[Senate Hearing 112-909]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 112-909
REVIEW OF THE NUCLEAR EMERGENCY IN JAPAN AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE
UNITED STATES
=======================================================================
JOINT HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON CLEAN AIR AND NUCLEAR SAFETY
AND THE
COMMITTEE ON
ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
APRIL 12, 2011
__________
Printed for the use of the Senate Committee on Environment and Public
Works
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gpo.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
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COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
BARBARA BOXER, California, Chairman
MAX BAUCUS, Montana JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont MIKE CRAPO, Idaho
SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, Rhode Island LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee
TOM UDALL, New Mexico MIKE JOHANNS, Nebraska
JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas
KIRSTEN GILLIBRAND, New York
Bettina Poirier, Majority Staff Director and Chief Counsel
Ruth Van Mark, Minority Staff Director
------
Subcommittee on Clean Air and Nuclear Safety
THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware, Chairman
MAX BAUCUS, Montana JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming, Ranking
FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey Member
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee
BARBARA BOXER, California, (ex MIKE JOHANNS, Nebraska
officio) JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma, (ex
officio)
C O N T E N T S
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Page
APRIL 12, 2011
OPENING STATEMENTS
Boxer, Hon. Barbara, U.S. Senator from the State of California... 1
Inhofe, Hon. James M., U.S. Senator from the State of Oklahoma... 3
Carper, Hon. Thomas R., U.S. Senator from the State of Delaware.. 5
Alexander, Hon. Lamar, U.S. Senator from the State of Tennessee.. 7
Udall, Hon. Tom, U.S. Senator from the State of New Mexico....... 8
Barrasso, Hon. John, U.S. Senator from the State of Wyoming...... 9
Lautenberg, Hon. Frank R., U.S. Senator from the State of New
Jersey......................................................... 11
Merkley, Hon. Jeff, U.S. Senator from the State of Oregon........ 12
Gillibrand, Hon. Kirsten E., U.S. Senator from the State of New
York........................................................... 13
Capps, Hon. Lois, U.S. House of Representative from the State of
California..................................................... 14
Bilbray, Hon. Brian P., U.S. House of Representative from the
State of California............................................ 16
WITNESSES
Jackson, Hon. Lisa, Administrator, U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency......................................................... 18
Prepared statement........................................... 19
Jaczko, Gregory B., Chairman Nuclear Regulatory Commission....... 21
Prepared statement........................................... 23
Responses to additional questions from:
Senator Boxer............................................ 27
Senator Inhofe........................................... 29
Tables:
Licensee Emergency Classes............................... 31
Fees Billed for License Renewal
Most Recently Issued License Renewals
Blakeslee, Sam, Senator, California State Senate, District 15.... 115
Prepared statement........................................... 116
Responses to additional questions from Senator Boxer......... 133
Boyd, James D., vice chairman, California Energy Commission,
California Liaison Officer to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission..................................................... 134
Prepared statement........................................... 136
Responses to additional questions from Senator Boxer......... 142
Letter to Michael Lesar, Chief, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, dated April 12, 2010
Schiliro, Lewis D., J.D., cabinet secretary, Delaware Department
of Safety and Homeland Security................................ 160
Prepared statement........................................... 161
Sommerhoff, Curtis S., director, Miami-Dade Department of
Emergency Management........................................... 163
Prepared statement........................................... 166
Pardee, Charles, chief operating officer, Exelon Generation
Company........................................................ 167
Prepared statement........................................... 170
Responses to additional questions from:
Senator Boxer............................................ 177
Senator Inhofe........................................... 180
Cochran, Thomas B., Ph.D., senior scientist, Nuclear Program,
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc......................... 181
Prepared statement
ADDITIONAL MATERIAL
Letter of support from W. Gary Gates, president and CEO, Omaha
Public Power District, dated April 12, 2011.................... 221
REVIEW OF THE NUCLEAR EMERGENCY IN JAPAN AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE
UNITED STATES
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TUESDAY, APRIL 12, 2011
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Environment and Public Works,
joint with
Subcommittee on Clean Air and Nuclear Safety,
Washington, DC.
The full committees met, pursuant to notice, at 2:45 p.m.
in room 406, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Thomas R.
Carper (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Senators Carper, Barrasso, Boxer, Inhofe,
Lautenberg, Udall, Merkley, Gillibrand, Alexander and Boozman.
Also present: Representatives Capps and Bilbray.
STATEMENT OF HON. BARBARA BOXER, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF
CALIFORNIA
Senator Boxer. The committee will come to order.
When Senator Carper comes, I am going to ask him to take
the gavel since he is the Chair of the appropriate
Subcommittee. But I want us to get started because we have a
number of witnesses today.
I want to say welcome to my distinguished Ranking Member.
Just over 1 month ago today, Japan was hit by a 9.0
magnitude earthquake and a tsunami that measured roughly 30
feet high. The devastation brought on by these catastrophic
events is heart breaking and our deepest condolences go out to
the victims and their families. Today we are hearing that this
event now, in terms of radiation leaked, is equal to that of
Chernobyl. So, the news is not good coming out of Japan.
The tragedy serves as an important wake up call for us. We
cannot ignore it. I think one thing that we would all agree to
is we must plan for the unexpected and when we know of threats
we must act quickly to address them. So, what can we learn from
the tragic situation in Japan?
The United States has 104 commercial nuclear power reactors
operating at 65 sites in 31 States. Twenty-three reactors are
boiling water reactors with Mark I containment systems like the
ones at the Daiichi plant. It is true that the NRC has
instituted an improvement program for this type of reactor.
However, the lessons from the tragedy in Japan demonstrate the
importance of reassessing the safety of these reactors.
The compromised reactors in Japan, like those in the United
States, were built on a set of assumptions regarding the
potential magnitude of natural disasters such as earthquakes
and tsunamis. We know that some U.S. nuclear facilities are
located in areas with high and moderate seismic activity. I can
tell you, you are going to hear from our people, that we have a
couple of those.
The situation in Japan has shown us we must take a hard
look at the risk assumptions that were made when the reactors
were designed. We know in the case of Japan, they designed it
for a lower magnitude quake.
As a result of the catastrophic situation in Japan, Senator
Tom Carper, who is going to chair this hearing as soon as I
complete my remarks, Tom Carper and I have called on the NRC to
conduct a comprehensive review of all nuclear facilities in the
United States to assess their capacity to withstand and respond
to natural or manmade disasters.
Senator Feinstein and I also requested special immediate
attention be given to those U.S. nuclear reactors that are
subjected to significant seismic activity or are located near
coastlines such as San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station and
Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant.
The NRC has identified both of these plants in California
as being located in high seismicity zones. The Commissioners
found another nine plants, which are located in North Carolina,
Illinois, Georgia, South Carolina, Virginia and Tennessee, but
they are in moderate seismicity zones.
Both reactors in California are located in high density
areas. Four hundred twenty-four thousand people live within 50
miles of Diablo and 7.4 million people live within 50 miles of
San Onofre. Let me repeat that. Four hundred twenty-four
thousand people live within 50 miles of Diablo and 7.4 million
live within 50 miles of San Onofre.
Other nuclear facilities in the United States are also
located in highly populated areas. If you look at the one in
New York, it is about 17 million people live within that 50-
mile radius.
Although evacuation plans are generally a State and local
concern, there have been calls for more involvement from FEMA
to assess those plans.
Today we will hear testimony from a number of our
colleagues as well as the Chairman of the NRC, Greg Jaczko, who
has been so helpful to us moving forward, and of course we will
hear from the Administrator of the EPA, Lisa Jackson.
I am very interested to hear how the EPA is monitoring the
radiation in the United States and we have, Lisa and I, have
talked over the weeks. I am just making sure we have accurate
up-to-date information on the radioactivity.
We know that low levels of radiation have been detected in
the United States from the compromised reactors in Japan. We
can only imagine what the potential impacts on health and
environment would be if, God forbid, we ever experienced the
same type of accidents that occurred in Japan.
Small but elevated levels of radiation have been detected
in milk and other food. We are going to talk about that.
Experts say that we are OK right now. I want to probe that. I
want to make sure of that. Whether it is the NRC's review
process of our reactors or EPA's monitoring of our drinking
water, complete transparency and prompt disclosure are vital to
maintaining the Government's credibility, our credibility,
frankly, at this Oversight Committee.
The Federal Government must heed the wake up call from the
catastrophe in Japan. As Chairman of this committee, working
with everybody on both sides of the aisle, and particularly my
Subcommittee Chair, I will continue to provide vigorous
oversight to ensure that we learn the tragic lessons from the
Fukushima reactors and take reasonable steps to make our
Nation's nuclear facilities as safe as they can be made.
I know that Chairman Jaczko and Administrator Jackson share
my concern for the safety of the American people. Our common
goal is to ensure we are prepared and obviously we take another
hard look at what is going on in our country at a time when we
need every bit of energy we can get. There is no question about
that. But, as we know from looking at what is going on over
there, it is the unthinkable and we have to avoid it.
So, with that I am going to turn the gavel over to Senator
Carper and ask Senator Inhofe to make his opening statement.
STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES M. INHOFE, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE
OF OKLAHOMA
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
First of all, Senator Johanns was going to be here today.
He is very interested in this hearing but was unable to do so.
He asked if I would put into the record a statement from the
Omaha Public Power District, which I put into the record right
now, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Carper. [Presiding.] Without objection.
Senator Inhofe. Chairman Jaczko, I appreciate your efforts
to assure the Nation that we are, that the nuclear plants here
in the United States are safe and I appreciate very much,
Administrator Jackson, your repeated assurances that traces of
radioactive materials that have drifted here from Japan will
not impact public health.
I am sure we all agree that we need to study the accident
at the Fukushima Nuclear Plant and learn from it. As Chairman
Jaczko frequently reminds us, we cannot be complacent with
regard to nuclear safety. Even so, we cannot allow ourselves to
be paralyzed by fear. Any, harnessing any energy source carries
some level of risk, and we need to be, to make sure that we can
safely manage that risk.
Ensuring the safe use of nuclear energy is a very serious
job. In 1974, Congress established an independent Commission
and charged five individuals with the responsibility to protect
public health and safety. The public is best served by a
Commission that functions collectively and collegially to pool
their expertise. I am concerned that the public may currently
be getting less than it deserves.
I was surprised to learn from my staff that Chairman Jaczko
has invoked emergency authority and transferred Commission
functions to himself in the wake of the earthquake in Japan,
especially after speaking with me personally by phone and then
appearing before this committee. Let us get our dates straight
because I want the Commissioner to address this.
First of all, it took place on the 11th, our phone call
took place on the 14th, the hearing took place on the 16th, and
never was this mentioned that this was going to be invoked. The
law confers emergency authority on the Chairman in the wake of
an emergency at a particular facility or materials regulated by
the NRC. At present, I am not aware of an emergency condition
that exists in the United States, in any United States
facility.
Chairman Jaczko, I want to work with you as the NRC tries
to understand what happened in Japan, what the United States
can learn from it, but our collaboration, and indeed,
collaboration with all of us in Congress, can only proceed
prudently if we have openness and fairness and transparency.
That applies to your office.
So, as we move forward I hope you would provide us with
full and complete information about your activities and that
you will work with your fellow Commissioners in the same
spirit. In that vein, I look forward to your testimony and to
yours, Administrator Jackson, and to working with both of you
on gaining full understanding of the impact of the Fukushima
accident.
Before I yield to my colleague, I think it is significant
that I get my request in here. I am anxious to see progress on
the nominations of Commissioners Ostendorff and Svinicki which
I hope President Obama sends us soon. Given the scope of the
issues before the Commission, it is important we have our
Commission full with all the members appointed and confirmed.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Senator Inhofe follows:]
Statement of Hon. James M. Inhofe, U.S. Senator from the
State of Oklahoma
Chairman Jaczko, I appreciate your efforts to assure the nation
that our nuclear plants here in the U.S. are safe. Administrator
Jackson, I also appreciate your repeated reassurances that traces of
radioactive materials that have drifted here from Japan will not impact
public health.
I'm sure we all agree that we need to study the accident at the
Fukushima nuclear plant and learn from it. As Chairman Jaczko
frequently reminds us, we can't be complacent with regard to nuclear
safety. Even so, we can't allow ourselves to be paralyzed by fear.
Harnessing any energy source carries some measure of risk that must be
safely managed for our nation to prosper.
Ensuring the safe use of nuclear energy is a very serious job. In
1974, Congress established an independent commission and charged five
individuals with the responsibility to protect public health and
safety. The public is best served by a commission that functions
collectively and collegially to pool their expertise. I'm concerned
that the public may currently be getting less than it deserves.
I was surprised to learn from my staff that Chairman Jaczko has
invoked emergency authority and transferred Commission functions to
himself in the wake of the earthquake in Japan, especially after
speaking with me personally by telephone and appearing before this
committee in a public briefing--and failing to mention it either time.
The law confers emergency authority on the Chairman in the wake of an
emergency at a particular facility or materials regulated by the NRC.
At present, I'm not aware that an emergency condition exists at any
U.S. facility.
Chairman Jaczko, I want to work with you as the NRC tries to
understand what happened in Japan, and what the United States can learn
from it. But our collaboration--indeed, collaboration with all of us,
Congress--can only proceed fruitfully if we have openness and
transparency. That applies to your office. So as we move forward, I
hope you will provide us with full and complete information about your
activities, and that you will work with your fellow commissioners in
the same spirit.
In that vein, I look forward to your testimony, and yours
Administrator Jackson, and to working with both of you on gaining a
full understanding of the impact of the Fukushima accident.
But, before I yield to my colleague, I'd be remiss if I didn't say
I'm anxious to see progress on the renominations of Commissioners
Ostendorff and Svinicki which I hope President Obama sends us soon.
Given the scope of issues before the Commission, it is important that
the agency continues to benefit from their valuable expertise.
STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS R. CARPER, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE
OF DELAWARE
Senator Carper. You bet. Thank you very much, Senator
Inhofe.
Let me begin by saying, first of all, Senator Inhofe and
Madam Chair, thanks very much for holding this hearing and for
giving me the opportunity to co-chair it with you.
Let me begin by saying that, again, I have said this before
and I will certainly say it again here today, our thoughts and
prayers go out to all of the citizens of Japan, especially
those families of the thousands of disaster victims and those
that are going through a very, very difficult time. As this
tragedy unfolds, I encourage the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
and other U.S. agencies to continue to coordinate with the
Japanese government to provide any assistance that they need to
recover.
The events that struck Japan are reminders that we are all
vulnerable to unexpected disasters, whether it is an act of
nature or a terrorist attack. While we cannot predict when or
where the next major disaster will occur, we know that it will
occur and we also know that adequate protection, adequate
preparation in response planning are vital to minimize both the
injury and death when it does happen.
Today's hearing is one of many I hope that this committee
will have to make sure that our Nation has prepared for the
worst in order to prevent any lives lost from nuclear power in
this country. In the United States we have, as you know, 104
nuclear power plants in some 31 States which generate
approximately one-fifth of our Nation's total electric
consumption. Nuclear power has helped to curb our reliance on
dirty fossil fuels and reduce air pollution that damages our
health and causes global warming.
Over the years, the NRC has strived to create a culture of
safety in the nuclear energy industry and as long as I have
been on this Subcommittee, we have worked very hard to
reinforce those efforts. As a result, we have seen, not seen,
any direct deaths from nuclear power by radiation exposure in
this country in over 50 years.
As part of its culture of safety, the NRC requires nuclear
facilities to be designed to withstand natural disasters and
terrorist attacks. After September 11th, the NRC took a closer
look at the nuclear industry and put in place additional safety
and security requirements.
Despite all of the protections that are in place, the
crisis in Japan is a clear warning, a clear reminder, that we
cannot become complacent when it comes to nuclear safety. I
often say it, and my colleagues are tired of hearing me say it,
if it is not perfect, make it better. That certainly applies to
nuclear plants and the way that they are operated with respect
to their safety.
That is why Chairman Boxer and I asked the NRC for a
conference review of our nuclear fleet. We want to make sure
that every precaution is being taken to safeguard the American
people from a similar nuclear accident. The NRC is just getting
started on this review and I anxiously await their results.
Today I look forward to hearing from our witnesses an
update on the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Plant and an update on
our response to that crisis. I also look forward to hearing
what we can learn from the ongoing crisis in order to prevent
similar events from occurring right here.
I am particularly interested in hearing about the State of
Emergency Planning Process from the Delaware Department of
Safety and Homeland Security. Secretary Schiliro, we welcome
you especially.
As Chairman of the Subcommittee on Nuclear Safety, I take
seriously my responsibilities, our responsibilities, to make
certain that we are taking appropriate measures to make the
nuclear industry as safe as it can possibly be. As I said
before, while I am a proponent of clean energy, my top priority
of our domestic power, our nuclear power industry, to me is
public safety.
With that having been said, I look over to my right and I
see Senator Lamar Alexander of Tennessee. We welcome you and
await your comments.
[The prepared statement of Senator Carper follows:]
Statement of Hon. Thomas R. Carper, U.S. Senator from the
State of Delaware
Let me begin by saying my thoughts and prayers go out to all
citizens of Japan, especially to the families of the thousands of
disaster victims. As this tragedy unfolds, I encourage the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC) and other U.S. agencies to continue to
coordinate with the Japanese government to provide any assistance they
need to recover.
The events that struck Japan are reminders that we are all
vulnerable to unexpected disasters, whether an act of nature or a
terrorist attack. While we cannot predict when or where the next major
disaster will occur, we know adequate preparation and response planning
are vital to minimize injury and death when it does happen. Today's
hearing is one of many I hope this committee will have to make sure our
nation has prepared for the worst--in order to prevent any lives lost
from nuclear power in this country.
In the United States we have 104 nuclear power plants in 31 states,
which generate approximately a fifth of our Nation's total electric
consumption. Nuclear power has helped curb our reliance on dirty fossil
fuels and reduce air pollution that damages our health and causes
global warming.
Over the years, the NRC has strived to create a ``culture of
safety'' in the U.S. nuclear energy industry. As a result, we have not
seen any direct deaths from nuclear power plant radiation exposure in
this country. As part of its ``culture of safety,'' the NRC requires
nuclear facilities to be designed to withstand natural disasters and
terrorist attacks. After September 11th, the NRC took a closer look at
the nuclear industry and put into place additional safety and security
requirements.
Despite all the protections in place, the crisis in Japan is a
clear warning that we must not become complacent when it comes to
nuclear safety. As I often say, if it is not perfect, make it better.
That is why Chairman Boxer and I asked the NRC for a comprehensive
review of our nuclear fleet. We wanted to make sure every precaution is
being taken to safeguard the American people from a similar nuclear
incident. The NRC is just getting started on this review and I
anxiously await their results.
Today, I look forward to hearing from our witnesses an update on
the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant and update on our response to that
crisis. I also look forward to hearing what we can learn from the
ongoing crisis in order to prevent similar events from occurring here.
I'm particularly interested in hearing about the State emergency
planning process from Delaware Department of Safety and Homeland
Security Secretary Schiliro.
As Chairman of the Subcommittee on Nuclear Safety, I take seriously
my responsibility to make certain we are taking the appropriate
measures to make the nuclear industry safe. As I have said before,
while I am a proponent of clean energy, my top priority for our
domestic nuclear power industry remains public safety.
STATEMENT OF HON. LAMAR ALEXANDER, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE
OF TENNESSEE
Senator Alexander. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank
you and Senator Boxer for----
Senator Carper. Senator, Senator, I did not notice that
Senator Barrasso had stepped in.
Senator Barrasso.
[Remarks off microphone.]
Senator Carper. Are you sure? OK, thank you very much.
Senator Alexander. Thanks, Senator Barrasso. Well, I want
to thank everybody. I thank Senators Boxer and Carper for
having the hearing.
I think nuclear power is, and I have said this before the
Japan accident, something we ought to have more oversight of
and that is because it is complex science, it is complex
engineering, and it is vitally important to the future of our
country.
I remember back when I was Governor of Tennessee in the
1980s. We had a question that was presented to me when we were
building, TVA was building, one of its nuclear power plants.
The issue was whether to distribute iodide tablets to people
who were in the area of the new nuclear power plant.
Some people said, oh, do not do that because you will scare
people to death. The other argument, of course, was, well, if
it would, if people understand what they are for, and they are
only to be used in the event of an emergency, then it is better
to go ahead and talk about the process that we are using and
let people know what we are dealing with. So, I made the
decision then, let us go ahead and let people who live within
the area of the nuclear power plant have access to iodide
tablets in case there was a problem.
I feel the same way today about our nuclear power program
in the United States and what happened in Japan. I cannot
imagine a future for the United States that does not include
nuclear power to create electricity. I mean, it is only 20
percent of our electricity, but it is 70 percent of our clean
electricity. Senator Carper has been very consistent. He cares
deeply about climate change. This is one way to deal with it.
He and I have worked hard on clean air in the Smoky Mountains
and the East Coast. This is one way to deal with it.
So, it is hard to imagine that. But on the other hand, I
think those of us who, who find it especially important have
maybe a special responsibility to see that there is clear
oversight and public understanding of this complex system of
science and engineering so that people are comfortable with
whatever risks there are.
As we look at our own history, actually, we have done a
fair job of that. I mean, Three Mile Island spawned several
improvements such as the Institute for Nuclear Power
Operations, which has improved safety. It is important for
Americans to know that while Three Mile Island was a
significant accident and a big problem, that no one was hurt at
Three Mile Island. That is important to know.
September 11th. That had nothing to do with nuclear power
but it caused nuclear power operators around the country to
take a look at what would happen if there were a terrorist
attack. You can go on YouTube and see what happens when an F-4
Phantom Jet runs into a concrete wall at 500 miles an hour. The
jet vaporizes but the plant is still there.
Hurricane Katrina had nothing to do with nuclear power but
it caused operators at the 104 nuclear plants around the
country and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to think about
well, what would happen if we had a horrific event like the
size of Hurricane Katrina.
So, I think we still have a lot to learn from what happened
in Japan. For example, spent fuel storage. There is a lot of
talk about that. It helps us think about, is it possible, how
long should it be in pools, how soon could it go to dry casks?
It is important also to know, as the Chairman of the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission says, as Dr. Chu has said, the
President's Energy Chief and Nobel Prize Winning Physicist,
that it is safe to store spent fuel onsite for 100 years.
It is important to know that all the fuel that we have
produced that is used fuel from commercial reactors in the
United States would fit on one football field to a depth of
about 20 feet. That is the mass that we are talking about.
It is important to ask, what about Yucca Mountain? We do
need to eventually dispose of it. We have collected $30 billion
to pay for an eventual disposal. Why do we not do it?
We could ask about safety improvements. We should be
thinking about new reactors. In Tennessee, TVA's got 3,200
people building a new reactor at Watts Bar. How can we know it
is even safer than the other 104 reactors we have had at which,
as Senator Carper said, we have not had one single fatality
related to a reactor in the last, well, in the history of those
facilities?
So, there are important questions to ask. There is a lot of
information to learn from the Japan disaster. But it is
important, at the same time, to recognize the safety record
that we have for this form of energy production in the United
States and keep it all in perspective.
Senator Carper and Senator Boxer, I welcome these hearings.
The more of them, the better. I believe that the more we
understand and talk about this complex system of energy
production, the safer it is likely to be and the more useful it
will be to help produce clean air in our country.
Thank you.
Senator Carper. Thank you, Senator Alexander. If it is OK
with Senator Barrasso, I am going to slip over to Senator Udall
and then back to you. OK? Senator Udall.
STATEMENT OF HON. TOM UDALL, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF NEW
MEXICO
Senator Udall. Thank you, Senator Carper, and thank you
very much, you and Senator Boxer, for holding this hearing. I
appreciate very much and welcome my colleagues that I served
with over in the House and look forward to hearing their
testimony.
As Senator Carper and others have said, I think our
thoughts and prayers really do go out to the Japanese people
for this tragedy and what has happened to them. I know when I
talked the other day with Japan's Ambassador to the United
States he was very, very appreciative of the level of
scientific support that we were giving Japan. I know many
scientists have come from both California and New Mexico and
from our national labs and so that is something that they
appreciate and I think we are all very proud of.
This is a three-part disaster, an earthquake, a tsunami and
a nuclear crisis and it is tragic. Americans should focus on
assisting our close friends, the Japanese, in recovering from
it. Nuclear energy has tremendous potential for good and also
for harm. Nuclear accidents are rare, but their consequences
can be severe. Nuclear energy safety must be the top priority
for Government regulators and it should be the top priority for
the industry as well.
The Japanese crisis underscores the need for information
transparency. Nuclear energy will almost certainly continue to
be part of America's energy mix. We have 100, 104 reactors
today, and if it economic, more will be built. But it will be
harder to build reactors if the public lives in fear of them.
Our role in Congress is to conduct the oversight to ensure
that the NRC and the EPA do their job and ensure U.S. nuclear
power plants are safe. Safety standards are of the utmost
importance and we should be highly skeptical of proposals to
``streamline'' or cut corners on safety standards. It will be
up to the banks and the investor community to decide whether to
invest in nuclear power projects compared to the other
investment options out there.
Nations like France, which rely heavily on nuclear power,
also have taxpayers picking up most of the tab. That is not
realistic for the United States' current budget situation.
So, I very much appreciate this list of witnesses today and
I am going to yield back my time so we can get quickly to the
witnesses.
Senator Carper. Thank you, Senator Udall.
Senator Barrasso is the Ranking Republican Member of the
Subcommittee on Clean Air and Nuclear Safety. Senator Barrasso,
thank you for your patience.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN BARRASSO, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF
WYOMING
Senator Barrasso. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I appreciate our guests for being here to testify and I
want to associate myself with the opening remarks of Senator
Udall regarding his concerns for the people of Japan.
Absolutely. Incredible challenges, incredible loss and I think
the hearts of all of us on this committee, and in this Body,
have great, great concerns for the people in Japan.
The tsunami and the earthquake occurred in Japan, not in
the United States. The emergency that preceded the tsunami and
the earthquake occurred in Japan. The emergency response is
occurring in Japan with the help of the United States.
Some people seem to want Americans to believe that the
disaster occurred here and that is not the case. As Ranking
Member Inhofe has pointed out, the current Chairman of the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission is operating under his emergency
powers since the disaster first occurred. The reasons why these
emergency powers continue to be in effect, and the implications
that has for future chairmen, does not have implications for
the United States nuclear safety, does have implications for
the United States nuclear safety response. This is one of the
reasons that I believe the hearing today is so important.
Some want to use this crisis in Japan as a tool to wipe out
nuclear power in the United States. For example, there is an
April 6th inside EPA story entitled ``Activists Step Up Effort
to Strengthen Oversight of Uranium Recovery.'' The article
states that ``environmentalists are stepping up their efforts
to push EPA to strengthen its oversight of uranium mining and
processing operations in the wake of the Japanese nuclear
disaster, targeting the processed metal because its extraction
marks the first step in the nuclear fuel cycle that its
proponents tout as a low carbon alternative to fossil fuels.''
Well, how uranium mining is tied to the Japanese nuclear
emergency is beyond me. I would hope that the EPA
Administrator, who is with us today, would ignore these types
of attacks which would have occurred whether the Japanese
disaster occurred or not.
Earlier today in this very committee we heard testimony
from those who want to stop hydraulic fracturing. This is the
process whereby we can tap America's vast domestic natural gas
reserves. Apparently, these activists do not want natural gas
either.
By attacking all of the affordable energy sources,
including our nuclear and natural gas, activists are driving up
the cost of energy. They are raising the costs of running a
factory, or a mine, or a small business. They are raising the
cost of heating and cooling homes across this country. This
will cost thousand of jobs during our economic downturn.
