[Senate Hearing 112-862]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 112-862
HURRICANE ISAAC: ASSESSING PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE, AND RECOVERY EFFORTS
=======================================================================
HEARING
before a
SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE
COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
SPECIAL HEARING
SEPTEMBER 25, 2012--GRETNA, LA
__________
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COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS
DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii, Chairman
PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi, Ranking
TOM HARKIN, Iowa MITCH McCONNELL, Kentucky
BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, Maryland RICHARD C. SHELBY, Alabama
HERB KOHL, Wisconsin KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas
PATTY MURRAY, Washington LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee
DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California SUSAN COLLINS, Maine
RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska
TIM JOHNSON, South Dakota LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina
MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana MARK KIRK, Illinois
JACK REED, Rhode Island DANIEL COATS, Indiana
FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey ROY BLUNT, Missouri
BEN NELSON, Nebraska JERRY MORAN, Kansas
MARK PRYOR, Arkansas JOHN HOEVEN, North Dakota
JON TESTER, Montana RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin
SHERROD BROWN, Ohio
Charles J. Houy, Staff Director
Bruce Evans, Minority Staff Director
------
Subcommittee on the Department of Homeland Security
MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana, Chairman
FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey DANIEL COATS, Indiana
DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi
PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont RICHARD C. SHELBY, Alabama
PATTY MURRAY, Washington LISA MURKOWSKI, Alaska
JON TESTER, Montana JERRY MORAN, Kansas
Professional Staff
Charles Kieffer
Chip Walgren
Scott Nance
Drenan E. Dudley
Rebecca M. Davies (Minority)
Carol Cribbs (Minority)
Administrative Support
Nora Martin
Courtney Stevens (Minority)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Opening Statement of Senator Mary L. Landrieu.................... 1
Prepared Statement of........................................ 6
Statement of Craig Fugate, Administrator, Federal Emergency
Management Agency.............................................. 8
Prepared Statement of........................................ 10
Preparations for Isaac........................................... 11
Coordinated Response and Recovery Efforts........................ 12
Looking Forward.................................................. 13
Statement of Major General John W. Peabody, Commander,
Mississippi Valley Division, Army Corps of Engineers........... 14
Prepared Statement of........................................ 16
Hurricane Preparedness Improvements Since Hurricane Katrina...... 17
HSDRRS Preparations, Rehearsals, and Execution................... 18
Performance During Hurricane Isaac............................... 19
Post-Isaac Assessment............................................ 19
Waterway Debris Removal.......................................... 20
Case Management.................................................. 21
Regional Offices................................................. 25
Recovery Effort.................................................. 26
Statement of John F. Young, Jr., President, Jefferson Parish..... 32
Prepared Statement of........................................ 36
Statement of Billy Nungesser, President, Plaquemines Parish...... 38
Prepared Statement of........................................ 40
Plaquemines Parish Levee Construction............................ 40
Letter From Billy Nungesser to Senator Mary L. Landrieu.......... 40
Statement of Natalie Robottom, President, St. John the Baptist
Parish......................................................... 43
Prepared Statement of........................................ 45
Statement of Pat Brister, President, St. Tammany Parish.......... 48
Prepared Statement of........................................ 50
Statement of Garret Graves, Chair of the Coastal Protection and
Restoration Authority of Louisiana, and Executive Assistant to
the Governor for Coastal Activities............................ 57
Prepared Statement of........................................ 59
Statement of Oneil P. Malbrough, President, Shaw Coastal, Inc.... 65
Prepared Statement of........................................ 67
Additional Committee Questions................................... 75
Questions Submitted to the Federal Emergency Management Agency... 75
Waterway Debris Removal.......................................... 75
Case Management.................................................. 76
Rental Housing--Tracking Proximity and Placements................ 78
Transition of Responsibility to Other Federal Agencies for
Recovery....................................................... 79
State Rainy Day Funds............................................ 79
Food Assistance.................................................. 80
Manufactured Housing............................................. 80
Remaining Hurricanes Katrina and Rita Issues..................... 81
Questions Submitted to the Army Corps of Engineers............... 81
Corps Budget..................................................... 81
Proven Flood Control Success..................................... 81
Corps Benefit-to-Cost Ratio Analysis............................. 82
Benefits/Needs of New Orleans Metropolitan Area Hurricane
Protection System.............................................. 83
Mitigation....................................................... 85
Plaquemines Levees............................................... 85
Questions Submitted to Jefferson Parish.......................... 86
Rainy Day Funds.................................................. 86
Local Use of Hazard Mitigation Funding........................... 87
Debris Removal................................................... 90
Responsible Building............................................. 91
Questions Submitted to Plaquemines Parish........................ 91
Rainy Day Funds.................................................. 91
Local Use of Hazard Mitigation Funding........................... 92
Debris Removal................................................... 93
Responsible Building............................................. 93
Questions Submitted to St. John the Baptist Parish............... 94
Rainy Day Funds.................................................. 94
Local Use of Hazard Mitigation Funding........................... 94
Debris Removal................................................... 95
Responsible Building............................................. 95
Questions Submitted to St. Tammany Parish........................ 96
Rainy Day Funds.................................................. 96
Local Use of Hazard Mitigation Funding........................... 97
Debris Removal................................................... 97
Responsible Building............................................. 98
Questions Submitted to the Coastal Protection and Restoration
Authority of Louisiana......................................... 98
State Resources for Flood Protection............................. 98
Obstacles From the Corps on Master Plan.......................... 98
Beneficial Use of Dredged Material............................... 98
Questions Submitted to Shaw Coastal, Inc......................... 99
True Costs of Projects........................................... 100
Material Submitted Subsequent to the Hearing..................... 103
Prepared Statement of Hon. Freddy Drennan, Mayor, City of
Slidell, Louisiana............................................. 103
Prepared Statement of Greater New Orleans, Inc................... 104
Prepared Statement of New Orleans Sewerage and Water Board....... 124
HURRICANE ISAAC: ASSESSING PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE, AND RECOVERY EFFORTS
----------
TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 25, 2012
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Homeland Security,
Committee on Appropriations,
Gretna, LA.
The subcommittee met at 10 a.m., at 200 Derbigny Street, in
Gretna, Louisiana, Hon. Mary L. Landrieu (chairman) presiding.
Present: Senators Landrieu and Vitter and Representative
Richmond.
opening statement of senator mary l. landrieu
Senator Landrieu. Good morning. Let me welcome everyone to
our Subcommittee on Homeland Security Appropriations field
hearing. We will begin in just a moment. I would like to
recognize Senator Vitter and Congressman Cedric Richmond, who
is here with us today, and I appreciate them joining me on this
field hearing. I want to begin by thanking Mayor Ronnie Harris,
Jefferson Parish President John Young, and the parish council
for hosting us this morning, this congressional hearing in
historic Gretna.
Less than 4 weeks ago on the anniversary of Hurricane
Katrina, Hurricane Isaac dumped over 18 inches of rain and
caused a man here to lose his life in a fire that destroyed
Laruth's restaurant. He was one of six people killed by this
hurricane, which also pushed a wall of water 11 feet high onto
Louisiana's shores, knocked out power to 871,000 households,
and hovered over region frighteningly for almost 60 hours.
Last year in the United States, there were over 99
disasters that were so severe they were declared eligible for
Federal assistance by the President of the United States. That
is the most disasters ever recorded in a single year since the
Federal Government began keeping records in 1953. It eclipses
the previous record of 81 that was set in 2010, and it is more
than one decade ago, in 2002 when the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) declared just 49.
In addition to the 99 disasters last year, there were
another 508 events in the country that did not qualify for
presidential disaster declaration, but which did prompt
emergency declarations from State and local officials. That is
one of the reasons it is so important for the Federal
Government to maintain a robust disaster fund, and important
for State and local governments to do the same.
Louisiana has certainly had its share of disasters,
including the most destructive natural disaster in the history
of the United States, Hurricane Katrina, and coupled with
Hurricane Rita 3 weeks later that hit our State and the gulf
coast. There is no comparison since records have been kept.
In addition, Gustav and Ike, the Deep Water Horizon several
years later, then Tropical Storm Lee, which acted like a
hurricane, and now Hurricane Isaac that was a category 1, but
came on land like a category 3.
We all know disasters will happen every year. We cannot
prevent them. But with smart planning, responsible budgeting,
and effective response, we can significantly minimize the loss
of life and property and prevent widespread economic or
ecological damage.
This hearing is part of a comprehensive 7-year effort that
I have undertaken as chair of this subcommittee, and previously
as chair of the Disaster Recovery Subcommittee, to evaluate and
improve our Nation's ability to cost-effectively prepare for,
respond to, and improve our Nation's ability to respond to
disasters, natural and man-made, of all types and sizes.
I chaired a previous hearing in October 2011 that laid the
groundwork for disaster relief financing reform, which I am
happy to say was enacted into law in December 2011. That hard
fought battle helped to ensure that adequate appropriations to
the FEMA Disaster Relief Fund is now available to Administrator
Fugate.
For the first time in over a decade, FEMA received the
resources it needed through its annual budget to help families
and communities recover without having to stop projects
recovering from past disasters in order to fund ongoing
disasters. That is not happening today as a result of the fight
and the battle that I led, and I am very proud of that and our
subcommittee.
But the Federal role in responding to disasters cannot be
limited to FEMA alone. Today we have two panels of officials
from the Federal, State, and local level to explore how local
government as a whole can better protect, prepare, and respond
to these evermore frequent events. Today we will focus in
particular on flood protection investments, or the lack
thereof, and the process of recovery by families and
communities through assisting them with assistance, food,
housing, transportation, debris removal, et cetera.
We must do more to protect our communities in south
Louisiana and in other parts of our State and country. We must
do it as quickly as possible to reduce the loss of life and
property and reduce the burden on taxpayers who continue
footing the bill for disaster cost that could have been
avoided.
A recent study by the Multihazard Mitigation Council found
that for every taxpayer $1 invested in mitigation, the Federal
Government will save $4 on future FEMA assistance. Up until
2000, the Federal Government provided assistance to repair
disaster-damaged buildings without targeting any money to
mitigate against the damage that occurred. I want to underscore
this point: Until the year 2000, FEMA rebuilt what was there
before storms, and a penalty was charged if you tried to
improve the structure. We removed that penalty and are building
in a much smarter way, rebuilding without penalties to rebuild
stronger and better.
So to correct that failed policy, we passed a law 5 years
ago that has resulted in billions of dollars to State and local
governments for mitigation measures, like levee repairs,
drainage improvements, wetland restoration, and home
elevations, in order to lessen the consequences of future
events.
If they are properly planned and executed, these projects
will actually save taxpayers money in the long term. But let me
be clear. We simply cannot protect southeast, southwest, or
south central Louisiana or any part of Louisiana or any part of
the Nation with mitigation grants alone. We need a more
consistent, more robust funding mechanism for building our
levees, securing our pump stations, flood protection, internal
drainage, and wetlands restoration. We need the Army Corps of
Engineers (COE) and the State to commit additional resources to
this effort, and we need a multilayered system of defense that
incorporates smarter planning and stronger building codes as
well.
For the sake of historical context, since 1992 FEMA has
spent over $131 billion through the Disaster Relief Fund. In 20
years, FEMA spent $131 billion of Federal funds. Louisiana
alone out of that $131 billion has received more than $60
billion. That is including the $14 billion from COE, so it is a
little bit exaggerated, the $60 billion, but that includes some
COE funding from the Federal Government to recover from
hurricanes that struck our State only between the years of 2005
and 2008. That is $60 billion between 2005 and 2008.
We can and must find a way to reduce costs to the U.S.
taxpayers by reducing the loss of life and property in future
events. Yet shockingly, we only spent $1.6 billion on COE's
annual construction budget nationwide, a level that is 25
percent less than what we spent in 2007, and only one-hundredth
of 1 percent of our gross domestic product (GDP). It is
shocking.
Federal funding for transportation infrastructure, on the
other hand, just to give comparison, like highways and
airports, which is by no means adequate, however, to support
the long-term economic growth, has increased as a percentage of
GDP over the past 15 years, and has nearly doubled since 1998
from $29 billion a year to $52 billion.
So I just want to repeat transportation of all sources has
doubled from $29 billion to $52 billion. The COE budget has
decreased by 29 percent since 2007 for new construction. In
stark contrast, the Federal COE budget over that same period
has gone up by less than $200 million and declined as a
percentage of GDP.
Most people in the world would probably expect that our
Nation's Presidents and Members of the Congress finally
realized the fatal consequences of underinvesting in flood
protection after the Federal levee failure overwhelmed the most
powerful Nation in the world, while the rest of the world
watched. But leaders apparently still do not get it because
COE's construction budget as a percentage of GDP has gone down
every single year since Hurricane Katrina. We should be
outraged by that fact. I am.
We owe it to the taxpayers of our Nation and, most
importantly, to the citizens of Louisiana that are on the wrong
side of the levee, and the citizens of the gulf coast to
reverse the Federal Government's trend of shortchanging vital
flood protection, and incurring exorbitant disaster costs as a
result.
Sadly, in this year, fiscal year 2012, COE spent only $6.4
million for construction in Louisiana, which is just 38 percent
of its annual construction budget. That is short-sighted,
dangerous, and irresponsible. Louisiana is desperately in need
of more levees, pumps, flood control structures, wetlands
restoration, and we need it now.
We are all grateful for the Federal Government's $14.5
billion investment in flood protection post-Hurricane Katrina
that no doubt prevented tens of millions of dollars in damage
from happening in this last storm during Hurricane Isaac, and
helped protect communities inside the system. But people that
live in those protection zones are not only the ones that are
here today, and one does not have to look any further than
Braithwaite on the East Bank of the river or in LaPlace; Indian
village in Slidell; or Lafitte in Jefferson Parish to realize
that we still have a long way to go.
The people who are here today still do not have the flood
protection they need and deserve. They are rightfully upset,
and so am I.
A flood protection effort of this magnitude should have
started 50 years ago, but now our political agendas, short-
sighted budget gridlock, gridlock in the Congress, a lack of
knowledge in civic engagement, prevented that effort from
beginning when it should have. And now we are playing a very
dangerous and expensive game of catchup.
Our local governments, some of whom are represented here
today, know where the protection gaps are within their
communities. But sadly, we always seem to be working so much on
recovering from previous disasters--Hurricanes Katrina, Rita,
Gustav, Ike, now Isaac--we do have the difficult time focusing
on investing in the future. We have built up resilience at the
local level through some mitigation efforts, smarter planning,
and better building codes, but we have a tremendous amount of
work to do.
FEMA is only the tip of the spear when it comes to Federal
Government response for the disasters, and I want to underscore
tip, not the entire weapon. It is important to remember that
FEMA plays also a coordinating role, and other Federal agencies
are equally vital to our recovery, including the Small Business
Administration, the Department of Housing and Urban
Development, the Department of Agriculture, the Federal Highway
Administration, and COE, all of whom responded to Hurricane
Isaac, all of whom are on the ground here, but many of them
have very few resources to operate.
Inevitably there will be more hurricanes and more flooding,
but we cannot abandon and neglect this vital region. General,
as you said in your opening testimony, which I read every word
of both your testimonies this morning, you said, ``Coastal
Louisiana is home to one of the large port complexes in the
world. It is the top producer of domestic oil, and it is the
top fisheries producer in the lower 48 States.''
That is, in fact, true. And we must find a way to protect
it, not just for the benefit of the people that live here, but
the people in the Nation that count on us to live here and
deliver the goods. And that will require a more serious and
sustained Federal investment in flood protection through your
agency, COE, and the emergency management system that better
anticipates and accommodates whatever is thrown at it.
That is what we will examine in today's hearing, what is
going right, what is going wrong, and where we go from here.
I will introduce our first panel in 1 minute, but first I
want to spend a short time talking about what I observed
personally during Hurricane Isaac.
I was here in Louisiana when the storm hit, as was our
congressional delegation. I waited anxiously through 30 hours
of rain with my family in Broadmoor, one of the lowest lying
neighborhoods in the region, hoping the levees would hold and
the pumps would work for the first time since 1978, and praying
for all those in harm's way.
After the rain finally let up, I visited parish after
parish, as did my colleagues. We spoke with citizens and local
officials alike. I traveled by boat and air boat to survey the
Braithwaite community in upper Plaquemines Parish. My visit
came less than 30 hours after Jesse Schaeffer and his son,
Jesse, Jr., heroically saved 120 neighbors during the worst
part of the storm that saw water rising a foot every 10 minutes
in the middle of the night in Braithwaite. And I firsthand
witnessed the heroic efforts of the Plaquemines Parish sheriff
and his deputies.
I surveyed other areas of Plaquemines Parish by helicopter
and witnessed the devastation in Murder Grove and Ironton on my
way to Grand Isle, where I walked the beaches and the ravished
levees with Mayor David Carmadelle. I hosted Secretary Janet
Napolitano on her visit to Louisiana post-Hurricane Isaac,
where we visited one of the food distribution sites with Parish
President Brister in St. Tammany, where storm survivors came
for help from places like Indian Village, Lacombe, South
Mandeville, Madisonville, and I will be visiting there this
afternoon.
I toured Lafitte in a high water vehicle with Jefferson
Parish President John Young, Councilman Chris Roberts, and
Mayor Timmy Kerner to visit the citizens of Lafitte, who, just
like the residents of Crown Point, Grand Isle, and Barataria,
are storm-weary and worn out after another flood in their
communities, which is so vital to this Nation's fisheries and
oil and gas infrastructure.
And finally, I welcomed President Obama to St. John Parish
where we surveyed the damage of the hardest hit areas with
Parish President Natalie Robottom. In neighborhoods such as New
51, River Forest, and Cambridge subdivisions, which have never
had flooding like that in 20 years, I held people as they wept
with 6 or 7 feet of water in their homes.
I had the opportunity to thank the President for his
assistance, for what his administration has provided so far.
But I warned him of the woefully insufficient COE budget, and
was encouraged by his offer to convene a high level meeting in
Washington on this subject, which we will do in the next 2
weeks.
With that, I would like to introduce our first panel. The
members, Senator Vitter and Congressman Richmond, will have an
opportunity for questions to this panel, and they have come
prepared to ask some tough ones. First, Mr. Fugate, who is the
Administrator of FEMA, a position he has held for almost 4
years. After Mr. Fugate, we will hear from General Peabody, who
is the Commander of COE, Mississippi Division in which Colonel
Fleming, our Colonel, reports to.
prepared statement
So, Mr. Fugate, we will start with you. You understand the
purpose of this hearing. If you could bring us up to date, you
have got 5 minutes. And then we will have questions after
General Peabody takes his 5 minutes of testimony. Thank you.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Senator Mary L. Landrieu
I'd like to begin by thanking Mayor Ronnie Harris, Jefferson Parish
President John Young, and the parish council for hosting this
congressional hearing today in historic Gretna, where less than 4 weeks
ago on the anniversary of Katrina, Hurricane Isaac dumped over 18
inches of rain and caused a man to lose his life in a tragic fire that
destroyed Leruth's Restaurant on Franklin Avenue. He was one of six
people killed by the hurricane, which also pushed a wall of water 11
feet high onto Louisiana's shores, knocked out power to 871,000
households, and hovered over the region for 60 hours.
Last year, in the United States there were over 99 disasters that
were so severe they were declared eligible for Federal assistance by
the President. That is the most disasters ever recorded in a single
year since the Federal Government began keeping records in 1953. It
eclipses the previous record of 81 that was set in 2010, and it's more
than twice the number of disasters declared one decade ago in 2002 when
FEMA declared just 49. In addition to the 99 disasters last year, there
were another 508 events that didn't qualify for Federal assistance, but
which did prompt emergency declarations from State and local
governments who mobilized to respond. That is one of the reasons it is
so important for the Federal Government to maintain a robust Disaster
Relief Fund. Louisiana has certainly had its share of disasters,
including the most destructive natural disaster in United States
history--Hurricane Katrina--and Hurricanes Rita, Gustav, and Ike,
Deepwater Horizon, Tropical Storm Lee, and now Isaac. We know disasters
will happen each and every year. We cannot prevent them, but with smart
planning, responsible budgeting, and effective response we can
significantly minimize loss of life and property, and prevent
widespread economic or ecological damage.
This hearing is part of a comprehensive 7-year effort that I have
undertaken as the chair of this committee and previously as chair of
the Disaster Recovery Subcommittee to evaluate and improve our Nation's
ability to cost-effectively prepare for, respond to, and recover from
natural disasters and man-made events of all sizes and types. I chaired
a previous hearing in October 2011 that laid the groundwork for
disaster relief financing reform, which was enacted into law in
December 2011. That hard-fought effort helped ensure adequate
appropriations to the FEMA Disaster Relief Fund. For the first time in
over a decade, FEMA received the resources it needed through its annual
budget to help families and communities recover.
But the Federal role in responding to disasters cannot be limited
to FEMA funding alone. Today, we have two panels of officials from the
Federal, State, and local level to explore how government, as a whole,
can better protect, prepare, and respond to these ever more frequent
events. Today we will focus in particular on flood protection
investments, or lack thereof, and the process of recovery; families and
communities recover by assisting them with food, housing,
transportation, debris removal, and other disaster-related needs.
We must do more to protect our communities in south Louisiana and
in other parts of our State and country, and we must do it as quickly
as possible to reduce loss of life and property and reduce the burden
on taxpayers who continue footing the bill for disaster costs that
could have been averted. A recent study by the Multihazard Mitigation
Council found that for every taxpayer dollar invested in mitigation,
the Federal Government saves $4 on future FEMA assistance. Up until
2000, the Federal Government provided assistance to repair disaster-
damaged buildings without targeting any money to mitigate the damage
that occurs. To correct that failed policy, Congress passed a law 5
years before Katrina in 2000, that has resulted in billions of dollars
to State and local governments for mitigation measures like levee
repairs, drainage improvements, wetlands restoration, and home
elevations, in order to lessen the consequences of future events. If
they're properly planned and executed, these projects will actually
save taxpayers money in the long term.
But let me be clear, we simply cannot protect southeast, southwest,
or south central Louisiana by relying solely on FEMA's mitigation
grants. We need a more consistent, more robust funding mechanism, for
building our levees, securing our pumps, flood protection, internal
drainage, and wetlands restoration. We need the Corps of Engineers and
the State to commit additional resources to this effort, and we need a
multi-layered system of defenses that incorporates smarter planning and
stronger building codes, as well.
For the sake of historical context, since 1992 FEMA has spent $131
billion through the Disaster Relief Fund. Louisiana alone has received
more than $60 billion from the Federal Government to recover from the
hurricanes that struck our State in 2005 and 2008. We can, and we must,
find a way to reduce the cost to U.S. taxpayers by reducing the loss of
life and property in future events. Yet, shockingly, we only spend $1.6
billion on Corps of Engineers annual construction nationwide, a level
that is 25 percent below what we spent in 2007, and only one-hundredth
of a percent of gross domestic product (GDP). Federal funding for
transportation infrastructure on the other hand, like highways and
airports, which is by no means adequate to support long-term economic
growth, has increased as a percentage of GDP over the past 15 years and
nearly doubled since 1998 from $29.4 billion to $52 billion in 2012. In
stark contrast however, Federal funding for Corps construction over
that same period of time has gone up by less than $200 million and
declined as a percentage of GDP. Most people in the world would
probably expect that our Nation's Presidents and Members of Congress
finally realized the fatal consequences of underinvesting in flood
protection after Federal levee failures overwhelmed the most powerful
nation in the world while the rest of the world watched. But our
leaders apparently still don't get it, because the Corps of Engineers
construction budget as a percentage of GDP has gone down every single
year since Katrina struck, and we should be outraged by that fact. I
am! We owe it to the taxpayers of our Nation, and to the citizens of
Louisiana and the gulf coast, to reverse the Federal Government's trend
of shortchanging vital flood protection and incurring exorbitant
disaster costs as a result. Sadly, in fiscal year 2012, the Corps only
spent $6.4 million for construction in Louisiana, which is just .38
percent of its annual construction budget. That's short-sighted,
dangerous, and irresponsible. Louisiana needs levees, pumps, flood
control structures, and wetlands restoration, and we need it now.
We're all thankful for the Federal Government's $14.5 billion
investment in flood protection post-Katrina that no doubt prevented
tens of millions of dollars in damage during Hurricane Isaac and helped
protect communities inside the system, but the people that live in
those protection zones are not the only ones who are here today. And
one doesn't have to look any further than Braithwaite on the East Bank
of Plaquemines Parish, the River Forest subdivision in LaPlace, Indian
Village in Slidell, or Lafitte in Jefferson Parish, to realize that we
still have a long way to go. The people who are here today still don't
have the flood protection they need and deserve, they're rightfully
upset about it, and so am I.
A flood protection effort of this magnitude should have started 50
years ago, but narrow political agendas, short-sighted budgets,
gridlock in Congress, and a lack of knowledge and civic engagement
prevented that effort from beginning when it should have, so now we're
playing a very dangerous game of catch-up. Our local governments, some
of whom are represented here today, know where the protection gaps are
within their communities, but sadly, we always seem to be working so
much on recovering from previous disasters--Katrina, Rita, Gustav, Ike,
and now Isaac--that we have a difficult time focusing on investing for
the future. We have built up resilience at the local level through some
mitigation efforts, smarter planning, and better building codes, but we
still have a tremendous amount of work to do.
FEMA is only the tip of the spear when it comes to the Federal
Government's response to disasters. It's important to remember that
FEMA plays a coordinating role, and other Federal agencies are equally
vital to disaster recovery, including the Small Business
Administration, Department of Housing and Urban Development, Department
of Agriculture, Federal Highway Administration, and Corps of Engineers
all of whom responded to Hurricane Isaac and are on the ground here in
Louisiana.
Inevitably there will be more hurricanes and more flooding, but we
cannot abandon or neglect this vital region of the country, which
contributes over 17 percent to the Nation's GDP. As General Peabody
said in his own testimony this morning, ``coastal LA is home to one of
the largest port complexes in the world, is the top producer of
domestic oil, and it the top fisheries producer in the lower 48
States''. We must protect it, and that will require a serious and
sustained Federal investment in flood protection through the Corps of
Engineers and an emergency management system that better anticipates
and accommodates whatever is thrown at it. That is what we will examine
in today's hearing. What went right and what went wrong during
Hurricane Isaac and where we go from here.
I will introduce our first panel in just a minute. But first, I
want to spend a short time talking about what I observed personally
during Hurricane Isaac. I was here in Louisiana when the storm hit. I
waited anxiously through 60 hours of rain with my family in Broadmoor,
one of the lowest lying neighborhoods in the region, hoping the levees
would hold and the pumps would work, and praying for all of those in
harm's way. After the rain finally let up, I visited parish after
parish and spoke with scores of citizens and local officials alike.
I traveled by boat and airboat to survey the Braithwaite community
in upper Plaquemines Parish. My visit came less than 30 hours after
Jesse Schaeffer, and his son Jesse Jr. heroically saved more than 120
neighbors during the worst part of the storm that saw water rising a
foot every 10 minutes.
I surveyed other areas of Plaquemines Parish by helicopter and
witnessed the devastation in Myrtle Grove and Ironton on my way to
Grand Isle, where I walked the beaches and ravaged Burrito levees with
Mayor David Carmadelle.
I hosted the Secretary of Homeland Security, Janet Napolitano, on
her first visit to Louisiana post-Isaac, where we visited one of the
food distribution site in St. Tammany Parish, where storm survivors
came for help from places like Indian Village, Lacombe, south
Mandeville, and Madisonville, which I'll be visiting again this
afternoon.
I toured Lafitte in a high water vehicle with Jefferson Parish
President John Young, Councilman Chris Roberts, and Mayor Timmy Kerner
to visit the citizens of Lafitte, who just like the residents of Crown
Point, Grand Isle, and Barataria, are storm-weary and flat worn out
after yet another flood in their communities which are so vital to this
Nation's fisheries and its oil and gas infrastructure.
I welcomed President Obama to St. John Parish, where we surveyed
damage in the hardest hit areas of LaPlace, such as the New 51, River
Forest, and Cambridge subdivisions. I had the opportunity to thank him
for the assistance his administration has provided so far, but I also
warned him of the woeful insufficiency of the Corps of Engineers'
budget and was encouraged by his offer to convene a high-level meeting
in Washington on the subject.
With that, I would like to introduce our first panel. Each will
have 5 minutes for comments and then time for questions. First, Mr.
Fugate, who is the Administrator of FEMA, a position he has held for
almost 4 years now. After Mr. Fugate, we will hear from Major General
Peabody who is the Commander of the Corps of Engineers' Mississippi
Division, a territory that runs from Canada to the gulf coast along the
Mississippi River.
Mr. Fugate we will start with you.
[Fugate Testimony]
Thank you. Major General Peabody.
[Peabody Testimony]
[Thank the witnesses for their testimony then begin questions.]
[panel ii]
Now we will hear from our second panel to get some local
perspective. We have on this panel four parish presidents who represent
some of the areas hardest hit by Hurricane Isaac--Jefferson,
Plaquemines, St. Tammany, and St. John. We also have the State
represented through the Coastal Protection and Restoration Authority;
and industry represented through Shaw Coastal Inc. Each of you will
have 5 minutes to offer opening statements and then we will move to
questions.
Mr. Young we will start with you. [After John Young, the order is
Billy Nungesser, Pat Brister, Natalie Robottom, Garret Graves, and
Oneil Malbrough.]
[After all witnesses present their testimony start questions.]
STATEMENT OF CRAIG FUGATE, ADMINISTRATOR, FEDERAL
EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY
Mr. Fugate. Thank you, Madam Chair, and Senator and
Congressman. The response to Hurricane Isaac is a combination
of several key pieces of legislation and tools. The response to
Hurricane Isaac was based upon the capability and resources
that the Congress has provided FEMA, most specifically the
post-Hurricane Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act, which
radically changed the way that FEMA has been structured to
approach disasters.
In Hurricane Katrina and other disasters, the Congress
found that many of the authorities that FEMA had were not
clear. Did we have to wait until the State was overwhelmed
before we could even begin mobilizing resources? Did we have to
wait for formal requests from the Governor to start expending
resources to be prepared to support the State? Did we have the
authorities to coordinate recovery activities beyond that of
the Stafford Act?
During my confirmation hearing, Madam Chair, you reminded
me of a to-do list that FEMA had not completed. Hurricane Isaac
is really, I think, a culmination of that and the Budget
Stabilization Agreement last year to fully fund the disaster
account. If you remember last year during Hurricane Irene, we
were questioning whether we had money to continue to respond to
an active disaster. This year the Disaster Relief Fund
currently has a balance of almost $1 billion going into the
next fiscal year, meaning that not only can we respond to the
current disasters, but we are prepared for the next disaster,
whether it is a forecast event, such as a hurricane, or a no-
knows event, such as an earthquake.
But other activities that have taken place in the last 3\1/
2\ years that I have been at FEMA are also at play, one of
which was a national disaster recovery framework. We learned
after Hurricane Katrina you cannot expect State and local
governments who are so overwhelmed in a disaster, to go through
the Federal catalog and try to determine what Federal agencies
can help them beyond the original help that is provided in the
Stafford Act.
But not only are we able to implement that plan, we are
working with the State to utilize that framework to coordinate
some of the longer term recovery issues that some of the
communities that were hardest hit by Hurricane Isaac faced. We
have more staff. We have more resources. We have equipment that
is ready to go. This response, based upon a storm tracked that
originally was threatening the Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico
throughout much of the gulf coast, and ultimately the majority
of the impact on the Mississippi coast and here in Louisiana,
also demonstrated that those investments that were made after
Hurricane Katrina paid dividends.
Mitigation--oftentimes we talk about the amount of money
that we will spend on mitigation and how much it saves us. I
think Hurricane Isaac showed us that not only is it the
reduction in damages, it is the preservation of key critical
functions of local government. Throughout the gulf coast
region, we saw numerous examples where structures that were
hardened and elevated to protect them against a hurricane
allowed local officials and first responders to remain in their
communities and operate safely. This, in turn, sped up the
response, and in many cases, the initial response to much of
the impacts was the local responders, because they were able to
stay in their communities. They had safe locations to work
from. Their communications and other systems that had been
enhanced since Hurricane Katrina allowed them to speed up their
response.
The State and our partnership with the Governor's team at
the Governor's Office of Homeland Security and Emergency
Preparedness (GOHSEP), as well as our Federal agencies, also
has expanded beyond what the Government does. We know from the
lessons of Hurricane Katrina that in many cases, it was the
private sector that oftentimes was first in communities getting
open and providing services.
This storm allowed us to exercise our National Business
Emergency Operations Center, where we are coordinating with
national chains as well as through States, Emergency Operations
Center, and their connection with the business community, not
to duplicate, but to complement where businesses are providing
services so we can focus on those areas that are not being
served.
As we saw with this storm, a slow-moving storm was a
challenge because in many cases, although we had resources and
teams ready to go, we couldn't respond until the storm
meandered its way up through the area. That meant that in many
cases, communities were not hit and then responding. They were
hit and responding and still being hit and responding.
And I think the story of mitigation really comes back to
not only is it the dollar savings and losses that were
prevented. It is the ability of those key local responders and
critical functions to remain operational through such a long-
duration storm and continue to provide those services without
necessarily having to wait for outside assistance to get there.
Many other lessons have been learned. Many other challenges
have been revealed by this storm. We continue to work with our
partners in the volunteer community, and faith-based
communities, and the private sector, but most importantly, with
our partners at the State and local level.
And I would like to end with this: I have been here for
3\1/2\ years. The team I get to work with is the best team I
have ever had an opportunity to serve with. And I am very proud
of the caliber of people that President Obama brought in. I was
doing a little count. We have over seven former State directors
who now are working at FEMA at senior levels. We have never
before had that many representatives of State and local
government. Our deputy administrator, Rich Reno, was formerly
the emergency medical services chief for the city of Boston.
I think the President's decision to infuse FEMA with local
and State officials who have been in the trenches and who have
dealt with the same thing the parishes here have dealt with and
the State of Louisiana has dealt with means that we may not
always be right the first time, but we are working as a team,
as partners, to get it right.
PREPARED STATEMENT
And with that, I will thank you, Madam Chair, Senator
Vitter, and Congressman Richmond. And I will await your
questions.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Craig Fugate
introduction
Good Morning, Chairwoman Landrieu, and members of the committee. I
am Craig Fugate, Administrator of the Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA) and I am grateful for the opportunity to speak here
today. I look forward to discussing the preparations that took place
before Hurricane Isaac made landfall, the coordinated response that
took place during the storm and is continuing today, and the recovery
efforts that lay ahead.
Tropical Storm Isaac formed in the Atlantic late on August 21,
2012, and continued westward into the Caribbean before turning
northwest across western Haiti and eastern Cuba, passing west of Key
West, Florida, and moving into the Gulf of Mexico. Isaac became a
category 1 hurricane early on Tuesday, August 28. The hurricane's
center made landfall along the southeast Louisiana coast at 6:45pm
central daylight time with sustained winds of 80 miles per hour and
gusts extending outward from the center up to 185 miles, primarily
affecting the coastal areas of Southeastern Louisiana, Mississippi, and
Alabama. The storm moved slowly back towards the gulf Tuesday night
before making a second landfall in southeast Louisiana early on
Wednesday, August 29. Tremendous storm surge reaching estimated heights
as high as 12 feet in coastal and riverine areas and rainfall amounts
estimated between 7 and 14 inches with isolated maximum amounts
estimated near 20 inches inundated much of Louisiana, southern
Mississippi, southern Alabama, and the western Florida panhandle. Tens
of thousands were ordered to evacuate.
In the days leading up to landfall of Hurricane Isaac, FEMA worked
with the whole community to support our citizens and first responders
as they prepared. It is clear the authorities given to FEMA in the wake
of Hurricane Katrina contributed to increased readiness and improved
response throughout the storm. By leaning forward, the agency was able
to support a prompt, coordinated response effort while effectively
understanding the needs of survivors and planning for future needs.
preparations for isaac
Long before Hurricane Isaac made landfall, FEMA was coordinating
and collaborating with whole community partners to plan and prepare for
a hurricane event. The State of Louisiana and FEMA's regional office
have worked closely to develop catastrophic, worst-case scenario
hurricane plans which were developed to be flexible and scalable for
incidents of lesser magnitude. Emergency managers at all levels work
together to review, update, and validate the Joint FEMA Region VI
Louisiana Hurricane Operation Plan annually through planning workshops,
table top exercises (TTX) and drills that foster relationship-building
and decisionmaking that proves essential for response in disasters. For
example, in May 2012, Federal, State, and local partners completed a
Rehearsal of Concept (ROC) drill and a 2-day exercise combining a TTX
with a functional exercise that simulated an air evacuation of
survivors from the Louis Armstrong New Orleans International Airport.
In the days immediately before Isaac reached the gulf coast, FEMA
worked with whole community partners to stage resources that would
support response efforts that began as soon as conditions were safe.
The agency's success coordinating these resources and the response
efforts to follow were due largely to the lessons learned following
Hurricane Katrina in 2005. In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina,
Congress enacted the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of
2006 (PKEMRA), which enabled FEMA to improve our processes in order to
more efficiently and effectively provide services to the communities we
serve.
PKEMRA required that FEMA ``develop an efficient, transparent, and
flexible logistics system for procurement and delivery of goods and
services necessary for an effective and timely response to natural
disasters, acts of terrorism, and other man-made disasters and for
real-time visibility of items at each point throughout the logistics
system.'' Recognizing the need to improve logistics capabilities, FEMA
elevated logistics from a branch-level operation to a full directorate
with the creation of the Logistics Management Directorate (LMD). LMD is
now organizationally aligned with and fully integrated into response
and recovery operations, enabling them to provide efficient,
transparent, and flexible logistics capability to ensure an effective
and timely response to disasters. This improved capacity was evident in
the prompt procurement, delivery, and dispersal of goods and services
supporting response and recovery efforts following Hurricane Isaac.
In addition to creation of the LMD, PKEMRA spurred creation of
FEMA's Incident Management Assistance Teams (IMATs), who plan, train,
and exercise with State and local partners to prepare for all hazards.
The IMATs are FEMA's first responders for all disasters. They arrive
on-scene early and work to establish Interim Operating Facilities
(IOFs) before Joint Field Offices are established to manage response
operations. IMATs also support the Unified Coordination Group (UCG),
which brings together senior leaders who represent the interests of
Federal, State, local, and tribal governments in an effort to promote
effective coordination and planning across entities. In response to
Hurricane Isaac, IMAT teams deployed before the storm made landfall.
