    [House Hearing, 113 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

          THE FATAH-HAMAS RECONCILIATION: THREATENING PEACE PROSPECTS

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   BEFORE THE

                                SUBCOMMITTEE ON
                        THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

                                     OF THE

                          COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                        ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                   __________

                                FEBRUARY 5, 2013

                                   __________

                                Serial No. 113-2

                                   __________

            Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

    Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/
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                          COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

                     EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman
    CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey     ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
    ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida         ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
    DANA ROHRABACHER, California             Samoa
    STEVE CHABOT, Ohio                   BRAD SHERMAN, California
    JOE WILSON, South Carolina           GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
    MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas             ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
    TED POE, Texas                       GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
    MATT SALMON, Arizona                 THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
    TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania             BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
    JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina          KAREN BASS, California
    ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois             WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
    MO BROOKS, Alabama                   DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
    TOM COTTON, Arkansas                 ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
    PAUL COOK, California                JUAN VARGAS, California
    GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina       BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois
    RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas            JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III,
    SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania                Massachusetts
    STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas                AMI BERA, California
    RON DeSANTIS, Florida                ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California
    TREY RADEL, Florida                  GRACE MENG, New York
    DOUG COLLINS, Georgia                LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
    MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina         TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
    TED S. YOHO, Florida                 JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
    LUKE MESSER, Indiana

         Amy Porter, Chief of Staff      Thomas Sheehy, Staff Director

                   Jason Steinbaum, Democratic Staff Director
                                     ------

                Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa

                     ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman
    STEVE CHABOT, Ohio                   THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
    JOE WILSON, South Carolina           GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
    ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois             BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
    TOM COTTON, Arkansas                 DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
    RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas            ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
    RON DeSANTIS, Florida                JUAN VARGAS, California
    TREY RADEL, Florida                  BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois
    DOUG COLLINS, Georgia                JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III,
    MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina             Massachusetts
    TED S. YOHO, Florida                 GRACE MENG, New York
    LUKE MESSER, Indiana                 LOIS FRANKEL, Florida

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page

                                   WITNESSES

    Matthew Levitt, Ph.D., director, Stein Program on
      Counterterrorism and Intelligence, The Washington Institute for
      Near East Policy...............................................     9
    Michael Rubin, Ph.D., resident scholar, American Enterprise
      Institute......................................................    21
    Mr. David Makovsky, director, Project on the Middle East Peace
      Process, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy.........    28

              LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING

    Matthew Levitt, Ph.D.: Prepared statement........................    12
    Michael Rubin, Ph.D.: Prepared statement.........................    23
    Mr. David Makovsky: Prepared statement...........................    31

                                    APPENDIX

    Hearing notice...................................................    64
    Hearing minutes..................................................    65

          THE FATAH-HAMAS RECONCILIATION: THREATENING PEACE PROSPECTS

                                  ----------

                           TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 5, 2013

                         House of Representatives,

               Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa,

                         Committee on Foreign Affairs,

                                Washington, DC.