We cannot reach a clean energy future without natural gas
and without nuclear power. We need all the power, not just
some. That means coal, natural gas, wind, solar, hydro,
geothermal and nuclear power. As Senator Carper and I talk
about and discuss and agree, the cheapest energy is energy that
is not used. So, we need to be more efficient in how we use our
energy.
But we need the kind of energy mix that keeps factories
running and homes heated. Countries like Germany, which are
phasing out domestic nuclear power, are discovering this fact.
The Washington Post ran an Associated Press story on April 6th
entitled Utilities: Germany Now Importing Energy After Taking
Nuclear Power Plants Off the Grid. The article goes on and
states that Chancellor Angela Merkel's decision to take some
atomic power plants offline in the wake of Japan's disaster
means Germany is now importing power from its nuclear-reliant
neighbors. It goes on to say Germany now imports about 50
gigawatts, gigawatt hours, or the capacity equivalent to 1.5
reactors, from France and the Czech Republic every day. This is
from the German Association of Energy and Water Industries.
So, this same pattern that we are seeing in Germany will
occur in the United States. American States that declare
themselves nuclear free, whether they are California or
elsewhere, whatever States declare themselves nuclear free and
shut down their nuclear plants will have to have power shipped
in from neighboring States. It is an energy shell game and it
will not hide America's growing need for affordable domestic
energy to power our economy.
Let us be careful not to jump to conclusions and try to
shut down another domestic energy source. Let us work together
to make America's energy as clean as we can as fast we can
without raising energy prices and costing American jobs.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to the testimony.
Senator Carper. Thank you, Senator Barrasso.
Senator Lautenberg.
STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE
STATE OF NEW JERSEY
Senator Lautenberg. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
As said, we all agree that our sympathies, our concern and
our desire is to be of help to the people in Japan who are
affected as a result of the earthquake, tsunami and nuclear
emergency. But we want to learn from it and we want to make
sure that we are doing what we can for the people in our
country.
Since the latest disaster began unfolding, Americans have
had one question on their minds. Could it happen here? I am not
willing to wait to find out. We need to answer that question
now.
Soon after the meltdown in Japan began, I asked the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission to conduct a comprehensive review of New
Jersey's four nuclear power reactors which provide our State
with about half of its electricity. I also requested the chief
executives of New Jersey's nuclear power companies to join me
in my office where they agreed to a thorough safety review at
each of the four reactors. The people of New Jersey need to
know if our State's nuclear plants are safe and we are
determined to make sure that they get the peace of mind that
they deserve, but the reality of being protected.
But this is not the only issue in New Jersey. Nuclear
energy provides 20 percent of America's electricity and so we
have to make nuclear safety a national priority. The United
States has a good track record of keeping our plants safe.
There have been few accidents and few fatalities. But we have
got to remain vigilant if we want to preserve this record.
Now Japan, a world leader in technology in its plants, were
built to resist earthquakes. But as we know, it was not enough.
So here in the United States we cannot take anything for
granted.
To keep Americans safe also means making sure that we give
citizens, our citizens, a clear guidance during emergencies. I
was troubled when American citizens in Japan were told to stay
at least 50 miles away from the site of this meltdown. In our
country, the NRC Emergency Guidelines require people to stay
only 10 miles away from plants during emergencies.
So, make no mistake, nuclear power generates emission-free
energy and it should and will be part of our energy future. But
we cannot ever trade people's safety for the sake of meeting
our energy demands. We saw Chernobyl a quarter of a century
ago, the effects of a single nuclear accident that will linger
for generations.
So, I look forward to hearing from today's witnesses, and
thank our colleagues from the House, about how we can learn
from the past mistakes and make sure that nuclear power remains
a safe, clean energy source.
I want to respond to something that we heard, talked about
this morning and that is, well, costs. Costs. Nuclear power
does so much for us but has risks. When we think of the
contribution that nuclear power brings to our energy needs, we
know that we are going to keep on having nuclear power created.
But burning fossil fuel has an extra cost. It has a lasting
effect on our environment and on the health and wellbeing of
our citizens.
So, when we look at the costs for energy, we have to look
at the costs of unfit air for those who have asthma or
otherwise, and pollution generally. So, we have to look at the
whole picture and I assure you that we would like to do just
that.
Thank you very much.
Senator Carper. Thank you, Senator Lautenberg.
Senator Merkley.
STATEMENT OF HON. JEFF MERKLEY, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF
OREGON
Senator Merkley. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
I express my deepest sympathies to the families in Japan,
victims of the triple tragedy, the earthquake, the tsunami and
certainly the nuclear disaster. I thank all of the heroes in
Japan who raced to the scene to provide assistance to victims
of the earthquake and tsunami and those who are working around
the clock to cool the nuclear reactors and contain the
radiation that is being released.
It is very much our worst nightmare that a natural disaster
of some kind should cause us some more tragedy in the United
States and that is why it is certainly appropriate and
important that we do everything possible to take and look at
the lessons in Japan and apply them to our own system. Just as
we applied a stress test to the banks in the financial crisis,
we need to apply a stress test to our nuclear plants and
understand what the weaknesses are.
When the disaster happened in Japan, and certainly a lot of
the discussion was around the cooling pools for rods, I was
taken back to when I was traveling through Hanford many years
ago, about 14 years ago, and was looking at the cooling pool at
Hanford, and it had that kind of eerie blue glow at the bottom
of the pool. I asked the question, if an earthquake occurs and
it splits this pool, what happens when the water rushes out?
Basically the response was a blank look with that would be bad.
Certainly we have to be prepared in far better ways than simply
saying that something would be bad.
In the last two decades, we have built only three new
nuclear reactors because the cost is so high by the time we
account for human error, by the time we account for natural
disaster, and by the time we account for terrorist attack and
design plans accordingly. We have to take a look at those
things because the upside risk is so substantial. So that is
certainly a factor.
We have strategies that have been put forward by groups
like New Scale, a group in Oregon, other research that has been
done on pebble bed strategies that have failsafe mechanisms
and/or passive protections that I think certainly should be, we
should look into and understand that part of this conversation,
whether fundamentally different designs would greatly mitigate
the risks.
These disasters occur because we lose the heating transfer
medium and plants overheat. But there are designs intended to
make sure that there is no meltdown even when that happens,
whether the medium be water or the medium be helium. That needs
to be part of the national discussion.
So with that, thank you very much, Madam Chair, and I yield
back the balance of my time.
Senator Carper. I believe the next person we recognize is
Senator Gillibrand.
Senator Gillibrand.
STATEMENT OF HON. KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE
STATE OF NEW YORK
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman, for
holding the hearing. Madam Chairwoman, I appreciate you holding
this hearing as well. This is obviously an issue that we share
a great passion for and in light of the disaster in Japan, I am
really looking for answers. So, I just want to thank you both
for drawing attention to such a serious issue.
I want to thank Chairman Jaczko for coming. Congresswoman
Capps, thank you so much for spending time with us to answer
our questions.
I may not have the opportunity to ask my questions, but I
do want to highlight some of the areas of my concern and I will
submit the questions directly for answers for the record, but I
do hope you get to address this in part of this hearing.
One issue is the issue of licensing exemptions. Now, in the
Indian Point Plant, which is the one that serves about 30
percent of New York's electricity right now, within a 50-mile
radius it hits 16 million people. So, we have significant
concern to focus on that, and all the plants in New York, to
make sure they are safe.
Now, with Indian Point, there have been a number of waivers
given. I would like an analysis and a review of in what
instances are waivers given? Are you going to re-look at the
issue in light of the Japan disaster to see if those waivers
were legitimate, if they should be reconsidered and perhaps
withdrawn? The issue of waivers is something I care a lot
about.
The second issue is the issue of evacuations. In Japan, we
have evacuated U.S. citizens within a 50-mile radius. The plan
with regard to Indian Point is a 10-mile evacuation plan. I
would like to know the reason why there are differences in
evacuation plans.
To do a 10-mile evacuation for Indian Point takes 9 hours.
I understand that there are different types of redundancies at
Indian Point, one is a going to a diesel system and another
diesel thereafter, but, then it is a battery system that only
lasts for 3 hours. How do you reconcile evacuations with what
your redundancies are and how capable they are in such a
situation?
I also care a lot about security issues. Now, obviously, we
are soon on the 10-year anniversary of 9/11 and one of the 9/11
Commission recommendations was to secure all nuclear
facilities. I would like to have an opportunity to talk to you
about those security measures and where they stand and what
kind of investigations are you doing with regard to employees,
with regard to background controls and other potentially
vulnerable infrastructure issues.
Then the last issue is the spent fuel pool and dry cask
storage issue. Are these pools designed to be long-term
storage? What do you intend to do to move them from fuel pool
to dry cask storage facilities as a general matter for safety?
So, obviously that is a long list of concerns and issues.
If you do get to address them, I will be very grateful. If not,
I will submit them all for the record, Madam Chairwoman.
Thank you very much, again, for your testimony.
Senator Carper. Thank you for your statement and
introducing Congresswoman Capps and Congressman Bilbray. Let me
just say to Congresswoman Capps, thank you so much for sharing
with us a former member of your staff, Emily Spain. She is a
gift to the people of Delaware. So, we are grateful for that.
With that, we would like to recognize Congresswoman Lois
Capps, 23d District of California, and followed by Congressman
Brian Bilbray, the 50th District of California. How many do you
all have, 53? Fifty-three. We have one.
[Laughter.]
Senator Carper. But as I like to say in Delaware, if you
can only send one, send the best.
We are glad you are here, we recognize you and please
proceed.
STATEMENT OF HON. LOIS CAPPS, U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM THE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
Ms. Capps. Thank you. Chairwoman Boxer, Ranking Member
Inhofe, Chairman Carper and Members of the committee, thank you
for holding this hearing and for the opportunity to testify.
I am here today because my congressional District includes
Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, which has become a central
focus in the weeks following the Japanese earthquake, tsunami
and subsequent nuclear crisis.
Last month, I called upon the NRC to stay the license
renewal process for Diablo Canyon until further studies
demonstrate that the plant's design and operations can
withstand an earthquake and other potential threats. Yesterday,
Pacific Gas & Electric, which I will refer to as PG&E, asked
the NRC to delay its license renewal application while it
completes their studies.
Here today, in light of PG&E's action, I am renewing my
request to the NRC to halt the re-licensing process. I do not
make this request lightly. Last month, I again toured the
Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant. Following that visit, I was
convinced of two things. First, that the employees are
committed to getting it right. Second, that we are not there
yet.
I am not alone in that assessment. I am grateful to be
joined today by my constituent, California State Senator Sam
Blakeslee, who also represents Diablo Canyon and its
surrounding communities. State Senator Blakeslee will testify
today both in his role as State elected official and also as a
scientist with a Ph.D. in seismic studies. I am confident that
our shared assessment of the situation will offer the committee
valuable, on the ground insight into the current and future
landscape of nuclear power in California.
The bottom line is this. We do not have the answers we need
to confidently move forward in extending the licensing
agreement of Diablo Canyon. We should not move forward until we
have those answers. Because the reactors do not need to be
relicensed for more than a dozen years, we have plenty of time
to find those answers.
Mr. Chairman, what happened so tragically in Japan offers
us an opportunity to question and question again whether we are
ready, whether we can handle the unthinkable. Now, the NRC is
already, had already determined that it is non-credible that
there could be multiple catastrophes such as an earthquake and
a meltdown at Diablo Canyon Plant. The NRC has maintained,
``The chance of such a bizarre concatenation of events
occurring is extremely small. Not only is this conclusion well
supported by the record evidence, it accords most eminently
with common sense notions of statistical probability.''
Yet, the unthinkable did happen in Japan. An earthquake, a
tsunami, and a nuclear accident, all occurring in sequence.
Clearly, a bizarre concatenation of events is not merely
hypothetical.
Mr. Chairman, let us be clear. We know seismic uncertainty
exists at the Diablo Canyon site. In the early 1970s, while the
plant was originally under construction, scientists discovered
the Hosgri Offshore Fault less than three miles away, forcing a
major re-design and pushing the project billions of dollars
over budget.
In 2008, scientists discovered yet another fault, the
Shoreline Fault, which lies offshore less than one mile from
the plant. The stakes were raised just last month when the NRC
confirmed that Diablo Canyon was one of two nuclear power
plants in the highest risk area for seismic activity in the
entire country.
Clearly, we need answers to major questions. Can this
plant, including the spent fuel pool, withstand an earthquake
and a nuclear accident at the same time? How long would the
plant be self-sustaining in the event of such damage? Is Diablo
Canyon's evacuation plan during an incident workable?
Many of us on the central coast of California remain
concerned that the NRC has not taken action to answer these
questions or address these warnings, so much so that the
California Energy Commission has recommended, and our State
Public Utilities Commission has directed, that independent,
peer reviewed, advanced seismic studies be performed prior to
applying for re-licensing. I agree with this assessment. That
is why it is so important to halt the re-licensing process. We
need to take some time to get all the answers.
It is important to note that I am not calling for Diablo
Canyon to be shut down. I am also not calling for PG&E to be
denied an operating license. What I am doing today is asking
that the re-licensing process be halted until updated, state-
of-the-art seismic studies and 3D seismic mapping are
completed, that they be considered as part of the re-licensing
process, and that these studies be done by third party,
independent scientists.
Failure to do so is unwise and irresponsible. It will feed
public uncertainty about the oversight and safety of nuclear
energy and it could cost taxpayers billions of dollars to once
again belatedly address issues that should have been dealt with
beforehand. That is why I am hopeful the NRC will work with all
stakeholders to get answers to the seismic questions which, at
this point, remain unstudied and unresolved prior to the
continuation of the re-licensing process.
Once again, I thank you for the opportunity to testify
today.
Senator Carper. Congresswoman Capps, thank you so much for
coming. I very much appreciate it.
Congressman Bilbray, welcome.
STATEMENT OF HON. BRIAN P. BILBRAY, U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM
THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
Mr. Bilbray. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Madam Chair, Members
of the committee, it is an honor to be here.
Let me say, first of all, as a lifelong resident of San
Diego County, I have the same concerns that everyone who lives
downwind of a nuclear power plant would have after seeing what
happened in Japan. Every one of my children and grandchildren,
except for those that have been exiled to Helena, MT, live
within not only the downwind area from San Onofre but also
within the tsunami zone of San Diego County.
I speak not just as a father and a grandfather, but as
somebody who had the privilege of serving two terms as the
Chairman of the Disaster Council for the 3 million people of
San Diego County that designed the evacuation and response to
not just the nuclear issue but also the tsunami issue, and also
had the privilege of serving on the California Coastal
Commission, an agency that has oversight and review of the
nuclear power plants in California. This issue really did bring
back memories of all the hearings and processes that we have
had.
Frankly, there are still the facts to be taken, still
research that needs to be done. But I think there are some
indications that are very, very enlightening. One was the fact
that even though the Japanese was not designed to those
engineered at California plants, it did survive an earthquake
that is well over what our plants ever perceived to be.
In fact, the 9.0 that we are talking about that has struck
this plant, we are looking at 7.0 maximum, or 7.2 maximum in
California. That frequency of 7.2, as pointed out by Secretary
Chu, occurs every 7,000 to 10,000 years. So, it gives you an
idea of the engineering.
The Japanese were hit with a ground motion of .52. Our
California San Onofre is designed not for a .52 but for a .67.
You have to remember that this is also in a region that
geologists say will not get anything over a 7.2, and that 7.2
will be between 7,000 and 10,000 years. It gives us some
perspective of the challenges we have to have.
The biggest concern was the fact that it was not the
earthquake, as we know with the information now, but it was the
tsunami. As a surfer, let me tell you something. This is not
one thing that is joking in any matter, but it is one that is
very, very disconcerting.
The fact is that Japan had a 10-foot surge wall. San Onofre
is sitting on a 20-foot elevation with a 30-foot-plus surge
wall. Diablo is around 85. Obviously, in an area where all the
experts say that the tidal waves would never reach that level,
but if they did, the difference between the California
facilities and the Japanese facilities is that the California
facilities have gravity-feed cooling built into their system
and they have their pump systems totally protected from
inundation, which the Japanese did not have. They did not even
have their fuel tanks protected, which was a major flaw. I
think that is where good assessment can really be made on this
issue.
Now remember as we talk about nuclear, ladies and
gentlemen, as a former member, 6 years on the Air Resources
Board, we are talking about 20 percent of our energy that
avoids emissions equal to 96 percent of all the automobiles
that are driving on American soil. I think that we have got to
recognize that the challenges that we have to go forward,
especially those of us who are addressing environmental issues,
need to remember that even the U.N. Council on Climate Change
has said that a robust commitment to nuclear is, has to be,
part of any plan looking to address climate change.
But I think that one of the things we need to get out of
this, Madam Chair and Mr. Chairman, is that where are we today,
have we over engineered and was that over engineering prudent.
I think the one thing that it looks like in California is we
have and that should be reassuring.
My biggest concern is that we do not talk about the fact
that, as Madam Chair knows, we are not just talking San Onofre
in San Diego, we are talking many nuclear reactors that are
within not just miles but within yards of residences in San
Diego that the U.S. Government owns. Those are issues that we
sort of ignore and I think this one we address.
I guess the biggest issue, and I would like to agree with
you strongly on, Senator, is not just how do we address the
technology that is 40 years old that we have on the ground
operating today, but how do we move forward with technology
that has been upgraded that not only avoids the threats of
meltdowns, totally engineers out that problem, but also creates
the opportunity to address that waste problem, that 100 yard by
20 foot, that now nuclear waste not only could be a fuel that
could be burned in the new technology that is now safe and
designed not to do this, but also a technology that could use
up our weapons grade material as we talk about going to zero
options.
So, I appreciate the chance to be able to address you
today, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Carper. Congressman Bilbray, Congresswoman Capps,
great of you to come. Thank you so much for your contributions.
We look forward to seeing you soon. Thank you.
With that we are going to invite our second panel, Chairman
Jaczko, Administrator Jackson, to join us at the table please.
Neither of our guests on the second panel are strangers to this
committee. It is great to see both of you. We appreciate your
stewardship and the hard work that you are doing in response to
the disaster, the disasters, in Japan.
First we will hear from Lisa Jackson, who is the
Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, and
following her testimony, we will hear from Greg Jaczko, who is
the Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
I will ask you to use about 5 minutes for your statement,
and then we will have some questions.
Thank you so much for coming. Your entire statement will be
made part of the record.
Please proceed.
STATEMENT OF LISA JACKSON, ADMINISTRATOR, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY
Ms. Jackson. Thank you, Chairman Carper. To you, Chairman
Carper, Chairwoman Boxer, our Ranking Member Inhofe, and all
the members of this committee, thank you for inviting me to
testify on EPA's role in responding to the tragedy in Japan.
I do want to begin by expressing my sympathy for those who
have lost loved ones from the earthquake and tsunami, and my
support to those who are working tirelessly to control the
radiation at the Fukushima Daiichi Plant in Japan. Their
efforts are selfless and truly heroic.
As Japan works to address the challenges at their nuclear
reactors, many Americans are concerned about what the
radiological releases to the atmosphere may mean to them and
what their Government is doing to make sure that they are safe
here in the United States.
Let me begin by speaking directly to those who are
concerned about radiation detection that monitoring and
sampling from EPA and other Federal agencies are picking up
throughout the United States. Let me be clear. EPA has not
seen, and does not expect to see, radiation in our air or water
reaching harmful levels in the United States.
All of the data which we have seen, which we continue to
make public and available on our Web site, indicates that while
radiation levels are slightly elevated in some places, they are
significantly below problematic levels.
To put this in perspective, days after the tsunami struck,
we detected radioactive isotopes consistent with a nuclear
incident at several air monitors along the West Coast. These
readings were so minuscule that they were 100,000 times lower
than the daily exposure we all receive.
Keep in mind that all of us are exposed to radiation every
day, both from natural sources such as minerals in the ground
and manmade sources such as medical x-rays. That said, we will
continue to monitor the environment for radiation. We will
continue to make the data public. We will continue to explain
what the data mean to the people and families we serve. As I
have said to this committee many times before, transparency and
communication with the public is a priority for our agency and
will guide all of our actions.
EPA's main role in this response is simple but very
important. Using a variety of techniques, we monitor and track
radiation and radionuclide releases into the environment in the
United States. These radioactive releases range from ones that
dissipate from the environment within days, such as iodine, to
those that have half-lives of thousands of years, such as
plutonium.
Let me speak for just a moment about those monitoring
efforts. EPA's nationwide radiation monitoring network, known
as RadNet, continuously monitors the Nation's air, drinking
water, rainwater and milk. The data provide the information
scientists need to estimate long-term trends in environmental
radiation levels and allows them to detect minuscule increases.
RadNet's air monitoring system is made up of more than 100
fixed stations that create a network of detection across the
United States. Over the last 5 years, EPA has been enhancing
the capabilities of the RadNet system by replacing existing
monitoring equipment with new air monitors that send real time
data to our laboratory.
In response to the Japanese nuclear incident, we added to
this system by quickly deploying mobile air monitors to far
westerly locations, including Alaska and islands in the
Pacific, to detect radiation as it slowly moved from Japan.
In addition, several times a week, we collect filters from
these air monitors and perform a detailed analysis that lets us
find even minuscule amounts of radioactive material in the air.
EPA also samples rainwater for radioactive isotopes.
Monitoring stations across the country submit precipitation
samples to EPA laboratories as rainfall, snow or sleet occur.
Under usual circumstances, these samples are analyzed by EPA
scientists quarterly. But during this response, we are
analyzing precipitation samples as they come in to the
laboratory and quickly post the results on our public Web site.
Also, EPA routinely samples milk and drinking water from
sites across the Nation. Like rainwater, these samples are
normally collected and analyzed on a quarterly basis but, in
response to the nuclear release in Japan, we have accelerated
the normal sampling schedule.
As I mentioned, the levels detected have been far below
levels of public health concern. The information is all
available on EPA's Web site, www.epa.gov/Japan2011. This Web
site was quickly expanded after the tsunami so that the general
public, especially those without a Ph.D. in nuclear physics,
could easily understand what the monitors in their communities
were indicating. EPA's Web site has been featured extensively
on CNN, Fox, and Facebook and it helps answer many of the
questions that some of your constituents may be asking.
Madam Chairman, thank you for your leadership on these
issues, both of our Chairmen, excuse me. I want to assure you
that EPA will continue our coordination with our Federal
partners and we will continue our outreach to the public and
the elected officials to provide information on our monitoring
results.
Thank you so much.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Jackson follows:]
Statement of Lisa P. Jackson, Administrator, U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency
Good morning, Madam Chairman, Chairman Carper and Members of the
Committee. I am pleased to be here today to discuss EPA's role in
monitoring for radiation associated with the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear
power plant emergency in Japan and the possible implications for the
United States. Let me begin by expressing my sympathy for those who
have lost loved ones from the earthquake and tsunami and my support to
those who are working to control the radiation at the Fukushima Daiichi
plant in Japan. Their efforts are selfless and deserve our recognition.
epa monitoring
As part of its ongoing radiation monitoring program, EPA regularly
monitors and tracks radiation and radionuclide releases into the
environment in the United States. Monitoring allows us to track known
releases and to watch for contaminants when there is an actual,
potential, or unexpected release. In addition, EPA may bring monitoring
equipment to the scene of an incident to look for localized radiation
and to help protect people and the environment.
EPA's nationwide radiation monitoring system, RadNet, contains 124
fixed, or stationary air monitors across the United States (of which
122 are currently operational), and 40 deployable air monitors that can
be sent to take readings anywhere in the United States or its
territories. The RadNet network continuously monitors the Nation's air
and regularly monitors drinking water, milk, and precipitation for a
variety of radionuclides (e.g., iodine-131) and radiation types (e.g.,
gross gamma (g)). The near-real-time air monitoring data is
continuously reviewed by computer, and if the results show an unusual
increase in radiation levels, EPA laboratory staff is alerted
immediately and further analyzes additional data from the monitor.
RadNet data provides a means to estimate levels of radioactivity in the
environment, including background radiation as well as radioactive
fallout from past atomic weapons testing, nuclear accidents, and other
large-scale releases of radioactive materials. RadNet also provides the
historical data needed to estimate long-term trends in environmental
radiation levels.
In the event of a threat of a significant radiation release, EPA
typically will increase the frequency of RadNet sampling and generate
many more data records for a given period of time compared to its
routine operation. As a result of the events at the Fukushima nuclear
plant in Japan, several EPA monitors have detected very low levels of
radioactive material in the United States consistent with releases from
the damaged nuclear reactors. In an effort to provide additional
geographic coverage to areas in close proximity to the releases in
Japan, EPA shipped 8 deployable monitors to islands in the Pacific,
including Guam and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands,
and the Western United States, including Hawaii, Idaho, and Alaska. EPA
has also accelerated its monitoring of precipitation, milk, and
drinking water in response to the radiation concerns from the Japanese
nuclear reactors. While the detections in air, precipitation, and milk
were expected, the levels detected have been far below levels of
public-health concern.
EPA, along with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Department of
Energy, Department of Defense, and the Department of Health and Human
Services (FDA, CDC) are among the many Federal agencies taking roles in
monitoring and assessing radiation emissions from the Japanese nuclear
facilities and modeling the potential dose assessments of radiation
that might reach the United States. As part of the Federal Government's
ongoing effort to make our activities and science transparent and
available to the public, EPA will continue to post all RadNet data in
the current on-line data base, accessible through the EPA Web site:
www.epa.gov/japan2011. In the highly unlikely event that radiation
levels begin to approach levels of concern for public health, the
Federal Government will coordinate with State and local governments to
ensure that public health and safety precautions are communicated to
the public.
monitoring results
EPA's RadNet radiation air monitors across the United States have
shown typical fluctuations in background radiation levels. The levels
detected are far below levels of concern. Results of EPA's drinking
water sampling, precipitation sampling, milk sampling, and air filter
and cartridge analysis have detected very low levels of radioactive
material consistent with releases from the damaged Japanese nuclear
reactors.
Keep in mind that all of us are exposed to radiation every day,
both from natural sources such as minerals in the ground, and from man-
made sources such as medical x-rays. Scientists estimate that the
average person in the United States receives a dose of about 310
millirem of radiation per year from natural background sources. Over
the course of a lifetime, a person will average an additional 300
millirem per year from medical procedures. The amount of radiation that
will have an impact on a person's health depends on the type of
radiation and the sensitivity of the individual to the radiation
exposure. Differences such as age, gender and even previous exposure
are factors that might influence a person's reaction to radiation
exposure.
Air samples obtained through the RadNet system have, to date,
contained very small amounts of iodine, cesium, and tellurium, which
are consistent with possible releases from the damaged Japanese
reactors. The largest amounts were found in samples from Alaska on
March 19 and 24, 2011, but all of the radiation levels detected during
the detailed filter analysis are hundreds of times below levels of
concern.
Drinking water samples taken at various locations throughout the
U.S. during the week of April 4, 2011, ranged from non-detects to trace
amounts of iodine-131--approximately 1.6 picocuries per liter (piC/L).
(An infant would have to consume over 200 gallons of this water at the
highest detection level to receive a radiation dose equivalent to a
day's worth of the natural background radiation exposure we experience
continuously from natural sources of radioactivity in our environment.)
Drinking water samples from across the country are currently being
analyzed. After all data are appropriately reviewed, EPA will release
analysis results and will post the results on our Web site.
Early precipitation samples collected by EPA indicated low levels
of radioactivity. Given the sampling results in other environmental
media, EPA expected to find very low levels of radiation in
precipitation samples. Similar findings are to be expected in the
coming weeks as radioactive materials are dispersed through the air
from Japan. While the levels in some of the rainwater exceed the
applicable Maximum Contaminant Level (MCL) of 3piC/L for drinking
water, it is important to note that the corresponding MCL for iodine-
131 was calculated based on long-term chronic exposures over the course
of a lifetime 70 years. The levels seen in rainwater are expected to be
relatively short in duration and are not expected to present any threat
to public health.