Teams were positioned at the State Emergency Operations Center (EOC)
and were directly involved in nearly every aspect of response efforts.
PKEMRA also grants FEMA the authority to lean forward and leverage
the entire emergency management team in response and recovery efforts,
a tool we take advantage of regularly and employed early for Hurricane
Isaac. The agency is permitted to take actions necessary to save lives
and protect property by positioning emergency equipment, personnel, and
supplies to support response to notice events like hurricanes. Despite
the inherent challenges of predicting hurricane landfall or
anticipating the full extent of its effects, FEMA worked with State and
local partners to alert, deploy, and stage resources beginning August
25, 2012, 3 days before Isaac made landfall. FEMA pre-positioned over
120 truckloads of commodities carrying almost 1.7 million liters of
water and 1.7 million meals, in addition to cots, tarps, blankets,
generators, and other resources to support caches already staged by the
State in preparation for the 2012 hurricane season. A total of 158
individuals from FEMA and other Federal agencies deployed in advance of
the incident to support pending response and recovery activities.
In the 72 hours prior to landfall, the Louisiana Governor's Office
of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness (GOSHEP) EOC, as well
as both FEMA's Region VI Regional Response Coordination Center (RRCC)
and the National Response Coordination Center (NRCC) were activated to
support pre-deployment activities and situational awareness. By request
from the State, FEMA also activated the national ambulance contract,
allowing the agency to stage ambulances and para-transit vehicles to
support evacuations of hospitals and nursing homes prior to landfall.
Search and Rescue (SAR) resources from FEMA and other Federal partners
were staged throughout the gulf coast.
coordinated response and recovery efforts
When Hurricane Isaac made landfall on Tuesday, August 28, 2012,
FEMA and other Federal agencies had deployed personnel, pre-positioned
commodities, and established State and Federal staging areas to
stabilize the incident within 72 hours of landfall. State and Federal
teams worked quickly to activate Points of Distribution (PODs), sites
where survivors were provided with food, water, and other essential
resources. Under the new National Disaster Recovery Framework (NDRF),
two members of the Federal Disaster Recovery Coordinators (FDRC) cadre
deployed almost immediately to hard-hit areas of Louisiana. These
individuals were available to support the State's recovery leadership,
and to monitor recovery impacts and issues in the aftermath of the
storm.
By Friday, August 31, 33 PODs in 12 parishes were supporting
survivor needs. Additional Federal resources were deployed to support
medical shelters and other response activities, and approximately 300
Community Relations (CR) personnel were deployed and formed teams to
provide disaster assistance information to survivors while conducting
damage assessments and providing situational awareness. The pre-
planning and coordination efforts between the State of Louisiana and
FEMA's regional office enabled the State to respond rapidly through the
State-Led Disaster Housing Task Force (SLDHTF), a task force of
subgroups that meet daily to identify issues while developing a
comprehensive housing plan that continues to guide disaster housing
recovery efforts. The SLDHTF also works with the Housing Recovery
Support Function coordinating agency under the NDRF, the U.S.
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), to identify ways to
leverage existing State programs using HUD-based programs like the
Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) Program and other funding
mechanisms.
The authorities and guidance established in PKEMRA have also helped
FEMA integrate the private sector into our preparedness, response, and
recovery efforts. In 2007, in response to recommendations in PKEMRA,
FEMA established a Private Sector Division (PSD) within the Office of
External Affairs. The PSD helps to formalize FEMA's approach to private
sector engagement by building bridges to businesses and other non-
governmental organizations to develop meaningful public private
partnerships and facilitate private sector innovation and networking
across FEMA.
In August 2012, FEMA's PSD announced the creation of FEMA's first-
ever National Business Emergency Operation Center (NBEOC). This new
virtual organization serves as FEMA's clearinghouse for non-
operational, two-way information-sharing between public and private
sector stakeholders in preparing for, responding to, and recovering
from disasters. Throughout Hurricane Isaac, the NBEOC worked to
coordinate, communicate, and collaborate with private industry to
foster relationships, improve information-sharing and situational
awareness, and engage key stakeholders who brought resources,
capabilities, and expertise to bear during response and recovery
efforts. The NBEOC was incredibly well-received during response efforts
from private sector stakeholders who applauded the communication and
coordination gained through the aggregation of multiple communications.
In the aftermath of Hurricane Isaac, FEMA's mobile outreach efforts
have continued to simplify the process of identifying and applying for
disaster assistance through DisasterAssistance.gov, a Web site
established in 2008 to help survivors apply for FEMA Individual
Assistance and find other forms of assistance. Between August 31 and
September 18, 422,160 disaster survivors visited DisasterAssistance.gov
to apply for assistance, update their information, and check the status
of their application online. As of September 19, Hurricane Isaac
survivors had submitted over 18,700 applications for assistance through
smartphones, which allow survivors to apply for assistance and track
submitted applications with the added flexibility of mobile access.
By constantly striving to support our citizens and first responders
in efficient, streamlined ways, FEMA is working to fulfill the agency's
mission while navigating the limitations of today's ever-strained
economic environment. Following Hurricane Isaac, over 46 percent of
registrants applying for individual assistance have opted to receive
all correspondence from FEMA electronically. This option was made
possible through the Electronic Correspondence (E-Corr) program,
implemented on August 15, 2011. The program has helped FEMA to
communicate with survivors in a convenient, efficient, and effective
medium. In Hurricane Isaac alone, E-Corr is estimated to have saved the
agency approximately $405,000 on postage, printing, and envelope costs.
looking forward
FEMA opened the first Hurricane Isaac Disaster Recovery Centers
(DRCs) on Saturday, September 1, providing survivors with resources and
information about FEMA and other disaster assistance programs. As of
September 19, 27 DRCs in Louisiana and 16 in Mississippi continue to
support survivor needs. Survivors in Louisiana have filed 182,683
registrations for disaster assistance, and survivors in Mississippi
have filed 19,936 registrations. FEMA has approved nearly $67.1 million
in assistance for qualified homeowners and renters in Louisiana and
$9.1 million for qualified homeowners and renters in Mississippi. More
than $7.6 million in public assistance funds have been obligated to
help affected communities recover. In addition, as of September 18,
nine business recovery centers had been opened by the Small Business
Administration (SBA), which had approved low-interest disaster loans
totaling over $1.4 million. The United States Department of Agriculture
(USDA) has granted the State's request for the Disaster Supplemental
Nutrition Assistance Program (DSNAP) benefits for eligible survivors,
allowing more than 86,000 households to receive over $36 million in
benefits.
In addition to providing disaster assistance, PKEMRA laid the
foundation for FEMA to provide those affected by disaster with
additional funding through the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP),
which provides grants to States and local governments to implement
long-term hazard mitigation measures after a major disaster
declaration. Prior to PKEMRA, the total amount of HMGP money allocated
to disaster-affected areas was determined by calculating 7.5 percent of
total disaster grants whose sum was less than or equal to $2 billion.
PKEMRA amended the Stafford Act to allow HMGP funding to total 15
percent of total disaster grants for disasters $2 billion and under.
The practical application of this modification means the communities
and individuals affected by Hurricane Isaac may receive twice as much
financial support through this grant program following the disaster.
While significant resources have supported response and recovery
throughout Hurricane Isaac, FEMA's investments in mitigation in the
years following Hurricane Katrina undoubtedly saved lives and money
during this most recent disaster, and will continue to support recovery
through the coming weeks and months. In the years since Hurricane
Katrina, FEMA has worked to support preparedness efforts in the gulf
coast and across the Nation through programs like the HMGP and the
Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP), which have been strongly
supported by this committee. In 2007, a $96.9 million HMGP grant, one
of the largest in history, was provided to elevate homes devastated by
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. By 2009, FEMA had provided $23.5 million
to help all 64 of Louisiana's parishes and 17 other entities create
detailed hazard mitigation plans, a requirement to qualify for the HMGP
that only four jurisdictions in Louisiana had satisfied before
Hurricane Katrina.
Since fiscal year 2007, the HSGP has provided nearly $315 million
to the State of Mississippi and more than $428 million to the State of
Louisiana to fund a range of preparedness activities including
planning, organization, equipment purchase, training, exercises, and
management and administration. These activities continue to improve
resiliency throughout the gulf coast, and contributed significantly to
successful response and recovery efforts during Hurricane Isaac. As of
September 19, 2012, FEMA has obligated almost $1.1 billion in Louisiana
and over $280 million in Mississippi through the HMGP since Hurricane
Katrina.
Immediately following Hurricane Isaac, FEMA Hazards Performance
Analysis (HPA) field staff deployed to support response and recovery
efforts, and to assess several sites where post-Katrina mitigation
funding was utilized. Property acquisition sites where homes once stood
had been converted into green spaces, and although surrounding areas
suffered flood damage, the green space required no repair. Other sites
were observed in neighborhoods with a mix of elevated and non-elevated
houses. All non-elevated houses appeared to have suffered damage, but
those structures elevated with funding from FEMA's HMGP appeared dry,
even where flooding depth reached 3 to 4 feet. These observations by
FEMA HPA staff, though limited, are reflective of the types of life and
cost savings during Hurricane Isaac that were made possible by
investments following Hurricane Katrina.
conclusion
As we move forward with response and recovery activities in the
aftermath of Hurricane Isaac, FEMA continues to collect and analyze
lessons learned and after-action reports. FEMA personnel are actively
tracking and assessing the implementation and application of PKEMRA
legislation throughout Hurricane Isaac, gathering information which
will be used to further improve disaster management in the future. We
will continue to improve our response and recovery efforts by making
use of the enhanced authority granted to FEMA by PKEMRA, and will
continue to wisely invest in resources and programs that will support
our citizens and first responders.
Thank you Chairwoman Landrieu, for providing me this opportunity to
appear before you today to discuss preparations that took place in
advance of Hurricane Isaac, the coordination that occurred throughout
the storm, and the recovery efforts that remain in-progress. I look
forward to answering questions you or other members of the committee
may have.
Senator Landrieu. Thank you.
General Peabody.
STATEMENT OF MAJOR GENERAL JOHN W. PEABODY, COMMANDER,
MISSISSIPPI VALLEY DIVISION, ARMY CORPS OF
ENGINEERS
General Peabody. Thank you, Madam Chair, Senator Vitter,
and Congressman Richmond. I appreciate the opportunity to
testify here today on behalf of the hundreds of COE
professionals who have not only built the hurricane storm
damage reproduction system, which you remarked on as
performance during the storm, but also prepared for, responded
to, and are continuing to help recover from Hurricane Isaac.
I am going to make five main points, and I've got a great
written statement which I was editing last night. But I am
going to dispense with that, I think.
The first point I would like to make--maybe six points--is
that Hurricane Isaac reminded us once again that extreme
weather events are dangerous and are capable of potentially
overwhelming, damaging, or destroying the built and the natural
environments. This is an important reminder that those of us
who do not experience extreme weather events as often as the
citizens of the coastal United States, especially Louisiana,
have in recent years need to be reminded of.
COE extends our deepest and heartfelt sympathies to all the
citizens of Louisiana and Mississippi who suffered losses from
this storm, especially those who lost family members. We had a
large number of our own New Orleans District employees who
suffered losses, some of whom continued to man their duty
positions during the storm.
To build a little bit on Administrator Fugate's remarks, I
would generally say that the emergency management and disaster
response system that COE has developed, which builds on two
authorities--the Stafford Act, for which we work as FEMA's
public works and engineer agency, and the Flood Control and
Coastal Emergency Act--enabled us to respond, in my view, quite
well to this particular event.
All of our regions have specific operational plans for the
types of weather events that could impact them in this region
that primarily focused on hurricanes, flooding, and to a lesser
extent, a potential seismic event in New Mandarin. But we
energized our capacity. We pre-deployed about 11 folks prior to
landfall and then another 300 COE professionals after landfall.
And in concert with our contracting professionals and under the
direction of FEMA, we were able to respond--and in close
coordination with the State, we were able to respond quickly to
the disaster. And we also were able to close the system around
greater New Orleans to prevent the flooding that you remarked
on, ma'am.
Third, it is important to continue to emphasize that the
enormous investment of the Nation in the Hurricane and Storm
Damage Risk Reduction System (HSDRRS), which to date we have
obligated $11 billion--we have expended a little more than $10
billion--worked in this storm. That is a testament to COE's
intensive scientific research, careful investigation of lessons
learned from Hurricane Katrina, leveraging a wide number of
professionals from both inside and outside COE, and the
Nation's commitment to support executing this program, as well
as a number of factors which I can address later if you have
questions, that I think made a significant difference, probably
the most important of which was we had full appropriations for
the programmatic cost estimate due to a number of supplements
that, Madam Chair, you, Senator Vitter, and your colleagues
passed a couple of years after the storm.
Fourth, we must always and everywhere continue to
investigate, research, and learn from each extreme weather
event. Hurricane Isaac was unexpectedly, for many people,
damaging. We tend to think of a category system and associate
the likely damages with that. But because the system was so
large and so very slow moving, it generated an enormous amount
of storm surge and rainfall, which created flooding that, I
think, many of the citizens who were impacted did not expect,
and I do not think many of us expected.
COE is committed to going forward to researching the
impacts from this storm, seeing where we had issues that did
not work quite like they should have, and improving our
operations and maintenance capabilities, and our construction
methodologies to address that.
Second to last, it is very obvious, you can see from some
of the photographs up here, that there is quite a contrast
between the impacts to citizens inside HSDRRS and the impacts
to many of the citizens in the coastal and Lake Pontchartrain
areas outside of that system where much of the flooding
occurred.
We are not finished with HSDRRS. We have got a few more
years of work to do, not the least of which is focused on the
New Orleans to Venice 9-foot levees in Plaquemines Parish,
where we continue to work diligently to execute this program as
quickly as possible.
And I will finish with a couple of notes. Much of coastal
and southern Louisiana continues to be at risk. COE is working
very hard on a large number of study authorities. Not advancing
as quickly as many would like, but we are working to ensure
that we have confidence in the scientific underpinnings and the
engineering judgments that will enable policymakers, such as
yourselves, to make decisions on whether or not to continue
investing in some of these areas.
PREPARED STATEMENT
So, ma'am, just to conclude, I just want to say COE is very
proud to serve the citizens across the entire United States. We
are proud of the partnership we had with our other Federal
agencies, particularly FEMA, and the States--both States,
Louisiana and Mississippi, in this event. And I look forward to
your questions, and thank you for the opportunity.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Major General John W. Peabody
opening remarks
I am Major General John Peabody, Commanding General of the
Mississippi Valley Division for the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
(Corps), and President of the Mississippi River Commission. On behalf
of the hundreds of U.S. Army Corps of Engineers professionals who
prepared for, responded to, and are helping to recover from Hurricane
Isaac, thank you for the opportunity to testify today.
As with many natural disasters, Hurricane Isaac brought with it
forces that overwhelmed elements of the built and natural environments.
It damaged and in some cases destroyed many engineered structures and
property, flooded hundreds of homes and businesses, rendered many
people homeless, and resulted in several deaths. The Corps extends our
deepest sympathies to all of the citizens suffering losses from
Hurricane Isaac--several of our own professionals suffered personal
losses from this storm as well. Along with physical destruction,
natural disasters also bring out the best in people. There are
countless stories of heroism and compassion carried out by the citizens
of Louisiana and Mississippi during this storm. The Corps is proud to
be part of the communities that make up these States.
The safety of the public is the Corps' top priority. Every year the
Corps, as part of the Federal Government's unified response to
disasters, sends hundreds of experts to respond to disasters at home
and abroad. The Corps assists the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) as the primary
agency with expertise in public works and engineer-related support. As
part of the National Response Framework, the Corps executes a multitude
of functions in support of FEMA, including emergency power, commodities
distribution, debris removal, temporary roofing and temporary housing,
infrastructure assessment, inundation mapping, and technical
assistance, among others. The Corps has dozens of Planning and Response
Teams (PRTs) trained and ready to deploy in advance of and in response
to natural disasters. For Hurricane Isaac, we deployed over 100 pre-
positioned professionals from across the Nation ahead of Isaac's
landfall and ready for a rapid response, and then deployed over 300
more in the immediate aftermath of the storm. The Corps received 40
mission assignments from FEMA totaling over $20 million. Although we
did not need to execute the full capability of these mission
assignments for this event, we were ready for a much more robust
response requirement. For example, although we installed 9 generators
to provide temporary power in Louisiana, we had nearly 160 generators
deployed to Baton Rouge prepared and ready to be sent throughout the
State, along with six dozen contractors and 20 prime power soldiers,
and we conducted power assessments at two dozen critical facilities in
Louisiana which will help the State better prepare for future events.
Each region and district in the Corps has standard operational
plans prepared, updated and rehearsed on an annual basis for the kinds
of disasters expected in the region. In the case of the Mississippi
Valley Division, our primary response plans relate to hurricanes,
floods, and a New Madrid Seismic Zone event. Our hurricane response
plans are updated each winter based on the lessons from the most recent
hurricane events as well as changed conditions on the ground. Our plans
include the mobilization of up to three district command teams to
provide robust senior leader support to the States of Mississippi
(Vicksburg District) and Louisiana (Memphis District), and an
Unwatering Task Force (Rock Island District) if needed, as well as
general support from the other districts. Elements from all three of
these commands were mobilized and deployed for this event in addition
to seven PRTs, and dozens of augmentation personnel. As the affected
district, the New Orleans District commander and his staff focus on
executing actions in collaboration with State, parish, and local levee
board officials to prepare the Hurricane and Storm Damage Risk
Reduction System (HSDRRS) for storm surge, as well as the civil works
structures and operating elements (locks and dams, operating vessels,
etc.) that is within the district's jurisdiction. The Corps has the
capability to mass its full resources and energy on any disaster, if
required. In the case of Hurricane Isaac, the Mississippi Valley
Division executed our operational plan, with some variations for
potential unwatering and other requirements.
In addition to disaster response in support of FEMA, the Corps has
inherent authorities under Public Law 84-99, Flood Control and Coastal
Emergencies, to provide technical assistance to non-Federal
authorities, to provide flood fighting assistance, and to rehabilitate
projects in the Public Law 84-99 program following a natural disaster.
During Hurricane Isaac, the Corps responded to mud slides on
Mississippi's Lake Tangipahoa Dam by sending geotechnical and dam
safety experts to make assessments and provide technical assistance to
the State for consideration in its decisionmaking process, as well as
developing and providing inundation maps to downstream areas in both
Mississippi and Louisiana. We also provided unwatering advice and
assistance to include pumps to the Lake Tangipahoa Dam as well as
Plaquemines Parish to unwater the Braithwaite polder, which was flooded
after non-Federal levees were overtopped by the 10- to 14-foot storm
surge. We are currently assessing damages from Hurricane Isaac.
hurricane preparedness improvements since hurricane katrina
Following Hurricane Katrina, the Corps has diligently prepared for
the day that another hurricane would threaten the greater New Orleans
area. Because of the work on the HSDRRS since then, the greater New
Orleans area has a much greater reduced risk of flooding from hurricane
surges now than it has had at any other time in history. Our experience
from Hurricane Isaac bore this out. Along with our Federal, State, and
local partners, the Corps strengthened and improved nearly 133 miles of
levees, floodwalls, gated structures, and pump stations, forming the
new greater New Orleans perimeter system. Construction of surge
barriers at Lake Borgne, Seabrook, the New Orleans Outfall Canals and
the West Closure Complex have pushed the line of defense outside of the
city and removed about 68 miles of interior levees and floodwalls from
exposure to storm surges. We also have improved internal drainage
conveyances with pump stations under Southeastern Louisiana (SELA)--
integrated HSDRRS perimeter and internal works. Much of the work
planned for this element of the system continues.
It is important to emphasize that the Corps has not have
accomplished this work on its own. This was absolutely a complete team
effort, with full engagement by Federal and State authorities, local
governments, levee authorities, levee boards, academia, industry, non-
governmental organizations, peer reviewers, and other stakeholders. We
have been able to accomplish this in a short time span by sharing
responsibility and working collaboratively with the single focus to
complete the HSDRRS. The Corps and its partners were enabled by a
number of key factors. After Hurricane Katrina, the Corps received
$14.6 billion for work on the HSDRRS. By the beginning of the 2011
hurricane season, the Corps was able to provide 100-year protection to
the city of New Orleans. The Army is now focused on completing work on
other components of the HSDRRS. In addition, the Council on
Environmental Quality authorized alternative environmental arrangements
for major elements of the greater New Orleans HSDRRS, to comply with
NEPA while the system was under construction. We also applied
innovative acquisition approaches on a large scale to deliver the work
efficiently and effectively, and our non-Federal partners delivered the
real estate requirements to sustain aggressive execution. In short, the
greater New Orleans HSDRRS was executed efficiently and functioned
effectively during Hurricane Isaac because the Corps was able to
leverage the capabilities and knowledge of the full panoply of experts,
stakeholders, and authorities at every level.
The HSDRRS was developed by rigorous application of cutting edge
scientific knowledge of storm impacts, and the concepts of engineered
structural redundancy, and resiliency. The known impacts from Hurricane
Isaac make clear, however, that while the greater New Orleans area has
achieved substantial hurricane storm risk reduction, much of coastal
Louisiana remains at risk. The contributions made by southern Louisiana
to the Nation's economy are significant, as are its ecological
resources. The Corps has many responsibilities to manage aspects of the
Nation's water resources in this region. Situated at the confluence
between the Mississippi River watershed and the Gulf of Mexico, coastal
Louisiana is home to one of the largest port complexes in the world, is
the top producer of domestic oil, and is the top fisheries producer in
the lower 48 States.
Managing flood risk is a shared responsibility between all levels
of government--Federal, State, and local--as well as the people at
risk. Managing risk should include all methods of risk reduction: land
use zoning; building codes; flood insurance; evacuation plans;
ecosystem restoration and resiliency, and structural measures. The
methodology for managing these storms must be multiple lines of
defense--all of the things I mentioned, as well as barrier island
creation, creation or restoration of marsh and swamp land--things that
can be accomplished to lessen the impacts of these storms before they
arrive at the doorsteps.
The Corps' primary role in flood risk reduction is to evaluate
alternative approaches to reduce flood risk by performing feasibility
studies and to make investment recommendations related to three factors
associated with any potential project: whether it is technically
feasible, environmentally acceptable and economically justified. The
Corps must evaluate projects based upon sound engineering and science,
and in accordance with law and established regulations including our
principles and guidelines. In an effort to improve our performance, the
Corps has begun an effort to transform our Civil Works program to
adjust to the fiscal and infrastructure realities we face today.
Part of that effort includes a transition toward a new planning
paradigm with the intent of executing feasibility studies in less time,
at less cost, and with greater confidence in the outcome. The
transformation of the Corps' Civil Works program ranks at the top of
the Corps' current strategic priorities, and reforming our planning
program is one of the key aspects of that effort. In a constrained
fiscal environment, the Corps' priorities are based upon performance of
the project in comparison to other projects, with the goal of
recommending those projects that return the highest benefit for the
investment to the Nation. To achieve this, the Corps is conducting more
rigorous analysis to ensure that the ``future without project
conditions'' are accurately portrayed, and that project benefits are
accurately captured. This will result in an increased confidence in the
Corps' judgments related to projects' technical feasibility,
environmental acceptability, and economic justification.
hsdrrs preparations, rehearsals, and execution
Since 2006, the Corps has improved how it does business not only in
design and construction of the HSDRRS, but in our operational and
contingency planning for HSDRRS closure. The New Orleans District
conducts annual structural assessments of the HSDRRS in partnership
with Federal, State, and local leaders. We have been open and
transparent every step of the way--for example, since the start of
construction we have published a HSDRRS map each June that provides a
snapshot of construction status, and where we focused efforts to effect
interim and permanent feature closures. We have shared this strategic
communication tool at public meetings and engagements, as well as with
elected leaders through meetings and briefings.
Prior to the start of each hurricane season, the New Orleans
District tests the operation of all major structures and conducts
tabletop exercises centered on a variety of hypothetical storms. The
purpose is to exercise our planned command and control procedures, as
well as our technical steps for responding to a storm event, to test
the procedures for closing and re-opening major structures, and to
exercise collaborative partnership efforts among Federal, State, and
local agencies. Major partners including the U.S. Coast Guard, Coastal
Protection and Restoration Authority Board, New Orleans Sewerage and
Water Board, the Jefferson Parish Drainage Department, the Governor's
Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness, the Southeast
Louisiana Flood Protection Authorities and the Louisiana Department of
Transportation and Development all participate in the Corps' extensive
planning process to ensure the successful overall operation of the
HSDRRS.
Cultivating and maintaining partnerships within States, parishes,
cities, and neighborhoods, as well as communicating the importance of
shared responsibility for risk has been one of the strategic objectives
in Louisiana and the Nation since Hurricane Katrina. To that end, we
have conducted more than 500 public meetings and engagements in
Louisiana to facilitate an open dialogue about the HSDRRS and risk;
held regular meetings with Federal, State, and local partners;
established a hotline to convey up-to-date construction impacts for
open and transparent communication; and implemented social media
channels, among many other efforts.
Another critical measure has been the cross agency and industry
planning to ensure that risk from water borne vessels is mitigated and
that U.S. Coast Guard Regulated Navigation Area (RNA) roles and
responsibilities are clearly defined in advance of the start of each
hurricane season. This is particularly important for the Inner Harbor
Navigation Canal--Gulf Inter-Coastal Waterway detention basin and the
Harvey-Algiers Detention basin. The U.S. Coast Guard, Corps, local
levee districts, and navigation industry stakeholders meet regularly to
review the RNA, which is necessary to ensure all vessels therein have
approved mooring plans to reduce the threat posed by the possibility of
break-away vessels. Finally, lessons learned from post event
assessments and after action reviews have been implemented to improve
emergency operations planning and seamless coordination with our
partners.
performance during hurricane isaac
All of our efforts since Hurricane Katrina to plan, design,
construct, and utilize the HSDRSS prior to each hurricane season
resulted in the system essentially performing as anticipated during
Hurricane Isaac. While the overall system performed as designed, that
performance was not without its challenges. For example, the massive
temporary pumps at the outfall canals along the south shore of Lake
Pontchartrain are performing well beyond the time they were intended to
be there. All pumps are machines that can break, just like cars and air
conditioners. During Hurricane Isaac, we had 5 of 43 total pumps that
we could not start at the 17th Street Interim Closure Structure from
inside the control structure. The New Orleans District professionals
were prepared for just such a contingency, with crews on site. Those
crews braved the hurricane force winds and started those pumps
manually, one of whom had his family and home flooded in Laplace while
he executed his duty. Unfortunately, we had one pump fail to operate
properly, resulting in the flooding of four homes in a neighborhood in
Oakville inside of the HSDRRS. The cause of that incident is still
being investigated.
In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, the New Orleans District
instituted procedures for repeatedly rehearsing its established
response to hurricanes prior to the beginning of each hurricane season.
This ensures that the New Orleans District will be ready to respond
quickly to such an event. The New Orleans District validated closure
plans through desk top exercises, rehearsed structure closures and
documentation of notifications in Louisiana's Levee Information
Management System (LIMS) reporting system, and developed contingency
plans to respond to possible issues to assist the New Orleans Sewerage
and Water Board and Jefferson Parish Drainage Department. Already
storm-proofed pump stations and those undergoing storm proofing proved
their worth during Hurricane Isaac.
One of the keys to success was the use of the Local Government
Liaisons (LGLs). These are Corps personnel that the New Orleans
District deploys to, and embeds with, parish and levee authorities.
Whenever local parish officials had a problem, their embedded LGLs got
an answer within minutes. We prepared our contractors to close their
construction gaps on time. We used our own in-house labor to effect
transportation system closures on Highways 23 and 90 at the advent of
tropical storm winds. We capitalized on lessons learned from previous
hurricanes and the spring 2011 flood to work effectively with the
Governor's Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness
(GOHSEP). In anticipation that the major effects from this storm would
hit Louisiana, I personally displaced to Baton Rouge ahead of landfall
and set up a forward command post at GOHSEP, effectively embedding
myself and several of our staff as another Corps link for the Governor
and his staff.
During Hurricane Isaac, the Corps shared its projected storm surge
hydrographs for the East Bank and West Bank of Plaquemines Parish from
our Advanced Circulation Model. The local parish leaders used these
storm surge model forecasts to inform their decisionmaking related to
parish actions.
post-isaac assessment
Hurricane Isaac's impact to the coastal Louisiana area, including
the greater New Orleans region and surrounding communities, was
considerable. While the HSDRRS prevented the storm surge from
inundating the areas on the protected side of the system, significant
flooding from storm surge and rainfall occurred in areas outside of the
Federal levee systems including Slidell, Mandeville, Madisonville,
LaPlace, Braithwaite, Lafitte, and other locations.
The Corps bases its decisions, designs, and construction on the
best science and engineering available. Prior to the start of
construction for the HSDRRS, the Corps conducted extensive surge
modeling and analysis that indicated minimal to no flooding impacts to
communities or areas outside of the system as a result of the HSDRRS.
Hurricane Isaac was a large, slow-moving storm with a considerable
amount of surge and rainfall that appear to have been the primary
variables driving the flooding witnessed from this storm. Nonetheless,
some have speculated that the HSDRRS caused unintended induced flooding
to areas outside the system as a result of Hurricane Isaac.
Congressional leaders, local and State officials have requested a
comprehensive analysis to identify the effects that the HSDRRS had
during Hurricane Isaac on the areas outside of the system.
The Corps has already begun this analysis. Engineers and scientists
from the Mississippi Valley Division, Engineering Research and
Development Center, the New Orleans District and the National Weather
Service will participate in the effort. My guidance to the modeling
team is to model the specific meteorological characteristics of
Hurricane Isaac; conduct a comparative analysis to high water data that
we collect through USGS; validate the 100-year elevations pre- and
post-HSDRRS; conduct an Independent External Peer Review consistent
with the Water Resources Development Act of 2007 through the Louisiana
Water Resources Council; engage the State of Louisiana and Water
Institute of the Gulf to participate in a simultaneous review; and
finally to ensure that the National Weather Service characterization of
the storm is included in our modeling parameters. The findings from
this analysis will be released to the public once the appropriate
internal quality assurance reviews have taken place, after which it
will be subjected to independent external peer review.
Following the initial evaluations, a second phase involving
detailed hydrodynamic modeling of specific areas impacted by Isaac will
be conducted over a period of several months. The Corps will use the
information obtained during this modeling effort to further improve our
emergency planning and preparations for the next tropical weather event
to hit this region.
closing remarks
This concludes my testimony. The Corps is proud to serve the people
of the United States and the gulf coastal region. Thank you for the
opportunity to testify and I look forward to your questions.
WATERWAY DEBRIS REMOVAL
Senator Landrieu. Thank you. We will have our first round.
First to you, Mr. Fugate, and please try to be as brief as you
can because we really have a substantial number of questions.
The first question is on the waterway debris removal, which
is a real problem for some of our local entities. As you know,
we are surrounded by bayous, rivers, lakes, et cetera. At least
four different Federal agencies have jurisdiction over water
debris removal--FEMA, COE, Coast Guard, Natural Resources
Conservation Service at the Department of Agriculture.
There is no uniform Federal procedure to determine
responsibilities for water debris removal. Therefore, parishes
might have to follow different rules, et cetera. In addition,
bureaucratic tangles in agencies: different types of debris
trigger types of rules. Sunken vessels must be treated
different than vegetation or silt. It is a patchwork, it is a
cluster, and it is a headache for those of us that live through
these hurricanes season after season.
Please describe what you are doing to coordinate this, and
how the Debris Task Force is operating, and what hope can you
give to our parish presidents that this is going to be
improved?
Mr. Fugate. Hopefully it has been improved, this response,
based upon work we have done with the States and the other
agencies. It is, as you point out, because of the different
funding authorities and because of the structure of committees,
differing authorities to different Federal agencies have that
overlap.
There is no single agency, so our job is to make sure that
we coordinate among the agencies as much as possible to reduce
the----
Senator Landrieu. Would it be possible after each storm to
designate at least a lead coordinating agency for debris
removal instead of having these parishes go from agency to
agency, whether it is a limb, or a plastic bag, or a sunken
barge?
Mr. Fugate. It would be possible as long as we still have
to deal with each Federal agency's different requirements and
authorities that each has. But I will take the recommendation
and look at what we are currently doing with the State. I know
that one of the challenges that we have had working with GOSHEP
is to make sure that it is Federal agencies we----
CASE MANAGEMENT
Senator Landrieu. Well, we are going to pursue that because
this was a nightmare after Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, Gustav,
and Ike, and we will hear from the parish presidents. I think
it still is a nightmare. We have got to find a better way
forward.
Second, case managers help to connect disaster affected
families with resources like employment assistance, temporary
housing, and food. We found this to be one of the key lessons
after Hurricane Katrina, just delivering individual stovepipe
assistance to families without having a case manager
coordinating it didn't work. So the job people find you a job
in Orleans Parish, but the housing people find you a house in
east Feliciana Parish. It does not necessarily work.
So the case management came in to being for the first time
in large measure after Hurricane Katrina because we realized
you have got to deal with the family unit together and not
individually. So the wife and husband can get their jobs back
in the same area. The kids can figure out schools, et cetera.
Since we authorized Federal support for case managers after
Hurricane Katrina, FEMA has entered into an interagency
agreement with the Administration of Children and Families
(ACF) through a contract with Catholic Charities. When
Hurricane Isaac hit, local case managers deployed, but FEMA and
ACF did not activate their contract with Catholic Charities.
Can you tell me why?
Mr. Fugate. Working with the State, it was determined to
utilize the State capabilities to do the case management. Many
of the elements of case management were being done through
enhancements we made in our community relations and our
national processing centers (NPCs). And we are currently in the
State on implementing its case management grant to be able to
fund those services.
Senator Landrieu. Well, we are going to look into how the
State did their case management and hear from the parish
presidents whether that is working or not or whether they would
prefer to have the Catholic Charities contract, which I think
many of them are familiar with some of the nonprofits and the
faith-based organizations. And we are going to look into that.
Let me ask you, General Peabody. COE has agreed--Senator
Vitter and I both asked, and he initiated it, and I supported
his request--for an independent review of the impact of the New
Orleans Metropolitan Area Flood Protection System on the
communities that were left out, obviously the ones that you can
see suffering on these charts.
When do you expect that this report will be completed and
released to the public? Can you provide any detail up to this
point regarding your initial storm surge modeling that was done
by COE prior to the system's construction and the impact that
it had on the outlying areas?
General Peabody. Yes, Senator. That modeling is ongoing. We
put together a team that includes professionals from the
National Weather Service. In fact, the director of the National
Hurricane Center visited here last week.
Senator Landrieu. And when is that going to be complete?
General Peabody. We expect our internal modeling to be
complete by mid-October. It will probably take us about 2 weeks
to do a quality assurance review, after which time in probably
early November we will publish the results. That would be
probably the latest. Then we will put it forward to independent
external peer review, which will take several months, and that
is a timeline that is controlled by the independent reviewers.
Senator Landrieu. And what details can you provide about
the initial storm surge modeling that you did before this
system was built and its impacts to outlying areas?
General Peabody. Yes, ma'am. We did extensive modeling of
152 storm tracks, literally thousands of variations on those
storms. And what that told us was that there would be very
minor induced flooding, but on the order of magnitude of one-
tenth of a foot, maybe 2, 3, or 4 inches at the most.
However, the Hurricane Isaac storm track and pace was not
one of the track and paces that was modeled. So while we do not
believe it is likely that we are going to see significant
induced flooding from HSDRRS as a result of Hurricane Isaac,
that possibility can work, and so we are taking an open mind in
looking at this objectively to see what our modeling shows us.
Senator Landrieu. This community is very interested in that
study.
Senator Vitter. We will do a second round of questions as
well. Go ahead.
Senator Vitter. Great. Thank you, Madam Chair, for hosting
this hearing. Very much appreciate it. Thanks to all of our
witnesses, first, for being here and, second, and more
importantly, for all of your work through Hurricane Isaac. We
all appreciate it.
I wanted to focus in my questions on the hurricane and
flood protection issues since those are really paramount in a
lot of our minds who live in the area, and also since I serve
on the relevant COE subcommittee as the top ranking Republican.
General, let me go right to that and build on Senator
Landrieu's question. I just want to confirm publicly, you all
are doing an immediate analysis modeling of the Hurricane Isaac
event, which was not done in terms of these other models prior
to the building of the system. Is that correct?
General Peabody. Yes, sir, that is correct.
Senator Vitter. Okay. And also pursuant to my specific
request, that will be completely peer-reviewed by outside
independent experts.
General Peabody. Yes, sir, through the Louisiana Water
Resource Council, I believe.
Senator Vitter. Okay. That council was created in the last
water bill. I drafted the language. And it is completely
outside and independent, but they do this work for COE. And so
you all do have some control of their schedule. Can you nail
down with them what their schedule will be, because we do not
want a year-long peer review. We want a month peer review with
some immediate usable conclusions.
General Peabody. Yes, sir. Senator, we will be happy to
convey to them the urgency of the information, but because it
is an independent, to use the term--verb ``control,'' I think
is an overstatement. I think we probably have some influence.
We will try to ask them to go as quickly as possible.
Senator Vitter. I will do this as well. If you can
specifically ask them for a deadline and communicate that to
me, that would be great.
General Peabody. We will make that request, sir.
Senator Vitter. And just so that you all know, we have also
asked the Water Institute of the Gulf, Dr. Charles Groat--the
State has participated in that as well--to do a completely
separate review of the same issue. I think it is very important
to understand what happened during Hurricane Isaac, why did it
happen, what, if any, any impact did the post-Hurricane Katrina
system have on that flooding.
General Peabody. We agree, Senator, yeah. The more sharp
minds we can get looking at this, the better and more
confidence we will have in our judgments. And Dr. Groat
contacted me personally. I was grateful for his offer of
assistance. He has team members who are embedded with us, and
then they can do whatever they want with that information going
forward.
Senator Vitter. Right. And, General, the good news is, we
have said, that the post-Hurricane Katrina work performed as
designed.
General Peabody. Right.
Senator Vitter. The bad news, as we have also said, is that
there was major, in some cases, catastrophic and unprecedented
flooding outside that core system. And what is particularly
disheartening about that, as you know, is that these are not
areas we simply never talked about protecting. Most or all of
these are areas with COE projects on the books that have taken
forever and dragged on forever, and/or been canceled since the
post-Hurricane Katrina work has been completed. And that is
more frustrating. That is really maddening for those of us who
live in the area.
