[Senate Hearing 112-925]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 112-925
STRENGTHENING THE INTEGRITY OF THE STUDENT VISA SYSTEM BY PREVENTING
AND DETECTING SHAM EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON IMMIGRATION,
REFUGEES AND BORDER SECURITY
of the
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JULY 24, 2012
__________
Serial No. J-112-88
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
93-287 PDF WASHINGTON : 2015
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Publishing
Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800;
DC area (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2104 Mail: Stop IDCC,
Washington, DC 20402-0001
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont, Chairman
HERB KOHL, Wisconsin CHUCK GRASSLEY, Iowa
DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California ORRIN G. HATCH, Utah
CHUCK SCHUMER, New York JON KYL, Arizona
DICK DURBIN, Illinois JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, Rhode Island LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina
AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota JOHN CORNYN, Texas
AL FRANKEN, Minnesota MICHAEL S. LEE, Utah
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware TOM COBURN, Oklahoma
RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
Bruce A. Cohen, Chief Counsel and Staff Director
Kolan Davis, Republican Chief Counsel and Staff Director
------
Subcommittee on Immigration, Refugees and Border Security
CHUCK SCHUMER, New York, Chairman
PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont JOHN CORNYN, Texas
DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California CHUCK GRASSLEY, Iowa
DICK DURBIN, Illinois ORRIN HATCH, Utah
AL FRANKEN, Minnesota JON KYL, Arizona
RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
Stephanie Martz, Democratic Chief Counsel
Matt Johnson, Republican Chief Counsel
C O N T E N T S
----------
STATEMENTS OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS
Page
Schumer, Hon. Chuck, a U.S. Senator from the State of New York... 1
Grassley, Hon. Charles, a U.S. Senator from the State of Iowa.... 3
prepared statement........................................... 22
Feinstein, Hon. Dianne, a U.S. Senator from the State of
California..................................................... 3
WITNESSES
Witness List..................................................... 21
Gambler, Rebecca, Acting Director, Homeland Security and Justice,
U.S. Government Accountability Office, Washington, DC.......... 5
prepared statement........................................... 25
Woods, John P., Assistant Director, National Security
Investigations, Homeland Security Investigations, U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, U.S. Department of
Homeland Security, Washington, DC.............................. 6
prepared statement........................................... 37
QUESTIONS
Questions submitted by Senator Grassley for Rebecca Gambler...... 47
Questions submitted by Senator Grassley for John P. Woods........ 48
ANSWERS
Responses of Rebecca Gambler to questions submitted by Senator
Grassley....................................................... 50
Responses of John P. Woods to questions submitted by Senator
Grassley (redacted)............................................ 55
STRENGTHENING THE INTEGRITY OF THE STUDENT VISA SYSTEM BY PREVENTING
AND DETECTING SHAM EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS
----------
TUESDAY, JULY 24, 2012
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Immigration, Refugees, and Border
Security,
Committee on the Judiciary,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:10 a.m., in
Room SD-226, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Charles E.
Schumer, Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding.
Present: Senators Schumer, Feinstein, and Grassley.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. CHARLES E. SCHUMER, A U.S. SENATOR
FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK
Chairman Schumer. The hearing will come to order, and I
want to thank my colleagues for coming. The majority of people
here are Chucks.
Senator Feinstein. Are what?
Chairman Schumer. Chucks: Chuck Schumer, Chuck Grassley.
[Laughter.]
Chairman Schumer. Okay. All right. Well, thank you and good
morning. Today's hearing is on strengthening the integrity of
the student visa system by preventing and detecting sham
educational institutions, and I want to thank both my
colleagues, the three of us, along with Senator McCaskill, who
asked for a GAO report, oh, about nine months ago. And I think
the GAO is now going to report to us. I have seen it, and I
think you have done a very good job.
It is an incredibly important topic. There are currently
more than 850,000 active foreign students in the United States
enrolled at over 10,000 schools, and by and large, the student
visa system provides an enormous benefit to the U.S. It allows
us to attract the world's top talent to our country to study
and hopefully to live here and create new companies,
technologies, and jobs. Foreign students also stimulate our
economy by spending money in our stores, restaurants, and
providing our universities with additional capital in the form
of full tuition payments.
But as with all our immigration laws, we must balance the
clear economic benefits of the Student Visa Program with the
need to keep our country secure. It is well known by now that
one of the September 11th terrorists entered the country on a
student visa and subsequently attended flight school. Two of
the September 11th terrorists received visitor visas and after
entering the country illegally attended flight schools. And
recently there has been a recurring problem in our immigration
system; that is, the illegal use of student visas by foreign
nationals to attend sham schools. These sham schools are not
real institutions of learning, but rather operate solely for
the purpose of manipulating immigration law to admit foreign
nationals into the country.
The latest phenomenon occurs in my colleague Senator
Feinstein's State, the Tri-Valley University in Pleasanton,
California--I know she has been involved in this--where over
1,500 students from foreign countries obtained visas to enroll
in an unaccredited school that failed to provide education.
In my home State of New York, an English language school
known as ``Accent on Language'' was recently shut down in April
for being a sham school.
So to get hold of the problem, Senators Feinstein,
Grassley, McCaskill, and I asked the GAO to study the Student
Visa Program to determine whether we are doing a good enough
job to stop sham schools, and what the GAO found was very
troubling.
GAO found that ICE has not implemented fraud prevention
practices to verify the legitimacy and eligibility of schools
giving out student visas, both during their initial
certification and after these schools begin accepting foreign
students.
GAO found that a significant number of schools certified to
give out visas to international students are not even licensed
by the State in which they operate.
Most shockingly, of 434 flight schools that provide student
visas, an astounding 167, 38 percent--let me repeat that--38
percent are not accredited by the FAA. This finding is
especially worrisome since two of the 9/11 hijackers
successfully applied for student visas to attend flight
schools.
GAO's report found out a lot about the Tri-Valley case and
that it is part of a larger trend of sham schools defrauding
the Student Visa Program.
In 2004, we required DHS to complete an audit of the 10,000
schools in the U.S. that provide student visas. GAO found that
eight years after the deadline for the completion of the audit,
federal authorities only recertified 19 percent of the visa-
issuing schools.