Results from samples of milk taken March 28, 2011 in Phoenix,
Arizona and Los Angeles, California showed approximately 3 pCi/L of
iodine-131, which is more than 1,500 times lower than the Derived
Intervention Level set by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration. These
types of findings are to be expected in the coming days and are far
below levels of public health concern, including for infants and
children. Iodine-131 has a very short half-life of approximately 8
days, and the level detected in milk and milk products is, therefore,
expected to drop relatively quickly. Additional information about the
broader Federal response can be found at: http://www.usa.gov/Japan2011.
conclusion
Since the events in Japan occurred, EPA's Web site has had
thousands of views and we have received many positive comments from the
public on the information we have made available. The Agency will
continue to provide monitoring results to the public in a very open and
transparent manner. While we do not expect radiation from the damaged
Japanese reactors to reach the United States at harmful levels, I want
to assure you that EPA will continue our coordination with our Federal
partners to monitor the air, milk, precipitation and drinking water for
any changes, and we will continue our outreach to the public and the
elected officials to provide information on our monitoring results.
Madam Chairman, Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to
testify. I welcome any questions you may have.
Senator Carper. Thank you much, very much, Administrator
Jackson.
Before you testify, Mr. Chairman, I just want to say to
you, to the other Commissioners, to the folks on your staff at
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, how much we appreciate the
way you have stepped up and to respond to try to be as helpful
as we can to the people of Miyagi and to say we appreciate your
continued vigilance and we just encourage you not to let up.
Thank you. Please proceed.
STATEMENT OF GREGORY B. JACZKO, CHAIRMAN, NUCLEAR REGULATORY
COMMISSION
Mr. Jaczko. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Madam
Chairman and Ranking Member Barrasso. I also appreciate the
opportunity to appear before you to address the response of the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission to the recent tragic events in
Japan.
People across the country and around the world who have
been touched by the magnitude and scale of this disaster are
closely following the events in Japan and the repercussions in
this country and in many other countries around the world.
As many have indicated, our hearts go out to all those who
have been dealing with the aftermath of these natural
disasters.
About 2 weeks ago, I made a brief visit to Japan to convey
a message of support and cooperation to our Japanese
counterparts there and to assess the ongoing situation. As part
of that visit, I met with senior Japanese government and TEPCO
officials and consulted with the NRC team of experts who are in
Japan as part of our efforts to support U.S. Government
assistance to Japan.
Just to briefly recap, on Friday, March 11, when the
earthquake and tsunami struck, the NRC's headquarters
Operations Center began to operate on a 24 hour basis
consistent with the emergency authorities and responsibilities
of the agency under the Reorganization Act of 1980.
For the past 3 weeks, the Operations Center has been
monitoring and analyzing events in Japan. In spite of the
evolving situation, the long hours and the intensity of the
efforts, the NRC staff has approached their responsibilities
with dedication, determination and professionalism. They still
remain focused on our central safety and security mission for
reactors and facilities here in the United States. I am,
needless to say, incredibly proud of their work.
As regards the current situation of the reactors in Japan,
from the information we have, we believe the situation
currently is static and we do not see significant changes on a
day-to-day basis with the reactors. It is not yet, however,
what we believe to be stable, namely that, given additional
events or other circumstances, that there would not be the
potential for significant additional problems at the reactors.
So, the efforts continue to be on these efforts, I think,
to transition from static to stable to ensure long-term,
ultimately, the ability to cool the reactors and to provide
cooling for the spent fuel pools.
Looking forward to the work that we have as an agency
dealing with facilities in this country, on Monday, March 21st,
only 10 days after the events in Japan, the Commission acted
quickly to move forward and establish a senior level task force
to conduct a comprehensive review of our processes and
regulations to determine whether the agency should make
improvements to our regulatory system. This is a responsibility
that we have to the American people, to undertake a systematic
and methodical review of the safety of our own domestic nuclear
facilities in light of the Japan situation.
This review will be conducted in the short term and a
longer term timeframe. The short-term review, which will take
approximately 90 days, has already begun and will identify
potential or preliminary near-term operational or regulatory
issues. A longer term review will begin as soon as we have
sufficient information from Japan. But we expect that review to
be completed within 6 months from the beginning of the
evaluation and, in fact, the Commission tasked our staff to do
it in that time.
As we move forward with these efforts, we also recognize
the importance of sharing our lessons learned with other
regulatory counterparts in other countries throughout the
world. I recently returned from the Fifth Review Meeting of the
Convention on Nuclear Safety which provided an important
opportunity for participating nations to address the events in
Japan and begin to formulate plans for short- and long-term
cooperation.
In conclusion, I want to reiterate that we continue to take
our domestic responsibilities for licensing and oversight of
the U.S. licensees as our top priority and that, I want to
stress, we believe that plants in the United States continue to
operate safely. Based on the 90-day review and the longer term
review that we have undertaken, we will take all appropriate
actions necessary to ensure the continuing safety of the
American people.
On behalf of the Commission, I thank you for the
opportunity to appear before you today and would be happy to
answer any questions that you may have.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Jaczko follows:]
Statement of Gregory B. Jaczko, Chairman, U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission
Chairman Boxer, Ranking Member Inhofe, Chairman Carper, Ranking
Member Barrasso, and Members of the Committee, I appreciate the
opportunity to appear before you to address the response of the United
States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to the recent tragic events
in Japan. People across the country and around the world who have been
touched by the magnitude and scale of this disaster are closely
following the events in Japan and the repercussions in this country and
in other countries.
I would first like to reiterate my condolences to all those who
have been affected by the earthquake and tsunami in Japan. Our hearts
go out to all who have been dealing with the aftermath of these natural
disasters, and we are mindful of the long and difficult road they will
face in recovering. We know that the people of Japan are resilient and
strong, and we have every confidence that they will come through this
horrific time and move forward, with resolve, to rebuild their vibrant
country. Our agency stands together with the people of Japan at this
most difficult and challenging time. As part of that, I made a brief
visit to Japan 2 weeks ago. I wanted to convey a message of support and
cooperation to our Japanese counterparts there and to assess the
ongoing situation. I also met with senior Japanese government and TEPCO
officials, and consulted with our NRC team of experts who are in Japan
as part of our assistance effort.
The NRC is an independent regulatory safety agency, with
approximately 4000 staff. We play a critically important role in
protecting the American people and the environment. Our agency sets the
rules by which commercial nuclear power plants operate, and nuclear
materials are used in thousands of academic, medical and industrial
settings in the United States. We have at least two resident inspectors
who work full-time at every nuclear plant in the country, and we are
proud to have world-class scientists, engineers and professionals
representing nearly every scientific discipline.
Since Friday, March 11th, when the earthquake and tsunami struck,
the NRC's headquarters 24-hour Emergency Operations Center has been
fully activated, with staffing augmented to monitor and analyze events
at nuclear power plants in Japan. At the request of the Japanese
government, and through the United States Agency for International
Development (USAID), the NRC sent a team of its technical experts to
provide on-the-ground support, and we have been in continual contact
with them. Within the United States, the NRC has been working closely
with other Federal agencies as part of our government's response to the
situation.
During these past several weeks, our staff has remained focused on
our essential safety and security mission. I want to recognize their
tireless efforts and their critical contributions to the U.S. response
to assist Japan. In spite of the evolving situation, the long hours,
and the intensity of efforts over the past week, NRC staff has
approached their responsibilities with dedication, determination and
professionalism, and I am incredibly proud of their efforts. The
American people also can be proud of the commitment and dedication
within the Federal workforce, which is exemplified by our staff every
day.
The NRC's primary responsibility is to ensure the adequate
protection of the public health and safety of the American people.
Toward that end, we have been very closely monitoring the activities in
Japan and reviewing all currently available information. Review of this
information, combined with our ongoing inspection and licensing
oversight, gives us confidence that the U.S. plants continue to operate
safely. To date, there has been no reduction in the licensing or
oversight function of the NRC as it relates to any of the U.S.
licensees.
Our agency has a long history of conservative safety
decisionmaking. We have been intelligently using risk insights to help
inform our regulatory process, and, for more than 35 years of civilian
nuclear power in this country, we have never stopped requiring needed
improvements to plant designs, and modifying our regulatory framework
as we learn from operating experience.
At the same time the NRC is providing a very high level of support
in response to the events in Japan, we continue to remain focused on
our domestic responsibilities.
I'd like to begin with a brief overview of our immediate and
continuing response to the events in Japan. I then want to further
discuss the reasons for our continuing confidence in the safety of the
U.S. commercial nuclear reactor fleet, and the path forward for the NRC
in order to learn all the lessons we can, in light of these events.
On Friday, March 11th, an earthquake hit Japan, resulting in the
shutdown of more than 10 reactors. The ensuing tsunami appears to have
caused the loss of normal and emergency alternating current power to
the six unit Fukushima Daiichi site. It is those six units that have
received the majority of our attention since that time. Units One, Two,
and Three were in operation at the time of the earthquake. Units Four,
Five, and Six were in previously scheduled outages.
Shortly after 4 o'clock AM EDT on Friday, March 11th, the NRC
Emergency Operations Center made the first call, informing NRC
management of the earthquake and the potential impact on U.S. plants.
We went into monitoring mode later that morning at our Emergency
Operations Center, and the NRC's first concern was possible impacts of
the tsunami on U.S. plants and radioactive materials on the West Coast,
and in Hawaii, Alaska, and U.S. Territories in the Pacific. We were in
communication with licensees and NRC resident inspectors at Diablo
Canyon Power Plant and San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station in
California, and the Radiation Control Program Directors for California,
Washington, Oregon and Hawaii.
On that same day, we began interactions with our Japanese
regulatory counterparts and dispatched two experts to Japan to help at
the U.S. embassy in Tokyo. By Monday, March 14, we had dispatched a
total of 11 NRC staff to provide technical support to the American
embassy and the Japanese government. We have subsequently rotated in
additional staff to continue our on-the-ground assistance in Japan. The
areas of focus for this team are: (1) to assist the Japanese government
and respond to requests from our Japanese regulatory counterparts; and
(2) to support the U.S. Ambassador and the U.S. Government assistance
effort.
On Wednesday, March 16th, we collaborated with other U.S.
government agencies and decided to advise American citizens to evacuate
within a 50-mile range around the plant. The 50-mile evacuation
recommendation that the NRC made to the U.S. Ambassador in Japan was
made in the interest of protecting the health and safety of U.S.
citizens in Japan. We based our assessment on the conditions as we
understood them at the time. Since communications with knowledgeable
Japanese officials were limited and there was a large degree of
uncertainty about plant conditions at the time, it was difficult to
accurately assess the potential radiological hazard. In order to
determine the proper evacuation distance, the NRC staff performed a
series of calculations using NRC's RASCAL computer code to assess
possible offsite consequences. The computer models used meteorological
model data appropriate for the Fukushima Daiichi vicinity. Source terms
were based on hypothetical, but not unreasonable, estimates of fuel
damage, containment, and other release conditions. These calculations
demonstrated that the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA's)
Protective Action Guidelines could be exceeded at a distance of up to
50 miles from the Fukushima site, if a large-scale release occurred
from the reactors or spent fuel pools. The U.S. emergency preparedness
framework provides for the expansion of emergency planning zones as
conditions require. Acting in accordance with this framework, and with
the best information available at the time, the NRC determined that
evacuation out to 50 miles for U.S. citizens was a prudent course of
action, and would be consistent with what we would do under similar
circumstances in the United States, and we made that recommendation to
the Ambassador and other U.S. Government agencies.
We have an extensive range of stakeholders with whom we have
ongoing interaction regarding the Japan situation, including the White
House, congressional staff, our State regulatory counterparts, a number
of other Federal agencies, and international regulatory bodies around
the world.
The NRC response in Japan and our Emergency Operations Center
continue with the dedicated efforts of over 250 NRC staff on a rotating
basis. The entire agency is coordinating and working together in
response to this event so that we can provide assistance to Japan while
continuing the vital activities necessary to fulfill our domestic
responsibilities.
It is important to note that the U.S. government has an extensive
network of radiation monitors across this country. Monitoring by
nuclear power plants and the EPA's system has not identified any
radiation levels that affect public health and safety in this country.
In fact, natural background radiation from sources such as rocks, the
sun, and buildings, is 100,000 times more than doses attributed to any
level that has been detected in the U.S. to date. Therefore, based on
current data, we feel confident that there is no reason for concern in
the United States regarding radioactive releases from Japan.
There are many factors that assure us of ongoing domestic reactor
safety. We have, since the beginning of our regulatory programs, used a
philosophy of Defense-in-Depth, which recognizes that nuclear reactors
require the highest standards of design, construction, oversight, and
operation, and does not rely on any single layer of protection for
public health and safety. Designs for every individual reactor in this
country take into account site-specific factors and include a detailed
evaluation for natural events, such as earthquakes, tornadoes,
hurricanes, floods, and tsunamis, as they relate to that site.
There are multiple physical barriers to radiation in every reactor
design. Additionally, there are both diverse and redundant safety
systems that are required to be maintained in operable condition and
frequently tested to ensure that the plant is in a high condition of
readiness to respond to any situation.
We have taken advantage of the lessons learned from previous
operating experience to implement a program of continuous improvement
for the U.S. reactor fleet. We have learned from experience across a
wide range of situations, including most significantly, the Three Mile
Island accident in 1979. As a result of those lessons learned, we have
significantly revised emergency planning requirements and emergency
operating procedures. We have addressed many human factors issues
regarding how control room employees operate the plant, added new
requirements for hydrogen control to help prevent explosions inside of
containment, and created requirements for enhanced control room
displays of the status of pumps and valves.
The NRC requires licensees to have a post-accident sampling system
that enables the monitoring of radioactive material release and
potential fuel degradation. One of the most significant changes after
Three Mile Island was an expansion of the Resident Inspector Program,
which now has at least two full-time NRC inspectors onsite at each
nuclear power plant. These inspectors have unfettered access to all
licensees' activities related to nuclear safety and security.
As a result of operating experience and ongoing research programs,
severe accident management guidelines have been developed for use at
nuclear power plants. These procedures were developed to ensure that,
in the event all of the above-described precautions failed and a severe
accident occurred, the plant would still protect public health and
safety. Severe accident management guidelines have been in effect for
many years and are evaluated by the NRC inspection program.
As a result of the events of September 11, 2001, we identified
important equipment that, regardless of the cause of a significant fire
or explosion at a plant, the NRC requires licensees to have available
and staged in advance, as well as new procedures and policies to help
deal with a severe situation.
Our program of continuous improvement, based on operating
experience, will now include evaluation of the significant events in
Japan and what we can learn from them. We already have begun enhancing
inspection activities through temporary instructions to our inspection
staff, including the resident inspectors and the region-based
inspectors in our four Regional offices, to look at licensees'
readiness to deal with both design-basis accidents and beyond-design-
basis accidents.
We have also issued an information notice to licensees to make them
aware of the events in Japan, and the kinds of activities they should
undertake to verify the continued operability of these mitigation
measures. It is expected that licensees review the information related
to their capabilities to mitigate conditions that result from severe
accidents, including the loss of significant operational and safety
systems.
During the past several decades, there have been a number of new
rulemakings that have enhanced the domestic fleet's preparedness
against some of the problems we are seeing in Japan. The ``station
blackout'' rule requires every plant in this country to analyze what
the plant response would be if it were to lose all alternating current
electricity so that it could respond using batteries for a period of
time, and then have procedures in place to restore alternating current
electricity to the site and provide cooling to the core.
The hydrogen control rule requires modifications to reduce the
impacts of hydrogen generated for beyond-design-basis events and core
damage. There are equipment qualification rules that require equipment,
including pumps and valves, to remain operable under the kinds of
environmental temperature and radiation conditions that you would see
under a design-basis accident.
With regard to the type of containment design used by the most
heavily damaged plants in Japan, the NRC has had a Boiling Water
Reactor Mark I Containment Improvement Program since the late 1980s.
This program resulted in the installation of hardened vent systems for
containment pressure relief, as well as enhanced reliability of the
automatic depressurization system.
A final factor that underpins our belief in the ongoing safety of
the U.S. fleet is the emergency preparedness and planning requirements
in place that provide ongoing training, testing, and evaluations of
licensees' emergency preparedness programs. In coordination with our
Federal partner, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), these
activities include extensive interaction with State and local
governments, as those programs are evaluated and tested on a periodic
basis.
Along with our confidence in the safety of U.S. nuclear power
plants, our agency has a responsibility to the American people to
undertake a systematic and methodical review of the safety of our
domestic facilities, in light of the natural disaster and the resulting
nuclear situation in Japan.
Examining all available information is an essential part of the
effort to analyze the event and understand its impact on Japan and its
implications for the United States. Our focus is always on keeping
nuclear plants and radioactive materials in this country safe and
secure.
On Monday, March 21, my colleagues on the Commission and I met to
review the status of the situation in Japan and identify the steps
needed to conduct that review. We consequently decided to establish a
senior level agency task force to conduct a comprehensive review of our
processes and regulations to determine whether the agency should make
additional improvements to our regulatory system, and to make
recommendations to the Commission for its policy direction.
The review will be conducted in both a short-term and a longer-term
timeframe. The short-term review has already begun, and the task force
will brief the Commission after 30, 60, and 90 day intervals and these
meetings will be public web-cast meetings. At the 90-day interval, the
staff will produce a public report to identify potential or preliminary
near-term operational or regulatory issues. The task force then will
undertake a longer-term review as soon as NRC has sufficient
information from the events in Japan. That longer-term review will be
completed in 6 months from the beginning of the evaluation.
The task force will evaluate all technical and policy issues
related to the event to identify additional potential research, generic
issues, changes to the reactor oversight process, rulemakings, and
adjustments to the regulatory framework that may warrant action by the
NRC. We also expect to evaluate potential interagency issues, such as
emergency preparedness, and examine the applicability of any lessons
learned to non-operating reactors and materials licensees. We expect to
seek input from all key stakeholders during this process. A report with
appropriate recommendations will be provided to the Commission within 6
months of the start of this evaluation. Both the 90-day and final
reports will be made publicly available.
As we move forward with these efforts, we also recognize the
importance to sharing our lessons learned with our regulatory
counterparts. I recently returned from the Fifth Review Meeting of the
Convention on Nuclear Safety, which provided an important opportunity
for participating nations to address the events in Japan and begin to
formulate plans for short- and long-term cooperation. We look forward
to continuing this dialog. We also commend International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) Director General Amano's announcement of the Agency's
intention to host a ministerial-level conference in June. We are
pleased to support the IAEA as it works to address and incorporate the
events at Fukushima into its activities, as well as continuing its work
in areas that have already been identified as nuclear safety and
security priorities.
In conclusion, I want to reiterate that we continue to make our
domestic responsibilities for licensing and oversight of the U.S.
licensees our top priority and that the U.S. plants continue to operate
safely. In light of the events in Japan, there will be a near-term
evaluation of their relevance to the U.S. fleet, and we are continuing
to gather the information necessary to take a longer, more
comprehensive and thorough look at the events in Japan and their
lessons for us. Based on these efforts, we will take all appropriate
actions necessary to ensure the continuing safety of the American
people.
Chairman Boxer, Ranking Member Inhofe, Chairman Carper, Ranking
Member Barrasso, and Members of the Committee, on behalf of the
Commission, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you. I look
forward to continuing to work with you to advance the NRC's important
safety mission.
__________
Response by Gregory B. Jaczko to Additional Questions from Senator
Boxer
Question 1. On April 11, PG&E asked the NRC to delay issuance of
the Diablo Canyon license renewal until after PG&E has completed the 3-
D seismic studies and submitted a report to the NRC addressing the
results. According to press accounts, the NRC is moving forward with
safety and other reviews of Diablo Canyon in preparation for a ruling
on PG&E's request for a license extension. What specifically did PG&E
communicate to the NRC regarding its request for a license extension?
Why is the NRC continuing its review of PG&E's application?
Will the NRC ensure that all stakeholders, including local
citizens, are able to comment on the relevance of the 3-D seismic
studies as part of the normal NRC relicensing process?
Response. The NRC received a letter dated April 10, 2011, from
Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E) requesting that the NRC not
issue renewed operating licenses for the Diablo Canyon nuclear power
plants, if approved, until after PG&E has completed 3-D seismic studies
and submitted a report to the NRC addressing the results of those
studies. PG&E also noted that it believes it would be prudent to
complete the seismic studies prior to issuance of the coastal
consistency certification that is required under the Coastal Zone
Management Act (CZMA). PG&E indicated that the 3-D studies and the
report addressing the study results are expected to be completed by
December 2015. On April 12, 2011, counsel for PG&E sent a letter to the
NRC's Atomic Safety and Licensing Board that states ``PG&E has not
requested any suspension or delay in the NRC staff's ongoing safety and
environmental reviews of the [Diablo Canyon] license renewal
application.'' It further notes that ``PG&E also is not requesting any
delay in the schedule for the licensing hearing process.''
As a result of PG&E's requested deferral of issuance of renewed
operating licenses for the Diablo Canyon nuclear power plants, the NRC
staff has updated the staff's review schedule and milestones to reflect
the delays in the license review process associated with the projected
completion of the seismic studies and the CZMA's coastal consistency
certification. While the staff review schedule delays are not a stay or
suspension of the license renewal process, the revised review schedule
allows for the time to consider information associated with the
anticipated 3-D seismic studies.
Stakeholders, including local citizens, will be able to comment on
the relevance of the 3-D seismic studies in at least one of two ways.
Stakeholders will be able to comment on the Environmental Impact
Statement (EIS) regarding the Diablo Canyon license renewal application
when it is published. After the EIS is published, members of the public
will have the opportunity to comment on the EIS in person at an NRC-
sponsored public meeting to be held near the plant or in writing
through www.regulations.gov. Stakeholders may also petition the NRC for
an action on the Diablo Canyon license renewal at any time. Please see
www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/regulatory/enforcement/petition.html for a
complete discussion of this process.
Question 2. The NRC license renewal process does not require a
review of emergency planning, security, current safety performance or
seismic issues because, according to the NRC, these items are dealt
with on an ongoing basis. As a Commissioner you argued that
``considering emergency preparedness during the license renewal process
would be good public policy and a very valuable exercise.'' Do you
still believe in the value of this analysis?
Are there other issues that could be appropriately addressed within
the license renewal process?
Response. Yes, I believe consideration of additional review areas,
such as emergency preparedness, as part of license renewal continues to
have merit; however, it is unlikely that the agency would change our
regulations given the number of plants that used the existing
requirements and past considerations used in developing the license
renewal regulations.
If we were to adopt more of a full scope license renewal review
process, an additional area for consideration would be review of a
plant's design basis and supporting analysis.
Question 3. Do you have an estimate of how long it will take before
the Japanese are safely able to maintain cooling and effectively
shutdown the reactors? How long does the NRC expect to have staff on
the ground in Japan?
Response. Based on the information available, it appears that Tokyo
Electric Power Company (TEPCO) is able to effectively maintain the
reactors in shutdown condition and maintain cooling.
The reactors at Fukushima were shut down immediately after the
earthquake and remain shutdown today. It is unlikely that damaged cores
such as those present in the Fukushima Daiichi plants can achieve a
geometry and material composition to spontaneously restart. In June,
TEPCO installed a circulating cooling system for the Fukushima Daiichi
Units 1 through 3. The normal reactor injection system consists of two
independent trains of three injection pumps. TEPCO also installed
redundant and diverse systems as backup for cooling the reactors, which
includes a train consisting of three pumps to inject fresh water via an
alternate injection path. Additionally, TEPCO has six dedicated fire
trucks capable of injecting into Units 1 through 3. Finally, TEPCO
placed additional fire trucks on high ground, which should survive
another severe tsunami.
The NRC has reduced the staff on the ground in Japan from the
initial level sent over shortly after the accident. The NRC anticipates
having some presence in Japan for the foreseeable future to advise the
US Ambassador on the safety of American citizens and military assets in
Japan. Additional NRC objectives are to gather lessons learned that can
be applied to US plants.
Question 4. Can you describe the enhanced inspection activities
your resident inspectors are undertaking here in the U.S. in response
to the disaster in Japan?
Response. Inspections were performed to assess licensee
preparations that have been put in place at every operating power
reactor to prevent or mitigate possible loss of functions (due to large
fires or explosions), station blackout (loss of all alternating
current), flooding, and flooding with earthquakes. The associated
inspection reports were issued on May 13. NRC inspectors found that all
the reactors would be kept safe even in the event that their regular
safety systems were affected by these events. The NRC will use its
Reactor Oversight Process to further evaluate the inspection results
and ensure any issues are fixed.
Inspections were also completed to assess licensees' readiness to
implement their severe accident management guidelines. These guidelines
outline licensee actions in the event of severe accidents beyond what
the plant was licensed for. The associated inspection results were
issued on June 6, 2011. Overall, the NRC believes plants are safe;
however, NRC inspectors found many of the plants should improve either
training of their staff on these procedures, or ensure the guidelines
are appropriately updated. The NRC's task force incorporated these
inspection results into its short-term review to help determine if any
immediate changes to NRC requirements are called for. The inspection
results will also help inform the NRC's long-term review of possible
revisions to agency licensing and oversight processes.
Question 5. The NRC recently issued an information notice to
licensees to make them aware of events in Japan and the kind of
activities they should undertake. It is my understanding that this
notice does not require specific action, but encourages it. Is this
understanding correct? If so, do you expect the NRC will issue new
requirements (rather than just recommendations) in response to the
disaster in Japan?
Response. Information Notices are issued to provide significant
recently identified information about safety, safeguards, or
environmental issues. Recipients are expected to review the information
for applicability to their facilities and consider actions, as
appropriate, to avoid similar problems. Information Notices do not
require action per se.
The NRC's task force studied the events at Fukushima and assessed
their impacts on U.S. plants, and issued its report with
recommendations to the Commission on July 12, 2011. The Task Force
developed a comprehensive set of 12 recommendations including
improvements in dealing with a loss of power, dealing with earthquakes,
flooding, spent fuel pools, venting and preparedness and updating the
regulatory framework so that it is more logical, systematic and
coherent. The Commission continues to deliberate on the Task Force
report, and will vote on the recommendations, supplemented by
additional staff papers that the Commission directed the staff to
provide, that require a Commission policy decision.
As described in the response to Question 4, the NRC also issued two
temporary instruction procedures to assess licensee's preparedness for
events that exceed the design basis of the plant. Also, on May 11, 2011
the NRC issued Bulletin 2011-01 to companies licensed to operate U.S.
nuclear power plants, requesting information on how the plants are
complying with requirements to deal with the potential loss of large
areas of the plant after extreme events. The Bulletin sought
information on the plants' approach to ensuring their strategies remain
effective over time. Plants responded to the Bulletin in June 10, 2011
with information confirming their mitigative-strategy equipment is in
place and available, and that the strategies can be carried out with
current plant staffing. Plants also responded to the Bulletin in July
with further information in areas including:
how essential resources are maintained, tested, and
controlled to ensure availability;
how strategies are re-evaluated if plant conditions or
configurations change; and
how arrangements are reached and maintained with local
emergency response organizations.
______
Response by Gregory B. Jaczko to Additional Questions from
Senator Inhofe
Question 1. Please provide a list of all dates when the NRC
Operations Center was activated in a response mode since 1980. Please
include the basis for its activation, the duration of its activation,
which mode it was in, and a description of the various response modes.
Response. For an incident at a specific licensed facility, the NRC
response mode is determined by consideration of the licensee emergency
classification (Table 1) and the NRC's independent assessment of
incident conditions. The NRC response mode for other types of incidents
(e.g., a transportation incident involving regulated material, regional
electric grid incident affecting multiple licensed facilities, large-
scale natural disaster, international disaster, national-level domestic
threat, and/or terrorist threat/attack not focused at a specific
facility) is determined by the NRC's independent assessment of the
aggregate of available incident-related information, including
information from licensees and other sources.