I want to talk about five specific areas outside the
system. Number one, and this is actually related to the system,
Plaquemines and lower Plaquemines, and the New Orleans to
Venice project.
Because prices and costs rose post-Hurricane Katrina, the
original 34 miles of that protection was reduced to 20 because
basically costs went up. First, did COE ever ask the Congress
for the additional money needed to complete all 34 miles, which
was what was envisioned in the post-Hurricane Katrina
appropriation bills?
General Peabody. Senator, I am not aware of any requests by
the administration to the Congress for that purpose. But I will
have to take it for the record to be sure.
Senator Vitter. Okay. The answer is no, and the obvious
question is why not. The post-Hurricane Katrina appropriation
bills talked about those 34 miles. Costs went up, and COE cut
it to 20 with a big gap in the middle, and never even
identified the price to do all of the work. Second, to deal
with the costs going up in July 2011, COE itself hosted a 3-day
project delivery summit with stakeholders. The outcome of that
summit was, okay, we think it is better to build 50-year
protection for all 34 miles and have that as a basis to build
on for the future.
And that was the outcome of the COE-hosted summit. Yet
nonetheless, 5 days before that was to be presented to your
superiors in Washington, General Walsh unilaterally said, I do
not care what you are talking about. We are doing the
heightened post-Hurricane Katrina standards 20 miles only with
a big gap in the middle.
Why was that decision made in Washington, and will it be
reviewed now to consider the product of that July 2011 summit?
General Peabody. Senator, Parish President Nungesser from
Plaquemines sent Colonel Fleming a letter on this specific
issue, I believe, last week, and Colonel Fleming shared that
letter with me.
As a result of discussions that Colonel Fleming and I had,
I have decided that I am going to review that precise issue.
And let me be clear on a couple of things.
First, there are two aspects to this. One is level of
protection, which generally equates to a probabilistic flood
event. In the case of Plaquemines Parish, we are building to a
2 percent, or what is commonly called a 50-year level of
protection standard. The thing that drove the cost estimate up
was the application of the HSDRRS Design Guidelines without any
consideration for variations to the Plaquemines Parish levees.
Now what I intend to do is take a very detailed look at
exactly what came out of that 3-day summit, and then
potentially, depending upon a site-specific risked-based
analysis, potentially make modifications or alterations to
those design guidelines for application to the New Orleans to
Venice/non-Federal levees area, because the legislation is very
clear that the primary purpose is to preserve Highway 23 as an
evacuation route. And our current approach does not accomplish
that.
What I cannot predict at this stage, Senator, is how long
this is going to take. I do not think it will take too long,
maybe 1 month or 2. And I cannot predict what the exact outcome
will be. But I can commit to you that I am going to take a very
hard look at this with the effort to try to find a way to
deliver that system for the entire length of the authorized
project for the Highway 23 reach. And we will take a look at
it, and then we will let you know once we have done our
analysis, as well as Mr. Nungesser and others, what we plan to
do.
Senator Vitter. Right. I will save the rest for my second
round. But I urge you to do that re-look. That is very similar
to the re-look we met about and discussed regarding Morganza.
General Peabody. Exactly, that same principle.
Senator Vitter. We have to do it to build some protection,
not to have some perfect model that stays on paper and is never
built.
General Peabody. Senator, if I could just say one last
thing. I think a certain amount of flexibility on the details
of the application guidelines is an important principle. But
the general principles of the design guidelines are also very
important. And so I would not make any recommendations to
change the principles behind the design guidelines. It is the
application of the design guidelines I think that we need to
look, as John Bostick discussed with you.
REGIONAL OFFICES
Representative Richmond. Thank you, Senator Landrieu, and
thank you, Senator Vitter.
I will start with Administrator Fugate. And first let me
just thank you for your effort and your work during the storm,
and your willingness to partner and your willingness to not
only listen, but to coordinate and cooperate with local
agencies. And I know that when the President was here, in
private when we met, everyone applauded your effort and the
President's efforts. So I wanted to say it publicly because so
often we do not say it publicly when people are working very
well and diligently. Do we have lessons to learn? Absolutely.
But it is very refreshing coming from Hurricane Katrina to
today with the level of cooperation that we have and the
sincerity of the effort.
Let me just start with an easy one, and I know that we are
wrapping the presence of our FEMA office in the area. Are we
changing or delaying that now that we have another event that
we are going to have to continue to have a large response to?
Mr. Fugate. No.
Representative Richmond. So we are still closing that
office?
Mr. Fugate. It will be phased down as the work is completed
with Hurricane Katrina.
Representative Richmond. What will we do then for Hurricane
Isaac? Will we set up another one? Are we transitioning?
Mr. Fugate. Hopefully, we will not be here that long. One
of our goals is to speedily right--and I think this is
something listening to the parish presidents specifically. We
want to get the debris and protective measures written and paid
over the next couple of months, not next couple of years. And
then we will work the permanent repairs and the mitigation
through the regional office.
We will maintain a presence here with GOHSEP and the
parishes as we get through those projects. But rather than
creating a separate entity to manage Hurricane Isaac, we are
going to use our regional structure and regional capabilities
to manage it.
Again, Hurricane Katrina was extraordinary in its size.
That work needs to continue. What we do not want to do is take
away focus on the continued recovery efforts in Hurricanes
Katrina, Gustav, and Ike. So we want to manage Hurricane Isaac
as part of the regional structure and complete it as quickly as
possible while continuing to be focused on post-Hurricane
Katrina recovery.
RECOVERY EFFORT
Representative Richmond. One of the frustrations that I
watched in post-Hurricane Katrina, and I would hope that we do
not duplicate here, and I will just give you an example of the
police station around the corner from my house, which was 3,000
square feet. If I can come in as a private citizen and get my
house back in order and fixed, it does not make sense to me
that it takes the Government or the city 3 years to do that
police station.
And when you really drill down into the slowdown, it is
because there is this big fight over the 50-percent designation
or 50-plus-1 designation where FEMA will come in and pay
replacement costs as opposed to fixing it. When you have that
sort of probably internal conflict, in my opinion, it makes
sense to continue to fight for 50-plus-1. But at the same time,
you hold the community hostage, and progress is delayed.
So have we looked at addressing that or figuring out a way
that we can somehow move forward with construction or repair in
the process while the fight goes on? Thankfully, Senator
Landrieu and our delegation inserted the language for
arbitration into the recovery bill. But we just cannot have the
fight over the 50-plus-1 designation.
Mr. Fugate. Unfortunately, I have a fiduciary
responsibility to make that case. Fifty-one percent should not
be an argument. It should be what exists and what we find. And
I think that is part of the process, as Senator Landrieu as
chairwoman has told us many times. We need to be clear on what
the program is so everybody understands the ground rules and we
do not change them in process.
So it should not be a debate about what is 51 percent. It
should be if there is more than 51-percent damages, it makes
sense to replace the structure. When it is less than 51
percent, it is going to be cost-effective to replace that
structure, to repair that structure, and mitigate it.
So we continue that balance. But the worse thing we can do
is to speed this process up to the point of haste and only find
ourselves with the inspector general coming in and begin de-
obligating funds because we could not demonstrate that the
structure was damaged to the point that it was more cost-
effective to replace than repair.
So my goal in working the State and parishes is to get to
the correct answer. What is eligible is eligible, and get
construction going whether it is repair or replacement.
Representative Richmond. And I would like to work with you
to see if we cannot somehow find a way to make sure that, one,
it is accurate, but, two, make sure that we do not paralyze the
recovery effort in the process.
Mr. Fugate. And that I do agree. Oftentimes when FEMA could
not get to a yes, we were prevented because we could not
support it. And if we had, it would have been overturned. We
have not always been forthcoming in saying we cannot do that.
We oftentimes have delayed and asked for more information and
hope that we will get a better answer.
As I talk to many of the parish presidents, I say, ``Let me
be honest with you. If the answer is no, I need to tell you no
on the front end, not delay that answer and hope it gets
better. And if the answer is yes, get to it definitely, and if
it is maybe, let us find the right answer.'' But we want to be
speedy, not hasty. As we have seen, and as many of the parishes
are dealing with post-Hurricane Katrina issues, we have the
inspector general coming in and finding that original decisions
were not correct, asking for money back.
Our goal is to get it right the first time. I think I heard
this loud and clear from the chairwoman, and she made it very
clear to me. She said, ``Craig, no matter what we do, let us
get it right the first time. Let us not go in 6 months from now
and start changing the answers.'' So that has been our focus.
Again, some of this becomes, as we get into insurance and
other things, very technical. But my commitment to the parishes
and the States has been, ``Let us get to the answer quickly.
Let us get resolution and know what the next steps are. And let
us not just kick the can down the road because I may not like
the answer I am going to give you, so I am going to delay it.
If the answer is no, I need to tell you no so you know what the
next steps are versus to keep any false hope or to merely delay
saying something you may not want to hear. I need to give you
what you need to know so you know what the next steps are.''
Representative Richmond. Senator, I will yield back for the
second round.
Senator Landrieu. Thank you. We are going to do a 4-minute
round real quick because we do have some questions, and we will
get to the parish presidents in just a moment.
But General Peabody, I want to say this as respectfully as
I can. I appreciate your demeanor before this subcommittee. But
from where I sit, your budget, to me, just looks like a
disaster waiting to happen. And I know that you are very
focused on the specific projects that Senator Vitter, and I,
and the Congressman have raised about the Plaquemines Parish,
and you can make some adjustments there, and we hope you can.
But let me just give you an example of why I am not
sleeping well at night, and I do not know how you are. One, the
west shore project was first authorized in 1971 in your
budget--that was 40 years ago, that project is in one of the
river parishes whom is represented here. There are two other
projects, but because we could not have all 19 coastal parishes
testify today, we have four parish presidents, but they are
representative of dozens.
This study has been in your budget for 40 years, and it has
not progressed one iota. Why is that? And why are you not
concerned about it or seem to be worried about it, or press for
additional funding to not only complete the study, but start
building in St. John, St. James, and St. Charles, so this could
have been avoided?
General Peabody. Madam Chair, I sleep well at night because
I think I was born with a special talent I guess.
Senator Landrieu. Well, we are glad for that.
General Peabody. It is a gift. But, no, to be very serious,
and I take your question very seriously, I think the reality of
the situation--to put this in a larger context is, COE is just
one very small element of a much larger Federal agency equation
under which all of our budgets are under pressure given the
Nation's fiscal challenges.
Senator Landrieu. But how do you justify--when you appear
before your superiors, what do you tell them looking in your
region, which is the Mississippi, about how much funding you
need, give us that for your testimony today. What is your
backlog in your region, your authorized backlog today of
necessary, authorized, and critical infrastructure projects?
General Peabody. I do not have the precise number for the
region, but I can tell you nationally our construction--just
construction--this is not operations and maintenance backlog--
is on the order of $60 billion. So that is significant.
Senator Landrieu. That is not operation and maintenance.
General Peabody. No, ma'am, that is construction.
Senator Landrieu. It is construction backlog. I would like
for the record of this subcommittee for you to submit your
region backlog for operations and maintenance.
General Peabody. Yes, ma'am. We will follow----
Senator Landrieu. And for construction, because our parish
presidents are incredulous when I tell them--Senator Vitter is
on the authorizing committee, he knows this. I am on the
Appropriations Committee. Yes, we can help get your project
authorized. But any indication that we could actually get it
built any time soon, you would have to get behind $40 or $50
billion of other projects.
This is an unworkable--if it was not so sad it would be a
laughable budget, but it is nothing to laugh about. And I do
not under what system--do you not report this to the superiors?
Do you not say this is our backlog? Do you not say, okay, our
plan is to get 10 percent a year until we catch up? Because it
looks like to us what COE does is simply ignore the pain and
suffering around the country, and your budget reflects that.
Neither your superiors or the President's budget reflect the
need--it is not just this President, but former Presidents.
And once Hurricane Katrina came along, our delegation had
to wrestle $14 billion out of the Army Corps of Engineers. I
think the country was so ashamed, they gave it to us. It was an
anomaly, extremely unusual, and probably unprecedented, and may
not be able to ever happen again. But that is the kind of
determination and action is necessary, not just after Hurricane
Katrina, but day in and day out in Washington. There does not
seem to be any sense of urgency about this.
General Peabody. The reality is that our budget cap is set.
It is then--when we send our budget proposals up to the higher
headquarters, we start with a 75-percent baseline from the year
prior, and then----
Senator Landrieu. That is your mistake. That is your
mistake, and that has to be changed. You have to send your
total requirements for the Nation. You cannot send 75 percent
of your former year budget.
General Peabody. That is the starting point.
Senator Landrieu. Well, I am going to change that starting
point because it is not appropriate for your agency, for this
agency. It may be for transportation. It may be for housing. It
is wholly inadequate for the people that I represent, and I
might be able to speak for other people in the country that
would feel the same way.
And I do not want to take too much time. Senator Vitter, go
ahead.
Senator Vitter. Okay. Thank you. General, let me go back to
that list of areas hard hit that are not in the post-Hurricane
Katrina system. And again, the angst and the outright anger
many of us feel is that there are COE projects. And actually
during the process of building the post-Hurricane Katrina
system in a very expedited way.
These areas outside the system were reassured, oh, we have
a project for you. We have a project for you. The problem is as
that core post-Hurricane Katrina system was finished, we went
back to the core normal, and those other projects either slowed
to a snail's pace or, in some cases, were outright canceled.
Let us go back to the west shore and LaPlace, 41 years on
the books. Still do not have an alignment. What is the schedule
for a final alignment to move forward with authorization?
General Peabody. Senator, the schedules depend upon
appropriations, but we need approximately $1 million to finish
the study, and 18 to 24 months. So if we got the appropriation,
we could finish the study. But this particular study, to my
knowledge, has never received any funding in the President's
budget. It has all been from congressional ads at various
points in time.
Senator Landrieu. It has been outlawed. Go ahead.
Senator Vitter. Has any action been taken with COE since
the LaPlace flooding to accelerate or find that $1 million? In
the grand scheme of things, that is a small amount of money,
but tight of money. You all move around within the COE budget
every month of every year.
General Peabody. Senator, all of our projects, our entire
backlog competes for the amount of money above the 75-percent
baseline that all the regions get. So we generally get year
over year about what we got the year before. Our budgets, as
you pointed out, Senator Landrieu, however, have been under
extreme pressure and have been coming down year over year.
Senator Vitter. Let me move on to the very impacted areas.
Lower Jefferson. Lower Jefferson is exactly the sort of area I
am talking about that was promised protection. Oh, do not get
in the way of this post-Hurricane Katrina work. Let it happen.
We have a project for you. Then their project was canceled. I
mean, to those of us here locally, that sort of seems like a
bait and switch. What do you tell the people of lower Jefferson
who did not obstruct help for their neighbors to the north, and
are now left out in the cold?
General Peabody. Senator, I cannot speak to promises or
decisions that were made in the past. But I was the decision
maker on terminating that study. And the reason I made that
decision was because we looked at several alternatives, and the
best case scenario was that we could only get to about a .55, I
believe, benefit-cost ratio.
So, there is no way that that can compete on economic basis
with all the other--and we spent $10 million. We could have
continued to spend money--the taxpayers' money--studying this
problem. That was clearly never going to meet the policy
requirements.
Senator Vitter. For that same area, section 205 projects
are also available.
General Peabody. That is correct.
Senator Vitter. Why can COE not move forward with smaller
section 205 projects?
General Peabody. There is a limit in general on those
projects, Senator, I think, around $5 million or $7 million.
Yes. And I think it is a matter of having alignments that allow
to deliver a risk-reduction measure within that available cap.
Senator Vitter. Okay. The north shore. One great help to
the north shore, including all the areas that were flooded by
Hurricane Isaac, would be some sort of surge barrier near the
Rigolets in the Chef Pass. That is exactly the sort of
additional project that we were talking about to have COE study
in the appropriation and authorization language immediately
post-Hurricane Katrina.
In my opinion, COE read all meaning out of that language
and did a very vague analysis so it would come up with no
actionable items for new projects. Will COE look back at that
language and look specifically at a surge barrier?
General Peabody. Senator, I was not aware of that, so I
will take that on. I will look at that. I will tell you that my
understanding is that the last time we took a hard look at the
barrier plan was in the 1984 reevaluation report, where
concluded that the so-called high-level plan was more
beneficial. It was less environmentally damaging, and it was
more acceptable to the public.
Senator Vitter. I will send you the post-Hurricane Katrina
language because I think it gets clear, not just the authority,
but mandates to COE to look at significant additional
protection like that.
And finally, I mentioned Morganza to the Gulf. We missed
another deadline. Now since then we did have a productive
meeting in my office to try to come up with an actionable plan.
Could you describe the consensus coming out of that meeting?
General Peabody. In broad terms, Senator, what the core is
doing is an economic re-analysis, which we should have complete
in the next 1 to 1\1/2\ months. And that analysis will take
into consideration the likely rebuild rates in the event of
future storms. Once we have that analysis, we will have a
tentative benefit-cost ratio associated with that. And that
will inform the specific analysis going forward to complete the
project.
The other thing that we committed to doing was to look at
the design guidelines from HSDRRS. And just like I committed to
doing with Plaquemines Parish, General Bostick committed that
we would take a hard risk-based, site-specific look at the
study area of Morganza to the Gulf. And I would hope that we
could find ways to reduce some of the costs associated with
that project and make it more competitive from a fiscal
stewardship standpoint.
Senator Vitter. Right.
Senator Landrieu. And we will make sure that is on the
agenda, Senator Vitter, for our meeting in a couple of weeks.
Congressman Richmond.
Representative Richmond. General Peabody, some of my
parishes up and down the coast are complaining about the
Charleston method for mitigation, and the fact that it will
triple their costs to do their own flood protection, and do
some of their projects.
Why can we not grandfather those projects in that were
before the decision to use the Charleston method? Why can we
not just allow them to use the formal method to calculate
mitigation needs?
General Peabody. Congressman, I am not sure the basis that
we would have for grandfathering, so I would have to take your
specifics for the record and maybe follow up with you.
But I think the bottom line with the modified Charleston
method, which is really just a name for an approach in
Louisiana, is that prior to implementing this method, we were
not following the intent of the law in executing our mitigation
stewardship requirements--404(c) requirements in Louisiana. And
so as a result of a very long, 3- or 4-year process of internal
evaluation, extensive public engagement, the previous and the
current district commanders, both of them moved forward with
development of this process.
Now the average change--before I think the mitigation cost
ratio was around 1.6. Now it is 2.4. So it has gone up, not
insignificant, but not enormous. There are some cases where the
mitigation costs have actually gone down. There are other cases
where the mitigation costs are even higher than that 2.4
average.
Representative Richmond. Well, for especially St. Charles
Parish, it becomes an issue with some of the things that they
are trying to do. And what we would like to do is work with you
all to makes sure that their budget and their plan to do levy
protection and things to protect their citizens is not
completely stopped because now the increased costs are just
cost-prohibitive.
Let me move on to where Senator Vitter was just talking
about--and Senator Landrieu, the modeling of the west shore and
the flood protection are the results of Orleans and if it had
an impact. I do not understand it. I guess most people I have
talked to do not understand Government language. If we are
already doing the modeling to see if the Orleans and Jefferson
flood structures had an impact on the west shore, and you are
telling me it is a million dollars to finish the study for west
shore. Why can we not marry those and do them all together?
That is the frustrating part for us is really if there is a
will to do it, there is a way to do it. And we are already
asking for peer review, and we are already working on a
modeling. Why can we not somehow combine those?
General Peabody. Yeah, that is a great question,
Congressman. I think it boils down to legislative authorities
and language in those authorities. So when we get an authority
to do a project, it tends to be very focused very strictly on
that specific project. So our ability to combine purposes
across different authorities is, in general, limited and in
general, not always, but in general we are not able to do it.
And so that is kind of a systemic issue.
Representative Richmond. The other thing is you mentioned
the cost-benefit ratio on a number of things. And at least what
my understanding is that--Senator Landrieu and I just came
under fire from the L.A. Times, and we had to take a moment to
educate them on the importance of south Louisiana to the
Nation.
But it appears that we have to do the same with COE in
terms of the cost-benefit ratio because we have to now argue
that we should look at the fact that how important we are to
the country in terms of oil and gas, how important we are in
terms of seafood, and that the areas we are protecting are the
same places where the people who go out and catch the fish and
work on the rigs, where they live.
And also if you look at this storm in the pictures,
Interstate 10 was shut down. And if you look at our impact, not
just the port, but the interstate to the national economy,
those things, I think, would severely impact a cost-benefit
ratio when we are talking about whether something is justified
or not. And that would help us, I think, meet some of those
needs, and I think it is something that should absolutely be
considered what Louisiana does contribute to the economy
looking at the Port of New Orleans, oil and gas, the
interstate, rail, and all of those things.
General Peabody. Congressman, I will take your suggestions
and take a hard look at them, and convey your concerns to the
higher headquarters.
Senator Landrieu. Thank you. I am sorry this is going to
lead us to the end of this round. I do have two additional
questions. I have several that I am going to submit for the
record, two I will mention. I want to get your feedback in
writing, Administrator Fugate, about what States use their
rainy day funds and disaster funds, and what States are doing a
good job of budgeting in advance, please submit the answer to
this question for the record. We are going to have some
questions to our State about that.
And then I want to follow up also the mitigation issue and
the cost-benefit analysis. We are going to send you some
detailed questions. We need responses.
General Peabody. Sure.
[The information is available in the Additional Committee
Questions for the Record on page 75.]
Senator Landrieu. What we are operating under now is just
not practical. And so we are going to have to have some serious
changes there.
But thank you all very much, and I know you are going to
wait around to hear the testimony from our parish presidents.
Thank you very much, and if the parish presidents, the second
panel, will come forward: Garrett Graves representing the
State, Oneil Malbrough representing--do we have enough chairs?
And if not, we are going to have to seat the parish presidents
and pull up an extra chair.
Thank you all very much, and thank you for, of course, your
patience. I know that you are happy that we are here to be able
to have this discussion publicly. I want to thank all of you
for your leadership, the parish presidents, and what you have
provided for your citizens in the last few weeks.
I want to thank particularly again Mr. Young, Parish
President Young, for hosting us here. And why do we not start
with you, Mr. Young, since we are in your parish?
STATEMENT OF JOHN F. YOUNG, JR., PRESIDENT, JEFFERSON
PARISH
Mr. Young. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Senator Landrieu. And please limit your remarks to 5
minutes, and I will be somewhat lenient. But we will do 5
minutes and then rounds of questions.
Mr. Young. I will try to do that. Thank you, Madam Chair,
Senator Vitter, Congressman Richmond. On behalf of the
Jefferson Parish Council, my colleagues here at the table, and
myself, I want to thank you for having this hearing in the
historic city of Gretna, Louisiana, which is the parish seat of
Jefferson Parish.
As we all know, the last 7 years have been very trying for
this entire metropolitan community. We have been through
Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, Gustav, Ike, the BP oil disaster. Let
us not forget about Tropical Storm Lee because I would be
talking about that in 1 minute. Lafitte, Crown Point, and
Barataria were flooded from Tropical Storm Lee. Yes, a tropical
storm that set on us for 5 days and, through the southeast
winds, flooded those communities. And of course, our latest,
Hurricane Isaac.
After Hurricane Katrina and the failure of the Federal
levee system, the Federal Government, through much of your
efforts, and your colleagues in the Congress, appropriated
about $14.5 billion to protect us--increase our level of
protection. Although Hurricane Isaac was not the most robust
test of that system, the improvements in HSDRRS worked. Those
areas within the levee protection system did not flood from
storm surge or tidal surge.
Our primary threat for those areas within the levee
protection system, as we anticipated prior to the storm making
landfall, was excessive rainfall, because I can speak for
Jefferson and Orleans, our internal drainage system is only
designed to drain 1 inch the first hour and one-half an inch
every 1 hour thereafter. So the Southeast Louisiana Urban Flood
Control (SELA) Program has vastly improved our internal
drainage system, but continued investment in the SELA Program
is needed.
However, those areas outside the levee protection system
did not fare as well. Areas in several parishes outside the
levee protection system flooded, many for the first time. We
have talked about St. John and LaPlace, Plaquemines,
Braithwaite, St. Tammany, and Slidell. But let us not forget
that Lafitte, Crown Point, and Barataria have flooded four
times--four times--within the last 7 years. Lafitte, Crown
Point, and Barataria were flooded from Hurricanes Rita, Ike,
Tropical Storm Lee, and now Hurricane Isaac. In fact, Lafitte,
Crown Point, and Barataria were flooded twice within 1 year
when you look at Tropical Storm Lee and Hurricane Isaac.
Many of those citizens down there had just finished
repairing their homes from the flood damage from Tropical Storm
Lee, and this was tidal and coastal flooding, not rainfall
flooding, when Hurricane Isaac hit. Hurricane Isaac, by the
way, being the worst in 52 years.
The western enclosure complex was built to protect upper
Jefferson, and you have mentioned that in your remarks,
Senators Vitter and Landrieu. And we were promised at that
time--and Mayor Kerner is here, and he can attest to this--that
we would have Donaldson built to the gulf to protect Lafitte,
Crown Point, and Barataria. But that has since been scrapped by
COE because of a cost-benefit analysis.
That makes it even more imperative that we find a way to
protect these communities. In the interim, it would be
elevation, elevation of homes, and in the long-term ring levees
in the coastal restoration system with locks and gates.
I have not mentioned the most famous island in the United
States as we have talked about, Senator Landrieu, and that is
Grand Isle, because Grand Isle is in a class all by itself.
Grand Isle gets hit every time--every time. All of these
communities were also--I am talking about Lafitte, Crown Point,
Barataria, and Grand Isle, ground zero for the BP oil disaster.
Fortunately through your efforts and your colleagues'
efforts, we have some relief coming in the RESTORE Act in the
Gold Mesa, and we have a State master plan that I want to give
credit to Gary Graves and the Governor--a $50 billion master
plan where we will invest over $1 billion over the next 50
years.
But I want to stress that it is time for studies--the time
for studies is over. We do not have the luxury of time. We are
literally losing land mass the size of a football field every
30 minutes.
We talk about cost-benefit analysis, but here is what I
want to stress. We need as a Nation to plant our flag in Grand
Isle, Louisiana, because if we do not do that, the tides and
waves of the Gulf of Mexico will be literally lapping at the
door of metropolitan New Orleans in the not too distant future.
It is not just a State or a local issue, as has already
been discussed. It is a national issue. We produce 30 to 35
percent of the oil and natural gas consumed in this country. We
produce 30 to 35 percent of the domestic fisheries consumed in
this country. The Barataria Basin is one of the most productive
estuaries in the world.
We need to continue to build on the significant level of
protection achieved since Hurricane Katrina. But we also need
to take the steps and appropriate the necessary funds to
protect those areas outside of the levee protection system, and
I will talk about Jefferson Parish. I am sure my colleagues
will talk about their particular needs--Lafitte, Crown Point,
Barataria, and Grand Isle.
Just as an aside, I thought there would be some--well,
there are some staff members not from here, and I know Senator
Landrieu, and Vitter, and Richmond know this. But it is
interesting to note that Lafitte, the town of Jean Lafitte is
named after a famous pirate, Jean Lafitte, who hid out on those
waterways. But one of the things he did was he assisted the
American troops in the Battle of New Orleans, and to his
credit, part of the victory was accredited to him. So that
community is named after Jean Lafitte, the pirate.
These communities deserve protection. They are part of our
community. They are part of our country. In all respect, if we
can rebuild cities in foreign and sometimes hostile countries,
we need to make them deliver upon a commitment to our fellow
U.S. citizens and assure them that we will not only rebuild and
rebuild better, but we also protect them from future events.
It is also not lost that Hurricane Isaac made landfall
exactly 7 years to the day after Hurricane Katrina hit, and we
still have some unresolved Hurricane Katrina issues. Number
one, forgiveness of about a $55 million special community
disaster loan, which we have not been successful in obtaining
despite the efforts of you, Senator Landrieu, you, Senator
Vitter, Congressman Richmond, and our entire congressional
delegation. We have been penalized because Jefferson Parish had
a false economy after the storm, but we helped rebuild the
entire metropolitan area. There have been events since
Hurricane Katrina--the storms, the BP oil disaster, the
sluggish national economy, and now Hurricane Isaac. These
events, in my humble opinion, merit forgiveness of that
community disaster loan, and we request that again. I know
Administrator Fugate is here, and certainly we make that
request again, and we thank you for your language in the bill.
And we hope that the Obama administration does not oppose
moving forward with that language in that bill.
The other thing that is quite frustrating is we are still
trying to get reimbursement for improvements that we made as a
parish with our own money post-Hurricane Katrina. And we were
told that we would get reimbursed from that by COE. These are
the monies we spent in constructing safe rooms, detention
ponds, and pumps. And that has been authorized. We went through
an extensive and frustrating audit process by COE. That money
has been now approved, but now we are told by COE despite money
in the budget, we need a specific appropriation.
Senator Landrieu. How much is that?
Mr. Young. That is about $40 million, Senator, most of
which comes to Jefferson. Some of it goes to New Orleans Sewage
and Water Board, and some of it, I believe, goes to St.
Tammany.
But again, this is a situation where we have been fighting
with COE. Again, no disrespect to anyone who is here. We have a
much better relationship with them since Hurricane Katrina. But
I do want to make this editorial comment. COE needs some
reformation at the top, but where they really reform is at the
Office of Counsel because the MO on the Motacapalani Office of
Counsel of COE is, the answer is no. What is your question? And
I am not being facetious in that regard.
A lot of the disagreements we have based upon, and we have
had discussion with you, Senator, and the rest of our
congressional delegation. We go up to Washington. We get
legislation passed. We think we are all on the same page, and
then COE comes back to the Office of Counsel and says that is
not the intent.
Senator Landrieu. They figure out a way not to do it.
Mr. Young. Right. But again----
Senator Landrieu. Okay, 30 seconds.
Mr. Young. We have relocation expenses. This is where we
have relocated for the SELA Program for utilities. They did a
reprogramming. It's just a coincidence, so they say, that the
$60 million that was reprogrammed is now the amount of
relocation costs that New Orleans Sewage and Water Board and
Jefferson Parish have to come up with up front instead of
paying it over 30 years, which was part of the legislation when
we did the SELA in the local Chef at 25 or 35 percent. So we
are asking for a 30-year payback on the relocation costs, as
well as the entire costs of these ongoing SELA projects.
I am going to close by saying the path forward we have to
look at our communities, those both inside the levee protection
system and those outside the levee protection system. And
obviously our priority outside the flood protection system
should be ring levees and house elevations for Lafitte, Crown
Pointe, and Barataria, upgrading existing pump stations,
generators, and three additional pump stations, gates for
Lafitte, Crown Point, and Barataria, armoring the Grand Isle
levees on the gulf side, and completing the segmented break
well on the north side of Grand Isle, and restoring and
armoring Fifi Island.
I would like to make one comment about areas within the
hurricane protection system, Senator, if you would. We had have
had a disagreement with COE about option 1, 2, and 2(a) and
pump to the river. And all of you all have been very helpful in
that regard. We did have a very successful response to
Hurricane Isaac, but I think I would be remiss if I did not say
this.
During the storm I got a call from Marcia St. Martin, and
when you get a call from Marcia during the storm, you know it
is not good news. She is not calling to tell me hello. We had
an issue at the outfall pump station. Fortunately, it did not
develop into a major issue, but again, for the record, we have
been saying this since COE decided to go with option 1, our
modified option 1, which they all admit is technically inferior
to option 2 and 2(a) pump to the river.
You have to tandem pump between pump station No. 6 and the
outfall station, which is now an interim station. We do not
think that is the best way to go. We think that station, pump
station No. 6, should be decommissioned. That canal should be
taken down. The street level should be drained by gravity and
should only have one station at the end for all three outfalls,
because what happened was we were instructed--Marcia was
because the Sewage and Water Board operates the pump station--
to pull back on the pump when the rain was at its height.
And when I had a lot of people I was concerned about, we
were keeping them dry thus far. If that delay would have lasted
longer than it did, we may have flooded from rainfall. And that
is the problem we have with tandem pumping. And because they
would only let the water get so high in those walls. So that is
an issue we need to look at it. And let us do it right this
time while we have that opportunity.
Senator Landrieu. I really hope COE is listening to that
final explanation, or we are going to be sitting here a couple
of years from now wishing, wishing, we could have, we should
have, but we did not.
PREPARED STATEMENT
Mr. Young. And I am going to close now. I do not want to be
sitting here a few years from now on another storm when
something drastic happens, and despite what we have been
saying--I want to be on the record--this is a disaster waiting
to happen.
Thank you very much, Senator.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of John F. Young, Jr.
Exactly 7 years to the day that Hurricane Katrina devastated the
gulf coast by exposing the inherent weakness of the levee protection
and creating the most expensive catastrophic disaster in American
History, Hurricane Isaac vividly reminded us of the destructive power
nature possesses as it pummeled the Louisiana coast with relentless
wind and violent storm surge while pinning us under a blanket of
rainfall as it crept north through the State.
Jefferson Parish Emergency Management conducted a partial
activation of its EOC and monitored the storm from over 150 hours
outside tropical force winds impacting the coast of Louisiana. However,
it was not until August 23 that NOAA projections began drifting the
path of the forecasted Hurricane toward the west from the coast of
Florida to Alabama with its eventual eye on Louisiana. This westerly
trend would continue until landfall 6 days later.
On August 26, 2012, Jefferson Parish President John Young signed a
declaration of a State of Emergency and the Emergency Operations Center
went into full activation. In conjunction with Mayor David Camardelle,
Jefferson Parish President John Young initiated a mandatory evacuation
of Grand Isle for all tourists and gave island residents until Monday
to seek alternate shelter locations. Shelters were open in Raceland in
Lafourche Parish for these residents to shelter in place. Residents in
low-lying areas of coastal Jefferson Parish outside levee protection
such as Jean Lafitte, Barataria, and Crown Point were reminded to pay
close attention to news reports in the event storm surge levels
warranted emergency measures or evacuations.
Although typically not triggered by less than a category 3
hurricane, The Jefferson Parish Department of Emergency Management, in
conjunction with the Department of Transit, the State Department of
Health and Hospitals and our regional DRC of Hospitals began the
process of evacuating all special needs medical residents to shelters,
realizing the slow nature of the storm and its forecast for a potential
category 2 would result in significant power outages. Those Special
Needs Medical (SNM) residents who were ambulatory were able to be moved
to facilities at the Louisiana State University in Baton Rouge. The
SNMs that were non-ambulatory or required care-giver assistance were
triaged and moved to both East Jefferson and West Jefferson Hospitals.
In addition, the American Red Cross opened shelters throughout the
State for citizens of Jefferson Parish to conduct self-evacuation. The
ability of the State to mobilize its assets and conduct these
operations was unprecedented and is a testament to the changes made in
the wake of Katrina/Gustav. These efforts resulted in over 350 special
needs medical residents receiving assistance during the incident from
local, State, and Federal assets.
All pre-staging of assets and equipment took place in preparation
of response activities. Each department conducted its required pre-
landfall checklists to ensure all actions necessary to prevent,
minimize or mitigate potential storm damage had been taken and that
personnel and equipment were in place to respond to the effects as soon
as conditions were safe enough to allow for actions without
jeopardizing the safety of the responders.
After more than a day of relentless pounding by both wind and rain,
which brought about one of the fastest rising storm surges experienced
in Grand Isle, the wind began to relinquish enough to allow for
response activities to begin. Even prior to the wind speed falling
under 30 mph, the dedicated personnel from the fire departments,
sheriff's office, public works, code enforcement, and administration
began swarming the parish to identify unsafe conditions, such as
debris, electrical wires crossing roadways, and localized flooding of
streets to began taking appropriate measures to make it safe for our
residents. In fact, before Entergy began dispatching their fleet of
responders, the Jefferson Parish Department of Public Works and Streets
Department had cleared all major roadways and arteries and were
focusing their efforts on residential streets and smaller laterals. The
sheriff's office established a command post in the Jean Lafitte, Crown
Point, and Barataria area to begin the process of conducting search and
rescue operations of residents stranded in their houses by the flood
waters.
With nearly every resident in the parish without electricity, the
parish, in conjunction with the State and FEMA established 7 points of
distribution for ice, water, MREs, and tarps, one each in Grand Isle
and Jean Lafitte and five throughout the East and West Banks of
Jefferson Parish. Nearly 1 million MREs, 2.4 million bottles of water,
300,000 bags of ice and 25,000 tarps were distributed from these
locations. In addition, the East and West Bank fire departments
distributed these items throughout their respective districts ensuring
the most vulnerable residents, being the elderly and handicapped, would
receive these essential services.
Five shelters were opened up within Jefferson Parish utilizing
recreational facilities to shelter residents whose homes had been
damaged and to offer cooling shelters to the elderly and handicapped as
a result of the extensive power outages. These shelters were managed by
the American Red Cross and offered hot meals as well. The nursing homes
and elderly residential living units were monitored by the Emergency
Management Department, council members, EMS personnel and fire
department personnel, and when Entergy was unable to restore power
quickly enough, generators were provided or the evacuation of
facilities transpired. At the height of shelter operations, nearly 450
residents sought shelter, food, and assistance.
In the aftermath, the State with assistance from the National
Guard, Jefferson Parish Sheriff's Office, and parish government opened
Disaster Supplemental Nutritional Assistance Program (DSNAP) sites for
the distribution of aid at three locations in the parish. In 13 days,
over 64,000 citizens/154,000 households were approved to receive
benefits in the amount of $27,043,676. In addition, disaster recovery
sites were opened in Grand Isle and Jean Lafitte originally and two
more are proposed to open this week, one on the East and West Bank of
Jefferson Parish, inside the levee protection system.
Although the National Guard was assigned to assist in the parish in
responding to and/or addressing particular issues, it is imperative
that the local emergency management director has the ability to
redirect missions and task with the troop's onsite command to redirect
this manpower for additional tasks in response to the current and
changing picture of the disaster.