        The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 o'clock
    a.m., in room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ileana
    Ros-Lehtinen (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. The committee will come to order. I would
    like to welcome everyone to our first hearing on the
    Subcommittee on Middle East and North Africa on the 113th
    Congress. I want to congratulate my good friend, my fellow
    Floridian colleague, Mr. Deutch, for earning the spot of
    ranking member. I look forward to working with Ted and with his
    staff throughout our Congress and our congressional session.
    Thank you, Ted.
        Mr. Deutch. Thank you.
        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. It is a pleasure to be with you.
        After recognizing myself and the ranking member, Mr.
    Deutch, for 5 minutes each for an opening statement, I will
    then recognize other members seeking recognition for a 1-minute
    opening statement. We will then hear from our witnesses. And,
    without objection, the witnesses' prepared statements will be
    made a part of the record. Members may have 5 days in which to
    insert statements and questions for the record subject to the
    length limitation in the rules. The Chair now recognizes
    herself for 5 minutes.
        With so much instability and turmoil surrounding the Middle
    East, Israel is in a more precarious situation than ever now,
    as it is surrounded by rogue regimes and terrorist
    organizations that wish to wipe her off the map. To Israel's
    northeast, the prospects of Assad falling to Syria seems to be
    a matter of when and not if as fears grow that Assad's chemical
    weapons arsenal might fall into the wrong hands. Yet, that
    isn't the only concern for Israel as she looks to her neighbors
    across the Sinai and sees Egypt once again engulfed in turmoil.
        Just 2 years after demonstrators took to the streets
    demanding freedom and an end to the regime of Mubarak, it
    appears that Egyptians are no better off now than they were
    back then. A continued threat to the Israeli people stems from
    smugglers and extremists bringing everything from drugs and
    weapons through the Sinai. The Egyptian Government continues to
    let the Sinai be used as a sanctuary for illicit activities and
    provides Iran the pathway to provide weapons to rearm Hamas.
    The threat is more apparent by Ahmadinejad arriving in Cairo
    today, making it the first time that an Iranian leader has
    visited Egypt since 1979.
        The existential threat that a nuclear Iran poses to Israel,
    to our U.S. allies, and our national security interests seeks
    to destabilize the entire region as recent reports suggest that
    Iran has told U.N. nuclear officials that it plans to add
    hundreds more centrifuges to further its nuclear enrichment
    program.
        Vice President Biden's recent comments about the
    administration's willingness to talk to the supreme leader will
    only embolden the Iranian regime. Instead, we must concentrate
    on enforcing and expanding our sanctions and cooperate with
    responsible nations to compel Iran to abandon its nuclear
    weapons ambition. And if all of that were not enough, we are
    witnessing Abu Mazen and Hamas seeking to unify their mutual
    hatred toward the democratic Jewish State of Israel.
        These overtures can leave the future of a peace process in
    serious jeopardy. The Palestinian Authority is corrupt and has
    not prevented Hamas and other Palestinian extremist groups from
    allowing violence to turn against the Jewish state. Congress
    needs to exert our oversight responsibility and urge the Obama
    administration to hold the Palestinian Authority accountable
    for its aggressive actions against our ally Israel.
        The destructive actions by the Palestinian Authority at the
    U.N., negotiating with Hamas, and undermining the peace process
    with Israel cannot continue without any repercussions. As a
    former chair of our Foreign Affairs Committee, I exercised due
    diligence at holding funds from reaching the Palestinian
    Authority.
        We should also leverage our contributions to the United
    Nations, specifically entities like UNESCO, to prevent the P.A.
    from pushing its anti-Israel agenda.
        I am disappointed that the administration continues to
    advocate for millions of taxpayer dollars to Palestinian
    programs and ignores existing U.S. law, which already prohibits
    funds to entities that recognize Palestine at the U.N. Should
    the U.S. be sending millions in hard-earned U.S. taxpayer
    dollars to the Palestinian Authority when it continues to
    embrace extremist violence against the Israeli people?
        It has become clear that Abu Mazen is more interested in
    joining forces with Hamas, a U.S.-designated foreign terrorist
    organization, than he is with brokering peace with Israel. This
    is the same entity that was visually attacking Israel with a
    persistent and ongoing barrage of rocket attacks from Gaza.
    They have all been clear signals that Israel cannot count on
    Abu Mazen as a true partner for peace. While he actively seeks
    to reconcile with Hamas, he shows where his true priorities
    lie, undermining the peace process.
        I agree with Prime Minister Netanyahu that Israel cannot
    negotiate with a partner who openly embraces a foreign
    terrorist organization that wishes to see the destruction of
    the Jewish State of Israel. Israel cannot find a true partner
    in peace with any government that is comprised of members of
    Hamas. If these efforts of unification are real, it gives us
    all a great deal of reason for concern for both the future of
    the peace process and, indeed, Israel's safety in the rapidly
    changing Middle East.
        And, with that, I am pleased to turn to my friend, the
    ranking member, Mr. Deutch, for his opening remarks.
        Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Madam Chairman. I'll first say how
    pleased I am to serve the subcommittee with you. We have had a
    chance to work together for years on our mutual efforts to
    thwart Iran's nuclear program, to ensure the safety and
    security of the State of Israel, and to advocate on behalf of
    the thousands of Holocaust survivors in south Florida and
    around the country.
        I would also like to welcome members of the subcommittee,
    especially those who are new to the Foreign Affairs Committee.
    This committee tackles one of the most volatile, yet vitally
    important regions of the world. And I thank you for your
    dedication to these issues.
        Today's hearing comes at a crucial time for both Israel and
    the Palestinians. Just 2 weeks ago, Israeli elections saw the
    highest turnout in a decade with a last minute surge by
    centrist parties. And once again we are reminded that Israel's
    vibrant democracy is a model in a region where many still
    struggle for free and fair elections.
        This weekend, President Perez officially tasked Prime
    Minister Netanyahu with forming a coalition government. The new
    government will grapple with precisely the question before us
    this morning. And it will grapple with broader issues
    surrounding Israel's quest for peace with its neighbors and the
    very possibility of a two-state solution.
        In 2010, Prime Minister Netanyahu began an unprecedented
    halt to construction for 10 months in the West Bank. And while
    this moratorium was demanded by President Abbas as a condition
    for negotiations, only in the last 3 weeks of the moratorium
    did he even agree to talks. And since September 2010, they have
    been frozen. Instead, Abbas abandoned direct talks and pursued
    the unilateral creation of a Palestinian state. In doing so,
    they violated U.N. resolutions 242, 338, and the Oslo, of
    course, all of which lay out the framework for a negotiated
    settlement between the two parties. He then internationalized
    the process by seeking statehood through the Security Council
    at the U.N. and pushing for upgraded status for the
    Palestinians at the U.N. this fall, again contrary to the
    established framework for peace talks.
        Alongside these unilateral actions, Fatah began negotiating
    reconciliation with Hamas, a terrorist organization that
    continues to call for Israel's destruction. To be sure, Hamas'
    rejection of the quartet principles precludes it from being a
    legitimate partner for peace.
        In May 2011, I was in Ramallah the day after Hamas and
    Fatah first announced reconciliation. We sit here today, nearly
    2 years later, after witnessing Hamas rain rockets down on
    Israel and continue to defy international conditions. Just
    weeks ago, Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal and President Abbas met
    in Cairo to further their supposed reconciliation. Talks will
    resume in Cairo again next week, and it remains unclear whether
    either side really intends to move forward.
        Let me be clear. The United States will not accept a
    Palestinian Government that includes Hamas. In fact, our laws
    dictate that aid to the P.A. will cease should Hamas play any
    significant role in the government without first adhering to
    the quartet principles. I made this very point to Prime
    Minister Fayyad 2 years ago.
        So the question remains, will President Abbas demand Hamas-
    renounced violence? We know Abbas' supposed request that Hamas
    dismantle militias to disarm is a major divide in these talks.
    And for Hamas, the answer appears to be an unwavering no.
        Today, Israeli and Palestinian security forces work
    together each day to secure the region and to enhance Israel's
    security with U.S. support. This assistance actually advances
    peace. So while I share my colleagues' frustration with Abbas'
    unilateral actions and pursuit of reconciliation with Hamas,
    U.S. law remains clear. Reconciliation with a terrorist group
    will mean no United States aid. But if we are to advance the
    prospect of peace and ensure lasting security for Israel, we
    have to assess the implications of our actions. Our goal must
    be to prevent reconciliation so that there continues to be a
    viable partner for peace with Israel operating in the West
    Bank.
        I don't want this to become a self-fulfilling prophecy. We
    have got to ensure that our discussions regarding
    reconciliation, our policy regarding reconciliation, do not
    leave the P.A. without any other option but reconciliation.
        Prime Minister Fayyad has worked tirelessly to build
    institutions capable of supporting a Palestinian state. These
    institutions are essential to the creation of an economically
    viable, stable Palestinian state and to the long-term lasting
    security of Israel. But the P.A. is facing massive budget
    shortfalls.
        And while the U.S. has been withholding funds for nearly a
    year, Israel recently agreed to resume the transfer of revenue
    to the P.A. after a 4-month suspension following Abbas' efforts
    at the U.N. And while I acknowledge the natural reaction to
    Abbas' efforts is to withhold funds, the longer salaries go
    underpaid, the more likely Fatah supporters will look elsewhere
    for support.
        I have grave concerns that the collapse of the Palestinian
    Authority would pose the gravest of threats to security in the
    West Bank and to our ally Israel and destroy any prospect for
    negotiations. This critical juncture demands that we examine
    all opportunities. Will a new Israeli Government renew
    prospects for the resumption of direct negotiations? And are
    direct negotiations even possible? Will Fatah drive to unify
    with a group that seeks Israel's destruction or will it take
    the only road to peace: Negotiations with the State of Israel?
        I would like our witnesses this morning to address the
    prospects for peace, how we will talk of reconciliation and
    U.S. policy about not just reconciliation but those very
    discussions affect the prospect for peace.
        Madam Chairman, as always, it is a pleasure to examine
    these issues with you. And I yield back.
        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much to my friend.
        And now I would like to recognize the members for a 1-
    minute opening statement, starting with Mr. Chabot, who is the
    chairman of the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific.
        Mr. Chabot. Thank you, Madam Chair. Thank you for holding
    this important hearing this morning. I certainly enjoyed
    chairing this committee for 2 years, which happened to
    correspond to the 2 years of the so-called ``Arab Spring.'' So
    it was very interesting times, and I look forward to working
    with you on this committee again.
        As I said, it is a very timely hearing. While President
    Obama has reiterated a number of times his belief that the
    resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is one of
    America's core interests in the Middle East, there has been a
    disconnect, I believe, between stated administration policy
    objectives and our aid policy.
        Palestinian leadership has, let's face it, thumbed its nose
    at Israel and its allies, including the United States, by
    unilaterally seeking non-member state status at the United
    Nations, and it now seeks a merger or a reconciliation
    agreement, as they call it, between Abu Mazen, its PLO faction
    in the West Bank and the terrorist-led Hamas in Gaza. Yet, over
    the last 3 years, as the Palestinian leadership has repeatedly
    retreated from a peace process, American assistance to the
    Palestinians has remained unchanged. I would certainly like to
    see that addressed this morning.
        Again, thank you very much for holding this hearing.
        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, sir.
        Mr. Kennedy of Massachusetts is recognized.
        Mr. Kennedy. Madam Chair, thank you very much. Mr. Ranking
    Member. Thank you for holding the hearing.
        To our witnesses, I want to thank each of you for being
    here today and my colleagues as well.
        The potential of a consensus government in Palestine and
    the effect that that would have on Israel and the broader peace
    process is of particular importance to my district back home in
    Massachusetts as well as to this country's foreign policy at a
    critical region and a critical time.
        Last year, I had the privilege of visiting our great friend
    Israel. I was deeply humbled by the incredible courage and
    dignity of Israelis who live, work, and raise families in the
    face of a daily existential threat. I saw firsthand in
    communities like Sderot, where kindergartens are reinforced by
    reinforced concrete and gas filtration systems. We saw it
    across the country where bus stops double as bomb shelters and
    enhanced security is a way of life, protecting innocent
    civilians from the threat of terror.
        Despite the complexities of an entrenched and painful
    conflict, I hold out hope, as so many others do. But for that
    to happen, Israel needs a credible partner and a negotiating
    table. I look forward to hearing your thoughts today about how
    we can move that process forward.
        Thank you.
        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, sir.
        Mr. Cotton is recognized.
        Mr. Cotton. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        I served in the Army in Iraq and Afghanistan. And I learned
    when someone says they are going to try to kill you or they try
    to kill you, you should take them seriously.
        Hamas still has that posture toward Israel. They don't
    recognize Israel's right to exist. They reject a two-state
    solution. They continue to use violence to undermine Israel's
    Government and to attack and kill Israelis. Mahmoud Abbas I am
    not sure appreciates that principle given his increasing
    sincerity on reconciliation with Hamas in trying to create a
    unity government. I know that Prime Minister Netanyahu still
    does.
        I would be curious to hear the panelists' views a little
    bit later on the results of the election last week,
    specifically the Yesh Atid party and what that would mean going
    forward and, as the madam chair and ranking member have said
    also, the implications for U.S. foreign aid toward Palestine.
        Thank you.
        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, sir.
        Congresswoman Meng of New York is recognized.
        Ms. Meng. Thank you, Madam Chair, Mr. Ranking Member, for
    holding this hearing.
        At the outset, as a New Yorker, I'd like to note the
    passing of a great New Yorker: Mayor Ed Koch. He cared deeply
    about the right of the Jewish people to live freely and
    peacefully in their own state. He taught us all a great deal,
    and we will all miss him.
        The prospect of a Fatah-Hamas reconciliation is
    particularly disturbing for me because it will render peace and
    security almost impossible. Let's be clear. Hamas is not a
    partner for peace. Hamas is not close to being a partner for
    peace. It is not even close to being a partner for peace. So,
    of course, reconciliation will be bad for Israel and bad for
    the prospects of peace. It has failed to even recognize
    Israel's right to exist.
        I look forward to hearing from the panelists about how we
    can weaken Hamas. I am particularly concerned about the role of
    the Gulf States in financing terror in Gaza and Syria. I also
    hope to learn more about Hamas's development of its political
    and terrorist infrastructure in the West Bank as well as about
    how any reconciliation might affect West Bank women, who in
    recent years have had more freedom and opportunity than ever.
        Thank you.
        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you.
        I am so proud to have so many Floridians serving on our
    subcommittee. DeSantis of Florida.
        Mr. DeSantis. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
        A reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas represents the
    death now of the peace process such that such a process exists.
    Hamas is intent on destroying the State of Israel and is
    dedicated to using terrorism to accomplish its ideological
    ends.
        Now, I am grateful, Madam Chairwoman, for you holding this
    hearing, but I am also mindful that Israel faces unprecedented
    security challenges from a nuclear Iran to the ongoing strife
    in Syria to the rise of Islamist militants in Egypt and
    throughout North Africa. Israel is our most trusted ally in the
    region. And our foreign policy must clearly project our support
    for Israel. Her security depends on it.
        Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, sir.
        My husband and I had the honor of serving with our next
    speaker in the Florida legislature. It seems like 1,000 years
    ago. Ms. Frankel is recognized.
        Ms. Frankel. Thank you so much, Madam Chairman. And it
    really is an honor to join both you and Mr. Deutch from Florida
    and the rest of this esteemed panel.
        You know, I served as a mayor of an urban city in Florida.
    And, you know, we dealt with gang violence and hurricanes and
    never the threat of our neighbor wanting to destroy us, which
    is a threat that Israelis families live with every single day.
    So I want to say that I share with our chairwoman and ranking
    member any support for the security of Israel, who is our
    closest and most important ally in the Middle East.
        And I look forward to hearing the views of this panel today
    and with a view toward how we can maintain and advance Israeli
    security.
        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much.
        Another Florida colleague, Mr. Radel of Florida, is
    recognized.
        Mr. Radel. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        I actually spent some time traveling Israel in the late
    1990s and did go to the West Bank. As with most of the areas of
    the world that I traveled to, there were great people there
    when you talked to individuals one on one: Kind, gracious,
    hospitable. And then following the passing of Yasser Arafat, we
    did think for a time maybe there was a glimmer of hope when it
    came to some sort of path to peace. And as recently as 2010, we
    saw direct negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian
    Authority providing hope for a two-state solution. But here we
    are today seeing overt signs that Mahmoud Abbas is willing to
    work with and partner with Hamas, a U.S.-designated foreign
    terrorist organization.
        Now, this growing relationship and partnership is a serious
    and grave threat to the possibility of any Israeli-Palestinian
    peace process. It is a serious and grave threat to the security
    of Israel. And it is a serious and grave threat to the security
    of the United States as well.
        I hope today that we can determine with your testimony the
    best use of taxpayer money. At a time when we have challenges
    at home with the economy, we need to demand accountability.
    And, finally, we must, must ensure that we have and keep our
    unwavering commitment to Israel.
        Thank you, Madam Chair.
        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, sir.
        Mr. Vargas of California is recognized.
        Mr. Vargas. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman and Ranking
    Member, for allowing me to have a moment. I stand strongly
    behind our country's commitment to our stalwart ally Israel and
    to sustainable peace with her neighbors. I also am a very
    strong supporter of Israel because of my religious background
    and believe that it should be our strongest ally.
        I am very concerned about what has happened recently,
    especially this merger of, really, a terrorist organization. We
    saw this as early as last years. And so Hamas is I think a
    great problem and one that I hope we hear extensive testimony
    today how we can help as Americans and how we can help on this
    committee. And I look forward to that.
        Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, sir.
        Mr. Meadows of North Carolina is recognized.
        Mr. Meadows. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
        As we hear your testimony today, we look carefully at the
    situation in the Middle East. And obviously, as the conditions
    deteriorate, we have to certainly stand by our closest and
    strongest ally in the Middle East: Israel.
        What is problematic for me is that over many years, we have
    talked a number of times about negotiation. And, yet, here we
    have the aggressor always being Israel. You know, we have got a
    10,000 square foot country surrounded by 5.2 square miles,
    million square miles, of oil-rich land. And, yet, Israel is the
    aggressor.
        And so what I would like to hear today is how as a nation
    we can stand up by our ally and certainly stand unflinchingly
    beside Israel.
        Thank you.
        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, sir.
        Mr. Higgins of New York is recognized.
        Mr. Higgins. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        I just want to say at the outset that before Hamas and
    Fatah can seek reconciliation with themselves, they need to
    seek reconciliation with the outside world. And the only way
    that they can do that is to denounce, to reject violence.
        In the Anglo-Irish history, many thought that that was
    never a problem that could be resolved. It was only resolved
    when two sides rejected violence and move toward a path toward
    a peaceful reconciliation, which you now have peace in northern
    Ireland.
        The fact of the matter is the Gaza Strip, which I have
    visited many, many times, could be and was once a beautiful
    place under the sun, you know, 27 miles long, 7 miles wide
    along the Mediterranean, what was once a destination for Gazans
    and for everybody from the Middle East. It has become destroyed
    because of war.
        So the death and destruction that exist there cannot be
    predicated on the continued destruction of Israel as a
    political goal. They have to reject violence, denounce
    violence. Then and only then can they be recognized credibly
    from the outside world.
        I will yield back.
        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, sir.
        Dr. Yoho of Florida.
        Mr. Yoho. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
        I look forward to hearing you guys speak today on your
    expert testimony. And I mimic what everybody here has said. And
    I just want to say I look forward to the testimony today to see
    what role the United States can achieve, help you achieve, in
    this process.
        Thank you.
        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, sir.
        And our last opening statement will be by Mr. Rohrabacher
    of California. Thank you, Dana.
        Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. And
    thank you for again your leadership in having hearings like
    this, as you have done as chairman of the full committee.
        Just one observation. And, look, I have been around in this
    town for about 30 years. And Israel during that time period has
    taken step after step after step trying to find a way to live
    in peace with its neighbors. And now they so much as move a
    shovelful of dirt and it is claimed that they are breaking down
    the peace, et cetera, et cetera, even while the other side
    shoots rockets into their territory.
        I think it is about time that we make sure that we put some
    demands and insist let's have some action out of the
    Palestinian side. Israelis have gone out of their way. They
    have given up territory. What have the Palestinians given up in
    these last 10 and 20 years? Let's see some progress from their
    side. And certainly let's pay attention if it looks like it is
    going to get worse.
        Thank you very much.
        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you.
        Mr. Deutch and I are so impressed with the opening
    statements of our colleagues. It is going to be a delight for
    us to co-chair this subcommittee. Thank you.
        I am so pleased to welcome our witnesses. Many of them
    are--well, you all are old friends of our committee. First, Dr.
    Matthew Levitt, who is a senior fellow and director of the
    Washington Institute's Stein Program on Counterterrorism and
    Intelligence. From 2005 to early 2007, Dr. Levitt served as
    Deputy Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis at the
    U.S. Department of Treasury. And from 2008 to 2009, he served
    as a State Department Adviser to the Special Envoy for Middle
    East Regional Security, General James Jones.
        Next, we would like to welcome Dr. Michael Rubin, an old
    friend of our committee, a resident scholar at the American
    Enterprise Institute, a senior lecturer at the Naval
    Postgraduate School's Center for Civil-Military Relations, and
    a senior editor of the Middle East Quarterly. From 2002 to
    2004, Dr. Rubin served as a staff adviser for Iran and Iraq in
    the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
        And, finally, we welcome Dr. David Makovsky, who is the
    distinguished fellow and director of the Project of the Middle
    East Peace Process at the Washington Institute. He is also an
    adjunct professor in Middle East studies at Johns Hopkins
    University School of Advanced International Studies.
        Thank you, gentlemen, for appearing before us this morning.
    I would like to remind you that your entire written testimony
    has been made a part of the hearing. If you could limit your
    testimony to no more than 5 minutes? And, without objection,
    your entire written statements will be inserted into the
    hearing record.
        We will begin with you, Dr. Levitt. Welcome.