In light of this report, Senators Grassley, Feinstein,
McCaskill, and I will be introducing legislation that will
combat sham schools. Our legislation, when passed, will achieve
the following objectives: Require flight schools to be
accredited by the FAA; require all schools to show proof of
appropriate State licensure before they are able to give
student visas; increase penalties for directors, officers, and
managers of sham universities; and prevent top officials
affiliated with a university shut down by ICE from being a
director, officer, or manager of another school to avoid them
opening up a new one after the old one is closed.
It will require the officer at each university in charge of
helping ICE give out student visas and ensure compliance to
have a background check, undergo training, and go through e-
verify before they can serve as a designated school officer;
and, finally, require ICE to visit every non-accredited school
that gives students visas within a year of enactment to ensure
legitimacy of the school.
These are much-needed steps that dramatically reduce fraud
and restore confidence in our Student Visa Program.
With that, let me call on Senator Grassley, and then I will
call on Senator Feinstein, each for opening statements.
STATEMENT OF HON. CHUCK GRASSLEY, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE
OF IOWA
Senator Grassley. You have had so many factual statements
that I am not going to repeat, so I will put that portion of my
statement in the record.
Chairman Schumer. Without objection.
[The prepared statement of Senator Grassley appears as a
submission for the record.]
Senator Grassley. I will just give a short summation here.
I am glad that we have Mr. Woods here from Immigration and
Customs Enforcement to explain how two departments under his
purview have allowed for sham schools to operate. I want to
hear assurances that interagency disagreements are a thing of
the past and that counterterrorism officials and program
officers are working together to root out fraud.
I want to know what changes have been made by Secretary
Napolitano's Department since the report was initiated,
including efforts to rein in crooked designated school
officials.
I want to know why the Department has not yet required
background checks of designated school officials and why the
Department has not yet changed its rules to kick a school out
of the program if it is not complying.
I want to know why non-FAA-certified schools continue to be
a part of the program, continue to have access to the SEVIS
data base, and are still allowed to bring in foreign students.
I am also calling on Secretary Napolitano to immediately
improve the oversight of schools and implement the GAO
recommendations. The Department needs to get its act together,
complete the recertification process, and use the resources
more effectively.
Additionally, and last, I am interested in hearing what
legislative changes need to be made. Senator Schumer has
already talked about the proposed legislation. This hopefully
can be enacted promptly, and so far it looks like it is going
to be in a bipartisan manner, and I hope that will continue so
that we can salvage the integrity of our Foreign Student Visa
Program and ensure safety for our citizens.
Thank you.
Chairman Schumer. Thank you, Senator Grassley.
Senator Feinstein.
STATEMENT OF HON. DIANNE FEINSTEIN, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
Senator Feinstein. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, first
of all, for this hearing, you and Senator Grassley for the
willingness to work together, and, I think, the recognition
that we have a continuing problem.
I started on this right after 9/11, and looking at sham
schools, there was one right next to my office in San Diego,
and my staff pointed it out. And a number of arrests were made
in California in the San Diego area.
The thing is it continues on, and if you look at the Tri-
Valley situation, which is 10 years after 9/11--and as you
said, 38 percent--well, let me not confuse it, but let me say
something about Tri-Valley.
School officials enrolled 1,500 foreign students until a
federal investigation exposed the school as a scam in February
2011. The school was authorized to only accept 30, but by May
2010, when ICE began its investigation, they had 939
international students, and by the fall of 2010, there were
1,555 students for a school that did not exist. They were
caught giving student visas to undercover agents posing as
foreign nationals who explicitly professed no intention of
attending classes. So the federal agents said they did not
intend to attend classes, but they still were accepted.
Now, the 9/11 hijackers would not have been able to carry
out attacks in the United States if they had been unable to
enter the country from the beginning. They received valid visas
to enter the United States in order to harm our Nation. And one
of them, Hani Hanjour, entered the United States on a student
visa in December 2000 to attend an English-language school in
my backyard, Oakland, California. After entering the United
States, he never attended the English-language school but
instead took refresher pilot training lessons at a flight
school in Arizona. Flight schools were teaching people how to
take off but not to land, and no one thought it was strange.
And I think what Senator Schumer has just said, that 38
percent of these flight schools do not have the required FAA
certification, there ought to be a strong penalty for that.
They ought to be prohibited from operating without FAA
certification and supervision, in my view.
So now the Student Exchange Visitor Program is often
unaware of when the FAA revokes certification for flight
training providers, and we understand that your agency is
working to correct this problem.
I think the time has come, Senator Grassley and Mr.
Chairman, to really get tough. We have had 10 years. It has
been ``try and fail.'' And I am for some very strict criminal
penalties. So I look forward to working with you in this
regard.
Chairman Schumer. Thank you, Senator Feinstein. We
appreciate your long-term leadership on this issue, and with
this legislation maybe we can finally do what is needed to be
done, and the report helps importune us on.
We now have two witnesses today. The first is Rebecca
Gambler. She is the Director of Homeland Security and Justice
Issues at the GAO, the Government Accountability Office, which
did our report. She joined GAO in 2002, has worked on a wide
range of issues related to homeland security and justice,
including border security, immigration, DHS management and
transformation, and I have heard you testify before, and you
are excellent. You know, you are the best of government
employees, hard-working, and we are glad that you are in the
GAO. And I am also proud that you have three master's degrees,
one of which is from Syracuse University School of
International Relations.
John Woods is the Assistant Director of National Security
Investigations for the Immigration and Customs Enforcement,
ICE, and he, I am proud to say, is a native New Yorker. I do
not want to be too chauvinistic here. If you have California or
Iowa connections, please state them in your opening remarks.
But, in any case, he is a career enforcement officer, began in
1987 as an INS special agent. For the last 25 years, he has
worked his way up to his current position. He is now chief of a
450-person division, manages a $160 million operational budget
which oversees ICE's investigative, regulatory, and
technological programs. He is in charge of targeting
transnational and national security threats arising from
illicit travel, trade, and finance.
So, with that, each of your statements will be read into
the record, and we are first going to call on--it is logical to
have the issuer of the report come first and then the response
from Mr. Woods.