There are many lessons that this storm has taught us, but in the
sake of brevity, I would like to focus on the following:
First and foremost, without the commitment of Congress and the
administration to take all appropriate actions necessary to restore the
marsh and barrier islands to reduce the impact of tidal surge on the
coast of Louisiana, it is only a matter of time before the gulf waters
start lapping at the door of metropolitan New Orleans. In light of the
nearly $15 billion spent to upgrade the Flood Protection and Risk
Reduction System to protect the area from a category 3 hurricane, it is
significant to note that Hurricane Isaac was a slow moving category 1
hurricane and one need only look to Jean Lafitte, Crown Point,
Barataria and Grand Isle, Braithwaite of Plaquemines Parish, and
LaPlace of St. John Parish to understand that this storm brought an
even higher storm surge than did Hurricane Katrina. Without significant
and consistent investment in ring levees and in our marsh and barrier
islands, our future is at serious risk.
Second, there are few communities in the world that have
experienced the level of catastrophic events over the past 7 years as
we have in the coastal parishes of Louisiana. We have been ground zero
for both the largest natural and man made disasters in American
history, Katrina and the BP Oil Spill. In fact, according to Kiplinger,
Louisiana is ranked number one as the most disaster prone State over
the past decade. Jefferson Parish received a Special Community Disaster
Loan (SCDL) following Katrina. As a result of all of the construction
and replacement of lost goods which created a false economy in our
Parish, we did not meet the forgiveness criteria. This needs to be
corrected and the SCDL needs to be fully forgiven, especially in light
of our most recent devastation as a result of Hurricane Isaac.
Third, the process by which the Saffir-Simpson Scale identifies
damages for insurance purposes has to be reviewed. The wind category
strength of the storm cannot dictate a particular storm's actual
devastation and a serious review needs to be conducted to determine how
we measure the effects and the correct preventative and preparatory
actions taken during the pre-storm hours.
Fourth, FEMA's response needs more flexibility to programmatic
changes that increases the effectiveness of assisting the citizens,
post-disaster. The programs and guidelines set forth to be eligible for
FEMA funding directs criteria that need to be met to receive Federal
funding. Affected areas that have been devastated should be eligible
for an aerial PDA review that allows for expedited approval for Federal
funding by obvious destruction of those neighborhoods.
Senator Landrieu. And we are going to go by seniority now.
So I think that is you, Mr. Nungesser.
STATEMENT OF BILLY NUNGESSER, PRESIDENT, PLAQUEMINES
PARISH
Mr. Nungesser. Thank you. Thank you, Senator. Thank you,
Senator Vitter, Congressman Richmond, for having us here today.
I gave you all little handouts so I do not have to go
through everything, where we are in this particular--Craig's
team on the ground has been doing a good job in Plaquemines
Parish.
[The referenced handout was not available at press time.]
The one issue that we are dealing with is the right on
personal property. As you will see from those pictures, the
dead animals are massive in the parish. And we do not go on
those private properties until they clean up the debris. And
initially, we went out and started cleaning the properties. Now
they do not even inspect these properties. And only in the
flooded areas, which we understand that is the only areas. We
are asking for assistance on private property, because the
debris is 10-12 feet deep. It runs from the levee across
Highway 23, and on the East Bank between the levees it is
massive.
And we are asking that Craig try to expedite that. To date
in the last week, only 17 properties have been cleared, and
those animals out there rot. And until we get on those
properties and start moving debris--you will see in the second
picture that was one driveway that was cleaned, and the amount
of dead corpses that were uncovered in that property. People
cannot get back and start working on their home because of the
smell and the sickness that this causes. We have put out that
this is a major health issue in the parish to get these
properties cleaned up.
We, too, have asked for the forgiveness of the Hurricane
Katrina loan. Because of the 90/10--hopefully 90/10--split, it
is going to put a financial burden on Plaquemines Parish for
this storm once it is done. The good news is the Federal levees
held up. Everywhere we had Federal levees, we did not--we saw
those levees over top in a couple of areas, but they held up,
and we saw no flooding in those areas.
I appreciate the general looking into covering the whole 34
miles on the West Bank. On the East Bank, we do not meet the
criteria by COE for a Federal levee. Plaquemines Parish had a
$30 million levee. They bonded out under construction. We just
did not get it finished. It would not have mattered for this
storm anyway.
But you can see the picture of the great wall in St.
Bernard, and why the people on the East Bank of Plaquemines are
so upset that they have got an 80-foot levee next to their 30-
foot wall.
Senator Landrieu. Because you did not get the cost-benefit
ratio.
Mr. Nungesser. Absolutely. And I got to tell you, Senator--
--
Senator Landrieu. Because the mouth of the Mississippi
River is obviously not important to the country in any way, so
that is no benefit to the mouth of the Mississippi. But go
right ahead.
Mr. Nungesser. We got Federal authorization on the West
Bank to bridge that gap. We have got Federal levees in south
Plaquemines, and Federal levees in north Plaquemines. But we
are going to bridge those 34 miles on the West Bank.
On the East Bank, we have got St. Barnard with a 30-foot
wall. We have got 18 miles--just 18 miles of levee that is a
parish levee. Then we have a Federal levee in south Plaquemines
on the East Bank. Those people were trapped. We got some of
them out by levee, some by air boat. Some people risked their
lives rescuing people.
But to have that 18 miles with no Federal levee, but keep
up the Federal levee in south Plaquemines----
Senator Landrieu. It does not make any sense.
Mr. Nungesser [continuing]. Does not make sense. And when
you look at the coal facilities, the export and import of goods
along both sides of the Mississippi and Plaquemines Parish,
part of the reason we have such great walls is the amount of
tonnage that moves out of Plaquemines Parish. And also all
those fishing docks where that great seafood comes in are shut
down for weeks.
PREPARED STATEMENT
We keep rebuilding and paying with Federal dollars to
rebuild these areas. We asked the President, when we met with
him weeks ago, this is an opportunity to get these two gaps in
Plaquemines Parish in the Federal system, get them built. And
as we saw in south Plaquemines, both sides of the river, they
are up and running again. We just could not get there. It does
not make a lot of sense to fund those Federal levees and not
fund the gaps in between them.
Thank you so much.
[The prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Billy Nungesser
plaquemines parish levee construction
West Bank Back Levee From Oakville to St. Jude.--We are requesting
the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to return to the 1-percent 50-year
protection design which will allow for enough money to complete the
West Bank Back Levee all the way from Belle Chasse to Venice.
East Bank Back Levee From Braithwaite to White Ditch.--We raised
the 18 miles of levee from Braithwaite to White Ditch to a uniform 8
feet in 2008 with parish funds to give our residents additional
protection. We are currently raising the same levee to 12.5 feet with
parish funds. We are requesting the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to
include this 18 miles of East Bank Back Levee into the Federal System
and build it to at least the 1-percent 50-year protection design.
It does not make sense for the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to
control and maintain Federal levees on the upper ends and the lower
ends of Plaquemines Parish and leave a section in the middle on both
sides of the Mississippi River unprotected by Federal levees. This cuts
our parish in half during a storm event and leaves our residents and
businesses in danger of flooding as was seen by Hurricane Isaac.
[See the attached request sent to Senator Mary L. Landrieu on
September 13, 2012:]
Letter From Billy Nungesser to Senator Mary L. Landrieu
September 13, 2012.
Hon. Mary L. Landrieu,
Chair, Subcommittee on Homeland Security,
Washington, DC.
Dear Senator Landrieu: The New Orleans to Venice (NOV) Louisiana
Hurricane Protection Project and the Non-Federal Levee (NFL)
incorporation into the NOV project collectively received more than $1.4
billion from supplemental bills (3rd, 4th, 6th, and 7th) post-Katrina.
At the time funding was approved, based on use of the Engineering
Manual Guideline (EM), it was thought that the amount of funding
received would be sufficient to complete the existing 50-year level of
risk reduction (LORR) for the existing NOV projects and incorporate NOV
into the existing projects. The intent of the funding included
incorporation of the 34 miles of existing small public and private back
levees on the West Bank of Plaquemines Parish from Oakville, Louisiana,
to St. Jude into the Federal system.
In February 2010, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers informed Parish
President Billy Nungesser that the funding in hand was inadequate to
complete the work due to a fundamental change in the post Hurricane
Katrina Design Guidelines. The new Hurricane Storm Damage Risk
Reduction System (HSDRRS) guidelines would require an additional $1.0
billion to complete. As a result of this decision Plaquemines Parish is
now faced with the possibility of completion of only 20 miles of levee
construction instead of 34 miles for the newly incorporated section
from Oakville to St. Jude on the West Bank and leaving parts of the
existing NOV projects unconstructed.
In July 2011, the U.S. Army Corp of Engineers hosted a 3-day
Project Delivery Summit for the combined NOV projects. The objective
was to optimize project features, establish a completion schedule,
reduce costs, and deliver a system-wide protection plan within the
budgeted and available funding. A plan was put together with over 100
participants including USACE, OCPR, and PPG. A comprehensive system
approach included analyzing the existing factor of safety, height
deficiencies and overtopping. This summit resulted in a plan that would
optimize all polders in the Federal and non-Federal sections, and
implement the needs expressed by the parish and the State.
This plan was scheduled to be delivered to Major General Walsh on
August 22, 2011. General Walsh, however, unilaterally decided on August
19, 2011, to implement the new HSDRRS design guidelines without
reviewing or discussing the aforementioned summit results. This
decision by General Walsh is not supported by the data from the summit.
While we might agree that given that the infrastructure costs in other
parishes are much greater, a 1-percent 100-year risk reduction system
may be needed for Orleans, Jefferson, and St. Bernard Parishes, we
believe that here in Plaquemines Parish our 2-percent 50-year risk
reduction system satisfies community needs. To require this new 1-
percent HSDRRS design for our parish is an enormous waste of Federal
money on a design that delivers less protection, an incomplete
protection system with gaps, and because of the resulting gaps in the
levee system, does not achieve the congressional objectives for a
complete ``risk reduction system.'' In point of fact, the stated
objective of the original authorization design was to protect all of LA
State Hwy. 23, not a piece of it. The decision by General Walsh does
not conform to the objective.
Two weeks ago Hurricane Isaac came through Plaquemines Parish
resulting in more than 7.5 feet of water in the same areas where
Federal levees were originally proposed to be constructed. If General
Walsh's HSDRRS decision is allowed to stand we would still have flooded
Hwy. 23 on the south end of the project.
Hwy. 23 is our only evacuation route. The primary reason for
including this area in the Federal protection supplemental was to
protect this evacuation route. As it currently stands we will now be 14
miles short of a complete ``risk reduction'' levee protection system.
It means 14 miles of water over Hwy. 23, cutting our parish in half and
making evacuation difficult if not impossible while ensuring a
continued negative economic impact for both our residents and our
businesses which, as we all know, will adversely affect the national
interests.
Our simple request is to reinstate the original Engineering Manual
(EM) guidelines. If the EM guidelines were to be reinstated for this
project, we can complete the full 34 miles of needed protection thereby
eliminating the flooding of Hwy. 23. This would in turn allow the doors
of our homes, communities, and businesses to remain open. (As a
sidebar; the EM guideline is the standard every levee system outside of
the New Orleans area is built to).
It is noteworthy that the existing 90 miles of Federal levees from
St. Jude to Venice and from Phoenix to Bohemia were built to the EM
standards. It is also noteworthy that we had no failures or overtopping
of the Federal levees during Hurricane Isaac.
Enclosed are a few pictures of the effects of Hurricane Isaac. Had
the levees been built to the EM standard as proposed, most likely our
homeless residents would today be living in their homes and not a
shelter; local, State, and Federal governments would be able to put
much needed resources to other uses in this recovery; and the oil and
gas industries would have been able to access their businesses and get
back in business much sooner.
We ask for your support in helping to reinstate the original
Engineering Manual Guidelines for the full 34 miles of the New Orleans
to Venice (NOV) Louisiana Hurricane Protection Project (The ``NFL''),
and help us fast track construction of this important project.
Sincerely,
William ``Billy'' Nungesser,
Parish President,
Plaquemines Parish.
[The referenced pictures follow:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Senator Landrieu. Thank you. Would it be Ms. Brister or Ms.
Robottom? Okay. Next in seniority. Go right ahead. I am
relatively new, so I am not 100 percent sure, but go right
ahead.
STATEMENT OF NATALIE ROBOTTOM, PRESIDENT, ST. JOHN THE
BAPTIST PARISH
Ms. Robottom. Madam Chairman, Senator Vitter, and
Congressman Richmond, first of all, thank you for hosting us
today.
Over the last 25 days, St. John the Baptist Parish has
worked hard to recover from the devastation caused by Hurricane
Isaac. More than 7,000 homes were damaged, but through the
grace of God no lives were lost.
St. John Parish has never flooded in the past. Flooding
occurs in our streets and along the interstate, but not in our
homes. Preparedness is ongoing. As our staff is trained, we
update standard operating procedures and our residents were
informed. We were prepared, but no one anticipated the disaster
that unfolded in our community.
On Sunday, a hurricane watch was issued for Louisiana, and
I, along with Governor Jindal and President Obama, issued
emergency disaster declarations. The OC was partially activated
in employee-secured facilities and pre-positioned generators
and barricades. Police officers were sent out to the homes
north of I-10 securing contact information for those electing
not to evacuate.
On Monday, the OC was fully activated, schools closed, and
sandbags distributed. Daily conference calls were held with
GOHSEP, the weather service, States agencies, and surrounding
parishes. And based on updates, slosh modeling, and historical
data, a voluntary evacuation was ordered in our low-lying
areas.
On Tuesday, Tropical Storm Isaac became a category 1
hurricane, and water levels rose at the lake, and hurricane
force winds reached the parish at about 3 a.m. On Wednesday at
6:30 a.m., water was shut off in LaPlace, and search and rescue
efforts began at 9 a.m. The sheriff's office, fire department,
National Guard, wildlife and fisheries, Coast Guard, and a host
of volunteers with their own boats continued search and rescue
efforts for more than 48 hours.
Our residents were rescued by boats and high water
vehicles, as our greatest fears were realized. Evacuation
routes were shut down. I-10 and Airline Highway were under
water. And portions of River Road were flooded. Ninety-five
percent of our homes lost power, and 28,000 residents were
without drinking water. Over 4,000 residents were transported
to State shelters.
Storm surge closed St. John exists at I-10, I-55, and
flooded I-10 between exits 206 and 209. This has never happened
before. U.S. 61 was closed in St. Charles and St. James
Parishes. Our residents were basically trapped.
Four weeks later, all parish services are restored, parish
schools open. A disaster recovery center is open, and over
12,000 of our residents are registered, and over $20 million in
FEMA assistance provided, $3.4 in disaster food stamps. This is
a first for our residents. As I said before, we do not flood.
Displaced residents are home, but housing is problematic.
There are no hotels, very few rental properties, and all of our
residents in hotels are outside of our parish. Many homes were
not in flood zones. Widespread flooding and closure of the
parish's outlets is unacceptable for residents of St. John, the
State, and this country.
Homeowners are currently being faced with elevation
challenges with little to no funding. One-in-five Louisiana
residents live in southeast Louisiana parishes, including
Orleans and Jefferson, which are home to over three-quarters of
1 million people. With highway and interstate closures, north
and westbound evacuation routes were eliminated.
We understand that people evacuate, and if they evacuate
they can come back. But because we are an industrial corridor,
there are other incidents that could happen following a storm
with our roads closed.
Entergy's nuclear power plant (Waterford 3) serves 2.8
million utility customers in four States, and 12 percent of
Louisiana residents. When evacuation routes are closed,
Waterford, which is located in St. Charles Parish, is unable to
restart, presenting potential problems, supplying petroleum and
chemicals outside of the area. Hurricane Isaac curtailed
refinery production, which resulted in increased gas prices
around the country.
The river region supports billions of dollars of
investments with over $30 billion more in potential investments
in the pipeline. Investors want to know that they will be
protected. This levee project has been under way for 40 years,
the latest study since 1985, with an estimated cost between
$300 and $600 million. All of the areas in the study flooded
during Hurricane Isaac.
How many studies are needed before our residents are deemed
worthy of protection? The vulnerability of parishes outside the
Federal levee system was exposed, and despite predictions of
our area becoming a funnel for Lake Pontchartrain, our levee
project has received no Federal funding since 2010. The State,
the Pontchartrain Levee District, and the parish are ready. We
need help fast tracking COE and their approval, permitting, and
funding.
PREPARED STATEMENT
No more studies. Hurricane Isaac was the ultimate study,
and it failed. We need your help, and I humbly ask you to help
us to protect our residents.
Thank you.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Natalie Robottom
Honorable Chairman and Senators--I am Natalie Robottom, St. John
the Baptist Parish president. Thank you for allowing me to address the
committee on behalf of our residents.
Over the last 25 days, we have been working hard to recover from
the widespread devastation and flooding caused by Hurricane Isaac. More
than 7,000 homes and 12,000 households have been affected by the
hurricane, many of which were not in a flood zone. Through the grace of
God, no lives were loss this time, but the loss of personal property
and a lifetime of possessions and treasured memories have caused
frustration and despair within our close knit community. St. John
Parish has never flooded--water accumulates in our streets and along
interstate interchanges--but not in our homes.
Hurricane preparedness is an ongoing effort within St. John Parish.
Department heads and staff members were trained for months, attended
one-on-one meetings, revised standard operating procedures, and
participated in a hurricane table top to ensure preparedness for
emergencies and other disasters. Public meetings were hosted throughout
the parish to assist residents in developing hurricane plans for their
families. Hurricane preparedness guides were distributed through
utility bills, local libraries, government offices, and local
businesses. Preparedness information was provided through news
releases, advertisements, public meetings, and local events leading up
to hurricane season. Residents were also encouraged to register for
first call alerts that allow them to receive free weather and emergency
information and parish updates through text messaging and emails.
The parish was proactive in its preparations and communications to
its residents for hurricane preparedness and disaster planning, but no
one anticipated the disaster that unfolded in our community.
The National Weather Service issued a hurricane watch for Louisiana
on Sunday, August 26, with then Tropical Storm Isaac about 52 hours out
from the coast of Louisiana. I, along with the Governor of Louisiana
and the President of the United States, issued Emergency Disaster
Declarations and the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) was partially
activated. Situational awareness was communicated to residents, parish
officials, and staff from that point forward. The parish continued
storm preparations by securing Government facilities, pre-positioning
generators at water systems, multiple drainage pumps, and lift
stations. They also pre-positioned barricades in anticipation of road
closures in low-lying areas and removed potential drainage barriers to
ensure the parish drainage systems functioned properly. The Sheriff
dispatched officers to the homes of residents north of I-10 encouraging
their evacuation, but securing contact information for those electing
to remain in their homes.
On the morning of Monday, August 27, the parish EOC was fully
activated, the school system closed, and sand bags distributed
throughout the parish. Approximately 30,000 sand bags were distributed
until weather conditions worsened to a point dictating the stoppage.
Daily conference calls were held with the National Weather Service,
GOHSEP, State agencies, and surrounding parishes to obtain and provide
situational awareness on Hurricane Isaac. Based on those discussions,
SLOSH modeling, and historical data, a voluntary evacuation was issued
for residents in low-lying areas. Parish officials continued to monitor
weather updates, including wind speed, surge predictions, and other
weather related warnings. Weather and preparedness updates were
disseminated through press releases, social media, and media outlets as
weather conditions changed.
On the morning of Tuesday, August 28, Tropical Storm Isaac was
upgraded to a category 1 hurricane and water levels began rising slowly
at the Peavine boat launch located on the northeast boundary of the
parish. At approximately 2 a.m., Hurricane Isaac made landfall along
the coast of southeast Louisiana as a category 1 storm with winds up to
75 mph. At approximately 3 a.m., St. John Parish began experiencing
hurricane force winds. By then, all emergency responders and parish
employees were hunkered down awaiting passage of the hurricane.
On Wednesday, August 29, at around 6:30 a.m., the Utilities
Department was forced to shut off water service to LaPlace to avoid
contamination of the system due to flooding and wind damage to a system
located 10 miles north of LaPlace adjacent to Lakes Pontchartrain and
Maurepas. Search and rescue efforts began at around 9 a.m. and remained
in effect for more than 48 hours from the east side of the parish to
the west side--from LaPlace to Garyville--from the Interstate to the
River Road. In addition to the St. John Sheriff's Office and Fire
Department, the Louisiana National Guard, the LA Department of Wildlife
and Fisheries, Coast Guard, and other volunteers assisted in the search
and rescue efforts.
This was not a drainage issue, but our greatest fears were realized
when Lake Pontchartrain and Lake Maurepas emptied themselves into St.
John Parish. The evacuation routes were shut down--I-10 and Airline
Hwy. were under water and portions of River Road were also blocked.
The parish opened their temporary shelter to allow residents a safe
haven until some 90 commercial buses could transport them to State-run
shelters in north Louisiana. It is estimated that by Wednesday evening,
over 3,000 residents were evacuated to State shelters, as search and
rescue efforts continued throughout the parish.
Although the western edge of the parish had not yet experienced
flooding from Hurricane Isaac, by the afternoon of Thursday, August 30,
water levels began rising in Lake Maurepas causing the homes of
residents from western LaPlace toward Reserve and Garyville to flood.
Parish search and rescue efforts resumed and residents in the affected
areas were transported to shelters in North Louisiana.
As evacuations continued, high winds and storm surge in Lake
Pontchartrain and Lake Maurepas caused all exits at I-10 and I-55 to
become impassable due to an excess of 6 feet of water. Exit 206 at
Belle Terre Blvd. was not re-opened until September 1, and exit 209 at
U.S. Hwy. 51 did not re-open until September 2. U.S. Hwy. 641 leading
to I-10 at Airline Hwy., and Airline Hwy. at the St. John/St. Charles
Parish line was also closed due to flooding.
Once flood waters began to recede, restoration of power began in
areas safe to enter. According to Entergy representatives, 95 percent
of parish households were without power initially. Scattered power
outages remained for approximately 14 days. All residents in the city
of LaPlace, the largest city in St. John Parish, were without drinking
water for 4 days because utilities crews could not reach water wells in
Ruddock to make needed repairs due to high water levels along U.S. Hwy.
51.
As of today, power has been restored to all but five customers,
water has been restored parish-wide, a levee of Hesco baskets has been
created around our LaPlace water system, and lift stations throughout
the parish are being repaired.
Three days following the storm, a Disaster Recovery Center (DRC)
was open and operating, registering over 12,000 residents through
Thursday, September 20. Through that date, 10,000 home inspections were
completed, with more than $18.3 million in Housing Assistance and over
$2.8 million in Other Needs Assistance awarded. Over 5,700 residents
have been determined eligible for Temporary Shelter Assistance, while
over 600 are in area hotels. The Department of Children and Family
Services (DCFS) was up and running on September 4, approving over 8,342
parish households for approximately $3.4 million in assistance through
the Disaster Supplemental Assistance Program (DSNAP) over 10 days.
Residents displaced by Hurricane Isaac and transported to State
shelters began returning home on Tuesday, September 4, and the American
Red Cross managed local shelter operations at the parish civic center
for 90 individuals. Housing continues to be a major problem as the
parish lacks the capacity to house its residents due to limited hotel
rooms and rental property. However, housing solutions are a key
component for our community's recovery.
An Executive order has been issued allowing temporary housing,
permit fees waived, and Temporary Housing Units approved by FEMA. My
staff is working with the HUD, the Hotel Association, DOTD, the LA
Housing Task Force, OCD, FEMA, and GOHSEP to address short- and long-
term housing needs, as well as transportation to aid our recovery. The
parish has implemented a business call center and resource center and
is working with the SBA to help businesses through the process. We have
also partnered with the Home Builders Association of New Orleans to
educate residents against fraud and to provide information and respond
to questions about rebuilding.
The parish is coordinating volunteer efforts and has established a
volunteer assistance hotline to pair volunteers with those in need. A
volunteer reception center was opened Saturday to assist residents who
are uninsured, underinsured, elderly, disabled, or single parents.
The Debris Removal Program is underway, although not progressing as
quickly as desired, but we are working with our Federal and State
partners to expedite the process and reduce the safety and health
issues posed by the long-term presence of this debris.
Despite the flooding of two public schools, all parish schools have
re-opened with hopes of maintaining a since of normalcy and encouraging
residents to remain in our parish. Both schools are operating in
temporary sites and repairs are planned for permanent facilities.
The parish requested and received support during response and
recovery efforts from multiple State and Federal agencies, other parish
governments, local business, individuals, private nonprofits, and
multiple faith-based and volunteer organizations. The outpouring of
support received by our parish is greatly appreciated and will never be
forgotten.
At this point, our main concern is securing a hurricane protection
system like our neighbors to the east and preventing road closures that
isolated our residents following Hurricane Isaac. Because of wide-
spread flooding, all parish outlets were closed at one point. This is
unacceptable for the residents of St. John the Baptist, the State of
Louisiana, and the United States of America. Not only did this make it
impossible for some residents to evacuate as water inundated our
parish, but flood water remained several days after the storm
interfering with our recovery efforts.
One out of every five Louisiana residents live in southeast
Louisiana, which is inclusive of St. John the Baptist, St. James, and
St. Charles Parishes. Two of the largest coastal parishes, Orleans and
Jefferson, have over three quarters of a million people between them.
With U.S. Highway 61, U.S. Interstate 10, and U.S. Interstate 55 were
closed due to flooding from Lake Pontchartrain and Lake Maurepas, the
most important north and west bound evacuation routes effectively
eliminated.
Entergy's nuclear power plant (Waterford 3), provides critical
power to petroleum plants and refineries in the river parishes and is
located in St. Charles Parish. It is the largest Entergy facility
serving approximately 2.8 million utility customers in four States,
providing 12 percent of the electrical needs in Louisiana. When flood
waters close the major evacuation routes for some 85,500 residents of
St. Charles and St. John Parish living within 10 miles of the plant,
Waterford 3 is unable to restart until evacuation routes are cleared
and passable. Delays in restarting the plant presents a significant
potential problem for our Nation's supply of petroleum and chemicals,
in addition to problems faced by our residents.
More than 7,000 households were affected by Hurricane Isaac
throughout St. John Parish. Some households will only have temporary
housing needs, while others with severe damage will have long-term
housing needs. Without housing solutions within the parish, many
residents may not return home. This compounds the impact to our
community, as parish residents are an integral part of our government
workforce, parish school system, and parish medical care system, just
to name a few.
St. John the Baptist Parish and our neighbors to the west and south
were under water. But the implications of Hurricane Isaac go far beyond
the households and businesses of St. John the Baptist Parish. Although
our parish was devastated, the regional and national impact to shutting
down the interstate system and curtailing production of our refineries
was felt around the country through increased gas prices.
Hurricane Isaac served to exacerbate the need for levee protection
for St. John Parish residents. For over 40 years, levee protection for
our residents has been discussed, but never completed. In 1971, a
resolution authorizing the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to include St.
John the Baptist Parish in the West Shore--Lake Pontchartrain,
Louisiana Hurricane Protection Project was offered in the House of
Representatives. Despite being impacted by Hurricanes Katrina, Rita,
Gustav, and Ike, and Tropical Storm Lee, this project has not received
Federal funding since fiscal year 2010, and it is not currently in the
fiscal year 2013 budget. Completion of this project is contingent upon
Corps approval and Federal and non-Federal funding. The State, the
Pontchartrain Levee District and St. John Parish are prepared to move
this project forward, but we need help expediting the approval and
permitting process, as well as securing Federal funding. As other
projects have been fast-tracked--we know it is possible.
Approximately 120,000 people live in St. John, St. James, and St.
Charles Parishes supporting billions of dollars of investments
currently in the river region, with over $30 billion more in potential
investments in this industrial corridor. We are awaiting results of a
feasibility study on the West Shore--Lake Pontchartrain project
evaluating three alignments to reduce the risk of storm damage for
these three parishes. How many studies are needed before our residents
are deemed worthy of protection?
Preliminary economic analysis from this study indicates a viable
hurricane and storm damage risk reduction project in the West Shore--
Lake Pontchartrain study area. The three alignments under consideration
provide a 1-percent level of risk reduction for the East Bank of St.
John the Baptist, St. James, and the western portion (Montz) of St.
Charles Parishes. Estimated costs for the three alignments or
alignments in phases are from $300 million to $600 million and include
levees, floodwalls, navigation structures, pump stations, LERRDS, and
mitigation. One alignment includes risk reduction for Ascension Parish.
All of the areas on the western shore of Lake Pontchartrain incurred
flooding as a result of Hurricane Isaac.
It is time to take action and move the West Shore--Lake
Pontchartrain Hurricane Protection Project forward. I humbly ask the
members of this committee to take time to review detailed reports,
alignment plans and alternatives completed over the past decades of
study. Hurricane Isaac was the ultimate study and it failed. We are not
a helpless people, but we need your help to secure the only system that
can protect our residents from this type of devastation--inclusion in
the Federal Levee System.
Thank you.
Senator Landrieu. Thank you.
Ms. Brister.
STATEMENT OF PAT BRISTER, PRESIDENT, ST. TAMMANY PARISH
Ms. Brister. Good morning, Senator Landrieu, Senator
Vitter, and Congressman----
Senator Landrieu. Can you pull the microphone closer to
you, if you would? Thank you.
Ms. Brister. Is that better?
Senator Landrieu. Yes.
Ms. Brister. Okay, thank you. Thank you for your support
during our time of crisis and for convening this hearing today.
It is on now? I will get closer. I can usually speak
louder.
Hurricane Isaac brought a storm surge between 7 and 10 feet
across St. Tammany Parish, as well as 15 to 20 inches of rain.
St. Tammany experienced flood conditions on every river in the
parish, from Tchefuncte to the Pearl. These rivers and bayous
could not drain into Lake Pontchartrain due its high level from
the storm surge. The Tchefuncte River was actually flowing
north.
Over 600 residents who chose to shelter in place had to be
rescued by first responders, and over 1,500 shelters were
flooded.
St. Tammany Parish is not the only community on Lake
Pontchartrain that suffered devastating effects from Hurricane
Isaac. We are part of a much larger ecosystem, the Lake
Pontchartrain Basin. Every parish surrounding Lake
Pontchartrain must come together to find a solution to flooding
in the basin. It must be a plan that protects our citizens and
does not put our neighbors in jeopardy, be that our neighbors
in Lake Maripa or neighbors in Bay St. Louis.
The citizens of St. Tammany Parish understand how tight tax
dollars are. We also understand that we must get the most of
every $1 entrusted to government. There is a solution to
flooding in Lake Pontchartrain that is far less costly than
building huge levees along every square inch of lakefront
property. Flood control at the Rigolets Pass provides the most
cost-benefit ratio for the million citizens who live adjacent
to Lake Pontchartrain and are subject to flooding from surge.
Hurricane Isaac also showed us the dangers of failing to
maintain flood control structures already in place. While
Hurricane Isaac was still making its way through southeast
Louisiana, I was notified of the imminent failure of lock No. 2
at the Pearl River navigational canal located near Bush in
northeast St. Tammany, necessitating the immediate evacuation
of over 1,200 homes.
But for the courageous actions of our own public works
employees and opening of the valves, and reducing the water
levels in the lock, hundreds of homes may have been washed
away, and thousands of lives put in peril. While his decision
was delayed, I appreciate General Peabody's response to the
near failure of lock No. 2, and his decision to allow parish
personnel to adjust water levels at the lock. Thankfully, the
crisis was averted, and the general has pledged that the
structural integrity of the lock will be restored and
maintained.
Hurricane Isaac provided a triple threat from storm water.
In addition to surge from the lake and the failure of lock No.
2, the eastern side of the parish was under an apparent threat
of catastrophic flooding from the Pearl River. The National
Weather Service projected the Pearl to crest at historic
levels, potentially flooding 5,000 homes. The timing of the
crest and potential for flooding as forecast by the National
Weather Service changed, and ultimately predictions of massive
flooding did not occur.
Unreliable forecasting and predictions by our country's
lead weather agency is unacceptable. I am therefore calling for
a joint task force made up of Federal, State, and local experts
to study the Pearl River Basin and model the effects of
differing storm events in the basin based on current
conditions. Those models are many, many years old.
I think that all can agree that the safety of our citizens
is our foremost goal when preparing and responding to severe
weather events. Local officials must have accurate information
which they can rely upon in order to make decisions during
times of emergency. There is no place for political boundaries
in the fight against storm water. Just as storm water crosses
parish and State lines, a successful storm water management
plan must cross those lines so that it will serve us all.
While we are working to find a long-term solution to the
threats of surge and river rain flooding, there are smaller
steps that we can take today to mitigate against future flood
damage.
The post-Hurricane Katrina building elevation mitigation
programs have made a substantial reduction in both the number
of flooded structures and the dollar value of flood damage in
St. Tammany. Raising flood prone structures works in St.
Tammany Parish by reducing future flood insurance claims. We
are asking that this program be continued and expanded in our
parish.
St. Tammany invests millions of local tax dollars every
year on storm water mitigation projects. We have been trying
for many years to participate in the SELA Program. The W-14
Drainage Project has been in the COE system for over 15 years
and is still not funded. The project is too large for local
dollars, and we need Federal partnership in this endeavor. Over
$14 billion has been spent in the past 7 years on levee
protection for the south shore, but we have not been able to
get a single project funded in St. Tammany Parish. We are also
asking that funding be dedicated toward moving these SELA
projects forward.
Administrator Craig Fugate has pledged a fair and swift
decisionmaking process post-Hurricane Isaac, and we appreciate
his forthrightness and his candor. We are hopeful that our
recovery from Hurricane Isaac is smoother than prior disasters.
In order for this to hold true, I encourage Administrator
Fugate to ensure that his straightforward message translates
into efficient and speedy processes for providing reimbursement
of costs incurred in allowing for quick repair of public
facilities and infrastructure. We will also add our voice in
asking for our request for community disaster loan forgiveness
to take place. It is more important than ever.
In closing, I would like to mention a special project.
Hurricane Isaac closed the St. Tammany fishing pier just a few
months after the first phase was opened. Both the pier and the
new road leading to the pier were heavily damaged. As you know,
this pier was being built from the remains of the twin spans
after Hurricane Katrina destroyed the bridges.
PREPARED STATEMENT
The pier was a testament to the resiliency of our citizens
after Hurricane Katrina made its final landfall in eastern St.
Tammany. In partnership with many private and public agencies,
we turned a symbol of destruction into a celebration of
community. I am asking today that you help us find the means to
rebuild our pier as quickly as possible. Tens of thousands of
citizens across the region will thank you.
And I thank you for the time today.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Pat Brister
Good morning Senator Landrieu. Thank you for your support during
our times of crisis and for convening this hearing this morning.
Hurricane Isaac brought a storm surge between 7 and 10 feet across
St. Tammany Parish as well as 15 to 20 inches of rain. St. Tammany
experienced flood conditions on every river in the parish from the
Tchefuncte to the Pearl. These rivers and bayous could not drain into
Lake Pontchartrain due to its high level from the storm surge. Over 600
residents who chose to shelter in place had to be rescued by first
responders. Attached is a Hurricane Isaac snapshot which provides
further details regarding the response to Isaac and its effects on our
community.
St. Tammany Parish is not the only community on Lake Pontchartrain
that suffered devastating effects from Hurricane Isaac. We are part of
a much larger ecosystem, the Lake Pontchartrain Basin.
Every parish surrounding Lake Pontchartrain must come together to
find a solution to flooding in the basin. It must be a plan that
protects our citizens and does not put our neighbors in jeopardy, be
that our neighbors in Lake Maurepas or our neighbors in Bay St. Louis.
The citizens of St. Tammany Parish understand how tight tax dollars
are. We also understand that we must get the most out of every dollar
entrusted to government. There is a solution to flooding in Lake
Pontchartrain that is far less costly than building huge levees along
every square inch of lakefront property. Flood control at the Rigolets
Pass provides the most ``bang for the buck'' or ``cost-benefit ratio''
for the million citizens who live adjacent to Lake Pontchartrain and
are subject to flooding from surge.
Isaac also showed us the dangers of failing to maintain flood
control structures already in place. While Isaac was still making its
way through southeast Louisiana, I was notified of the imminent failure
of lock No. 2 at the Pearl River Navigational Canal located near Bush
in northeast St. Tammany necessitating the immediate evacuation of over
1,200 homes. But for the courageous actions of our own Public Works
employees in opening the valves and reducing the water levels in the
lock, hundreds of homes may have been washed away and thousands of
lives put in peril.
I would also like to thank General Peabody of the Mississippi
Valley District Corps of Engineers for his response to the failure of
lock No. 1 and his decision to allow parish personnel to adjust water
levels at the lock. Thankfully, the crisis was averted and the General
has pledged that the structural integrity of the lock will be restored
and maintained.
Hurricane Isaac provided a triple threat from storm water. In
addition to surge from the lake and the failure of lock No. 2, the
eastern side of the parish was under an apparent threat of catastrophic
flooding from the Pearl River. The National Weather Service projected
the Pearl to crest at historic levels potentially flooding 5,000 homes.
The timing of the crest and potential for flooding as forecast by NWS
changed and ultimately the predictions of massive flooding did not
occur.
Unreliable forecasting and predictions by our country's lead
weather agency is unacceptable. I am therefore calling for a joint task
force made up of Federal, State, and local experts to study the Pearl
River Basin and model the effects of differing storm events in the
basin based on current conditions.
I think that we all can agree that the safety of our citizens is
our foremost goal when preparing and responding to severe weather
events. Local officials must have accurate information which they can
rely upon in order to make decisions during times of emergency. There
is no place for political boundaries in the fight against storm water.
Just as storm water crosses parish and State lines, a successful storm
water management plan must cross those lines so that it will serve us
all.
While we are working to find a long-term solution to the threats of
surge and riverine flooding, there are smaller steps that we can take
today to mitigate against future flood damage.
The post-Katrina building elevation mitigation programs have made a
substantial reduction in both the number of flooded structures and the
dollar value of flood damage in St. Tammany. Raising flood prone
structures works in St. Tammany Parish by reducing future flood
insurance claims. We are asking that this program be continued and
expanded in St. Tammany.
St. Tammany Parish invests millions of local tax dollars each year
on storm water mitigation projects. We have been trying for many years
to participate in the SELA program. The W-14 drainage project has been
in Army Corps of Engineers system for over 15 years and is still not
funded. This project is too large for local dollars and we need Federal
partnership in this endeavor. Over $14 billion has been spent in the
past 7 years on levee protection for the south shore but we have not
been able to get a single project funded in St. Tammany Parish. We are
also asking that funding be dedicated toward moving these SELA projects
forward.