    STATEMENT OF MATTHEW LEVITT, PH.D., DIRECTOR, STEIN PROGRAM ON
    COUNTERTERRORISM AND INTELLIGENCE, THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR
                            NEAR EAST POLICY

        Mr. Levitt. Thank you very much, Madam Chairwoman, Mr.
    Ranking Member, members of the committee.
        It is a pleasure to be here. It is an important subject
    because, in the eyes of many still today, reconciliation
    between Fatah and Hamas is a prerequisite for advancing peace
    between Israelis and Palestinians. And nothing could be further
    from the truth. The idea is that Palestinians cannot negotiate
    with Israel in any serious way when divided between the West
    Bank rule of Fatah and the Gaza rule of Hamas. And, to be sure,
    P.A. officials in the West Bank can make neither demands nor
    concessions when it comes to the Gaza Strip, but the same
    cannot be said for their position of strength in the West Bank.
    And there is much that could be done. And I think we, the
    United States, should focus our efforts on improving things in
    the West Bank. But I will leave that line of reasoning to my
    colleague David Makovsky, who has done tremendous work on that
    issue.
        The other flaw behind the reasoning that a reconciliation
    between Fatah and Hamas is some kind of panacea is that Hamas
    has not changed. Hamas remains committed to violence aimed at
    destroying Israel, refuses to acknowledge Israel's right to
    exist, and rejects a two-state solution. So a reconciliation
    with Hamas is the equivalent of inviting the fox into the
    henhouse. The preconditions for reconciliation from their
    position are things like controlling key ministries, like the
    Ministry of Interior, so that there can be no security
    cooperation with Israel or preconditions like insisting that no
    changes be made to the security services in the Gaza Strip so
    that they remain under Hamas' control and mixed between Hamas'
    security services, as such, and the Hamas terrorist wing: The
    Qassam Brigades.
        Recently, by the way, Hamas has also talked about trying to
    reenter the PLO as another form of reconciliation. This would
    be no less of a problem. So, for example, Hamas insists on
    ``liberation first and then a state.'' We will fight first. And
    then we will negotiate over what is left. Why? Because Khaled
    Mashal, the head of Hamas, explains, a state based on, and I
    quote, ``compromise or settlement is not a real state.'' If
    that were not clear enough, he explains that ''Hamas will
    always be with the resistance. Resistance is not a hotel that
    we can check into and out of.'' Indeed, it is at the core of
    Hamas's identity.
        So if we look at Hamas over the past period of time, most
    people focus on the Gaza Strip and with good reason. The
    conflict in November made very clear Hamas has spent its time
    procuring weapons, including long-range Chinese-made rockets
    and other things that they are more than willing to fire at
    Israel. Less people are aware of Hamas' efforts to build up a
    domestic production capability in the Gaza Strip so that it can
    produce its own long-range rockets. Those are not yet fully
    capable, but, according to the Israelis, they were also
    building unmanned aerial vehicles to be able to conduct attacks
    into Israel proper. But it is not just the Gaza Strip. And I
    don't think enough people pay attention to this.
        As I go into in my written report, there has been a
    tremendous amount of activity in the West Bank. And in the
    event that we cease providing funding for the Palestinian
    security services, their ability to help Israel contain and
    control that threat in the West Bank would be severely
    curtailed. And that would be something that would risk Israeli
    security, Palestinian security, and U.S. national security
    interests.
        Just at the end of January, a week or so ago, the Israeli
    Defense Forces and the Israel Security Agency, the Shin Bet,
    arrested 20 known Hamas members who were plotting just the most
    recent attack.
        The other thing I don't think people pay attention to is
    that while Hamas has an immediate interest in fighting Israel,
    its ideology is shared not only with the Muslim Brotherhood
    extremists that are arising in Egypt and Tunisia and
    elsewhere,--indeed, that is one of the reasons it felt so
    emboldened as to carry out the violence in November, which it
    started with two different attacks that preceded the Israeli
    counterattack--but also because its ideology is consistent with
    other Jihadist groups. And so we have the case of Abu Ghazala,
    an active Hamas member who went off and was fighting with al-
    Qaeda in Iraq. We have examples of Mamoun Qafisha and others,
    who are running Hamas' operations, not fundraising, not
    politics, operations, from Saudi Arabia. We have Hamas
    operatives procuring weapons in the Ukraine, in Turkey, in
    China. So Hamas is very, very active in these fronts, and it
    hasn't changed.
        One of the reasons, one of the other reasons, that Hamas
    did what it did in the Gaza Strip is because the most hard-
    lined members of Hamas in the Gaza Strip have risen to
    political prominence. So Ahmed Jabari, until he was killed, and
    his successor now are both senior political leaders in Hamas.
    And they are moving the organization further to the right,
    pushing for ongoing ``resistance'' as they term it, terrorist
    attacks against Israel, in an effort to deal with the threat
    that they get from the more al-Qaeda-affiliated groups in the
    Gaza Strip, who challenge them with not being sufficiently
    Islamic or sufficiently tough on Israel.
        At the end of the day, while I do think that U.S. funding
    for the Palestinian Authority needs to continue, it need not be
    unconditional. For years, Congress required that PLO
    Commitments Compliance Act, the PLOCCA, which required the
    State Department to tell us exactly what then the PLO--we could
    do it now with the P.A.--was doing to further its commitments.
    But the fact is that, to its credit, the State Department has
    been doing some great things, including trying to get Europeans
    and others to crack down on Hamas financing in their countries.
        I do think, finally,--and with this, I will conclude--that
    we need to have a very serious focus on Egypt because Hamas, as
    I said, has not changed. And a cease-fire will last only as
    long as it takes Hamas to rebuild its stockpile of weapons.
    Those come west to east from Libya and south to north Iran
    through Sudan. And unless Egypt does what it has to do on its
    sovereign territory and not only at the last five yard line
    before the Gaza Strip, then those weapons will arrive.
        Thank you very much.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Levitt follows:]

                                  ----------

        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much.
        Dr. Rubin?

     STATEMENT OF MICHAEL RUBIN, PH.D., RESIDENT SCHOLAR, AMERICAN
                          ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE

        Mr. Rubin. Madam Chair, Ranking Member Deutch, honorable
    members, thank you for the opportunity to testify today.
        Far from advancing peace, Hamas-Fatah reconciliation will
    accelerate conflict. At issue is not only the sanctity of
    diplomatic agreements which form the basis for Middle East
    peace efforts but also the outcome of a battle between more
    secular movements struggling against a radical Islamist
    revival. The desire to fund the Palestinian Government does
    more harm than good, not only to moderate Palestinians who
    desire to live in peace with Israel but also to U.S. regional
    interests.
        The current debate about how to approach Fatah-Hamas
    reconciliation falls into a decades-long pattern of shifting
    goals and diluting demands to keep diplomacy alive. I have
    provided examples in my written testimony, but suffice it to
    say the record of the State Department's failure to hold its
    Palestinian partners to their commitments to abandon terrorism
    is extensive and its results clear. Absent a clear-cut,
    inalterable demand that the Palestinian groups first uphold
    their commitment to abandon terror, diplomacy will fail and the
    situation will worsen.
        Too often when it comes to rogue regimes, the passage of
    time, rather than reform, legitimizes dialogue in diplomats'
    eyes. It is a pattern which discourages reform and compromise.
    Engaging and legitimizing the most violent factions
    incentivizes terrorism and disadvantages groups which play by
    the rules. Diplomacy with terrorist groups can also throw a
    lifeline to movements which otherwise might peak and collapse.
        It is impossible to consider today's reconciliation between
    Fatah and Hamas without reference to the broader context of the
    Arab Spring. While the uprisings which sparked the Arab Spring
    had their roots in a desire among ordinary people for
    government accountability, it was not long before the Muslim
    Brotherhood and even more radical Islamist groups and Salafi
    movements hijacked the revolutions.
        These Islamist groups had two distinct advantages. First,
    in opposition for decades, they could promise the world. And,
    second, Islamist movements did not have to operate on an even
    playing field. Not only rich emirates like Qatar but also
    Turkey subsidized the most radical Islamist groups.
        The overriding competition within the Middle East today is
    between Islamist and secular regimes. Iran may be Shi'ite and
    Egypt Sunni, but Teheran sees Cairo as a new ally in its fight
    against secularist regimes. Hamas' renewed empowerment comes
    not autonomously but against the backdrop of Muhammad Morsi's
    rise in Egypt and Hamas' growing relations with Iran.
        Fatah may not be moderate, but relative to Hamas, it is
    restrained. Rather than see Hamas moderate in order to join a
    coalition with Fatah, the opposite will become true. Hamas will
    have doubled down on its rejectionism, and Fatah will
    radicalize.
        To promote the two movements' reconciliation would
    effectively enable Hamas to subsume Fatah. The results would be
    grave. Should Hamas establish its dominance on the West Bank,
    not only would Israel face a growing threat, but the Kingdom of
    Jordan would be destabilized. Second and third order effects
    will undermine both prospects for peace and broader American
    interests in the region. Chaos in Syria and the radicalization
    of the Syrian opposition will only compound the problems.
        Because money is fungible, it is impossible for the United
    States to support only Fatah elements should Fatah and Hamas
    govern together. U.S. foreign assistance should never be an
    entitlement, and it should never benefit groups which are
    endemically and inalterably hostile to the United States.
        Diplomacy will fail when any figure, be it Mahmoud Abbas,
    Ismail Haniyeh, or Khalid Mishaal, treats diplomatic
    commitments not as sacrosanct but as an a la carte menu from
    which to pick and choose. It will be hard to expect any
    government to place its security on the line for diplomatic
    assurances which in practice expire in less than two decades.
        The White House and State Department may believe they chart
    a path to peace, but if they fall behind Egypt in what Egypt is
    trying to do in the region right now, they are committing a
    strategic error, which could permanently handicap prospects for
    peace and, instead, encourage a more devastating conflict.
        With that, thank you.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Rubin follows:]

                                  ----------

        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, sir.
        Mr. Makovsky?

       STATEMENT OF MR. DAVID MAKOVSKY, DIRECTOR, PROJECT ON THE
     MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS, THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR
                              EAST POLICY

        Mr. Makovsky. Thank you, Madam Chairman, Ranking Member
    Deutch, and distinguished members of the subcommittee.
        Given the limited time imposed, please see my written
    testimony for a more in-depth look at this issue of Fatah-Hamas
    unity and its histories since 2007.
        Of course, the idea of unity is desirable in most contexts,
    but the question remains, on whose terms unity. Does Hamas in
    Gaza, which favors Israel's destruction, become more like the
    Palestinians in the West Bank or the reverse?
        If Hamas wants to be legitimate, the onus is on them to
    adhere to the international community or the quartet's terms
    for eligibility, which are three: Disavow violence, accept
    previous agreements, and accept Israel. The question is whether
    the U.S. can use its influence with Egypt, which did play a key
    role in the Gaza cease-fire in November, and perhaps Turkey or
    Qatar to use their influence to get Hamas to accept these three
    terms. So far this has not happened.
        Moreover, despite the obvious appeal of unity among the
    Palestinians, actual unity is far more elusive. And, therefore,
    I am not yet persuaded that, despite all of the statements,
    this will indeed occur right now. Fatah does not want to give
    up its turf in the West Bank. Hamas does not want to give up
    its turf in Gaza.
        President Abbas has resisted calls of Hamas demands to give
    up security cooperation with Israel. This is very significant.
    In 2002, more than 400 Israelis were killed in terror
    infiltrations from the West Bank. Thanks to Israel and the
    Palestinian Authority working together for more than the last 5
    years, the number is about zero. This is an important point for
    those of you who care about the security of Israel, as we all
    do.
        Hamas, at the same time, feels emboldened. And this is a
    matter of grave concern. It believes it has leverage with the
    establishment of a sister Muslim Brotherhood government in
    Egypt. Moreover, Hamas feels emboldened because it has seen the
    P.A. be weakened, specifically the reduced domestic leverage of
    Palestinian Prime Minister Salam Fayyad.
        When I testified before the full House Foreign Affairs
    Committee in September 2011, I made clear that Fayyad has had
    an exemplary record in focusing on reform in governance in the
    West Bank since assuming this post in 2007. And he has helped
    spur West Bank growth at a 10-percent per annum clip over
    several years. However, when I appeared before the full
    committee, I stated in my view that if the U.S. withholds
    economic support from the P.A., it will undermine the very
    moderate forces that have been gaining ground there.
    Unfortunately, that is exactly what happened.
        According to World Bank report this past September, growth
    levels in the West Bank have dropped by a full 3 percentage
    points. Unemployment has bumped up from 15-17 percent in the
    West Bank. There is a deepening financial crisis, and this has
    prevented Fayyad from paying full salaries on time to his
    160,000 employees for the last few months.
        People ask, is there consequence for the U.N., for the
    Palestinian to go to the U.N.? Well, we have seen the economic
    consequence. But there are considerable indications that
    because of this deepening crisis, there have been
    demonstrations outside of Fayyad's office, not outside Abbas'
    office. And one could argue that the Fatah people have helped
    to orchestrate this because they see him vulnerable now and
    they fear him as a threat to succession.
        Without regular assistance, the P.A. could collapse. And it
    is incumbent upon all of us in this room to ask, who fills the
    vacuum if they do? Do the moderates really come in or does this
    help the radicals? Pulling data shows an upsurge of support of
    Palestinian use of violence against Israelis, despite open
    opposition to such violence by Abbas and Fayyad. Nobody could
    point to a date when everything could explode, but current
    tensions should be noted.
        So what can the U.S. do at the start of the second term of
    the Obama administration to end the utter impasse between
    Netanyahu and Abbas? What is not feasible is a final status
    deal. Neither party is prepared for it, and the leaders are
    unlikely to make a deal amid turmoil in the region and the
    ascendance of political Islam. Instead, we should focus on
    interim goals that are more realistic that would prepare for an
    eventual two-state solution, such as shrinking practical
    Israeli control over parts of the West Bank, where a
    Palestinian state will emerge, and acknowledge that Israel will
    retain a slice, probably about 5 percent of the West Bank near
    Israeli urban areas, adjacent to the old boundary with the
    ultimate land exchange or land swaps based on President Obama's
    May 2011 speeches.
        The trade-off should be between Palestinians extending
    their control of the West Bank beyond their own urban areas and
    Israel extending its control in the Israeli urban areas in what
    is known as the settlement blocks. And this area roughly
    coincides to where Israel's security barrier exists.
        This overall approach of zones of agreement would delay
    security-related issues in the Jordan Valley and along the
    Jordan River until the overall volatility in the Middle East
    clarifies itself. The approach of zones of agreement will
    finally get us out of the box between either a grand deal or
    complete paralysis, where we have been for years.
        In short, each side says it cannot achieve everything but
    still agrees to take certain steps. This could lower anxiety
    levels on both sides and give moderates some results against
    radicals. Secretary Kerry would have to talk to the parties,
    whether this could be achieved through direct talks or the U.S.
    mediation.
        I have no time left. So I will wait until the Q&A to
    discuss the impact of the Israeli election, as one of the
    members has asked, on this process.
        But I would just like to say, in conclusion, we have to
    deal not just with governments. We have to deal with a public
    strategy as well with the peoples because there has been a
    profound sense of disbelief that peace is possible. And this is
    of great concern. You ask both sides, do you believe in the
    two-state solution? There are still majorities that say yes.
    But then you ask the next question, does the other side want
    it? Will it happen? The answer is a resounding no.
        I would just argue that, unless we have a public strategy,
    which I would like to elaborate in the Q&A, we won't succeed.
    This is a conflict that has been tragic. And we should do what
    we can. We cannot maybe solve it all at once but do what is
    possible and lay the foundations for a better future for both
    peoples.
        Thank you all very much.
        [The prepared statement of Mr. Makovsky follows:]