Ms. Gambler, you may proceed.
STATEMENT OF REBECCA GAMBLER, ACTING DIRECTOR, HOMELAND
SECURITY AND JUSTICE, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,
WASHINGTON, D.C.
Ms. Gambler. Good morning, Chairman Schumer and Members of
the Subcommittee. I appreciate the invitation to testify at
today's hearing to discuss GAO's work on the Student and
Exchange Visitor Program, or SEVP.
Within the Department of Homeland Security, ICE is
responsible for managing the program to ensure that foreign
students comply with the terms of their admission. ICE also
certifies schools to be eligible to enroll foreign students in
academic and vocational programs. As of January 2012, more than
850,000 active foreign students were enrolled at over 10,000
certified schools in the United States.
I would like to focus my remarks this morning on two areas
related to ICE's management of SEVP. First, I will discuss the
extent to which ICE has identified and assessed program risks.
Second, I will discuss the extent to which ICE has implemented
procedures to detect and prevent fraud and noncompliance on the
part of certified schools.
With regard to the first area, ICE does not have a process
to identify and assess risks posed by schools in SEVP. In
particular, we reported that SEVP has not evaluated information
on prior and suspected cases of school fraud and noncompliance
to identify lessons learned from such cases. For example, as of
March 2012, ICE reported that it had withdrawn 860 schools from
the program since 2003, at least 88 of which were withdrawn for
noncompliance issues. However, SEVP has not evaluated these
schools' withdrawals to determine potential trends in their
noncompliant activities. We reported that such information
could help SEVP focus its compliance efforts.
Additionally, SEVP has not obtained and analyzed
information from ICE criminal investigators on school fraud
cases. Information from investigations could help provide SEVP
with insights on the characteristics of schools that have
committed fraud and the nature of those schools' fraudulent
activities. ICE is beginning to study the potential risks posed
by schools in SEVP, but these efforts are in the early stages
of implementation.
With regard to the second area, we identified weaknesses in
ICE's monitoring and oversight of SEVP-certified schools
related to four key program controls.
First, we reported that ICE has not consistently verified
certain evidence initially submitted by schools in lieu of
accreditation.
Secondly, ICE has not consistently maintained certain
evidence of selected schools' eligibility for SEVP.
Specifically, in our random sample of 50 school case files, 30
files did not contain at least one piece of required evidence,
and ICE was unable to produce two school case files.
Third, ICE does not have a process to monitor schools'
State licensing status and non-language schools' accreditation
status.
Finally, we reported that some SEVP-certified schools that
offer flight training do not have the FAA certifications
required by SEVP policy to be eligible to offer flight training
to foreign students. The specific FAA certifications are
required by SEVP because FAA directly oversees these flight
schools on an ongoing basis. As of December 2011, we found that
about 38 percent of SEVP schools certified to offer flight
training to foreign students did not have the required FAA
certifications.
ICE is taking actions to address these issues, such as
working with the FAA to determine which schools have not met
the requirements, and taking withdrawal actions against those
schools as appropriate.
In closing, ICE aims to facilitate study in the United
States for hundreds of thousands of foreign students each year.
Effective oversight of SEVP entails balancing this objective
against the program's potential risks. ICE has taken some steps
to assess program risks and develop policies for certifying and
monitoring schools. However, we reported that the program
continues to face significant challenges and that ICE should
take additional actions to improve its ability to prevent and
detect potential school noncompliance and fraud. We have made a
number of recommendations to ICE to strengthen its management
and oversight of the program, and ICE has agreed with our
recommendations.
This concludes my oral statement, and I would be pleased to
answer any questions the Members may have.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Gambler appears as a
submission for the record.]
Chairman Schumer. Thank you, Ms. Gambler.
Mr. Woods.
STATEMENT OF JOHN P. WOODS, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, NATIONAL
SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS, HOMELAND SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS, U.S.
IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
HOMELAND SECURITY, WASHINGTON, D.C.
Mr. Woods. Chairman Schumer, Ranking Member Grassley, and
Senator Feinstein, thank you for the opportunity to discuss the
Student and Exchange Visitor Program, or SEVP, and our response
to the GAO findings in its recently released report.
SEVP is one area that ICE continues to prioritize, and
after reviewing GAO's recommendations, we have already made
progress in implementing them. SEVP is committed to maintaining
national security while keeping the international student and
exchange visitor visa issuance process efficient for schools
and students.
As you know, SEVP, within ICE's Homeland Security
Investigations Directorate, is funded by fees collected from
students, exchange visitors, and participating schools. It
manages information on nonimmigrants whose primary reason for
coming to the United States is to study in a U.S. institution
certified for inclusion in the Student and Exchange Visitor
Information System, or SEVIS. This data base tracks foreign
students, exchange visitors, and their dependents during their
authorized stays in the United States. SEVIS also monitors the
schools that have been approved by DHS to enroll foreign
students and the exchange visitor programs designated by the
Department of State to sponsor these visitors. SEVP regulates
schools' eligibility to enroll foreign individuals for academic
and vocational training purposes and manages the participation
of SEVP-certified schools in the program and nonimmigrant
students in the F, J, and M visa classifications and their
dependents.
HSI's Counterterrorism and Criminal Exploitation Unit, or
CTCEU, is the first national program dedicated to the
enforcement of nonimmigrant visa violations. SEVP and CTCEU
execute complementary missions to regulate foreign students and
exchange visitors and to proactively develop investigations
that bolster our national security.
Each year, the CTCEU analyzes the records of hundreds of
thousands of potential status violators using information from
SEVIS and the US-VISIT data base, along with other information.
The CTCEU resolves these records by further identifying
potential violations that would warrant field investigations,
and many times resulting in establishing compliance, or
establishing departure dates from the United States, or
effecting the arrest and removal of an individual violator.
In its report, GAO made eight recommendations with which we
have concurred.
First, the GAO recommended an increased focus on detecting
fraudulent schools. The collaboration between CTCEU and SEVP
facilitates processing for millions of legitimate foreign
students while ensuring that those who want to defraud our
systems or do us harm are not allowed to remain in the United
States.