I would like to take this opportunity to thank FEMA Administrator
Craig Fugate. He has pledged a fair and swift decisionmaking process
post-Isaac and we appreciate his forthrightness and his candor. We are
hopeful that our recovery from Isaac is smoother than prior disasters.
In order for this to hold true, I encourage Administrator Fugate to
insure that his straightforward message translates into efficient and
speedy processes for providing reimbursement of costs incurred and
allowing for quick repair of public facilities and infrastructure.
In closing, I would like to mention a special project. Hurricane
Isaac closed the St. Tammany Fishing Pier just a few months after the
first phase was open. Both the pier and the new road leading to the
pier were heavily damaged. As you know, this pier was being built from
the remains of the Twin Spans after Katrina destroyed the bridges.
The pier was a testament to the resiliency of our citizens after
Katrina made its final landfall in eastern St. Tammany. In partnership
with many private and public agencies, we turned a symbol of
destruction into a celebration of community. I am asking today that you
help us find the means to rebuild our pier as quickly as possible. Tens
of thousands of citizens across the region will thank you.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Senator Landrieu. Thank you, Parish President Brister.
Let us move to Garret Graves.
STATEMENT OF GARRET GRAVES, CHAIR OF THE COASTAL
PROTECTION AND RESTORATION AUTHORITY OF
LOUISIANA, AND EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT TO THE
GOVERNOR FOR COASTAL ACTIVITIES
Mr. Graves. Thank you, Madam Chair, Senator Vitter, and
Congressman Richmond. Appreciate the opportunity to be here
today. My name is Garret Graves, and I represent the Coastal
Protection Restoration Authority (CPRA) of Louisiana.
First, Madam Chair, I would like to thank FEMA, COE, and
the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration for their
assistance in embedding in the emergency operation center in
Baton Rouge during Hurricane Isaac. I think it was the most
effective disaster response in regard to communication and
coordination that I have been involved in. Administrator Fugate
and General Peabody personally served on behalf of their
agencies to ensure that all resources were in place, such as
pre-positioning resources, providing technical assistance, and,
of course, providing forecast and predictions regarding the
storm's impacts in Louisiana.
You made a point in your opening statement with regard to
mitigation. You indicated the study that was done that showed
for every $1 we invest in mitigation, you have $4 in benefits.
And I am sure you recall the Congressional Budget Office also
did a study that indicated there were $3 in savings for every
$1 invested. General Arnold, I heard him give a very energetic
speech years ago where he said that he believes that it is in
excess of $10 for every $1 invested in south Louisiana. Of
course, I ran up to him after that speech and asked him for the
citation of that, and he said, oh, I made that up.
But he said, but I believe it. And I think that in south
Louisiana, Madam Chair, that it is case in point looking at the
FEMA dollars that you indicated that have been spent in our
State just over the last several years.
Another good example is a hurricane protection system, and
I would like to thank the subcommittee, the members here, and,
of course, COE for the work that was done there. Without the
hurricane protection system, the work that was done, I have no
doubt that your subcommittee would have been challenged with
coming up with hundreds of millions of dollars in additional
funding to compensate for the re-flooding in the New Orleans
area from the same areas that flooded as a result of Hurricane
Katrina.
The Inner Harbor navigation canal surge barrier alone hit
an excess of 14 feet of water stacked up against us, which
would have gone in and flooded areas of New Orleans and areas
of St. Bernard Parish, which of course was prevented. More
importantly, lives were saved. So once again, I want to say
thank you to COE and thanks to our delegation for your efforts
in securing those dollars.
But, importantly, as other members of this panel have
discussed, outside the levee system it is a tale of two cities.
We have heard the discussion in the communities of LaPlace,
Lafitte, Braithwaithe, and other areas of Plaquemines Parish
that have experienced extensive flooding. Taking those apart,
and the members discussed this, the west shore project has been
in the study phase for 4 years. Lafitte has had an
authorization dating back to the early 1990s for a number of
continuing authorities projects that were consolidated into a
$100 million hurricane protection project in 2007.
The Lake Pontchartrain barrier dates back to the 1960s. Of
course the protection was provided for the south shore, but you
still had vulnerabilities on the north shore and west shores
that have not been addressed. And then moving over to the west,
you have other bad examples, like the Morganza to the Gulf
project, which has been in the study phase for 20 years with an
excess of $70 million spent, none of that on construction.
To quote General Arnold once again, it seems that we are
stuck on stupid. This is an academic exercise, and it is like
someone who is in college and just a career student. At some
point you have got to step out in the real world and actually
get a job. And I feel like this academic exercise of studying
is like being stuck in that career student situation.
Funding is important, and COE certainly needs more funding.
Madam Chair, you address the real dollar decrease in COE
funding that we have seen over the last several years. And it
is important to provide the additional funds to COE. But I
think importantly, we cannot just pour additional dollars into
the broken system.
There was an alternative system that you guys set up for
delivery of the hurricane protection system, and I think when
you compare and contrast the delivery, the effectiveness of
that approach as compared to the traditional approach that COE
is performing the west shore project on, Lafitte, Morganza to
the Gulf, and others, I think that you will see that you can
generate much more cost savings by taking a more efficient
approach. And there are other models that are out there--the
Coastal Wetlands Planning, Protection, and Restoration Act
(CWPPRA) process and SEAP. Pre-disaster mitigation run by FEMA
perhaps could be expanded to improve upon the process.
I do not want to give COE a free pass here. I think that in
many cases, they have made the job harder upon themselves by
simply not following the law or getting stuck in dulu in some
situations. Colonel Fleming often notes that the State and COE
have a love-hate relationship, and I think that I agree with
that. COE loves to slow us down and make things more expensive,
and we hate it. And we have got to fix that.
The subcommittee seems interested in the relationship
between the local governments, the State, and the Federal
Government. And I think it is really important to take a look
at that. Right now under existing law, the State and levee
districts pay one-half the costs for all planning, engineering,
and design. On the construction side, we pay 35 percent of the
costs, but then, importantly, we pay 100 percent of the life
cycle costs: the operations, maintenance, repair,
rehabilitation, and replacement. And we also pay 100 percent of
the costs for the smaller projects that often fill the gaps or
do not meet the benefit-cost ratios, cost-of-effort ratios
discussed earlier.
Over the last 5 years, we have committed collectively--the
levee districts, the parishes, and the State--unprecedented
levels of funding. In fact, exponentially higher than at any
other time in history. In addition, the State has fundamentally
changed its organizational structure in establishing the CPRA
as an implementation body. As a result of that, outside the
hurricane protection system, we have built more miles of
levees. We have protected more citizens, and we restored more
per square miles of our coastal wetlands than any other time in
our State's history.
But we are still not getting ahead, and that largely goes
back to the sustainable management of our resources in south
Louisiana. Right now, Madam Chair, as you are aware, we have
lost 1,900 square miles. We are losing today 16 to 20 square
miles of land per year as a result of the management--the
Federal management of the lower Mississippi River system.
We can spend--we can tax ourselves to the tune of billions
of dollars in south Louisiana, and we can develop the most
efficient process in the world. But until COE manages the lower
Mississippi River system in a sustainable manner, it is going
to be difficult for us to get ahead.
I heard discussion earlier about the modified Charleston
method of mitigation where COE is coming in and requiring
others to mitigate wetlands, maybe two or in excess of two
times the actual impacts that they cause. Yet COE is in a
hypocritical situation in that they are the cause of the
largest rate of wetlands loss in the Nation.
Madam Chair, the last thing I just want to make reference
to is the oil spill. Prior to the hurricane, we had been in
discussions with BP and the Coast Guard about trying to get
them to clean up some additional layers where we knew there was
oil. There are a million barrels of unaccounted oil in the Gulf
of Mexico today, four or five times all that was spilled in
Valdez.
BP was trying to move areas out of response, saying they
were clean and no longer under threat of re-oiling. Yet our
nightmare came true with Hurricane Isaac with the re-oiling
that occurred everywhere from St. Bernard Parish on over to
Lafourche Parish with, of course, in excess of 1,000 miles of
tidal shoreline in between.
As in the oil spill where BP is going to pay one way or
another, I think the Federal Government is going to pay one way
or another. If we can get ahead of the problem and make
proactive investments like in the hurricane protection system--
sort of like in the hurricane protection system where
communities are protected--or we can come in after the fact and
spend exponentially more FEMA dollars on disaster response
where you have disrupted communities, disrupted families as
opposed to sustainable, resilient communities.
PREPARED STATEMENT
And I thank you for the opportunity to speak, and I, of
course, would be happy to answer questions.
[The prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Garret Graves
Thank you for the invitation to testify today on behalf of the
Coastal Protection and Restoration Authority of Louisiana and the
citizens of our State. We appreciate the opportunity to share
Louisiana's perspective on disaster preparedness, response and
recovery. Unfortunately, in recent years, Louisiana has become quite
experienced in these fields.
Over the last 7 years, Louisiana has been hit by Hurricanes
Katrina, Rita, Gustav, Ike, and Isaac. In 2010, our State experienced
the worst oil spill in our Nation's history, which continues to this
day and has ramifications that could last for many years to come. And,
in 2011, record high water on the Mississippi River system challenged
flood protection systems statewide--yielding one of the largest flood-
fighting efforts in Louisiana's history.
Local and State communication and coordination have improved to
unprecedented levels. Senior Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA), National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), and
Corps of Engineers (Corps) representatives were fully integrated into
our Emergency Operations Center in Baton Rouge for Hurricane Isaac.
From my perspective, Hurricane Isaac emergency response efforts among
all levels of government improved to some of the most efficient
processes we have seen. For this, we thank our local, Federal partners,
and the many volunteer and NGO services that were provided.
FEMA worked with Louisiana's Homeland Security and Emergency
Preparedness Office to pre-position resources needed in Hurricane
Isaac's aftermath. Though the hurricane was somewhat volatile in regard
to models and trajectory, NOAA's forecast tools helped to inform flood-
fighting efforts, evacuation orders and deployment of recovery
resources prior to landfall. Still, the State of Louisiana renews its
post-Katrina request for NOAA, in cooperation with other Federal,
State, and local government representatives, to develop improved storm
prediction and communication tools. The Saffir-Simpson hurricane
category scale is based upon only a single storm characteristic--wind
speed. Many other factors contribute to risks associated with a
specific tropical event. Storm surge, storm speed, landfall trajectory,
barrier islands, shoreline slopes, near-shore topography, vegetation,
ridges, cheniers, roadways, levees and other factors are considerations
when determining risks associated with a particular storm upon impacted
communities. Threats from slower moving storms, like Hurricane Isaac,
are often lost upon the public due to the lower Saffir-Simpson rating.
NOAA's Sea Lake and Overland Surges from Hurricanes model (SLOSH)
and the Advanced Circulation (ADCIRC) used by the Corps each help to
inform emergency managers. But that information can serve a more direct
and useful purpose if it can be properly translated into language the
public can understand--and clearly in an emergency the public craves
that kind of information. Properly tailored, this information will help
to save lives. We look forward to working with NOAA to develop improved
tools to inform the public of the threat posed to them by an
approaching tropical event.
The Corps of Engineers worked with State and local officials to
assist on technical recommendations and resources related to flood-
fighting and dewatering operations. The Corps also assisted in
supplying a portion of the portable pumping plants used post storm.
We do want to highlight an important achievement--the performance
of the greater New Orleans Hurricane Protection System (HPS). An
estimated 14 feet of water stacked up on the Lake Borgne Surge Barrier
alone. While Hurricane Isaac clearly did not test the limits of the
HPS, the system prevented flooding and saved lives during Hurricane
Isaac. I believe that FEMA saved hundreds of millions of dollars in
disaster response costs from Hurricane Isaac due to the repairs and
revisions performed to date on the HPS. We thank you for helping to
ensure that much of the HPS work has been funded to date and strongly
urge that you provide the resources and oversight to finish the job and
get it done right this time.
It is essential to note that a number of the witnesses testifying
before you today believe that the repairs and revisions to the HPS
induced flooding in their communities--such as the north and west
shores of Lake Pontchartrain, the Lafitte area, and the West Bank of
Plaquemines Parish. A full analysis must be conducted to determine and
address any adverse impacts of this work. We appreciate the Corps of
Engineers' efforts to closely study the impacts of Hurricane Isaac to
determine any flood implications of the HPS on these important
communities. The Water Institute of the gulf has also been engaged to
provide independent review and analysis of the Corps' study effort.
The CPRA must identify a growing concern regarding the management
of the HPS that threatens the performance of the system in future
storms. Recently, the Corps of Engineers has determined that it will
transfer operation and maintenance of small segments of the HPS to the
CPRA and levee districts rather than waiting for completion of actual
projects or polders. Attempting to coordinate the management of
adjacent polder or project segments of a levee or floodwall during a
disaster by different organizations is entirely contrary to proven
disaster management principles and contradicts on the record statements
of senior Corps officials. This change in Corps policy is a dangerous
precedent that could be expanded to other areas of the country.
Congress should provide strict guidance to the Corps on the transfer of
responsibility for completed projects that are designed holistically to
provide independent function or utility to ensure consistent management
of protection infrastructure.
Hurricane Isaac confirmed two other important points. First, the
storm demonstrated that relatively weaker hurricanes can still cause
extensive destruction, flooding and even death. Second, Hurricane
Isaac, once again, proved that the continued loss of our coastal lands
and wetlands increases the flood risk of our communities. The evidence
is empirical: towns that have been around for hundreds of years such as
Lafitte, Braithwaite, LaPlace, Madisonville, and Slidell all flooded
during Hurricane Isaac. The Gulf of Mexico has now replaced the 1,900
square miles of coastal lands and wetlands that have eroded, moving the
gulf that much closer to our populated areas that have sustained
centuries of tropical storms and hurricanes. A significant portion of
our wetlands buffer is now gone.
I have heard many senior Federal agency officials and Members of
Congress from outside of Louisiana say that the Federal Government
simply cannot afford to fund projects to protect and restore Louisiana.
The facts, common sense, and sound fiscal policy prove otherwise. Every
consumer in the country has a stake in coastal Louisiana. One example
is national energy implications of disasters in Louisiana. A few days
after Hurricane Isaac made landfall, gasoline prices spiked an average
of 25 cents/gallon nationwide. This translates to consumers paying an
extra $100 million a day in higher gas prices. Following Hurricanes
Katrina and Rita in 2005, consumers paid an estimated $300 million a
day in higher gasoline prices and the 2008 hurricanes (Gustav and Ike)
caused consumers to incur over $500 million a day in higher prices to
fill their gas tanks.
In recent years, over $100 billion in disaster efforts in Louisiana
have been administered by FEMA and other Federal agencies. In just the
last 10 years, a fraction of this amount could have been proactively
invested in hurricane protection, flood control and coastal restoration
projects in Louisiana--saving over 1,000 lives, preventing the
displacement or evacuation of over 1 million Louisianans and protecting
hundreds of billions of dollars in economic activity and infrastructure
in south Louisiana.
The Congressional Budget Office determined that every $1 invested
in proactive disaster mitigation efforts results in $3 in cost savings.
A report for FEMA developed by the National Institute of Building
Sciences found that up to $4 in benefits resulted for every $1 in
hazard mitigation. We believe that the Federal Government would realize
even higher rates of cost savings and benefits from proactive hurricane
protection and coastal restoration investments in Louisiana.
Again, the performance of the HPS during Hurricane Isaac
exemplifies the benefits of protection investments. It must be noted,
however, that the HPS work was performed in response to Hurricane
Katrina floodwall failures and outside of the normal water resources
project process. The conventional alternative leaves much to be
desired.
While the Corps of Engineers must be commended for their relative
expediency in conducting repairs and revisions to certain components of
the HPS, a stark contrast lies in areas outside this levee system. In
fact, an estimated 90 percent of the flooding that occurred as a result
of Hurricane Isaac could have been prevented had the command simply
completed authorized tasks. Let me repeat that for emphasis: an
estimated 90 percent of the flooding that occurred as a result of
Hurricane Isaac could have been prevented had the Corps of Engineers
simply completed tasks previously authorized by Congress,
authorizations that the Corps either ignored or failed to complete. I
can cite many examples, such as the West Shore project, first
authorized for project development in 1971. The project has been in the
Corps' ``study phase'' for over 40 years. Had the project been
constructed thousands of homes would not have flooded and flooding of
Interstate 10 and U.S. Highway 61 could have been prevented. Flooding
of these vital thoroughfares severed vital conduits for emergency
response and recovery operations.
Several hundred million dollars for flood protection efforts in
Plaquemines Parish have sat in Corps' construction appropriation
accounts dating back to 2005 and 2006 with virtually no construction
activities since that time. As you know, many areas of Plaquemines
Parish were flooded by the hurricane. Congress authorized the
consolidation and construction of several Corps flood protection
projects (section 205 projects) in the Lafitte area in 2007. The Corps
has not taken any action to protect these residents despite repetitive
flooding over the last several years--each requiring millions of
dollars in FEMA aid. Dewatering efforts in Lafitte continued for
several days following Hurricane Isaac.
Every single parish in south Louisiana has an ongoing, bad example
of Corps' delays and sky-rocketing costs. The southwest study
(Calcasieu, Cameron, and Vermilion Parishes) is on track to be 5 years
late in developing a final plan for coastal restoration and hurricane
protection. Congress authorized the construction of a portion of the
Morganza-to-the-Gulf hurricane protection project several years ago and
authorized construction of the entire project twice. Despite these
repeated authorizations, the Corps has spent over $70 million and 20
years studying the project without a single construction activity.
During this same period, over $1 billion in FEMA and Federal disaster
response funds have been expended in this same area. The completed
project was estimated to cost $550 million in 2000.
There is a clear choice here--fund and execute preventative
measures to reduce the overall cost to U.S. taxpayers, and the pain and
suffering of the Louisiana residents and business owners impacted; or
let the necessary protection measures sit in study mode with no end in
sight.
Another example is the Mississippi River Gulf Outlet (MRGO) closure
and restoration report, which was required under Federal law to be
submitted to Congress by May 2008. Four years later, the reports
remains incomplete and the Corps threatens to abandon the project
without a $1 billion ``voluntary contribution'' by the State of
Louisiana to the project. The Louisiana Protection and Restoration
analysis and design was due to Congress in late 2007 pursuant to
Federal law. The Corps provided a response to Congress in 2010 that
failed to answer a single question posed by Congress. Further, the
report costs ballooned from the original estimate of $8 million to over
$26 million. Again, the report was not even remotely responsive to
Congress or in compliance with numerous Federal laws. Conversely, the
State of Louisiana worked with parish governments, mayors, community
leaders, and other stakeholders for 2 years to deliver a 50-year
coastal master plan that was approved unanimously by the Louisiana
Senate and the Louisiana House of Representatives.
In fact, the Corps has failed to comply with a single statutory
deadline on any work in Louisiana since Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
over 7 years ago. Over 15 deadlines required under Federal law on
various proactive plans, reports and projects have been ignored by the
command with zero accountability. Meanwhile, our State continues to
flood and erode while FEMA spends billions of dollars reacting to
hurricanes and flooding disasters. Numerous other misinterpretations of
the law and regulatory obstacles have impeded State and local efforts
to protect our citizens and restore our coast.
These problems are not limited to projects. For example, the Corps
regulatory program requires private landowners and government agencies
to mitigate for virtually any adverse impact they cause to wetlands.
However, the Corps is responsible for the largest historical and
ongoing wetlands loss in the Nation through their management of the
Lower Mississippi River system. An estimated 16-20 square miles of
wetlands are lost each year. In response, the Corps has not mitigated
for a single acre of this loss. The Corps should lead by example and be
held to the same standard established for private citizens and other
government agencies.
Madame Chair, the arrogance and complete disregard for Congress and
Federal law by the Corps of Engineers must stop. In recent years, a
number of new military leaders within the Corps appear to recognize the
fundamental problems within the command. While these developments are
cause for optimism, the systemic nature of these problems and the
bureaucratic resistance to change will require the direct involvement
of the White House and Congress to solve.
Importantly, the Corps' impeding actions on State and local
efforts, project inaction, and their hypocritical position on wetlands
mitigation do not save the Federal Government money. In fact, they
actually expose the Federal Government to greater Stafford Act
liabilities by increasing the probability of homes flooding, of more
families being displaced, a greater number of businesses being
destroyed, adversely affecting employment opportunities, causing a
declining ecosystem and reducing economic activity through business
interruption. Recent Federal court decisions involving the Corps'
actions and failure to properly maintain the Mississippi River Gulf
Outlet have the potential to result in billions of dollars in judgments
against the Federal Government. Common sense, which the American people
are more swiftly demanding of our leaders, should lead the Corps' and
the Federal Government to take preventative measures to prevent
billions of dollars in damages before future storms have the
opportunity to create them.
Madame Chair, these are all symptoms of more fundamental problems.
History proves that the Federal Government is going to pay one way
or another. They can make proactive investments to reduce or eliminate
vulnerabilities or hazards caused by Federal actions or the Federal
Government can pay exponentially more responding to the death and
destruction of a disaster.
To be fair, these problems began years ago and transcend Republican
and Democrat administrations. Further, it must be noted that there are
some truly good people within the Corps of Engineers. Many of them
recognize the dysfunction in the process and want just as much as we do
to address these issues.
Still, the entire Federal water resources project development and
implementation process must be revisited. This full-scale analysis
should include whether the Department of Defense is truly the most
appropriate agency to lead the Nation's wetlands restoration and flood
control efforts to the unique, repetitive and intimate role of Congress
in water resource projects. A number of other Federal and non-Federal
project models exist that could result in significant time and cost
savings.
These models include the Coastal Wetlands Planning, Protection and
Restoration Act program, Coastal Impact Assistance Program, Gulf of
Mexico Energy Security Act, Federal Highway Program, HPS repairs and
revisions, and other examples.
Expanding upon FEMA's pre-disaster mitigation program may provide
another venue for proactive, cost-saving, and life-saving flood
protection investments.
Several billion dollars in projects have been identified for
implementation. These authorized projects have been subjected to years
of studies, planning, public comment, environmental reviews, and other
processes. Outside of the post-Katrina HPS repairs and revisions,
virtually no construction funding has been made available for any of
these hurricane protection, flood control or coastal restoration
programs in the last several years. Stakeholders in these authorized
projects often base fundamental decisions upon the efficient and
successful implementation of such projects. Decisions such as whether
to continue living in a newly flood-prone area, whether to elevate a
home, economic development decisions, public infrastructure investments
and others are all predicated upon these projects. The uncertainty and
unpredictability associated with a project in limbo could be even more
dangerous than not providing protection or restoration at all. Our
citizens deserve some predictability or certainty on project schedules.
Our estimates indicate that a newly conceived water resources
project involving the Corps' process takes in excess of 40 years to
implement. In south Louisiana, our threatened communities simply do not
have that kind of time. In effect, the emergency exists today. A
responsive project development and implementation process must
correspond to the crisis we face.
Some have suggested that the States, counties/parishes, and levee
districts simply fill the void created by the inability of the Corps to
efficiently deliver projects. While this may seem like a simple
solution, one must consider several decades of the roles and
relationship among the various Federal, State, and local water resource
entities. Historically, the Corps of Engineers funded the entire cost
of many projects. Cost-sharing by non-Federal entities (State and local
governments) is already extensive. The non-Federal cost share on most
Corps-administered projects today is 50 percent for feasibility,
planning, engineering, and design while construction costs are 35
percent non-Federal and the entire operations, maintenance, repair,
rehabilitation, and replacement costs are covered by the non-Federal
project sponsors (usually States, counties/parishes, cities/towns, and
levee districts).
In recent years, State, parish/county, cities/towns, and levee
districts have had increasing financial liabilities associated with
Federal water resource projects, including more stringent project
inspection requirements, expensive new levee standards, expanded
requirements for fee-title real estate acquisitions from unwilling
sellers and other expenses. Failure to act through attrition is
unacceptable. These projects must advance. To implicitly add the entire
financial burden of construction costs on these non-Federal entities in
addition to other expenses is a serious reversal of decades of water
resource policy that requires several years of financial and technical
transition planning. Further, it is noteworthy that all federally
authorized projects must go through a robust economic evaluation to
ensure that the benefits of a project outweigh the costs--justifying
Federal investment.
In Louisiana, the State has a constitutionally protected revenue
stream to invest in restoration and protection projects. Further,
Governor Jindal and the Louisiana Legislature have invested more
dollars in hurricane protection, coastal restoration, and flood control
over the last 5 years than any prior 20-year period in our State's
history. In total, the CPRA, together with our levee districts have
administered nearly $2 billion in hurricane protection, flood control,
and coastal restoration efforts. Additionally, many of our communities
have voted to impose both property tax and sales tax on themselves to
help fund hurricane protection and flood control efforts. Our Governor,
Legislature, and citizens have taken these bold steps despite the fact
that we did not move to the disaster or vulnerability. Rather, the
disaster moved to us as a result of Federal actions such as levee and
river management on the Lower Mississippi River System.
Even if our citizens were to tax themselves billions of dollars a
year, we would still not be able to offset the ongoing losses of up to
20 square miles per years of coastal wetlands loss caused by the Corps'
and their refusal to mitigate their actions. The first step in a
sustainable Louisiana is sustainable management of the coastal area by
the Federal Government. In the fall of 2010, President Barack Obama
established the Gulf of Mexico Ecosystem Restoration Task Force. The
task force was charged with developing a strategy for the resiliency of
gulf coast communities and the gulf ecosystem. The December 2011
strategy identified a number of reforms that must be enacted to stop
the ongoing damage and increasing vulnerabilities to Louisiana's
coastal area. Unfortunately, no action has been taken on these
recommendations to date. One of the most important actions Congress
could take would be to require the Corps of Engineers to carry out
their actions in a sustainable manner thereby stopping the net growth
of hurricane-vulnerable citizens and allowing restoration projects
implemented to result in a net gain of restored wetlands rather than
simply offsetting ongoing losses attributable to the Corps and the BP
oil spill.
Noting the subcommittee's jurisdiction, I would be remiss without
mentioning your recent letter to the U.S. Coast Guard regarding BP's
failure to locate and clean oil in and near Louisiana's shoreline and
other concerns. The State and parishes appreciate you raising these
concerns to the Coast Guard and strongly urge you to continue pushing
BP to fully comply with the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 and remove the up
to 1 million barrels that are estimated to remain in the Gulf of
Mexico. This amounts to four or five times the volume spilled during
the entire Valdez disaster.
While BP denied the existence of additional oil, our concerns were
affirmed when large oil mats and tarballs were exposed or re-suspended
as a result of Hurricane Isaac. The proof could not be any more clear.
Some of the very areas that experienced extensive re-oiling during the
hurricane are the same areas that BP was pushing to remove from active
cleanup operations just prior to the storm. The only successful clean
up performed by BP is their $100 million whitewash campaign being
perpetrated on the citizens of this country subjected to BP's extensive
media campaign. While beaches in Florida, Alabama, and Mississippi have
regular oil spill patrols provided by BP to remove tarballs, the
company has refused to provide any type of comparable patrols in
Louisiana despite our State receiving more oil on our shorelines than
all of the other States combined. Further, when oil hits a beach, it is
simply scraped away. When oil penetrates our coastal wetlands, tides,
winds, and currents push the oil deeper into our wetlands where removal
practices usually just leave the oil there to slowly degrade over years
as it has a much longer term and greater environmental impact on some
of the most productive ecosystems in the Gulf of Mexico. BP must be
held fully accountable for oil removal without any further dependence
upon the Federal treasury, State coffers, parishes, or taxpayers as
required under Federal law.
Finally, Madame Chair, we want to thank you and your colleagues for
taking the time to hold this important hearing in Louisiana. There are
numerous lessons to be learned from Hurricane Isaac. The most
important, of which is that proactive, comprehensive efforts to protect
our coastal communities and restore our coast is achievable. Louisiana
is the canary in the coalmine in regard to coastal sustainability. The
Nation and world are watching to see what fate their States and nations
can expect in the future. The State together with our parishes and
levee districts have built or improved more miles of levees and
restored more acres of coastal wetlands than ever before. We have an
opportunity to demonstrates success to the world through the
implementation of the Louisiana Coastal Master Plan. We need a
functional Federal water resources program to achieve this goal.
Up to 20 percent of the Nation's maritime commerce, five of the top
ports in the country, national energy prices, the top fishing area in
the Continental United States and 2 million of some of the best
Americans our country has to offer are all dependent upon our joint
success.
Isaac taught us that we have the capacity to protect our
communities. It also taught us that where we don't fund projects--we
jeopardize the lives and property of our citizens.
Again, thank you for this opportunity to testify today. I look
forward to your questions.
Senator Landrieu. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Graves. And I
have asked Neil Malbrough to testify about some new ways, new
approaches, and some ideas that could expedite some of this
work and the tremendous challenge before us. Thank you for
representing an entire industry. We should have a whole panel,
but, Neil, we think you can do it as well as anyone.
STATEMENT OF ONEIL P. MALBROUGH, PRESIDENT, SHAW
COASTAL, INC.
Mr. Malbrough. Thank you, Senator. Again, I want to thank
you for allowing me to be here, and I will try to talk about
and discuss some things where we have not only talked about,
but have been able to demonstrate some fairly significant cost
savings and some of the flood control projects that we have
worked on.
My experience goes back over 25 years. We have been
primarily in the coastal protection flood risk-reduction
business in different places. And we have designed and managed
the construction of over 15 flood gates now, okay?
Early on in our process, we were attempting to build flood
gates similar to what had been built in Golden Meadow and Rose.
We knew we were going to be part of eventually of the Morganza
to the Gulf project, so we had to build projects that met the
core criteria. And quite frankly, the first two flood gates
that were designed and built were built exactly like the Golden
Meadow gates. They were, what we call, the monolithic type
sector gates, concrete primarily, built in the channel.
Later on and in call cases we were using State and local
funds only. Early on we realized in the Morganza to the Gulf
there are 13 flood gates. We could not afford to build those
kinds of gates, so we had to look back and do some things. We
had to give up convenience. As Tony Alfred would say, we had to
give up convenience for protection. We knew it was nothing with
those sector gates. They worked perfect. If we had enough
money, we would build them all exactly that way. Unfortunately,
we did not have that.
So we began looking at other ways of doing that. And we
have now built five in the system. We are actually building--
right now as we speak, there is a 250-foot flood gate being
built in the Homem navigation canal. We are building a 200-foot
bayou in Grand Caillou. And we are designing a 400-foot for
Bayou Chene. In all of those cases, when the client has been
driven by economics and can only afford to do certain things,
the alternative of what we are doing now and what we would like
to have done if we had all the money in the world, we could not
do.
So in every case, in the first five cases, we were forced
to look at alternatives by the clients, and in all cases they
selected what we call the steel barge gates. And all of them
are publicly bid. The COE build is publicly bid. So the
question is, why are they publicly bidding something, and we
are all doing the process, and hear every day talking about
building things--building more for less. And I am going to use
the phrase loosely.
So I have tried to do that, and I have tried to look back
at what we have done in the 15 gates that we have done, and
decide how did we get to these cost savings, and what has been
driving that. I have come up with 10 things, and I will go
through them real quick like.
We always look at the least-cost alternative at each design
phase as we go. We openly discuss that, and the client, the
engineers, and the public are well aware of the decisions that
we make at every one of those stages. Always do that. Not do it
when we can, do it when we want. We always do that.
We always break the bid documents in areas of local
expertise. We have driven--because we were using in some cases
local money, we tried to build it with local funds. We have to
publicly bid. We cannot restrict it to local people. But in our
area, we have grown up in the oil patch. We have everything in
the oil patches built out of steel, so we have expertise in
industries, contractors, and people. So we have designed our
projects around that local expertise, and we are here to say
that in the case of the Homem navigation canal, the $50
million, about $32 million of that is actually being spent in
Terrebonne by Terrebonne contractors, building something that
meets the core criteria for the particular application. So we
always do that.
We minimize the amount of bids, but always stay in what we
call the contractor's experience. We make sure that there are a
number of contractors who can bid specifically on what we do.
Always construct the best available alternative with the
dollars at hand. Again, a very important component because we
do not design a project outside the limit of the client. We are
building the Homem navigation canal, as an example, where there
are hydraulic pumps, there are backup pumps. The funding was
there to build it right.
When we first built the first one in Petit Caillou, we did
not have that. There was no automatic hydraulic systems. There
was no pumping system to de-water and flood the system. We used
gravity. We opened the sea chest and sunk the barge. We had
four hand-operated winches closing the gate. Later on as the
levee district funding came in place, we converted those hand-
operated winches to automation. Now we have some elaborate
system on some of the gates. But the idea was if we try to
build a Cadillac, we do not have enough money, and having
nothing there is the worst thing that could happen. So in all
cases, we force ourselves to drive to that.
We tried to maximize wet construction instead of dry
construction. Staying away from coffer dams and bypass
channels, and all the systems that go there just dried the
costs. When you look at the monolithic gate, there is a
significant amount of construction that goes in the facility
that leaves when the job is finished. So, the oil field has
always been built on wet construction, and we try and eliminate
dry construction whenever we can. In some cases, you cannot do
away with it, but in 99 percent of the cases you can.
We try to maximize yard fabrication components in that
construction. It is much cheaper to build in a yard and bring
it to the site. If you noticed the 13 sites in Morganza to the
Gulf, all are at remote sites. In the case of the Homem
navigation canal, there is not even a road to get there. Grand
Caillou, there is no road.
So we design the projects around yard fabrication
components that were brought to the site. If you look in the
pictures that I gave you all--I gave you all this book--the
last picture shows the big Homem navigation canal. But the idea
there is the buttress or the construction of the flood gate was
actually built the way they build offshore platforms, built at
Gulf Island, loaded on a barge, built with a derrick barge and
sided, and matched to the site. Those techniques are what is
being done.
[The referenced picture book was not available at press
time.]
So when you look at those techniques, we can tell you that
if we publicly bid, levees were about 33 to 50 percent cheaper
by using the State process. On flood gates, we are somewhere
between 50-85 percent cheaper by using barge gates instead of
the sector gates.
The process, the policies, the manuals, do not allow that,
but if you look at the first picture of the flood gate, which
is that monolithic, and you look at the third picture there,
you will see both of those gates are 12 feet high. Both of
those gates have a 56-foot opening. And both of those gates
have a minus 8-foot seal. When the gates are open, the
navigation and the channel are exactly the same. The difference
is that one costs 25 percent of the other one.
So what we are talking about is building more for less. If
we had four times the money that we had, we would always build
the gate, the first pictures. The idea is that you build to
suit the project and to build what you can.
PREPARED STATEMENT
So that is what I am here to say. And the process, we are
doing it now. We are doing it in a number of locations. And I
think we have got to implement--we have got to build more for
less because the dollars, as you know, are tighter and tighter.
[The statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Oneil P. Malbrough
I'd like to first begin by thanking Senator Landrieu and the
subcommittee for allowing me to testify today primarily to discuss some
of the ways we have been able to demonstrate some fairly significant
cost savings while designing, building and mitigating for flood
protection, risk reduction, and hazard mitigation projects in coastal
Louisiana.
My name is Oneil Malbrough and I am president of Shaw Coastal, Inc.
(Shaw Coastal), which is a civil, coastal and environmental engineering
firm located within the commercial State and local segment of Shaw's
environmental and infrastructure division. Shaw Coastal has been in the
design and engineering business for 25-plus years and has worked on
many of the flood risk reduction projects in Ascension, Iberville,
Jefferson, Plaquemines, Orleans, Lafourche, Terrebonne, St. Mary, and
Iberia Parishes. We have worked on the design and construction
management of 15 different size floodgates and saltwater intrusion
structures in coastal Louisiana and are presently managing the
construction of a 250' wide floodgate in the Houma Navigation Canal, a
200' wide floodgate in Grand Caillou Bayou and we are designing a 400'
wide floodgate in Bayou Chien. A listing of these structures we have
completed and/or are working on are as follows:
--Bayou Petit Caillou Auxiliary Structure;
--Lower Bayou Dularge Floodgate Structure;
--Humble Canal Floodgate Structure;
--Walnut Street Floodgate Structure;
--Bayou Black Floodgate Structure;
--Company Canal Saltwater Intrusion Structure;
--Bush Canal Floodgate Structure;
--Placid Canal Floodgate Structure;
--HNC Floodgate Structure;
--Bayou Grand Caillou Floodgate Structure;
--Bayou Lafourche Saltwater Intrusion Floodgate (in Bidding Phase);
--Bayou Petit Caillou Flood Gate Structure (in Design Phase);
--Four Point Bayou Floodgate (in Design Phase);
--Bayou Chene Floodgate Structure (in Preliminary Design Phase);
--Freshwater Bayou By-Pass Channel Structure (Preliminary Design
only).
In addition, Shaw Coastal has designed and managed a significant
amount of flood control levees, some of which have been designed to
meet Corps, State and local design criteria. In light of this
experience we feel that we have a significant amount of experience in
designing, bidding and managing the construction of flood control
projects, both pre- and post-Katrina, and we hope our testimony will be
helpful.
What I would like to talk to you about today is how we are
presently designing and building projects in a manner that allows for
cost savings, while still delivering a project that meets the
appropriate sponsor's design criteria.
To summarize, we:
--Always include ``least cost'' alternatives at each design phase
with constructability in mind.
--Always break down the bid documents in areas of ``local''
expertise. Minimize the amount of bids but stay in the
available contractor's experience. Always try to receive as
many qualified bids as possible, and structure contracts to
allow smaller local contractors whenever possible to reduce per
diem costs.
--Always construct the best available alternative with the dollars at
hand. In other words, ``Don't design a project outside the
limits of the client'' or as TLCD President Alford would say,
``give up convenience for protection''. For example, most of
the structures that are only closed once a year do not have
automation. These are operated manually by opening and closing
valves significantly reducing the costs.
--Try to maximize wet construction techniques in lieu of
``construction in the dry'' techniques. Always compare steel to
concrete, whenever possible and always stay away from
cofferdams, whenever possible.
--Maximize yard fabrication components in lieu of building in the
field.
--Minimize the risk to contractors. When risk is unavoidable, allow
the owner to absorb as much as possible in lieu of adding cost
to the project. For example, contractors are paid on actual cut
of material moved or dredged to reduce their risk from material
settling during construction.
--Minimize change orders.
--Use standard engineers cost curves in establishing engineering fees
and minimize construction management cost and field changes.
--Always use side cast borrow for levee construction whenever
possible and in most cases even if you have to double handle
it.