Since 1980, the NRC Headquarters Operations Center (HOC)
has never entered the EXPANDED ACTIVATION Mode.
Since 1980, the NRC HOC has never entered the ACTIVATION
Mode.
Since 1980, the NRC has staffed its HOC on 15 occasions
while in the MONITORING Mode. The basis and durations for these 15
events are listed below. Please note, however, that prior to 2001, the
NRC Events Data base was not used to document the agency's entrance
into MONITORING Mode. Thus, the duration of the NRC's response for
events prior to 2001 is not available.
Davis Besse Loss of Feedwater Event (06/09/85)
Sequoyah Fuels Uranium Hexafluoride (UF6) Release
Event (01/04/86)
Chernobyl Reactor Event (04/26/86)
Vogtle Station Blackout Event (03/20/90)
GE Wilmington Potential Criticality event (05/29/91)
Hurricane Andrew (08/23/92)
TMI Security Intrusion Event (02/07/93)
Tokaimura Criticality Event (09/30/99)
9/11 Terrorist Attacks (09/11/01)
Northeastern U.S. Electrical Blackout (08/14/03 @
16:40-8/15/03 @ 20 o'clock)
BWXT-Lynchburg Criticality Alarm Event (07/13/05 @
23:20-07/14/05 @ 00:26)
Hurricane Katrina (08/28/05 @ 17 o'clock -09/06/05 @
19 o'clock)
BWXT-Lynchburg Material Event (08/02/07 @ 12:15-08/
02/07 @ 14:15)
B&W N.O.G-Lynchburg Fuel Event (07/15/09 @ 20:47-07/
16/09 @ 01:03)
Japan Earthquake/Tsunami (03/11/11 @ 09:46-05/16/11)
Unless otherwise designated, the NRC is in a constant
State of readiness or NORMAL Mode. NORMAL Mode is the NRC's routine, or
normal State of operations.
The NRC's response is flexible and tailored to the specific
incident(s). Pre-designated response modes enable the agency to
activate response capabilities in a structured manner and focus the
agency's response, as appropriate, at the region, headquarters, or
incident site. This flexibility permits the NRC response to be
commensurate with incident characteristics and severity and with
licensee activities. The NRC's response modes are described below:
NORMAL Mode.--The routine, or normal, State of NRC
operations includes all activities designed to maintain incident
response readiness, such as 24/7 staffing by Headquarters Operations
Officers (HOOs). In addition, the NRC is poised to respond at its
alternate Continuity of Operations (COOP) site. The regional offices
are prepared to back up each other and headquarters. When warranted,
such as during national special security events, the NRC may dispatch
staff to the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) National
Operations Center (NOC) and other sites to enhance coordination and
communications.
MONITORING Mode.--The NRC escalates to the MONITORING
mode, a heightened State of readiness for incident assessment, upon a
decision by designated headquarters and regional managers. For a
facility-specific or region-specific incident, the responsible regional
office has the lead for agency response and appropriately staffs its
incident response center. Headquarters supports the region and may have
specific individuals participating in monitoring and/or analysis
activities, but the HOC is not staffed and activated.
The NRC may escalate to the MONITORING mode for situations that are
not facility or region-specific, including but not limited to, natural
phenomena potentially involving one or more licensees, multi-region
electric grid incident, international incident, or terrorism-related
incidents. For such situations, headquarters has the lead for agency
response and the regions provide appropriate support.
ACTIVATION Mode .--The NRC escalates to the ACTIVATION
mode if an incident is sufficiently complex or uncertain that it
warrants extensive analysis and evaluation by the agency, if it
warrants consideration for sending an NRC site team to the vicinity of
the incident, or if the incident involves terrorist activities. In the
ACTIVATION mode, the lead for agency response shifts from the region to
headquarters. The HOC is fully staffed by the needed support teams
under the leadership of the Executive Team (ET). As conditions develop
and the incident is better understood, staffing may be reduced
accordingly. For a facility-specific or location-specific incident such
as a transportation incident, the responsible regional office continues
staffing of its incident response center and may prepare a site team to
travel to the licensee's site or the location of the incident.
Headquarters and the regional office maintain continuous communication,
evaluate available information, make appropriate notifications, and
prepare for escalation of response should it be necessary. Other
regional offices provide appropriate support.
EXPANDED ACTIVATION Mode.--The NRC escalates to the
EXPANDED ACTIVATION mode if the incident severity and/or situation
uncertainty warrants the dispatch of a site team, delegation of
selected authority to the Site Team Director, and turnover to the site
team. EXPANDED ACTIVATION may be initiated in response to a facility-
specific incident at a licensee's site, incident(s) involving multiple
licensees' facilities, terrorist attack or other incidents in which the
site team capabilities of the NRC are needed to support the overall
Federal response. Headquarters continues to lead the agency's response
in the EXPANDED ACTIVATION mode. The ET Director leads the agency
response, and the HOC maintains full staffing by the ET and support
teams. Team membership is tailored to the specific incident. The
regional office incident response center maintains full staffing which
is adjusted to accommodate the site team. Other regional offices may
partially staff their incident response centers or provide resources
and/or personnel to the NRC site team.
The EXPANDED ACTIVATION mode involves dispatch of an NRC site team
to the licensee's site or the vicinity of an incident under the
leadership of the Regional Administrator or designee. The Site Team
Director may be delegated specific authorities from the ET Director to
lead NRC response activities. The focus of NRC response is at the
incident site, and the site team may have the lead for most of the
agency response. At the site, the Site Team Director may assume
supervision of NRC personnel, may represent NRC in interactions with
other agencies (e.g., represents the NRC locally as coordinating agency
or cooperating agency in accordance with the national response
framework), and may decide what response actions must be taken,
consistent with the delegated authority. The ET Director retains any
authority not specifically delegated to the Site Team Director.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T8763.001
Question 2. Please provide a list of all the occasions since 1980
that an NRC Chairman has exercised emergency authority granted under
Section 3 of the Reorganization Plan of 1980. Please indicate the basis
for and duration of the exercise of emergency authority.
Response. A list of the times and the associated duration in which
the NRC has responded to an emergency situation is contained in the
response to the previous question.
Question 3. Please provide a comprehensive list of all actions you
have taken under your emergency authority since March 11th.
Response. I have kept my fellow Commissioners currently and fully
informed of the NRC response to the events in Japan. These information
exchanges have taken the form of direct briefings of Commissioners once
per day in the first week after the accident (including one planning
for a Commission meeting) and on an ad hoc basis after March 18. The
Commissioners' staffs received numerous briefings from the Executive
Team in the NRC Operations Center, as well as written status report at
regular and frequent intervals.
Specifically, I orally briefed the Commission as a collegial body
on nine separate occasions on the Japan accident, and individual
Commissioners on ten separate occasions.
Commissioner's Assistants received 62 briefings from the Executive
Team between March 11 and May 4. Three of these briefings occurred
within the first 12 hours after the NRC entered into the mode of
monitoring the accident on March 11 and a fourth was conducted within
the first 24 hours.
As of May 4, the Commission had also received 96 written status
updates from NRC's Headquarters Operations Officer. In addition, the
Commission received other written information and one page documents
with pertinent information and analysis, and had access to the internal
NRC Website where all of those reports were maintained.
In addition, I worked with my fellow Commissioners to create a Task
Force to examine the agency's regulatory requirements, programs,
processes, and implementation in light of information from the accident
following the March 11 earthquake and tsunami. The Task Force presented
its report to the Commission on July 12, proposing recommendations on
improving several safety-related areas.
Question 4a. and b. On April 1st, the NRC appointed a task force to
examine the agency's regulatory requirements, programs, processes, and
implementation in light of information from the Fukushima Daiichi site
in Japan, following the March 11 earthquake and tsunami.
How much do you estimate this review will cost?
Will the Commission need to reprogram funds from other programs to
support this review? If so, from which programs?
Response. The cost in fiscal year associated with NRC staff efforts
to respond to the situation in Japan is $19 million. This amount was
contained in the NRC's fiscal year reprogramming action that was
approved by Congress. The cost in fiscal year to implement the task
force's near-term recommendations to ensure that the NRC's regulations,
requirements and processes reflect the lessons learned from the
Fukushima nuclear emergency is still to be determined, and depends on
what actions are approved by the Commission.
Question 4c. On April 1st, the NRC appointed a task force to
examine the agency's regulatory requirements, programs, processes, and
implementation in light of information from the Fukushima Daiichi site
in Japan, following the March 11 earthquake and tsunami.
In addition to the announced task force members, how many staff
will support this review. Please indicate the offices and programs
where they currently work and the estimated time they will spend in
support of the review.
Response. The task force members have consulted with senior
management and technical staff in various offices, including the Office
of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, the Office of New Reactors, the Office
of Nuclear Regulatory Research, the Office of Nuclear Security and
Incident Response, and the Regional Offices on specific topics that are
being addressed. The Task Force spent over 100 hours talking to agency
staff, in addition to e-mails and other written communications.
Additionally, during the task force's deliberations, the importance
of severe accident management guidelines (SAMG) was highlighted. In
order to evaluate the current status of SAMGs onsite and determine the
need for any further recommendations, a temporary instruction (TI)
inspection was issued on April 29, 2011, requesting that information
regarding SAMGs at the 65 operating power reactor sites be gathered,
assessed, and summarized. Approximately 900 direct inspection hours by
NRC inspectors were spent to complete the TI inspection requirements.
Question 5. What, if any additional resources are needed to ensure
that adequate funding of the Fukushima task force does not impair
progress on new plant licensing and design certification.
Response. As discussed in the response to Question 4, the NRC
reprogrammed $19 million in fiscal year from prior year unobligated
carryover funds to cover the costs of the near and long term evaluation
of the need for NRC actions following the events of Japan. Accordingly,
the NRC did not require additional resources in fiscal year to continue
efforts devoted to new reactor plant licensing and design certification
reviews. Depending on how the Commission votes on the Task Force
recommendations, and supplementary staff papers, the agency will likely
be required to adjust its fiscal year budget to address potential
changes to NRC's regulatory requirements, programs, and processes.
Question 6. Please provide a list of the fees billed under 10 CFR
170 to license renewal applicants currents under review and the 20 most
recently issued license renewals.
Response. See the attached tables starting on the next page.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]
Senator Carper. Well, thanks to both of you for your
testimonies.
Madam Chairman, Chairman Boxer?
Senator Boxer. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman.
First, I want to thank both of you because you have been
available to those of us on both sides of the aisle here to
answer our questions. I appreciate that so much.
I want to put in the record something I got from USGS that
shows how many earthquakes, because Senator Barrasso said look,
this earthquake happened over in Japan, it did not happen here.
Obviously. But, how many earthquakes, I would say to my friend,
have we had in America that they have managed to document? It
is 157 earthquakes all over this great Nation and in every part
of this country. So, I want to put that into the record. These
are over 6.0.
Senator Carper. Without objection.
[The referenced material was not received at time of
print.]
Senator Boxer. One hundred fifty-seven earthquakes over
6.0.
I also ask for the documentation on tsunami. What I do have
is the areas where the highest risks are. That would be Alaska,
Hawaii, very high, West Coast, high, Puerto Rico, Virgin
Islands, high, the others low to very low. So, I am going to
put those, both, in the record.
Senator Carper. Without objection.
[The referenced material was not received at time of
print.]
Senator Boxer. Thank you.
Mr. Jaczko, I know you have been very involved, Mr.
Chairman, in helping the people in Japan. We, every one of us
on both sides, are grateful because I think America is at its
best when we are there for our friends and we certainly are.
Well, right now you described, you said that it is a static
situation, not a stable situation. So let me ask you, what is
the best thing that could happen right now with those reactors,
and what is the worst thing that could happen?
Mr. Jaczko. Well, I am reluctant to speculate on what the
worst thing is that could happen because, again, there is
always things that one could postulate that are possible
although very unlikely.
Senator Boxer. Well, I think it is important. What is the
worst thing could happen? I think we all believe you have to
look at this. What is the best thing that could happen, what is
the worst? Now, we all hope for the best, but what is the worst
thing that could happen?
Mr. Jaczko. Well, right now what our focus is on, it
focuses on ensuring that we can continue to provide, or the
Japanese can continue to provide, cooling to the reactor and
water into the spent fuel pools. That is a process that is
working right now.
As I said, it is not necessarily the most stable
configuration. So, for instance, there was an aftershock, I
believe it was last night, and as a result they had to remove
some individuals from the site. They lost some of the offsite
power. So, some of the pumps in the systems that were working
were not able to continue to work for about 50 minutes.
So what we want to see is to move into a situation in which
that kind of situation would be dealt with in a more
predictable manner and with less possibility of the loss of the
cooling systems. So, every day that the reactors continue to
have cooling and continue to receive water and other types of
cooling, the likelihood of a more significant release continues
to go down.
Senator Boxer. So the cooling, obviously here, is the key
and there is nothing else that could happen in your mind, that
could go wrong?
Mr. Jaczko. That really is----
Senator Boxer. If there is cooling going on.
Mr. Jaczko. That is correct. The primary focus is to
maintain cooling. If you lose the ability to cool the reactor
cores, then you have the possibility of a further degradation
in the fuel which could lead to possibly a greater release than
what is going on now.
Senator Boxer. Are the leaks still going on into the ocean?
Mr. Jaczko. We believe right now that some of them have
been stopped. But there is the possibility that there are other
leaks and other material being released.
Senator Boxer. How radioactive is that water?
Mr. Jaczko. Right now, the Japanese are surveying the water
that is going out and being, into the ocean, and they are doing
surveys. I have not seen the latest figures about that level of
contamination.
Senator Boxer. Would you let me know, as soon as you know,
what contamination is flowing into that ocean?
Mr. Jaczko. Absolutely. We can provide you with detailed
information about that.
Senator Boxer. OK. Administrator Jackson, your Scientific
Advisory Board found that EPA's fixed radiation monitors had a
potential sampling bias against the collection of larger
particles which could include hot particles. Have you taken any
actions to address the SAB's concerns?
Ms. Jackson. Yes, Chairman, we have. That report was done
several years ago, and since that report was done, EPA
responded to the request from the SAB to do an additional study
on the efficacy of our monitoring equipment in capturing all
sizes of particles. The really problematic ones are the smaller
ones, and what we found through that study is that our fixed
monitors can collect the very smallest particles reasonably
effectively.
Now, I do want to say, having newer monitors, there are
newer monitors out there that get even greater capture, but if
you look at the purpose of the system, which is to give broad
levels of background for events that are known, the current
system is certainly effective.
Senator Boxer. Well, my time has expired. I just want to
say to Chairman Jaczko, I have these two nuclear plants that
were built a very long time ago and now apparently PG&E and
Southern California Edison have withdrawn their re-licensing
processing now.
I guess what I want to say, and you do not need to answer
this, but I am going to be talking to you about this, for me.
Again, nobody has to respond to this. It is just, I am thinking
common sense. You have now 7.4 million people that live within
a 50-mile radius of one of my plants, and you have got about a
half a million that live within a 50-mile radius of the other.
Both of these sit on or near earthquake faults.
So, all I am going to say to you and the other
Commissioners when we do get a chance to speak with the others,
and I think we will, is that to my mind, I think the
Commission, when you are re-licensing, have to look at this as
if it is a new opportunity. Would you license a plant that came
to you now with that circumstance, right by or near earthquake
faults, studies that say there will be more frequent
earthquakes, both involved near tsunamis, or the one is more
vulnerable to a potential tsunami?
I just hope that you, and again, I do not, I am not asking
you to answer this because you have got to think a long, hard
time about this. But to me, as someone whose highest
responsibility is the health and safety of all of these
millions of people, if you would say no to a new operator, I
hope you will think about how it makes any sense to just keep
on going unless there is major reinforcements and hardening of
some of these buildings and the rest.
So, I just leave you with that thought. Those are my
concerns.
Senator Carper. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Senator Barrasso.
Senator Barrasso. Thank you very much Mr. Chairman.
I appreciate both of you being here today and Chairman
Jaczko, I appreciate the time you have been available to me by
phone, visiting in the office and addressing some of these
various concerns that are critical and questions that need to
be answered. So, I appreciate that.
I noted that last week the California Coastal Commission
concluded that ``a nuclear emergency such as is occurring in
Japan is extremely unlikely at the State's two operating
nuclear power plants.'' Would you agree with that California
Coastal Commission's conclusion?
Mr. Jaczko. We think it is very unlikely to see a large
earthquake and a tsunami.
Senator Barrasso. They went on to say that the combination
of a strong ground motion and massive tsunami that occurred in
Japan cannot be generated by the kind of faults that exist
close to the, in the vicinity of, the two plants, nuclear
plants in California. Do you agree with their assessment there?
Mr. Jaczko. It is my understanding that the type of fault
in Japan was a different type of fault that does not exist off
the coast of California.
Senator Barrasso. OK. Thank you.
Administrator Jackson, I mentioned in my opening statement
that an April 6th Inside EPA story was entitled Activists Step
Up Efforts to Strengthen Oversight on Uranium Recovery and I
mentioned how those activist groups are using the nuclear
emergency in Japan as a reason to place additional red tape on
approving uranium mines domestically here in the United State.
Do you see a connection between the Japanese nuclear
emergency and the uranium mining in the United States?
Ms. Jackson. No direct kind of connection, Senator.
Mr. Barrasso. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, when we last had an opportunity to visit in
my office, I discussed my concerns about the delay in approving
permits for uranium mines in Wyoming. You had mentioned that
the delay was because you were still working things out with
the EPA and you thought that we had finally achieved the
resolution that was necessary. You thought you now had a
template to move forward with approving additional uranium
mines.
Do you believe you have worked out any of those issues now
with the EPA in terms of uranium mining permitting so that now
we can proceed with a faster permitting process?
Mr. Jaczko. Well, I believe we have worked out, come to a
good understanding of, how we deal with our environmental
impact statements. We are, however, continuing to work through
issues that are our responsibilities under, to consult with
tribal governments as part of other requirements, and that is
the last activity that we are working on as we finalize our
efforts on these uranium recovery applications. That is not
necessarily an issue involving the EPA.
Senator Barrasso. So then, Administrator Jackson, you are
comfortable with that statement? Do you commit to work with any
issues that we need to resolve between the NRC and EPA in a
timely manner?
Ms. Jackson. I remain committed to working to resolve any
issues we might have with respect to Wyoming. I do not believe
the article in question actually referenced any sites in
Wyoming but----
Senator Barrasso. Just the overall approval. Thank you.
I wanted to get back, Mr. Chairman, with the NRC's response
in Japan and I know you have about 250 NRC staff working on a
rotating basis, full functioning, and working hard on this.
Given the commitment of the NRC's resources to Japan, if we
had any sort of an emergency in the United States, would you be
able to redeploy in a way that we would not put ourselves at a
disadvantage?
Mr. Jaczko. Absolutely. As this event has gone forward, we
have looked at our staffing levels and actually we have
transitioned our approach now to the staff in our Operations
Center to have a smaller team there who can respond quickly but
then would reach back to our larger agency to get information
requests as they need. So, it is, it allows us to respond in
the same timely way, but to do it in a way that allows us to
continue with our other important responsibilities.
Senator Barrasso. Finally, I think Senator Inhofe raised
the issue about your invoking of emergency powers as a result
of this. Could you describe to me how that, how you interacted
with your fellow Commissioners during this nuclear incident?
Have you relied on them for some of their expertise in making
decisions as well?
Mr. Jaczko. Sir, there is not so much, I think, invoking
of, through the emergency authorities, that is an authority
that the Chairman has. But most of the activities that I have
engaged in as part of this response have been in my normal
supervisory authorities over the staff at the agency and my
communication responsibilities.
I would note, and we could provide this information for the
record, but immediately after we entered our monitoring mode on
March 11th, an email was sent out indicating that we had done
that. Within the first 24 hours, we had had four briefings of
the assistants to each of the Commissioners. Over the last
several weeks, I have done at least 26 briefings to my
colleagues on the Commission, including one public Commission
meeting that was held about a week after the event started.
There have been about, overall, 60 briefings to staff of
the Commission assistants and about 80 products have been
provided to the Commission indicating the status of our
response efforts and the activities that are ongoing.
So, I think there has been very good communication with the
Commission about what we are doing and how we are dealing with
the response.
Senator Barrasso. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
Mr. Chairman.
Senator Boxer. Mr. Chairman, as a point of personal
privilege, since the Senator mentioned the plants in my State,
I appreciate his concern, let me put into the record two
letters by the California Coastal Commission saying that before
there is a re-licensing they want new earthquake studies. That
is No. 1.
No. 2, what my friend said about the fact that it would be
unlikely we would have such an accident in California,
absolutely very unlikely. It is unlikely. That is exactly what
they said about Japan. To the word. So, we have got to move
beyond talk and get to the serious question of what do we do to
everything in our power to make it safe.
Senator Carper. Is there objection to the request? Hearing
none, so ordered.
Alright. I would ask a question, my first question, of
Chairman Jaczko if I could.
You have, I think, heard me say before that I like to quote
Albert Einstein. Albert Einstein once said, in adversity lies
opportunity. When Chairman Boxer asked the question, what is
the worst that can happen, following up on this tragedy, one of
the worst things in my mind that could happen is that we would
not learn anything from it. That is one of the worst things
that I think could happen.
We have had not a whole lot of time, but some time has
passed since this sad chapter began unfolding. Talk to us about
some of the lessons that we have learned in the past weeks and
maybe that would suggest that what we are doing is appropriate,
good, smart, safe, and maybe some things that we have learned
that would suggest that we could do better.
Mr. Jaczko. Well, I think one of the issues that we have
really come to recognize is that the station blackout event is
a very serious event. I think the good aspect about it is that
we have always known that that is a very serious type of event.
It is a situation in which you lose all of the ability to have
electrical power to the site.
Fundamentally, right now, we think that is really the
primary cause of the problem. What we are really working to
establish is why exactly they got into this situation where the
station blacked out and what were really the lead factors
affecting that.
I think we have seen the importance of emergency planning
and having the ability to respond and provide emergency
guidance to the population around a nuclear power plant and we
have seen that that carries on its intended function, which is
it moves people out of an area in which they can be exposed to
harmful levels of radiation.
So, if we just look at the kinds of things that we have
right now, those are, I think, some of the big lessons that we
have learned.
We have this 90-day task force that is going to be looking
at some very specific things in the next 2 months, 2 \1/2\
months, and I do not want to get too far in front of the work
that they are doing because I think we have put together some
really talented people at the agency who are going to do a
good, thorough look at this, and I do not want them to start
giving the answers that they hear me say at a hearing.
So, I think at this point, I think that if there is any one
other lesson I could say that we have learned is that after
Three Mile Island we learned that it was very important to go
about this kind of review in a systematic and methodical way
with the appropriate sense of urgency and the need to move
expeditiously.
I think that is what we are doing, and that will be the
continued focus that I have with the agency because we want to
make sure that we put in place the kind of changes that make
safety better, and not the kind of changes that in the end wind
up undermining safety. So, that is why it is so important that
we do it systematically and methodically.
Senator Carper. OK. Thank you.
I think it was Senator Alexander who said earlier,
mentioned that if you took all of the spent fuel in this
country and you stacked it up on a football field it would be
about 20 or 25 feet high. To some that might sound like a lot,
to others not so much.
We have a Blue Ribbon Commission that has been working at
the direction of the President to consider what we should be
doing with that spent fuel. Give us some idea when we expect to
hear back from that Commission? I think what they find or
recommend to us might actually tie in closely with what they
are facing in Japan.
Mr. Jaczko. Well, I think that we are anticipating, I think
an interim report from the commission sometime this summer and
then with a final report sometime later, by the end of the
year. When we look at these issues of spent fuel, this is
something, again, the agency, the Commission, has put a strong
focus on, on making sure that spent fuel can be stored safely
and securely.
The structures, whether in pools or whether in dry cask
storage, are very robust structures that are designed to deal
with a large earthquake, that are designed to deal with natural
disasters and significant security-related events. So, we have
kind of a multi-tiered system of protection that exists at all
of our plants and that includes these unlikely events like
these natural disasters and then a layer of protection on that
to look at, if that kind of unlikely event happens and all the
safety systems do not function well, we have additional
procedures in place to address that kind of situation and
ultimately equipment that is put in the plants to kind of do
that last line of defense in terms of providing cooling to the
pools or, ultimately, to the reactor core.
Senator Carper. All right. Thanks.
We have 104 nuclear power plants. I said earlier that I
thought the first one was built about 50 years ago. I think it
was built 42 years ago, not 50 years ago. But there are a
number of plants that are up for re-licensure and some have
already been relicensed. We have a number of applications
before the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to build new plants
with new technology, new design.
How do the events from Japan, the tragic events from Japan,
how do they figure into the re-licensing process for the, oh, I
do not know, the dozen or so that are before the Commission
today, or will soon be, for re-licensure? How do the lessons
learned figure into the approval process, the review process,
for the new design?
Mr. Jaczko. Fundamentally, we think about these issues not
necessarily for a plant that is 41 years old or 42 years old or
1-year old or 10 years old. We think about this in terms of the
plants that are there now and the safety of the existing fleet
of reactors.
So, the reviews that we are doing, the first review is
really to identify any issues that we would need to address
immediately. So, we would not wait for re-licensing or any
other type of activity related to license extension to make
changes to the plants. So, fundamentally, the kinds of changes
we are looking at or possibly would need to make would be
applicable to all of the plants in the country, whether they
are getting their license extended or not.
In addition, we have a very robust process of reviewing the
license applications and the renewed license applications that
gives the public an opportunity for input, that gives them an
opportunity to raise issues. We think those procedures and
processes are robust enough to deal with the new issues that
come about from the Japan situation.
But fundamentally, some of these changes may take time to
implement and in the interim we will evaluate every situation
as it comes up. If there is something we need to do to slow
down, we will slow down. If we can move forward appropriately,
we will move forward appropriately. But I think we will know,
we will be in a much better position, after this 90-day review
is done to see if there are any real immediate actions that
need to be taken.
Senator Carper. All right. Thank you very much.
Senator Alexander, you are next.
Senator Alexander. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. Thank you both for
your testimony.
Ms. Jackson, as we look at electricity produced in the
United States, we use about, I think, about 25 percent of all
electricity in the world for our country. I believe about 44
percent is produced by coal, 20 percent by nuclear power, 23
percent by natural gas, 7 percent by hydroelectric power, we
usually think of those as base load powered, base load
electricity, electricity that is reliable over long periods of
time, about 3 percent is wind, much less than 1 percent is
solar.
What would be the effect on our country's ability to comply
with EPA's clean air standards if we did not, if we replaced
nuclear power with either coal plants or natural gas plants?
Ms. Jackson. Well, nuclear powerplant emissions are low to
zero for the pollutants that EPA regulates so there would be,
presumably, an increase in pollution. Even with the best
pollution control technology, fossil fuel plants are going to
have higher emissions, including greenhouse gas pollution which
nuclear power does not have.
Senator Alexander. But probably half our coal plants do not
have that----
Ms. Jackson. About half of our coal plants in the country
are not controlled for air toxics like mercury, arsenic,
cadmium, acid gases. In fact, we just recently proposed a rule
to address that issue. When it comes to carbon pollution, of
course it is quite different.
Senator Alexander. We have a lot of discussion, Senator
Carper and I have worked a long time on the mercury issue. But
the point is, to keep it in perspective, nuclear power provides
about 20 percent of our electricity but about 70 percent of our
emissions-free electricity, which is important as we think
about clean air and climate change.
Mr. Jaczko, how, for how long can the 104 reactors we have
safely store spent fuel onsite?
Mr. Jaczko. Well, the Commission recently restated what we
refer to as our Waste Confidence Finding and that said that we
believe at least about 40 years beyond the expected lifetime, I
am sorry, about 60 years beyond the expected lifetime of a
plant we can safely store spent fuel. That gets you generally
to about 100 years of time that you could store this fuel
safely and securely.
