    [House Hearing, 113 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

       THE CRISIS IN MALI: U.S. INTERESTS AND THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   BEFORE THE

                          COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                        ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                   __________

                               FEBRUARY 14, 2013

                                   __________

                                Serial No. 113-3

                                   __________

            Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

    Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/
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                          COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

                     EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman
    CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey     ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
    ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida         ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
    DANA ROHRABACHER, California             Samoa
    STEVE CHABOT, Ohio                   BRAD SHERMAN, California
    JOE WILSON, South Carolina           GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
    MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas             ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
    TED POE, Texas                       GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
    MATT SALMON, Arizona                 THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
    TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania             BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
    JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina          KAREN BASS, California
    ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois             WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
    MO BROOKS, Alabama                   DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
    TOM COTTON, Arkansas                 ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
    PAUL COOK, California                JUAN VARGAS, California
    GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina       BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois
    RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas            JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III,
    SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania                Massachusetts
    STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas                AMI BERA, California
    RON DeSANTIS, Florida                ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California
    TREY RADEL, Florida                  GRACE MENG, New York
    DOUG COLLINS, Georgia                LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
    MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina         TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
    TED S. YOHO, Florida                 JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
    LUKE MESSER, Indiana

         Amy Porter, Chief of Staff      Thomas Sheehy, Staff Director

                   Jason Steinbaum, Democratic Staff Director

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page

                                   WITNESSES

    The Honorable Johnnie Carson, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of
      African Affairs, U.S. Department of State......................     6
    Ms. Amanda Dory, Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs,
      Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense.    19

              LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING

    The Honorable Johnnie Carson: Prepared statement.................     9
    Ms. Amanda Dory: Prepared statement..............................    21

                                    APPENDIX

    Hearing notice...................................................    54
    Hearing minutes..................................................    55
    The Honorable Christopher H. Smith, a Representative in Congress
      from the State of New Jersey: Prepared statement...............    57
    Questions submitted for the record by the Honorable Ileana Ros-
      Lehtinen, a Representative in Congress from the State of
      Florida, and responses from:
      The Honorable Johnnie Carson...................................    59
      Ms. Amanda Dory................................................    66
    Question submitted for the record by the Honorable Joseph P.
      Kennedy III, a Representative in Congress from the Commonwealth
      of Massachusetts, and response from the Honorable Johnnie
      Carson.........................................................    68
    Questions submitted for the record by the Honorable Ted Poe, a
      Representative in Congress from the State of Texas, and
      responses from:
      The Honorable Johnnie Carson...................................    73
      Ms. Amanda Dory................................................    75
    Question submitted for the record by the Honorable George
      Holding, a Representative in Congress from the State of North
      Carolina, and response from the Honorable Johnnie Carson.......    76

       THE CRISIS IN MALI: U.S. INTERESTS AND THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE

                                  ----------

                          THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 14, 2013

                           House of Representatives,

                         Committee on Foreign Affairs,

                                Washington, DC.

        The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:06 a.m., in
    room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Edward Royce
    (chairman of the committee) presiding.
        Chairman Royce. The committee will come to order. We meet
    today to review the continuing crisis in Mali.
        After recognizing myself and the ranking member, Mr. Engel,
    for opening statements, I will then recognize the chairmen and
    ranking member of the Africa and Terrorism, Nonproliferation,
    and Trade Subcommittees for any opening remarks.
        Over the past year and a half, northern Mali, a vast desert
    landscape, has fallen to jihadists. Al-Qaeda's regional
    affiliate and others, many coming from outside the region,
    capitalized on the country's weak government in order to take
    over this region.
        Bolstered by weapons that they received from Ghadafi's
    stockpile, these forces have destabilized the entire region.
    Last month, scores of civilians--including U.S. citizens--were
    taken hostage at a remote Algerian energy facility. Those
    connected with the attack on our mission in Benghazi are
    thought to be connected to the militants in Mali. Militants in
    Somalia and northern Nigeria have received aid as well. They
    received training from these groups. As a matter of fact, this
    particular al-Qaeda franchise is the fastest growing al-Qaeda
    franchise in the world.
        But it is Mali that has paid the highest price. Extremists
    have attempted to destroy much of its rich cultural heritage.
    At the center of ancient trans-Saharan trade, Mali is home to
    priceless Arab and Islamic literature and mosques of historical
    significance. Several of the most ancient of these mosques have
    been destroyed. A culture is under attack.
        The militants sought to impose their radicalism onto
    Muslims they viewed as too liberal. Music was banned. Those who
    didn't obey faced hanging, stoning, or flogging. An already
    tough life became hell on earth.
        With Mali's capital, Bamako, in jeopardy, and its interim
    government pleading for help, the French Government took
    decisive action. Malians have welcomed French forces with
    enthusiasm--ultimate proof of the extremists' brutality.
        Six thousand French citizens live in Bamako. They had been
    used as pawns, captured by this extremist organization and held
    for ransom for some number of years as the organization used
    this as its resource for hard currency. AQIM, frankly, is a
    threat to France. It has a chapter. It has a cell in Paris. But
    it also has cells in London and other capitals around Europe.
    So Paris had an interest in intervening. But there should be no
    doubt that this militancy in northern Mali and the region
    threatens us all.
        Yet, when France sought U.S. assistance, the administration
    was tepid in answering our ally's call. It seems the
    bureaucracy slowed our pace of support. And as Secretary of
    Defense Panetta put it, ``Every time I turn around, I face a
    group of lawyers.'' This is a NATO ally fighting al-Qaeda-
    linked terrorists--it shouldn't be that hard.
        While the French understandably would like to wind down
    their mission quickly, and have an abrupt turnover to United
    Nations forces that, frankly, would be a disaster. This
    militant threat remains too committed and too deadly to push
    this mission on to an ineffective, under resourced or hamstrung
    peacekeeping force at this time.
        It doesn't help that the administration has been divided.
    According to a former senior administration official, U.S.
    policy toward the region has been hindered by divisions between
    a Defense Department that wanted to confront the threat--and a
    cautious State Department that sought to instead contain it.
    We'll hear from both Departments today. We hope everyone's
    working in unison now.
        Testifying before this committee last month, then-Secretary
    Clinton noted that in this region, in her words, ``we are in
    for a struggle, but it is a necessary struggle. We cannot
    permit northern Mali to become a safe haven. We have got to
    have a better strategy.''
        Today's hearing is a step toward achieving that better
    strategy.
        I'll now turn to Ranking Member Engel for his opening
    remarks.
        Mr. Engel. Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this very
    timely hearing on the situation in Mali. I was on C-Span this
    morning and I was asked several questions about this hearing. I
    think it's very timely and very good that we're doing this now.
        Last year, a coalition of Islamic extremists--including a
    regional affiliate of al-Qaeda--took control of northern Mali,
    an area larger than the State of Texas. Armed to the teeth with
    weapons plundered from neighboring Libya, they imposed a harsh
    form of Sharia law, amputating limbs, banning music and
    destroying priceless cultural artifacts.
        These troubling developments raised fears that northern
    Mali would become a source of instability for the entire
    region, and possibly a safe haven for terrorists plotting
    attacks on the United States and other western interests. The
    situation became even more urgent in early 2013, just this
    year, when the extremists renewed their offensive, and began
    driving south toward the capital city of Bamako.
        The international community was forced to act and France
    took the lead by launching airstrikes and putting boots on the
    ground. I'm pleased that we're now supporting France and other
    West African nations participating in this critical effort, but
    I was disturbed by early reports that we were planning to
    charge Paris for providing airlift. If we can find a way to pay
    for military flyovers at parades and professional sporting
    events, then surely we can cover the cost of aiding a close
    ally in an operation that supports U.S. national security
    interests.
        France has made it clear that it doesn't plan to keep large
    numbers of troops in Mali on a long-term basis, and we must
    work with our allies and partners in the region to figure out
    next steps in terms of promoting security. Some have suggested
    that the West African troops now deploying to Mali should form
    the nucleus of a traditional U.N. peacekeeping operation. Is
    that the right approach, since efforts to dislodge the
    extremists from northern Mali will likely require offensive
    combat operations for some time to come? Should we explore
    alternatives to a blue-helmet peacekeeping mission, such as the
    model offered by the African Union force currently operating in
    Somalia? These are all questions that I hope we can discuss
    today.
        While the immediate focus in Mali is on the military
    operation, we must recognize that this is a complex and multi-
    layered conflict. The French and African successes on the
    battlefield will not be sustained if we ignore the non-military
    facets of the conflict, and if the political situation in
    Bamako is not resolved.
        Mali is now governed by an interim President that lacks
    popular legitimacy. The leader of last year's coup, Captain
    Sanogo, continues to play a role in Mali's political process.
    And it appears that elections, already postponed for a year
    until this April, will be postponed again until at least July.
    Clear steps must be taken toward having elections, Captain
    Sanogo must be marginalized, and the legitimate grievances of
    the entire population in the north must be addressed-not just
    those of the Tuareg minority.
        We must also focus on the human rights and humanitarian
    situation in Mali. Hundreds of thousands of people have been
    displaced by the current conflict and by severe drought. And
    there have also been reports of serious human rights abuses by
    the Malian military, a force that received U.S. training before
    last year's coup, and which other countries are now supporting.
        Unless these issues are addressed in a meaningful way,
    there is a risk of further radicalization in the north and
    prolonged conflict along ethnic lines, which will make it even
    more difficult to stabilize the country. As we consider the
    U.S. role in Mali and seek to increase cooperation with other
    countries in the region, it is critical that we learn the
    appropriate lessons from past efforts. In particular, I am
    interested to hear how the Departments of State and Defense
    plan to evaluate counterterrorism and governance programs in
    light of the failures we have seen in Mali, and whether you
    believe, our witnesses believe, some rebalancing of our
    assistance for the region is in order.
        Mr. Chairman, I look forward to the testimony of the
    witnesses, and once again thank the chairman for holding this
    important hearing. I yield back.
        Chairman Royce. Thank you, Mr. Engel. We're going to go now
    to Mr. Poe, who is the chairman of the Terrorism,
    Nonproliferation, and Trade Subcommittee for 3 minutes,
    followed by Mr. Sherman, the ranking member, for 3 minutes.
        Mr. Poe.
        Mr. Poe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mokhtar Belmokhtar is one
    of the rebel leaders in Mali. He leads a brigade called Those
    Who Sign with Blood. It is a spinoff group of al-Qaeda in the
    Islamic Maghreb. It was his followers that attacked an Algerian
    gas plant last month in a kidnap plot that left 37 dead
    including 3 Americans. Belmokhtar is running loose somewhere in
    Mali. The French are looking for him in the mountains. Mali is
    not, as some have thought recently, or thought in the past,
    some island in the South Pacific. It is a country in Africa.
    It's even bigger than Texas. But I will say this, Mr. Chairman,
    Texas is bigger than France.
        One of those Americans killed at the gas plant was Victor
    Lovelady from my congressional district. Victor Lovelady is an
    oil and gas worker. He's from Atascocita. He works in
    Nederland. That's an oil and gas refining community and he
    worked on assignment for ENGlobal, when he was in Algeria. He's
    a family man. He waited to go over to Mali until his kids were
    older and it was important to him that he was able to provide
    an income for his kids. He had 18 days left to go before he
    came back to Texas for his daughter's birthday. He was killed.
    Life was stolen from him by those who kill Americans because
    they are Americans. He was not a diplomat. He wasn't in the
    military. He was an American and that's why he was murdered.
        Belmokhtar is a terrorist. The bandit of the desert must be
    brought to justice because really justice is what we do in this
    country. I yield back. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Royce. Thank you, Mr. Poe. We're very saddened and
    very sorry for Victor's family's loss and all the other
    Americans who lost their lives there.
        We'll go now to Mr. Sherman.
        Mr. Sherman. We're engaged in a struggle against extremist
    terrorism. We've put our overwhelming effort into Iraq and
    Afghanistan. So Americans naturally would reach the conclusion
    that the vast majority of the threat is in those two places.
    The fact is, this is a worldwide struggle. In 2012, Americans
    were aware not only of Iraq and Afghanistan, but our concerns
    with Yemen, Libya, and Somalia. Now they've learned that Mali
    is not in the South Pacific.
        I fear that Americans will become aware of dozens of other
    countries that so far have escaped our common knowledge and
    that we will be introduced to these countries and their
    locations and cultures because there will be a report that this
    is a new theater in the war that we are forced to wage against
    Islamic extremism. This is a worldwide effort.
        As the ranking member demonstrated in hearings we held
    several years ago, it even involves the tri-border area of
    South America, and of course, parts of 9/11 were plotted in
    Hamburg, Germany. It's a worldwide effort and we cannot limit
    our scope to just one theater. We occupied Iraq and
    Afghanistan, but we cannot occupy every country where
    terrorists might find refuge or even support. This is going to
    last a long time. It has already lasted longer than any other
    conflict our nation has faced. In this effort, we need allies.
        Now to the extent that foreign policy is an expression of
    our psychological needs and attitudes, we would say America
    should always be number one, macho, in the lead of every
    effort. And nothing could be more disdainful than how some
    repeat the President's phrase that sometimes we lead from
    behind. But the fact is we need allies and we cannot always be
    in the lead in every theater in this conflict. In this case, we
    are behind and we should stand behind France and applaud their
    efforts in Mali. And we should know that as this effort
    continues--it will be long--that we need allies, that we cannot
    invest too much effort into any one theater, and that not only
    do we need to cooperate with allies, but there are times and
    areas where they will take the lead and we will play a
    supportive role.
        I applaud France, and I yield back.
        Chairman Royce. Thank you, Mr. Sherman. We're going to go
    to our ranking member of the Africa Subcommittee, Congresswoman
    Karen Bass.
        Ms. Bass. Thank you, Chairman Royce, and Ranking Member
    Engel. I want to thank both of you for your leadership in
    moving swiftly to hold a hearing on the troubling situation in
    Mali.
        Let me also acknowledge and thank Assistant Secretary
    Carson and Deputy Assistant Secretary Dory of Defense for your
    leadership and willingness to come before this committee.
        Ambassador Carson, this week you gave an important talk at
    the Brookings Institution, not on Mali, but on the Democratic
    Republic of the Congo. You spoke of an Africa that is more
    stable today than it has been in decades. You said democracy is
    on the move.
        In 2012 alone, we have seen peaceful transitions in power
    from countries like Ghana, Ethiopia, Malawi, and Senegal. For
    the first time in over 20 years, the Government of Somalia is
    once again recognized by the United States and in coming weeks,
    Kenyans head to the polls in an election that will be closely
    followed.
        As an important U.S. strategic partner, there is a great
    hope that Kenya's election will be peaceful, transparent, and
    nonviolent.
        I reference these examples because it is important that we
    place Mali within the context of what's taking place across the
    continent and this perspective is essential for our nation's
    Africa policy. The situation in Mali is unique and dissimilar
    to the remarkable progress taking place across the continent,
    sustained peace, stability, clear examples of democracy and
    governance. This future is possible in Mali with U.S. support
    and the support of the international community.
        The current military intervention from France provides a
    backdrop to work to help Mali define, shape, and implement the
    current political dialogue. Mali's President should be
    encouraged to consult all key political actors on the
    composition, mandate, and work of the Commission on Dialogue
    and Reconciliation and seek a political agreement on ways to
    conduct a dialogue.
        But let me be clear. The threat of AQIM and rogue fighters
    in northern Mali must not be ignored. These groups pose
    internal and external threats and must be held to account for
    their violent actions. There are reports that AQIM and others
    have recruited child soldiers, carried out executions,
    flogging, Taliban-style repression of women, and destroyed
    numerous religious shrines of cultural and religious
    importance.
        While pressure must be kept to ensure these groups are
    disbanded and not able to reconstitute themselves, it is
    important that the Government of Mali address accusations of
    human rights' abuses perpetrated by its own armed forces.
        I am pleased to learn that President Obama has moved to
    release limited Defense funds to further support airlift and
    logistical support of African and French forces. I will be
    particularly interested to hear the witnesses today comment on
    the African-led support mission to Mali as part of the broader
    ECOWAS strategy and your thoughts on the possibility of
    sustaining gains made by French intervention.
        I thank you and I look forward to your testimony. I yield
    back my time.
        Chairman Royce. Thank you, Congresswoman. Ambassador
    Johnnie Carson is the Assistant Secretary of State for African
    Affairs. Prior to his appointment, he served as the national
    intelligence officer for Africa at the National Intelligence
    Council. Ambassador Carson's distinguished 37-year career with
    the Foreign Service includes ambassadorships to Kenya, to
    Zimbabwe, and to Uganda. And it's been my privilege over the
    years to work with Ambassador Carson on many difficult issues.
    And it is good to see you and to see you again, Ambassador
    Carson and have you with us.
        We also have Ms. Amanda Dory. She serves as the Deputy
    Assistant Secretary of Defense for African Affairs in the
    Office of the Secretary of Defense. Previously, she was the
    Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and the
    Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense.
        We welcome both of our witnesses back to the committee and
    I'll share with you that without objection we'll have your full
    statements put in the record if you could focus on a 5-minute
    address here today. And members may have 5 days to submit
    statements and questions for the record as well that we would
    ask that you respond to.
        So we'll begin with Assistant Secretary Carson.

    STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JOHNNIE CARSON, ASSISTANT SECRETARY,
          BUREAU OF AFRICAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

        Mr. Carson. Chairman Royce, thank you very, very much for
    that kind introduction. Thank you for your friendship. Thank
    you for your commitment to causes across Africa and your
    interest in the foreign policy of this nation. We look forward
    to working with you in the Africa Bureau in your new capacity
    as the chairman of the full committee.
        Mr. Chairman, I would also like to recognize Ranking Member
    Engel as well as the other members of the committee who are
    here with you and us this morning. I am pleased to have a
    chance to testify before you on this very important topic.
        The evolving crisis in Mali is one of the most difficult,
    complex, and urgent problems West Africa has faced in the past
    two decades. Mali's problems reflect the fragility of
    governance in the region, the lack of economic development,
    especially in northern Mali, the absence of meaningful
    opportunities for people to engage with their government, and
    the widespread desperation that exists in an unforgiving arid
    region with chronic food insecurity.
        The March 2012 coup and subsequent loss of northern Mali to
    Islamic extremists demonstrates all too clearly how quickly
    terrorists prey upon fragile states. Poor governance, weak
    democratic institutions, and a lack of development and economic
    opportunity create fertile ground for terrorism and also
    political instability.
        As the Malian Government, regional partners, and the
    international community continue to respond vigorously to the
    ongoing crisis in Mali, we must be mindful of the four
    underlying challenges Mali continues to face: The continued
    presence of al Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb, AQIM, in northern
    Mali; the restoration of democracy which is essential; the need
    to begin negotiations with northern groups especially the
    Tuareg that renounce terrorism and recognize the unity of the
    Malian state; and a significant and ongoing humanitarian and
    development crisis across the northern part of that country.
    Failure to address these four challenges, comprehensively and
    simultaneously, risks perpetuating the cycle of violence and
    insecurity that has plagued northern Mali for decades and that
    has also threatened stability across the wider Sahel.
        First, the presence of extremists in northern Mali poses a
    threat to the entire Sahel region and beyond. The French are
    disrupting and dislodging terrorist enclaves and liberating
    northern towns and populations after more than a year of
    terrorist occupation. The United States strongly supports
    France's efforts and has actively engaged to assist France in
    Mali. As of February 13, we have conducted 22 refueling
    missions which have provided about 867,000 pounds of jet fuel
    to French aircraft. The United States Air Force has also flown
    43 C-17 sorties moving French and Chadian personnel, supplies,
    and equipment into Mali and Niger. We have lifted 1,090 tons of
    equipment and supplies and over 830 passengers into the
    operational theater. We are also supporting the efforts of
    several African states who have contributed troops to AFISMA,
    the African-led International Support Mission to Mali. Subject
    to congressional notification, we intend to provide $96 million
    during Fiscal Year 2012 to support the AFISMA operation. This
    support includes training, equipment, and logistical assistance
    for the AFISMA troops.
        Although AFISMA is currently an African regional
    intervention force, we believe a transition to a U.N.-
    authorized and a U.N.-led effort which brings to bear all the
    comparative advantages of a U.N.-integrated mission would be
    suitable under the right conditions to consolidate French gains
    on the ground. A transition to a U.N. peacekeeping force will
    take time, however, as French and AFISMA operations continue
    and as the U.N. develops its plans in consultation with the
    Malian Government and with its African partners, this is
    something that will take time, but it is important.
        However, Mali's problems cannot be solved by military means
    alone. The gains achieved by French and African forces on the
    battlefield in northern Mali will be short-lived if not
    accompanied by democratic elections, strengthened institutions,
    and national reconciliation. We welcome the Malian national
    assembly's January 29 unanimous approval of a political roadmap
    and timetable to restore the country's democracy.
        Now the interim Malian Government must implement the plan
    seriously and expeditiously and elections must be conducted
    free from intimidation and interference by military and
    security forces. We continue to unequivocally state that coup
    leader Captain Sanogo and the rest of the military junta
    members must remove themselves completely and permanently from
    Malian politics. We have imposed targeted sanctions on some 87
    individuals who were involved in the March coup who supported
    its authors or who continue to impede the restoration of
    democracy.
        Any continued interference in Mali's progress toward the
    restoration of democracy is unacceptable and risks the
    imposition of further sanctions from the United States, our
    partners, and international organizations. We also recognize
    that the indigenous populations of northern Mali who have a
    history of resisting foreign Islamic extremists and who have
    welcomed the arrival of French forces, have legitimate
    political, social, and economic grievances.
        Stopping northern Mali's cycle of instability will require
    a serious and sustained effort by Malian authorities, non-
    extremist northern groups, regional actors and international
    partners to address the legitimate political and economic needs
    of non-extremist northern groups from Timbuktu to Gao to Kidal.
    We are encouraging the Malian Government to quickly establish
    the Commission for Negotiations as called for in Mali's
    political roadmap. We are also working closely with neighboring
    countries and the international community to lend support to
    the negotiating process. Any successful process must address
    the short-term need to restore Mali's territorial integrity
    while at the same time laying the foundation for long-term open
    dialogue needed to address legitimate political and social
    grievances and to build trust between northern populations and
    their government.
        Lastly, the United States continues to work to mitigate the
    effects of the humanitarian crisis in Mali and in Sahel which
    has resulted in chronic food insecurity in the region and has
    left more than 400,000 individuals homeless and displaced since
    the start of the fighting in Mali in March of last year.
        In Fiscal Year 2012, and to date in Fiscal Year 2013, the
    United States has provided more than $120 million in
    humanitarian assistance to address the emergency in Mali. This
    is part of more than $467 million in humanitarian assistance we
    have provided to the Sahel region in Fiscal Years 2012 and
    2013. We must remember that any military success will be
    fleeting without a democratic and creditable government that is
    responsive to the needs of all Malians. We will continue to
    work to ensure that military success can be translated into
    long-term political stability by encouraging expedited
    elections, marginalizing the military junta, holding
    accountable all perpetrators of human rights' abuses and
    violations including those who were in the Malian army and
    supporting a national reconciliation process that addresses the
    long-standing and legitimate grievances of northern populations
    including those of the Tuareg.
        By continuing to address Mali's multiple challenges
    simultaneously and comprehensively, we aim to break the cycle
    of conflict in favor of a just, lasting, and prosperous peace
    for Mali and for the region.
        Mr. Chairman, thank you. I have a longer statement that has
    been submitted for the record. And I will be happy to take
    questions.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Carson follows:]

                                  ----------

        Chairman Royce. Thank you very much, Ambassador Carson.
        We're going to go now to Amanda Dory, Deputy Assistant
    Secretary of Defense.

     STATEMENT OF MS. AMANDA DORY, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR
       AFRICAN AFFAIRS, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, U.S.
                         DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

        Ms. Dory. Thank you. Good morning, Chairman Royce, Ranking
    Member Engel, members of the committee. Thank you for your time
    this morning and the opportunity to come to speak to you about
    what the Department of Defense is doing as it pertains to the
    crisis in Mali.
        DoD is very concerned about the conflict in Mali and is
    working with international and interagency partners to counter
    extremists and restore Malian sovereignty. Since January 11th,
    France has been operating in Mali following a request from
    Bamako to counter the threat posed by al-Qaeda and affiliates
    and to help the Malians regain control of their territory,
    consistent with the U.N. Security Council Resolution 2085.
        We are supporting the French through intelligence, air
    refueling services, and airlift as Ambassador Carson has
    already mentioned. The counterterrorism effort in Mali
    complements parallel U.S. strategic objectives that relate to
    the transition back to the democracy addressing legitimate
    northern grievances and ameliorating the humanitarian situation
    there.
        France's intervention in Mali has contributed to our shared
    strategic objectives in multiple ways. These include shrinking
    AQIM safe haven, contributing to the restoration of Malian
    territorial integrity, and setting the conditions that will
    enable elections and a return to democratic governance.
        As you know, DoD engagement with the Malian armed forces is
    restricted by law and by policy as a result of the coup last
    March. There's no consideration of putting U.S. combat forces
    on the ground in Mali. However, we continue to support Mali's
    neighbors to contain and degrade shared threats. We're working
    closely with the State Department to support the African-led
    International Support Mission in Mali, or AFISMA, authorized by
    U.N. Security Council Resolution 2085.
        Africa Command and the Department of State are engaged with
    AFISMA to refine the requirements for that mission and match
    them with international contributions. AFISMA will host its
    next planning conference next week. Currently, 13 different
    African nations are deployed to Mali and supported by 22
    countries from outside the region including the United States.
        DoD's broader efforts in North and West Africa are focused
    on building the capacity of partners to counter shared threats
    and provide for security for their people. We incorporate
    military professionalism, ethics, and human rights training
    throughout our engagements and that training yields positive
    results. As you well know, intervention by the military in
    politics is anathema to our values and the importance we place
    on civilian control of the military.
        The military coup in Mali was an outgrowth of the January
    2012 rebellion and the Malian Government's response to it. This
    is the fourth such rebellion with Malian independence in 1960
    and was the result of long-standing, unresolved conflicts
    between the government in Bamako and its northern populations.
    This time, unlike previous rebellions, northern Tuaregs began
    working with hardened and armed extremists, some associated
    with AQIM. Drawing on weapons and fighters from North Africa,
    this new rebellion resulted in an armed advance on northern
    population centers, destruction of world heritage sites and the
    imposition of brutal rule.
        DoD was actively engaged in Mali prior to the coup. Part of
    the challenge we encountered was that the Malian Government was
    less focused than we on countering AQIM and significant levels
    of narcotics and other trafficking in the region. From Fiscal
    Year 2009 to 2012, DoD spent approximately $41 million in
    training and equipping a limited number of units of the Malian
    armed forces to enable them to put pressure on AQIM. However,
    rather than moving against AQIM, despite indications that the
    terrorist threat was growing, the Government of Mali focused
    primarily on the perceived threat posed by zoned Tuareg
    population. As a result, we began to shift our efforts to
    countries like Mauritania and Niger which were more focused on
    the counter terrorism mission.
        In the period following the rebellion and coup, northern
    Mali became a safe haven for AQIM and affiliates that made it
    easier for these groups to recruit supporters and connect with
    other extremists. This is part of a growing terrorist presence
    in the region that threatens U.S. citizens' interests and
    partners as we saw in Benghazi, Libya and in Amenas, Algeria.
        While we have not seen indications that AQIM is capable of
    attacking the United States directly, the group maintains the
    ability to attack western interests and to attack or kidnap
    westerners for ransom. AQIM is part of a network of violent
    extremist organizations in Africa that stretches from Egypt to
    Libya to Somalia to Nigeria and Mali. The risk of cross
    fertilization and cross pollination between affiliated groups
    is one we're very concerned about. The threat is dynamic and
    evolving and our efforts to counter it must be as well.
        As the French transition from combat operations against
    extremists to a stabilization mission, it will be critical that
    the international community help Mali and its neighbors craft a
    sustainable African-led solution and address legitimate
    grievances, maintains pressure on extremists and ensures
    protection of civilians. We should also anticipate a dynamic
    situation in the north with some groups forswearing violence to
    engage in political dialogue, while hard-core extremists
    retreat to the mountains and desert, refocusing their efforts
    on asymmetric attacks.
        In closing, DoD strongly believes in the need to address
    the parallel political, security and humanitarian crises and
    will continue to provide requested support to international and
    inter-agency efforts to do so. Thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Ms. Dory follows:]