                                  ----------

        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you. Thank you to our panelists for
    their excellent testimony.
        And all of you discussed this, but I wanted to get specific
    answers about U.S. aid to the P.A. I have been opposed to
    sending hundreds of millions of dollars, of taxpayer dollars,
    to the P.A. with few restrictions, as you had pointed out, as
    if it were an entitlement. While some of it gets funneled into
    Gaza and Hamas, it is worth reiterating that U.S. law does
    prohibit funding to the P.A. if Hamas is part of any consensus
    government.
        So my questions are these: What is the return on our
    investment on these funds if the P.A. continues to undermine
    Israel at the U.N. and threatens the peace process at every
    turn? Similarly, is it in the U.S. national security interest
    to continue to fund a future P.A. government that might include
    members of Hamas that is a designated foreign terrorist
    organization?
        And over the last decade, we have given billions, with a
    ``b,'' billions of dollars, to the P.A. knowing its endemic
    corruption practices by its officials, by its affiliates. What
    steps should the Obama administration take to address these
    concerns and tackle the inefficiencies of the programs that we
    are funding?
        We'll start with Dr. Levitt.
        Mr. Levitt. Thank you very much.
        I think that, for all of its works, the P.A. in the West
    Bank is critical for acting as a security partner to Israel.
    Without question, we need to do more to focus on, I would say,
    the two big C's: Corruption and civil society. The United
    States under multiple administrations of both persuasions has
    made the mistake of mistaking elections as democracy when
    elections without building civil society are--well, we see what
    they are. They are Hamas in Gaza. They are Hezbollah in
    Lebanon. And so there is a lot more that can be done. And that
    does get to the issue of women, et cetera.
        But I think that there is a real return on U.S. policy. The
    question is, what type of measurements do we put in place? How
    do we measure that? That is critically important.
        The other thing I think we need to think of, though I agree
    with David that I do not think that reconciliation is likely,
    if you look at the polling data that David is referring to,
    Palestinians actually are very eager for reconciliation, not
    because they are eager for the end of the peace process,
    because they are sick and tired of this infighting.
        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you.
        Let me just go to the other panelists, if I could. Dr.
    Rubin?
        Mr. Rubin. Yes. There is a tendency to try to bolster
    partners. And there is a long history of this. Unfortunately,
    it hasn't been successful.
        Accountability is key. I would agree firmly with you on
    that. We do have a legal framework in place. And we have
    already discussed the PLO Commitments Compliance Act. However,
    if one looks, for example, at the writings of former diplomats,
    the memoirs and such, it is also clear that the State
    Department at times has omitted reporting information which
    would have cased PLOCCA to kick in. It is essential that
    Congress use its oversight to ensure that such money and such
    commitments to law, such red lines, as it were, aren't shunted
    aside because the result of that is disastrous.
        Thank you.
        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. David?
        Mr. Makovsky. Thank you.
        In terms of what have we gotten out of the aid, I would say
    we have gotten a quiet West Bank for the last 5 years, which is
    not a small measure. We had people blowing up there almost
    every day with infiltrations from the West Bank into Israel.
    Now Israel and the Palestinian Authority work virtually hand in
    glove in the West Bank. And I know the commanders on both
    sides. I sit with them. And that is not a small thing if we are
    serious about peace.
        And the issue of accountability, financial accountability
    and corruption, I am glad you raised it, Madam Chairman. I
    think that it is very important that, you know, you have
    someone like Salam Fayyad there, where there are external
    audits.
        I mean, remember the Yasser Arafat days? It wasn't too long
    ago: In 2002, 2003, and 2004. And they used to pay people out
    of a paper bag. I mean, those were the worst corruption days
    that were done. Now you have an external auditing. Their budget
    is on the internet. It is transparent. I have not heard any
    complaints from Prime Minister Netanyahu or any Israeli
    official, for example, about corruption. To the opposite, they
    laud Fayyad for his effort of cleaning up----
        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you.
        Mr. Makovsky [continuing]. What was a horrible situation.
        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you.
        Let me go back to Dr. Levitt so he could finish what he
    wanted to say.
        Mr. Levitt. I just wanted to answer the second part of your
    question, which is about what happens with U.S. funding if
    Hamas joins the government. And here I think that Congress
    needs to play a particularly active role because after January
    2006, when Hamas won the elections and we did have a government
    that had Hamas in it, there were ways to fund that government,
    whether it was down to municipalities or otherwise. And so
    there are ways to keep things so that the West Bank didn't
    implode with the type of consequences David has described.
        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you.
        Mr. Levitt. And that is important.
        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. All right. Thank you very much.
        Mr. Deutch is recognized for 5 minutes of questioning.
        Mr. Deutch. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
        One of our priorities as Israel's ally must be I think
    fostering conditions on the ground that would best create an
    environment for a sustainable peace. And we have got to promote
    conditions to protect and ensure security for Israel.
        I have serious concerns that if we were to cut off all aid
    to the P.A. in advance of reconciliation simply as a result of
    talk of reconciliation, that there are other regional actors
    that don't share our goals that will fill the gap. And we can't
    ignore the real implications of these discussions. None of you
    have. You have all addressed them. The collapse of the P.A.
    would be a serious threat to the day-to-day security for
    Israelis. It would destabilize the entire region.
        I am concerned, very concerned, as, Mr. Makovsky, you spoke
    of, that the progress made in the institutions built by Fayyad
    in preparation for statehood will crumble. And I am concerned
    about what a West Bank with a growing Hamas presence, let alone
    controlled by Hamas, would mean for Israel for the prospect of
    peace at any time.
        Dr. Levitt, you spoke about our inability to continue to
    fight Hamas efforts in the West Bank if we ceased funding to
    the P.A. security. Dr. Rubin, you spoke about the possibility
    of a Hamas stronghold in the West Bank. And, Mr. Makovsky, you
    have spoken about a Hamas that has been embolden and what might
    happen again if we were to walk away.
        So I would ask the witnesses, if the P.A. collapses, what
    does that mean for Israel's security in terms of preventing
    terrorists from coming into Israel, the flow of weapons into
    the West Bank, the possibility that what we saw coming from
    Gaza, Israel would be forced to endure from the West Bank or,
    alternatively, that the IDF would have to launch a major
    operation to prevent that?
        And, finally, despite our very real concerns, my very real
    concerns, about the P.A. in terms of corruption issues, lack of
    true democracy, and the refusal to negotiate without
    preconditions, I would ask the witnesses, what are the chances
    of preserving any chance, even the possibility of a two-state
    solution, if we make decisions that will undercut the P.A.'s
    ability to govern in such a way that its very existence may be
    called into question?
        Mr. Makovsky, let's start with you.
        Mr. Makovsky. It is clear. We cut off aid. It is a self-
    fulfilling prophecy. And there will be greater radicalization.
    You know, we know that in the narrative, the radicals have won.
    The U.S.-supported, an internationally supported P.A. has
    crumbled. And victory is on our side. We are on the right side
    of history in the words of the radicals. So this would be a
    terrible, have terrible, implications.
        And then, as you point out and as I have said in my
    comments, the security cooperation I think would be
    devastating. There would be a void. Israel would have to
    probably triple the number of forces that it devotes to the
    West Bank like it did beforehand in trying to achieve what
    achieves very little cost.
        Again, I want to be clear. I am for this because I want
    dignity for both sides, not just for Israel's security, but
    this has been one of the great success stories of the U.S. I
    think in this regard. And this is not a small matter.
        Mr. Deutch. Dr. Levitt?
        Mr. Levitt. You are absolutely right. If the funds are
    dried up immediately, someone else will fill the gap. And that
    might be the same people who are funding Hamas today: Qatar,
    Turkey, others. And that would drive the P.A. to the right,
    toward violence. And that would be a huge problem.
        One of the things we can do today is to try and push our
    allies into the region who have yet to fulfill their
    commitments, lots of money that they have pledged, none of
    which they have given, Saudis and others. It is a tremendous
    embarrassment. And there is a lot of money out there that
    should be going to the P.A.
        Again, to me, the question isn't, do you fund the P.A.? I
    think that would be very bad policy. The question is, how do
    you measure their compliance? How do you measure what they are
    doing? And I think that there is a lot more we can do there.
        You know, when General Dayton went in and took people and
    vetted them and trained them, he told them, ``Palestinians, you
    may have to take on Hamas. Those may be your cousins or
    others.''
        And they said, ``Fine so long as it provides dividends and
    we see that there is movement toward a state.''
        My concern is that if the Palestinians, good, moderate
    Palestinians, were working with the Israelis day in and day out
    on security, if they don't see the prospect of movement toward
    something, at least on the West Bank, how much longer does this
    cooperation continue?
        Mr. Deutch. And so, Mr. Makovsky, you spoke of the need for
    a public strategy, then, which I would imagine is exactly--this
    is exactly the need for it.
        Mr. Makovsky. That is absolutely true. I mean, either a
    public strategy that would--I mean, you know, Matt's point is
    without the state and state building, these people would be
    accused of being collaborators. And it won't be sustainable
    over time, maybe a couple of more years. But it won't work.
    And, therefore, this all connects, the bottom up, the top down.
        In terms of--and I just want to reiterate what Matt, my
    colleague, said about the need to press the Arabs. I would love
    that this subcommittee, Madam Chairman--and I said this to you
    when you were the chairman of the full committee--would have a
    hearing on why it is that Qatar, who is supposedly a friend of
    the United States, where we have an Air Force base, gives $400
    million to Hamas? There is a perception in the world and not
    just in Washington that because of that Air Force base, they
    buy immunity from the United States Congress. That is a
    terrible perception. I think a hearing about their funding of
    Hamas would start getting at that perception and also with the
    Saudis. It takes months of prodding before they step up. So
    there needs to be some focus on the lack of Arab support here,
    too.
        Now, Congressman Deutch, about your point about the public
    strategy, this is critical. I mentioned these polls saying the
    people saying, ``I am for two states, but the other side
    doesn't want it. Therefore, it will never happen.'' I think
    what we need is a multidimensional approach that would, say,
    get some synchronized political messaging; if both leaders
    talked about the historic connection of each side, of the other
    side, to the land and to Jerusalem, when President Abbas gets
    up at the United Nations and says, ``Jerusalem is important to
    Islamic and Christianity,'' doesn't mention Judaism, what
    message that sends.
        The public is getting more and more disengaged. They are
    tired. They are skeptical. They are downright cynical as
    fatigued as you are, they are even more so. So we need to think
    creatively.
        I also think, getting back to my idea of the zones of
    agreement approach, by clarifying also that Israel's focus on
    that 5 percent, indeed, almost all of their settlement
    construction--I am not here as a fan of settlement
    construction--is in that 5 percent. But because they don't say
    it as such, people say,----
        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you.
        Mr. Makovsky [continuing]. ``Oh, we want to take over the
    whole West Bank.'' So this ambiguity might be good for some
    politicians, but it is deadly for Israel that is more isolated
    in the world.
        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much. Thank you.
        Mr. Chabot, the chairman of the Subcommittee on Asia and
    the Pacific, is recognized for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Chabot. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        A couple of years ago, I think it was back in 2011, I was
    in Israel meeting with various officials, Palestinian leaders
    and Israeli officials. I was in Ramallah meeting with Prime
    Minister Fayyad, who, as we all know, has been a critical
    figure in that region, and in that part of the world,
    specifically in that area, and his important state-building
    efforts there, you know, relative to a whole range of things.
    Ultimately this reconciliation agreement between Hamas and
    Fatah apparently happened while I was in the meeting with him,
    we later found out. And we actually met in Tel Aviv with
    Netanyahu that evening.
        It turned out that, as far as we can tell,--and I have
    talked to a lot of people about this--Fayyad didn't know in
    advance this was even happening when the agreement was signed.
    We talked about a whole range of things. Unless he was a heck
    of a good actor, he didn't even bring it up. And we heard he
    didn't know about it.
        Now, during the months since, observers of the region have
    speculated about a whole number of different leadership
    scenarios that could take place under a Hamas-Fatah agreement.
    Many of those speculate that Mr. Fayyad would not likely even
    play a role in a new coalition. I think we all know that
    Fayyad's trustworthiness and competence have been critical in
    building credibility within the Palestinian institutions. Those
    institutions for quite some time have really been a bottomless
    pit of corruption, let's face it.
        The fact I would like to pose is if, in fact, Mr. Fayyad is
    not a part of a new coalition, are the gains that we have seen
    in the West Bank sustainable? And if a Fatah-Hamas
    reconciliation occurs, what changes to U.S. aid policy to the
    Palestinians should be implemented?
        Mr. Makovsky, I will begin with you and just go down the
    line.
        Mr. Makovsky. Thank you. Thank you, Congressman.
        I think the point is right. I think every single person in
    this room agrees that if the thing actually went through and
    they put Hamas people in and they took Fayyad out and they
    gathered the security services, there is not a single person I
    think in the United States that would support continued
    American assistance for such a Palestinian Authority because