We actually, as part of this recent decision, asked the
staff to go back and really look longer than that and see are
there, if there are any issues right now that would make it
challenging to store that fuel for 200 or 300 years or a longer
timeframe. So we expect to begin looking at that in the next
year and have an answer in probably a couple of years about
that question.
But right now, we do not see any major issues that would
present a significant challenge for that longer term storage of
the fuel.
Senator Alexander. For purposes of understanding what we
are trying to store, does it sound about right to say, as I did
earlier, that all of the used nuclear fuel that has been
produced in the last 35 years would fill a football field then
about 20 feet high?
Mr. Jaczko. I have heard that statistic many times. I have
actually never sat down and calculated it and made sure that it
is right. But it sounds reasonable as an approximation.
Senator Alexander. Now, the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of
1982 established a fund into which ratepayers, those of us who
pay our electric bills, have paid about $30 billion to build a
final resting place for used nuclear fuel. A second step of the
Obama administration's plan for used nuclear fuel, which I
heartily endorse, is not just to store it safely onsite but
then to do advanced research to find a better way to reuse
nuclear fuel which will greatly reduce the mass of it and
permit it to be used over and over again.
But in the end, are we not still going to have some stuff
left that needs to be stored over a long period of time? We
still have this football field full of nuclear fuel spread
around at 104 sites. Where are we going to put that? I mean, we
have got $23 billion sitting in a fund we have collected from
electric bills. Should we not be using it to find a way to put
that since Yucca Mountain does not seem to be going anywhere?
Mr. Jaczko. Well, from the NRC's perspective, our job is to
make sure that that fuel, regardless of how it is being used,
or stored, or reprocessed, or whatever the approach may be, is
done safely and securely. So that is our No. 1 focus. We, of
course, work with the industry, we communicate with the rest of
the Federal Government as approaches are being developed to
possibly deal with that in the long term.
The Commission staff have been briefing the Blue Ribbon
Commission and providing them with information about our
approach to safety and security as they work to formulate their
opinions about ultimately what could be done with this fuel in
the long term.
Senator Alexander. Thank you.
Senator Carper. You are welcome. Thank you.
Senator Lautenberg.
Senator Lautenberg. Thanks to each of you for the knowledge
and energy that you bring and I use that term directly.
Obviously, we feel pretty comfortable. However, the long
history that Japan had with nuclear power and established
nuclear regulatory system looked like Japanese installations
were absolutely safe. But clearly, they were not.
Now, what assurances do we have that our nuclear plants are
as prepared as we could get for our worse case scenario?
Mr. Jaczko. Well that, Senator, I would say that there are
really three or four levels of protection that we have at the
plants. First and foremost, the plants are designed for these
very unlikely events based on what we think the maximum
historical natural phenomenon is, so, like a hurricane or an
earthquake or a tsunami. So, we start with that and we design
the plants to be able to deal with that kind of a situation.
Then, on top of that, all of the plants have a set of
procedures and guidelines for what you would do in the
situation that all of those systems that you built in to deal
with the situation fail. Those are what we refer to as Severe
Accident Management Guidelines. Those give you the procedures,
the approaches to dealing with these very severe events if they
were ever to occur. For that to occur, a lot of safety systems
that are redundant and have a lot of backups would have to fail
and not work properly.
Even beyond that, if all of those systems were to fail, we
have required all of the plants in this country to have an
additional set of procedures to deal with very extreme damage
conditions at the plant, much like you are seeing in Japan. We
required all of the utilities to put equipment in place to
respond and ultimately to be able to supply cooling to the
reactors and cooling to the spent fuel pools.
So, we have a robust system to really ensure that we can
minimize or mitigate any potential releases to the public.
Senator Lautenberg. What we see is rather frightening in
scope because almost no matter what you do, you cannot guaranty
that there will be zero risk in the production of nuclear
energy and nuclear facilities. So, we keep on developing new
policies as a result of, unfortunately, some terrible
experience, and we have, we hope that we have no further
terrible incidences.
Ms. Jackson, you know New Jersey is home to four nuclear
reactors, including the oldest nuclear plant in the country,
the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station, 2 years older than
the damaged Japanese plant.
Now, with your long experience of protecting health and the
environment in New Jersey, how confident can we be that the
nuclear plants in our State are sufficiently safe to protect
all of our people at all times?
Ms. Jackson. Well, I would defer to the Chairman on the
safety issue, except to note what was recently announced, which
is that that plant is voluntarily, the owners of that plant
have agreed to shut it down. I think it is part of the solution
with respect to that particular facility.
Senator Lautenberg. Well, we are, it is little reassurance,
honestly, because if they said OK, we will even cut short the
period that the license covers, which means that there is an
element to worry out there, and they cannot be----
Mr. Jaczko. Senator, if I could just comment? My
understanding of the, part of the reason for not extending the
plant operation was motivated by the cost and some of the
economic factors. Certainly, from the NRC's perspective, we did
not see a safety reason for the plant to not operate beyond, I
think, 2019 when the plant will operate.
Again, when we do our license renewal, what we do is we add
on additional requirements to the licensees for them to monitor
the plant to make sure that as the plant equipment and the
systems that are important for safety get older, that they have
the way to monitor and make sure that those, that aging of
those equipment does not have any adverse impact on safety.
So, in addition to the standards in the regular strong
safety program that we have, we add on top of that these
additional requirements to make sure that as the plants age
they do it in a way that is protective of public health and
safety.
Senator Lautenberg. Tom, I have one more question. One last
question. The rest, beyond that, I will send to you for the
record and look for a response.
The NRC requires evacuation plans only within 10 miles of a
plant. But the American Government has warned Americans in
Japan to stay at least 50 miles away from the damaged reactor.
They only confirmed that when we turned our ships around about
50 or 60 miles out, I am not really sure.
I guess, when all else fails, we have to be absolutely
certain that a way to evacuate these areas is foolproof in
terms of its ability and its durability. Would it make sense to
require evacuation plans in our country to address the same
distance to U.S. facilities for new plants?
Mr. Jaczko. Well, that is something we are going to look at
as part of the reviews that we are doing. The 10-mile
evacuation zones that we currently have are designed to be the
region in which you pre-stage and pre-prepare evacuations. If
conditions were to warrant some additional option beyond that,
those options, of course, could always be taken.
But I think, as we have seen in Japan, nuclear events tend
to develop over a long period of time. This is 3 weeks into
this event and we have had the time and ability to make
protective option recommendations and to update those and
modify them as conditions at the plant change.
So that 10 miles is really based around the idea of what
you need to have prepared right away so if you have an event
that develops quickly, you can address that and have pre-staged
and pre-prepared what to do. But there is always the
possibility to go farther, if necessary, or to modify the plans
to deal with the existing conditions and the exact conditions
on the ground.
But I also want to stress that this is something we are
going to take a look at as part of the reviews that we are
doing to see if there are changes we should make to the
requirements for emergency preparedness.
Senator Lautenberg. Thanks very much and thanks to each of
you.
Senator Carper. Thank you, Senator Lautenberg.
Senator Merkley.
Senator Merkley. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you all
for your testimony.
The first question I want to ask about, Mr. Jaczko, is, the
venting system to release the hydrogen in the Japanese plants
succeeded in getting the hydrogen outside of the core only to
have it explode outside.
The United States went through, in the 1980s, a hardening
of our vent systems on our Mark I reactors and I understand the
Japanese plants also went through an upgrade. But what is our
initial understanding of why the venting system did not succeed
in disposing of the hydrogen such that it would not explode
after it left the core? Is there a difference in the venting
system between the Japanese plants and the U.S. plants that
should give us confidence that we would not have a similar
problem?
Mr. Jaczko. Well, at this point, it is not exactly clear
what the source of the hydrogen was. Obviously, we saw
hydrogen, or some fires, in the Unit 4 reactor. Well, that
likely came from the spent fuel pools, the spent fuel pool in
that building, because the reactor core there was not, did not
have fuel in it.
So, at this point, we do not have definitive information
about the source of the hydrogen. It is possible that it came
from the spent fuel pools and not necessarily from the venting
operation. That is something that we will look into as we get
some more, really as we get past the more emergent crisis in
Japan, we will get the detailed information about that effort.
But I would say that, really, the fundamental issue that we
see here really is the station blackout event. In the United
States, when we are talking about a station blackout event, we
have a lot of protections in place to prevent that complete
loss of electrical power to the site. We require each plant to
have at least two diesel generators for each reactor. So, if
there a multiple reactor site, they will have at least four
diesel generators on the site. Those diesel generators have to
have their fuel in an area that is protected so that it can be,
it can supply the diesel generators in the event of some type
of natural hazard.
Then, beyond that, we have something that we call our
station blackout or coping requirements which requires the
utilities to be able to deal with that loss of offsite power
until they are able to restore the offsite power.
Senator Merkley. I am going to interrupt you because I only
have a limited amount of time and actually you dodged the basic
question which was, is our venting system different from the
Japanese system?
Also, I think it is understood that a fair amount of
hydrogen in 1 and 3 came from both the splitting of water
molecules and from probably explosion of the zirconium
clouding. So, in that situation, and understanding that
scenario, why did the hydrogen explode after it was vented
rather than be dispersed safely into the atmosphere?
If we have no insight, that is fine. But again, back to the
core question, is our venting system different in some
significant way?
Mr. Jaczko. At this point, we do not have the detailed
information to know.
Senator Merkley. Let me go on to a second question then.
In at least one of the reactors, I believe it is vessel 2,
that there was discussion of plugs in the bottom of the reactor
vessel, the core, that were used for loading fuel in and the
concern that that design left a vulnerability and that plugs
that were inserted after fuel was put in melted at a lower
temperature than the rest of the containment, the rest of the
core containment vehicle, and could have been a flaw that would
allow, if you will, fuel to escape.
Is that just specific to that one reactor or is that a
common design? Has that been a discussed concern in the past?
Do we have that design in the United States?
Mr. Jaczko. We can get you specific information on that
design. But again, I would stress that right now the
information about the condition of all of the reactors is very
preliminary and very uncertain. You indicated the hydrogen
explosion. Again, it is correct that that is a result of,
usually of exposure of fuel. But that can, of course, occur
both in the spent fuel pools as well as in the reactor core.
So again, the exact source of the hydrogen at this point is
not clearly understood and it probably will be some time before
we know definitively where that hydrogen came from, whether it
was an interaction with the zirconium clouding in the spent
fuel pool or the reactor core itself. That is where there is a
bit of, some uncertainty right now.
Senator Merkley. Here again you did not answer my core
question which is, these plugs that are apparently in the
design of at least one of those reactors that are on the bottom
side, are those, do we have a similar design and that is a
concern in American nuclear power plants?
Mr. Jaczko. Again, as I said, we can get you that
information. I do not have that off the top of my head right
now. But again, I do not want to speculate necessarily that
that was a contributing cause to any of the condition in
Reactor 2 at this point.
Senator Merkley. OK. Another issue is really the
containment vessel itself. In 1972, there was a report from the
predecessor organization, the Atomic Energy Commission, that
recommended the Mark I system be discontinued because of
unacceptable safety risks, basically because of the smaller
containment design and it was susceptible to explosion and
rupture from a buildup in hydrogen, obviously something that
seems like it was an interesting insight given what we have now
witnessed. Indeed, apparently the reason for this smaller and
lighter container vehicle was simply the cost of the heavier
and stronger containment vehicle.
There was later, in the 1980s, discussion. An NRC official
noted that Mark I reactors had a 90 percent probability of
bursting if fuel rods overheat and melt.
Have we, but there has been some changes to containment
vehicles. Have we, do we feel like we have satisfactorily
addressed the issues about the weakness of the containment
vessel that were raised in the 1970s and the 1980s?
Mr. Jaczko. Fundamentally, the issues, the actions that
were taken were, as I think you indicated, one was to provide
hardened venting which provides a release path, a sensor to
release material as pressure builds up in the containment, to
release that pressure and to do it in a way that you release,
that you prevent as much of the release of radioactive material
as possible when you do that process.
The other thing that was done was efforts to do what is
called inerting, or nitrogen inerting, which essentially means
you introduce nitrogen into that containment atmosphere and
based on the chemistry of that you reduce the likelihood of a
hydrogen combustion.
So, those came out of results and studies that were done in
the late 1980s in what we called our Individual Plant
Examinations and then a series of followup studies that looked
at what are these kinds of severe accident risks and how do you
ultimately mitigate them.
So, for the Mark I containments, that was, those were the
changes that were made to address that. Now, again, we are
going to look at the information from Japan to see how similar
or different their designs were at the time of the accident to
our designs to see if there are additional lessons that we
would learn to apply to those particular containments.
Senator Merkley. Thank you.
Senator Carper. You are welcome. Thank you.
Madam Chair.
Senator Boxer. Thanks.
I want to followup on earthquake faults because we have
written the Commission and we have asked you for an explanation
of how many of our reactors, or let us just say our plants, are
located on or near seismically actively faults? Do you have
that number for me today?
Mr. Jaczko. The number, and I think you mentioned it in
your initial statement----
Senator Boxer. I know.
Mr. Jaczko. Generally, we would say that there are two
plants that are near, in high seismic areas, and about nine
plants that are in more medium areas.
But I want to stress, we design, require all plants in the
United States to be designed to deal with seismic events. Some
of us who are here in Washington know, it was only a couple of
months ago that we felt an earthquake here in Washington.
So, they are all designed to deal with seismic events and
we design them, again, based on the accelerations that the
plant itself would feel, or the actions and motions that the
plant would feel at the actual site of the plant rather than
based on the magnitudes of the earthquake because----
Senator Boxer. OK, before you get into all that, I do not
have a lot of time. In Japan, they would give the same answer.
They gave the same answer. TEPCO said we are proud of the
robustness of our containment vessels. In the case of an
earthquake, everything would safely stop, blah, blah, blah. I
would put this into the record if I could.
Senator Carper. No objection.
Senator Boxer. Not the blah, blah, blah, but the actual
words----
[Laughter.]
Senator Carper. No, I think we should put in the blah,
blah, blah.
[Laughter.]
Senator Boxer. The point is it is eerie to me because I do
not sense enough humility from all of us here. We are, as some
great scientist once said, we think we have all the answers but
Mother Nature may not agree with us.
A lot of what you are saying is the same thing that they
said. You are right, you are being conservative because even
though plants do not sit on or near, you are being, you are
thinking ahead. But the fact is, if you take one of my, we have
the two plants that are high intensity seismic areas, one is
built to, they are both built to withstand a certain level of
earthquake, and yet, so was the Japanese plant, it was, I
believe, 7.5 it was built to withstand. They got a 9.0.
We cannot know for sure what is going to happen. So I
guess, are you doing a major inspection as Senator Feinstein
and I asked you to, the NRC, of our two plants that are in
these high propensity earthquake zones?
Mr. Jaczko. Well, we are looking at all the plants to make
sure that we have----
Senator Boxer. I am asking about my two plants.
Mr. Jaczko. We are not doing anything specific to those two
plants, but we are looking at all the plants in this country to
see if there are lessons learned from Japan----
Senator Boxer. Well, you just said that there are two
plants that are in the highest risk and yet you are not
treating them any differently. That is a little worrisome to
me.
Mr. Jaczko. Well, Senator, I would not necessarily say that
they are in the highest risk.
Senator Boxer. Well, you said there were two plants on the
highest seismic activity areas and those two are my plants in
our State.
Mr. Jaczko. What we look at, ultimately, is the
consequences. The plants that are in California are designed to
deal with much, much higher seismic activity than any other
plants in the country.
Senator Boxer. Well, there may be a reason for that, Mr.
Chairman----
Mr. Jaczko. Absolutely.
Senator Boxer. Because they are more at risk. Look, we just
had the new report that says that they are not built to high
enough earthquake-proof standards because we have reports there
is a new fault at Diablo. We will hear that from Senator
Blakeslee, who is coming forward. We, and in the case of San
Onofre, there are reports that say there will be much more
frequent activity than were suspected, both in perhaps tsunami
and this.
So look, I am asking you again. I do not know if we got the
letter back from them on this, a response? If you could just,
you know how Senator Feinstein and I feel. We, it is on our
watch. I do not know how many people are in the States of
Delaware? How many people in Delaware?
Senator Carper. Almost 1 million.
Senator Boxer. How many in your State? Half a million. I
have got a half million people who live within 50 miles of one
of my plants, and 7.4 million who live within 50 miles of my
other. So, this is not about some theoretical catastrophe if
something went wrong.
I know you feel you do ongoing inspections and all the
rest. Well, some of those ongoing inspections found some safety
problems, too. So, let me just press you. I know Senator
Blakeslee is coming up. He is from the other political party
and we are working together on this. I think that is an
important point. This has nothing to do with partisanship.
If I will not be here for his testimony, can I send you his
testimony and ask you to take another look because, we have
both of these plants are up for renewal, although their
licenses run until about 2022, something like that, 2027, 2022?
So, they are not going anywhere. But they are up.
They are both now going to undertake new 3D earthquake
studies, which is great, and I praise both of the operators for
doing that. But it seems to me that while that is happening,
correct me if I am wrong, but I think Congressman Bilbray said,
tell me if I heard him right, that the chance of something like
this happening, an event like this, is between 7,000 and 10,000
years----
Mr. Jaczko. I think he said the frequency of a 7.0
magnitude earthquake is about every 7,000 years, approximately.
Senator Boxer. OK.
Mr. Jaczko. But I do not want to speak for the Congressman.
Senator Boxer. But again, I would say to you, take a look
at the record and the 157 earthquakes we have had over 6.0. So,
and as we know, listen, I was told when I was a County
Supervisor they said 100 year flood, we have to plan for a 100-
year flood. I was a lot younger then and I said, oh, gosh, do
we really need to do this? It is a 100-year flood. Well, that
does not mean it is going to happen in 100 years. It could
happen seven times within 10 years, and then not happen again,
as you know.
So, we have got to respond in a much different way. I just
do not feel the humility from all sides here. I do not think we
are humble enough in the face of what Mother Nature could do. I
think that is, although I have to admit that the statements
made by all parties here, I thought were very reasoned.
But I just think we need to inject a little more humility
in this because look at what happened in Japan. They are so
proud, they are bragging about how this could never happen.
They arrogantly boasted of their world best nuclear power
technology. Now, they cannot even figure out how to stop the
darn thing from leaking and all the rest.
So, anyway, enough said. Thank you.
Senator Carper. Thank you.
Senator Barrasso? All right.
Administrator Jackson, I do not want you to feel like you
are being ignored here, so I am going to----
[Laughter.]
Ms. Jackson. I am happy.
Mr. Jaczko. I thought since she was here I would not get so
many questions.
Ms. Jackson. I very much appreciate it.
Senator Carper. You can barely see her lips move when you
speak, Mr. Chairman.
[Laughter.]
Senator Carper. Administrator Jackson, if you could, we
were talking earlier, I do not know if it was Senator Alexander
or somebody else, we were talking about the number of people
who have died in the 41, 42-year history of nuclear power
plants in this country because of the radiation, folks either,
folks who worked in those plants or lived in the area around
those.
I think I asked this question of Chairman Jaczko the last
time he was here and I think he said, to the best of his
knowledge, no one has died of radiation poisoning or sickness.
Is that close to what you said?
Mr. Jaczko. At nuclear power plants. There have been in
some of the related industries, some accidents that let to
fatalities. But in the nuclear power, at the plants themselves,
no, there have not been.
Senator Carper. OK. Thanks.
Administrator Jackson, you have been great to work with us
on a wide range of clear air issues involving sulfur dioxide
emissions, nitrogen oxide emissions, mercury emissions, and I
do not know, I do not want to put you on the spot.
But, I would like to just get a sense for the range of
injuries, death, brain damaged children born, babies born,
because of emissions from fossil fuel plants that put out not
just CO2 but also sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxide
and mercury. Can you just give us a sense for that?
I think we are talking about people who, we are talking
about the loss of not just tens of lives or hundreds of lives
but far greater. Can you just give us a sense of that over, I
do not know, 40 years? Just give us a sense of the magnitude.
Are we talking about thousands of folks who lives have been
shortened, whose lives have been taken? Just give us a sense of
that magnitude.
Ms. Jackson. I would be happy to. But first let me thank
you for your leadership on clean air issues. You have a long
and outstanding record.
Senator Carper. Thanks for saying that.
Ms. Jackson. Why do I not simply say that we recently
released a proposed rule to deal with mercury and other toxic
emissions from fossil fuel plants, primarily power plants that
burn coal, and the estimates were annual estimates of tens of
thousands of fewer bronchitis incidents, and 150,000, I believe
the number was, fewer asthma-related doctor or hospital visits.
When it comes to fine particle pollution, it is not just
sickness, it is death. So, literally tens of thousands per year
of avoided deaths, premature deaths, as a result, each and
every year.
So I do not have a number for 40 years that accumulates,
but of course, the Clean Air Act has been around for 40 years
and has a long and proud history of, I think the most recent
estimate was $2 trillion in avoided health costs and benefits
by 2020 alone. Of course money is not the same as lives saved
and the tragedy of a sick child, but it has quite, those
emissions have real impact for public health.
Senator Carper. One of our colleagues earlier in the
hearing made the point that for almost any source of
electricity in this country, there are risk concerns related to
them. Obviously, we have the kind of concern, the risk has been
borne in Japan. We need to be mindful of, to learn as much from
this as we can, to make sure that kind of tragedy does not
occur here or hopefully in any other country.
But whether it is coal-fired plants, in our State we want
to deploy offshore windmill farms and hopefully we will start
doing that in about a year or so, but there are people who
think they are unsightly, there are people who are concerned
about the lives of birds. We have concerns with respect to
tapping the great reserves of natural gas that we are happy to
have found but there are concerns raised about the fracking.
There are concerns with respect to solar panels and some of the
materials that we use to create those.
There are all kinds of concerns. What we have to have here
at the end is to be as vigilant as we can for all of them. But
I would just ask us to be as mindful and concerned about our
air pollution problems that relate to fossil fuel plants as we
are the potential loss of life or endangerment of health due to
nuclear power plants. Sometimes, I think we lose our sense of
balance.
I want to ask you, as a followup to that, Administrator
Jackson, about the EPA's radiation monitoring, if I could. In
the next panel, we have got several State and local officials.
Let me just ask, how does the EPA inform State and local
officials about potentially high levels of radiation in milk or
water in their community, and what actions will be taken if
high levels of radiation are found by EPA monitoring?
Ms. Jackson. Let me first State that every model we have
seen, and we agree with the inputs to the model, do not show
that we will see any high levels. We have not seen high levels.
If anything, I would characterize them as trace increases from
background. One of the wonderful things about our RadNet system
is that we have decades of background data. So, we have a good
understanding of what is normal, if you will, for these
monitors.
What we have done is set up a system where we do post the
data for rainwater and drinking water and milk, we post those
on our Web site along with the air monitoring data which is
both near real time. There is about a 4-to 6-hour delay, as
well as some filter and cartridge data that takes a longer
period of time.
Even when we see a trace, a blip above background levels,
we alert the States, entities that are affected where those
monitors. We work very closely with our partners at Health and
Human Services, because the CDC and FDA, depending on whether
we are talking about foodstuffs like milk or other issues, it
is very important that the health officials in those States are
not surprised by even trace increases. Because we want them to
feel comfortable that they know what the data says, what they
mean, and to conceptualize that for citizens because most
people are not used to speaking of radiation or understand some
of these units that are coming at them.
So, we have worked very hard at that. We have not gotten it
perfect every time. We also work with elected officials, so
that includes Members of Congress and Governors' offices as
well.
Senator Carper. All right. I am going to stop. A number of
our colleagues, some of them were here, some of them were not,
will have questions to submit in writing. How long do they have
to submit them, do we know? Two weeks. So, colleagues have 2
weeks to submit their questions in writing if they wish and we
would just ask that you promptly respond to those.
Thank you so much for being here and for testifying today.
Again, our thanks to you and the teams that you lead at EPA and
at the NRC for the continued vigilance that has been
demonstrated in response to this disaster. Thanks so much.
With that, we invite up our second panel, actually third
panel. As our third panel participants take their seats, I am
going to go ahead and begin the introductions.
The first introduction is that of California State Senator
Sam Blakeslee of the 15th District of California. Next we have
Mr. James Boyd who serves as Vice Chair of the California
Energy Commission.
Next we have a familiar face and a friend from Delaware,
Lew Schiliro. Mr. Schiliro retired from the FBI before becoming
a Cabinet Secretary of Delaware's Department of Safety and
Homeland Security. You are welcome. It is great of you to come.
Next we have Mr. Curtis S. Sommerhoff and he is the
Director of Miami-Dade County's Department of Emergency
Management. Thanks so much. Next we have Mr. Charles Pardee.
Actually, Charles Pardee is quite a notable citizen in the
State of Delaware, so you have a namesake who you can be proud
of in our State. This Charles Pardee is Chief Operating Officer
at Exelon Generation.
Finally we have Dr. Thomas B. Cochran, whose initials are
the same as many of my colleagues and me, and he is a Senior
Scientist with the Nuclear Program at the Natural Resources
Defense Council. I welcome Dr. Cochran.
For all of your statements, if you would actually use, I
will give you about 5 minutes. Do not try to go much over that.
If you do, I will have to rein you in a little bit. But 5
minutes, and your full statements will be included in the
record.
Let me start with Senator Blakeslee. My first question is
to you. How many State Senators are there in California? We
know you have 53 House Representatives.
Mr. Blakeslee. We have 40 State Senators in California
representing about 37 million people. So, just a little bit
under 1 million constituents per Senator.
Senator Carper. How many State Reps do you have?
Mr. Blakeslee. Fifty-three Members of Congress and 80
members of the Lower House.
Senator Carper. All right. Great. Thanks. Please proceed.
STATEMENT OF SAM BLAKESLEE, SENATOR, CALIFORNIA STATE SENATE,
DISTRICT 15
Mr. Blakeslee. Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
My name is Sam Blakeslee. I am a California State Senator
and, as Chairman Boxer indicated, I am a Republican. In fact, I
am the former Minority Leader in the Lower House.
I am a former research scientist who earned his doctorate
for California Earthquake Studies from U.C. Santa Barbara, and
as a geophysicist I worked for a number of years in the oil and
gas industry for Exxon in Houston, Texas. I now live with my
wife and two daughters in San Luis Obispo, 10 miles from Diablo
Canyon.
The seismic setting for the Diablo Canyon site has been a
source of well-documented controversy for over four decades. In
1967, the operator of Diablo Canyon, PG&E, stated in their
initial permit application the site had only ``insignificant
faults that are showing no movement for at least 100,000 years
and possibly millions of years.''
Four years later, using oil industry seismic data,
researchers discovered the Hosgri fault only three miles
offshore which the USGS has estimated is capable of producing a
magnitude 7.3 earthquake. In the end, it took 15 years, major
retrofits, and more than $4.4 billion in cost overruns before
the plant became operational.
Upon being elected to the California legislature in 2005, I
called on Pacific Gas & Electric to use more sophisticated oil
and gas 3D seismic imaging technologies to assess the complex
seismic setting just off the coast. PG&E's response to my call
was a column written by a PG&E Vice President stating
``Freshman Assemblyman Sam Blakeslee's proposed legislation to
conduct another seismic survey of Diablo Canyon is unnecessary
and bad policy for California customers.''
Well, in 2006, Governor Schwarzenegger signed the
legislation directing the Energy Commission to perform an
independent review of the data to assess the potential seismic
vulnerability of the State's nuclear power plants and to
provide recommendations.
That same year, PG&E moved to initiate the process to
relicense the facility though there was no compelling need to
rush the process as their current licenses last through 2024
and 2025. Then, in 2007 while the Energy Commission study was
being performed, a magnitude 6.8, not 9.0, 6.8 struck Japan and
the largest nuclear power plant in the world was damaged with
three of its reactors still shut down to this day.