                                  ----------

        Chairman Royce. Thank you.
        Ambassador Carson, as I understand it, discussions are now
    underway to transition quickly into a U.N. peacekeeping
    operation and I also understand the administration is
    supportive of this move.
        As I noted in my opening statement, I am worried about
    prematurely taking that step. I think that might lead us right
    back to square one because, frankly, I don't think there's a
    peace at this point to keep in Mali. We met with the U.N.
    Secretary General yesterday. I know that he agrees with the
    Foreign Minister of Mali in terms of the situation on the
    ground that there isn't a peace to be kept at this moment.
        So why push for the U.N. peacekeeping mission at this time?
    I think we've got plenty of examples on the continent where the
    conditions for a successful peacekeeping mission did not exist,
    but were authorized anyway and we've dealt with some of the
    challenges as a result.
        Quite frankly here what we need are some battle-hardened
    soldiers like the French Foreign Legion that are engaged there
    right now and that can root out these very violent jihadists
    before we end up deploying a hamstrung peacekeeping force.
        And I would ask, have we set on the ground conditions, the
    benchmarks that must be met prior to deploying this envisioned
    peacekeeping force? And if so, what are they? And again, just
    in concept, why push for a U.N. peacekeeping mission at this
    time?
        Mr. Carson. Mr. Chairman, thank you very, very much for an
    excellent question. As I stated in my testimony, we believe
    that in time that the AFISMA force should transition to a U.N.
    peacekeeping force. We do not want to do that hastily. We don't
    want to do it prematurely. We want to do it at a point at which
    it is timely, appropriate, and likely to be successful. We want
    to do it in conjunction with any decisions by the French in
    their departure, any decisions by the Africans in what they are
    prepared and want to do, as well as conditions which exist on
    the ground. But planning is important to help us get a sense of
    what may be required so that we are not surprised in the future
    by a sudden French withdrawal and a collection of African
    forces who might be better managed and organized under a U.N.
    peacekeeping regime.
        We think that over time the U.N. does have peacekeeping
    norms and standards which would be applicable and useful in
    Mali.
        I would add one other thing, Mr. Chairman, and that is that
    there's going to be an on-going need for a counterterrorism
    operation in northern Mali. And that probably will always
    reside in the hands of the French and not in the hands of the
    United Nations.
        Chairman Royce. I just wanted to raise our concerns because
    as we read about the push for the quick transition, you and I,
    I think, concur on some of the downsides if we make that too
    quick.
        Let me go to a question to Ms. Dory because in my opening
    statement I raised this issue that we were a bit slow in our
    response to our French ally. We've got multiple news outlets
    around the world that reported week after week on this story
    and we're exactly a month now, I think, into when the French
    began the operation. But it's only this week that we see that
    the administration responded affirmatively on some of the
    provisions of assistance to the French such as the draw-down
    authority for refueling and airlift.
        As I understand it, the French put in the request as soon
    as the mission started. So if we were to contrast this and this
    is what's gleaned from the reporting on this, if we were to
    compare it to the assistance to NATO allies with Libya, those
    requests for assistance took days. This takes a month. What's
    the hold up here? And could Congress help speed up this
    process? Is there something we could do affirmatively to let
    you know that yes, we do want to support our ally in this
    mission?
        Ms. Dory. Thank you, Congressman. Secretary Panetta made
    very clear, as soon as we began to receive French requests,
    that we would be responsive to those as quickly as feasible as
    befitting allies. The first French request related to
    intelligence support, ISR coverage to airlift and to refueling.
    And each of those was met as quickly as feasible. Some of them
    came almost instantly and the others followed within days.
        The reference to paperwork this week, signed by the
    President that approved drawdown authority has to do simply
    with reimbursement, and the actual services have been provided
    since much earlier on. The intelligence, all of the channels
    available to us were fully opened as soon as the French made
    that request consistent with sharing guidelines that we have in
    place. That happened instantly in Paris, in Bamako, and in
    Senegal. So we were in a position to be very swiftly sharing
    intelligence. The Department of Defense quickly provided----
        Chairman Royce. I don't disagree with you on the
    intelligence front.
        Ms. Dory. Right.
        Chairman Royce. But you know the issue. You know the issue
    with respect to support for the French operation and you know
    some of the consternation that is created.
        Ms. Dory. In terms of the priorities that we were
    presented, the first priority was intelligence and ISR support
    and that is what--we worked on the priorities that we received.
    The airlift followed second and has been very wholesome.
    Ambassador Carson gave the statistics to you. We've moved a
    mechanized battalion at this point from France into theater and
    are now working on a company that will provide IED support. The
    refueling services came third. Each of these was subject to
    legal review. That worked relatively smoothly and swiftly. Is
    never as quick as one might like when you're on the waiting
    end, but it did move. And the French have expressed their
    gratitude and their support in multiple different conversations
    with DoD officials, with State Department officials, and with
    the White House. So we believe we're in good shape in terms of
    our support to the French and our appreciation for what they
    are doing in Mali in terms of our shared interest there.
        Chairman Royce. I appreciate the attention to this because
    obviously, the Secretary of Defense Panetta was quite concerned
    about the length of time and the fact that, as he said, every
    time he turned around he was facing a group of lawyers that
    were holding up the process. So we appreciate the attention to
    this.
        My time has expired. I'm going to go to the ranking member,
    Mr. Engel. Thank you.
        Mr. Engel. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'd like to ask both of
    you, we've spent tens of millions of dollars, almost 10 years
    of training African troops in Western Africa and particularly
    in Mali which I think obviously is a good idea, but it seemed
    to fall apart in the face of hostile forces. So how we're
    looking to increase security assistance to Mali's neighboring
    countries to deal with the spillover effects.
        Could you let us know what steps your two Departments are
    taking to evaluate your security assistance programs in light
    of some of the failures we've seen in Mali?
        Mr. Carson. Congressman Engel, again, thank you for the
    question. We are constantly reviewing and reevaluating our
    programs and our security assistance programs and our
    relationships with governments. And we believe that much of the
    money that we have spent in the Sahel region has been put to
    good effect.
        There is no question that Mali is a political and military
    disappointment. Its military failed to perform on the
    battlefield and then it turned around and undertook a military
    coup dislodging a democratic government. But I would also take
    a look at the West African response to this crisis where we
    have had over a dozen African states, most of them associated
    with ECOWAS, all of them recipients of U.S. support and
    military assistance, responding with alacrity to a crisis in a
    neighboring state.
        The response from the government, a democratic government
    and a military in Niger, trained by the U.S. has been very
    positive. We've seen the same kind of response from governments
    in Burkina Faso. We've seen responses from Benin, Togo,
    Nigeria, Chad, and Mauritania; all of whom have received great
    military assistance from us and have benefitted from our
    programs. And in fact, they are responding in the way that we
    would want them to do, helping a neighboring state in trouble,
    dealing with a problem that is both national and sub-regional,
    and doing it in a collaborative fashion among themselves while
    also reaching out to the international community and the A.U.
        Yes, Mali is in trouble. Yes, they did not perform well,
    but the others in ECOWAS have stepped up to the plate and
    demonstrated that what we put in to their hands is doing
    precisely what we want it to do and that's to respond to a
    crisis.
        Mr. Engel. Thank you. Ms. Dory?
        Ms. Dory. Thank you. I think I would simply add to that two
    different dimensions. In terms of our overall strategy of
    building partnership capacity, when we're working with
    partners, we focus on the capacity, but we also need to focus
    on the will and the shared sense of security objectives. And as
    we look back with Mali, I referenced this in my statement, we
    focus in terms of our training on increasing their capabilities
    with select units. But over time, there was a divergence in
    terms of their perception of the security environment and the
    threat environment and our own. So I think one of the lessons
    learned as we move forward is in terms of the partners with
    whom we're engaging is the shared sense of will there alongside
    the development of capacity and capability.
        The second lesson I would point to is our view that in
    addition to tactical and operational engagements, it's
    critically important to engage at an institutional level as
    well to ensure that the strategic approach that the ethics and
    the professionalism are there throughout in an institution and
    not simply with a unit that you may be engaging with. This is
    something our British and French colleagues do in terms of
    having advisors that are on site in different security
    institutions, ministries, and it's something that we're
    beginning to do at DoD outside the Afghanistan theater as well,
    and we're looking to do that in the African context.
        Mr. Engel. Let me just very quickly, because I know my time
    is up, ask you if you could briefly tell us what your current
    evaluation is of the threat that AQIM and the other jihadi
    groups, which are active in northern Mali--what threats do they
    pose to the U.S. homeland and our interests abroad?
        Ms. Dory. I mentioned briefly in my statement--in a
    different setting we could go into much more detail, but I
    think it suffices to say they do not at this point pose a
    direct threat to the U.S. homeland or territory. They certainly
    pose a threat to American citizens overseas, U.S. interests in
    the region, western interests, and African interests in the
    region.
        Mr. Engel. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Royce. We'll go down to Ileana Ros-Lehtinen.
        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. Thank
    you for convening this meeting. I have two questions. One is on
    funding for the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership, and
    the other one has to do with the AFRICOM; and let me lead up to
    those.
        The situation in Mali, as we have seen, does not exist in a
    vacuum. When analyzing the crisis in Mali, we've got to examine
    the spillover effect emanating from northern Africa, from the
    Maghreb to the Sahel region to Egypt, Algeria, Libya, and
    beyond. Last month, former Secretary Clinton testified in front
    of the Senate and said there is no doubt that the Algerian
    terrorists had weapons from Libya. There is no doubt that the
    remnants of AQIM in Mali had weapons from Libya. So for years,
    radical Islamists and extremist organizations have been
    aggressively expanding their operations in Africa.
        Since 2001, we have witnessed a dramatic increase in
    attacks by al-Qaeda and its affiliates all across the
    continent, most notably in Maghreb and the Sahel regions. The
    recent attacks on our consulate and Embassies in Libya,
    Tunisia, and Egypt underscore this harsh reality. If al-Qaeda
    becomes entrenched in Mali, the country that has been one of
    the most susceptible to al-Qaeda's influence, it will
    eventually create a safe haven there, and this may cement the
    opportunity for terrorist organizations to further organize
    globally and have an even stronger trans-national reach.
        How did we get there? Did we not see this threat coming?
    And has the administration been naive to these growing threats?
        [Response follows:]
    Written Response Received from the Honorable Johnnie Carson to Question
         Asked During the Hearing by the Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen
        For several years, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) used
    camps in the mountainous regions of northern Mali to support attacks
    against Algeria and launch kidnap for ransom (KFR) operations in the
    northern Sahel. Recognizing that Mali and its neighbors did not have
    the adequate capacity to prevent AQIM from exploiting this large swath
    of remote territory or protect their porous borders, the United States
    took lessons from the earlier Pan Sahel Initiative and launched the
    Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) in 2006 to assist
    countries in the Sahel and North Africa, including Mali and Algeria, to
    improve their long-term defenses against the evolving threat. Long-term
    success of counterterrorism (CT) efforts in the region depends on the
    ability of the countries in the region to take responsibility for their
    own defenses, and consequently our programming focuses on building
    host-nation capacity to counter violent threats. The United States,
    France, and other countries focused on multi-year, multi-sector
    initiatives to enable Mali and its neighbors to improve their CT
    capacities. The approach reflected a common understanding that short-
    term CT approaches could not address the vulnerabilities that AQIM and
    other groups attempt to exploit.
        The TSCTP approach has proven successful in Mauritania, Niger,
    Chad, and Burkina Faso, where willing CT partners have intensified
    their efforts to confront the AQIM threat over the years. In
    Mauritania, for example, U.S. assistance has enabled military and law
    enforcement (police and Gendarmerie) to deploy and sustain units in the
    extremely austere frontier. Mauritania has also deployed U.S.-supplied
    aircraft to support its operations along the Malian border and is using
    U.S. assistance to improve the infrastructure of forward operating
    areas along the same border. Similarly, Niger has benefited from U.S.
    training and equipment to bolster its efforts to protect in borders and
    interdict terrorists attempting transit through its territory.
        By contrast, Malian security forces, including units exposed to
    U.S. training, failed to adequately respond to AQIM's use of northern
    Mali as a safe haven. The flow of Libyan arms and fighters into
    northern Mali in the security vacuum after the 2011 Libyan revolution
    exacerbated this situation by significantly bolstering the capabilities
    on AQIM and other groups. The January 2012 rebellion in northern Mali
    overwhelmed the ability of Malian security forces to respond, and the
    military coup in March 2012 further spoiled the political environment
    and impeded the government's ability to effectively respond to the
    crisis in northern Mali. The performance of Mali's security forces is
    disappointing and demonstrated its institutions' fragility.
    Notwithstanding Mali's performance, our assistance to regional partners
    in their long-term defenses against AQIM and other extremists is
    consistent with U.S. national security objectives.