    the gains are reversible.
        And, again, I think, you know, it is--on the corruption
    issue, he has made huge inroads with these external audits by
    American auditing firms. I mean, I just remember the bad old
    days, and it has been a quantum leap forward.
        But your point is the right one, which is it is reversible.
    If the actual Fatah-Hamas merger takes place with Hamas in,
    Fatah out, security over, there is no reason why the U.S.
    should support that.
        Mr. Chabot. Thank you.
        Dr. Rubin?
        Mr. Rubin. I would agree that the gains are absolutely
    reversible. There is a danger, however, when it comes to Fayyad
    of gearing U.S. policy toward a single personality. We have
    seen in Afghanistan and elsewhere a tendency to do that. It
    seldom works out positively in the long term.
        I would just add very quickly that funding the Palestinian
    Authority should be based on Palestinian Authority behavior and
    its meeting of commitments. And we'll see how that goes as
    things move forward. When we look at the success of the West
    Bank relative to Gaza, we also need to recognize that the West
    Bank is landlocked. And perhaps this shows that Jordan is a
    much better ally than Egypt when it comes to what is supplied.
        And we also can't pretend that it is only American money
    which is causing Palestinian behavior to moderate, if you will.
    The fact of the matter is Israel has conducted unilateral
    security measures, such as the wall. And that, arguably, has
    had a far bigger impact on restraining Palestinian terrorism
    from the West Bank than has endless American subsidiaries.
        Thank you.
        Mr. Chabot. Thank you.
        Let me just emphasize what you just said about the wall.
    There were an awful lot of people years ago who were talking
    about this Draconian wall and how terrible it was. I think it
    was one of the most positive things that has been done in a
    long time, both to protect Israeli citizens and also to
    stabilize the whole region and to allow peace to at least have
    a chance.
        Dr. Levitt?
        Mr. Levitt. Thank you.
        Everything that Fayyad stands for is what Hamas has issue
    with. There is the transparency on the finance side. They love
    to commingle the money, muddy the waters, the security
    cooperation. It is clear that all of the good things about him
    are the reasons Hamas despises him. And one of their
    preconditions for reconciliation is that he not hold a senior
    position.
        One of the reasons I can't see the reconciliation going
    forward as such is that Hamas still insists on taking control
    of the Ministry of Interior. This has to be an absolute red
    line. For Hamas to take over the whole security portfolio would
    be the end of everything and certainly would be the end of U.S.
    funding.
        I do believe that the wall, the security barrier, has been
    tremendously successful, but, like David, I have spent a lot of
    time in the West Bank and Israel speaking to the two different
    security services. They both talk about the need to be able to
    couple that with cooperation on the ground. And I do not think
    that on its own, without that cooperation, the wall alone would
    stop all of the infiltrations as it has over the past 5 years.
        Mr. Chabot. Thank you.
        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, Mr. Chabot.
        Ms. Frankel of Florida is recognized.
        Ms. Frankel. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        I listened to--there is great angst on the part of some of
    my colleagues as to whether or not to continue to fund the
    Palestinian Authority, either with more conditions, or not to
    fund it.
        My question is, what are some of the indicators or measures
    we should be looking at to know whether there is either
    progress or regression? Mr. Levitt?
        Mr. Makovsky. I think, what I would look at to, you know,
    gauge progress in the Palestinian Authority, I mentioned
    security cooperation, the lack of terrorism, of Israel and the
    Palestinians working together. I mentioned the idea of Fayyad's
    efforts of external audits, transparent budgeting, working with
    the World Bank, the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee, and others to
    make sure that its finances are in order. Yes, it has been
    running deficits, but that is because of a lack of external
    funding, frankly.
        And I would look at how much they continue the reform
    process, too. They had municipal elections last fall that
    Fayyad pushed. And that is important as well. You know, these
    are all positive metrics going forward.
        I mentioned in my testimony, though, that there are some
    financial setbacks, which have coincided with the lack of
    funding from the outside. And that has hurt Fayyad. He is the
    goose that lays the golden eggs. And without that, that effort
    is hurt.
        And then there are also the negotiations with Israel, which
    is a whole issue in and of itself, which I am happy in follow-
    up questions to get into greater detail.
        Mr. Rubin. I would agree, but let me just add one more
    point. We should also be looking at incitement in the education
    system and state media against not only Israel but also against
    the United States.
        Thank you.
        Mr. Makovsky. I agree with that.
        Mr. Levitt. Yes. We are all in agreement on all of this.
        I will just add there are all kinds of things that have
    been going on that haven't been getting a lot of public
    attention. So, for example, in a short period of time, when you
    had this Hamas-Fatah government after the 2006 elections, it is
    not well-known that Hamas simply started rubber-stamping every
    request for Hamas individuals to open up charities, businesses,
    et cetera. And for the years since, Fatah in the West Bank has
    been auditing and going through every one of these and finding
    all kinds of Hamas front organizations and just shutting them
    down, no press coverage, no fanfare.
        I had the opportunity to spend a decent amount of time,
    more than once, with the woman--one of you had asked about
    women before--who heads this department in the ministry in the
    West Bank. And they are doing phenomenal work. It is important
    that this type of thing continue.
        And the fact that Hamas was able to open up so many of
    these fronts in such a short period of time before the Hamas-
    Fatah government collapsed is a sign of how quickly all of the
    good work could fall apart if we allow it to.
        Ms. Frankel. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Ms. Frankel.
        Mr. Weber of Texas is recognized.
        Mr. Weber. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        I really don't have a lot of questions or comments. I am
    basically here to learn from our witnesses and their comments.
    It is doubtful they can learn much from me. So I yield back my
    time.
        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Okay. Thank you.
        Let me see. Who is the next one? He is yielding his time.
    So we will go with--thank you. Mr. Radel of Florida is
    recognized.
        Mr. Radel. Thank you, Madam----
        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. He had yielded his time. So I am not
    butting anybody here.
        Mr. Radel. A specific question and then bigger context
    here. And I think, Mr. Makovsky, you can answer both. The first
    very specific question, you talked about the West Bank and its
    economy. I am curious. Is any of it self-sufficient? How much
    of it is strictly dependent upon our money, taxpayer dollars?
        In the bigger picture here, though, what we are seeing, it
    is kind of a darned if you do, darned if you don't with foreign
    aid. Should we seek to prevent any kind of political unity,
    reconciliation? Is there any kind of laws or policy--you can
    include foreign aid in this--that would be even influential
    into preventing reconciliation?
        I would start with you, Mr. Makovsky, and anyone else who
    wants to chime in.
        Mr. Makovsky. Well, I think the West Bank has had usually a
    middle class that has been growing in recent years. They have
    been exporting to Israel. They export to Jordan and elsewhere.
    There have been some issues about exporting into Europe with
    security concerns. But a lot of that, it might be cumbersome,
    but Israel has legitimate security concerns in terms of
    material coming in and out.
        But I tend to think that this is something that should be
    encouraged. That is why I am so focused on the economics of
    this. And I say, you know, when you don't pay salaries--you
    know, that is times 5, 160,000 people times five--it affects a
    lot of people.
        Is donor assistance--that is kind of implied in your
    question, which is a very legitimate questions. Part of
    Fayyad's success that he has been so successful in getting
    donor aid, that it has helped grow the economy. I think it is
    part of it. I don't think it is the whole thing. I think we
    finally have a leader in Fayyad who believes that he will be
    measured more how much does he raise living standards upwards,
    rather than tear Israel down. That is a revolutionary idea.
        He is a PhD from the University of Texas in economics. He
    worked at the IMF for many years. And I think this idea of
    growing the middle class is something that is very important.
    And that is why it is not just about, you know, focusing on an
    individual. It is about the set of ideas that he is trying to
    install in government. And that is why I think this is such a
    vitally important experiment.
        Mr. Radel. Okay. Dr. Levitt, your take on preventing any
    kind of reconciliation, influence, policy, foreign aid?
        Mr. Levitt. I think we need to be very vocal about the fact
    that Hamas coming into this partnership without changing is
    crossing every red line. If people understand that that is the
    American position, they will understand there are consequences
    to that kind of behavior.
        I also don't think that this reconciliation--for all of the
    signing of documents and subsequent meetings, I don't see it
    happening simply because Hamas still insists on changing not
    one iota of its behavior and insisting that Fatah change its
    and getting the Interior Ministry.
        I think that we just need to make very, very clear how
    serious we are about the fact that there are things that Hamas
    can do to be admitted into the family of nations, starting with
    recognizing that there are Quartet principles, et cetera. Short
    of that, it is completely outside.
        Mr. Radel. And on the flip side, the consequences of not
    doing so.
        Dr. Rubin?
        Mr. Rubin. We have to be very careful of allowing ourselves
    to get into a situation where we fall victim to good cop/bad
    cop pressure on the part of various Palestinian groups, who may
    believe that we consider any particular group too big to fail.
    While I recognize, as David has said, the success of Fayyad, it
    is also important if we look at the metrics and public opinion,
    that the growth of the middle class and the West Bank, while
    good in long term, hasn't fundamentally altered attitudes. And,
    for that, we need to start focusing on issues such as--and I
    repeat--the incitement.
        There is always a tendency of the State Department to--an
    unwillingness to hold firm to declared principles if such a
    stand of holding firm would prevent more dialogue. It is
    crucial Congress intercede in such cases to ensure that the
    United States national security interests are upheld.
        Mr. Radel. Thank you, Madam Chair. I yield my time.
        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, sir.
        Mr. Vargas of California.
        Mr. Vargas. Thank you very much, Madam Chair. I appreciate
    it.
        I don't understand at all how we could possibly give any
    aid to any organization that would have terrorist elements. And
    so any merger here I think would be an absolute cutting off of
    aid. That is my view.
        I do want to ask, however, about Egypt. All three of you
    mentioned it very briefly. I mean, here is a nation of over 80
    million people, the current President talking about incitement
    in incendiary language. I mean, the comments that President
    Morsi had made in the past are just incredibly outrageous.
    Could you comment a little bit about what is happening and how
    this, our so-called allies, come into this? Because I do think
    it is very frightening to see what is happening with the
    implosion of many of these countries that border Israel through
    its security.
        If we could start off with Dr. Rubin? I see you were most
    anxious to answer. If you could go ahead and begin?
        Mr. Rubin. When I was in the Persian Gulf last year, I was
    talking to a number of liberals throughout the Persian Gulf.
    And they said, ``Look, it is not a surprise the Muslim
    Brotherhood would win in Egypt. They have been in opposition
    for eight decades. They could promise people the world. They
    could promise everyone a chicken in every pot, a pot in every
    home.'' They would provide everything. As soon as they won the
    elections, not just the Muslim Brotherhood but other Islamists
    behind them, they started losing support because what quickly
    became apparent is years of religious rhetoric would not be a
    panacea for ordinary people.
        What I was told by liberals in the Persian Gulf is the
    tragedy isn't that the Muslim Brotherhood would have won in
    Egypt. The tragedy is if anyone considers them too big to fail
    and refuses to allow them to fail because perhaps the best
    thing that could happen would be that Egyptians would wake up
    one day, as perhaps it seems they are, and recognize that the
    religious rhetoric of the Muslim Brotherhood and more radical
    groups doesn't provide an answer to them.
        So what we need to really ask is whether the Muslim
    Brotherhood is involved in a situation of one man one vote one
    time or, to paraphrase Recep Tayyip Erdogan back in the days
    when he was mayor, when he said, ``Democracy is like a
    streetcar, you ride it as far as you need and then you get
    off.'' We don't want a situation like that. Ultimately, the key
    United States interest in these regions is to ensure
    accountability.
        I would argue what the United States policy should be
    toward Egypt isn't simply apologizing for the Muslim
    Brotherhood but, rather, ensuring that there is another
    election in which the Muslim Brotherhood can be replaced if
    need be.
        Mr. Levitt. I agree. And I would add that, therefore, the
    fact that they kicked out U.S. civil society is a huge, huge
    issue.
        But, just focusing on Hamas, I think it is important to
    remember Hamas is the Palestinian branch of the Muslim
    Brotherhood. Its ties to Egypt go back very, very far, run
    very, very deep.
        When Mousa Abu Marzook, the deputy leader of Hamas, left
    Syria, he didn't go to Qatar. He didn't go to other places in
    the Persian Gulf. He went to Egypt. He now lives in Cairo. That
    is of particular interest to you and to me because he is
    indicted here in the United States. He is a fugitive of U.S.
    justice. And he is no longer living in a country that doesn't
    have an extradition agreement with us, as I understand. What
    would Egypt do if we asked them? I am pretty sure I know they
    wouldn't have ever heard of someone named Mousa Abu Marzook.
        But, again, I want to focus, as I did in my remarks and in
    my written testimony, on Sinai. The issue of the smuggling is
    of critical importance. Now, as we speak, I guarantee you
    weapons are moving across that territory headed for the Gaza
    Strip. The cease-fire from November will last only as long as
    it takes Hamas to rearm.
        Hamas has not changed one iota. It has pressures within the
    Gaza Strip from groups that are to the right of it that are al-
    Qaeda-like. And it, therefore, feels the need to act, even more
    than it did before. There is no situation under which Hamas
    simply stops attacking. All it is waiting for is to rearm. And