In 2008, the Energy Commission issued their report stating
that uncertainties did in fact exist near the Diablo Canyon
plant and that 3D seismic studies were recommended. PG&E's
written response to the Commission was ``we believe there is no
uncertainty regarding the seismic setting and hazard at the
Diablo Canyon site.''
Mere weeks later, the USGA discovered the active Shoreline
fault running within some hundreds of yards offshore from
PG&E's nuclear power plant and with an orientation that could
potentially intersect with the much larger and very powerful
Hosgri fault.
Within mere days, PG&E rushed to declare ``we don't see
anything that exceeds the plants design basis.'' The statement
was made before collecting the data necessary to determine the
precise location, length and relationship of the Shoreline
fault to the nearby Hosgri.
Fast forward to the events of just 1 month ago when a
magnitude 9.0 earthquake struck offshore Japan on a fault
system believed capable of only a magnitude 7.9. Like the 2007
Japanese earthquake, the 2011 earthquake far exceeded the
utilities seismic and engineering assumptions.
Three weeks ago, at a California Senate hearing on this
issue, I asked PG&E is they still continue to maintain, did
they believe their previous assertion that there was no
uncertainty in the seismic setting near their plant. This time
PG&E responded that, although there is always some uncertainty,
they were ``not concerned.''
I then asked PG&E to suspend or withdraw their license
application with the NRC until the seismic data is in hand to
allow regulators to make informed decisions because, although
PG&E may not be concerned about the seismic uncertainty, my
community was very concerned. Yesterday, 1 day before this
hearing, PG&E agreed to take this action.
After 6 years of calling for these seismic studies, State
legislation, recommendations by the Energy Commission,
direction from the California Public Utilities Commission, two
devastating Japanese earthquakes, and now a nuclear disaster of
Chernobyl proportions, the utility is finally willing to slow
its relicensing effort to collect long-overdue seismic
information.
In closing, I have two questions for Federal regulators.
First, in the aftermath of the Japan crisis, will the NRC
strengthen its own earthquake hazard review procedures that are
conducted during the relicensing process for these two nuclear
facilities that the NRC itself has identified as being located
in the Nation's highest seismic hazard area?
Second, given the longstanding reluctance of PG&E to accept
even the need for such studies, what procedures will the NRC
put in place to ensure there is independent peer review
analysis so that we have accurate, scientifically-robust
conclusions that are drawn by those who have looked at the data
independently rather than relying solely upon the utility and
in-house NRS staff?
Thank you for the opportunity to present to this body.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Blakeslee follows:]
Statement of Sam Blakeslee, State Senator, California State Senate,
District 15
I am a California State senator who represents the 15th District on
the Central Coast. For the previous 6 years I was the State Assembly
Member representing the 33d District and served as Republican Leader
immediately prior to being elected to the State Senate. I am a former
research scientist who earned bachelors and masters in Geophysics from
UC Berkeley and a Ph.D. for earthquake studies at UC Santa Barbara. I
worked for Exxon as a research geophysicist and later as a strategic
planner at their research lab in Houston Texas. I live with my wife and
two young daughters in San Luis Obispo, 8 miles from Diablo Canyon, one
of two operating nuclear power plants in the State of California.
The seismic setting of the Diablo Canyon site has been a source of
well-documented controversy for more than four decades. In 1967, the
operator of Diablo Canyon, Pacific Gas and Electric (also known as
PG&E) stated in their initial permit application the site had only
``insignificant faults that have shown no movement for at least 100,000
and possibly millions of years.'' Four years later in 1971, researchers
discovered the Hosgri fault about three miles offshore, which the USGS
estimates is capable of a magnitude 7.3 earthquake. This significant
discovery led to major seismic retrofits. In 1981, PG&E realized that
the retrofit blueprints had been reversed_structural supports that were
meant for one reactor were actually built for the other reactor. In the
end, it took 15 years and more than $4.4 billion in cost overruns
before the plant was operational.
After reviewing the geophysical work performed by PG&E, I became
increasingly concerned that they did not appreciate the potential
complexity of the seismo-tectonic setting of major fault blocks near
the plant. Upon being elected to the California legislature in 2005 I
called on my local utility to use more sophisticated geophysical
methods to assess the complex seismic setting on the coast. My
experience as an industry scientist had allowed me to become intimately
familiar with the power of 3D seismic imaging techniques to directly
image complex fault systems, particularly in marine settings.
PG&E's response to my call was a column written by the nuclear
power plant's vice president stating, ``Freshman Assemblyman Sam
Blakeslee's proposed legislation to conduct another seismic study of
Diablo Canyon . . . is unnecessary and bad policy for our California
customers''.
I then drafted Assembly Bill 1632, which was passed by the
California legislature and signed by Governor Schwarzenegger in 2006,
which directed the California Energy Commission to perform their own
independent review the data and to assess the potential seismic
vulnerability of the state's nuclear power plants and to provide
recommendations. That same year PG&E moved to initiate the process to
relicense the nuclear power plant though there was no compelling need
to rush the process as their current licenses last through 2024 and
2025.
While the California Energy Commission was being performed a
Magnitude 6.8 earthquake struck Japan in July 2007. The shaking far
exceeded what the Japanese utility expected was possible for the
offshore fault and the largest nuclear power plant in the world was
badly damaged. Today, nearly 4 years later, 3 of the 7 reactors remain
offline with cumulative energy replacement costs in the billions.
In 2008, the California Energy Commission issued their report,
pursuant to AB1632, which stated that the uncertainties did in fact
exist near the Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, and that 3D seismic
studies were recommended. PG&E's written response to the Commission
was, I quote, [we] ``believe there is no uncertainty regarding the
seismic setting and hazard at the Diablo Canyon Site''.
Mere weeks later, the U.S. Geological Survey discovered the
Shoreline fault running within some hundreds of yards offshore from
PG&E's nuclear power plant and with an orientation that could
potentially intersect with the powerful Hosgri fault.
Within days, PG&E declared, ``We don't see anything that exceeds
the plant's design basis.'' This statement was made before having
completed any of the necessary analysis to determine the precise
location, length, and relationship to the dangerous Hosgri fault. The
USGS scientist who discovered the fault, in conversations with me,
expressed her deep concern that PG&E would rush to make these
assertions prior to completing the necessary research to determine the
facts.
In a California Assembly hearing as recently as 2009 PG&E stated
``we're willing to go to the 3D, but right now we just don't think you
jump right there as the prudent thing to do''. This foot dragging on
acquiring the necessary seismic data has continued; all the while, PG&E
has moved rapidly to finalize relicensing with the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission.
Fast forward to the events of this last month, when yet another
Japanese earthquake struck. This time, a 9.0 magnitude earthquake
struck offshore Japan on a fault system believed capable of a 7.9
magnitude quake. This massive earthquake caused explosions at three
reactors at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant. Like the 2007
Chuuetsu earthquake, the Toohoku earthquake far exceeded both the
seismic and engineering assumptions. The devastating series of
unexpected events revealed unknown vulnerabilities at the nuclear
facility and their backup safety systems.
Professor Akira Omoto of the Japan Atomic Energy Commission, who
was involved in the construction of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear
facility, admitted that the engineering assumptions and redundant
failsafe systems believed by experts to guard against a nuclear
disaster, in the end, simply proved inadequate. ``We thought we had
taken adequate precautions . . . but what happened was beyond our
expectation.'' Despite having filed with the California Public
Utilities Commission to obtain authorization for ratepayer funding for
seismic studies that included an offshore 3-D survey, PG&E recently
told local press that it is still evaluating whether to complete the
studies.
Three weeks ago the California Senate held a hearing on the
Japanese earthquake, tsunami, and resulting nuclear crisis. I asked
PG&E directly if they still continued to support their earlier
assertion to the California Energy Commission that there was no
uncertainty in the seismic setting near the plant. PG&E responded by
saying that although there is always some uncertainty they had no
concerns about that uncertainty. Under repeated questioning they said
that they were not concerned about the uncertainty.
In the wake of their repeated denials regarding any seismic
uncertainty, their denial of any concerns, their documented resistance
to acquiring necessary geophysical data, their premature assertions
that all is safe without first obtaining the necessary data to support
their conclusions, their rush to relicense a dozen years before their
current licenses expire, and the tragic events producing the damage and
destruction of two coastal nuclear plants due to two separate offshore
earthquakes, I asked that PG&E suspend or withdraw its license
application with the NRC until the seismic data is in hand to allow
regulators to make informed decisions. They refused to answer my
question at the hearing but said they would get back to me. I followed
up a week later and called asking for a meeting with their President to
discuss the issue. They refused to allow the meeting to occur. They
have not yet responded to my request. That is why I am here today to
seek your help as the utility appears determined to race to re-
licensure before the seismic data can be acquired and analyzed.
We are at a critical juncture in California. In the aftermath of
the two Japanese earthquakes and nuclear accidents policymakers have a
duty to ensure that State and Federal regulators have all the necessary
data to make informed decisions regarding the conditions of re-
licensure for California's two coastal nuclear power plants.
Failures by Federal and State regulators to provide adequate
independent oversight and responsibly enforce appropriate safety
measures has recently led to catastrophic human and environmental
disasters in the past.
The Deepwater Horizon Gulf oil spill, the most significant
environmental tragedy in the history of the Nation, was attributed by
experts as both an industry and governmental regulatory failure.
Mineral Management Services adopted a passive check-the-box mentality
and failed to provide rigorous oversight.
And here we face another potentially threatening scenario, yet
again, with Diablo Canyon confirmed by Federal regulators as one of two
nuclear power plants in the highest risk seismic areas in the Nation.
It is unquestionable that there remains significant uncertainty about
the seismic potential and risk around Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power
Plant, and this uncertainty is of great concern to the California local
and State regulators and authorities. In recent years, elected
officials and regulators with oversight responsibility have reiterated
requests that PG&E first conclude the necessary seismic work prior to
pursuing relicensing. The data that would be collected from these
studies must be available to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission before
the relicensing application process is completed. As the current
operating licenses for Diablo Canyon are valid through 2024 and 2025,
we believe that there is more than sufficient time for advanced seismic
studies and review to be properly performed. Relicensing prior to the
completion of this rigorous analysis would be premature.
It is our sincere hope that PG&E will earn the trust of local
residents, regulators, and elected officials by voluntarily withdrawing
or suspending its re-licensing activities until the geophysical has
been completed. If PG&E will not voluntarily do so, I would request
that this body direct the NRC to suspend its consideration of PG&E's
application until it has received the critical information it needs to
make a thorough and responsible decision.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]
Responses by Sam Blakeslee to Additional Questions from Senator Boxer
Question 1. On April 11th, PG&E asked the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission to delay issuance of the Diablo Canyon license renewal until
after PG&E has completed the 3-D seismic studies and submitted a report
to the NRC addressing the results. We have subsequently learned that
PG&E did not request a delay in the license hearing process, but merely
a delay in the final issuing of the license until after PG&E has
completed the 3-D study.
Why is it important for the results of the 3-D seismic study to be
considered as part of the license renewal hearing process? Do you
believe that all stakeholders, including local citizens, should be able
to comment on the relevance of the study's results as part of a normal
NRC relicensing process?
Response. The critical safety threat to Diablo Canyon is seismic
risk. The dominant seismic feature and greatest seismic risk, according
to the NRC, is the Shoreline Fault. The NRC cannot adequately conduct a
safety review without knowing the potential shaking of the site. Strong
ground motion shaking is directly related to the proximity of the plant
to the fault, the total length and size of the fault, and the degree to
which the fault interacts the Hosgri Fault. This information must be in
hand while the NRC is conducting the safety review, not after. After
reviewing the completed seismic studies, the NRC may find it
appropriate to condition relicensing on retrofits, which should be part
of the safety review.
Three dimensional seismic reflection mapping is necessary to
understand the complex geologic setting of Diablo Canyon. Diablo Canyon
was designed to withstand a 7.5 M seismic event on the Hosgri Fault.
The Shoreline Fault was not considered at the time Diablo Canyon was
originally reviewed and approved by the NRC. Our current understanding
of the Shoreline Fault is based on data from a number of micro
earthquakes that delineate a portion of the fault. The actual
seismically active segment of the fault could be much larger and could
tie directly into the Hosgri Fault. An intersection of the two faults
would dramatically change our understanding of the seismic setting of
the plant and force a reconsideration of the plant's current design.
In addition to my own efforts, the County of San Luis Obispo Board
of Supervisors, the California Energy Commission, California Public
Utilities Commission, California Coastal Commission, and Congresswoman
Lois Capps have all either recommended and/or required the completed 3-
D study in advance of any decisions regarding relicensing of Diablo
Canyon. The only entity not making the seismic study a priority is the
very entity charged with the greatest responsibility for ensuring the
safety of the plant, the NRC.
The most pressing issue facing Diablo Canyon and the NRC is to
resolve the seismic uncertainty, not immediate approval of the license
renewal application. The current operating licenses do not expire until
2024 and 2025, well over a decade from when the seismic studies should
be complete. It is both perplexing and disturbing that the NRC would
insist on making a decision on the license renewal application
uninformed by the completed 3-D seismic study.
Question 2. The NRC license renewal process does not review
emergency planning, security, current safety performance or seismic
issues because, according to the NRC, these items are dealt with on an
ongoing basis. Do you agree with this approach?
Do you believe that the use of this information in relicensing
could help officials determine the true costs to Californians of
relicensing the facility by providing information on the costs of
potentially needed retrofits or whether such retrofits could address
plant safety issues?
Response. Seismic issues at nuclear power plants in active fault
zones, like Diablo Canyon, should be reviewed in a comprehensive,
systematic manner during license renewal. This punctuated higher level
review should analyze plant systems and how they operate in potential
events. The analysis should include the expertise of a broad range of
third parties and include an independent peer review to ensure the data
and conclusions are thoroughly vetted. An analysis of this caliber is
more robust than routine day-to-day monitoring. Ongoing monitoring
should not preclude a punctuated higher level analysis during license
renewal. These activities are not mutually exclusive.
Senator Carper. Thanks so much. Thanks for coming here to
testify for us today. Very, very good testimony. Thank you.
Mr. Boyd, please. Welcome.
STATEMENT OF JAMES D. BOYD, VICE CHAIRMAN, CALIFORNIA ENERGY
COMMISSION, CALIFORNIA LIAISON OFFICER TO THE U.S. NUCLEAR
REGULATORY COMMISSION
Mr. Boyd. Thank you, Senator, and to Senator Barrasso,
thank you for being here.
I am Jim Boyd, Energy Commissioner, and I happen to be the
State's Liaison Officer to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, which may indicate why, perhaps, I am here. I
appreciate this opportunity. I appreciate you having this
hearing.
Senator Carper. A quick question, Mr. Boyd. Are you
appointed by the Governor and confirmed by the Senate? How does
it work in California?
Mr. Boyd. Yes.
Senator Carper. OK. How long have you served?
Mr. Boyd. Nine, I am in my tenth year.
Senator Carper. OK. Thanks very much. Please proceed.
Mr. Boyd. This tragic 9.0 magnitude earthquake and its
impacts on the Japanese people and this power plant certainly
underscore the importance relating to seismic understandings in
a State like California.
You have heard all about our two plants. You have heard
from Senator Blakeslee in detail the difficulties we have had
with the operator of one plant and the need for seismic
studies. We have another plant, San Onofre, which, the
recommendations apply equally. The 2008 study found that there
are seismic concerns there that affect tsunami potential as
well.
Subsequently, you heard from Senator Boxer, earlier, who
referenced that my agency and the PUC directed the two
agencies, the operators of these plants, to undertake the
studies. But that resulted in a race by PG&E to file for
relicensing well in advance of what anyone thought would be
necessary.
This new technology, technology that Senator Blakeslee has
indicated, has been used by the oil industry for years. PG&E
has done some studies, mainly because the NRC ordered them to
have an active seismic study after all the fiasco of many years
ago and to have a need to redesign the plant.
Unfortunately, while we had been pushing for this, the NRC
has to date indicated that the license renewal review process
does not include an assessment of seismic vulnerabilities. It
does not require that these advanced seismic studies be
included within the scope of their review.
Until yesterday, when we learned that PG&E has changed
their mind and they want to hold up their license, we felt that
the NRC was going to finish their review in 2012, and these
studies would not even be done until 2013.
So, I thank you for having a hearing that may have had an
impact upon PG&E. But, in spite of that, we still need a
condition from Southern California Edison, the operator of San
Onofre, that they will do the same types of studies, and they
told me they are reconsidering their position.
For us, lessons learned are first that we are looking to
the NRC to carry out its short-term and long-term review of
events in Japan and if they do the good job that they did on
Three Mile Island, we expect a lot of positive recommendations
and results. But we need to implore the Congress support the
NRC, not only in these efforts but in implementing and ensuring
that followup actions are taken and implemented at all U.S.
reactors as soon as feasible after they finish their studies.
Not only should they include the lessons learns from Japan,
but we have some thoughts we would like to pass on to the NRC,
and have in previous correspondence, in addition to lessons
learned studies that we have underway with regard to seismic.
First is in the Waste Confidence Decision. The Chairman
referenced to that. The NRC's Waste Confidence Decision which
concluded that spent nuclear fuel can be stored safely onsite
at reactors for 100 years should be reexamined, particularly
spent fuel stored in seismically active coastal areas. The
safety of long-term storage of spent fuel in seismically active
or tsunami prone areas need to be reevaluated in light of what
is happening in Japan.
Second, spent fuel management. The Nation's spent fuel
management systems and practices should be reevaluated,
including the current practice of storing spent fuel in pools
in tighter storage configurations than original plant designs
called for.
The Energy Commission, in 2008, recommended that the
utilities return their spent fuel pools to more open racking
configurations as soon as feasible. Storing more spent fuel in
pools in closer configuration creates greater heat load,
thereby increasing the risk of fire and other possible
problems.
As more and more spent fuel accumulates at reactor sites,
plant owners have had to re-rack their pools multiple times to
increase their onsite spent fuel storage capacity. This is an
increasing safety issue at California's two plants, and the
station blackout issue is another one that affects the
operation of spent fuel pools.
So, in closing, I would say we would like to see that the
two utilities in California undertake the studies that have
been recommended. We would like to have these studies included
in NRC's license renewal evaluation of these plants because
they give no support in their routine oversight of a plant
license for the activities that are being carried out and the
recommendations that have been made.
We need to assure ourselves that when these studies are
done, all of these activities that need to be taken with regard
to equipment and process operations should be taken into
account.
Thank you for this opportunity.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Boyd follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]
Responses by James D. Boyd to Additional Questions from Senator Boxer
Question 1. The NRC license renewal process does not review
emergency planning, security, current safety performance or seismic
issues because, according to the NRC, these items are dealt with on an
ongoing basis. Do you agree with this approach? Do you believe that the
use of this information in relicensing could help officials determine
the true costs to Californians of relicensing the facility by providing
information on the costs of potentially needed retrofits or whether
such retrofits could address plant safety issues?
Response. While the NRC position of indicating that these issues
should be dealt with on an ongoing basis is perhaps strategically
correct, our experience is that it is not working properly, in
California in the case of the license renewal process for Diablo Canyon
Nuclear Power Plant. NRC has both not acted on the extensive
discussions and correspondence on seismic issues at Diablo Canyon over
the past years under their ``ongoing basis'' criteria, nor has it made
it a factor to be considered in the current relicensing process. One
can only assume the same practice if and when San Onofre files for
license extension.
The NRC license renewal process should include a site-specific
evaluation of significant issues, that vary from plant to plant,
including emergency planning and preparedness, security, current safety
performance and seismic issues. Such an analysis will provide
information that is needed to determine the true costs and benefits of
relicensing the facility. This is particularly true for seismic issues
with respect to the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station (SONGS) and
Diablo Canyon Nuclear Plant, since they are located in the most
seismically active areas when compared with other U.S. reactors.
In my attached letter to the NRC dated April 12, 2010, we
identified a number of issues that PG&E and the NRC should analyze in
depth regarding the possible environmental and safety impacts from
renewing the operating licenses for Diablo Canyon. The issues we
identified are: seismic risks, at-reactor accumulation of spent fuel,
security, emergency planning, reactor vessel embrittlement, evaluation
of energy alternatives, plant safety culture, and plant once-through
cooling. A thorough analysis of these issues will provide information
that is essential to assessing the true costs and benefits of renewing
Diablo Canyon's operating licenses compared with alternatives and the
potential environmental and safety impacts from license extension.
Seismic issues should be thoroughly evaluated during license
renewal for California's nuclear power plants, particularly in light of
the long history of seismic concerns at Diablo Canyon and SONGS and the
fact that construction costs for both Diablo Canyon and SONGS greatly
exceeded original estimates largely due to seismic retrofit costs. For
example, Diablo Canyon's construction costs exceeded the initial $320
million estimate (1968 dollars) by more than $5 billion largely due to
seismic retrofits. \1\ Construction costs at SONGS also far exceeded
initial estimates $436 million (1971 dollars) compared with $4.5
billion.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ California Energy Commission, Nuclear Power in California:
Status Report: Final Consultant Report; Prepared for the 2005
Integrated Energy Policy Report, available at: http://
www.energy.ca.gov/2006publications/CEC-150-2006-001/CEC-150-2006-001-
F.PDF
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The discovery in 2008 of a new major fault--the Shoreline Fault--
near the Diablo Canyon and recent tragic events at the Fukushima
Daiichi plant following the 9.0 magnitude earthquake and tsunami on
March 11 underscore the importance of analyzing seismic issues as part
of California's license renewal evaluation. Although the NRC says they
examine seismic issues on an ongoing basis, the NRC did not require
PG&E and SCE to complete advanced seismic studies to address major
uncertainties regarding seismic hazards at both sites. In addition,
although the NRC required PG&E to develop a Long-Term Seismic Program,
SCE was not required to have one nor were either utility required to
have an Independent Peer Review Panel to review their study plans and
findings. The NRC to date has consistently stated that they will not
evaluate site-specific seismic issues during their license renewal
evaluations.
The Energy Commission and its consultant conducted a 2-year
comprehensive assessment of California's operating nuclear plants.
Assembly Bill 1632 (Blakeslee, Chapter 722, Statutes of 2006) directed
the Energy Commission to assess the potential vulnerability of ``large
baseload generation facilities of 1,700 megawatts or greater'' to a
major disruption due to a seismic event or plant age-related issues.
The Energy Commission adopted this assessment in November 2008 as part
of the 2008 Integrated Energy Policy Report (IEPR). \2\ We believe that
the studies recommended in the Energy Commission's AB 1632 Report and
the 2008 and 2009 Integrated Energy Policy Reports (IEPRs), including
the advanced seismic studies, must be included as part of license
renewal review evaluations. If these seismic studies indicate that
there are potentially greater risks or higher stresses for the plants'
structural components and additional seismic retrofits are required,
this information must be included in the cost-benefit analysis for
license renewal. As noted in the 2009 IEPR, the comprehensiveness,
completeness, and timeliness of these studies will be critical to
license renewal assessments for Diablo Canyon and SONGS. Although PG&E
is required to submit its license renewal feasibility assessment to the
California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) by June 30, 2011, PG&E
does not expect to complete the advanced seismic hazard studies until
2013. In addition, the NRC's stated plans are to issue the Draft Safety
Analysis Report and the Draft Environmental Impact Statement for Diablo
Canyon's license renewal review in June 2011 before these advanced
seismic studies have been completed. These license renewal evaluations,
including NRC's safety and environmental impact analyses for Diablo
Canyon's license renewal, must include the results of the AB 1632
Report recommended studies that the Energy Commission and the CPUC have
directed PG&E to complete.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ California Energy Commission, An Assessment of California's
Nuclear Power Plants: AB 1632 Report, available at:
[http:www.energy.ca.gov/2008publications/CEC-100-2008-009/CEC-100-2008-
009-CMF.pdf]; also see AB 1632 Assessment of California's Operating
Nuclear Plants: Final Consultant Report, MRW & Associates, Inc.,
October 2008, CEC-100-2008-005-F available at: [http://
www.energy.ca.gov/2008publications/CEC-100-2008-005/CEC-100-2008-005-
F.PDF
Question 2. According to a 2008 California Energy Commission (CEC)
report, new seismic and geologic data indicates that San Onofre Nuclear
Generating Station ``could experience larger and more frequent
earthquakes than had been anticipated when the plant was designed.''
Can you explain how you came to such a conclusion and how this
information should be used by plant operators and the NRC?
Response. The AB 1632 Report concluded that the design basis for
SONGS is based on a safe-shutdown earthquake (SSE) of magnitude 7.0 at
a distance of 8 km on the Southcoast Offshore Fault Zone. \3\ Following
NRC review, SCE calculated the maximum bedrock acceleration from this
earthquake at 0.67 g. As part of the subsequent Probabilistic Seismic
Hazard Assessment (PSHA), SCE evaluated the SSE value of 0.67g to be
associated with an annual probability corresponding to a return period
of 7,194 years. The standard for nuclear plant design is a return
period of 10,000 years. A more recently updated PSHA which accounted
for blind thrust faults, newer ground motion attenuation relationships,
and near-source ground motion effects evaluated the return period
associated with the SSE bedrock acceleration to be 5,747 years. As a
result, the AB 1632 Report concluded that advances in seismology have
revealed that the SONGS site ``could experience larger and more
frequent earthquakes than had been anticipated when the plant was
designed.'' \4\ In addition, the California Coastal Commission's
analysis indicated that ``there is credible reason to believe that the
design basis earthquake approved by U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(NRC) at the time of the licensing of SONGS 2 and 3 . . . may
underestimate the seismic risk at the site.'' \5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ MRW & Associates, AB 1632 Assessment of California's Operating
Nuclear Plants, Final Consultant Report, October 2008, CEC-100-2008-
005-F, pp. 58-59, available at [http://www.energy.ca.gov/
2008publications/CEC-100-2008-005/CEC-100-2008-005-F.PDF]
\4\ MRW & Associates, AB 1632 Assessment of California's Operating
Nuclear Plants, Final Consultant Report, October 2008, CEC-100-2008-
005-F, pp. 58-59, available at [http://www.energy.ca.gov/
2008publications/CEC-100-2008-005/CEC-100-2008-005-F.PDF]
\5\ California Coastal Commission, http:www.coastal.ca.gov/energy/
E-00-014-3mmi.pdf,page 19.
Question 3. In your testimony you mentioned that the California
Energy Commission recommended that PG&E and Southern California Edison
change the way they are storing fuel in their spent fuel pools. Can you
explain why the Commission made this recommendation and how it would
increase safety?
Response. Due to the lack of a Federal permanent spent fuel
disposal facility, the spent fuel pools at Diablo Canyon and SONGS have
been ``re-racked'' to provide increased storage capability by placing
the fuel assemblies closer together (Federal regulations permit
reracking of spent fuel pools.) The more densely configured spent fuel
pools are considered to have greater risk than a spent fuel pool that
has a more open racking arrangement. A loss-of-coolant event
precipitated by an accident or extreme event, such as a terrorist
attack, earthquake, or tsunami, in a re-racked spent fuel pool with its
spent fuel more closely packed than original designs, could result in
extensive radiation release and contamination. Reconfiguring the spent
fuel in the pools to more evenly distribute radioactive decay heat
loads may help reduce the vulnerability of spent fuel pools. A 2006
study by the National Academies concluded that it appears to be
feasible to reduce the likelihood of a fire involving spent fuel
following a loss-of-pool-coolant event by using readily implemented
measures including reconfiguring the spent fuel in the pools
(redistributing the high decay-heat assemblies so that they are
surrounded by low decay-heat assemblies.) \6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ National Academies, Safety and Security of Commercial Nuclear
Fuel Storage, Public Report, 2006, p. 9.
Question 4. What are your recommendations for storing spent fuel at
nuclear power plants in California?