        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. On numerous occasions, the President has
    gone so far as to say that al-Qaeda has been ``decimated and
    that it is on the path to defeat.'' These sentiments illustrate
    that the administration has avoided the grim reality of the
    situation. Al-Qaeda is like the mythical hydra. It's a beast
    with many heads, which if you cut off one head, two grow in its
    place. Weak governance has left these nations vulnerable to
    infiltration by radical groups like AQIM, Boko Haram, and other
    U.S.-designated terrorist organizations that are seeking refuge
    from the increased pressure that we're putting to bear in the
    Middle East.
        Have the recent tragic events in Benghazi and Mali and
    Algeria finally gotten the attention of the administration? And
    for the many criticisms that the George W. Bush administration
    has gotten, he started a key counterterrorism initiative to
    fight this expansion, and it's the Trans-Sahara
    Counterterrorism Partnership. It was created with the purpose
    of addressing these rapidly-evolving threats in Sahel and
    Maghreb regions by supporting partner countries in an effort to
    eliminate the terrorist organizations from getting a foothold
    in Africa. And although this important program has had
    successes, it comes as a surprise that combined funding for
    this partnership administered through State and USAID has
    decreased every year since 2009.
        So my question is: How would you assess the efficacy of the
    Trans-Sahara counterterrorism partnership today? And given that
    the situation facing our frontline posts, our personnel, our
    interests in the region, the situation is not new. Why were
    programs like this partnership reduced on an annual basis under
    the administration when the threats were so apparent?
        And lastly, on U.S. Africa Command, AFRICOM, this is
    another key partner in assisting our allies in the region and
    leading our counterterrorism efforts. How can we best equip
    AFRICOM to play a more constructive role in fighting these
    threats from AQIM and other extremist groups? And do the
    African nations have the willingness and the capacity to assist
    and support U.S. security objectives in the region?
        Thank you.
        Mr. Carson. Congresswoman Ros-Lehtinen, let me take the
    first question. First of all, we believe that the Trans-Sahel
    counterterrorism program is important. The administration
    strongly supports it and endorses it. The very existence of
    this program for the last decade is a reflection of the fact
    that we did see terrorism emerging as a potential threat in the
    region and therefore we're spending money in some ten different
    African countries across the Sahel in order to help them to
    enhance and boost their counterterrorism capacity, their border
    security, and their militaries.
        So the program, its very existence for more than a decade
    now, is a reflection of the fact that we were looking ahead,
    that we saw problems on the horizon. The fact that it continues
    to exist is a recognition of this.
        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. I don't want to take up more of the time
    I'm allotted. If you could give me those answers in written
    form, I would appreciate it. Thank you, sir.
        Mr. Carson. I will.
        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, ma'am.
        Chairman Royce. Will go now to Mr. Faleomavaega.
        Mr. Faleomavaega. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I certainly want
    to commend you and the ranking member for calling this
    important hearing before the committee. And I do want to
    personally again offer my strongest commendation to Ambassador
    Carson in the many years of tremendous service that he has
    given for our country, and Secretary Dory as well.
        I also wanted to thank my good friend and colleague from
    Texas in giving a great lesson in geography to our colleagues
    and to remind them that Mali is not a little island somewhere
    in the South Pacific. In fact, a couple of years ago, I was
    introduced on the floor of the House by one of our colleagues
    saying that I was from Somalia. I can fully appreciate and
    understand the concerns of my friend from Texas about sometimes
    the members of this committee and the Congress need to have a
    little better understanding of the geography of the regions of
    the countries and what we're talking about.
        I do want to warn my good friend from Texas that there was
    a little joke that we from the Pacific have learned. The
    gentleman from Alaska was warning the gentleman from Texas to
    quit bragging about Texas being the largest state of the Union
    because when they divide Alaska in two, Texas will be only the
    third largest state in the Union. At least that's what I
    understand it to mean.
        Secretary Carson and Secretary Dory, thank you so much for
    your testimony and trying to help members of the committee to
    understand better the crisis that we're now faced with in Mali.
        There are two things that I wanted to certainly seek your
    understanding and clarification on. I know we keep throwing
    this word al-Qaeda all over the place as if al-Qaeda is only
    one little bunch. It's my understanding that there's basically
    two al-Qaeda functioning groups going on. And in Mali, one is
    the al-Qaeda Maghreb group and the al-Qaeda Osama bin Laden.
        And I wanted to ask Secretary Carson if you can make those
    distinctions, because there's a little suggestion that I might
    offer to my colleagues of the complexity of the situation among
    the African countries. It's not as simple as we think it to be.
    And always the danger of thinking that we know more or we know
    what we should do to help these countries with historical--
    things that we know nothing about hardly.
        [Response follows:]
    Written Response Received from the Honorable Johnnie Carson to Question
        Asked During the Hearing by the Honorable Eni F.H. Faleomavaega
        Al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is an affiliate of al-
    Qa'ida Core. Al-Qa'ida Core most likely does not have any operatives in
    Mali at this time and has never operated there as a group. AQIM has its
    own goals and reasons to pursue extremism based on its history as an
    Algerian-based terrorist group. While AQIM officially affiliated (or
    ``publicly aligned'') with AQ in 2006, AQIM's activities are often not
    in line with AQ guidance. AQIM does not represent a threat to the U.S.
    Homeland or U.S. Vital National Interests at this time.

        Mr. Faleomavaega. Secretary Carson can correct me that
    you're talking about a society that historically has had tribal
    rivalries for centuries. This is true in other countries, not
    just in Africa, but in other regions as well. So now we've got
    this situation developing whether it's in the Tuareg ethnic
    group, that seems to be the dominant group that's having all
    these difficulties and trying to set up this democratic
    Government of Mali. But if I could ask Secretary Carson, is
    there a distinction between these two al-Qaeda functions or
    groups right now in Mali?
        Mr. Carson. I'll be prepared to provide you with a longer
    answer. Let me just say this. Mali is comprised of a population
    which is probably 98 percent Muslim and they have always been,
    for the most part, moderate Muslims. The AQIM that we know of
    is an extension of the GSPC from Algeria. Over the last decade
    and a half, as the Algerians have been successful in
    eliminating the jihadist and terrorist threat in the urban
    areas and in some of the rural areas, they have pushed jihadist
    Salafists down into the barren expanses of northern Mali.
        That AQIM leadership today, including Mokhtar Belmokhtar
    who Congressman Poe pointed out, is not a Malian. Mokhtar
    Belmokhtar is an Algerian and much of the leadership of AQIM
    which operates in northern Mali is, in fact, Algerian and
    Mauritanian. What we have tried to do in defining what the
    situation is is to not allow the long-standing, historical, and
    legitimate, political and social grievances of the Tuareg, in
    particular, to be hooked up to the jihadist Salafist and
    Islamist agenda of AQIM coming in from the north.
        Mr. Faleomavaega. I'm sorry, Secretary Carson, my time is
    up. I will appreciate getting a submission in writing. Thank
    you, Mr. Chairman.
        [Response follows:]
    Written Response Received from the Honorable Johnnie Carson to Question
        Asked During the Hearing by the Honorable Eni F.H. Faleomavaega
        In 2012, elements of the Tuareg ethnic group, fueled by arms
    proliferation and returning mercenary fighters from the Libyan
    Revolution, launched a fourth Tuareg Rebellion with the avowed aim of
    establishing independence for northern Mali, underscoring their
    perceived marginalization and lack of development from the central
    government in Bamako. Early fighting with Malian security forces was
    not decisive, and, in the previous three revolts, the Tuareg and
    Malians had fought each other to stalemate and worked out their
    differences in negotiation. However, this time AQIM and the more
    extremist Tuareg-based Ansar al-Dine group provided more fighters,
    including returning mercenary fighters with arms from Libya. This
    tipped the balance in favor of the extremists who marginalized or
    recruited with money the other Tuareg factions, seizing the rebellion
    as their own. Malian security forces faced four shocks: the initial
    Tuareg rebellion; the addition of extremist forces to that rebellion
    that made it more effective; the lack of will power and capabilities on
    the part of the Malian government to effectively counter the rebellion;
    and the subsequent coup d'etat by disgruntled elements of the Malian
    military.
        The Tuareg, in fact, are not the most populous group in northern
    Mali and there are other major ethnic groups there to contend with. The
    non-extremist Tuareg have given up on their demand for independence and
    are prepared to negotiate with the Malian government, and at least one
    group claims to have severed any ties with extremist groups. AQIM,
    MUJAO and what still exists of the more extremist Ansar al-Dine are
    under severe pressure by the French and African intervention and are
    beginning to disaggregate and become much less effective.

        Chairman Royce. We go now to Mr. Smith.
        Mr. Smith. Mr. Chairman, thank you for convening this very
    important and timely hearing. Welcome, Bill Delahunt, who just
    popped into the room, former Member of the House and friend.
        I regret missing the opening statements, Mr. Chairman. I
    would ask that my full statement be made a part of the record.
        Chairman Royce. Without objection.
        Mr. Smith. I was co-chairing, along with Steve Israel, a
    meeting on adoptions from Russia, Americans adopting, with
    Sergey Kislyak, the Ambassador, and it went over, so I
    apologize.
        Ms. Dory, let me ask you exactly what is the United States
    Government doing to implement the humanitarian and human rights
    elements of Resolution 2085 so that forces in Mali are trained
    in and are compliant with internationally human rights law
    including and especially sex trafficking training? And can we
    stem, in your opinion, the ethnic and religious reprisals by
    the forces that we support?
        Ms. Dory. Congressman, at this point, Department of Defense
    is not engaging at all with the Malian armed forces since the
    coup that took place last year. So through law and by policy
    the cutoff of security assistance to the Malian armed forces
    means that we are not actively engaged in training with them at
    the present time.
        Mr. Smith. That doesn't apply to AFISMA though.
        Ms. Dory. Exactly, it does not apply at all to AFISMA.
        Mr. Smith. So what are we doing especially on the sex
    trafficking? Because we know with DR Congo and in other
    deployments in the past, there have been huge problems of
    exploitation, particularly of women and children.
        Ms. Dory. I think Ambassador Carson will want to speak to
    this as well, but what is currently happening with AFISMA is a
    process with the State Department and Department of Defense
    evaluating the different troop-contributing countries to see
    what their training needs are, what their equipment needs are
    and then to determine, along with the other elements of the
    international community who will train which forces. Those
    forces that will be trained by the U.S. will, of course, have
    the requisite ethics and human rights training included
    alongside their operational training. But that training has not
    yet begun.
        Mr. Smith. So there won't be uniformity. Particularly on
    the sex trafficking piece, there has been terrible, terrible
    abuse, as you know, and there has been a diminution of
    enforcement by the U.N. itself. I know this is going to be an
    African-led force when it comes to investigating allegations
    that had been made on other deployments.
        Ms. Dory. One of the other--we spoke earlier before your
    arrival about a potential U.N. operation operating in Mali at
    the appropriate time. And one of the benefits of that will be
    having the full complement of human rights observers, the
    political dimensions that the U.N. operation would bring to
    bear alongside a peacekeeping operation. That's one of the
    reasons why we believe that that shift at the appropriate time
    from AFISMA--currently, Mali and France operating together,
    you'll add in the AFISMA forces as they're deployed and then
    employed into different locations in Mali and then eventually a
    U.N. peacekeeping.
        Mr. Smith. I am always concerned it's a matter of emphasis.
    I believe it will be done, but how robustly it will be done is
    always the question.
        Let me ask you, Ambassador Carson, in your testimony to my
    subcommittee on June 29 on Mali, you said, ``We are
    coordinating closely with our mission in the United Nations to
    press the African Union and ECOWAS to define a clear mission
    for their proposed ECOWAS peacekeeping mission in Mali. That
    said,'' you testified, ``we think an ECOWAS mission to
    militarily retake the north is ill-advised and not feasible.''
        Is that still your belief that it's ill-advised and not
    feasible? What will be the mission of AFISMA peacekeeping
    force?
        Mr. Carson. Let me----
        Mr. Smith. And if you could touch on the rules of
    engagement very briefly, too.
        Mr. Carson. Yes. Let me do and I'll be very brief. First of
    all, we take seriously our responsibilities for implementing
    U.S. law with respect to human rights violations. The Leahy
    amendment, which is a part of that law, requires us to vet and
    approve any units that we supply, train, and support to make
    sure that they have clean human rights records. We are
    attentive to charges and allegations of these units. We do not
    want to be associated with or endorse any military units that
    have human rights violations.
        Most of the units deployed now moved in before there was
    any training and support, but units that we support moving in
    will be Leahy vetted and if, in fact, there are any violations,
    including sexual trafficking by these units, we will cut off
    our assistance to them, and we will expose them and certainly
    bring it up with government. So it is important to us. Leahy
    vetting is critical.
        The second thing that I would say is that I'm not sure that
    I said ill advisable in those stark terms. What I--and I'll be
    glad to look at it, Congressman Smith. What I was saying is
    what we thought at the time that before ECOWAS moved in, we
    thought it should be an African-led force. We thought it should
    be well planned. We thought it should be well managed and
    integrated and that it also should be well resourced.
        What we did not want to do is to have an African force move
    in prematurely and be defeated by the very enemy they were
    trying to fight.
        [Additional information follows:]
     Additional Information Received in Writing from the Honorable Johnnie
         Carson to Question Asked During the Hearing by the Honorable
                              Christopher H. Smith
        The intervention by the French has changed the state of play on the
    ground in Mali and all of our previous planning assumptions about the
    role of an ECOWAS force have been overtaken by recent events. The
    French are conducting offensive air and ground operations to clear
    northern population centers of armed terrorist groups' control. After
    the French retake of the northern cities, Malian and the ECOWAS-led
    African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA) forces are
    falling in behind the French by holding the recovered northern cities
    and maintaining security. Because the timeline for deploying ECOWAS
    troops to Mali was significantly abbreviated in response to the
    intervention, some of the currently deployed troops lack adequate
    training and equipment. State, largely through our African Contingency
    Operations and Training Assistance (ACOTA) program, has accelerated the
    timeline for training troop contributing countries and will be
    providing training and equipment to the AFISMA troops that will begin
    to rotate into the mission this summer. The State Department is
    providing logistics support and equipment to the AFISMA forces. The
    European Union has begun deployment of its training teams to work with
    the Malian forces.
        At the time of the June 29 testimony, there was no plan for a
    French intervention and ECOWAS had not developed a sufficiently planned
    and financed concept of operations for a peacekeeping mission in Mali.
    Because there was no well-defined plan at that time, an ECOWAS mission
    to militarily retake the north was ill-advised and not feasible. We did
    not want an African force to move in prematurely and be unable to
    succeed. Since then, the situation on the ground has changed, and it
    continues to evolve. Now that France and its African partners have
    militarily retaken key population centers in the north, ECOWAS can play
    a role in stabilizing Mali through peacekeeping and not offensive
    operations. U.S. planners are currently in Bamako working with ECOWAS
    and the AU to develop a new concept of operations that will address the
    role of ECOWAS in the changed security environment in Mali. The French
    have stated that they intend to remain in Mali until AFISMA has
    demonstrated effective command and control, established logistics
    support, and is deployed throughout the entire country.