To combat student visa fraud, we established a School
Exploitation Section of CTCEU and later the SEVP Analysis and
Operations Center, which supports HSI's main goal of preventing
exploitation of legitimate student pathways into the United
States and school fraud activity.
As GAO noted, collaboration between SEVP and CTCEU is
essential to identify and close loopholes in the issuance of
student and exchange visitor visas. SEVP and CTCEU have a
process to coordinate on criminal investigations of
nonimmigrant students, designated school officials, and SEVP-
certified schools in order to provide law enforcement with
high-quality, timely, analytical information and service
support for school compliance and foreign student issues.
The GAO also identified the need for increased
communication regarding potential criminal cases. SEVP notifies
CTCEU of all schools that SEVP places on its compliance list.
Schools are reviewed based on leads from SEVP and HSI field
offices, our own internal risk analysis, or information
received through other means, such as tips from school
employees or students. Schools are vetted based on a complex
list of risk factors, and SEVP and CTCEU continue to work to
develop additional criteria and ways to strengthen the process
so that the programs can more aggressively identify fraud among
noncompliant schools.
As GAO outlined in its report, flight schools have a unique
set of risks. SEVP is currently working with the FAA to ensure
that all SEVP-certified flight schools obtain the required FAA
certification.
In coordination with the FAA, SEVP has developed a list of
all SEVP-certified flight schools that do not have the required
certifications. SEVP has contacted those flight schools that do
not have the required certification and, in consultation with
the FAA, is developing time frames to require those schools to
re-obtain their FAA certification. Schools that do not meet the
time frames will have their SEVP certification withdrawn.
GAO also noted that determining whether a school meets
certification or accreditation requirements can be complex and
may change over time. A key part of SEVP's mission is to
certify that all enrolled F and M nonimmigrant students are in
status. With the general exception of English language
programs, which will be required to be accredited in December
2013, schools are not required to have national accreditation
in order to obtain SEVP certification.
If a petitioning school claims national accreditation, SEVP
requires evidence of such accreditation. Some States impose
their own licensing requirements on educational programs.
Therefore, we are is developing procedures to require
validation of any State license or other accreditation
information they provide to us.
GAO also had recommendations concerning recordkeeping. When
SEVP was established in 2003, it inherited a large amount of
decades-old paper records from the former Immigration and
Naturalization Service, which has presented a challenge in
terms of records management. SEVP has worked diligently since
receipt of the more than 10,000 school files to review and
digitize these historical record. Working through the update
and recertification process, we are ensuring that these files
are updated, complete, and correct.
Again, we appreciate the assistance of GAO's findings, and
we are working diligently to fully address the remaining
concerns. With thousands of colleges, universities, and other
institutions of higher learning in the United States, we remain
the gold standard in education around the world. While we
encourage a growing and robust foreign student population, we
must also maintain our unwavering commitment to protecting our
Nation's security.
Again, thank you for the opportunity to testify today, and
I would be pleased to answer any questions that you have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Woods appears as a
submission for the record.]
Chairman Schumer. Let me thank both witnesses.
I will try to keep the questioning to five minutes so that
we can have second rounds and because Senator Grassley has
another appointment.
First, I want to ask each of you, you have heard what our
bill will do; you have seen our bill. Do you think the
provisions of the bill will positively address the
vulnerabilities in the Student Visa Program? And what might you
add? First, Ms. Gambler.
Ms. Gambler. We have had a chance to review the provisions
of the bill, and those provisions certainly address a number of
areas that we pointed out were challenges in ICE's management
of the program, including looking at how the accreditation
process is certified and reviewed by SEVP and also looking at
the extent to which ICE is monitoring whether or not flight
schools have the required FAA certification.
Chairman Schumer. Do you think we are leaving anything out?
Is there anything that you would add or change in the bill?
Ms. Gambler. I think the bill certainly addressed the
different challenges that we pointed out with the program.
Chairman Schumer. Good. Thank you, Ms. Gambler.
And what about you, Mr. Woods? I do not know what kind of
constraints you are under, but what is your--does your
Department have an opinion on our bill? And do you have a
personal opinion on our bill?
Mr. Woods. First of all, I had the chance to review the
bill, and as a law enforcement agency, we appreciate the
legislature's efforts to enhance our law enforcement efforts.
In due time, when it comes out for comment, we would be
glad to provide an official stance from the agency, but at this
time I would like to encourage your staff to work with our
staff to ensure that----
Chairman Schumer. But do you think it is going in the
right--this is your own personal opinion. You----
Mr. Woods. My personal opinion is it is going in the right
direction, yes.
Chairman Schumer. All right. Second question--for you, Mr.
Woods. What is the status of DHS' actions to address
noncompliant flight schools that remain SEVP certified?
Mr. Woods. Like I said in my opening statement, we have
initiated work with the FAA to identify those schools that do
not have the proper--which would be the 141--classification or
certification to remain in SEVP, to remain a SEVP-certified
school.
As of now, we have identified, of the 469 schools that we
have SEVP certified for flight training programs, 153 that do
not have the proper FAA certifications. But when you drill that
number down further, you will find 30 of these institutions
have closed completely and are withdrawn from the program; 61
do not even offer flight training anymore as part of their
curriculum. Although they have been certified by SEVP to offer
flight training, they have to take their I-17 and take that off
their certification process. So that is an update issue.
Chairman Schumer. Will it interfere with them granting
visas when they should not? Will that stop them--``interfere''
is the wrong word. Will that stop them from granting visas when
they should not if they do not have flight programs?
Mr. Woods. They would not be able to provide I-20s to
students for flight training. They could provide it for other--
many schools that provide flight training----
Chairman Schumer. I understand. But I am asking will it
prevent----
Mr. Woods [continuing]. Along with other----
Chairman Schumer. Will it prevent them from falsely
bringing--you know, wrongly bringing people into the country
who should not be here?
Mr. Woods. Until their I-17 is updated, no, it will not.
Chairman Schumer. Okay. Keep going. So those 61 could still
be committing----
Mr. Woods. Yes. And we are working with the FAA on the
remaining schools to determine a time frame on which they can
re-obtain their----
Chairman Schumer. So have you closed any new ones? Have you
closed----
Mr. Woods. At this point, 32 schools have been closed.
Chairman Schumer. You closed them or you said 30 closed.