Response. The Energy Commission's 2008 Integrated Energy Policy
Report, recommended that PG&E and SCE should return the spent fuel
pools to open racking arrangements as soon as feasible, while
maintaining compliance with NRC spent fuel cask and pool storage
requirements, and report to the Energy Commission on their progress in
doing so. \7\ The California utilities to date have not reported any
progress in pursuing the Energy Commission's recommendation to modify
their spent fuel pools' racking to a less dense configuration. With
abandonment of the Yucca Mountain repository program, a Federal
permanent geologic repository or centralized dry cask storage facility
likely will not be available for decades. This means the accelerated
additional and continued utilization of onsite dry cask storage. As a
result, spent fuel will remain at Diablo Canyon and SONGS indefinitely.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ 2008 Integrated Energy Policy Report, p. 69, available at:
[http://www.energy.ca.gov/2008--energypolicy/index.html]
Question 5. On April 11, PG&E asked the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission to delay issuance of the Diablo Canyon license renewal until
after PG&E has completed the 3-D seismic studies and submitted a report
to the NRC addressing the results. We have subsequently learned that
PG&E did not request a delay in the licensing hearing process, but
merely a delay in the final issuing of the license until after PG&E has
completed the 3-D seismic study. Why is it important for the results of
the 3-D seismic study to be considered as part of the license renewal
hearing process? Do you believe that all stakeholders, including local
citizens, should be able to comment on the relevance of the study's
results as part of a normal NRC relicensing process?
Response. It is essential that these advanced seismic studies be
included in license renewal reviews because, as mentioned previously,
new studies may indicate a greater seismic hazard for Diablo Canyon
than previous estimates, which could have significant safety and cost
implications if expensive seismic retrofits are required. There are
major uncertainties regarding Diablo Canyon's earthquake hazard, for
example, whether the Hosgri and Shoreline Faults may potentially
interact together creating a larger magnitude earthquake than if either
fault ruptured independently. PG&E in a January 2011 report to the NRC
indicated that the Shoreline Fault is segmented. However, a recent USGS
report indicated that there is no objective evidence supporting
segmentation of the Shoreline Fault. Segmentation vs. non-segmentation
is important in estimating earthquake magnitude potential. For example,
the Japanese greatly underestimated the 9.0 magnitude earthquake and
tsunami on March 11 and had predicted that the large offshore fault
zone was segmented and that these segments would rupture separately.
However, five segments ruptured together, rather than independently,
creating a much larger earthquake than had been predicted.
The Energy Commission in its 2008 and 2009 Integrated Energy Policy
Reports recommended that PG&E and SCE complete certain studies and
actions, including completing 3-D and other advanced seismic studies
for Diablo Canyon and SONGS, and that these studies be included in the
California Public Utilities Commission's and the NRC's license renewal
reviews for Diablo Canyon and SONGS. The California Public Utilities
Commission (CPUC) in June 2009 directed PG&E and SCE to complete these
studies as part of these plants' license renewal evaluations. The CPUC
approved funding for the advanced seismic studies at Diablo Canyon and
in 2011 funded an Independent Peer Review Panel to review PG&E's study
plans and findings.
The California Coastal Commission similarly notified the NRC on
April 25, 2011 that the proposed relicensing for Diablo Canyon ``is
subject to Federal consistency review by the California Coastal
Commission, completion of which is a necessary part of the NRC's
eventual relicensing decision.'' To help conduct its review, the
Coastal Commission has asked PG&E to provide the results from these
advanced seismic studies. In addition, California Senator Sam
Blakeslee, Congresswoman Lois Capps and the San Luis Obispo County
Board of Supervisors have called for including these advanced seismic
studies in Diablo Canyon's license renewal evaluations. Therefore, an
increasing number of State and local officials are calling for
completing these advanced seismic studies and including them in the
license renewal evaluations for Diablo Canyon and SONGS. There is
sufficient time to complete these studies, thoroughly analyze the
results including independent peer review of the results, and include
this information in cost-benefit evaluations of license renewal for
Diablo Canyon. Diablo Canyon's operating licenses do not expire until
2024 and 2025 and SONGS' licenses do not expire until 2022. PG&E
recently told the CPUC they plan to complete these advanced seismic
studies by 2013.
I agree that stakeholders should be provided an opportunity to
comment on the seismic study results as part of the NRC's license
renewal review. Although PG&E has maintained an extensive Long-Term
Seismic Program at Diablo Canyon as a condition of their operating
license, PG&E did not discover the Shoreline Fault nor did they
discover the Hosgri Fault. A Shell Oil scientist discovered the Hosgri
Fault and USGS scientists discovered the Shoreline Fault. Independent
reviews of earthquake hazard potential for Diablo Canyon are vital to
understanding the seismic risks for the site. Interested stakeholders
may have significant new data to contribute or different
interpretations of PG&E's study results and should be allowed to
comment on the study results as part of NRC's license renewal
evaluation for Diablo Canyon.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]
Senator Carper. Thank you, Mr. Boyd.
Next we will introduce Lew Schiliro, Secretary Schiliro.
How long have you been Secretary now?
Mr. Schiliro. Just over 2 years, Senator.
Senator Carper. Before that I know you spent a few years in
the FBI. How many?
Mr. Schiliro. Twenty-five years, sir.
Senator Carper. Twenty-five years. Thank you for your
service to our country and to our State. We are delighted that
you are here today.
Please proceed.
STATEMENT OF LEWIS D. SCHILIRO, J.D., CABINET SECRETARY,
DELAWARE DEPARTMENT OF SAFETY AND HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Schiliro. Thank you, Senator, and good afternoon,
Chairman.
I am Lew Schiliro, the Secretary of Delaware's Department
of Safety and Homeland Security. On behalf of Governor Jack
Markell, I am honored to be here today to address the important
issue of Homeland Security as it relates to radiological
emergency plans and preparedness. I would like to thank you for
the attention and focus on this most important topic.
In the days and weeks that have followed the nuclear energy
crisis in Japan, many citizens have raised concerns regarding
radiological emergency preparedness in the United States. In
Delaware, the citizens' concerns about the safety of nuclear
energy facilities and the State's ability to handle a
radiological emergency were directed to our Department.
Our Department is comprised of several Public Safety
Divisions, including the Delaware State Police, Capital Police,
the Office of Highway Safety and, most importantly, the
Delaware Emergency Management Agency, which we refer to as
DEMA.
While our divisions often work together during a public
safety emergency, DEMA is primarily responsible for the State's
Radiological Emergency Plan and preparedness activities. I
would like to open my statement today with information on the
nuclear energy utility located just off our State's shore and
our State's Radiological Emergency Plan. I will then share some
insight into our experiences with the utility.
Our State's location along the East Coast puts it within 50
miles of four nuclear generating stations. They are Limerick
Nuclear Generating Station and Peach Bottom Atomic Energy
Station, both in Pennsylvania, Calvert Cliffs Nuclear
Generating Station in Maryland, and the Salem/Hope Creek
Nuclear Generating Station in New Jersey. Of these four
stations, Salem/Hope, which is a 740-acre site operated by
PSE&G, is the closest, located just 2.5 miles from the Delaware
shoreline. Together, these plants comprise the second largest
nuclear generating facility in the United States and generate
enough electricity for 3 million homes each day.
According to the 2010 Census, there are approximately
41,000 people in Delaware who currently live within a 10-mile
radius of this utility. The area is more commonly known as the
Emergency Planning Zone or EPZ. It should be noted that within
the last 10 years, Delaware's population in the EPZ increased
by over 17,000 citizens, according to the recent census. This
increase necessitates a mandatory evaluation of our evacuation
routes and times.
The close proximity of Salem/Hope makes it the most
potential threat to our State and as such, DEMA's radiological
staff continues to work closely with the nuclear people at
PSE&G and the New Jersey State emergency management officials
to maintain and update the State's radiological plan. This
comprehensive plan, which is approved by FEMA, is DEMA's
roadmap to provide command, control and coordination for any
potential nuclear plant incident impacting our State.
As required by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and FEMA,
within a 6-year cycle, DEMA conducts three plume exercises
which really test the State's emergency response capability
within the EPZ and one injection exercise which tests the
State's readiness to address needs within a 50-mile radius of
the utility.
Historically, Delaware's Federally-graded exercises have
received very high marks from FEMA and these are graded
exercises that are quite thorough and exhaustive inasmuch as
they test each and every State emergency response resource that
could potentially have a role in any radiological emergency
incident. They involve our first responders, our evacuation
plans, reception centers which are registration and
decontamination sites, traffic control access points, shelters,
schools, hospitals and emergency worker decontamination
centers.
In addition to that, FEMA conducts quarterly radiological
drills with PSE&G and New Jersey that specifically focus on the
EPZ and our responder resources. In 2010, 821 people received
training specific to the REP Plan and Emergency Worker
Equipment.
I am going to cut some of this short, Senator, but we have
absolutely an excellent relationship with PSE&G and the
emergency response officials in New Jersey.
I welcome the opportunity, as this goes on, to answer any
questions that you may have regarding those plans.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Schiliro follows:]
Statement of Lewis D. Schiliro, J.D., Secretary, Delaware Department of
Safety and Homeland Security
introduction
Good Afternoon, Chairman Boxer, Ranking Member Inhofe, and members
of the Subcommittees. I am Lewis D. Schiliro, Secretary of the Delaware
Department of Safety and Homeland Security. On behalf of Governor Jack
A. Markell, I am honored to be here today to address the important
issue of homeland security as it relates to radiological emergency
plans and preparedness. I would like to thank you for your attention
and focus on this most important topic.
In the days and weeks that have followed the nuclear energy crisis
in Japan, many citizens have raised concerns regarding radiological
emergency preparedness in the U.S. In Delaware, citizen concerns about
the safety of nuclear energy facilities and the State's ability to
handle a radiological emergency were directed to our Department. Our
Department is comprised of several public safety divisions including
the Delaware State Police (DSP), Capitol Police and the Delaware
Emergency Management Agency (DEMA). While our divisions often work
together during a public safety emergency, DEMA is primarily
responsible for the State's radiological emergency plan (REP) and
preparedness activities. I would like to open my statement today with
information on the nuclear energy utility located just off the State's
shore and our State's Radiological Emergency Plan. I will then share
some insight into our experiences and relationship with the Utility.
nuclear generating stations in close proximity to delaware
Our State's location along the East Coast puts it with in 50-miles
of four nuclear generating stations. They are Limerick Nuclear
Generating Station and Peach Bottom Atomic Power Station, both in
Pennsylvania; Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Generating Station in Maryland;
and Salem/Hope Creek Nuclear Generating Station in New Jersey. Of these
four stations, Salem/Hope Creek, a 740-acre site operated by PSEG
Nuclear, is the closest, located just 2.5 miles from the Delaware
shoreline. Together, the plants comprise the second largest nuclear
generating facility in the U.S and generate enough electricity for
three million homes each day. According to the 2010 Census, there are
approximately 41,000 people in Delaware who currently live within a 10-
mile radius of the Utility. This area is more commonly known the
Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ). It should be noted that within the last
10 years, Delaware's population in the EPZ increased by over 17,000
citizens according to the recent census study. This increase
necessitates a mandatory evaluation of our evacuation routes and times.
radiological emergency plan, exercises and notification
The close proximity of Salem/Hope Creek makes it the most potential
threat to our State and as such DEMA's Radiological Staff continues to
work closely with PSEG Nuclear and New Jersey State Emergency
Management officials to maintain and update the State's radiological
emergency plan. This comprehensive plan, approved by FEMA, is DEMA's
roadmap to provide command, coordination and support for any potential
nuclear power plant incident impacting our State. As required by the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and FEMA, within a 6-year cycle
DEMA conducts three (3) plume exercises which test the State's
emergency response capabilities within the EPZ and one (1) ingestion
exercise which test the State's readiness to address needs within a 50-
mile radius of the Utility. Historically, Delaware's federally graded
exercises have received high marks from FEMA. These federally graded
exercises are quite thorough and exhaustive in that they test each and
every State emergency response resource that could potentially have a
role in a radiological emergency incident. They involve our first
responders; evacuation plans; reception centers which are registration
and decontamination sites for the public; traffic access controls;
shelters; schools; hospitals; and emergency worker decontamination
centers. In addition, DEMA conducts quarterly radiological drills with
PSEG and New Jersey that specifically focus on the EPZ emergency plans
and responder resources. In 2010, 821 people received training specific
to the State's REP Plan and Emergency Worker Equipment.
A. Partnerships with Multiple Governmental and Private Agencies
Over the years, DEMA has successfully forged partnerships with
multiple Federal, state, county and local agencies to support our
emergency response plans. DEMA currently maintains 22 Memorandums of
Understanding with various agencies and organizations for resources and
assistance. These agencies bring resources that would not otherwise be
readily available to DEMA. For example, unlike other states, our
Delaware National Guard is an integral part of our emergency plan. It
provides support for field monitoring and air sampling as well as
staffing for two reception centers and an Emergency Worker
Decontamination Center. In 2010, Delaware participated in drills and
exercises that involved 1,070 staff from private and governmental
agencies.
B. Emergency Notification and Activation of Plan
DEMA has established a 24-hour contact through Delaware State
Police (DSP) Communications for Salem/Hope Creek notifications. Within
15 minutes of a radiological emergency, PSEG shall send an alert to
DEMA via DSP Communications. This alert triggers the activation of the
State's Emergency Operations Center and will start the notification
process to our emergency support resources including the State Division
of Public Health, Department of Natural Resources and Environmental
Control (DNREC), National Guard and Department of Agriculture as well
Federal resources that include FEMA, U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency, Department of Energy, U.S. Department of Agriculture and NRC.
C. Monitoring Sites
While notification of a radiological incident shall come from PSEG,
DEMA also has seven (7) stand-alone monitoring sites within the EPZ.
These units provide readings 24-hours a day and are equipped with
battery powered back-ups. These units are also programmed to send an
alert to DSP Communications for the purpose of initiating the
notification procedure. An alert from any of the stand-alone units
would necessitate a call to PSEG to determine and confirm if there had
been an incident of concern. If the alarm was not triggered by a PSEG
release, DEMA would contact DNREC to investigate and determine the
source and extent of the incident.
One additional stationary monitoring unit is located in Dover. This
unit is managed and monitored by the USEPA through its RADNET program.
public information and education
On a nearly continual basis, DEMA participates in various outreach
programs throughout the State. Emergency preparedness information
provided to the general public covers public notification, evacuations,
sheltering and distribution of potassium iodide. The public also
receives information via the PSEG Nuclear Informational Calendar. It
offers detailed planning guidance for residents living within the EPZ.
DEMA also makes direct contact with civic associations, community
groups, schools and businesses located in the EPZ to provide plans and
training.
A. Potassium Iodide Distribution
For the past 10 years, Delaware has offered a potassium iodide
public distribution program. The NRC has provided the recommended
dosage of potassium iodide to all Delaware residents within 10-miles of
the Salem/Hope Creek Nuclear Generating Stations. In determining the
amount of potassium iodide Delaware requests, the anticipated growth of
the population within the 10-mile Emergency Planning Zone was taken
into consideration, to ensure all persons living within the EPZ are
issued the appropriate dosage. Besides the public distribution,
additional supplies in caches are maintained at the Registration sites
for distribution to the public upon arrival, if warranted. Each year in
the fall, DEMA and the Division of Public Health work together to host
several potassium iodide public distribution events. In response to
recent citizen requests, a potassium iodide distribution event was held
last week.
experience and relationship with pseg nuclear officials
The Department and DEMA have a positive working relationship with
PSEG Nuclear officials and have found them to be quite responsive to
our needs and concerns. PSEG provides approximately $1.4 million each
year to fund the State's radiological emergency preparedness program
and activities. This is the State's only source of funding for its
radiological program.
PSEG Nuclear has invited Department leaders and DEMA staff to the
Salem/Hope Creek Generating Stations on several occasions for plant
tours. More importantly, during the quarterly drills, several DEMA
radiological staff and public information officers travel to Salem/Hope
Creek Generating Station to work as a team with PSEG staff and New
Jersey officials. This arrangement has allowed our staff to become very
familiar with not only the emergency plans and procedures but with the
PSEG facility and its staff. In addition, PSEG hosts annual training on
utility emergency plans and procedures. Each year, PSEG officials
partner with DEMA to host an awards luncheon for elementary school
students who submit artwork for its radiological emergency information
calendar that is distributed to residents within the Delaware portion
of the EPZ. Likewise, a similar activity is sponsored by New Jersey &
PSEG for the New Jersey portion of the EPZ.
closing
At this time, the Department does not have any specific concerns
regarding the Salem/Hope Creek Generating Stations or the other nearby
nuclear energy facilities. I am confident that DEMA and its supporting
partners are prepared to handle a radiological incident within our
State.
Senator Carper. Thank you very, very much, Mr. Secretary.
Welcome, again, Mr. Sommerhoff. Please proceed. Thank you
for joining us.
STATEMENT OF CURTIS S. SOMMERHOFF, DIRECTOR, MIAMI-DADE
DEPARTMENT OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
Mr. Sommerhoff. Good afternoon, and I wanted to thank
Environment and Public Works Committee Chairman Boxer, Ranking
Member Inhofe, Clean Air and Nuclear Subcommittee Chairman
Carper, Ranking Member Barrasso, and the distinguished
committee members.
I am Curtis Sommerhoff, Director of the Miami-Dade
Department of Emergency Management. The community I serve spans
nearly 2,000 square miles, includes 35 municipalities, and has
a population of more than 2.5 million. We are a coastal
community vulnerable to a number of natural and manmade
disasters including the threat of hurricanes, flooding, fires,
mass migration, oil spills and radiological events.
Miami-Dade County's response to emergencies and disasters
is guided by a Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan, an all-
hazards approach which supports the County's ability to respond
to any type of emergency. Within our comprehensive plan we have
a number of hazard-specific annexes, including a Radiological
Emergency Preparedness Plan.
Our plans are regularly assessed and assumptions analyzed,
revised and ultimately certified by the Federal Emergency
Management Agency. Site visits and evaluated exercises bring
together local, State and Federal agencies, as well as members
of the utility, to enhance collaboration and programming. FEMA
oversight and formal after action reports highlight significant
areas that might need improvement.
In the event of an emergency at the nuclear power plant, we
have a public alert and notification system that includes
warning sirens in the area around the plant, identified support
facilities for the delivery of emergency services, fully
trained and equipped public safety response personnel, and
protective measures that are adjusted to the threat level.
Our ability to effectively respond to a radiological or
other threat lies not only in our comprehensive planning but
our long history of implementing protective actions for the
public. Over the past decade alone, evacuation orders have been
issued to the public on 10 occasions as a result of hurricanes
and tropical storms and, together with our partner agencies, we
have coordinated the evacuation, transportation, sheltering,
medical care and feeding of tens of thousands of evacuees.
Consider this. In the 10-mile Emergency Planning Zone
surrounding the Turkey Point Nuclear Power Plant, there are
approximately 180,000 residents. Within Miami-Dade's three
designated Hurricane Evacuation Zones, there are more than half
a million residents.
We have identified shelters for temporary housing with
special consideration given to individuals with special needs.
We have designated areas for the dissemination of emergency
supplies, like water, ice, food and tarps in the event of
widespread destruction or power outages.
We have ready-to-activate Disaster Assistance Centers to
provide social services to residents in need of financial
assistance, prescriptions refills, short- and long-term housing
and first aid, and contracts and mutual aid agreements to
ensure the continuity of operations during disaster response
and recovery. In line with the National Response Framework, all
of our plans are scalable, flexible and adaptable.
The County's Department of Emergency Management fosters an
ongoing collaborative planning relationship with the County's
mission essential departments and partner agencies to address
life safety and property implications from existing hazards. We
have a long-established state-of-the-art Emergency Operations
Center, our nucleus for response and recovery efforts.
When disaster threatens, our emergency managers, private
and non-profit sector partners, as well as our media partners,
come together under one roof, a critical component for a
coordinated response and timely and accurate information
dissemination. Local, State and Federal coordination enables us
to augment and resupply personnel and equipment as needed, even
over extended periods.
Our strengths and experiences from hurricane response carry
over to our ability to implement actions for a radiological
event. Conversely, our planning for a potential radiological
event has a positive effect on our ability to respond to other
hazards.
Based on our experiences, we respectfully offer the
following recommendations for consideration.
The recommendation of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to
evacuate Americans out to 50 miles from the Fukushima Daiichi
Plant has raised many questions. We support analysis of the
data and assumptions behind the recommendation to determine if
Emergency Planning Zones in the United States need to be
revised. Of course, a wholesale change to increase the plume
exposure pathway must be carefully evaluated and weighed
against the value of making the revision.
It is also important to note that local officials currently
have the flexibility to revise public protective action based
on accident parameters and the situation on the ground.
As we have seen in the crisis in Japan, as well as other
disasters across the United States, interaction and
coordination with Federal partners is sometimes hampered by the
lack of familiarity of local and State response organizations
with Federal processes and systems. Increasing the inclusion of
FEMA and other Federal agencies in local and State training and
exercises would make the transition from a local response to a
Federally-integrated response more seamless and efficient.
Finally, it is essential to maintain and expand emergency
management all-hazard funding programs such as the Emergency
Management Performance Grant Program. This year alone, every
EMPG dollar spent in Miami-Dade County is matched with over
five local dollars to build emergency management capabilities
that enhance our community's disaster preparedness.
EMPG dollars have also enabled us to invest in staff and
resources that have been made available to communities
throughout the country, including assistance we were able to
deploy to New York after the 9/11 attacks and, more recently,
to neighboring Florida counties directly impacted by 2004s
record-breaking hurricane season.
Once again, I thank you for the opportunity to share our
experiences, observations and recommendations.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Sommerhoff follows:]
Statement of Curtis Sommerhoff, Director, Miami-Dade Department of
Emergency Management
introduction
Thank you Environment and Public Works Committee Chairman Boxer,
Ranking Member Inhofe, Clean Air and Nuclear Safety Subcommittee
Chairman Carper, Ranking Member Barrasso, and distinguished committee
members.
I am Curtis Sommerhoff, Director of the Miami-Dade Department of
Emergency Management, and am pleased to have the opportunity to share
with you Miami-Dade's approach to preparedness, response and recovery,
including our plans in the event of a radiological emergency. The
events at Japan's Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power station have rightly
focused attention on the safety of existing nuclear power plants, the
soundness of emergency plans, and the readiness of emergency
responders.
Let me begin by sharing a bit about myself and Miami-Dade County. I
have spent my career in and around emergency management_from addressing
water and wastewater emergencies . . . to overseeing hazardous
materials and response programs . . . to managing Miami-Dade County's
Radiological Emergency Preparedness Plan. I have served during 8
Presidentially Declared or Major Disaster Declarations, including
Hurricanes Wilma and Katrina, and was appointed Director of Miami-Dade
Emergency Management in 2009.
The community I serve spans nearly 2,000 square miles, includes 35
municipalities and has a population of more than 2.5 million people. We
are a coastal community vulnerable to a number of natural and man-made
disasters, including the threat of hurricanes, flooding, fires, mass
migration, oil spills and radiological events.
abilities & strengths
Miami-Dade County's response to emergencies and disasters is guided
by a Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan . . . an ``all-hazards''
approach which supports the county's ability to respond to any type of
emergency. Within our comprehensive plan, we have a number of hazard
specific annexes, including a Radiological Emergency Preparedness Plan.
The Turkey Point Power Plant operated by Florida Power and Light is
located approximately 25 miles south of the city of Miami, and includes
two nuclear power reactors. Miami-Dade County's vulnerability analysis
accounts for the possible risks posed by nuclear power, and we have a
robust planning, training and exercise program to ensure our response
capabilities are appropriate.
Our plans are regularly assessed and assumptions analyzed, revised,
and ultimately, certified by the Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA). Site visits and evaluated exercises bring together local, State
and Federal agencies, as well as members of the utility to enhance
collaboration and programming. FEMA oversight and formal after-action
reports highlight significant areas that might need improvement.
In the event of an emergency at the nuclear power plant, we have a
public alert and notification system that includes warning sirens in
the area around the plant; identified support facilities for the
delivery of emergency services; fully trained and equipped public
safety response personnel; and protective measures that are adjusted to
the threat level.
Our ability to effectively respond to a radiological--or other
threat--lies not only in our comprehensive planning, but our long
history of implementing protective actions for the public. Over the
past decade alone, evacuation orders have been issued to the public on
10 occasions as a result of hurricanes or tropical storms; and together
with our partner agencies, we have coordinated the evacuation and
transportation, sheltering, medical care and feeding of tens of
thousands of evacuees.
Consider this: In the 10-mile Emergency Planning Zone surrounding
the Turkey Point Nuclear Plant, there are approximately 180,000
residents. Within Miami-Dade's three designated Hurricane Evacuation
Zones, there are more than a half a million residents.
We have identified shelters for temporary housing, with special
consideration given to individuals with special needs. We have
designated areas for the dissemination of emergency supplies like
water, ice, food and tarps in the event of widespread destruction or
power outages. We have ready-to-activate Disaster Assistance Centers to
provide social services to residents in need of financial assistance,
prescription refills, short and long-term housing and first aid; and
contracts and mutual aid agreements to ensure the continuity of
operations during disaster response and recovery. In line with the
National Response Framework (NRF), all of our plans are scalable,
flexible and adaptable.
The County's Department of Emergency Management fosters an ongoing,
collaborative planning relationship with the county's mission essential
departments and partner agencies to address life-safety and property
implications from existing hazards. We have a long-established, state-
of-the-art Emergency Operations Center _our nucleus for response and
recovery efforts. When disaster threatens, our emergency managers,
private and non-profit sector partners, as well as our media partners,
come together under one roof_a critical component for a coordinated
response and timely and accurate information dissemination. Local,
State and Federal coordination enables us to augment and resupply
personnel and equipment, as needed, even for extended periods.
Our strengths and experience from hurricane responses carry over to
our ability to implement actions for a radiological event. Conversely,
our planning for a potential radiological event has a positive effect
on our ability to respond to other hazards.
recommendations
Based on our experiences, we respectfully offer the following
recommendations for consideration:
(1) The recommendation by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to
evacuate Americans out to 50 miles from the Fukushima Daiichi Plant has
raised many questions. We support analysis of the data and assumptions
behind the recommendation to determine if Emergency Planning Zones in
the U.S. need to be revised. Of course, a wholesale change to increase
the plume exposure pathway must be carefully evaluated and weighed
against the value of making any revision.
It is also important to note that local officials currently have
the flexibility to revise public protective action based on accident
parameters and the situation ``on the ground''.
(2) As we have seen with the crisis in Japan as well as with other
disasters across the U.S., interaction and coordination with Federal
partners is sometimes hampered by the lack of familiarity of local and
State response organizations with Federal processes and systems.
Increasing the inclusion of FEMA and other Federal agencies in local
and State training and exercises would make the transition from a local
response to a federally integrated response more seamless and
efficient.
(3) We support recent revisions to radiological emergency
preparedness regulations requiring greater variation in exercise
scenarios. Variations that are infrequently exercised at the local
level, but carry great importance include consideration of food
embargos, legal and financial challenges to home and business owners,
long-term displacement of residents, impacts to the environment and
economy, and integration of American Nuclear Insurers into the recovery
process.
(4) Because a nuclear event of Japan's magnitude invariably
engenders a great deal of national and international interest, a
centralized Web site similar to the Deepwater Horizon site
``restorethegulf.gov'' can provide a one-stop source for official
information.
(5) Finally, it is essential to maintain and expand emergency
management all-hazard funding programs such as the Emergency Management
Performance Grant Program (EMPG). This year alone, every EMPG dollar
spent in Miami-Dade County is matched with over five local dollars to
build emergency management capabilities that enhance our community's
disaster preparedness.
EMPG dollars have also enabled us to invest in staff and resources
that have been made available to communities throughout the country,
including assistance we were able to deploy to New York City in the
aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, and more recently, to neighboring
Florida counties directly impacted by 2004s record-breaking hurricane
season.
