[House Hearing, 113 Congress] [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office] [H.A.S.C. No. 113-5] FRAMEWORK FOR BUILDING PARTNERSHIP CAPACITY PROGRAMS AND AUTHORITIES TO MEET 21ST CENTURY CHALLENGES __________ COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION __________ HEARING HELD FEBRUARY 14, 2013 [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] ---------- U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 79-493 PDF WASHINGTON : 2013 COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES One Hundred Thirteenth Congress HOWARD P. ``BUCK'' McKEON, California, Chairman MAC THORNBERRY, Texas ADAM SMITH, Washington WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina LORETTA SANCHEZ, California J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia MIKE McINTYRE, North Carolina JEFF MILLER, Florida ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania JOE WILSON, South Carolina ROBERT E. ANDREWS, New Jersey FRANK A. LoBIONDO, New Jersey SUSAN A. DAVIS, California ROB BISHOP, Utah JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio RICK LARSEN, Washington JOHN KLINE, Minnesota JIM COOPER, Tennessee MIKE ROGERS, Alabama MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam TRENT FRANKS, Arizona JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado JOHN GARAMENDI, California ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia HENRY C. ``HANK'' JOHNSON, Jr., DUNCAN HUNTER, California Georgia JOHN FLEMING, Louisiana COLLEEN W. HANABUSA, Hawaii MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado JACKIE SPEIER, California E. SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia RON BARBER, Arizona CHRISTOPHER P. GIBSON, New York ANDRE CARSON, Indiana VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire JOSEPH J. HECK, Nevada DANIEL B. MAFFEI, New York JON RUNYAN, New Jersey DEREK KILMER, Washington AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois MARTHA ROBY, Alabama SCOTT H. PETERS, California MO BROOKS, Alabama WILLIAM L. ENYART, Illinois RICHARD B. NUGENT, Florida PETE P. GALLEGO, Texas KRISTI L. NOEM, South Dakota MARC A. VEASEY, Texas PAUL COOK, California JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma BRAD R. WENSTRUP, Ohio JACKIE WALORSKI, Indiana Robert L. Simmons II, Staff Director Kim Shaw, Professional Staff Member Mark Lewis, Professional Staff Member Aaron Falk, Staff Assistant C O N T E N T S ---------- CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 2013 Page Hearing: Thursday, February 14, 2013, Framework for Building Partnership Capacity Programs and Authorities to Meet 21st Century Challenges..................................................... 1 Appendix: Thursday, February 14, 2013...................................... 35 ---------- THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 14, 2013 FRAMEWORK FOR BUILDING PARTNERSHIP CAPACITY PROGRAMS AND AUTHORITIES TO MEET 21ST CENTURY CHALLENGES STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ``Buck,'' a Representative from California, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services.............. 1 Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Ranking Member, Committee on Armed Services............................ 2 WITNESSES Sheehan, Hon. Michael, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict, U.S. Department of Defense........................................................ 4 St. Laurent, Janet, Managing Director, Defense Capabilities and Management Team, U.S. Government Accountability Office......... 9 Wolff, LTG Terry, USA, Director, Strategic Plans and Policy (J5), Joint Staff, U.S. Department of Defense........................ 6 APPENDIX Prepared Statements: McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ``Buck''.............................. 39 Sheehan, Hon. Michael........................................ 43 Smith, Hon. Adam............................................. 41 St. Laurent, Janet........................................... 65 Wolff, LTG Terry............................................. 55 Documents Submitted for the Record: [There were no Documents submitted.] Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing: Ms. Bordallo................................................. 93 Mr. Enyart................................................... 94 Mr. Larsen................................................... 93 Mr. Wilson................................................... 93 Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing: Mr. Barber................................................... 98 Mr. McKeon................................................... 97 FRAMEWORK FOR BUILDING PARTNERSHIP CAPACITY PROGRAMS AND AUTHORITIES TO MEET 21ST CENTURY CHALLENGES ---------- House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, Washington, DC, Thursday, February 14, 2013. The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:05 a.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Howard P. ``Buck'' McKeon (chairman of the committee) presiding. OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD P. ``BUCK'' MCKEON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES The Chairman. Committee will come to order. I would like to welcome everyone to today's hearing on ``A Framework for Building Partnership Capacity Programs and Authorities to Meet 21st Century Challenges.'' Although building partnership capacity may seem like a broad term, this is an important area for the committee's oversight of the recent defense strategy which places great emphasis on the important role of partnerships to U.S. national security. Likewise, we have enacted significant legislation in this area because the committee has supported the notion that military commanders need to build certain capacities in partner nations to satisfy specific security theater requirements. We heard testimony yesterday about the fiscal challenges the military faces as it deals with implementing sequestration, a long-term continuing resolution, and the underresourcing of overseas contingency operations accounts. These constraints will disproportionally hurt the Department's operations and maintenance account from which the building partnership capacity authorities are also funded. Given this fiscal environment, the emphasis on building partnership capacity and last year's defense strategic guidance, and the global threats to U.S. national security interests, this hearing is the beginning of a continuing discussion on what is the proper roles for these BPC [Building Partnership Capacity] authorities. In spite of our support for these authorities, many questions remain. What is the right amount of funding? What is the right balance between the Defense and State Departments in funding, strategizing, and executing these authorities? What is the right level of engagement and focus by the combatant commands and services on these activities? And is it a plausible assumption that partner nations will in fact use their new capabilities to act consistent with U.S. national security objectives? Congress is the ultimate decisionmaker on funding. Our oversight responsibilities also require us to understand the impact of these authorities on U.S. national security interests and the ability of the COCOMs [combatant commanders] and Services to execute these authorities without compromising their key priorities and core capabilities. Furthermore, this committee has expressed concern about the proliferation and duplication of BPC authorities. The authorities to be discussed today make up at least $750 million per year in authorized funding, not including over a billion a year in counternarcotics activities, and the trend is on the rise. In today's fiscal environment, it is important that the Defense Department, COCOMs, and Services prioritize these BPC authorities and activities in coordination and consultation with the State Department. And it is critical that the Administration understand Congress's intent in authorizing these authorities and the need to strategize, plan, fund, execute, and assess these authorities. Mr. Smith. [The prepared statement of Mr. McKeon can be found in the Appendix on page 39.] STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM WASHINGTON, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for holding this hearing. I think this is an incredibly important topic and a central tenet in our national security policy going forward. We have global responsibilities and global interests. Go anywhere in the world and there is a U.S. interest there from Africa to Latin America to Asia. We have a lot of places that we are trying to influence events and obviously with limited resources. So to the extent that we can build partner capacity, develop partnerships with other nations, it can be a force multiplier for us in achieving our interests and certainly there have been a great many successes. I think most notably in Somalia, which was and continues to be a significant challenge but has at least been contained with Al Shabaab's efforts there, and we did that with a fairly light U.S. footprint. We did it because we were able to build partnerships with Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda and other African nations as well and work with them to contain the threat there and the capacity that we built amongst those nations was incredibly helpful to us and we are going to have a similar challenge up in Mali trying to find partners up there that we can work with. I think the training that our military does to build the capacity of these nations is an incredible asset for our national security strategy. You know, it is a broad challenge. I agree with many of the chairman's remarks in terms of what we need to look at in terms to make this work better because it is not just Department of Defense. The Department of Defense has a variety of different programs, but when you are thinking about building the capacity of partner nations, security is one element, but governance, rule of law, their education system, health care system, all of that too is important. So it becomes a whole-of-government effort that we need to work on, and I do believe the Department of Defense in recent years has done a great job of working with the other aspects of U.S. interests, you know, USAID [United States Agency for International Development], State Department. I was in the Philippines a few years ago, looking at one of our efforts down there and was really impressed at how closely the Special Operations Command was working with USAID on the projects that were necessary to build the capacity of the local population there. I think figuring out how those interagency pieces need to work is one of the key challenges because we frequently hear the complaint that the Department of State and others have large numbers of responsibilities; DOD [Department of Defense] tends to have the most money. As a result of that, DOD has developed a number of development programs, other things that arguably are crossing over into what the lane traditionally would be USAID or other development agencies. So figuring that out, figuring how to make sure everyone in our Government works together in capacity building is a critically important piece of this, but for our committee's purposes, first thing is to understand the DOD programs and those specific programs that are in place to help us build partner capacity. So overall, I view this as an incredible success for us in the last 10 years. We want to figure out how to build on that, how to make it work better, how to get the whole-of-government approach to maximize the efficiency of this effort. I think this hearing is incredibly important. I look forward to testimony and questions. I thank the Chairman for holding it. I yield back. [The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the Appendix on page 41.] The Chairman. Thank you. To testify before the committee today, we have Mr. Michael Sheehan, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict; Lieutenant General Terry Wolff, Director, Strategic Plans and Policy (J5) the Joint Staff; Ms. Janet St. Laurent, Managing Director, Defense Capabilities and Management, U.S. Government Accountability Office. I would like our witnesses--I would like to thank all of you for being here today, for your participation and for your contributions that you are making in this effort. And also I would like to note that the Department of State who has a key role to play in this discussion was also invited to participate, but declined. We will continue to engage State in partnership with the Foreign Affairs Committee in this ongoing dialogue. Secretary Sheehan. STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL SHEEHAN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE Secretary Sheehan. Thank you, Chairman McKeon, Ranking Member Smith. Thank you for very well framing the issue that we are going to discuss this morning. And distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to talk with you this morning about building partner capacity. I provided a longer statement for the record. Myself, and Lieutenant General Wolff will make some brief remarks and get quickly to your questions. I appreciate the opportunity to discuss these programs, define what they are, discuss their strengths and weaknesses, and outline the way forward in this critical area of our defense strategy. DOD has a wide range of authorities to assist partners in developing their defense capabilities. The most important of these authorities are Section 1206, to Train and Equip Counterterrorism Units, Section 1207N, which provided funding for two specific theaters of actions against A.Q. [Al Qaeda] affiliates in Yemen and in East Africa, and the Global Security Contingency Fund, which is a new pilot program. The Global Security Contingency Fund, GSCF as you know, is a joint program between State and DOD, which authorized a pooled fund of up to $250 million to meet emergent security issues. As part of this program, we started what we call a soft carve out specifically designed to support Admiral McRaven's initiative to build a global soft network with Special Operations forces around the world. We have just concluded the first year of this program, and although it was admittedly a bumpy process, I think the fund has shown promise as an additional authority to pursue our defense needs. I also want to mention Section 1208, which is not really a BPC authority as it is designed to directly support our operations, but it also has the added benefit of building important C.T. [counterterrorism], counterterrorism capabilities, in some of the most sensitive areas with some of the most sensitive units in areas plagued by Al Qaeda presence. In addition to, we have various authorities that enable us to shape the local defense institutions at their national level to ensure the units that we equip and train are properly managed by the leadership of the host countries. These programs include Minister Defense Advisory Program or MODA, the Defense Institution Reform Initiative or DIRI, and our Counterterrorism Fellowship Program. In the counternarcotics arena, we have authorities that help build partner capacity to fight organized crime and drug trafficking groups, Sections 1033, 1004, 1022 and 1021, that provide training, equipment, base operations, intelligence sharing, and other support to our counternarcotics programs. We appreciate the flexibility of these counternarcotics authorities that also enable us to support efforts to attack the nexus of counterterrorism and counternarcotics, an area of increasing concern, particularly in Northwest Africa. Also providing the Department of Defense a central transfer account for counternarcotics, we are in a stronger position to manage these programs and align them with our security priorities. Based on our experience with this account in counternarcotics, we may want to consider a similar account for our counterterrorism programs. As Secretary Panetta recently made clear, the task of training, advising, and partnering with foreign military and security forces has moved from the periphery of our defense strategy to become a critical skill set across our armed forces. We have gained a great deal of experience in this in the last decade. BPC is often conducted by our Special Operations forces. Their training, regional orientation, and language skills make their operators very well prepared to do this type of activity. However, the general purpose forces are also preparing for BPC as well. Last March the U.S. Army Chief of Staff, General Odierno, announced that Army brigades will be realigned for a variety of purposes, including training and