    Egypt here is the player.
        Mr. Makovsky. Congressman, I think, you know, taking a step
    back, I think it is very important for America's interests that
    we recognize that the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty of 1979 has
    been a cornerstone of American strategy, a successful one, for
    over three decades. There used to be interstate wars there,
    costing billions and billions of dollars every few years,
    dating back to 1948. The peace treaty, once you take 84 million
    people, the biggest Arab state, out, there are no more
    interstate wars.
        There are other problems: Hezbollah, Hamas, the Iran issue
    we could discuss. But this was a watershed. And the U.S.
    Congress was visionary in the early 1980s in understanding this
    is something we have to support. Again, I consider one of the
    great success stories of the United States of the last three
    decades that we were helpful in keeping that peace together.
        It is clear and we want to make sure that we don't want to
    take the aid away and become a self-fulfilling prophecy that
    they pull the rug from the peace. Yes, the aid, though, is part
    of their support for peace. There is no doubt. They only have
    $15 billion in foreign reserves; $1.2 billion in military
    assistance is important.
        I would just say you people, all of you on this panel, have
    a lot of influence because you are going to be meeting with
    Egyptians, the Egyptian military, the Egyptian political
    establishment. The Egyptian military has been a lobby within
    the Egyptian system for peace. And that is something that
    Israel has wanted to encourage: The Egypt-Israel military-to-
    military relationship.
        But I think you need to tell the Egyptians like what Matt
    Levitt just said. And that is the issue of the tunnels. Morsi
    cannot tell all of you people, ``Well, I don't really control
    it. It is the military.'' This past summer, he politically
    decapitated 70 top generals when he had to. He has influence.
        And you know what? If you really get into the Sinai, which
    I have really started doing, what you see is there are only a
    few routes that are passable to get Fajr-5 rockets, the ones
    that hit Jerusalem, that hit Tel Aviv. There are only three
    roads they can use.
        So it is not like there are thousands of roads here. There
    are two or three. I would even say two. But the point is it is
    Morsi using his influence with the military.
        And I personally believe if the Members of Congress could
    say it quietly, you could say it any way you feel useful.
    Convey that message here, ``We want to support you. We want to
    support peace. We just want to know what direction you are
    heading in when it comes to a peace treaty with Israel. We want
    to know your efforts on stopping the tunnel smuggling,'' which
    does more to bolster Hamas than anything else.
        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much.
        Dr. Yoho is recognized.
        Mr. Yoho. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
        You know, I hear this debate. And I have watched this for,
    you know, 20-30 years unrolling and just over and over again
    and Chairwoman, Ms. Ileana, saying that we have given billions
    of dollars. And we have seen this go back and forth. And we are
    given that money. And how can you separate it from Hamas and
    Fatah, you know, is one thing.
        You know, I agree with you, Dr. Rubin, that if we are going
    to give the money, there have got to be certain hoops or
    criteria that they follow. And if we don't do that, you know,
    we are just going to--I don't want to say kick the can down the
    road, but that is a phrase that I want to put to rest forever.
    You know, we are going to stomp on the can so it doesn't roll.
    But, you know, this has been an ongoing process.
        What I want to know is, what are they trying to accomplish?
    I know peace is the ultimate thing. But, yet, what is Egypt
    doing? You were saying the money that we give to Saudi Arabia.
    And we can't get them to the table. How do we do that?
        And why are they not coming to the table? Because, I mean,
    they are bordering countries. And they should be there every
    bit as we want because if we want the peace, you know, we are
    the outside player. We are the third person here. I want to
    know what they are doing to encourage that more than we should
    be. And we should take a supportive role. I just want to hear
    your thoughts on that.
        Thank you. Yes. You can start, Mr. Makovsky.
        Mr. Makovsky. I said in my remarks that I think that, you
    know, you should register your disappointment with the
    Egyptians, not that we give Saudi Arabia aid, but they should
    be giving the assistance to their Palestinian brothers, whom
    they always talk about.
        Mr. Yoho. Right.
        Mr. Makovsky. But, in practice, they are very slow to give
    the money. And I think it wouldn't be bad to bring the Saudi
    Ambassador here and ask him a lot of questions, saying, ``Here.
    Look, this is what we have done to help the Palestinians. What
    have you done?''
        And I mentioned my point about Qatar, $400 million to
    Hamas. And I feel that unless the Congress people are not
    active, the administration will always say, ``We have other
    equities to deal with. And we can't raise this issue too far,''
    of either side, Republican/Democratic administration. So I
    think it is very important the U.S. ask them about their level
    of support.
        You know, I don't want to repeat myself about what has been
    achieved about the metrics. I feel that we have had a quiet
    West Bank where Israel and the Palestinians are working
    together. And I think that is very valuable.
        I listed some other metrics. I wholeheartedly agree with my
    colleague Michael Rubin about the incitement issue that needs
    to be stressed as well. Attitudes of violence, of using
    violence, against Israel have dropped. But lately it has spiked
    up amid the impasse and the financial crisis there.
        Mr. Yoho. You were saying how it was quiet, but back in
    November, we had that massive, you know----
        Mr. Makovsky. From Gaza, Gaza, not West Bank.
        Mr. Yoho. Okay.
        Mr. Makovsky. So two separate places. Hamas controls Gaza.
    And the Palestinian Authority controls the West Bank. So all
    three of us I think are--you know, I don't want to speak for my
    colleagues but see these two very differently and call for
    saying, you know, where it is working in the West Bank we would
    want to bolster.
        And all of us have no illusions about what Hamas is. They
    are a terrorist organization.
        Mr. Yoho. Absolutely.
        Mr. Makovsky. There are no two ways around that.
        Mr. Yoho. Dr. Rubin?
        Mr. Rubin. Very briefly. You asked about the broader
    situation. I think it is important to recognize that for some
    people, the process is more important than the peace. Ideology
    matters. And we shouldn't assume the sincerity of all of our
    partners just because they may sit down at the same diplomatic
    table.
        If we look back at the Oslo process, Yasser Arafat visited
    the White House during the Clinton administration more than any
    other foreign leader. He wanted the recognition, the
    legitimacy, the aid which that brought him. Unfortunately, he
    was never willing to make the peace.
        And if we look at what so many people in the region already
    say--and Representative Cotton referred to this in his opening
    statement--we need to actually take people at their word. And
    if they are not willing to stand up publicly and say that they
    want peace, we should stop pretending they do.
        Mr. Levitt. I will just add on the question of how do you
    separate the funding between Fatah and Hamas, it is separated
    now. We are talking about what if there were a reunification?
    Therefore, I think it is important to stress again that I think
    any discussion of preemptive defunding would be
    counterproductive.
        Post-reunification, if there were to be such a thing, which
    would be very bad, as we all agree, then there would be a
    serious discussion need to be had about what kind of funding
    could be continued and under what circumstances.
        There is precedent. The Bush administration continued
    funding in 2006 after Hamas and Fatah formed a government
    together. It was very flawed. I was in government at the time.
    It was very complicated. I don't know that it could be done
    again. Maybe we should learn from that lesson. That is
    something we should look back on. We should anticipate.
        I think from both sides of the aisle, there will be
    pressure to find ways to fund non-military things, other things
    because of humanitarian issues, et cetera. That is something we
    should think about beyond just the broad statements of ``We
    don't want to fund Hamas.'' Nobody wants to fund Hamas. And
    there are clear U.S. laws against giving money to any part of
    Hamas, but there will be serious conversations that will need
    to be had about is there a way--maybe not--to provide funds to
    some elements of the Palestinian governance that aren't Hamas--
    --
        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you.
        Mr. Levitt. It may be uncomfortable, but that conversation
    will have to be had.
        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much.
        Mr. Higgins of New York?
        Mr. Higgins. Thank you, Madam Chair.
        I think there is a lot of discussion about essentially the
    same thing. The crux is the same. And that is, you know, the
    West Bank, I get where you would try to legitimize Fatah by
    assisting Mahmoud Abbas toward the goal of creating economic
    growth in a place that really has not experienced any kind of
    impressive economic growth. And if you succeed in that regard,
    then what you do is the only thing that you can do. You present
    a model to Palestinians that their future is either here on the
    road to stability and recognition or it is back in Gaza under
    Hamas that is preoccupied with the destruction of Israel.
        So you can't state build without political stability. And
    you can't have political stability without a categorical
    rejection of violence and a recognition of Israel's right to
    exist and Israel's right to defend itself.
        So, you know, I don't think there is anything the West
    really can do to change that. You know, they have decided a
    future that says it is better to fight the Jews than it is
    whether you win or lose than it is to fight for a better future
    for your own kids.
        So I would just throw that out and ask you to respond.
        Mr. Makovsky. Let me just say that I think you are hearing
    some skepticism, at least from Matt and myself, Congressman,
    that this unity thing is really going to happen. They all love
    to talk about it because who could be against unity as a
    theory, but, as we tried to say in our testimony, there are
    some real impediments to actually making it happen.
        And, by the way, it might even help for Members of Congress
    to consider that people are able in the Arab world to say that
    America is against unifying the Palestinians. We are not
    against them. We just want to make sure that unity happens on
    the basis of international criteria and that Hamas is not ten
    feet tall.
        If you would have told them in 2006 that they couldn't peel
    off the Europeans from the United States, they would have
    laughed at you. They would have been shocked. And, yet, the
    United States and the Europeans have held together, something
    that is not usually discussed, but that is an important point.
        We are kind of in the situation like West Berlin/East
    Berlin. And we want to see the West Berlin model be successful.
    And we are doing what we can, and everyone should do what they
    can, I should say, to make sure that the West Berlin model
    works because we have seen some positive results.
        Mr. Levitt. I will just add, as we have said, it comes
    down--you know, the idea of reconciliation isn't bad. It is on
    what terms, on whose terms. That is the key.
        I find the theme that you raised is an extremely important
    one. It is the most frustrating one to me. I wrote my book on
    Hamas in 2006. It came out shortly after Hamas won the
    elections. And the concluding chapter argued, ``Why don't we
    beat Hamas at their own game?'' Because what makes Hamas
    popular isn't actually their attacks, but it is the provision
    of social service, their Dowa, social welfare infrastructure.
    And, actually, if you look at the numbers, it is actually not
    huge numbers. If we directed some of our aid to that, maybe we
    could beat them at that game, at least in the West Bank.
        The international community was on board with the idea. The
    quartet was on board with the idea. Former Prime Minister Tony
    Blair was given that portfolio. And, for reasons that are a
    hearing unto itself, we have failed, all of us, miserably in
    this regard.
        I think it is absolutely crucial that we try and create in
    the West Bank something that people look at and say, ``Oh, you
    can succeed.'' The idea of peaceful negotiation can succeed. It
    requires the type of interim steps David talked about so
    Palestinians and Israelis both see that progress can happen
    politically, but it also requires things on the ground in terms
    of social welfare, economic opportunity. And then let people
    look at Gaza and see what it is.
        Mr. Rubin. Very, very quickly. Attacks do bolster
    popularity, unfortunately. We saw this after the Hezbollah
    conflict in 2006. We saw this most recently last year. If we
    legitimize a strategy, which is their strategy, then what we do
    is ensure that we have more violence down the road. It is all
    well and good to try to extract what you can at the diplomatic
    table or through the political process, but if you still have
    in the back of your mind the idea that if you can't get what
    you won at the ballot box or in diplomatic circles, then you
    are just going to fire rockets at Israel, then that really is a
    commitment to violence that we can't afford to ignore.
        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much.
        Mr. Kinzinger, it is a pleasure to have you on our
    committee.
        Mr. Kinzinger. Oh, it is great to be here.
        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you.
        Mr. Kinzinger. Thank you. Thanks, Madam Chair. And thank
    you guys for coming out. Appreciate it.
        You know, we have hammered a lot of those issues and may
    hit some of them as the discussion progresses.
        Mr. Makovsky, I have a couple of questions for you
    specifically. You mentioned in the Sinai region, that there are
    basically two or three roads. That could be whether it is
    controlled or patrolled or whatever. Do those terminate, do
    those actually terminate, into Israel? Is there a termination
    point in Sinai? And if they do terminate in Israel, are we
    seeing that the weapons are getting off that road at some point
    and being smuggled in? Are they being smuggled through those
    roadblocks? What can you tell me about that a little bit?
        Mr. Makovsky. Here it is. Let's take the Fajr-5 rockets
    that were used, the longer-range rockets, by Hamas from Gaza in
    the November attacks. The rockets start off in Iran. And
    Matthew Levitt is a bigger expert than I am, but you asked the
    question of me. So it often goes through Eritrea or Sudan and
    gets brought in through the shore, the western shore, of Sinai
    on these two or three roads and goes into Gaza, southern Gaza.
    Israel isn't there. Israel got out of Gaza in 2005. And it
    goes, you know, through these tunnels from Egypt, of northern
    Sinai into southern Gaza, often in trucks, to northern Gaza and
    then fired in Israel. And there are only two or three roads.
    And it is really--I am sorry--in my view an issue of political
    will of the Egyptians to stop it. And I totally----
        Mr. Kinzinger. You said there are two or three roads. But
    it basically gets to a point whereby Israel itself cannot
    necessarily----