--Minimize hauling distances when using hauled in fill and get annual
hauled in prices whenever possible.
If these processes are forced into the design and bidding
processes, then the cost will come down.
Our experience has shown us that comparative locally bid prices for
levee fill has ranged from 33 percent to 50 percent less for hauled-in
fill and over 50 percent less for side cast borrow fill. Our experience
has also shown us that when building floodgates across navigable canals
and channel we can build our ``steel swing barge'' floodgates for 35
percent to 85 percent less than the conventional monolithic type sector
gates depending on the size requirements and floodwall lengths.
In closing, if these type ``reduced cost'' features can be included
in our hazard mitigation projects, we should be able to ``build more
for less'' and move closer to a sustainable coastal Louisiana that
we're all trying to accomplish.
Senator Landrieu. Thank you so much. We are going to have a
round of questions and probably go to about 12:30 p.m., and I
appreciate your patience. I think this is so very, very
important.
I want to underscore two things that I heard. Everything
was important. But what Garret Graves said, and I think,
General Peabody, I know that you were listening intently, and I
think this is a point worth underscoring, that COE is itself
responsible for a greater wetlands loss than all of these
parishes sitting at the table when we leveed the Mississippi
River and the inability of that river to overflow and to create
the delta.
COE itself is responsible for significant wetlands loss
when you look at it from the big picture, not the specifics.
And so for COE to advocate for very, very steep mitigation
requirements for other local governments if it does not even
apply it to itself is a real issue at the very highest of
policy level, which I intend to bring directly to the President
of the United States and to the members of the Congress that I
serve with. Because it is about time that COE itself takes
responsibility for its impacts to the loss of wetlands in
Louisiana, and those studies have been well documented from
every international, independent enterprise that has looked at
what our bigger problem is.
Second, the big picture is that we cannot, as a State--it
is not fair to ask the citizens of Louisiana to bear the entire
cost or a significant cost for the draining of the entire
continent. Forty to 50 percent of the continent drains through
Billy Nungesser's parish and the river parishes. And what does
not drain through rains through the rivers of the Pearl, the
Tchefuncte, and the Washita. You could go on and on. I mean, we
are the bottom of the barrel, and it is just inconceivable that
the Federal Government's policies would be, well, that is the
problem for the people of Louisiana to solve. No, it is not.
Which is why 15 years ago I looked at the pitiful COE
budget and decided it would be a long time to fix it--I did not
realize it would be that long--and started to find other money
through revenue-sharing, and why we fought so hard and
succeeded in that against all odds, and why we have focused
recently on passing the RESTORE Act, which you are looking at
the three of the co-sponsors. And for the first time in our
Nation's history, we will receive when the BP penalty is paid
anywhere from $5 billion to $20 billion that is going to be
invested in the gulf coast with the largest portion of that
coming to Louisiana.
So while I recognize, and I am alarmed at, the budget of
COE, I am not waiting around for it to be transformed. I am
going to push for it, but we are working on other avenues.
Now, to you, Mr. Graves, and I let you know that I would
ask this question because it is very, very important to us. I
am aware of what the Federal Government has provided, and I am
going to get to that in just 1 minute here. Since 1990, the
Federal Government has authorized and funded programs providing
billions of dollars to our State.
First, the SEAP money, which is Federal money, came to the
State for a total of $500 million. CWPPRA, which is again
Federal money, has provided over $720 million in the last 10
years. The RESTORE Act, which we just passed, is going to be
bring anywhere from $2 billion to $6 billion to Louisiana. And
the Gulf of Mexico Energy Security Act, which was also passed,
will bring in millions of dollars starting in 2017 unless I can
get it advanced and the cap lifted, which we are working on.
In addition, the Federal money to the State has been $14.5
billion for the system we just talked about. Most of that has
been obligated.
What is the State contributing to our master plan? And
please do not reflect any of these dollars.
Mr. Graves. Sure.
Senator Landrieu. What is the State of Louisiana putting
up, and how much have you put up in the last 5 years?
Mr. Graves. Sure. Madam Chair, first of all, I think it is
important to point out that on the hurricane protection system
dollars, the State has been asked to cost share. We have signed
agreements cost-sharing $1.8 billion on the hurricane
protection----
Senator Landrieu. $1.8 billion that the State has to put up
of its own money, not using any of this money?
Mr. Graves. Right now, yes, ma'am.
Senator Landrieu. You cannot use any of this money. You
cannot use CWPPRA or RESTORE Act money?
Mr. Graves. RESTORE Act money possibly. Possibly RESTORE
Act money. Right now that is not how we budgeted it.
Senator Landrieu. Okay. If you did not use RESTORE Act
money, where would you get your $1.8 billion from?
Mr. Graves. There is a State trust fund that was set up
that is actually constitutionally protected that draws money
from State oil and gas revenues.
Senator Landrieu. How much do you have in it?
Mr. Graves. The trust fund right now probably has a total
balance of somewhere around $700 million.
Senator Landrieu. Is that the rainy day fund?
Mr. Graves. No, ma'am. No, ma'am. That is the coastal
protection and restoration fund.
Senator Landrieu. Okay, $700 million, and that comes from
where?
Mr. Graves. That is primarily from oil and gas revenues on
State lands and waters.
Senator Landrieu. Okay. So you have $700 million to build
the master plan. What else?
Mr. Graves. That is the balance of the trust fund, but we
have committed about $2 billion in projects over the last
probably about----
Senator Landrieu. Out of this trust fund.
Mr. Graves. Out of the----
Senator Landrieu. Not any Federal money.
Mr. Graves. Out of the trust fund. That includes--let me
think. That does include some corporate dollars. To answer your
question----
Senator Landrieu. Well, what I would like you to do is you
could----
Mr. Graves. Sure.
Senator Landrieu [continuing]. Because I really need the
answer to this question.
Mr. Graves. Sure.
Senator Landrieu. I need to know how many State dollars the
State of Louisiana has put into this master plan of flood
protection, not CWPPRA dollars, not SEAP dollars, not RESTORE
dollars, not Federal revenue-sharing, your own hard cash, okay?
And I need that submitted to the subcommittee.
Mr. Graves. Sure.
Senator Landrieu. All right. Let me ask one more question.
The parish presidents all represented today you all have been
thinking about and you have testified about how you are going
to come up with your match. Right now, the match is 25 percent.
In order to get to a 90/10, the State has to file damage in
excess of $593 million. We have only filed $168 million, okay?
We have to get to $593 million to be able to get to 90/10, and
we have only filed to $168 million. So it is unlikely that we
will get to a 90/10 match.
Now, our Governor has sent a public letter asking for 100-
percent reimbursement. Now I want to say on the public record
the Governor did not help in any way to put money into this
fund when I asked him for his help. He declined. The fund has
$1 billion in it thanks to this delegation. He did not help put
a dime into that fund, but he has asked for 100-percent
reimbursement from it.
Do the State parish presidents know that you have the State
Emergency Response Fund (SERF), which has a balance of $16.5
million. The FEMA reimbursement fund has a balance--this is
State money--of $16.5 million. The Inter-Emergency Board Fund
has a balance of $4.6 million. The budget stabilization fund,
also known as the rainy day fund, has a balance of $443
million. I think we had a rainy day on August 29. Would you all
agree? And last week, the State declared a surplus of $130
million. So right now today as we sit, the State of Louisiana
has almost $500 million of unobligated funds.
Now that you know this, would you be inclined to ask the
State to maybe put up your 25 percent or your 10 percent since
your parishes have been hit over and over again, Ms. Brister?
Ms. Brister. Not only are we inclined to, but I have signed
a letter to that effect to the Governor.
Senator Landrieu. Ms. Robottom?
Ms. Robottom. Yes, we have signed on as well.
Senator Landrieu. President Young--Mr. Young?
Mr. Young. Yes, we will ask.
Senator Landrieu. Mr. Nungesser.
Mr. Nungesser. Yes.
Senator Landrieu. Thank you, because that would be a good
place to start.
And then I will turn it over to Senator Vitter.
Senator Vitter. Thank you, Madam Chair. I want to follow up
with Garret and Neil about COE reform. Both of them mentioned
ideas in that regard. I have filed legislation to move the
project around responsibility of many COE projects to the State
and local government. That is the norm with highways. It is the
great exception for some reason.
What do think that could do in appropriate cases to lower
costs in the timeframe?
Mr. Graves. Senator, I think that the Morganza to the Gulf
project is a perfect example and certainly one that Mr.
Malbrough has a lot of experience in.
There are rumors going around right now that that project's
cost estimate could reach numbers as high in excess of $12
billion. According to protection that the State, the parish,
and the levee district have come up with, we believe we can do
it for somewhere around a quarter to a third of that amount,
saving billions and billions of dollars.
So I think without question we can cut the time periods
probably in half if not better, and on the dollars saving as
much as two-thirds on the project cost.
Mr. Malbrough. Yes. I agree, too. And my first inkling
would be the funding structure that the highway department--
Federal Highway Department structure would, in fact, drive
significantly the thing.
The other thing is, and I talked a little bit about it in
my original talk, is innovation. We have got to be able to use
the construction techniques and things that we can do now that
we do in most of the construction. And I do not want to get too
technical, but when you talk about semi-lightweight concrete,
post inching, and construction, strand post tensioning, and a
whole bunch of ways that you see this building was built and a
whole lot of other things, in some cases do not meet that
criteria. And technically, there is nothing wrong with that,
and we should be looking at innovative construction techniques
to do that.
And then the second thing is that to put in place a degree
of urgency, the time element to what we are doing. We talk
about in this we have participated in a number of studies, the
Morganza to the Gulf feasibility study, the dollars to the gulf
feasibility study, the Acadian Gulf of Mexico Access Channel
feasibility study. We watched the west shore--Lake
Pontchartrain levee district.
We have got to come up with some kind of system that drives
the urgency of completing the thing in a timely manner because
if you get too long, then the community you are trying to save
has changed. And you end up with things that in some cases do
not make sense. So we have got to do those three things: a
funding structure change, innovation, and a degree of urgency
to that planning effort.
Mr. Nungesser. Yes. You know, exactly what you are talking
about, Plaquemines Parish has just bonded out $50 million for
our coastal plan. And we work with COE. We partner with them to
get a certified plan. And Craig Fugate wrote a letter that said
they will recognize this plan once it is in place.
But the reason we decided to bond out $50 million of our
money to start the plan, which will lower storm surge 5 feet to
our parish, is because we believe by leasing a dredge for 3
years, we are going to cut the costs of moving material, I will
go out on a limb and say by one-half.
We go out and do a dredge project, $7 million, $1.5 million
is mob and demob. We come in, we go out 3 months later 100
yards from there and do another project. The mob and demob, we
are spending more money than moving material. So why do we not
long-term lease these dredges and put them to work on a long-
term basis and get that cost down so we are moving material,
building land, building protection?
And I guess if you take all the projects we have done and
look at the money we have spent putting that pipe in my
parish--we have put the pipe in four times since I have been
parish president at a cost of over $2 million, taking it out
and putting it back in the same place. So we are securing
right-of-ways and putting pipes in that we will leave there so
the money can go out in the marsh.
And, we got welding jobs. We do not need to pay these
welders to put this pipe in place over and over again. And by
putting these projects together in the long-term--and we are
going to show it. By the first of the year, we will have a
lease on a dredge for 3 years, and we are going to embarrass
them, hopefully, into doing things in a smarter way and
spending that money better.
Senator Landrieu. Yes?
Mr. Young. Senator, just real quick, I support your effort
in that regard, and obviously the model is the Federal highway,
the way we deal with the Federal highway through the State and
local governments, and we get the highway projects done.
But in the interim, we know that when COE is in emergency
mode it can do a lot better than when it is in regular COE
mode. And I will just point out the example being the western
closure complex. That is the largest pump station in the world
that COE got built since Hurricane Katrina, and it is
operational today.
So when there is a will, as Congressman Richmond said,
there is a way.
Senator Landrieu. And the money.
Senator Vitter. Thank you.
Representative Richmond. First of all, let me just thank
the parish presidents. President Robottom, you came up to DC
last week to express the needs of the residents of the Parish
of St. John. John, you were up a couple of days before her,
and, Billy, you and I have talked. And, Pat, I know what you
are doing. So just thank you for, one, the coordinated effort
to make sure that we are talking with one voice as much as
possible. I think that that certainly helps.
Garret, you mentioned earlier--and the analogy I always
use, especially during football season, although this is a
painful one, is that we spend too much time in the huddle, and
we do not go run the plays. That is what we are going to have
to do, and it seems like we are just stuck on planning and not
executing.
But one thing, Garret, we could do, and I think it would do
a great service to Louisiana, is to make sure that we try as
much as possible to speak with one voice. I will give Senator
Landrieu a lot of credit, although I also introduced a bill to
make sure that we did not have to pay-fors for disaster
assistance in this country. It is the wrong way to go.
But when we are fighting for that, it hurts us tremendously
when the Governor comes out and endorses a pay-for for disaster
assistance when I did not get a chance to ask Administrator
Fugate. But I am sure that if there was a need for Democrats
and Republicans to agree on what to cut before we help people
in Louisiana, we would be so far behind where we are right now.
So the need to speak with a consistent voice, I think is
very important. And the ability for the State to use Federal
resources and to ask for Federal resources to help the great
citizens of Louisiana is also important.
So we need to just be consistent with do we want Federal
help, do we not want Federal help, do we need pay-fors for
disaster assistance? So the more we can be coordinated on that,
I think it would help us.
Mr. Graves. Congressman, I could not agree with you more.
And one of the greatest things about the job that I get to work
on is everybody believes that our coasts need to be restored,
and everybody believes we need hurricane protection. It is not
a partisan issue, and it has been great being able to work on
something that everybody believes in.
In regard to the Governor's letter and the budget situation
and everything else, I think there are a couple of points that
are really important. These communities that are flooded,
whether it is LaPlace, whether it is Braithwaithe, the north
shore--these communities date back 300 years; they have been
around. They did not flood like this. They would not exist if
they flooded on a repetitive basis. Lafitte would not be around
if they flooded four times every 6 years. Those folks would
have moved.
As a result of the 1,900 square miles of land we have lost,
these communities have become more vulnerable. And as Senator
Landrieu said, they are vulnerable because of COE's actions.
And so I think there is some justification for asking that FEMA
participate financially in some cases more than they do in
other areas. But I agree with you that we need to look at this
holistically. We need to take a better look at this.
The State is the only one right now paying for the Morganza
to the Gulf project, the Rose to Golden Meadow project, the
work in Lafitte, the Louisiana Coastal Area project. And so I
think we need to look at this holistically and figure out,
instead of fighting about where money comes from and things
like that, figure out who is going to do what. What is COE
going to do, what is FEMA going to do, and what are the State,
levee districts, and parishes going to do?
One of the most dangerous things we can do is have these
projects out there that are in limbo without being to tell
these people, you are going to have your project in 10 years.
The people in west shore for 40 years have thought they are
going to have protection. That is not okay. They do not know if
they should move, if they should elevate their home, move their
business, make economic development investments. That limbo
situation is more dangerous than anything else, and I think it
is very important that we look at this holistically.
The State has incurred billions of dollars in liability
over the past few years in expenses that previously we did not
cover. So, comments about the cost-sharing and things like
that, I think it would be appropriate to look at it more
holistically, including the increased vulnerability that our
State experiences as a result of Federal action.
Representative Richmond. I want to be clear. I agree with
you 100 percent, and I think FEMA should pay, and I think they
should pay more. But my point is still the same. They cannot
pay more if the Governor's position is we should have a pay-for
before FEMA can do anything because the Congress that I serve
in, Democrats and Republicans are not agreeing on anything. And
if they had to agree on where to cut around the country, cut
other people's funding to give us money, I think that it would
not happy. And it would certainly slow our progress.
So when I say ``one voice in funding,'' it is the fact that
we are a great State that provides a great service to this
country, and for that I think that the Federal Government
should help us, especially for damages that they cause. But at
the same time, I think that we need to be consistent in our
position in terms of what we need.
And I say this privately, and I will say it publicly. Now,
the needs of the State of Louisiana are great. And it is
because of those needs and the fact that I think Congress
people and our Senators are the best able to identify needs,
which is why, in my opinion, you need to have congressionally
directed spending, because you all get a chance to come and
meet with us. You do not get the chance to meet with the
President. You are going to have spending directed from
somewhere. It is either going to be the White House that has a
larger disconnect with you all, or it can us where you all can
actually talk to us and tell us the needs to have closure
complexes and to do those things.
So, I would just caution that we do not have the luxury of
being very partisan in Louisiana because our needs are too
great, and our people are too vulnerable. And to that extent,
the more we can talk with one voice and the more we can work in
a bipartisan manner, the better we are going to be.
And the best example is the RESTORE Act, in which the
delegation came together--Senator Vitter, Senator Landrieu, and
the congressional delegation--to do really almost an impossible
task, is just the best example of what we can do when we decide
to put the party labels and just put Louisiana first.
So, Senator Landrieu, thank you for having this----
Senator Landrieu. Excellent way to end. As you all know, I
want to thank our witnesses again. I thank Administrator
Fugate, General Peabody, all our parish presidents, and
particularly, Mr. Graves, you and Mr. Malbrough for giving your
views as well.
ADDITIONAL COMMITTEE QUESTIONS
We will keep this record open for 2 weeks. I encourage the
parish presidents to add to this record. Your statements and
testimony were right on point. But you should submit your cost
estimates and your requirements for your levees.
[The following questions were not asked at the hearing, but
were submitted to the Department for response subsequent to the
hearing:]
[Responses from the Louisiana Governor's Office to
questions for the record were not made available to the
subcommittee.]
______
Questions Submitted to the Federal Emergency Management Agency
waterway debris removal
Question. At least five different Federal agencies could have
jurisdiction over waterway debris removal--FEMA, the Corps of
Engineers, the Coast Guard, the Natural Resource Conservation Service
(NRCS) at the Department of Agriculture, and the Environmental
Protection Agency. There is no uniform Federal procedure to determine
responsibility for waterway debris removal. Therefore, parishes might
have to follow different rules for NRCS waterways, federally regulated
navigation channels, ports and harbors, public drainage canals, and
privately owned waterways.
Administrator Fugate you agreed to look into designating a lead
Federal agency for debris removal during disasters. Will this
recommendation be implemented?
Answer. After a disaster, local and State governments have primary
responsibility for removing debris resulting from the disaster. If the
local and State governments are overwhelmed, they may request direct
assistance from the Federal Government, and FEMA will mission assign
the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) to remove the debris on behalf
of the State and local jurisdictions. Generally after a disaster, FEMA
Public Assistance (PA) assembles a debris management team for the size
and scope of the disaster. This team is responsible for providing
debris-related technical assistance to applicants for the timely,
efficient, and accurate production of PA grants for debris operations.
PA's major responsibilities in supporting debris operations include:
identifying major debris issues and applicants with potential debris
problems (based on PDAs and in conjunction with the State); developing
and implementing a PA Debris Operations Strategy; reviewing applicants'
debris management plans and contracts; coordinating debris-related
mission assignments; and formulating, developing, and writing PA
subgrants. This process is conducted through coordination with the
State and applicants to identify needs and actions to be taken. During
the process of identifying damage and scoping work, sometimes debris
removal work is identified that falls under the authority of another
Federal agency due to the location of the project. In these instances,
FEMA coordinates with the other Federal agency, the State, and
applicants to assess the scope of work and identify available
resources. For example, when an applicant requests public assistance
for work that FEMA considers to be within the authority of another
Federal agency, FEMA will ask the specific Federal agency with
responsibility to review the request and advise FEMA whether the work
would be eligible under that agency's authority. If the work is outside
of that agency's statutory authority, FEMA will evaluate the work for
eligibility under the Stafford Act. FEMA's role is that of a lead
coordinating agency for the response to and recovery from a major
disaster.
In that role, FEMA coordinates with other Federal agencies that
have their own statutory authorities to implement and resources that
they can bring to bear in support of State and local efforts to respond
to a disaster incident.
Question. What else can be done, specifically, to lessen the
confusion and inefficiencies of dealing with each Federal agency's
varying requirements and authorities?
Answer. Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs) between agencies help
to clarify roles and responsibilities for efficient response to
disaster impacts. In September 2010, FEMA executed a MOU with USACE and
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to define the leadership and
support roles and responsibilities in contaminated debris missions.
FEMA is engaged with Natural Resources Conservation Service (NRCS) to
develop a memorandum of understanding to delineate the authorities,
roles, and responsibilities of FEMA and NRCS.
Question. How is the debris removal effort being coordinated in
Louisiana for Hurricane Isaac?
Answer. FEMA established a debris operations cell at the Joint
Field Office (JFO) for United States Army Corps of Engineers, NRCS, and
FEMA. Currently, FEMA is funding debris operations in 52 parishes and
has approved private property debris removal in four of those parishes.
As of November 28, 2012, more than $61 million has been obligated for
debris removal. NRCS has also prepared disaster survey reports as
requested by several parishes and local governments for projects under
the authority of the Emergency Watershed Program (EWP). FEMA and NRCS
are working together to identify the projects that fall within each
respective agency's authorities to maximize funding and avoid
duplication. FEMA is also reviewing NRCS projects that exceed the
funding available from the EWP and determining if FEMA's Stafford Act
authorities can be applied to provide funding.
Louisiana has estimated debris removal costs to be $4.6 million
within the waterways under NRCS jurisdiction, but the agency has only
made $1 million available to complete the work because it is so low on
funding. Once the money runs out, FEMA will not step in to cover the
unmet need. This issue is not specific to Louisiana. The Emergency
Watershed Program is over-subscribed by $127 million, with 16 States on
the wait list. I have written to the President urging him to request
additional funding for the program.
Question. As head of the Federal coordinating agency for this
recovery, what is your plan to ensure timely removal of debris from
NRCS waterways, so as not to exacerbate the threat of flooding and
create more problems in the next disaster?
Answer. FEMA is coordinating with NRCS to identify the most
efficient means of removing debris from NRCS waterways within each
agency's respective authorities. Additionally, FEMA is engaged with
NRCS to develop a memorandum of understanding to delineate the
authorities, roles, and responsibilities of FEMA and NRCS. For example,
with regard to Hurricane Isaac, FEMA, in coordination with NRCS, the
State of Louisiana, and Plaquemines Parish, was able to find a solution
that will provide assistance to the parish to address threats posed by
debris affecting the parish's drainage system.
case management
Question. Case managers help connect disaster-affected families
with resources like employment assistance, temporary housing, and food.
Congress authorized Federal support for disaster case management in
2006 after Katrina demonstrated the value of utilizing nonprofit
organizations to help storm survivors locate the help they need to get
back on their feet.
Mr. Fugate, you testified that instead of activating the Federal
contract, ``it was determined to utilize the State capabilities to do
case management'' but that FEMA is working with the State to implement
the program and to potentially provide FEMA funding for the services
provided by the State.
Paul Parsons, FEMA Disaster Case Management Lead and Program
Specialist, along with other representatives from FEMA and the
Administration of Children and Families, submitted a Disaster Case
Management Program Assessment on September 16, 2012. The assessment
covered 21 parishes designated for Individual Assistance and included
interviews with State and local emergency managers, social service
directors, and voluntary agencies. The report identified a need for
immediate and long-term case management in numerous Louisiana parishes
and demonstrating vulnerability risks of poverty, low literacy rates,
high pre-disaster unemployment, and a large population of children in
those areas.
The assessment also identified: ``diminished capacity'' to
``conduct immediate disaster case management'' in six parishes;
``limitations with resources and funding'' and ``diminished capacity''
to ``conduct long-term disaster case management'' in seven parishes;
low levels of ``community agency activity in disaster recovery'' in
nine parishes; eight parishes without immediate resources available to
conduct disaster case management; and across the entire disaster-
affected area it cited ``a high level of immediate needs including
housing, counseling services, muckout/cleaning services and assistance
with navigating the FEMA application process. . . a high level of long-
term disaster caused unmet needs. . . (and) limited resources to meet
long-term disaster caused unmet needs.'' For example, it states that
``In St. John the Baptist Parish, there is a demonstrated need for both
immediate and long-term case management. . . according to data
collected from the Parish Office of Emergency Management and United Way
there are no local agencies with experience in disaster case
management, limited staffing resources and no infrastructure in place
to provide disaster case management. Additionally, the local social
services office is currently closed due to flooding, school and
childcare offices are closed. . . (and) voluntary agencies. . . are
having challenges in organizing and distributing (resources). In the
longer term, there are numerous identified needs--as of the date of
this report there are over 11,000 Individual Assistance registrations
with 46 max grants and high proportions of persons displaced (and)
there is a high level of severely damaged or destroyed homes.'' The
report concludes that ``based on the high level of disaster impacts,
diminished capacity for disaster case management and the ability to
connect disaster survivors to resources as well as increased
vulnerability risks, an enhanced focus is recommended on Saint John the
Baptist, Saint Bernard Parish, Saint Tammany Parish and Plaquemines
Parishes.'' In addition to those four parishes, the report cited ``a
moderate need for Federal Assistance in Disaster Case Management'' in
another 12 parishes.
In other words, the report painted a stark picture of significant
unmet disaster-related needs and a demonstrated need for disaster case
management on the ground. After reviewing the report, the State of
Louisiana asked FEMA for help. Dr. Rhenda Hodnett, Child Welfare
Administrator at the Louisiana Department of Children and Family
Services, submitted a request to Mr. Parsons on September 19, 2012, 3
days after the report was issued, specifically requesting six
coordination specialists for a period of 30 days to help staff the
State's 211 call centers and 35 case managers for a period of 90 days
to work in eight affected parishes. The request indicates the exact
number of case managers the State would like to allocate to each of
those eight parishes. In her request, Dr. Hodnett references the
contract that FEMA chose not to activate, in saying ``It is my
understanding that ACF maintains a contract with Catholic Charities USA
and through this means, has the ability to expand the number of case
managers currently providing services in these parishes as the need
dictates.''
Based on the finding of a demonstrated need for Disaster Case
Management that FEMA and ACF reported on September 16, and the State of
Louisiana's request for case management support from the Federal
Government on September 19, I cannot understand why FEMA and ACF did
not activate the Catholic Charities contract?
Answer. When a major disaster declaration is approved for
Individual Assistance and it includes a request for Disaster Case
Management (DCM) Services, FEMA automatically initiates a DCM
assessment. This assessment is utilized to determine the level of need
as well as the capability of partners at the State and local level. The
assessment looks at the following factors: disaster impacts, case
management capacity, vulnerability risk factors for certain
populations, and FEMA registration information. Based on the DCM
assessment completed for this event, it was determined that providing
Immediate DCM Services through HHS ACF was not the most effective and
cost-efficient method for providing DCM Services in Louisiana following
Hurricane Isaac. The assessment revealed that there was a strong need
for local resource coordination and the most efficient alternative for
filling this resource gap was to mission assign AmeriCorps members to
identify available local resources and connect localities in need with
appropriate resources.
Question. Who had responsibility for reviewing the September 16
report and making the decision about whether and how to provide Federal
assistance?
Answer. FEMA had the responsibility, via the Robert T. Stafford
Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, section 426.
Question. Who made the final decision to rely exclusively on State
and local capability and not the Federal contract?
Answer. FEMA made the decision based on the results of the DCM
Assessment, which considers the following factors: disaster impacts,
case management capacity, vulnerability risk for certain populations,
and FEMA registration information.
Question. Has FEMA responded to the State of Louisiana's request
for Federal disaster case management assistance dated September 19,
2012? If so, please provide a copy of that response.
Answer. [Copy provided separately.]
Question. The FEMA/ACF needs assessment references a score of 162
without explaining what data was used to develop that score or whether
there are specific numerical thresholds to demonstrate a low, moderate,
or high need for disaster case management. What were the specific data
that resulted in this score?
Answer. The following data is used to complete the assessment for
DCM: the Preliminary Damage Assessment data provided by the State in
support of the request for a Major Disaster Declaration, Census Data,
Bureau of Labor Statistics, Department of Education Statistics, FEMA
Disaster Data (i.e., registration, inspection, damage assessments,
etc.), as well as survey information regarding the capacity of the
State and local governments and voluntary sector. Once the assessment
is completed, FEMA asks local voluntary organizations, through
coordination with the identified lead State agency for case management,
to complete a Capacity Survey to capture specific resources identified
as lacking in the initial needs assessment. The results of the surveys
revealed that there was a strong need for local resource coordination
and the most efficient alternative for filling this resource gap was to
mission assign AmeriCorps members to identify available local resources
and connect localities in need with appropriate resources.
Question. How many case managers have been deployed to Disaster
Recovery Centers, and how many hours have they worked at each Center?
Answer. FEMA does not provide case managers in DRCs; however, State
and voluntary agency partners do provide these services in DRCs. FEMA
does not track the number of case managers in DRCs.
Question. How many case managers were deployed to shelters, and how
many hours did they work at each one?
Answer. The American Red Cross provided case workers in the
shelters. FEMA does not track that information.
Question. Has FEMA now funded a case management grant for the State
of Louisiana? If so, for how much? If not, what do you need in order to
proceed?
Answer. FEMA received the State's revised application for a DCM
Grant on November 30, 2012. FEMA is currently in the process of
finalizing its review of the State DCM grant application, which
requests a grant of over $6 million.
rental housing--tracking proximity and placements
Question. We don't know how many people are occupying FEMA-funded
rental units, as a result of Hurricane Isaac, since FEMA tracks the
number of people approved for rental assistance, but not how many
placements there are. Further, despite an emphasis by FEMA on placing
people in temporary housing closest to their permanent home, there is
no information about the actual distances from their damaged home to
their temporary housing unit for Hurricane Isaac survivors.
Why doesn't FEMA measure the distance between damaged properties
that FEMA inspects and the rental units these households eventually
occupy?
Answer. The Stafford Act provides FEMA the authority to provide
financial assistance to applicants to rent alternate housing
accommodations; which is further implemented in 44 CFR 206.117, which
does not explicitly state that FEMA should or has the authority to
limit the distance, or monitor the distance, from the damaged residence
to the temporary rental unit. Although FEMA's authority or regulations
do not require FEMA to measure the distance between the damaged
residence and the temporary residence, FEMA does take into
consideration the normal commuting patterns of the area and a
reasonable commuting distance of the declared area when determining if
a direct housing mission is needed.
Question. Why doesn't FEMA track the number of people who have been
placed in a rental unit, instead of simply tracking the number of
people that qualify for rental assistance?
Answer. The Individuals and Households Program provides assistance
to a household, which includes all persons who lived in the pre-
disaster residence who request assistance, as well as any person who
was not present at the time of the disaster, but who are expected to
return during the assistance period (e.g., college student, infant,
etc.). FEMA's application for disaster assistance (FEMA Form 009-0-1,
OMB Collection 1660-0002) inquires about the occupants living in the
primary residence at the time of the disaster. Since FEMA assists all
persons residing in the pre-disaster residence on a single application,
FEMA's assistance is provided to the household. However, FEMA does take
into consideration the total number of occupants in the household when
determining eligibility for continued financial temporary housing
assistance (i.e., rental assistance).
transition of responsibility to other federal agencies for recovery
Question. No matter the size of the disaster, a smooth transition
from response to recovery, and a coordinated Federal, State, and local
effort is critical. In September 2011, FEMA published the National
Disaster Recovery Framework in recognition that a coordinated effort is
needed. It intends to lay out how Federal agencies will effectively
organize and operate to promote effective recovery and support States.
How exactly will the National Disaster Recovery Framework be
executed to ensure a smooth transition that promotes a common sense and
cost-effective recovery?
Answer. To ensure a smooth transition, the National Disaster
Recovery Framework Support Group for Hurricane Isaac in Louisiana was
integrated into the joint field operations as early as September 19
when the State of Louisiana appointed a State Disaster Recovery
Coordinator (SDRC) and requested designation of a Federal Disaster
Recovery Coordinator (FDRC), who was appointed by FEMA region 6 on
September 21. By working closely with the SDRC and involving parish
leadership from the heavily impacted parishes, who in turn appointed
Local Disaster Recovery Managers, the joint NDRF Support Group was able
to begin the process of leveraging existing Federal and private sector
resources in order to build capacity and resilience at the State and
local level. Currently, recovery support efforts are centered on St.
John the Baptist, Plaquemines, New Orleans, St. Tammany, and Jefferson
Parishes. In addition, six State agencies and three Non-Governmental
Organizations (NGOs) have been approached and are taking part in these
efforts.
Question. Please provide an example of this framework in action and
how it will be used specifically in Hurricane Isaac recovery?
Answer. One of the first actions initiated by the FDRC was to
execute mission assignments to the primary coordinating agencies
responsible for implementing the recovery support functions (RSF).
These agencies deployed field staff to the JFO and quickly began
conducting initial mission scoping assessments, by sector, to identify
opportunities to support the State and local officials and improve
resiliency for future disasters. Currently, the Community Planning and
Capacity Building (CPCB) RSF, whose lead agency is FEMA, is working
with the Housing RSF and the State-Led Disaster Housing Task Force in
four parishes: St. Tammany, Jefferson, Plaquemines, and St. John the
Baptist. The CPCB RSF is helping to identity the housing needs of the
parishes while also supporting the efforts of the State-Led Disaster
Housing Task Force's specific housing plans. HUD is working with the
State to provide resources and reallocate funds as necessary.
Additionally, the CBCP, under the NDRF, will provide technical
assistance to the parishes to help them implement existing recovery and
rebuilding plans or proposed plans. The NDRF Support Group and the
local recovery managers will jointly participate in community
engagement efforts to identify potential recovery projects and
initiatives, and identify a broad set of stakeholders for
implementation. Additionally, the NDRF Support Group will identify
performance measures, and metrics to track NDRF support implementation
progress.
Question. Who, specifically, should Congress hold accountable for
it working?
Answer. The signatory agencies and departments responsible for the
implementation of the NDRF are accountable for it working. They are:
--Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management
Agency;
--Department of Housing and Urban Development;
--Department of Interior;
--Department of Commerce;
--U.S. Army Corps of Engineers; and
--Department of Health and Human Services, and other Recovery Support
Functions primary and support agencies.
state rainy day funds
Question. Administrator Fugate, you have experience as an emergency
manager in Florida. Of course now, in your role as the head of FEMA,
you have seen how different States across the Nation finance disaster
response and recovery efforts.
Do many States establish special accounts to ensure funding is
available to match the Federal support that is provided when a disaster
strikes? If so, who does it best and why?
Answer. States may establish reserve accounts or ``rainy-day''
funds to provide an additional resource when disasters occur. The
establishment and management of such State rainy-day funds is at the
discretion of each State.
Question. In most disasters, the Federal share of disaster funding
is 75 percent, and the non-Federal share is 25 percent. Does anything
prevent the State from matching these costs, or is it wholly the
responsibility of the parish to match the Federal contribution?
Answer. How the non-Federal share of FEMA public assistance grant
funding is distributed is at the discretion of each State.
food assistance
Question. The Disaster-Supplemental Nutrition Program (D-SNAP)
provides necessary food assistance to households that have been
stricken by disaster. After the State bungled the D-SNAP registration
process for Hurricane Gustav in 2008, it promised changes.
Unfortunately, many of the same problems have returned in the wake of
Isaac: confusing registration information, hours-long lines in the hot
sun, and inconvenient opening and closing hours that make it difficult
for many people to sign-up.
The State has made attempts to fix these issues, and it is
understandable that some delays are inevitable when so many people need
help. However, it makes no sense that the sign-up process is not more
customer-friendly.
As the coordinator of disasters, what technical assistance is FEMA
providing to both USDA and to the State to ensure that D-SNAP
registration is coordinated with other disaster assistance services and
this program is run as competently and efficiently as possible?
I understand that the savings accounts of families are being
counted as funds available for disaster needs, potentially
disqualifying some from D-SNAP benefits. These savings are for their
children's college, retirement, or to buy a home. Families should not
be penalized because their savings are not in a tax-deferred account,
or an investment portfolio. Exempting stockholdings but not savings is
inconsistent.
What solution can FEMA, in coordination with USDA, derive to make
this disaster assistance fairer?
Answer. The delivery of recovery assistance by FEMA and the U.S.
Department of Agriculture Food and Nutrition Service (USDA-FNS) are
distinct services authorized under unique statutory authorities. The
primary responsibility for providing emergency food assistance rests
with State and local governments and therefore the administration of D-
SNAP is governed by USDA-FNS and the respective States. Further
questions on D-SNAP should be directed to USDA-FNS.
manufactured housing
Question. FEMA is evaluating existing commercial sites in southeast
Louisiana, also known as RV parks, for placement and installation of
park model units for displaced storm survivors who can't reoccupy their
homes.
Can you update us on the status of this direct housing mission to
provide manufactured housing units to Louisiana families in need?
Answer. There were 72 families approved for a Temporary Housing
Unit (THU). Of this number, 29 families have been housed, three
families are pending lease-in, one has received an insurance settlement
to replace their mobile home, and 39 families declined a THU for
various reasons such as found a resource, staying with family or
friends because repairs would be completed within a short timeframe, or
they simply did not want to live in a THU or in a commercial park. In
this disaster, we could not place units on private sites due to flood
zones and size constraints.
Question. Is FEMA also planning to provide park model homes for
people at private sites, such as a driveway, so they can continue to
live on their property while they work on repairing their home?
Answer. No, FEMA does not plan to provide park model homes for
people at private sites so that they can continue to live on their
property while repairing their damaged dwelling. Our direct housing
team has been able to locate enough commercial pads to house everyone
that was approved for a THU. There currently are three families that
are waiting to move into a THU in a commercial park. Those units are in
the process of being installed and our goal is to have all three
families licensed in by the end of the week. At that point, everyone
who was approved for a THU for this disaster will be housed.
remaining hurricanes katrina and rita issues
Question. The State of Louisiana has made repeated requests to meet
with FEMA officials in Washington to discuss the so called ``Global
Summit'' issues, resulting from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, which were
first presented in Baton Rouge in July 2011. Kevin Davis, Director of
the Governor's Office of Homeland Security and Government Affairs,
wrote to you again on September 13, 2012, to reiterate his request for
a dialogue on these issues, but FEMA has refused to schedule the
meeting so far and denied the State a chance to clearly explain its
decisions and to ask questions about the Agency's policy
determinations. Thousands of applicants and billions in funding are
affected by these decisions, and I'm confounded by FEMA's unwillingness
to simply sit down and have a structured conversation with the State's
officials who are managing the largest recovery effort in our country's
history. There is absolutely a need for FEMA to act on the State's long
outstanding and very reasonable request. What day and time will this
meeting occur?