mentoring partnered nation security forces. Our track record I think has been solid. Our 1206 programs have been critical in supporting our efforts in Afghanistan. For example, in the Republic of Georgia, after many years of support from our 1206 program, Georgia is the largest per capita ISAF [International Security Assistance Force] contributor in the field. They are now able to occupy their own battle space and play a key role in our counterinsurgency strategy to clear, hold, and build. They are a very important contribution that eases the burden on U.S. forces in Afghanistan. Outside of ISAF, we have had great success in the Philippines against the Abu Sayyaf Group, in Yemen against AQAP [Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula], in Colombia against the FARC [Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia] and narco- trafficking groups, and in East Africa as Congressman Smith mentioned in his remarks, against Al Shabaab. In the coming years we can and must build on a record of success. Programs like 1206, 1207N, and our CN [counternarcotics] authorities and other institution building programs have been critical to develop these programs. After 9/11, the Congress and the Executive Branch called a series of audibles. The Congress created a series of temporary authorities for the Department of Defense, and they have largely succeeded in their intent. I think it is now an appropriate time for the Congress to consider extending some of the specific year-to-year authorities and perhaps make them permanent. In addition, we support finding appropriations to these funds such as GSCF [Global Security Contingency Fund] and 1207, that as the chairman mentioned, are funded out of O&M [Operations and Maintenance] and other accounts, to provide a more steady stream of appropriation. These programs are proven winners. Not perfect by any measure, but worthy of continued support and refinement. In conclusion, let me say that we expect combined operations with capable partners to continue to be an effective way to respond to the emerging security challenges worldwide and particularly in counterterrorism, but in a wide range of other ones. I am focusing a lot on countering the proliferation of WMD [weapons of mass destruction] as well. These may be important instruments for those programs. And Mr. Chairman, I am quite aware that foreign assistance is not always the most popular program with the public, especially in times of fiscal constraint. However, the programs that you have authorized and funded in this committee have brought real results to our national security. These are not foreign aid giveaways, but these successes should remind us that we cannot measure progress on a day-to-day basis. These efforts take many months and years to get results, and the most important measure of effectiveness is on the battlefield in denying Al Qaeda and its affiliates the ability to organize strikes against our homeland from foreign sanctuaries and in protecting our Nation from other emerging threats to our security. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Smith, and members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today and testify in the Department's efforts to build partner capacity. That concludes my statement. [The prepared statement of Secretary Sheehan can be found in the Appendix on page 43.] STATEMENT OF LTG TERRY WOLFF, USA, DIRECTOR, STRATEGIC PLANS AND POLICY (J5), JOINT STAFF, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE General Wolff. Chairman McKeon, Ranking Members, members of the committee, thanks for the opportunity to testify here today, and I am pleased and honored to be here with Assistant Secretary Sheehan and Ms. St. Laurent from the GAO [Government Accountability Office], and I ask that my oral remarks be entered into the records. From our strongest allies to our newest relationships, strengthening partner engagement increases stability and security around the world, and these engagements are specifically constructed to enable a range of results from developing trust and furthering partnerships to strengthening coordination, interoperability, and mature allies. The January 12th, the Defense Strategic Guidance states that building partner capacity remains important for sharing costs and responsibilities for global leadership. Looking ahead, the Department and the military will remain globally engaged providing a stabilizing presence through a network of alliances and presence through partnerships and cooperative approaches to address common security problems. Across the globe we seek to be part of a security partnership of choice--we seek to be the security partner of choice, pursuing new partnerships with a growing number of nations. The Department and the military undertake a number of security cooperation activities to enable and encourage our foreign partners to work with us to achieve common security objectives, and these activities are aimed at preventing future crises and should these preventive efforts fail, ensuring that the Department and our partners are sufficiently trained and equipped to respond, as necessary. Building partner capacity is a complex interwoven system of multiple lines of effort and throughout the Department and certainly across the interagency. Our main goal is to help our partners develop effective and legitimate security institutions that can provide for their own country's internal security and contribute to the greater regional stability as well as participate in multilateral operations. Our coalition in Afghanistan stands as an example of the importance of interoperable and capable partners. Throughout the war, well-trained and highly effective partners have been fighting side by side U.S. forces. Many of our coalition partners deployed without caveats to some of the most dangerous regions of Afghanistan and performed admirably. As ISAF and USFOR-A [United States Forces--Afghanistan] reshape our presence in Afghanistan as we move towards 2015, our reliance on these partners will continue, and as we work collectively with the Afghanistans it will be important to help them provide for their own Nation's security. As we turn the page on a decade of a war, the Arab world is in a period of turmoil and change imparting across the region, as you well know, with somewhat of an uncertain future, and while the wave of unrest has changed the security environment, many of our long-standing U.S. goals in the region certainly endure. And while the new strategic guidance directs us to a re- balance of the Asian Pacific region, we remain committed to our enduring strategic security interest in the Middle East, including maintaining freedom of navigation, confronting the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, countering violent extremism, and continuing to advance towards Mideast peace process. All while supporting and watching political process and reform. The task of training and advising and partnering with foreign military and security forces has moved from the periphery to become a critical element of our strategy. The successful implementation of this effort has paid dividends in Jordan, Lebanon, Qatar, UAE [United Arab Emirates], among others. In Jordan, the evolution of the Jordanian armed forces as a regional enabler has facilitated their ability to house multilateral special operating force exercises, such as Eager Lion which occurred last spring. Our partnerships with the Lebanese armed forces through Central Command's joint capabilities review resulted in increased capacity to secure and defend their borders. Qatar and the UAE continue to support regional security and they provide support to both Operations Unified Protector and Enduring Freedom. As I turn to the Western Hemisphere we are seeking opportunities to build partner capacity, develop, and continue to develop these security partnerships and create innovative, low-cost, and small footprint approaches to these hemispheric security objectives. The security assistance to Colombia, Central America, and the Caribbean as well as the deployment at the El Salvadorian military in support of OAF [Operation Allied Force] and OEF [Operation Enduring Freedom] underscore the opportunity for expanding these capabilities and capacities to further regional stabilization efforts. We have tremendous partners in the U.S. Southern Command's area responsibility who are dedicated to our shared principles. Our efforts in the Asia-Pacific region are part of a synchronized whole-of-government approach that are aimed at refreshing and reinvigorating our military and our military-to- military relationships with established allies as well as other key emerging partners. So we use building partner capacity events to engage our partners in this region. Exercises augment and supplement this. If you think about Pacific Command over the past few years, they have continued to grow their engagements in quality and quantity to achieve the best training value. I use RIMPAC [Rim of the Pacific] as an example, which had 14 countries in 2010, which moved to 22 countries last year in the largest naval exercises that exist. So PACOM's [Pacific Command] regional exercise has helped train not only the U.S. but partner forces, and they help reinforce our commitment to the Asia-Pacific region, improve interoperability, and send a strong message to the nations across the region. The reliance on Asia represents a strategic adjustment that acknowledged the growing importance of the region as well as an area full of developing economies and the emergence of new security threats, but it doesn't mean a departure from established alliances. And if I think to Europe, it has to do with how we are adjusting our presence there and we will reduce the conventional army presence there to only two brigades, but that doesn't mean European commands, Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine and Special Operating Forces won't continue time-honored partnership efforts with NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] allies and others through a robust exercise program. African states and regional organizations are making progress, as the Assistant Secretary talked about, and this is about helping them deal with their security concerns and sources of instability. Nevertheless, our partners in Africa still lack important capabilities and the capacity to address varying results of instability across the region. Facing this reality, the Department, in conjunction with State, continues to assist on the African continent to build their capacity to respond to these threats. These tailored efforts, as you know, include security assistance, exercises, some rotational presence, advisory efforts, and training and equipping, and all this is being implemented in a low-cost, small-footprint approach. So in conclusion, as we face the security challenges of the 21st century, we have allies and partners who share an intent and in helping us advance this common security vision and shouldering a burden of global security, we believe that building partner capacity is a prudent investment which deepens our strategic ties and helps defend our interests in an area of diminishing resources in a fiscally constrained environment. Globally integrated operations do place a premium on partnering and our forces must be able to operate effectively with U.S. Government agencies, partner militaries, indigenous and regional stakeholders and security forces through technology, command, and control, and a low-cost, low-footprint partnering capability. So whatever form building partner capacity efforts take over time, in the end they have to be agile, flexible enough to respond to a rapidly changing world, and they must be conducted steadily over the long term to instill partner confidence with our commitment and reinforcement all with the State Department's role in leading to U.S. foreign policy efforts. Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to appear before the committee today and testify on the Department and our military's efforts to build partner capacity, and I do want to thank you and this committee for your continued support to our men and women in uniform. I look forward to your questions today. [The prepared statement of General Wolff can be found in the Appendix on page 55.] The Chairman. Thank you. Ms. St. Laurent. STATEMENT OF JANET ST. LAURENT, MANAGING DIRECTOR, DEFENSE CAPABILITIES AND MANAGEMENT TEAM, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE Ms. St. Laurent. Chairman McKeon, Ranking Member Smith, and members of the committee, thank you very much for the opportunity to be here today to discuss DOD's efforts to build the security capacity of partner nations. Our work, over the past few years, looking at a variety of these programs, suggests that three key management practices are critical in helping DOD to achieve meaningful results and outcomes from these efforts. These practices include identifying clear goals and terminology for the various programs, coordinating and sharing information among program stakeholders, and evaluating program performance. The first area, setting clear goals and defining terminology, is important to help ensure that DOD focuses its activities on the highest priority activities in light of resource constraints rather than undertaking a diffuse set of activities. Our work has shown that some programs are well aligned with broader goals, while others need to be better aligned. For example, following our review of a joint task force in the Horn of Africa, we observed that the efforts being undertaken there needed to be reassessed and better aligned with Africa Command's priority missions. My understanding is that is in the process of being addressed. Our report on this topic was done a couple of years ago, so there has been some action. We have also found that DOD uses a wide variety of terms to describe its partnership building activities, and some of this terminology does lead to some confusion. For example, in May 2012, we reported that the combatant commands and the military services had different views and perspectives about what the term ``Security Force Assistance'' means and how it differs from other DOD terms, such as ``Security Cooperation,'' which is somewhat of a broader term that encompasses exercises, military-to-military exchanges, et cetera. But as a result, combatant commands and the services were not totally clear about what steps they should take to implement DOD guidance on security force assistance, develop long-range strategies and programs, and adjust training for general-purpose forces which are potentially going to play a greater role in this area in the future. Therefore, we recommended that DOD clarify its intent and expectations for the combatant command and the Services. The second area involves the need for DOD components to effectively coordinate both within the Department and with civilian agencies to plan and execute security cooperation activities and share information. This is an area where DOD has taken some positive steps. For example, U.S. Southern Command has involved over 10 intra-agency partners as it developed its recent planning and strategy documents, thereby helping to ensure a whole-of- government approach. Still, opportunities for improvement remain. For instance, JO's [Joint Office] review of the National Guard State Partnership program found that the Guard bureau and combatant command's information systems did not always have accurate or consistent information on program activities and funding in this area. Moreover, in a recent review of security assistance programs that supply equipment and training to foreign nations, we found that program officials do not always have accurate information on the status of acquisitions and equipment deliveries because DOD information systems contain limited information and are not always kept up to date. As a result, some of these equipment deliveries to foreign partners have been delayed and additional costs have been incurred. The third and final area that I would like to discuss involves sustaining programs and measuring their results. Since 2010, we have reported the need for improvement and evaluation across a range of programs, including the section 1206 Train and Equip Program, DOD's humanitarian assistance efforts, counternarcotics activities, and the National Guard State Partnership Program. Without good information on the impact of security assistance activities, it may be difficult for these programs to compete for funding during a time of tight budgets. For example, in 2010, we reported that DOD and other U.S. agencies need to place additional emphasis on