Mr. Woods. They are closed and out of business. But we did
not close them, no.
Chairman Schumer. So what is taking so long? That is my
question.
Mr. Woods. We are working with the schools to make sure
that they update their FAA certification so they can continue
to bring in students if they wish to, but they have to have the
right certification. And the FAA process is a time-consuming
process, apparently.
Chairman Schumer. Okay. Now, let us see here. I have time
for one more.
The Border Security Act required recertification for all
SEVP-certified schools by May 2004--that is eight years ago--
and every two years thereafter. However, ICE began the first
recertification cycle in May 2010, and as of March 2012, it
only recertified 19 percent of the SEVP-certified schools. So
two questions: As of July 20th, what percentage of schools has
ICE recertified? What actions, if any, has ICE taken or plan to
take to expedite this recertification process? You must admit
it is going at a snail's pace.
Mr. Woods. Yes, I would admit that. The process going back
to 2004, SEVP was not correctly funded to initiate a
recertification program. With the fee rule in 2009, we were
able to set up and fund the hiring of adjudicators to do the
recertification process. As of now, we are fully staffed with
adjudicators to do that process, and we are conducting
somewhere between 350 and 400 recertifications a month, and we
are up to 32 percent of the total school population.
Chairman Schumer. My time has expired, Senator Grassley. We
will have a second round.
Senator Grassley. Well, I will follow the same line that
Senator Schumer did. We have 167 flight training schools that
did not have proper certification and were still SEVP
certified. GAO said that ICE may not be aware of the flight
schools that had their FAA certification revoked. They also
identified one school that had lost its FAA certification but
still enrolled foreign students. Obviously this is both a
national security issue and something that is unacceptable.
GAO recommended that ICE establish target time frames for
notifying schools that lack certification so that they can re-
obtain it. Homeland Security officials responded that they
would work on those time frames and that it could be done by
September 30th. I do not think this is an issue that should
take months to resolve. So my question to you, Mr. Woods, and
if you cannot be specific, I would take an answer in writing:
What kind of time frames are we talking about? Are we talking
about a day, a month, a week, or how long? And are they allowed
to bring in foreign students during that process?
Mr. Woods. To answer your question, as of right now, we
have notified every school that has certification to do flight
training that does not have the proper FAA certification to go
out and re-obtain their 141 certification. If they do not do
that forthwith, as I said in my opening statement, they will be
withdrawn from SEVP through the administrative notice to
withdraw process.
Senator Grassley. Are they allowed to bring in foreign
students during this process?
Mr. Woods. I think it is under review whether they are
issuing I-20s for flight training or not, those institutions.
Senator Grassley. Okay. For both you and Ms. Gambler,
before I ask a question, I have this lead-in. There are several
issues regarding the Student and Exchange Visitor Program,
including lack of coordination within ICE, flight schools, and
sham universities. On top of that, ICE is forced to verify in
lieu of letters provided by unaccredited universities. Some
would say that only accredited schools should be eligible to
enroll foreign students. Doing so would reduce the workload of
ICE to focus on accredited schools. It also may have prevented
the Tri-Valley incident.
Questions for both of you, two questions. Should
unaccredited schools be able to participate in the SEVP program
and bring in foreign students, or should we limit the program
to accredited schools only? And, second, if we did take
unaccredited schools out of the program, would you make any
exceptions to that rule? First, Ms. Gambler.
Ms. Gambler. It would really be a policy decision on the
part of Congress or ICE to determine whether or not
unaccredited schools should be allowed to participate in the
program. What we looked at as part of our review, and as you
mentioned, Senator, was that ICE was not consistently verifying
evidence presented by schools in lieu of certification.
As part of our review of a random sample of 50 case files,
we looked at 34 case files for unaccredited schools, and we
found that in seven of those cases, the case files were lacking
evidence presented by schools in lieu of accreditation.
We also found instances during our review of prior cases of
schools submitting false or fraudulently obtained in lieu of
letters for accreditation.
So certainly this is an area of risk to the program, an we
recommended that ICE do a better job of assessing what the
risks are to the program and what the characteristics are of
schools that may be potentially noncompliant or fraudulent. And
so we made recommendations to ICE to look at that.
Senator Grassley. Okay. Mr. Woods, would you answer my two
questions?
Mr. Woods. Obviously the requirement for higher education
to be accredited would greatly reduce the risk factors involved
in school fraud for a SEVP-certified school. Currently the
greatest concern that we do have is those higher education
institutions that are not accredited, and we look at them as a
higher risk factor for compliance and site visits to ensure
that they are providing education to the students that they
bring into the United States.
Senator Grassley. Should you limit the program only to
accredited schools?
Mr. Woods. The difficulty in the accreditation process is
that it changes from State to State. Many States have an
accreditation process. Some have a licensing process. And we
are working with each individual State to identify their
process and our validation techniques to ensure that the
documents that the schools provide are legitimate. And as I
said, you know, I think some sort of State or national
accreditation would reduce the risk factor for fraud.
Senator Grassley. I think I can wait for round two, so why
don't you go to Senator Feinstein.
Chairman Schumer. Okay. Senator Feinstein.
Senator Feinstein. The way I look at this is it is process,
process, process, and nothing happens. And it is exactly the
same as it was before 9/11.
My view is very clearly--Senator Grassley, you hit the nail
on the head--a non-accredited school should not be permitted to
take these students, and if you open a sham school, you go to
jail. It is just that clear. And I think that is where we have
to be.
I think you have to be FAA certified to teach and to grant
a pilot's license. And if we have not learned this, I do not
think we learned anything.
I know the back of all of this is money. People have the
lust to get the money, and it is cheating. It has got to stop
because the Nation's security is at stake.
I wanted to ask one question here. Mr. Woods, one of the
most troubling things that GAO found was that--and I would like
to quote from the report--``SEVP management has not referred
potentially criminal cases to the enforcement arm in accordance
with ICE's procedures.'' And that is CTCEU, which is the
criminal unit. I gather relations are very bad between them.
What can you say about that?