Answer. FEMA will continue to work with the State of Louisiana to
complete recovery efforts for Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, including
continuing our meetings on the ``Global Summit,'' and will work with
the State in finalizing a date and time for the next meeting.
______
Questions Submitted to the Army Corps of Engineers
corps budget
Question. What is the national backlog in authorized construction
projects; and in operations and maintenance for Corps of Engineers
projects?
Answer. The national backlog in authorized construction projects is
approximately $60 billion; for Operation and Maintenance (O&M), the
national backlog is $2.8 billion for the O&M account and $122 million
for the Mississippi River and Tributaries (MR&T) O&M program.
Question. What is the Mississippi Valley Division backlog in
authorized construction projects; and in operations and maintenance for
Corps of Engineers projects?
Answer. The Mississippi Valley Division (MVD) backlog in authorized
construction projects is approximately $19 billion; for operation and
maintenance the MVD backlog is $510 million for the O&M account. The
full $122 million backlog in the MR&T O&M program is within MVD.
proven flood control success
Question. Recently, I wrote the President encouraging him to seek
additional funding for Corps flood prevention projects that would save
lives, protect property, and reduce the costs of future floods.
Can you give me five examples of Corps projects, built in the last
25 years, that have subsequently saved lives and property during major
disasters? Please provide estimated costs of those projects and
estimated savings that were produced in subsequent disasters.
Answer. The following Corps projects have contributed greatly to
the protection of human life and defense from significant property
damage during major disasters.
Mississippi River and Tributaries Project.--Over the life of the
project, which is still pending completion, approximately $612 billion
in damages have been prevented, for an investment of $14 billion. Most
recently, the system was severely tested during the floods of 2011. The
system operated as designed, protecting approximately 4 million people
and preventing approximately $230 billion in property damage and
destruction.
Red River of the North--Grand Forks, North Dakota and East Grand
Forks, Minnesota.--The project consists of levees and floodwalls to
protect a combined population of nearly 60,000 residents. The project
was certified as substantially complete in July 2007. In spring 2011
the cities protected by this project experienced their third largest
flood of record. During this event, flood damages of more than $350
million were estimated to have been prevented by the project. The total
estimated project cost is $394 million.
Mark Twain Lake and Clarence Cannon Dam--Ralls and Monroe Counties,
Missouri.--This 55,000-acre multi-purpose project was completed in 1984
at an estimated cost of $380 million. During the period of 1993-2011,
over $1.7 billion in flood damages were estimated to have been
prevented by this project.
Muscatine Island, Iowa.--The project was completed in June 2000 at
a cost of $7.85 million and reduces flood risk to 30,800 acres of
commercial, residential and agricultural properties in Muscatine
County, Iowa. The project was responsible for preventing disastrous
flooding in 2001 and 2008. In 2001 the project prevented $223,536,100
worth of damages and in 2008 the project prevented $333,542,000 in
damages. This project protects approximately 43,000 residents in the
county.
Cedar Falls, Iowa.--The project was completed in 2003 at a cost of
$6,430,000. The project reduces flood risk to downtown Cedar Falls and
consists of 5,500 feet of levee and 1,400 feet of floodwalls and
protects approximately 36,000 residents. The city's entire small
business downtown would have been devastated by the Cedar River 2008
Flood, but the Corps project provided full protection with record flood
levels to the top of the levee with no flood damage or loss of life.
This could be contrasted with downstream at Cedar Rapids with no Corps
levee where the Cedar River devastated the entire downtown. In 1999 the
project prevented $5,817,600 worth of damages. In 2004 the project
prevented $4,308,700 worth of damages. In 2008 $34,838,700 worth of
damages were prevented.
New Bedford, Fox Point, and Stamford Hurricane Barriers.--New
Bedford, Massachusetts; Providence, Rhode Island; Stamford,
Connecticut. These three projects combined, prevented over $9.7 billion
in damages from storms in 2011 and 2012:
--The New Bedford Hurricane Protection Barrier lies across New
Bedford and Fairhaven Harbor. Completed in 1966, at a cost of
$18.6 million, it protects about 1,400 acres in New Bedford,
Fairhaven, and Acushnet, Massachusetts, from tidal flooding
associated with hurricanes and coastal storms.
--The Fox Point project, completed in 1966 at a cost of $15 million,
provides virtually complete protection against tidal flooding
from hurricanes and other coastal storms to about 280 acres of
downtown Providence, Rhode Island.
--The Stamford Hurricane Barrier, completed in 1969, at a cost of
$14.5 million, provides protection to about 600 acres, which
includes principal manufacturing plants, a portion of the main
commercial district, and residential sections.
corps benefit-to-cost ratio analysis
Question. While the Federal Government has partnered with the State
and local governments to construct vital, effective flood protection
levees in Louisiana, there are far too many areas left unprotected,
including the parishes represented on the second panel. This is in part
because the Corps has determined that their protection projects do not
have the positive benefit to cost ratios necessary to proceed with
Federal involvement. However, as a result of the lack of investment in
levees and flood protection, FEMA has been required to pay billions of
dollars in response to storm events.
Additionally, the contribution to the Nation in terms of oil and
gas and seafood production--and the cost to the Nation if these could
no longer produce these commodities--is not currently considered in
determining the benefit-to-cost ratios. As I understand it, the ``first
line of defense'' benefits that barrier island communities provide for
larger inland metropolitan areas when a storm hits are also not
considered.
Does the Corps consider the amount of money FEMA has paid related
to disaster damage in the area being studied for possible protection--
or the probability that they will incur expenses in the future?
Answer. The Corps does consider emergency costs in the National
Economic Development (NED) benefits calculations. However, these
benefits are based on anticipated future expenditures, not historical
expenditures. Emergency costs include those expenses resulting from a
flood that would not otherwise be incurred, such as the costs of
evacuation and reoccupation, flood fighting, cleanup including
hazardous and toxic waste cleanup, and disaster relief; increased costs
of normal operations during the flood; and increased costs of police,
fire, or military patrol. Emergency costs do not include certain items,
such as FEMA expenditures to reconstruct or repair damaged properties
since these damages are already captured in the NED benefit analysis
for all Flood Risk Management analyses.
Question. Does the Corps consider insurance payouts?
Answer. The Corps does not directly consider historical insurance
payouts in the calculation of benefits. Nor does it include as a
project benefit any effect that occurs prior to project initiation.
Estimates of flood damages reduced (benefits) are calculated as the
difference in estimated future economic damage (to structures, their
contents, infrastructure, and other damages such as emergency costs)
without a project and with a project. This is done using a risk based
analysis considering both probability (likelihood of occurrence) and
consequence (how bad is the damage). Historical damages, including FEMA
flood claim payouts, represent data that are helpful in validating and
calibrating estimates of future damage, but are not appropriate for
inclusion as a project benefit. This framework for project benefit
inclusion is established in ER 1105-2-100 in section 3-3 Flood Damage
Reduction, and in Appendix D Economic and Social Considerations.
Question. Does the Corps consider the economic impact of major
refineries, petrochemical plants, and coal transfer facilities being
shut down for days or weeks as a result of flooding?
Answer. The Corps considers all NED impacts of flooding.
Contributions to NED are increases in the net value of the national
output of goods and services, expressed in monetary units. In addition,
flooding will often also result in economic impacts that are not
national impacts. These are called Regional Economic Development (RED)
benefits and include benefits such as employment shifts from one region
to another. RED benefits impact a region, not the Nation as a whole.
The total economic impact of major refineries, petrochemical plants,
and coal transfer facilities being shut down for days or weeks as a
result of flooding requires very complex analyses to determine the
various NED and RED impacts.
Question. Can you describe the factors that are considered in
determining a benefit-to-cost ratio and are these factors set by
statute or Corps regulations?
Answer. The Economic and Environmental Principles and Guidelines
for Water and Land Related Resources Implementation Studies (P&G) 1983,
are the rules that govern how Federal agencies evaluate proposed water
resource development projects. Typically, Corps Flood Risk Management
(FRM) analyses are based on NED benefits, although health and safety
and loss of life are also important considerations. The objective of
NED is to maximize increases in the net value of the national output of
goods and services. Within the Corps, this is done by comparing the
difference in the value (benefits) produced by the project to the value
of the resources (costs) required to produce those goods and services
or construct the project. Benefits are increases in the net value of
national outputs (goods and services) and typically fall under the
categories of physical damages, income losses, and emergency costs. The
costs (opportunity costs) are the costs of the resources required or
displaced to achieve the plan, such as concrete and steel for building
a floodwall.
Question. Are there any statutes that prevent the Corps from
amending the factors that are considered?
Answer. The Corps economic evaluation procedures have been
developed to reflect and comply with the P&G, established pursuant to
the Water Resources Planning Act of 1965 (Public Law 89-80), as amended
(42 U.S.C. 1962a-2 and d-1). The P&G are comprised of two parts: The
Economic and Environmental Principles for Water and Related Land
Resources Implementation Studies and The Economic and Environmental
Guidelines for Water and Related Land Resources Implementation Studies.
Together both parts provide the framework for Corps of Engineers water
resources planning studies. Additionally, independent review
requirements (pursuant to the Information Quality Act and section 2034
of WRDA 2007) establish transparent review processes to assure Corps
analyses are policy compliant and reflect sound economic theory and
practice.
benefits/needs of new orleans metropolitan area hurricane protection
system
Question. Last year's historic flooding along the Mississippi River
provided a perfect example of how wise and timely investment in
construction and maintenance can save lives, property, and resources.
Analysis of benefits to cost for that system are still being analyzed
but after decades of investment in the system, may be as high as 38-to-
1 after last year's flooding.
Has the Corps done any comparable preliminary analysis on the
benefits to cost of the post-Katrina New Orleans metropolitan area
hurricane protection system?
Answer. The Corps has collected some information on reported
flooding that has occurred in the area since Hurricane Katrina. The
Corps has not computed flood damages or damages prevented for the post-
Katrina greater New Orleans Hurricane and Storm Damage Risk Reduction
System.
Question. What construction needs still exist for the system? What
are the estimated costs?
Answer. As of September 2011 construction of the greater New
Orleans Hurricane and Storm Damage Risk Reduction System (HSDRRS) had
progressed to the point where the system is ready to defend against a
100-year storm surge, a surge with a 1-percent annual probability of
occurrence. Of the $14.6 billion program $11.0 billion has been
obligated through October 2012.
Major elements of the HSDRRS program remaining to be constructed
and their approximate estimated costs are as follows:
--Armoring.--$320 million;
--Environmental Mitigation.--$250 million;
--New Orleans to Venice and Plaquemines Parish Non-Federal Levees.--
$1.0 billion;
--West Bank and Vicinity--Mississippi River Co-located Levees.--$280
million;
--Southeast LA (SELA) Urban Flood Damage Reduction.--$1.0 billion;
and
--Permanent Canal Closures and Pump Stations.--$750 million.
Question. What are the annual maintenance costs for the New Orleans
protection system? What levee boards, drainage districts, and other
local entities operate in this system and how is the Corps working with
these entities to ensure that the system will operate as effectively
and efficiently as possible in years to come?
Answer. Average annual operation and maintenance costs for the
greater New Orleans Hurricane and Storm Damage Risk Reduction System,
including the Lake Pontchartrain and vicinity; West Bank and vicinity;
and Southeast Louisiana flood damage reduction projects are estimated
at $38.8 million.
The Louisiana Coastal Protection and Restoration Authority (CPRA)
served as the sole non-Federal sponsor for execution of the Project
Partnership Agreements for the Lake Pontchartrain and vicinity; West
Bank and vicinity; and Southeast Louisiana (SELA) projects.
Accordingly, CPRA is the responsible agency for operation, maintenance,
repair, rehabilitation and replacement of the projects and/or features
thereof. In practice, the following subordinate and/or cooperative
State and local agencies will carry out operations and maintenance
activities on behalf of the non-Federal sponsor:
--Southeast LA Flood Protection Authorities East and West;
--Pontchartrain Levee District;
--East Jefferson Levee District;
--Orleans Levee District;
--Lake Borgne Basin Levee District;
--West Jefferson Levee District;
--Sewerage and Water Board of New Orleans;
--Jefferson Parish;
--Plaquemines Parish Government;
--St. Charles Parish; and
--Algiers Levee District.
Operations and Maintenance Cost Estimates.--To help prepare the
non-Federal sponsor, flood protection authorities, levee districts and
drainage districts for execution of their O&M responsibilities for the
Lake Pontchartrain and Vicinity (LPV); West Bank and Vicinity (WBV);
and Southeast Louisiana (SELA) flood risk reduction projects, the Corps
commissioned the development of O&M cost estimates that may be used for
planning to accomplish O&M in accordance with authorizing legislation,
project partnership agreements, and operations manuals. The estimates
have been provided to the non-Federal sponsor to assist them in
estimating their annual O&M requirements/costs and to support their
budgetary planning actions. The estimates provide a basis to determine
annual variations in funding requirements and a basis for staffing and
identifying required equipment. The estimates can also be easily
expanded to include additional features with similar characteristics
and can be viewed by individual category and task costs such as mowing,
fuel requirements, periodic inspections, etc. The estimate model
provides the ability to readily accommodate adjustments in labor rates,
overhead rates, crew makeup, and/or other cost factors.
Strategic Partnership.--To facilitate an integrated approach to
flood risk management in the greater New Orleans and southeast
Louisiana region, the Corps, and the State and local agencies have for
several years maintained regular dialog through participation in
monthly strategic partnership meetings at which all manner of issues
are discussed.
System Management Plan.--The Corps has drafted a System Management
Plan to facilitate the effective governance and long-term
sustainability of the HSDRRS. The primary objectives of the System
Management Plan are to:
--Promote long-term sustainability;
--Ensure that senior executives and decisionmakers are aware of
system readiness;
--Provide training opportunities for staff;
--Improve communications;
--Promote public awareness of risk and reliability;
--Periodically compare system performance with IPET recommendations;
--Provide for integration of State plans, Federal studies and
projects with the HSDRRS; and
--Define long-term resource requirements for system sustainability.
mitigation
Question. A barrier in moving forward with vital flood protection
efforts is that the current system for mitigating damage to wetlands is
not working in coastal Louisiana. I understand that we have to
mitigate, but we simply cannot complete projects that double in costs
with each mitigation effort.
Instead, a more collaborative link between mitigation and
restoration efforts should be fostered. I understand that parish
governments have proposed restoration projects through two programs
with Federal oversight given to them by the Coastal Wetlands Planning
Protection and Restoration Act and the Coastal Zone Management Act.
Those projects have been rejected for meeting mitigation requirements.
Can you explain why these types of projects are rejected for
meeting mitigation projects?
Answer. Under the Coastal Wetlands Planning Protection and
Restoration Act (CWPPRA), a task force composed of Federal and State
partners evaluates numerous coastal restoration projects proposed by a
variety of sources, including parishes. The task force must rank
proposed projects based solely on which provide greatest environmental
benefit relative to cost, and select those projects yielding the most
benefit for cost expended for inclusion on annual priority project
lists. Funds to construct selected projects are appropriated upon
availability.
The Federal Mitigation Rule states that aquatic resources that are
restored, established, enhanced or preserved to satisfy the
requirements of other Federal programs may not also be used for
compensatory mitigation for Department of the Army (DA) permits,
although district engineers may evaluate and approve on a case-by-case
basis situations where a consolidated project is used to satisfy more
than one set of requirements, provided the same resource is not
``double counted.'' For example, if 10 acres of wetlands were needed as
compensatory mitigation for a DA permit, and 10 acres were needed for
some other Federal program, a 20-acre project could be authorized to
fulfill the requirements of both, but the same 10-acre project could
not.
A coastal zone consistency determination from the State of
Louisiana pursuant to the Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA) is
required for any project occurring in the coastal zone. If the project
requires DA permit authorization and the State denies CZMA approval,
then the Corps cannot issue a DA permit. Proposed projects must comply
with the State's coastal zone management program.
Question. What can the Corps do to pursue a more comprehensive,
system-wide approach to mitigation, in order to move away from
seemingly impossible regulations for small scale projects that are
perhaps not as effective?
Answer. The Corps must comply with implementing regulations of the
Mitigation Rule. The Corps is obligated to ensure that each and every
permit decision complies with the Clean Water Act, including the
requirement to adequately compensate for unavoidable impacts to aquatic
resources using a watershed approach. The Corps recognizes the
importance of balancing program flexibility with consistency and the
need to better serve the public and protect important aquatic
resources. Therefore, the Corps, in collaboration with other Federal
and State agencies, also considers the landscape context and amount and
quality of the proposed impacts that may be authorized to determine the
appropriate compensatory mitigation.
Question. What can the Corps do to make mitigation more affordable
and to ensure that vital flood protection projects can move forward?
Answer. The Corps cannot and does not regulate the costs of
mitigation; applicants for DA permits have several options for meeting
compensatory mitigation requirements, including use of mitigation
banks, in-lieu fee programs, and permittee responsible mitigation. The
cost of mitigation is not determined by the Corps but does include the
total costs for providing the ecologically successful mitigation for
the long term. The Corps, in coordination with other Federal agencies,
strives to review and approve mitigation bank proposals in an
expeditious manner, to provide the mitigation banking industry with the
approvals needed to afford this mitigation option to the regulated
community. However, the best way to reduce mitigation cost is to
propose projects that avoid and minimize impacts to aquatic resources
to reduce the requirements for compensatory mitigation.
plaquemines levees
Question. After Hurricane Katrina, Congress appropriated $1.4
billion for the incorporation of Plaquemines Parish non-Federal levees
into the Federal system to elevate all 34 miles of back levee on the
West Bank of the parish. However, following publication ofpost-Katrina
levee design guidelines, the Corps decided that all new construction,
including this project, must comply with the new standards. This
doubled the cost to complete the project, which means that if the Corps
decision is upheld, the available funds will not be sufficient.
Recognizing the budget climate in Washington, local officials have
advocated for the Corps to use the original design standards to achieve
a 50-year level of protection. If the Corps agrees, completion of the
project as originally designed with available funding could be
possible.
Please describe the issues and the benefits with both approaches
from your view.
Answer. An overarching principle of the Hurricane HSDRRS (post-
Katrina) Design Guidelines is to construct a project using a system-
wide risk-based approach. However, in the case of Plaquemines Parish
there are multiple existing authorizations (100-year and 50-year
HSDRRS, as well as Mississippi River and tributaries) and funding/
authority requirements are insufficient to complete an integrated
system and implement the HSDRRS Design Guidelines in all of Plaquemines
Parish. These complexities prevent the closing of three polders
(westbank Non-Federal Levees (NFL) from Oakville to St. Jude, westbank
New Orleans to Venice (NOV) from St. Jude to Venice, and eastbank NOV
from Phoenix to Bohemia), thereby preventing the levees from
functioning as an integrated system, or meet the congressional intent
to reduce the risk to the affected region.
The Corps will perform a risk-based analysis on the NFL to be
incorporated into the New Orleans to Venice (NOV) project (from
Oakville to St. Jude), with an objective of ``closing the gap'' on the
westbank and tie into the existing NOV back levees at St. Jude, if
possible.
Additionally, a risk-based analysis will be performed on the
existing westbank NOV polder from St. Jude to Venice, with an objective
of identifying priority reaches for construction within available
funds. These analyses will include consideration of application of the
Engineering Manual (EM 1110-2-1913) criteria, as requested by
Plaquemines Parish. These analyses will inform possible adjustments to
the HSDRRS criteria for application to the levee systems in Plaquemines
Parish, which could allow greater levee lengths to be completed with
available funds.
Question. When will the Corps make a final decision?
Answer. The Corps Risk Management Center has developed a scope and
schedule, in consultation with the local Corps district and the non-
Federal sponsors, to complete these risk-based analyses for NFL from
Oakville to St. Jude and NOV from St. Jude to Venice. The goal is to
have the results of the analysis by mid May 2013 and make a decision on
path forward by end of May 2013.
Question. Does the Corps have any plans or pending applications to
upgrade flood protection on the East Bank of Plaquemines Parish?
Answer. On the East Bank of the Mississippi River between Phoenix
and Bohemia, the existing NOV Federal levee is deficient to the 50-year
level of risk reduction elevation. The Corps does not have any plans or
pending applications to upgrade flood protection on the East Bank of
Plaquemines Parish, except in two areas for which funding is currently
available. These two areas are the Pointe a la Hache and Bellevue Pump
stations fronting protection projects.
Between Caernarvon to Whites Ditch, there are 18 miles of existing
non-Federal back levee that are approximately 17-feet deficient to the
50-year design grade. Authorization and appropriations do not exist to
provide improvements in this area.
The Mississippi River levees on the East Bank of Plaquemines Parish
are not deficient to the HSDRRS design grade, and no upgrades for that
purpose are required.
______
Questions Submitted to Jefferson Parish
rainy day funds
Question. Most of the parishes that have Presidents testifying in
the hearing have been declared eligible for Federal disaster assistance
six times in the past 7 years (after Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, Gustav,
and Ike, Tropical Storm Lee, and now Hurricane Isaac). In all of these
disasters, FEMA authorized public assistance for Louisiana communities
with a cost-share. Congress waived that cost-share for Hurricanes
Katrina and Rita after 2 years of foot-dragging by the previous
administration, but the current earmark ban prohibits Congress from
taking similar action now.
The Governor has asked the Federal Government to pick up 100
percent of emergency response costs from Hurricane Isaac by eliminating
the normal 25 percent match. My colleague, Senator Vitter, has written
to the President in support of that request.
State Representative Jared Brossett recently raised the issue of
State budgeting for disasters as Chairman of the Hurricane Recovery
Committee in the legislature, and he sent a letter on Friday to the
Governor and Commissioner of Administration that I will include in the
hearing record. According to information provided to my office by the
legislature, the State of Louisiana has five separate reserve funds
which could be tapped to assist parishes with their cost-share for
Isaac recovery:
--The State Emergency Response Fund (SERF) has a balance of $16.5
million;
--The FEMA Reimbursement Fund has a balance of $35,000;
--The Interim Emergency Board fund has a balance of $4.6 million;
--The Budget Stabilization Fund, also known as the Rainy Day Fund,
has a balance of $443 million; and
--And last week, the State declared a surplus of more than $130
million.
That comes to $499 million in Baton Rouge that the Governor has
authority to use for the purpose of assisting local governments with
their cost-share for this event. It's my understanding that parishes
did not receive any assistance from the State to split or defray their
cost-share requirements in Gustav or Ike and that the Governor has not
offered to help parishes with their cost-share for this disaster
either.
Have each of you now asked the Governor and/or the legislature to
provide a portion of those State funds to help cover your 25 percent
cost-share for Hurricane Isaac?
Answer. Jefferson Parish is in discussions with the Governor's
office regarding this issue.
Question. If you have already made such a request to the State,
what response, if any, have you received? If not, are you still
inclined to do so?
Answer. As stated above, Jefferson Parish is in discussions with
the Governor's office in this regard.
Question. Does your parish have money in its regular budget for
disaster response and recovery efforts, including funding to satisfy
Federal cost-share requirements and leverage Federal dollars under the
FEMA public assistance program?
Answer. Jefferson Parish has in the past necessitated the borrowing
of Special Community Disaster Loans to fund disaster recovery
approximating $54 million.
Question. Do you have emergency legal authority to borrow or raise
these funds when recovery priorities demand it?
Answer. Jefferson Parish has legal authority to borrow funds.
local use of hazard mitigation funding
Question. Each of the parish presidents represented in the hearing
has to make choices about flood protection projects to reduce
vulnerability to future flood events through drainage improvements,
levee repairs, home elevations, and other measures.
What are highest priority flood protection projects in your
parishes and what are the costs associated with them?
Answer. Jefferson Parish has prioritized improvements to our pump
stations, canals, and subsurface drainage system to bring them up to a
level of service that will prevent property damage in the event of the
``10-year storm'' recurrence event. Once projects that will prevent
property damage are identified, priority is placed on improving the
pump stations first, then the outfall canals that drain to the pump
stations, followed by the subsurface drainage system. To get the full
benefit of an improvement, the downstream elements must also meet the
required standard. Under the Southeast Louisiana Flood Control Program
(SELA) and the Jefferson Parish Capital Improvement Program, over $1
billion will have been spent in the last 30 years upgrading the
drainage system. At this time, we will continue our focus on home
elevation and providing increased levels of protection to those
communities in Jefferson Parish which are located outside the present
hurricane protection system.
[Please see attachment A as follows:]
ATTACHMENT A--PUBLIC WORKS PROFESSIONAL SERVICE CONTRACTS
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Project name/PW No. Brief project description
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Lake Cataouatche....................... Replacing the pump diesel
engines. Replacing the pumps
and pump controls.
Old Bayou Segnette..................... Replacing the pump diesel
engines. Replacing the pumps
and pump controls.
Westwego 1............................. Purchase and installation of
three 100 cfs vertical pumps
to increase the current
existing capacity.
Bainbridge Canal PW No. 2009-15-dr..... Provide design engineering,
field assessment to include
surveying and geotechnical
investigations and
engineering, construction
management services related to
the design and construction of
drainage improvements to the
Bainbridge Canal from Canal
No. 14 to Veterans Boulevard,
including the crossing under
Veterans Boulevard.
Bannerwood PW No. 2008-23-dr........... Installation of 54'' rcp on
Willowbrood from Penwood to
Surfwood.
Bonnabel Canal PW No. 2008-50-dr....... Provide design engineering,
field assessment to include
surveying and geotechnical
investigations and
engineering, construction
management services related to
design and construction of
drainage improvements to the
Bonnabel Canal from the south
side of Veterans Blvd. to the
south side of West Esplanade
Avenue.
Butler Ditch PW No. 2008-56-dr......... Improvements from Airline Drive
to the I.C. Railroad
consisting of the installation
of a 10' x 8' u channel.
Canal 10 @ West Esplanade.............. Upgrading the existing culvert
crossing along West Esplanade
Avenue at Canal No. 10 from a
72'' RCPA to a double 6'x6'
box culvert, or hydraulic
equivalent, as identified in
Hartman Engineering's January
2011 report entitled
Evaluation of District 4 Canal
Constrictions.
Canal 13 PW No. 2008-55-dr............. Concrete slope paving of Canal
13 between Butler and Loyola.
Clearview and Mounes PW No. 2009-30-dr. Installation of new 54'' x 88''
RCPA and 45'' x 73.5'' RCPA on
Mounes between Clearview and
Camp Plauche Ditch.
Cousins 1 Pump Station................. Replacing all the Waukesha
Engines for pump Nos. 2, 3 and
4.
Elise Avenue PW No. 2009-9-dr.......... Drainage improvements in the
Elise Avenue/Camphor Street
area consisting of the
installation of a 140 cfs pump
station in the area
immediately north of West
Metairie Avenue at Elise
Avenue, including generator
and discharge control
structure installation, the
reconstruction of the drainage
structures at West Metairie
and Parkaire Drive, and the
upgrade of subsurface drainage
along Elise Avenue between
Ruth Street and Camphor
Street.
Manson Ditch........................... Hydraulic study of the Manson
Ditch Drainage Area. Defined
as the combined drainage
contributory areas of Camilla
Gardens Ditch, Manson Ditch,
Arnoult Ditch and Shrewsbury
Ditch between the Mississippi
River and IC Railroad Ditch
and the Manson Ditch
contributory area between the
IC Railroad Ditch and West
Metairie Canal.
Parish Line PW No. 2007-23-ps.......... A short term solution to
increase the pumping capacity
to 200 cfs. A long-term
solution to increase the
pumping capacity to 1400 cfs.
Planters Pump Station.................. Replacing all the Waukesha
Engines for pump Nos. 1, 2, 3,
and 4.
Westwego 1 + 2......................... Engineering improvements to
Canal D between Westwego 1 and
2 by adding a box culvert
between the stations. The
design of a new pump equipment
platform and shelter, designed
for three pumps, and the
installation of one variable
speed 100 cfs pump.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Question. There are three main sources of funding to meet this
need, Federal, State, and local.
First, what parish-wide or other localized taxes do residents pay
toward construction of flood protection and drainage projects and how
much funding does this generate on an annual basis?
Answer. Jefferson Parish receives in excess of $56 million per year
in taxes relative to drainage projects to maintain and operate the
drainage pump systems and canal/pipe infrastructure so as to ensure the
maximum drainage protection possible for Jefferson Parish given
budgetary constraints.
Question. Second, what does the State provide to support the known
need? State revenue sharing generates approximately $700,000 per year.
Finally, after Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, Gustav, and Ike, parishes
have millions in Federal funds for mitigation from FEMA. Much of these
funds have not yet been obligated. Please provide how much your parish
has received through Hazard Mitigation Grant Program funds and explain
how you plan to use such funds within your parish to meet your
priorities. When will these funds be obligated?
Answer. To our knowledge the only funding at this time that has not
been obligated is the additional $15.5 million that has been allocated
to Jefferson Parish for 1786 (Gustav, scope of work limited to
elevations of Severe Repetitive Loss (SRL) and Repetitive Loss (RL)
structures) and the $4.7 million for the Manson Ditch drainage project.
The parish is in the process of submitting fundable applications for
these two projects to GOHSEP/FEMA for approval/award/obligation.
Additional funding may soon be allocated for Hurricane Isaac, but
official documentation has not yet been seen.
[Please see attachment B as follows:]
ATTACHMENT B--JEFFERSON PARISH MITIGATION PROJECTS
(As of April 10, 2013)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Federal share of Number of
Project ID Program Project type Project status Total project award award structures
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1603-051-0006................... HMGP Katrina/Rita.. Residential Active............. $25,236,229.00 $22,478,271.00 185
Elevation.
1603-051-0007................... HMGP Katrina/Rita.. Residential Active............. 4,820,259.00 3,052,991.00 16
Reconstruction.
1603c-051-0013.................. HMGP Katrina/Rita.. Residential Active............. 7,457,453.00 7,030,737.00 44
Elevation &
Reconstruction.
1603c-051-0020.................. HMGP Katrina/Rita.. Drainage Active............. 10,250,789.00 10,250,789.00 ...........
Improvement.
1603c-051-0026.................. HMGP Katrina/Rita.. Drainage Active............. 6,472,054.00 5,131,685.00 ...........
Improvement.
1603n-051-0016.................. HMGP Katrina/Rita.. Drainage Active............. 3,164,202.00 3,164,202.00 ...........
Improvement.
1603n-051-0027.................. HMGP Katrina/Rita.. Drainage Active............. 31,950,586.00 20,000,000.00 ...........
Improvement.
1607-051-0001................... HMGP Katrina/Rita.. Residential Active............. 6,002,704.00 5,688,765.00 39
Elevation &
Reconstruction.
1607-051-0002................... HMGP Katrina/Rita.. Residential Active............. 10,800,135.00 7,744,429.00 45
Elevation &
Reconstruction.
1607-051-0004................... HMGP Katrina/Rita.. Residential Active............. 4,048,442.00 4,048,442.00 31
Elevation.
1607-051-0006................... HMGP Katrina/Rita.. Residential Active............. 9,198,235.00 6,176,066.00 36
Elevation &
Reconstruction.
1607-051-0007................... HMGP Katrina/Rita.. Residential Active............. 3,877,203.00 3,877,203.00 29
Elevation.
1607-051-0008................... HMGP Katrina/Rita.. Residential Active............. 6,027,395.00 4,248,445.00 26
Elevation &
Reconstruction.
1607-051-0009................... HMGP Katrina/Rita.. Residential Active............. 3,491,562.00 3,491,562.00 29
Elevation.
SRL-PJ-06-LA-2008-005........... SRL 2008........... Residential Active............. 8,682,660.00 7,814,394.00 51
Elevation.
SRL-PJ-06-LA-2008-006........... SRL 2008........... Residential Pending Closeout... 1,471,689.44 1,106,404.33 6
Reconstruction.
SRL-PJ-06-LA-2008-007........... SRL 2008........... Residential Active............. 6,563,644.00 5,909,979.60 42
Elevation.
SRL-PJ-06-LA-2008-008........... SRL 2008........... Residential Active............. 8,735,580.00 7,862,022.00 52
Elevation.
SRL-PJ-06-LA-2009-003........... SRL 2009........... Residential Pending Closeout... 928,913.00 714,533.00 4
Reconstruction.
SRL-PJ-06-LA-2009-004........... SRL 2009........... Residential Active............. 5,734,575.00 5,161,117.00 35
Elevation.
SRL-PJ-06-LA-2009-005........... SRL 2009........... Residential Active............. 5,382,956.00 4,844,659.40 35
Elevation.
SRL-PJ-06-LA-2009-013........... SRL 2009........... Residential Active............. 1,691,943.75 1,522,749.37 11
Elevation.
SRL-PJ-06-LA-2009-015........... SRL 2009........... Residential Active............. 1,297,563.75 1,167,807.37 8
Elevation.
SRL-PJ-06-LA-2009-019........... SRL 2009........... Residential Active............. 811,187.50 730,068.75 4
Elevation.
SRL-PJ-06-LA-2009-022........... SRL 2009........... Residential Active............. 401,136.25 361,022.62 3
Elevation.
SRL-PJ-06-LA-2010-004........... SRL 2010........... Residential Active............. 4,384,536.25 3,946,082.62 31
Elevation.
SRL-PJ-06-LA-2010-010........... SRL 2010........... Presidential Active............. 7,839,411.85 7,055,470.67 46
Elevation.
SRL-PJ-06-LA-2011-003........... SRL 2011........... Residential Active............. 3,906,768.75 3,516,091.88 24
Elevation.
SRL-PJ-06-LA-2012-0001.......... SRL 2012........... Residential Active............. 4,289,525.00 3,860,572.50 26
Elevation.
1786-051-0001................... HMGP Gustav/Ike.... Residential Active............. 7,709,899.00 5,782,424.00 45
Elevation.
FMA-PJ-06-1A-2008-002........... FMA 2008........... Drainage Active............. 3,787,167.00 2,840,375.25 ...........
Improvement.
--------------------------------------------------------
206,416,404.54 170,579,361.36 903
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ For a more in-depth explanation of these projects, please contact the program management consultant, Solutient.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total Awarded from HMGP........................ $140,507,147.00
==================
Total Awarded from FMA......................... 3,787,167.00
==================
Total Awarded from SRL......................... 62,122,090.54
==================
Total Awarded for Drainage..................... 55,624,798.00
==================
Total Awarded for Residential.................. 150,791,606.54
==================
HMGP properties...................................... 525
FMA properties....................................... .................
SRL properties....................................... 378
------------------
Total properties............................... 903
------------------------------------------------------------------------
debris removal
Question. Please describe your efforts so far to assess and remove
storm-related debris--whether from roadways, neighborhoods, or
waterways.
Answer. Jefferson Parish had two pre-event contracts for removal,
processing and disposal of storm debris from right-of ways. The
contracts are for unincorporated Jefferson Parish with the option for
the towns of Lafitte and Grand Isle to, on a case-by-case basis, choose
to be part of Jefferson Parish for debris removal purposes. In the case
of Hurricane Isaac, both towns opted to be a part of Jefferson Parish
for debris removal purposes. The contracts include prices for removing
sand from roads and removal of debris from roadside ditches and
drainage canals, although these tasks were not necessary following
Hurricane Isaac.
The contract with Ceres Environmental Services, Inc. was used to
collect, process and dispose of storm debris on the East Bank of
Jefferson Parish. The contract with DRC Emergency Services, Inc. was
used to collect storm debris on the West Bank of Jefferson Parish,
including Lafitte and Grand Isle. Ceres also performed leaner and
hanger removal from trees on the rights-of-way and the vegetative
debris removal in Lafreniere and LaSalle Parks.
In accordance with LA R.S. 30:2413.1, vegetative debris on the East
Bank was reduced by 50 percent volume and weight by bringing it to Wood
Materials, 6148 River Road, Harahan, where it was chipped and used in
compost.
Vegetative debris on the West Bank was reduced by 50 percent volume
and weight by bringing it to Hwy. 90 C&D Landfill, 5000 Hwy. 90 W,
Waggaman, where it was chipped and beneficially re-used as ground
cover/roadbed material at the landfill.
Jefferson Parish collected 280,560 cu. yds. of storm debris
(218,007 cu. yds. vegetative debris and 62,553 cu. yds. construction
and demolition debris). We also collected 2,200 tons of bagged waste.
Jefferson Parish prepared an RFP for storm debris removal
monitoring and management. Nine proposals were received, and an
Evaluation Committee met on 8-21-12 and scored the proposals. The
parish council was to select a firm at the 8-29-12 parish council
meeting, which was canceled as Hurricane Isaac made landfall on 8-29-
12. The parish president executed an emergency contract with SAIC,
which had the highest overall score considering both technical
capabilities and cost, to monitor Isaac debris removal activities. SAIC
monitored all debris removal activities, including right-of-way
collection, residential storm debris drop-off sites, debris management
sites, right-of-way leaner/hanger removal, park cleanup, emergency
street sweeping, PPDR activities, and will also be monitoring
demolition work.
The contractors were placed on standby prior to the event, and the
contracts were activated immediately after the event. Jefferson Parish
employees and the contractors began assessing the amount and type of
debris as soon as they could safely go outside. Jefferson Parish began
right of way debris removal within 24 hours after the hurricane's
passage and was finished with right-of-way debris removal by the end of
September 2012. Private Property Debris Removal (PPDR) work was
authorized by FEMA for the Laffite, Barataria, and Crown Point areas in
lower Jefferson Parish, which was hardest hit and experienced some
flooding of homes. PPDR work will be complete next week, with
vegetative debris to be reduced by 50 percent volume and weight by a
controlled open burn in a remote area of Parc des Families. FEMA also
authorized demolition of some storm damaged residential properties in
the Laffite, Barataria, and Crown Point areas. We anticipate
demolitions in the Lafitte area to be completed by early June 2013. The
parish will use an existing contract that the Dept. of Inspection and
Code Enforcement has with Durr Heavy Construction, Inc. to conduct
demolitions. The contract is typically used for dangerous building
abatement, and FEMA has approved its use for Isaac demolitions.
Hurricane Isaac generated a large amount of bagged debris, mostly
leaves, due to persistent and long-lasting winds and spoiled food due
to unpowered refrigerators. Jefferson Parish has a provision in its
garbage contract to collect additional garbage/trash due to a disaster
with a pre-contracted price. IESI was used to collect the extremely
large amount of bagged waste generated by Hurricane Isaac. IESI
disposed of all bagged waste at the Jefferson Parish landfill. In
addition, due to the huge volume of bagged waste, the parish suspended
IESI curbside recycling collection services for one week, and used the
recycling trucks to collect bagged storm debris. Jefferson Parish also
had the Public Works Department crews assist in bagged storm debris
collection.