how initiatives funded through the Section 1206 program will be evaluated and sustained over time. Only 26 of the 135 proposals we reviewed addressed how projects should be sustained. We understand DOD is taking some actions to help address this area recently. During our review of the National Guard State Partnership Program, we also heard positive, anecdotal accounts about the program's usefulness; however, DOD did not have a set of metrics and was not collecting information on results systematically. Without such efforts, along with greater focus on sustainment issues, the benefits of DOD partnership building activities could quickly erode. In conclusion, by setting clear goals, coordinating activities, and sharing information and evaluating progress, DOD can better focus its efforts on helping U.S. partners enhance their capabilities in meaningful ways. Effective management will also help DOD steward its resources and provide Congress with the information it needs to evaluate current programs, consider future funding levels, and modify programs and funding approaches to the extent needed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would be happy to respond to any questions. [The prepared statement of Ms. St. Laurent can be found in the Appendix on page 65.] The Chairman. Thank you. Secretary Sheehan, General Wolff, yesterday this committee heard testimony about the readiness crisis and the significant fiscal difficulties facing the Defense Department. BPC activities, such as 1206 and the Global Security Contingency Fund are funded out of the operation maintenance account, which is already in extremis, but it will take significant further cuts if sequestration is implemented. What priority will BPC authorities get under the C.R. [Continuing Resolution] sequestration and shortfall in the OCO [Overseas Contingency Operations]? Are these activities more important than the training and deployments that cannot currently be funded? If the Department does plan and execute BPC activities, how will the Department prioritize which BPC activities it must complete, not simply in term of COCOM activities, but in light of the other O&M deficiencies that the joint staff is dealing with? Secretary Sheehan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a very important question as we face sequestration. The Secretary has been very clear about the potential catastrophic effect of sequestration on the Department. And we are going to be forced with some very difficult choices in the weeks and months ahead. As you know, Mr. Chairman, a lot of our programs in BPC are funded by defensewide O&M, which are not always applicable to supporting Navy operations. So they are not necessarily out of the same pot of money, but the general question that you ask in terms of setting priorities among these is an appropriate one and a difficult one. I would say, however, though, that our support for building partnership capacity programs remains a very high priority. When you think about these programs that are funding units that are directly engaged in pushing back Al Qaeda sanctuaries in different parts of the world, these are in direct interest of the United States; places where we cannot either for our own political decisionmaking process or the political decisionmaking process of the host country, that we cannot or should not deploy in those countries, the units that we are training and supporting are directly confronting those organizations that threaten our national security. So I would say, Mr. Chairman, these programs are going to remain a priority to support, and if you look at 1206, of course is a counterterrorism program, and in the other programs, for instance in 1207N and then Global Security Contingency Fund, those programs are primarily designed to support the specialized counterterrorism units of countries where there is a significant Al Qaeda presence, and so those will remain high-priority issues, Mr. Chairman. The Chairman. How would they rank as compared to readiness? I have heard stories that troops are not getting the same training that they were a year ago, that they are not having as much opportunity to fire their weapons and other things, cuts that are already being made in training which affects readiness. How would it compare to that? Secretary Sheehan. Mr. Chairman, obviously the readiness of our forces are always a paramount priority in the Department. The Chairman. Would that be like number one? Secretary Sheehan. I would--yes. Yes, Mr. Chairman. However---- The Chairman. Thank you. Okay. General. General Wolff. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I would just say I think readiness would remain number one, and there will be a delicate balance that we will have to work our way through as a better understanding of the impacts are assessed. As the Assistant Secretary has said, and so have you all, the building partner capacity efforts are fairly small in the grand scheme of things, and it is fairly economical. So we have to figure out how to retain the appropriate balance and make the right trade-offs so that we can continue to deal with helping build those capacities out there where we watch these emergent threats continue to change. The Chairman. Most of the choices that we will be forced to make aren't between a good thing and a bad thing. They are between two good things, and that is why it is difficult. Ms. St. Laurent, your testimony mentioned several systemic challenges facing the implementation, execution, evaluation of the BPC authorities. What role do you think multiplicity, duplication, and overlap of all these authorities has in complicating these systematic challenges? Ms. St. Laurent. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Many of the programs do have some similar features; however, they also have differences. So for example, a number of them are focused on enhancing counterterrorism skills. Also, a number of them are focused on enhancing partner nations' capacity to participate in stability and reconstruction operations. So to some extent there are similarities, but in other cases there are differences. GSCF, for example, provides multiyear funding, also has some additional authorities to do other kinds of activities. We have done a large body of work on duplication and overlap in Federal programs over the past few years at GAO in response to a congressional mandate, and I would like to point out a couple of key themes from that work. First of all, there are probably some additional administrative costs, legal review costs, management costs associated when there are large numbers of programs operating in a particular Government area, whether it is education and training programs, or in this case, security cooperation or building partnership activities. To the extent that there can be some consolidation of programs to create fewer broader programs, that may reduce the amount and time of management attention needed to focus on the administrative costs of those programs. So it may be possible to do some potential consolidation in this area. However, there is always a trade-off because these programs are not identical and they have been set up, for example, in some cases to focus on specific countries and in other cases to focus on specific types of activities, like counterterrorism. The Chairman. Well, we are going to have to realize that we will be having trade-offs, but in times of this really tight fiscal constraint, I think we are going to have to look at all possible areas where we can cut duplication certainly be one of those very important ones. Mr. Smith. Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. If I can actually follow up on that, I guess one of the questions that occurs to me, why are there so many different authorities to accomplish a similar task? And you have mentioned some of the programs work better than others. And it is a question for Mr. Sheehan as well. I guess the example I would take is when you are looking to--you have a partner capacity challenge like we have now I guess in the area of North Africa, and you are trying to piece together. You say, well I need, I don't know, $30 million or a lot less than that. How do you sort of look at the menu of authorities and say, I can get some from here, I can get some from there? So how do you piece that together now? And second, Ms. St. Laurent, I would be interested, what would make more sense. You know, how would you say, well, we don't really need that, let's consolidate that and make it more simple? How do we make greater sense of these authorities? Because I think at the starting point, it would be hard to figure out how much money you have available until you go look at a whole wide variety of authorities and say, okay, what is out there. So there is a couple questions in there, but Mr. Sheehan, why don't you start. And then Ms. St. Laurent, if you could offer a comment on that, it would be great. Secretary Sheehan. Thank you, Congressman Smith. Actually the reason we have these multiple authorities, I believe, because this committee and others recognized that we had a very changing, evolving security landscape at 9/11, and they reacted by creating special authorities to deal with certain evolving threats, and I believe it has been effective. So yes, we may want to consolidate, but if you look at the purposes of these authorities, they were specifically targeted at very specific defense requirements; 1206 is a counterterrorism authority. It is very narrow in its application, and that is not necessarily a bad thing. We then went to 1207 when the Congress recognized the evolving threats of Al Qaeda in Yemen and the evolving threat of Al Shabaab in East Africa. 1207N funding was directly targeted to those areas, and I think that was appropriate and effective in focusing the resources of our Government on those threats. Counternarcotics authorities are obviously designed to prevent the scourge of drugs coming into the U.S., but also the flexibility of those authorities that enabled us to use counternarcotics funding on the nexus of terrorism and counternarcotics is a good thing. So yes, they are different, but I think there is sometimes strength in the differences of these programs and the focus they provide and the flexibility they provide to go after certain aspects of our national security. These programs, I want to underscore this to me as a member of the Department of Defense--and I also was a senior official in the Department of State also--these programs are very important to the Department of Defense. They enable the Department of Defense to focus its effort. Other programs that are run by the Department of State are also very, very important, but they are different. They do not enable the Department of Defense to respond quickly and effectively to these emerging threats like these authorities have over the past 6 or 7 years. So I just want to underscore that yes, they are different. It looks like there is some duplication, but there was purpose in their creation, and in my view, they have been extremely effective in terms--if you look at the foreign aid programs of the last 50 years since the old Cold War, if you look at these and stack them up, I would argue that they have been extremely effective because of their focus. Mr. Smith. Ms. St. Laurent, you want---- Ms. St. Laurent. I would agree that often the reason why new programs do get added is because there is a gap in some of the existing programs and new authorities are needed. What sometimes happens is over time then in a particular area, there are a number of programs and some of the earlier programs are not necessarily evaluated to see if they need to continue. So I think this is an area of---- Mr. Smith. Can you give us an example right now of one that might fall into that category within the BPC? Ms. St. Laurent. Well, I think one of the issues over the long term to think about is how, for example, there are a number of military-to-military exchange programs. So the National Guard State Partnership Program contributes to some extent to that, but the theater commanders also have a number of other tools and programs that facilitate military exchanges. It may be that Congress and the administrations decide to retain all those programs because they do serve different purposes, but that is an area where there is some commonality. Mr. Smith. Okay. Ms. St. Laurent. The other point I would like to make is when programs can be established to focus on providing a capability that we want to create in a partner country, in a partner country's military forces, that may be an appropriate way to structure programs. For example, one of the things we hear when we travel to the combatant commands is that they often have to piece together numerous funding sources to accomplish an objective. So for example, the state partnership program may pay for the cost of transporting National Guardsmen to participate in activity, but then the combatant commander also has to find other funding sources to help round out all the other costs associated with whatever the particular activity is. So to the extent you can focus on capabilities that could be beneficial. Mr. Smith. One more quick question. There is also a fine line between BPC programs and development programs because I know DOD has been, you know, there is like the MIST [Military Information Support Team] program for instance, and some others out there, and there is a lot of concern--Secretary Gates had expressed the concern that DOD was doing stuff that frankly the State Department and USAID ought to be doing, and we ought to transfer those authorities over to them. Now part of the reason that DOD's doing that is because they have the money. You know, sequestration could change that, but certainly they have more money than either State or USAID. You know, I know this isn't directly, you know, listed as a building partner capacity program within DOD, but I think they are very linked. How does the BPC programs match up with the development programs? And where might there be some crossing over of authorities there that could be rationalized? Ms. St. Laurent. My response to that would be that the BPC programs are more focused on building the capabilities of other countries' military forces for counterterrorism, stability operations, et cetera. However, DOD has other programs, for example, some of the humanitarian assistance and civic aid programs under OHDACA [Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid] where DOD is engaged in activities like building schools, building wells, things like that. Those activities do tend to look like some of the activities that AID and State Department fund. So there is a tremendous need to ensure that there is good coordination. We have found that there is room for improvement in that area, and we have a report on that topic that identifies where some of that overlap occurs and makes suggestions for enhancing the coordination. So that is one area where further improvement would be needed. Mr. Smith. Okay. Thank you very much. I yield back. The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Thornberry. Mr. Thornberry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I would just say that I agree with some of the comments Mr. Smith made at the beginning. I think this is a very important part of our national security. From my standpoint of looking at this, it is a dangerous world. We can't be everywhere. Helping others develop the capability to do the things that need to be done makes sense, and part of the reason DOD is doing more of it is because they actually get it done; particularly on counterterrorism in a timely way. But as the chairman points out, money is tight and part of what we have got to look at is whether these authorities that have kind of sprung up in various ways and various reasons on an ad hoc basis can't be improved in some way, and I think that is an important area for us to discuss. Ms. St. Laurent, let me just ask a couple of quick questions right quick. You talk about metrics and I am a big fan of being able to measure what we are getting for our money, but as I think back about some of the great successes in building partnership capacity, Philippines, Colombia, et cetera, what metric would you use to measure year by year the effort that is being made in situations like that? Ms. St. Laurent. That is an excellent question, and we do recognize that this is a challenging area but however, there are different types of metrics. So first of all, I think it is important for all the programs to think about metrics and establish, perhaps, a mix of metrics that they are going to use to gauge program success and