA's Stennis Space Center (SSC) to support the Navy Special Operations Forces (SOF) Jungle and Riverine Training Western Maneuver Area (WMA). The WMA land acquisition of 5,200 acres is scheduled to be completed in three phases. Phase One has been completed with Phase Two and Three programmed for FY15.

a. The WMA land acquisition is on track as planned. Environmental compliance was covered in a Record of Decision signed by Mr. Wayne Arny, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy (DASN) for Installations and Facilities, on October 6, 2004. A property value assessment is underway as required within one year of acquisition. Currently, Phase Two and Three remain on track and approved for FY15 in our FY2014 Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP).

b. U.S. Special Operations Command has projects planned to ensure our forces training at SSC have the best training facilities available. Among the projects is a Naval Small Craft Instruction and Technical Training School (NAVSCIATTS) Applied Instructor Facility to be constructed in 2015 per the FY2014 FYDP.

While there are training improvements in the works, Naval Special Warfare Command is investing in an assessment of NSW ranges, training and support facility shortfalls at SSC and developing a detailed Military Construction (MILCON) and Operations and Maintenance (O&M) investment strategy to mitigate identified gaps. Provided funding is available under sequestration, this assessment will be complete by the end of CY2013 to help guide the efficient programming of future year resources to ensure our forces training at SSC have the best training facilities available.

c. U.S. Special Operations Command has a structured Strategic Planning Process that guides the programming and expenditure of resources to efficiently support the entire Special Operations enterprise. Expediting the process is not warranted, provided U.S. Special Operations Command is fully resourced to execute its deliberate development plans.

Mr. PALAZZO. How is the Air Force prioritizing the airlift capabilities under the constraints of a limited budget. With the Asia-Pacific shift will we have the lift capabilities here at home for things such as rapid deployment of National Guard and Reserve assets should they be needed?

General FRASER. Airlift capabilities are prioritized under the strategic guidance provided by our National Defense Strategy. As illustrated in the Mobility Capability Requirements Study-2016 and the more recent Mobility Capabilities Assessment-2018, our anticipated airlift capabilities are adequate to satisfy all national strategy requirements, including the Asia-Pacific shift, as well as domestic deployment requirements.

Mr. PALAZZO. There has been a lot of talk about moving planes from base to base over the past year under the different changes to the total force proposal; in some cases there have been exhaustive arguments made to discredit the moves or argue for why certain planes should stay at certain bases. I know you have looked at all of those and weighed those options.

How much of a factor did cost play in that analysis?

In some cases we are talking about new construction, moving simulators and other major components that is bound to cost millions upon millions of dollars.

In our current sequestration environment do you believe that we can afford to move planes and crews that are accomplishing everything that we ask of them, without cost saving being a top factor?

Under a sequester and with the possibility of another yearlong continuing resolution is the Air Force still planning on following through with the FY14 shift of airlift capabilities?

General FRASER. Due to the fiscal constraints mentioned, Air Mobility Command, as the air component to USTRANSCOM, was forced to make tough decisions to retire or divest mobility force structure as part of their initial FY13 Program Objective Memorandum submission to HQ U.S. Air Force. While I am not involved in the Air Force basing decisions or budgeting decisions to support aircraft force structure, I have previewed the results of the FY13 NDAA and determined that airlift force structure is sufficient to meet Defense Strategy requirements.

The current fiscal environment and looming additional fiscal pressure will impact future budget decisions. While the Air Force has agreed to extend the C–130 floor through FY14, any necessary future intratheater airlift force structure actions for FY15 and beyond will be announced in conjunction with the FY15 PB.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BRIDENSTINE

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. I am concerned about Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) activities in Yemen. I believe we must have a comprehensive strategy in Yemen and that we cannot simply kill our way to success. Do we have a strategy for Yemen that leverages your interagency partners?

General MATTIS. Yes. The CENTCOM strategy in conjunction with other U.S. Government (USG) agencies is to conduct regional operations, activities, and actions to achieve regional stability. The success of this plan depends on our ability to integrate military planning efforts with those of the broader federal interagency (IA). Essential tasks inherent to the Yemen Country Plan have been developed in consultation and coordination with the Interagency Action Group (IAG) liaison officers (LNO) representing their respective Federal agencies. These LNOs are assigned or detailed to CENTCOM and serve as the conduit for continued collaboration and coordinated planning between CENTCOM and the IA community.