        Mr. Makovsky. Israel doesn't control Sinai. It is Egyptian
    sovereign territory.
        Mr. Kinzinger. Right. I understand that.
        Mr. Makovsky. And Gaza is not Israeli territory either. So,
    I mean, the point to me is that it is about a political
    resolve----
        Mr. Kinzinger. Sure.
        Mr. Makovsky [continuing]. Of Morsi, of Egypt. Matt and I
    agree you don't stop it at the 5-yard line.
        Mr. Kinzinger. Right.
        Mr. Makovsky. You are on the goal line, like right just at
    the tunnel from northern Sinai into southern Gaza. You want to
    stop it way back,----
        Mr. Kinzinger. Yes.
        Mr. Makovsky [continuing]. Much earlier. Now, is----
        Mr. Kinzinger. Thank you.
        Mr. Makovsky. It could bomb some convoys in Sudan----
        Mr. Kinzinger. Yes.
        Mr. Makovsky [continuing]. Out of, I would say, frustration
    that the Egyptians have not done their part. And this is a big
    issue.
        Mr. Kinzinger. Mr. Levitt, just briefly do you want to
    address that? I just had one other issue I wanted to hit, too.
        Mr. Levitt. It is an honor that David tells me I am the
    expert on this, but----
        Mr. Kinzinger. Yes.
        Mr. Levitt [continuing]. It makes me feel good. You know, I
    feel like you touched it well. And I'll use your football
    analogy. He loves sports analogies.
        Look, the thing is this. It is not just that there are two
    or three roads. There are certain mountain passes that they
    have got to get through. They can go off those roads as they
    get closer to the Sinai. This is being done by criminal
    syndicates, mostly Bedouin, in the Sinai, been smuggling for a
    long, long time. Some of them discovered radical Islam and
    Jihad along the way. Some of them will work for anybody for
    money. All of them are very heavily armed. And the Egyptians
    don't want to take them on, even though----
        Mr. Kinzinger. So is it a lack of will to take them on or
    is it----
        Mr. Levitt. Absolutely.
        Mr. Kinzinger [continuing]. A desire to see this stuff
    actually happen?
        Mr. Levitt. It is absolutely a lack of will, even after
    Egyptian soldiers have been killed by some of these entities. I
    think there is also a small element of lack of capability if
    that still exists, but that is something that is easily
    rectified. We can be providing intelligence on some of these
    convoys, et cetera. But, short of that, the only thing that
    Israel has left is, as David said, air strikes, either in
    Sinai--there have been some----
        Mr. Kinzinger. Sure.
        Mr. Levitt [continuing]. Or further abroad.
        Mr. Kinzinger. Let me ask you, had we used, had the
    administration used, the deliverance of the F-16s or the N-1
    Abrams as kind of a stick to say, ``We will withdraw the
    deployment or the selling of these assets to you or the giving
    of these assets to you in Egypt. As a result, if you want these
    to follow through on our contract, you have to crack down on
    this in Sinai,'' could that have been effective or do you think
    that is just something totally different?
        Mr. Levitt. I think that type of that discussion has to be
    had. I would phrase it differently. I wouldn't make it an
    explicit threat. I would say, ``Look, we are excited to give
    you this stuff, but we really need to know, how do you intend
    to solve this problem here?''
        Mr. Kinzinger. And I think that is a big concern we have
    been having. You know, we have had this for decades, the idea
    of, well, if we pull aid away or reduce aid, then we lose a
    seat at the table and then we can't have influence, but, as we
    are seeing, we don't have influence. And so, in essence, how
    was aid even being used for that? You see that in Pakistan. You
    see it in Egypt. So that is even a bigger question.
        And let me hit, then, when it comes to the Palestinian
    Authority--I know we have addressed it a little bit--so if this
    unification happens, we are in that question--I heard, Mr.
    Makovsky, I think you said something about you can't reduce
    aid. And I think, Mr. Rubin, you said you can use aid as a way
    to negotiate. Maybe I didn't exactly get that correctly.
        But let's say unification happens, got the aid. Why don't
    you just very briefly address because I am almost out of time
    how the carrot or stick approach to aid can be used in ensuring
    that there is stability in a world that, frankly, kind of
    appears to be on fire?
        Mr. Rubin. I just want to clarify. I don't think United
    States aid should ever be an entitlement to a hostile regime. I
    very much do think we can use aid as a stick and that we
    shouldn't be giving aid to any administration, be it in the
    Palestinian areas or anywhere else, that is actively promoting
    terrorism and hostile----
        Mr. Kinzinger. I agree with you. And I think as pro foreign
    aid as I am, I think it is important that foreign aid not just
    be used as a seat at the table and a table that you are not
    going to get a seat at and actually be used to guarantee that
    we do get a seat at the table.
        With that, I am out of time. Madam Chair, thank you.
        Mr. Makovsky. Can I just respond? I just want to be sure
    that no one misinterprets me. I want to reiterate it again.
    When I called for U.S. support for the P.A., I did not say that
    if there is a P.A.-Hamas government with Hamas people there and
    no security and no Fayyad. I certainly said I don't think a
    person in the United States would support it. I just called for
    continuing now while there is no unity deal. I don't believe it
    is happening.
        Mr. Kinzinger. Yes.
        Mr. Makovsky. And so I just want to be sure no one confuses
    those two.
        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much. Thank you, Adam.
        Mr. Schneider, thank you so much.
        Mr. Schneider. Thank you, Madam Chair. And thank you to the
    witnesses for joining us.
        I believe one of you, I believe it was Dr. Levitt,
    mentioned in opening remarks that Hamas has a long view in
    history and I think the Arab world does this. And we see in the
    region around the Israeli-Palestinian conflict with the Arab
    Spring, the Arab emergence, whatever you want to call it,
    countries at a crossroads. And my sense of what is happening in
    Israel and the Palestinian territories is that they feel that
    they are not at a crossroads, not on a path anywhere, but,
    really, on a treadmill, that we are doing the same thing over
    and over again and, Mr. Makovsky, your comment that we should
    have a policy that rewards those that focus on coexistence with
    Israel, those that will take the steps toward peace and we
    should make sure we never reward those who promote antagonism
    or terrorism. And, yet, what we see in the West Bank is Hamas
    is becoming re-emergent, and we are taking steps backwards as
    Fatah continues in its path of corruption.
        And Fayyad for all of the support we wants to give him
    seems not to have any support, any constituency getting behind
    him. How do we help Fayyad? How do we help that third way, if
    you will, to a path that can get this off of this treadmill?
        Mr. Makovsky. My point is that, look, we are holding up a
    lot of aid. I think a lot of the 2012 aid has not been
    disbursed. He has been viewed as indispensable to that. And I
    tend to believe that as long as he is continuing on the path of
    reform--and, by the way, he doesn't often get credited for
    this, but he has been pivotal in the security cooperation with
    Israel and the Palestinian Authority. You know, we support
    those who, you know, support our values. And I think that he
    has had a lot of success.
        I said in my opening remarks where I feel the lack of aid
    has hurt him and made him more vulnerable. And there are a lot
    of people who fear his ascension to follow Abbas has enabled
    them to unite around it.
        And so, instead of our lack of aid hurting Abbas and having
    demonstrations outside of his office, all the demonstrations
    are outside Fayyad's office. In my view, that is
    counterproductive.
        And as long as there is no unity on the basis of Hamas
    accepting the international criteria--again, I am not against
    the idea of unity, but until Hamas changes along the
    international criteria lines, there should be no unity. And
    Fayyad keeps his policies. And we should be supportive and
    release the holds on this money so we could bolster those key
    people who support the idea of coexistence and have helped
    Israel keep the area quiet for the last 5 years.
        Mr. Schneider. Dr. Levitt?
        Mr. Levitt. Hamas does have a long view. And when it looks
    at the Arab awakening, it sees its long view vindicated. It
    feels empowered right now. As I said, I think this is one of
    the reasons why it decided to open up hostilities in November.
        And when you compare that to the position of the moderates
    in the West Bank who are taking a position of non-violence,
    taking a position of two-state solution in negotiations and are
    getting defunded, it becomes extraordinarily difficult for them
    to explain to their constituents why their position still holds
    merit. While Hamas is still bravely fighting and sticking its
    eye in Israel's finger [sic] and then you are competing for
    public opinion, it is very, very hard. I think this is the type
    of thing that helps Palestinian public opinion polling data
    lead to questions like, do you support violence and see a
    short-term uptake in that after violence like November because
    we don't see the moderates on the other side being able to show
    tangibly what they are getting.
        Mr. Rubin. Let me just phrase this a different way.
    Throwing the lifeline to Egypt and describing Turkish Prime
    Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan as best friend to America is to
    throw a lifeline to Hamas right now. What we are seeing between
    Hamas and Fatah cannot be separated from what is going on in
    the broader region. And, unfortunately, rather than having a
    broader strategy to address it, we tend to be in full-blown
    reactive mode.
        Thank you.
        Mr. Schneider. Pulling you back to the West Bank in
    specific because the people I talk to are saying that over the
    past couple of years, the cooperation, security cooperation, in
    particular, between Israelis and P.A. forces has led to a great
    reduction in violence in the West Bank, hopefully to get us off
    of that treadmill. How do we make sure that we don't compromise
    that ability of the Israelis and Palestinian to cooperate in
    the West Bank?
        Mr. Rubin. There will not be a continuation of that
    cooperation if there is a reconciliation with Hamas. The West
    Bank has had the advantage both to be under Fatah's leadership
    or Fayyad's management and also to border Jordan, which takes
    the threat of Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood more broadly and
    as seriously as does Israel.
        What we see in Gaza isn't simply the Hamas administration
    there but the active involvement of some of the neighboring
    states. It is important to recognize not only the support we
    have given to Fayyad but the unilateral Israeli security
    measures, like the wall,----
        Mr. Schneider. Right.
        Mr. Rubin [continuing]. And the cooperation of the Kingdom
    of Jordan. We should be coordinating with the Kingdom of Jordan
    on some of these issues, rather than seeing everything through
    the lens of Egypt.
        Mr. Schneider. Thank you. I am out of time.
        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much.
        Mr. DeSantis of Florida is recognized.
        Mr. DeSantis. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. I thank the
    panelists.
        I have missed a lot because I am also on Judiciary, and we
    are starting our immigration hearings, more cameras in that one
    if you can imagine. But thank you. So if I ask questions that
    have been asked, I apologize.
        I think we all agree on Hamas, but in terms of the
    Palestinian Authority, Mr. Abbas, what is your sense? Because
    when I started first following this a while ago, it struck me
    that, you know, we would have this idea of a peace process. You
    had Arafat at the time, various Israeli Prime Ministers, and
    the American President would be involved. But then if you
    actually went back and looked at what was going on in the
    Palestinian areas, you would see maps that didn't have Israel
    there. You would listen to some of the things that were said in
    Arabic. And it was not necessarily conducive to wanting a
    peaceful solution.
        So at the end of the day, people like Hamas and the
    Palestinian Authority, just what is your sense? Do they
    honestly think a two-state solution is a lasting peace or is
    that just a step to eventually move Israel out of the area?
        Mr. Makovsky. I think on the issue when you asked about
    President Abbas, in particular--and I think he is flawed in
    many ways, but I will say this for him. He is a man of this
    way, of great courage in the sense that he has been very
    consistent against violence. And he has had death threats
    against him.
        He said the Second Intifada--at one point, he said it was
    terrorism. That was between 2000 and 2004, where there are
    1,000 dead Israelis, 3,000 dead Palestinians. He has paid a
    price. He has said publicly, you know, ``We want the West Bank,
    but the rest of it, Israel, that is Israel forever.'' That is
    good. He has done certain things. But he has been,
    unfortunately, risk-averse in the sense of wanting a grand deal
    that would--he would have to make historic concessions.
        And people could look at 2008 in his final months of the
    Olmert premiership. People say, ``Well, Olmert was a lame duck.
    He was at 3 percent in the polls. Come on.'' But Abbas there
    had a great opportunity that, you know, he didn't take.
        And so this risk aversion to do the grand deal I think is a
    very fair question about his ultimate attentions and maybe
    things like refugees, Jerusalem, any sort of compromises there.
    He is not capable. We don't know yet.
        My point is--and Matt says I love football and sports. So I
    will use an analogy. If we throw a hail, Mary pass, we are
    going to throw an interception or we are going to throw an
    incomplete pass. We should focus on screen passes, short
    passes, that enable us to make yardage down field. We might not
    score a touchdown, but we will have made a lot of progress. I
    think that you can do with him. And I think the fact that he is
    committed to security cooperation is a very important point.
        I mean, I just remember Yasser Arafat. That is not for me
    ancient history. This is a guy who yelled ``Jihad'' and
    ``Aljazeera'' in the middle of an intifada. That is like
    calling for fire in a crowded theatre.
        And so I think they have come a long way, but there are
    definitely shortcomings. And if we had more time, I would like
    to go into greater detail.
        Mr. DeSantis. Dr. Rubin?
        Mr. Rubin. Well, to make another football analogy--thank
    you for not completely running down the clock--Mahmoud Abbas is
    in the ninth year of his 4-year term as President. I think that
    shows a little bit about his interest in the rule of law.
        As I argued before, he is a man that shows a deep interest
    in the process, rather than the peace, so long as he gets the
    privileges of the process. I don't think he is willing to take
    that final step.
        And, lastly, I would just suggest that his strategy at the
    United Nations and his willingness to cast aside all of the
    previous agreements which the Palestinian Authority had made,
    which its existence has been based upon, suggests that perhaps
    he is not as committed to the same end goal that many diplomats
    in the State Department believe he is.
        Thank you.
        Mr. DeSantis. And if you could, Dr. Levitt, just beyond
    Abbas the man, I mean, is he just reflecting a deep hostility
    amongst the Palestinian people to have a two-state solution in
    your judgment?
        Mr. Levitt. I don't think so. I don't think he is. I think