Orphaned containers were identified by the Jefferson Parish
Department of Environmental Affairs, and removed by the U.S. Coast
Guard and LDEQ in October/November 2012.
Question. Did your parish have a debris management plan in place
before Isaac, including identified contractors and storage sites? How
has the development of a plan, or lack thereof, impacted your success?
Answer. Yes, Jefferson Parish had a Debris Management Plan, which
was approved by FEMA in November 2008, and has been used as a model by
several other parishes. Our success in disaster debris removal is
enhanced by:
--having a debris management plan;
--having pre-event contracts in place;
--having several sites throughout the parish designated and permitted
by LDEQ as emergency debris sites;
--having residential storm debris drop-off sites available to our
residents, as this quickens the debris removal process;
--knowledge and compliance with LA R.S. 30:2413.1 and the State
Debris Management Plan;
--knowledge and compliance with FEMA and GOHSEP regulations; and
--seeking guidance from GOHSEP and FEMA throughout post-event
activities.
Jefferson Parish anticipates receiving the maximum allowed
reimbursement for all Hurricane Isaac debris removal operations.
responsible building
Question. Construction permitting, building code enforcement, and
floodplain management are all local responsibilities.
Please describe your parish's efforts leading up to Hurricane Isaac
to strengthen and enforce codes, promote responsible construction, and
reduce disaster-related property damage.
Answer. Jefferson Parish strictly adheres to the technical codes
proscribed by the Louisiana State Uniform Code Construction Council
(LSUCCC) when reviewing and permitting development application and when
inspecting sites for compliance. It is through a competent inspection
process that our Parish promotes responsible construction and
effectively reduces disaster-related property damage.
Question. Have you considered any new initiatives related to
building codes or floodplain management since the storm?
Answer. With regard to the technical codes, the LSUCCC does not
provide Jefferson Parish with any authority to modify these codes.
However, we continually consider and occasionally amend the
administrative sections to achieve optimal compliance. Hurricane Isaac
did not present any new challenges, and therefore no new initiatives
have been considered.
Question. Do you have a parish-wide drainage and rainwater control
planning process?
Answer. Jefferson Parish's code of ordinances addresses the various
requirements for new developments and existing properties for detaining
rainwater and/or routing to the established drainage system as well as
the maintenance of drainage right of ways, catch basins, and subsurface
piping.
______
Questions Submitted to Plaquemines Parish
rainy day funds
Question. Most of the parishes that have Presidents testifying in
the hearing have been declared eligible for Federal disaster assistance
six times in the past 7 years (after Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, Gustav,
and Ike, Tropical Storm Lee, and now Hurricane Isaac). In all of these
disasters, FEMA authorized public assistance for Louisiana communities
with a cost-share. Congress waived that cost-share for Hurricanes
Katrina and Rita after 2 years of foot-dragging by the previous
administration, but the current earmark ban prohibits Congress from
taking similar action now.
The Governor has asked the Federal Government to pick up 100
percent of emergency response costs from Hurricane Isaac by eliminating
the normal 25 percent match. My colleague, Senator Vitter, has written
to the President in support of that request.
State Representative Jared Brossett recently raised the issue of
State budgeting for disasters as Chairman of the Hurricane Recovery
Committee in the legislature, and he sent a letter on Friday to the
Governor and Commissioner of Administration that I will include in the
hearing record. According to information provided to my office by the
legislature, the State of Louisiana has five separate reserve funds
which could be tapped to assist parishes with their cost-share for
Isaac recovery:
--The State Emergency Response Fund (SERF) has a balance of $16.5
million;
--The FEMA Reimbursement Fund has a balance of $35,000;
--The Interim Emergency Board fund has a balance of $4.6 million;
--The Budget Stabilization Fund, also known as the Rainy Day Fund,
has a balance of $443 million; and
--And last week, the State declared a surplus of more than $130
million.
That comes to $499 million in Baton Rouge that the Governor has
authority to use for the purpose of assisting local governments with
their cost-share for this event. It's my understanding that parishes
did not receive any assistance from the State to split or defray their
cost-share requirements in Gustav or Ike and that the Governor has not
offered to help parishes with their cost-share for this disaster
either.
Have each of you now asked the Governor and/or the legislature to
provide a portion of those State funds to help cover your 25 percent
cost-share for Hurricane Isaac?
Answer. Yes for Plaquemines Parish.
Question. If you have already made such a request to the State,
what response, if any, have you received? If not, are you still
inclined to do so?
Answer. The Governor says funding is unavailable at this time.
Question. Does your parish have money in its regular budget for
disaster response and recovery efforts, including funding to satisfy
Federal cost-share requirements and leverage Federal dollars under the
FEMA public assistance program?
Answer. No.
Question. Do you have emergency legal authority to borrow or raise
these funds when recovery priorities demand it?
Answer. No.
local use of hazard mitigation funding
Question. Each of the parish presidents represented in the hearing
has to make choices about flood protection projects to reduce
vulnerability to future flood events through drainage improvements,
levee repairs, home elevations, and other measures.
What are highest priority flood protection projects in your
parishes and what are the costs associated with them?
Answer. (1) Coastal Restoration Plan construction; (2) drainage
improvements in Belle Chasse; and (3) federalized 1 percent levees in
lower and East Bank regions that are 100 percent federally funded.
Question. There are three main sources of funding to meet this
need, Federal, State, and local.
First, what parish-wide or other localized taxes do residents pay
toward construction of flood protection and drainage projects and how
much funding does this generate on an annual basis?
Answer. There are no parish-wide or other localized taxed leveed
specifically toward construction of flood protection and drainage
projects. Needed local funds are generated through bonding future
general tax revenues as required and available. The parish has bonded
out $50 million recently to try and address as many of these issues as
possible.
Question. Second, what does the State provide to support the known
need?
Answer. CDBG, HMGP, and LGAP funding opportunities although most
are competitive.
Question. Finally, after Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, Gustav, and Ike,
parishes have millions in Federal funds for mitigation from FEMA. Much
of these funds have not yet been obligated. Please provide how much
your parish has received through Hazard Mitigation Grant Program funds
and explain how you plan to use such funds within your parish to meet
your priorities.
Answer. Even though Plaquemines Parish was heavily damaged we
received relatively little HMGP funding after Katrina, Rita, Gustav,
and Ike.
Question. When will these funds be obligated?
Answer. These funds are all currently obligated and either under
construction or completed. We have recently learned that an additional
$64 million has been obligated in CDBG funding for Plaquemines and St.
Johns Parishes. Plaquemines Parish hopes to receive at least 50 percent
of that allocation.
debris removal
Question. Please describe your efforts so far to assess and remove
storm-related debris--whether from roadways, neighborhoods, or
waterways.
Answer. PWs are written and activity underway for roadways and
neighborhoods. Waterways are still being evaluated by FEMA for
approval. Levee debris removal is currently underway. Neighborhoods
that are unimproved and are without residents along with waterways have
not yet been deemed reimbursable by FEMA and the parish does not have
the funds to remove debris.
Question. Did your parish have a debris management plan in place
before Isaac, including identified contractors and storage sites?
Answer. Yes. Emergency response contracts were in place and debris
removal locations and timeframes were mapped out.
Question. How has the development of a plan, or lack thereof,
impacted your success?
Answer. Positive impact has been minimal due to the FEMA PW
approval process. Work cannot be started until approved and approval
has taken longer than expected. We do have a good working relationship
with FEMA however and have every expectation for a positive outcome in
the end.
responsible building
Question. Construction permitting, building code enforcement and
floodplain management are all local responsibilities.
Please describe your parish's efforts leading up to Hurricane Isaac
to strengthen and enforce codes, promote responsible construction, and
reduce disaster-related property damage.
Answer. The parish adheres to the National Building Code for
construction and has code enforcement officers to inspect work in
progress. New FIRMs are being reviewed for BFE requirements. The parish
was thrown a significant curve to overcome with the Biggert-Waters Act
which was passed by Congress. The impact on the homeowners and the
economy of this parish cannot be overstated. We must get Congress to
amend or repeal at least portions of the act. For instance, we have
homes that were elevated using Federal dollars to bring them into
compliance with the current BFEs. Those same homes will now need to be
raised again as a result of doing away with the grandfathering of
rates. We have homes which were constructed as much as 4 feet above
current BFEs in order to provide additional safety from rising water.
Those homes will now be required to be 6 to 8 feet higher just to meet
the new BFEs required by the new FIRMs or the homeowners will see their
NFIP rates skyrocket or see their homes lose their value. East coast
residents impacted by Hurricane Sandy are experiencing the same issues.
Something must be done to correct this injustice.
Question. Have you considered any new initiatives related to
building codes or floodplain management since the storm?
Answer. We are considering new FIRMs for elevations and
construction requirements. We constantly consider ways and new
initiatives to improve building codes and floodplain management. We
have a floodplain manager on staff who is tasked with insuring we
adhere to best practices and latest available information.
Question. Do you have a parish-wide drainage and rainwater control
planning process?
Answer. Yes. We have a drainage master plan and a comprehensive
master plan which address these issues.
______
Questions Submitted to St. John the Baptist Parish
rainy day funds
Question. Most of the parishes that have Presidents testifying in
the hearing have been declared eligible for Federal disaster assistance
six times in the past 7 years (after Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, Gustav,
and Ike, Tropical Storm Lee, and now Hurricane Isaac). In all of these
disasters, FEMA authorized public assistance for Louisiana communities
with a cost-share. Congress waived that cost-share for Hurricanes
Katrina and Rita after 2 years of foot-dragging by the previous
administration, but the current earmark ban prohibits Congress from
taking similar action now.
The Governor has asked the Federal Government to pick up 100
percent of emergency response costs from Hurricane Isaac by eliminating
the normal 25 percent match. My colleague, Senator Vitter, has written
to the President in support of that request.
State Representative Jared Brossett recently raised the issue of
State budgeting for disasters as Chairman of the Hurricane Recovery
Committee in the legislature, and he sent a letter on Friday to the
Governor and Commissioner of Administration that I will include in the
hearing record. According to information provided to my office by the
legislature, the State of Louisiana has five separate reserve funds
which could be tapped to assist parishes with their cost-share for
Isaac recovery:
--The State Emergency Response Fund (SERF) has a balance of $16.5
million;
--The FEMA Reimbursement Fund has a balance of $35,000;
--The Interim Emergency Board fund has a balance of $4.6 million;
--The Budget Stabilization Fund, also known as the Rainy Day Fund,
has a balance of $443 million; and
--And last week, the State declared a surplus of more than $130
million.
That comes to $499 million in Baton Rouge that the Governor has
authority to use for the purpose of assisting local governments with
their cost-share for this event. It's my understanding that parishes
did not receive any assistance from the State to split or defray their
cost-share requirements in Gustav or Ike and that the Governor has not
offered to help parishes with their cost-share for this disaster
either.
Have each of you now asked the Governor and/or the legislature to
provide a portion of those State funds to help cover your 25 percent
cost-share for Hurricane Isaac?
Answer. Yes, a request has been made to the Governor for assistance
with the local match.
Question. If you have already made such a request to the State,
what response, if any, have you received? If not, are you still
inclined to do so?
Answer. I was informed that funds are not available to assist with
the match.
Question. Does your parish have money in its regular budget for
disaster response and recovery efforts, including funding to satisfy
Federal cost-share requirements and leverage Federal dollars under the
FEMA public assistance program?
Answer. St. John the Baptist Parish does not have adequate funds
within our budget to support disaster response and recovery or to
satisfy the local cost-share.
Question. Do you have emergency legal authority to borrow or raise
these funds when recovery priorities demand it?
Answer. Yes, the parish has legal authority to borrow funds to
address recovery priorities.
local use of hazard mitigation funding
Question. Each of the parish presidents represented in the hearing
has to make choices about flood protection projects to reduce
vulnerability to future flood events through drainage improvements,
levee repairs, home elevations, and other measures.
What are highest priority flood protection projects in your
parishes and what are the costs associated with them?
Answer. The Westshore Lake Pontchartrain Levee Protection Project
is the highest priority need relative to flood protection for St. John
the Baptist Parish. The Corps of Engineers needs $1 million to complete
an ongoing Feasibility Study for this project. An additional $550
million is required for construction of the ``Locally Preferred
Alignment'' from the Upper Guide Levee to the Marvin Braud Pump
Station, encompassing St. Charles, St. John, St. James, and Ascension
Parishes.
Question. First, what parish-wide or other localized taxes do
residents pay toward construction of flood protection and drainage
projects and how much funding does this generate on an annual basis?
Answer. St. John the Baptist Parish supports all Public Works
functions through a .375 percent sales tax that generates $4 million
annually. These funds are supplemented by one-third of a 1-percent
sales tax that generates $11 million annually; however, these funds are
used for personnel, service and maintenance of roads, bridges and
drainage. There is no dedicated tax for flood protection and major
drainage projects are funded through bond issues and grant funds.
Approximately $10 million in drainage projects have been completed in
the last 3 years with another $7 million in design.
Question. Second, what does the State provide to support the known
need?
Answer. There is no direct State support for drainage projects,
however St. John has benefited from grant funds through the Office of
Community Development--Disaster Recovery Unit. There have also been
capital outlay requests to support levee construction through the
Pontchartrain Levee District. Funding through the Coastal Protection
and Restoration Authority is also anticipated for future projects.
Question. Finally, after Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, Gustav, and Ike,
parishes have millions in Federal funds for mitigation from FEMA. Much
of these funds have not yet been obligated. Please provide how much
your parish has received through Hazard Mitigation Grant Program funds
and explain how you plan to use such funds within your parish to meet
your priorities. When will these funds be obligated?
Answer. In 2009, the Louisiana Recovery Authority in conjunction
with the Office of Community Development, the Disaster Recovery Unit
and HUD obligated $10.4 million to St. John the Baptist Parish for
Mitigation and Hazard Mitigation projects for infrastructure recovery,
home repairs, and community resiliency.
PROJECTS IN ST. JOHN THE BAPTIST PARISH \1\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Reserve Drainage Project--(GOSEPH/FEMA-sponsored)....... $3,400,000
Foxwood Levee--(CDBG Mitigation)........................ 1,700,000
Home Repairs--(Housing Mitigation)...................... 2,200,000
Emergency Generators--(Mitigation)...................... 1,100,000
Canal Clearing--(Mitigation)............................ 1,200,000
Peavine Boat Launch--(Mitigation)....................... 300,000
Community Resiliency & Land Use--(CDBG)................. 500,000
------------------------------------------------------------------------
The parish received no HM funding for Katrina.
debris removal
Question. Please describe your efforts so far to assess and remove
storm-related debris--whether from roadways, neighborhoods, or
waterways.
Answer. The parish has focused on removing construction and
demolition (C&D) debris and vegetative debris from roadways and
neighborhoods for the past 6 months. During that time, in excess of
221,000 cubic yards of debris has been removed. Assessment of canals,
storm drains and culverts is ongoing, but we anticipate additional
removal efforts.
Question. Did your parish have a debris management plan in place
before Isaac, including identified contractors and storage sites? How
has the development of a plan, or lack thereof, impacted your success?
Answer. The parish's debris management plan was in place and was
included in the Emergency Operations Plan before Isaac. Contracts were
in place for both debris removal and monitoring prior to hurricane
season, along with identified and permitted storage sites. Flooding of
one of the permitted storage sites briefly delayed debris removal, but
the situation was quickly remedied. This prior planning greatly
enhanced the success of the debris removal process and allowed the
parish to seamlessly move into debris removal once the storm water
subsided.
responsible building
Question. Construction permitting, building code enforcement, and
floodplain management are all local responsibilities.
Please describe your parish's efforts leading up to Hurricane Isaac
to strengthen and enforce codes, promote responsible construction, and
reduce disaster-related property damage.
Answer. St. John the Baptist Parish is a member of the National
Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) and has participated in the Community
Rating System Program (CRS) since 1991. The parish undertakes a series
of activities to protect its citizens from losses caused by flooding
and has significantly exceeded the requirements for NFIP participation
and effective floodplain management.
In May 2010, St. John was awarded a CRS class 8 grade due to
upgraded building codes and adherence to stronger State requirements
for building. The Department of Planning and Zoning maintains elevation
certificates, provides flood insurance rate maps to our citizens,
conducts citizen outreach projects throughout the year, makes flood
information literature available throughout the parish, i.e., library,
Home Depot, etc. A digitized mapping system (GIS) is maintained and
updated, annual notifications are provided to our repetitive loss
property owners, and flood information is provided to insurance and
real estate agents throughout the parish.
In June 2010, St. John was awarded a grant through the LRA's
Comprehensive Resiliency Program. This grant focuses on community
resiliency, as well as the capability to anticipate risk, limit impact,
and bounce back in the face of turbulent changes. Also included in the
grant is completion of phase IV of a comprehensive land use plan and
revisions to existing zoning and subdivision ordinances.
In October 2010, St. John the Baptist Parish adopted FEMA's updated
Flood Maps.
St. John Parish currently has an agreement with the South Central
Planning and Development Commission to serve as the parish's third-
party building official to assist with implementation of the Louisiana
State Uniform Construction Code. Pursuant to La. R.S. 40:1730.21 et
seq., the Louisiana State Uniform Construction Code and any amendment
adopted thereto are hereby adopted as the regulations for governing the
construction or placement of buildings and structures within the
parish.
In March 2011, an updated Hazard Mitigation Plan (HMP) was adopted.
In June 2011, St. John the Baptist Parish became an active member
of a Community Rating System User Group involving five-area parishes.
The group is known as FLOAT (Flood Loss Outreach and Awareness
Taskforce) and meets monthly to brainstorm ideas relative to mitigation
and raising the bar toward higher flood regulations.
Have you considered any new initiatives related to building codes
or floodplain management since the storm?
Answer. As of yet, St. John the Baptist Parish has not considered
any new initiatives related to building codes or floodplain management
other than possible acquisitions/elevations for Repetitive and Severe
Repetitive Loss properties.
Question. Do you have a parish-wide drainage and rainwater control
planning process?
Answer. St. John the Baptist Parish has parish-wide drainage which
includes gravity flow from the Mississippi River to Lake Pontchartrain
and numerous pumping stations. Drainage plans for new subdivisions and
developments include a drainage study as well as possible retention
ponds. Drainage for new construction is the responsibility of the
developer. All drainage plans are reviewed by the Department of Public
Works and the parish engineer prior to issuing a permit.
______
Questions Submitted to St. Tammany Parish
rainy day funds
Question. Most of the parishes that have Presidents testifying in
the hearing have been declared eligible for Federal disaster assistance
six times in the past 7 years (after Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, Gustav,
and Ike, Tropical Storm Lee, and now Hurricane Isaac). In all of these
disasters, FEMA authorized public assistance for Louisiana communities
with a cost-share. Congress waived that cost-share for Hurricanes
Katrina and Rita after 2 years of foot-dragging by the previous
administration, but the current earmark ban prohibits Congress from
taking similar action now.
The Governor has asked the Federal Government to pick up 100
percent of emergency response costs from Hurricane Isaac by eliminating
the normal 25 percent match. My colleague, Senator Vitter, has written
to the President in support of that request.
State Representative Jared Brossett recently raised the issue of
State budgeting for disasters as Chairman of the Hurricane Recovery
Committee in the legislature, and he sent a letter on Friday to the
Governor and Commissioner of Administration that I will include in the
hearing record. According to information provided to my office by the
legislature, the State of Louisiana has five separate reserve funds
which could be tapped to assist parishes with their cost-share for
Isaac recovery:
--The State Emergency Response Fund (SERF) has a balance of $16.5
million;
--The FEMA Reimbursement Fund has a balance of $35,000;
--The Interim Emergency Board fund has a balance of $4.6 million;
--The Budget Stabilization Fund, also known as the Rainy Day Fund,
has a balance of $443 million; and
--And last week, the State declared a surplus of more than $130
million.
That comes to $499 million in Baton Rouge that the Governor has
authority to use for the purpose of assisting local governments with
their cost-share for this event. Its my understanding that parishes did
not receive any assistance from the State to split or defray their
cost-share requirements in Gustav or Ike and that the Governor has not
offered to help parishes with their cost-share for this disaster
either.
Have each of you now asked the Governor and/or the legislature to
provide a portion of those State funds to help cover your 25-percent
cost-share for Hurricane Isaac?
Answer. Yes.
Question. If you have already made such a request to the State,
what response, if any, have you received? If not, are you still
inclined to do so?
Answer. I have not received any response.
Question. Does your parish have money in its regular budget for
disaster response and recovery efforts, including funding to satisfy
Federal cost-share requirements and leverage Federal dollars under the
FEMA public assistance program?
Answer. No.
Question. Do you have emergency legal authority to borrow or raise
these funds when recovery priorities demand it?
Answer. Yes.
local use of hazard mitigation funding
Question. Each of the parish presidents represented in the hearing
has to make choices about flood protection projects to reduce
vulnerability to future flood events through drainage improvements,
levee repairs, home elevations, and other measures.
What are highest priority flood protection projects in your
parishes and what are the costs associated with them?
Answer. A high priority project is the elevation of Highway 11 in
the Slidell area. This project is estimated to cost $2 million. The
parish has other high priority flood protection projects within its
boundaries, including the Slidell levee system. Portions of this levee
system have been or are in the process of being built by the parish.
The majority of the system is yet to be constructed pending
identification of funding. The estimated cost to complete the system is
over $100 million.
There are three main sources of funding to meet this need, Federal,
State and local.
Question. First, what parish-wide or other localized taxes do
residents pay toward construction of flood protection and drainage
projects and how much funding does this generate on an annual basis?
Answer. We have no funds for flood protection. Our drainage tax
generates $3 million parish-wide of which $800,000 is used for
maintenance activities and the balance of $2.2 million is used for
capital projects.
Question. Second, what does the State provide to support the known
need?
Answer. The State has provided partial funding to St. Tammany for
our Slidell levee project via the Capital Outlay process. This is the
only State funding that has been received.
Question. Finally, after Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, Gustav, and Ike,
parishes have millions in Federal funds for mitigation from FEMA. Much
of these funds have not yet been obligated. Please provide how much
your parish has received through Hazard Mitigation Grant Program funds
and explain how you plan to use such funds within your parish to meet
your priorities. When will these funds be obligated?
Answer. St. Tammany has received over $30 million in residential
mitigation grants to elevate or acquire flood prone structures. With
respect to FEMA mitigation funding for drainage projects, we have just
received notice of award on three projects totaling approximately $17
million. We have previously been awarded three other drainage projects
totaling about $2 million.
debris removal
Question. Please describe your efforts so far to assess and remove
storm-related debris--whether from roadways, neighborhoods, or
waterways.
Answer. St. Tammany Parish immediately after Isaac assessed all
storm-related debris and activated its pre-storm contracts for right of
way debris removal and monitoring. These efforts have continued and are
almost complete pending a pass to remove household hazardous waste,
white goods and other regulated debris streams.
Did your parish have a debris management plan in place before
Isaac, including identified contractors and storage sites? How has the
development of a plan, or lack thereof, impacted your success?
Answer. Yes, we had a plan in place prior to Isaac.
responsible building
Question. Construction permitting, building code enforcement, and
floodplain management are all local responsibilities.
Please describe your parish's efforts leading up to Hurricane Isaac
to strengthen and enforce codes, promote responsible construction, and
reduce disaster-related property damage.
Answer. St. Tammany Parish strictly enforces all State adopted
construction codes and all required NFU guidelines. We have multiple
flood plain managers on staff which are integral parts to our
permitting process. We have an active hazard mitigation section which
counsels those in flood prone areas on options for mitigating against
future flooding.
Question. Have you considered any new initiatives related to
building codes or floodplain management since the storm?
Answer. St. Tammany Parish has applied for planning grants to
assist in identifying and prioritizing residential and commercial
structures in flood prone areas. Such an effort is needed in order to
proactively address the over 2,000 repetitive loss structures (and
other non-listed flood prone structures) with the available funding.
Question. you have a parish-wide drainage and rainwater control
planning process?
Answer. Yes.
______
Questions Submitted to the Coastal Protection and Restoration Authority
of Louisiana
state resources for flood protection
Question. The Federal Government has authorized programs that
provide billions of dollars to the State of Louisiana for flood
protection and coastal restoration efforts. When all dollars are
obligated, the Coastal Impact Assistance Program (CIAP) will have
provided $500 million to the State of Louisiana, the Coastal Wetlands
Planning Protection and Restoration Act (CWPPRA) has provided over $720
million in the last 10 years, and the RESTORE Act is expected to bring
$2 to $6 billion to Louisiana. By way of supplemental appropriations,
the Federal Government also committed $14.5 billion to the New Orleans
metropolitan hurricane protection system.
What is the average annual investment in flood protection and
coastal restoration by the State, not including Federal ``pass
through'' dollars? What is the total investment by the State since
Hurricane Katrina, and what will the State invest in the next 5 years?
What are the sources of that revenue?
What are the costs associated with developing and maintaining the
State Coastal Master Plan for the last 7 years and for the upcoming 5
years? How much in State funding has the State of Louisiana obligated
to development and maintenance of the Plan over the last 7 years and
for the future 5 years?
Answer. [Responses were not provided.]
obstacles from the corps on master plan
Question. From the State's perspective, what Corps issues must
still be resolved in order for the State to move forward as efficiently
and cost-effectively as possible with the Coastal Master Plan?
Answer. [A response was not provided.]
beneficial use of dredged material
Question. We have regular dredging activity from the lower
Mississippi River. What can the State do to augment the beneficial use
of the dredged material to replenish our wetlands?
Answer. [A response was not provided.]
______
Questions Submitted to Shaw Coastal, Inc.
Question. Can you speak to the impacts of the Modified Charleston
Method for calculating mitigation requirements for some of the projects
with which you're familiar?
Answer. In short, the Modified Charleston Method is an ``arbitrary
and capricious'' process and has ``double or tripled'' our mitigation
cost which are primarily public projects. It is a ``black box''
approach with no method of contesting the results. This method has
increased mitigation cost by two or three times and has not relaxed the
``maintaining for 20 years'' requirement: which over a 20-year period
could extend the cost five to ten times greater due to severe storm
events. The method is not flexible. For example, the analyst has a
spreadsheet that has very limited range of categories to classify
wetlands such as either low-quality wetlands or medium-quality wetlands
or high-quality wetlands. If in doubt, and an analyst classifies a low-
quality as a medium-quality area, the results on required mitigation
can be greatly impacted by this simple classification error.
Question. What are the top three changes that could be made in the
Corps process for planning, engineering, and designing (and
construction) that would expedite projects and make the process faster
and more cost-effective?
Answer. [Follows:]
(1) The decision process for water resources projects, hurricane
protection, waterway improvements, and port development and
improvements is not a functional process. The time it takes to
authorize a study, appropriate the study funds, go thru a 5- to 8-year
study process as outlined in the Corps Principles and Guidelines,
authorize a plan and then appropriate the funds to build the project is
so long that in most cases the needs and requirements of the projects
have changed before it is finished. In the private sector, decisions
and funding has to be made in a manner that is driven by the needs and
requirements of the project or the project is guaranteed to fail before
it starts.
--(A) Hurricane Protection.--If after 30 years of construction, a
project that should have taken 5 to 8 years to complete is not
finished, then the needs and requirements for that project in
year 31 would certainly have changed and therefore the project
is not functional to the intent it was built, and is probably
doomed to fail.
--(B) Waterway Improvements.--If the requirements of a existing
waterway or channel take to 10+ years to plan, engineer, and
design, and then 5 to 8 years to construct, then the planners,
decisionmakers, engineers, appropriators, and builders need to
either shorten their decisionmaking process or make sure they
are at least 15 to 18 years ahead of the actual needs of the
waterway system to deliver the benefits for which the waterway
has been constructed.
A good example would be that the Mississippi River, the Gulf
Intracoastal Waterway and the Nation's Inland Waterway Systems
cannot function properly in 2013, based on a design of a
waterway transportation plan produced in the 1930s. Imagine how
our Nation's highway system would function if we were still
only using our 1930 roads and bridges and we didn't have such a
sophisticated Interstate Highway System. One of the main
differences in our Federal Interstate System and our Federal
Water Resources Program is the there is a dedicated
transportation funding source (should be growing with inflation
but it's not) and the improvements are planned and engineered
in a timely manner and construction is funded in 5-year
increments.
--(C) Port Development and Improvements.--Publicly funded port
improvements problems are somewhat similar to the problems in
(1) and (2) above, but the main difference is that the
timeframe between identifying the needs and when the
improvements are required are even shorter. The increased
domestic port capacities required to support the ``new'' Panama
Canal Expansion Project is a good example of this problem.
Everybody knows that the funds and construction of the domestic
improvements to this major navigation project should have
already be started and that we be not be able to reap the
benefits associated by this project until later and we might
lose them altogether to other Caribbean ports.
(2) Construction ``in-the-wet'' should become the normal not the
exception. It has been our experience that when time and money are the
driving forces for the Decision Makers constructing the project ``in-
the-wet'' greatly reduces the construction time, therefore getting the
project benefits earlier, and greatly reduces the cost of cofferdams,
de-watering systems, by-pass channel, temporary navigation fendering
and lighting systems and many other cost that don't have anything to do
with the completed structure. In addition to the time and cost savings
with proper O&M the structure life can be made to be similar to
``poured-in-place'' concrete structures.
(3) Making everybody involved in the planning, engineering and
design, bidding, construction and construction management responsible
and accountable for their cost and delivery dates. It is also key to
the program's success that the funding streams for the five functions
listed above be implemented in a timely manner with project outcomes
and benefits as the driving forces toward decisions and
implementations.
true costs of projects
Question. Can you speak about this and provide specific examples?
Answer. [Follows:]
--Houma Navigation Canal Complex.--a 250'W x 24'D x 18'H movable
barge-type floodgate with 750' of floodwalls built for $49.0
million compared to an estimated $85 million earthen dam.
--Bayou Grand Caillou.--a 196'W x 12'D x 18'H movable barge-type
floodgate with 450' of floodwalls built for $25.5 million.
--Bush Canal Floodgate.--a 56'W x 10'D x 18'H movable barge-type
floodgate with 350' of floodwalls built for $15.1 million.
--Reach F Levee, Reach H2 Levee and Reach H3 Levee Projects.--Built
for $11.97 per cubic yard and $8.98 per cubic yard
respectively. (H2 included a significant amount of rock bank
stabilization along a portion of the borrow canal.)
Question. Why do you believe Shaw's estimates are so much lower?
Give examples.
Answer. Shaw's recent projects (Houma Navigation Canal Complex, the
Bayou Grand Caillou, the Bush Canal Floodgate, and the Reach F levee
projects) have been within budget and successful partly for the
following reasons:
--Use of ``in-the-wet'' construction techniques as discussed above
that greatly shorten construction schedules and equipment,
material, and labor requirements.
--Decentralization and Flexibility of the Decisionmaking Process.--
The local levee districts and the Louisiana Office of Coastal
Protection and Restoration (OCPR) often employ the same
professional consultants that the Corps use, but the local
board and OCPR allow the professional engineers to design the
projects without using overly cumbersome guidelines and
engineering manuals that don't provide the flexibility that
novel designs require.
For example on the structure projects, there is no engineering
manual that the Corps can consult to build a steel sheet pile wall
braced with steel piles that is the key component to these projects.
There is no manual so the Corps cannot build it.
For example on the levee projects, the Corps requires the use of
borrow pits that the Corps certifies. This limits competition and can
increase hauling distance. On the Reach F1, Reach H2, and Reach H3, the
land adjacent to the project was tested and met Corps requirements for
clay. Therefore it was dredged using an excavator and placed directly
on the levee alignment without requiring hauling from a remote borrow
pit.
Question. Would the projects in question still be built to ``Corps
standards?''
Answer. Yes, with certain qualifications.
CONCLUSION OF HEARING
Senator Landrieu. We are really going to try to push the
envelope. We do not have an answer, but we can promise you we
are going to give it our best effort.
Thank you, and the meeting is adjourned. The subcommittee
staff will close this on October 9. Thank you so much.
Mr. Graves. Thank you, Madam Chair. I appreciate it. Thank
you to your staff as well.
Senator Landrieu. Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 12:35 p.m., Tuesday, September 25, the
hearing was concluded, and the subcommittee was recessed, to
reconvene subject to the call of the Chair.]
MATERIAL SUBMITTED SUBSEQUENT TO THE HEARING
[Clerk's Note.--The following outside witness testimony was
received subsequent to the hearing for inclusion in the
record.]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Freddy Drennan, Mayor, City of Slidell,
Louisiana
Chairwoman Landrieu and members of the committee: Thank you for
allowing me to submit a statement for the record on behalf of the city
of Slidell, Louisiana.
Hurricane Isaac has caused severe damage to the State of Louisiana.
The city of Slidell had more than 200 flooded households within its Old
Town area, many of which are just getting back to pre-Katrina
conditions. Alleviation of flooding threats is crucial to long-term
confidence and economic recovery as well as the emotional wellbeing of
residents. Fortunately, the source of flooding from Isaac has been
identified and a remedial action, which is cost effective and
expedient, is possible.
Bayou Pattasat drains a large basin comprised of much of the old
section of Slidell and serves as a vital outlet for storm water runoff.
Unfortunately, the areas surrounding the pump station at the end of
this canal are lower in elevation than the adjacent railroad tracks
under which the bayou passes. As lake levels rise, this area is
overtopped allowing flood waters to flow up the canal, under the
tracks, and into the residential areas as happened during Katrina and
now Isaac. The protection system would be 2,000 feet in length with an
average height of approximately 5-6 feet above the current grade.
The cost of gutting and debris hauling from the affected homes
alone should be at least $2,500,000. This cost does not take into
account the economic impact to families or the interruption of service.
Conversely, the project cost for construction of the proposed
protection project is estimated at a mere $985,000.
While the economic cost to the citizens of Slidell can be
quantified and cataloged, the emotional and long-term impacts on a
community caused by a flooding event are difficult, if not impossible,
to fully capture. This project provides a prompt and cost-effective
solution to a problem, which, unabated, will remain a certain risk each
storm season. We hope that this letter will provide the impetus to move
forward with a project sure to serve the community of Slidell well in
the near future and many storm seasons to come.
Again, thank you Madam Chair and members of the committee for
allowing this statement to be entered into the record.
Prepared Statement of Greater New Orleans, Inc.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Prepared Statement of New Orleans Sewerage and Water Board
Chairwoman Landrieu and members of the committee: Thank you for
allowing me to submit a statement for the record on behalf of the New
Orleans Sewerage and Water Board (S&WB).
Hurricane Isaac was a large, slow-moving storm that produced more
rainfall than Hurricane Katrina. It produced over 20 inches of total
rainfall in New Orleans, which was the highest in the metro area. The
S&WB drainage system relies on 24 pump stations to empty the city of
rainwater. Since Hurricane Katrina, about $1 billion has been spent
repairing and modernizing the system; however, the system can only
remove an inch of water on the streets within the first hour after the
pumps are activated and half an inch per hour thereafter. While we did
have street flooding in many of the usual, low-lying areas, overall the
S&WB's drainage system performed very well. Our system benefited from
on-site power and, despite battling power outages, it pumped at full
capacity throughout the storm. The system also benefited from
redundancies, which provided multiple layers of back up, and much
improved coordination and communication with the Corps of Engineers and
other government entities.
However, we did face challenges when an issue arose with several of
the Corps' pumps located at the Interim Control Structure on the 17th
Street Canal. This matter is of great concern to both New Orleans and
Jefferson Parish. As you know, our systems frequently must work in
tandem to properly drain areas within the Hurricane Storm Damage Risk
Reduction System (HSDRRS). This ability was hampered by the Corps
inability to remotely trigger their pumps at the 17th Street Canal.
Because the Corps was unable to remotely start their pumps, the S&WB
was forced to slow down pumping operations at Pump Station 6 in order
to avoid overtopping at the 17th Street Canal. The Canal was not full
at the time so this pumping lull did not worsen street flooding.
However, this scenario could be avoided if the Corps would allow us to
decommission Pump Station 6 and our other two interior drainage pumping
stations, which are located on the Orleans and London Avenue canals,
and not rely on tandem pumping.
The improved pump stations are significant features of the
Southeast Louisiana Urban Flood Control Program (SELA). While there are
hiccups, overall SELA is a good model of a coordinated, multi-
jurisdictional drainage and flood damage reduction program.
Construction of SELA projects has been ongoing since 1997. The S&WB and
the Corps have set an aggressive construction schedule to complete the
remaining nine SELA projects in Orleans Parish and are committed to
completing them by 2016. The current estimate to construct these
projects is $600 million. Pursuant to the Project Partnership
Agreement, the S&WB will be required to fund approximately $40 million
of this cost immediately. SELA must be fully funded and work expedited
for New Orleans and Jefferson Parish to reap the maximum benefits. To
that end, it is paramount that the financing of land, easements, rights
of way, relocation of utilities and disposal of soil area (LERRDs) be
allowed to move forward with the 30-year repayment plan outlined in
Public Law 110-329.
Lastly, the S&WB sustained approximately $60 million in damages
from Hurricane Isaac alone. Flying debris damaged facilities and caused
a fire, fallen trees ruptured underground pipes, winds tore roofs off
our buildings, and drainage canals were littered with trash, which had
to be cleared. In an effort to mitigate destruction from future storms,
it is imperative that continued storm proofing and fortification be
expedited and funded.
Due to numerous improvements in the last 7 years, the S&WB's
drainage system performed well and helped prevent major flooding within
Orleans Parish. Moreover, as work continues on SELA projects, it is
anticipated that our system will perform even better in future storm
events. The importance of all SELA projects cannot be overstated.
Because these projects aid in the drainage of the entire area within
the HSDRRS, it is vital that they be completed as soon as possible and
allowing the non-Federal partners to finance LERRDs over 30 years will
ensure this happens. Furthermore, while there was much improved
coordination and communication with the Corps, issues with the 17th
Street Canal and tandem pumping need to be re-examined and addressed as
soon as possible.
Again, thank you Madam Chair and members of the committee for
allowing this statement to be entered into the record.
[This prepared statement was submitted by Marcia St. Martin,
Executive Director, New Orleans Sewerage and Water Board.]
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