those could be a combination. For example, in the counternarcotics area, you know, there are both output measures in terms of the number of interdictions, the number of individuals trained, things like that. So that is one form of metric that is perfectly acceptable. The harder and more difficult metrics to get at is the actual outcome. So in this case for example, in training of the security forces, there could certainly be metrics about the numbers of individuals trained, the types of capabilities that they are trained in, but then there are ways to assess, we do it with our own forces through our readiness indicators, et cetera, the extent to which those capabilities are actually being enhanced. And I think of the 1206 program DOD has begun to do more of these evaluations. You often need some baseline data as well to identify where you are starting from or where these countries are starting from and then be able to assess the progress over time. So it is difficult to do---- Mr. Thornberry. Yes. Ms. St. Laurent [continuing]. But it can be done and we understand that it is not necessarily going to be perfect, but I think it will be very important so that these programs can demonstrate their value. Mr. Thornberry. Yes, well I appreciate that. Let me ask one other brief question, and then I want to get to Mr. Sheehan on something. You talk about sustainability, and I think what you mean is starting something that the host country can then continue, but also something about sustainability are these programs that are just temporary. So if a program is going to expire in 3 or 4 years, how can we, much less the host country, have that kind of sustainability? So do you agree that part of the issue here is that these are all temporary authorities and that some sort of permanent, rationalized authority would make some of these sustainability questions a little easier to deal with? Ms. St. Laurent. Again, I agree. This is a challenging area, funding can vary from year to year. It is often challenging for DOD to know exactly what funding they are getting, when they are getting it, and to create a longer term plan. I do agree that in some cases either multiyear authority and more continuity in funding would be helpful. Congress has to evaluate that, of course, as to when they want to give that kind of authority and when they don't, but a key point is, again, sustainability of something that needs to be thought about at the beginning of programs---- Mr. Thornberry. Okay---- Ms. St. Laurent [continuing]. When they are being created. Mr. Thornberry. Thank you. Mr. Sheehan, just right quick, to fight terrorism, it is not always militaries in these countries that are needed. To fight narco-terrorism, sometimes it is Coast Guard-like functions and law enforcement. You know, that is what the global security fund was supposed to do, but in the first years--I don't know--I think there is a fair amount of disappointment in the first year. Is that fair or not? Secretary Sheehan. Mr. Chairman, I, as you know, I have been frustrated to a degree in this first year working with this new authority. There is no question about it. It has been a difficult and bumpy process. We didn't nearly get to as many programs as we have liked to have, but I would say that some good came out of this program and I think there is some positive aspects in the future. First, what we call the global soft carve-out was very, very important for Admiral McRaven and the special operations community to build the soft relationships that can be so crucial for our programs down the road, and we opened up some funding programs for that in what we call the Mainline GSCF. Also, we were able to work with our State Department partners to focus those efforts in some very important countries for our national defense interests. In Libya with a border security program and obviously with the flow of weapons out of southern Liberia into the Sahel, this is a major, major problem that is upsetting the entire balance of security in North Africa. In Nigeria, we have gotten into Nigeria with a counter-IED [improvised explosive device] program to start to build a relationship with the Nigerians, give them some capability to deal with Boko Haram in the northeast which is, again, is a looming problem for Africa that threatens the stability of that part of the region, not only with Al Qaeda, but with other aspects of sectarian violence that is very troubling. We also supported a program in the Philippines, a very important partner both for counterterrorism and maritime programs, and as you mentioned Mr. Chairman, the GSCF enables us to provide funding to other than military organizations like Coast Guard and police, Minister of Interior organizations that are very important for our counterterrorism efforts. So GSCF, although difficult, first year problematic did enable us to do some things that our authorities didn't, so I would give it overall a passing grade in terms of moving our interests forward and we hope to improve it in the years ahead. The Chairman. Thank you. The gentleman's time has expired. Ms. Sanchez. Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you all for being before us. I have been on for 17 years on this committee and worked through a lot of the issues with respect to Colombia when President Uribe was there and some of the work that we have done and have gone down several times especially with some of the training that we have done there from a military standpoint. I mean, obviously we were in there for a lot of reasons; lack of stability, FARC, and others who we thought might at some point be negative towards the U.S. if we lost ground in Colombia, and of course, the drug trade, all which effect in particular California because we are on the Pacific. So my question to you is--and by the way, I also sit on WHINSEC [Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation] so you know the whole training up of--or interchangeability of trying to do civilian control over some of these military over in South America. And so my question is, where do you see--where do you see some of the programs expanding with respect to Latin America, Mexico, Central America, the Caribbean, where do you see some of the efforts happening? What do you do when countries are so continuously changing maybe zinging back from left to right politically speaking, what are the things that concern you and what types of programs do you see for the future going into these countries south of us? And I guess it would start with Mr. Secretary. Secretary Sheehan. Thank you, Congresswoman Sanchez. And I think by bringing up Colombia is obviously one of the models of our building partnership capacity. I first went to Colombia as a Lieutenant in 1980. I went to their commando school as a young Special Forces officer. At that time, we were beginning a partnership with the Colombians. Over the last 30 years has been extremely close tight, growing every year and this is the point I want to make here is that the persistent engagement with the Colombian Army and the Colombian police as you know, has yielded results. We have invested the time, the money, the relationships that has reshaped their army, reshaped their police dramatically since I was there in 1980. And I believe that it--Colombia represents a model for moving forward. What we did in Colombia is a combination of many, many authorities, both counterterrorism, counternarcotics authorities, to build their institutions from the top to the bottom, reforming them, ensuring that to try to protect them from the scourge of corruption involved in these huge sums of narcotics monies to strengthen their institutions to provide them the equipment, the training, and the wherewithal to deal with this nexus of narco-terrorism---- Ms. Sanchez. So Mr. Secretary, I see something like that and then I see for example what has been going on in Mexico, which has just been so much more difficult for us to help that country to get things together there. So---- Secretary Sheehan. I think Mexico, I think, is a very special, unique case as you know. They are much more sensitive to American military presence in their country than say, Colombia where we had hundreds of advisers there operating in a very smooth and effective way. Mexico is a different equation and actually what is interesting now to see, the folks that we worked with in Colombia over the years, it is easier for them to operate in Mexico and they are now assisting the Mexicans in providing their experience in dealing with this threat in Mexico. And I think though in Mexico, we will find a way with the new government with the PRI [Institutional Revolutionary Party], to find a way to help them deal with this scourge and we will move forward. I think perhaps one of the more promising areas or one of the most challenging and difficult areas would be in Central America, which also is now being affected by the narcotics trade through their territory. I think we will look to Colombia for examples of how we can strengthen those institutions in Central America that are under assault from the violence and the corruptive monies of the narcotics industry moving through there. And in the Andean region as well, where we have been engaged for a long time with the cocaine and opium threats, we will again look to the Colombia model to build a comprehensive program to strengthen their ministries to deal with the threat. General Wolff. I would add just one thing or two things. Number one, that SOUTHCOM [Southern Command] I think has it about right with Operation Martillo. It is a good way to empower others to help work these tasks, and additionally, there are other partners in the hemisphere who can help us. The Canadians want to help down in Central America as well. So you build this network of partners that can help you so it is not always you in the lead and there are others that can help where there is historical baggage. Ms. Sanchez. Thank you. The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Wilson. Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I want to thank Congresswoman Sanchez for raising the point about Plan Colombia. I wish the American people knew what a success that is--and Secretary Sheehan that you were there, that is great. But I know firsthand, we have exchange students who have stayed with us from Cali. Two of my sons went to high school as exchange students in Colombia to see this success, and, truly, the American people should be very proud of the American military efforts to provide stability in that extraordinary country. I know firsthand, too, of the success of the relationship with the Republic of Bulgaria, the Slovak Republic. I am the co-chair of the Bulgaria caucus. I am a member of the Friends of Slovakia caucus--to visit with our allies, our partners in Afghanistan, working side by side to promote peace in that country and the success there and the friendships that are being developed and the partnerships, the modernization, the professionalism, truly, they are success stories that should be told. Additionally, Secretary Sheehan, a recent Government Accounting Office report raised concerns about the National Guard State Partnership Program. GAO highlighted concerns about the oversight funding and training and effectiveness of the program. Do you believe it is appropriate for Congress to amend Title 32 in order to codify the National Guard State Partnership Program regarding the funding sources, purposes of the program, and specifying certain limitations on the use of funding? I appreciate very much that Congresswoman Madeleine Bordallo of Guam and myself have introduced legislation that I hope would be of assistance. Secretary Sheehan. I thank the congressman. I believe that the weaknesses of have been--excuse me. I am sorry. Mr. Congressman, I believe that the weaknesses identified by the GAO are very important for us to strengthen our programs with the National Guard. At this point, I am not really prepared to say that we are ready to make those changes, but I will get back to you as soon as I can to come up with the DOD's response to the weaknesses found in this program, and I owe you an answer on that, Mr. Congressman. [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 93.] Mr. Wilson. And as a former National Guardsman myself, I know that the Guard members truly--and I--we have the A.G. [Adjutant General] up front and former reservists here, too, but good people--we have had the privilege of working with our partners and it can be very positive. A question I have for each of you; how will our counternarcotics funding be utilized in relation to the Afghan police and military in Afghanistan post-2014? Secretary Sheehan. Congressman, we haven't made all our decisions regarding the post-2014 equation right now. That is being carefully considered, and we will review those over the next weeks and months ahead, but I will say that there are some aspects of the counternarcotics program in Afghanistan that have been very, very effective, particularly where we work with vetted units within the Afghan Ministry of Interior, have been very important in tackling the narcotics threat there. So as we move forward with our final package for the post- 2014, we will be evaluating what role the counternarcotics authorities will have there. Mr. Wilson. And how does the counternarcotics partnership fit into the Administration's Asia-Pacific strategy? Secretary Sheehan. Mr. Congressman, I think the counternarcotics program is important for all of our theaters, the narcotics monies that fuel these organized crimes have often had relation with terrorist organizations, or also provide smuggling networks that can be used to smuggle terrorists, weapons of mass destruction, or other threats to our security are extremely important in the Pacific as well as our theaters. It will be central to our strategy. Mr. Wilson. Again, I would like to thank each of you for your service and it really is a success story that--I had the opportunity to also visit with the Armed Forces in Ghana, and we have had nearly a 50-year relationship that--it really would be positive for the American people to know, understand, and know how appreciative the people are and how successful. I yield the balance of my time. The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Andrews. Mr. Andrews. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. Thank you for your service. I want to come back to Mr. Sheehan's comments that this is not foreign aid. I notice that the fiscal year 2013, 1206 notifications, the first tranche, is about $71 million, give or take, if you add it up. It has $7.63 million for Bulgaria. I think most of my constituents would say, why in God's name are we engaging in some joint security operation with Bulgaria? What does it possibly have to do with us? And it is a fair question. The question was answered last July, a bus carry--would have carried 47 Israeli tourists near the airport was blown up by a bomb attack. In recent days, the Bulgarian Government has identified Hezbollah as the likely perpetrator of the bomb attack. An account of that report from the New York Times last week says Bulgaria was chosen as a target not only because of the Black Sea's popularity with Israeli tourists, but because security there was more lax than in other European countries. It goes on to say that Bulgarians living along the scenic Black Sea coast did not fear for their safety or expect a terrorist attack. The network of terrorists around the world, as you well know, is agile and intelligent. It finds the soft spots in the world and then attacks there where it seems to be the most likely case. And one thing I think we need to keep in mind here, I think Mr. Thornberry said this very, very well, that this is a real investment in securing our citizens around the world. I did a little math on this. The money we are sending to Bulgaria this year represents $1 out of every $100,000 the United States spends on defense. So out of every $100,000 we spend in our defense budget, $1 goes to Bulgaria or will go to Bulgaria for the purpose of providing interoperable command and control capabilities for force protection companies and military assistance teams, which, as a lay person, I take to mean, you know, figuring out the bad guys, where they are before they could strike and hurt other innocent people. I think that this points out that we have three options in a world that is globally dangerous. The first is to adopt a catastrophic strategy of passivity, just sort of hoping this won't happen in Croatia or Estonia or Hungary or Latvia or Lithuania or any of the other countries. I think that is a major mistake. The second option would be to increase the number of personnel we have and increase our global footprint. You know, put more U.S. troops or put U.S. troops in Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Hungary. I am not for that. I think it stretches us economically; it creates all kinds of geopolitical problems that we don't need. And I think it is not--the benefit is not worth the cost. What you are suggesting and advocating for--and I agree with--is a strategy of making alliances and partnerships and enhancing the security capabilities of those strategic partners. Now I know a lot of that funding has come from our OCO accounts, or overseas contingency accounts, and those accounts are obviously going to drop pretty dramatically over time, as they should. What is the importance of us replacing those OCO expenditures with regular baseline budget expenditures in order to continue strengthening these partnerships? Secretary Sheehan. Thank you, Congressman Andrews. I think--I am glad you raised the issue of our support, not only of Bulgaria but our East European partners. And I think this is, again, one of the most significant strategic relationship changes we have made over the last 10 years and it is based on them participating in ISAF, which supported 14 mostly East European countries and of course, these are not poor countries. So you asked the right question. Why would we support them? But I would say that these modest investments in those countries gave us the ability to help shape their forces so that they could participate successfully in ISAF, thereby reducing our requirement to put additional U.S. forces on the ground. I think it was an exceptionally good investment. And I think I will turn to General Wolff also to follow up on that, as he has much more experience on that. General Wolff. Sir, I just merely suggest that we have got about--they have about 580 or so Bulgarians in Afghanistan right now as part of ISAF, and so as those units have trained to go there, it has been about increasing and improving their capability so they can be a contributing member of the coalition. So this has grown over time as we have watched these countries improve their capability. Mr. Andrews. Thank you. I think this is a good investment. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The Chairman. Thank you. Dr. Wenstrup. Dr. Wenstrup. Yes, thank you for what you are doing. I look at most of the work that you are doing as a form of prevention in many areas of the world and avoiding larger-scale conflict. My question is logistically does every BCP program or mission have an estimated end game or exit that is a goal or part of the metric, as we referred to it before, where we are planning to leave or at least have a minimal presence in these efforts? Secretary Sheehan. Congressman, the issue of exit strategies and exits is an appropriate one, and we want to--our goal, as a former Special Forces operator, our goal is to work ourselves out of a job. When we are effective, we are able to go home. I would caution, though, that normally the places where we go to operate are countries that are broken. We are not going to operate in Switzerland or in Germany or France. These are countries that are really--been broken up by years of internal conflicts, by scourges of narcotics or terrorism there that are surging through their countries. So it often takes a long, long time, but I think it is very incumbent upon us, particularly even with our East European allies that are so important, to work ourselves out of a job with those countries as they gain their footing, as they gain their strength, that we exit ourselves out of that job. General Wolff. Sir, I might say that, you know, when I look at the NATO class of 1999 and then the NATO class of 2004, having watched how they contributed in OIF [Operation Iraqi Freedom] in Iraq and now OEF, I think it is a success story. So over time, they do get better. They improve their own capabilities and their institutional ability to man, equip, train, deploy, and then employ forces, and that is kind of the graduation exercise, I think. Dr. Wenstrup. Thank you, and thank you for your efforts. And I yield my time. The Chairman. Thank you. Mrs. Davis. Mrs. Davis. Thank you very much. It is good to see you all here, and it is actually refreshing over the years, when we started talking about interagency and then whole of government and this is all part of that discussion. In--and I appreciate--I know that Secretary Sheehan and General Wolff, you both talked about the importance of and the role of the State Department here in building that capacity. And I am actually sorry, Mr. Chairman, that we weren't able to have the State Department here as well, because I think that is such an important relationship. There are areas--and David Berteau yesterday in our Emerging Threat Subcommittee, talked about the fact that the DOD has actually accepted missions that they weren't necessarily trained to handle. We know that some of the missions morphed and in many ways were more the mission of the State Department, and yet we see some reluctance, I guess, to give that up in some areas. And I wondered if you could speak to that, whether you think the DOD is willing to relinquish their lead in some of those areas? General Wolff. Congresswoman, if I might lead. I think a lot of this is, we are talking about complementary efforts in a way, and some of the things that the Department of State does through Title 22 versus what we are talking about, I think, create a complementary effect. And the issue here is how can you ensure that that is economized and complementary in nature. So out in Iraq and in Afghanistan we do interagency things at the tactical level, and then back here in Washington, we try to bring that together at the strategic level so that we have an understanding of what USAID is trying to do, as well as what the rest of State is doing. I would merely suggest that it is not about them or us. It is really about the complementary nature of how we do things, and so we routinely deal with Assistant Secretary Shapiro from P.M. [Political-Military Affairs] who works so much of that for the Department of State. So it is complementary. Mrs. Davis. Is there a collaboration piece of this thought that quite honestly, you know, whether it is cultural or otherwise, that there are some barriers to it that we still are having some difficulty addressing? And I guess if you could bring that, not just with necessarily with the State Department, but just with other entities of Government to try and do a number of the things that we are talking about here? And Ms. St. Laurent in terms of sharing that data aligning better, is there an area particularly that we really do need to focus on a lot harder than we are doing today? General Wolff. The efforts by the whole-of-government approach that was mentioned previously in what we saw both in Iraq and Afghanistan, ultimately, what I found in my three tours in Iraq was that, if you were going to try to help their security forces make changes, it was all going to be tied into the rule of law. And so while there, I then went to find the Treasury attache, because I needed help trying to work through rule of law issues, so we could better ensure that their security forces could legally apprehend bad guys in their system and then keep them in their jails properly, and then try them in their courts versus a system we would try to impose through really a lack of understanding of the culture. So it really is a whole-of-government approach that we have to better bring to bear. Secretary Sheehan. Congresswoman Davis, I would like to follow up on General Wolff. I agree that the area where we need, where there is the grayest area, is in the Ministry of Interiors, and the police law of order functions. In our Government, in the United States, we know our police departments, they are local, and they stick to criminal activity. In many other countries, to deal with the internal security threats that they have, it is a combination of their army doing it and police units. Some of these police units are paramilitary in nature, and so in that area there is a blending of both State functions and authorities and DOD authorities. And I do believe that the flexibility that we have got under GSCF for instance, to train Minister of Interiors that are conducting paramilitary operations that are much more similar to what we do in the U.S. military, is important. And so we need to stay very closely aligned with the State Department in those areas of where we work with Ministers of Interior. Mrs. Davis. And Ms. St. Laurent do you believe that in the work that you have done in trying to look at some of these areas, and the three practices that you identified are, what kind of timeline I guess would you like to see to go back and look at those areas where we lack some capacity to deal with, whether it is the data collection or alignment or whatever. What should we be looking at 6 months from now? Ms. St. Laurent. Well, I think it kind of varies by program. Overall, I think this is a work in progress and we do recognize these are very challenging areas. Putting good evaluation mechanisms in place, even doing the interagency coordination, we have seen improvement over the past few years in a number of areas in terms of State and DOD collaborating more. Each of the combatant commanders has a process for doing their security cooperation plans that they engage with State Department. However when we do our field work, we still see examples where State Department or embassies are not aware of things that DOD is doing. So it is an ongoing, ongoing challenge and at times there is, for example, in the Trans-Sahel area of Africa, you know, sometimes there is a need for specific plans to be put in place, for example, to get at some of the counterterrorism issues there and do more of a plan that recognizes both what State is going to bring to the table as well as DOD. The Chairman. Thank you very much. Gentlelady's time has expired. Mrs. Hartzler. Mrs. Hartzler. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I was visiting with a National Guardsman the other day who was sharing an incident that he had heard about in Central America where he was shot at in a law-and-order event while on duty there, and it just raised the greater question I have, since I believe they weren't allowed to carry firearms outside of the line of their duty, how is our National Guard resourced in these partnerships around the world? And how can they protect themselves in these dangerous countries? Secretary Sheehan. Thank you, Congresswoman. It is a difficult issue. We put people in harm's way every day; both Active Duty, National Guard, Reserve, reservist, and often we send them to parts of the world that are dangerous and they do not carry weapons. That is happening right now in many parts of the world. If we feel that to go to a part of the world and they are not allowed to carry weapons and it becomes too dangerous, we will call them back. Unfortunately, though we do take some risk when we go to these parts of the world; criminal activity, terrorist activity, others, but I think we are very prudent in evaluating those threats and trying to protect them. But generally speaking in many of these countries our trainers and advisers will go unarmed, and it is incumbent upon us to make sure that we provide them the best protection they can and if becomes too dangerous, not to send them. Mrs. Hartzler. Have there been discussions in allowing them to carry, I mean, like concealed carry we have here between the foreign country as a prerequisite for us providing the aid, allowing our people to defend themselves or have that option? Secretary Sheehan. If I might add, generally, I don't know the exact incident to which you are referring, but normally the host nation has the responsibility to provide that sort of security for us normally when we operate there. In many of the countries they won't want us to bring weapons, because they will say, ``We will provide that security for you. We want your training value not to be on your own force of protection, but to help us in other areas, and we will provide that security.'' But we can certainly research the incident that you have referred. Mrs. Hartzler. I am not sure--we will consider that, but I thought I did raise a very important vulnerability that we are sending our citizen soldiers abroad and they are vulnerable to people. On another front, to what extent of all, if at all, does the Department of Defense conduct follow-up monitorings to ensure that partner military assets provided under BPC authorities, both equipment and trained units, are being used in support of U.S. national security objectives for which they were provided? Secretary Sheehan. We in the Department have recognized that we need to improve our ability to assess, particularly in for instance our 1206 programs, which is a big program. And we are now in the process of developing a formalized process to evaluate our 1206 programs, and those are currently under way. These weaknesses were identified by the GAO and others and we are taking some major steps now to put those processes in place. Mrs. Hartzler. Ms. St. Laurent, do you have anything to add on that? Ms. St. Laurent. Well, I would say there is also an upfront piece of this, that processes that Congress and requirements that Congress has put in place to ensure that we are giving the assistance to countries that do not engage in gross violations of human rights. So there is that check up front also that is a part of many of these programs. So that can be helpful. Mrs. Hartzler. Okay. What is the U.S. response if units trained and equipped by the U.S. misuse our equipment? And have there been any such misuses for instance in Yemen? Secretary Sheehan. I think the record in Yemen is a very strong one. Obviously this is an army and a police force that has a lot of challenges, but we have been highly encouraged by President Hadi, who stepped in about a year ago, in reforming, restructuring both the army and the other ministries to align itself with the professional standards that we would expect in one of our partners. So we think Yemen is moving in the right direction. Our investments there are paying dividends in the professionalization of their force, and in concrete, on the ground, denying of Al Qaeda sanctuary in a country that is a major threat to our interest. General Wolff. If I might say, the partnering occurs at multiple levels from their Ministry of Defense as well as enabling that ministry to lay out its way forward as it reforms its military and all of it is conventional forces, to the C.T. portion which is ongoing as well. So this will be a many-year project, but at President Hadi's request, Central Command has a team that has been working this to lay out the reorganization that they desire. Mrs. Hartzler. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Yield back. The Chairman. Thank you. Ms. Bordallo. Ms. Bordallo. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank all the witnesses for being here this afternoon. It is an important hearing. My colleague, Congressman Joe Wilson mentioned that he and I have co-authored a bill. We introduced H.R. 641. This bill would codify the National Guard State Partnership Program, he brought this up earlier, to the Secretary. The bill is nearly identical to Section 335 of the House- passed fiscal year 2013 NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act], but it wasn't included in the final conference report, and I believe the State Partnership Program provides the Department of State and the combatant commands with a tremendous tool to partner with our allied nations. Now, the conference report required DOD, Mr. Secretary, to ensure compliance with the Anti-Deficiency Act. What is the status of this report? Does the Department of Defense place this in any kind of a priority? You didn't mention anything in your report to Congress, your testimony. Secretary Sheehan. Congresswoman, I did not mention it. It is a priority, and we do owe you an answer to that, and I will get back to you as soon as I can after the end of this hearing. [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 93.] Ms. Bordallo. Thank you. Also, I have a question for Ms. St. Laurent of GAO. I note that the GAO report from May 2012 highlighted some concerns with the management of the state partnership program. The report raises concerns about the oversight framework, as well as the amount of guidance and training for the use of the program activities. So beyond the internal efforts, do you believe that additional statutory authority would be helpful to address the use of funds and to clarify the roles and the missions of the state partnership program? And would changes help to ensure better oversight with the program by Congress? Ms. St. Laurent. Thank you. Yes, you are correct. Our report did identify a number of areas for improvement in managing the state guard partnership program. Specifically, we talked about the need to clarify the goals of the program, and again, put some procedures in place to evaluate the results, as well as ensure that the Department has accurate data on the activities being funded by the program. Many of those issues can be resolved by DOD guidance and direction, and DOD is in the process of doing that. They did put out a new directive in December that clarifies some of these areas. Particularly, the guidance points out that the activities of the partnership program should be in support of the combatant commander and State Department priorities. So I think that is very helpful. While DOD guidance could probably rectify many of these issues, additional legislation that would clarify from a congressional perspective the purposes of the program and also reaffirm that these activities should be in support of State Department and also combatant commander priorities, may be helpful. Ms. Bordallo. So your answer then would be affirmative to better oversight with the program by Congress? Ms. St. Laurent. I think, again, it could help to clarify Congress's intent. We would say it is not absolutely necessary. The DOD could address many of our management issues on its own. If Congress chooses to clarify congressional intent and purpose, that would be appropriate. Ms. Bordallo. Thank you. My final question, Mr. Chairman, is for General Wolff. Can you comment on the value of the State partnership program to the combatant commanders? I have noticed a real focus and effort to expand this program with our allies in the Asia- Pacific region. So from your role in the J5, can you comment on the value of this program in building partnerships? General Wolff. Thank you for the question. I see enormous value added. It has got to be the right mission set though. So we can't ask the state partnership element to try to do something that far exceeds its capabilities. We have seen phenomenal return on investment with the OMLTs [Operational Mentor and Liaison Team] and the POMLTs [Police Operational Mentor and Liaison Team] that have basically gone out and worked with their partner countries and then accompanied those forces into Afghanistan. So the linkage, the person-to-person linkage that is established by our, you know, our military service folks linking up with those national militaries and then accompanying them on a mission is quite enormous. So I see a good economy of effort there and an economy of opportunity. Ms. Bordallo. And I certainly hope that now our focus will be to the Asia-Pacific area, which we are looking at currently. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. The Chairman. Thank you. Mrs. Walorski. Mrs. Walorski. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My question is for Mr. Sheehan, and thanks for what you do. I appreciate it. Can you describe the vetting process the Department of Defense uses when they determine which foreign military or other security units receive U.S. equipment and training through the BPC? And how long is that process, the vetting process? Secretary Sheehan. You are referring to vetting of the country or vetting of the unit? Mrs. Walorski. Vetting of the country and then also of the unit. How is the determination made? Secretary Sheehan. We do both. What we do in my office is when I look at the map, I look at those parts of the world that are directly threatening U.S. interests both to the homeland and to our interests abroad, and we do an analysis based on our intelligence understanding of where those threats are. And our resources align very, very closely with those threats, only modified by the extent that we can work with some partners more than others. And some parts of the world where we have some threats we are unable to establish the types of relationships we would like to, and we work on those. So I would say it is directly correlated with the threat to our country that determines where we put our resources. That is where the vetting goes, and that is done in coordination with the Department of State, and I would say generally we have a tremendous consensus on that. When it comes to the units and the individuals, for the units, again, we work in the country team to make sure that we are identifying the proper unit that is going to accomplish our goal, and particularly that that unit has the right mission within its national force, that it has the proper commanders that can execute the mission, and we vet it at the country team. Then all the way down to the individuals, we are required under the Leahy vetting requirements to ensure that the people that receive our training uphold the standards of human rights and respect for the rule of law, and we consider those attributes as important as their ability to conduct combat operations. So there is vetting that goes from the strategic right down to the individual who receives the training. Mrs. Walorski. So how long does that take then? So if you identify an area, how long does that vetting process take? Secretary Sheehan. I would say we look at the countries annually, and sometimes it changes rapidly. If situations evolve like they have in the Sahel in the last year, we are able to shift resources where we see Al Qaeda making rapid gains. Although we were anticipating this, we saw it, but the landscape changed in North Africa since the Arab spring, and we have been able to respond and shift resources to that area. In terms of--so I think that is sort of on an annual basis. In terms of the vetting of the individuals, I think that can be done in weeks and months at the country team level. Mrs. Walorski. Thank you. I yield my time. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The Chairman. Thank you. Mr. Larsen. Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Ms. St. Laurent, can you--has GAO looked at how much total spending there has been for the--all the BPC authorities? Ms. St. Laurent. We have looked at selected aspects, the Section 1206 program, and certain other accounts, but--and the State partnership fund--but probably not the entire range of programs. Mr. Larsen. Have you made any assessment about whether there ought to be one person in the Pentagon who looks across all the BPC authorities and programs to prevent inefficiencies and duplications? Ms. St. Laurent. We haven't specifically made a recommendation on that. I certainly think that Mr. Sheehan's office is, you know, the key lead there in terms of trying to provide oversight. Mr. Larsen. Mr. Sheehan, is there a difference between being a key lead and actually being one person in the Pentagon who has authority across BPC authorities? Secretary Sheehan. Mr. Congressman, I think I have enough authority in this realm to provide oversight to most of our most important programs, if not all of them. I think it is fairly well established, although it probably could use a scrub to make sure that it is properly designated as the---- Mr. Larsen. Have we let the Pentagon evolve into that, or is there enough direction? Secretary Sheehan. There is a certain degree of evolution that has happened over the years, but I think it is settling in to reside in my office and with the J5 in partnering to manage these programs. Mr. Larsen. How much total spending then in fiscal year 2012--spending in fiscal year 2012 did you all across these programs have in BPC authorities? Secretary Sheehan. I don't have that number at my fingertips, sir. I will get back to you on that. [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 93.] Mr. Larsen. Please do that. Considering countries that have received assistance, there has been discussion about those who have graduated, and it is perhaps telling that the ones you noted that have graduated were NATO countries that you pointed to, General Wolff, as examples. But are there countries that have flunked out, have graduated, or are they all similar to every parent's nightmare, which is the college student who is on the infinite year plan? General Wolff. Sir, I think we have some teenagers still in our midst who are learning and growing, and there are setbacks as they--you know, as they learn to kind of spread their wings a bit. I would use Mali as a good example where we did make some investment into the Mali military, and it didn't particularly pan out very well. We have gone back and taken a hard look at that. Chairman Dempsey has asked us to go do kind of a complete top-to-bottom review with Africa Command. And we have taken a hard look at why some of the previous investments didn't, you know, generate kind of the outcome we had hoped, and I think we learned from these, and there are a lot of reasons in this particular case. So we kind of take those into play and try to ensure that we can learn from that experience. Mr. Larsen. Mr. Sheehan. Secretary Sheehan. I would agree that Mali is clearly our biggest failure. We spent tens of millions of dollars in Mali with that army and they got their butts kicked in northern Mali by the Tuareg rebellion, which was subsequently highjacked by AQIM [Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb], creating a major problem for us. However, part of the reason of that was outside of their control. The amount of weapons pouring in from Libya definitely made their job more difficult, but it is no excuse. We didn't do very well there, but I would contrast that with a tremendous record of success on the African continent in the last 5 years. When you look at the partnerships we have established in East Africa with the Ethiopians, the Ugandans, Djiboutians, the Burundians, the Kenyans; these have been extraordinarily successful in not only building the partnerships, successful militaries in action. I can tell you that one of the NATO partners told me that the Kenyans would never get the Kismayo in Somalia. They weren't capable of doing it. They weren't up to the task, that they were a parade ground military. Well, the fact of the matter is they are there. They did the job. We were there with them. We helped train and equip them, and we are very proud of our partnerships there. So we have some failures, but I think the record of success far outweighs them. Mr. Larsen. Great. I have a follow up. Mrs. Hartzler asked a question earlier that I think you gave an answer to a different question, and it is probably just because you didn't connect one and one here to get two. What she asked is to what extent does the DOD conduct follow-up monitoring to ensure partner military assets provided under the authorities are being used to support U.S. national security objectives for which they are provided, as opposed to being used for objectives that are not our objectives. You answered a question about assessing 1206 generally. This is a question about are the military assets we provide being used for the things that they are supposed to be used for, or are they being misused, and if they are, what are we doing about it? General Wolff. Congressman, I would say there is a time factor here. So, you know, as the training is applied, as the military grows in capability and capacity, the question then is at some point if they are not contributing to, let us say ISAF--I will use that as a very simple example, the question then is will those trained forces continue to contribute with inside their system? And I think the return on the investment, if the answer to that is yes, if we have trained them, if they have contributed to the mission at hand, but then the capability they bring back in their own military becomes, you know, additive in nature, then I think it is still a good investment on our part. Mr. Scott. [Presiding.] The gentleman's time has expired. Mr. Enyart. Mr. Enyart. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Sheehan, I, too, would like to know when the SecDef [Secretary of Defense] plans to certify the regulations regarding the State partnerships programs, if you could provide me that, I would appreciate it. [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 94.] Secretary Sheehan. Yes, sir. Mr. Enyart. And, Mr. Sheehan, I appreciate your comments, that these are proven programs. And General Wolff, I appreciate your comments that these are agile, flexible programs, that they need a steady state in order to instill partner confidence. I agree with you. I think that is a critical element in the success of these programs. If we are not building partner confidence, then we are not succeeding in the programs. In line with that--and I appreciate Mr. Thornberry's comments and question regarding metrics, and perhaps for Ms. St. Laurent, this is more anecdotal evidence, but my experience with the state partnership program has been that particularly the relationship between the Illinois National Guard and the Republic of Poland has been very productive--dates back to 1993--and that when the Republic of Poland was asked to provide military forces into Iraq, their first requirement for that was we will go if the Illinois National Guard goes with us. And for the last 10 years, there have been Illinois National Guardsmen directly incorporated into that Polish battle group's staff. And today, as we speak, there are 17 Illinois National Guardsmen serving with the Poles directly incorporated into that battle group staff. I understand the difficulty of measuring quantitatively that leveraging, that synergy that has been developed. However, what I would ask you is do you have an idea or do you have a concept of how we might be able to measure, to provide a metric that will establish how that partnership between the National Guard, particularly the Illinois National Guard--and Poland in this case--has led to the success in Afghanistan of that Polish battle group. Ms. St. Laurent. Again, I think we recognized in our report that we heard, first of all, very positive remarks by both combatant command staff and others about the value of the program. So we did recognize that. The program itself did not have any systematic effort to collect data. So we think it is important. We also recognize, as I mentioned earlier, that it is challenging to get real good outcome measures, but there are some ways to do that and a variety of measures probably need to be put in place, both in terms just to document the range of activities that is going on in this particular program, in terms of number of contacts, the extent of contacts, because we found that kind of data was incomplete in both the combatant commands and the Guard's records. And I think, again, over time, there may be some ways through--I think you have to also maybe take a look at how other mil-to-mil exchange programs are evaluating their results, but through a combination of even surveying periodically other governments, certainly unless there is an actual operation that comes up, so you have got a data point that a country actually participates because of this, you probably can't do them on a systematic basis, but I understand that that is a significant outcome. Mr. Enyart. Thank you. I will yield back. The Chairman. Mr. Carson. Mr. Carson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We have all heard stories about how American-supplied weapons had been used against our troops in Afghanistan, both those provided to combat the Soviet Union and those recently that were used in ``green-on-blue'' attacks. Could you describe what Afghanistan has taught us about military aid and training and how those lessons are being used in pursuit of new partnerships? Do you believe that there is some level of inherent risk present in these partnerships that we should perhaps prepare for? Secretary Sheehan. Mr. Congressman, clearly our most important capacity-building exercise we face in the Department of Defense is with our Afghan partners there, and we have learned a lot, particularly in the last several years, in trying to accelerate their ability to take on their responsibilities to secure their territory within their country. We have learned a lot of lessons. It is a very dangerous and risk-filled environment. Obviously, and when you have a situation of internal stability, the enemy has the ability to penetrate the national security forces of the host country, particularly when they are so large, as in the case of Afghanistan, because of the nature of that threat. It is a very large force and they have been able to penetrate, which has its inherent risks of this green on blue or even green on green violence that we see in Afghanistan. So we have learned a lot, and we are making great progress, and but there is a lot more to do, and I will turn to General Wolff. General Wolff. Sir, I would say there is an inherent risk, and as the Assistant Secretary has said, we are concerned about it. As you know, based on the rash of incidents last fall, General Allen instituted a series of requirements within the ISAF forces, but equally important he put additional and huge pressure on the leadership of the Afghan national security forces, beginning with the Minister of Defense, all the way down. So while General Allen's directives to his command were to try to do everything possible to minimize this, the Afghans were also expected to do the same, and a lot of that had to do with revetting. A lot of that had to do with embedding CI [counterintelligence] sorts of forces in to take a look and see what was happening in those organizations, and doing a better job of looking at Afghan security forces coming back from leave, where we knew they were being possibly touched by extremists. Ms. St. Laurent. And also if I could just add a point, we just put out a report within the past few days on Afghanistan issues, and one of the points we made is that certainly more progress in trying to reach agreement with DOD and the Afghan Government about sharing a biometric information would really help also in this situation. Mr. Carson. Sure. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back my time. Mr. Scott. Mr. Veasey. Mr. Veasey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I wanted to ask you a couple of questions about Yemen. During the 2011 unrest in Yemen, did units trained and equipped by the U.S. misuse the U.S. equipment, and how extensive is the U.S. end use monitoring in Yemen? Secretary Sheehan. Thank you, Congressman. Let me go back and review the 2011 period. I was not on the job at that point, but in 2011, of course, the president at the time, President Saleh, was in charge. He is subsequently gone from that and President Hadi is now the leader. That has been a positive step in the right direction, and as we met--and both General Wolff and I mentioned before--we believe he is instituting the proper reforms of their military. And right now, over the last, I would say, last year or so, our partnership with the Yemeni military and some of their Ministry of Interior forces, have been extraordinarily effective and have contributed to a major progress against AQ in the Arabian Peninsula; AQAP, which is a major threat to U.S. homeland from Yemen. So I think that, over the last year or so, with the new leadership at the top, we have much more confidence that our training and assistance is being used properly. Mr. Veasey. Okay. My next question I wanted to ask you about drone strikes in southern Yemen and how are the locals--how are they perceiving the drone strikes? What is your---- Secretary Sheehan. Congressman, I don't want to avoid the question; we normally don't discuss those types of operations in an unclassified setting. Mr. Veasey. Okay. Okay. I understand. Thank you. I yield back the time. Mr. Scott. Ma'am, General, Mr. Sheehan, I don't think there are any further questions, and thank you for your time. This meeting is adjourned. [Whereupon, at 11:46 a.m., the committee was adjourned.] ======================================================================= A P P E N D I X February 14, 2013 ======================================================================= PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD February 14, 2013 ======================================================================= Statement of Hon. Howard P. ``Buck'' McKeon Chairman, House Committee on Armed Services Hearing on Framework for Building Partnership Capacity Programs and Authorities to Meet 21st Century Challenges February 14, 2013 I'd like to welcome everyone to today's hearing on a framework for building partnership capacity programs and authorities to meet 21st century challenges. Although ``building partnership capacity'' may seem like a broad term, this is an important area for the committee's oversight of the recent defense strategy, which places great emphasis on the important role of partnerships to U.S. national security. Likewise, we have enacted significant legislation in this area because the committee has supported the notion that military commanders need to build certain capacities in partner nations to satisfy specific theater security requirements. We heard testimony yesterday about the fiscal challenges the military faces as it deals with implementing sequestration, a long-term continuing resolution, and the underresourcing of Overseas Contingency Operations accounts. These constraints will disproportionately hurt the Department's operations and maintenance (O&M) account, from which building partnership capacity authorities are also funded. Given this fiscal environment, the emphasis on building partnership capacity in last year's Defense Strategic Guidance and the global threats to U.S. national security interests, this hearing is the beginning of a continuing discussion on what is the proper role of these BPC authorities. In spite of our support for these authorities, many questions remain. What is the right amount of funding? What is the right balance between the Defense and State Departments in funding, strategizing and executing these authorities? What is the right level of engagement and focus by the combatant commands and Services on these activities? And is it a plausible assumption that partner nations will, in fact, use their new capabilities to act consistent with U.S. national security objectives? Congress is the ultimate decisionmaker on funding. Our oversight responsibilities also require us to understand the impact of these authorities on U.S. national security interests and the ability of the COCOMs and Services to execute these authorities without compromising other key priorities and core capabilities. Furthermore, this committee has expressed concern about the proliferation and duplication of BPC authorities. The authorities to be discussed today make up at least $750 million per year in authorized funding--not including over a billion a year in counternarcotics activities. And the trend is on the rise. In today's fiscal environment, it's important that the Defense Department, COCOMs, and Services prioritize these BPC authorities and activities, in coordination and consultation with the State Department. And it's critical that the Administration understand Congress's intent in authorizing these authorities, and the need to strategize, plan, fund, execute, and assess these authorities. To testify before the committee today, we have:LMr. Michael Sheehan, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict; LLieutenant General Terry Wolff, Director, Strategic Plans and Policy (J5), Joint Staff; and LMs. Janet St. Laurent, Managing Director, Defense Capabilities and Management, U.S. Government Accountability Office. I'd like to thank our witnesses for being with us today and to note that the Department of State, who has a key role to play in this discussion, was also invited to participate, but declined. We will continue to engage State, in partnership with the Foreign Affairs Committee, in this ongoing dialogue. Statement of Hon. Adam Smith Ranking Member, House Committee on Armed Services Hearing on Framework for Building Partnership Capacity Programs and Authorities to Meet 21st Century Challenges February 14, 2013 Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thanks to our witnesses for appearing before us today. Building partnership capacity is an integral part of the way the United States addresses our national security concerns. However, from the outset, I want to be clear that while I understand that today, in this context, we are talking about Title X programs that are designed to address a specific U.S. national security concern by, with, and through the efforts of our foreign partners, I take a broader view. Instability as a byproduct of insecurity is in nobody's interest. Regardless whether or not we have a pressing national security concern in a given region at the moment, we do have an overarching interest in reducing instability so that it does not breed the conditions that develop into a pressing national security concern. But in terms of the more narrow family of BPC authorities under consideration in this hearing, it is important to understand that they are separate and distinct from what we think of as traditional foreign aid that responds to the needs our international partners perceive as their own national security requirements within the context of our larger U.S. foreign policy framework. BPC programs are designed to address a U.S. national security problem that a combatant commander, through the Secretary of Defense, has identified and thus enable our partners to assist us with a mutual security concern that is a priority for the United States. In some cases, with our help, they are better positioned to address it. In other cases, we are using an economy of force approach. But in all BPC cases, we are addressing a very real U.S. national security problem. In the past few years we've seen some successes in our BPC efforts. We've been active in the Philippines and they have developed a significant counter to the insurgency in Mindanao, for instance. With our assistance, Uganda and Burundi have really taken the fight to Al Shabaab in Somalia and that country is beginning to turn around. Certainly our European partners who have deployed to Afghanistan with our assistance have been indispensible. But we've also had some problems in places like Mali, where it was clear that our efforts to build capacity of their Army were ineffective when it came time to oppose AQIM's march to Bamako. So, we must be judicious about with whom we choose to partner, what shape that partnership takes, and how we evaluate the return for our effort. Returning to the broader view, security assistance programs shouldn't exist in a vacuum. In instable areas the problem is rarely the lack of guns. In general, our security assistance programs, including those conducted under Title 22, ought to be a component of broader efforts to reduce the conditions that breed instability. Where feasible, BPC programs should be implemented in combination with programs that reduce poverty, improve governance, and encourage economic development. This is why the State Department and USAID have an essential role in the development of our BPC programs. It is both a check that the BPC program is consistent with U.S. foreign policy and an opportunity to fit these activities in the regional engagement architecture the State Department oversees. Lastly, today I'd like to hear some discussion about what enduring form BPC authorities ought to take. Now it seems like it is a jumble of complementary, overlapping authorities that makes it a challenge to piece them together to address one complex security challenge. AFRICOM loves to brief a slide that shows a Ugandan soldier and how it took many different authorities to get him ready to deploy to Somalia. The Global Security Contingency Fund we passed into law in 2011 was supposed to get at some of that, but I've been disappointed about how it has seemed to get bogged down. Certainly, there's not a common understanding of its purpose, both here on the Hill, and, it seems, within the interagency. I'd like to get at some of that today. [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] ======================================================================= WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING February 14, 2013 ======================================================================= RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MS. BORDALLO Secretary Sheehan. As required by section 1204 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2013 (Public Law 112-239), the Department of Defense will provide on February 26, 2013, a copy of Department of Defense Instruction 5111.20, ``State Partnership Program,'' dated December 14, 2012, the regulations required by subsection (a) of section 1210 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (Public Law 111-84). Appropriate modifications have been made, and appropriate controls have been issued, to ensure the compliance of the State Partnership Program with section 1341 of title 31, United States Code (commonly referred to as the ``Anti-Deficiency Act''). [See page 26.] ______ RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. LARSEN Secretary Sheehan. Total Fiscal Year 2012 BPC authority expenditures included: Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program ($32.77M); Defense Institution Reform Initiative ($12.8M); Global Train & Equip Program (including Section 1206 ($218.6M), \1\ Section 1207(n) Yemen ($75M), \2\ Section 1207(n) East Africa ($41.2M), \3\ and Counter-Lord's Resistance Army (CLRA) 1206 ($22.5M) \4\); Humanitarian & Civic Assistance ($10.2M); International Counter-drug Program ($691.1M); Ministry of Defense Advisors Program ($11.5M); and Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster & Civic Aid ($117.4M). [See page 29.] --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ This figure reflects the amount notified to Congress for Section 1206 programs, not actual expenditures. In the course of executing the program, eight (8) FY2012 Section 1206 programs notified early in FY2012 resulted in savings. Savings from these programs were used to fund programs notified in the latter half of FY2012. \2\ The FY2012 Section 1206 appropriation was also used to fund the Transitional Authorities programs under Section 1207(n) for Yemen and East Africa, and the CLRA program for Uganda. DOD requested a reprogramming action to backfill the FY2012 Section 1206 appropriation to fund additional proposals submitted by the GCCs in FY2012; however, the request was not approved. \3\ The FY2012 Section 1206 appropriation was also used to fund the Transitional Authorities programs under Section 1207(n) for Yemen and East Africa, and the CLRA program for Uganda. DOD requested a reprogramming action to backfill the FY2012 Section 1206 appropriation to fund additional proposals submitted by the GCCs in FY2012; however, the request was not approved. \4\ The FY2012 Section 1206 appropriation was also used to fund the Transitional Authorities programs under Section 1207(n) for Yemen and East Africa, and the CLRA program for Uganda. DOD requested a reprogramming action to backfill the FY2012 Section 1206 appropriation to fund additional proposals submitted by the GCCs in FY2012; however, the request was not approved. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- ______ RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. WILSON Secretary Sheehan. The Department acknowledges shortfalls highlighted in the GAO report and the need for updated program goals, objectives, and oversight. As a result of the GAO report and concerns expressed by Congress, the Department published Department of Defense Instruction 5111.20, ``State Partnership Program.'' We believe this Instruction provides appropriate modifications to the program and that appropriate controls have been implemented to address those concerns. The Department sees the National Guard State Partnership Program (SPP) as a valuable tool in its security cooperation toolkit. Now with the new instruction in place, the Department is evaluating proposed legislation regarding the SPP. [See page 20.] ______ RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. ENYART Secretary Sheehan. On December 14, 2012, the Department of Defense issued Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 5111.20, ``State Partnership Program,'' in part to address the requirement in subsection 1210(a) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (Public Law 111-84), that the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Secretary of State, shall prescribe regulations regarding the use of funds appropriated to the Department of Defense to pay the costs incurred by the National Guard in conducting activities under the State Partnership Program. I will provide a copy of the DODI to Congress on February 26, 2013. [See page 31.] ? ======================================================================= QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING February 14, 2013 ======================================================================= QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MCKEON Mr. McKeon. Section 1206 was originally intended as a temporary authority. Almost 7 years later, the authority continues with no foreseeable end. Does the Department view 1206 as a permanent authority or as a temporary authority? Is the Department examining how 1206 activities could be incorporated into or executed under the GSCF? Secretary Sheehan. We view Section 1206 as a critical element of the DOD ``tool kit'' for responding to near-term and emerging counterterrorism and stability operations requirements identified by Geographic Combatant Commanders. The Global Security Contingency Fund (GSCF) authority is a 3-year pilot program with a broader scope, and we are in the early stages of assessing its effectiveness. Thus far, the multiple GSCF congressional notification and prior approval reprogramming requirements have proven inherently challenging, and it remains unknown the extent to which GSCF--as a shared authority with the Department of State--will address future DOD priorities that lack sufficient support within the Department of State. We will work closely with Congress and our State Department colleagues to improve the GSCF process throughout the pilot program. At the same time, we will continue to rely on the Section 1206 authority to increase capacity of partner nations to counter terrorist threats in North Africa, regional threats from Al Qaeda, and other emerging counterterrorism challenges. Mr. McKeon. To what degree, and in what ways, are the current authorities governing U.S. counterterrorism assistance in sub-Saharan Africa sufficient to enable a strategic, effective, and transparent response that is appropriately scaled to the threat? What are the key challenges in providing counterterrorism capacity-building assistance to African partners? What changes to the relevant legislative authorities would you recommend, if any, to address these challenges? Secretary Sheehan. Existing authorities, such as Section 1206, allow the U.S. Government to provide certain counterterrorism (CT) capabilities to our foreign partners, which enables U.S. Africa Command to work effectively toward our Nation's strategic goals in the region. The key challenge we have in developing CT capacity with African partners is in maintaining persistent, long-term engagement with them that endures political turmoil in the region. As we have experienced with certain West African partners over the past five years, all U.S. security assistance is normally suspended during internal political crisis. Section 1206 is a year-to-year, project-by-project authority; its effectiveness is particularly affected by such discontinuity. Legislation that allows greater flexibility to sustain critical partner relationships in these scenarios would expand policy options for long- term capacity building in fragile states, and improve our ability to counter transnational terrorist groups seeking to expand their safe havens. Mr. McKeon. To what extent are host country officials involved in developing and evaluating the various BPC programs? For each BPC authority, could you please tell us at what point host nation officials are asked to participate and which officials do participate? What types of feedback do host nation officials provide, and how is it used to evaluate and develop lessons learned for BCP programs? Secretary Sheehan. We recognize that partner government buy-in is a critical component of developing and evaluating our Building Partner Capacity (BPC) programs. Host-nation engagement is among the first phases in security sector assistance planning, ensuring that DOD has adequately assessed partner capacity and capability and political will. We seek to ensure that the United States and the partner share common expectations for the use, sustainment, and evaluation of U.S. assistance. For each program, planning includes robust country team review, supported by senior defense official or security cooperation officer engagement with host nation officials. These engagements provide critical insights into the potential challenges a partner's security forces may encounter toward integrating new capabilities into existing infrastructure and applying capabilities in ways that complement U.S. goals and objectives. Indeed, country team discussions with the host nation during the planning phase often identify potential shortfalls in host-nation absorptive capacity or gaps within defense institutions (e.g., resource management or human capital management), which, when addressed, can ensure a better return on U.S. investments. Mr. McKeon. To what extent, if at all, does DOD conduct follow-up monitoring to ensure that partner military assets provided under BPC authorities, both equipment and trained units, are being used in support of the U.S. national security objectives for which they were provided? Secretary Sheehan. As an example, and in part as the result of a 2010 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report on Section 1206 that identified a need to perform assessments, we began a two-phase process in late 2010 to assess Section 1206 programs. In the first phase, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) (SO/LIC) commissioned RAND Corporation to survey the Section 1206 stakeholder community and identify possible sources of assessment data. In the second phase, OSD SO/LIC commissioned SAIC to develop an assessment framework for Section 1206 programs and to conduct assessments in five countries. A joint U.S. Government-SAIC team conducted assessments in the Philippines, Georgia, Djibouti, Tunisia, and Poland last year. SAIC submitted the assessment framework report, individual country reports, implementation guidance, and an assessment handbook to OSD Policy. We shared these reports as well as an overview of the assessment framework and results with House and Senate staff in February 2013. DOD's counternarcotics program measures partner nation progress towards desired Building Partner Capacity (BPC) end-states through frameworks that rely on explicit, objective, and observable demonstration of partners' capabilities. These frameworks are documented in our standard operating procedures and are intrinsically linked to national strategic goals and DOD counternarcotics and global threats strategy. Performance data are collected annually or more frequently as required by the specific BPC initiative and operating environment. I would also note that the Department sought to establish a Security Cooperation Assessments Office. We recognize the importance of effective assessment, monitoring, and evaluation of our BPC programs. Thus, we were disappointed that this Committee acceded to the Senate Arms Services Committee requirement communicated in the 2012 Defense Authorization bill for fiscal year 2012 to not fund the Security Cooperation Assessments Office that would have been located within OSD SO/LIC. Mr. McKeon. Recognizing that the BPC authorities were initially designed to respond to emerging threats, the list of BPC recipient countries has been fairly consistent from year to year, given ongoing terrorist threats in certain regions. What is the cost-benefit to being able to identify and budget BPC support for specific cases prior to the beginning of the fiscal year, and if so, would it be possible for DOD to submit proposed country- or region-specific programs in its annual budget requests, similar to the State Department's annual foreign operations requests? Secretary Sheehan. DOD recognizes the utility of prior planning, and we try to apply this principle to our Building Partner Capacity (BPC) programs, as appropriate. As I mentioned in my Statement for the Record, through the work of Expeditionary Requirements Generation Teams, Geographic Combatant Commands, and country teams, we are working to become more anticipatory of partner requirements. However, prior planning is useful only to an extent, particularly when faced with certain complex threats. Agile BPC authorities help us realize U.S. defense objectives by being more responsive to cooperation opportunities with like-minded partners. For example, the Section 1206 authority provides DOD unique and critical flexibility to address emergent threats, allowing us to change course rapidly to tackle unforeseen security threats. When Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab tried to blow up a plane on Christmas Day 2009, DOD was working on a Section 1206 program of assistance focused on other terrorist threats. We were able to shift priorities quickly and the next Section 1206 tranche of programs notified to Congress focused on Yemen and the threat posed by Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). Maintaining flexibility to respond to urgent threats is key to successful execution of the Section 1206 program. ______ QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BARBER Mr. Barber. Ms. St. Laurent, in May 2010, the President released an updated version of his National Security Strategy. The President's strategy noted that American shoulders cannot continue to bear the burden of the challenges of the new century alone. Instead, we must increase our reliance on allies and partners to respond to global threats. To do so, requires that our allies possess the capability to respond to and counter these global threats. Building capacity with our allies and partners not only reduces the burden on our military but augments our foreign relations. While the State Department has led for the Nation in matters of foreign affairs, the Department of Defense has provided a substantial contribution to this effort. For instance, the Arizona Air National Guard's 162nd Fighter Wing trains 25 of our allies on various aircraft. Through this mission, they build relationships and understanding with our allies, service member to service member. As we continue to build partner capacity and rely more heavily on partners and allies, the U.S. military by default plays a larger role in our Nation's foreign relations. More to the point, the U.S. military has the ability to foster positive international relations separate from the Department of State. However, the Department of Defense relies on legislative authorities granted by this body to build partnership capacity. Ms. St. Laurent, what authorities need to be amended or granted to allow the Department of Defense to better facilitate foreign relations? Ms. St. Laurent. The Department of Defense (DOD) conducts its efforts to build the capacity of foreign partner nations under a variety of authorities, and GAO's prior work has found that additional congressional guidance for some programs could be provided to help clarify the scope of programs and DOD's roles and responsibilities in performing partner capacity building activities. For example, GAO's 2012 report \1\ on DOD's humanitarian assistance efforts found that the legislation guiding DOD's humanitarian assistance efforts does not provide detailed guidance on the Department's role in performing these activities. Our report suggested that given the fiscally constrained environment and potential overlap in the types of peacetime, humanitarian, and development assistance activities being performed by DOD, the Department of State, and the U.S. Agency for International Development, DOD and other agencies involved in assistance efforts could benefit from additional direction from Congress. Specifically, our report recommended that Congress consider amending the legislation that supports the Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid (OHDACA) program to more specifically define DOD's role in humanitarian assistance, taking into account the roles and similar types of efforts performed by the civilian agencies. In another example, our 2010 report \2\ on DOD and the Department of State's Section 1206 security assistance program--used to build the capacity of foreign military forces in order to conduct counterterrorism operations or support U.S. operations--found that there were uncertainties regarding what funds could be used to support sustainment of projects, which can affect the long-term impact and effectiveness of projects. We therefore recommended that DOD, in consultation with Department of State, seek additional guidance from Congress on what funding authorities could be used to sustain Section 1206 projects that DOD determines are effective at addressing specific terrorist or stabilization threats in high priority countries when partner nation funds are unavailable. As of December 2012, DOD had not obtained such guidance from Congress, according to officials from the Section 1206 program office. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ GAO, Humanitarian and Development Assistance: Project Evaluations and Better Information Sharing Needed to Manage the Military's Efforts, GAO-12-359 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 8, 2012). \2\ GAO, International Security: DOD and State Need to Improve Sustainment Planning and Monitoring and Evaluation for Section 1206 and 1207 Assistance Programs, GAO-10-431 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 15, 2010). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Mr. Barber. Ms. St. Laurent, in your testimony you cited the need in building partner capacity to equip, advise, and assist host countries' security forces in becoming more proficient at providing security to their populations and protecting their resources and territories. You also state that building the security capacity of partner nations is a key mission area for the Defense Department and a worldwide priority for the United States. A great example of this is the success of the Iron Dome missile program in Israel. Developed with the Israelis and funded by the United States, just a few months ago in the conflict between Israel and Hamas in Gaza, this system showed its great promise and performed superbly. I believe it is a critical investment that needs to be fully funded and opportunities for co-production explored, so that we may continue our commitment and deliver a weapon system that will ensure the security, safety, and prosperity of Israel. As the Defense Department continues to emphasize building partner capacity, do you agree that the need for efficient and effective coordination with foreign partners, such as has been achieved thus far with Iron Dome, has become increasingly important to our defense strategy? And do you believe that the United States should continue investing in mutually beneficial relationships with our allies even in the face of our country's fiscal challenges because of the long-term benefit to our global security? Ms. St. Laurent. GAO has often reported on the importance of efficient and effective coordination among U.S. entities and foreign partners. For example, in November 2012, we reported that DOD efforts to provide timely security assistance to foreign partners were affected by communication and coordination issues. \3\ Specifically, DOD security cooperation officials we interviewed reported that a lack of information on security assistance shipment tracking resulted in problems such as delayed assistance, increased costs, or negative effects on their ability to keep partner countries informed about the progress of the assistance agreements. We concluded that this lack of timely and accurate information on security assistance agreement and delivery status could delay assistance, impact the costs of fielding equipment and training, and may adversely affect U.S. relationships with partner countries. Over the last several years, we have also reported on the importance of aligning U.S. development objectives with U.S. national security goals and foreign partner objectives in places such as Afghanistan and Iraq. \4\ For example, we noted that the roles, responsibilities, commitments, and activities of all the organizations involved in these countries, including the host governments, should be clearly defined and coordinated to prioritize the spending of limited resources and avoid unnecessary duplication. \5\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \3\ GAO, Security Assistance: DOD's Ongoing Reforms Address Some Challenges, but Additional Information Is Needed to Further Enhance Program Management, GAO-13-84 (Washington, D.C.: November 16, 2012). \4\ GAO, Iraq and Afghanistan: Security, Economic, and Governance Challenges to Rebuilding Efforts Should be Addressed in U.S. Strategies, GAO-09-476T (Washington, D.C.: March 25, 2009). See also, GAO, Afghanistan Development: U.S. Efforts to Support Afghan Water Sector Increasing, but Improvements Needed in Planning and Coordination, GAO-11-138 (Washington, D.C.: November 15, 2010). \5\ GAO-09-476T. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------