        Chairman Royce. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. We're going to
    go to Mr. Sherman.
        Mr. Sherman. Ambassador Carson, I want to thank you for
    coming, along with your colleague, to tell us about Mali. I
    want to drift a little bit away from that and ask you to kind
    of lay out what other countries in the Sahel and West Africa
    are of security concern to the United States with the global
    effort against Islamist extremists and terrorism. What other
    countries might you be here testifying, along with Ms. Dory,
    about in the next year or two? And focus on West Africa and
    Sahel.
        Mr. Carson. Congressman Sherman, I hope I'm not here
    testifying about any of them, and I don't have a crystal ball,
    but let me just say that in my testimony I mention that there
    are criteria that make states in the region susceptible to
    terrorism: Weak governance, poor development, no borders, or
    very poor borders, and communities that feel that they have
    legitimate grievances that are not being responded to by
    central government authorities.
        But I would say that there is a growing awareness on the
    part of governments across the Sahel region that AQIM does
    constitute a serious threat, that they need to work with one
    another to combat this threat, and that they also need to
    respond to the economic and social needs of their people in a
    way that ensures that terrorist groups cannot make them
    vulnerable.
        Mr. Sherman. There are many West African Sahel countries
    that want to thank you for not naming them individually in your
    response to my question.
        Ms. Dory, it has been widely reported that the U.S. is
    eager to build a drone base in Niger. To the extent you can
    tell us in an open hearing, has that base begun construction or
    even been completed? Are drones being launched from that base
    and how many U.S. personnel are there?
        Ms. Dory. To start, we do not have a drone base in Niger,
    so hopefully that is helpful. What I can say is that
    commensurate with the growing threat in the region, Africa
    Command, as well as the intelligence community is very
    interested in increasing resources that are focusing on the
    region to improve our understanding of what is happening there
    and we are seeing a growth in intelligence resources of all
    kinds to include ISR.
        What you're referring to in part, I believe, is news that
    stemmed from the recent conclusion of a status of forces
    agreement with the Government of Niger. This is the type of
    foundational agreement that we pursue in many different
    countries in Africa that have regular relationships with Africa
    Command for purposes of exercises and other activities. So that
    was what made it into the news and then an extrapolation about
    a drone base from there. But we are certainly----
        Mr. Sherman. A news report that was an exaggeration.
    Unusual.
        Ms. Dory. It does happen.
        Mr. Sherman. Ambassador Carson, resolving the on-going
    conflict in northern Mali is obviously critical to maintaining
    the stability and integrity of the Malian state, along with
    setting a date for elections, the roadmap for transition,
    adopted by Mali's Parliament on January 30 that lays out a need
    for opening negotiations to separatists in the north. What is
    your assessment of this roadmap and does it provide a good
    path, a clear path toward reconciliation and unity?
        Mr. Carson. I think the roadmap is a significant and
    important document. It demonstrates and underscores a consensus
    of the Malian political class and the Parliament to stand
    behind a rapid transition to elections and a new democratic
    dispensation.
        I think that it is incumbent upon all of us in the
    international community to encourage as strongly as possible
    the Malian Government to follow this roadmap and live up to the
    time table that's outlined there.
        Chairman Royce. We'll go to Mr. Rohrabacher.
        Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and
    Ambassador Carson, I want to thank you for your many years of
    service and your great contributions to our country over your
    life, and those of us who know about it really respect you, and
    you are providing us good information today as well and thanks
    for that.
        I'd like to get a little bit of understanding about this
    conflict and about why we have to be involved or even France
    has to be involved. Is this essentially an ethnic or tribal
    conflict in this country? Do we have black Africans in the
    south and Arabic Africans in the north? Is that the nature of
    this conflict?
        Mr. Carson. Congressman, the situation is a very complex
    one. There are historical disagreements that divide the Tuareg,
    in particular, who were mostly northern Berber and Arab
    descendants from those who live in the southern part of the
    country. The Tuaregs were a political and security problem for
    the French long before independence in----
        Mr. Rohrabacher. Ambassador Carson, it sounds like this was
    a real caldron before al-Qaeda actually ever existed and
    perhaps we are superimposing today's definitions on to an
    ancient conflict. I will tell you, the Pushtans in Afghanistan
    have been at war with the various ethnic groups in Afghanistan
    forever and we are finding it very difficult to get out of that
    country when we got in after we are attacked. It seems to me
    that--are you confident that the West can come into a situation
    like this that sounds like it has historic, ethnic, and tribal
    roots and actually make a difference?
        Mr. Carson. Let me say, as I've tried to say in my
    testimony and in other comments, there are several things
    happening simultaneously here. This is a very complex problem.
    I do not want to in any way diminish the threat and concern
    that we should all have, particularly the French in the region,
    about AQIM.
        It is also true that the issues of the Tuareg are decades
    and decades old and they certainly predate the arrival of AQIM.
    But AQIM and its existence in the region is a fact and they
    have to be dealt with. I think it is important to make sure
    that we don't conflate the historical and legitimate grievances
    of communities in the north with the ideological and jihadists
    who are part of AQIM.
        And I would say, if I could, that my colleague said that we
    may not have an immediate threat to our own homeland, but the
    region and the French do have serious concerns.
        Mr. Rohrabacher. Let me note, Mr. Ambassador, I remember
    hearing stories about Khartoum and Sudan and sending down
    Colonel Gordon during the last century and there have been
    these upheavals and these conflicts between southern central
    black Africans and the Arabic Africans in the north have been
    going on for centuries. It seems to me that the United States
    does not need to get itself involved in trying to create
    stability which seems like almost an impossible task because
    this instability has been going on for centuries. I'm as upset
    and concerned about radical Islam and their association with
    terrorism as anyone else, but simply to have them superimpose
    themselves in a conflict like this, we could be just getting
    involved in a quagmire that we will never get out of. I mean
    Afghanistan is complicated enough.
        Mr. Carson. Congressman, I don't think that we are engaged,
    involved directly ourselves. We are assisting the French and we
    are assisting the Africans. But we have no intentions of
    putting boots on the ground or engaging our forces militarily
    there.
        Mr. Rohrabacher. My time has run out, but let me just say
    that we are not saying boots on the ground, but it sounds like
    to me we're trying to be the king makers. We're trying to be
    the decision makers and in the end everyone is going to end up
    hating us in no-win situations like this. Thank you very much
    again, Ambassador Carson, for your insights and we deeply
    appreciate it.
        Chairman Royce. Karen Bass?
        Ms. Bass. I'm oh so tempted to respond to my colleague, but
    I think I'll do that after the hearing. Let me thank you for
    your testimony again.
        I wanted to ask a few things leading up to talking about
    the elections, but I'm wondering and the chairman mentioned
    also about our delay in getting involved after the French. I'm
    wondering whether Section 7008 that prohibits the State
    Department and USAID from participating because of the coup and
    until there is an election, if that, one, was a contributing
    factor to any delay, and if there's any change that should be
    made in that section. Two, I know that elections are scheduled
    for June, and I would hate to see them postponed, but on the
    other hand I'm very concerned as to whether or not Mali is
    going to be ready for elections. And if there's efforts to push
    them prematurely, I want to know what you know about the
    process, what's going on, who might be the candidates beyond
    the current President, what we might be doing to support their
    efforts? And then if there can be credible inclusive elections,
    especially considering that over 300,000 persons are displaced
    and are we providing any resources for the election?
        Mr. Carson. Congresswoman Bass, again, thank you very much
    for your question and also for your interest and support on the
    Africa issues that we face.
        First of all, I would just underscore all the points that
    my colleague, Deputy Assistant Secretary Amanda Dory made with
    respect to whether there was delay or not. I think that we
    tried to respond as expeditiously and in serial fashion to the
    French requests as they came in, and we certainly support and
    are assisting them to the best of our ability.
        The legislation that you referred to requires the U.S.
    Government to cut off assistance to any government that comes
    to power as a result of a military coup d'etat, and so as a
    result of the March 23 coup in Mali, we did cut off all but
    emergency help and food assistance.
        Ms. Bass. Right.
        Mr. Carson. I don't think that the legislation needs to be
    changed. I think it is a strong affirmation of the U.S. support
    for democracy and against coup d'etat. So I would say it has
    not had an impact on our relationship in terms of providing
    support to the French and others.
        That legislation does have a carve out that allows us to
    support elections. And we do have the capacity through State
    Department and USAID to help the Malian Government with
    technical and financial support to run elections as they have
    outlined in their roadmap. And it is our intention to join
    others in the international community in providing them with
    support probably through IFES, probably through NDI or IRI here
    in the United States. So we will go ahead to do that.
        I believe that it is possible for the Malian Government to
    hold inclusive, credible, free, and transparent elections by
    July 31, which is the date that is outlined in the timetable
    and the roadmap.
        As I said before, I think it's incumbent upon the regional
    states and ECOWAS for the international community, for the
    U.S., France, Britain, and the European Union to push as hard
    as possible to make these elections----
        Ms. Bass. Since that's so soon, do you know anything about
    the process? I mean I am assuming, but not sure that the
    current President might run. Are there any other candidates? I
    mean that seems like such a short timeline.
        I also wanted to throw in a question about AFRICOM.
        Mr. Carson. Let me just say on that, neither the current
    President nor Prime Minister will be candidates in the
    election.
        Ms. Bass. Okay.
        Mr. Carson. I point out that Mali was scheduled to have
    democratic elections in April about a month before the coup
    d'etat. There are a number of individuals who would be
    candidates for the presidency. There are formed political
    parties. And the one thing I think is important to remember is
    that although Mali is the size of both Texas and California
    combined, some 90 percent of all Malians live in the southern
    part of the country and have not been affected at all by the
    military operations in the north.
        The Tuaregs and others, the Malian Arabs comprise only 10
    percent of the population, and there are ways now that major
    cities have been recaptured to hold elections and also to hold
    elections in refugee camps and among displaced people. So it
    should not be an impediment. They can do it.
        Ms. Bass. Thank you.
        Chairman Royce. Mr. Chabot.
        Mr. Chabot. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The U.S. has put a lot
    of resources into this region through counterterrorism programs
    including training security forces and attempting to secure
    porous borders and promoting democracy. Arguably, these haven't
    gone so well. Overall, the amount of aid to this region with a
    particular focus on Mali has reached $1 billion over the last 7
    years.
        We've also heard testimony that the level of support has
    actually been inadequate and not commensurate with the threat.
        However, it seems, as usual, the U.S. bears most of the
    burden on these initiatives and, in some cases, because world
    leaders are not as well equipped or don't want to get involved
    and thus take a back seat, expecting the U.S. to take the lead.
    Now in this case, we welcome France's initiative to take action
    so quickly. Regardless, the U.S. is expected to supply cargo
    planes, surveillance aircraft, airlift support, and other
    things. The U.S. also recently pledged to contribute
    approximately $96 million to support the African-led
    international support mission in Mali, as you had indicated Mr.
    Ambassador, while China and India together contributed $1
    million. So $96 million from the U.S., $1 million from China
    and India, and the African-led force expects another $50
    million to $60 million in U.S. support. In this time of
    economic constraints and sequestration, if I might add, we've
    got to look at every U.S. taxpayer dollar being spent.
        Are other nations planning to provide assistance to this
    operation? What are we doing to see that other countries take a
    bigger assistance role, especially financial-wise, and share
    the burden to build up the capacity of regional forces? China
    has been a big player in the region for many years, so why
    isn't China, for example, offering more assistance? One million
    dollars from China and India, compared to $96 million from the
    U.S. I'd ask either one to address that particular issue.
        Mr. Carson. Congressman, thank you. I would say that there
    are others in the international community who have stepped up
    to the plate, particularly our colleagues in the European
    community. They have initially pledged some $ deg.50
    million euro. They have also agreed to put on the ground a
    European military training mission which has the purpose of
    retraining, rebuilding, and rehabilitating the Malian military.
        I would also add that across Europe from the U.K. to
    Denmark to Germany to Canada, all of those countries have also
    come to the assistance of the French and have provided
    transport aircraft and assistance as called upon. We are not
    out there alone with the French. Others are there as well.
        Mr. Chabot. What about China, in particular, though? And
    India? First and second most populous nations on earth and
    growing economies and everything, yet China especially does
    not--well, you don't have to answer that, but it's a question
    that I think we should emphasize more and more.
        Let me mention one other thing because I'm going to run out
    of time. As Chairman Royce had mentioned in his opening
    remarks, Mali boasts some of the richest cultural heritage in
    the world today. It's been a center of religious mysticism, its
    mosques and mausoleums have been named world historical sites.
    Its tombs of Muslim saints and warriors date to the 15th
    century, and its libraries hold 700,000 ancient manuscripts.
    This heritage has been systematically targeted by the Islamists
    laying claim for the country's northern towns. Malians were
    forbidden to worship as they did before. They were restricted
    from playing music, an integral part of society there. Limbs,
    as the chairman mentioned, have been hacked off. These Malians
    were specifically targeted because their practice of Islam was
    too liberal for these extremists.
        Ambassador Carson, you talked and emphasized, I think,
    Mali's lack of development, but what about this radical
    ideology being imported from outside the region as a source of
    their woes? Your formula had emphasized elections and
    development and national reconciliation. How do we make sure
    that we're pushing back against this violent ideology as well?
    It seems that's really what the average Malian is concerned and
    worried about.
        Mr. Carson. Thank you. Two quick comments on that. First,
    we here in Washington and in the administration were deeply,
    deeply shocked and appalled by the destruction of historical
    manuscripts that date back over several centuries that were in
    Timbuktu. In the past, we have put money into the preservation
    of those documents through our Ambassadors Cultural Fund.
        The second thing that I would say is that we recognize that
    radicalism is a problem and we do have programs that are
    jointly run by the State Department, USAID, and our colleagues
    in the Defense Department to counter violent extremism,
    reaching out to vulnerable communities and vulnerable
    population groups especially young men who are unemployed and
    who could be susceptible to a radical message and agenda.
        Mr. Chabot. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Royce. Mr. Cicilline.
        Mr. Cicilline. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you,
    Ambassador Carson and Assistant Deputy Secretary Dory for your
    testimony today.
        Ambassador Carson, I'd like to follow up a little bit on
    Congressman Bass's questions about the likely political future
    in Mali and ask you to comment on. It seems as if the presence
    of these extremist organizations, these terrorist organizations
    is really happening at the ground level in the delivery of
    services and responding to economic conditions on the ground.
    I'm wondering whether you have an opinion as to whether or not
    that terrorist organization will be reflected in the outcome of
    the elections in any way.
        Secondly, what is the path for some reconciliation with the
    separatist Tuaregs in the north, if there is one and whether or
    not since so much of the political legitimacy is going to be
    the outcome of this election? Do we have a sense of who is
    likely to prevail in those elections and what the relationship
    might be going forward with the United States?
        Mr. Carson. Congressman, thank you. I think AQIM does not
    have the popular support across northern Mali, and I do not
    think that they will gain in any way from democracy and
    elections. As I say, people like Mokhtar Belmokhtar and the
    leadership of AQIM are actually not Malian. They're Algerian.
    They're Mauritanians. And those individuals don't have the kind
    of popular following that will allow them to become elected
    officials.
        Second, I would say that the overwhelming welcome that the
    French troops received across northern Mali is a reflection of
    the fact that they too felt deeply oppressed by what AQIM was
    doing to impose Sharia law: Cutting off hands and limbs, and
    banning things like cigarettes, beer, and television. These are
    things that did not sit well with the Malian community.
        Third, I would say is that there have been formed political
    parties. There are political leaders who will contest
    elections, and I believe that those elections can go well.
    Prior to March of last year, Mali had had 20 years of democracy
    and had had several Presidential and parliamentary elections
    that had gone well. I think this can be restored. There is the
    democratic tradition that we want to help to restore.
    Reconciliation can take place.
        Again, I'll refer back to my colleague who made a slight
    reference to a point that I think has to be underscored. In
    Bamako, many people had a different perception than we did of
    what the threat in the north was. We have always been deeply
    concerned about the AQIM threat, about the jihadists and the
    old GSPC people who came down from Algeria. In Mali, the
    government in Bamako through the threat was the age-old
    traditional enemy, the Tuareg. The Tuareg have had legitimate
    grievances that go back to the 1860s, 1870s, and 1880s, and
    they're about political representation, about a fair share of
    the development projects that are there. So there has to be a
    solution overall that accommodates their political grievances
    as long as they renounce violence, territorial secession, and
    any jihadist tendencies.
        Mr. Cicilline. Thank you. Ambassador, I'm also going to ask
    you to respond in writing--because my time is running out--to
    two other issues, and I'd ask the Deputy Secretary to do that
    as well. One is the current capabilities of this terrorist
    organization in light of the French military action. What's
    your assessment of their capabilities today?
        And the second issue which I would like you to address is:
    General Ham raised concerns that the Malian army had not spent
    sufficient time focused on human rights and rule of law. I'm
    interested to know what we're doing to be sure that that is
    corrected and your assessment of what the current deployment of
    West African troops is on that issue of human rights and rule
    of law and whether you're satisfied that we are engaging or
    other troops from other countries are being engaged with
    sufficient sensitivity to important human rights and rule of
    law issues. So I could invite written responses on that. And
    again, thank you for your testimony.
        Mr. Carson. I'll take the first part and let my colleague
    take the second part. I think AQIM has been degraded, but not
    defeated and we should expect asymmetrical activities rather
    than face-to-face combat.
        Chairman Royce. I think we can do that in writing. I think
    that will satisfy the member.
        Mr. Carson. Okay.
        [Responses follow:]
    Written Response Received from the Honorable Johnnie Carson to Question
           Asked During the Hearing by the Honorable David Cicilline
        Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) has been degraded, but not
    defeated. AQIM, the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa
    (MUJAO), and affiliated groups continue to pose serious challenges to
    our interests in Mali, especially our efforts to promote democracy,
    civilian security, economic prosperity and regional stability and
    cooperation. These extremist groups' goals and methods remain
    antithetical to Malian populations, leaving the extremists with little
    room to expand over the long term. These groups exploited the political
    chaos created by the northern rebellion and coup d'etat to expand their
    safe haven in the north and impose their extremist ideology on local
    populations. Although they have been largely pushed out of key towns in
    northern Mali, they still have the ability to launch asymmetric
    attacks, as we have seen in the recent violence in Gao and Kidal.
        Although the coup d'etat and subsequent division of the country
    have hampered Malian, regional and international counter-terrorism
    efforts in the Sahel, we continue to enhance our work with Mali's
    neighbors to increase their capacity to secure their borders, disrupt
    AQIM supply lines, and contain the spread of extremist groups. The
    Trans Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) has bolstered
    capacity, fostered regional cooperation and combated violent extremism
    in the region. Lasting resolution to the terrorist threat will require
    that the countries in the Sahel develop the capacity to counter this
    threat, along with other transnational threats such as drug smuggling
    and human trafficking. In addition, we believe it is critical to
    enhance the stability, governance, economic prospects and inclusivity
    of nations in the region in order to undermine the foundation of
    extremist philosophies. This is only possible in an environment that is
    secure enough for programs that work to achieve these objectives can
    operate. Although such an environment has been lacking in northern
    Mali, we are confident that extremism in this region can ultimately be
    defeated.
                                   __________
    Written Response Received from Ms. Amanda Dory to Question Asked During
                  the Hearing by the Honorable David Cicilline
        General Ham has noted that we didn't pay ``requisite attention'' to
    military professionalism, civil-military relations, and the rule of
    law. A key word there is ``requisite''--how do we adjust the quantity
    and/or quality of our focus on these critical topics? What are
    appropriate measures of effectiveness? And at the most fundamental
    level, how can outsiders best support the forward progress of democracy
    and the appropriate role for militaries on the African continent? With
    all that said, each military training mission that we undertake with
    our partner militaries does include human rights training as a part of
    the curriculum.
        Looking back, DoD has identified areas for improvement in our
    partnerships with foreign militaries. These include: additional
    engagement at an institutional level in addition to operational
    training (e.g. the Defense Institute Reform Initiative and the Ministry
    of Defense Advisors Program) as well as an increased focus on building
    political will and a shared understanding of the threat.
        Many of the West African countries deploying to Mali have already
    received training in proper military conduct from the United States and
    will receive additional training either from us or from European
    partners. That training is not a guarantee of appropriate behavior, but
    we believe that appropriate efforts are being taken to encourage
    professional military conduct.