    that most Palestinians want a two-state solution, certainly in
    the West Bank and I think even predominantly in the Gaza Strip,
    though I haven't been in the Gaza Strip for several years now.
        Look, there is need for political reform, as Mike has
    pointed out. There is need for better things on rule of law, as
    Mike has pointed out. But I think that David is also right that
    on the issue of articulating a message of non-violence, he has
    been good.
        It is not enough because he has to bring people along on
    the whole package, which includes only staying in office as
    long as you are supposed to and other issues. But the process
    has to be given space to progress in order for all of these
    things to happen.
        At least in the West Bank, you do have a partner working
    with you on security measures. And I speak to the Palestinians
    about this. I speak to the administration here about this. But
    I speak to the Israelis about it. And they don't like to go out
    with pom-poms, but you talk to them privately, and they will
    tell you just how much the Palestinians are doing and just how
    bad it would be if they stopped.
        Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much.
        Mr. Meadows of North Carolina is recognized.
        Mr. Meadows. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
        Dr. Rubin, earlier, you were talking about, as the chairman
    had brought up with some of the funding and so forth, that
    there had been already violations as we see it in terms of some
    of the foreign aid and that there would need a greater
    accountability and oversight. Can you speak to that
    specifically and what you would like to see and how either
    policy from this body or another oversight body would play into
    that?
        Mr. Rubin. Specifically, during the Oslo process and after,
    there were instances in which the American discussions with
    Yasser Arafat and the PLO would have to be severed if the
    United States drew the conclusion that Yasser Arafat was
    directly involved in terrorism. We had instances, for example,
    of his signature on disbursements of $20,000 in aid to
    operatives working in Fatah who subsequently staged terrorist
    attacks. What we were told by the State Department was that was
    not conclusive evidence.
        We need to have a willingness to recognize that the State
    Department is going to try to continue with dialogue and
    continue with the process in the hope of creating, of opening
    doors. But so long as we don't hold their feet to the fire when
    it comes to definitive evidence or perhaps even the
    preponderance of evidence, then ultimately we are going to be
    trapped in a good cop/bad cop approach.
        Sometimes I would argue we need to go back to the past,
    when we were willing, the United States Congress was willing,
    to hold up items which the United States State Department
    wanted in order to ensure a much more coherent compliance with
    the laws which the U.S. Congress had passed.
        Thank you.
        Mr. Meadows. Okay. And then following--go ahead, Dr.
    Levitt.
        Mr. Levitt. I was just going to say, you know, historically
    this is absolutely true. And if you Google PLOCCA, the first
    two things you will get are the reports that I wrote at the
    time blasting the State Department for some of these things
    that they left out, ignoring the Karin A weapons-smuggling ship
    to seize documents, et cetera. And it wasn't just the PLOCCA
    report. It was also what we then called the Patterns of Global
    Terrorism, the annual CRT report that is now called Country
    Reports on Terrorism.
        However, if you look at the latest Country Reports on
    Terrorism--and bits of it I quote in my written report--there
    is a marked improvement in truth-telling, maybe not quite there
    but a marked, marked improvement.
        And I know firsthand that the State Department over the
    past few years has been investing the kind of resources it
    hadn't in years in working with foreign governments, especially
    in Europe but also elsewhere, to do more to combat the
    financing of Hamas and Gaza in an effort to do all of the
    things we have been talking about today.
        So I want to make clear I completely agree with Mike, but
    the really bad actions by the State Department in failure to
    tell truth were several years ago. And there is a marked
    difference today.
        Mr. Makovsky. I am not aware, sir, that the Israelis, for
    example, have any complaints about the Palestinian Authority as
    smuggling weaponry the way they feared under the Yasser Arafat
    battle days. Again, I am not saying that things today are
    perfect, but----
        Mr. Meadows. Right.
        Mr. Makovsky [continuing]. I am just saying I remember
    those days. And I don't see any complaints from Israel today
    like there were in the old days, which were justified.
        Mr. Meadows. All right. And getting back to, you know, the
    football analogies that we have on both sides of this, you
    know, one is a hail, Mary pass that obviously is either
    intercepted or dropped and the other is screen passes. Do we
    end up making screen pass plays that never get us past the red
    zone?
        Mr. Makovsky. It is a fair question. I just feel that right
    now we are stuck in this box that it is either all or nothing
    in the Middle East. It is always nothing. And we have had other
    paralysis for the last 4 years between Israel and the
    Palestinian Authority. And I am concerned that this will lead
    to radicalization on the ground if people say, ``Look, you have
    heard this legacy of non-violence, Mr. Abbas, but what have you
    achieved?'' I think that is a real concern.
        And, you know, with the screen pass, I can go longer down
    the field or shorter down the field----
        Mr. Meadows. Okay.
        Mr. Makovsky [continuing]. Pending the players. It is not
    all up to the United States.
        Mr. Meadows. All right. Dr.----
        Mr. Makovsky. But I just feel we have got to stay out of
    this all or nothing approach because I am concerned that
    paralysis is going to lead to an explosion.
        Mr. Meadows. Thank you. Dr. Rubin?
        Mr. Rubin. Sometimes moral clarity is important on the part
    of the United States and its foreign policy. We cannot force a
    peace until all Palestinian factions internalize the idea that
    they want that peace. Thank you.
        Mr. Meadows. Thank you.
        Mr. DeSantis [presiding]. Thank you.
        The chair recognizes Mr. Collins from Georgia.
        Mr. Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I appreciate it.
        I am going to stick with the football analogy. It has
    become popular today as I will be coming in. But I don't want
    to talk about plays. I want to talk about the draft. I am going
    to go back a little bit further because some of us mentioned
    earlier about the broader view. And I think this is a concern
    because I believe as we are sitting in a town of political
    motives and we are sitting in a town of harsh realities, that
    there may be a deeper issue here that I would like to explore
    with each of you and the dealing with Hamas and the unrest in
    Syria, Iran, the things that have been going on there and
    basically the aid that they have been getting from these two
    entities who are now struggling on different fronts, which has
    been significantly reduced. Due to the less support that seems
    to be coming in for Hamas, do you believe, one--is that driving
    them maybe to make more of a show of unification with Fatah? I
    happen to believe, as some have said, that maybe unity is not
    where this is going to lead to but a show that is being done
    that may be hedging this bet or saying, ``Here is where we are
    at right now. This is the political reality. Here is the only
    place we can go.''
        I would like to see what the future would look like because
    I think for Israel and other partners there, this is critical.
    This is where we need to go. And I would like to hear your
    comments on that. And maybe we will just start with whichever
    way you want to start.
        Mr. Levitt. I am regretting bringing up an old football
    analogy. Mr. Kennedy has left. But every time we mention it, I
    just think about my Patriots not making it.
        There is a myth out there that Iran is not funding Hamas
    anymore. It is a myth. Iran is still giving a tremendous amount
    of money and weapons, especially weapons, to Hamas. And that is
    a huge problem. Syria, of course, is another issue right now,
    but the Iran issue is still something we struggle with.
        I agree with you that I don't think that either party is
    seriously interested in reconciliation right now because both
    parties understand that Hamas feels ascendant because of the
    Arab awakening and Hamas feels no need to make any concessions
    on its key demands for an end to security cooperation, et
    cetera.
        But both need to be seen or see themselves as pursuing this
    because the public, the Palestinian public, still calls for it.
    They want it. They want the fighting to stop. They don't deal
    with the big picture. Will Hamas do this? Will Fatah do that?
    They just want the Palestinian populace to be one again, which,
    as David said, sounds like a nice idea but when you get into
    the weeds has real ramifications.
        At the end of the day, I think that if you have small plays
    and you go not only just for the first downs but you make sure
    that as you do that, you are continuing to make headway down
    field, as an interim thing, that is where we need to be.
    Eventually, then, maybe you will have a ripe environment when
    you find yourself closer to the red zone. We are nowhere near
    that now.
        The problem is if you still only think about the red zone,
    when the environment is not right for it at all, you are going
    to backtrack. So we have to do what we can now so that we don't
    have a complete collapse so that when the environment improves,
    we will be able to take advantage of it.
        Mr. Makovsky. I think your point about the unity facade is
    what is accurate. And maybe they are hedging their bets, you
    know, if, indeed, something happens, that they have this
    opportunity as a plan B. I certainly don't see it as a plan A
    for all of the reasons we have been saying in this panel, which
    I don't want to repeat. But I do think that there is a need to
    find ways to go down field.
        Maybe we all talk football because we just saw the Super
    Bowl. And hopefully it is not lights out in the West Bank. But
    we need to find a way that the people who support the idea of
    two-state solutions are not marginalized and parody, ``Oh, you
    haven't achieved anything'' because the security cooperation is
    based that these Palestinians are telling their public, ``Yes.
    We are coordinating against our own brothers working with
    Israel because it is part of state building. And we are
    building a state.'' If there is no state-to-state building,
    these people become vulnerable. And I just don't think that it
    will be sustainable over time.
        So I think that if we make progress, whether we are--you
    know how much the progress is, we could define it, but I think
    it is critical there. And it is also critical for Israel, where
    it is being more and more isolated and people are trying to
    depict Netanyahu, ``Oh, you are doing the settlements because
    you really want to take over the whole West Bank.'' And, in
    fact, virtually all of his construction is in 5 percent. Again,
    I am not defending it, but I am just saying by signaling a
    direction, we give the moderates some ammo, political
    ammunition, against their own radicals internally.
        Mr. Collins. I don't want you to answer, but in dealing
    with this, I am looking at the picture as well as Hamas looking
    to the future. Every organization is self-fulfilling or self-
    sustaining. And I just don't believe at this point there has
    been enough proven evidence to say that they are backing off
    now become states in doing this. Is there more of an angle that
    you see here for a long term of where they are going here?
        Mr. Makovsky. Hamas has made clear in its statements that
    it doesn't believe that it should ever throw away its gun. If
    there is any unity, it will subsume Fatah. Hamas will subsume
    Fatah.
        I would argue that where my disagreement is with my two
    colleagues, very briefly, is there are two general philosophies
    of diplomacy. One is to wait for the opportunities to occur,
    for the stars to align for the right circumstances to occur.
    And the second is to use a process to force those doors to
    open. I am not sure not only that the second choice doesn't
    work, but sometimes I believe that trying to use a process to
    force the right circumstances can actually backfire a great
    deal.
        Mr. Collins. I think that is something we definitely need
    to look forward into the future. And I believe my time is up.
        Mr. DeSantis. All right. The chair recognizes Mr. Weber
    from Texas.
        Mr. Weber. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        David, you said something a minute ago that kind of got my
    attention. I forget the terms you used. You said Israel and the
    P.A. for the last 4 years have been at a stalemate or
    paralyzed.
        Mr. Makovsky. I said that there has been a negotiating
    impasse for the last 4 years. The Obama administration has only
    been 3 weeks of talks in the last 4 years. We have never been
    in this situation before.
        Now, how do I apportion the blame? Why is that? You know, I
    think there is probably enough blame to go around. I think in
    terms of Abbas, he should come to the table. He says, ``Well,
    if I come to the table and Netanyahu builds settlements, I look
    like a fool. And my internal political standing as a politician
    is going to be hurt.'' But if you don't try to go forward, on
    the other hand, you are not going to be achieving your goals.
    So risk aversion I think has led him to be in a shell.
        ``So all right. I will go to the United Nations,'' which I
    think we all know there are no shortcuts. You can't have
    statehood without peace. And I think that that has been a major
    mistake.
        And I think with Netanyahu, he could--we didn't have a
    chance to talk about the Israeli domestic results. If anyone
    would ask me, I would be happy to offer some thoughts on this.
    But I think while he showed boldness in many ways on the
    economics and working with Fayyad and taking down checkpoints
    in the West Bank and he doesn't always get the credit for what
    he has done----
        Mr. Weber. I get that part, but, I mean, we said here that,
    number one, the violence has decreased from the Palestinian
    Authority.
        Mr. Makovsky. Right.
        Mr. Weber. And we said that the cooperation has increased.
        Mr. Makovsky. Right.
        Mr. Weber. That doesn't sound like an impasse.
        Mr. Makovsky. No, no, no. The bottom-up stuff has been
    better than ever. I said there have been some blips with Fayyad
    going back, but for the most part, the trajectory has been
    forward. But on the negotiation of, can Israel and the
    Palestinian Authority find a way to decide ``Where do we draw
    this border? How do we build this two-state solution?'' there
    has been a complete impasse.
        Mr. Weber. On that one particular----
        Mr. Makovsky. On that point.
        Mr. Weber. I got you.
        Mr. Makovsky. On the top-down negotiation. And the question
    is, can the bottom up be sustained if there is no top down? And
    my argument is that it can be over time, but I am not saying it
    is going to break down tomorrow morning. I am just saying they
    have to go together. That is all.
        Mr. Weber. Thank you.
        Mr. DeSantis. Do you yield back?
        Mr. Weber. I do.
        Mr. DeSantis. Okay. Well, thank you. Thanks to all of the
    witnesses for your time and your great testimony. This hearing
    is adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 11:58 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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