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. From my understanding, the Department of Defense supports retaining the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund (PCF) authority and other military aid programs to Pakistan. It is also my understanding that PCF depends on the Government of Pakistan allowing U.S. trainers in the country. Can you provide an update on the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund (PCF) and other military aid programs to Pakistan?

General MATTIS. The PCF and PCCF authorities have been essential in improving Pakistan's Counter Terrorism (CT) and Counter Insurgency (COIN) operations against militant groups. PCF and PCCF are the primary funding sources for the development and modernization of Pakistan's combat forces deployed in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. These units help advance U.S. interests in Afghanistan and the region by attacking violent extremists and limiting cross-border attacks. The acquisition of items such as night-vision devices, radios, and medical equipment has made Pakistan military operations more effective in targeting these violent extremists. PCF/PCCF-funded counterinsurgency training has prepared the Pakistan military and Frontier Scouts for the fight against insurgents by providing courses in small-unit tactics, intelligence analysis, and law of armed conflict. As more of the PCF/PCCF-funded major end items are delivered to Pakistan, Pakistan's military will gain improved capabilities to conduct close air support, night operations, and organic intelligence-surveillance-reconnaissance operations. Moving forward, our PCF/PCCF-funded efforts to build Pakistan's CT and COIN capabilities do not depend on Pakistan permitting U.S. trainers in country.

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. While much of our attention focuses on Afghanistan and Iran, we cannot forget our continuing commitments in Iraq, particularly our military personnel at the Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq (OSC–I). What is the future of OSC–I? Does OSC–I have the authorities it needs for "train and assist" missions?

General MATTIS. OSC–I currently maintains necessary "train and advise" authorities, but there is a concern that those authorities will lapse in the next fiscal year. The authorities have allowed OSC–I to provide the training and advice needed to advance U.S. interests such as developing the Iraqi counterterrorism forces. We remain mindful of our enduring commitments in Iraq. OSC–I is an integral component of the U.S. Mission in Iraq and will continue to advance U.S. interests for the foreseeable future. OSC–I's Security Assistance and Security Cooperation activities increase U.S. leverage and access within the nascent Iraqi government. In the near term, OSC–I is transitioning to a model that will be uniform to other U.S. Embassies in the Middle East. We are seeking an extension to the FY13 authorities through FY14 in order to complete the train and advise functions.

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. While direct-action missions—such as the Bin Laden raid—often get the headlines, we cannot lose our capability to conduct "indirect" Special Operations Forces (SOF) missions. How are you rebalancing your forces to execute these core SOF activities? Are there any core SOF activities that could be turned over to Conventional Forces?

Admiral MCRAVEN. SOF direct action missions do garner the majority of the headlines, despite the fact that the majority of SOF efforts fall into the category of "indirect" or nonkinetic missions. Over the past decade, the priority for our country (and thus SOF) shifted to Southwest Asia. This focus on Iraq and Afghanistan resulted in a conscious decision to accept risk in other Geographic Combatant Commanders' (GCCs') Areas of Responsibility (AORs) by retasking previously regionally aligned SOF units to rotations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Simultaneously during this period, GCC requirements for SOF have actually increased. With drawdowns in Iraq and Afghanistan, SOF will be able to meet some of the GCCs' demand for SOF which has been suppressed for a decade. USSOCOM's deliberate and rigorous analysis

over the past year has identified this demand, and we are developing a plan with our GCC and Service partners to resource the demand to the best of our ability, taking into account that the demand exceeds the supply. This effort, combined with reinvigorated education and training programs, comprises the core of our "rebalance" initiatives.

With regard to conventional forces, their assistance is absolutely essential for SOF to conduct our core activities. However, SOF should not divest itself of any of its core missions at this time. SOF units and operators are unique in many aspects. Size of the unit, rank structure, and training are some of the primary elements which differentiate SOF from conventional forces. The required level of training and maturity allows SOF to deploy to locations where large conventional units cannot be supported by the host nation, and they interact with both senior-level U.S. and foreign officials as part of their daily missions. SOF are uniquely suited to operate in austere and/or ambiguous environments. In short, they achieve strategic results with tactical operations. But it is important to reiterate that conventional forces' high-demand/low-density skills and resources, such as aviation, logistics, and intelligence greatly improve SOF's capabilities with only a limited footprint.

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