        Chairman Royce. We're going to go to Mr. Poe.
        Mr. Poe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My understanding is that
    Qatar delivered weapons to Libya probably with the green light
    of the United States before Ghadafi failed. After Ghadafi met
    his maker, some of those weapons were sent into Algeria.
    Belmokhtar even said in a press statement that he used some of
    his money to buy those weapons. According to General Ham, his
    group is the richest of all the al-Qaeda operatives because
    they have $50 million they've gotten from kidnappings and
    ransoms primarily of Europeans and tourists.
        My question is do we have any understanding that the
    weapons used by Belmokhtar or other al-Qaeda groups had that
    traffic flow from Qatar, Libya and then these al-Qaeda
    operatives?
        Do you want to weigh in on that, Ms. Dory?
        Ms. Dory. Sure. I'd be glad to. I can't specifically say
    what the connection would or wouldn't be. I think what we do
    know is a tremendous amount of weapons trafficking in the
    region, much of it related to the access to weapons in Libya
    after Ghadafi's fall, they have moved in all different
    directions. It's very difficult to track for the regional
    states themselves in terms of the vast distances we've referred
    to already, and the limited amount of border security
    capabilities they have. And if you layer on top of that the
    limits to the amount of intelligence focus and assets that we
    have in that area, so you can--the theory is clear in terms of
    the connection of the weapons and other traffic moving through
    the region. But whether there's a direct connection back to UAE
    weapons, I cannot tell you.
        Mr. Poe. You wouldn't argue with--or would you?--
    Belmokhtar's statement that he bought weapons for AQIM that
    came into Libya. Would you argue with that statement?
        Ms. Dory. I would not argue with his statement.
        Mr. Poe. I have two other questions. I'll try to get to
    them. As of right now, today, February 14, starting with the
    Embassy attack in Benghazi, is there anybody anywhere that we
    have held or believe to be accountable for those actions, and
    are they in custody some place?
        Ms. Dory, do you know that the bad guys have been
    apprehended?
        Ms. Dory. I am not aware of the current status of the FBI
    investigation in terms of who is in custody.
        Mr. Poe. So you don't know that there is anybody?
        Ms. Dory. I do not know.
        Mr. Poe. Mr. Ambassador, did you want to weigh in on that?
        Mr. Carson. The response is the same. I don't have any
    information that I can provide you. I'll get some if we've got
    it.
        Mr. Poe. I would accept your statement you'll get us some.
        [Response follows:]
    Written Response Received from the Honorable Johnnie Carson to Question
               Asked During the Hearing by the Honorable Ted Poe
        The State Department defers to the FBI on any updates regarding
    their ongoing investigation into the September 11, 2012 attacks on our
    facilities in Benghazi.