Mr. Woods. I would disagree with that. I would say that the
relations maybe in the past when they were part of two
different divisions were strained because there was a lack of
communication. But now that they are both housed within the
National Security Investigations Division and I oversee both
units, I ensure that there is crossover of our personnel, that
agents are working in with the adjudicators. We set up over the
past two years a School Exploitation Section, which focuses
solely on school fraud. We set up the SEVP Operations and
Analysis Section, which looks at the compliant schools.
Senator Feinstein. Let me stop you. So you disagree with
everything on pages 33 and 34 of the GAO report. Is that
correct?
Mr. Woods. I do not disagree with everything. I am just
saying I disagree that there is a lack of communication. I
think communication has enhanced over the period of the last
number of years, and I think we are working toward making one
fluid step. The compliance list is shared with our enforcement
program to ensure that if there are cases where we feel there
are significant risk factors that we want to send investigators
out to look at schools, we do.
Senator Feinstein. Okay. Let me read something. ``However,
in our interviews with eight ICE field offices, field
investigators at two offices gave examples of SEVP officials'
continuing administrative activities when asked to cease such
activity. In one case, investigators stated that the target and
owner of a flight school became suspicious of increased
attention by SEVP officials and fled the United States in 2011
to avoid prosecution. Our review confirms that the SEVP office
was aware of the criminal investigation but continued to take
administrative actions.
``In another ongoing case in California, field
investigators stated that SEVP officials conducted a site visit
to an institution following an owner's indictment after the
local ICE field office investigators instructed SEVP to stop
administrative activities.''
Mr. Woods. And I would agree that there are some hiccups
out there----
Senator Feinstein. Hiccups?
Mr. Woods [continuing]. Where communication has failed. We
have developed a new ``Use These Lessons Learned.'' We have
developed a ``School Fraud Handbook'' at the end of 2010,
beginning of 2011, to ensure that there is proper communication
between both our enforcement and administrative programs. We
are----
Senator Feinstein. Sir, you are into process. We need to
get into enforcement. I think that is the difference between
us. I was where you were 10 years ago, but it has not worked.
Nothing has changed, and the statistics and the GAO report
indicates that.
You know, at some point, I think you have got to accept the
reality of it, and the reality is your failure to complete the
mission.
I am very frustrated. I do not usually talk this way.
Chairman Schumer. Keep going. That is true. She is one of
the most polite Senators.
Senator Grassley. It is probably an institutional problem
as opposed to Mr. Woods' problem. I mean, it is an
institutional problem, but he has got to help us solve it.
Senator Feinstein. Well, that is right. As you look through
this and you look at the ICE response, you know, ICE will seek
to withdraw schools, ICE agreed that SEVP adjudicators should
verify all in lieu of, ICE noted that case files may be
missing, ICE is developing a quality assurance process. It goes
on and on and on, and nothing changes.
Chairman Schumer. Exactly. And the frustration we all have
is this created a national crisis, and it is 11 years later,
and we are still sort of developing things. Can you explain in
common-sense, plain language, Mr. Woods, not, in all due
respect, a bureaucratic answer, why is it 11 years later we
have not had any prosecutions, we have had still a large number
of the schools not addressed or looked at or examined? What is
going on here? What is wrong? Do you lack the resources? Do you
lack the will? Is it not a high enough priority of the agency?
Senator Feinstein. Or is it philosophy?
Chairman Schumer. Okay. Good question. Is it philosophy?
Can you please give us a frank answer on this? We want to know
what is wrong so we can help correct it. We are not out to just
flagellate anybody.
Mr. Woods. I understand, Chairman Schumer. I feel your same
frustration. I have been in this position for three years, and
I have taken every effort we can to enhance and try to better
the communication between our administrative SEVP program and
the CTCEU, which is the basic headquarters element that talks
to these agents that are out in the field and assists them on
their investigations.
Chairman Schumer. Well, is that--I am sorry to interrupt.
Is the headquarters not giving the agents enough of an impetus
to focus on this issue? Do they say there are other issues that
are much more important?
Mr. Woods. No, that is not----
Senator Feinstein. The agents are not cooperating.
Mr. Woods. The agents are cooperating. In 2009, with the
increased fee rule and the schools and students, we were able
to obtain further resources to go out and combat the school
fraud issues. Prior to that, the focus of the CTCEU, which was
the CEU at the time, Compliance Enforcement Unit, was to focus
on the individuals, the individual students that may cause a
national security threat. We have expanded that program----
Chairman Schumer. Instead of the schools.
Mr. Woods. Instead of schools. We have expanded that
program at this point----
Chairman Schumer. And that lasted about seven years until
you came in? Is that what you are saying?
Mr. Woods. That is when we had the resources to move
forward on that issue, and we obtained those resources, and we
moved forward to where now we focus on the institutions that
provide the pathways for the fraud, and we focus on those. And
we have dedicated agents in the field that every day focus on
this. I think that is why this Committee and others are
interested in this school fraud issue because we have increased
our prosecutions of these cases. We have gone after the
designated school officials.
Chairman Schumer. It is three years since 2010, and the GAO
did not give you good grades, so how do you explain that?
Mr. Woods. I am not saying we do not have a long way to go.
We are moving forward, and we are trying to make the
corrections, both administratively and through either procedure
and policy, to ensure that we meet GAO's requirements to all
their eight recommendations, to ensure that as we recertify
institutions we keep proper records.
Chairman Schumer. When will you meet these eight
recommendations given your present level of resources and
focus?
Mr. Woods. As I said, you know, we are moving forward. We
are processing somewhere between----
Chairman Schumer. No, we need--that is not a good--when? A
year? Five years?
Mr. Woods. The recertification process will take two years
to complete of all the schools. Through that process, we will
have the recordkeeping in order. We are in the process of
hiring a new records manager. That will be done this year. We
are in the process of developing risk factors which will be in
place before the closeout of this fiscal year. So I would say
for probably seven of the eight recommendations, with the end
of this calendar year we will have them all in place. As for
the recertification program and getting that up to 100 percent,
it is a two-year process that will be rotating and continuing
on.
Chairman Schumer. So, in other words, all eight--at least
you will have rules in place to meet all eight GAO
recommendations by the December 31, 2012?
Mr. Woods. Correct.
Chairman Schumer. That is a little bit--and then you say it
will take you two years to get compliance to implement those
rules and regulations?