Once again, thank you for the opportunity to share our experiences,
observations and recommendations. I am pleased to answer any questions
you may have.
Senator Carper. Good. Thanks so much, Mr. Sommerhoff.
Mr. Pardee, you are now recognized. Please proceed. Thank
you for joining us.
STATEMENT OF CHARLES PARDEE, CHIEF OPERATING OFFICER, EXELON
GENERATION COMPANY
Mr. Pardee. Good afternoon, Chairman Carper, members of the
committee.
My name is Charles Pardee. I am the Chief Operating Officer
at Exelon Generation and as such responsible for all of the
company's generating assets, including 17 units at 10 sites in
Illinois, Pennsylvania and New Jersey.
I appreciate the opportunity to appear this afternoon on
behalf of the nuclear industry to discuss the safety of nuclear
power plants here in the United States.
We have been following the events in Japan closely since
the historic earthquake and tsunami struck the plant on March
11th. Many in the United States nuclear industry have both a
professional and a personal interest in the events unfolding
there.
Many of us, myself included, have been to Japan a number of
times as part of international technical exchange programs to
share operating experience with the Tokyo Electric Power
Company and others. In fact, I was at the Fukishima Daiichi
station about a week prior to the earthquake striking there on
one such exchange.
Our hearts go out to the Japanese people as they respond to
the humanitarian crisis they are facing. Currently, six Exelon
employees are in Japan assisting with efforts there to secure,
stabilize and ultimately decommission the Fukushima Daiichi
reactors.
It is understandable that many Americans are asking if
power plants in the United States are safe in light of the
events in Japan. I firmly believe that they are safe, and I
would like to make three primary points about the safety of
nuclear plants in the United States to buttress this belief.
First, our plants are designed and licensed to withstand a
variety of natural disasters including earthquakes, floods,
tornadoes and, where appropriate, tsunamis. Plants are designed
to withstand potential disasters based on the most extreme
event known in their geographic location with significant
margin added to that extreme event to ensure safety. Margins
are reviewed and improved as necessary as additional
information or experience becomes available to us.
Second, safety systems, equipment and emergency procedures
at nuclear power plants are not frozen in time once the plant
is built. In fact, safety is an issue that is being constantly
examined by both the industry and our regulators. We have
undertaken extensive safety enhancing upgrades to our plants in
the aftermath of Three Mile Island, the events of 9/11, and
other events such as Hurricanes Katrina and Andrew that have
impacted the United States.
Particular attention has been paid to putting systems in
place to avoid a buildup of hydrogen in containment areas, the
likely cause of the explosions at the Japanese plants. In
addition, we require multiple redundancies and back up power
supplies in the event of a loss of offsite power, the
precipitating factor in the loss of cooling water issues that
have led to the most extensive damage at the Japanese reactors.
In addition, full capability simulators have been installed
at each plant in the United States, giving every operating crew
the ability to train under realistic conditions on extreme
events, such as loss of all AC electrical power, to ensure our
mitigation strategies are robust and our operators are fully
qualified to respond. I earned an operating license at a plant
similar to one of the Fukushima Daiichi reactors in the 1990s,
and I personally went through this training to learn how to
combat scenarios such as the loss of all electrical power.
Third, while it may take months, if not years, to fully
understand what happened at the Japanese reactors, the industry
is not waiting to take action to incorporate lessons learned
from this event. Indeed, I firmly believe that the nuclear
industry is unparalleled in its ability to incorporate lessons
learned to ensure excellence in operations.
There are two institutions, the U.S.-based Institute of
Nuclear Power Operations and its international equivalent, the
World Association of Nuclear Operators, that are devoted to
ensuring excellence by sharing best practices, assessing and
incorporating lessons learned from events such as this, and
rigorously assessing plant performance to ensure sound
operations.
In the United States, the Institute of Nuclear Power
Operations ensures that reactor operators do not become
complacent in any area of operations, particularly when it
comes to safety-related issues. There is a focus on continuous
learning from events, both large and small, that occur at other
plants. Whenever a significant event occurs, INPO performs an
analysis to determine relevant lessons learned that are then
shared with all operators.
Within days of the earthquake and the tsunami, the industry
issued directives to each of our plants to undertake a variety
of actions to ensure that seismic and safety-related equipment
was in good material condition and to review our emergency
response plans including each plant's capability to manage a
total loss of offsite power. These assessments are ongoing and
I am confident that both industry and NRC will have additional
action items in the coming weeks and months to further enhance
our ability to operate safely.
Aside from the safety of nuclear reactors, I know that
there are also concerns about the safety of spent fuel pools in
light of the events in Japan. As with our reactors, we have
taken a number of steps in the aftermath of Three Mile Island
and 9/11 to bolster security to spent fuel pools. Back-up power
systems, abundant onsite water supplies and additional high
capacity pumps provide us with the defense and depth to ensure
safety of these pools.
Let me conclude by recognizing the dedicated employees of
the United States nuclear industry. Safety is, and continues to
be, the primary focus of our industry, and we have tens of
thousands of highly skilled, thoroughly trained employees
working tirelessly every hour of every day such that our plants
operate safely and efficiently.
Thank you for this opportunity.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Pardee follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]
Senator Carper. Mr. Pardee, thank you so much for joining
us today.
Dr. Thomas Cochran. We have a Senator named Cochran, Thad
Cochran from Mississippi.
Mr. Cochran. Not related.
Senator Carper. What was that? Uncle Thad?
[Laughter.]
Mr. Cochran. Not related.
Senator Carper. Oh. OK.
STATEMENT OF THOMAS B. COCHRAN, Ph.D., SENIOR SCIENTIST,
NUCLEAR PROGRAM, NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL, INC.
Mr. Cochran. Chairman Carper, and also Chairman Boxer and
members of the committee, I want to thank you for providing
NRDC and me the opportunity to present our views on the
Japanese nuclear disaster and its implications for nuclear
power reactors in the United States.
I have submitted my complete statement for the record. I
will briefly highlight a few things here.
You requested that I offer my views regarding the
implications the disaster has for reactor safety in the United
States. First, I think we all are in agreement that the first
priority is to provide assistance to our friends in Japan. But,
eventually, and even today, we are turning to the issue of the
implications for the United States.
Before turning to that issue, I wish to make two
observations. First, my colleague, Dr. Matthew McKinzie, and I
made a rough preliminary estimate of the collective radiation
dose from the external exposure based on monitoring data from
Japan. We should be mindful that the uncertainties in the
estimated exposures at this stage are quite large. There is
much we simply do not know. With this caution, we find the
collective dose from the external exposure to date, and the
consequentially excess cancers that are projected to result,
appear to be 10 to 100 times greater than the collective
radiation dose resulting from the Three Mile Island accident.
After Chernobyl, the Fukushima nuclear accident ranks as
the second most dangerous civil nuclear power reactor accident
to date. The collective dose to date from the Fukushima
accident appears to be in the neighborhood of 100 times less
than that from the Chernobyl accident. Similarly, the long-term
human health consequences are one to two orders of magnitude
less than the immediate non-nuclear consequences of the
earthquake and tsunami. This is a preliminary comparison and it
may change as we learn more.
Second, Dr. McKinzie and I have reexamined the historical
frequency of partial core melt accidents. We found the
historical frequency of core melt accidents worldwide is far
greater than what the NRC considers safe. By this measure,
operational reactors worldwide are not sufficiently safe.
Because of differences in the numbers of reactors, the
reactor safety cultures and the regulatory oversight, the next
nuclear power plant disaster is more likely to occur abroad
than in the United States. But if nuclear power is to have a
long-term future, greater attention should be given to current
operational reactors. Older obsolete designs should be phased
out rather than have their licenses extended.
Turning to the implications for U.S. nuclear power
reactors, there are concerns raised by the Fukushima nuclear
disaster that bear directly on the safe operation and
regulation of our domestic fleet. While others will add to this
list, our immediate concerns include:
Are old GE BWRs with poorly designed Mark 1 and Mark 2
containments and subsequent upgrades imposed by the NRC safe
enough to continue operation or have their licenses extended?
What additional improvements should be made to cope with
hydrogen production in the event of a fuel clad interaction
with steam? What improvements must be made to extend the time
reactors can cope with loss of offsite power?
The NRC is overdue in requiring that spent fuel be removed
from wet pools to hardened dry casks as soon as the spent fuel
has cooled sufficiently to be passively cooled in air.
Which reactor sites are located in areas that cannot be
adequately evacuated? Which reactor stations impose an undue
economic risk to local, State and even the U.S. economy in the
event of a partial core melt accident? Which U.S. reactors
should be upgraded or phased out due to the risk of earthquake,
flooding or tornado that is beyond the design basis?
Potential radiological accidents caused by earthquakes and
tsunamis should be addressed in emergency response plans for
U.S. reactors. Nuclear plant owners and operators must assume a
larger share of financial risk in the event of a catastrophic
nuclear accident.
What are the implications of predicted sea level rise due
to climate change on the safety of nuclear reactors near
coasts? What are the implications for continued failure of the
NRC to finalize and implement a fire protection rule?
What changes should be implemented regarding radiation
monitoring during routine plant operations following an
accident? Perhaps most importantly, what is the best process
for addressing these concerns?
I would like to elaborate on a couple of these starting
with the last, the need for an independent commission----
Senator Carper. Doctor, I am going to ask you not to
elaborate too much, if you will.
Mr. Cochran [continuing]. Similar to the Kemeny Commission
that investigated the Three Mile Island accident. Such an
independent body could engender public confidence by thoroughly
examining nuclear safety issues including assessing the
conclusions and proposed corrective actions arrived at by both
the nuclear industry and the NRC's 90-day safety review.
I will just touch on one of these issues that I raised. The
20-year license extensions already granted to 23 U.S.
operational BWRs with Mark 1 and Mark 2 containments should be
shortened. Similarly, no 20-year license extension should be
granted to the eight BWRs with Mark 1 and Mark 2 containments
that have not received license extensions.
Mr. Chairman, thank you. I will stop there. I have some
more but I have run out of time and look forward to your
questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Cochran follows:]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]
Senator Carper. Thanks so much for your testimony. As I
said earlier, the entire statement will be made part of the
record.
I am going to telegraph a pitch and let you know what my
last question is going to be to the panel. Basically I am going
to ask each of you to give us a just a really good takeaway, a
really good takeaway, not just for Chairman Boxer and myself
and Senators Inhofe and Barrasso, but just really one good
takeaway from each of you from this hearing for our committee,
please. So just be thinking about that.
In the meantime, let me ask a first question of Secretary
Schiliro, and that would be, after seeing the devastation in
Japan, are you concerned with our State, with Delaware's
emergency planning process? Could anything be improved? To
follow onto that, do you feel our plan is flexible enough to be
changed if you saw a need to expand beyond the 10-mile
evacuation plan?
Mr. Schiliro. Thank you, Senator. We have a very robust
group in Delaware and it truly is a team effort. The ability of
DEMA to incorporate all of our partners from the law
enforcement and public safety communities, both State and our
Federal partners, I think is very robust.
Certainly I think the lesson that we need to learn is what
can we take away from the events in Japan that would allow us
to evolve that plan? Because it truly is a living document and
certainly something that we need to understand.
As has been stated, the 10-mile EPZ is something that we do
practice for and plan for. However, I do think the plan is
flexible enough, and certainly in the power of the Governor,
that in the event that the circumstances go beyond that 10
miles, that we certainly could react to. We do, as has been
stated, plan for that in terms of hurricane evacuations. So, it
is adaptable.
I think, as was stated earlier, what the 10-mile zone
allows us to do is to really give that early warning and to
really just start to begin from that. But there is no doubt in
my mind, based upon the people that we have in Delaware, that
if we needed to expand it, we certainly could and would do
that. So, I feel very comfortable with that.
Senator Carper. All right. Thank you.
Let me follow that one with a question of Mr. Sommerhoff
and perhaps of Secretary Schiliro as well. The question is,
many of the families in Japan have been away from their homes
for I guess close to a month or so. In your emergency planning,
is it explained to people being asked to evacuate that it could
be not just for a couple of hours or a couple of days? It could
be, in this case, for over a month for a lot of the folks in
Japan, and I guess the clock is still running there.
But do we have long-term emergency housing that can
accommodate people for these kinds of extended periods of time?
Mr. Sommerhoff. One of the things we try to do as we, when
we educate the public and certainly practice these drills and
exercises, is we have an emergency reception center concept.
The idea with the emergency reception center is to have a
place, at least temporarily, for people to seek shelter and
emergency services from local government.
From there, we are also looking at some offsite reception
centers, some more long-term sheltering capability. Then we
would be looking at Federal resources coming in, as well as
aids from the nuclear industry through American nuclear
insurers and others, to provide more resources for those long-
term housing needs and those types of opportunities.
But all of those things that you mentioned in terms of both
human and health services type things, as well as the housing
issues and the mass care issues, all that is provided and
explained to folks in terms of education, as well as the
resources at the reception center concept.
Senator Carper. OK. Mr. Schiliro, Secretary Schiliro,
anything you want to add to that?
Mr. Schiliro. Just one quick note, Senator. As you know, we
have had occasion, unfortunately, to stand up, primarily
through the Red Cross short-term shelters, one in the event of
certain snowstorms that we have recently had and weather-
related events, and generally that works very well.
But obviously in the event that we needed longer term, the
primary responsibility would be for the public safety and, if
that were the case, I am confident that through our Federal
partners and other related resources we would be able to
accomplish that.
Senator Carper. All right, thank you.
A question, if I could, of Mr. Pardee. This is a question
relating to alert systems. In Secretary Schiliro's written
statement, he stated that within, he said within 15 minutes of
a radiological emergency, PSE&G must send an alert to
Delaware's emergency response team. Do you know if that is a
requirement that is established by the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission?
Mr. Pardee. Yes, Mr. Chairman. The Nuclear Regulatory
Commission has very strict reporting guidelines that are
applicable to all nuclear stations in the United States that
ensure timely reporting of events as they are unfolding and
regular periodic updates to make sure, as further information
is acquired by the station, that that information is shared
with State and Federal officials for the purposes of making
quick protective action recommendations and mustering resources
to assist.
Senator Carper. OK. During an emergency, how does a company
communicate with the NRC and with local governments?
Mr. Pardee. We have emergency response facilities both
local to the site and remote from the site, our emergency
operating facilities. Those facilities all have dedicated
communication links between the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
op centers and on a State-by-State basis. They are emergency
operating centers. These are dedicated phone lines, they have
back-ups in the form of satellite, radio or cellular
communications and such. So, there are multiple communications
links in which to share the information I described.
Senator Carper. Did you say earlier that you had spent some
time in Japan?
Mr. Pardee. I have. I have been to both Fukushima Daiichi
and the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa station that suffered an earthquake
about 3 years ago. In that case, I went about 2 weeks after
that earthquake hit.
Senator Carper. A member of my staff, I think it might have
been Laura Haynes, I think, said to me earlier today, suggested
that the NRC has the ability to monitor control rooms, maybe of
all the nuclear power plants in the United States. I do not
know if that is true, but if you know, and the second, like a
followup, whether that is true or not, do the folks in Japan
have a similar kind of capability?
Mr. Pardee. We in the United States all have something
called the Emergency Response Data System which is a provision
to provide technical data to the NRC Emergency Operations
Center and other interested parties. I am not strictly familiar
with what exists within the Japanese regulatory protocol, but I
do know that information flow seems to be much more greatly
challenged than I would ever expect it to be here in the United
States.
Senator Carper. OK. Thanks.
I am going to ask a question of Secretary Schiliro and then
I am going to ask Dr. Cochran and Mr. Boyd and Mr. Pardee to
followup on this. But here is the question of Secretary
Schiliro. In your written testimony, I think you stated
approximately 41,000 Delawareans live within 10 miles of
PSE&G's Salem/Hope Creek facilities. Is that about right?
Mr. Schiliro. That is correct, Senator.
Senator Carper. All right. If there was a full evacuation
of that 10-mile radius because of an emergency at the PSE&G
facilities, how long do you think it would take to conduct that
full evacuation?
Mr. Schiliro. Our modeling, Senator, depending on the time
of the day and the time of the year, anywhere between three and
6 hours.
Senator Carper. Three and 6 hours. All right. Again, if I
could, of Dr. Cochran and Charles Pardee and Mr. Boyd, if a
nuclear power plant in this country faced a full blackout,
faced a full blackout, similar to what we have seen at the
Fukushima facility, in your opinion, would we have a few days
before we might see the fuel rods degrade and therefore see
harmful radiation levels?
I am going to say that one again. I will just say it again.
If a nuclear power plant in this country faced a full blackout
similar to what we have seen at the Fukushima facility, in your
opinion, would we have a few days before we might see the fuel
rods degrade and therefore witness harmful radiation levels?
Mr. Cochran. I do not believe so if you include within that
full blackout the loss of emergency power generation at the
site. For example, you have both batteries and diesel generator
backup systems. Diesel generators failed in Japan because of
the tsunami. If they failed in the United States, you then can
rely on, and they also relied upon, battery power. At some
reactors the batteries are only designed for 4 hours, it is my
understanding.
Senator Carper. Do we have any idea if those batteries can
be recharged? I just drove one of those new Chevrolet Volts
yesterday and the Chevrolet Volt, as you may know, the battery
provides, constantly provides, the force, if you will, for the
wheels to move. Whether the engine, if the engine is running,
the engine does not run, turn the wheels. It powers the battery
so the battery can be charged constantly.
Any idea if these batteries at the nuclear power plants can
be charged or recharged while they are drawing down
electricity? Does anybody know?
Mr. Pardee. Yes they can, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Carper. OK. Thanks.
Mr. Pardee. We have to have the requisite equipment
available, but they can be recharged. They are big automobile
batteries. Very big automobile batteries.
Senator Carper. I bet they are. Thanks. OK. Doctor, go
ahead and finish your response now.
Dr. Cochran. Well, in order to recharge them, you have to
have a source of power. Your original premise was that you lost
power, that you had a station blackout, so you would not be
able to charge them under those circumstances.
I think you have touched on one of several very important
issues that need to be addressed as a consequence of this
disaster. In my judgment, the most important thing you need to
do is address how this process should be undertaken. We support
the NRC's review. We support the industry's review. But we do
not feel that is adequate.
We should rely solely on the NRC to review its own previous
failures, and we therefore believe that you need something akin
to a Kemeny Commission that you had following the TMI accident,
similar to the Blue Ribbon Commission you had following the BP
oil spill.
There are people in the industry, people in the Government,
who do not want to have an independent review because they see
that it might threaten their future course of actions.
Senator Carper. All right. Thank you. May I ask, if I
could, Mr. Boyd and Mr. Pardee to respond as well to this
question. Mr. Boyd?
Mr. Boyd. Thank you, Senator. I know, and I just checked
with my good Senator here, that Diablo Canyon has a real
problem with regard to evacuation of, you heard the very small
numbers of people. But there is incredibly limited access. So,
the number we have is about 15 hours to evacuate the area
because, and that assumes the overpasses have not collapsed on
the freeway and that assumes it leaves one of the only two
escape routes available.
At SONGS, it is a little different with 7 million people. I
do not have the estimate on the top of my head but it, while we
have significant freeway systems there, it is still a very
substantial period of time that has been modeled over and over
again and I can get you that information.
Additional comments on the second question because it
relates to the evacuation issue. Both of our plants have 8 hour
battery backup capability. Diablo Canyon's backup generators
are fairly high up on the hillside so it would take a very
significant tsunami to impact them. But, nonetheless, we are in
discussions now as a result of what happened in Japan with both
utilities about the whole question of station blackout.
The SONGS generators are right at the plant which is right
on the beach although, hopefully, a less earthquake prone area.
But nonetheless, they have the advantage of the entire Marine
Corp across the street, Camp Pendleton, and arrangements have
been made for backup generation, portable generators and what
have you, in the event of some kind of problem there.
Diablo Canyon does not have that luxury and we have been
talking about helicoptering in batteries and what have you in
the event there is a serious problem there.
Senator Carper. All right. Thank you. One last word, if you
would, Mr. Pardee, on this question, please.
Mr. Pardee. Yes, sir. For the first question regarding
evacuation times, our times also vary, station dependent, time
of day, time of year, seasonal varieties, but somewhere on the
order of four to 10 hours is representative of our stations as
well.
To your question about our ability to forestall fuel damage
for a number of days per station blackout, I do not believe
that we would have fuel damage, although I do not mean to
trivialize the amount of work that would be required on the
part of the operators to create that result.
But we do have, even in the event of depleting batteries,
we have procedures here in the United States for manual
operation of our emergency pumps that would require no battery
power for operation or measurement instrumentation. In other
instances, we have temporary or portable battery supplies, such
as carts with batteries on them, that would allow us to operate
the equipment necessary to keep the core from being damaged.
This equipment and these procedures are pre-staged. We train on
them. We have formal qualification programs on them.
I am positive that we will learn things out of the Japanese
event that will make us better. We are already starting to
investigate how we can extend the lives of our batteries and
such. I am sure we will have to look harder at spent fuel pools
and their ability to withstand sustained loss of AC electrical
power. But the direct answer to your question is, I would not
anticipate fuel damage after 48 hours.
Senator Carper. OK. Thanks very much.
Let me go back to the pitch I telegraphed earlier and that
is to ask each of you if you could share with us one takeaway
before you go back. I will just start, if I could, with, I will
start with Senator Blakeslee. If you would not mind responding,
that would be great.
Mr. Blakeslee. Thank you, Senator. I appreciate the
opportunity.
We have 104 reactors in the Nation and the NRC has
identified there are only two plants that are in the highest
seismic potential category and both of them happen to be
coastal plants. But only one of them has a recently identified
fault of significant proportions in very close proximity.
My concern in listening to Commissioner Jaczko's comments
in response to Senator Boxer's questioning was that, although
he is looking at procedures in a 90-day and a 6-month window, I
heard nothing that identified the unique needs of these two
plants, and the one plant in particular, which have these
direct analogies to the threat faced in Japan through the 2007
and 2011 earthquakes.
So I would again, the one take away I hope we can walk away
with is that for these two facilities in California, we upgrade
our relicensing procedures to formally include seismic safety
criteria and standards that directly relate to earthquake
hazard in our process.
Senator Carper. All right. Thank you, Senator. Thanks so
much for being with us today.
Mr. Boyd, please.
Mr. Boyd. The Senator took my first item but I knew he
might so I have got a couple of others noted here. I will
mention one of them, and that is the spent fuel pool safety
issue that has been discussed today. The re-racking of the
spent fuel pools into high density and the slow speed with
which these pools are being emptied in order to put materials
into dry cask storage is a serious concern to us, particularly
in the high seismic activity areas, again, like California's
two plants.
Senator Carper. All right. Thank you, sir. Secretary
Schiliro?
Mr. Schiliro. Yes, thank you, Senator. In my mind, and as
you know, Senator, our obligation is for the safety of the
people of Delaware. But what to me is paramount is that we
learn from the events in Japan from the standpoint of their
reaction and the emergency response that they had. We need to
learn the lessons from that. That information needs to be
transparent. It also needs to be shared with the State and
local counterparts, the people that would actually be forced to
respond to this kind of event.
So, what I hope is that once the lessons are learned, and
once that information is gotten, that there be system to share
that with us so that we can change and develop our plans to
meet that. If that does not occur, then to me, that would be
the greatest tragedy.
So, I would hope that as the NRC and the other Federal
agencies get that that it be shared and that we learn from
that. Thank you.
Senator Carper. All right. Good. Thanks so much for joining
us today.
Mr. Sommerhoff.
Mr. Sommerhoff. Senator, thank you. Our protective action
decisionmaking, it is based on plant conditions and it is based
on the conditions on the ground. From that, we start making our
implementation for protective actions for the public.
We are always looking first, when we look at issues that
are going to require evacuation, and evacuation is not always
the protective action that we are going to implement, it might
be sheltering in place, but we will look at those people who
are in close proximity to the plant initially and then we are
also going to look at those vulnerable populations, those
difficult to move populations.
I cannot think of a situation where we would just say,
everybody within 10 miles evacuate now. It does not happen like
that. It happens in phases. That is how we conduct evacuations
for all types of hazards, including hurricanes and other types
of hazards.
So, I just wanted to make sure that this was this
understanding that the way we do implement evacuation
protective actions, it is not everybody evacuate at once. I do
believe the 10-mile Emergency Planning Zone is the appropriate
planning standard for us.
We have always considered that there could be
implementation of protective actions outside that 10-mile zone.
We have never thought that, based on environmental conditions
or conditions at the plant that somehow radiation would stop at
10 miles and just fall to the ground. We always have considered
that we would have to move outside that 10 miles and implement
actions outside to address the public there.
So, I just wanted to make sure that that understanding was
known.
Senator Carper. Good. Thanks. Thanks so much. Mr. Pardee,
one good takeaway.
Mr. Pardee. Yes. Thank you again for the opportunity. For
my takeaways, I would simply say that we understand the concern
on the part of the committee and the general public, the public
at large.
We are committed to open, transparent and proactive
communications regarding our current State and what changes we
are implementing based on the lessons learned from the events
in Japan and that we share the objective of the committee to
protect the public health and safety. We will do that through
concerted operations and by profitably learning from the
lessons learned and taking actions to improve our safety
posture.
Senator Carper. All right. Thanks. Thanks so much.
Dr. Cochran, you have the last word, please.
Mr. Cochran. Mr. Chairman, on page 5 of my written
statement, I gave you just over a dozen take-home lessons.
Senator Carper. Cheaper by the dozen?
Mr. Cochran. I would hesitate to choose one or even several
as more important than others. But, let us take the spent fuel
issue. We are 50 years into this industry and we do not have a
geologic repository. We need to start getting that spent fuel
in hardened, safe, dry cask storage and we ought to do it at
the reactor sites as well as any interim site.
Then there is the issue of these BWRs. We have old reactor
designs out there. One-third of the U.S. fleet. The issue that
you should be thinking about is whether we have in place a
process that ensures that those reactors get relicensed over
and over again and we try to patch up their design
deficiencies, or are we going to get the clunkers off the
street? We ought to have a process that retires these old,
obsolete designs and replaces them with better technology.
Senator Carper. All right. Thanks. Thanks for those closing
thoughts.
Before I thank you all and send you on your way, I just
want to go back to something that Chairman Boxer said earlier
in the hearing. She was asking our second panel, Chairman
Jaczko and Administrator Jackson, she asked what is the worst
that can happen? I think that is paraphrasing her, but she
asked what is the worst that can happen?
I said, a few minutes after that, I said maybe the worst
thing that could happen was on the heels of this terrible
tragedy where the folks of Miyagi, which as I may have said
earlier and as Secretary Schiliro knows, is our sister State to
the State of Delaware, the Miyagi Prefecture, I have been there
before and feel a real sense of empathy and compassion for the
folks there.
But maybe the worst thing that could happen, at least for
us here, would be for all this pain and suffering to have
occurred in Japan and for us not to have learned anything from
it. Or maybe for us to have learned from it but not to have
done enough about it, not to have acted on the lessons that we
have learned.
There is a responsibility, I think, for all of us, not just
on this committee, not just in the Congress, not just in the
industry, not just at the NRC, but there is a responsibility
for all of us to work together to make sure that we fully
implement the lessons that we learn and that we remain vigilant
until we have done that.
I will close with the words I use often in this room and
that is, everything I do I know I could do better. I think that
is true for all of us and it remains true of the nuclear
industry. We just need to remain eternally vigilant, eternally
vigilant. I am encouraged today that that is our intent and we
need to make sure that that is not only our intent, but it is
actually what occurs.
With that having been said, I thank you again for joining
us here today and for providing your input. We look forward to
working with you in this ongoing dialog. Thank you so much.
With that, this hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 5:40 p.m. the committee was adjourned.]
[Additional statement submitted for the record follows:]
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