        Mr. Poe. The other comment or question I had is about AQIM,
    foreign terrorist--labeled foreign terrorist organization. They
    seem to roam Africa at will. Borders are poor.
        But Ms. Dory, you made the comment that you don't think
    that they are a threat to the American homeland. I know the
    Ambassador made a comment that they're kind of on the way down,
    but tell me what you see the future holds for AQIM?
        Ms. Dory. I think the future for AQIM depends on how
    sustained the intention of the international community is to
    addressing the problem set and continuing to dedicate resources
    to putting pressure on the organization. As we've seen, the
    French intervention has certainly set them back tremendously.
    They no longer hold territory, key cities, in the northern part
    of Mali. They are now on the run. They have moved into
    different parts of Mali that are less beneficial in terms of
    ability to hold terrain, more difficult terrain.
        I think it will depend on the continuation of French
    operations going forward, the ability to rebuild the Malian
    defense forces to take action within their own territory. It
    also depends on the neighbors and the actions that they take.
    We are helping----
        Mr. Poe. Let me interrupt you real quick. Do we know the
    policy of the French? Is it France's policy that they're going
    to root them out and get them or do we know what their long-
    term goal is with AQIM and what they're doing in Mali?
        Ms. Dory. The French strategic approach at this point is to
    in response to the actions taken by terrorist organizations
    moving south in Mali they took immediate action and that's what
    we've seen the last month. They're now looking to have African
    partners, the AFISMA forces and Malians, to step forward and
    help stabilize in the key population centers and the----
        Mr. Poe. Excuse me. If you have anything else to add,
    please put it in writing. I appreciate it, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Royce. Mr. Grayson.
        Mr. Grayson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
        Ambassador, your testimony alluded to the grievances of the
    northern populations including the Tuareg. And I'd like to ask
    you some true or false questions in that regard.
        The civil war in Mali started as a Tuareg tribal revolt,
    sort of an independence movement. Is that true or false?
        Mr. Carson. I never like to do true and false. I would say
    partially correct.
        Mr. Grayson. Partially correct. I'll go with that. Now the
    Tuareg independence movement, that actually dates back for
    decades, true or false?
        Mr. Carson. Elements of the Tuareg community have had
    desire for greater autonomy for many years.
        Mr. Grayson. All right, and the Tuaregs actually represent
    a majority in some parts of northeast Mali, particularly the
    desert areas. True or false?
        Mr. Carson. The Tuareg are a minority within a minority.
    They are not the dominant group in northern Mali. They are the
    most publicized group. They are also the group that's willing
    to stand up and fight. The north of Mali has Berber. They have
    Malian Arabs, Berber. They have Songhag and Fula.
        Mr. Grayson. Now the Tuaregs have never associated
    themselves as a tribal group with al-Qaeda or any other
    terrorist group. True or false?
        Mr. Carson. The grievances of the Tuareg and the political
    and economic aspirations of the Tuareg go back to, as I said,
    back to 1870, 1880, when the French came in direct contact with
    them. I don't think al-Qaeda was around in those days.
        Mr. Grayson. All right, now you mentioned that there's an
    interesting mix of people in northern Mali and northeast Mali.
    And in fact, it is true that the Tuaregs have been
    discriminated against by other Mali groups including up to mass
    killings of Tuaregs. Is that a fair statement?
        Mr. Carson. I think that there's a lot of truth to that.
        Mr. Grayson. All right, and in fact, the Tuaregs and the
    AQIM are mortal enemies. Isn't that true?
        Mr. Carson. Let me just say they have had different
    historical and political trajectories. As I said before, the
    Tuareg have not traditionally been jihadists or radical
    Muslims. They have, like many of the people across the Sahel in
    Mali, going all the way from Senegal to Niger and Burkina, have
    been moderate Muslims who have not been jihadists or Salafists.
        Mr. Grayson. But in fact, even in the past 12 months we've
    seen Tuaregs and AQIM forces fight each other to the death.
        Mr. Carson. They have come together, and they've also split
    apart, and they've come together. As I've said, one of the
    things we've been trying to do and to underscore is that we
    don't want to have these linkages created. I think both groups
    found at one point it was opportunistic to work together, but I
    think many of the Tuaregs did not find some of the things that
    were being done by AQIM as acceptable.
        Mr. Grayson. You mean the torture?
        Mr. Carson. Sharia law has never been practiced in northern
    Mali. Cutting off hands and limbs has been anathema.
        Mr. Grayson. You mean to the Tuaregs and to other
    reasonable people?
        Mr. Carson. To Tuaregs and other communities who are also
    Muslim.
        Mr. Grayson. And the Tuaregs have sometimes been the
    victims of that, correct?
        Mr. Carson. I think in terms of the internal and ethnic
    conflicts, they have been the victims of political violence,
    but they also have inflicted political violence as well.
        Mr. Grayson. Now whether the Tuaregs have independence or
    not really has no impact on us here in the United States,
    right? It's no threat to us in the United States if the Tuaregs
    were independent, correct?
        Mr. Carson. Let me just say that we support the territorial
    integrity of Mali. We do not support the dismemberment or the
    vulcanization of that country. We do not support the
    aspirations of some Tuareg to have an independent state of
    Azawad. We support the territorial integrity of that country.
        Mr. Grayson. I understand that, but the question was if
    there were such a state, it would be more no more of a threat
    to us than south Sudan is to us today, correct?
        Mr. Carson. Again, it's hypothetical. I don't even want to
    try and answer what I can't see.
        Mr. Grayson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Royce. Thank you. We will go now to Mr. Marino.
        Mr. Marino. Thank you, Chairman. As a prosecutor, I prefer
    leading questions with short answers. So I have two questions
    here and I'm going to ask each of you to respond.
        Madam Deputy Assistant Secretary, I'd like to start with
    you, if you would, please? The Ambassador said we have no
    intentions for boots on the ground in Mali, and I take him at
    his word. However, the best intentions often head south at warp
    speed. How confident are you about the degree of support we
    will get from the Mali people?
        And question number two, and equally important, what is the
    probability that the U.S. wades deeper into this, and where are
    we when the French bail out?
        Ms. Dory. So your first question, sir, was how we would be
    received by Malians. You said we would not have boots on the
    ground, but then you said how would we be received by the
    Malians?
        Mr. Marino. Yes, how would we be?
        Ms. Dory. Hypothetically, again, I said the same thing in
    my statement. We do not envision U.S. combat forces on the
    ground in Mali. I do think the reception of the French in Mali
    is instructive in terms of the welcome that French forces have
    received, in terms of the overwhelming reception the French
    President received when he visited Mali, and in terms of the
    liberation of the northern cities and their support for the
    assistance rendered in ejecting the extremists from the cities
    in north Mali.
        Mr. Marino. And what about the probability of us wading
    deeper into this disaster in Mali, and what happens when the
    French bail out?
        Ms. Dory. I wouldn't want to give a probability in terms of
    a crystal ball what our future support will entail. I think
    what we can say is that we are strongly supporting the French
    at this point and we are strongly supporting African partners
    in terms of their ability to deploy forces into Mali and their
    ability to employ them going forward.
        Mr. Marino. Mr. Ambassador, do you have a response?
        Mr. Carson. I'm tempted to say, Mr. Marino, that I am not a
    lawyer.
        Mr. Marino. I'm a prosecutor. I draw a distinction there.
    We talk about hypotheticals, and this is more of a statement
    than a question, so I'm not looking for a response unless you
    want to. I just hope and pray that as we go through this
    process in Mali, and any other country, that we try to
    anticipate as much as possible what the ramifications would be,
    and what the negative aspects would be down the road. I think
    sometimes we get caught up in the emotional part of situations
    like this and really do not pragmatically sit down and say what
    happens if? So just please bear that in mind. I yield back my
    time. Thank you.
        Chairman Royce. Thank you, Mr. Marino. Now we go to Mr.
    Vargas.
        Mr. Vargas. Mr. Chairman, I also want to thank you for
    putting this hearing together so quickly. I appreciate it. I
    think we all do. I think if there was any surprise to the
    international community it was how swiftly and effectively the
    French intervened. I mean it was pretty amazing how quickly
    they decided to put boots on the ground and to intervene and do
    so effectively. In fact, I'm 51 years old and I can't recall a
    time when I could say that the French intervened swiftly and
    effectively. And yet, they have. And of course, they're well
    received by the population there. I appreciate that very much.
        I would ask this and some statements were made about our
    assistance to them. I don't want to put words in anyone's
    mouth, but that we have done basically all that we could. Have
    they asked for anything that we have not assisted them in?
        Ms. Dory. No.
        Mr. Vargas. Is there any assistance that they would ask
    for? I know drones were brought up and I know that we do have a
    reluctance to put boots on the ground, but we do have
    capabilities now that other nations do not have. If they were
    to ask for assistance from our drone capability, would we be
    willing to assist them in that?
        Ms. Dory. We are providing very full support across all the
    different elements of intelligence sharing.
        Mr. Vargas. I guess I would ask not in intelligence
    sharing, but actually as a weapon, not so much to gather
    intelligence, but to actually eliminate the threat to either
    French troops or to civilian populations and use it as an
    effective weapon, not simply to gather intelligence. Would we
    be willing to share that capability with them?
        Ms. Dory. Those are not the types of platforms that we have
    in the theater. The intelligence surveillance for constant
    assets that we have are just that. They are focused on
    intelligence.
        Mr. Vargas. There was an issue that was brought up earlier.
    Maybe you could answer this that there was a conflict,
    supposedly, between the State Department and the Defense
    Department here that there was an awkwardness, maybe lawyers in
    between. So we weren't acting as expeditiously as we possibly
    could. Is there something to that that notion? That we were
    delayed in any way because of maybe a lack of coordination
    between the Defense Department and Department of State?
        Mr. Carson. I think the level of inter-agency collaboration
    between State and Defense with respect to Mali has been close,
    continuous, tight, and uniform. And we have worked together on
    this issue in a very collaborative and, I think, in a very
    aggressive fashion.
        Ms. Dory. I would second that.
        Mr. Vargas. I guess I would just conclude by saying I think
    this has been a very successful operation. Certainly to applaud
    the French. I think that from all I can tell we were with them
    as allies and continue to be allies and help them in any way
    that we possibly can.
        I do think that al-Qaeda is a threat around the world and I
    do think that when other nations like France and the French
    take the lead, we ought to applaud them. Maybe we can get some
    French fries back in this building. But in fact, that was one
    of the things that was pretty interesting about this whole
    thing. I think there is a notion that the French, in fact,
    quotes that the French are going to bail out. So far they seem
    to have been quite effective and quite aggressive. I'm not sure
    that we would have moved as quickly as they did, but they did
    it, I think, fantastically and we should applaud them for that.
        I yield back my time, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Royce. Thank you, and Mr. Ambassador, that was
    good to hear, Ambassador Carson. That's not what we read in the
    press or understood from some quarters who talked to us about
    this, but it's good to know that Department of Defense and
    Department of State are working together to resolve these
    problems quickly and that some of the hurdles maybe that were
    faced because of the legalistic barriers have been overcome.
        Let's go now to Mr. Meadows.
        Mr. Meadows. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for
    coming to testify. As we've heard your testimony and obviously
    looked at some of your previous testimony, there are four
    components as you see it that must happen at the same time. My
    question to each one of you is as we start to look at that,
    taking the lead, obviously, the French have taken the lead in
    some components of that, but how do we make sure that we have
    all of those issues addressed and that we're just not throwing
    money at a particular situation, whether it's humanitarian
    relief or whether it's intervention, boots on the ground,
    whatever the case may be? Who is going to manage that process,
    and how best can we address that?
        Mr. Carson. Let me say that that is the work of our
    diplomatic establishment. I think that we have to remain
    diplomatically engaged on a bilateral basis with the Malian
    Government. We have to remain diplomatically engaged on a
    multilateral basis with our colleagues in New York, at the
    U.N., at the Security Council, and also with our European
    colleagues, particularly the French and the European Union, who
    take the greatest amount of interest.
        We have to, to the greatest extent possible, have a shared
    set of outcomes that we want to achieve and we need to be
    consistent in pushing those forward. But it's not all the time
    public work, and it's not all the time visible work but it's
    that continuing diplomatic engagement at every level, not only
    in terms of what we do at State, but also our colleagues in the
    military as they interact with their military colleagues in
    Africa and Europe as well.
        Mr. Meadows. So you would say more the State Department
    taking more the diplomatic lead in this than DoD?
        Mr. Carson. At this juncture I would say yes, because this
    is--the problems in Mali will not and cannot be exclusively
    defined as security and terrorist problems, and there must be
    solutions beyond the military and security and terrorist
    framework in order to make Mali a strong and stable country
    again. So there have to be both military and political
    solutions.
        I think the French have advanced the agenda on the anti-
    terrorist side and the security side. We have to advance the
    agenda on the political, diplomatic, and economic and
    development side. And also the reconciliation side between
    Tuaregs and those in the south.
        Mr. Meadows. Ms. Dory, would you agree?
        Ms. Dory. I would agree. I would add to what Ambassador
    Carson is discussing, that we have the State Department clearly
    leading the overall foreign policy direction, that we are
    working closely together at the strategic and policy level here
    in a very robust inter-agency process. We do so at the
    operational level in terms of Africa Command and the robust
    State Department participation on staff there and then the same
    thing repeats at the--in DoD we would call it the tactical
    level, but at the Embassy level in terms of the country team,
    the participation by attaches and supplemented planners who are
    working alongside the State Department colleagues. So it's
    happening at all three levels very robustly.
        Mr. Meadows. And both of you have put an emphasis in terms
    of democratic elections and the critical nature of both of
    those, but without a respect for the rule of law. We've seen in
    other regions that democratic elections don't necessarily
    translate into a sound government. How does Mali differ in that
    regard?
        Mr. Carson. Elections are only one step in the democratic
    process. Strengthening democratic institutions is critical,
    creating political will, political space and political----
        Mr. Meadows. Who does that? Who does that?
        Mr. Carson. Again, I think we engage as diplomats with
    government and political elites and political power, political
    parties and we encourage our other democratic partners around
    the world to also do so in a very active fashion.
        Mr. Meadows. So do we have other success stories where we
    can see where that's actually happened in the region?
        Mr. Carson. I think we've got lots of success stories out
    there. Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Cote d'Ivoire, and
    Niger. The number is quite substantial. I think there is a
    positive trajectory for democracy and a positive trajectory for
    stability. These are challenges, but there are also lots of
    successes.
        Mr. Meadows. Thank you both.
        Chairman Royce. Mr. Castro?
        Mr. Castro. Thank you, Chairman. I want to say first of all
    thank you to Ambassador Carson and to Ms. Dory for the work
    that each of you do on behalf of the nation on these issues.
        I have a question regarding AQIM and its relationship with
    core al-Qaeda. Earlier, we heard Mr. Rohrabacher ask or suggest
    that we may be superimposing certain labels on these terrorist
    groups. How do we go about distinguishing whether they have a
    strong and true connection to core al-Qaeda or whether they are
    simply imposters, so to speak, who are just adopting that brand
    name?
        Mr. Carson. I may want to come back to you with a response
    from our colleagues in the intelligence community on this and
    how they define them, but there is a linkage between AQIM and
    core al-Qaeda, but I would rather have them define the strength
    of this relationship.
        [Response follows:]
    Written Response Received from the Honorable Johnnie Carson to Question
            Asked During the Hearing by the Honorable Joaquin Castro
        Al-Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) originated as
    an armed Islamist resistance movement to the secular Algerian
    government. The Groupe Islamique Arme (GIA) was formed after Algeria's
    military regime canceled the second round of parliamentary elections in
    1992 when it seemed that the Islamic Salvation Front, a coalition of
    Islamist militants and moderates, might win and take power. In 1998,
    the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) was formed,
    declaring its independence from the GIA, due to the GIA's brutal
    tactics against civilians. The GSPC declared its allegiance to al-Qaeda
    as early as 2003, but al-Qaeda senior leader Ayman al-Zawahiri did not
    officially approve GSPC's merger with al-Qaeda until September 11,
    2006. Zawahiri's videotaped acceptance of the merger marked the group's
    public re-branding as an al-Qaeda affiliate. The group officially
    changed its name from GSPC to ``Al Qaida in the Lands of the Islamic
    Maghreb'' in January 2007.
        In a July 2008 interview with the New York Times, the Emir of AQIM
    Abdemalek Droukdal, who also had been the emir of GSPC since 2004,
    stated that ``Our general goals are the same goals of Al Qaeda the
    mother.'' Since its merger with al-Qaeda, some of AQIM's attacks have
    reflected core AQ goals. In 2007, AQIM bombed the UN headquarters
    building in Algiers and the Algerian Constitutional Court, killing 60
    people. AQIM also has conducted kidnap for ransom operations against
    Western citizens and participated in the most recent Tuareg rebellion
    in northern Mali.