Mr. Woods. It will take two years to recertify all the
schools. When you talk about 10,000 institutions and doing 400
a month, that takes about two years to go through the whole
process. And then we start again and start with----
Chairman Schumer. Okay. And just one other, and then I will
defer to my colleagues. You know, one of the things that GAO
recommended is that you do things--you spend the same amount of
time investigating Stanford as you do investigating a Tri-
Valley Flight School. Why don't you start looking at risk to
our country and focus on the schools that, you know, just on a
first look are the ones who would create the danger?
Mr. Woods. Right now we have developed a risk scorecard for
institutions that go on to our compliance list. We are
enhancing that, working with DHS in the high-track process,
and----
Chairman Schumer. Is that being used now, that risk
scorecard?
Mr. Woods. Yes, it is.
Chairman Schumer. Since when?
Mr. Woods. Since January of this year.
Chairman Schumer. I see. Pretty reasonable. Okay. I have
asked a lot of questions. Let me defer to either of my
colleagues.
Senator Grassley. Can I go ahead, please?
Chairman Schumer. Yes, please.
Senator Grassley. You know, we have talked about this since
September 11, 2001, but this is a problem that goes back to the
1993 World Trade Center bombing because we had student visa
violators involved in that, and we created SEVIS as a result of
the 1993 incident and I know, Mr. Woods, you are connected or
you know a lot about that because you were on the Joint
Terrorism Task Force from 1993 to 1995. And I do not say that
to embarrass anybody. I just say that you have a background and
you know what this problem is. And I wonder if you are not
connected with a lot of bureaucrat initiative, and you said you
have been working hard, and I do not question that you probably
have been working hard. But if heads do not roll--you know, you
put out instructions, and if heads do not roll, you are never
going to get any change of behavior.
Let me lead to a question for you, Mr. Woods, dealing with
designated school officials. We have learned that there are
some of these DSOs who are bad actors and commit fraud in order
to enroll foreign students. While these school officials must
be U.S. citizens or legal permanent residents, there is no
requirement that the school conduct a background check of them.
Some educational institutions voluntarily do do that.
Why doesn't ICE require all schools who participate in the
Student and Exchange Visitor Program to undergo background
checks? And would you commit to issue a rule that would require
background checks of DSOs?
Mr. Woods. In working with our Office of Policy, I would
recommend to them that we issue a rule, absent legislation
requiring it, that we do a background check on all designated
school officials. That is one of the recommendations we have
pending our policy program.
Senator Grassley. So do I interpret that to mean you are
already in the process of issuing such a rule?
Mr. Woods. We are recommending that to our Office of
Policy, yes.
Senator Grassley. Okay. Is that moving along fast enough
that it is going to become a rule, or what is the impediment to
getting that done in a certain time frame?
Mr. Woods. Again, there are competing priorities on
rulemaking and which rules are going to be adopted by the
Department, and we fall in line with the rest of the Department
on policies and rules.
Senator Grassley. Okay. For you, Ms. Gambler, do you think
that the SEVP office lacks an enforcement-minded approach that
is required of an agency whose mission is to protect the
homeland?
Ms. Gambler. As part of our review, we did hear from the
criminal investigators in CTCEU that they were concerned that
SEVP has not focused enough on compliance and oversight.
Certainly it is a shared responsibility between SEVP and the
criminal investigators to identify potentially noncompliant
schools--that would be on the part of SEVP--and referring that
information to CTCEU when it becomes potentially criminal in
nature.
At the same time, the criminal investigative side can
really help SEVP identify potential risks to the program that
could help SEVP target its compliance activities and, do a
better job of certifying schools, checking the evidence at
certification, and providing ongoing monitoring for schools to
ensure that they are still eligible to be in the program.
Senator Grassley. Let me follow on something that would fit
into what Senator Feinstein said about philosophy. In your
view, is there more interest for the office to be a friend of
the schools rather than a regulator?
Ms. Gambler. We did not specifically look at that issue,
Senator, but, again, we did hear some concerns from the
criminal investigators in CTCEU that SEVP was not putting
enough emphasis on its compliance and monitoring mission.
Senator Grassley. Okay. I thank you.
Chairman Schumer. Can we have Mr. Woods follow up on what
Ms. Gambler said? Because it is right in line with both Senator
Feinstein's and Senator Grassley's comments. What she is saying
is your focus is sort of being more friends to the schools,
helping them, as opposed to compliance and enforcement. Senator
Feinstein asked about the attitude of people in the field on
this issue. Would you address that, Mr. Woods?
Mr. Woods. Certainly. CTCEU is composed of special agents,
law enforcement individuals. The Student and Exchange Visitor
Program is composed of adjudicators, program analysts, and
support staff. SEVP and CTCEU do have complementary missions
where SEVP does not need to provide support and service to the
designated school officials who maintain the SEVIS data base.
They work hand in hand with school officials and the
universities to ensure that they are complying with the law,
complying with the regulations to bring students in. They have
to strike a balance between the friendly side to the
universities and the enforcement side to the universities.
Additionally, where our special agents can focus strictly
on criminal investigations, we move forward on those cases and
have a strict enforcement mode. So SEVP does have a dichotomy
where they need to balance both being a friend to the school
and helping them to comply and also identifying sources of
fraud that are systematic or egregious that we can enforce.
Chairman Schumer. Senator Feinstein.
Senator Feinstein. I am just very dissatisfied with the
progress. I think this a very good GAO report, and what I am
going to do--and it would be wonderful if you wanted to do it--
is send this report with a letter from us that we have been
watching this situation, that we are really concerned about the
lack of progress that has been made, the vulnerability, the
over-attention to process.
Let me read something on page 36 of the report. ``While the
coordination standard operating procedure for SEVP, CTCEU, and
ICE field offices requires that SEVP refer allegations or leads
revealing possible criminal violations to the Enforcement Unit
in a timely manner, the procedure does not have criteria for
determining when certain noncompliant activity becomes
potentially criminal.'' It goes on and on.
``The SEVP Compliance Unit first shared its compliance case
log with CTCEU in October 2011. Upon review of this
information, CTCEU officials stated that several of the
compliance cases could involve potential criminal violations.