        Mr. Castro. Sure. That's no problem. Also you all have
    spoken about, I think you specifically, said that there are
    certain conditions in a nation that make it more susceptible to
    terrorism activity, including poor governance and poor
    development. I don't think we've covered that yet. Can you give
    a description of the poverty and desperation that exists in
    this nation and others in that region?
        Mr. Carson. I don't know the precise number where Mali
    falls on the U.N. human rights development index. And I'll find
    that number out for you.
        Mr. Castro. Sure.
        [Response follows:]
    Written Response Received from the Honorable Johnnie Carson to Question
            Asked During the Hearing by the Honorable Joaquin Castro
        Mali is among the 25 poorest countries in the world as measured by
    the U.N. Human Development Index (HDI). The HDI is a composite that
    measures the average achievement of a country in three basic human
    dimensions of human development--a long and healthy life, knowledge,
    and a decent standard of living. Of the 187 countries ranked in the
    HDI, Mali placed at 174th. Its neighbors Niger, Burkina Faso, Cote
    d'Ivoire, and Mauritania respectively placed 186th, 181st, 170th, and
    159th.

        Mr. Carson. But I'm almost certain that it ranks probably
    in the bottom 10 to 15 percent of the poorest countries in the
    world with the per capita income of the country probably being
    no more than $200 to $300 a year.
        Mr. Castro. But you would agree generally the better the
    standard of living, the harder it is for these terrorist
    organizations to coax folks to join their forces?
        Mr. Carson. Yes, sir. And I would also add one other thing.
    Political engagement and the fact that people believe they have
    a stake in the country, the government, and that the government
    has a stake in delivering services to them. In northern Mali,
    the big problem that precedes many years before al-Qaeda is
    that the Tuaregs have felt that they've gotten the short end of
    the development stick: No roads, no schools, no clinics, and
    that promises made by the central government have not been
    lived up to. These are political grievances that also have an
    economic element to them as well.
        Mr. Castro. And then my final question, do you have any
    insight into the goals and future military presence of French
    forces?
        Ms. Dory. We are in constant discussions with the French at
    all different levels at this point. They are in the midst of
    conducting on-going combat operations while also looking ahead
    to the transition to the next phase as we've talked a little
    bit today. The stand up and force employment of the AFISMA
    force and then the eventual possibility of a U.N. peacekeeping
    operation. So we are in very robust dialogue with the French at
    senior leader levels, at operator levels about how they see
    this unfolding, conversations about when different transitions
    will happen.
        It's very important for us to understand their intentions
    and vice versa and to connect with the on-going process of
    developing the AFISMA force so it's available to be employed.
    The French are certainly not going to lose the gains that have
    been accomplished over the last month or so by a hasty
    transition to a force that's unprepared to stabilize the
    government.
        Mr. Castro. And Representative Vargas asked you about
    whether we had ever said no to a request to our allies, the
    French, and your reply was no, that we haven't. So I want to
    say thank you very much for that. I yield back.
        Chairman Royce. Mr. Connolly.
        Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and welcome, both of
    you.
        Mr. Ambassador, in your previous responses to questions
    from my colleagues, did I understand you to say that we're all
    of one mind in the United States Government with respect to how
    we should respond to the terrorist threat in northern Africa or
    in Africa?
        Mr. Carson. I was talking about Mali and the specificity of
    the question about whether there was collaboration and
    cooperation between DoD and State. And I said that the
    collaboration and cooperation was very good and synergistic.
        Mr. Connolly. I'm looking at an article, Mr. Ambassador,
    from the Washington Post, published exactly 10 days ago. It
    quotes Charles Wald, the former Four Star Air Force General in
    charge of operations. He's quite explicit about his critique of
    various folks including Vicki Huddleston, the U.S. Ambassador
    to Mali at the time, about conflicts and their approach to
    terrorism or figures associated with terrorism including
    Belmokhtar and what to do about him. Are you aware of that
    article, published 10 days ago?
        Mr. Carson. I am aware of it.
        Mr. Connolly. And do you find it accurate?
        Mr. Carson. I think it's out of context. I think the most
    important thing to remember there is that I think General Wald,
    who was the Deputy Commander of EUCOM, and Ambassador
    Huddleston were there, I think, probably 15 years ago. Much has
    changed. I think one has to look at the context in which they
    were talking and operating.
        Mr. Connolly. So this article is describing something from
    your point of view that's way in the past?
        Mr. Carson. It's historical and it is dated. I think that
    one has to look at the context in which they were operating at
    the time.
        Mr. Connolly. Well, I just, I mean, ancient history, it
    quotes a 2008 GAO report, talking about the lack of
    comprehensive, integrated strategy among the Pentagon, the
    State Department, and USAID. You're saying that in the
    intervening 4 years that report is also now OBE?
        Mr. Carson. Sir, I'm not aware of that report and so I
    can't comment on it. I'm not aware of it.
        Mr. Connolly. Well, in light of your testimony, whether
    you're aware of the report or not, you obviously would disagree
    with that characterization, at least as it would apply in
    today's context?
        Mr. Carson. Yes, because I think that as we both said here
    this morning, there is a robust inter-agency process that
    brings us together, both in a formal setting, but we also talk
    quite frequently. I meet with and see very frequently General
    Ham from AFRICOM. We travel together from time to time. There's
    a robust amount of discussion and engagement there.
        Mr. Connolly. Obviously, you can understand the sensitivity
    here. The fight against terrorism is very much on our minds.
    Our country has been badly victimized by terrorism. Much of the
    locus of terrorist activity or planning, and even deployment of
    capability, is now shifted to the African environment. And it's
    imperative--vigorous debate is one thing, but fundamental
    disagreement about approach and what to do by way of response
    would be of great concern, obviously to those of us here,
    especially on this committee, and we would want to know about
    it. So thank you, Mr. Ambassador.
        Mr. Carson. Yes, I agree.
        Mr. Connolly. Ms. Dory, in the brief time I have left,
    could you tell us a little bit about our sense of the French
    military capability? Hollande was just there. Seemed to be
    announcing we're pulling out. It looked like the insurgents
    kind of melted away in front of French-Malian troops as soon as
    they appeared in Goa or Timbuktu or wherever it might be.
        What is the French capability vis-a-vis the insurgents?
    Should we worry that they just melted away, and they'll return
    once the occupation or the military advance ceases, and what is
    our sense of what the French military intention is at least in
    the short term if not the long term in Mali?
        Ms. Dory. Thank you. I would at the outset point out a
    comment made by Deputy Secretary Carter when he was recently
    visiting in France. He made the point there is a number that
    you can count on one hand of countries that are able to project
    power and employ force the way the French have in the past
    month, very impressive capability. And we have supported them
    along the way, as I've mentioned earlier, in terms of airlift,
    the refueling capability, intelligence, et cetera. So we feel
    very confident in French capabilities in the intervention in
    Mali.
        You're highlighting the conflict inevitably will shift.
    They have made the point and we agree that the initial
    intervention can sometimes be the easiest part and then things
    get very complicated. Ambassador Carson has highlighted the
    complexity of the situation. I think we see that as the
    extremist exit from population centers and will pursue a
    variety of asymmetric tactics going forward.
        So I don't think there's an ability to say mission complete
    any time soon. It's really entering into a new phase going
    forward. We're confident in French capabilities, and we will
    continue to assist them.
        Chairman Royce. Alan Lowenthal.
        Mr. Lowenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you for
    holding this important hearing.
        According to the congressional--and I think you've touched
    upon this and actually the Ambassador mentioned it a little bit
    in his earlier statements, that according to--but I want to
    kind of dig deeper to the period that really occurred before
    the coup. According to the Congressional Research Report
    entitled ``Crisis in Mali,'' there are indications that prior
    to the coup last March, the Malian public was growing
    increasingly resentful of perceived government corruption and
    cronyism, and the corruption arguably left Mali vulnerable to
    instability, especially what we've talked about in the north
    and to terrorist insurgency.
        The U.S. was one of the largest bilateral donors to Mali
    prior to the coup with eight programs focusing on food
    security, health, education, governance, counterterrorism and
    military professionalization. And yet, our efforts failed to
    create a stable, transparent government protective of
    humanitarian rights.
        The question I have is going forward how can we assess our
    intelligence and practices to ensure that the U.S. foreign aid
    is administered most appropriately and effectively? And really,
    another way of saying it is how do we better support strong
    democracies that truly serve the people of their country? And
    how do we make those distinctions?
        Mr. Carson. Thank you very much for the question. The short
    answer is that we take a hard look and reevaluate what went
    wrong as well. We try to calibrate our policies to both
    successes to replicate them and failures to prevent them. And
    so we do look.
        Again, I'm not aware of this report, ``Crisis in Mali,''
    but I'm going to get a copy of it very quickly and read it and
    see what it says. Mali did have problems. It's an enormously
    poor country. It had only had democratic leadership for 20
    years. There was, in fact, a concern about growing corruption,
    and as I've pointed out, certainly people in the north and
    particularly Tuaregs felt that they were not getting the kinds
    of services from the central government that they thought they
    should be. So obviously therein is a problem that had not been
    sufficiently addressed.
        Mr. Lowenthal. Thank you. I yield my time back.
        Chairman Royce. And lastly, to the most patient, Lois
    Frankel.
        Ms. Frankel. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and you are very kind.
    I'm learning the tricks of going in and out, but I've been here
    the whole time. And it's been very interesting to hear the
    questions of my colleagues and your answers. Thank you very
    much for being here, and it's obvious that many of my
    colleagues have a very intricate familiarity with this issue.
        I'm going to ask a more basic, a ``living room'' question
    which is my constituents sitting in a living room if they were
    listening to this what they would ask basically which is--and
    you can answer this in a general term, which is what are the
    immediate and long-term consequences to the United States and/
    or our allies if we just ignore Mali and the region and what's
    going on?
        Mr. Carson. We live in a very small and now very closely-
    knit, global, and interconnected community, and absolutely
    nothing overseas, not even in places in Africa that are
    confused between the Pacific and Africa itself, can be
    dismissed as something that we should not be worried about. We
    have had, and I'll say this very quickly, enormous success in
    one part of the world where we turned out back on the issues of
    state failure--and we suffered the consequences of it--and that
    is Somalia.
        We walked away from Somalia in a relief effort after
    Blackhawk Down in 1993. And as a result, we saw Somalia as a
    country burn, and we saw its fragmentation and then we saw the
    impact on the region and we saw the impact on the global
    community. The global community impact was unprecedented levels
    of piracy along the Red Sea. The regional impact was the huge
    refugee crisis and food crisis. One hundred thousand, sorry,
    700,000 refugees in Kenya alone, and for us in the United
    States, it was the terrorist events of August 7, 1998, when we
    lost not one, but two Embassies in Nairobi through something
    called Al-Qaeda East Africa that we don't talk about very much
    these days because the foundation stones of it have been
    significantly weakened. But we forget that there was an Al-
    Qaeda East Africa that also did in Nairobi what was a precursor
    to 9/11.
        So we do have to keep our eye on these things and when we
    turn our backs on them the international community turns their
    backs on them. But these are global.
        The French acted not only because they were concerned about
    what was happening in Mali and the region, but for one other
    reason and that is that the largest Malian community outside of
    Mali resides in France. And these are second and third
    generation Malians who were French men who can get on the plane
    as disgruntled youth, French youth, who happened to be black,
    whose families are Malian, and go back to Paris and potentially
    start to undermine French security as well.
        We can't turn our backs on it. It doesn't mean we have to
    lead the effort, but we must always be conscious about the
    effort and we must contribute wherever we can to its solution,
    which is why we work with the French and this is why we work
    with the Africans. We don't have to lead it, but we can support
    it because if we turn our back on it, it might become powerful
    enough like events in Somalia to come back and haunt us.
        Chairman Royce. I think Ambassador Carson expressed well
    our concern. I will add that over the years, over the last 6
    years, this particular franchise of al-Qaeda, in just the money
    that they raised by taking hostages and ransoming them, had
    raised $50 million, enough money to allow them to establish
    cells not only in France, but also in Switzerland, in Britain,
    Italy, and Germany. And if we look at the growth of this
    franchise, we begin to realize why the French took action and
    why the international community is appreciative of that. I
    think our Secretary of State put it well when she noted that we
    are in for a struggle, but it is a necessary struggle. We
    cannot permit northern Mali to become a safe haven. We've got
    to have a better strategy.
        This hearing today with Ambassador Carson and with the
    representative from the Department of Defense is an attempt to
    get the agencies to work more closely together and to work with
    us and Congress in order to implement a more effective
    strategy.
        I did want to recognize the Ambassador of Mali and the
    Ambassador of Niger who are with us and ask them to stand for a
    minute so that we might recognize you both. We thank you very
    much for your participation as well. We appreciate the work of
    the diplomatic corps.
        And with that we stand adjourned. We thank our witnesses
    very much.
        [Whereupon, at 12:29 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

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