CTCEU officials identified examples of potentially criminal
violations, including designated school officials sharing SEVIS
passwords, a school not holding class but reporting attendance,
a school reporting its own address as students' addresses, and
a school charging additional fees for showing students as
compliant.''
And it goes on like that.
It is so elemental, and yet--and it was elemental 10 years
ago, that I really think we need to bring the Secretary's
attention to the failure of the system and ask for major
reforms, and particularly an enforcement mode.
Chairman Schumer. I agree.
Senator Feinstein. Because these case studies--and it goes
on and on and on. The sham----
Chairman Schumer. You said process, process, process.
Senator Feinstein. Yes, exactly. That is my----
Chairman Schumer. I think it is a good idea to send a
letter. We will ask Senator Grassley and Senator McCaskill as
sponsors to do it.
Now, I have a few more related questions. Some people say--
and I would ask Ms. Gambler this--that the penalties are so low
that the enforcement part of ICE does not bother. Do you think
the penalties--and I guess I would ask Mr. Woods, too. We have
a two-year mandatory sentence for false accreditation and
reporting, up to 15. Will those be sufficient? Are they tough
enough? And will they then get Enforcement to do more? Because
one of the ex--one of the reasons--I was going to say
``excuses.'' But one of the reasons they say is the penalties
are not tough enough to merit criminal prosecution. Any
comments on that, Ms. Gambler?
Ms. Gambler. Mr. Chairman, we did not look at the penalty
issue as part of our review. What we did focus on was really
the extent to which ICE was effectively implementing the
existing controls and processes it has in place.
Chairman Schumer. Did you come across any of this, you
know, that the penalties were too weak from any of the people
you interviewed?
Ms. Gambler. We did not hear that as a theme as part of our
work, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Schumer. Mr. Woods. Existing penalties, not the
ones in our bill.
Mr. Woods. The Sentencing Guidelines for this type of
activity are low in comparison, maybe, with other crimes. But
that does not affect the amount of resources that we put at
this program. We have dedicated agents that fall into the fee-
funded rules that----
Chairman Schumer. Not you. It is the prosecutors. They say,
``Hey, to go through a whole court case for a small slap on the
wrist is not worth it to us.'' Is that a factor?
Mr. Woods. That is a factor in every United States
Attorney's----
Chairman Schumer. Do you think the penalties----
Mr. Woods [continuing]. Office in the Nation.
Chairman Schumer [continuing]. We have are strong enough?
Mr. Woods. Is what strong enough?
Chairman Schumer. Are the penalties that we have in our
bill strong enough to get the----
Mr. Woods. Any enhancement in mandatory minimums usually
brings----
Chairman Schumer. Are these strong enough?
Mr. Woods. I think it is an improvement.
Chairman Schumer. Okay. Next, just one more. We are going
to send you that in writing to get an official answer from your
agency.
Mr. Woods. Certainly.
Chairman Schumer. And I would like you to show that to the
Enforcement folks and let them answer it with you.
Chairman Schumer. The last question I have, which Senator
Feinstein and I discussed, is the issue of certification and
not allowing non-certified--accredited, sorry, accreditation,
certification of non-accredited institutions to take these
students does have one difficulty. There are certain types of
institutions of higher learning that do not have an
accreditation process. Juilliard in my home State of New York
would be one of those. We certainly want to let Juilliard take
some foreign students. There are many talents musicians,
singers, and whatever.
Senator Feinstein. That is a music school.
Chairman Schumer. Yes. It is one of the best in the
country. And so maybe what we could do is say that there has to
be accreditation, the way Senator Feinstein did, but allow
schools to apply for an exception if there are no accreditation
process. Obviously with flight schools there is with the FAA,
so none of them would be exempt.
What do you both think of that idea?
Ms. Gambler. Again, I think that is really a policy
decision. What would be key is ICE, as our work has shown,
consistently implementing whatever kind of----
Chairman Schumer. That is why we want to switch the burden
of proof, so ICE has to implement unless there is an exception
as opposed to doing it the other way.
What do you think, Mr. Woods?
Mr. Woods. I think that is similar to the approach we take
right now, which we call in lieu of letters to show that the
school's processes are accepted by other institutions that may
be accredited and that they would take credits or the learning
from that school. Like you said, there should be some
exemptions, but I believe what we are doing and implementing
based on the GAO report is validating to ensure that those
letters and those----
Chairman Schumer. No, but it is taking forever----
Mr. Woods [continuing]. Documents are true.
Chairman Schumer. We would rather do it the other way. If
you do not have certification, you are out until you can prove
you should be in, as opposed to let us at a snail's pace, as
you even admitted, go through saying who is out and they are
assumed to be in. What do you think?
Mr. Woods. I would agree with you.
Chairman Schumer. Oh, good. Okay. We are not happy with how
ICE has handled this and SEVP has handled this, as you know. We
hope that you will speed things up. We hope our legislation
will help make things better for you. But we are not going to--
I know I speak for Senator Feinstein, who is passionate about
this, as well as Senator Grassley, and I believe Senator
McCaskill. We need real change here, and we will do it
legislatively, but we will also do it with the letter that she
suggested as well as oversight, continued oversight.
So if you do not have any more questions, Senator, then I
want to thank both witnesses. I want to thank you for an
excellent report, Ms. Gambler, and I want to thank Mr. Woods
for being here as well and answering our questions--many of
them, quite frankly--which we appreciate.
The record will stay open for seven days for additional
written questions to be submitted by Committee Members, and the
hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:07 a.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Prepared Statement of Ranking Member Charles Grassley
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Prepared Statement of Rebecca Gambler, Acting Director, Homeland
Security and Justice, U.S. Government Accountability Office,
Washington, DC
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Prepared Statement of John P. Woods, Assistant Director, National
Security Investigations, Homeland Security Investigations, U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, U.S. Department of Homeland
Security, Washington, D.C.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Questions
Questions submitted by Senator Charles Grassley for Rebecca Gambler
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Questions submitted by Senator Charles Grassley for John P. Woods
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Answers
Responses of Rebecca Gambler to questions submitted by Senator Grassley
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Responses of John P. Woods to questions submitted by Senator Grassley
have been redacted.
[all]